-
https://d1y502jg6fpugt.cloudfront.net/25778/archive/files/ef78f30804794fed59b1a85b44d08a1d.pdf?Expires=1712793600&Signature=hDbLhjBq58WZFvs%7Exx-wKZ2oZpO5XOEuFGmGCIoNiitv-mJs09VM1YDjQV5bDnaAjxuAZt-HIY0yN8U0CiE4QYOnVzRPHXv%7EDXPiTdpwM%7EIQoPpDOLIwwV35aTNDtIHj5MyqExApPQGfZqlNIHKigLpaPwzdT1Bb0iSgrS-C-CRcble2SvEuIeJxhoyKpAATHhhWf2n5-Uo%7ErlUKgxcOqvHjhay1DJaXkDfpsaBKNBtuz1MtFVrBU1qL2aVA6ZDsIeiTG9mcRmLNclqepkz7FxHeTdQWQXBEj%7E-da9tK4SDaMpXIbiW5kIegl%7EUxokJG0w8KHnmc0snqFxTQdd6Dfw__&Key-Pair-Id=K6UGZS9ZTDSZM
cab9b801a35d24a14e0135ee9a14a694
PDF Text
Text
SECULAR SOCIETY
y ,
^platform*
V.
THE STORY
OF
THE SOUDAN.
BY
ANNIE BESANT.
LONDON:
FREETHOUGHT
PUBLISHING
63, FLEET STREET E.C.
1 8 84.
PRICE
ONE
PE NN Y.
COMPANY,
�THE STOBY OF THE SOUDAN.
(Told from the Parliamentary Pa^oers.}
------------- 4.--------------
Friends,—The thoughts of England have been turned
much during these latter weeks to the Soudan, and as
there is the profoundest and most widespread iguorance
concerning that vast country, it, may, I think, be helpful
at the present crisis if I take it as the subject of my lecture
this morning, and try to throw some light on that dim
strange land.
The country now named the Soudan embraces the whole
of Nubia, as well as Kordofan and Darfour. It stretches
from Assouan on the first cataract on the Nile southwards
as far as the equator; on the east it is bounded by the
Red Sea, the kingdom of Abyssinia, and the districts
inhabited by the Caffre and Galla tribes; on the South
stretch vast deserts inhabited by Gallas, Somalis, and
others, who “ do not encourage travellers,” and which are
“practically almost quite unknown.” (“Report on the
Soudan,” by Lieutenant-Colonel Stewart, p. 7 Parlia
mentary paper, “Egypt, No. 11, 1883.” This document
will henceforth be referred to simply as Report). On the
West is the Libyan desert inhabited by Bedouin Arabs,
andthe boundaries are undefined, but run between the 22nd
and 30th parallels of longitude. In length about 1650
miles, and at its broadest part from 1200 to 1400 miles, •
it forms a country, according to General Gordon, covering
an area larger than that of France, Germany, and Spain
put together, or larger than dur Indian Empire.
In this enormous district there are naturally vast
differences of race, soil, and climate. “Between Assouan
and Khartoum, beyond the narrow strip of cultivation
along the Nile, the country is almost a desert, and
inhabited by nomads belonging, it is said, to aboriginal
tribes. A low range of broken and barren hills separates
the Nile valley from the coast. Another low range to the
west shuts out the Nile from the Desert of Bayuda. The
�THE STORY OF THE SOUDAN.
67
climate is dry and enervating. The summer heat is
excessive .... To the country west of the White Nile,
between the parallels of Khartoum and Kaka (about 1,1 °
latitude) the general appearance is that of a vast steppe,
covered with low thorny trees (mimosa, gum-trees, etc.)
and prickly grass. Occasionally low groups of bare hills
are met with. The villages and the patches of cultivated
ground are few and far between. Water is scarce, and
stored in wells and trunks of baobab trees. In the
extreme west of the Darfour Province the country greatly
improves in appearance. The hills are more lofty and
continuous, and the cultivation is luxuriant. In summer
the heat is excessive. Prom September to May the climate
is dry, with no rain. The rainy season lasts from about
the middle of May to the end of September .... East
of the White Nile, and for some degrees south of the
parallel of Khartoum, the country is a well-cultivated and
a well-watered plain .... From the parallel of Kaka
(11° north) to that of Gondokoro (5° north), the country
is a perfectly level plain, with huge marshes on both banks
of the Nile and the Bahr Ghazelle. South of the Gondo
koro to the equator the country becomes more and more
mountainous. The forests are everywhere very extensive,
and with a large variety of trees, fruit-trees, etc. Water
is everywhere abundant, and owing to it the climate to the
west of the Nile is unhealthy. The heat is very great ”
(Report, pp 7, 8).
Taking this description as accurate, we cannot wonder
at General Gordon’s estimate of the Soudan as a whole:
“The Soudan is a useless possession, ever was so, and ever
will be so ... . No one who has lived in the Soudan
can escape the reflection, ‘What a useless possession is
this land.’ Few men also can stand its fearful monotony
and deadly climate” (Parliamentary paper, Egypt, No. 7,
1884, pp. 2, 3).
Turning to the history of the Soudan, we find that
Arabs, crossing the Red Sea from Arabia, settled there in
700 and 800 a.d. These intermarried with the native
negroes, and became “known collectively under the name
of Fung,” and the Fung kingdom spread far and wide.
The pure-blooded negroes were constantly attacked by the
more warrior mixed race, and were carried captive into
slavery; these settled in villages and cultivated the ground,
while the Fung tribes were mostly nomadic, their wealth
consisting in these slaves, cattle, camels, and horses. In
�68
THE ATHEISTIC PLATFORM.
1786 this Fung kingdom perished by intestine wars, and
general anarchy prevailed, tribe fighting with tribe for the
supremacy. In 1819 Mehemet Ali, then ruler of Egypt,
“wishing to introduce the benefits of a regular govern
ment, of civilisation, and at the same time to occupy his troops
(the italics are mine), ordered his son Ismael, with a
numerous army of regulars and irregulars, with many
learned men and artisans, to invade the country ” (Report
p. 4). Ismael was murdered, in revenge for his barbarities,
but. from that time forth the Soudan was claimed as
subject to Egypt, and the former anarchy continued, with
such additional disorder as was imported by the Egyptian
governors. In 1874 Colonel (now General) Gordon was
appointed by the Khedive Governor-General of the
Equatorial Provinces. Two years later he was raised to
the Governor-Generalship of the Soudan.
In August, 1881, a remarkable personage appeared on
the scene, Mahomet Achmet, the Mahdi. He proclaimed
himself sent from God as the foretold prophet, to raise
Islam, and to drive the infidels before him. The people
were superstitious and credited his mission; they were
miserable, and hoped it was true. To understand the
welcome given to him, you must listen to what Colonel
Stewart tells us of the administration of “justice,” and of
taxation under the Egyptian rule. In each province there
is a chief town, and here was established a court, consisting
of a president and eight members. At Khartoum was a
Court of Appeal, and all very serious cases were carried
to Cairo. Both the Court of First Instance and Court of
Appeal might only inflict imprisonment up to a certain
maximum. But “although these courts are thus tied down
as to the amount of imprisonment they may award, there
is no limit as to the length of time to which they can keep
a ease pending, so that practically an accused person can
be kept in prison awaiting trial for a period perhaps
considerably exceeding that to which he could be legally
sentenced if guilty of the crime of which he is accused . . .
With reference to this point, there are now in the Istinaff
Court seven cases pending, and in the Malhalla Court (of
Khartoum) eighteen to twenty-one. The oldest of these
cases dates back twelve years. It is presumably worse
in the provinces.” Colonel Stewart alleges “General
ignorance of the president and members .... The
members being unpaid, and having other business to
attend to, are with difficulty induced to attend in sufficient
�THE STORY OF THE SOUDAN.
69
numbers to form a court .... Their decisions are liable
to be biassed by their enmities and friendships. Probably
bribery and corruption exert a considerable influence.”
He further speaks of “the ease and facility with which
false testimony can be procured” (Report, pp. 11, 12).
The raison d'etre of a government being to administer
justice, I consider that the utter failure of the Egyptian
rulers on this head justified the Soudanese in revolt.
When invaders seize and cannot administer, surely the
invaded may throw off the forcibly imposed yoke.
But this was not all. The governors who could not
govern could tax, and used their power to wring the very
last piastre from the burdened and suffering people. One
instance given by Colonel Stewart is eloquent of the sys
tem. Jaafar Pasha, Governor- General, fixed a certain
tax at 500 piastres. “This officer stated openly that he
was quite aware the tax was excessive, but that he had
fixed it at that rate in order to see how much the peasant
would really pay, and that he hoped after three years’
trial to be able to arrive at. a just mean.” He was, how
ever, removed long before his three years were over, and
his successors, either through ignorance or indifference,
allowed the tax to continue. In the Report just quoted a
melancholy account is given of the ruin this excessive
taxation brought on the country. Many were reduced to
destitution, others had to emigrate, and so much land
went out of cultivation that in 1881, in the Province of
Berber, there were 1,442 abandoned sakiyes (waterwheels)
and in Dongola 613” (Report, p. 14). This is not won
derful when we learn that a commission found on examin
ing' “two sakiyes irrigating fair average land .... that
the net returns, exclusive of taxes, were for one sakiye
391 piastres, and for the other 201 ” (Report, p. 15). As
Jaafar Pasha had put a tax of 500 piastres on each sakiye,
and as in addition to this there were other taxes raising
the taxation to 607 piastres per sakiye, it is hardly sur
prising that the people found it cheaper to abandon them,
and with this abandonment necessarily went the non-cultivation of the ground.
In a despatch forwarded home on January 20th, 1883,
Colonel Stewart says: “The chief means of oppression is
through the tax-gatherer. AR over the country is a class
of smaU officials, on salaries from 200 to 400 piastres, who
have the very responsible duty of coUecting the taxes.
These officials are irregular soldiers (Bashi-Bazouks),
�70
THE ATHEISTIC PEATFORM.
Turks, Tunisians, Dongolauroi, etc., the former race per
haps predominating. As there can be but little supervi
sion over such an immense area, these men have it pretty
much their own way, and squeeze the people to their
hearts’ content. I have heard of instances where the
Bashi-Bazouk on his small salary maintains twelve horses,
twenty servants, and a number of women, and this in
places where the payment for the water for his cattle
alone would have cost more than three times his salary.
It is no uncommon thing for a peasant to have to pay his
taxes four or five times over, without the treasury being
any the richer” (Egypt, No. 13, 1883, p. 4). “ One octroi
farmer actually defended himself on the ground that for
every piastre he took others stole dollars; that he robbed
the poor, but did not meddle with the wealthy; that I
showed great ingratitude in finding fault with him, after
his hospitable reception............ I think there can be no
doubt that the whole local government is in league to rob
and plunder” (Egypt, No. 22, 1883, p. 7). “They (the
Bashi-Bazouks) appear to consider themselves in a con
quered country, and that they have a right to take any
thing they choose ” (p. 9).
It was to these people, oppressed and burdened, highspirited and smarting with a sense of wrong, hating and
despising their Egyptian rulers, and longing for the return
of their old freedom, that the Mahdi appeared as a
messenger of deliverance and of independence. Little
wonder that they crowded to his standard, and hoped that
the disorder and civil war in Egypt might facilitate their
own struggle for freedom. Lord Dufferin on April 2nd,
1883, wrote to Lord Granville his belief “that the recent
disturbances were mainly to be attributed to the mis
government and cruel exactions of the local Egyptian
authorities at Khartoum, and that, whatever might be the
pretensions of the Mahdi to a divine mission, his chief
strength was derived from the despair and misery of the
native population ” (Egypt, No. 13, 1883, p. 54). So also
Colonel Stewart said that “ the real cause of the rebellion
was misgovernment and oppression, and that all the Mahdi
did was to apply a lighted match to the fully prepared
tinder” (Egypt, No. 22, 1883, p. 6).
During 1882 almost constant conflict seems to have been
going on in the Soudan; the various towns garrisoned by
the Egyptian troops became more and more imperilled;
“rebels” appeared and disappeared, cutting off stragglers,
�THE STORY OF THE SOUDAN.
71
fighting when fighting at advantage was possible, vanish
ing when hardly pressed. Colonel Stewart on January
5th, 1883, described their tactics : “I am constantly hear
ing of small fights and of the slaughter of a few rebels.
The rebels attack, are driven back, and disperse to
reassemble on the following day ” (Egypt, No. 13, p. 9). So
troublesome was the aspect of affairs that on October 2nd,
1882, Sir E. Malet forwarded to Earl Granville a memo
randum from Sir Charles Wilson stating that 11 it would
be advisable to send two English officers to the Soudan to
report on the state of the country and the steps which will
be necessary to insure its pacification”; to this Sir E.
Malet added: “I do not think we can possibly be in a
position to form a correct opinion as to the state of affairs
in the Soudan unless we obtain information from agents
of our own, and I therefore beg to recommend Sir Charles
Wilson’s suggestion of sending officers to your lordship’s
favorable consideration” (Egypt, No. 1, 1883, p. 31). Lord
Granville assented to the proposition, giving permission
to “ send Captain Stewart to the Soudan to report of the
state of that district” (p. 35). He was, however, careful
to guard against the idea that England had any responsi
bility for the state of affairs in the Soudan, and on Novem
ber 3rd he wrote to Lord Dufferin (p. 48): “Her Majesty’s
Government are not prepared to undertake any expedition
into the Soudan,” and again on November 7th to Sir E.
Malet (p. 50): “I have to inform you that Her Majesty’s
Government are unwilling to take any responsibility for
the proposed expedition or military operations in that
district. They assent to Colonel Stewart and the two
other officers named proceeding thither to make enquiries,
but it must be distinctly understood that these gentlemen
shall under no circumstances assume to act in any military
capacity.”
But why, under these circumstances, send English officers
into the Soudan at all ? Why make enquiries which were
to lead to no results? The time was not suitable for
enquiries of merely historical interest, and what was the
sense of sending English officers into a district where
fighting was going on, if England had there no responsi
bility ? Confusion was rendered the more likely, and misconception the more probable, by the presence of other
English officers in the Soudan who were fighting in the
■Egyptian army. Was it likely that these officers, some
fighting as Egyptians, others surveying operations as
�7^
THE ATHEISTIC PLATFORM.
Englishmen, would hold no communications with each
other? Was it likely that they would miss so fine an
opportunity of dragging England into the melee on the side
of their adopted country ?
That which happened was exactly what might have, been
expected. On December 10th, 1882, Colonel Stewart had
reached Berber, and telegraphed to Sir E. Malet that a
reinforcement of 800 men had reached Khartoum and that
all was safe (p. 91). He continued to send home detailed
reports on military matters as well as on the causes of
Soudanese discontent. On March 2nd, after a long report
on military affairs, he remarked : “I expect Colonel Hicks
to arrive either to-morrow or the day following ” (Egypt,
No. 13, 1883, p. 54), and he telegraphed on the 10th from
Khartoum : “ General Hicks arrived here on the 2nd inst.”
(p. 26). Colonel Hicks during March—he is called Colonel
and General indifferently—telegraphed to Lord Dufferin
accounts of his proceedings at Khartoum, as though Lord
Dufferin were his employer, and Lord Dufferin sent on the
telegrams to Lord Granville. At last Lord Granville took
alarm, and though he had hitherto accepted copies of
Colonel Hicks’ telegrams without protest, he wrote on May
7 th the following letter to Mr. Cartwright: “I notice that
io. your despatch of the 10th ultimo you inclose a telegram
from General Hicks to Sir E. Malet, on the subject of the
military operations in the Soudan. I understand the whole
of that telegram, with the exception of the first sentence,
to be a message from General Hicks to General Baker, and
I presume that it was addressed to Sir E. Malet because
General Hicks found it convenient to forward it through
Colonel Stewart. But it is unnecessary foi* me to repeat
that Her Majesty’s Government are in no way responsible
for the operations in the Soudan, which have been under
taken under the authority of the Egyptian Government, or
for the appointment or actions of General Hicks ” (p. 65).
But the situation was becoming complicated; English
General Hicks, General Baker, General Wood were irre
sponsible ; English Colonel Stewart and Sir E. Malet were
responsible; General Hicks, irresponsible, “found it con
venient ” to telegraph to General Baker, irresponsible, via.
Sir E. Malet, responsible, and with the help of Colonel
Stewart, responsible. No wonder the position of the Eng
lish became rather difficult to understand. Lord Dufferin’s
position complicated matters even more, for General Hicks
telegraphed to Lord Dufferin on May 3rd about his victory
�THE STORY OF THE SOUDAN.
,
73
on April 29th, and his intentions, and asked Lord Dufferin
to “ communicate to Baker Pasha and ask him to send to
War Office” (Egypt, No. 22, 1883, p. 1). Ten days later
he telegraphed again, and Lord Dufferin having left Cairo,
Sir E. Malet forwarded the telegram to Cherif Pasha, say
ing that “although General Hicks finds it convenient to
communicate with Lord Dufferin or with me, it must not
be supposed that we indorse in any way the contents of his
telegrams. It is, I am sure, unnecessary for me to repeat
to your Excellency, that Her Majesty’s Government are in
no way responsible for the operations in the Soudan which
have been undertaken under the authority of His High
ness’ Government, or for the appointment or actions of
General Hicks” (p. 27). Nevertheless, on June 5th, Sir
E. Malet telegraphed to Lord Granville, sending on a
telegram he had received from the General, in which the
latter asked what troops could be sent to him by the
Egyptian Government, and Sir E. Malet in forwarding this
told Lord Granville that it was “impossible for the Egyptian
Government to supply the funds demanded for the Soudan,”
and remarked that “ a question arises as to whether General
Hicks should be instructed” to narrow the sphere of his
operations (p. 27). Here, again, if “ Her Majesty’s Govern
ment are in no way responsible for the operations in the
Soudan,” why should Her Majesty’s officials accept tele
grams on military details, and take into consideration the
giving of instructions to the commanding officer ?
On August, 1883, the East Soudan joined in the insur
rectionary, movement, and “Osman Digna, the Vizier of
the Mahdi,” summoned the sheiks to follow him in the
war (Egypt No. 1, 1884, p. 13). In this district Tewfik
Bey was holding.Sincat, and defending it with remarkable
courage and ability. Meanwhile things were going from
bad to worse. Captain Moncrieff, British Consul at Sua
kin,left his post at the end of October, with 500 Egyptian
soldiers, who were endeavoring to relieve Tokar. Sir E.
Baring, on the ground that he could not “ do any good,
whilst he may do harm, by joining the Egyptian troops,”
telegraphed to his superior officer to instruct Captain Mon
crieff to “return to his post at Suakin, and remain there ”
(p.. 83), an English ship being sent to Suakin to protect
British subjects. Unfortunately, Captain Moncrieff’s rash
ness proved fatal to him; before the message of recall
could, reach him, the Egyptian troops whom he had so in
judiciously and improperly accompanied, had been attacked
�a
THE ATHEISTIC PLATFORM.
"by the Arabs near Tokar, and Captain Moncrieff fell in
the battle.
During October and November no news from General
Hicks reached Cairo. On November 19th, Sir E. Baring
telegraphed home that great anxiety was felt as to the
general’s fate, and added : “ I think that it is not at all
improbable that the Egyptian Government will request
Her Majesty’s Government to send English or Indian
troops”; to this Lord Granville promptly replied: “We
cannot lend English or Indian troops. If consulted, re
commend abandonment of the Soudan within certain
limits ” (p. 93). On November 22nd, news arrived : “ A fight
took place at Kuz, between rebels and Egyptian troops;
rebels in great numbers. During two first days rebels
suffered great loss; Mahdi, seeing this, advanced with
his regular troops from Obeid, all well armed. Fighting
continued from 2nd to 5th November, when Hicks’ whole
army was destroyed ” (p. 94).
If the Government had now remained true to their declara
tions that they would accept no responsibility for General
Hicks, all might yet have been well. The Arabs would
have driven the Egyptians out of the Soudan, and would
have regained their freedom. Unhappily Lord Granville
hesitated. On November 1 st he had instructed Sir E. Baring
that the English force in Egypt was to be reduced, and
only 3,000 men were to be left in Alexandria (p. 19), the
duty of preserving civil order being remitted into the
hands of the constabulary under General Baker. But at
the request of the Egyptian Government, after General
Hicks’ defeat, although he had refused to lend English
troops, he practically did so by countermanding the order
for withdrawal (Nov. 25th), thus setting free the Egyptian
forces to carry on the iniquitous war. At the -very same
time that this help was given, the parrot-phrase was re
peated: “Her Majesty’s Government can do nothing in
the matter which would throw upon them the responsibility
of operations in the Soudan ” (p. 98).
“ And saying she will ne’er consent,
Consented.” ■
Lord Granville next bent his efforts towards forcing the
Egyytian Government to surrender the Soudan. At first,
as we see above, he only directed Sir E. Baring to recom
mend that course “if consulted.” On December 13th, he
no longer awaited consultation, but wrote : “Her Majesty’s
�THE STORY OF THE SOUDAN.
75
Government recommend the Ministers of the Khedive to
come to an early decision to abandon all territory south of
Assouan, or at least of Wady Haifa” (p. 131). Cherif
Pasha, however, declined to adopt this course: “His
Highness’ Government could not adopt the decision to
abandon territory which they regarded necessary for the
safety and even existence of Egypt ” (p. 146). Accordingly
Cherif Pasha made vigorous efforts to send forth another
army. Zebehr Pasha was communicated with, and directed
to raise some negro regiments, with which to proceed to
Suakin ; Sir E. Baring, fearing that “the employment of
Zebehr Pasha may not improbably attract attention in
England,” very justly urged: “Up to the present time
[Dec. 9thJ the whole responsibility for the conduct of the
affairs in the Soudan has been left to the Egyptian Govern
ment. It appeared to me that, under present circumstances,
it would not have been just, whilst leaving all responsi
bility to the Egyptian Governmemt, to have objected to
that Government using its own discretion on such a point
as the appointment of Zebehr Pasha” (p. 137). Baker
Pasha was also called on for aid, Zebehr being placed under
his orders, and on December 17th, he was nominated “to
take command of the operations which have for their object
the pacification of the region lying between Berber and
Suakin ” (p. 161).
Lord Granville, however, remained resolute against these
proposed measures. On January 4th, 1884, he wrote to Sir
E. Baring that the English Government “ see no reason to
modify their conclusions,” and at last he claimed on behalf
of England the absolute right to dictate the Egyptian
policy, declaring- that it was “indispensable” that the
“advice ” tendered by England “should be followed,” and
declared that, in view of 1 ‘ the responsibility which for the
time rests on England,” the Government must “insist on
the adoption of the policy which they recommend, and that
it will be necessary that those ministers and governors who
do not^follow this course should cease to hold their offices ”
(pp. 1/5, 176). Rather a change this from the repudiation
responsibility, and the advice which was to be tendered
“ if consulted. ”
On this the Cherif Pasha Ministry resigned, and the
more flexible Nubar Pasha accepted office, entirely conof abandoning the Soudan” (p.
Meanwhile Baker Pasha had reached Suakin, and on
�THE ATHEISTIC PLATFORM.
the 18th January he left Suakin to endeavor to relieve
Tokar. His troops were of the most wretched description;
many were carried in irons on board the steamers in which
they were embarked, weeping and praying to be left in
peace at home. With such troops, undrilled, half-armed,
filled with fear of the Soudan and its wild tribes, the failure
of his expedition was fore-doomed. On February 5th, Sir
. Hewett telegraphed from Suakin that the Egyptian
army under Baker Pasha had been defeated, and that he
intended to land “men to take charge of town and allay
panic” (Navy, Egypt, c. 3890). Upon this all the “non
responsibility ” was suddenly dropped, and all the previous
policy reversed. Lord Northbrook telegraphed to Sir W.
Hewett to ask how many men were wanted to relieve
Sinkat and Tokar by arms (p. 8); Sinkat fell on February
12th and on the same day Sir W. Hewett was ordered to
‘ ‘ try by native messenger, at any expense, to tell garrison
[of Tokar] they will be relieved by British troops before end
of month” (p. 9). On the same day the Adjutant-General
telegraphed to the general officer commanding in Egypt:
“ Force to be collected at Suakim with the object, if pos
sible, of relieving Tokar garrison,” and desiring “the
greatest publicity to be given to the determination to re
lieve Tokar by British soldiers ” (c. 3889, p. 314). Tokar,
however, surrendered before we reached it.
Why this sudden, this extraordinary change? Why
should British troops have been sent to relieve Tokar, after
they had been so long and so steadily refused ? Was it
done to pacify the factitious cry raised by the idlers in the
London clubs, the loudly proclaimed sympathy with Pashas
Hicks, Baker and other English adventurers in Egypt ?
It was said that England should step in to avenge Hicks
and to save the others. Why ? Free-lances, who hire
themselves out to foreign Governments and degrade them
selves into leading savages against savages in brutal and
barbarous warfare, should be left to the companions they
have deliberately chosen. The hired bravos should lose
all rights of English citizenship, and should take the riskswith the gains of their ignoble trade.
It is not necessary to trace in detail the brief and shame
ful campaign. As we invaded without reason, so we slew
without ruth. In two frightful battles some 6,000 Arabs
were killed and some 18,000 wounded; Arabs fighting on
their own soil, in defence of their own land, fighting with
dauntless bravery, with splendid self-devotion, but, to
�THE STORY OF THE SOUDAN.
77
quote from a war-correspondent: “they never reached
our square ; they were mown down in layers as they came.”
Who is answerable to humanity for that awful slaughter ?
at whose door flows that river of uselessly shed human
blood ? We penetrated into the wilds as far as the chief
village of Osman Digna; the women and children had
wisely fled, and only mud huts remained, “not worth a
lucifer match.” These we burned “to show we had put
our foot there ”—beautiful mark of English civilisation—
careless that while not worth a match to us, they were the
homes of the natives of the land, and dear to them as ours
to us. When we had performed all these horrors, we left
the Soudan again, having quenched many brave lives,
broken many hearts, left many maimed for life, and be
yond this—Nothing. Our retreat was as inexplicable as
our advance. Having protested we would not go, why did
we go ? Having gone, why did we return with nothingsettled ?
While all these events were passing in East Soudan, a
most curious tale, the denoument of which is still unreached,
was being told in the central part of the country—the
mission of General Gordon.
On December 1st, 1883, Lord Granville telegraphed to
Sir E. Baring : “ If General Gordon were willing to go to
Egypt would he be of any use to you or to the Egyptian
Government, and if so, in what capacity?” The reply
came promptly : “ The Egyptian Government is very much
averse to employing General Gordon, mainly on the ground
that the movement in the Soudan being religious, the
appointment of a Christian in high command would
probably alienate the tribes who remain faithful.” (hi
January 10th, 1884, Lord Granville again telegraphed:
“ Would General Charles Gordon or Sir C. Wilson be of
assistance under altered circumstances in Egypt?” The
Egyptian Government again refused. On the 15th Lord
Granville tried again, and on the 16th the Egyptian
Government gave way, and “ would feel greatly obliged if
Her Majesty’s Government would select a well-qualified
British officer to go to Khartoum.” On this Gordon was
appointed (Egypt, No. 2, 1884, pp. 1, 2). His instructions
were to report “on the military situation in the Soudan,
and on the measures which it may be advisable to take for
the security of the Egyptian garrisons still holding
positions in that country, and for the safety of the Euro
pean population in Khartoum. You are also desired to
�78
THE ATHEISTIC PLATFORM.
consider and report upon the best means of effecting the
evacuation of the interior of the Soudan,” and “you will
consider yourself authorised and instructed to perform
such other duties as the Egyptian Government may desire
to intrust to you ” (pp. 2, 3). A most extraodinary mission,
in which an Englishman is to try to serve two masters, and
is to receive orders from London and Cairo indifferently.
General Gordon’s view of the situation had at least the
merit of clearness : i ‘ My idea is that the restoration of the
country should be made to the different petty Sultans who
existed at the time of Mehemet Ali’s conquest, and whose
families still exist; that the Mahdi should be left alto
gether out of the calculation as regards the handing over
the country; and that it should be optional with the
Sultans to accept his supremacy or not .... the arsenals
.... should be handed over to the Sultans of the states
in which they are. placed .... Her Majesty’s Govern
ment will now leave them as God has placed them; they
are not forced to fight among themselves” (Egypt, No. 7,
1884, pp. 2, 3).
Why, with such a policy accepted by the Government,
we should have tried to destroy Osman Digna, a man of
one of these ruling families, and why we should call those
rebels in East Soudan to whom in Central Soudan Gordon,
our accredited agent, was proclaiming freedom from
the Egyptian yoke, it is impossible to say. If the Govern
ment understands its own policy, it is a pity it does not
explain it, for most certainly no one else can see any co
herency or consistency in it.
General Gordon arrived at Khartoum on February 18th,
and one of his first acts was to recognise the slave trade.
He issued the following proclamation: “ To all the people ;
my sincerest desire is to adopt a course of action which
shall lead to public tranquillity, and knowing your regret
at severe measures taken by government for suppression
of slave traffic, and seizure and punishment of all concerned
according to Convention and Decrees, I confer upon you
these rights, that henceforth none shall interfere with your
pioperty; whoever has slaves shall have full right to their
services, and full control over them.”
General Gordon at the same time proclaimed Mahomet
Ahmet, the Mahdi, as Sultan of Kordofan, and telegraphed
(still on Feb. 18th) to Sir E. Baring recommending Zebehr
Pasha as his own successor at Khartoum : “As for the man,
Her Majesty’s Government should select one above all
�THE STORY OF THE SOUDAN.
79
others, namely Zebehr. He alone has the ability to rule
the Soudan, and would be universally accepted by the
Soudan” (Egypt, No. 12, 1884, p. 72). Sir E. Baring en
dorsed the recommendation : “I believe Zebehr Pasha to
be the only possible man” (p. 73). To this Lord Granville
replied that “The public opinion of this country would
not tolerate the appointment of Zebehr Pasha” (p. 95);
Gordon shortly answered: “ That settles question for me.
I cannot suggest any other. Mahdi’s agents active in all
directions” (p. 115). Sir E. Baring, in forwarding this
telegram to Lord Granville, urged strongly that some clear
policy should be adopted; two courses were possible, he
argued : to evacuate the Soudan and leave it to anarchy ;
or to set up a capable governor acceptable to the Soudanese
and able to hold his own as Sultan independently: “What
ever may be said to the contrary, Her Majesty’s Govern
ment must in reality be responsible for any arrangements
which are now devised for the Soudan, and I do not tbink
it is possible to shake off that responsibility. If, however,
Her Majesty’s Government are unwilling to assume any
responsibility in the matter, then I think they should give
full liberty of action to General Gordon and the Khedive’s
Government to do what seems best to them. I have no
doubt as to the most advisable course of action. Zebehr
Pasha should be permitted to succeed General Gordon. . .
I think General Gordon is quite right when he says that
Zebehr Pasha is the only possible man. I can suggest
none other, and Nubar Pasha is strongly in favor of bim.
It is for Her Majesty’s Government to judge of the impor
tance to be attached to public opinion in England, but I
venture to think that any attempt to settle Egyptian ques
tions by the light of English popular feeling is sure to be
productive of harm, and in this, as in other cases, it would
be preferable to follow the advice of the responsible au
thorities on the spot ” (pp. 114, 115). Colonel Stewart
advanced the same opinion (p. 137). General Gordon
repeatedly telegraphed, pleading and urging that Zebehr
should be sent: “I tell you plainly it is impossible to get
Cairo employes out of Khartoum, unless the Government
helps in the way I told you. They refuse Zebehr, and are
quite right (may be) to do so, but it was the only chance ”
(March 1st, p. 152). “The sending of Zebehr means the
extrication of the Cairo employes from Khartoum, and the
garrisons from Senaar and Kassala. I can see no possible
way to do so except through him” (March Sth, p. 145). The
�SO
x
THE ATHEISTIC PLATFORM.
General was evidently intensely depressed by the refusal of
the Government to follow his advice; on March 9th and
1 Oth, he sent telegram after telegram, begging for definite
instructions, urging that there was no use in holding out at
Khartoum if nothing was to be done, that all the roads
were being closed; “you must give a prompt reply”
(p. 161). Leave Khartoum he would not till the safety of
those surrounding him was secured; “how could I look
the world in the face if I abandoned them and fled ? ”
(p. 156). At last he seems to despair; he will send all the
white troops and employes to Berber with Colonel Stewart,
and will “ask her Majesty’s Government to accept the
resignation of my commission, and I would take all steam
ers and stores up to the Equatorial and Bahr Gazelle Pro
vinces, and consider those provinces as under the King of
the Belgians” (p. 161). The last telegram from him was
dated April 8th, and of this Sir E. Baring says: “he
evidently thinks he is to be abandoned, and is very indig
nant.” Apparently, however, General Gordon does not at
present regard himself as in immediate danger; his chief
difficulty is that he sees no prospect of improvement. At
last on April 23rd, Lord Granville appears to have realised
that it was the duty of the Government to ensure General
Gordon’s safe retreat from Khartoum, and telegraphed
asking what force was “necessary in order to secure his
removal” (Egypt, No. 13, 1884, p. 15).
That he shoidd be removed is clear. Gordon went to
Khartoum as an English agent, and whatever blunder was
committed in sending him, England’s honor would be
stained by allowing him to perish at his post. And.his
rescue should be effected as rapidly as possible, and so an
end put to the weary vacillations of our policy. We ought
never to have interfered, and the sooner we cease inter
fering the better. Enough blood has been shed ; enough
ruin has been wrought. Nothing that Lord Beaconsfield
ever did was worse* than oui* bloody incursion into East
Soudan, and well may Eadicals blush for the conduct
denounced in Opposition and practised in Government.
The least that can now be done is to prevent further
mischief, leaving the Story of the Soudan to take its place
in history with those of the Transvaal, of Zululand, and of
Afghanistan.
Printed by Annie Besant and Charles Bradlalgh, at 63, fleet
Street, London, E.C.—1884.
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Victorian Blogging
Description
An account of the resource
A collection of digitised nineteenth-century pamphlets from Conway Hall Library & Archives. This includes the Conway Tracts, Moncure Conway's personal pamphlet library; the Morris Tracts, donated to the library by Miss Morris in 1904; the National Secular Society's pamphlet library and others. The Conway Tracts were bound with additional ephemera, such as lecture programmes and handwritten notes.<br /><br />Please note that these digitised pamphlets have been edited to maximise the accuracy of the OCR, ensuring they are text searchable. If you would like to view un-edited, full-colour versions of any of our pamphlets, please email librarian@conwayhall.org.uk.<br /><br /><span><img src="http://www.heritagefund.org.uk/sites/default/files/media/attachments/TNLHLF_Colour_Logo_English_RGB_0_0.jpg" width="238" height="91" alt="TNLHLF_Colour_Logo_English_RGB_0_0.jpg" /></span>
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Conway Hall Library & Archives
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2018
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Conway Hall Ethical Society
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Pamphlet
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
The story of the Soudan
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Besant, Annie Wood [1847-1933]
Description
An account of the resource
Place of publication: London
Collation: [66]-80 p. ; 18 cm.
Series title: Atheistic Platform
Series number: 5
Notes: "Told from the Parliamentary papers." Part of the NSS pamphlet collection.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Freethought Publishing Company
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1884
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
N071
Subject
The topic of the resource
Sudan
International relations
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
<a href="http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/mark/1.0/"><img src="http://i.creativecommons.org/p/mark/1.0/88x31.png" alt="Public Domain Mark" /></a><span> </span><br /><span>This work (The story of the Soudan), identified by </span><a href="https://conwayhallcollections.omeka.net/items/show/www.conwayhall.org.uk"><span>Humanist Library and Archives</span></a><span>, is free of known copyright restrictions.</span>
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
application/pdf
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Language
A language of the resource
English
NSS
Sudan-History-1881-1899