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2.52L Pio/?
ON THE
COMMON AREA OF THOUGHT
IN THE
DIFFERENT SIGNIFICATIONS OF THE ENGLISH
WORD
a
RELIGION.”
A
PAPER
READ BEFORE
THE
LONDON
DIALECTICAL SOCIETY,
On October 2nd, 1878.
BY
ALEX. J. ELLIS, B.A., F.R.S., F.S.A. *
PUBLISHED BY THE
LONDON DIALECTICAL SOCIETY,
LANGHAM HALL, 43, GREAT PORTLAND STREET, LONDON, W.
Price Threepence.
��ON THE COMMON AREA OF THOUGHT IN
THE DIFFERENT SIGNIFICATIONS OF
THE ENGLISH WORD “ RELIGION.”*
Some words are bandied about from mouth to mouth
so frequently, that the significations attached to them
by the different speakers can rarely cover the same
areas of thought, and, on plotting them down mentally,
* When the Paper was announced the subject was stated as
simply “ Religion,” as I wished to avoid a long explanatory
title, and thought that I had sufficiently limited my purpose by
the Paper itself. But the course of the debate upon it showed
that I was mistaken, and that it was thought I wished to “ define
religion. My argument was, that all the senses in which the
English word was used had a common area of thought, and
hence that other systems of thought and action, not usually con
sidered to be forms of religion, but having that common area of
thought, might be also justly called religions. I likewise ex
pressly stated, that all such systems of thought and action contain
other areas of thought much larger than that which is common
to all; but of course the nature of the inquiry excluded these.
Unfortunately most of the debaters dwelt on the area of
thought in their own special use of the word, which was not
common to all others, and which naturally chiefly engaged their
own thoughts. But they thus missed the object of the Paper
which was not to define “religion,” but to inquire into the actual
use of that English word. The Committee having requested me
to print the Paper, it appears exactly as I delivered it, with the
exception of a few footnotes which refer to the debate.
�4
they will be found to have little or no common area,
but to show very large outlying districts, which seem
to have no possible relation to one another. This is
more or less the case for every word in every lan
guage that is in common use. But it is of course
more especially the case with words which were ori
ginally conceived without any approach to strictness
in the delimitation of their connotation, and which,
involving much consideration, and not a little acquaint
ance with various habits of thought, are generally
used without any attempt to stricter definition, but, on
the contrary, with the utmost laxity of thought. To
this category belong all words bearing upon moral
and social subjects, on which there has been the
widest diversity of opinion. What is right, just, true,
has been disputed for more years than we should find
time to reckon up in one evening’s meeting, and will,
no doubt, continue to be disputed with the same im
possibility of arriving at an agreement. To these we
may pre-eminently add the word religion, with which
I propose to trouble you to-night.
The etymology of the word is quite lost; that is,
we know that it is formed from the Latin religio, but
we can give no satisfactory origin to this Latin word.
Some say it was from re-ligere, “ to collect again,” and
this Professor Max Muller favoured, in his recent
Hibbert lectures. Others say it is from re-ligare,
�“ to bind again,” a derivation which Auguste Comte
adopts and enforces. “ In itself,” says he, in the
beginning of his positivist catechism, “ this word indi
cates the complete oneness which distinguishes human
existence, personal as well as social, when all its
parts, both moral and physical, habitually converge to
a common end. Thus it would be equivalent to syn
thesis, if this word were not almost universally limited
to the intellect, whereas religion embraces the sum of
human attributes. Religion, then, consists of regu
lating (r'egler) each individual nature, and binding
again (rallier) all individualities. These are but two
different cases of one problem, because a man differs
from himself successively, as much as he differs from
others simultaneously, so that fixity and commonness
follow identical laws.” So far Comte. Puff’s inter
pretation of the meaning of Lord Burleigh’s nod was
nothing to this. The re-ligare or binding again seems
to be lugged in neck and crop, to support a theory
certainly very far indeed from the minds of those who
first used the word religid.
It would be interesting, but lengthy and laborious,
to investigate all the words in Greek or other lan
guages which we translate by religion. The word
QpyaKeta, used in the well-known definition of “ pure
and undefiled religion,” in the Epistle of James, i. 27,
is of very uncertain origin also, and the definition of
�6
religion given in the passage alluded to, namely, simple
charity and spotless morality, is not generally ac
cepted. It is not my purpose to attempt such a
research this evening, or to criticise the various defi
nitions of religion which have been given by various
writers, of which the two preceding may serve as
samples, and both of which would, to most persons,
seem to lack the very essence of the whole. My
inquiry is directed towards the discovery of that area
of thought, to use my opening illustration, which is
common to the various connotations of the English
word religion. I do not inquire what A or B thinks
religion ought to mean, nor what is the precise sense
which, after Socratean questioning, A or B would
own they attached to the word religion. I merely
want to know, if possible, what are the conditions
under which A or B would acknowledge that Y or Z
had a religion or were religious. These conditions
are at first sight widely different. A or B would talk,
no doubt, of the religion of the Jews, the Brahmins,
the Buddhists, the Confucians, the Christians of every
grade, the Mahometans of all sects, the Parsees, the
Asiatic, African, Armenian, and Polynesian races. I
cannot say whether an ancient Latin, or Greek, or
Goth, or Celt, would, had he known these various
forms of so-called religion, have labelled them with
the same name as he employed for what A or B
�would call his own peculiar form of religion. This is
indifferent. My object is to find what it is in these
various and intensely diverse systems that induces A
or B to call them forms of religion in English. I
assume that the same word is not usually applied to
objects which have nothing in common, and which do
not even suggest some common thought. And I want
to know what that common something or analogy or
thought may be. Possibly it may turn out that some
things, not now usually considered religious, have as
good right to be called so as others which are so
called without hesitation.
Now we may begin by exclusion. If all the forms
of thought and feeling that I have just cited be entitled
to the name religion, it is clear that anthropomor
phism, which, although it characterises many does
not characterise all, is not what we seek. We must
at once draw a distinction between theistic and nontheistic religions. But when we have got so far as to
admit of a non-theistic religion, we find that the com
mon basis must be sought in the thoughts and feelings
of man independently, but not exclusively, of any
theistic assumption. Except to the Berkleyite, how
ever, whose philosophy appears to me out of place
when I am addressing an assembly of individualities
which the mere fact of my speaking to them proves
that I believe to be something different from my own
�8
sensations of vision—except to these strict idealists,
whom I designedly leave out of consideration, it is
not sufficient to consider man by himself. We must
view man in relation to. his surroundings. That is,
we must look for the common ground we seek in
man as viewed in relation to his environment. By
regarding the subject in this light I came to the follow
ing notions, which I will first state laconically, in order
to guide the hearer while I endeavour to explain the
meaning which they convey to me. Of course ■ there
is the disadvantage of using phraseology which must
be imperfectly understood when first heard, but this
seems a less disadvantage than presuming upon the
hearer’s bearing in mind a rather complicated state
ment, and being able at its conclusion to apply it to
the results produced. It is all very well in a novel to
keep the denouement concealed while we are tying the
noeud as hard as we can. In such a' short paper as
the present I prefer beginning with the end.
The common ground, then, on which the term
religion is applied to all the very various systems of
thought previously cited appears to be this : they all
assume a theory of the universe, and they all base
human conduct upon that theory. Religion then is a
word used to imply a theory of the universe and conse
quent conduct A theory of the universe, independently
of its effect on conduct, is mere philosophy or science.
�A theory of conduct independently of a theory of the
universe, by which conduct is influenced, is mere
morality or sociology. It is in making conduct
dependent upon the acceptance of some theory of the
universe that I seem to find the common ground
required. All this is a very bald statement, and no
doubt in the minds of most of those who hear me
grave doubts as to its correctness have already arisen,
some of which at least will probably remain undis
persed when my paper is concluded, and I shall,
I hope, have the advantage of hearing them stated.
“The Universe of Thought” is a logical phrase,
signifying the sum total of all that is thought of in the
propositions under consideration. If we extend this
term to the sum total of what has ever occupied the
thoughts of any individual, we have his extreme
horizon of the universe, and practically this horizon
has to be further limited to the portion concerning
which any man is conscious at any time of having
thought, as the real horizon is often limited by hazy
atmospheric conditions. Where thought is not re
corded in writing, or in set forms of words which
can be preserved by the memory of certain men who
take the part of books, as in the case of the Indian
Vedas and doubtless many other documents, this
individual horizon of the universe is very limited
indeed. In modern times, when every student forms
�a record, the’ universe of thought must be extended to
the sum of all individual universes in time past and
present. Even then, however, we have no difficulty
in recognising that the universe of mankind is a very
minute fraction of what we may term the absolute
universe. Yet it is only from the small portion known
to the individual or to the race that any theory can be
*
deduced.
The word theory has a somewhat preten
tious sound. But it merely means a view, and most
generally only a small set of very disjointed views can
be formed at best. The man of no record, reduced
to his individual experience and individual memory,
has a very narrow, insufficient view of things, and he
* These words seem to me to exclude very decidedly any
notion that “a theory of the universe ” implied a theory of the
“ absolute ” universe. Yet even this was misunderstood in the
debate, and it was somehow supposed that a man must know
everything before he can frame a theory of the universe. A boy
who throws a stone a second time to hit an object has framed a
theory of the universe which would astonish him if he could work
it out into more detail than idle stone-throwing. The child that
put her book in her lap, closed her eyes, and prayed that she
might know her lesson, had formed another—hardly so well
founded as that of Hogarth’s mad musician, who puts his book
open on his head, that the music may get
his head more
directly than through the eyes. The man who attributes any value
to kissing the calf-skin cover of a book in court has another theory.
All these are very narrow individual theories, but they are quite
enough to influence conduct, and hence to form systems of
thought and action having the “common” characteristic of all
so-called religions.
�naturally judges of them by himself; he animates or he
anthropomorphises. Ignorance makes theory very
easy. But with every step in knowledge it becomes
more difficult. It is not long before there grows up a
set of men (variously named, but equivalent to our
priests) who transmit theory, whose business it becomes
to maintain theory, and whose subsistence and honour
depend upon keeping up a particular theory. These
take various forms under various circumstances, but
at first certainly the child receives a certain ready-made
theory from his parents. It saves him the trouble of
thinking, and he adopts it.
It would be crude speculation for me to attempt to
assign the origin of different theories of small universes
of thought extending from individuals to families,
tribes, and nations, and the mode in which that
theory is by some increase of knowledge, frequently
in an individual, or some unexpected circumstance
happening to a race, some war, some immigration,
some peaceful contact with thinkers of other tribes,
seriously and even completely modified. It is enough
that we all know the nature of some of those theories,
though of the greater part we shall ever remain pro
foundly ignorant, because it is as impossible for the
modern mind to think itself back into the ancient
theories which grew into it by processes we cannot
conceive, as it is for the adult to figure to himself the
�12
reasoning of the infant, or for the human being to
imagine the conceptions of the brute. Whenever we
attempt to depict them we use words implying
thoughts which the others never possessed, and
deceive ourselves with counters. But so far as I can
imagine, from any accounts I have studied, one very
early theory is that of animation, which was especially
associated with motion independent of the observer,
as in rivers, seas, clouds, sun, moon, planets, and
stars, wind, thunder, lightning, and rain, or with
actions ensuing after the observed presence of objects
and hence attributed to the human-like action of the
object. Professor Max Muller thinks fetichism neces
sarily implied some power behind it, and hence could
not be original. But it need not have implied any
thing but the human-like action of the object itself
This I conceive to be the basis of Auguste Comte’s
conception, and wherever human-like action was
assumed he seems to have recognised fetichism. I
do not know whether we are really free of this even
now—whether the greatest thinkers have worked
themselves entirely out of its power for every con
ception they have ; but certainly by far the greater
number of thinkers are entirely under the influence
of conceptions which in themselves seem to be
nothing more nor less than the attribution of human
like action to what is non-human, and often non-ani-
�i3
mate. How few even, of so-called philosophers—
certainly none who are Christians—recognise in all
its aspects the latest and most advanced theory of the
universe, namely, the invariable and unconditional
relations under which every event occurs ! We con
tinually find the intrusion of something called “will,”
which is merely human-like.
A theory of the universe is not formed in idleness.
If man never wanted food or shelter he might never
have speculated, or have had the experience on which
to form speculations. But he has to provide, and for
this purpose to contrive, which implies crude specuations on so-called cause and effect—in short, a
theory of the universe. The object of this theory is
dimly seen to be prediction, and the requisitions of
family government and tribal war lead to the necessity
of extending predictions to the actions of human
beings. At the present day the theory of invariable
and unconditional relations is apt to break down in
many minds at this very application to moral actions,
on which men were from the first led to speculate by
the necessities of government. And this early specu
lation seems to be the foundation for that extended
theory of the universe which is implied in the phrase
of “moral government,” a mere transplacement of
human government. Originally a very crude con
ception, it has been nursed up into something almost
a 4
�14
tangible, and it might be hard to find any one, even
among sensible and well-educated Englishmen, who is
not to a very material extent under the influence of
this conception, which is the backbone of Christianity
as it is presented to the modern mind.
A real acceptance of the theory of moral govern
ment, which rigidly rewards the good and punishes the
wicked, is a very advanced theory of the universe. It
implies some conception of goodness and wickedness,
other than the acceptance or rejection of some one
particular theory of the universe—the characteristic
of most forms of the Christian theory itself, which is
apt to regard the “ Jew, Turk, infidel or heretic” as
much more suitable for everlasting punishment than
the staunch upholder of the popular creed, however
immorally he may live. Two other theories seem to
be more general, and intrude in various forms on all
others. These may be termed “ fear ” and “ favour,”
neither of them particularly well reconcilable with any
advanced notions of moral government, but both as
theories greatly influencing conduct and action, and
hence touching the very centre of the common area
of religious thought; both, however, based upon a
theory of animation, mostly rising to anthropomor
phism. These two last views I distinguish thus:
animation consists in attributing human-like action to
what is not human, although, as for trees and
�animals, it may be living; anthropomorphism consists
in attributing not merely human-like action, but actual
human form, thoughts, feelings, powers, chiefly greatly
exaggerated, without subjection to the common phy
sical and physiological laws under which the human
form is alone known to exist,—to those imaginary
beings that are supposed to sway the natural environ
ment on which the thinker’s whole existence depends.
It is quite inessential to the conception whether there
be one or many such anthropomorphic beings, but
oneness is an advanced stage of the theory. “ Fear
and “favour” then come into play exactly as in the
usual arbitrary and despotic government of chiefs.
The overwhelming atmospheric and terrestrial pheno
mena over which man has no apparent control what
soever—the whirlwind, the hurricane, the storm, the
earthquake, the volcanic eruption, the flood, the
thunderbolt, the epidemic, the drought, the famine,
and what is readily connected with them, the eclipse
and the comet—are generators of “ fear.” The theory
is that things are under the control of despotic power,
which must be pacified, and can be pacified by the
voluntary sacrifice of a part, and by cringing acknow
ledgment of superiority. How much of this remains
even in the Christianity of enlightened England need
scarcely be noticed. Some writers have gone so far
as to found all religious feelings upon “ fear,” but that
�i6
seems to me far too limited a view. The sense of
dependence, which others prefer, is properly only
the preliminary to the feelings of “ fear ” and “ favour,”
which are inseparably bound up together, “fear”
seeking relief by relying on “ favour.” “ Mediation ”
is the direct expression of “ favour,” and, of course,
has been highly cultivated because it gave power to
the mediating class—the equivalent of priesthood.
In professed Christianity only one mediator is ad
mitted, who himself represents a sacrifice, made to
appease an angry governor of the universe ; but
practical Christianity admits of hosts of secondary
mediators, the saints, and the priests, the whole
function of whom is to obtain “ favour,” by prayer,
by adoration, by doing what is supposed to be accept
able to the supreme governor, as explained by their
living representatives.
But “ fear ” and “ favour ” require only animation,
not anthropomorphism, and much less one supreme
head, to form the link connecting a theory of the
universe and corresponding conduct, in which, in my
view, is situate the common principle of all that we
call religion. The first region in which “ fear ” and
“ favour ” find their proper action is of course actual
existent life. Whole systems of religious thought thus
based probably exist without reference to anything
else but present existence, and it is not necessary to
�i7
refer to any other but the well-known case of the
ancient Jews. But their action is enormously ex
tended by the growth into the theory of the universe,
of a conception, that present life is only one link in a
vast chain which extends further than can be con
ceived both ways. We have thus to deal with three
states : pre-existence, existence, and post-existence,
of which the first and last are mere theories, but are
often wound into the whole mental condition of
human beings. Here in England, and among Chris
tians generally, pre-existence is generally looked upon
with some wonder as a Pythagorean fancy, forgetting
that in the main figure of Christianity this very pre
existence is a principal characteristic. But in India
it is still apparently an essential part of many creeds.
Post-existence is of the essence of Christianity, and
also of Buddhism, which admits of no supreme extramundane power. In later times the various theories
of post-existence—hell, purgatory, paradise among
Christians, metempsychosis and nirvana among Bud
dhists, the vaguely felt power on the present of an
cestral spirits in China, and in numerous barbarous
tribes—need no more than this passing allusion. But
all of them form admirable levers, admirably mani
pulated for the doctrines of “ fear ” and “ favour,”
and thus strengthen the link between the theory
of the universe and corresponding practical con-
�i8
duct, on which I believe the conception of religion
to rest.
But if you are inclined to admit with me that the
term religion is now usually applied to such a con
nected theory and practice, may not the term religion
be also aptly applied to cases which present the same
sort of connection, although the name religion is at
one time withheld by the great body of those who call
themselves religious, and is at another refused by
those who yet would be entitled to it on the view here
advocated ? Auguste Comte’s “ religion of humanity ”
claims to be a religion, but its claims are not allowed
by Christians, and perhaps other theists, because it
expressly avoids the conception of a deity. But it
has a theory, intended for, and believed by its
founder to be, the most complete theory of the uni
verse that can be formed, embracing all that is
known, or rather was known, to Comte himself, and
much which was “subjectively” imagined by him
as a foundation for future knowledge. Whatever
may be thought of the execution of this grand theo
retical work of Auguste Comte’s (to which I personally
desire to express my own great obligations), and
however much it now may need to be supplemented
and corrected by such men as Herbert Spencer and
Huxley, who have risen to the requisite height
whence mankind and mankind’s thoughts and works
�19
may be “ surveyed,” as Johnson has it, “from China
to Peru,” yet it must be owned that no anterior
theory of the universe exists which will bear com
parison with it. In working out the second part, the
practice, and the connecting link, the cult, he may
not have been so happy. I am one of those who
were dazzled with it as it came out, but who have
subsequently, as their eyes got used to the new light,
seen what they believe to be grave defects, in the
midst of magnificent suggestions. But, putting criti
cism aside (which I only for the moment admitted,
lest my position with respect to Comte’s work might
be misunderstood, and my hearers should imagine
my paper to be merely a positivist essay in disguise),
certainly the “religion of humanity” possesses that
common ground of all religious systems, a link con
necting theory and conduct, a link to which Comte
gives great prominence, and which he enforces by
a variety of proposed rites, ceremonies, and customs,
intended to keep alive the feeling of the influence of
theory on practice, and make it a part of the life
of every human being.
Now, to take the modern Secularist, as he calls
himself (a term to which, as being distinctly eccle
siastical, I have personally a very strong objection),
who avows that he has no god and no religion, does
he form a correct estimate of himself? I think not.
�20
The Secularist has no god, at any rate nothing
approaching anthropomorphism, and perhaps avoid
ing pantheism. But he certainly has a theory of the
universe, and that theory ip intention represents
the best science of the day, and hence only differs
from positivism in so far as we may have advanced on
positivism, or, at any rate, altered our views. The
Secularist claims also to be moral, to have an ethical
theory which is based upon higher grounds than the
Christian. Upon what grounds? Clearly on no
other than his theory of the universe. The sanction
that his moral rules have is, that they are in con
formity with that theory: that they are its practical
embodiment; or that they are logical deductions
from that theory, especially of the part relating to
mans nature, development, and social state. I am
not one of the body that calls itself Secularist, and I
may not clearly understand its views, but if they
amount to what I have stated, then I feel that Secu
larism is a religion; it has its theory, it has its prac
tice, and it grounds its practice on its theory. It
does not build temples, but it erects halls of science •
it does not preach sermons, but it delivers lectures on
the most vital subjects of human thought, and it
enforces its arguments by an appeal to the best
results of science. What it advocates may or may
not be in accordance with those results. That is of
�UmHI
d
[
1
21
no consequence for the present argument. What the
preacher advocates is often little in accordance with
his professions or his text-books. But it always is so
i
in intention, if the preacher is worth his salt. It
is enough that it makes the rule of conduct an off
shoot from its theory of the universe, especially that
part which deals with social man, but not intentiond ally neglecting the rest. And this, in my view, makes
!
Secularism a form of religion.
It may perhaps be asked in the course of the
1
following discussion what my own views may be,
as I am neither a positivist nor a secularist, and
although the individual views of a single man are
worth very little till they have been closely scanned
by many others, you will perhaps allow me briefly
to anticipate the inquiry. I profess to have a relij
gion in the sense laid down. In one sense, certainly
; : very far from anthropomorphic, I might term my
t religion theism, but if I had to coin a word I might
j perhaps select homalism, for a reason which will
;
appear presently. My theory of the universe is that
i
of modern science, which I briefly express, as applied
Ito all phenomena, vital or other, to be the acknow
ledgment of unconditional invariable relations, co
existing independently, each having its full effect, the
compound result being due to all (as in the second
law of motion), but each brought into action by
�22
secondary variable conditions (as usual in mechanics).
Both of these conceptions are derived from Comte.
Between all these relations there is an agreement^
or consensus, which we all feel, producing a smooth
ness or evenness in the result, making it homalous
(6/zaXos) as opposed to anomalous (a’r^aXo's), whence
I get the term homalism, on which however I lay no
weight whatever. This consensus is to me the re
presentative of the deity of monotheisms, seeming to
me to be that aimed at in such forms of religion. In
this sense I use theism in relation to my own form of
*
religion.
Conduct is of course intentionally formed
* My right to do so was much contested in the debate It
was in view of such contestation that I coined the word
homahsm.” Certainly if “theism” involves either an in
dividual personality (like a man), or even a collective personality
(like humanity), it would be wrong to use “ theism ” thus. But
I do not see that it does. I inquire into the objective rational
antecedents of the notion “ deity ” among the greatest thinkers
who now use the term, excluding low orders of thought entirely.
The foundation of omnipresence and omnipotence I find in the
universal presence of irresistible invariable relations. The foun
dation of the notion of “unity” I find in the perfect accord
with which these relations act, whence flow the higher notions of
design, final cause, and wisdom, although these are generally
personified. I take, then, this accord or “homalism” as the
central point in the conception of theism, and in calling my own
form of religion in this sense “theistic,” I seem to be merely
seeing the principle which the ordinary views veil. I have
called these “rational” as opposed to “sentimental” ante
cedents of the notion of deity. The latter are essentially sub
jective, differing extremely with the constitutions of individual
�upon the best scientific knowledge I possess on social
and human relations. But what is the link, the
sanction to this conduct, the only claim which the
whole theory could have, on my view, to be considered
a religion ? This is supplied by a sense of duty which
requires us to endeavour so to dispose the secondary
variable conditions as to bring into action those
constant relations which science shows will produce
what science again points out to be the most favourable
results to the race.
*
The strictly religious element is
men, and they cannot be so easily reduced under the sense of
“ homalism.” It seems, however, to me that they have no other
real foundation. But this cannot be developed in a footnote.
The notion of “ infinity,” as applied to deity, is merely part and
parcel of the notion of the invariable unconditionality of relations,
and does not require special notice. Naturally, most of the
speakers, on the spur of the moment, thought and dwelt on their
own notions of deity, or of the impossibility of deity, and pro
fessed not to understand what I meant. It was scarcely possible
from merely hearing such a brief compendium once read, that
they should have entered into the long series of thought from
which it arose, but which was necessarily not even indicated.
Perhaps this footnote may give some notion of its character.
* Although some of the speakers said that they approved of
what I said respecting the sense of duty, yet no one inquired, so
far as I remember, whence I derived it. I had purposely omitted
the point from 'the dry bones of my statement, because it required
too long a treatment. The sense is greatly subjective, and
varies much in different individuals. In some it is so strong that
the voice of duty is to them the best representative of the voice
of the deity and proof of his personal existence. But putting
this aside as not applicable to humanity, which has at most a
�24
then this conscious, as opposed to the usual ^conscious,
co-operation in the work of the universe. I am fully
aware how impossible it is in a few sentences to
furnish anything like an intelligible view of what
seems to me the ideal form of religion in view of
the present state of our knowledge of all parts of the
cosmical and human problem. What I have said
must be merely taken as indications, which would
require a treatise properly to elucidate.
If my paper is not already too long, I should wish
to anticipate some objections which may be raised on
the score of omissions. I have made no allusion to
that sense of the infinite on which Professor Max
Muller laid so much stress in his recent Hibbert
lectures, as the source of religious conceptions. He
modified his first statements in subsequent lectures,
till the feeling for 11 infinity ” seemed to me to amount
to not much more than the feelings for “externality,”
that is, something which is not oneself. I do not
collective and at the same time an eclectic conscience in the minds
of its best representatives, the objective sense of duty is an
offshoot of the social part of the above theory of the universe
Perhaps I may be allowed to refer to the hymns bearing my
name in the South Place Chapel collection, as giving in poetical
language the theistic view which I entertain, and my three
printed discourses there delivered on 7>z^, Speculation, and
Diity, as containing an explanation of those hymns (there re
printed) from the point of view here indicated.
�find in this feeling the germ of religion. But at the
same time I do not profess to assign or even to in
dicate the source of religious feelings. That lies
beyond the scope of this paper, and I wish to avoid it
altogether.
Another objection might be urged to my apparently
giving the chief weight to the intellect and but little
to the feelings. In fact, however, all theories of
the universe are at first rather the result of feeling
than of thought, that is, they are usually formed upon
some extremely imperfect inductions, the steps of
which are very vaguely known, and which are jumped
at suddenly, by what is known as “ the logic of the
feelings.” It is possible and even probable that most
of the early theories of the universe were merely sub
jective imaginings due to the feelings of their framers.
There is, however, another side to this objection.
Those who raise it are usually thinking of a personal
God, that grand benevolent being with whom they
delight to converse, and consider that to strike Him
out of the definition of religion is to deny the action
of the feelings altogether. But I do not. I admit
this theory of the universe as well as every other, and
all I bargain for is that every other should not be
rejected for the sake of this one. I am as little in
clined as Lessing’s Nathan the Wise to define “true ”
religion. I have merely striven to point out what
�26
appears to me the common points of resemblance in
all systems of moral thought which we usually term
religion, and to show that, in consequence, others not
usually included in the term have a full claim to be so
denominated.
Postscript.
I avail myself of an unfilled space to reply to one or two
other objections which were raised in the debate or privately
communicated to me on my leaving the room. A good friend
of mine asked if I should call a man religious whose theory of
the universe led him to the conclusion that there was nothing
worth having but sensuousness in this life, and, in accord with
this conclusion, regulated his whole conduct on the plan of
“let us eat and drink, for to-morrow we die
“because,” said
my friend, “if you would, I would not.” Certainly, if such
conduct was actually founded upon that theory, such a man
would be as much entitled to be called religious as any Christian,
though he would also certainly, as Christians are to the majority
of the so-called religious that do not profess Christianity, be
simply detestable. I am confirmed in this view by a great
Christian writer, who has used words implying that such a view
constitutes a religion : “walk” that is, practise religion, “ so as
ye have us for an ensample,” says Paul, “for many walk, of
whom I have told you often . . . whose God is their belly ”
(Phil. iii. 17-19). Religions are not necessarily good and holy
things to those who do not hold them, nor do they necessarily
lead to what moralists hold to be the highest morality. Reli
*
gious wars and fanaticisms in general are well-known examples.
But they are religious. The massacre of St. Bartholomew was
distinctly religious. The “ Bulgarian atrocities ” had a similar
origin.
One of the debaters considered religion as especially the pur
suit of an ideal—of course, a moral ideal—which its pursuer was
�27
impelled to realise, and to which he sacrificed everything else.
So another said religion was nothing if it did not force a man
(mentally, of course) to do a thing which he knew to be right
whether he liked it or not. It seems to me that both of these
views could be held without any objective theory of the universe
coming consciously into play, and that especially the latter
might be entirely subjective. If such be possible, neither the
one nor the other would, simply because he held such views,
come under the name religious. The first might be called an
enthusiast, the second a strictly conscientious man. But most
probably, if it was worth anything, the ideal would be the out
come of a theory of the universe, and the directing conscience
would act in accord with such a theory, which very easily, and
indeed in all laudable cases, overlooks the individual good in
the good of the race.
In the lowest forms of animal and vegetable life it is extremely
difficult to say whether a living, moving, multiplying organism
is animal or vegetable. We know a man, a whale, a herring, an
eagle, an oak, a fern, very distinctly. But what are the moving
organisms of putrefaction ? So there are great forms of religion
for which we have no hesitation in using the word,.but there aie
low, vile, wretched, offensive forms to which we hesitate to apply
a term that has been always noble to our own feelings. Yet they
may be as strictly religious after all as that which we ourselves
cherish.
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AND CHARING CROSS.
�yrrniran Jliakrtiral Socitfji,
LANGHAM
HALL,
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Victorian Blogging
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A collection of digitised nineteenth-century pamphlets from Conway Hall Library & Archives. This includes the Conway Tracts, Moncure Conway's personal pamphlet library; the Morris Tracts, donated to the library by Miss Morris in 1904; the National Secular Society's pamphlet library and others. The Conway Tracts were bound with additional ephemera, such as lecture programmes and handwritten notes.<br /><br />Please note that these digitised pamphlets have been edited to maximise the accuracy of the OCR, ensuring they are text searchable. If you would like to view un-edited, full-colour versions of any of our pamphlets, please email librarian@conwayhall.org.uk.<br /><br /><span><img src="http://www.heritagefund.org.uk/sites/default/files/media/attachments/TNLHLF_Colour_Logo_English_RGB_0_0.jpg" width="238" height="91" alt="TNLHLF_Colour_Logo_English_RGB_0_0.jpg" /></span>
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Conway Hall Library & Archives
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2018
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Conway Hall Ethical Society
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Title
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On the common area of thought in the different significations of the English word "Religion": a paper read before the London Dialectical Society, on October 2nd, 1878
Creator
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Ellis, Alexander John
Description
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Place of publication: London
Collation: 27, [1] p. : 15 cm.
Notes: Part of Morris Miscellaneous Tracts 2. Printed by William Clowes and Sons, Stamford Street and Charing Cross. Information on the Society's aims and officers on back page.
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London Dialectical Society
Date
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[1878]
Identifier
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G3359
Subject
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Religion
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<a href="http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/mark/1.0/"><img src="http://i.creativecommons.org/p/mark/1.0/88x31.png" alt="Public Domain Mark" /></a><span> </span><br /><span>This work (On the common area of thought in the different significations of the English word "Religion": a paper read before the London Dialectical Society, on October 2nd, 1878), identified by </span><a href="https://conwayhallcollections.omeka.net/items/show/www.conwayhall.org.uk"><span>Humanist Library and Archives</span></a><span>, is free of known copyright restrictions.</span>
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application/pdf
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Text
Language
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English
Morris Tracts
Religion