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AN
EXAMINATION
OF
SOME RECENT WRITINGS ABOUT IMMORTALITY.
By W. E. B.
“ Is it not unreasonable to expect to see clearly through such a veil as death ?”
“ Let me do the will of God, and be swallowed up in His work. Conscious that His
goodness is perfect, let me spend not a thought on the contingencies of my future,
which He will provide as His wisdon sees good.”—F. W. Newman.
PUBLISHED BY THOMAS SCOTT,
MOUNT PLEASANT, RAMSGATE.
Price Sixpence.
��AN
EXAMINATION
OF
SOME RECENT WRITINGS ABOUT IMMORTALITY.
----------- ♦----------- -
Modern Materialism and its Relation to Immortality. By John
Owen, Theological Review, October, 1869.
Practical Aspects of the Doctrine of Immortality. By Presbyter
Anglicanus, Theological Review, April, 1870.
Immortality and Modern Thought. By John Owen, Theological
Review, July, 1870.
The Doctrine of Immortality in its Bearing on Education. By
Presbyter Anglicanus. Scott, Ramsgate.
Is Death the End of all Things for Man ? By a Parent and
Teacher. Scott, Ramsgate.
A Reply to the Question, “ What have we Got to Rely on, if we
cannot Rely on the Bible? ” By Prof. F. W. Newman. Scott,
Ramsgate.
Another Reply to the Question, “ What have we Got to Rely on if
we cannot Rely on the Bible?” By Samuel Hinds, D.D.
Scott, Ramsgate.
A Reply to the°Qucstion, “ Apart from Supernatural Revelation,
What is Man’s Prospect of Living after Death?” By Samuel
Hinds, D.D. Scott, Ramsgate.
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Mr Owen’s first article was written in review of
Professor Huxley’s well known paper in the Fort
nightly Review for Feb., 1869, “ On the Physical Basis
of Life.” Mr Owen is very indignant with Professor
Huxley for having asserted that the “ matter of life ”
is composed of ordinary matter, “ differing from it only
in the manner in which its atoms are aggregated.”
Whether the Professor was or was not justified in
making this assertion we may fairly leave him to settle
if he can with Mr Owen. But after reading the after
part of Mr Owen’s paper, in which he elaborates an
argument in favour of immortality which he expressly
�4
An Examination of some
declares to be quite unassailable by any materialistic
objections, it is difficult to account for tbe reason of
his indignation with Mr Huxley for this statement,
and for other remarks about protoplasm. Future
scientific inquiry may throw more light upon Professor
Huxley’s protoplasmic researches, and may either con
firm or refute what his reviewer terms his ‘‘ dogma
tism ” concerning them. With no pretence to scientific
erudition, I should feel it to be presumptuous to hazard
a prediction either way, and am content with a simple
protest against Mr Owen’s assertion of the probable
finality of our knowledge in the direction referred to.
The main portion of Mr Owen’s Constructive argu
ments in favour of immortality seem to differ from
those which the most thoroughgoing materialist might
advance, chiefly, if not solely, in nomenclature. If he
would use “ force ” always, as he does generally, in
place of “ spirit,” all, or nearly all that he advances
with any pretence of logical demonstration, could be
endorsed by an advocate of materialism. Mr Owen
thus states his argument in its briefest terms :—“ The
spiritual force of the universe is eternal; man is an
unit of that spiritual force ; therefore man is immortal.”
The conclusion of this syllogism is somewhat incorrectly
stated. It should be, “ therefore man is eternal,” and
the necessity which Mr Owen evidently felt of substi
tuting one word for the other fairly illustrates what
appears to me to be the fallacy of his syllogism. Man
as man, that is as a combination of what is commonly
distinguished as matter and spirit, is not an unit of
any purely spiritual force, any more than man as man
is eternal. Mr Owen’s meaning would probably be
better represented as follows :—The spiritual force of
the universe is eternal; the spiritual force of man is
an unit of the spiritual force of the universe; therefore
the spiritual force of man is eternal. This argument
from a spiritualistic standpoint is of course unassail
able. The materialist would simply substitute material
�Recent Writings about Immortality.
5
for spiritual, and would then adopt the altered syl
logism as his own. The real dispute is whether there
exists any spiritual force in the universe (and inclusively
in man) at all. If then it be possible to demonstrate
scientifically by protoplasmic researches or otherwise
that what are now termed spiritual or mental forces are
precisely similar to material or physical forces, it seems
that, after all, Mr Owen’s claim for the security of his
argument from materialistic refutation would fall to
the ground. In fact he admits this when he says :—
“ If, indeed, it could be proved, as the materialist
assumes it can, that the force we call vital or mental is
of precisely the* same nature with what he terms
physical forces, no doubt the question might be
regarded as settled, so far at least as the human claim
to immortality is concerned (although even in that
case the mind, which finds expression through the
laws of the universe, would be left unaccounted for by
his theory, and an eternal witness against its unlimited
application).” But Mr Owen goes on to state his
belief, and li that of those who have most closely
surveyed it from either side,” that the gulf between
matter and mind “is primordial and utterly impass
able.” It is plain then at the outset that although
his arguments may help to strengthen the convictions
of those who already have faith in immortality, they
can be of no avail with people whom materialistic
probabilities or possibilities have rendered doubters,
since they rest on an assumption which begs the
question. He makes this plainer still as he proceeds ;
for not only does he assert that—“ Whoever ... re
cognises, whether in the operations of nature, or in the
course of history, or in the constitution of his own
being, a peculiar spiritual force which cannot even in
imagination be conceived as identical with such
material force as electricity or magnetism, will always
find a firm standing ground whereon to build his hope
of immortality; ” but he actually goes so far as to
�6
An Examination of some
assume “ the undeniable fact (the italics are mine) of
man possessing within him such a spiritual force, by
whatever name it is called, so distinguished from ail
other forces of which he can have any cognisance.” It
is not much to claim that an argument is impervious
to the assaults of opponents so long as it rests upon an
assumption which they at the outset deny. The
parenthesis of a previous quotation from Mr Owen to
the effect that on the materialistic basis “ the mind
which finds expression through the laws of the universe
would still be left unaccounted for,” exposing as it
does the most hopelessly weak point in the materialistic
theory, gives a. far sounder foundation to what, for
want of another name, we term spiritualism than does
the argument on assumption that Mr Owen deems
so thoroughly impregnable. This is in effect the
“ design argument.” which, in spite of a vast amount
of denial and ridicule, remains, and will remain, a
stronghold, if not the chief stronghold of anti-mate
rialistic faith.
Further on in his article, Mr Owen pleads for “ the
recognition of the essential unity of all spiritual
forces.” Why not of all forces spiritual or other
wise 1 Must not the creative or initiative force of the
universe include within itself, or contain the germs of,
the physical and organic as well as the mental and
“ spiritual ” forces which we are cognisant of 1 If this
be admitted, the syllogism of Mr Owen before quoted
must be extended, so as to include all material as well
as spiritual forces as units of the force of the universe.
In concluding his paper, Mr Owen remarks :—“ No
scientific discovery will ever suffice to prove that his
torical progress is the creature of physical forces, or
that virtue is an amiable manifestation of heat or
electricity. Hence the ground taken by Bishop Butler
in the well-known chapter of the Analogy, will always
be that which the more thoughtful of the defenders of
immortality will choose to occupy—the ground of pro-
�Recent Writings about Immortality.
7
bability supported by analogy. . . . Recognizing as
we do the scientific impossibility that the least part of
a physical force should be annihilated, we have en
deavoured to prove the analogical improbability that
any, even the smallest part, of divine energy can be
entirely and irreparably lost.” The conclusion, then,
to which Mr Owen’s clever arguments bring us is, that
all force is immortal. But does not his analogy carry
us too far—at least, if we wish to be convinced of in
dividual immortality? No particle of matter is an
nihilated although it is transformed, any more than an
unit of force is lost when it is transmuted. Then, does
not the argument from this analogy lead us to suppose
that as matter in the form of a human body certainly
does not everlastingly retain its individuality, so neither
does the force individualized in a human mind or
spirit ? In spite of some remarks by Mr Owen to the
contrary, this seems to me to be the only logical con
clusion of his argument from analogy. He indeed
admits that to him “ this qiiestion of personal, in
dividual existence in a future, world is of mere
secondary importance compared with the grand fact of
such existence,” and he quotes with approval Schleiermacher, whose arguments might comfort a Buddhist,
but would scarcely give consolation to a Christian.
Abrwana is not that for which those bereaved by
death so passionately yearn. The hope of immor
tality would lose by far its strongest and sweetest in
tensity with all but a few, at any rate amongst the
western nations, and would probably perish entirely
with the majority, if “incorporation into the divine
substance” could be proved to be the only Heaven
we may reasonably aspire to.
“ Presbyter Anglicanus,” in his paper on The Prac
tical Aspects of Immortality, is more occupied in
pointing out the effects that would result from the
acceptance of Mr Owen’s conclusions, than in con
troverting his arguments. It is always a subject for
�8
An Examination of some
regret when a controversialist introduces to the con
sideration of a question the bias which inevitably
results from taking into account the practical results of
the acceptance of such or such a conclusion, instead of
criticising it from the purely philosophical stand-point
of whether it is true or false. But in those portions
of his essay in which “ Presbyter Anglicanus” brings
his clear common sense to bear upon the mysticism of
a portion of Mr Owen’s argument, deprecates the in
troduction of scriptural teaching as of any supernatural
authority, and points out the unphilosophical nature
of the theory of immortality for the righteous and
annihilation for the wicked, he has done good service.
He has, however, in my opinion, done anything but
good service to the cause of a pure morality in those
remarks of his which point to the doctrine of a future
life as the only sound basis of moral teaching. “ That
the whole moral as well as the religious training of
Englishmen,” he states, “ rests on the belief of the
continued existence of each individual man after death,
no one will probably dispute. Whether we regret the
fact or not, the fact itself is patent; and the remark
applies equally to the instruction given by men of all
schools of thought (for it will not be pretended that
at the present time there is any systematic instruction
to the young based on the professed negation of con
tinued life).” In making this statement, “ Presbyter
Anglicanus” seems entirely to ignore the Utilitarian
school; for although the Utilitarian philosophy is not
systematically taught to the young on a large scale per
haps, it certainly has at the present time some influence
upon the moral training of Englishmen. The separation
of ethics from theology is one of the most promising
signs of the times, and I confess it is with surprise
that I find “Presbyter Anglicanus” holding to the
old mischievous combination. I altogether fail to see
that if we tell the young “ that acts tend to make
habits, that habits determine our character and affect
�Recent Writings about Immortality.
9
our spiritual condition indefinitely,—if we tell them
that right is to he done at whatever cost, and that
success here is to be to us as nothing in comparison
with our growth in all good and kindly qualities,—we
are using language every word of which implies not
only human immortality, but the continued existence
of each individual being whom we address.” It is as
well, however, to observe that the signification of the
expression (l success here ” involves a considerable
portion of the question at issue. That it is best in
the only true sense to be and do the best we can, is an
axiom of pure and enlightened ethics. If the majority
of men are not yet sufficiently enlightened to receive
it, let us try to educate them to it, and not teach down
to them a more sensual philosophy. It is a pity that
one so advanced in enlightened thought as “ Presbyter
.Anglicanus” undoubtedly is, should not know what
reply to make to one with “ a mind not yet matured,”
“ if he asks us why he should cause himself trouble
and discomfort by seeking to reach a high standard of
action, when life would be easier and pleasanter, and
probably more successful, by contenting himself with a
lower one, &c.” One who intelligently believes in the
present moral government of the world would reply
that life is not—cannot, in the order of Divine Pro
vidence, be easier, pleasanter, and more successful in
the highest and only true sense of those terms to the
man who contents himself with a low ideal, than to
him who strives to live up to a high one. For, are
not the eternal and divine laws of morality something
more than, or rather, quite different from mere arbitrary
restrictions upon the inclinations and pleasures of
human beings ? Should we not, on the contrary, be
lieve that we are only forbidden to do that which is in
the real sense injurious to us collectively as the great
family of God’s creatures, and to each of us individually
as a member of that family? Does not the highest
sense of ease, pleasure, and success consist in living, in
B
�IO
An Examination of some
accordance with our noblest instincts and tendencies ?
Is there not, for instance, a far nobler, sweeter ease in
the knowledge acquired at the cost of much labour
than in the gross indolence that rests stupidly content
in ignorance 1 Is not the pleasure derived from the
perhaps at first tiresome cultivation of music, or of
poetry, or of pure intellectuality, far superior to the
delights of the palate, or to the gratification of any of
the comparatively gross sensual faculties ? And is not
the success of a noble, beautiful life, such as is in
accord with all the most exalted attributes of our
nature, far more gratifying and satisfying than the
mere satiety of acquisitiveness, of love of fame, or of
desire for power ? To teach the converse of this—to
teach that this life is in itself a failure, and that a
supplementary life is necessary to compensate for the
bankruptcy of this is, in my opinion, one of the worst
forms of infidelity. I hold with Mr Owen, and against
“ Presbyter Anglicanus,” that whether we believe or
doubt future existence as individuals, we should live
precisely the same, that, to take the lowest view, virtue
pays in the only true and extended sense of the word,
and that consequently the belief in personal immor
tality can have no influence whatever upon a rightly
conceived and inculcated system of morality.
Mr Owen, in his reply to “ Presbyter Anglicanus,”
puts this truth concisely before his readers, when he
says :—Our most advanced and enlightened thinkers
have arrived at last at the conclusion that the morality
founded upon the assumed weal or woe of a future
world is not of the most noble or disinterested charac
ter ; and hence there have been various attempts to
place Christian ethics upon another and a sounder
foundation, adopting either the Utilitarian basis of the
welfare of humanity, or else insisting on the divine and
a priori immutability of ethical distinctions.” And
again :—“ In all our teaching (z.e., to the young) on this
subject, we should studiously avoid basing the simplest
�Recent Writings about Immortality.
11
ethical teaching upon their possible destiny in another
life. Our better aim, as well as that most in harmony
with the nature of the proof we assign to immortality,
would be to instil into them mere unselfish and
elevated rules of conduct, teaching them that, in any
case, it is better to be virtuous than the reverse, and
that the present is sacred, and has its hallowed duties
quite irrespective of what the future may happen to
be.” He well enforces this when he states :—“ Nothing
is more certain than that a child ” (and he might have
added, a man also) “ lives in the present, and is in
fluenced mainly by present and immediate considera
tions. Hence the reward that is future, or the
punishment that is distant, has but little effect on his
conduct. Present sanctions, such as honour, truth,
goodness, are therefore far better fitted to make an
impression on his character, than those which are
derived from a remote future with which he has little
or no sympathy.” A practical illustration of the truth
of this last statement is afforded by the fact that an
honourable “ man of the world,” who is but little if at
all influenced by doctrinal theology, is really, as the
popular estimate assumes him to he, more trustworthy
in all that relates to honour, truth, and magnanimity,
than is the representative “ religious ” man, as the
term is commonly applied.
Mr Owen seems to me to be a less reliable guide
when he reverts to his mysticisms—when, for instance,
in reply to the declaration of “ Presbyter Anglicanus”
that he does not understand what is meant by Schleiermacher’s definition,—“ In the midst of the finite to be
one with the Infinite, and in each passing moment to
have eternal existence, that is the immortality of re
ligion,” he says :—“ If ‘ Presbyter Anglicanus ’ could
by possibility have asked Schleiermacher himself what
was to be understood by these words, he would pro
bably receive for a reply, that they were to be inter
preted not by the intellect, but by the feeling.’
�12
An Examination of some
Nothing seems more certain than that feeling (i.e.,
sensation) alone can interpret no theory ; and the
appeal to the feelings, so common with those who are
pushed beyond the confines of logic by a sound argu
ment against vague or otherwise unsubstantiable
theological doctrines, is unworthy of a careful thinker
like Mr Owen. Equally objectionable is his further
elucidation of Schleiermacher’s formula, that “ it is a
necessary deduction from his (Schleiermacher’s) defini
tion of religion ; i.e., it consists in ‘ the consciousness
of the eternal,’ in the feeling (my italics) of per
manency, so to speak, which underlies our transitory
existence.” To this it must be objected that there is
no such intuition as “consciousness of the eternal,”
and that all belief is the result of thought, and not of
feeling, although our sentiments may welcome, and to
some extent give support to, a faith that is in conson
ance with them.
In disavowing the inference of Presbyter Anglicanus,
that if we accept Schleiermacher’s definition of immor
tality there are few who can hope for it, Mr Owen
affirms :—“ It must be borne in mind, the spiritual
energy with which we, on behalf of our race, claim
kindred, is revealed by more than one variety of
manifestation. On the one hand are its ethical ele
ments, duty, patience, love, self-denial; and on the
other, its intellectual elements, imagination, foresight,
hope, and desire.” If then he admits the intellectual
elements to kinship with the “ spiritual energy ” which
gives in his opinion a title to immortality, it is evident
that the brutes may put in their claim ; for whether or
not we allow that the lower animals possess any of the
ethical elements, we cannot deny that some of them
at least show capabilities of imagination, foresight,
hope, and desire. Indeed Mr Owen sees that his
arguments tend in this direction, and further on in
his paper, after speculating upon probable differences
in the condition of those who will enjoy a future
�Recent Writings about Immortality.
13
existence, he says :—“ And if this were once thought
reasonable and in accordance with what we now
observe of God’s operations in this world, one great
difficulty connected with a belief in a future existence
would be obviated; for we might then reasonably
extend it to imperfect types of intellectual or moral
growth, whether among our own race or among races
of animals which we, often unworthily, call c inferior.’”
Why not down to the lowest of the animals? It
would be difficult to find any creature of which it
could be absolutely declared that it possesses no
“ intellectual elements ” whatever. At least it would
be impossible for us to draw the line; and as animal
and vegetable life in certain forms are said to be indis
tinguishable, and as, further, organic force in its
simplest stage is as far as we can judge by observa
tion, identical with what is at present distinctively
termed physical force, Mr Owen’s arguments once
more lead us to a conclusion so broad that they lose
all value as supports to the belief in individual
immortality—namely, to that of the eternity of all
forces.
In some further remarks in reply to those arguments
of Presbyter Anglicanus against which I have strongly
protested, Mr Owen is most eloquent and impressive,
and it would be easy and pleasant to quote largely
from them. They are in the main an enlargement
upon the principle that “ evil is essentially antagonistic
to the divine energies which govern the world,” and
that therefore there is a firm basis for ethics altogether
apart from the doctrine of future retribution.
There is no portion of Mr Owen’s essay so weak as
that in which he exhibits a leaning towards the
illogical theory of the annihilation of the wicked.
This theory is of course strikingly incompatible with
that in which he bases the claim to immortality upon
the possession of some intellectual or moral elements
akin to the spiritual energy of the universe. But he
�T4
An Examination of some
veils the inconsistency in a cloud of mysticism. He
argues that “if there are individuals who do not
exhibit in any form or in the very least degree the
spiritual force of which we have been speaking, then
we are fully prepared to “ grant that nothing but non
existence can be predicated of such beings. But it
must be borne in mind that this is not annihilation as
commonly understood. Annihilation is generally used
of the entire extinction, the reducing to nothingness of
what once had existence. We, however, predicate of such
individuals as we have above mentioned, not their final
extinction, but their present non-existence” (my italics).
It is to be presumed that Mr Owen means their spiritual
non-existence in some mystical sense. Having spoken
of them as individuals, he cannot of course mean to
affirm their individual non-existence. Then their an
nihilation as individuals would after all be “the reducing
to nothingness of what once had existence,” the vulgar
conception of annihilation which Mr Owen disclaims.
But this is probably another of the beliefs that are “ to
be interpreted not by the intellect, but by the feeling
for it is obvious that there is nothing very rational in it.
The method of simply denying the existence of an
obstruction to the reception of a doctrine is, no doubt,
very convenient for the purposes of argument. It has,
however, in this case one drawback which, to thinkers
not mentally intoxicated by a wrapt contemplation of
German mysticism, detracts somewhat from its value,
and that is its utter unintelligibility. It is, moreover,
difficult to imagine why Mr Owen need have troubled
himself to introduce this extraordinary proposition.
It certainly was not necessary to the purpose of his
argument, since, according to his definition of the title
to immortality, the “ non-existent ” being becomes a
mere myth, the veriest madman, by the possession of
■imagination, having a claim to everlasting life.
In taking leave of Mr Owen as a contributor to
modern theories of immortality, I can only declare the
�Recent Writings about Immortality.
15
impression, which, a careful and unprejudiced considera
tion of his essays leaves upon my mind. It is this,
that however strong he may he against materialists—
and no doubt materialists as well as spiritualists assume
a great deal that they cannot sustain by proof—his
elaborate arguments give but little support to the only
doctrine of immortality which ninety-nine out of every
hundred perhaps of his readers would care to have
substantiated.
Presbyter Anglicanus, in his pamphlet on “ The
Doctrine of Immortality in its Bearing on Education,”
written mainly in further reply to Mr Owen, whilst
with some reason complaining of misrepresentation of
his views through miscomprehension, goes on to repeat
what I agree with Mr Owen in considering to be false
and mischievous theories concerning the basis of
morality. After in effect disclaiming the pessimism of
those who conceive of this world as a 11 vale of tears,”
in which the good man has much the worst of it, and
the wicked man triumphs, and from which the good
man must hopelessly turn off his eyes, and look to that
future life in which alone he can hope for compensation
for the wrongs of this—after affirming his belief that
the divine “ purpose which runs through all the ages,”
and which “ must be accomplished,” “ is the highest
good of every creature, and that this highest good lies
in the absolute harmony of the human will with the
will of God” (p. 6)—after declaring that he has
“nowhere spoken of either restraint or punishment,
or even of suffering, except in that sense in which
(he supposes) even M. Comte or Mr Congreve would
assert that the wilful disregarding or violation of our
duty brings with it, generally or always a sense of
dissatisfaction, remorse, or wretchedness” (p. 8)—after
all this it is passing strange that Presbyter Anglicanus
should still contend “ that no teaching which positively
asserts that death is the end of existence to the indi
vidual man can furnish an effectual motive, that no
ethical system can be based upon it, and that any
�An Examination of some
ethical system which is said to be consistent with it
lies really on a foundation of treacherous and shifting
sand” (p. 11).
The explanation of the apparent
inconsistency between the last quoted utterance and
the preceding extracts, lies evidently in the fact that
Presbyter Anglicanus does not believe that the divine
purpose—the highest good of every creature, is ever
completely accomplished in this life, nor even that it
is best in the only true sense, to be and do one’s best
as far as this life only is concerned. Now there is,
perhaps, no harm in teaching that this divine purpose
is not completely accomplished here, but that there is
a future life in which it culminates in a fruition of
bliss which is far beyond what any one pretends can
be enjoyed in this life ; but to teach, either directly or
by implication, that it is not best to be and do one’s
best here, even if there be no life to come, is, in my
opinion, a mischievous error, involving as it does
involve the infidel (although “orthodox”) assumption
that the spirit of evil is triumphant in this world.
Presbyter Anglicanus is further indubitably teaching
this erroneous doctrine, when he says that “ we dare
not tell ” the thoroughly vicious and degraded, “ that
they and many generations after them must, if they
care to get out of their slough of filth, toil on with
heroic energy for next, to no recompense here (the italics
are mine) and no recompense whatever hereafter”
(p. 12). I trust indeed that we dare not tell them any
such terrible falsehood.
I agree with Presbyter
Anglicanus too, that we should “ feel the inhumanity
of telling ” “ those for whom their physical life here is
one of protracted and hopeless suffering,” that “ they
have the highest consolation for their years of agony
in the thought that their patience, hope, and faith are
all to go for nothing (my italics) (p. 12). But does
Presbyter Anglicanus think that patience and hope
ever do go for nothing, even if a faith, possibly
mistaken may 1 And does he regard physical disease
�Recent Writings about Immortality.
17
(often, though not always in itself a punishment for
evil conduct) as a virtue that in justice demands a
reward ?
In making these latter remarks, however, I am far
from underrating the terrible difficulty which all
thoughtful men must feel in the contemplation of
these lives of protracted suffering (as in the contem
plation of many other apparently absolute evils of this
world), especially when traceable to no error of the
sufferers themselves. The visiting of the iniquities of
the fathers upon the children to the third and fourth
generation is, unfortunately for an easy faith, as true
as it is scriptural. Nevertheless, this does not affect
the question before us, for the difficulty remains,
whether we believe in a future life or not, since happi
ness in future life would not prove the justice of
punishing an individual here for sins that are not his.
I pass on with pleasure to those eloquent passages
in which Presbyter Anglicanus gives us the reasons
for his faith in immortality, and I gladly recognise in
some of them a far more forcible plea for individual
immortality than can be extracted from the ostensibly
more philosophical arguments of Mr Owen. I say in
some of the passages, because in others the plea is
based upon the same erroneous views of life which
have above been combatted. Presbyter Anglicanus
holds that the doctrine of immortality “ by no means
rests only on the foundation of probability supported
by analogy,” since “ the reduction of a proposition into
an absurdity is taken as a proof of its converse; and
the direct negation of immortality . . . involves a
series of absurdities which shock alike our mental and
moral sense ” (p. 18). I gladly admit the full force of
this passage :—11 It is shocking that the love which
has withstood the waves of a thousand griefs, tempta
tions, and disasters, and whose flame has burnt clearer
and purer with advancing years, should he rewarded
with extinction,” except that I must demur to the use
�18
An Examination of some
of the word rewarded. It is shocking to believe that
this love should ever be extinguished ; but surely it
brings its own reward in this life. Equally forcible is
this :—“ It is shocking that the thoughts, the aspira
tions, and yearnings of the wisest and best of men
should be a mere delusive dream—that the words
which bid us hope and strive on because we cannot
know here the fulness of blessing which God has
prepared for them that love Him, should be a mere
cheat and a cruel deception.” But with regard to the
other passages (see pp. 18 and 19 of the pamphlet) let
me ask—do the inferior forms of life have full scope
and exercise any more than man has ? How about
the worm crushed under foot, or cut through with the
spade ? Is there not a claim for “ compensation ” here
if anywhere ? And are not the faculties of animals
“ extinguished ” sometimes “just when they are rising
into vigorous activity ? ” Again, is iniquity ever truly
successful ? And do “ striving, and effort, and pur
pose, and will” ever go for nothing even in this
world ?
The writer of the pamphlet, “ Is Death the end of
all Things for Man ?” goes over much the same ground
as that traversed by Presbyter Anglicanus in the papers
already noticed, and his position on the question
exhibits in the main the same strength and the same
weakness.
Professor E. W. Newman in his Pamphlet disclaims
the authority of Scripture as an argument for immor
tality, and in reply to those who complain that the
discrediting of that authority has robbed them of a
“ delicious dream,” he eloquently observes: “ The true
heaven does not consist in aspirations quite ridiculous
in puny man, but rather in self-forgetfulness ; in that
faith which says, ‘ Let me do the will of God, and be
swallowed up in His work. Conscious that His good
ness is perfect, let me spend not a thought on the con
tingencies of my future, which He will provide as His
�Recent Writings about Immortality.
J9
wisdom sees good.’ ” This is an epitome of the sublimest piety and faith. “ But,” he proceeds, “ I am
gravely sensible that there is another view of immor
tality in which self is quite forgotten; in which the
enlargement of men’s destiny beyond the grave is
viewed as ennobling our nature and assuaging the
grief with which we see human afflictions end in dark
moral degradation. Such a doctrine of immortality is
encumbered with severe logical difficulties to a Theist,
but with fewer (I think) than with those which meet a
Biblical Christian” (p. 13). And surely it seems to
me this view of immortality is encumbered with fewer
difficulties than any other. Then follows a frank and
manly divulgence at once of the faith and the “ honest
doubt ” of an honest man. “ In my book called
1 Theism,’ I have elaborately developed all the argu
ments which commend themselves to me. When I
read them, I find them very powerful. Some of them
are even short enough, if sound, to generate vivid
electric faith. The discomfort to me is, that they do
not wholly refute, they rather outweigh, arguments on
the other side; and where you deal with a balanced
argument, you strike the balance differently, I believe,
in different frames of mind. Perhaps when I am too
much pre-engaged by sense, and too little devout, the
spiritual arguments for immortality lose force with me.
Whether that is the explanation I cannot tell; but I
frankly confess that what at one time I think to bring
full conviction, at another time seems overbalanced by
objections. I do not at all imagine that I have solved
the problem. I sometimes think that the half faith
which I sustain may be precisely the thing most whole
some to men; and, indeed, is it not unreasonable to
expect to see clearly through such a veil as death 1 ... .
Let your complainant exercise the grace of waiting for
light, and of hoping that more light may dawn on our
successors than God has yet granted to us” (pp. 13, 14).,
This is truly a noble confession of faith and of doubt
�20
An Examination of some
such as no mind but a large, brave and honest one
would ever have made. We feel as we read it that a
great soul has revealed itself to us, strengthening our
belief to a far greater extent than volumes of half sin
cere though more positive dogmatism can. Here at
any rate we have a mind which does not despair of
morality because it cannot demonstrate a future life.
And there is a faith beyond the faith of all the creeds
in the trust that the good Spirit, in whom we live, and
move, and have our being, has given to us all the light
that is necessary to guide us here, and that to Him
belongs the care of us hereafter. And this faith will
enable each one of us to say with the grand old Scotch
man in Alton Locke, “I have long left the saving of my
soul to Him who made the soul.” (Iquote from memory).
Dr. Hinds, in the first of his two interesting tracts,
reminds those who ask what we have to rely on
if we cannot rely on the Bible, that a question of like
import, and of equally vital interest to those who asked
it, has been answered in modern times to the satisfac
tion, at least, of all Protestants. That question was,
“If we cannot rely on the Church, what have we got
to rely on?” The reply was, “The Bible,” and an
infallible Bible accordingly was substituted for an
infallible church. Dr Hinds proceeds very ably to
advocate the giving up of the assumption, “ that God
must have provided an infallible teaching of religious
truth,” and to warn those who manifest a want of faith
by asserting that they recognise no foundation for
religion apart from the Bible, to be on their guard
“ against substituting a vain and presumptuous prying
into the hidden things of the Lord, for the desire to
know Him by seeking to conform to His will” (p. 13).
He thinks that “ the tree of knowledge in the garden
of Eden, the craving after which caused Adam and Eve
to be banished from the tree of life, may serve as an
emblem to us.” For, “ we too, in our eager pursuit
after forbidden knowledge, may find ourselves wander-
�Recent Writings about Immortality.
21
ing far away from the life which is destined other
wise to nourish and prepare us for heaven” (p. 14).
It is only, thus, indirectly that this pamphlet hears
upon the subject of immortality, which is directly
treated by Dr Hinds, in his “ Reply to the Question,
Apart from Supernatural Revelation, What is Man's
Prospect of Living after Death ? ” Dr Hinds limits
the scope of his reply to the question of individual
immortality, stating that to this only “ our thoughts
and aspirations are directed,” and that “to believe that
we shall revive from death in total oblivion of any
previous existence, would be as little consolatory as to
believe that the extinction of life is final.” “The
question, therefore,” he writes, “ which I am requested
to consider must be whether, excluding from the
inquiry all supernatural revelation on the subject,
there is any reason for believing that death is a
passage to a new phase of life, on which we enter with
the consciousness of personal identity with our former
selves” (p. 1). Proceeding to answer this question,
Dr Hinds says, “ Our reasonable course is to see, in the
first instance, what light is thrown on the subject by
the analogy of creation. And it must be admitted
that the result is disappointing to our hopes and
wishes. There is no annihilation of any part of the
material universe, so far as we can observe............... The
process which is going on, and has gone on, as it would
appear, through successive ages, is the continual dis
integration of the several substances of which the
world is composed, and the working of them up into
new combinations............... We do not perceive, as in the
case of the material substance, what becomes of the
principle of life ; but this principle is no less than the
component parts of the human body, or of a rock or
tree, a portion of the elements on which creative power
is exercised. Arguing then from what takes place in
the case of these elements which are seen and felt, to
that which is not an object of the senses, we should
�An Examination of some
infer that the same law of creation must be applicable
to that also, unless it can be shown that there are
different laws for the two. That the one is visible and
tangible, the other not, is a difference which does not
imply that the law of creation is not uniform” (pp. 1, 2).
I quote thus at length because it is impossible to put
into fewer words the sense thus simply and clearly
conveyed.
Dr Hinds goes on to discuss the question whether
there is anything in our human nature to lead us to
suppose that the analogy does not hold good with us,
“whatever may be the fate of the inferior creatures.”
He decides that the possession of a reasoning faculty
gives us no title to individual immortality, since it is ap
parently shared in an inferior degree by the brutes, and
only characterizes man “ as the highest in the scale of
that manifold creation, the general law of which is that of
a continual dissolution of its elements, and a recombina
tion of them.” He thinks that as far as the argu
ment from analogy goes, we must conclude that the
same law holds good with mind, even as, although less
palpably than it does with matter. But he argues,
“ there is a surer resting place for our hope, in the
desire for personal and conscious immortality which
the Creator has made part of man’s nature.” For, not
only does the possession of this desire “ distinguish us
from all the rest of earthly creation,” but we are
justified in arguing from it, “ that the Creator would
never have made it a part of our nature, if the object
to which alone the desire is directed were unattainable.”
(p. 5.) This argument is repeated with even greater force
a little further on : “ the strength of the argument lies
as I have observed, in our conception of the divine
nature as revealed to us in creation. To suppose that
the Creator has made man with a strong desire as part
of his nature, and that the object on which alone that
desire can be exercised, does not exist, is as incon
sistent with what we know of Him and His ways, as
�Recent Writings about Immortality.
23
to suppose that He might have given His creatures
eyes when there was no visible object, or ears when there
was no such thing as sound,” (p. 6.) This, then, is an
argument from analogy after all, only the analogy is
between one intellectual conception of the truth of
which we have ample evidence, and another which we
desire to substantiate, and not between a set of ob
served physical laws, and a spiritualistic theory. The
former, if it be sound, warrants us in sustaining a
firm hope of personal immortality ; the latter leads us to
quite a different conclusion. It will be observed,
however, that this argument of Dr. Hinds rests upon
an undoubted belief in an intelligent Creator and
Sustainer of the universe, and consequently that to
one who has no such belief, it possesses no cogency.
And it is well to recognize the fact that it is impossible
in the present state of knowledge to bring forward any
arguments in favour of individual immortality, that have
any force with a pure materialist. As pointed out in a
preceding portion of this paper, Mr Owen’s arguments
prove from analogy, as far as an argument from analogy
can prove anything, universal indestructibility, and
the materialist would be the first to admit this; but
they possess no validity if urged in favour of individual
immortality. The analogy to be of any use in this
direction, must be based, like that employed by Dr.
Hinds, upon a Theistic foundation. Indeed, we are
fully warranted in saying that a belief in a personal
God is indispensable to a faith in personal immortality.
For these reasons it seems to me that Mr Owen
has greatly underrated the effect which a future
development of such speculations as those of Mr.
Huxley on Protoplasm, may have upon the only faith
in immortality which is cherished by the vast majority
of religious thinkers, in what are called Christian
countries at least. For my own part, however, I have
no fear that the course of future scientific inquiry will
ever substantiate the theories of those gross materialists
�2.4
An Examination of some
who deny the immanence of a great Intelligence in
the universe. No Theistic theories seem to me so
utterly wild and unreasonable as those of the Antitheists. And so long as a reasonable belief in a
moral and intelligent Creator remains, so long will the
true analogical argument of Dr Hinds possess a force
which cannot be denied. But, forcible as it is, this
argument may, even on a Theistic basis, be disputed.
In the first place it may be questioned whether the
desire for personal immortality is so nearly universal
as to justify us in considering it to be a part of our
nature; and in the second place, it may be argued
that even admitting this, it does not follow that such
a desire will be realized in accordance with our present
conceptions. As to the first of these objections, it
must be admitted that we have ample evidence to
prove that some primitive races of mankind have no
belief in a future state of existence, and it is more than
doubtful whether the ancient Jews had. Nay, it may
even be that some who are advanced in the religious
thought of the present time, look upon the idea of a
life that will never, never end, with more of dread than
of delight. I sometimes think that if it were not for
the relatives and friends whom we lose by death,
most of us would have but little, if any, desire for a
future life. We cannot bear the thought of parting
for ever from those we love, and this makes us cherish
the hope of meeting them aJer death. This last con
sideration, however, only serves to strengthen Dr
Hind’s position.
With regard to the second objection that, admitting
the desire for immortality to be a part of our nature,
it does not follow that such a desire will be realized
in accordance with our present conceptions, there is
much that may be urged in its favour. The Indian’s
happy hunting ground is as truly an ideal of future
existence for him, as our hopes of Heaven are for us.
If his conception seems gross to us, may not ours seem
�Recent Writings about Immortality.
25
equally so to those who will live in a more enlightened
age to come ? Is it not possible that our yearning
for an extension of our poor individual lives beyond
the grave, may embody after all only a less gross
ideal of immortality than that of the Indian1? Mr
Owen at any rate seems to have some such idea as
this.
But Dr. Hinds thinks we have another indication of
personal immortality in “ the universal craving for
spiritual communion ” with God. And he goes on to
remark : “ However diverse may be the shapes which
the effort to satisfy this craving has taken, and still
takes, they all testify to the fact, that the Creator has
made the craving a part of man’s nature.” (p. 6).
This craving, he says, is not fully satisfied in this life.
However devout a man may be, and however great
the comfort which he derives from the measure of
intercourse with God that is vouchsafed to him here,
there is no true and full communion, since “ there is
no reciprocity.” Bor, although Christians believe
that God does in some way answer prayer, and may
“ substitute faith for conscious fruition of a Divine
intercourse with them when they address Him,” yet
there is not that interchange of communication which
we call communion when we speak of intercourse
between man and man, and for which Dr Hinds
thinks there is a natural craving.
The measure of force which this argument may
claim must obviously vary greatly with different minds,
and even with the same mind in different states of
feeling. I fear that the vast majority of human beings
have no conscious yearning for communication with the
Divine Being, though that is no proof that it is not
an undeveloped tendency of their nature—a tendency
perhaps stunted and all but destroyed by the influence
of gross and demoralising theological theories. As
soon as man emerges sufficiently from a state of
brutish savagery to speculate upon the origin of all
�26
An Examination of some
that he sees around him, he naturally begins in
some sense to feel after God ; hut the religious sen
timents must be considerably developed before he
will be conscious of any longing after divine com
munion. Such yearning, when it does come, is ap
parently the result of thought combined with religious
love and veneration. It can scarcely be considered as
a definite instinct of our nature, though it may be a
natural tendency, that only develops itself when our
noblest faculties have become paramount. And is it
not possible that the highest state of religious thought
and sentiment would give to us a satisfactory con
sciousness of actual reciprocity in a strong sense of
direct communication between the Divine Spirit and
our own ? May it not be that our present con
ception of communion with God is after all a low
one, and that a higher one is possible to us, which
would be capable of completely satisfying our re
ligious aspirations? That, Dr Hinds might reply,
would be heaven itself, and if it could be attained
here, no future state would be necessary to satisfy the
longing after divine communion. But then, he might
justly urge, the cessation of such a heaven in death
would be even more dreadful and incomprehensible
than the cessation of our life under existing conditions;
and, besides, how about those who had died with the
longing still unsatisfied ?
Dr Hinds further urges : “ There is this peculiarity,
too, about man, which, if there is no future state for
him, makes him an anomaly in creation. In all other
living creatures completeness characterises the Creator’s
work; in man, incompleteness. . . . The individual
is almost a different being, according as his spiritual
part has been cultivated by education and other social
influences ; progress of the inner man marks the his
tory of the human race; and still there must be an
-incompleteness in the work of his Creator, until he
reaches that further stage of existence in which the
�Recent Writings about Immortality.
desires that distinguish him from all other animate
beings on earth shall be provided with their appro
priate objects, and shall be fully developed in the
realization of those objects ” (pp. 8, 9). It would be
impossible for a theist to deny the force of this argu
ment. The atheist would reply that our desires are
now superstitiously misdirected, and therefore have no
claim to realization. This, then, like the rest of Dr
Hinds’ arguments, is calculated to strengthen the con
viction of the theist and spiritualist, but would have
little if any weight with the atheist and materialist.
For the latter, probably, Dr Hind does not write.
The plea for a future life to compensate for the
inequalities of this, I have already noticed in my
remarks in reply to Presbyter Anglicanus.
The
argument, considered by itself, has the fault of proving
too much, if it proves anything. Dr Hinds puts it
before us concisely enough, when he writes : “ There
are inequalities in the divine government of the world
which would seem to be inconsistent with the divine
nature and attributes as otherwise made known to us,
unless there is another life to complete the present, in
which their inequalities are to be redressed ” (p. 10).
But animals, and even vegetables, are subject to the
unequal conditions of existence here equally with man,
although they cannot, of course, be said to suffer
equally with man on that account. The poor donkey,
half starved and otherwise brutally treated ; the dog,
chained for the greater part of his existence to a
kennel in a back yard ; the half-killed pigeon, and
the often hunted fox,—all made wretched for the use
or sport of man, have surely, according to this argu
ment, a claim for future compensation, even if the
plant, stunted and starved on the barren rock, has not.
One more argument Dr Hinds briefly notices, namely,
that which he draws from “ the belief in the occasional
apparition of dead men.” Dr Hinds thinks that
whether this belief be a delusion or not, its existence
�28
An Examination of some
is “ one more evidence of the strong craving after that
future world of continued life, which God has made a
part of our nature ” (p. 12). The same remark applies
to the modern belief in so-called spiritualistic mani
festations. “ Spiritualists,” as the believers in these
alleged manifestations, with rather arrogant distinctive
ness, term themselves, claim for their new “ revela
tion ” that it has rescued hundreds of sceptics from
the doubt of immortality. Whether this be correct
or not, it is certain that many thoughtful men, in their
desire for certain evidence of independent spiritual
existence, were disposed to inquire with eager hope
into the nature of the manifestations, but soon became
disgusted with the imposture and buffoonery that are
so intricately mixed up with them, even if there be
anything genuine.
In concluding my imperfect review of this and the
other essays noticed, I wish to enlarge a little upon the
objection which I have taken to each and all of them,
namely, that they start from the spiritualistic thesis,
instead of endeavouring first to prove it. By this
method the real opponents of the belief in immortality
are merely passed, and are not encountered. The
primary question in dispute is not whether the soul is
immortal, or whether it dies with the body, but whether
there be a soul to live or die. The Materialists are the
real opponents of the doctrine of immortality, and they
deny the existence of the spiritual entity called the
soul. They deny that there is anything in man be
yond matter and force. The sublimest thoughts and
the devoutest aspirations are to their conception only
brain in action. It is useless to deny the strength of
their position, for they have much to urge in its favour
which it is difficult, if not impossible, entirely to re
fute, though it may be possible to overrule on the
ground of superior probability. Their arguments may
he briefly stated as follows:—We observe (they say)
that the character of a man depends upon the size and
�Recent Writings about Immortality.
29
conformation of his brain, and the nature of his tem
perament. If certain brain organs are defective in the
individual, we observe a corresponding defectiveness in
his mental and moral manifestations. Very defective
mental organs invariably co-exist with idiotcy, and
deranged ones with insanity. A brain otherwise de
fective—defective in what are termed the moral organs,
again, always indicates a low state of moral sensibility
in the possessor of it, and a derangement of these
organs manifests itself in what is called moral insanity.
The health of the body obviously influences not only
the intellectual but also the moral characteristics. A
blow on the skull benumbs all mental activity. Sleep,
drunkenness, over-eating, over-working, fasting, and
semi-poisoning distinctively influence what Spiritualists
term the “ soul.” If there be a spiritual entity in man,
it seems then that it is merely a characterless spiritual
force which can only manifest itself in accordance with
the constitution and varying conditions of the corporeal
organism. This we prefer (for want of a better name)
to call vital force, and we see nothing more spiritual
in it than we recognize in chemical, electric, muscular,
or nervous force. We fully admit the indestructibility
of all matter and force. Matter decays and forms new
combinations, and force is thereby transmuted. We
see no evidence of any different result with regard to
what we call the moral and intellectual organism, and
what you Spiritualists term the soul. Therefore we
find no ground for belief in personal immortality.
In reply to all this the Spiritualist may say:—You
Materialists assume too much when you infer from the
fact that what we call the soul can only manifest itself
by means of the material organs of the brain, that
there is nothing but these organs to be manifested—or
nothing beyond what you term vital force. In all
probability it is the character of the soul which de
termines the characteristics of the mental organism,
and not vice versa. Or, even if it be otherwise, it is
�30
” An Examination of some
obvious that if the Supreme Spirit Himself were to
became the occupant of a human frame, He could only
manifest Himself by means of the human faculties of
the particular individual so occupied. Each one of us
is able to think about his bodily frame and ailments as
something belonging to rather than constituting him
self. From this it seems reasonable to infer that there
is something within, and distinct from mere brain
matter which so speculates. The individual conscious
ness, or, in metaphysical terminology, the ego, is able
to take cognizance of and speculate about the material
brain organs through which alone it (or he, or she) can
be outwardly manifested—speculate even about their
possible future derangement. Does not this fact of
consciousness prove that there is an indwelling in
dividual spirit—not a mere vital force—"which per
meates the human organism, and acts upon and through
it, even as we believe there is a Divine Spirit per
meating, and acting upon and through the material
universe ?
Much more might be urged on either side. Self
consciousness is said by some to be distinctively
human, but this is a very questionable assertion. The
Materialist sees in it nothing more than thought turned
inward. He has, too, some questions to ask which it
is very difficult for the Spiritualist to answer. For
instance, he asks when the soul first takes up its abode
in the human frame. Is it in the foetus at the instant
of conception, and if not, at what stage in the growth
of the foetus, the child, or the man ? Inability to reply
adequately to a question, although a serious drawback
to a constructive theory, is not, of course, a proof
against it. But then the issue seems to be nothing
more than a balance of probabilities, and I fear that
this is the only available issue for us in the present
state of knowledge. For my own part, I do not feel
qualified to give full force to either side of the contro
versy, and can only state the difficulties of the situation
�Recent Writings about Immortality.
31
honestly and fairly as they present themselves to me,
leaving it to those who are more positive to teach with
more authority, or at least to blow the trumpet with
less uncertain sound.
One truth shines out clearly, and it is this, that as
our Creator has given us no absolutely certain evidence
of a future life, however strong the probabilities may
be, it is not intended that we shall base our rule of
conduct here on any future prospects that faith and
imagination may place before us. We have a life to
live in this world, at any rate, and to live that worthily
is full occupation for our energies. Those who despise
it are not taught to do so by God. If there be an
everlasting Heaven for us, we shall best prepare for it
by leaving it entirely out of consideration, as far as our
practical life is concerned. To do our duty according
to the purest light that is manifested to us, that is the
best preparation for life and death alike. The sublimest faith is that which sustains us in a perfect trust
in the divine government in this world, and which
will enable us fearlessly to resign ourselves to the care
of the living God in the hour of death, believing that
whatever may be in store for us will be best for us,
seeing that it will be what seemeth to Him fit.
POSTSCRIPT.
Since the above paper was written, a pamphlet in
reply to Presbyter Anglicanus, entitled “Does Morality
depend on Longevity?” by Edw. Vansittart Neale,
has been published by Mr Scott. It consists chiefly
of a very able and interesting historical argument
against the doctrine that morality depends upon a be
lief in immortality. Mr Neale not only shows that
the most moral of the ancient nations had no belief in
a future life, but that some of the most horrible wars
and cruel murders can be traced to the prevalence of
�32
Recent Writings about Immortality.
that belief. His motive for entering into the contro
versy seems to have been the same which has prevailed
with me, and affords that full justification for entering
publicly into so abstruse a subject which, in my own
case, I feel to be necessary. I here give, and fully
endorse his words :—“ It does appear to me . . .of no
small importance in the education of the young, that
we should rest the principles of conduct upon the
knowable and present, instead of upon a future, about
which we can only dogmatise, without knowing any
thing certain. With this view, I propose to adduce
some considerations, which seem to me to show that
there is no necessity for making this uncertain fore
cast in order to gain a solid foundation either for reli
gion or morality” (p. 5).
TURNBULL AND SPEARS, PRINTERS, EDINBURGH.
�
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An examination of some recent writings about immortality
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Place of publication: Ramsgate
Collation: 32 p. ; 18 cm.
Notes: From the library of Dr Moncure Conway. Printed by Turnbull and Spears, Edinburgh. A review of eight articles which have appeared in earlier Scott pamphlets including work by John Owen, Francis William Newman and Samuel Hinds. Includes bibliography (p.[3]).
Creator
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Bear, William Edwin
Date
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[187-?]
Publisher
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Thomas Scott
Subject
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Immortality
Rights
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<img src="http://i.creativecommons.org/p/mark/1.0/88x31.png" alt="Public Domain Mark" /><br />This work (An examination of some recent writings about immortality), identified by Humanist Library and Archives, is free of known copyright restrictions.
Identifier
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RA1607
G5504
Format
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application/pdf
Type
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Text
Language
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English
Conway Tracts
Immortality