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NATIONAL secular
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THERE IS A GOD.
’•
“ This Plea for Atheism,” writes Mr. Bradlaugh in
conclusion to the pamphlet bearing that tit le, “ is put
forth as a challenge to Theists to do battle for their cause.”
The challenge we step forward to accept, but wish
beforehand our intentions to be clearly understood, and
our mode of warfare as well aB our plan of battle, briefly
explained.
If we accept, it is not with even the remotest fear as
regards the strength of our cause, which is in no want of
a champion, and has stood for ages by its own unassailable
force. Nor do we dread that our adversary may succeed
in imbuing the minds of his numerous hearers and readers
with anything like the Atheism of which he professes to
be so profoundly convinced. In so momentous a question,
however, as that of the existence of God, were he to
succeed only to raise the shadow of a doubt in the minds
of his hearers, that shadow would, we feel certain, be
attended with the most fatal results. There are moments
when men, urged onwards by the torrent of their pas
sions, would not—even though sure of eternal torments
immediately following their act—hesitate to commit crime;
and much more numerous still are the occasions on
which they would act, if they could only imagine that
they doubted of the existence of a Supreme Avenger
of guilt. We do not here intend to affirm that Mr.
Bradlaugh upholds a system of direct immorality; we only
point out the reasons which make it worth our while to
oppose him. The apparent doubt* he may too often raise
• We employ purposely the words, apparent doubt, to mean a pretext
for acting as if there were a real doubt. Whether we admit or no that
there can be a real doubt as to the existence of God, will appear in our
answers to the objections.
�THERE IS A GOD.
fig
minds of uninstructed men removes a check to crime
®jB»<'heck which, however powerless it may be in the great
^^■xysms of passion, is most certainly of continual use in
rne ordinary circumstances of life. So, in endeavouring to
’confute Mr. Brad laugh, and prove the existence of God,
we are actuated by the hope of destroying the mists he
may have raised in some minds, of hindering them from
being raised in others, and thus, of contributing indirectly
to public morality and virtue, by defending the strongest
of all checks to immorality and vice.
In this essay we shall oppose Mr. Bradlaugh’s theories
in one way, and in one way only, i.e., by appealing to
common sense. We are convinced that the common sense
of a moderately intelligent and earnest man suffices amply
to solve the problem,—and for a good reason too. If
God’s existence could be proved only by abstruse meta
physical demonstrations, the immense majority of mankind
would never understand, and consequently would have a
right to doubt them. But one cannot at the same time
be a doubter and a believer; so iu that case the immense
majority of men would have a right to be practically
Atheists. That, of course, is what we must necessarily
deny ; and our denial supposes that the fact of God’s
existence can be made clear, even to the uninstructed, by
the only method of reasoning which they possess,—com
mon sense.
We therefore, keeping as closely as possible to this plan
of action all through,* except where the arguments of our
adversary oblige us to follow him on to metaphysical
ground, intend firstly to state the objections against
Theism, which have led Mr. Bradlaugh to reject that doc
trine, expounding his arguments, not of course at length
and in his own terms, but with their full force of argument,
and indeed trying rather to add strength to them than to
* We must make an exception for one of the proofs of God’s exist
ence, based upon the existence of eternal truth ; but this proof is so
beautiful and so conclusive to a reflecting- mind that we could not leave
it out. As for the others, if they are found too metaphysical, we can
only say that we have done our best to make them plain, clear, and
intelligible to all.
’
�THERE 13 A GOD.
5
lessen their power. We shall then set forth the con
clusions to which he has arrived, or, in other words, ex
pound the Atheistic system set up by him. All this part of
the discussion is required by the commonest sense of fair
play and impartiality ; and our side being the side of truth,
we feel free to give the opposite party the first innings.
We then, of course, proceed to point out the shortcomings
of his system, and then to demonstrate the truth of our
own.
After the demonstration, we might leave Mr. Bradlaugh’s
objections unanswered ; when the truth of a proposition is
proved, the arguments against it are evidently false. Still,
it would hardly be just or polite to refuse answering such
easily solvable objections; for we may inform Mr. Brad
laugh that there are other difficulties much more subtle,
and much less easy to be apswered, than those he brings
forward. When he finds them out we shall be willing to
try our hand at solving them as well as we can. In the
meanwhile we shall endeavour to conclude this essay by
answering satisfactorily to the objections which to our
adversary appear so weighty and so important.
It will first be necessary to state them, i.e., the principal
ones. Mr. Bradlaugh has published two pamphlets on the
question of Theism ; the first entitled, “Is there a God?”
and the second, “A Plea for Atheism.” In his debates he
generally either attacks Theism connected with some
peculiar religious system, or, when he brings out a direct
argument against the existence of God, he only repeats
what has already been written in the above-mentioned
essays; so it becomes unnecessary to quote anything of
his debates, except one or two seemingly new arguments
against Mr. Cooper.
First of all, let us take some selections from the essay,
“Is there a God?” Mr. Bradlaugh accepts Professor
Flint’s definition of God : A supreme, self existent, the one
infinite, eternal, omnipotent, omniscient, unchangeable,
righteous and benevolent, Personal Being, creator and pre
server of nature, maker of heaven and earth, who is distinct
from, and independent of what He has created, who is a
free, loving, supreme, moral intelligence, the governor of
�6
THERE IS A GOD.
nations, the heavenly father and judge of man. Thia defini
tion once set down, he proceeds to deny the existence of a
being corresponding to the definition.
1. * According to Professor Flint, God is the Supreme
Being. Now, (as Mr. Bradlaugh argues,) according to
reason He cannot be supreme. But what is at once su
preme and not supreme is absurd : therefore the idea of
God involves an absurdity. That God is supreme, ac
cording to Professor Flint, is undoubtedly true. That, ac
cording to reason, He cannot be supreme is also evident;
for the definition supposes Him to be infinite. Now, “su
preme" is a superlative, and includes the idea of a com
parison made between two or more individuals. But there
are not, there cannot be, two infinite beings to compare
together: therefore God cannot be called infinite by relation
to any other such being. Neither can He be said to be
supreme in relation to finite beings, for between the Infinite
and the finite there is no proportion, and consequently all
comparison is impossible. But even allowing comparison
to be possible, God would not always have been supreme;
for Professor Flint affirms Creation, and God would only
have been supreme over finite beings since then ; be
fore, there could be no comparison, as there was nothing
to compare ; now, the idea of God having become supreme,
after having been otherwise, gives us to conclude that His
very definition has been changed, whereas Professor Flint
says He is unchangeable.
2. Secondly, if God existed, He would be Creator and
not Creator at one and the same time; which being absurd,
it follows that God does not exist. Creator according to
the definition itself, not Creator because of the impossi
bility of creation. Creation is the making of existence ;
now, if existence were made, before it was made nothing
existed, for what could exist when existence itself had not
been made yet? Now, it is impossible to admit that at any
moment of the past there existed nothing at all; otherwise
whence would that which now exists come from ? So
existence must have always existed, and cannot have been
• The numbers refer to the answers, infra.
�THERE IS A GOD.
7
made; therefore creation is impossible, and God is at once
Creator and not Creator: which is absurd.
3. Thirdly, God would be at the same time infinitely
benevolent and not infinitely benevolent,—a self-contra
dictory proposition. All the difficulty, admitting that Pro
fessor Flint proves Him satisfactorily to be benevolent, will
now be to demonstrate that He is not so. As is generally
admitted by Theists, God might have created a sinless world
if such had been His will.* Why therefore has He not
done so? All will allow that He might at least have made
a less sinful one, if, for instance, He had given more grace
to man, or created him with more strength of mind to
rule his passions. “ But, argue the Theists, God is not
obliged to do that; the idea of duty is incompatible with
that of the supreme and independent Being.” No answer
could be more worthless. A benevolent man is not the
man who does his duty, but one who does more than his
duty. It follows therefore that a being infinitely benevo
lent should do infinitely more than his duty, and either
create a sinless world, if that be possible; or, if not,
create at least a world much less sinful than the one in
which we live.
4. Fourthly, God would be personal and impersonal,—a
doctrine which no one in his senses can admit. The idea of
God, as stated by Professor Flint, proves Him to be per
sonal, but the same idea will also prove His impersonality.
A personal being is something limited ; now, God is either
infinite, i.e., unlimited, or not God. Therefore, if He be
infinite, He cannot be personal; but He must be so, since
He is the intelligent Maker of heaven and earth. There
fore God is a personal impersonal being.
5. Fifthly, infinite and finite. Infinite, since there are
no bounds to His perfection; finite, since He possesses
one perfection which by itself supposes limitation,—intelli
gence. Intelligence is essentially clear, definite, precise,
* We here state the argument as brought to bear upon those whose
Convictions coincide with our own, for we do not admit, with Mr. Arm
strong, that the conception of a sinless world is self-contradictory.
Against those who share his opinions the argument can be framed
otherwise, and, we believe, unanswerably.
�8
THERE IS A GOD.
and consequently limited : therefore all things intelligent
are limited beings. But God is intelligent, therefore He
must be finite; and yet we have already seen that He
cannot be so.
The following objections are taken, in substance, from
the “ Plea for Atheism.”
6. Theism checks man’s efforts, it is therefore a doctrine
Dot to be admitted. It teaches that all things depend
absolutely upon the will of God. Such teaching is a check
upon the activity of man ; for in all things we may say : If
this be contrary to God’s will it will never take place, and
if it be according to God’s will it will take place, whether
we exert ourselves or no.
7. God cannot be intelligent. Intelligence comprises
perception, memory, and reasoning. Neither of these acts
are possible to God. Perception results in the obtaining a
new idea; God, being omniscient, has the same ideas
eternally, and therefore cannot perceive. Memory recalls
the past; for an unchangeable God there is no past, and
consequently no memory. Beason implies a succession of
acts; in God there is no succession, and so He is deprived
of reason by His very immutability. If God can neither
perceive, nor remember, nor reason, can He judge or think ?
To judge is to join two ideas together ; but whatever is
joined was not joined previously, and this is contrary to
immufability. To think is to separate that which is
thought from that which is not thought; that, too, implies
change, and besides contradicts omniscience. If God
knows everything unchangeably, He must ever be un
changeably thinking of everything. But if God can neither
perceive, remember, reason, judge, nor think, He can by
no means be said to be intelligent.
8. God is not all-wise. If He were so He would not
have created beings, or parts of beings, without any use
whatever. That such beings and parts of beings exist
plentitully in nature is a well-known teaching of embry
ology, and indeed of all natural history. If therefore God
be the author of nature, He must be said not to be all-wise.
9. God is not the Creator. For creation either added to
the sum of being already existing, or it did not. If it
�THERE IS A GOD.
9
added anything, then the sum is greater than the part, and
the universe with God better than God without the uni
verse. He is therefore not infinitely good if something can
be better than He. If it added nothing, then the universe
is identically the same as God, which is contrary to Theism.
If it took anything away from the sum of being already
existing, God was not all-wise in creating ; or, if He could
not help creating, He was not all-powerful. Creation
therefore neither adds anything to, nor adds nothing to,
nor takes anything from, the sum of being. Creation
therefore is absurd.
10. Some men are not convinced of God’s existence.
Now, if God existed, He could convince men of His exist
ence, so as to leave in their minds no doubt about the
matter. If He could not, it would be because He did not
know how to, or had not enough power. Therefore He
will not; but if so, He is not infinitely good, for by so
doing He could spare men a very great deal of misery.
These are the most important arguments put forth by
Mr. Bradlaugh in the two essays to which we have already
alluded. We have been obliged to choose, for in many
places there are as many as nine or ten arguments crowded
together, with rare conciseness, in one page ; nay, some
times one argument is so worded that it may be taken in
two very different senses. But we trust we have chosen
the most important objections; and as for shortening them,
our only excuse is that it is impossible to do otherwise
without writing a commentary upon each of these essays,
(which we should do with great pleasure,) pointing out
one by one all the fallacies employed by our opponent.
11. In the debate with. Mr. Cooper, there are also two
arguments that can be mentioned, although they are but
variantes of others already stated. The first runs pretty
nearly as follows. Theism supposes a motionless cause
which is the principle of the universe, i.e., which acts to
create the world. If so, they can explain how action with
out motion is possible. That, however, is inexplicable ;
therefore the hypothesis of Theism cannot be admitted.
12. Another is : Two beings cannot be in the same place
at the same time. But God is everywhere; therefore, to
�10
THERE IS A GOD.
make room for the universe He must retire from “ some
where,” and is no longer infinite; or else He must make
the universe out of “everywhere,” that is, nowhere. The
first alternative contradicts the idea of God ; the second is
self-contradicted by facts. It follows that God has not
created the world.
Such are the difficulties which have prevailed so far upou
Mr. Bradlaugh, that he thinks himself justified in taking a
position of defiance to nearly the whole human race, and
building a system of which the denial of God’s existence
forms the principal point. This system we now wish to
state as clearly as possible.
“ I exist.* My existence is either self-existent or created.
It is not created, consequently it is self-existent, and I am
self-existent too. If that existence were created, it would
have been so either by an existence the same as itself, or
else by another existence. Neither can be allowed, and so
it is not created. It cannot have been created by an
existence the same as itself; for then it would have been
only a continuation of the same existence. It cannot have
been created by any existence different from it, for an
existence different from it would have nothing in common
with it, since what has nothing in common with another
thing can have no relation with it. Now creation is really
a relation,—the relation of cause and effect. Creation
therefore being impossible, my existence is self-existent.
“But what has just been proved for my particular
existence can be proved in exactly the same manner for all
existence. And, as all things we see have mutual relations
one with another, it follows that what seems to be different
existences is only the same existence, differently condi
tioned, otherwise they would have nothing in common.
There is therefore but one existence ; the world, which
means the same as ‘ matter,’ or ‘ universe,’ is a great
uncaused being (debate with Dr. Baylee, p. 32), infinite
and eternal. I am but a phenomenon of existence, and
all that we hear, see, or feel, are only separate phenomena,
* Debate with Dr. Baylee, page 41; Plea tor Atheism, appendix;
Debate with Mr. Cooper, passim.
�THERE IS A GOD.
11
not separate beings ; different conditions of existence, and
not different existences.”
“ These phenomena, conditions, or modes of existence
are distinguished in thought by their qualities.” Whether
the modes are really distinct from each other, or only in
thought, is not determined ; whether the qualities which
form the distinction are really different qualities or no is
not stated. “Qualities are characteristics by which in
thought I distinguish that which I think,” says Mr. Bradlaugli, and he says no more. But what if the same ques
tion be again asked, viz., whether those characteristics are
really different from each other, or only rendered different
by the process of thinking? Let us give an example of
the two distinctions. We say that Mr. Bradlaugh is really
distinct from any other man, because it seems that, inde
pendently of our thought, and whether we think about
him or no, he is not the same as another man ; and we say
that their characteristics are really different. We say
that M r. Brad laugh the philosopher can be (in thought)
distinguished from Mr. Bradlaugh the orator, and that the
characteristics of both are only distinguished in thought.
Now the question is, whether Mr. Bradlaugh admits real
distinctions or no; whether all things are, according to
him, only distinguished in thought. To this question no
answer is given in any of the debates aud essays which we
have had the occasion to Bee.
It is only now that our work begins seriously, by re
futing Mr. Bradlaugh’s system. Until this moment we
have but stated his objections and theories, and though we
promised to stand by the logic of common sense, we evi
dently did not intend meaning that such logic should
extend to our opponent. As has already been seen, Mr.
Bradlaugh brings forward some deeply metaphysical ob
jections, and his system is built upon the most metaphysical
of all ideas,—existence. We have, of course, to follow
him wherever he goes, but even in the deepest and most
entangled metaphysical problems we shall ever try to keep
an eye upon common sense.
Waiving for the present a direct answer to the objec
tions accumulated by the adversary of Theism, we think
�12
TBERE IS A GOD.
proper first of all to examine his own system. Even if his
objections were unanswerable, it would Dot follow that
his system is certain. Of his objections, not a single one
is completely new ; some,—for instance, the one against
creation,—dates as far back as Aristotle, a philosopher
well known to be by no means an A theist.* These objec
tions therefore might, if unanswerable, prove the eternity
of matter, a dual principle, positive pantheism, transcen
dentalism, or even Atheism of some sort; but they would
not necessarily prove Mr. Bradlaugh’s Atheism.
Mr. Bradlaugh argues that his own pxistence is not
created; and, according to him, the same may be said of all
existence. But why ? Because creation is the action of
one existence upon another, different from it,—which is
absurd. If Mr. Bradlaugh sees very clearly the absurdity
of one thing acting upon another, different from it, so
much the better for him. For our part, we do believe,—
and shall continue so to do until further notice,—that the
hammer of the smith is different from the inass of red-hot
iron drawn out of the forge, and that the difference in
question does not hinder it from acting on the said mass of
metal. We believe that two prize-fighters are not identi
cally one and the same being, and yet they act upon one
another very forcibly. In our humble opinion, confirmed
by these facts and many others, two different beings can
act upon each other.
Let us, however, examine the axioms brought forward to
sustain the system. What has nothing in common with
another has no relation with it. If you mean by “ having
in common,” to be identically the same, we should think
that nothing has anything in common with another by the
very fact that it is something else. Two drops of dew,
two blades of grass, suppose them as like as you will ; or
take, if you like better, two atoms of exactly the same size,
form, and intensity and direction of movement. We have
said, the same size, and we can say so in one point of view,
* We will, however, give Mr. Bradlaugh credit for having found
these objections out “all by his own self.” Otherwise, how could he *
not be aware that they have all been answered a thousand times, from
the days of Tertulliuu to those of Leibnitz and of Clarke ?
�THERE 19 A GOD.
13
for in our mind the size is the same ; but the expression is
no longer exact if we apply it to the reality t hat exists.
Each has its own size ; that size happens exactly to resem
ble the size of the other; but the quality, though perfectly
alike, is not identically the same. If therelore you take
things in that light, your axiom proves far too much. No
two things have anything in common in that sense; conse
quently, according to you, no two things can act upon
each other, or have any relation with each other. Causes
are no more, effects exist no longer, and ail relations
vanish away.
If, on the contrary, you take the word, “to have in
common,” to mean the possession of something that, al
though not really and identically the same in both, is
exactly alike, owing to a fundamental similitude in both
natures, then indeed we must admit the axiom. The
hammer, were it not as solid as the iron, and more so,
would not be able to act upon it; its action therefore
depends on the mutual solidity of both, one, however,
being greater than the other. A lady could hardly act
upon a prize fighter in the boxing way, because they have
little in common to render a contest possible. If Mr.
Bradlaugh takes it in this manner we admit the axiom.
But now let us see how it works. Is it true that one
existence is either totally identical with another, or so
distinct, so different, as to have nothing alike,* having
either everything in common, or nothing in common,
without a medium ? In the first signification of the word
this might be true; one existence is completely and
totally different from another, for the very reason that it
is another. Every particular and individual thing exists in
a way that excludes participation with any other, whatever
it may be. If A is A, and B is B, then A is by no means
and in no wise B, and B is by no means and by no wise A.
This is not metaphysics ; it is mere common sense. Ask
the simplest-minded boor whether he be auy thing else but
* It is so in Mr. Bradlaugh’s system, for by existence he understands
whatever exists ; there can therefore be but one. But we are now
attacking the demonstration of his system, to defend which he has no
right to suppose the conclusion as already demonstrated.
�14
THERE IS A GOD.
himself: the answer would soon be made, and unhesi
tatingly. Yes, this is true ; but in this souse the axiom,
we have already seen, is false. Because I am not anybody
else, it does not follow that I have no relation with any
body else.
It is only true in the second sense: things which have
nothing in common, {i e., nothing alike in their nature,)
can have no relation with each other. Well, precisely iu
this sense it is monstrously untrue to say that two exist
ences have either everything in common or nothing iu
common. They can have, as everybody is aware, like
qualities, and even like essences. All men possess intelli
gence to a certain degree, and by means of this intelligence
they can act upon each other. Stones are not intelligent,
and precisely from this point of view men cannot act upon
stones, nor stones on men. But both have in common that
they are solid bodies, capable of movement; as such they
can and do act reciprocally. So we see that in the grand
argument by which Mr. Bradlaugh proves his own exist
ence to be uncaused and eternal, if we admit one part we
must deny the other, unless, as we pass from the former to
the latter, we change the sense of the words.
Now, by changing the sense of words we may prove a
great many things as we go along, to the entire satis
faction of weak-minded people and idiots. For instance—
Puss is a cat;
A cat is a whip ;
A whip is a member of parliament;
A member is a limb ;
A limb is a part of the body;
Therefore Puss is a part of the body.
But, it will be said, this is manifest nonsense that any
body can see through, and if Mr. Bradlaugh’s argument
resembled this one you would not want to write against it.
We should certainly not want to write against it if
everybody was as familiar with the two senses of the words
“ in common " as with the two senses of the words cat,
whip, member. Unfortunately it is not so. Words are
often employed without attention to their precise sense,
and if there are two different senses, of which the difference
�THERE 18 A GOD,
15
does not seem great, the difference is often overlooked.
This may be allowed in ordinary conversation, not in
philosophical debate. A few grains weight, more or less,
matters little at the grocer’s; at the druggist’s the same
difference in quantity may matter a good deal. And the
drugs furnished by the latter, though sufficiently pure for
medical purposes, may be rightly considered by the
analytical chemist as miserably impure. Between Mr.
Bradlaugh’s argument and the ridiculous string of non
sense quoted above, the difference is in the matter only,
not in the manner.
However, let us for the present say no more of the
reasoning in question, and scrutinize with a little closer
attention the system which it is intended to uphold. Ac
cording to Mr. Bradlaugh, the words “matter,” “uni
verse,” and “ existence,” are synonymous. The whole
universe is one great uncaused being. Of that being, each
phenomenon is but a separate condition. Every man, for
instance, exists, i.e., possesses existence, but existence is
identically the same in all. Possessing existence, he is a
being, and yet there is but one being,—the universe. To
explain matters yet more clearly, a stone, a tree, a dog,
and a man, are all the same being, but in a different way.
Here you have the being existing stonily, there arborescently, further on doggedly, and humanly at last. It
weighs in the stone, grows in the tree, barks in the dog,
and thinks in the man. Stone, tree, dog, and man are all
outward appearances, nothing more, somewhat in the same
way (we imagine) that a single drop of dew or prism of
crystal can be seen red, blue, yellow, or green at the same
time by different spectators. Whether the theory be
poetical or no we shall not attempt to decide; as our
opinion is decidedly that “ truth alone is beautiful,”
“Bien n’est beau que le vrai...... ”
we shall only examine whether it be true.
And firstly, let us remark the unpleasant fact that this
theory sets Mr. Bradlaugh by the ears with nearly all
mankind. We do not speak only of the more intelligent
part of men, deeply read in science and in philosophy.
�16
THERE TS A GOD.
We do not even allude to the class of ordinary intelli
gence ; we take the very lowest class of all, and appeal to
those whose uncultured stolidity brings them almost to
the verge of idiocy itself. To them we would say: “A
very intelligent gentleman is of opinion that whatever he,
you, anybody, or anything else may be, we are not several
beings, but only one ; that if you see any difference be
tween yourselves and the clods of earth which surround,
you, it is a mistake to think there is any difference in
reality, it only appears so. Whatever exists in you is
absolutely the same as what exists in the clods of earth ;
you seem to be different, and that is all.” What would
their answer be ? We need not anticipate it.
The system is not only contrary to the universal con
viction, but also to the senses, i.e., to those organs which
set us in communication with the external world. Mr.
Bradlaugh,'having brought forward his one existence, or
oDe being, must necessarily admit that nothing else exists
besides it. Well then, what are the phenomena which we
see going on before our eyes? Are they beings ? No, of
course. Are they one Being? My senses tell me they
are not. I see the balloon ascend and the stone fall. Can
one and the same being receive at the same time two con
trary movements?
Why, even a mathematical point
cannot be imagined thus, much less a real being. Will
you say that these phenomena, modes, conditions,—or
whatever you may call them,—are not really distinct
appearances of the Being, but only Actively so, only seemings of which all the difference proceeds from our own
thought, and has no foundation in the world that is? But
it is impossible for us, when we feel cold or heat, to think
that cold and heat have no foundation but in our thoughts.
If your doctrine of Atheism denies the real difference of
phenomena, we should, to follow it, have to make first of
all a blind act of faith, not in the veracity, but in the
absolute mendacity of our senses. All becomes a dream,
and you cannot expect any reasonable man to admit that.
If, on the contrary, you admit their real difference, your
theory is doomed ; for when I see the balloon and the
stone, and think that they are the same being possessed
�THERE IS A GOD.
17
with contrary movements, I think an absurdity. You
might have escaped this result, if you had anywhere said
that the phenomena in question, which we call substances,
are parts of the same great being. But you nowhere em
ploy that expression ; and rightly, from your point of view;
for to break up one existence into innumerable parts would
be the ruin of your doctrine.
If we turn to the faculty of self-consciousness, we find
other and perhaps greater difficulties still. “ Doubt as I
may,”* says Mr. Bradlaugh, “I cannot doubt of my own
existence.” But seif-consciousness, by the very same act
by which it reveals our existence to us, reveals it as some
thing limited, individual, clearly distinct from all that is
not ourself. In Mr. Bradlaugh’s system our existence is
not different from all existence, and is therefore infinite,
universal, mingling confusedly both us and all other
phenomena together in one great whole. Now the ques
tion is, whether conscience lies, in revealing our existence
to ourselves as it does. If it does not lie, Mr. Bradlaugh’s
system is overthrown ; for either conditioned existence is
the same as existence in itself, or it is not. If it is the
same, it cannot lose all the qualities of existence, merely
by being conditioned. If it is not the same, we may beg
to remark that all existence is conditioned, and that there
fore the one existence, infinite, eternal, indistinctly the
same in all and under all phenomena, is nothing else but
a myth, a creature of imagination. But let us suppose
that Mr. Bradlaugh prefers saying that self-consciousness
is wrong ; that existence is the same in all, but that it
seems—only seems—to self-consciousness to be distinct
from all. The reply comes immediately : “ As the very
same act gives you the knowledge of your existence, and
of the manner of your existence, you cannot separate the
one from the other; you cannot doubt of the manner iu
which you really exist, without doubting of your very exist
ence. You cannot impugn a document that tells against
you, without also attacking the favourable clauses it con
tains. You cannot take down the sail that carries you
where you do not wish to go, without being abandoned to
• Discussion with Dr. Baylee, p. 41,
2
�18
THERE IS A GOD.
the mercy of the waves.” Self-consciousness is the faculty
that tells us what we feel, and in what way we feel it. If
I deny that in doing so it expresses the truth, if I am not
as I feel that I ain, it might as well be that I am not,
although Ifeel that I am. Mr. Bradlaugh has, we believe,
no way of escape from these difficulties, unless indeed he
should affirm that his self-consciousness tells him his
existence is infinite, eternal, and universal; or, at least,
that it gives him no information whatever about it. This
would evidently close the discussion under that head.
Another fact at least as unpleasant is, that Mr. Brad
laugh’s system is the negation of all arithmetic. We
should have been less inclined to note this disagreement, if
our adversary did not continually point out and exaggerate
the contradictions he finds, (or thinks he finds,) between
arithmetic and the different sorts of Theism. He even
makes merry about them, and needs, though at the cost of
spoiling his mirth, to be reminded that those who live in
glass houses should be careful about throwing stones.
Addition is the foundation of all arithmetic, and Mr.
Bradlaugh’s system is contrary to addition. Every school
boy that knows how to read knows that one and one are
two, and one are three, etc. Let us take any object, A
for instance. A exists, or is, i.e., A is being (according to
logic). . But what being is A? Is it all being, or only
some being? It all being, then necessarily nothing can be
added to it. But we can say the same of B, C, D, or any
other object of thought of which being can be predicated
in the same way. Then all together, instead of making up
several beings, (though each is everything!) only make one,
and there is an end of addition. If A is one, (by which unit
we designate all being,) and B is one, then A added to B
ought to make two ; and they only make one. But let us
fancy that the other alternative is taken ; each is only some
being. Then again, if A is distinct from B, A is some
being, B is some other being, and both together, (each
separately being one,) form two beings. But no, that
cannot be ; A is distinct from B, but neither is distinct
from being; and as there is only one, the being A, added to
the being B, cannot form more than one. You can add
�THERE IS A GOD.
19
np phenomena as much as you like, you will never come to
more than an addition of phenomena. Jones exists, there
fore Jones is a being; Smith exists, therefore Smith is a
being ; Brown exists, therefore Brown is a being. But
are Smith, Brown, and Jones, taken together, three beings?
Not in the least ; they are only one being and three
phenomena. Not having had the opportunity of putting
these difficulties to Mr. Bradlaugh himself, we naturally
try to find the most reasonable reply he could make. He
might, it is true, avoid the difficulty to a certain extent, by
saying that one can exist without being ; that he can with
perfect truth say at the same time, “ I exist, and I am not
a being.” But this would only open the way to other and
greater objections ; besides, we should be sorry to load
with unnecessary absurdities a system so heavily laden
already.
By a process resembling that already followed, it might
easily be shown that the system contradicts the ruleB of
subtraction, multiplication, and division; but the proof is
the same, and repetition would be tedious. Should Mr.
Bradlaugh try to escape by saying that his system allows
the counting up of phenomena, and operating upon them
as if they were beings, the terrible question always returns,
Are these phenomena really distinct from each other and
among themselves, or are they but phantoms of the brain ?
If the distinction is real, then there is in them something
real on which the real distinction is founded, and that
something, distinct in each, exists separately from the one
existence mentioned, which is contrary to monism.* If
not, these phenomena are only a succession of seemings, all
false, and to which no reality belongs. Four are not really
* For if one thing exists separately from another, there must be a
sufficient reason for the separation ; and as there is nothing in the
“existing” which is not in “existence” (its intrinsic principle), we
must seek the sufficient reason in “existence” itself. If, therefore,
two phenomena are separate from each other, that quality, “ separate”
must be found in their existence also. Thus their existence is
separate in each. But what is separate is not one, but many, in so
far as it is separate; so, at least under one point of view, there
would be many existences. This is so far contrary to monism ; for
it would be absurd to suppose that many existences could at the same
time be only one, under the same point of view, i. e. as individuals.
�20
THERE IS A GOD.
more than two, but only appear so, like four quantities
added together, all equal to zero. If there is nothing
distinctly real in phenomena, a farthing and a million
sterling only seem to be different, but are not so. A
farthing is existence conditioned in a certain phenomenal
way. A million sterling is the very same existence con
ditioned in the very same way, which way (not which
existence) is repeated 960,000,000 times; but this way
is only an appearance, and so its repetition makes no
difference whatever on the total amount. We doubt, how
ever, whether capitalists, (solvable ones at least,) would be
willing to adopt this very original manner of considering
money.
Finally, all science is destroyed by the system in ques
tion. Either the one existence is distinct from the pheno
mena, or no. If distinct, the phenomena exist apart, and
there are more existences than one. If not, each pheno
menon is existence it self, only modified by the mind:
infinite in itself, rendered finite by our mind ; eternal in
its nature, but mentally circumscribed by time. All that
our mind tells us of these phenomena, eveu with indubit
able evidence, is false, totally false. All that we can learn
of the sun, the stars, the earth, is absolutely untrue.
History, geography, chemistry, physics, all give way, all
are useless pursuits of knowledge. All that is, we know
already ; why should we strive to ascertain that which
only seems ?
We should much regret any unintentional unfairness to
Mr. Bradlaugh as to the exact understanding of his sys
tem ; but even if we had misunderstood him, it would not
be our fault. Our opponent, in all his essays and debates,
keeps to offensive warfare for the most part, and is much
more occupied in at tacking other systems than in stating
his own. A few pages contain all that he says in its favour ;
he does not even appear to dream that anything can be
said against it, and supposes that, with all its consequences,
it will be taken for granted. That we feel some degree of
hesitation in taking it thus will perhaps be understood,
after the perusal of the defects we think we perceive
therein. But Mr. Bradlaugh is very clever, and may be
�THERE IS A GOD.
21
able still to show us that all is right; that existence and
phenomena are identical, though different; that the
addition of several beings to each other only forms one,
although they are many ; and that, while we cannot doubt
of our existence, because we are aware of it, we can still
doubt whether we exist in the manner of which we are
aware. And yet, even though Mr. Bradlaugh should
prove these wondrous things, we submit, that it is hardly
worth while to leave the mysteries of Theism for others
darker still, whether or no there be a direct demonstration
of the existence of a Deity.
Of such existence, however, there are demonstrations,
and in great ’number, some of which we now desire to
bring forward, after having made a few preliminary re
marks concerning one of Mr. Bradlaugh’s assertions.
He complains that the greatest difficulty in a discussion
is to know what is meant by the word “ God ;” because, if
we do not agree about the sense of the word, we shall not
even know what we are disputing about; and to prove
that different meanings are given to the word, he shows
that Pagans, Jews, Mahometans, Arians, Trinitarian Pro
testants, and Catholics, have different views of the attri
butes of God. To this it will be sufficient to reply that all
have the same definition of the u-ord, but a different one
of the Being that the word is intended to name. The
starting point is the same for all ; but, the directions taken,
being various, the goals at which they arrive are various
too. But what can it matter about the goal, if the starting
point is identical for all ? Wherever false systems or
gross ignorance have come to wrong conclusions about
anything, we have the same confusion as to consequent
reasonings upon primitive ideas. Would it not be ridicu
lously absurd for anybody to pretend that we do not
know what is meant by the word “Man”? And yet we
can say that Plato defines him to be “ a two-legged animal
without wings or feathers;” that Aristotle calls him, “a
reasonable animal;” that de Bonald says he is “an intelli
gence served by organs;” that the Christian philosophers
of the middle ages affirm him to be “ an immortal spirit,
substantially united to a mortal body;” that modern
�22
THERE IS A GOD.
naturalists give him the title of “a bimanous mammal-”
and that the negroes of the Gabon coast confound him
with the gorilla, whom they call “ the stupid old man."
Now, from all these expressions, representing widely
different ideas, we might, by the same process of reasoning
that Mr. Bradlaugh uses, gather that nobody really knows
what is meant by the word man.
We^ therefore start from a mere verbal definition of the
word “God,” and afterwards prove that a Being answering
to the sense of the definition really and positively exists.
1 hat is all we intend to do, and we wish it to be understood
at the very outset. Were we to go farther our essay
would become a theological treatise, which We do not wish
it to be. At the bare fact of God’s existence, once proved,
we stop short, admitting of course implicitly all those of
His attributes which may be by argument deduced from
that fact, but not attempting to prove them. Should Mr.
Bradlaugh therefore condescend to examine our demon
strations, let him take the definitions as we give them ;
for as we are to bring forward several demonstrations, so
several definitions shall also be given.
lhe apparent difference of definitions by no means
interferes with the sense of the word itself; only we shall
adnnt that from some it is not possible to draw the idea of
a God infinite in being; but that is of no consequence, if
we can deduce the idea from other definitions. We shall
therefore draw up two series: of adequate definitions and
of inadequate ones. Mr. Bradlaugh will of course not
mn to observe that such proofs as do not demonstrate a
God infinite in being do not demonstrate what is required.
We reply that they prove the existence of a being ausweryig to the definition ; if they do not demonstrate Him to
be infinite, others do; it suffices that they do not prove
Him to be finite. Should our adversary again take excep
tion to our defining the sense of one word in two different
wavs, we can refer him to a well-known example in
geometry. Euclid defines a line as “length without
breadth,^and Legendrecalls it, “the intersection of two
surfaces.
Both define the same word in the same sense
perfectly well, but from different points of view. Differ-
�THERE 13 A GOD.
23
ently worded definitions do not therefore argue different
significations, but different manners of expressing those
significations.
We must also allow that none of our demonstrations
prove immediately, and without the help of farther reason
ing, the unity of God. But they prove that there is
at least One. It is only afterwards that the impossibility
of several Gods appears. This remark applies to some of
Mr. Bradlaugh’s complaints. He would wish for an argu
ment that proved immediately the existence of one, infinite,
eternal, omniscient, immeasurable, all-good Creator. If
such a proof were possible, on its being brought forward
he would doubtless complain again, and insist that it be
given him in one single argument and were it to be thus
given, he would find it still too long. Let him carry this
system of cavilling into the domains of other sciences, and
ask, for instance, why chemical nomenclature and notation
throw no light upon the phenomena of the viscous fermen
tation, or why the Pons' Asinorum is unable to prove that
a sphere is equal to the two-thirds of the circumscribed
cylinder. The answer from both chemist and geometrician
would be, “ Have patience, my friend, we shall come to
that in good time.” Il time is allowed to the geometrician
and the chemist, should it be refused to the theologian ?
Adequate Definitions.—I. By the word “ God,” I
mean the principle of all existence. II. By that word I
mean the priuciple of all possibility. III. By that word I
mean a Being, (or beings, if there be more than one,) to
whom there is none superior. IV. By that word I mean
a Being answering to the idea we have of the Infinite, i.e.,
perfection without end.
Inadequate Definitions.—I. The principle of all
change and variation. II. The principle of all movement.
III. The author of all moral obligation.
First Proof.—All existence must have an existing
principle. Now, this priuciple I call God. (I. Det.)
Therefore God exists.
All existence must have an existing principle. By “ prin
ciple,” I mean a sufficient reason for its existence. Now,
�24
THERE IS A GOD.
evidently nothing can exist without there being a sufficient
reason for its existing.
Existing. If the principle were only ideal and imaginary,
it could not be a sufficient reason for that which exists.
In this proof we have not demonstrated that God is
separate from the universe; so, if this demonstration were
taken apart, Mr. Bradlaugh might say that his views
coincided w'ith our own, that lie admits existence to be its
own principle, that therefore existence is God, or that all
is God.
But we object to the demonstration being taken apart
from the refutation of Mr. Bradlaugh’s theorv ; having
amply shown that the theory of one existence only is ab
surd, we cannot admit that Mr. Bradlaugh quite agrees with
us. True, he might still plead that even if there be many
existences, each of them may be self-existent, or containing
in itself the principle of its being, and that there might
thus be as many gods as there are atoms. We reply,
firstly, that if that were the case, the strength of our
argument would be in no wise diminished. If it pleases
anybody to say that every atom is a God, he may do so
(until proved to be absurd); but he has not the right to
say there is none. We may also answer that the idea of
an atom having in itself the principle of its existence is
contrary to common sense. If it were self-existent, it
would be necessary; if necessary, the supposition that it
might not have existed is absurd ; and yet who would have
missed it? It is only a contingent, not a necessary part
of the universe. Besides, the principle that gives exist
ence, gives all perfection, since existence is the fountain
of perfection. If our atom possessed that fountain in
itself, it would be infinite in all things, for nothing could
bound it except itself, and nothing can limit itself. In
finite therefore in all things, in dimensions, in activity, in
beauty, and at the same time being only an atom, it would
be in all a most elementary and imperfect being. Now,
if anybody was to tell us that all the water of the ocean
was contained in a dew-drop, we should very naturally ask,
How is the dew-drop so little ? And if we see a poor man
who gets by his work only just enough to live, and no
�THERE IS A GOD.
$
,
25
more, and are told that he has an unlimited credit at the
banker’s, the question arises, Why is he not better off?
only in the latter case the answer might be, Because he
does not choose to be so ; whereas a being that is its own
principle can by no means change its nature, and choose
to be otherwise. A man cannot by a wish become a stone:
whatever is essential is necessary.
But this again is a digression. We do not mean to
attack Polytheism now ; we do not mean even to attack
Pantheism. We prefer, if agreeable to all parties, doing
one thing at a time: and, as Mr. Bradlaugh calls himself an
Atheist because he denies all definitions of God, we defy
him to deny this definition, or attack this demonstration.
Second Proof.—Whatever is possible must have an
existing and intelligent principle. Now, that principle I
call God. (II. Def.) Therefore God exists.
We must subjoin to this argument a few words of ex
planation. “Whatever is possible,” means only whatever
is not absurd, i.e., whatever is simply and absolutely true
without reference to time or place. Thus the multiplica
tion table, though invented by Pythagoras, contains a
series of truths which were only discovered by him, and
which were true as independently of him as they are of
the things to which they are applied. Were there not two
calculable beings in the world, still two and two would
make four. In the same manner they are independent of
human reason, that only perceives, but does not makei
them. Were all mankind to go mad, and no longer to
admit that two and two are four, it would be none the less
true for their denial. What is there in that truth ? A
simple possibility, a mere intelligibility, expressed by a
formula independent both of existence and of man.
Now we say that whatever is possible must have an
existing principle, and to prove it we return to the defini
tion of a principle, i.e., a sufficient reason. Would a pos
sible being be the sufficient reason of what is possible?
No ; for nothing would ever have been possible if nothing
had existed. Possibility therefore depends on a certain
existence ; not mine, nor yours, nor any existence which
we know to be subject to change and mutability. Now,
�26
THERE IS A GOD.
the something on which possibility depends is called its
principle, and we call that principle God.
Nextly, we affirm that the principle in question must be
intelligent; not as men are said to be intelligent, since we
have seen that the intelligibility and consequent truth
of things possible has nothing whatever to do with man,
and is completely independent of him. But, knowing
them to be intelligible since all eternity, we ask, Can
anything be eternally intelligible without there being
something eternally intelligent I Fancy for an instant
that intelligence disappears totally from the universe ;
nothing is intelligible any longer. The difference between
the absurd and the non-absurd,—-consisting only in the
contradiction of characteristics, which contradiction cannot
subsist without intelligence,—ceases at once. Now, if
Mr. Bradlaugh does not hesitate to affirm that there is no
difference between what is absurd aud what is not, we
shall not trouble him any longer with our affirmation of
an eternal intelligence; but until he shall make that
declaration we are free to maintain that all eternal,
immutable, and necessary truths depend (to be what they
are) on an eternal, immutable, necessary, and intelligent
existing principle; and this principle we call God.
As already stated, we do not by this argument intend to
prove the unity of God, since that is quite out of the
question for the present. Plato was, if we mistake not,
the first who employed this manner of reasoning, and he
argued thence the existence of ideal forms, unchangeable,
necessary, and eternal. If by “ideal forms” he meant
beings existing separately, these “forms” were so many
gods, and his philosophy ended in Polytheism. However,
though this conclusion might have been false, the argu
ment, as we have stated it, is true, and the number of
gods is, we repeat, only a secondary question. If Mr.
Bradlaugh is struck by its efficacy, he is by no means likely
to fall into the error of Plato ; not being very partial to
the idea of God, one God is probably the most he can
admit, and if he does, we shall ask him no more.
Third Proof.—There exists at least one Being to
�THERE IS A GOD.
,
27
whom none is superior. Now, that Being to whom none
is superior I call God. (Def. III.) Therefore God exists.
It is impossible for Mr. Bradlaugh to take exception,
even in his system, to such an argument; as he admits
only one being, no others can be superior to it, and there
fore his one being is God. But we have already proved
the absurdity of supposing that there is only one being in
the world. There being therefore several, we proceed to
prove our argument from this starting point.
We first of all take for granted, as a fact known by all
who are in their senses, that there is a difference in the
perfection of some beings. We think it not at all hard to
be obliged to admit that Hamlet is superior to Caliban,
that the elephant is something more than the oyster, and
the palm-tree than the blade of grass.
If this be granted, common sense will at once see that
in the series of all beings, some being above others, there
must be some, (or, still more probably, one.) that are
the highest of all, i.e., to whom none is superior : for the
number of existing beings cannot possibly be infinite, and
therefore must be terminated at both ends if we ran»e
them by order of perfection. Anybody can see that no
number can be infinite if he reflects that it would be the
greatest of all numbers possible. Let us suppose that
a hundred quintillions be called infinite; then what would
be a hundred quintillions plus one? And how can any
number be innumerable ?
To those who prefer a more mathematical demonstration
we can give one such. Let x represent the whole number
of beings, ranged by order of perfection, and let us take at
random any part of the more perfect beings: x* will
represent the more perfect part, x" the less perfect. But
among the beings represented by xi, are all equal in per
fection or no ? If all are equal, then we have already the
leing (or beings) to whom none is superior, and the problem
is solved. It not, then by a similar process we find x™
aud xlv; xM representing the more perfect part of the
beings represented by x*. Aud as the number each time
diminishes regularly by at least one unit, it is evident that
we must in time solve the problem, simply by repeating
�28
THERE IS A GOD.
our mode of reasoning often enough. And whether we
come at last to one being who is above all others, or
to several equal to each other, and to which no others are
equal, the question is henceforward, not between Atheism
and Theism, not between Pantheism and the doctrine
which it contradicts, but between Polytheism and Mono
theism. With a Polytheist we should now be willing to
open the debate ; but Mr. Bradlaugh could hardly be con
sidered as such, and so we avoid entering into useless
details.
Fourth Proof.—An absolutely Infinite Being, taken
as we conceive it in our minds, must be either absurd, or
merely possible, or really existing. Now, it is neither
absurd nor merely possible. Therefore it exists, and
therefore (acc. to Def. IV.) God exists,*
We take for granted, first of all, that we possess the
idea of an Infinite Being, i.e., whose perfection is ab
solutely without limit in every way. Secondly, that this
idea is a real idea, i.e., an intellectual representation of an
object. To these two postulata self-consciousness must
bear testimony.
This being settled, we proceed to notice that the Infinite
cannot be absurd if we have a real idea of it. Of a thing
absurd we cannot properly have an idea; as, of a round
square, we have two ideas, the idea of round, the idea of
square; and, if we see that it is absurd, we have, besides,
t he idea of conflict between the two thus brought together.
But not only we have not any idea of conflict when we
say: perfection without end, i e., perfection without imper
fection, or (what comes to the same) being without nonbeing; not only we do not seize the conflict, but the two
intelligible notes of the idea are blended together in one;
that is, we have of the Infinite a true idea. We think
that this fact will be evident to any one who takes the
trouble to examine his thoughts as they occur to him in
* Many, we know, justly criticize the argument a priori for God’s
existence, in which one proves a fact from simple possibilities, and
passes thus from the ideal to the real order of things. But our argu
ment is only exteriorly like the one we allude to. It argues from a fact
to a fact: from the fact of our having the idea of the Infinite, to the
existeuce which this idea implicity includes.
�THERE IS A GOD.
29
' the mind’s laboratory: and so, the Infinite cannot be
absurd.
Still less can the Infinite be a merely possible being.
Non-existence is a very great limitation, a very con
siderable non-entity, and, though not the strongest
possible, yet still a strong negation of being. “ A living
dog is better than a dead lion,” says the proverb ; and
there is no doubt that a merely possible man is incom
parably less perfect than an existing grain of sand. Now
we have already said that our idea of an Infinite Being,
not absurd, supposes Him to have all imaginable per
fections, absolutely without limit. Therefore, if the
Infinite Being were merely possible He would be ab
solutely perfect and at the same time very imperfect,
which is inadmissible. Therefore, in the idea we have of
the Infinite, we must comprise that of real existence,
much in the same way as in the word “I” we comprehend
the idea of our own existence.
Therefore, God exists.
One objection to all the preceding demonstrations has
been perhaps already made by the reader. Setting aside
the possibility of Polytheism, and supposing each demon
stration to prove the existence of a single being, it follows
that we have:
1st. The Being who is the principle of all existence.
2nd. The Being who is the principle of all possibility.
3rd. The Being to whom none is superior.
4ih. The Being whose perfection is infinite.
Assuming tor an instant that these are different beings,
* each very great in his way, but not one and the same,
which of them are we to call God ? And, as long as it is
not proved that they are one and the same, we have the
right, as we please, either to call each of them God, or to
withhold the name from all.
The answer is that, according to our definitions, we
cannot withhold the name, if the Being answering to the
name be proved to exist. We are consequently at liberty
either to consider God as one being, or as four, so long as
it is not proved that these four are one: that the principle
of all existence is also that of all possibility, has no
�30
THERE IS A GOD.
superior, and is infinite. But, once more, and for the last
time, the question of God’s existence is quite different
from that of the numerical unity of the Divine essence.
We must now rapidly set forth a few proofs which by
themselves would not demonstrate the existence of God,
according to all the plenitude of the idea, but which
nevertheless are useful, if employed together with the
proofs already given : what may be wanting to these in
depth will be supplied to them by the former; and on the
other hand, the latter will perhaps be more perspicuous to
certain minds. However, we only use these arguments as
secondary and auxiliary ones, knowing that against some
of them many objections may be raised; they are thus only
stated for the sake of fuller illustration of the subject,
and because we consider the existence of God as a fact
already settled by the four proofs just laid down.*
“ God,” has been previously defined as “the principle of
all change.” By “change,” we understand the passage
from one state to another, by which a beiȣ, having before
existed in one manner, exists afterwards differently. Now,
nothing can change itself alone, without any intervening
cause whatever. Cold water, for instance, is not warm,
and will never become warm of itself; if, therefore, we find
that it has become warm, we naturally conclude that
something external has acted upon it, whether as a pro
ductive or as an occasioning cause. In cold water there
is only the possibility of warmth, not actual warmth ; and
if this mere possibility were left to itself, the water would
doubtless remain eternally cold. In general, nothing can
give itself what it has not; unless, indeed, we admit that *
it is possible to draw money out of an empty purse.
Something external must act upon the water, in order
to change its state. This external agent is subject to the
question: In acting upon the water does it change? does
* Some will be surprised to find that neither in the preceding nor in
the following proofs, any mention is made of the well-known argument
drawn from the order of the universe, that denotes a supreme Intelli
gence. The reason is that the proof, though good, has been so much
impugned in the very principles on which it is based, by the modern
school of Positivists, that it would take too much space to establish
properly here.
�THERE IS A GOD.
31
it pass from the inactive to the active state? If it acts
without change then it is a principle, and as such comes
under the denomination of God. If it changes, then some
other external agent determines the change, which agent
is itself liable to the same enquiry. Now this question
may recur again and again ; but still we must come to an
end at last. An infinite Beries of agents is absurd,
because all such series must be so ■ and even were it not
absurd in itself, it could not be admissible here. If you
construct in imagination an infinite series of agents, you
destroy the very principle of change; for you put it
nowhere. Each particular agent is but the transmitter
(so to speak) or conductor, not the real principle of
change; and if you tell me that change has no beginning,
no origin, you may as well tell that you have received a
letter that had passed through an infinite series of postal
stations, without having been sent off by anybody. An agent
which only produces change by changing itself, is nothing
else but a medium of transmission, not a principle, and, as
all change supposes some degree of activity or actuation,
when I see that activity or actuation I have the right to
inquire whence it proceeds. If my researches lead me
higher and higher, farther and farther, to a First Prin
ciple of mutation, which must exist if mutation exists, I
call this principle God, and affirm its existence. If you
say that there is no first principle of mutation, you deny
that there is any principle, and according to you, that
most universal phenomenon has no sufficient reason for
being what it is.
Another definition describes God as the principle of all
movement. Inertia is the first mechanical law of matter.
And yet matter moves. You will say : It moves because
it is moved by other matter; one ball pushes another for
ward and is itself urged on by a third. Yes: but who
gave the impulsion to the third ? You reply : We do not
know how movement came into the world ; but in the
world it is, and the universe is so fortunately arranged
that no movement is ever lost, but passes on from one
body to another, and so on ; until at last it returns to the
�32
THERE TS A GOD.
place whence it came. By that means we can very well
do without the notion of a First Mover.
You can, can you ? Whether that may be true philo
sophically speaking we do not know; we prefer submitting
your hypothesis to the test—the terribly severe test—of
common sense.
Take an uneducated countryman, as ignorant, as likely
to be imposed upon as you can possibly imagine one.
Show him a circular railroad, of, say a mile, in circum
ference. The whole of this railroad is crowded with
carriages, which form, so to speak, a circular train. There
is no engine, no locomotive; and yet the train moves on ;
one carriage touches another, and communicates the move
ment which it has itself received. Then tell the man that
nobody has set all these in movement; that the carriages
move each other, and that thus the whole moves on ; that
t he idea of a first mover is a totally useless supposition, and
that, since every part moves each other, the whole can be
considered as self-moving. It is very much to be doubted
whether he would take you in earnest; and he would
certainly be right not to do so. And yet there are philo
sophers who claim to be in earnest, and wish us to believe
the great movement of the universe (of which almost every
material part—indeed every material part taken as such—
is quite as inert as any railway carriage) to proceed from
itself, and pass ou from one portion of matter to another,
without having to refer to any First Principle of Move
ment whatever.* Why should that which is absurd and
nonsensical on a small scale, become reasonable and
philosophical on a large one? For our own part, we see
in such a system nothing but magnified absurdity and
gigantic nonsense.
By a third definition, God is called the Author of moral
obligation. We do not, absolutely speaking, allow this
* Mr. Bradlaugh seeks to elude the difficulty by defining the uni
verse as “all that is necessary for the production of every pheno
menon.” He might as well define the train in question as “the
carriages in movement, and all that is necessary to set them in move
ment.” He would thus, by a confusion of terms, be able to say that
the train moves itself, since he therein comprises the mover. But thia
is mere shuffling.
�THERE IS A GOD.
33
proof to be a good one; for we can only deduce the idea
of moral obligation from that of the existence of God : it
would consequently be a vicious circle to prove the exis
tence of God by moral obligation. However, for those
who do admit the existence of moral obligation, the proof
is valid, and runs thus:
Certain acts we know to be wrong, and therefore for
bidden. Now, what is “to forbid?” Is it merely the
promulgation of a consequence: If you act thus, you will
suffer thus? Murder, for instance. “If you commit
murder and are caught, you will be hanged; and even if
you are not caught, you will have to suffer from fears of
the law, and sorrow for having destroyed a member of the
human race.” Is that all ? Then let us suppose that
from a murder committed no evil consequences should
arise in this world: that it is impossible for the action to
be detected, and equally impossible for any sorrow to arise,
the man killed having been the object of the most deadly
hatred on the part of the murderer. Well ; would murder
in this case still be forbidden? Of course it would, all
reply. But then, by whom could it be forbidden ? By
society? Society can go no further than impose a penalty ;
and, if this penalty be eluded, society’s prohibition is vain.
By the murderer’s own nature? But the murderer’s own
nature has prompted him to do deliberately what he has
done; he has not acted under the impulse of passion, but
with cold-blooded craft. How can nature forbid that
which she herself does? You will say that human nature
recoils from murder. So it does in general; but human
nature taken in general is but an abstraction, and an ab
straction cannot forbid a real concrete being. This human
nature at least, i.e.t the murderer’s, has not recoiled, since
it has acted. Now, if man be responsible to none but to
his own nature, his nature will absolve him in each par
ticular case of crime which it has not hindered him from
doing. And yet murder is forbidden? By whom? By
the Author of moral obligation, whom we call God.
Take another instance. Is suicide forbidden ? If we are
answered in the negative, we can only prove it to be so by
God’s eternal prohibition; but we have a great majority
�34
THERE JS A GOD.
of men who consider it; in no case to be allowed. To
those then, we say : Who can forbid it? A man is utterly
wretched in this world. Society cannot punish him for
suicide, by which he escapes all punishment; by destroying
his own human nature he does not punish himself; on the
contrary, he liberates himself from a state which he feels
to be unbearable. Besides, to diminish the sum of misery
in the world may appear a good and virtuous action. And
yet, is suicide forbidden? Yes. Who can forbid it?
Only One on whom human nature depends, and who, in
dependently of punishment, can say with truth: Man has
no right to do wrong. And indeed, all men would, if God
did not exist, have the right to do wrong and suffer the
consequences. According to the Atheist, if a man were
deliberately to choose that which is wrong, taking upon
himself all consequences, he would have not only the
physical power to act thus, but also the moral right.
Each human being has the moral right to do whatever he
chooses, if only he have no physical restraint upon him.
And if this doctrine be contradictory to any one’s idea of
right and wrong, he must confess that by that idea he
implicitly admits the existence of God.
Our work,—all but the part which refers to Mr. BradJaugli’s objections,-:—is now ended. Before we give our
answers to these objections, we wish to say a few words as
to the manner in which he came by them. Sages of all
times, from the first ages of the world’s existence up to
the present day, have by the preceding arguments been,
satisfied, even to the most absolute certainty, that there
exists a God. This great question once answered, they
take up a second as important as the first (if possible),
though entirely dependent upon it, viz.: What is God ?
What may be the nature of that existing and Infinite
Principle of all? By dint of deep thought and profound
meditative labour, they have succeeded in finding out
some of His attributes, which, on one hand, are as certain
as the facts which'prove His existence, since they are only
strict inferences drawn therefrom; and which, on the
other, involve many mysterious problems, so wonderfully
luminous that they almost seem self.contradictory : just as
�THERE IS A GOD.
35
the sun emits a blinding light. So Mr. Bradlaugh collects
all he can find in the way of mysteries, and having brought
them together, says: God must have these and those
attributes; now each of them contradicts the other, there
fore, the idea of God is absurd. He ought, however, to
remember that we only draw our different inferences as to
the attributes of God after having proved His existence;
so our opponent ought first of all to prove invincibly that
our demonstrations are of no value, and only then to
attack those attributes, which are all based upon the said
demonstrations. If God be an absurd being, there must
certainly be a flaw in the proof; why then not point it out
more clearly?* So long as Theists are able to defend
their demonstrations—and that will be very long indeed—
let him not trouble himself about anything else. So long
as any one proof remains standing, it will be an insur
mountable obstacle to Atheism. When we are reduced to
silence, and the existence of God, instead of being an in
dubitable truth, is evidently proved to be a mere hypo
thesis, why, then it will be time to examine whether or no
that hypothesis be absurd. What would become of
science, were a similar method to be pursued, and the
great truths it proclaims to be denied on account of the
minute difficulties which those truths involve? Such
objections are unfair, unless put with the intention, not to
overthrow the truth, but only to cast more light upon the
darker sides of the question. It is therefore in this sense
alone that we are willing to answer them, considering our
answers as only a development of that most fundamental
answer to all difficulties—the demonstration.
1. What strikes Mr. Bradlaugh first of all is, that if
God be Infinite, He cannot be called Supreme. If He
were only the most perfect of all finite beings, He might
receive that title; but, as soon as He is proved to be In
finite, it is impossible. He will not allow us to say that
the Infinite is greater or less than the Finite, or even
» Mr. Bradlangh does indeed assail the demonstrations of the
existence of God ; but, strange to say—or rather, nof at nil strange to
Bay,—he dismisses the most important of them with a few words and
accumulates all the strength of Iris arguments upon the least important.
�36
THERE IS A GOD.
equal to it, if lie follows up his principle, for we are not
permitted to institute any comparison between them ; the
reason is, we suppose, in the axiom : between the Infinite
and the Finite there is no proportion. But how did he
come by the axiom ? was it not by comparing them
with each other? It is, therefore, only in a limited
sense, and not absolutely (as Mr. Bradlaugh does) that we
can say, that there is no proportion. The very axiom
indeed, can be put under the form of a proportion, thus:
The Infinite is to the Finite, as 1 (or any number) is
to 0.
Now the want of proportion between 0 and 1, does not
hinder us from saying that 1 is greater than 0.
But, let us take a more direct view of the question.
That there is between the Infinite and the Finite, con
sidered as such, any other relation than that of inequality
must of course be denied; but that of inequality exists.
If so, the idea “greater than” can at once be applied to
the Infinite in relation with the Finite. But is the idea
“supreme” anything more? It only affirms besides, what
we already know, viz.: that there is nothing greater than
the Infinite.
Moreover, we can consider God independently of His
Infinite attribute, and simply as one of the immense series
of beings. We at once see that He occupies the first rank,
above all others; for it is absurd to suppose that a real
being cannot be classed with other real beings, if we
abscind from what sets him apart from them. Every day
we see naturalists place man at the head of the animal
kingdom, along with monkeys, butterflies, snails and star
fishes, merely because they abscind from the faculty of
reason that sets man apart from all other beings.* Seeing
then that God is First of all things existing and possible,
we can surely call Him supreme by relation to them.
Thus, as Infinite, God is above all finite beings; as a
Being, He is at the head of the whole series. In both
ways He is entitled to be called Supreme.
• And they are perfectly right so to do, reason not being a faculty
that belongs to natural history, which ought only to describe exterior
characteristics of the animated and inanimate world.
�THERE IS A GOD.
37
We shall now try the value of Mr. Bradlaugh’s objection,
by putting it in the same way to other subject-matter.
The Queen cannot be called the supreme ruler of the land,
for she would be supreme either in relation to another
queen, or to subjects. Another queen there is not; but,
“supreme ” means, “ the first of all in a series ;” now, it is
impossible for the Queen to be the first of all her subjects,
since she is no subject. It is, perhaps, a very pretty play
upon words,—we are no judges of such things; but it is
nothing better than that.
He adds to this difficulty a short remark in which he
says, that even if God were Supreme now, He would not
always have been so, the fact of Creation being admitted.
We shall only notice in reply, that the word “ supreme”
is a title referring to the existence of other beings, not to
the nature of God in itself; therefore, even if there were a
change in the idea, it would not be a substantial change in
God, as considered before and after Creation. If I stand
still, and a carriage passes from my left to my right, I may
be said to have been, first at the right of the carriage,
then at the left: and yet my position has not changed in
the least. Suppose the Queen of England, (to return to
our comparison) were one morning to find herself alone in
her kingdom, all her subjects having died suddenly, she
would, of course, be no longer queen ; but would that in
volve any change whatever in her? Titles which proceed
from an external relation are merely names which may be
applicable or no, according as the relation changes.
2. Our adversary fares no better with the next objection,
against the creation of the world. “Creation is the
making of existence.” Of all existence? We deny it
formally; never did we think that God made Himself,
although He is His own principle. Of some existence?
That we are willing to admit. Creation is the making of
a finite, contingent and temporal existence by an Infinite,
necessary, and eternal one. So, before that temporal
existence was, something existed already; and it is grossly
unfair to represent Theism as supposing nature commence
ment, in the sense which Atheists give to “nature,” i.e.}
all that is.
�38
THERE IS A GOD.
Let us try an adaptation of Mr. Bradlaugh’s argument
on creation, and prove that it is impossible to light a fire.
To light a fire is to produce heat: now heat cannot be
produced; for, before heat was produced it was nowhere,
and there was no such a thing as heat in the world. But
I cannot look back to a moment when there was no heat,
for I know that all bodies possess, and ever have possessed,
more or less of it. Consequently, to light a fire is an
impossible undertaking. Such an argument, applied to
the lighting of a fire, would have brought its author to a
cell in Bedlam; applied to the creation of the world, it has
raised him to a seat in the parliament of England.
3. The argument against God’s benevolence has the
merit of being rather more specious. “A benevolent man
is one who does more than his duty; a being infinitely
benevolent ought to do infinitely more. God, in not
creating a sinless world, has not done infinitely more :
consequently God is not infinitely benevolent.”
Indeed ! Pray, what is the duty of God ? He has none,
and owes us nothing. The Supreme Being can be by no
means bound by duty towards those who depend upon
Him in all. Owing us nothing, it follows that in whatever
world we live, and however little God may have done for
us, He will have done infinitely more than His duty, if it
be true that something is infinitely more than nothing, and
that any number is infinitely more than zero. Even the
most ardent Atheist will confess, we hope, that existence
is better than non-existence, that to have a chance of being
happy is better than to be utterly deprived of that chance.
Well, all of us have both existence and a chance of being
happy. God, by that gift, does infinitely more than He
ought, and shows thereby His infinite benevolence. Why
does God not do more still, since our world is not perfect?
That we do not know, and if Mr. Bradlaugh wanted only
to prove that man is not omniscient, he would easily gain
his point; but as a proof that God is not benevolent it fails
completely. We fancy that our opponent is led astray by
a false idea of infinite action, which in his mind would be,
“ to do as much as one possibly can.” Now the fact is,
that an act can be infinite in itself, and yet produce only
�THERE IS A GOD.
y
39
finite results, on account of the debility and imperfection
of the matter on which it works.
4. Another difficulty arises. God cannot be personal,
because He is either infinite or not God. Now, all ideas
of “personality” give us also the idea of limitation. We
beg leave simply to deny the latter proposition without
more ado. Personality we consider as the highest sub
stantial perfection of an intelligent being. If the being in
question involves in its essence limitation and imperfection,
personality will no doubt be limited and imperfect, not
because it is personality, but because it belongs to such
a being. Thus, God having been demonstrated to be in
finite, it follows that His personality is also infinite.
5. This brings us to the next question, whether an in
telligent being can at the same time be infinite. We have
not to ask whether in every known case intelligence is
limited, but whether the very idea of intelligence argues
limitation ; and we answer in the negative. Intelligence
is essentially clear: is the Infinite essentially dim? Intelligence is something definite and precise: is the Infinite
indefinite and vague? Let Mr. Bradlaugh have the kind
ness to go back to our definition of the Infinite Being,—one who possesses perfection without end. Therefore the
Infinite must be infinitely clear, infinitely definite, infinitely
precise, since precision, definitenesBj and clearness are
perfections. All those qualities are qualities of intelligence, and intelligence is itself a perfection ; consequently
God must be intelligent, because He is infinite.
6. “ Theism checks man’s efforts,” says Mr. Bradlaugh.
That depends. A certain Theism, infected by fatalism,
certainly does so. If we believe that whatever happens
happens necessarily according to God’s will alone; if we
annihilate the liberty of man, and suppose that all that is
to happen must take place antecedently to any display of
human activity, and without his choice having any effect
upon that which shall be, then we certainly check man’s
efforts in the most fatal way. But this is far from being
Theism itself, since a great many schools of Theistic doc
trine have declared in the most emphatic manner their
abhorrence of this error. The only effect which we can
�40
THERE IS A GOD.
discern in the ordinary doctrine of submission to the will
of God is that we learu
“ To mend what can,
And bear what can’t be mended
and not only to bear, but be glad of it, since we know that
it is the will of the All-good. A seeming evil menaces us;
our duty is to exert ourselves to the utmost in order to
ward off the peril. But if all our endeavours are useless,
if the seeming evil does really fall upon us, then we are
happy ; for we know that the evil is only a seeming one,
and in reality a great good, since it comes from the Allgood. A true Theist is the most happy of men ; if suc
cessful, he is happy for having done what he wished to do ;
if unsuccessful, he is still more happy for not having done
what was against the Divine will.
But a still more evident proof that Theism does not
check man’s efforts is, that Fatalism can exist independently
of any Theistic doctrine; for Fatalism springs merely from
the denial of human liberty, not from the affirmation of
the power of God. Substitute to “ God’s almighty will ”
the “ laws of nature,” and you have modern fatalism, of
which, if we are not much mistaken, Mr. Bradlaugh is
himself an adept, for he seems clearly to deny free-will iu
man.* Now if, instead of all things proceeding from the
eternal decree of an intelligent being, all proceeds from
the everlasting law of an unintelligent one, we are at a loss
to see how this sort of Atheism differs from that kind of
Theism ; both have the same maxim : What is ivas to he,
and could not be otherwise. Why then give ourselves any
trouble? is the natural consequence of both. We here
detect a second stone which Mr. Bradlaugh throws, un
mindful of the fragility of his own dwelling.
7. The argument we have next quoted, though directed
against God’s intelligence, only proves that the intelligence
of God is of a different nature from ours; which, seeing all
His other attributes, and the immeasurable distance be
tween His nature and ours, was certainly a very likely
conclusion. AV e perceive new ideas, remember old ones,
• “ What did Jesus teach ?” p. 7, “Heresy,” p. 49.
�THERE IS A GOD.
41
and attain by reasoning to higher knowledge. God is
omniscient, and therefore neither perceives, remembers,
nor reasons; consequently, (according to Mr. Bradlaugh,)
to know everything signifies to be without intelligence!
If so, why should not the highest degree of intelligence be
to know nothing? Cannot the gentleman see that if God
does not perceive, remember, or reason, it is because He
does not want those faculties, but has the grand faculty of
omniscience, which transcends and supersedes them all?
Why do we perceive? To fill up a defect in our intelli
gence, which is never in possession of all it is able to know.
Why remember? Because another defect renders our
intelligence unable to have everything present to its mental
vision at the same time. And we reason only to supply a
third defect, which is, that we cannot at once see all the
relations of all ideas one with another, and all the con
clusions that flow therefrom. Mr. Bradlaugh’s enumera
tion of the acts of intelligence is, in fact, only the enu
meration of the defects in our intelligence. Perfect in
telligence is that which knows everything at one glance,
with an implicit judgment contained in that glance. God
has but one idea; this idea represents everything that is,
that was, that will be, and contains in itself all true judg
ments, as the idea of existence affirmed, (z.e , of the identity
between the subject and the predicate,) is comprised in the
idea “I.” Such is the rapid and imperfect outline of God’s
intelligence, which we give for want of space to add more.
“Judgment,” says Mr. Bradlaugh, “implies the joining
of two ideas.” Explicit judgment may do so; implicit
judgment supposes the two ideas joined in one already.
And the one idea which God has, being infinite, being God
Himself, is equal to an infinite multitude of human ideas.
“To think is to separate what is thought from what is not
thought.” Yes, in man, since man’s mind is not able to
think of all things at once and without confusion. But
the Divine is not the human nature ; His thought embraces
all, abscinds from nothing, unites all things in one vast
affirmation, without concentration of mind on one par
ticular object to the detriment of the rest. God’s mind is
concentrated upon all things together. And thus Mr.
�42
THERE IS A GOD.
Bradlaugh’s objections prove only this,—that our intelli
gence is of a very bounded and feeble description, obliged
to aid its flickering gleam by numerous faculties, which,
while they help its action, declare openly its radical
infirmity; just as the numerous members and organs of
the lower animals at the same time supply a want and
reveal an imperfection.
8. “ But G-od is not all-wise, having created beings and
parts of beings that are of no use.”
Of no use? We cannot find words to treat such pre
sumptuous ignorance as it deserves: but here silence is
best, the silence of scorn : not for our opponent, but for his
objection. Besides, another has, long ago already, in
sublimer language than we can command, joined the highest
flight of poetry to the soundest accents of reason in con
demnation of such temerity. Our only answer will be
a quotation from the immortal author of the “ Seasons.”
“Let no presuming impious railer tax
Creative Wisdom, as if aught was made
In vain, or not for admirable ends.
Shall little haughty ignorance presume
His works unwise, of which the smallest part
Exceeds the narrow vision of her mind ?
As if upon a full-proportioned dome,
On swelling columns raised, the pride of art,
A critic fly, whose feeble ray scarce spreads
An inch around, with blind presumption bold,
Should dare to tax the structure of the whole ?
And lives the man, whose universal eye
Has swept at once the unbounded scheme of things,
Marked their dependence so,-and firm accord,
As with unfaltering accent to conclude
That this availeth nought ?”*
9. Creation is again brought forward. “ The sum of
existence,” say you, “ cannot change.” But we also, who
believe in the creation, admit that, and we are algebraically
right. Let us discuss the question algebraically, not that
we intend thereby to decide whether or no algebra can be
applied to philosophical reasoning, but merely as a manner
of stating rather more clearly the point in discussion.
Call what existed before the creation, 00, (i.e., the
* Thompson, “Seasons,” (Summer.)
�THERE IS A GOD.
43
Creator,) and what existed after, CO + a, («.<?., the Creator
and things created ;) we say,
y'
*
00 = 00 + a ;
and we defy any man who knows algebra to say that our
equation is a false one: for nothing finite, however great,
can add anything to that which is infinite already. The
existence or the non-existence of creatures adds nothing
whatever to the sum of existence, or, to speak with more
exactitude, it adds comparatively nothing. Now, the
infinite, to which you add something that is comparatively
nothing, is like a quantity to which you add another in
finitely small; it becomes no greater than it was before.
And yet a may be as real as you like, as great as you like,
as distinct as you like from the infinite, the result will be
always the same. But if things are so according to
algebra, the most precise of all sciences, what more will
you have? If exactitude itself fails to content you, how
can we hope to satisfy your objections?
10. “Some men are not convinced of God’s existence.”
Thereupon Mr. Bradlaugh builds an argument to prove
that the Deity is either not all-wise, or not all-powerful, or
not all-good. To reply, we begin by denying the basis.
There is no man who is not convinced of God’s existence.
Some may be so ignorant that they have never thought
about the matter. Some there are who perversely refrain
from thinking about it; others may strive to raise clouds
before a truth as bright as the sun, accumulate objections
without number, and pile up difficulties without end. But
the honest doubt of a man who wishes sincerely to see his
way to what is true, there certainly is not. And as neither
pride, nor passion, nor wilful ignorance can be laid to the
charge of God; as, moreover, ignorance, it not guilty, is
not punished, we are right in affirming that there are
practically no Atheists. “ The fool hath said in his heart,
There is no God.” Not in his mind, even though he is a
fool: conviction will not enter there. Where then? In
his heart. That is, “ I wish that there be no God. I have
settled that there ought not to be one. I am determined
to seek every reason to prove to myself that there is none.
�44
THERE IS A GOD.
But all that is useless, and the Atheist only succeeds in
being an Atheist in his heart, and remains a fool. Cer
tainly, the expression is strong; but should we use a softer
one for a man who by every possible effort of will strove
to elude the evident truth that two sides of a triangle are
greater than the third ? Now, the existence of God is not
one whit less evident. Of course we do not by these
remarks mean to say that Mr. Bradlaugh is anything but
a very clever man; we only regret he should waste such
abilities as his in so hopeless a cause.
11. He considers Theism as inadmissible, because it
cannot show “ how the first cause, which is motionless,
can have moved to make the world.” In this reasoning
there are two weak points. Firstly, Theism is not bound
to show how things are ; it suffices that it shows that they
are so : and that we have done already. Secondly, we
deny that the First Cause moves to make the world. It
acts without moving. How is that ? we cannot understand
it, but it is proved to be so. “ Action” is not synonymous
with “movement.”* In movement we find an imperfec
tion, a variation, a constant change, which may perhaps
be essential to the action of finite beings, but certainly
not to that of the Infinite One. An eternal immutable
Act, which in eternity is the principle of God’s own
existence, and in time that of all other beings,—such is
God. No movement, no mutation, but a calm, undying,
unchangeable Activity. How can that be ? No man
knows : but nothing is further from absurdity than this
act, the perfection of all acts, and from which every shade
of passivity and inertia is banished.
12. And now we come to the last recorded objection,
which argues either that God, being everywhere, made
the universe nowhere, or that, if the universe is nowhere,
* On the contrary, we find in Mechanics that with levers of the first
class, where the force is applied to the shorter arm, the less the acting
force moves, the greater is the movement it produces: for the shorter
the arm where the force is applied, the longer the other which is put
in motion. Here we have, therefore, a very strong action combined
with very little movement, which produces a very considerable move
ment of matter. Therefore, to act is to produce movement, but not
necessarily to be moved oneself, at least, not at all in proportion with
the intensity of the act.
�THERE IS A GOD.
45
God is not everywhere : and that, by the reason that two
existences cannot be together in the same place. Mr.
Bradlaugh is certainly very pardonable for bringing
forward this difficulty, as it coincides perfectly with his
views on the question. He says he is unable to conceive
anything else but matter, and that for him the words
“ matter” and “ existence” have the same sense. Now
matter is universally allowed to be impenetrable, so that
two different bodies cannot occupy the same place. If,
therefore, we imagine God as a body, the argument might
be very difficult, if not impossible to answer. But that
is precisely what we deny ; God, according to our point
of view, is purely spiritual. Now, though an immaterial
being may occupy space as well as a material one, it does
not occupy space in the same way. It is not extended
into quantitative parts by the proportionate parts of space
which it occupies : it is only present by its action in space,
and that is all. Besides, do we not every day see
examples—not of bodies, it is true,—but of phenomena
which compenetrate each other? A room is full of air; if
you speak in the room, it will be filled with sound. How
is it that sound and air exist at the same time in the same
place ? Because they do not exist in the same way. You
are in a railway carriage ; the train goes full speed, and
you walk across from one window to another. Your body
is in movement, but animated at the same time by two
different motions : one, interior, that proceeds from itself;
another, exterior, that comes from the train. How can
two different movements exist in the same body at the
same time ? Because they do not exist in the same way.
I know that these examples only prove co-existence for
phenomena, and not for substances ; but we say that if
phenomena have the power of co-existing thus, we can
suppose that a substance which is not a body can possess
like qualities. All we humbly beg and pray our adversary
to allow us, is that a spiritual substance can exist and
occupy space in a different way from a corporeal one; it
is very hard to refuse us so little. And yet he grounds
his argument upon the fact that it is absurd to suppose
a spirit that does not behave exactly like a bodily sub-
�46
THERE IS A GOD.
stance. If that is the starting-point, of all his philosophy,
and a self-evident proposition which cannot be proved,
and which it is ridiculous to deny, we are surely in a
very hard case: but then, why so much reasoning? If
spiritualistic philosophy denies your very first principle,
you had better leave it alone, and not seek to prove its
falsity by means of a principle which it denies. If
Tertullian, Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, Bacon, Descartes,
Leibnitz and Clarke, were all so mad as not to have
seen what is self-evident, why should you dispute against
their conclusions, which of course are still more foolish ?
Either agree that your axiom is not self-evident, and then
prove your axiom by something besides itself, or abandon
discussion altogether.
Let us, in conclusion, sum up the whole debate in few
words.
1st. It is certain that in the universe there are many
beings, since everybody admits, or ought to admit, that
there are many phenomena, each existing separately from
the other : for separate existence is all we require for the
notion of a being.
2ndly. Of all the beings which we see or know directly,
not one possesses in itself the principle of its existence.
There must therefore exist another Being, which is at once
its own and their principle of existence. That principle
we call God.
3rdly. All objections here stated against the existence
of that, Being, drawn from its demonstrated attributes,
although they take an obviously unfair advantage, may be
and have been successfully answered.
4th ly. Therefore, Mr. Bradlaugh’s difficulties are utterly
worthless, his doctrines ridiculously absurd, and his
attempts to shake the demonstration of God’s existence
hopelessly inefficient.
5t hly. All this does not in the slightest degree interfere
with hia being, privately and personally, a very remarkable
man.
PRINTED BY RICHARDSON AND SON, DERBY.
�
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Victorian Blogging
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A collection of digitised nineteenth-century pamphlets from Conway Hall Library & Archives. This includes the Conway Tracts, Moncure Conway's personal pamphlet library; the Morris Tracts, donated to the library by Miss Morris in 1904; the National Secular Society's pamphlet library and others. The Conway Tracts were bound with additional ephemera, such as lecture programmes and handwritten notes.<br /><br />Please note that these digitised pamphlets have been edited to maximise the accuracy of the OCR, ensuring they are text searchable. If you would like to view un-edited, full-colour versions of any of our pamphlets, please email librarian@conwayhall.org.uk.<br /><br /><span><img src="http://www.heritagefund.org.uk/sites/default/files/media/attachments/TNLHLF_Colour_Logo_English_RGB_0_0.jpg" width="238" height="91" alt="TNLHLF_Colour_Logo_English_RGB_0_0.jpg" /></span>
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Conway Hall Library & Archives
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2018
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Conway Hall Ethical Society
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Title
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There is a god : a reply to Mr Bradlaugh's "Plea for atheism"
Creator
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Winterton, Francis
Description
An account of the resource
Place of publication: Derby
Collation: [3]-46 p. ; 18 cm.
Notes: Part of the NSS pamphlet collection.
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Printed by Richardson and Son
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[1883]
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N699
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Atheism
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<a href="http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/mark/1.0/"><img src="http://i.creativecommons.org/p/mark/1.0/88x31.png" alt="Public Domain Mark" /></a><span> </span><br /><span>This work (There is a god : a reply to Mr Bradlaugh's "Plea for atheism"), identified by </span><a href="https://conwayhallcollections.omeka.net/items/show/www.conwayhall.org.uk"><span>Humanist Library and Archives</span></a><span>, is free of known copyright restrictions.</span>
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application/pdf
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Text
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English
Atheism
Charles Bradlaugh
God
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