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pamphlets
^or the Peop/e
No* 11
DEITY AND
DESIGN
CHAPMAN COHEN
sa
THE PIONEER PRESS
�Deity and Design
The one certain thing about the history of the
human intellect is that it runs from ignorance to1
knowledge. Man begins knowing nothing of his own
nature or of the nature of the world in which he is
living. He continues acquiring a little knowledge
here and there, with his vision broadening and his
understanding deepening as his knowledge increases?
Had man commenced with but a very small fraction
of the knowledge he now possesses, the present state
of the human mind would be very different from what
it is. But the method by which knowledge is acquiredis of the slowest. It is by way of what is called trial
and error. Blunders are made rapidly, to be cor
rected slowly; some of the most primitive errors are
not, on a general scale, corrected even to-day. Man
begins by belieying, on what appears to be sound
evidence, that the earth is flat, only to discover later
that it is a sphere. He believes the sky to be a solid
something and the heavenly bodies but a short
distance away. His conclusions about himself are
as fantastically wrong' as those he makes about'the
world at large. He mistakes the nature of the
diseases from which he suffers, and the causes of the
things in which he delights. He is as ignorant of the
nature of birth as he is of the cause of death.
Thousands of generations pass before he takes the
first faltering steps along the road of verifiable
knowledge, and hundreds of thousands of genera
tions have not sufficed to wipe out from the human
intellect the influence of man’s primitive blunders.
Prominent among these primitive misunderstand
ings is the belief that man is surrounded by hosts of
�DEITY AND DESIGN
3
mysterious ghostly agencies that are afterwards
given human form. These ghostly beings form the
raw material from which the gods Of the various
religions are made, and they flourish best where
knowledge is least. Of this there can be no question.
Atheism, the absence of belief in gods, is a com
paratively late phenomenon in history. It is the
belief in gods that begins by being universal. And
even among civilised peoples it is the least en
lightened who are most certain about the existence
of the gods. The religious scientist or philosopher
says: “ I believe ”; the ignorant believer says: “ I
know.”
Now it would indeed be strange if primitive man
was right on the one thing concerning which exact
knowledge is not to be gained, and wrong about all
other things on which knowledge has either been, or
bids fair to be, won. All civilized peoples reject the
world-theories that the savage first formulates. Is it
credible that with regard to gods he was at once and
unmistakably correct ?
It is useless saying that we do not accept the gods
of the primitive world. In form, no; in essence, yes.
The fact before us is that all ideas of gods can be
traced to the earliest stages of human history. We
have changed the names of the gods and their
characteristics; we even worship them in a way that
is often different from the primitive way; but there
is an unbroken line of descent linking the gods of the
most primitive peoples to those of modern man. We
reject the world of the savage; but we still, in our
churches, mosques, synagogues and temples, per
petuate the theories he built upon that world.
In this pamphlet I am not concerned with all the
so-called evidences that are put forth to prove the
existence of a God. I say “ so-called evidences,”
because they are not grounds upon which the belief
in God rests; they are mere excuses- why that belief
�I
4
I
DEITY AND DESIGN
should be retained. Ninety per cent, of believers in
God would not understand these “ proofs.” Roman
Catholic propagandists lately, as one of the adver
tisements of the Church, have been booming the
arguments in favour of a God as stated by Thomas
Aquinas. But they usually preface their exposition—
which is very often questionable-—by the warning
that the subject is difficult to understand. In the case
of Roman Catholics I think we might well raise the
percentage of those who do not understand the argu
ments to ninety-five per cent. In any case these
metaphysical, mathematical, and philosophic argu
ments do not furnish the grounds upon which anyone
believes in God. They are, as I have just said,
nothing more than excuses framed for the purpose of
hanging on to it. The belief in God is here because
it is part of our social inheritance. We are born into
an environment in which each newcomer finds the
belief in God established, backed up by powerful
institutions, with an army of trained advocates com
mitted to its defence and to .the destruction of every
thing that tends to weaken the belief. And behind
-all are the countless g’enerations during which the
belief in God lived on man’s ignorance and fear.
In spite of the alleged “ proofs ” of the existence
of God, belief in him, or it, does not grow in strength
or certaintv. These proofs do not prevent the
number of avowed disbelievers increasing to such an
extent that, whereas after Christians proclaiming for
several generations that Atheism—real Atheism—does
not exist, the defenders of godism are now shriek
ing ag'ainst the g’rowing' number of Atheists, and
there is a call to the religious world to enter upon a
crusade against Atheism. The stage in which heresy
meant little more than an exchange of one god for
another has passed. It has become a case of accept
ance or rejection of the idea of God, and the growth
is with those who reject. This is not the way in which proofs, real proofs,
operate. A theory may have to battle long for
�DEITY AND DESIGN
5
general or growing acceptance, but it grows pro
vided it can produce evidence in its support. A
hypothesis is stated, challenged, discussed, and
finally rejected or accepted. On the question of the
hypothesis of God the longer it is discussed the. less
it is believed. No wonder that the ideal attitude of
the completely religious should be “ on the knee,”
with eyes closed and mouths full of nothing but
petitions and grossly fulsome praise. That is also
the reason why every religious organization in the
world is so keen upon capturing the child. The cry
is : “ If we lose the child we lose everything ”—which
is another way of saying that if we cannot implant a
belief in God before the child is old enough to under
stand something of what it is being told, the belief
may have to be given up altogether. Keep the idea
of God away from the child and it will grow up an
Atheist.
If there is a God, the evidence for his existence
must be found in this world. We cannot start with
another world and work back to this one. That is
why the argument from design in nature is really
fundamental to the belief in deity. It is implied in
every argument in favour of Th.eism, although
nowadays, in its simplest and most honest form, it is
not so popular as it was. But to ordinary men and
women it. is still the decisive piece of evidence in
favour of the existence of a God. And when ordinary
men and women cease to believe in God, the class of
religious philosophers who spend their time seeing
by what subtleties of thought and tricks of language
they can make the belief in deity appear intellectually
respectable will cease to function.
But let it be observed that we are concerned with
the existence of God only. We are not concerned
with whether he is good or bad; whether his alleged
designs are commendable or not. One often finds
people saying they cannot’ believe there is a God
�6
DEITY AND DESIGN
because the works of nature are not cast in a benevo
lent mould. That has nothing to do with the essen- '
tial issue, and proves only that Theists cannot claim
a monopoly of defective logic. We 'are concerned
with whether nature, in whole, or in part, shows any
evidence of design.
My case is, first, the argument is fallacious in its
structure; second, it assumes -all that it sets out to
prove, and begs the whole question by the language
employed; and, third, the case against design in *
nature is, not merely that the evidence is inadequate,
but that the evidence produced is completely irrele
vant. If the same kind of evidence were produced in
a court of law, there is not a judge in the country who
would not dismiss it as having nothing whatever to
do with the question at issue. I do not say that the
argument from design, as stated, fails to convince;
I say that it is impossible to produce an\> kind of
evidence that could persuade an impartial mind to
believe in it.
The argument from design professes to be one
from analogy. John Stuart Mill, himself without a
belief in God, thought the argument to be of a
genuinely scientific character. The present Dean of
St. Paul’s, Dr Matthews, says that “ the argument
from design employs ideas which everyone possesses
and thinks he understands; and, moreover, it sbems
evident to the simplest intelligence that if God exists
he must be doing something, and therefore must be
pursuing some ends and carrying out some purpose.”
(The Purpose of God, p. 13.) And Immanuel Kant <
said the argument from design was the oldest, the
clearest and the best adapted to ordinary human
reason. But as Kant proceeded to smash the argu
ment into smithereens, it is evident that he had not a
very flattering opinion of the quality of the reason
displayed by the ordinary man.
But what is professedly an argument from analogy
turns out to offer no analogy at all. A popular Non
conformist preacher, Dr. Leslie Weatherhead, whose
�DEITY AND DESIGN
7
book, Why do Men Suffer? might be taken as a fine
text-book of religious foolishness, repeats the old
argument that if we were to find a number of letters
so arranged that they formed words we should infer
design in the arrangement. Agreed, but that is
obviously because we know that letters and words
and the arrangement of words are due to the design
of man. The argument here is from experience.
We infer that a certain conjunction of signs are de
signed because we know beforehand that such thing's
are designed. But in the case of nature we have no
such experience on which to build. We do not know
that natural objects are made, we know of no one
who makes natural objects. More, the very division
of objects into natural and artificial is an admission
that natural objects are not, ftrima fade, products of
design at all. To constitute an analogy we need to
have the same knowledge that natural objects are
manufactured as we have that man’s works are
manufactured. Design is not found in nature; it is
assumed. As Kant says, reason admires a wonder
created by itself.
The Theist cannot move a step in his endeavour to
prove design in nature without being guilty of the
plainest of logical blunders. It is illustrated in the
very lang'uage employed. Thus, Dr. Matthews cites
a Roman Catholic priest as saying, “ The adapta
tion of means to ends is an evident sign of an intelli
gent cause. Now nature offers on every side
instances of adaptations of means to ends, hence it
follows that nature is the work of an intelligent
cause.” Dr. Matthews does riot like this way of
putting the case, but his own reasoning shows that
he is objecting more to the argument being stated
plainly and concisely rather than to its substance.
Nowadays it is dangerous to make one’s religious
reasoning so plain that everyone can understand the
language used.
Corisider. Nature, we are told, shows endless
�8
DEITY AND DESIGN
adaptations of means to ends.' But nature shows
nothing of the kind—or, at least, that is the point to
be proved, and it must not be taken for granted. If
nature is full of adaptation of means to ends, then
there is nothing further about which to dispute. For
adaptation means the conscious adjustment of things
or conditions to a desired consummation. To adapt
a thing is to make it fit to do this or that, to serve
this or that purpose. We adapt our conduct to the
occasion, our language to the person we are address
ing, planks of w’ood to the purpose we have in mind,
and so forth. So, of course, if nature displays an
adaptation of means to ends, then the case for an
adapter is established.
But nature show's nothing of the kind. What
nature provides is processes and results. That and
nothing* more. The structure of an animal and its re
lation to its environment, the outcome of a chemical
combination, the falling of rain, the elevation of a
mountain, these things, with all other natural
phenoipena, do not show an adaptation of means
to ends, they show simply a process and its result.
Nature exhibits the universal phenomenon of causa
tion, and that is all. Processes and results looked
like adaptations of means to ends so long as the
movements of nature were believed to be the expres
sion of the will of the gods. But when natural
phenomena are regarded as the inevitable product of
the properties of existence, such terms as “ means ”
and “ ends ” are at best misleading', and in actual
practice often deliberately dishonest. The situation
was well expressed by the late W. H. Mallock : —
When we consider the movements of the starry
heavens to-day, instead of feeling it to be wonderful that
these are absolutely regular, we should feel it to be.
wonderful if they were ever anything else. We realize that
the stars are not bodies which, unless they are made to
move uniformly, would be floating in space motionless, or
moving across it in random courses. We realize that they
are bodies which, unless they moved uniformly, would not
be bodies at all, and would exist neither in movement nor in
�DEITY AND DESIGN
9
rest. We realize that order, itistead of being the marvel
of the universe, is the indispensable condition of its
existence—that it is a physical platitude, not a divine
paradox.
But there are still many who continue to marvel at
the wisdom of God in so planning the universe that
big rivers run by great towns, and that death comes
at the end of life instead of in the middle of it.
Divest the pleas of such men as the Rev. Dr.
Matthews Qf their semi-philosophic jargon, reduce
his illustrations to homely similes, and he is marvel
ling- at the wisdom of God who so planned things
that the two extremities of a piece of wood should
come at the ends instead of in the middle.
The trick is, after all, obvious. The Theist takes
terms that can apply to sentient life alone, and
applies them to the universe at large. He talks about
means, that is, the deliberate planning to achieve
certain ends, and then says that as there are meads
there must be ends. Having, unperceived, placed the
rabbit in the hat, he is able to bring it forth to the
admiration of his audience. The so-called adapta
tion of means to ends—properly, the relation of pro
cesses to results—is not something that can be picked
out from phenomena as a whole as an illustration of
divine wisdom; it is an expression of a universal
truism. The product implies the process because it
is the sum of the power of the factors expressed by
it. It is a physical, a chemical, a biological platitude.
I have hitherto followed the lines marked out by
the Theist in his attempt to prove that there exists a
“ mind ” behind natural phenomena, and that the
universe as we have it is, at least generally, an
evidence of a plan designed by this “ mind.” I have
s also, pointed out that the only datum for such a con
clusion is the universe we know-. We must take that
as a starting point. We can get neither behind it nor
beyond it. We cannot start with God and deduce the
�7
IO
DEITY AND DESIGN
i
universe from his existence; we must start with the
world as we know it, and deduce God from the
world. And we can only do this by likening the uni
verse as a product that has come into existence as
part of the design of God, much as a table or a
wireless-set comes into existence as part of the
planning of a human “ mind.” But the conditions
for doing this do not exist, and it is remarkable that
in many cases critics of the design argument should
so often have criticized it as though it were incon
clusive. But the true line of criticism, the criticism
that is'absolutely fatal to the design, argument is that
there is no logical possibility of deducing design
from a study of natural phenomena. And there is no
other direction in which we can look for proof. The
Theist has never yet managed to produce a case for
design which upon examination might not rightly
be dismissed as irrelevant to the point at issue.
In what way can we set about proving that a thing
is a product of design ? We cannot do this by show
ing that a process ends in a result, because every
process ends in a result, and in every case the result
is an expression of the process. If I throw a brick,
it matters not whether the' brick hits a man on the
head and kills him, or if it breaks a window, or
merely falls to the ground without hurting anyone or
anything. In each case the distance the brick travels,
the force of the impact on the head, the window, or
the ground, remains the same, and not the most
exact knowledge of these factors would enable any
one to say whether the result following the throwing
of the brick was. designed or not. Shakespeare is
credited with having written a play called King Lear.
But whether Shakespeare sat down with the de
liberate intention of .writing Lear, or whether the
astral body of Bacon, or someone else, took posses
sion of the body of Shakespeare during the writing
of Lear, makes no difference whatever to the result.
Again, an attendant on a sick man is handling a
number of bottles, some of which contain medicine.
�DEITY AND DESIGN
II
others a deadly poison. Instead of giving- his patient
the medicine, the poison is administered and the
patient dies. An inquest is held, and whether the
poison was given deliberately, or, as we say, by
accident, there is the same sequence of cause and
effect, of process and result. So one might multiply
the illustrations indefinitely. No one observing the
sequences could possibly say whether any of these
unmistakable results were designed or not. One
cannot in any of these cases logically infer design.
The material for such a decision is not present.
Yet' in each of these cases named we could prove
design by producing, evidence of intention. If when
throwing the brick I intended to kill the man, I am
guilty of murder. If I intend to poison, I am also
guilty of murder. If there existed in the mind of
Shakespeare a conception of the plan of Lear before
writing, and if the play carried out that intention,
then the play was designed. In every case the essen
tial fact, without a knowledge of which it is im
possible' logically to assume design, is a knowledge
of intention. We must know what was intended, and
we must-then compare the result with the intention,
and note the measure of agreement that exists be
tween the two. It is not enough to say that one man
threw the brick, and that, if it had not been, thrown,
the other would not have been killed. It is not
enough to say if the poison had not been given the
patient would not have died. And it certainly is not
enough to argue that the course of events can be
traced from the time the brick left the hands of the
first man until it struck the second one. That, as I
have said, remains true in any case. The law is in
sistent that in such cases the intent must be estab
lished ; and in this matter the law acts with scientific
' and philosophic wisdom.
Now in all the cases mentioned, and they are, of
course, merely “ samples from bulk,” we look for
design ■ because we know that men do write plays,
men do poison other men, and men do throw things
�12
DEITY AND DESIGN
at each other with the purpose of inflicting bodily
injury. We are using what is known, as a means of
tackling, for the time being, the unknown. But our
knowledge of world-builders, or universe designers,
is not on all-fours with the cases named. We know
nothing whatever about them, and therefore cannot
reason from what is known to what is unknown in
the hopes of including the unknown in the category
of the known.
Second, assuming there to be a God, we have no
means of knowing what his intentions were when he
made the world—assuming that also. We cannot
know what his intention was, and we cannot con
trast that intention with the result. On the known
facts, assuming God to exist, we have no means of
deciding whether the world we have is part of his
design or not. He might have set about creating
and intended something different. You cannot, in
short, start with a physical, with a natural fact, and
reach intention. Yet if we are to prove purpose we
must begin with intention, and having a knowledge
of that see how far the product agrees with the
design. It is the marriage of a psychical fact with a
physical one that alone can demonstrate intention,
or design. Mere agreement of the “ end ” with the
“ means ” proves nothing at all. The end is the
means brought to fruition. The fundamental objec
tion to the argument from design is that it is
completely irrelevant.
The belief in God is not therefore based on the
perception of design in nature. Belief in design in
nature is based upon the belief in God. Things are
as they are whether there is a God or not. Logically,
to believe in design one must start with God. He, or
it, is not a conclusion but a datum. You may begin'
by assuming a creator, and then sayi he did .this or
that; but you cannot logically say that because
certain things exist, therefore there is a God who
made them. God is an assumption, not a conclusion.
�DEITY AND DESIGN
13
And it is an assumption that explains nothing. If I
may quote from my book, Theism or Atheism:—
To warrant a logical belief ■ in design, in nature, three
things are essential. First, one must assume that God
exists. Second, one must take it for granted that one has
a knowledge of the intention in the mind of the deity before
the alleged design is brought into existence.. Finally, one
must be able to compare the result with the intention and
demonstrate their agreement.
But the impossibility of
knowing the finst two is apparent. And without the first
two the third is of no value whatever. For we have no
means of reaching the first except through the third. And
until we get to the first we cannot make use of- the third.
We are thus in a hopeless impasse. No examination of
nature can lead back to God because we lack the necessary
starting point. All the volumes that have been written and all
the sermons that have been preached depicting the wisdom
of organic structures are so much waste of time and breath.
They prove nothing, and can prove nothing. They assume
at the beginning all they require at the end. Their God
ds not something reached by way of inference. It is some
thing assumed at the very outset.
Finally, if there be a designing mind behind or in
nature, then we have a right to expect unity. The
products of the design should, so to speak, dovetail
into each other. A plan implies this. A gun so de
signed as to kill the one who fired it and the one at
whom it was aimed would be evidence only of the
action of a lunatic or a criminal. When we say we
find evidence of a design we at least imply the
presence of an element of unity. What do we find ?
Taking' the animal world as a whole, what strikes
the observer, even the religious observer, is the fact
of the antagonisms existing in nature. These are so
obvious that religious opinion invented a devil in
order to account for them. And one of the argu
ments used by religious people to justify the belief in
a future life is that God has created another world
in which the injustices and blunders of this life may
be corrected.
For his case the Theist requires co-operative
�14
DEITY AND DESIGN
action in nature. That does exist among the social
animals, but only as regards the individuals within
the group, and even there in a very imperfect form.
But taking animal life, I do not know of any instance
where it can truthfully be said that different species
of animals are designed so as to help each other. It
is probable that some exceptions to this might be
found in the relations between insects and flowers,
but the animal world certainly provides none. The
carnivora not only live on the herbivora, but they
live, when and where they can, on each other. And
God, if we may use Theistic language, prepares for
this, by, on the one hand, so equipping the one that
it may often seize its prey, and the other, that it may
often escape. And when we speak of a creation that
brings an animal into greater harmony with its en
vironment, it must not be forgotten that the greater
harmony, the perfection of the “ adaptation ” at
which the Theist is lost in admiration, is often the
condition of the destruction of other animals. If
each were equally well adapted one of the competing
species would die out. If, therefore, we are to look
for design in nature we can, at most, see only the
manifestations of a mind that takes a delight in
destroying on the one hand what has been built upon
the other.
There is also the myriads of parasites, as clear
evidence of design as anything, that live by the infec
tion and. the destruction of forms of life “ higher ”
than their own. Of the number of animals born only
a very small proportion can evbr hope to reach
maturity. If we reckon the number of spermatozoa
that are “ created ” then the number of those that
live are ridiculously small. The number would be
one in; millions.
Is there any difference when we come to man ?
With profound egotism the Theist argues that the
process of evolution is justified because it has pro
duced him. But with both structure and feeling
there is the same suicidal fact before us. Of the
�DEITY AND DESIGN
15
human structure it would seem that for every step
man has taken away from mere animal nature God
has laid a trap and provided a penalty. If man will
walk upright then he must be prepared for a greater
liability to hernia. If he will live in cities he must
pay the price in a greater liability to tuberculosis.
If he will leave his animal brothers behind him, he
must bear reminders of them in the shape of a use
less coating otf hair that helps'to contract various
diseases, a rudimentary second stomach that pro
vides the occasion for appendicitis, rudimentary
“ wisdom teeth ” that give a chance for mental
disease. It has been calculated that man carries
about with him over one hundred rudimentary
structures, each absorbing- energy and giving
nothing in return.
So one might go on. Nature taken from the point
of view most favourable to the Theist gives us rro
picture of unified design. Put aside the impossi
bility of providing a logical case for the inferring of
design in nature, it remains that the only conception
we can have oif a designer is, as W. H. Mallock, a
staunch Roman Catholic, has said, that of “a
scatter-brained, semi-powerful, semi-impotent mon
ster . . . kicking his heels in the sky, not perhaps
bent on mischief, but indifferent to the fact that he
is causing it.”
Issued for the, Secular Society Limited, and
Printed and Published by
The Pioneer Press (G. W. Foote & Co., Ltd.)
2 & 3, Furnival Street, London, E.C.4,
ENGLAND
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Gods and Their Makers.
Giving ’em Hell.
The Church’s Fight for the Child.
Deity and Design.
What is the Use of a Future Life?
Thou Shalt Not Suffer a Witch to Live.
Freethought and the Child.
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A collection of digitised nineteenth-century pamphlets from Conway Hall Library & Archives. This includes the Conway Tracts, Moncure Conway's personal pamphlet library; the Morris Tracts, donated to the library by Miss Morris in 1904; the National Secular Society's pamphlet library and others. The Conway Tracts were bound with additional ephemera, such as lecture programmes and handwritten notes.<br /><br />Please note that these digitised pamphlets have been edited to maximise the accuracy of the OCR, ensuring they are text searchable. If you would like to view un-edited, full-colour versions of any of our pamphlets, please email librarian@conwayhall.org.uk.<br /><br /><span><img src="http://www.heritagefund.org.uk/sites/default/files/media/attachments/TNLHLF_Colour_Logo_English_RGB_0_0.jpg" width="238" height="91" alt="TNLHLF_Colour_Logo_English_RGB_0_0.jpg" /></span>
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Conway Hall Library & Archives
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2018
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Conway Hall Ethical Society
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Pamphlet
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Deity and design
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Cohen, Chapman [1868-1954]
Description
An account of the resource
Place of publication: [London]
Collation: 15 p. ; 19 cm.
Series title: Pamphlets for the People
Series number: No. 11
Notes: "Issued for the Secular Society Limited." Date of publication from KVK. Part of the NSS pamphlet collection.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Pioneer Press
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
[1912]
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
N140
Subject
The topic of the resource
Deism
Free thought
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
<a href="http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/mark/1.0/"><img src="http://i.creativecommons.org/p/mark/1.0/88x31.png" alt="Public Domain Mark" /></a><span> </span><br /><span>This work (Deity and design), identified by </span><a href="https://conwayhallcollections.omeka.net/items/show/www.conwayhall.org.uk"><span>Humanist Library and Archives</span></a><span>, is free of known copyright restrictions.</span>
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
application/pdf
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Language
A language of the resource
English
God
NSS