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Text
I
VOL I., No. 2.—JUNE, 1870.
A VOICE FROM MEMORY.
WRITTEN
ON THE
24TH OF MAY, THE ANNIVERSARY OF THE DAY ON
WHICH ELLIS GRAY LORING DEPARTED FROM THIS LIFE.
BY L. MARIA CHILD.
Again the trees are clothed in vernal green,
Again the waters flow in silv’ry sheen ;
But all this beauty through a mist I see,
For earth bloomed thus when thou wert lost to me.
The flowers come back, the tuneful birds return;
But thou, for whom my spirit still doth yearn,
Art gone from me to spheres so bright and far,
Thou seem’st the Spirit of some distant Star.
Oh, for some telegram from thee, my friend !
Some whispered answer to the love I send !
Or one brief glance from those dear guileless eyes,
That smiled to me so sweetly thy replies.
My heart is hungry for thy gentle ways,
Thy friendly counsels and thy precious praise ;
I seem to travel in the dark alone,
Since thou, my wisest, truest guide, art gone.
And yet at times so near thou art to me,
That each good thought seems still inspired by thee.
I almost hear thee say, “Fear not, my friend!
Our friendship, pure and loyal, knows no end.”
vol. i.—5
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The Legal Status of Woman.
Oh, lead me ever nearer to thy sphere,
And guide and help me, as thou didst while here !
For still I lean on thy pure, faithful heart,
Angel or seraph, wheresoe’er thou art.
THE LEGAL STATUS OF WOMAN.
BY H. H. BOND.
Civilization in its development,
and laws in their consequent ad
vance, seem to go from one position
to another, each position in its turn
serving as a basis for the making of
still further inroads into the unde
veloped future. In the advance, the
different acts appear like little dots
along the line of the broad princi
ple in which they are at last absorb
ed ; and a step once taken, the same
advancing course is repeated.
In the status of woman, starting
from the firmly-established system in
which the central feature was the
legal absorption of the individuality
of woman in the status of man, the
law, as we have seen, has been con
stantly abandoning that position :
First, adding legal duties to balance
the husband’s legal rights, and re
stricting by degrees the latter ; next,
under the guise of fiction, avoiding
the effect of many of the strict legal
rules ; then, through a court of con
science, bringing many cases out
side of the legal system, and gra
dually extending these till equity had
“eaten out the heart of the law”
which belonged to a different age ;
and lastly, through legislation, ar
ranging and advancing the new or
der of things, till it has finally, in a
great measure, worked itself into a
new system, in which, if we may
judge from the tendency of the past
and the indications of the present,
the moving principle will be, the full,
individual equality of man and wo
man before the law.
We are led to this position not
only by the logic of legal progress,
but also by the logic of reason and
justice.
Laws, it will hardly be denied,
should carry out the principle upon
which a government is founded.
Says that great inquirer into the
spirit of laws, Montesquieu, “The
relation of laws to the principle of
government strengthens the several
springs of government ; and this
principle derives from thence, in its
turn, a new degree of vigor.”
Individuality is one of the funda
mental features of the principle upon
which our government is based, and
therefore one which should be recog
nized by our laws. Herein lies a
distinctive difference between the
ancient and modern state. Says
that profound thinker and writer
upon questions pertaining to the in
dividual and the state, Dr. Lieber,
“ One of the main and characteristic
differences between the ancient states
�The Legal Status of Woman.
ancl modern ones is this, that in an
tiquity the state nearly absorbed the
■ndividual rights and interests, and
public attention was directed far
more toward the preservation of the
whole than the protection of the in
dividual. Politics, however, estab
lished according to the point of view
which is taken in modern times,
places the protection of the indivi
dual, the individual rights of man, in
the most prominent position among
all the objects of the state.”
The individuality of man is a truth
which, though we regard it as self-evi
dent, is too often forgotten or unheed
ed in our laws, and will bear constant
reiteration. As an individual, man
has a certain destiny which leads to
individual responsibilities and their
complementary rights ; rights which
we consider as springing from the
nature of man, and hence natu
ral; rights which are not properly
the subject of ridicule or contempt,
but which are essential; rights which
are not to be arrogated by others,
but which are inalienable, or in
separably connected with the indi
vidual.
Among the first of these rights is
that of personality, or the right to be
recognized and treated as an indi
vidual. Any system which absorbs
this right is a system of slavery ;
and what else is that system which
“ demands that husband and wife be
recognized as one ”—one absorbing
the individuality of the other ? It
would seem, therefore, that “ decla
mation ” against this is not neces
sarily the “mere quibble? which the
author of Ecce Femina is pleased to
term it.
Again, we include the individual
•'right of property- among the natural
67
rights of man. We can hardly com
prehend how it is that a system which
denied this right to the individual wo
man to the extent it has done, has been
so tenaciously held to be just, when it
violated that which was deemed most
sacred to the individual man. Fully
carried out, this right covers a broad
field ; for with it are concerned nine
tenths of all laws. Political rights
from this gain a strong support.
There is sterling worth in the idea
which we see struggling through Eng
lish history, and becoming crystalliz
ed in the familiar maxim, “ No taxa
tion without representation.” Eng
land, especially, which, clings more
to the property theory of govern
ment, and where voting is often call
ed a vested right of property, is lo
gically led forward to the acknow
ledgment of woman’s right to the
ballot.
But further, each individual is en
dowed with an imperfect nature, the
development of which is a life-long
duty. Hand in hand with this re
sponsibility goes free-agency ; and to
each individual, therefore, belongs
the right to work out his or her own
manhood or womanhood in his or
her own way ; and upon every other
individual, number, or class of indi
viduals devolves the correlative duty
of, at least, placing no obstacles in
the way of this free development.
In this respect there has been a
prominent defect in the legal status
of woman. While not acknowledg
ing her to be wanting in reason and
judgment, the law has arbitrarily re
stricted her life to a narrow channel.
“ Her disabilities,” said an eminent
judge, “ come not from want of judg
ment, but from want of free-agency.”
This would seem to be answer
�68
The Legal Status of Woman.
enough to the oft-repeated objec
tion, which is by many deemed
most fundamental, that women do
not ask or wish for this or that.
Whether they ask for it or not, if it
be their right, there is the duty on
the part of every one else to see to
it that they place nothing in the way
of the exercise of that right.
It also meets the objections found
ed on the assumption that “society
is organized for and by the majority.”
If this were true, why is it that the
constitutional government of modern
times has come to mean a govern
ment that protects the individual
from power whether in one or many ?
There are rights which should be
carefully preserved from the uncer
tain will of that power which did
not hesitate to sentence a Socrates,
or to persecute and crucify a Sa
viour.
This, too, meets the attempt of
any person to rigidly mark out the
scope of another’s life. Each one
lives his own life, and is responsible
for the use of his own nature. The
ancient ordinances of Menu furnish a
text, which, as Dr. Lieber expressed
it, “ sounds like a passage from the
Bible“ single is each man born;
single he dieth ; single he receiveth
the reward of his good, and single the
punishment of his evil deeds.”
But, it is said, there is a radical
error in this mode of reasoning; be
cause society, instead of being a
union of individuals, is a union of
families. And then follows the very
plausible argument, that, “ as the law
recognizes the family as one, of
course there can be but one repre
sentative ; and as the husband,” etc.
etc. The importance of the institu
tion of the family is not questioned;
but the assumption that it is the
unit of society is not so readily
maintained. Absorb all individuali
ty in this family unit by the most
perfect theory that human language
can devise ; and when it is done, the
plain, practical fact, which, like Banquo’s ghost, will never down, rises
up to refute it, that the individual
yet remains. Have we, indeed, been
retrograding that the law has come
to reach down to the individual?
Barbarian law looked only to the
family, and every thing was con
sistently shaped in accordance with
that theory. But we have changed
this unit of fiction to the unit of fact.
The difference is forcibly expressed
by Professor Maine in the words,
“ The unit of an ancient society was
the family; of a modern society it is
the individual.”
Closely connected, and blending
with the individualism of modern
society, is the equality of individuals,
which is so essential a feature of our
polity, and which should, therefore,
also shape our laws. The “ all men
are created equal ” of our Declara
tion of Independence, and the fuller
expression, an outgrowth of the for
mer, “All men are equal by na
ture and before the law, in the
French Declaration of Rights, are
phrases that have a meaning in
them. To make these “glittering
generalities ” practical truths, is a
task for a high degree of civilization.
Caste, in one form or another, is
ever making some particular indivi
duals peculiar favorites of nature
and law. The Hindoo will give
ready ear to the doctrines of the
Christian till it is intimated that the
Pariah is his equal; but that is
something inconceivable to him!
�The Legal Status of Woman.
The Christian himself shook his
head, like the heathen, at the appli
cation of the same truth to the ne
gro. The law, therefore, makes the
(Pariah an outcast, and made the
African a slave. Something the
same has been the lot of woman.
Caste had decreed that she was infe
rior to man by nature, and she was
therefore made subordinate to him
by law. Modern civilization has
done much toward doing away with
the effects of caste, and bringing out
in a clearer light the principle of
equality. Every period has had
prominently before it some one of
the phases of this principle. At the
present day none is more prominent
than this: that natural rights know
of no distinctions of sex. This
phase has long remained in the
background, but is now coming to
take its proper place. And as it
does so, there is a demand that wo
men as well as men shall not be re
stricted by law from acting out their
full part in the play of life i a de
mand for a broader application of
the fundamental truth that all men
are equal by nature and before the
law.
To this equality there appears to
be no sound objection. Christianity
is of course made to oppose it; for
what reform is there that it has not
been made to oppose ? Yet one of
the great truths which Christianity
teaches is that of individual equality.
Physical and intellectual reasons are
continually adduced against it; but
only a half application is made of
them when they are applied to wo
men only; and are we at this late
day to make it a condition precedent
to the concession of rights that a
person should be a Hercules in
69
physical strength, or a Shakespeare
in intellectual vigor ? Then there is
made the objection of which men
have no reason to be proud, but
which may perhaps be a practical
one to most women, that woman
will, on account of it, lose the re
spect of men. Some women may
so act as to forfeit their claim to re
spect; but should, for example, Vic
toria be entitled to less respect as
a woman because she happens to
be Queen of England; or Florence
Nightingale because of her not
following the line marked out by
some worthy reverend ; or Mrs.
Stowe because of her having won
a respected name in literature ; or
ought any woman to be any less
worthy of respect because she may
happen to own property in her sepa
rate right, or be entitled to cast a
ballot if she chooses ? When driven
from one position to another, the
opponents of this equality, or some
of them, frankly admit that its ad
vocates have the argument, and then
intrench themselves in a last strong
hold, that the reasons which are op
posed are too deep and subtle for
expression. That position at most
is hardly satisfactory, and if safe
from attack, will not be apt to ob
struct the advance.
That a woman should be the legal
equal of man does not require that
she should forsake her own nature
and acquire his, any more than for
him to assume the feminine charac
teristics ; on the contrary, for men
and women to associate as equals—
to do which the law should recog
nize them as such—would seem na
turally to bring out the true nature
of each more perfectly. In so far
as they have come to be regarded as
�70
The Legal Status of Woman.
equals it has been for the good of
each, and for the benefit of the world
at large; and, at all events, a gov
ernment which founds itself upon
the theory that every citizen is, as
an individual, the legal equal of
every other, should be willing to give
its own theory a fair trial.
Innovations in behalf of woman
have heretofore been founded on the
theory of charity rather than that of
justice. Victor Hugo, through his
character of Javert, says, “ It is
easy to be charitable, but, O God ! it
is hard to be just !” There is a good
deal of meaning in that sentence,
and the status of woman is one of
the illustrations showing its truth.
Men arrogated to themselves the
control of the legal rights of wo
men, and then set up the claim that
it was out of pure charity, so great
a favorite was woman. If -women
were now and then favored with the
privilege of exercising a right, it was
discussed and treated as a cha
ritable action on the part of man.
But the moment there was a demand
made by woman for any thing as a
right, the demand was looked upon
as a presumption calling for manly
ridicule and contempt. It is well to
be able to feel that we have been
charitable, but it would be better to
be able to answer in the affirmative
the question, Have we been just?
Law deals in justice. And if the
proposition be correct that the rea
son of our law requires the con
sideration of individuals as equals,
justice certainly demands that this
principle be impartially carried out
in the legal status of woman.
It may perhaps be well to add
that, while we advocate this course
we have no picture to present of
millennial days to immediately en
sue upon its being carried out. We
have no anticipation of any such rej
suits. We imagine that we shall all
wake up from the change to recog
nize something of the same world,
and in it find the same hard battle
of progress to fight. It will only be
a new position taken which the pre
sent civilization seems to demand,
and which will be more favorable
than the old for a further advance.
�
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Victorian Blogging
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Conway Hall Ethical Society
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Title
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The legal status of women
Creator
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Bond, H.H.
Description
An account of the resource
Place of publication: [Chicago]
Collation: 66-70 p. ; 24 cm.
Notes: From the library of Dr Moncure Conway. Printed in double columns. From The Standard, Vol. 1, No. 2, June 1870.
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[s.n.]
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[1870]
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G5439
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Women's rights
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<a href="http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/mark/1.0/"><img src="http://i.creativecommons.org/p/mark/1.0/88x31.png" alt="Public Domain Mark" /></a><span> </span><br /><span>This work (The legal status of women), identified by </span><a href="https://conwayhallcollections.omeka.net/items/show/www.conwayhall.org.uk"><span>Humanist Library and Archives</span></a><span>, is free of known copyright restrictions.</span>
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Text
Language
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English
Conway Tracts
Women-Legal Status
Women's Rights