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CONTEMPORARY WARS.
(1853-1866.)
STATISTICAL RESEARCHES RESPECTING THE LOSS OF
MEN AND MONEY INVOLVED IN THEM.
BY
PAUL LEROY BEAULIEU.
LAURÉAT DE L’INSTITUT.
From the French Edition issued in the “ Peace Library ” of the Paris
“ International League of Peace.”
TRANSLATED AND REPUBLISHED BY THE
LONDON PEACE.
SOCIETY,
19, NEW BROAD STREET, E.C.
1869.
PRICE FOURPENCE.
�LONDON :
R. BARRETT AND SONS, PRINTERS
MARK LANE.
�PREFACE.
The London Peace Society has been engaged for
more than fifty years in endeavouring to create a public
opinion in this and other countries against War and
warlike armaments, and in favour of settling inter
national differences by Arbitration instead of an appeal
to the sword. In the United States there has been a
similar association in existence for about the same
period. But in Europe the English Peace Society has,
during the larger part of that time, been the only
organised body working for that object. Of late, how
ever, there has been a very earnest movement in the
same direction on the Continent, which has given rise
to several societies who are labouring in various ways
for substantially the same ends. One of the most im
portant of these is the International League of Peace,
not to be confounded with another association, with a
somewhat similar title, which originated in the Geneva
Congress of 1867.
The League was founded mainly by the indefatigable
exertions of M. Frederic Passy, and numbers among its
supporters many distinguished persons, not only in
France, but in Germany, Italy, Belgium, and other
continental countries. Among other modes of operation
B
�2
PREFACE.
it is issuing from the press, under the general title of
Bibliothèque de la Paix, a series of small volumes,
admirably adapted for popular instruction. Eight or
nine such volumes have been already published. One
of the most valuable of these is Les Guerres Contem
poraines, by M. Paul Leroy-Beaulieu, a translation of
which is here presented to the English reader. It is, as
will be seen, a work of great labour and research, and so
careful has the author been not to exaggerate, that he
has in several instances very much understated the
cost in blood and money of the wars in which Europe
has been engaged within the last sixteen years. These
pages must surely be regarded as presenting a melan
choly illustration of the civilisation and Christianity of
the nineteenth century.
�CONTEMPORARY AVARS.
The important legislative debates which for some weeks
have kept the country in a state of suspicion and uneasi
ness, and imbued the public mind with the most painful
apprehensions, have imparted to all the circumstances of
contemporary wars a prominent reality and interest.
Questions of military statistics, which were previously only
interesting to a few persons, have suddenly acquired., in the
estimation of all, an incontestable importance.
Hence we do not shrink from presenting to our readers
a work bristling with figures and facts. We have deter
mined to indicate, with the utmost possible exactness, the
material losses, both of money and of men, involved in the
great wars which have afflicted mankind from 1853 to 1866,
and which constitute, to use the graphic expression of one
of our Deputies, the bill of cost of each war.
The ground upon which we are about to enter has not
been thoroughly explored hitherto. The material losses
comprise the losses of men and money—the losses of men
are enumerated in the official statistics, and the losses of
money are set forth in the respective budgets.
A minute exactness is often difficult to attain. There is
an abundance of official documents respecting the loss of men,
but they are sometimes contradictory ; the greater part of
them are issued too soon after the war, and this precipitancy
is a cause of much inaccuracy. As regards the two great
wars in the Crimea and in the United ¡States, and also as to
the Schleswig War, so far at least as Prussia is concerned, we
have been enabled to attain complete precision. For these
wars have been described in large and comprehensive histo
ries, in which the losses have been studied, enumerated, and
classified, systematically and scientifically. The official re
�4
ports of the Crimean War presented to the British Parlia
ment, the remarkable book of Dr. Chenu, the various memo
rials composing “ the Medical and Chirurgical History of the
American Rebellion,” the very recent publication by Dr.
La?ffleur on the “ Schleswig Campaign,” are works of scien
tific exactness. Unfortunately the documents respecting
other wars neither possess similar value nor authority.
As regards finances, we have also met with some embar
rassing difficulties. There is a means of calculating financial
losses, which is in vogue with our statesmen, and which has
met with general favour—it is to add together the various
loans contracted on account of war, and to take the sum of
these different loans for the amount of the expenses of the
war. Nothing is more simple, but nothing is less exact.
In fact, it often happens that sums of money borrowed in
view of a war are only partially expended upon such war.
Thus, the loan contracted in 1859 by France was not
entirely absorbed by the Italian War, and the considerable
portion which was not required by the war was diverted by
a special law to works of public utility. Further, it often
happens that the sum of the loans is very far from being
equivalent to the sum of the expenses of a war. It is neces
sary to take cognisance of the revival of old imposts, or of
the establishment of new taxes, of the use of extraordinary
resources, and of important sums which may have been pro
cured by the reduction of civil expenses, or bv the transfer
of accounts. Thus, the expenses of England for the Crimean
War were four times greater than the loans which she con
tracted during that struggle.
The only rational means of arriving at moderate precision
is to study carefully the war budgets during the contest,
and to compare these with those of the preceding period of
peace. In order to do this, we must know what the budgets
are. But there are States which have none, or, rather,
which had none. Thus, the expenses of Russia during the
Crimean War will always be difficult to calculate, notwith
standing the able researches of MM. Leon Faucher and
Wolowski. It also happens that, certain wars being very
recent, we do not possess their complete budgets, or returns,
of expenditure. In some countries these returns take a long
time in their completion. We know that it was only in the
�5
session of 1867 that the French Legislative body voted the
law to sanction the financial returns of 1863.
And even when we have been enabled to determine with
precision the total expenses of war to the belligerent
countries, we are still far from the knowledge of all the
expenses, even the public ones, which the war has involved.
We must also study the budgets of neutral nations, for
war in our day has this particular feature, that it strikes a
blow at the finances even of neutral nations, and forces
them into an attitude of anxiety, which involves large
armaments. Again, in some countries, we must extend our
researches still further. Any one who should only estimate
as the expenses of the Northern States of America during
the Secession War, the expense they incurred as members of
the Union, without taking account of those incurred by the
separate states and districts, as such, in their preliminary
outlay upon the volunteers, and their equipment of every
kind, must acknowledge that he has not arrived at the total,
and that his estimate would be incomplete. And this is
not all. There are some countries, both primitive and
advanced, where the initiative efforts of individuals are on a
large scale, and where the private contributions towards war
are a very important accompaniment of the public expense.
The gifts furnished to the Czar by the Russian aristocracv,
and all that English and American patriotism so largely
contributed as offerings, equipments, or supplies, should
also be taken account of. As regards Russia, or England,
these private contributions mount up to a hundred million
francs ; and as regards America, to a thousand millions.
And at length, when we have made all these calculations,
shall we then have accomplished our task ? By no means !
All the private losses, the ravage of the lands, the spoiling
of crops; in case of siege or maritime war, the ruin of
cities and the destruction of shipping ; all these losses,
impossible to be estimated, must be always kept in view,
although they cannot be calculated. And even this is not
the whole. Eor by the side of these losses, which we
may term positive ones, and which consist in the material
destruction of acquired wealth, we must take account of the
losses which we may term negative, and which are involved
in the stagnation of business, the dulness of commerce,
�6
and the stoppage of industry. All these ruinous effects,
which the curse of war accumulates, escape our statistics;
but they are not the least part of that curse.
The Crimean War.
Loss of Life.
The Crimean War is the most murderous of those Euro
pean wars of which the calamities have been scientifically
calculated with some degree of precision.
In the estimate of the loss of men, we shall chiefly take
for our guide the report of Dr. Chenu to the Army Board
of Health. This valuable document possesses the double
merit of being official and scientific; it emanates, in fact,
from the Ministry of War, and it obtained from the Aca
demy of Sciences the grand prize for Statistics.
The French army had to struggle against three great
dangers—the cholera, the enemy’s fire, and the scurvy. In
the month of September, 1854, our army had not yet seen
the enemy, but it had already lost 8,084 men, chiefly through
cholera.—(Dr. Chenu, p. 622.) Throughout the campaign
disease carried off four times as many victims as the Russian
fire. Here is the exact state of the losses of the French
army as given by Dr. Chenu :—
Received into
Ambulances or
Hospitals.
Various diseases and cholera, from
April 1 to Sep. 20, 1854 ... ... 18,073
Ambulances in the Crimea and
Hospitals at a distance from
Constantinople .......................... 221,225
Hospitals at Constantinople.......... 162,029
Killed by the enemy, ormissing...
—
Died without entering ambulances
or hospitals....................................
—
Loss of the ¿JèmiWante ;—
1. Troops on board .............
—
2. Marines.............................
—
Coast infirmary and naval hos
pitals .......................................... 34,817
Killed
or
Dead.
...
8,084
...
...
•••
29,095
27,281
10,240
•••
4,342
•••
•••
394
308
...
846
�7
Killed
or
Dead.
Received into
Ambulances or
Hospitals.
Died in France in consequence of
diseases and wounds contracted
during the war, up to 31st Dec.,
1857 ........................................
Total
—
... 436,144
...
15,025
95,615
Thus, according to Dr. Chenu’s calculation, which cannot
be refuted, France lost 95,615 men in the Crimean War;
the number of men whom she had sent to the East at differ
ent periods of the struggle form a total of 309,268 ; hence
we see that the number of dead are, to those sent out,
nearly in the proportion of 1 to 3. It is interesting to in
vestigate the causes of this mortality. The preceding table
indicates that only 10,240 men were killed by the enemy;
the number of those who sunk in consequence of their
wounds was not much greater; there remains, then, about
75,000 men who died of cholera, of scurvy, or of other dis
eases. We have seen that the cholera carried off, during
the first four months of the expedition, on Turkish territory,
8,084 men ; and, according to the estimate of M. Jacquot,
the mortality attributable to scurvy comprehended one-third
of the total loss. The 20,000 men who died on the field of
battle, or in consequence of their wounds, had at least
obtained a speedy death, accompanied by innumerable glo
rious associations. But these 75,000 victims of cholera, of
typhus, and of hospital corruption, were obliged to undergo
all the delays, all the sufferings and miseries of a death of
unmitigated horror.
We are bound to make this distinction between the dis
eased and the wounded, for the amount of the calamities of
war can only be really understood when we take a correct
account of the sufferings of those unnoticed multitudes
slowly and needlessly consumed by disease.
If 95,615 Frenchmen were carried off* by death, are we to
believe that this is the limit of our losses ? Are we to
believe that the 214,000 soldiers who escaped death in this
disastrous expedition, returned to France in the same con
dition in which they left it ? Are we to believe that those
30,000 wounded men, whose wounds were not mortal, those
�8
10,000 cholera patients who were discharged from the
Turkish hospitals, and all those unfortunate beings tainted
and emaciated by scurvy, dysentery, and many other fright
ful diseases, brought back to France, to agriculture, to in
dustry, or to national service, the strength of which they
had been deprived ? Are we to believe that amongst the
214,000 survivors, who have spent so many days in hospitals,
there are not a great proportion—a quarter, at the lowest
estimate, probably a third, and perhaps a half—whose health
will always remain enfeebled, shattered, and prone to re
lapse ? What an enormous and incalculable loss of strength !
Here follow the losses of the English army :—
Received into
Ambulances or
Hospitals.
Wounded................................. ... 18,283
Died in hospitals in consequence of
wounds.................................
Killed on the field of battle ...
—
Fever patients and otherwise
diseased
......... ’.............. . ... 144,410
—
Died in hospital ................ .........
Died at sea or elsewhere
. ...
—
Total
.................. 162,693
Killed
or
Dead.
—
1,846
2,756
..
—
16,298
1,282
...
22,182
The effective force first despatched was 97,804 men ;
hence the mortality was about one-fourth. The immense
superiority of the sanitary service and of the general ma
nagement during the second part of the campaign, explains
why the mortality was relatively less in the English than in
the French army.
The aggregate losses of Piedmont, out of an effective
force of 12,000 men, were, according to Dr. Chenu—
Killed by the enemy................................................
Died in consequence of wounds
.........................
Died of various diseases in the Crimea..................
Died in the hospitals of the Bosphorus..................
Died subsequently in Piedmont .........................
Total
...........................
12
16
1,720
446
1
2,194
Here, again, is a mortality of 18 per cent., although the
�9
Piedmontese army, as is implied by the return of the killed,
took no active part in the siege.
The losses of the Turks and Russians can only be conjecturally ascertained. Dr. Chenu estimates at 10,000 the
number of Turks who perished by the fire of the enemy
before Sebastopol, and during the bloody campaign of Wal
lachia and of the Danube: he places at 25,000 the number
of Turks who died of disease.
Ä3 to the Russians, he believes that 30,000 must have
been killed on the battle-fields of Turkey and the Crimea:
he computes at 600,000 the number of Russian soldiers who
died of disease and fatigue. This computation may, at first
glance, appear exaggerated, but a little reflection shows
that it is founded upon legitimate reasoning. In the first
place it is necessary to take notice of the considerable levies
called out in Russia during the war. Instead of taking for
soldiers 7 serfs out of every thousand, as had been the prac
tice, there were in 1854 two levies, each ot 12 serfs per
thousand. It was the same in 1865. Thus, in these two
years there were raised 48 serfs per thousand instead of 14,
which was the normal number ; that is to say, there were
withdrawn from tillage three and a half times as many men
as in preceding years. In an empire so vast as Russia,
conscriptions, which in two years take 5 per cent, of the
number of serfs, furnish an enormous effective force, and
indicate at the same time the magnitude of the losses.
It must be remembered that the greatest part of these
recruits, in order to reach Sebastopol from the provinces,
whether central, northern, eastern, or western, had to march
three, four, or five hundred leagues across impoverished
districts and where roads are few. Account must also be
taken of the experience of Russia in preceding wars. One
of the most distinguished major officers of our time, the
Baron de Moltke, has written a remarkable monograph of
the war -with Turkey in 1828-29 (“ Der Russische Türkische
Feldzug in der Europäischen Türkei, 1828-29, dargestellt
durch Freiherr von Moltke”).
In six months, says Baron Moltke, from May, 1828, to
February, 1829, the Russian army, of which the effective
force did not exceed 100,000 men, numbered in ambulances
and hospitals 210,108 cases of disease, which was an
�30
average of two illnesses per man within six months, whilst
in the French army in the Crimea, during two years, there
were only 150 cases per 100 men. Major Moltke adds that
during the first campaign alone the Kussian army lost the
half of its effective force. In May, 1829, 1,000 men per
week entered the hospitals ; in July 40,000 men, nearly half
of the effective force, were in hospital; in five months from
March to July, 1829, 28,746 died of disease! The mor
tality increased during the following months, and Major
Moltke estimates at 60,000 the number of .Russians who
died of disease during this short campaign, out of an effec
tive force amounting to 100,000 men ! He adds that only
15,000 soldiers were able to recross the Pruth and that
the Kussian army was almost annihilated by disease.
In the absence of the precise statistics, which are not
obtainable, relative to the Kussian losses in the war of
1853-56, we have thought it appropriate to refer to the
above statistics borrowed from a standard work by one of
the most able and esteemed writers of the day. They will
furnish a base for comparison and justify the calculation
given by Dr. Chenu.
These enormous losses are usual in the Kussian armies.
Those of the Polish campaign in 1831, or of the Hungarian
campaign in 1849, were relatively quite as great. It is
said that the army of the Caucasus loses 20,000 men per
year, and it is estimated that the Kussian losses in the
Caucasus since the beginning of the contest with the Cir
cassian tribes, has been nearly 500,000 men !—{Quarterly
lie view, March 1854.) According to the admission of an
enthusiastic partisan of Kussia, Baron d’Haxthausen, half
the recruits formerly died of exhaustion, disease, and
debility, and this mortality is probably still nearly one
third. All these statements, borrowed from one of the
most valuable military monographs of our time, the book of
Baron Moltke, and from a work pervaded by Russomania,
that of Baron d’Haxthausen, are sufficient to warrant the
estimate of Dr. Chenu, that 630,000 Russians were cut off
by the Crimean War.
He then gives us the following general table of the losses
sustained by the whole of the armies brought into the field
during the war (Chenu, p. 617) :—
�11
Year.
Killed.
Died of Wound s
or Disease.
Total.
French Army...
1854-56 . . 10,240 85,375 95,615
English Army...
19,427 22,182
55
• . 2,755
Piedmontese Army 1855-56
12
2,182
2,194
Turkish Army... 1853-56 . . 10,000 25,000 35,000
Russian Army...
. 30,000 600,000 630,000
>>
Total Deaths ..........
53,007 731,984 784,991
Hence the Eastern War must have devoured nearly eight
hundred thousand men 1
Loss or Money in the Crimean War.
1. The Allies.—The loss of capital in the Crimean War
was not less enormous than the loss of life.
England had at the head of her finances when the war
broke out, a celebrated man whose reputation has increased
subsequently—Mr. Gladstone.
This financial economist
wished to meet the expenses of the war by increased tax
ation ; and taxes were actually imposed to an incredible
extent; but it, nevertheless, became necessary to have
recourse to a loan; just as in Erance where our financiers
had pronounced in favour of a loan, it was not the less
necessary, eventually, to have recourse to taxation, so
greatly did the costs of the war exceed all anticipation.
The following is the abstract of the English budgets from
1853 to 1857
Civil Service.
Army.
Navy.
1853 ............ £7,044,321 ... £9,685,079 ... £6,640,596
1854 ............ 7,638,650 ... 12,397,273 ... 12,182,769
1855 ............ 8,435,832 ... 29,377,349 ... 19,014,708
1856 ............ 8,392,622 ... 25,049,825 ... 16,013,995
1857 ............ 9,839,325 ... 15,107,249 ... 10,390,000
The budget of 1853 may be considered the normal budget
of the time of peace ; it is, however, greater than most
preceding budgets. If we add to it the four war budgets
from 1854, the year in which the war began, to 1857,
the year in which the last expenses were incurred, we find
a total of £81,931,690! Four budgets of army expenses
equal to that of 1853 would only amount to £38,740,316.
Hence, in this department alone, the Eastern War cost
�12
England £43,191,380. The same operation with the naval
department proves that the addition here is £31,039,088.
The extra charge for the two united services gives a sum
total of £74,230,468, or 1,855,761,700 francs: the total
expense which, the Eastern Expedition imposed upon
England !
To furnish these extraordinary costs, and to procure this
£71,230,468, England made unprecedented efforts. Her
taxation was increased in an incredible proportion. The
following are examples of this great increase. The tax on
brandy which had been 7s. lOd. in England, 3s. 8d. in Scot
land, and only 2s. 8d. in Ireland, was increased by succes
sive stages to 8s. in the three kingdoms ; it was then more
than double in Scotland and more than triple in Ireland.
The tax on malt had been from 2s. and 2s. 7d., according to
quality; from May 8, 1854, to July 5, 1856, during the
requirements of the war, it was raised to 3s. Id., and even
tually to 4s. This was an increase of 60 per cent.
The increase bore with special force upon the Income
Tax. The history of this tax is a curious one. It was
created by Pitt to meet the demands of the Avar against
Napoleon. It was abolished in 1816, re-established in 1S42
for three years, prolonged for a similar period from 1845 to
1848, imposed for one year ouly in 1851 and in 1852, and
authorised for seven years in 1853. The Act of 1853,
which legalised its prolongation, extended it to Ireland,
which had always been exempt from it. By the same Act,
the exemption from the tax enjoyed by incomes below £150
was limited to incomes below £100. But incomes of from
£100 to £150 were only to pay 5d. instead of 7d. in the
pound. The EasternWar brought about, after April Sth, 1854,
the doubliug of these taxes. The next year a halfpenny more
in the pound was added to incomes of from £100 to £150,
and 2d. for all others, so that the tax stood at Is. 4d. and
ll^d. These augmentations ceased in 1857, when there
was a return to the former taxation of 5d. and 7d.
Although these augmentations of taxation had raised the
revenue from 50 millions sterling, the average for each of
the ten years, from 1843 to 1853, to the enormous sum of
63 millions in 1855, 68 millions in 1856, and 66 millions in
1857 ; although the year 1853 had left a considerable
�13
surplus, it became necessary to have recourse to a loan, and
to augment that debt which there had been so many efforts
to reduce.
Crushing taxes, an augmented national debt, and exces
sive floating liabilities—such was the harvest reaped by
England from the Crimean War, which demanded for the
British army and navy an increased expenditure of more
than 1,855 million francs ! (£74,000,000).
France had to make sacrifices almost as great as her ally.
This may be judged of by the following table of her total
expenses, both ordinary and extraordinary, from 1850 to
1856
1850 ...... 1,472,637,238 francs
1851 ...... 1,461,329,644 „
1852
1,513,103.997 „
1853
1,547,597,009 „
1854
1,988,078,160 „
1855
2,399,217,840 „
1856
2,195,751,787 „
We see that the advance is frightful. Let us examine it
in detail. We may presume, as a fair supposition, that the
provisional budgets of the army and navy for 1854 repre
sent the normal expenses of these two departments in time
of peace. All that exceeds the extent of these budgets,
whether in the year 1854 or the following years, we may
attribute to the Eastern War.
According to the provisional budget of 1854, the expenses
of the army were to be 308,386,046 francs, and those of the
navy 116,476,001 francs. According to the budget of
1854, sanctioned by the law of the 3rd of June, 1857, the
expenses of the army were raised to 567,245,687 francs,
and those of the navy to 175,088,126 francs, in
addition to 2,797,301 francs for extraordinary expenses.
For the year 1855, according to the special budget, sanc
tioned by the law of the 6th of May, 1858, the expenses of
the army were raised to 865,607,477 francs, and those of
the navy to 212,677,474 francs, in addition to 68,821,S04
francs for extraordinary expenses. In that year, 1855, the
united expense of the two departments of army and navy
amounted to the enormous figure of 1,147 million francs I
In 1856, according to the special budget, sanctioned July
�6th, 1860, the expenses of the army were 693,153,176
francs, and those of the navy 220,163,567 francs, besides
5,555,146 francs for extraordinary expenses — in all,
918,870,889 francs. In 1857, the year in which the last
payments for the war were made, the expenses of the army
department still reached 410,919,408 francs, and those of
the navy 138,962,467 francs, besides 4,862,431 francs for
extraordinary expenses, or 100 millions more than these
budgets had required during the peace which preceded the
Crimean War.
From these statistics, and reckoning as normal taxation
the military and naval expenses of the provisional budget
of 1854, sanctioned June 10th, 1853, we find that the
Eastern War forced upon France more than 1,660 millions
of extraordinary outlay. We do not, however, conceal that
this sum is greater than that which is avowed in the minis
terial account of the Eastern War; but we feel that we
ought to adhere to the figures just given, inasmuch as they
result from an attentive examination of facts, and we
submit them in full confidence to all critics. The method
which we have pursued in obtaining them is as simple as it
is natural. The result must be beyond the reach of
objection.
Nearly the whole of these expenses were covered by
loans, but it was nevertheless necessary to have recourse to
taxation. The duty upon spirits was raised from 34 francs
the hectolitre to 50 francs : from this source alone a gain of
30 millions was anticipated. The tax upon railway fares
was similarly increased, and was expected to produce
6 millions. The freight of goods forwarded at express speed
was tithed: this would bring in 1,800,000 francs. Subse
quently the second general tax of one-tenth was imposed,
and which, as is well known, continued long after the war.
This last tax was calculated to increase the revenue by
52 million francs.
Thus taxes were created by the war, which lasted longer
than the war. The Treasury was burdened with a per
manent charge for the interest of loans. After the special
budget of 1853, authorised by the law of June 25th, 1856, the
interest of the debt only absorbed 374,484,506 francs 74 cen
times ; in the special budget of 1856 the interest required
�15
71,709,380 francs additional. The floating debt, which in
1853 was 614,980,562 francs, became 895,281,625 francs in
1857. The deficiencies and reimbursements, which were
98 millions in 1853, amounted to 110 millions in 1854,
121 millions in 1855, 128 millions in 1856; the expenses
of administration and of the collection of revenue, which
were only 151 millions in 1853, amounted to 164 millions
in 1854, and to 179 millions in 1855. Whilst expenses
were thus augmenting, receipts remained stationary ; thus
the product of indirect taxes was just the same in 1854 as
in 1853. The worst financial evil of the war, in addition to
an increase of 1,660 millions in immediate expenses, was the
permanently high amount of the army and navy budgets
during the subsequent period of peace. These two depart
ments have since involved much greater expenses than
previously. It is thus in all wars: they first produce a
sharp attack of disease, more or less dangerous, though
temporary ; but they always leave behind them a chronic
disarrangement, which occasions permanent disorders and
an habitual condition of anxiety.
Piedmont affords a proof of this. In the special budget
of 1856, which M. Lanza presented to the legislature in
Januarv, 1859, the extraordinary expenses of the kingdom
of Sardinia, on account of the Eastern War, were reported
as follows :—
Army.
Navy.
Total.
Actual payments in 1855... 19,790,741 2,416,467 22,207,208
Actual payments in 1856... 22,654,659 4,897,180 27,551,839
Expenses reported..............
2,500,928
645,415
3,146,343
Demands recognised, but}
not liquidated up to the 1
2,196
.........
2,196
end of 1856..................... 3
Total...... (francs) 44,948,524 7,959,062 52,907,586
Thus this little sub-Alpine nation had spent nearly
53 millions for the Eastern War in addition to the ordinary
expenses of its army and navy. Further, in 1855 and 1856
it contracted two war-loans, one of £2,000,000, and the
other of 30 million francs. It was already marching with
rapid strides along that perilous path of loans which was
destined to involve it in the perplexities in which enlarged,
but young, Italy now finds itself.
�16
Turkey.—It is to be wished that we could ascertain the
share contributed by Turkey to the expenditure of the allies;
but here certainty and precision fail us. M. Engène Poujade
made a calculation, in 1857, of the amount of the Turkish
debt, including the loans contracted during the Eastern
War, the paper money, bearing interest or otherwise, the
old and new bonds, the old and new arsenal debts, and the
various other debts, returned or not returned, after the war.
The total of these amounts he estimated to be at least
705 million francs.—{Annual Report of the Public Credit,
1st year, 265-66.) It is difficult to ascertain exactly how
much of this sum should be attributed to the Crimean
War; but if we reflect upon the expenses which must have
been involved in the autumn and winter campaign in
Wallachia and in the Asiatic campaign, the maintenance of
troops at Sebastopol, an estimate of 400 millions as the
Turkish share in the expenses of the war will be evidently
considerably below the real amount.
Then we have as a general total—
1,855 million francs for England ;
1,660 million „ for France ;
400 million „ for Turkey ;
53 million „ for Piedmont.
In other words, the Eastern Expedition cost the allies
3,9G8 million francs (or £158,720,000) !
2. Russia.—Let us now endeavour to determine, with the
utmost attainable precision, the costs of Russia in conse
quence of this war. “ It is difficult to fix the exact amount of
the Russian public debt,” wrote M. Maurice Block ; “ the
Russian official return respecting it appears to be compiled
w ith so little attention to clearness that those who seek to
receive information from it find its statistics mutually
inconsistent.”—(Puissance Comparée des divers Etats de
TEurope.) Recent works have thrown more light on this
obscure subject, which can be really investigated, provided
sufficient discrimination is exercised. The statements pub
lished three years ago by M. Wolowski in the Revue des
Peux RLondes, further corrected by the definite information
furnished by M. Horn in the “ Year-book of Finances,” and
the anticipatory calculations of M. Leon Faucher at the
�17
beginning of the war, have combined greatly to simplify the
difficulties of this question.
The amount of the Russian consolidated debt, previous to
the commencement of the difficulties with the Porte, was
336,219,412 silver roubles, or 1,513 million francs. In 1857
this debt had reached 522 millions of silver roubles, or
185,785,588 roubles more than it was before the war, that
is to say, 743,142,352 francs. The amount of bills of credit
and paper money before the war did not much exceed 300
million roubles ; at the end of 1854 it was 356 millions ;
in 1855 it was 509 millions; in 1856, 689 millions; in
1857, the year of settlement, it attained 735 million
roubles, or 2,940 million francs. But this was not all the
cost of the war. The Russian Government recalled 100
millions which it had lent to other nations in 1847, and
of which 50 millions were in the French funds. It diverted
from their destination a large portion of the funds intended
to guarantee the repayment of bills of credit. These funds
amounted, in March, 1854, to nearly 160 million silver
roubles ; in the month of September they were only
146,500,000 roubles. They continually decreased during
the war until they fell to about 100 million roubles.
We must also take into account the voluntary contribu
tions to the Russian Government. The clergy, at the
beginning of 1854, offered 80 million francs ; other volun
tary contributions were shown by M. Leon Faucher to be
about 100 million francs. If we suppose, which is probable,
that during the remaining period of the war these voluntary
gifts were doubled, that is to say, making, with a sum of
180 millions contributed bv the clergy, an amount, according
to M. Leon Faucher, of 360 millions, we shall arrive at a
total of 3,183 million francs (£127,000,000). We must
further take cognisance of the increase of the principal
taxes (for instance, by a ukase of December 1, 1854, the
duty on salt was raised from 28 kopecs to 44, and all the
other indirect taxes shared the same fate). Neither must
we lose sight of contributions in kind, which, in a country
like Russia, must be very considerable. It must be remem
bered that requisitions for provender, &c., were made on a
grand scale in that immense empire, then traversed every
where by thousands of men who were marching to the
o
�18
Crimea, even from the most distant provinces. The requi
sitions made by the Russians in Wallachia alone are
estimated by M. Ubicini at 50 million francs. If all these
things are taken into account it will be evident that Russia
did not spend less than 4,000 million francs on the Crimean
War (£160,000,000) !
Further Losses involved by the Crimean War.
1, Austria.—We have not yet done with the extra
ordinary expenses which the Crimean War imposed upon
the European powers. Even neutrality is sometimes costly.
Austria affords an instance of this. The following are the
militarv expenses of Austria for the three years 1855, ’56,
and ’57
1855.
1856.
1857.
Ordinary expenses ...114,320,715 flor. 109,695,558 106,890,019
Extraord. expenses ...101,720,117 „ 14,138,279 11,130,634
The ordinary expenses of the ministry of war for 1857
still continued higher than those expenses were previously
to the Turko-Russian conflict. We may, however, take
this sum of 107 million florins as the normal rate of
military expenses in time of peace ; we then perceive that
the additional expense which the Crimean War imposed
upon Austria amounted to 137,129,000 florins, or about
343 million francs (£13,720,000). It is known that, during
the Eastern War, Austria contracted three great national
loans (so called) which were professedly needed to liberate
the state from its old obligations to the bank, but the
greater part of which was otherwise appropriated, and,
notably, towards the extraordinary expenses called for by
the uncertain neutrality which the nation foresaw would
have to be maintained during the struggle.
2. Prussia, Sweden, fyc.—The same war, and the possible
complications which it might involve, determined the
Prussian Government to demand of the chambers, in 1854,
an extraordinary loan of 30 million thalers (112,500,000
francs) for the ministry of war. At the same time various
taxes were increased. It is, however, to be specially noticed
that the Prussian Government had the wisdom only to
expend a portion of the loan on armaments.
�19
Sweden and Denmark also voted special loans, and the
Germanic Confederation made similar preparations.
If we add these expenses to the 343 millions expended by
Austria, it must be admitted that, without exaggeration,
the total expenditure of the neutral powers amounted to
500 million francs (£20,000,000), which, with the 4,000
million francs expended by the four allies, and the similar
4,000 million francs which the war must have entailed
upon Russia, gives a total of 8,500 million francs, or
£340,000,000!
Additional Losses oe Russia.
But is even this the whole loss ? Certainly not. That
which a war costs to the public finances of a country, or
that which figures in the budget, only represents a small
portion of the losses imposed upon the national property,
such as the suspension of industry, the ruin of commerce,
the unsettlement of all financial prospects, the bankruptcies,
the enforced idleness—these are exceedingly serious evils.
Any one who supposes that the Eastern War only cost
Russia 4,000 million francs, can have no idea of the immense
loss of capital which this war occasioned. Never, since the
great Continental Blockade, has a nation been placed under
the pressure of a struggle so formidable to all its financial
and commercial interests. Its ports being blockaded, per
mitted neither exportation nor importation; its ships were
rotting, at anchor, behind the fortifications. After the
month of March, 1854, not a single Russian flag was to be
seen in the ports of France or of Great Britain, and those
which had been delayed by wnnter were sold to escape the
risk of seizure.—fBlackivood's Magazine, April 1, 1854.)
The trading vessels which allowed themselves to be over
taken in the Baltic, in the Black Sea, and even in the Sea
of Azov (where they appeared to be protected by the fleet)
had been destroyed. At how much are we to estimate the
value of these ships and their cargoes ? And how can we
ascertain the value of the injuries and of the loss of interest
of capital involved by the rotting of so many vessels in har
bour ? Even neutral ships did not enjoy full liberty of
arrival and departure, if loaded with Russian cargoes, as
�22
which burdened the Turkish people ? And, lastly, was it not
the case that both France and England were specially incon
venienced by being prevented from having recourse to Russia
for provisions to supply the deficiency of their harvests ?
Except in Russia, the harvests were at that period smaller
than usual throughout Europe. If peace had continued,
Russia could have easily supplied her neighbours with 40
million bushels during the two years (stated by M. de
Molinari, in the Journal des Economistes). But her crops
were shut up at Odessa by the allied fleets, which, in order
to injure the Russians, starved their own countries. The
Tory reviews announced that, for a few shillings more per
bushel, a ready supply of wheat could be obtained from the
far-west of America.—(Blackwood's Magazine, April 1,
1854.) But “a few shillings more per bushel” are suffi
cient to substitute scarcity for abundance.
Once more, is it not certain that France and England
injured themselves permanently by ruining Russia ? The
amount of business that can be carried on with a nation,
just as with an individual, is in proportion to its resources.
Everything which impoverishes a nation also injures those
who do business with that nation. It is foolish to ruin
him who buys from us, or who sells to us, for by so doing
we deprive him of the means of purchase or production.
In fact it was quite as much to the detriment of English
and French industry, as to that of Russian commerce, that
our cruisers blockaded the Baltic ports. And the fleet
which closed the harbours of the Black Sea were no less
mischievous to the hungry populations of England and
France than to the Russian corn-growers.
Summary.
We have now endeavoured to ascertain the accumulated
losses which were caused by that Crimean War, which was
so thoughtlessly entered upon. Eight thousand Jive hun
dred million francs (340 million pounds sterling') is the
acknowledged burden imposed by this war upon the public
finances of Europe. But it is absolutely impossible to
calculate the sum of those indirect losses which we have
alluded to, or of a multitude of other losses which have not
�23
come under our notice; it would be presumptuous even to
attempt an approximate estimate of these.
THE WAR IN ITALY (1859).
Respecting the losses of the Italian War, we do not
possess any such comprehensive works as those which have
afforded such valuable aid in our reviews of the Crimean
Expedition. Dr. Chenu is now preparing a work on this
subject, and, pending its publication, we are limited to a
critical study of various official papers which, in too many
cases, bear indications of haste and confusion. We shall
take for our chief guide the paper read by Baron Larrey to
the Academy of Medicine, with numerous corrections from
subsequent statistics, furnished either by distinguished
statisticians and surgeons, or derived from recent minis
terial documents.
The general estimate which has been arrived at as to the
total losses in the Italian War, including the number of
persons killed, wounded, and missing in the three armies,
is as follows, viz. 38,650 Austrians, 17,775 Frenchmen,
6,575 Sardinians ; total, 63,000. These results have been
obtained by the researches of one of our most distinguished
military statisticians, M. Boudin, editor of the “Journals of
Medicine and Military Surgery.” This general amount of the
losses is, however, only estimated at 61,978, according to
the official dispatches collected under the direction of
Col. Saget, the head of the historical and statistical depart
ment of the Ministry of War. The discrepancy between
these two estimates is only 1,022 ; and it should be remarked
that in Colonel Saget's papers no account has been taken of
a considerable number of missing and wounded men whose
recovery has not been notified to the hospitals.
The greatest confusion is indicated in some of these
official returns. At Magenta, for example, certain official
dispatches return the number of killed and wounded at only
3,223 ; subsequent dispatches raise the number to 4,535,
including, it is true, the missing, most of whom were even
tually found amongst the dead. It is the same as regards
�24
Solferino, where the first calculation of the killed and
wounded in the French army was 8,530, an amount which was
increased in later documents to 11,670 private soldiers, and
720 officers in addition. In such cases the larger and more
recent returns are the more correct.
“ The statistics of the dead,” says Dr. Larrey, “ appear to be
more difficult to ascertain than those of the wounded. Whilst
giving, in the first place, from the official returns, a total of 8,084
men as killed on the field of battle alone, in the armies of
France, Sardinia, and Austria, those statistics include, so far
as the French army is concerned, the number of persons who,
throughout the campaign, died of wounds or of disease. But
how large a number died subsequently, and how many, who
were reported as missing, may have been drowned in rivers or
have perished in some other way ! ”—Larrey, page 61.
During the campaign itself, disease exercised but little
influence on our army; but during the subsequent occu
pation of Italy and the return to France it made many
victims.
The mortality then caused 11 appears to have
exceeded, in the French army, the number of men killed on
the field of battle.”—{Larrey, page 62.)
“ We are
dropping our men at all the hospitals along the route ! ”
exclaimed a regimental doctor, on the return of the army.
A publication, emanating from the General Statistical
Board of France, gives us the following information re
specting the deaths in the French army in 1859 :—
In
France.
In
Algeria.
Died on the field of battle
or in ambulances..........
32
54
Died in hospitals .......... 5,835 2,361
112
24
Suicides .........................
In
Italy.
In
Rome.
Total.
5,872 0 5,868
4,360 84 12,640
167
31 0
Totals
5,979 2,439 10,263 84 18,675
The 10,263 soldiers who died in Italy were, certainly,
not the only victims of that war; to these must be added
the number of those who, after the campaign, entered the
French hospitals to sink under the wounds and diseases
received during the expedition; and these must have been
very numerous, if we receive the statements of Dr. Larrey.
And, if we follow the plan adopted by all military statis
ticians, by Dr. Chenu, Dr. Laeffleur, and by the authors of
the English reports on the Eastern War, we ought also to
�25
add the number of those who, in the year following the
close of the campaign, perished from its consequences. We
cannot, then, hesitate to admit that the Italian War cost
the lives of at least 15,000 Frenchmen.
Then, as to the other combatants, we must bear in mind
that, for several reasons, such as the greater precision of
our weapons, the larger calibre of our projectiles, and the
disorder inseparable from defeat, the mortality from wounds
must have been incalculably greater in the Austrian army
than in the French. The deaths from disease must also
have been far more numerous in the enemy’s camp than in
ours, from the more excessive fatigue of the troops and the
deficiency of provisions. After the battle of Solferino the
overcrowded hospitals of Verona were swept by typhus and
contagious corruption.—(Larrey, page 57.) Turning our
attention to the Italian army we find, from the observations
of Dr. Cazalas, that, from several causes, there was com
paratively a much greater mortality from wouuds amongst
their troops than in the French army.
Considering all these circumstances, we may legitimately
conclude that, inasmuch as the number of our troops killed
by the fire of the enemy and by disease was 15,000, the
total loss of life in the three armies from those causes, and
from deaths through fatigue and privation, must have
amounted to 45 or 50 thousand !
Loss of Money by the Italian War.
From losses of life we turn to losses of money. "We shall
not here meet with those formidable lines of figures which
encountered us in our investigation of the Crimean War.
But we shall enter into certain details relative to the
disastrous expedients, to which an empire in extremity was
obliged to have recourse, in order to meet the ruinous
expenses in which it had been involved by its unwar
rantable pride. We shall analyse closely those burdensome
contrivances which the evil genius of Austrian finance
suggested to her. We shall see the abyss of paper-money
and of national deficit open before us and become deeper
and deeper, and shall perceive that the war in Lombardv
was, both as regards Austria and Italy, if not the first and
only cause, at any rate the principal source, of the economic
�26
and financial confusion which continues to arrest the com
mercial and industrial progress of two great nations, and
which still deprives them of the spirit of enterprise, and
condemns them to inaction and wretchedness. We shall
also witness the counter-stroke of war upon the neutral
Powers ; we shall watch loans and extraordinary credits
drawing successively within their deadly coil all the German
States, and the contagion of armaments and foolish military
expenditure spreading itself even amongst those whose
situation should render them safe from any fear of war.
France.—So far as France is concerned, the debts autho
rised at first, by the Budget Law, for the Ministry of War,
in 1859, amounted to 337,447,500 francs. Successive im
perial decrees added the following supplementary debts :—
Francs.
Decree of July 2, 1859
„
July 14, „
„
Aug. 17, „
99
„
„
99
99
Dec. 11, „
Feb. 18,1860
850,000
131,360,000
24,470,000
23,500,000
26 380,000
9,380,000
Total
215,940,000
From this there must be deducted the debts an
nulled by the decrees of Feb. 18 and 28, 1860
30,122,000
Balance of debts sanctioned by decrees ...
... 185,818,000
Two former debts, authorised by special laws
March 31 and June 4, 1859, amounted to ... 90,158,691
This gives, with the Budget, a total of ...
To this must be added for closed accounts
276,018,691
613,466,191
7,350,475
Making the Army Budget of 1859 amount to ...
620,816,666
This amount was never before surpassed, except in two
instances, those of 1855 and 1856; when in the first case
the expenses of the army budget rose to 865 millions, and
in the second to 693 millions. The total expenses in the
navy budget of 1859 were 213,800,000 francs, and those
for Algeria and the Colonies 39,600,000. This is 92 mil
lions more than in the preceding years of peace. The
�27
Ministry of War, on its part, had required 283 millions
more than the normal amount in time of peace.
We are thus enabled to estimate the expenses of France
for the Italian War at 375.^ millions (£15,020,000). It is
evident that the loan of 500 millions was far from being
absorbed. The special budget of public works, voted
June 26, 1860, authorised the application, to great works
of general utility, “ of the funds of the loan then remaining
unabsorbed.”
Austria.—Thisltalian War imposed still greater sacrifices
upon Austria. On the very day of the crossing of the Ticino
(April 29) the Vienna Gazette announced to the Austrian
people that a decree, dated April 11, had authorised the
Bank of Vienna to refuse specie payments for its notes and
to enforce its paper currency. The Bank repaid this favour
by a loan of 134 million florins (£13,400,000) on the
security of a public debt of 200 million florins to be con
tracted on the first suitable occasion. But this was
merely an initiative measure, as a commencement of the
business.
The impossibility of having immediate recourse to a
public loan necessitated the levying of heavy duties. The
accumulation of taxation was pushed to its utmost limits
and extended to every source of revenue. The decrees in
the month of May embraced every province. Hungary
which had hitherto been exempted from taxes on wine
and butcher’s meat, was now assessed for these articles.
Throughout the empire the taxes on articles of consumption
were increased 20 per cent. In the economy of nations
as in that of individuals, in proportion as the development
of general wealth is diminished, the greater is the extent
to which the expenses of consumption, strictly so termed
(the consumption of food), encroach upon the total income
of individuals or communities. These excessive taxes upon
butcher’s meat, corn, wine, and beer, weigh much more
heavily on the people of Austria than they would on the
populations of France or England. The duty upon salt,
largely increased since 1850, was again raised by the decree
of May 7. The poorer classes of Austria were already
paying an annual average of 33 million florins upon salt;
they were henceforth required to pay 38 million florins
(£3,400,000).
�28
The decrees of May 7, which so rigorously taxed articles
of consumption, also extended to business matters, and in
creased the charges on all fees, stamps, entries, and regis
tration. The increase varied from 15 to 40 per cent., and
this at a time when the stagnation of business and the
depreciations and changes of currency already rendered
transactions so difficult and hazardous.
A decree of May 13 equally increased the direct taxation,
not only for the whole continuance of the war, but also
during “ the extraordinary state of affairs brought about by
the events of the war.” The tax on cultivated land, already
ranging from 12 to 16 per cent., was augmented onesixth, as was also the duty on rentals. The tax on country
residences, or class-tax, was raised one-half. The indus
trial taxation, laying burdens upon manufacturers, traders,
and artisans, and also the income-tax, were increased
one-fifth. What suffering and misery were thus laid upon
the people for the presumed honour of the House of
Hapsburg !
But nothing equalled the grievance of paper-money and
the sufferings springing from this source. It has been
appropriately remarked that the depreciation of paper
money appears to be subject to a law analogous to that
which regulates the rapid descent of a mass of rock falling
from a mountain. It proceeds according to a geometrical
progression. The paper of the United States, during the
¡Secession War, was maintained for a long time at a loss of
a fifth or a fourth. Then it rapidly descended to a depre
ciation of one-half, and still more rapidly to a depreciation
of two-thirds. If the South had been less exhausted and
could have continued the war one year longer, the loss
upon “ greenbacks” would probably have been five-sixths.
—(Michael Chevalier in the Revue des Deux Mondes, of
June 1, 1866.) Austria, in 1859, was in a similar position.
She was compelled to procure effective resources ; in other
words—gold and silver.
On the 25th of May, 1859,
she forced on the Lombard and Venetian people a specie
loan of 75 millions. The city of Venice could only pay the
first instalment by increasing taxation on income and in
dustrial occupations 85 per cent, and by adding several
additional kreutzers (halfpence) to the already extreme
�29
burden of the tax on rentals. Every imaginable expedient
teas had recourse to, to gain possession of all the gold and
silver in the, empire. The State, which only paid in paper,
demanded by a decree of the 29th of April that the custom
house charges should only be paid in specie. This was
the ruin of the foreign trade. The merchant, who was
already paying an exchange rate of from 30 to 50 per
cent, upon the price of goods bought abroad, now had
to pay a similar rate upon the specie required for fees at
the custom-house. The last of these ruinous decrees was
to involve bankruptcy. The State was irresistibly borne
on to it. On the 11th of June, a decree suspended the
payment of metallic currency throughout the period during
which the extraordinary circumstances, involved by the war,
should continue. It was indeed time that the Peace of
Villafranca should be conceded.
On the return of peace the Bank was, more than ever,
unable to resume payments in specie. With a specie total of
79 millionflorins, it had circulated notesfor 453 millions! The
augmentations of taxation, terrible as they were, were main
tained indefinitely by the decree of December 1S59. The
army budget had become immoderately swelled. It was
106 million florins in 1858. In 1859 it rose to 292 millions,
this was an increase of 186 million florins (£19,200,000).
But this was only to meet the expenses of 1859. The army
budget of 1860 shows 138 millions of ordinary, and 36
millions of extraordinary, expenses—in all more than 174
millions; consequently it exceeds by 68 million florins the
army budget of 1858. The budget of 1861, on the contrary,
manifestly approaches the budget of 1858, which may be
considered the normal budget of the army department in
time of peace. The special expenses of Austria for the
Italian War are therefore 186 million florins spent in 1859,
and in addition 68 millions which were not paid till 1860—
a total of 254 million florins (or about £26,000,000).
But these figures afford no correct idea of the burdens of
the population. The interruptions of trade and industry,
the taxable resources devoured by the treasury, the variations
of currency, the disadvantages of exchange—all these
disasters were to become chronic maladies for Austria. Such
was the cost of a false plea of honour! To estimate the
�32
been raised to nearly 1,000 millions, and notwithstanding,
also, all the increased taxation, there resulted, as in Austria,
a considerable deficit. According to the report presented
by M. Galeotti, on behalf of the commission which had been
appointed to consider a demand for the authorisation of a
new loan of 150 millions in 18G0, the financial account of
1859 had left a total deficit of 104,399,956 francs. The
war of 1859 had cost Piedmont 255 million francs, in
addition to the increase of 10 per cent, upon all taxation,
and irrespective of the incalculable evils of paper-money.
France spent 375| millions (£15,000,000); Piedmont,
255 millions (£10,200,000); and Austria, 650 millions
(£26,000,000) ;
making a total of l,280i millions
(£51,200,000). But this is by no means the sum of the
expenses occasioned by that war. We must also take into
account the outlay of Germany upon special armaments.
Germany.—It is well known that the war of 1859 aroused
a great excitement in Germany, that suddenly old animosities
were revived, and that a convulsion of anger agitated all the
Germanic populations throughout the territory of the Con
federation. Hence originated extensive warlike preparations
which necessitated supplementary credits and loans.
In Prussia, the law of May 21st, 1859, which provided
for the possibly necessary contingency of calling out the
army during the course of the year, authorised the Minister
of Finance to increase, to the extent of 25 per cent., the
income tax, the land tax, and the corn and timber taxes.
The Cabinet Council of June 14th, which ordered the
calling-out of six battalions, was immediately followed by
the above increase of taxation, which continued long after
the end of the war. A second law, also passed on the 21st
of May, authorised the government to incur every expense
which might be rendered necessary by the “ Kriegsbereitschaft ” (readiness for war). According to this permission,
the government might borrow money to the extent of
40 million thalers (£6,000,000). A royal order, of May
26th, immediately prescribed the negotiation of a loan of
30 million thalers (£4,500,000).
The expenses of the smaller German States were, in pro
portion, much greater than those of Prussia. In the Grand
Duchy of Baden, the special military expenses, in conse
�33
quence of the “ Marschbereitschaft,” amounted to 4,257,000
florins (£364,400). This was provided for by the appro
priation of money raised for the construction of railways,
the completion of which was accordingly postponed. On
the 7th of June, the Chambers of Hesse Darmstadt
unanimously voted a loan of 4 million florins (£333,333).
Electoral Hesse had voted a loan of 700,000 thalers
(£105,000), which was exhausted by the end of June,
1859, and the government then demanded a fresh loan of
1,300,000 thalers (£171,000). Wurtemberg raised by loan
7 million florins (£583,333). In Hanover, the special
military expenses amounted to ll| million francs. In
Saxony, subsidies were voted of 5,636,725 thalers (£845,508).
In Bavaria, the loans for special armaments reached to
80 million francs. Hence, for these seven secondary States,
we have an expense of 152 million francs. If to this we
add the expenses of Prussia and those of the other smaller
States, respecting which latter we have not been able to
procure positive information, the costs of the three belli
gerent Powers are found to be 1,280 million francs, and the
total expenses of both belligerents and neutrals 1,500 million
francs (£60,000,000).
We have then, to sum up, a cost of 60 million pounds
sterling imposed on the finances of Central Europe; heavv
taxes, temporarily levied at first, but ultimately rendered
permanent by the course of events; the augmentation of
war-budgets which never completely returned to their pre
vious level; the commercial and industrial disorganisation
of Italy and Austria—these constitute the penalty paid by
Europe for that very short war, which, by the exercise of a
little good feeling on the part of the government at Vienna,
might have been so easily avoided.
THE AMERICAN WAR.
Of all the instances of the squandering of human life
caused by war, this is the most frightful. In four years the
North called to arms 2,656,000 men. To stem this tide or
manhood rolled against her, the South opposed a dyke, long
D
�34
insuperable, of 1,100,000 human breasts. And before the
South could be conquered these 1,100,000 soldiers, many of
whom were youths of sixteen or old men of sixty, were to
be violently swept aside, and more than half of them were
to sink under the force of the struggle.
This gigantic strife involved a carnage previously unheard
of, and which should obtain the attention of philanthropists
and be recorded by a faithful historian. We have before us
a remarkable work, the Report, prepared for general circu
lation, by Major-General Joseph K. Barnes, surgeon-general
of the United States army. (Report on the Extent and
Nature of the Materials available for the Preparation of a
Medical and Surgical History of the Rebellion^)
This
medical and surgical history is not yet completed, but the
published materials furnish most valuable information.
The monthly reports issued from rather more than one
half of the regiments in the field, during the first year, give
17,496 cases of wounds by fire-arms. The monthly reports
issued from three-fourths of the regiments, during the year
ending June 30th, 1S63, present 55,974 cases of wounds.
The lists of wounded persons carried off the battle-fields in
1861 and 1865 include more than 114,000 names. But we
are informed that these returns still await completion by
additions from the reports of general hospitals, where many
wounded persons were received whose names had neither
been registered by the hospital clerks on the battle-fields
nor by the regimental surgeons. There should also be
added the names of those who were killed during the
conflicts. There would thus be given a total of 221,000
wounded, without reckoning those killed on the field. This
enormous amount of wounded far surpasses the total of
similar cases in all the armies engaged in the Crimean War.
To understand clearly the gigantic and unprecedented
features of this American War, it is necessary to enter into
special details, and to compare the respective number of
cases of particular injuries or important operations in the
Union army with those in the French and English armies in
the Crimea. If we take, for instance, fractures of the femur
by fire-arms, we find that in the French army in the Crimea
there were 459 injuries of this description and 194 in the
English army, whilst more than 5,000 similar cases were
registered in the United States army. If we take some
�35
important operation, as the point of comparison, for example
the amputation of the upper portion of the humerus, the
Crimean reports mention 16 of these amputations in the
English and 42 in the French army, whilst in the American
army we iind reported 575 operations of this nature. (Recueil
de JUedecin et de Chirurgie Militaire, vol. xvii. pp. 390,
391.) Such details are characteristic, and indicate the extent
and horror of the massacre.
If we pass on from wounds to diseases, we find a result
more satisfactory to humanity. Two distinguishing features
of the American War are the considerable comparative
increase in the number of victims under the enemy’s fire,
and a similarly great diminution in the number of persons
visited by diseases. This demonstrates that the means of
destruction have made gigantic progress, but also that
superior measures for the restoration and maintenance of
health are being extensively adopted. During the first year
of the war, with an effective force of 290,936 men, 14,183
died of disease. In the second year, with an effective of
644,508 men, the number of deaths from disease was 42,010.
During the whole continuance of the war about 97,000 men,
in the Northern armies, were killbd under fire, and 184,000
died of disease; in all 281,000 men.
The losses of the South were much greater; but on this
subject we do not possess any scientific work. In the fol
lowing statistics furnished to us, the number of dead is not
distinguished from that of the wounded:—
Alabama ........... ...
Arkansas........... ...
Florida............... ...
G eorgia ........... ...
Louisiana........... ...
Mississippi ....... ...
Missouri ........... ...
North Carolina ...
South Carolina ...
Maryland........... ...
Tennessee........... ...
Texas ............... ...
Virginia ........... ...
Enlisted.
Killed or Maimed.
120,000 ... ........... 70,000
50,000 ... ........... 30,000
17,000 ... ........... 10,000
131,000 ... ........... 76,000
60,000 ... ........... 34,000
78,000 ... ........... 45,000
40,000 ... ........... 24,000
140,000 ...
65,000 ... ........... 40,000
40,000 ... ........... 24,000
60,000 ... ........... 34,000
93,000 ... ........... 53,000
180,000 ... ........... 105,000
Total....... , 1,074,000 ... ........... 630,000
�36
We have here a total of 630,000 killed or maimed out of
1,074,000 enlisted, or GO per cent.! If, now, we compare
these losses with the total amount of the white population
in the South, we see that they form more than 10 per cent.,
or 20 per cent, of the male population.
It may be said, then, that the American War swept off
nearly all the youth of the Southern States; and this is no
metaphor, but a literally true statement.
If to these 630,000 men, lost to the South, we add the
2Sl,000 who were killed in the Northern armies, we have a
total of more than 900 thousand men. But it must not be
overlooked that, in the return of 630,000 men, many maimed
are included. If we consider that the immense majority of
the Southern losses were occasioned by disease and fatigue,
by the poor constitution of the army which embraced youths
of sixteen and elderly men of sixty, and by the almost total
absence of rest for want of reinforcements, we may estimate
that four-fifths of these 630,000 men as killed and onefifth as maimed, we shall then obtain, in the two armies,
a total of nearly 800 thousand dead! *
Financial Losses.
The financial losses were still more unprecedented. “ The
North expended upon this war 14,000 million francs,” says
M. Vigo Roussillon (Puissance Militaire des Etats-Unis,
since the Secession War.)
He states further that it
cost the South nearly as much, and that altogether the
civil war entailed upon the United States of America
more than 25,000 million francs (£1,000,000,000) in actual
military expenses, and fully double this sum if account is
taken of the loss of productive power and the value of the
property and crops destroyed.
It is our opinion that M. Vigo Roussillon and the public
generally form too low an estimate of the actual expenses of
this war. To say that the American War cost the Northern
States 14,000 million francs (£560,000,000) is to mistake the
amount of the debt contracted for the actual sum of the
costs. We have previously protested against this defective
mode of calculation, which takes no account of the taxation,
the increase in which was enormous during the years of the
Vids Note at the end of this work.
�Secession War. The very exceptional nature of this high
taxation is indicated by the fact that, on the return of peace,
it was found practicable to pay off an extraordinary pro
portion of the debt. The following are, in round figures, the
budgets of the army and navy, from I860 to 18G6 :—
1860- 61 ..........
35 million dollars
1861- 62 .......... 437
„
„
1862- 63 .......... 662
„
1863- 64 .......... 776 „
1864- 65 .......... 1,153
„
„
1865- 66 .......... 327
„
„
{Moniteur of Nov. 3, /866.)
The budget for the army and navy had already required,
in 1860-61, a sum much greater than those of previous years,
which had never exceeded 25 million dollars. We may, how
ever, take the sum of 35 millions, reached in 1860-61, as the
normal amount for the army and navy budgets in time of
peace, and may assume that, if the struggle had not broken
out, this sum would not have been surpassed in the sub
sequent annual expenditures. The total amount of the five
military budgets from 1861 to 1866 w’ould then have been
175 million dollars. But its actual amount, on the other
hand, was 3,355 million dollars, that is, 3,180 million dollars
for extraordinary war expenses.
Now 3,180 million dollars are about 17,000 million francs
(£636,000,000). Thus a very simple calculation has fur
nished us with an estimate of extraordinary war expenses
surpassing, by about 2,000 millions, the amount of the
American debt.
But to these 17,000 millions must be added the amount
of voluntary contributions. According to the Aeiü York
Herald and Dr. Evans, these contributions exceeded,
at the commencement of 1862, 1,000 million francs.
According to M. Elyse Bed us, they had reached 1,144
millions by the 1st of March, 1864. The Sanitary Com
mission and auxiliary or similar societies spent 120 millions
in drugs, maintenance, clothing, and hospital expenses. We
thus obtain the amount of 18,264 millions, which is fully
conceded, and from which there is nothing to abate.
But we have not yet reached the complete amount. We
should add the expenses of states, counties and districts, in
armaments and in bounties to volunteers. The bounties
�38
were very considerable; they amounted to 2,000 dollars
(10,700 francs) per head, certainly the half of which was
paid by the states, districts or counties. M. Vigo Roussillon
gives us the total of these payments to the army, from
July 1, I860. This sum is only 5,145,000,195 francs,
which would only be 1,938 francs per head per each
volunteer. It must surely be admitted that the states,
districts, or counties furnished a sum at least equivalent.
The expenses of the North would amount to 23,500 millions !
{940 million pounds sterling /) As to the expenses of the
South, it is impossible to estimate them.
We venture
to say that the whole of the circulating, or portable, capital
in the rebel States was almost entirely absorbed by the war;
and as to representing statistically an amount which can in
no wise be calculated, we shall not have the presumption to
attempt it.
And how shall we estimate, even approximately, the
indirect losses and ruin ? To say nothing of the immense
number of estates in the richest parts of the Union, in
Virginia, Tennessee and Missouri, constantly traversed and
ravaged, for four years, by innumerable armies; to say
nothing of three million labourers transformed into soldiers
and so depriving agriculture, and other industry, of their
powerful co-operation ; all the crops destroyed; all the
plantations neglected for want of workers ; all the manu
factories closed for want of capital and security ; all the rich
stocks of cotton, for which Europe teas so anxious, devoured
by flames; these incalculable losses we pass by because we
cannot compute their value.
But there is a further loss which does not evade calcula
tion. In consequence of the war, wbat became of that
superb mercantile navy which constituted the glory of the
United States ? To how many millions did the Northern
losses from privateers amount? The injury caused to
Northern commerce by the Alabama alone, in her short
career, is estimated at 80 million francs (£3,200,000).
How many fine ships and rich cargoes became the prey of
Southern corsairs, which, being unable to bring them into
-European ports, burnt them in mid-ocean! Then, again,
what general confusion ensued in all the commercial relations
of the United States, and what a high rate of insurance !
The Northern States were obliged to sell to England,
�39
at a loss, the greater part of their ships, and to denationalise
their mercantile navy.
From 1858 to 1860, the average number of vessels sold by
the Americans to the English was 40, measuring altogether
16,000 tons ; in 1861, it was no longer 40, but 126, and of
a tonnage of 76,000 ; in 1862 it was 135 ; in 1863 it was
320, of 252,579 tonnage. The statistics are wanting for the
years 1864 and 1865, which were the most terrible years for
the commerce of the Union. In 1860, two-thirds of the
exports of the United States were conveyed in American
vessels; in 1863, two-thirds icere conveyed in foreign ships ;
(Langel, “ Les Corsaires Confédérés,” Revue des DeuxAIondes,
July 1, 1864). We have quoted this particular statement
because it presents some exact figures. But it is a matter
of merely secondary importance amid the immense exhibition
of the sufferings, ruin and catastrophe which afflicted the
United States during those four years.
European Losses
by the
American War.
And they were by no means the only sufferers who were
involved : the manufacturing population of Lancashire, of
Alsace and the Lower Seine, were also deeply affected by
the war. This fearful Cotton Crisis, with its disasters
and reactionary effects, that for several years disturbed
Europe, is a wound that must be probed, in connection with
the influence of the American War. The following explana
tion of the subject is given by M. Pouyer-Quertier in his
report on the proposal to the Legislature for the authorisa
tion of a loan of 5 million francs in aid of the localities
affected by the depression of the cotton-industry :—
“ The cotton-industry is one of the principal employments in the
world. Taking Europe only, the imports and labour connected
with this manufacture, within the last few years, have been of the
value of at least 4,000 million francs per annum (£ 160,000,000)
viz. 2,000 millions for England, 800 millions for France, and
1,200 millions for the remainder of the Continent. Of this amount
the raw material (of which four-fifths were derived from the United
States) represents a value of 1,200 millions ; the dyes, grease,
oils, machinery, &c. make up 800 millions, whilst the wages paid
(in Europe) for labour at this branch of industry are about 2,000
millions (of francs).
“ From these summary statistics it may be easily compre
hended how much trouble must have been occasioned in the
�40
cotton-manufacturing countries by the scarcity of the indispen
sable material. England, which is, unquestionably, the greatest
consumer of raw cotton, was the first to diminish the regular
course of its manufacture. From the month of August, 1861,
this industry began to fall off in Lancashire. The American
War having broken out in the spring of 1861, and the blockade of
the Southern ports having been almost immediately made
effectual, the price of cotton rose rapidly. In consequence of
this sudden rise in the raw material, the hours of labour were
further shortened in the manufactories ; and from the month of
July, 1862, nearly all the factories in Great Britain were working
on short time. From that date to the 31st of December, 1862,
the pressure continued to increase, and hence extreme distress
spread throughout the cotton districts.
“ In France the supply of the raw material on hand was com
paratively much greater. Hence a serious diminution of labour
did not commence in Normandy until about August or Septem
ber, 1862, and in the Eastern manufacturing district of France
not until December.
“ In 1860 Europe had attained a weekly consumption of 90,000
bales of cotton, and it was estimated that new sources of produc
tion ■would raise the amount to at least 100,000 bales per week
in 1861, the period when the American War broke out. The
actual stock on hand for all Europe was then only 360,000 bales
of American cotton. For two years the value of American
cotton had been from 70 to 80 francs per 50 kilogrammes. At
the beginning of September, 1862, it had reached 350 and even
360 francs. In November it sunk to 275, but again rose in
December to 300 francs.”—(Moniteur, January 27, 1863.)
We have quoted the above from the words of an eminent
manufacturer; they are, however, open to criticism, and
doubtless contain some exaggerated statements on certain
points, especially as to the reduction of wages in the cotton
working districts of France and of Europe generally.
But the distress occasioned in the Old World by the
American War is not the less immeasurable, as the following
statistics will show:—
“ The imports of cotton into England, for the year 1863,
cost three millions of pounds sterling more than those of
1861, although not amounting, even as to quantity alone, to
one-half the ordinary value of the latter.’’—(Journal des Economistes, January, 1864, p. 118.) There were, it is true,
additional supplies of cotton from India and Egypt, but
of a very inferior quality to that produced in America.
�41
This very necessity of having recourse to Egypt and India
created much embarrassment in European countries. “The
heavy purchases of cotton from countries which hitherto had
only exported it in small quantities, and which' had con
sequently not acquired the habit of a corresponding con
sumption of European products, occasioned in 1863 large
exportations of specie, from which the Continent has been
suffering, especially during the last three months. The
Bank of England, which began the year with a rate of
interest of 3 per cent., reached 8 per cent, in December.”—
(Journal des Economistes, p. 119, January, 1S64.)
Thus it is evident that a great war can import a multitude
of disturbances into our industrial and financial progress.
The year 1863 was a specially terrible time to pass through.
“ This winter,” wrote the Journal des Economistes, in
January, 1864, “will, happily, not be so difficult to undergo
as that of 1863. Calculations, which appear to be correct,
have shown that the average value of the French cotton
manufactures is 530 million francs f £21,200,000), of which
a fifth part, or 106 millions, represents wages, and that
there will only be half the amount of work done this year,
that is to say, that our operatives will lose about 53 million
francs. The importation of cotton has increased in the past
year about 50 per cent., and it will follow that the loss of
wages will be diminished one third. But the loss will be
actually much less, because a considerable number of
operatives have taken themselves to the manufactures
of woollen and linen and hemp, which have profited by the
rise in cotton.”
The calculations of M. Paul Boiteau appear to be more
correct than those of M. Pouyer-Quertier. But a loss
of 53 millions in wages, at an average rate of 3 francs
per day, or 1,000 francs per annum, implies 53,000 opera
tives without the means of existence. Even if this loss and
this number be reduced one half, and if we consider that
the French manufactories only furnish about the fifth part
of all the cotton fabrics of Europe, it will follow that at
least 100,000 of the working population of Europe were, in
consequence of the American War, left almost continually,
for nearly three years, without employment, and that three
or four times as many had to suffer a considerable diminu-
�42
tion of wages. How many deaths must have been occasioned
by this terrible “ holiday ! ” But such is war. Its nature is so
homicidal that it slays thousands of victims even at thousands
of leagues distance from the battle-fields !
But, again, if America overthrew our industry by ceasing
to furnish us with the raw material, she gave us further
trouble by no longer buying our manufactured produce.
“ It is evident that a customer so exhausted can only be a
poor customer to us, and that, when the war is over, the
effects of the past cannot immediately disappear. Hence it
appears from the Customs Returns that French exports to
foreign parts, especially as regards silk and woollen goods,
have undergone an important and significant diminution.”
(Journal des Economistes, vol. xlvii. p. 306.) The operatives
of Saint Etienne were scarcely in a better condition than
those of Mulhouse and Rouen on the conclusion of that
war.
It would be in vain to adduce a multitude of additional
statistics ; they would not enable us to estimate all the
calamities of the war. And yet, says M. Horn, “ 4,000
million francs (£160,000,000) would have sufficed to abolish
slavery by purchasing every slave at the general average
rate of 1,000 francs (£40) each, taking young and old, men
and women, the infants and the aged, uniformly.” What
economy this would have been! But, as was remarked by
M. Michael Chevalier, to have exercised this wise and self
denying foresight, America should have possessed, in the
crisis of 1861, men as great as those who directed the crisis
of the last century,—a Franklin in the North and a Wash
ington in the South. Yet even this should not have been
necessary. For a truly-informed and virtuous people knows
how to act, irrespectively of its great men, and will adopt
useful and right measures from the prompting of its own
intelligence and virtue.
THE SCHLESWIG- AND GERMAN WARS.
(1864—1866.)
The very recent occurrence of the two wars of 1864 and
1866 presents an unfavourable condition for judging with
accuracy respecting even their material results. In par
�43
ticular, we have no precise information as to the financial
expenditure involved. For the European governments have
not acquired the prompt and practical business habits of the
government at Washington, thanks to whose despatch the
financial situation of the Union is as readily ascertainable
as that of a large loan association.
We possess a valuable and quite recent work upon the
human losses in the Danish War (General 'Report on the
Medical Service in the Campaign against Renmark, by Dr.
Laeffleur, Physician in Chief to the Prussian Army). This
book, which has just been issued, has afforded us useful
information.
On the 1st of February, 1864, the allied army crossed
the Eyder ■ it was then composed of 60,000 men, of whom
one-third were Austrians and the remainder Prussians.
The Austrian contingent was not increased throughout the
campaign ; the Prussian force, on the contrary, was raised to
63,000 men. Out of this considerable force the following
losses in the Prussian army took place :—
Killed in action, or died of wounds ... 738 men
Died of diseases or various accidents ... 310 .,
Total ... 1,048
The number of dead in the Prussian army is therefore
only 1-j per cent, of the effective. This very small propor
tion of deaths is very surprising ; and yet the engagements
were very sanguinary, relatively much more so than even
those of the Crimean War; and, in proportion to the num
bers engaged, the assault of Duppel was as terrible as that
of the Malakoff. There were returned, in the Prussian
army—
At Missunde (February 2)
206 wounded, 59 dead
At Duppel (April 17 and 18) 1,780
,,
550 „
At Alsen
...
...
351
„
104 ,,
And what is most striking in this campaign is the very
small number of those who died from disease. There were
only 26,717 diseased, of whom only 310 died. This low
rate of mortality is chiefly owing, as Dr. Laeffleur acknow
ledges, to the philanthropic efforts of private associations
for the assistance of the soldiers.
It is more difficult to ascertain correctly the losses of the
Danish army. But it is certain that, for various reasons,
�44
and, amongst others, on account of the inferiority of its
armaments, it suffered much more than the Prussians. We
may fairly estimate the Danish losses, under fire, at double
those of the Prussian army, or about 1,500 men.
The Danish army was much more severely visited by
disease than its adversary. On this point we cau borrow
some exact details from Dr. Laeffleur. There were 31,575
cases of disease ; typhus made considerable ravages, and the
losses of the Danes from disease were 756 men, or much
more than double the Prussian losses from the same cause.
The Austrian losses must have been very inconsiderable ;
for, being less numerous than the Prussians, they took a
smaller part in the action.
To sum up,—the Prussians lost l,04S men; the Danes
certainly lost more than double as many, and the total loss,
including that of the Austrians, must have been about 3,500
men.
The financial losses are more difficult to ascertain. As
regards Austria and Prussia they were covered by the in
demnities of the war. The Danish budgets are not before
us, but we have, at least, the state of their debt before and
after the war;—
Before the War.
Rixdalers.
Ordinary debt of the Danish monarchy ... 98,261,793
Special debt of the kingdom
...
...
1,289,780
Holstein debt
...
...
...
...
666,000
Total
... 100,217,573
The debt of the kingdom, on the 31st of March, 1865, was
132,110,802 rixdalers; so that the war cost Denmark at
least 30 million rixdalers. To this must be added the war
indemnities paid by the Duchies and the share of the Duchies
in the debt of the monarchy previous to the war. We
thus obtain an approximate amount of 180 million francs
(£7,200,000). 180 million francs and 3,500 men are a
terrible loss of capital and of human life ; and the more so,
when it was so easy to have retained for industry and useful
labour all this money and all those vigorous limbs.
�45
THE WAR BETWEEN PRUSSIA AND AUSTRIA
IN 1SG6.
We now come to the great war of 1866. The statistics
relating to its loss of life are found to vary, particularly as
regards Prussia. An early official statement, dated Decem
ber, 1866, has been greatly exceeded by the most recent
returns from the Statistical Board of Berlin. It is probable
that even the latter do not afford exact statistics, and that
when Dr. Laeffleur prepares, as we hope he will do, a work
on the campaign in Bohemia, similar to that which he has
just published on the Schleswig campaign, it will be seen
that the amount of loss has been even greater than is
already admitted.
The number of wounded men in the Prussian army is,
according to the first report, 15,554; but according to the
later ones, 16,177. The first returns only indicate 2,910
killed; the corrective dispatches place the number of the
dead, within forty-eight hours, at 2,931 ; and of those who
sank afterwards in consequence of their wounds, at 1,519—
a total of 4,450. The first returns are silent as to diseases,
but the later ones announce 6,427 deaths from typhus and
other diseases. This makes in all, 10,877. It is evident,
from this illustration, that the corrective returns give higher
numbers than the provisional reports, and that still further
additions may be expected when the finally-corrected reports
are issued.
As regards Austria, we are still dependent upon the
merely provisional reports. The 13th annual report of the
Statistical Commission of Vienna, contains a series of
authentic results which indicate the strength and the losses
of the Austrian army during the war against Prussia. The
returns are merely based on the state of the army at the
end of August, 1866, from which it is evident that they
must be very defective and much lower in amount than
the reality. For who will tell us how many men have died
of their wounds since the month of August 1866 ? All
military statisticians, as for example, Dr. Chenu,Dr. Lseffleur,
�46
and the English author of the Reports on the Crimean War,
prolong their investigations for at least eighteen months
after the commencement of peace. Further, the Austrian
returns appear to take no account of the number of the
sick and diseased.
The Austrian army, at the beginning of the struggle, was
composed of 646,636 men, of whom 407,223 were then
arrived at the two great scenes of conflict. The total
number of avowed losses is 10,994 killed, 29,304 wounded,
and 43,743 missing. We are assuredly far from the truth
here ; and we do not hesitate to say that the number of
killed must have been double. Out of these 29,304 who
were still living in the month of August, 1866, experience
authorises us to assume that several thousands, at least four
or five thousand, must have died subsequently from their
wounds. We have seen, from Dr. Chenu’s Report on the
Crimean War, that those who died in France, in conse
quence of injuries received during the expedition, amounted
to 15,000 in the eighteen months after the war. Similarly,
those who died in Austria, either in hospitals or at home,
during the period of eighteen months after this contest,
must have been very numerous.
Further, there is not the least allusion, in the Austrian
returns, to diseases, which, amongst the Prussians, carried
off more than 6,000. It is not likely that the losses of
the Austrians, under this head, were less considerable ; their
fatigues were as great, their diet was inferior rather than
otherwise, and the thorough demoralisation of the Austrian
troops was a powerful auxiliary to epidemics. We have,
then, still to await a complete work on the losses of Austria
in 1866, and a revision which will be at the same time a
supplementary addition to the present insufficient returns.
It is, at least, certain that such rectifying statistics will
raise the total losses of the Austrian army to 20 or 25
thousand men.
We have not accurate accounts of the losses of the Ger
manic Confederation, properly so termed. We have only
before us the Saxon returns published almost immediately
after the war ; and they present indications of the greatest
confusion. We have no statistics respecting the Bavarians
and Hanoverians, although they were engaged in bloody
�47
encounters. We may, without any exaggeration, admit an
amount of 3,000 killed from the smaller states.
A supplement to the Florence Gazette, quoted by the
Moniteur, of July 9, 1866, contains the following calculation
of the Italian losses at Custozza: — 951 killed, 2,909
wounded, 4,252 prisoners. The number of dead only in
cludes those who expired in the first few days after the
battle. It must, therefore, be considerably augmented—
almost doubled, in fact—to include those who died from
their wounds in the year following the battle. For the day’s
conflict at Lissa, the Nazione claims to have received infor
mation of a total loss, to the Italians, of 743 killed, and 155
wounded.—(jbloniteur of July 29, 1866.)
We have no
details of the losses of the Volunteers, which must have
been extensive. We may calculate at 3,000, at least, the
number of Italians who perished from the enemy’s fire at
Custozza, at Lissa, and in Garibaldi’s campaign. Notwith
standing the short duration of the war, this estimate of
mortality should evidently be doubled, if we are to take
account of the deaths occasioned by disease, fatigue, poor
food, and all other sufferings, physical or moral.
To sum up—the number of Prussians killed or dead was
about 11,000 ; we consider the probable amount of Austrian
losses as varying from 20 to 25 thousand; those of the
smaller states of the Confederation at from 3 to 4 thousand ;
and those of the Italians as nearly 6,000. This makes a
total of from 40 to 45 thousand killed or dead. We believe
that this amount is not exaggerated, and we hope that a
systematic and scientific history of this war will furnish us,
in two or three years, with the exact figures, which may be
greater than ours, but which will certainly not be less.
Financial Losses oe the Wab.
The financial losses of the war are difficult to ascertain
with rigorous exactness; they are certainly not liquidated,
and we cannot obtain the true amount.
Austria, as early as November 23,1865, had negotiated a
loan at Paris. It was not a war loan, but was applied to
reimburse the advances of the National Bank. Immediately
the war broke out, in the early part of the month of May,
recourse was had to various expedients. The Government,
�48
issued notes of from 1 to 5 florins, for forced currency:
this issue reached the amount of 150 million florins. A law
passed July 7 authorised the minister to obtain a further
200 million florins, either by a voluntary loan or by an in
creased issue of Government notes. The Bank of Vienna
advanced, temporarily, 60 millions in bank-notes. An imperial
decree of the 25th of August authorised the Minister of
Finance to issue 50 million florins in 5 per cent, bonds and
90 millions in Government notes. This was the completion
of the 200 millions which the law of July 7 permitted. In
addition to these resources, the Government had intended,
early in June, to impose on Venetia a forced loan of 12
million florins. This made a total of 362 million florins
which it had sought to obtain. We cannot believe that
this enormous sum, which amounts to nearly 900 million
francs (£36,000,000), was wholly absorbed by the war. It
appears doubtful whether the forced Venetian loan was ever
obtained; and out of the 150 million florins levied in addi
tion to the previous costs of the war, we believe that only a
portion can have been absorbed by its special demands.
Nevertheless, the expenses of Austria, for this war, may be
estimated at 600 millions, at least, without reckoning
the indemnity which she had to pay to Prussia.
The expenses of the latter country are much more diffi
cult to calculate. The cash balance, or reserved fund, of
Prussia, amounted, before the war, to 21 million thalers.
After the beginning of May, these resources being absorbed,
the Government began to have recourse to various expe
dients. For what was the creation of the mercantile loan
Bank but a Treasury expedient ? This bank was authorised
to issue 25 million thalers in paper money (Darlehnskassensclieine'), which were rendered a compulsory currency, at
par, in all public banks. Then again, throughout the war,
the Prussian troops subsisted upon the enemy. And after
the war, the contributions imposed upon the vanquished
amounted to nearly 200 million francs (£8,000,000). In
the Legislature, on the 13th of August, 1866, the Minister
of Finance made a demand for extraordinary loans to the
extent of not less than 60 million thalers (£9,000.000). Of
this amount, however, 21 million thalers were devoted to
liquidate outstanding balances, and another portion was not
�49
expended. But, altogether, the expenses of this war, to
Prussia alone, must have amounted to 400 million francs
(£16,000,000). (Vide Moniteur, Sept. 3, I860.) Of this
sum, nearly one half was reimbursed by the contributions of
the conquered States.
As to Italy's share of expenditure on this war, it com
menced on the 1st of May, 1866, by the decree of an enforced
paper currency, and by a loan of 250 millions from the
National Bank. In pursuance of a decree, dated June 28,
1866, she imposed a general tax upon all moveable property,
a source of many subsequent difficulties. Finally, she had
recourse to a compulsory loan of 350 millions. Although
the total amount of these resources, which exceeded 600
millions, was not absorbed by the expenses of the war, there
is no doubt but that the latter reached at least 400 million
francs (£16,000,000).
We are unable to state accurately how much was the cost
of this war to Hanover, the Hessian States, Wurtemberg,
Saxony, &c. ; but when we remember that in 1859 the
special expenses of these secondary States, as set forth in
their respective budgets, were 152 million francs for the
seven principal States alone, although they did not then fire
a single gun, and were merely put into a condition of readi
ness for war (ffiriegsbereitschaft), it is difficult to believe
that the smaller States can have spent less, during the war
of 1866, than 250 million francs (£10,000,000), at any rate,
and without including the indemnities paid to Prussia.
The sum of the official and immediate expenses of the
war of 1866, may be therefore reckoned at about 1,650
million francs (£66,000,000) for the respective governments
in Germany and Italy.
But in this war, as in every other, the expenses indicated
in the public budgets, were the less considerable ones.
What a commercial and financial catastrophe was produced
in Italy by this inopportune war, with its triple plague of
paper money, forced loans, and the vexatious and inequitable
tax on moveable property ! It was a deadly blow from
which she will, probably, take twenty years to recover.
There had been debates on economy and it appeared that
some effectual steps would be taken in that direction, just
before the war broke out which demanded an unsparing inE
�50
crease of expenditure. How can young Italy struggle
successfully with the pernicious consequences of the ab
sorption of its circulating capital by the forced loan, the
annihilation of legitimate profits by the tax upon moveable
property and the losses and unsettlement of currency in
volved by the paper money ? These losses were especially
disastrous to a country whose imports had, for several years,
far exceeded its exports, and which was now to suffer, in its
foreign commercial transactions, the very heavy expenses of
a disadvantageous and exceedingly variable rate of exchange.
Austria was placed in a similar situation. She was truly
in a pitiable state. She had barely got over one crisis,
and was but beginning to remove the evils occasioned by
that crisis, when she voluntarily plunged herself into another
similar one. In 1858 she had just terminated the com
pulsory currency which had been so disastrous to her for
ten years. In 1859 she re-established it. In 1866 she was
repaying the advances made by the bank and there was a
prospect of the second termination of the forced currency,
when she threw herself, of her own free will, into new
dangers. By her mistakes and faults she became the prey
of paper money, continually increased taxation, commercial
disorganisation and industrial stagnation.
And even Prussia, so powerful and prosperous, had to
suffer, for six weeks, a suspension of all business. At the
beginning of the month of May, 20,000 of the working men
of Berlin found themselves out of employment, and, on the
declaration of war, mechanics, professors, bankers, labourers
and traders were all taken away from their usual avocations.
The Government proclaimed a universal holiday, as it were,
for two months throughout the kingdom, on account of the
war. During this time workshops and schools were closed
or empty. Thus we have the spectacle of a great nation
dead to labour and study for two months ! What an arrest
of civilisation ! In the public catastrophe how many indi
vidual and obscure or unnoticed calamities were involved 1
Failures took place to an incredible extent: they occurred
in Berlin at the rate of twenty or twenty-five per day, or
about the usual weekly number in ordinary times.
The smaller German States, roused abruptly from their
peaceful and industrious life, also expiated, by many losses,
�51
the general folly. All the public works which were being
so energetically pushed forward were checked. Thus Baden
had just contracted a loan for her railways ; the war absorbed
it. A similar exigency had already occurred in that State
in 1859. All the other minor States which, except in the
moment of delirium in 1859, had only contracted peace
loans were now compelled to rush into war-loans. To these
burdens must be added the various military requisitions,
ravages and arbitrary contributions, the six million florins
which General Vogel do Falkenstein extorted from Frank
fort, and the 25 million florins which General Manteufel also
extorted from the same city the very next day. We must
also remember the condition of Bohemia, desolated, laid
waste, and almost ruined by the quartering and conflicts of
600,000 men.
The blow struck in Germany influenced all Europe.
This unforeseen catastrophe, this sudden folly which had
overspread the centre of Europe, affected, by contagion, the
adjacent countries. In every direction men thought of
nothing but new rifles, strange guns, huge or small, and
gigantic armies. It was deemed necessary to have new
conscription-laws, new loans and new taxes. Countries
which had just been reducing their armies now only thought
of increasing them as much as possible.
In short, this German crisis raised the war-budgets of
every European nation. It inscribed 1,650 million francs
(£66,000,000) on the budgets of the belligerents alone;
it resulted in 45,000 deaths, in the ruin of Austria and
Italy, and in the universal and permanent increase of burdens
and public anxieties. Such is the balance-sheet of the
campaign in Bohemia!
Whence comes it that even two years after this war our
industry is languishing and our commerce suffering ?
Whence comes it that our money capital remains idle in
our banks, instead of supporting our manufactures and
creating new enterprises ? It is because war, even when
dead, leaves its spectre behind it, which long continues to
terrify the people afresh and to make them apprehensive of
further misfortunes.
�52
DISTANT EXPEDITIONS.
We now come to those disastrous Expeditions which have
involved so heavy an expense to the European Powers, and
especially to France. Unfortunately here statistics fail us,
especially as respects the losses of human life. We shall
hardly venture even any conjectural estimate. We shall
content ourselves with a mere reference to the great distance
of the scenes of conflict in China, Cochin China, Mexico,
and St. Domingo; the variations of climate, the yellow fever,
typhus and marsh fever, the fatigues of a war of incessant
skirmishes, the obstinate resistance of the enemy in Mexico
and Cochin China, the insufficiency of communication, of
hygienic assistance, and, at times, even of provisions. We
leave it to the reader to form, in view of these disadvan
tageous circumstances, a more or less accurate idea of the
number of victims which these deplorable Expeditions must
have swept off.
Although we are enabled to form a less vague conception
of the financial losses involved, an exact result is not attain
able. The expenses of most of these Expeditions are not yet
liquidated. The Legislative Assembly voted, as recently as
1867, the settlement of the accounts of 1S63. The accounts
of 1864, 1865, and 1866 are not yet known with precision.
Another difficulty in these calculations is that the expenses
of distant Expeditions are returned in the several budgets
under different headings, and are sometimes confounded
with expenses of another description. A state of very great
confusion characterises all these matters, and the time for
putting an end to it does not appear to have yet arrived.
These exceptional expenses have eventually become so
habitual that they have passed from the extraordinary into
the ordinary budgets. A proof of this is afforded by the
publication of the accounts accompanying the law of assess
ment for the expenses and receipts of the year 1863, pre
sented to the Legislative Assembly, May 6, 1S62, by M.
Vuitry, as Commissioner. The ordinary Navy Budget bore
an increase of 18,773,501 francs (£750,940) over the prec eding one ; and M. Vuitry accounted for this increase in
the following manner:—“tFor several years in succession
the various budgets, each copying the preceding one, repeated
�53
the same number of ships as being requisite for the reception
of marines, namely, 152 ships for a force of about 26,000 men,
although different circumstances had obliged the Department
of Naval Affairs either to form new stations or to increase the
capacity of some of the existing ones. Consequently, special
loans were needed to meet these expenses, which, although
appearing to be merely casual and temporary at first, even
tually partook of a normal and permanent character. The
ordinary budget used to provide for 152 armed vessels; in
1859 the number of these was 300, of which, however, 123
were required for the Italian Army and for the Indo-Chinese
Expedition. In 1860 the number of effective war-ships was
raised to 275—77 of which were for the Indo-Chinese and
Syrian Expeditions. In 1861 the number would probably
be nearly the same. Under these circumstances, the Govern
ment had found it expedient carefully to determine what
proportion of the special armaments of preceding years
should henceforth be regarded as indispensable for maintain
ing the service of our naval stations, whose number and im
portance have increased in consequence of the new establish
ments of the kind being formed in distant seas by the French
nation.”—(JZbm’tewr, March 12, 1862.)
These distant Expeditions had, in fact, terribly augmented
our Naval Budget. In 1857 it was only 121,S65,000 francs
(£1,872,600) ; in 1859, without reckoning Algiers and the
colonies, it rose to 213,800,000 francs (£8,552,000) ; and
in 1861 (as admitted in the Exchequer Bill of June 8,
1864), it required more than 230 millions (£9,200,000).
Thus the Navy Budget had increased, in consequence of
distant Expeditions, about 100 millions (£4,000,000), and
this augmentation had almost come to be regarded as a per
manent one. The Army Budget also suffered from the
influence of these Expeditions. In 1861, a year of peace,
it demanded (as is admitted in the Exchequer Bill of June
8, 1864) 400,975,814 francs, an excess of 55 millions over
the anticipated amount of 345 millions (£13,800,000).
Hence one of the most vexatious results of these far-off
wars has been the immeasurable expansion of our ordinary
budgets.
The supplementary loans will cease with the
Expeditions themselves, but the augmentation of the Army
and Navy Budgets, caused by these wars, has been declared
by Government to be normal and permanent; and it has, in
�54
point of fact, been subsequently so recognised as being
normal and permanent.
As to the total expenses of these Expeditions, M. Larrabure estimated them, even four years ago, as already
amounting to 270 millions (£10,800,000) for the Mexican
and Cochin China Expeditions only. In a Legislative dis
cussion at the same period, M. Calley Saint Paul calculated
at 450 millions (£18,000,000) the costs of the wars in China,
Cochin China, Mexico, and Japan. M. Vuitry (Government
Commissioner), in reply, admitted expenses of 17 millions
for the Syrian Expedition, 11 millions for that to the Kabyles
(in North Africa), and 166 millions for that to China and
Cochin China; and at the time of the Treaty of Miramar,
the French Government announced that it had spent 270
millions in Mexico. However, it has subsequently retracted
this statement as an over-estimate.
According to the Report of M. du Mirai on the Budget
of 1868 the expenses of the Mexican Expedition were as
follow
Army.
Francs.
Year.
1861
1862
1863
1864
1865
1866
1867
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
Total ...
27,119,000
72,012,000
51,732,000
29,342,000
41,792,000
9,993,000
Navy.
Francs.
.
. ..
. ..
. ..
. ..
. ..
. ..
Finance.
Francs.
3,200,000
35,902,000
24,606,000
15,667,000
10,583,000
13,798,000
13,117,000
..
.
..
379,000 .. .
.. 1,001,000 . .
.. 1,675,000 .
.. 1,480,000 . .
.. 9,567,000 .. .
..
200,000 . .
Totals.
Francs.
3,200,000
63.400,000
97,619,000
69,074,000
41,405,000
65,157,000
23,310,000
231,990,000 . .. 116,873,000 .. 14,302,000 .. . 363,165,000
(£9,279,GOO) . . (£4,674,920) .. (£572,080) .. .(£14,527,000)
According to another table, extracted from the same
Report, the receipts, more or less available, during the
Expedition, consisting of repavments and Mexican bonds,
amounted to 61,975,000 francs (£2,479,000); whence the
excess of expenditure would be 301 million francs
(£12,040,000).
. It is needless to remark that this official return is exces
sively below the actual cost. M. Berrver offers to prove
that the Expedition has absorbed 600 millions (£24,000,000),
but this is impossible. However, inasmuch as the Govern
ment itself avowed an actual expenditure of 270 millions
at the time of the Convention of Miramar, that is to say,
when the war was not half completed, it is difficult to con-
�55
elude otherwise than that the further expenses, after allowing
fordeductions and repayments, must have swelled this amount
to at least 400 millions (£16,000,000).
As regards the Expeditions to China, Cochin China, and
the Lebanon, we cannot estimate them at less than 300
millions (£12,000,000). This sum represents, almost
exactly, the unforeseen augmentations of our Army and
Navy Budgets in the years of peace, 1860, 1861, and 1862,
when the Mexican Expedition had, as yet, cost but little.
As we are aware, the Expedition to Cochin China still con
tinues, and forms a constant increase of our budget.
If we add to these officially recognised expenses the
losses of capital diverted from productive employment
sunk, without return, in Mexican loans, it will be found
that these distant Expeditions have cost France at least a
thousand million francs (£40,000,000), in addition to the
permanent increase which they have imposed upon our naval
establishments.
SUMMARY OF LOSSES BY RECENT WARS.
I.—Loss or Human Life.
Number of men wrho were slain on the field of battle, or
who died through wounds and disease:—
Killed by War.
Crimean War ...
Italian War (1859)
War of Schleswig Holstein
American Civil War—
Northern Army
Southern Army
War of 1866, between Prussia,
Austria, and Italy...
Distant Expeditions and various
wars, Mexico, Cochin China,
Morocco, St. Domingo, Para
guay, &c..................................
Total
784,991
45,000
3,500
281,000 1 #
519,000 j
45,000
65,000
1,743,491
Understated—vide Note at the end of this work.
�56
Hebe is a total of about 1,750,000 men swept off
BY WAB FBOM CIVILISED NATIONS BETWEEN 1853 AND
THAT IS TO SAY, IN THE SPACE OF 14 YEABS.
1866,
This is a number equal to the whole male population of
Holland. It is also a number equal to that of all the work
ing men employed by the industrial or commercial classes in
France. (Audiganne, “ Les Ouvriers d' a present]' page
405.) And yet this immense amount of human life, strength,
and intelligence, has been devoured by war in the eecent
14 yeabs of this century, so distinguished by its civilisation,
industry, and popular liberty !
SUMMARY OF THE FINANCIAL LOSSES BY RECENT
WARS.
Crimean War, 1853-4 ...
American Civil "War,
1861-5—
The North ...
The South
Italian "War, 1859
War of Schleswig Hol
stein, 1864
War of 1866, between
Prussia, Austria, and
Italy
Distant Expeditions to
Mexico,
Cochin
China, &c....
Total
340 million pounds sterling.
940 million
460 million
60 million
n
99
7 million
J,
99
66 million
99
99
J?
99
40 million
... 1,913 MILLION POUNDS
99
STEELING !
Even these are only the immediate and positive expenses
of the wars ; and some of the struggles are not yet ended.
Complete returns cannot be obtained respecting the expenses
of Spain in the Expedition to Cochin China, nor of those of
Peru, Chili, and St. Domingo. We are not in possession
of the costs of recent conflicts between the Republics of
South America and Spain, or of the still continuing war
between Brazil, La Plata, and Paraguay—a persistent and
furiously devastating struggle. Nor have we full returns
�57
from Mexico as to its war for independence against France.
And yet, irrespective of all these unfurnished expenses, we
have accounted for the frightful amount of nearly 48,000
million francs (or £1,913,000,000), which, if employed in
works of peace, would have entirely transformed the social
and financial condition of civilised nations. But the evil
genius of War has devoured the whole of it in fourteen years,
IN OBDEE TO SWEEP FROM THE EACE OF THE EARTH NEARLY
1,800,000 MEN.
NOTE.
A gentleman at New York, after reading “ Contemporary
Wars,” has written to Mr. Henry Richard, M.P., London, to say
that M. Beaulieu’s work greatly understates the losses of life and
property caused by the late Civil War in his country. He says :—
“ M. Beaulieu’s work is an able one, and generally correct ;
but, instead of 281,000 men killed in the Northern armies, the
total loss is known to be 1,100,000 by all causes up to 1867
inclusive.
“ By the census of 1860 the whole property of the United States
(exclusive of slaves) was valued at 14,183 million dollars, and
the loss of capital during the war (also exclusive of slaves) is
known to be over 5,000 millions, or fully one-fifth of the whole
property of the country in 1860. We look upon the present
prosperity, therefore, as merely fictitious, and destined to a
tremendous collapse, which is only a question of time.”
The same writer complains of the terrible amount of vice and
immorality occasioned by the habits formed during the war,
and forwards the following statement on the subject, extracted
from the New York Journal of Commerce, one of the highest
class newspapers in the United States :—
“ The ‘ Moral ’ Effect
of the late
Civil War
in
America.
“The prevalence of bold, wanton crime throughout all parts of
the country cannot be denied. It is not this city or the large
centres of population generally that are chiefly infected, although
some, for selfish purposes, encourage this idea. Many causes
have conspired to produce this outcropping of evil, but the chief
cause, beyond question, is the demoralisation produced by the war.
Some enthusiastic writers and orators claimed that the conflict
would be like “ a purifyingfurnace, ” from which the nation would
emerge cleansed and sanctified, like gold from the crucible. We
�58
pointed to all history in refutation of this theory, and urged the
adoption of every possible means to mitigate the evils that must
inevitably follow and grow out of the long and bitter contest.
Recklessness of life—disregard of the rights of person and pro
perty—the disposition to take by strategy, and still more by the
strong arm, any coveted good—a contempt for laws, so often
violated or silent in the presence of armed force—a sense of the
might of physical power in the presence of restraints purely
moral—familiarity with deeds of blood, rapine, and cruelty,
deadening the conscience and blunting all the finer sensibilities
of the soul—these and many kindred associations suggest them
selves to every careful observer who studies the demoralising
effect of war upon the nation at large. They are peculiar to no
age or race, and they operate on man as man in every com
munity and by every fireside. There is probably as great a ratio
of difference between the past and present condition of the most
moral and virtuous community in the country in the debasing
effect of the war, as between the criminal classes, once partially
restrained, but now rendered more brutal, daring, passionate, and
reckless, as the result of this national experience. We might
safely appeal to individual consciousness to sustain this assertion,
if men were willing to examine and judge themselves impartially;
but its truth is capable of demonstration.”
R. BARRETT AND SONS, PRINTERS, MARK LANE.
/A
�
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Victorian Blogging
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A collection of digitised nineteenth-century pamphlets from Conway Hall Library & Archives. This includes the Conway Tracts, Moncure Conway's personal pamphlet library; the Morris Tracts, donated to the library by Miss Morris in 1904; the National Secular Society's pamphlet library and others. The Conway Tracts were bound with additional ephemera, such as lecture programmes and handwritten notes.<br /><br />Please note that these digitised pamphlets have been edited to maximise the accuracy of the OCR, ensuring they are text searchable. If you would like to view un-edited, full-colour versions of any of our pamphlets, please email librarian@conwayhall.org.uk.<br /><br /><span><img src="http://www.heritagefund.org.uk/sites/default/files/media/attachments/TNLHLF_Colour_Logo_English_RGB_0_0.jpg" width="238" height="91" alt="TNLHLF_Colour_Logo_English_RGB_0_0.jpg" /></span>
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Conway Hall Library & Archives
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2018
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Conway Hall Ethical Society
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Contemporary wars (1853-1866): statistical researches respecting the loss of men and money involved in them
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Beaulieu, Paul Leroy
Description
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Place of publication: London
Collation: 58 p. ; 19 cm.
Notes: From the library of Dr Moncure Conway. From the French edition issued in the 'Peace Library' of the Paris 'International League of Peace'. Printed by R. Barrett and Sons, Mark Lane, London.
Publisher
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London Peace Society
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1869
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G5394
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War
Pacifism
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application/pdf
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Text
Language
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English
Conway Tracts
Peace
War
War Casualties
War-Economic Aspects