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HAS MAN A SOUL?
BY C. BRADLAUGH.
[This lecture was originally delivered to the Sheffield
Secular Society, and was printed from the reporter’s notes
without efficient correction from myself, I, at that time,
suffering under a severe attack of acute rheumatism. The
lecture has since been often re-delivered; and three editions
having been exhausted, I have again corrected and revised
the present edition. It is not intended as an answer to the
question which forms the title, but it is intended to provoke
thought upon this important subject.]
What do you mean by soul? What is the soul ? Is it I ?
Is it the body? Is it apart from the body ? Is it an attri
bute of the body ? Has it a separate and distinct existence
from the body ? What is the soul ? If I ask one of those
who claim to be considered orthodox men, they will tell me
that the soul is a spirit—that the soul lives after the body
is dead. They will tell me that the soul is immortal, and
that the body is mortal; that the soul has nothing what
ever in common with the body ; that it has an existence
entirely independent of the body. They will tell me that
after the body has decayed—after the body has become
re-absorbed in the universe, of which it is but a part, that
the soul still exists. Is there any proof of the existence ol
the same individual soul apart from all material conditions ?
I have endeavoured to examine this subject, and, up to the
present time, I have not found one iota of proof in support
of the positions thus put forward. I have no idea of any
existence except that of which I am part. I am. Of my
own existence I am certain. I think. I am. But what is
it that thinks ? Is it my soul ? Is it “me,” and yet distinct
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HAS MAN A* SOUL?
from me? Iam but a mode of existence. I am only part
of the great universe. The elements of which I am com
posed are indissolubly connected with that great existence
which is around me and within me, and which I help to
make up. If men tell me I am a compound, and not a com
pound—a mixture,and not a mixture—a joining together, and
not a joining together—of two entirely different existences,
which they call “ matter” and “ spirit,” I am compelled
to doubt those men. The ability to think is but an attri
bute of a certain modification of existence. Intelligence is
a word by which we express the sum of certain abilities,
always attending a certain mode of existence. I find intelligence
manifested so far as organisation is developed. I never
find intelligence without animal organisation. I find intelli
gence manifested in degree, only so far as I find a higher or
lower type of organisation—that is, I find man's intellectual
faculties limited by his organisation But the orthodox tell.
me that my soul has an immaterial existence, independent
of all organisation—independent of all climatic conditions—
independent of all education. Is that so ? When does the
soul come into man ? When does it go out of man ? If the
soul is immortal, why is it that standing here, in the prime
of health and strength, if part of that roof should fall frac
turing my skull, and pressing upon my brain—how is it,
if my soul is not subject to material conditions, that it
then ceases to act ? Is the plaster roof more powerful than
my immortal soul ? Or is it that intelligence is the neces
sary result of a certain condition of existence, and that the
moment you destroy that condition—the moment you des
troy the organisation—the result ceases to be realisable ?
By the course of reasoning you adopt (says the orthodoi
objector) you reduce man to the same level as the beasts*
And why not ? I stand on the river’s bank, I see there a
man full grown, possessed of the physical figure of man, but
an idiot—an idiot from his birth upward—one who could
not, even if he would, think and act as other men. A little
child is there playing on the bank, and the idiot, having
large destructive propensities, has thrust the child into the
water, and he stands there jabbering and gesticulating while
the little child is drowning in the river. And see how halfvacantly, half-triumphantly, he points to the helpless child.
A. Newfoundland dog has come to the bank; it jumps in and
brings the little child out and saves its life. Yet theologians
veil me that the idiot has a soul, and that the Newfoundland
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dog has not one. I cannot understand these nice distinc
tions, which make the man so superior to the beast in mat
ters in which he is positively inferior. Man has doubtless
an organisation on the whole far superior intellectually to
that of any other animal, but he is only superior by virtue
of his superior organisation and its consequent susceptibility
for development or education. Many brutes can see more
clearly than man; but they possess not the capability for
the manufacture of telescopes to aid their vision. Many
brutes can run more swiftly, but they manifest no capacity
for the subjugation of a steam power which far outstrips
their speed. But man himself, a well-organised, thoughtful,
intelligent, well-educated man, by a fall from a horse, by a tile
from a roof, may receive an injury to his nervous encephalic
apparatus, and may be, even while a man in shape, as low as
the brute in the imbecility of his reason, and inferior to the
brute in physical strength. There is as much difference
between different races of men, there is, in fact, more
difference between a pure Caucasian and a Sahara negro,
than between the Sahara negro and the infant chimpanzee.
When did the soul come into the body ? Has it been
waiting from all eternity to occupy each body the moment
of birth ? Is this the theory that is put forward to man—■
that there are many millions of •souls still waiting, perhaps,
in mid air, ’twixt heaven and earth, to occupy the still un
born babes ? Is that the theory ? Or do you allege that
God specially creates souls for each little child at the moment
it is born or conceived ? Which is the theory put forward ?
Ts it that the soul being immortal—being destined to exist
for ever, has existed from all eternity ? If not, how do you
know that the soul is to exist for ever, when it only comes into
existence with the child ? May not that which has recently
begun to be, soon cease to be ? In what manner does the
soul come into the child ? Is it a baby’s soul, and does it
grow with the child ? or, does it possess its full power the
moment the child is born ? When does it come into the
child ? Does it come in the moment the child begins to
form, or is it the moment the child is born into the world ?
Whence is it this soul comes? Dr. Cooper, quoting
Lawrence on the “ Functions of the Brain,” says :—“ Sir
Everard Home, with the assistance of Mr. Bauer and his
microscope, has shown us a man eight days old from the
time of conception, about as broad and a little longer than a
pin’s head. He satisfied himself that the brain of this
�HAS MAN A SOUL?
homunculus was discernible. Could the immaterial mind
have been connected with it at this time ? Or was the tene
ment too small even for so etherial a lodger ? Even at the
full period of uterogestation, it is still difficult to trace any
vestiges of mind; and the believers in its separate existence
have left us quite in the dark on the precise time when they
suppose this union of soul and body to take place.” Many
of those who tell me that man has a soul, and that it is im
mortal—that man has a soul, and that the beast has not one
—forget or ignore that at a very early stage in the first
month of the formation of the brain, of the state of
the brain, corresponds to that of the avertebrated
animal, or animal that is without vertebra. If the brain
had stopped in its first month’s course of formation,
would the child have had a soul? If it would have
had a soul, then have avertebrated animals souls also ? if
you tell me it would not have had a soul, then I ask—How
do you know it ? and I ask you what ground you have for
assuming that the soul did not begin to form with the for
mation of the brain ? I ask you whether it was pre-existing,
or at what stage it came? In the second month this brain
corresponds then to the brain of an osseous fish. Supposing
the development of the child had been then stopped, had it
a soul at that time ? If so, have fishes souls ? Again, if
you tell me that the child has not a soul, then, I ask, why
not ? How do you know it had not? What ground have
you for alleging that the soul did not exist in the child ?
We go on still further, and in the third month we find that
brain corresponds then to that of a turtle, and in the fourth
to that of a bird; and in the fifth month, to an order termed
rodentia ; sixth, to that of the ruminantia; seventh, to that
of" the digitigrada ; eighth, to that of the quadrumana ; and
not till the ninth month does the brain of the child attain a
full human character. I, of course, here mean to allege no
more than Dr. Eletcher, who says, in his “ Rudiments of
Physiology,” quoted by the author of the “Vestiges of
Creation”—“ This is only an approximation to the truth;
since neither is the brain of all osseous fishes, of all turtles,
of’ all birds, nor of all the species of any of the above order
of mammals, by any means precisely the same; nor does the
brain of the human foetus at any time precisely resemble,
perhaps, that of any individual whatever among the lower
animals. Nevertheless it may be said to represent, at each
of the above-named periods, the aggregate, as it were, of the
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HAS MAN A SOUL?
5
brains of each of the tribes stated.” Now, should a birth
have taken place at any of the eight stages, would the child
thus prematurely born have had a soul ? That is the ques
tion 1 propose to you. You who affirm that man has a
soul, it lies upon you, here, without charging me with
blasphemy—without charging me With ’ignorance—without
charging me with presumption—it lies upon you who affirm,
to state the grounds for your belief. At which stage, if at
any, did the soul come into the child ? At the moment of
the birth ? Why when a child is born into the world it can
scarcely see—it cannot speak—it cannot think—but after a
short time I jingle my keys, and it begins to give faint
smiles ; and after a few weeks, it is pleased with the jingling
of my keys. Is it the soul which is learning to appreciate
the sound of the jingling keys, and pleased with them? Is
it the immaterial and immortal soul amused and pleased
with my bundle of keys ? Where is the soul ? How is it
that the soul cannot speak the moment the child is born—
cannot even think ? How is it, that if I keep that child
without telling it any thing of its soul until it become
fourteen or fifteen years of age, it would then speak and
think as I had taught it to speak and think ; and if I kept
it without the knowledge of a soul, it would have no know
ledge of a soul at that age ? How is that ? Rajah Brooke,
at a missionary meeting at Liverpool, told his hearers there,
that the Dyaks, a people u ith whom he was connected, had
no knowledge of a God, of a soul, or of any future state.
How is it that the Dvaks have got this soul and yet live
knowing nothing whatever about it ? And the Dyaks are
by no means the only people who live and die knowing
nothing of any immortal and immaterial soul. Again you
tell me that this soul is immortal. Do you mean that it
has eternally existed—has never been created ? If so, you
deny a God who is the creator of all things. If the soul
began at some time to exist, where is the evidence that it
will not also at some time cease to exist ? If it came into
existence with the body’s birth, why not cease with the
body’s death ? You say the soul is immaterial, do you mean
that it is susceptible to material conditions, or do you not?
If susceptible to material conditions, what do you mean by its
being immortal and immaterial ? If not susceptible to mate
rial conditions, then explain to me how it is that under good
conditions it prospers and advances, and under bad con
ditions deteriorates and recedes. If a child is born in some
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HAS MAN A SOUL*
of the back streets of our city, and lives on bad food in a
wretched cellar, it grows up a weak and puny pale-faced
child. If allowed to crawl into existence on the edge of a
gutter, imperfectly educated, in fact mis-educated, it steals—
steals, perhaps, to live—and it becomes an outcast from
society. Is this immortal soul affected by the bodily con
ditions ? or is the soul originally naturally depraved ? And
if the soul is primarily naturally depraved, why is God so
unjust as to give a naturally depraved soul to anybody ? If
not, how is it that this immortal soul, when the body is kept
without food, permits the man without money to buy food,
to steal to satisfy his hunger ? You allege that the soul
moves my body. You assert that matter is inert, unintelli
gent ; that it is my active, intelligent soul that moves and
impels my inert and non-intelligent body. Is my immortal
soul hindered and controlled by the state of my body’s
general health? Does my soul feel hungry and compel my
body to steal ? Some theologians declare that my soul is
immaterial—that there is no means by which I can take any
cognisance whatever of it. What does that mean, except
that they know nothing whatever about it ? Sir W.
Hamilton admits that we are entirely ignorant as to the
connection between soul and body. Yet many who in so
many words admit that they have no knowledge, but only
faith in the soul’s existence, are most presumptuous in
affirming it, and in denouncing those who dispute their
affirmation. It is an easy method to hide ignorance, by
denouncing your opponent as an ignorant blasphemer.
Joseph Priestley in his book upon matterand spirit, quotes
from Hallet’s discourses, as follows:—“ I see a man move
and hear him speak for some years. Prom his speech I cer
tainly infer that he thinks as I do. I then see that man is
a being, who thinks and acts. After some time the man
fells down in my sight, grows cold and stiff, and speaks and
acts no more. Is it not then natural to conclude that he
thinks no more; as the only reason I had to believe that he
did think was his motion and his speech ? And now that
his motion and speech have ceased, I have lost the only way
of proving that he had the power of thought. Upon this
sudden death, one visible thing, the one man, has greatly
changed. Whence could I infer also, the same being con
sisted of two parts, and that the inward part continues to
live and think, and flies away from the body? When the
outward part ceases to live and move, it looks as if the whole
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�HAS MAN A SOUL?
7
man was gone, and that he, with all his powers, ceases at
the same time. His motion and thought both die together,
as far as I can diseern. The powers of thought, of speech
and motion, equally depend upon the body, and run the
same fate in case of declining old age. When a man dies
through old age, I perceive his powers of speech, motion,
and thought decay and die together, and by the same degrees.
That moment he ceases to move and 'breathe, he appears to
cease to think, too. When I am left to my reason, it
seems to me that my power of thought depends as much
upon the body as my sight and hearing. I could not think
in infancy; my power of thought, of sight, and of feeling
are equally liable to be obstructed by the body. A blow on
the head has deprived a man of thought, who could yet see,
and feel, and move ; so naturally the power of thinking
seems as much to belong to the body as any power of man
whatsoever. Naturally there appears no more reason to
suppose that a man can think out of the body than he can
hear sounds and feel cold out of the body.”
What do those mean who say that man is made up of two
parts—matter and mind ? I know of only one existence.
I find that existence manifested variously, each mode having
certain variations of attributes by which it is cognised. One
of these attributes, or a collection of certain attributes, I
find in, or with, certain modifications of that existence, that
is, in or with animal life—this attribute, or these attributes,
we call intelligence. In the same way that I find upon the
blade of a knife brightness, consequent upon a certain state
of the metal, so do I find in man, in the beast, different
degrees, not of brightness, but of intelligence, according to
their different states of organisation. I am told that the
mind and the body are separate from one another. Are the
brightness and steel of the knife separate ? Is not bright
ness the quality attaching to a certain modification of exis
tence—steel? Is not intelligence a quality attaching to a
certain modification of existence—man? The word bright
ness has no meaning, except relating to some bright thing.
The word intelligence, no meaning, except as relating to
some intelligent thing. I take some water and drop it upon
the steel, in due course the process of oxidation takes place
and the brightness is gone. I drop into man’s brain a bullet,
the process of destruction of life takes place, and his intelli
gence is gone. By changing the state of the steel we des
troy its brightness, and by disorganising the man destroy
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HAS MAN A SOUL?
his intelligence. Is mind an entity or a resul. ? ai existence
or a condition? Surely it is but the result of organic
activity a phenomenon of animal life.
Dr. Engledue
says:—“ In the same way as organism generally has the
power of manifesting, when the necessary stimuli are
applied, the phenomena which are designated life; so
one individual portion—brain, having peculiar and dis
tinct properties, manifests on the application of its appro
priate stimuli a peculiar and distinct species of action.
If the sum of all bodily function—life, be not an entity,
how can the product of the action of one portion of
the body—'brain, be an entity 1 Feeling and intelligence are
but fractional portions of life.” I ask those who are here to
prove that man has a soul, to do so apart from revelation.
If the soul is a part of ourselves, we require no supernatural
revelation to demonstrate its existence to us. D’Holbach
says : —“ The doctrine of spirituality, such as it now exists,
affords nothing but vague ideas ; it is rather a poisoner of
all ideas. Let me draw your attention to this:—The advo
cates of spirituality do not tell you anything, but in fact
prevent you from knowing anything.
They say that
spirit and matter have nothing in common, and that mortal
man cannot take cognisance of immortality. An ignorant
man may set himself up as an orator upon such a matter.
He says you have a soul—an immortal soul. Take care you
don’t lose your soul. When you ask him what is my soul,
he says he does not know—nobody knows—nobody can tell
you This is really that which they do. What is this doc
trine of spirituality ? What does it present to the mind ?
A substance unsubstantial that possesses nothing of which
our senses enable us to take cognisance.” Theologians urge
that each of us has a soul superior to all material conditions,
and yet a man who speaks cannot communicate by his speak
ing soul so freely with that man who is deaf and dumb; the
conditions cramp that which is said to be uncontrolled by
any conditions. If you cut out a man’s tongue, the soul no
longer speaks. If you put a gag in his mouth, and tie it
with a handkerchief, so that he cannot get it out, his soul
ceases to speak. The immaterial soul is conquered by a gag,
it cannot utter itself, the gag is in the way. The orthodox
say that the soul is made by Gfod ; and what do you know
about G-od ? Why just as much as we know about the soul.
And what do you know about the soul ? Nothing whatever.
How is it that if the soul is immaterial, having nothing in
�HAS MAN A SOUL ?
9
common with matter, that it only is manifest by material
means ? and how is it that it is encased and enclosed in my
material frame ? They affirm that my soul is a spirit—that
I received the same spirit from God. How is it that my
spirit is now by myself, and by my mortal body, denying its
own existence ? Is my mortal soul acting the hypocrite, or
is it ignorant of its own existence, and cannot help itself to
better knowledge ? And if it cannot help itself, why not,
if it is superior to the body ? and if you think it a hypocrite,
tell me why. What is meant by the declaration that man is
a compound of matter and spirit?—things which the ortho
dox assert have nothing in common with one another. Of
the existence of what you call matter you are certain, because
you and I, material beings, are here. Are you equally cer
tain of the existence of mind, as an existence independent
and separate from matter ? and if you are, tell me why.
Have you ever found it apart from matter ? If so, when and
where ? Have you found that the mind has a separate and
distinct existence ? if so, under what circumstances ? and tell
me—you who define matter as unintelligent, passive, inert,
and motionless—who talk of the vis inertice of matter—tell
me what you mean when you give these definitions to it?
You find the universe, and this small portion of it on which
we are, ceaselessly active. Why do you call it passive,
except it be that you want courage to search tor true know
ledge, as to the vast capabilities of existence, and, therefore,
invent such names as God and Soul to account for all
difficulties, and to hide your ignorance? What do you mean
by passive and inert matter ? You tell me of this world—
part of a system—that system part of another—that of
another—and point out to me the innumerable planets, the
countless millions of w'orlds, in the universe. You, who tell
me of the vast forces of the universe; what do you mean by
telling me that that is motionless ? What do you mean by yet
pointing to the unmeasurable universe and its incalculably
mighty forces, and affirming that they are incapable of every
perceptible effect? You, without one fact on which to base
your theory, strive to call into existence another existence
which must be more vast, and which you allege produces this
existence and gives its powers to it. Sir Isaac Newton
says“ We are to admit no more causes of things than are
sufficient to explain appearances.” What effect is there
which the forces of existence are incapable of producing?
Why do you come to the conclusion tnat the forces of the
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HAS MAN A SOUL?
universe are incapable of producing every effect of which I
take cognisance ? Why do you come to the conclusion that
intelligence is not an attribute—why ? What is there which
enables you to convert it into a separate and distinct exis
tence ? Is there anything ? Is it spirit ? What is spirit ?
That of which the mortal man can know nothing, you tell
me—that it is nothing which his senses can grasp—that is,
no man, but one who disregards his senses, can believe in it,
and that it is that which no man’s senses can take cognisance
of. If a man who uses his senses can never by their aid
take cognisance of spirit, then as it is through the senses
alone man knows that which is around him, you can know
nothing about spirit until you go out of your senses. When
I speak of the senses, I do not limit myself to what are
ordinarily termed man’s five senses—I include all man’s
sensitive faculties, and admit that I do not know the extent
of, and am not prepared to set a limit to, the sensitive capa
bilities of man. I have had personal experience in connec
tion with psycho-magnetic phenon ena of faculties in man
and woman not ordinarily recognist d, and am inclined to the
opinion that many men have been made converts to the
theories of spiritualism, because their previous education
had induced them to set certain arbitrary limits to the
domains of the natural. When they have been startled by
phenomena outside these conventional limitations, they at
once ascribed them to supernatural influences, rather than
reverse their previous rules of thinking.
Some urge that the soul is life. What is life ? Is it not
the word by which we express the aggregate normal func
tional activity of vegetable and animal organisms, necessa
rily differing, in degree, if not in kind, with each different
organisation ? To talk of immortal life and yet to admit the
decay and destruction of the organisation, is much the same
as to talk of a square circle. You link together two words
which contradict each other. The solution of the soul pro
blem is not so difficult as many imagine. The greatest diffi
culty is, that we have been trained to use certain words as
“ God,” “ matter,” “ mind,” “ spirit,” “ soul,” “ intelli
gence,” and we have been further trained to take these
words as representatives of realities, which, in fact, they do
not represent. We have to unlearn much of our school lore.
We have specially to carefully examine the meaning of each
word we use. The question lies in a small compass. Is there
one existence or more ? Qf one existence I am conscious,
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HAS MAN A SOTO
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because I am a mode of it. I know of no other existence.
*. know of no existence but that existence of which I am a
mode. I hold it to be capable of producing every effect. It
is for the man who alleges that there is another, to prove it.
I know of one existence. I do not endeavour to demonstrate
to you my existence, it needs no demonstration—I am. My
existence is undeniable. I am speaking to you. You are
conscious of my existence. You and I are not separate
entities, but modes of the same existence. We take cogni
sance of the existence which is around us and in us, and
which is the existence of which we are modes. Of the one
existence we are certain. It is for those who affirm that the
universe is “ matter,” and who affirm that there also exists
“ spirit,” to reinember that they admit the one existence I
seek to prove, and that the onus lies on them to demonstrate
a second existence—in fact, to prove there is the other exis
tence which they term spiritual. There cannot exist two
different substances or existences having the same attributes
or qualities. There cannot be two existences of the same
essence, having different attributes, because it is by the
attributes alone that we can distinguish the existences. We
can only judge of the substance by its modes. We may find
a variety of modes of the same substance, and we shall find
points of union which help to identify them, the one with
the other—the link which connects them with the great
whole. We can only judge of the existence of which we are
a part (in consequence of our peculiar organisation), under
the form of a continuous chain of causes and effects—each
effect a cause to the effect it precedes, each cause an effect
of the causative influence which heralded its advent. The
remote links of that line are concealed by the darkness of the
far-off past. Nay, more than this, the mightiest effort of
mind can never say—This is the first cause. Weakness and
ignorance have said it - but why ? To cloak their weakness,
to hide their ignorance. Knaves have said it—but why ? Tb
give scope to their cunning, and to enable them to say to the
credulous, “ Thus far shalt thou go and no farther.” The
termination is in the as yet unknowable future; and I ask
you, presumptuous men, who dare to tell me of God and
soul, of matter and creation—when possessed you the power
to sunder links of that great chain and write, “In the
beginning ?” I deny that by the mightiest effort of the
strongest intellect man can ever say of any period, at this
point substance began to be—before this existence was not.
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HAS MAN A
soul?
Has man a soul ? You who tell me he has a soul, a soul
independent of material conditions, I ask you how it is that
these immortal souls strive with one another to get mortal
benefits ? Has man a soul ? If man’s soul is not subject
to material conditions, why do I find knavish souls ?—Why
slavish souls ?—tyrannous souls ? Your doctrine that man
has a soul prevents him from rising. When you tell him
that his soul is not improvable by material conditions, you
prevent him from making himself better than he is. Man’s
intelligence is a consequence of his organisation. Organisa
tion is improvable, the intelligence becomes more powerful
as the organisation is fully developed, and the conditions
which surround man are made more pure. And the man
will become higher, truer, and better when he knows that
his intelligence is an attribute, like other attributes, capable
of development, susceptible of deterioration, he will strive
to effect the first and to guard against the latter.
Look at a number of people putting power into the hands
of one man, because he is a lord—surely they have no souls.
See the mass cringing to a wretched idol—surely these have
no souls. See men forming a pyramid of which the base is
a crushed and worn-out people, and the apex a church, a
throne, a priest, a king, and the frippery of a creed;—have
those men souls? Society should not be such a pyramid, it
should be one brotherly circle, in which men should be
linked together by a consciousness that they are only happy
so linked, conscious that when the chain is broken, then the
society and her peace is destroyed. What we teach is not
that man has a soul apart and independent of the body, but
that he has an ability, an intelligence, an attribute of his
body, capable of development, improvable, more useful,
according as he elevates himself and his fellows. Give up
blind adhesion to creeds and priests, strive to think ana
follow out in action the result of your thoughts. Each
mental struggle is an enlargement of your mind, an addition
to your brain power, an increase of your soul—the only soul
you have.
Printed by Austin & Co., 17, J jhnson’s Court, Fleet Street, E.C.
�
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Has man a soul?
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Edition: [4th ed.?]
Place of publication: [London]
Collation: 12 p. ; 18 cm.
Notes: Pages 3-11 bound in the wrong order (have been corrected in the PDF). "This lecture was originally delivered to the Sheffield Secular Society, and was printed from the reporter's notes without efficient correction from myself ...The lecture has been often re-delivered; and three editions having been exhausted, I have again corrected and revised the present edition." Tentative date of publication from KVK. Includes biblical references. Part of the NSS pamphlet collection.
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Bradlaugh, Charles [1833-1891.]
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[1861?}
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G4949
N094
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Soul
Rationalism
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Soul
-
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NAnONALSEOlIAB BT -
THE BRAIN
London:
WATTS & Co., 17, Johnson’s Court, Fleet Street, E.C.
Price One Penny.
�*-
ALSO BY THE SAME AUTHOR.
WAS JESUS AN IMPOSTOR?—Discussion with Mrs, Wilkie ..
SOCRATES, BUDDHA, AND JESUS............................................
THE MIRROR OF FREETHOUGHT..............................
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THE BIBLE GOD AND HIS FAVOURITES ..
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FICTITIOUS GODS
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CHRISTIANITY UNWORTHY OF GOD
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THE SECULAR FAITH ..
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IS RELIGION NECESSARY OR USEFUL?
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HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS
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THE OLD FAITH AND THE NEW
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�8 4-jO 2
THE BRAIN AND THE SOUL.
AVhat is the soul? is a question that has been asked for
/thousands of years, and those who have been credited with
a full and perfect knowledge of the matter have been unable,
up to the present, to give a satisfactory answer to the oftrepeated interrogation. Not only can theologians not tell
us what the soul is, but they are equally doubtful as to
where it is located. A few years ago, in the little parish of
Horsleydown, two men met at a small public-house. They
talked pleasantly on a variety of subjects, and at length the
problem of the existence of an immortal essence in man
was brought on the tapis. One of them declared his belief
that the soul of man was to be found in his head—in fact,
he was not quite sure that the intelligence of man wras not
in reality his soul. The other said that he was convinced
that the soul was located somewhere in the stomach; and
so the discussion proceeded. But it had not proceeded far
when one of the disputants, who had warmed himself to
the subject by a plentiful doze of alcoholic drink, took up
the pewter pot out of which he had been drinking and
struck his antagonist a heavy blow on the head with it,
felling him to the ground. It was a terrible blow, splitting
the poor fellow’s head in two ; the blood flowed freely, and
in a few moments the man was dead. But the questions as
to what the soul is and where it is located were, I need not
say, not finally settled by this brutal experiment.
And so it is necessary again to ask, What is the soul ?
Is it spirit? If so, what is that? With sublime in
genuousness, a short time ago a theologian answered
that “ spirit is an unknown substance.” But, if it is an
“unknown substance,” how are we to know that it is
a substance at all ? And, if spirit is a substance, whether
known or unknown, is it in the possession of every child
born into the world, at the time of birth, or at what period
�4
THE BRAIN AND THE SOUL.
of the development in the foetus does it make its first
appearance ? Or are there innumerable souls in the uni
verse waiting to enter the body of each child born into the
world ? These puzzling questions have been put to the
believers in the existence of the immortal element in man
times out of mind, and, though a variety of replies have
been vouchsafed, they have of necessity been of a very
contradictory and unsatisfactory character.
In the present age, when men are seeking rational expla
nations of natural phenomena, it may not be altogether
uninteresting to glance at the views Materialists have taken,
and now take, of this question, which is one of absorbing
interest to every earnest seeker after truth. In recent years
nothing has been made more plain than that, whatever
theologians may think the soul to be in itself, they have
uniformly admitted that it is very closely associated with
the mind of man. Herein they have shown that they have
been powerless to resist the stream of tendency along which
so many are drifting towards Rationalism. Many scientists
as well as theologians of the past were of opinion that the
soul was in the body. Professor Buchner, in his “ Force
and Matter,” tells us that the philosopher Fischer thought
that the soul was “ immanent in the whole nervous system
and Professor Erdmann, of Halle, held that the theory that
the seat of the soul was in the brain was quite erroneous.
Now, the whole question must be determined by the weight
of evidence, and, while there are absolutely no facts at all to
lead us to the belief that the soul is an entity located some
where in the stomach, the evidence in support of the oppo
site theory is simply overwhelming. “No fact in our con
stitution,” says Professor Bain, “can be considered more
certain than this, that the brain is the chief organ of the
mind, and has mind for its principal function.” By the
word mind is expressed the totality of mental phenomena.
Without brain we can have no thought, no intelligence, no
mind. And the power of a man’s mind is dependent
almost entirely upon the size, quality, and constitution of
the brain. With large brain of good quality you have
mental power and vigorous intelligence. Men’s brains are,
on an average, larger than women’s, and women’s larger
than those of children. The average weight of a male
European brain is 49 ounces; that of a female 44 ounces.
�THE BRAIN AND THE SOUL.
5
But though, as a general rule, the larger the brain the greater
the mental power, it sometimes happens that an average
sized brain is capable of displaying more intelligence than
..an abnormally large one. The quality of brain has much
.to do with this, for not only does it seem necessary that the
brain should be large, but that the convolutions in it should
be complex and deep with sulci between them, before any
■ extraordinary power is shown. Dr. Carpenter says that
almost all men who have manifested great talent have
possessed large brains, and he instances Newton, Cuvier,
.and Napoleon; but it is a fact that some men of genius
have had only average-sized brains, though the quality and
■convolutions of them were doubtless the cause of the
splendid talent. The late M. Gambetta might be quoted
.as an example.
That there is a distinct relation between the size of brain
. and thought-ability may be seen from the fact that the races
lowest down in the scale of civilisation have been shown to
possess the smallest brain. The European brain is larger
than that of the Hindoo, the North American Indian, or
the Chinese. The sane man’s brain is considerably larger
than that of the idiot. Some idiots’ brains have not weighed
more than io ounces, others reach 19 to 22 ounces, and the
largest among them do not exceed 25 ounces. Insanity, as
■distinguished from idiocy, is caused, there is very little
reason to doubt, through disease of the brain, or from
nervous derangement. Now, if intelligence depends upon
the size and quality of the brain, the soul of man is injured
in proportion as these qualities are deficient. In a healthy,
active, well-developed brain you have an active, vigorous,
.and wonder-producing instrument; but in a small, weakly,
diseased brain you have manifestations which indicate either
the total loss of intelligence or a very partial possession
of it.
Now, if the characteristics of the brain, taken collectively,
.are the soul, the question very naturally arises, Have idiots
souls ? And, if they have, will they live again ? And, if
they live again, will they be the same persons as they were
in this world ? If so, they will be idiots ; and, if they are
not idiots, they will not be the same persons; and, if they
are not the same persons, it will not be they who are living
.again, but somebody else. Assuming that the mind of man
�6
THE BRAIN AND THE SOUL.
is the soul, there is absolutely no evidence whatever to lead'
us to the opinion that it is immortal, except in the sense
that, as matter and force are alike imperishable, the elements •
of which the brain is composed exist through all eternity,
in some form or other, in the universe.
Taking the facts as they stand, we find that the brain of "
the child is altogether inferior in vigour to that of the man,
and that with the growth of the body we have a correspond
ing growth of brain. Not only so, but it is also true that in
the brain substance of the child there is more water and less
cerebral fat than in that of the adult. It follows, therefore,
that, if the soul be identified with the phenomena of mind,
it is subject to change; that it grows with the growth of thematerial organisation; that it becomes strong and active as the individual advances towards maturity, and suffers a
gradual diminution of power in old age.
Between the ages of twenty-five and fifty the brain reaches
its maximum weight and power, and afterwards slowly
diminishes, until we find the individual has lapsed into a
second childhood, “ sans eyes, sans teeth, sans everything.”
In illness, too, the soul’s power of manifesting itself is
considerably diminished. Under some diseases there hasbeen an entire loss of intelligence ; and often, when the
patient has been restored to health, the previous intellectual
activity has been, in a large measure, wanting. A sailor
who met with an accident, which caused a piece of bone to
lodge on the brain, lay in a state of unconsciousness for a
whole year till the bone was removed : he then recovered
his normal mental state. Now, if the mind is the soul, cam
disease affect it ? Can illness deprive an immortal quality
of its power ? Can an injury to the brain cause its activity
to cease ? If it can, how can it be contended that the soul
can exist apart from the body, and act independently of it,
when we have seen that its power to manifest itself depends^upon the healthful condition of the body, and that a piece
of bone protruding on to the brain will cause its manifesta
tions to entirely cease ? Does this piece of bone really
paralyse the “immortal soul”?
Some contend that the human body is merely an in
strument upon which the soul performs; that, though the
brain appears to be the organ of thought, just as the stomachis the organ of digestion, the lungs of respiration, and the -
�THE BRAIN AND THE SOUL.
7
kidneys of secretion, it is really the animistic principle which
thinks; and that there are good grounds for supposing that
the essential part of man does think when the body has
ceased to perform its functions. Hence, the brain has been
likened to a piano, upon which the mind performs. To
test the value of this analogy, we have only to ask what is
meant by an organ or instrument but that which produces
certain results, without which they could not be performed?
A knife, for example, is an instrument that cuts. An organ
is only an organ by virtue of producing certain results. The
stomach is the organ of digestion because, by means of its
operations, food is digested; the lungs are the organs of
respiration because they respire ; the kidneys are the organs
of secretion because they secrete; and the brain is the
organ of thought because the result of its workings produces
thought.
It is a fact generally known, but not often reflected upon,
that for every movement of the body or brain there follows
a loss of substance, which must be replaced ; and as neither
the working of the nervous system, nor the muscles, nor the
brain produce anything, the organism, to repair the waste
that is continually going on within, requires nourishment
from without, and this is only to be obtained by the means
of food.
One-fifth of the blood in the human body is con
stantly traversing the brain, and in accordance with the
speed with which it flows are the effects which follow. For
the brain to continue in a healthy condition it is necessary
that the individual shall eat good food, and that the flow of
blood shall be perfectly regular. A too rapid flow may be
caused by the excessive use of alcoholic liquor; and atmo
sphere strongly charged with carbonic acid gas will cause a
decrease in the rate of the flow, and produce a fainting
sensation.
It has been clearly shown that the primary cause of idiocy
is a deficiency either in the size or quality of the brain ; and
in all cases examined by eminent physiologists this unfortu
nate falling off has been completely demonstrated. Insanity,
on the other hand, results, as many eminent specialists have
shown, from a derangement of the nervous system. Many
men who have given splendid evidence of the possession of
great intellectual power—who have, indeed, achieved con
�8
THE BRAIN AND THE SOUL.
siderable success in the world of literature, science, and art
—have, unhappily, become insane. In such cases there
was, apparently, no deficiency in size, quality, or power of
the brain, but a complete derangement of the nervous
system. The effect produced by insanity is the total per
version of the moral faculties.
“ It is,” observes Louis Buchner, in “ Force and Matter,”
“ through the nervous system radiating from the brain, and
which may be considered as presiding over all organic func
tions, that the brain sways the whole mass of the organism,
and reflects again to various parts external impressions,
whether of a material or spiritual nature.” A nervous man
turns pale with fright; his brain loses its equilibrium when
he is under cross-examination, and he flounders about in
hopeless bewilderment: if, however, he is encouraged and
spoken to kindly, his eyes sparkle, and his face is suffused
with a pleasant smile ; but, if his anger is excited, his cheeks
colour, his lips are compressed, and a frown disfigures his
countenance. Now, if the mind works through the brain
employing it as an instrument, is it not strange that a de
rangement of the nervous system should cause the mind to
behave in such an extraordinary fashion as to convert an
honest man into a thief, a veracious man into a deceiver,
or a nervous man into a fool? If the mind is an entity,
its quality ought not to be altered by any physical weak
ness of the organism. Nor should any lack of mental
power in the individual interfere or retard the action of
the mind. If the body is only an instrument upon which
the mind operates, it could perform its work just as well
without the instrument as with it; or, if it cannot, what
reasonable grounds have we to suppose that it can exist
without the body ? And, if it can perform it functions only
through the medium of an organ or instrument, that would
lead us to suppose that, if the mind or soul is immortal, the
body must be immortal also, or else the soul, having no
instrument upon which to perform through all eternity,
would remain after the death of the body in endless in
activity.
It has been contended that, if the brain is the instrument
of thought, it ought to continue to perform its work when
the head is separated from the body. But I have shown
that this faculty is kept at work by the regular supply of
�THE BRAIN AND THE SOUL.
9
blood, and that when this supply is diminished the operations
are interfered with, and, if the supply is stopped, the opera
tions cease altogether. Still, Dr. Buchner has shown that
manifestations of the working of the brain may be produced
even after death. He says (“ Matter and Force ”) : “ On
decapitating an animal, say a dog or a rabbit, the severed
head gradually loses its excitability ; the eyelids are closed,
the eyes rigid, the nostrils immovable. Now, if at that
moment blood of a bright red, and deprived of its fibrous
matter, be injected into the arteries of the brain, the pre
viously lifeless head is re-animated; the eyelids open, the
nostrils expand, warmth and sensibility return, the eyes
revive, look at the bystanders, and move in their sockets.
If the animal be called by its name, the eyes turn in the
direction whence the sound came. These signs of returning
life last as long as the injection is continued, and vanish
and re-appear as the operation is suspended or recommenced.
These experiments have not yet been tried on human heads
severed from their bodies; but we may safely assume that
the same results would follow. M. Brown Sequard, to
whom especially we are indebted for these investigations,
made the attempt on a human arm recently cut off, though
already cold and insensible. In a few moments warmth,
sensibility, contraction of the muscles—in fact, all the
normal activities returned, and M. Brown Sequard was
enabled to repeat the experiment with the same success,
until sheer fatigue compelled him to desist.”
“ The blood is the life ” is a conventional phrase, which
appears to carry with it a great deal more of truth than
most persons imagine. The brain cannot perform its office
normally without a copious supply of it, in all its richness
and purity.'
On the assumption that the soul of man is associated
indissolubly with the mind or intelligence, it is extremely
difficult to understand upon what rational grounds animals
are to be excluded from living again when their organs have
ceased to work and their bodies are converted into dust.
Even theologians are prepared to admit that many of the
lower animals are exceedingly intelligent; but, when it is
claimed for them that many of their actions give indication
of sound reasoning previous to the performance of them,
they dissent, and assert, in opposition, that animals’ actions
�IO
THE BRAIN AND THE SOUL.
are instinctive, and that man, in the whole realm of organised
being, is the only animal who is moved to the performance
of an action as the result of the exercise of reason.
The most eminent authorities in physiology seem now of
opinion that the difference between the mind of man and
that of animals is not one of kind, but merely of degree;
that the intelligence of the animal reveals itself after precisely
the same fashion as that of man. According to Carl Vogt,
there is not one intellectual faculty which belongs exclusively
to man ; and though man is, on the whole, much more intelli
gent than the animal, the difference is distinctly relative, and
is brought about by greater intensity and a proper combina
tion of his faculties. All scientific opinion upon this point
points in one direction. In his “ Descent of Man ” (p. 65)
Darwin says : “ If no organic being, excepting man, had
possessed any mental power, or if his powers had been of a
wholly different nature from those of the lower animals, then
we should never have been able to convince ourselves that
our high faculties had been gradually developed. But it can
be shown that there is no fundamental difference of this
kind. We must also admit that there is a much wider
interval in mental power between one of the lowest fishes,
as the lamprey or lancelet, and one of the higher apes, than
between an ape and man; yet this interval is filled up by
numberless gradations.” Louis Buchner says : “ Neither in
form or chemically can any essential difference be proved
between the animal and the human brain; the differences
are great, but only in degree.” Professors Huxley, Carpenter,
Bain, and Haeckel also support this view.
In using the word instinct, theologians have mistaken alto
gether its real meaning ; for it does not imply, at all events
in its scientific sense, that an animal does an act from a
blind, unreasoning impulse, an infallible power implanted
within it by a beneficent deity at its creation, but it rather
means that an animal, after having performed a certain class of
action through successive generations, comes to perform such
actions automatically or instinctively, as the result of repeated
comparisons and conclusions. For instance, a monkey will
instinctively drink spirituous liqours when offered to him
but, if he gets drunk, and, as a necessary result, suffers from
headache on the following morning, he is wise enough to,
abstain from such drink ever after (see Darwin’s “ Descent.
�THE BRAIN AND THE SOUL.
11
of Man ”). This looks very much as though the monkey
were a better reasoner than many men.
Most old animals are far more sagacious and prudent than
young ones; yet, if animals acted instinctively, and not on
account of the exercise of their intelligence, there ought to
be no apparent difference. T have watched a cat for more
than an hour peeping just round the side of a huge hole
into which it had seen a rat seek refuge. Now, this feline
creature waited patiently round the corner, just as a school
boy does who wants to catch his playmate, until the grand
opportunity came for pouncing upon its prey. Other cats
had been put to the same hole, yet their instinct did not
prompt them to act in the self-same fashion. On the theory
that Deity has implanted in animals an unerring instinct in
lieu of endowing them with reason, all animals, under
similar circumstances, should be prompted to act in precisely
the same way. But this is not found to be so.
In the Zoological Gardens I have often watched the
monkeys in their exceedingly interesting performances. Once
I remember that I gave a young monkey some bread and
meat, the meat having a thick coating of mustard. The
animal took the morsel and tore it into fragments, then smelt
a piece several times, and at last put it in his mouth. For
a few seconds the mustard did not take effect; but presently
the monkey spat the whole of it out, and rubbed his tongue
furiously. Several hours later in the day I presented some
bread and meat to the same animal, but he graciously refused
to accept it. Was this reason or instinct ? Is it from instinct
that dogs go to butcher shops and steal meat when the
master is not looking, or that foxes rob the roost when the
farmer is engaged elsewhere ? I remember a dog that went
to a particular butcher’s shop every week and stole loose
scraps of meat from the board. One day, when the dog
made his appearance, the butcher was waiting to give him a
warm reception, and, when the animal had rescued a large
chop from the board, the butcher gave him another, on the
tail, which the poor beast is likely to remember to the end
of his days. Is it from instinct that this dog has not visited
that shop again ? Is it from instinct that elephants and bears
open their mouths for stray missiles of food, and that thesplendidly-trained horses of Messrs. Sanger go through their
performances with as much apparent enjoyment as the men.
�12
THE BRAIN AND THE SOUL.
and women who ride them ? If animals are not intelligent,
and do not reason, how is that they are capable of being
taught anything ? How is it that a monkey can be taught
to beat a drum or fire off a rifle ? How is it that dogs are
trained to go through acrobatic performances, jump through
hoops, etc., with almost as much skill as men. Then take
birds. How marvellously intelligent are some of these ! The
sparrow is never afraid of a man who does not carry a gun.
If you try and catch the young of the partridge, the old bird
will fly by your side and almost throw itself into your
clutches in order to induce you to pursue it in preference to
the young onesid By way of revenge, many a swallow has
been known'-to; wall up the flyhole of its nest on finding it
occupied, on' its-.return in spring, by a sparrow. Was it by
instinct that the swallow acted thus ?
Man, it is admitted, deliberates before he performs an
act. He remembers the effect of past conduct; sees that
similar actions produce like results upon his fellows, and
thus is enabled to judge as to how he should act in the future.
But it should always be remembered that, even in reference
to man, most of his actions are performed automatically,
without reasoning on each occasion as to why he should do
thfifci. For example, when a man rises in the morning he
does not say to himself: “ Well, I must go to work to-day,
and, in order for me to do so, I must dress myself, have my
■breakfast, and walk to the station, and go by rail to town.”
Automatically he rises, gets himself prepared, and starts for
business, and it very often occurs that a man who is accus
tomed to go by one route goes in that direction, even though
he meant to go in another (see Dr. Carpenter on “ Uncon
scious Cerebrum ”). But the point I am concerned to put
now is that, if a man is to live again because he has intel
ligence, or, as the theologian prefers to call it, mind, I see no
valid reason why animals should not live again, inasmuch
as there is overwhelming proof that they also have intelli
gence, which, though it is not so fully developed as in man,
nevertheless exists, and is susceptible of very great improve
ment by contact with higher forms of life.
Turning for a moment from the arguments of the theo
logian, we are at once confronted by the Spiritualist, who
commands us to examine the evidence as to the existence
of the “modern ghost.”
�THE BRAIN AND THE SOUL.
13
When Hamlet beheld the ghost of his dead father be was
not much surprised, because “ walking ghosts,” clad in full
attire, were among the ordinary occurrences of every-day, or
rather night, life; but with the growth of modern science and
general scepticism concerning the supernatural the ghosts
have been considerably exorcised. Now, if they come at
all, they only put in an appearance at seances specially
arranged for their reception, among people who have a
strong belief in their reality. And w’hen they come, fearing
lest they should shock the delicate or refined feelings of the
spectators, they bring their clothes with them. Cunning
spirits ! sagacious ghosts ! They know full well “ that the
tailor makes the man,” and that their decency, if not their
respectability, might be challenged if they came wrapped
only in the “ garment of thought.” Well might an American
wit observe that “ he could understand the ghost of his
great grandfather; but for the life of him he could not
understand the ghost of his grandfather’s overcoat.”
Modern Spiritualists acknowledge no essential relation
between brain and soul. To them the soul is an entity,
that has existed from all eternity, and acts just as well—
often much better—apart from than when existing in con
nection with the body. Taking it for granted that he has
always existed, the Spiritualist argues that the “ human
soul” must be immortal, and he does not allow such matters
as those relating to the soul of brutes and to the personal
immortality of idiots—which have been already considered
—to trouble the even tenour of his thoughts. Nor does it
strike him as at all strange that the spirits who make their
appearance at his “ friendly gatherings ” generally come on
foolish errands, and know no more than the “ medium ”
through whom they communicate their nonsense.
The spirit of “John King” makes his entrance silently
and with ghostly tread, and everybody at once recognises
his well-cut features and his long straggling beard; and
when Mrs. Guppy comes mysteriously through the ceiling,
and leaves no trace of the spot through which her portly
body slid, there are no evidences of surprise or incredulity.
“ The greater the miracle, the stronger the belief,” is espe
cially true in regard to Spiritualists. Even Dr. Nichols,
whom I know to be an exceedingly thoughtful gentleman,
said a short time ago, in answer to me, that he had seen a
�14
THE BRAIN AND THE SOUL.
■chair “ deliberately walk across the room.” But the learned
Doctor was silenced when I further inquired how long this
article of furniture “deliberated” before it commenced its
journey? If the chair deliberated at all, it must have
thought—that is, chairs must be classed among things intel
ligent, and the probability is—if the reasoning of Spiritualists
on this point is at all valuable—have souls also.
Even admitting that extraordinary psychical phenomena
really do occur, that is no reason for believing that man’s
soul or personality is immortal. If phenomena happen
which we, in our ignorance, are unable to understand, that
affords no ground for the allegation that no possible combi
nation of matter and force could produce them. For man
to say that nature cannot account for such and such a result
is for him to declare that he knows the limits of Nature’s
capabilities, which is tantamount to the declaration that
man can, with truth, dogmatically say, “Nature can go so
far and no farther.” Besides, if the soul is something
different from the body, and distinct altogether from matter,
how is it that this “ immaterial ” element can mingle with,
or in any way affect, matter? And, if the soul can exist as
well without as with the body, how is it that it ever clothes
itself with such a useless encumbrance ? Moreover, if it is
said that the soul thinks, recollects, classifies, judges, may it
not be reasonably asked what purpose the brain serves, and
whether it would not have been quite as easy for God to
have made the brain to perform all these functions, without
complicating matters by the introduction of the “ immortal
clement ” of which man knows nothing ?
In absolute despair, the theologian and the Spiritualist
proclaim in chorus that the belief in the immortality of the
soul is a comforting faith, especially to those whose lives are
miserable on earth, and who, if they did not expect to live
again when their bodies had crumbled to dust, would not
endure the pain and suffering to which “ flesh is heir,” but
would “ take up arms against a sea of troubles and, by
■opposing, end them.”
But is the desire of man for a future life of happiness to
be considered a proof that he will get it ? Are our wishes
to be regarded as the measure of truth ? Do not thousands
of men desire to achieve success in various walks of life,
and yet lamentably fail to accomplish their purpose, how-
�THE BRAIN AND THE SOUL.
I
-ever noble it may be ? I have known men who have bid.
fair to win honourable distinction for themselves, who, in
the end, have died in poverty and wretchedness, despite
their firm belief that they would one day achieve the greatest
success. Not one-hundredth part of the seeds that are sown
in the earth blossom into flower and come to maturity ; and
out of the hundreds of thousands—nay, millions—of chil
dren born into the world, few, indeed, ever attain to man
hood. The desire for a future life, therefore, affords no
reasonable ground for its reality.
Some theologians have said that the idea of annihilation
is nothing short of horrible; while, on the contrary, lofty
thoughts and silent meditations on life in heaven are com
forting and soothing to the soul. Yet, when we are dead,
there are no dreams of hell flames to disturb the everlasting
sleep. In the beautiful words of Colonel Ingersoll:—“Upon
the shadowy shore of Death the sea of trouble casts no
waves. Eyes that have been curtained by the everlasting
dark will never know again the touch of tears. Lips that
have been touched by eternal silence will never utter another
word of grief. Hearts of dust do not break ; the dead do
not weep ; and I had rather think of those I have loved and
those I have lost as having returned—as having become a
part of the elemental wealth of the world. I would rather
think of those as unconscous dust; I would rather think
■of them as gurgling in the stream, floating in the clouds,
bursting in the foam of light upon the shores of worlds; I
would rather think of them as inanimate and eternally un
conscious, than to have even a suspicion that their naked
soulshad been clutched by an orthodox god.” If, however,
we have an immortal soul, it must be remembered that dis
belief will not harm it. Scepticism has no power against an
immortal essence; but surely, in deciding, each for our
selves, this great problem, we should not be led away by preju
dice or sentiment, but should view the facts in all their naked
force. Looking at the subject in its purely scientific aspect,
and weighing the facts with a full desire to arrive at truth, I
am led to close with Carl Vogt, the great German scientist,
who, as the result of deep study and wise research, says :
“Physiology decides definitely and categorically against
individual immortality, as against any special existence of
the soul. The soul does not enter the foetus, like the evil
�16
THE BRAIN AND THE SOUL.
spirit into persons possessed, but is a product of the develop
ment of the brain, just as muscular activity is the product
of glandular development. So soon as the substances com
posing the brain are aggregated in a similar form will they
exhibit these same functions. We have seen that we can
destroy mental activity by injuring the brain. By observing
the development of the child we also arrive at the convic
tion that the activity of the soul progresses in proportion as
the brain is gradually developed. The foetus manifests no
mental activity, which only shows itself after birth, when the
brain requires the necessary material condition. Mental
activity changes with the periods of life, and ceases altogether
at death.” Yet, if there is no personal immortality for man,
at least we have the consolation of knowing that there is a
practical immortality for the race. Good deeds leave their
indelible impress upon the book of nature, and the influence
an unknown good man exerts in the world can never perish.
The silent deeds of goodness done by a loving mother for
her child, the generosity of the philanthropist, the heroism
of the reformer, produce good fruit and add lustre and
nobility to the human character in succeeding generations.
And when a dear brother dies we will say, in the words of
the Freethought poet, Saladin :—
Was he brave ? We’ll bear his courage
Down the rushing stream of time.
Was he wise ? Then may his wisdom
Make our stunted lives sublime.
Was he kind ? We’ll bear his kindness
To the savage battle van,
And bandage with his mantle shreds
The bleeding heart of man.
•
Heap the red earth on our brother,
And lay him to his rest,
After life’s weird, fitful mystery,
Close to Terra’s kindly breast ;
Another phase in Nature’s modes,
And this we know alone,
Nor dare to tread in blasphemy
The shores of the Unknown.
Printed by Watts
<Sr
Co., 17, Johnsons Court, Fleet Street, London..
�
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The brain and the soul
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Rationalism
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Brain
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Text
NATIONAL SECULAR SOCIETY
THE
MORTALITY
OB'
the soul
BY
. DAVID HUME.
Reprinted from the Original Edition of liS->
WITH
An Introduction
by
G. AV. Foote.
Price Twopence.
LONDON
progressive PUBLISHING company,
28 Stonecutter Street, E.O.
1890.
�LONDON:
TRUSTED AND PUBLISHED BY G. W. FOOTE
AT 2ft STONECUTTER STREET, E.C.
�1
’’W'W
N T RO DUCT I ON.
By G. W. FOOTE.
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Referring to David Hume, in his lecture on the Physical
m
ine rny
Basis of Life, Professor Huxley speaks of “ the vigor of thought
and the exquisite clearness of style of the man whom I make
bold to term the most acute thinker of the eighteenth century
—even though that century produced Kant.”* Even Carlyle
assigns Hume a place “ among the greatest,”! which for a
writer like Carlyle to a thinker like Hume is a remarkable
tribute. No less clearly is the Scotch philosopher’s greatness
acknowledged by Joseph de Maistre, the foremost champion of
the Papacy in this century. “ I believe,” he says, “taking all
into account, that the eighteenth century, so fertile in this
respect, did not produce a single enemy of religion who can be
compared with him. His cold venom is far more dangerous
than the foaming rage of Voltaire. If ever, among men who
have heard the gospel preached, there has existed a veritable
Atheist (which I will not undertake to decide) it is he. +
Hume’s influence has been felt through the whole course of
philosophy since his day, and the writings of such a man—so
lucid, yet so profound; so acute, yet so comprehensive—can
never be neglected. Upon religious topics, no less than on
political and philosophical, he was singularly penetrative. His
Essay on Miracles is the starting-point of all subsequent dis
cussions of that most vital element of the Christian faith; his
Natural History of Religion strikingly anticipates many of
the teachings of modern Evolution; and his Dialogues on
* Lay Sermons and Addresses, p. 141.
t Essays (People’s Edition), vol. iv., p. 130.
t Lettres sur I’Inquisition, pp. 147, 148.
�iv.
Introduction.
Religion turn the arguments of Theism in every possible
light, leaving little but elaboration to his successors.
In the ordinary editions of Hume’s Essays the following
reprint is not to be found. This essay was published for- the first
time after his death, at Edinburgh, in 1789, by C. Hunter, Par
liament Square. It was the second of two posthumous essays,
the first being a remarkable essay on Suicide. A copy of the
original edition has been faithfully followed in this reprint.
Not a word has been changed, but such forms as “ ’tis ” have
been brought into accord with the sedater fashion of to-day,
and the frequent dashes in the midst of long passages have
been treated as the marks of fresh paragraphs.
Professor Huxley, whose thoroughness is apparent to all who
follow him, gives the title of this essay On the Immortality of
the Soul, but the word used on the original title-page is
mortality, which indicates the author’s argument. This is a
mere inadvertence, however, for Huxley is well acquainted
with the essay, and gives long extracts from it in his splendid
little volume on Hume. He calls it a “ remarkable essay,”
*
and “ a model of clear and vigorous statement.” It long
remained but little known, but “ possibly for that reason its
influence has been manifested in unexpected quarters, and its
main arguments have been adduced by archiépiscopal and
episcopal authority in evidence of the value of revelation. Dr.
Whately, sometime Archbishop of Dublin, paraphrases Hume,
though he forgets to cite him ; and Bishop Courtenay’s elabo
rate work, dedicated to the Archbishop, is a development of
that prelate’s version of Hume’s essay.”
Anyone who turns to the first essay in Whately’s Some
Peculiarities of the Christian Religion will perceive the truth
of these remarks, at least with respect to the Archbishop.
Sometimes he follows Hume step by step, and even uses his
very illustrations. But Hume himself had doubtless profited
by the arguments of Anthony Collins in his replies to Dr.
Samuel Clarke’s letters to Dodwell. Clarke argued for the
Immateriality of the Soul, and Collins for its Materiality ; and,
as Huxley elsewhere admits, Collins had by far the best of the
discussion. He wrote, says Huxley, with “ wonderful power
and closeness of reasoning,” and “in this battle the Goliath of
* Hume, English Men of Letters Series.
�Introduction.
V.
Freethinking overcame the champion of what was considered
*
Orthodoxy.
Some readers may notice one omission in Hume’s essay. He
does not refer, as Huxley remarks, to “ the sentimental argu
ments for the immortality of the soul which are so much in
vogue at the present day,” and a perhaps he did not think
them worth notice.” But he does fence them by anticipation
in saying thata All doctrines are to be suspected which are
favored by our passions.” Nothing but man’s overweening
egotism could induce him to think that he will live for ever
because he would like to; and that such an argument for a future
life should be put forward by theologians, only proves what is so
obvious on many other grounds, that religion, with all its fine
pretences, is constantly appealing to the blind irrationality of
individual selfishness.
We must conclude this Preface with a word of warning to
the reader. Let him not be misled by the opening and closing
paragraphs of Hume’s essay into supposing that the great
sceptic deferred to the authority of Revelation. They are only
his ironical bows to orthodoxy. He indulges in the same
gestures in his Essay on Miracles. This has brought upon
him, as it brought upon Gibbon, a charge of disingenuousness.
But both of those masters of irony were perfectly aware that
every sensible man understood them. If they wore a mask, it
was transparent, and did not conceal their features; and those
who upheld the Blasphemy Laws for the persecution of
Freethinkers, had no right to complain when conformity was
yielded with an expressive grimace.
Critiques and Adresses, “ The Metaphysics of Sensation.’
��The Mortality of the Soul.
By DAVID HUME.
By the mere light of reason it seems difficult to prove
the Immortality of the Soul; the arguments for it are
commonly derived either from metaphysical topics, or
moral or physical. But in reality it is the Gospel and
the Gospel alone, that has brought 'ft/e and immor
tality to light.
I. Metaphysical topics suppose that the Soul is
immaterial, and that it is impossible for thought to
belong to a material substance. But just metaphysics
teach us that the notion of substance is wholly confused
and imperfect, and that we have no other idea of any
substance, than as an aggregate of particular qualities,
inhering in an unknown something. Matter, there
fore, and spirit, are at bottom equally unknown, and
we cannot determine what qualities inhere in the one
or in the other. They likewise teach us that nothing
can be decided a priori concerning any cause or effect
and that experience being the only source of our judg
ments of this nature we cannot know from any other
principle, whether matter by its structure or arrange
ment, may not be the cause of thought. Abstract
reasonings cannot decide any question of fact or
existence. But admitting a spiritual substance to be
dispersed throughout the universe, like the etherial fire
of the Stoics, and to be the only inherent subject of
�8
The Mortality of the Soul.
thought, we have reason to conclude from analogy that
nature uses it after the same manner she does the other
substance matter. She employs it as a kind of paste or
clay; modifies it into a variety of forms and existences ;
dissolves after a time each modification, and from its
substance erects a new form. As the same material
substance may successively compose the body of all
.animals, the same spiritual substance may compose
their minds. Their consciousness, or that system of
thought which they formed during life may be con
tinually dissolved by death. And nothing interests
them in the new modification. The most positive
assertors of the morality of the Soul, never denied the
immortality of its substance. And that an immaterial
substance as well as a material, may lose its memory
or consciousness appears in part from experience, if the
Soul be immaterial.
Reasoning from the common course of nature,
and without supporting any new interposition of
the supreme cause, which ought always to be excluded
from philosophy, what is incorruptible must also be
ingenerable. The Soul therefore, if immortal, existed
before our birth; and if the former existence no
ways concerned us, neither will the latter.
Animals undoubtedly feel, think, love, hate, will,
and even reason, though in a more imperfect manner
than men ; are their Souls also immaterial and
immortal ?
II. Let us now consider the moral arguments, chiefly
those derived from the justice of God, which is sup
posed to be farther interested in the farther punish
ment of the vicious and reward of the virtuous.
But these arguments are grounded on the supposition
that God has attributes beyond what he has exerted in
this universe, with which alone we are acquainted.
Whence do we infer the existence of these attributes ?
�The Mortality of the Soul.
9
It is very safe for us to affirm that whatever we know
the Deity to have actually done, is best; but it is very
dangerous to affirm, that he must always do what
to us seems best. In how many instances would
this reasoning fail us with regard to the present
world ?
But if any purpose of nature be clear, we may affirm,
that the whole scope and intention of man’s creation,
so far as we can judge by natural reason, is limited to
the present life. With how weak a concern from the
original inherent structure of the mind and passions,
does he ever look farther ? What comparison either
for steadiness or efficacy, betwixt so floating an idea,
and the most doubtful persuasion of any matter of fact
that occurs in common life. There arise indeed in
some minds some unaccountable terrors with regard to
futurity; but these would quickly vanish were they
not artificially fostered by precept and education.
And those who foster them ; what is their motive ?
Only to gain a livelihood, and to acquire power and
riches in this world. Their very zeal and industry
therefore is an argument against them.
What cruelty, what iniquity, what injustice in
nature, to confine all our concern, as well as all our
knowledge, to the present life, if there be another
scene still waiting us, of infinitely greater consequence ?
Ought this barbarous deceit to be ascribed to a benificent
and wise being ?
Observe with what exact proportion the task to be
performed and the performing powers are adjusted
throughout all nature. If the reason of man gives
him a great superiority above other animals, his neces
sities are proporti onably multiplied upon him ; his
whole time, his whole capacity, activity, courage,
passion, find sufficient employment in fencing against
the miseries of his present condition, and frequently,
�10
The Mortality of the Soul.
nay almost always, are too slender for the business
assigned them.
A pair of shoes perhaps was never yet wrought to
the highest degree of perfection which that commodity
is capable of attaining. Yet it is necessary, at least very
useful, that there should be some politicians and
moralists, even some geometers, poets and philosophers
among mankind. The powers of men are no more
superior to their wants, considered merely in this life,
than those of foxes and hares are, compared to their
wants, and to their period of existence. The inference
from parity of reason is therefore obvious.
On the theory of the Soul’s mortality, the inferiority
of women’s capacity is easily accounted for. Their
domestic life requires no higher faculties, either of
mind or body.
This circumstance vanishes and
becomes absolutely insignificant, on the religious
theory : The one sex has an equal task to perform as
the other ; their powers of reason and resolution ought
also to have been equal and both of them infinitely
greater than at present. As every effect implies a
cause, and that another, till we reach the first cause of
all, which is the Deity ; everything that happens is
ordained by him, and nothing can be the object of his
punishment or vengeance.
By what rule are punishments and rewards dis
tributed ? What is the divine standard of merit and
demerit? Shall we suppose that human sentiments
have place in the Deity ? How bold that hypothesis.
We have no conception of any other sentiments.
According to human sentiments, sense, courage, good
manners, industry, prudence, genius, etc., are essential
parts of personal merits. Shall we therefore erect an
asylum for poets and heroes like that of the ancient
mythology ? Why confine all rewards to one species
of virtue? Punishment without any proper end or
�The Mortality of the Soul.
11
purpose is inconsistent with our ideas of goodness and
justice, and no end can be served by it after the whole
scene is closed. Punishment according to our concep
tion, should bear some proportion to the offence. Why
then eternal punishment for the temporary offences of
so frail a creature as man ? Can anyone approve of
Alexander's rage, who intended to exterminate a whole
nation because they had seized his favorite horse
Bucephalus ?
*
Heaven and Hell suppose two distinct species of
men, the good and the bad ; but the greatest part of
mankind float betwixt vice and virtue.
Were one to go round the world with an intention of
giving a good supper to the righteous, and a sound
drubbing to the wicked, he would frequently be
embarrassed in his choice, and would find that the
merits and demerits of most men and women scarcely
amount to the value of either.
To suppose measures of approbation and blame
different from the human confounds everything.
Whence do we learn that there is such a thing as moral
distinctions, but from our own sentiments ?
What man who has not met with personal provocation
(or what good natured man who has) could inflict on
crimes, from the sense of blame alone, even the com
mon. legal, frivolous punishments ? And does anything
steel the breast of judges and juries against the senti
ments of humanity but reflection on necessity and
public interest? By the Roman law those who had
been guilty of parricide and confessed their crime,
were put into a sack along with an ape, a dog, and a
serpent and thrown into the river. Death alone was
the punishment of those who denied their guilt, how
ever fully proved. A criminal was tried before
Quint. Curtius lib. vi., cap. 5.
�12
The Mortality of the Soul.
Augustus and condemned after a full conviction, but
the humane emperor when he put the last interrogatory,
gave it such a turn as to lead the wretch into a denial
of his guilt. “ You surely (said the prince) did not
kill your father.”* This lenity suits our natural ideas
of right even towards the greatest of all criminals, and
even though it prevents so inconsiderable a sufferance.
Nay even the most bigoted priest would naturally
without reflection approve of it, provided the crime
was not heresy or infidelity ; for as these crimes hurt
himself in his temporal interest and advantages,
perhaps he may not be altogether so indulgent to them.
The chief source of moral ideas is the reflection on
the interest of human society. Ought these interests
so short, so frivolous, to be guarded by punishments
eternal and infinite ? The damnation of one man is an
infinitely greater evil in the universe than the sub
version of a thousand millions of kingdoms. Nature
has rendered human infancy peculiarly frail and
mortal, as in were on purpose to refute the notion of a
probationary state ; the half of mankind die bfore they
are rational creatures.
III. The Physical arguments from the analogy of
nature are strong for the mortality of the soul, and are
really the only philosophical arguments which ought
to be admitted with regard to this question, or indeed
any question of fact.
Where any two objects are so closely connected that
all alterations which we have ever seen in the one, are
attended with proportional alterations in the other ; we
ought to conclude by all rules of analogy, that, when
there are still greater alterations produced in the
former, and it is totally dissolved, there follows a total
dissolution of the latter.
* Suet. Augus. cap. 3.
�The Mortality of the Soul.
13
Sleep, a very small effect on the body, is attended
with a temporary extinction, at least a great confusion
of the soul.
The weakness of the body and that of the mind in
infancy are exactly proportioned, their vigor in man
hood, their sympathetic disorder in sickness, their
common gradual decay in old age. The step further
seems unavoidable ; their common dissolution in death.
The last symptoms which the mind discovers are dis
order, weakness, insensibility, stupidity, the fore
runners of its annihilation. The farther progress of
the same causes increasing, the same effects totally
extinguish it. Judging by the usual analogy of nature,
no form can continue when transferred to a condition
of life very different from the original one, in which
it was placed. Trees perish in the water, fishes in the
air, animals in the earth. Even so small a difference
as that of climate is often fatal. What reason then to
imagine, that an immense alteration such as is made
on the soul by the dissolution of its body and all its
organs of thought and sensation can be effected with
out the dissolution of the whole ? Everything is in
common betwixt soul and body. The organs of the
one are all of them the organs of the other. The
existence therefore of the one must be dependent on
that of the other.
The souls of animals are allowed to be mortal;
and these bear so near a resemblance to the souls of
men, that the analogy from one to the other forms a
very strong argument. Their bodies are not more
resembling ; yet no one rejects the argument drawn
from comparative anatomy. The Metempsychosis is
therefore the only system of this kind that philosophy
can hearken to.
Nothing in this world is perpetual, everything
however seemingly firm is in continual flux and change,
�14
lhe Mortality of the Soul.
the world itself gives symptoms of frailty and dis
solution.
How contrary to analogy, therefore, to
imagine that one single form, seemingly the frailest of
any, and subject to the greatest disorders, is immortal
and indissoluble ? What a daring theory is that; how
lightly, not to say, how rashly entertained! How to
dispose of the infinite numbers of posthumous exist
ences ought also to embarrass the religious theory.
Every planet in every solar system, we are at
liberty to imagine peopled with intelligent mortal
beings, at least we can fix on no other supposition. For
these then a new universe must every generation
be created beyond the bounds of the present universe,
or one must have been created at first so prodigiously
wide as to admit of this continual influx of beings.
Ought such bold suppositions to be received by any
philosophy, and that merely on the pretext of a bare
possibility ? When it is asked whether Agamemnon,
Thersites, Hannibal, Varro, and every stupid clown
that ever existed in Italy, Scythia, Bactria or Guinea
are now alive ; can any man think, that a scrutiny of
nature will furnish arguments strong enough to answer
so strange a question in the affirmative ? The want of
argument without revelation sufficiently establishes
the negative.
“Quante facilius (says Pliny
}
*
certius que sibi
quemque credere, ac specimen securitatis antigene tali
sumere experimento." Our insensibility before the
composition of the body, seems to natural reason a
proof of a like state after dissolution.
Were our horror of annihilation an original passion,
not the effect of our general love of happiness, it would
rather prove the mortality of the soul. For as nature
does nothing in vain, she would never give us a horror
* Lib. 7, cap. 55.
�The Mortality of the Soul.
15
against an impossible event. She may give us a horror
against an unavoidable event provided our endeavors,
as in the present case may often remove it to some
distance. Death is in the end unavoidable; yet the
human species could not be preserved had not
nature inspired us with an aversion towards it. All
doctrines are to be suspected which are favored by
our passions, and the hopes and fears which gave rise
to this doctrine are very obvious.
It is an infinite advantage in every controversy to
defend the negative. If the question be out of the
common experienced course of nature, this circum
stance is almost if not altogether decisive. By what
arguments or analogies can we prove any state of
existence, which no one ever saw, and which no way
resembles any that ever was seen ? Who will repose
such trust in any pretended philosophy as to admit
upon its testimony the reality of so marvellous a
scene ? Some new species of logic is requisite for that
purpose, and some new faculties of the mind that may
enable us to comprehend that logic.
Nothing could set in a fuller light the infinite
obligations which mankind have to divine revelation,
since we find that no other medium could ascertain
this great and important truth.
�Free Will and Necessity.
A Philosophical Inquiry concerning Human Liberty.
By ANTHONY COLLINS.
First Published in 1715. Now Reprinted", with Preface and Annotations,
by G-. W. Foote, and a Biographical Introduction by J. M. Wheeler.
“ I do not know of an^fcqg thartrhas been advanced by later writers in
support of the scheme of Nece^ity^of which the germ is not to be found
in the Inquiry of Collins.”—Prof. Dugald Stewart.
.
“ColUns states "the arguments against human freedom with a logical
force unsurpassed by any Necessitarian. —Prof A. C. Eraser.
_ „
“ Collins writes with -wonderful power and closeness of reasoning.
P“°"CoE^was one of the most terrible enemies of the Christian
religion.”—Voltaire.
PRICE ONE SHILLING.
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and b°Und ™ Cl°™’
Progressive Publishing Co., 28 Stonecutter St., London, E.C.
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GOD THE IMAGE OF MAN.
MAN’S DEPENDENCEWDN NATDRE^THE LAST AND ONLT
By LUDWIG- FEUERBACH.
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“ No one has demonstrated and explained the purely human oilgin o
the idea of God better than Ludwig Feuerbach. —Buchnei.
■
confess that to Feuerbach I owe a debt of inestimable gratitude.
FeeUne about in uncertainty for the ground, and finding everywhere
SS§g sands, Feuerbach cast a sudden blaze in the darkness and dis
closed to me the way.”—Rev. S. Baring Gould.________ _
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me
Rev- 8. Bating Gould.
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By JEREMY BENTHAM.
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�
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Victorian Blogging
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Title
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The mortality of the soul
Creator
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Hume, David [1711-1776]
Foote, G. W. (George William) [1850-1915]
Description
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Place of publication: London
Collation: 15 p. ; 18 cm.
Notes: Reprinted from the original edition of 789. Publisher's advertisements on back cover. Includes bibliographical references. Part of the NSS pamphlet collection.
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Freethought Publishing Company
Date
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1890
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N316
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Soul
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<a href="http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/mark/1.0/"><img src="http://i.creativecommons.org/p/mark/1.0/88x31.png" alt="Public Domain Mark" /></a><span> </span><br /><span>This work (The mortality of the soul), identified by </span><a href="https://conwayhallcollections.omeka.net/items/show/www.conwayhall.org.uk"><span>Humanist Library and Archives</span></a><span>, is free of known copyright restrictions.</span>
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application/pdf
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Text
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English
Immortality
NSS
Soul