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REASON v. RATIONALISM
PREFACE TO THE SERIES
We propose in this series of papers to consider and
answer various objections to religion and the super
natural which one hears expressed at the club, the
“pub./’ the workshop, the debating society, and the
street corner, and which underlie much of the writing
in the secular press—objections that are neither subtle
nor profound, but which have a certain surface plau
sibility that i ecommends them. Many are gratuitous
assertions, dictated, perhaps unwittingly, by a desire to
escape the consequences which a conscientious faith
entails ; others spring from mere ignorance, or mental
confusion, or inability to follow abstract reasoning ;
others, again, from misreading of history. Trivial as
they commonly are, they need an explicit refutation,
for they impress unthinking minds and by constant
repetition acquire a sort of prescriptive claim to be
accepted. The Bellman’s dictum—“What I tell you
three times is true ”—suggests a style of argument very
frequently met with in anti-religious propaganda.
�No. -2,.
WHAT
IS
THE
GOOD OF
GOD?
“Earth’s crammed with heaven,
And every common bush afire with God ;
But only he who sees takes off his shoes.”
E. B. Browning, Aurora Leigh.
“ Our thoughts come nearer to God’s reality than our speech
does, and He is yet more real than we can think.”—St. Augustine,
Ou the Trinity, vii 6.
CONTENTS
PAGE
There is no sign of a Creator in the Universe ...
3
The Idea of Creation is based on a mistaken inference .
3
Creation is an impossible concept........................................ 4
Chance may account for the Universe, thus making the
notion of Design in Creation gratuitous
...
6
5. Chance, plus unlimited Time, can explain the order
ascribed to Creation......................................................... ?
6. A Creator is unnecessary to produce Life....
9
7. Why a Personal Creator rather than “Unknown Causes ” ? 10
8. The proofs of Creation are not convincing
.
.
.11
9. Creation cannot at any rate be proved from Causality . 13
10. Belief in a Creator is traceable to Fear .... 14
11. Belief in a Creator is due to Ignorance .
.
12. Many eminent Scientific Men reject Creation .
.'
I7
13. Science alone gives certitude, so Creation remains a
hypothesis
14. Creation depends for proof on Philosophy, a system now
discredited
20
15. Amid rival theories, Scepticism is the safest course .
22
Appendix ....
1.
2.
3.
4.
-24
�What is the Good of God ?
3
1. There is no sign of a Creator in the Universe.
Science in these latter days has progressed wonderfully :
the properties of nature have been thoroughly in
vestigated : even invisible forces have been detected
and controlled: but nowhere, on earth or in the
skies, has man come across God. Therefore we are
justified in denying what is in no way perceptible.
Even the Apostle agrees with us, for he admits—“ No
one hath seen God at any time” (i John iv 12).
A puerile objection this, which supposes all know
ledge to consist of sense-perception. A thing may be
known directly or by inference. Robinson Crusoe
knew that his solitude was broken by seeing, not a
human being, but a human footprint, and the objector
may examine his watch for a long time without de
tecting its maker’s presence. Yet he knows that the
maker exists. And, in like manner, we know of God’s
existence from His handiwork. Design, or adaptation
of means to end, implies a Designer.
2. The Idea of Creation is based on a mistaken
inference.
God, ex hypothesi, in a unique conception. Therefore
His existence cannot be inferred from common physical
relations of effect and cause. Show me a real Creator
at work on earth, and I shall be more ready to admit
a heavenly one. Because matter may be arranged by
man in different forms, it does not follow that it can
be brought into existence.
The analogy between the watch and its maker and
the universe and its Creator is simply an application of
the general law on which the argument is really based,
viz., that every effect is due to a proportionate cause.
If the various products of human activity point to
adequate causes in the minds and manual skill that
achieved them, so, we conclude, must the wonderful
haimony and order of the visible universe. It is the
expression of the Mind of God, and, as Kepler, the
great astronomer, said : “ All science is the reading of
God’s thought after Him.” The question of actual
�4
What is the Good of God?
creation in the strict sense does not enter into the
argument here, which simply proves that, there being
manifest purpose displayed throughout the Universe,
such purpose must be due to an adequate Cause, sc.
an intelligent Designer.
3. Creation is an impossible concept.
(1) From nothing only nothing can come—“Ex nihilo
nihil fit.” But creation supposes nothing to turn into
something!
We grant that self-creation is an impossible idea : the
axiom quoted merely means that nothing can cause itself
to exist, not that a thing existing in the Divine Mind
cannot be given actual existence by the Divine Power.
God does not take nothing as if it were a thing actually
in being and give it another shape, &c. When finite
creatures try to produce anything, they can only succeed
in effecting certain changes and combinations in already
existing matter. But an infinite Power can do infinitely
more than we can ; it can produce existence where pre
viously there was none. If it could merely change and
not create, it would differ from our power in decree
only, and not in kind. As things are, the divine power
of creation is not only infinitely greater than ours, but
so peculiar to God that it cannot be communicated to
creatures. We do not profess to say how creation is
effected: that is still a mystery, but it is much less
mysterious than self-creation, or an effect without a
cause, would be.
(2) Spencer declares that the creation of matter “out of
nothing” is incomprehensible,for sue)i a notion involves
the production of a relation in thorn%ht between something (the Creator) and nothing (1
'he object-not-yet
created); of a relation, therefore ;in which the one
wemfor is non-existent; consequently , of an impossible
relation.
y
aSnosticiS„i!ilgOOd>.SPeCimen °£ the mis«‘«ss of the
agnostic philosopher, who prided himself on the
ong>nahty and independence of his mentd processes'
�What is the Good of God?
5
A child can see that the same “ impossibility ” arises
whenever an idea is translated into fact. If Spencer’s
reasoning were sound, Tennyson could not have written
his poems. Before they were composed and written
they did not exist. Therefore the poet in composing
them produced a relation between himself and some
thing non-existent ! The fact is, of course, that the
materials of the poems existed z/z the mind- of the poet
before they were actually composed, and, in the same
way, the universe, before creation, existed in the mind
of God.
(3) Eternal evolution is at least as simple and rational
a concept as creation out of nothing. Therefore, the
latter hypothesis cannot be said to hold- the field. We
postulate, then, eternal matter and force acting from
eternity according to immutable laws. By the inter
action of this matter and force the universe is gradually
evolved, until at a certain point of evolution equilibrium
is disturbed, the whole cosmos dissolves into chaos and
the process starts afresh. So that instead of a continuous
evolution, which, starting from eternity, must long ago
have reached its term, we have a series of alternate
cycles of construction and ruin. Thus the line of cause
and effect is unbroken and unending, and the impos
sible conception of a self-existing cause is done away
with.
This argument, excogitated by the Germans, Strauss
and Buchner, is no sounder than Spencer’s. For this
eternal matter-and-force either had in itself sufficient
reason for its existence from eternity, or had not. If it
existed of itself, then it is the First Cause, and a per
sonal one, for intelligence, which undoubtedly exists in
the world, cannot be accounted for by an unintelligent
First Cause. If it did not exist of itself, and there was
nothing to give it existence, it is an effect without a
cause—a contradiction in terms.
Again, this matter-and-force substance must originally
have been either homogeneous or heterogeneous. If
homogeneous, the existing diversity of species is un
accounted for ; if heterogeneous, then there were
�6
What is the Good of God?
originally a multitude of self-existing things, whereas
only one such thing can be conceived.
Finally, from mere matter and force there cannot
arise life, still less the rational soul of man. It will be
noticed that these materialists who deride philosophy
and plume themselves on scientific fact, yet build up
their systems on pure metaphysical notions such as the
Absolute and Relative, the nature of Causality, the idea
of the Infinite. A little acquaintance with the Aristo
telian philosophy which they sneer at would have saved
them from many childish misconceptions, a thousand
times explained in the past.
4. Chance may account for the Universe, thus
making the notion of Design in Creation
gratuitous.
You are rather too hasty in postulating Design in the
Universe. There may be another cause. What is there
Chance cannot bring about ? Very often a man’s
course of life is quite altered by chance. Great discovene the spread of disease, 'devastating fires are
often due entirely to Chance.
*J
'
" ch’ance hi“nd 7‘her Si”ilar ar«umen‘s ‘he word
hance is used incorrectly. Scientifically speaking
' ere is no such thing as chance, if the te™ ft
°CC~ °f e«;CtS -hhoS ad
loosely tl X(
tmetlmeS the word is employed
mechanics!
i"gulsh what is due to causes merely
iron what ’iXZ “fX With°Ut °Ur faow'edgel
Everything hat iX u kn°™ intellig“‘ Purpose
“-■7inggX
1 eo SNat:TiaaU3e £
animal instinct or Jut laws> the action
‘he Creator. Bu ”XelT V ’ “V”6 '"'“vention of
dentally combiX maf o
”e,?hanicaI fo'ces acci-
which simulates design as X
y Pr°dUCe an effect
host mould a iuttilg ’ 1 r ^'n Snd wind al’d
human face. This result n
1° * 'C sembi™ce of a
peaking relatively, not absoXlXXX? ‘X6'
ty' To ascribe action
�What is the Good of God?
j
to “ chance,” meaning the absence of an efficient cause,
is to speak quite unscientifically, not to say foolishly; a
reproach which soi-disant scientists frequently incur/
5. Chance, plus unlimited Time, can explain the
order ascribed to Creation.
There are acknowledged “ freaks of Nature ”—chance
products of natural forces which exactly reproduce the
works of intelligence. Why should not the whole
harmony of the Universe be the result of the blind
working of the laws and properties oj matter, through
endless ages ? Given time enough, and the wonderful
facts of chemical affinity and repulsion, order and
harmony might evolve gradually out of initial chaos.
First premising that this hypothesis does not do away
with the necessity of a First Cause, to which matter and
its properties are due, we reply that the order of the
Universe emphatically requires Intelligence to account
for it. A strictly fortuitous concourse of atoms, even
endowed with invariable properties, will not do. All
the laws of mathematical probability are against it.
Let us examine this a little more closely. Instead of
taking' a quasi-infinite number of atoms, let us take
seven little stones which, arranged in especial order,
may represent the colours of the rainbow. How many
other different positions are possible ?
Let the little
stones be designated as a, b, c, &c. The first two have
only two possible positions :—
ab, ba.
The first three only 3 x 2—•
abc, bac, cab.
acb, bca, cba.
1 No one has pointed out more eloquently the universal reign of
causation than the agnostic, Huxley. After describing the sea
shore in a storm as a group of phenomena which the thoughtless
would ascribe to “chance,” he savs :—
“ The man of science knows that here, as everywhere, perfect
order is manifested ; that there is not a curve of the waves, not a
note in the howling chorus, not a rainbow glint on a bubble, which
is other than a necessary consequence of the ascertained laws of
nature ; and that with a sufficient knowledge of the conditions,
competent physico-mathematical skill could account for, and indeed
predict, every one of those ‘ chance ’ events.”
�What is the Good of God ?
The first seven have 7x6x5x4x3x2=5040 possible
positions. With twelve little stones the number would
amount to 479,001,600; with thirteen, to more than six
thousand millions ; with fifteen, to over a billion ; with
twenty, to more than two trillions. The probability,
therefore, in this latter case, against hitting on one
special position is as two trillions to 1.
Here we have only twenty little stones, yet the
number of atoms in the whole world are innumerable.
The earth alone contains more than 2,700 cubic miles.
How many atoms would that make ? The sun is 333,000
times lai ger than the earth, Again, how many atoms ?
Our solar system is only a little part of the Universe
Celestial photography has already discovered a hundred
million fixed stars. It is altogether beyond earthly
arithmetic to calculate the odds against this definite
arrangement of matter, which we call the Universe
resulting from the interaction of the material atoms
composing it.1
On the hypothesis, therefore, that the original masses
of atoms were like an immense and chaotic sandstorm
rnming along the illimitable inane,” without any law
01 purpose impressed on them from without, who with
ny common sense could possibly imagine that they
°U S0 arranSe tbemselves as to form the majestic
and beautiful design of the Universe, so wonderful as1 a
whole and in its smallest detail. It would bea less
silly to assert that a child, if it hammered on the piano
Liszt’s"" ft ’ ""g114 “1(lmately Produce, note by note
Liszts Hungarian Rhapsody.” As a result tt,„
’
come Sth^nS “
‘o intelhgence.
Even the free^K "
with two°£ andlwo^pS 35?“ “ Ka die are 5 to r ;
if for a million years a mill;™? nd'veKronig has reckoned fhaf
attained the ag’ Tten X™
e
bo,rn ^ly, each of whijm
cast thirty dice twenty times it is nnf'S| a?^each minute of his life
ever obtain
™
�What is the Good, of God ?
9
a watch implies a watchmaker, and a palace an architect,
how can it be that the Universe does not imply a Supreme
Intelligence ? ”
We are all of us, atheists and agnostics included,
constantly judging of causes from their effects, and
ascribing to intelligence whatever shows marks of in
telligence. A page of intelligible print is a certain in
dication that a mind originated it. But the Book of
Nature is read by many who deny Intellect to its Author!
Nowhere is the fixed desire to escape from a Personal
Cause more evident than this appeal to blind laws
working through indefinite time. This conception is
so little “scientific” that a smattering- of arithmetic is
enough to dispose of it.
6. A Creator is unnecessary to produce Life.
The j>roof of God's existence which is drawn from the
necessity of an efficient cause to produce life is worth
less ffior it has been maintained by modern scientists
that life may originate from non-living matter.
Herbert Spencer says : “ At a remote period in the past
when the temperature of the surface of the earth was
much higher than at present, and other physical con
ditions were unlike those we know, inorganic matter
through successive complications gave rise to organic
matter.1 And Huxley asserts that if it were given him
“ to look beyond the abyss of geologically recorded
time ” he might “ expect to be a witness of the evolution
of living protoplasm from non-living matter.”2 Weismann, the great biologist, declares that spontaneous
generation, in spite of all vain efforts to demonstrate it,
“ remains for me a logical necessity ” ; 3 and finally
Virchow, speaking before the Science Congress at
Munich in 1877, said: “ There is indeed no positive
fact to prove spontaneous generation ever took place
. . . nevertheless the acceptance of this theory is the
only possible way of explaining the first living being.”
These various dicta are good types of the abandon
ment of scientific methods to which even eminent
1 Nineteenth Century, May, 1886.
2 Critiques and Addresses, p. 239.
'
3 £osrr)-s, p. 3^.
�IO
What is the Good of God ?
scientists resort when they leave their special domain.
Huxley, although owning that in the controversy
between bio-genesists and abio-genesists the former
were “ victorious all along the line,” 1 is content to state
his opinions unsupported by a single fact. Spencer,
with more solemn show of argument, states his personal
impression. The Germans imply, honestly enough,
that their determination not to admit the supernatural
forces them to maintain spontaneous generation. Yet
the whole negative force of scientific testimony is
against them. All the resources of science have been
employed to no purpose in the endeavour to produce
life, and Virchow himself proclaims : “ Never has a
living being, or even a living element—let us say, a
living cell—been found of which it could be predicated
that it was the first of its species.” 2 Finally, Professor
B. Moore, the celebrated bio-chemist, states positively :
“ The mode of production of living matter is character
istic, and cannot be brought about by the actions solely
of inorganic forms of energy.” 3
7. Why a Personal Creator rather than “ Un
known Causes”?
But why should I admit God ? He is not a fact of
exfieiience, with which alone Science deals. His exist
ence is merely inferred. And if I choose to “stick to
�What is the Good of God ?
11
my last” and concern myself with the material Universe
alone, saying of its origin—I know nothing: I ascribe
it to unknown causes, to energies of matter which may
well have existed under earlier and different conditions
—who can complain of my attitude ? Speculation is
not science.
The objection to such an attitude is that it is a
deliberate narrowing or blinding of the human intellect. It is like the proverbial conduct of the ostrich
in presence of danger. Man’s mind is compelled by
its constitution to search for truth and ultimate truth.
To'refuse to draw logical inferences from ascertained
facts, lest the knowledge thus obtained should be in
convenient, should humble pride or rebuke sensuality,
is a cowardly crippling of man’s highest faculty. The
position, once more, is an illegitimate claim on the part
of physical science to the whole sphere of knowledge.
There are many truths which are not within the pur
view of physical science. It is mock modesty to say
we cannot go farther than she leads us. That were to
limit all knowledge to the records of our senses. Our
senses tell us the world exists ; our minds tell us with
at least equal certainty that it had a cause. An un
known cause, in one sense, because it cannot be fully
comprehended ; but known at least as completely as
the force of gravitation is known, through its effects.
Finally, to appeal to material forces and energies, as
possibly existing in the beginning and capable of pro
ducing the Universe, yet of which matter has now no
trace, and which, moreover, contradict all we know of
matter, is surely to fly in the very face of scientific
method, which is solely concerned with the observation
of facts and logical deductions from them.
8. The proofs of Creation are not convincing.
At best, it is one hypothesis against the other : material
ists ascribe the Universe to the potentialities of eternal
matter; theists to the creative act of a personal God.
The proofs the latter advance do not as a matter of
�12
What is the Good of God ?
fad carry conviction to many reasonable minds, as
experimental or mathematical proofs do.
There are other forms of evidence no less valid than
mathematical or experimental proofs ; for instance, the
proof we call deductive or inferential. The proofs of
God's existence are of this nature, not such as exclude
all possibility of doubt, but such as make doubt or
denial unreasonable.1 And their cogency, as we have
already implied, depends much on the moral and
intellectual prepossessions of those to whom they are
addressed. Some of these arguments are philosophical,
some are scientific. We may take one of the former,
referring the reader for further information to books
quoted in the appendix.
The Principle of Causality which, rightly understood,
is an axiom, asserts that nothing can come into existence
except through the action of some adequate cause,
independent of itself. Now the physical universe has
had a beginning. Therefore it must have had an
external cause, capable of giving it existence and inde
pendent of itself. This conclusion is irresistible once
the premisses are granted. The first premiss is, as we
have implied, self-evident, i.e., it is seen to be true on
analysis of its meaning. To say that a thing has had a
beginning is to say that it once did not exist. There
fore, it must have been given existence by some other
thing, as existence is a necessary preliminary to action.
• ?^Td Premiss~that the Universe is not eternalis admitted by most competent scientists, both believers
nrfiv^atena uDU ThUS HUX1Cy Speal<S Of the visible
aS ' henomena, the very nature of which
,
theZmus^al
had a be§inning and that
y must also have had an end.”3 And Lord Kelvin
opinions, the° Empero^fdSessed^^1!8 T"®, utterinS hifidel
“You believe in my genius but
the following effect:
know of its existence by my victories ” A^h have,s,een k ? You
inference, yet, if one wzsfe/oneSt crtdkW7 *’ea?°nable
to chance or good luck.
Napoleon s victories
3 Lay Sermons, p, 13,
�What is the Good of God ?
13
says: “ Regarding the Universe as a candle that has
been lit, we become absolutely certain that it has
not been burning from eternity, and that a time must
come when it will cease to burn.” The scientific
law of the Dissipation of Energy makes it clear
that if the forces of Nature had started working in
eternity they would long have been exhausted.1 The
same argument may be suggested with equal cogency
as regards a single aspect of the Universe, sc. the
presence of life. Science teaches that in the first
stages of the existence of the Universe the temperature
was such as to preclude the possibility, even in germ,
of life as we know it, />., the power of self-motion.
Whence then did life originate ? Not from anything
lifeless, for “ you cannot get more out of a sack than
there is in it.” And therefore from some living Being
outside the Universe—viz., the First Cause—God.
9. Creation cannot at any rate be Proved from
Causality.
David Strauss denies the validity of all proofs of God’s
existence, because it is impossible to get beyond the
series of natural proofs. If every single thing has its
cause in another, this is a universal law which must
hold good always and everywhere, thus making it im
possible to reach an exterior cause.
An objection which denies the validity of rational
inference! A train passes before my window. It is so
long that I cannot see eithei- the beginning or the end.
I can only see that every carriage is drawn by another
and that evidently there must be some motive power,
and I naturally conclude that there is an engine in front
of the train. My conclusion goes beyond what I can
see. Strauss would say that my conclusion is wrong
1 Once we grant a First Cause, self-existent from eternity, the
eternity of the created universe becomes conceivable, for the" First
Cause may have been eternally creative. It is not easy to arrive at
a clear conclusion on such matters as these, for by a necessity of
our minds we cannot think of eternity except as infinite time
whereas it does not involve succession, as time does,
’
�14
What is the Good of God ?
for that very reason. He would admit that each
carriage was pulled by another, but would deny the
necessity of a locomotive. Is it credible ?
Others, again, affect a childish precocity, and assert
that as we seek the cause of all things, so we should go
further back and seek the cause even of God Himself.
But this is absurd. The law of causality only says :
“ Every effect must have a cause,” or, in other words :
“ That which is not self-existing must have the cause of
its existence in something else.” Does it not clearly
follow that a First Cause must exist, One whose essence
includes His existence ? This Being—God—exists
necessarily of Himself and of no other; to demand
a further cause for the self-existent is nonsense.
io. Belief in a Creator is traceable to Fear.
The only scientific way to investigate this question is
to go back to origins and study development—the
positive, historical method. According to ethnographists, religion took its start from the fears of
primitive man, excited by the terrible phenomena of
nature. As Horace says even of the Romans of his
time: “ When ffove thunders in the sky we believe in
the fad of his sovereignty.” 1
As usual, we are met by an unverified assumption.
There is no evidence in history for a continuous
evolution of man from a lower to a higher moral and
intellectual level. Indeed, what evidence we have
tends to prove that the human race started in a “ Golden
Age of some sort, from which it afterwards degeneiated. The Biblical narrative, containing the first revela
tion, is confirmed by the oldest literature in the world.
1 he only inference to be drawn from the fact that savages
attribute natural phenomena to their gods, is that they
relieve those deities to be immensely superior to men.
We cannot “scientifically” conclude that belief in the
existence of the gods actually arose from the pheno
mena, whether formidable or beneficent. It is mucl|
1 Odes, iii 5.
�What is the Good of God ?
1
I
i5
truer to say that fear (fear, that is, of an omnipotent
judge) causes disbelief in God. “ No one denies God’s
existence unless he has an interest in doing so,” says
Bacon. “ There is no God ” might often be para
phrased “ I wish there were no God, for I have reason
to fear Him.”
ii. Belief in a Creator is due to Ignorance.
The riddles of Nature gave rise to a belief in God.
It seemed simpler to seek their solution in a personal
agent than to account for them otherwise. But the
growth of science has explained things fully, and
experience has banished mere speculation. As a
general rule such credulity disappears with the advance
of learning. It was but natural in the savage, of
whom Pope writes:
“ Lo, the poor Indian whose untutored mind
Sees God in clouds or hears Him in the wind,'' &c.
Essay on Man.
This argument is characteristic of the methods of
certain modern scientists who hope by repeated unsup
ported assertions to give currency to their own peculiar
views. It also illustrates the inspired saying of St.
Paul : “ Scientia inflat ”—“ Knowledge puffeth up.”
It is full of an arrogance which is quite alien to the
spirit of true learning. The real wise man is too
conscious of the narrow limits of his own knowledge to
despise the ignorance of others. To these self-sufficient
sciolists may fitly be addressed the words of Job : “ Are
ye, then, the only men that there are, and shall wisdom
die with you ? ”1 As a matter of fact, whether we
count names or weigh merits, the witness to God’s
existence among men of science is overwhelmingly
great. Let us mention but a few of the more prominent
modern English-speaking scientific men, who, in spite of
their great learning, have retained their religious beliefs.
Amongst Physicists, Chemists, &c., we find Lord Kelvin,
Lord Rayleigh, Sir William Ramsay, Sir Henry Roscoe,
§ir William Crookes, Professor Balfour Stewart,
1 fob xii 2.
�i6
What is the Good of God ?
Professor P. G. Tait, Sir William Abney. Amongst
Mathematicians, Professors H. Lamb, A. C. Dixon,
George Chrystal, M. W. Crofton, G. M. Minchin, Sir
Oliver Lodge. Amongst Geologists and Palaeontologists,
Professors J. Geikie, W. Boyd Dawkins, H. G. Seeley,
Sir Joseph Prestwich, E. Hull, W. J. Sollas, Sir
Archibald Geikie. Amongst Biologists, Physiologists, &c.,
Professors G. J. Romanes, Augustus Waller, W.
Stirling, L. S. Beale, Sir Douglas Galton, Sir Jas.
Crichton-Browne, Sir Victor Horsley, J. Butler Burke,
Gerald Leighton, B. Windle. Amongst Astronomers,
Sir David Gill, Dr. E. W. Maunder, Professor H. H.
Turner, Dr. A. C. Crommelin, Professor Ellard Gore, Sir
Robert Ball, Professor S. Newcomb. In the Medical
Profession, Lord Lister, Sir Thomas Barlow, Sir Patrick
Manson, Sir James Y. Simpson, Sir Lauder Brunton, Sir
Samuel Wilks. Amongst Zoologists, Professor A. Sedg
wick, Sir Richard Owen, Professor G. H. Carpenter,
Dr. S. O. Harmer, Professor H. Macintosh. Amongst
Psychologists, Professor James Ward, Dr. J. C. Schiller,
Professor J. C. Murray, Professor H. L. Orchard.
We have not given all possible names ; we have not
included all the branches of Science ; we have not men
tioned men of past generations or of other countries, or
clergymen eminent in scientific research ; there are
enough and to spare here to give the lie to the
constantly repeated assertion that real learning is
incompatible with belief in God.1 One believer of
commanding eminence in Science would sufficiently
disprove it, and there are hundreds.
In strong contrast to the dogmatism of many pseudoscientists is the caution of the genuine pioneers and
discoverers With few exceptions these realize the
units of their subject and the inadequacy of their
A. HRel,^io1^ Beliefs of Scientists, by
by J. J. wLlsh ’ C?
Sciencc' Ist and 2lld series;
K. A. Kneller, S.J, translated by f M l^ttlf m'p'T Sfe'lC%f}
^graphical dictionary.
y
-Kettle, M,P„ and any full
�What is the Good of God?
*7
methods. Romanes declares (Nineteenth Century, June,
1888), the theory of evolution has done nothing but
“throw back the question of design from the facts
immediately observed to the causes subsequently dis
covered. And there the questions must be left by
science, to be taken up by philosophy”—for which
latter pursuit most “ popular scientists ” are singularly
ill-equipped. Speaking merely as a scientific man, Du
Bois-Reymond, who is an avowed materialist, has the
honesty to confess that, after all that science has done,
its verdict as to ultimate truths must be, “ We do not
know and we never shall.” Still more explicit is the
testimony of the late Lord Kelvin, one of the most
eminent physicists of the 19th century. He, if any one,
had penetrated into the deepest secrets of nature, yet
this is how he sums up his life-work, even within
the domain of science itself :—
“ One word characterises the most strenuous efforts I have
made perseveringly during fifty-five years : that word is failure. I
know no more of electric and magnetic force, or of the relation
between ether, electricity, and of ponderable matter, or of chemical
affinity than I knew and tried to teach to my students fifty years
ago in my first session as Professor.” 1
In the light of such testimonies, the absolute dicta of
Haeckel and his English vulgarisateurs, Clodd, McCabe,
Hird and the rest, may be rated at their true worth.
So far from belief in God resting on ignorance, it is
more imperatively demanded by every advance in
human knowledge.
12. Many eminent Scientific Men reject Creation.
No doubt many learned men have been believers, but
there are, and have been, many who are atheists. If
knowledge leads to belief in God, why do not they
believe ? No one can dispute the profound knowledge
of a Darwin, a Spencer, a Huxley, a Haeckel—yet their
great intellects and eminent talents left them, perhaps
even made them, creedless.
As we have just seen, the pursuit of Science, even
when attended by the greatest success, so far from
1 Speech on the occasion of his Jubilee, 1896. See Life, vol. ii,p,984.
�18
Whad is the Good of God ?
leading away from God, is quite compatible with full
acceptance of the supernatural. So the atheism and
agnosticism of many scientific men must be ascribed to
some other cause or causes. Some of these are un
doubtedly moral—belief in God implies recognition of
His claims, acknowledgement of certain limitations to
human liberty, and due responsibility for human action.
Some, again, are intellectual—every one has some philo
sophy, practical or speculative, and if his philosophy is
false, if it denies, for instance, the existence of absolute
truths, or the invariability of metaphysical laws, it
may easily blind him to the cogency of the proofs for
God’s existence. Add to this, that God has designedly
left those proofs such that, unlike mathematical truths,
they can be denied without obvious self-stultification ;
in other words, that good-will must enter into the act of
faith—and we have enough to account for the un
doubtedly disquieting phenomena of many powerful
intellects arrayed against the truth. If the boasted
methods of science were applied rigorously all round
and its due weight given to every form of evidence,
reason alone would lead to God. As Lord Kelvin said
to some University students in 1903 1 : “Do not be
afraid of being free-thinkers. If you think strongly
enough you will be forced by science to the belief in
God, which is the foundation of all religions. You will
find science not antagonistic but helpful to religion.”
Long ago Bacon expressed the same thought: “A
little philosophy inclineth man’s mind to atheism • but
depth in philosophy bringeth men’s minds about to
leigion.
But to start, as many sceptics do, with
assuming as an axiom that there is nothing beyond
nature, is to close one’s mind to all possible evidence
The sclT'f3tUral_SUrely "Ot 3 scientific proceeding !
™ eXlP
SCle",Ce Pr°Pe‘-Physical science—is the
SS'X*’ are applicable “d
PP
’^>1099.
all leasoning processes on what* Essays: Of Atheism.
�If'hat is the Good of God?
19
ever subject. A sincere acceptance of the inexorable
and self-evident law of causality—“ Nothing can begin
to be without a cause independent of itself ”—would go
far to upset all the theories of the materialists.
13. Science alone gives certitude, so Creation
remains a hypothesis.
After all, “ seeing is believing.” As a matter of fact
the man of Science, as Huxley says, “ has learnt to
believe in justification, not by faith but by verifica
tion” lize believe vchat has been experimentally
proved. All the rest is the creation and, perhaps, the
mere figment of the brain.
This is the common talk of half-educated scientific
smatterers. Such men do not realize that a great deal
more than fact verified by experiment enters into their
knowledge. They talk glibly of the laws of nature—
which of them has ever seen such a law ? These
“ laws ” are, to quote Huxley again, “ the product of a
mental operation upon the facts of nature which come
under our observation, and has no more existence
outside the mind than colour has.”1 They discourse
learnedly, once more, about atoms, molecules, etherwaves of light, but all these things are mere postulates
of the reason. None of them has been seen or
measured. Disciples of Haeckel should remember,
though he himself frequently forgets, their master’s
descriptions of “purely scientific investigation,” viz.
“firstly, experience; secondly, inference.”* We must
insist again upon the reality of our purely inferential
knowledge. Philosophy is as truly a part of “ science ”
as is the study of natural forces, &c.: they differ only
in the fact that the former deals with ultimate causes of
phenomena, and the latter with proximate causes and
the phenomena themselves. The logical process that
determines the existence of the electric fluid is exactly
the same as that which demonstrates the existence of
God. To question the validity of our mental operations
1 Pseudo-Scientific Realism, p. 77. • Riddle oj the Universe, p. 6.
�20
What is the Good of God ?
or the power of our mind to acquire certain knowledge
is to destroy the possibility of Science itself.
14. Creation depends for proof on Philosophy, a
system now discredited.
At one time Philosophy was all in all, and Science
was hardly thought of. Bid since the time of Bacon
these positions have been gradually reversed, until in
most scientific circles Philosophy is only mentioned to
be laughed at. But without Philosophy there can be
no real proof of God's existence.
In order to criticize this statement properly we must
determine what is meant by philosophy. It is the
application of mind to the facts of experience with a
view to discovering their ultimate nature. Just as
Mathematics has its axioms, so Philosophy must have
its principles, certain assumptions, for instance, about
the power of the intellect to ascertain absolute truth, or
about the laws which govern the right use of the mental
processes. One system of Philosophy differs from
another according to the principles it starts with or the
piocesses it sanctions. If any philosophical system has
been disci edited, it is important to discover which it is.
The only systems which are known or studied nowadays
in scientific circles ” are those which arose after the
general abandonment of Catholic philosophy by those
who left the Church at the Reformation. These, there
fore, being the only ones they know, are the only systems
scientific men have a right to laugh at, and we may
well grant them that right. Since Descartes and Kant
the so-called modern philosophy has let the
�What is the Good of God?
1
1
our sense-experience, and our deductions therefrom
have no correspondence with reality. There are two
orders, of thought and of thing, but there is no means
of uniting them. On this assumption he undertakes to
investigate our knowledge and intellectual powers ; but
with what instrument ? With his own intellect, of
course, which, according to him, is completely unre
liable. What result can we expect from such an inves
tigation ? Kant tells us that we have certain mind-forms,
a priori cognitions, such as those of space and time, by
which our sense-experience is necessarily modified.
But those “ forms ” have no existence outside the mind,
so that we have no knowledge of things as they are.
How, then, can he expect us to accept his opinions as
true ? Must he not admit that he too is the victim of
illusions, and that he cannot know whether he tells the
truth or not, whether he explains human knowledge
rightly or wrongly ? Kantian Dualism is weighed and
found wanting.
Fichte (1762-1814) went still further, and denied the
reality of sense-perceptions, explaining them as crea
tures of the Ego which alone possesses any reality. So
that the world does not exist outside consciousness.
This is idealistic Monism, and is equally unsatisfactory.
We need not further examine the later philosophy of
Hegel (1770-1831), which is more purely arbitrary than
its predecessors. Everything is an expression of Abso
lute Thought ; we are aH part of God, &c. This is
Pantheistic Idealism. That such philosophical systems
should fall into discredit even in the land of their origin
is not surprising, but rather quite natural. What foun
dations remain if this huge visible world of matter and
force, of light, colour, and sound, is nothing more than
a mere projection of my inward sense, or, if the whole
world of thoughts and ideas is nothing but a phantom
of the “ Ego,” a creation of the mind without any true
objective equivalent ?
The reaction from such spinning of cobwebs has
�22
/F/W
is the Good of God ?
naturally taken amongst unbelievers the form of
Materialism. In this system, which is also monistic,
instead of everything being Mind, everything is Matter.
Comte (1798-1857), the inventor of Positivism, or the
Religion of Humanity,1 was a Materialist, in that he
limited all valid knowledge to sense-perception, for the
senses can only tell us of the existence of matter. The
chief modern exponent of Materialism is Haeckel, who,
while professing to keep within the limits of pure
Science, is as speculative as the veriest Idealist of them
all. If this form of Philosophy is not also derided by
men of Science it is because it masquerades under
another name, and thus conceals its non-scientific
character. We need say no more of it here.
To such depths has modern philosophy sunk. But
it would be a great mistake and a sign of a very limited
knowledge indeed if one confounded these vague and
arbitrary systems with the true, sound, always valuable
“ philosophia perennis ” which was founded by Aris
totle, adopted by Christianity, and marvellously
developed by the Scholastics, especially by St.
Thomas Aquinas, and which even nowadays is in full
harmony with the results of the natural sciences, and
gives us the only consistent explanation of the world.
But it needs the humble repentance of the Prodigal
Son and a “ Pater, peccavi,” to find God, and this the
poor, hungry, and naked so-called modern philosophy
has not got the courage to say.
15. Amid rival theories, Scepticism is the safest
course.
Aflei hearing of all these different opinions and systems
of the philosophers, one is finally driven to the opinion:
Nobody knows anything for certain; one person
denies what another asserts.” Therefore, the only
thing left for the man who has not the time or the
a 11 y for pei sonal investigation, is to remain in an
tht'e^peiaX Gid'
°‘ “S adtarents-t0 “nsisl °f
�What is the Good of God?
23
altitude “ of honest doubt.” Scepticism becomes the
only rational policy.
Scepticism, in its full sense, holding nothing as cer
tain, is not only not rational, but is also not possible.
For as soon as a sceptic makes an assertion, he contra
dicts himself and admits at least something as true.
He either maintains the incertitude of all cognition,
and claims that assertion and the arguments which
support it to be true ; or, he doubts that assertion, in
which case he still holds several things as true ; for
instance—that, true and false are not the same, that
certitude and doubt differ from each other, that one
cannot acquire certitude, that he himself has that
opinion, and that he himself is existing. “ But I doubt
even that.” “ Do you doubt the difference between
true and false ?” “Yes.” “ Why, then, do you contra
dict me ? For it does not matter to you whether it is
so or not ! Do you also doubt the difference between
your opinion and mine ? ” “ Yes.” “ Then you have no
reason whatever to say anything. Moreover, you have
just now asserted two things, and even if you were to
say again, 11 do not know,’ you would at least affirm
your ignorance. In short, if you wish not to contradict
yourself you must never express yourself.”
It is clear, then, that as long as a man uses his reason
at all he cannot doubt everything. By its very con
stitution the mind is bound to admit facts which are
based on evidence, just as a healthy eye must see, if
the necessary conditions are at hand. And there are
a number of truths which are self-evident. Thus he
must admit the fact of his own existence, for if he
doubt it, his doubt supposes it already. The same with
the principle of contradiction, z.e., that the same thing
under the same aspect cannot exist and not exist at
the same time ; for every denial and every doubt pre
supposes the principle. Even in mathematics the first
general and fundamental propositions, that the part is
less than the whole, for example, are taken as self-
�24
What is the Good of God ?
evident. They may be explained but not proved, for
they are self-evident and fundamental truths.
From the existence of unchangeable truths like these,
moreover, the existence of a real primitive truth—that
is, the existence of God—follows as a logical sequence.
Accordingly, although “ doctors disagree” very fre
quently and fundamentally in this modern world, the
business of the learner is to discover some logical
system which makes no arbitrary demands, which
acknowledges the soundness and, at the same time,
the limitations of natural faculty, which gives an answer
to all the puzzles of life, or at least gives reasons why
the answer is not yet possible, which, logically pursued,
does not issue in immorality or inhumanity. There is
only one system that does all that, the system which
is based on the fact of a Personal Creator to whom
the Universe belongs and to whom man is accountable.
APPENDIX
BOOKS AND PAMPHLETS FURTHER DEVELOPING THE
PRECEDING ARGUMENTS
Pamphlets—
The Existence of God, by Mgr. Canon Moyes. Sands, 6d. net.
Science and Faith, by Rev. Dr. Aveling. Sands, 6d. net.
The Church versus Science, by Rev. J. Gerard, S.J. Sands, 6d. net
Modern Free Thought, by Rev. J. Gerard, S.J. Sands, 6d. net. •
Why I Believe tn God, by A. E. Proctor. C T S id
Agnosticism, by Rev. J. Gerard, S.J. C.T.S. id’’
Modern Science and Ancient Faith, by Rev. J. Gerard, S.J.
c. 1 .o., id.
Science and Sczendsfc; Science or Romance?; Evolutionary
Philosophy and Common Sense, by Rev. J. Gerard, S.J. Three
volumes. C.T.S., is. each.
Books—
by Rev- Bernard Boedder, S.J. Longmans,
•, By ,Pre,sident Windle. Sands, 3s. 6d. net.
Se Old
Dr< AvelinS- Sands, 3s. 6d. net.
^ Re^J Ger”ald
<Criticism of Haeckel),
The Reign if Law, by the Duke^rgyU
5 Pap6r’ 6d<
Agnosticism, by Prof. Robert Flint. Blackwood.
printed and pcbushedby THE CATHOLIC truth
SOCIETY, LONDON.
�
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What is the good of God?
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SCRIPTURE AND SCIENCE
By THOMAS LUMISDEN STRANGE.
PUBLISHED BY THOMAS SCOTT,
NO. 11, THE TERRACE, FARQUHAR ROAD,
UPPER NORWOOD, LONDON, S.E,
1 87 6.
Price Sixpence.
��SCRIPTURE AND SCIENCE.
UMEROUS have been the attempts to make it
appear that the statements respecting the world
and its products presented in what is assumed to be the
word of God, and the facts coming to us from scientific
observation, are not at variance. At the outset of this
contest the biblical defenders made a more or less
plausible stand against the advancing knowledge bear
ing upon the subject, but as information has increased
they have been driven to new shifts to keep their
ground, or have had to retreat where the adverse testi
monies have proved too strong to be resisted. Eor
example, no one now maintains that the earth is the
centre of its associated system and is motionless, not
even revolving on its axis, while in respect of its anti
quity most biblicists are satisfied that the scripture
has to be read in some manner to allow of a period of
immeasurable duration being accorded thereto. On the
antiquity of man the battle is still maintained, though
here also some are disposed to make concessions by
giving up the integrity of the scripture genealogies.*
I have selected, to promote the examination of these
questions, the work of the late Archdeacon Pratt, en
titled “ Scripture and Science not at Variance,” as one
that has occupied its place through a good many edi
tions for nearly twenty years, and as coming from one
of recognised scientific attainments, who was at the
same time a dignitary of the church. The writer thinks
N
* The Legends of the Old Testament (Triibner & Co.), pp
186-189.
�6
Scripture and Science.
the position he has taken up so satisfactory, that, what
ever the facts yet discoverable in the realms of science,
believers in the Bible may rest assured that none can
appear to contradict the statements of the scripture.
The Archdeacon’s examination is confined to what
appears in the first eleven chapters of Genesis. His
view of the narrative of the creation is that the first
and second verses in Genesis relate to a period ante
cedent to the six days, the acts of which are described
from the third verse onwards. In this early period he
conceives all the strata of the earth were laid down,
with their fossilized deposits, till we reach the Quater
nary period in which we stand, and he holds that then
occurred the present creation which was accomplished
in six natural days. Thus the vast antiquity of the
earth and of its stocks of ancient vegetation and animals,
as demonstrated by the geologists, is admitted, while
the existence of the human race is limited to the six
thousand years traceable in Genesis.
The interruption claimed between the first and second
and the third verses of Genesis is not expressed in the
text. To the natural eye a continuous narrative is pre
sented. The first and second verses, as a prelude,
declare that “ In the beginning God created the heaven
and the earth,” and that the earth at this time was
“ without form and void,” and then we are told in what
manner he carried out his work through the six days
occupied in completing it. All that can be designated
creation was, we are to understand, embraced in these
six days. There was no creation before their occurrence,
and none subsequent thereto. This is what in the
natural .acceptation of the text we are taught in Genesis,
and this is the construction that all men put upon the
narrative till facts appeared to disturb its statements.
That in the beginning, before the occurrence of the six
days, there was a vast development of creative power
upon the earth, is a piece of information not communi
cated in the text, but arises solely, as the biblicists must
�Scripture and Science.
7
admit, from the facts ascertained by the scientists, of
which, otherwise, the Bible readers could have possessed
no knowledge. On the contrary, they would come
away, and did come away, with the conclusion that the
operations of God in connection with the earth began
on the first day the text speaks of. Nor is it con
sistent with the statement that previously the earth
was “ without form and void,” to allege that during
this prior period all those orderly strata, stored with
the remains of vegetal and animal forms, which we
see prevailing to the end of the Tertiary deposits, were
laid down upon the primeval crust. The Carboniferous
and Cretaceous sections may be particularly instanced as
occupying each its place in very distinct form, and as
teeming, the one with the remains of terrestrial vegetal,
and the other with those of marine animal life, in
prolific abundance.
The Archdeacon concludes that “ an interval of time
of untold duration ” intervened between the ancient and
the modern creations, and supports himself with the state
ment of M. D’Orbigny, “that not a single species,
either vegetable or animal, is common to the Tertiary
and the human periods/’ admitting, however, that this
is a view commonly disputed by other geologists, and
especially so by Sir C. Lyell. The fact is, in nothing
are competent observers more united than in the opinion
that the products of the earth and sea have been raised
up by continuous action, the changes effected being
graduated by the interlacing of forms with one another,
so that nowhere has there been a belt indicating ab
solute interruption of the creative processes prevailing
at any one period over the whole surface of the earth,
as the view now in question necessitates. The sections
I have just instanced, namely the Carboniferous and
Cretaceous deposits, give evidence of continuity, linking
the old with the modern operations, and showing that
there has been no such disjunction in the courses of
creation as the writer contends for. The peat bogs now
�8
Scripture and Science.
on the surface of the earth appear to be coal in embryo,
and assuredly large tracts of marine exuviae recently
found at the bottom of the Atlantic must be chalk in
embryo. The climatic changes from temperate to
tropical or arctic degrees which the earth has under
gone in remote ages, and is still undergoing, also
demonstrate the continuousness of the creative acts.
M. D’Orbigny, it is to be observed, speaks of there
having been twenty-nine creations separated from one
another by catastrophes which have swept away the
species preceding them. This goes beyond the require
ments of Genesis as interpreted by our author, and it
may be assumed that the observations on which the
statement depends were made over detached surfaces of
the earth, and do not therefore embrace its entire super
ficies. The occurrence of such partial changes or dis
ruptions to which our globe has been subjected by floods,
alterations of levels, or marked alternations of climate,
all geologists will acknowledge, but this by no means
presents us with the chaos of Genesis, for which, it is
universally allowed, the requisite marks are wanting.
It is difficult to conceive the state of things appearing
in the biblical record, as put to us by the Archdeacon,
when even the atmosphere, or ether, with which the
globe is surrounded, had in some manner to be formed
and adjusted when the new creation was undertaken.
The author, in endeavouring to support the language
of the scripture as to this atmosphere, fails to deal with
all that belongs to the representations made.
He
allows that “ the ancients conceived the heavens to be
an enormous vault of transparent solid matter, whirl
ing around the earth in diurnal revolution, and carrying
with it the stars, supposed to be fixed in its substance,”
and he strives to make it appear that the scripture
statements do not necessarily involve such an idea;
but he does not touch upon the true meaning of the
scripture phraseology, or the conditions associated with
this atmosphere, all of which imply its solidity.
�Scripture and Science.
9
The Hebrew term is rakia, which the author describes
as meaning merely an expanse, and therefore possibly an
ethereal expanse, while its true signification is something
expanded by being beaten out thin as might be a solid
substance. It is used in Isaiah xlii. 5 of the earth
which is said to have been thus “ spread forth,” and
accordingly it is rendered in the Septuagint stereoma,
and in the Vulgate firmamentum, in keeping with the
idea of solidity attaching to the atmosphere in early
times.
The uses attributed to this expanse in Genesis require
for it the element of solidity, or it could not have
divided the waters that were above it from the earth
and the waters that were below, the writer here
showing his ignorance of the mode in which rain is
generated by the free passage of exhalations from the
earth to the heavens. Consequent upon the exist
ence of the solid intervening expanse, when any pas
sage had to be effected from the heavens to the earth,
it became necessary that openings should be made
through the interposed medium. These are termed
“ doors ” (Ps. Ixxviii. 23 ; Rev. iv. 1), or “ windows ”
(Gen. vii. 11, viii. 2 ; 2 Kings vii. 2, 19 ; Isa. xxiv. 18 ;
Mai. iii. 10). The “ windows of heaven had to be
“ opened ” to let down the rain for the deluge, and
to be “ stopped,” or closed, when the rain had to be
shut off (Gen. vii. 11; viii. 2) ; “the doors of heaven”
were “opened” when manna was ‘‘rained down” to
feed the Israelites in the wilderness (Ps. lxxviii. 23) •
“ a door was opened in heaven ” to admit John to the
celestial glories which were above (Rev. iv. 1) : “ the
heavens ” were in like manner “ opened ” when “ visions
of God ” were imparted to Ezekiel (Ezek. i. 1), when
the celestial dove descended on Jesus at his baptism
(Matt. iii. 16 j Mark i. 10 ; Luke iii. 21), when “the
Son of Man standing on the right hand of God ” was
displayed to the sight of Stephen (Acts vii. 56), and
when a vessel full of four-footed beasts was “ let down”
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in view of Peter (Acts x. 11) ; and John saw in
anticipation “ heaven opened ” when Jesus, as the em
bodied “ word of God,” has to come down in judgment
upon the earth, seated on a white horse (Rev. xix. 11).
This intervening expanse is also described as something
tangible that admits of being “stretched out” or
“spread out” (Job ix. 8; Isa. xlii. 5; xliv. 24; xlv. 12;
li. 13; Jer. x. 12; Zech. xii. 1), as might be a “ cur
tain” or “tent” (Ps. civ. 2; Isa. xl. 22) ; and in
the last day it is to be “folded up” as a “vesture,” and
“rolled together as a scroll,” and so removed and
“changed” (Ps. cii. 26; Isa. xxxiv. 4; Heb. i. 12 ;
Rev. vi. 14).
The formation of this substantial medium in
terposed between heaven and earth was the work
of the second day. The Archdeacon discriminates
between the various Hebrew words employed to de
note what was “ made ” or “ created,” according the
highest significancy to the term bara. This word
occurs over fifty times in the scripture, and signifies
the creation of something that before had no existence.
It is applied in the first verse of.Genesis to what was
done “ in the beginning,” which the writer contends
was the primitive creation, and it is equally applied to
objects of the last or modern creation, which he distin
guishes as belonging to the “human period.”. Por
instance, it is employed to designate the creation. of
man, of all the animal tribes, and in fact of everything
made during the six days (Gen. i. 27 ; ii. 3; v. 2 ;
vi. 7), and it is specially used in regard to the expanse
or firmament with which we are now occupied (Isa.
xlii. 5). It is apparent thus, according to the writer of
Genesis, as interpreted by the Archdeacon, that this
expanse, or as we now know it to be, ethereal space, had
no existence during the pre-human period, and we
have to understand, how we may, in what manner the
teeming products, vegetal and animal, of the prior
period, whose fossilized remains give evidence that they
�Scripture and Science.
if
were constituted as the life forms now on earth, re
quiring air to support their vitalities, could have
existed without the surrounding ether.
The conversion of the “ days ” of Genesis into ages,
while meeting one difficulty, involves others which are
fatal to this theory. The period, whatever it was,
embraced divisions that represented the occurrence
therein of “ western light ” and “early dawn,” which
the translators recognize as meaning “ evening” and
“morning,” It consisted thus of what we know as
night and day ushered in by the “ western light ” and
the “early dawn.” The third age gave forth seed
bearing herbs and fruit-bearing trees. How was this
to be accomplished without the presence and influence
of the sun which was not “ made ” till the introduction
of the fourth age ? How could plants exist with the
long-sustained alternations of darkness and light in the
ages thus constituted ? During the half age of sunlight
the earth and its vegetable contents would be burnt up
by the continuous heat, and the terrestrial animals
would perish from lack of food. During the supposed
half age of darkness, how could the animals obtain
the constant supplies they need every few hours for
their sustenance ; and are we to conceive the sparrow,
through this long period, perched in repose upon one
leg with its head under its wing ? When the division
of night and day is represented by ages, what meaning
are we to attach to the ordinance that the heavenly
bodies were to “rule over” the “day” and “night,”
“dividing the light from the darkness” as now
effected? We have moreover presented to us the
serious disturbance of geologic order in the existence
of the terrestrial seed and fruit-bearing plants, with an
age intervening, before marine products were created.
The Archdeacon reasons against this class of interpre
ters, disputing the conclusions of Miller, M‘Caul,
Dawson, M‘Causland, and Warington, and supporting
himself on his side with the names of Chalmers, Buck
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land, and Sedgwick. Thus the doctors differ, and the
simple student of nature finds them resorting to forced
interpretations and violent assumptions, not warranted
by the text, to free the scripture statements from the
pressure of the realities which, to the natural mind,
ever defeat the asserted revelation.
However the days of Genesis are to be estimated, all
agree that with the formation of man on the sixth day
the acts of creation ended. The Creator “rested” from
his labours, whatever he had designed to do having
been accomplished. People appear to forget the para
sitical growths which infest all organized objects, plants,
and animals. “The human body,” the last of the
forms produced in the days in question, Mr Herbert
Spencer notices is “ the habitat of parasites, internal
and external, animal and vegetal, numbering, if all
were set down, some two or three dozen species, sundry
of which are peculiar to man.” These must have been
introduced after the supposed rest set in. If there
were no men, observes Professor Huxley, there would
be no tape worms. The course of creation consequently
did not end with the production of man. But in fact
there could be no such rest as has been declared, the
maintenance of all things depending on the ever active
sustaining and directing power of him who made them.
No atom in creation is ever at rest, every form is under
going continual change, assimilating what is appropri
ate to it, and advancing or receding and waning under
a constant process of development or decay, and as it
decomposes fresh forms are built up out of its consti
tuents. Can such operations be carried on without the
agency of the constructor of all things ? Has matter
independent capacity to enter into combinations, the
divine ruler refraining from all interference as not re
quired to regulate the results 1 This position biblicists
cannot possibly admit. If “ in him we live and move,
and have our being,” there can be no such cessation of
agency on his part to constitute the rest imputed to
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13
him. It is one ignorant of the processes of nature
going on around us who makes the assertion.
We are told that “by one man sin entered into the
world and death by sin.” Death is hence said to have
been introduced into this creation through the trans
gression of Adam. The remedy appointed is a new
creation, ’wrought out in Christ, in substitution for that
thus tainted and under judgment. The first Adam in
this manner becomes displaced by Jesus, who is
exhibited as the head of the new order of things.
“ The whole creation,” it is said, “ groaneth and travaileth in pain together until now,” waiting for the
deliverance; upon which there is to be “no more
curse,” and “ no more death.” Thus death is brought
in and removed according to the scripture account. It
was the penalty for sin, and disappears when sin no
/ more prevails. Butin the ages prior to man myriads of
animals passed away through subjection to death, and it
is apparent that death is due to an universal law applic
able to all terrestrial fife, and has not been brought into
the world at the particular time, and under the special
circumstances, which the biblical doctrine asserts; and
with the dispersion of the asserted cause of death the pro
vided remedy for death is equally made void. The Arch
deacon allows the feature of the extinct animals to present
“ a formidable difficulty,” and from it he endeavours to
escape by the supposition that man, as originally con
stituted, was exceptionally organized, so as not to be
liable to that end of his physical being which overtakes
plants and animals, and now man himself, as by an
-apparent universal law. The writer confesses that “no
doubt, while ignorant of the fact which the book of
nature reveals, we should conclude from the Apostle’s
words that it was the sin of Adam that had brought
death upon the irrational as well as the rational
creation.” This, he says, is an instance where “ science
comes to our aid to correct the impressions we gather
from scripture,” a result which the students of nature
will of course fully appreciate.
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Scripture and Science.
Archdeacon Pratt examines various other matters in
respect of which the scripture statements are ordinarily
called in question on the basis of being at variance with
facts in nature scientifically ascertained, such as the
form and motion of the earth, its antiquity, the
unity of the human race, the common origin of
languages, Hindu and Chinese astronomical calculations,
creation in specific centres, and the phenomenon of the
deluge, reviewing various well-known works touching on
these subjects, namely, Bunsen’s “Egypt’s place in
Ancient History,” Lyell’s “Antiquity of Man,” Dar
win’s “ Origin of Species,” Huxley on the “ Physical
Basis of Life,” and “Man’s Place in Nature,” and
Bishop Colenso on the “ Pentateuch.” Over this well
trodden ground it is not necessary that I should con
duct my readers. I will endeavour, preferably, to meet
the Archdeacon’s challenge that there is nothing possibly
obtainable from natural sources, as observable scienti
fically, beyond what he has treated of, that can prove
at variance with the scripture representations. I have
met him in regard to the earth’s antiquity, showing
that if the subject-matter of the first and second verses
of Genesis relates to that of the verses that follow, the
ancient deposits, stocked with vegetal and animal re
mains, now known of, contradict the idea derivable
from Genesis that the first day of creation occurred
about 6000 years ago. I will now occupy myself, on
grounds hitherto little discussed or understood, with the
time that man may be shown to have been on the earth,
to which the like limit of the 6000 years is commonly
assigned, a position attaching to the Bible statements
from which there seems to be no fair means of
escape.
It is a well ascertained fact that there have been
very marked alterations of temperature upon the
earth, the same region having been visited, for lengthened
periods, with a climate that was at one time tropical, at
�Scripture and Science.
15
another temperate, and at another polar. Europe has
at present a temperate climate, but its coal fields, which
occur in all directions, demonstrate that it had formerly
a degree of warmth equal to the production of tropical
plant growth, and the glacial boulders scattered over
its surface prove that it has also been under the
domination of ice. The fossilized remains of its animals
afford the like indications. When the climate was
temperate, the ox, deer, boar, horse, bear, fox, badger,
weasel, otter, lynx, and beaver possessed the land;
when tropical, the elephant, lion, tiger, hyena,
rhinoceros, and hippopotamus; and when arctic, the
alpine hare, reindeer, musk sheep, woolly mammoth, and
woolly rhinoceros. Melville Island, one of the coldest
places visited by arctic explorers, has coal deposits, and
marks of glaciers have been observed in Europe to about
50°, and in America as far as 31°, north latitude, and
similar signs prove their prevalence within the tropics
in India and Africa.
The indications of glaciers are of a well recognized
order. From some ill understood cause, these ice
formations are subject to a slow, constant movement
upon the earth’s surface, and in their progress they
leave behind them indubitable signs of their passage.
The first is till, or a stiff clay, they grind up as they
move along. This has been found in places to a thick
ness of a hundred feet and upwards, proving the
density and mighty weight of the moving ice deposits.
Another evidence of the passage of glaciers is the
scorings on the rocks over which they have passed.
The till carries with it hard pieces of rock which are
themselves thus scored, and they act as ice chisels,
graving the rocks below along which they are grated.
These marks of scoring run necessarily all in the same
direction, and demonstrate the agency by which they
have been effected.
A third evidence is the occurrence of erratic boulders.
When the lower surfaces of the land are covered with
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a thick coating of ice, the mountain tops standing above
the icy plain are subjected to extreme cold which
splinters off from them pieces of rock, often of consider
able size, and these fragments, falling on the ice below,
travel with it and are deposited wherever the ice finally
disappears. In Scotland, Professor Geikie* informs us,
they are to be traced from the Highlands to the Pent
land Hills, from fifty to eighty miles off, to the lowlying parts of Fife, to the Lammermuir Hills, and
onwards to Strathallan, the Ochil Hills, and the vale of
the Forth, and they are found also in the valleys of the
Clyde and the Irvine. They are met with on the
slopes of the Jura, borne thither from the adjacent
Alps. In India I have seen them on the high plains
of Bellary, eastward of the great range of mountains
running from Bombay to Cape Comorin, and on the
opposite side westward a few miles out at sea off the
coast of Malabar, where they bear the name of the
Sacrifice Rocks, the distances from the mountains being
some hundred and fifty miles in one direction, and fifty
in the other. A correspondent of mine, a scientific
observer, has seen them strewed over the table-land of
Mysore and the lower level of Chittoor where they lay
“ scattered over a grassy plain extending for many
miles/’ this latter region being some 250 miles from
the mountains; and he observed one on St Thomas’s
Mount, near Madras, which must have travelled thither
more than 300 miles. Du Chaillu gives testimony to
the existence of these boulders in equatorial Africa,
which is the more interesting as coming from one who,
while recording the phenomenon, was wholly unable to
account for it. He says, “Not far from Mokenga there
was a remarkable and very large boulder of granite
perched by itself at the top of a hill. It must have
been transported there by some external force, but
what this was I cannot undertake to say. I thought
it possible that it might have been a true boulder
* The, (treat Ice A ge.
�Scripture and Science.
17
transported, by a glacier, like those so abundant in
northern latitudes. . . . Whilst I am on the subject of
boulders and signs of glaciers, I may as well mention
that, when crossing the hilly country from Obindji to
Ashera-land, my attention was drawn to distinct traces
of grooves on the surface of several of the blocks which
there lie strewed about on the tops and declivities of
the hills. I am aware how preposterous it seems to
suppose that the same movements of ice which have
modified the surface of the land in northern countries
can have taken place here under the equator, but I
think it only proper to relate what I saw with my own
eyes.”* The boulders here in question must have
travelled hundreds of miles from the central mountain
region. These ice-borne masses are sometimes of vast
dimensions. Thegreat rock, estimated to weigh 1500 tons,
which forms the pedestal of the statue of Peter the Great,
is one of them. The Needle Mountain in Dauphiny,
measuring 2000 paces in circumference at its base, is
supposed to be another. Others measure 40 feet by 50,
and there are estimates specified of cubic contents of
some running from 1200 to 2250, 10,296, and 27,000
cubic feet, and of weights ranging from 680 to 2310 and
5400 tons. There is one in Sutton Common, Craven,
of about fifty yards in circumference and ten yards in
height, and those I saw off the coast of Malabar werelarge blocks of the size of ordinary buildings.
A fourth sign of glaciers are the moraines, or rubbish
heaps, which have been thrown out laterally in the
onward course of the ice. The moraines of past times
appearing in the Alps denote the passage of glaciers of
immense magnitude, compared with which those of the
present day are mere pigmies. In Canada the ice has
left a bed of drift from 500 to 800 feet in depth.
In hilly regions the depth which the ice has
attained may be estimated. In Scotland the till has
been seen at heights of 2300 feet, and the stones* A Journey to Asliango-land, 1867, pp. 292-294.
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embedded therein have left their marks upon hill-tops
to elevations of 3500 feet. The erratic boulders have
been met with there at all levels up to 3000 feet. On
the Jura they lie to the height of 3450 feet above the
sea. Norway has been under the pressure of ice
estimated at a thickness of 6000 or 7000 feet, and in
Connecticut it has been supposed to have attained in
places that of 6000 to 8000 feet. When the ice
coatings terminate in the ocean, masses are broken off
by the action of the water and are sent adrift as ice
bergs, and some of these are of stupendous size. Capt.
Boss met with one that had stranded in 61 fathoms
of water which was supposed to weigh about thirteen
hundred millions of tons, and Dr Hayes found one to
the north of Melville Bay that was aground in water
nearly half a mile in depth, the weight of which has
been estimated at two thousand million tons. The
glaciers of polar regions are considered to be from
3000 to 5000 feet in thickness. The vast area of
Greenland, containing 750,000 square miles, is, with
the exception of a little strip on its western shore,
covered with ice. The antarctic continent is similarly
buried under ice. Sir J. Ross sailed for 450 miles
along its precipitous cliff of ice, which rose in places
180 feet above the water. From all these indications
Prof. Geikie concludes that Scotland and the neigh
bourhood of the Jura must have been under the
pressure of ice 3000 feet thick. The contiguous
countries were of course similarly circumstanced. It
must have taken long ages to accumulate and disperse
such vast deposits, and Sir Charles Lyell raises the
assumption that glacial epochs are to be measured
by hundreds of thousands of years.
The visitations of the ice have been frequent, and
between them a warm climature prevailed. Professor
Geikie informs us that deposits of glacial till are found
intercalated with stratified beds of sand and clay, these
beds varying in thickness from twenty to forty feet,
�Scripture and Science.
19
and containing layers of peat and other vegetable re
mains, with bones of the extinct ox, Irish elk, horse,
reindeer, and mammoth. Borings at the estuary of the
Forth have disclosed four several deposits of till with
stones, divided from each other by intervening beds of
sand. Similar evidences occur in England, Scandi
navia, and North America. Professor Newbury has
described the occurrence of a regular forest-bed, inter
calated among true glacial deposits, with bones of the
elephant, mastodon, and great extinct beaver. Professor
Geikie comes to the conclusion that there have been
similar alternations of climate through all the older
deposits, as low down as the Silurian beds. Mr
Groll says there is evidence of at least three ice periods
prevailing during the deposition of the Tertiary forma
tions, and he says there are marks of their occurrence
• in the Cretaceous and Permian deposits. Professor
Ramsay considers that there are ice-borne boulder
beds in the Old Red Sandstone of Scotland and the
North of England, as also in the Permian strata. Mr
Milton informs us of such boulders being found in
mines, at the depth of seventy-four fathoms or four
hundred and forty-four feet below the surface. The coal
formations indicate the like changes. “ Every foot of
thickness of pure bituminous coal,” observes Professor
Huxley, “ implies the quiet growth and fall of at least
fifty generations of Sigillariae, and therefore an undis
turbed condition of forest growth through many cen
turies.” The coal seams are separated from one another
by intervening beds of shale and clay-slate, the coal being
evidence of high tropical fertility, and the shale and clay
marking absolute sterility, and thus probably repre
senting the intervention of glacial temperature. In
Coalbrookdale there are ninety such alternations; the
Saurbriicker coal, according to Humboldt, consists of
120 beds, besides many which are less than a foot
in thickness; and the Cumberland, Durham, and
Northumberland coalfield has 147 different strata, the
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coal alternating with limestone, sandstone, and clay
slate ; in the Hainaut (or Mons and Charleroi) basin,
says Mr Prestwich, the coal measures are 9400 feet
thick, containing 110 seams; in the Liege basin they
are of 7600 feet, with 85 seams; and in Westphalia
they are of 7200 feet, with 117 seams. The coal seams
in Melville Island and other places in the arctic circle
are evidences of alternations of climate in those parts.
Shells indicating the warmth of the Mediterranean have
been found in the Pliocene strata of England; such as
belong to Senegal occur in the Upper Miocene of
France; fossil palms and other tropical plants have been
met with in the Lower Miocene strata of Iceland; speci
mens of hazel, poplar, alder, beech, plane, and lime
appear in the Miocene of North Greenland within 12°
of the pole, Spitzbergen, the banks of the Mackenzie
Fiver, and Bank’s land; and remains of tropical palms,
and fossil fruits of the cocoanut and custard apple, with
tropical shells, are found in the Lower Eocene strata of
the Isle of Sheppey. Professor Geikie comments on
the long intervals of time necessary to have effected
these changes. “ The disappearance of a mer de glace,”
he observes, “ which in the lowlands of Scotland at
tained a thickness of nearer 3000 feet than 2000 feet,
could only be effected by a very considerable change of
climate. Nor, when one fully considers all sides of
the question, does it appear unreasonable to infer
that the comparatively mild and genial periods, of
which the inter-glacial beds are memorials, may have
endured as long as those arctic or glacial conditions
which preceded and followed them. We have a diffi
culty in conceiving of the length of time implied in the
gradual increase of that cold which, as the years went
by, eventually buried the whole country underneath one
vast mer de glace. Nor can we form any proper conception
of how long a time was needed to bring about that other
change of climate, under the influence of which, slowly
and imperceptibly, this immense sheet of frost melted
�Scripture and Science.
21
away from the lowlands and retired to the mountain
recesses. We must allow that long ages elapsed before
the warmth became such as to induce plants and ani
mals to clothe and people the land. How vast a time,
also, must have passed away ere the warmth reached
its climax, and the temperature again began to cool
down! How slowly, step by step, the ice must have
crept out from the mountain-fastnesses, chilling the air,
and forcing fauna and flora to retire before it; and
what a long succession of years must have come and
gone before the ice-sheet once more wrapped up the
hills, obliterated the valleys, and, streaming out from
the shore, usurped the bed of the shallow seas that
flowed around our island! Finally, when we consider
that such a succession of changes happened not once
only, but again and again, we cannot fail to have some
faint appreciation of the lapse of time required for
the accumulation of the till and the inter-glacial
deposits.”
Various suggestions have been offered to account for
the extremes of climate to which the earth has been
subjected. Sir Charles Lyell has thought that the
altered relations of land and water may have produced
these changes, but in so saying this eminent geologist
can scarcely have weighed all the conditions. It is
obvious that to bury a country at one time under 3,000
feet of ice, and at another to cover its surface with
a heavy growth of tropical plants, requires some far
more potent agency than the distribution of its sur
rounding waters could occasion. Professor Geikie com
bats this view. A possible change of climature incurred
in the progress of the whole solar system through space
is another idea that has been offered. That we pass in
this way through torrid and frigid regions is purely
ideal, nor is it reasonable to suppose that these should
be constantly alternating in correspondence with the
necessities of the case as marked upon the earth’s sur
face. The swaying of the poles in effecting what is
B
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known as the precession of the equinoxes, is another
suggested cause. This is a circular movement, the
radius of which is commonly held to be of 23° 28',
accomplished in a period of 25,870 years. Colonel
Drayson,* in view of strengthening this agency,
maintains the radius to be of 29° 25' 47", and the
time 31,840 years. No doubt some change of climate
must be induced as the earth in this movement
alters its position relatively to the direction of the
sun’s rays, but would the variation be sufficient for *
the phenomena ? We are told, and the circumstances
appear amply to warrant the supposition, that the
glacial epochs, in the magnitude of their results,
must be measured by hundreds of thousands of years,
but here a torrid, or an arctic temperature, if thus
to be induced, would recur every 13,000, or at most
16,000 years; nor is the explanation projected as
covering the whole conditions before us. Those
who offer it aim only at changes affecting Europe
to 50°, and America to 31° north latitude, while the
reality is, though hitherto not observed or acknow
ledged, that we have to account for the equator being
covered with ice as the polar regions are at this day,
which the movement in question could not effect.
Another cause for the climatic changes proposed is the
variation in the ellipticity of the earth’s orbit. The
diameter of the ellipse is held to vary by 13 J millions
of miles, which means that the earth is at times 6J
millions of miles nearer to the sun than at others, and
a computation made by Mr Stone of the Greenwich
Observatory for Sir C. Lyell, would show that it occu
pies 515,600 years to bring the earth from one extreme
in this distance to the other. Every 1,031,200 years,
consequently, the earth is nearer or farther away from
the sun by the said 6| millions of miles, and has
travelled back again to the said extreme points. Here
we have certainly the element of time for the periodical
* The last Glacial Epoch of Geology.
�Scripture and Science.
23
climatic changes in what approaches apparent sufficiency,
but will the earth’s altered position in its orbit induce the
requisite variations of heat and cold ? Professor Geikie,
in adopting this movement as a cause of the changes of
climate that are in question, admits “that mere prox
imity to the sun will not necessarily produce a warm
season.” We see in fact that it does not do so. The
sun is not situated centrically to our orbit, and in our
annual course we are therefore at times nearer to him,
and at others more distant, and it happens that when
nearest to him it is mid-winter, and when furthest from
him mid-summer. The heads of the Himalaya and
Andes are nearer to him than their bases, but the re
sult is that the tops of these mountains are covered
with perpetual snow, while a tropical temperature rules
at their feet. This circumstance demonstrates that
atmosphere is an essential instrument in conducting
heat to the earth’s surface; when dense the heat is
freely imparted, when ratified it is dissipated. The
mere alteration therefore of the earth’s distance from
the sun as the ellipticity of its orbit is altered, would
induce no variation of climate, the change being effected
in a space void of atmospheric properties. Professor
Geikie suggests that the two movements last discussed,
namely, the precessional gyration of the earth’s poles,
and the alteration in the ellipticity of its orbit, combine
together to effect the extremes of heat and cold to which
the same parts of the earth are at different times sub
jected. It is not apparent how movements with such
vastly differing periodicities can act in unison for their
results, nor does the Professor here explain himself.
The need to make use of both these movements to
account for the phenomena in view, amounts to an
admission that singly neither of them is adequate for
the purpose. Nor would these movements disturb the
existing alternations of summer heat and winter cold,
so that the extremes of temperature would still annually
succeed each other, over the parts that are in question,
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and not be maintained continuously as the exigency
requires.
The true way to account for natural phenomena
the immediate cause of which is not apparent, is to
presume that what occasions the like effects under cir
cumstances open to our observation, must be that which
has produced the same results in the instances remain
ing to be judged of. The disturbances to which the
planet Uranus was subjected led to the discovery of the
planet Neptune. It was known from the conditions of
the spheres in view that their approaches towards each
other in their courses induced such perturbations, and
this caused a search to be made for the unseen sphere
whose presence was necessary to account for the de
flections of Uranus, and thus the existence of Neptune
was brought to light. It is observed how through
atmospheric and other causes rocks and hill-sides are
worn down, and their debris cast upon the lower levels;
how these lower levels are washed away by surface
waters; how still heavier drifts are effected by fluvial
operations; and how sediments in ocean-beds or Jake
bottoms are accumulated; and we become satisfied that
the strata composing the earth’s crust, layer upon layer,
must have been brought together and deposited by
similar agencies in the past ages. The various circum
stances that are connected with the existing glaciers—
the till, the scorings of the rocks, the erratic boulders,
and the lateral moraines, where they occur, prove to us
that glaciers have occupied the land where now no ice
can hold its ground. The conclusion should follow, as
an inevitable consequence, that the conditions which
have produced and maintain the ice coatings in the
present day, must be those which produced and main
tained them when ice similarly prevailed elsewhere in
the bygone ages. That is, the conditions which have
induced the heavy coating of ice with which Greenland
is at this moment covered, are those that were present
and operated in former times when the low-lying parts
�Scripture and Science.
25
of equatorial India and Africa were buried under the
like glacial covering ; and we should be equally assured
that the circumstances which cause the growth of
tropical vegetation in the warmest portions of the globe,
are the same which brought about similar growths in
Melville Island, Baffin’s Bay, and other regions near
the pole, where coal formations, the product of such
growths, are found.
It is evident that the extremes of heat and cold wit
nessed in various places on the earth are due to the
positions of those parts relatively to the sun, his rays
falling in the warm regions vertically, or nearly so, and
in the cold regions very obliquely or for seasons not at
all. We should be prepared then to recognize the
necessity that to induce tropical growths near the pole,
and heavy domination of ice at the equator, the relative
positions of the earth and the sun must have been other
than they now are, and that there have been times
when the sun’s rays fell vertically at the poles and
obliquely at the equator.
It is necessary to apprehend in what manner the
earth undergoes that diurnal revolution which consti
tutes it a globe revolving on an axis. No one will be
prepared to deny that the power, whatever its descrip
tion, is one exerted upon it by the sun. Magnetism,
which the sun indubitably sheds upon the earth,
would effect such a movement. Baron Reichenbach
informs us that the sun’s rays will restore the power of
a weakened magnet, and have converted an iron key
into a magnet. Mr Proctor, citing General Sabine,
says that the magnetic action, connected with the
earth, varies according to the earth’s propinquity to the
sun, being intensified in both hemispheres in December
and January, when its orbit is nearest to the sun.
Magnetic disturbances or storms are now traced to solar
agency, and the aurora is also associated with the same
agency. An iron vessel will exercise a different effect
upon its compass according as it has been constructed
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in the line of the magnetic poles, or north and south,
or of the magnetic equator, east and west. The vessels
have thus become magnetic according to the direction
in which they have been exposed to the sun’s influence.
Professor Tyndall notices that magnetic currents will
set a body in rotation, exercising a repulsive force
which drives the object in one direction while an
attractive force draws it round in the opposite line. A
correspondent of mine has verified these circumstances
in illustration of the sun’s operation upon the earth. He
says, “ one of Farraday’s experiments I have myself
made in model. A round ball of wood floats in water,
with an iron wire through its poles. This wire has
been made magnetic in the ordinary way, so that it has
a north and south pole. The ball and its poles now
represent the earth floating in space. By means of an
electro-magnet at some little distance from it, the ball
can be made to rotate on its axis.” Humboldt, citing
Halley, states that there are four magnetic poles on the
earth’s surface, a representation which Mr Proctor en
dorses. These are situated north and south of the
equator, at positions removed therefrom by from 70° to
75°, and lie about 80° on each side of the axis of the
earth’s rotation. There is thus a broad belt of magnet
ism reaching the earth’s surface, prevailing as far as
its spherical form will arrest the magnetic current, and
directed towards it in the line of its axis, by means of
which it may be presumed the earth’s diurnal rotation
is effected or promoted. Mr Crooke’s discovery that
light has a motive power introduces another equally
potent agency, it being apparent that as his disks revolve
in an exhausted receiver by means of the light of a
candle, so will the earth poised in space revolve under
the powerful action of the sun’s rays.
Such being the circumstances under which it may be
presumed the earth is made to rotate upon its axis,,
namely, by the means of power, magnetic and luminous,
cast upon its surface by the governing orb, the sun, in
�Scripture and Science.
17
the direction of its axis, it requires but an alteration in
this line of action to effect those great climatic changes
that have to be accounted for. If this line of action
slowly moves from its present position, passing from the
direction of the poles to that of the equator, the polar
regions become equatorial and the equatorial polar, and
as it completes its circuit these regions return to their
former conditions. Thus may be brought about all
that we have seen to have occurred upon the earth's
surface, tropical plants raised in the polar regions and
ice dominating in the equatorial, nor does it seem reason
able to assume that these effects have been induced in
any other manner.
The sun, it must be remembered, is a moving body,
liable to disturbances from other spheres outside of it,
equally as is the earth. That is, it revolves on its axis,
taking twenty-five days to effect the revolution, and it
is believed to be in progress round some very distant
centre. There are thus systems within systems belong
ing to the heavenly orbs, each under its proper govern
ance. The satellites are specially associated with the
planets that possess them, and are held circling round
their respective governors ; the planets, with their satel
lites, are similarly held circling round the sun; and the
sun, with its attendant orbs, is apparently holding a
like course round its distant governor. The planets
are liable to disturbances from the influences of the
bodies associated with them as these approach them.
The earth has various indications of experiencing such
disturbances. It is swayed at its poles, whereby the
precession of the equinoxes is effected ; this movement
is made in a nutatory or waving line; the earth's circuit
round the sun is elliptic and not circular; its position is
not centrical to this ellipse; and the diameter of the
ellipse is continually changing; furthermore, a constant
alteration in the angle of the ecliptic shows the earth
to be ever undergoing a geographical change rela
tively to its path round the sun. There is then no
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improbability, but on the contrary a likelihood, that
the sun is in a similar manner affected by orbs with
which it may be associated in regions beyond our sys
tem, and some consequent disturbance to which it may
be thus subjected might alter the direction of its radiation
towards the earth in the manner contemplated as that
bringing about the climatic changes which are in question.
That astronomers have not detected such a variation
of the polar axis should not be conclusive against its
occurrence. We maybe said to be still in the infancy
of science. It is not three hundred years since G-alileo
was denounced by every astronomer in Europe for
maintaining that the earth revolved daily on its axis.
The nutation of the poles at the precessional movement
was first noticed by . Bradley two hundred and twenty
eight years ago ; the planet Uranus was discovered by
Herschel less than a hundred years ago; it is but
thirty years since Adams detected the existence of
Neptune ; and at the beginning of the current century
but seven minor planets circling between Mars and
Jupiter were known of, and their number now is found
to exceed a hundred, and is constantly being added to.
The nutation of the poles, their precessional gyration,
the variation in ellipticity of the earth’s orbit, and the
change in the earth’s position indicated by the altera
tion of the angle of the ecliptic, are all circumstances
disturbing the earth’s relative position towards the
sun which would interfere with close observation of the
movement of the polar axis that is in question. The
conditions, namely, the long maintenance of the ice
where it prevails, and of tropical heat where that
exists, necessitate that this movement should be a very
slowly executed one, and it would take long intervals,
between accurately recorded observations, to establish
such a movement. It is possible, therefore, that in the
course of time it may yet be ascertained.
I here introduce a communication received by me
in respect of the present production, from a scientific
�Scripture and Science.
29
friend to whom I am already under deep obligations for
aid in following out the theory connected with the
■changes of climature the earth has undergone, which
I have ventured to advance. He says,—
“The grand movement of the earth’s mass* originating
primarily from the sun which is here sought to he
•established to account for the climatic changes every' where evident upon its surface, cannot at the present
day be clearly proved by astronomy, inasmuch as the
change alluded to occupies or involves probably millions
of years during only one revolutionary cycle. To
•detect so slow a change by merely optical observations,
involving errors of refraction of light, in so short a
period as two or three hundred years, is not to be ex
pected. We have no certain method even at this
moment to tell within 8" or 10" what the refraction of
the air really is, and also it varies at different times,
so that to fix the precise position of any part of the
earth’s surface astronomically with sufficient accuracy
to detect the small movement referred to, would be to
imply the non-existence of all disturbing influences.
Even the parallax (the difference between the real and
apparent place) referring to any of the heavenly bodies
is by no means correctly ascertained. This of course
involves most important results. For mere approxima
tion of stellar distances it is accurate enough, but what
is now in view is an exceedingly slow motion of the
mass of the earth corresponding with that of the sun,
leaving the rotation of the two bodies still at their
natural angle—-which as far as our observations extend
has not yet been detected. To prove how easily so
small a quantity has been overlooked : in the most
ordinary observations for transit, it is usual to allow for
what is called a personal equation, that is one man
* This is not as I have expressed the suggested movement. I
take it to be an alteration of the polar axis relatively to the earth,
and not a movement of the mass of the earth relatively to the
polar axis. My correspondent concedes that the case may be as I
have stated it.
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looking through the same transit instrument will not
see the sun or a star pass his centre wire at the same
instant of time which another will do with equally good
eyesight. It is therefore obviously inaccurate to cite
the merely optical measurements of astronomy as any
argument against the slow change of the earth’s surface
here asserted in unison with that of its primary the
sun. In hundreds of years hence it will probably be
detected. Several astronomers have lately hinted at the
probability of such a movement.
“ The late observations to ascertain the sun’s parallax,
or, in other words, his mean distance from the earth,
by the transit of Venus over his disc, although taken
in all parts of the globe, so far as we yet know of them,
are singularly discrepant. The French astronomers, with
first-rate instruments, make the parallax 8". 8 79. Our
own deductions are not yet all published, but several of
them show many decimals under this result. Therefore
astronomy is not to be appealed to at present in the
face of geological facts, and these being undeniable, re
main for acceptance to the full measure of their value.”
The contemplated change in the axis of rotation
involves another circumstance, the bearings of which
have to be taken into account. A globe always
revolves on its shortest axis. The earth now does
so, the diameter from pole to pole being shorter by a
little above 26|- miles than the diameter at the equator.
The crust of the earth is known to be elastic, being
subject to continual upheavals and depressions, and
especially at the equator, so that every portion of the
globe has been under water, or raised up out of the
water, becoming at one time sea bottom, and at another
dry land, and its surface, whether below or above the
water, is ordinarily undulating and diversified by high
and low levels, forming the hills and valleys which are
before us. The bulge of the earth at the equator is
attributed to the centrifugal force violently operating in
that direction as the globe whirls in space in effecting
�Scripture and Science.
31
its diurnal revolution. It follows if the axis of rotation
is varied, the equator is correspondingly varied, and the
new region becoming equatorial is subjected to the
high degree of centrifugal force exerted in that direction.
In this way there would be a constant change effected
in the form of the earth as the line of its axis of rota
tion underwent alteration, and the conditions would be
maintained of the shorter diameter in the line of the
axis, and the longer one in that of the equator.
The reasonableness of the solution offered will better
appear upon reducing the proportions of the earth to
dimensions that the mind can easily appreciate. The
crust of the earth, judging from the known stratifica
tions is supposed to measure about twenty miles. Let
this be expressed by one inch, when the earth may be
represented by a globe about thirty-three feet in
diameter. It is quite conceivable that the thin elastic
crust of such a globe would yield to the pressure
of great force continually acting at its centre, so
that its diameter in that quarter might be distended
by about an inch and a quarter, which is all that
the circumstances before us require. But as this
crust is also persistent, brittle, and fragile, the operation
could not be effected without leaving marks of the
exerted force, and these indications actually do appear.
The strata originally laid down horizontally by deposi
tion in water, are twisted and turned in every direction,
and the more so the lower down they are situated, and
in mines, whether of coal or of metals, the seams or veins
are invariably broken through, the fractures often
occasioning in the metallic mines the loss of the lode
that has to be followed up, it being difficult to discover
where the severed portion has been left. These faults,
as they are termed in mines, are sure to occur at suffi
cient depths. The process of the equatorial distention
is, it must be assumed, maintained continuously, and as
the same portion of the globe is brought repeatedly to
undergo it, it follows that the deeper we penetrate the
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earth’s crust the more will there be evidence of its
disturbance. The marks of violence that the crust of
the earth exhibits, and the constant alteration effected
in its levels, are thus circumstances necessarily to have
occurred under the polar movement contemplated. The
theory offered of the change in the direction of the axis of
the earth’s rotation may hence be seen to embrace all
the conditions which it should cover, nor has any other
solution yet been proposed that can he admitted as
affording a satisfactory explanation of the observed
phenomena.
There are other features which illustrate the move
ment in question, and which at the same time afford
the means of rebutting Archdeacon Pratt’s conclusion
that there have been two distinct creations, an ancient
and a modern one, and that the latter period, having
man connected with it, is to be confined within the
limits of 6000 years. These are the cave deposits, and
especially those of Kent’s Cave, near Torquay, which I
will proceed to trace out.
The explorations in Kent’s Cave have been conducted
under the supervision of a Committee of the British
Association since the year 1865, two of the body being
the well known geologists Messrs Vivian and Pengelly,
whose reports are annually laid before the public through
the medium of the Association. In this cavern are six
distinct deposits, namely (1) of back mould forming
the surface floor of the cavern ; (2) a floor of granular
stalagmite ; (3) a stratum of red cave earth ; (4) a floor
of crystalline stalagmite ; (5) a stratum of brown rock
like breccia; (6) another floor of stalagmite. The
bottom of the cave has, in most parts of it, not yet
been reached. The soft or granular deposit of stalag
mite, forming the second in the above series, remains
intact as originally laid down; the next floor of stalag
mite, which is hard and crystalline, is in parts undis
turbed, and in parts has been broken up into large
fragments which have been in places forced through
�Scripture and Science.
33
the three superior strata, and thus sometimes exhibit
themselves at the surface floor of the cave; the rock
like breccia and the third floor of stalagmite have both
been broken up. The stalagmite formations which
have thus suffered run to several feet in thickness, in
some places to as much as twelve feet, and are thus of
great density and strength, and through all these
deposits are large blocks of the solid rock of the cavern
that have been from time to time torn from its sides
and roof. The present condition of the cavern is quite
sound, not a splinter being detached within it by the
heavy blastings that occur. The question arises, What
has led to the recurrent floors of stalagmite and to the
disruptions of the stalagmite and of the rocky lining of
the cavern ?
The stalagmite floors are formed by the dropping of
water through the limestone roof, which slowly deposits
the lime below. Something must have occurred to
have arrested the drip at the completion of one of the
floors, and to have set it free again for the formation of
another floor, and from the extent of the intervening
accumulations of cave earth or breccia, the period of the
interruption must have been a lengthened one. The
phenomenon, it is apparent, is due not to a local but a
general cause, for there are distinct floors of stalagmite
in other caverns; for example, there are two in the
Windmill Hill Cave at Brixham, also in Poole’s Cavern
Buxton, in the Caves of the Wye, and in the Trou de
la Naulette, near Dinant, in Belgium. The recurring
glacial and warm periods which visit the earth at once
account for what has happened. When the cave has
passed into the icy temperature, the drip has been frozen
up and arrested, and when it has passed into a suffi
ciently warm temperature, the drip has been let loose,
and the formation of a fresh floor of stalagmite has
ensued. The breaking up of the stalagmite floors, and
the disruption of the rocks within the cave, are just
what would occur when the cavern entered into the
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Scripture and Science.
equatorial region and ’became subjected to the violent
distention in that quarter effected by the centrifugal
force there in operation. The Committee who are
exploring the cavern say that some power like that of
an earthquake has been necessary to cause the disrup
tions in question, and the polar changes contemplated
would introduce just such a power. The upper floor of
stalagmite can have passed but once under the pressure
at the equator, and being soft and yielding has not
suffered in the process. Time has altered the consist
ency of the second and third floors, and made them
hard and unyielding, as is the condition of the com
pacted breccia between them ; these have been
equatorial more than once, and the pressure upon them
which twists the strata of the earth and snaps solid
beds of coal across, has sufficed to break them up. The
same cause has also splintered off the rocks within the
cavern, and left masses thereof occupying every stage of
its deposits.
Cape Farewell, or the southern point of Greenland,
stands in about 60° N. Lat., and Disco Island,
off the western coast of Greenland, in about 70°
N. Lat. The glacial line may be said to lie mid
way at about 65°.* In the entire circle, consequently,
there would be two sections at the North and
South Poles, measuring about 50 degrees each where
ice would prevail, and between them would be two
regions of warmth, temperate and tropical, measuring
about 130 degrees each. The cavern may be supposed
to have been in a position relatively to the sun corre
sponding to 65° S. Lat. on the Eastern hemisphere
when the third, or lowest floor of its stalagmite,
began to be formed, the same being completed when
the cave reached a position corresponding to 65° N.
Lat. Then it may be presumed a glacial epoch ensued,
* Capt. Bach says that the sub-soil, twenty inches below the
surface, is perpetually frozen in latitude 64° North (Narrative of
Arctic Land Expedition, p. 479-)
�Scripture and Science.
^5
and the drip was frozen up and ceased till the cave,
passing across the pole, came to be in a position
corresponding to 65° N. Lat. on the Western
hemisphere, when the drip was resumed and the
second floor formed. After that must have occurred
another glacial epoch, till 65° S. Lat. on the
Eastern hemisphere again became its position, when
the first or uppermost floor now in course of completion
began to be formed. The cave would seem thus to
have experienced two seasons during which ice domi
nated, and three (the last not yet concluded by the
measure of about 15 degrees), during which warmth,
temperate and tropical, prevailed. The animal remains,
which are found chiefly in the cave-earth intervening
between the superior and the second floors of stalag
mite, denote the passage of the cave through these
various climates, there being those of the ox, horse,
sheep, deer, hare, rabbit, pig, rat, fox, wolf, badger, bear,
and beaver to mark the prevalence of a temperate
climate, those of the hyena, elephant, lion, and rhino
ceros to show a tropical climate, and those of the rein
deer to indicate an arctic climate.
It would have been interesting had the Committee
afforded the means of judging what the periods may
have been that have been requisite for the formation of
the floors of stalagmite, and so of estimating the time that
may be occupied in effecting a complete revolution of
the polar axis. But though they have not ventured
upon any such calculation, they give us grounds of
assurance that the periods in question have been very
lengthy ones. At one spot where a former explorer
cleared away the stalagmite twenty-eight years ago, a
constant drip has left a formation, covering a few inches
only, to the thickness of writing paper. At a place
called The Crypt of Dates are inscriptions of names and
initials cut into the stalagmite by visitors, with dates
reaching back to 1618, and yet after a lapse of two
centuries and a half, in a region where the drip is un-
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Scripture and Science.
usually copious, and the stalagmite, consisting of the
superior and second floors, here brought together, is
above twelve feet in thickness, these letters, which it is
supposed were never more than an eighth of an inch in
depth, remain still unobliterated. At another place
called The Arcade, there is a boss of stalagmite measur
ing forty feet in circumference, and fully thirteen feet
in height, on the upper part of which is an inscription
of the year 1604, the condition of which shows that the
stalagmite “ has undergone no appreciable augmentation
of volume ” during the period of more than two and a
half centuries that has gone by. Mr Vivian, in a paper
of his on the evidences of Glacial Action in South
Devon, referring to a place in Kent’s Cave called The
Cave of Inscriptions, containing names and initials on
the stalagmite, one of which is of the year 1688, sug
gests that the rate of deposit thereupon may have been
“one-tenth of an inch” “during each one thousand
years.” He does not give the thickness of the stalag
mite at this spot, but supposing his rate may be appli
cable to the twelve feet of stalagmite at The Crypt of
Dates, the period required for that accumulated deposit
would be 1,440,000 years.
The glacial phenomena have been traced by geologists
through the Tertiary and all lower strata down to the
Silurian formation, and here in Kent’s cavern is appa
rent proof that in the modern period in which the
cavern stands have occurred two glacial epochs. Thus,
in correspondence with other abundant indications of a
like tendency, we have evidence of the continuity of
the creative processes, and that there has been no such
interruption thereof as Archdeacon Pratt calls for in
order to establish his idea that there have been two
distinct creations, an ancient and a modern one; and
the vast time that must have been occupied in forming
the stalagmite floors of the cavern, three in number,
with interruptions between the periods caused by the
domination of ice, puts an end to the supposition by
�Scripture and Science.
$7
which he is bound, that what he terms the modern
creation can possibly be brought within anything like
the limits of six thousand years.
The duration of man upon earth, hundreds of thou
sands, and it may be millions of years, beyond the
period marked out in Genesis, is also apparent from the
same quarter. The upper floor of stalagmite in Kent’s
Cave contains, with the remains of extinct animals,
paloeolithic flint implements and charred wood, and in
a portion twenty inches in depth in this deposit have
been found a human tooth and portion of a jaw-bone
containing four teeth. In the cave-earth below have
been discovered similar flint and chert instruments,
burnt bones, charred wood in great quantities, and
“ bone tools and ornaments, consisting of harpoons for
spearing fish, eyed needles or bodkins for stitching
skins together, awls, perhaps, to facilitate the passage
of the slender needle or bodkin through the tough
thick hides, pins for fastening the skins they wore, and
perforated badger’s teeth for necklaces and bracelets.”
In the breccia, below the second floor of stalagmite,
which is described to be in places upwards of twelve
feet in thickness, have been found fifty-six flint and
chert implements and flakes, together with numerous
teeth of the cave bear, five teeth and a portion of the
skull of the lion, and the jaw of a fox—the remains of
the hyena, with his coprolites, which abundantly appear
in the superior cave-earth, and the bones of the various
animals which he may have there dragged in, not
occurring in this more ancient deposit. “ A glance,” it
is said, “ at the implements from the two deposits,” (the
cave earth, and the breccia), “ shows that they are very
dissimilar. Those from the breccia are much more
rudely formed, more massive, have less symmetry of
outline, and were made by operating, not on flakes
purposely struck off from nodules of flint or chert, as
in the case of those from the cave-earth, but directly
on the nodules themselves.” A great age, the Committee
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conclude, has intervened between the two eras with
their distinctive deposits, tools, and men; one particular
massive implement they specify, measuring 4'5 inches
by 3 inches, as the finest and the oldest specimen
in the breccia, and this was met with four feet down
in this very ancient and solid deposit.
The evidence for the antiquity of man afforded by
Kent’s cave is consonant to what appears in other
directions. Just such remains of men and animals
occur in other limestone caverns below their stalagmite
floors. So far back as the year 1774, human bones
and fragments of rude pottery, with bones of bears and
hyenas, were found in such a position in caves of
G-ailenreuth in Franconia ; in a similar position, under
a dense crust of stalagmite, Dr Schotte and Baron von
Schlotheim met with human bones, some of which
were eight feet under the remains of a rhinoceros, in
the caves of Kostritz in Upper Saxony; in a breccia
floor, below cave-earth and stalagmite, in the Caverne
de Chauvaux, near Namur, Belgium, Professor A.
Spring discovered five human jaw-bones, a parietal
bone, and a flint hatchet, in contact with remains
of the eland, auroch, and other animals; and in sandy
clay, three metres and a half below the second floor of
stalagmite in the Trou de la Naulette, Belgium, were
found a human jaw-bone, two teeth, and an arm-bone,
with the fragment of a reindeer horn, which had
apparently been bored by some sharp instrument.
Archdeacon Pratt, as his theory made imperative on
him, disputes the fact that vestiges of man have existed
in the Tertiary deposits, but there are certainly seem
ingly reliable statements, showing that they have there
appeared. Mr James Watson is reported to have dis
covered portions of a human skull at Altaville, near
Angelos, Calaveras county, California, in a stratum of
undisturbed Tertiary, at a depth of 130 feet, in a min
ing shaft; M. Desnoyers and the Abbe Bourgeois are
said to have found bones of the elephant and rhinoceros,
�Scripture and Science.
39
with figures of animals engraved thereon, in the upper
Pliocene strata at Prest, near Chartres; in a similar
deposit at Calle del Vento, near Savona, M. Issel, and
in the still deeper Miocene at Selles-sur-Cher (Loire-etCher) the Marquis de Vibraye, are said to have dis
covered bones in like manner exhibiting the figuresMf
animals engraved on them ; and in 1873, Mr Prank
Calvert made known, through Sir John Lubbock, that
from a cliff of the Miocene period, in the vicinity of
the Dardanelles, he extracted a fragment of the joint
of a bone of the dinotherium or mastodon, measuring
nine inches in diameter and five in thickness, with the
figure of a horned animal deeply incised thereon, and
traces of seven or eight other figures which were nearly
obliterated, as also a flint flake and some bones of
animals that had been “ fractured longitudinally,
obviously by the hand of man for the purpose of
extracting the marrow, according to the practice of
all primitive races.”
Mr Calvert concludes from
his own and other such like discoveries, that it is
“ established beyond a question that the antiquity of
man is no longer to be reckoned by thousands, but by
millions of years.”
"With the statement in Genesis, in respect of the
period when the world was formed and occupied by the
human race, thus violently overthrown, the whole
scheme of artificial religion prevailing in Christendom
falls to the ground. The history of Adam, biblically
given as that of the first man, is an essential feature in
this scheme. If he disappears, or was not the first of
the race, the tale of what happened in the garden of
Eden is made void ; and the circumstances narrated to
account for the introduction of sin into the world
becoming unreal, equally unreal must be the special
provision offered to our acceptance as made for the
sin. If we have to do away with the first Adam, it is
impossible to retain upon the scene the second Adam
who was to replace him. The latter is derived from
�4©
Scripture and Science.
“ Enos which was the son of Seth, which wTas the son
of Adam, which was the son of God,” hut if there was
no such root for man as this Adam, created hut 6000
years ago, and the family have really been in existence
hundreds of thousands, and it may be millions of years,
and have sprung from some other stock, the genealogy
proves to be a nullity, and the personage in whose
favour it has been constructed, in the position asserted
for him, becomes in like manner removed from the
field of fact. And thus knowledge, based on possession
of the actualities, always puts an end to fiction, or the
imaginative representations of the ignorant.
TURNBULL AND SPEARS, PRINTERS, EDINBURGH.
�
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Victorian Blogging
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A collection of digitised nineteenth-century pamphlets from Conway Hall Library & Archives. This includes the Conway Tracts, Moncure Conway's personal pamphlet library; the Morris Tracts, donated to the library by Miss Morris in 1904; the National Secular Society's pamphlet library and others. The Conway Tracts were bound with additional ephemera, such as lecture programmes and handwritten notes.<br /><br />Please note that these digitised pamphlets have been edited to maximise the accuracy of the OCR, ensuring they are text searchable. If you would like to view un-edited, full-colour versions of any of our pamphlets, please email librarian@conwayhall.org.uk.<br /><br /><span><img src="http://www.heritagefund.org.uk/sites/default/files/media/attachments/TNLHLF_Colour_Logo_English_RGB_0_0.jpg" width="238" height="91" alt="TNLHLF_Colour_Logo_English_RGB_0_0.jpg" /></span>
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Conway Hall Library & Archives
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2018
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Conway Hall Ethical Society
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Scripture and science
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Strange, Thomas Lumisden
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Place of publication: London
Collation: 40 p. ; 18 cm.
Notes: Includes bibliographical references. From the library of Dr Moncure Conway. A critique of John Henry Pratt, Archbishop of Calcutta's 'Scripture and Science Now at Variance' (London, Hatchard, 1858) using evidence of glacial geology. Printed by Turnbull and Spears, Edinburgh.
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Thomas Scott
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1876
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CT187
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<img src="http://i.creativecommons.org/p/mark/1.0/88x31.png" alt="Public Domain Mark" /><br /><span>This work (Scripture and science), identified by </span><a href="https://conwayhallcollections.omeka.net/items/show/www.conwayhall.org.uk"><span>Humanist Library and Archives</span></a><span>, is free of known copyright restrictions.</span>
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Text
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English
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Religion
Science
Conway Tracts
Religion and science
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Text
WHAT 18 RELIGION?
(F. Max Midler's First Hibbert Lecture)
A DISCOURSE
GIVEN AT
^OUTH
j-’LACE
J^HAFEIz,
MAY $th, 1878,
BY
MONCURE D. CONWAY, M.A.
LONDON :
SOUTH PLACE, FINSBURY,
PRICE TWOPENCE.
�LONDON:
PRINTED BY WATERLOW AND SONS LIMITHD,
LONDON WALL.
�WHAT IS RELIGION?
The community may congratulate itself upon the fact
that the bequest of an advanced liberal man for the
promotion of free religious inquiry, should find its
fulfilment in the ancient chapter-house of Westminster
Abbey. It is probable that if the dogmas which
founded that Abbey still reigned, the first Hibbert
lecturer would have been sooner burnt than listened
to. But now, amid those historic walls are repre
sented ideas of religion which have been raised quite
out of the region of authority, and worthily claim only
to stand or fall along with the reason and knowledge
of man,—acknowledging no revelation but the history
of man.
On Thursday last, in his second lecture, the Pro
fessor remarked that even if the theory of human pro
gression could be proved m all other affaiis of mankind,
that would not prove the same theory true of religion.
�4
This remark applied to the far past; and it is true
that what is called religion was for ages the unpro
gressive, the stationary institution of the world. And
this because the religious sentiment was confused with
theology,—identified with alleged revelations,—thus
removed from the normal current of human interests.
But the scene- in the chapter-house marks a great
change. The Hibbert Trust is, I believe, outcome
of money earned by toiling negroes on West Indian
plantations. The House of Commons freed those
slaves. The wealth they coined comes back to the
room in «which the House of Commons first sat.
There African degradation is turning to English cul■ ture. The progress in civilisation represented in that
fact is not greater than the religious progress it
implies. The leading Unitarian (Martineau) and the
. Dean of Westminster have united to bring a German
liberal there to raise the standard of a human religion.
It is now a religious House of Commons. Four
centuries ago an old monk frescoed the walls of it
with the visions of the Apocalypse. The angels and
dragons are now fading around a wider apocalypse.
The Isle of Patmos sinks beneath the horizon. The
■ Isle of England rises from the night, its awakened eye
■ holding the Apocalypse of Man.
The eminence of Max Muller is the work he has
. done in recovering the vast fields of human experi
�5
ence represented by the Aryan race. No West Indian
slave was more bound under his master than our:
English brains under thraldom to ancient Semitic
notions. Hebraism waved its sceptre over European
culture, and excluded two-thirds of the world and of
history as heathenism and devil’s work. Many have
been our deliverers from that prison, but no one of
them has done more than our first Hibbert lecturer
to carry this liberation from the scholar’s study to
the layman’s home. It was because of this that he
was called to expound the religion of humanity amid
walls built to fortify the dogmas of one tribe against
the rest of mankind, and against universal progress.Westminster Abbey has survived to hear sentence
passed upon every creed for which it stood. And so
at last even tardy religion is caught up into the great
loom of the world to be woven in with general civili
sation.
That is, so far as it is a sound thread. But is it
sound ? Is it real ? Some say it is rotten, some say
unreal: man’s childish awe of phantoms, conjured up
by his own ignorance. But Max Muller detaches re
ligion from all its special forms or accidents; maintains
its reality and vitality; rests it upon the universal human
sense and feeling of the Infinite. He appeals to the
broad facts common to the civilized man and the
barbarian, to East, West, North, South; and he thus,
�6
in laying his foundation, leaves out of sight those
facts not universal; such as the special and narrow
theories of which a Christian may feel conscious here
and a Buddhist there. His question relates not to
this so-called religion or that, but to religion itself.
All religions might perish, and this essential religion
still stand. That he declares to be a natural thing,
which has had natural evolutions comprehensible by
science. Supernaturalism may, therefore, so far as the
present atmosphere of Westminster Abbey is con
cerned, be regarded as a small way one religion] has
of saying to another “ Stand aside, I am holier than
thou.” The interest of the human intellect has
passed beyond that pious egotism. It is now pro
foundly concerned to know, not whether Christianity
is true, but whether religion itself is real; or whether
our spiritual emotion is merely surviving emotion of
waves after the blasts of superstition have so long
swept over them.
The main principle affirmed is, that religion is man’s
apprehension of the Infinite. In searching the largest
and the smallest, man reaches an end of his com
prehension, the limit of the heavens he can see, the
limit of the atom he can divide; but where compre
hension ends, apprehension continues; imagination,
wonder, admiration, faith, hope, soar on into an immea
surable expanse; and the emotion awakened within
�7
for that transcendent immensity is the religious emo
tion.
Now there are certain inferences from this principle
which it hardly lay in the way of the lecturer to un
fold. It was intimated, however, in what he said
about the progressive development of conceptions of
colour, and I will use that to illustrate my own point.
In arguing that the ancient races of men apprehended
the Infinite vaguely, though they had no word for it,
he said, 11 We divide colour by seven rough degrees.
Even those seven degrees are of late date in the evolu
tion of our sensuous knowledge. In common Arabic, as
Palgrave tells us, the names for green, black and brown
are constantly confounded. In the Edda the rainbow is
called a three-coloured bridge. Xenophanes says that
what people call Iris is a cloud, purple, red and yellow.
Even Aristotle still speaks of the tricoloured rainbow,
red, yellow and green. Blue, which seems to us so
definite a Colour, was worked out of the infinity of
colours at a comparatively late time. There is hardly
a book now in which we do not read of the blue sky.
But in the ancient hymns of the Veda, so full of the
dawn, the sun and the sky, the blue sky is never men
tioned in the Zendavesta the blue sky is never men
tioned ; in Homer the blue sky is never mentioned;
in the Old, and even in the New, Testament, the blue
sky is never mentioned. In the Teutonic languages
�S'
blue comes from a.root which originally meant bleak
and black. The Romance languages found no useful
word for blue in Latin and "borrowed their word from
the Germans.’7
The Hibbert lecturer believes those ancients saw
the blue sky as we do, but they had no word
for it because they had not detached it mentally from
dark or bright. But whether the outer eye has un
folded or the inner eye,—visual power or the analytic
mind behind it,—it is equally shown that the full
phenomena were not revealed; and we are again
reminded that in going back to the ancient world for
his beliefs man suffers a relapse from the height he
has attained. In the matter of blue sky the Bible is
as much a blank as the Vedas. So far neither was a
revelation—or unveiling—of phenomena. That know
ledge, by natural means and scientific culture, we have
reached, and see seven colours where our ancestors
saw three or four. Are we to suppose their spiritual
senses were finer, while their other senses were duller,
than ours? Are we to suppose that their religious
analysis was more perfect than ours ? If so, it would
be a miracle; but where is the evidence of any such
miracle? Compare the God of the Vedas or of the
Bible—Indra or Jehovah—with the God of Theodore
Parker, nay, of any living Theist, and only a blindness
worse than blue-blindness can declare those thunder--
�9
gods equal to the Divine Love adored by the en
lightened heart to-day.
That conclusion is inevitable from the moment it
is admitted that religion is a subject for scientific
treatment. Once let it be admitted that religion is to
be dealt with by unbiassed reason,—by such calm
sifting of facts as if the subject were electricity,—and
from that instant every particular system of religion
must take its place in the natural history of mankind.
Be it Brahminism, be it Christianity, it comes down
from the bench and goes into the witness-box. Each
testifies what it knows, but it cannot coerce the judg
ment of Reason, Christianity may testify that it saw
miracles; Confucianism that it saw none; Islamism
that it was revealed from Allah ; but it is no longer
the sword which determines their credibility; it is
Reason. So their testimony goes for precisely what
it is worth. If they saw only three colours where
there were seven, possibly they also saw miracle
where there was only natural fact. The world cannot
go back to the year One for its ideas of the Infinite
any more than for its optics. It may recognise in
Christ a great religious teacher, just as it recognises
in Aristotle a great scientific teacher; but as it
cannot diminish the known colours because Aristotle
knew only three, so it cannot deny religious facts
because unknown to Christ. But it may find fresh
�IO
reason for faith in science and religion in that, with
grand vitality, they far outgrow both Aristotle and
Christ, and all the systems that would confine them.
Now, as to this apprehension of the Infinite in
which the Hibbert lecturer finds the religious faculty;
it sounds at first rather metaphysical. It is tolerably
clear that no abstract notions of the Infinite can have
any commanding power over the nature and passions
of mankind. We must, therefore, in considering
historic religions, think rather of the forms with which
human imagination has peopled the Infinite. The
Infinite in itself is metaphysical; but its vault, popu
lous with gods, becomes practical. The creed which
has. swayed the world has been in an Infinite just
transcending man s finite in power or excellence ;
while it is finite enough to deal with him and feel
with him. The god or personality which man asso
ciates with infinitude may be of unknown strength,
so separate from finite man; but he may be angry»
loving, ambitious, so-linked on to the finite?
It is just in this twofold aspect of these images of
the Infinite that we may discover the reality and
meaning of religion. To which side of the god does
it belong—his finite or his infinite side ? his likeness
to man or his transcendency of man? his compre
hensibility or incomprehensibility.
Religion,—whether it be a sense of dependence, or
�II
awe, of emotion, or aspiration—whatever its aspect,
•refers to that in which the object of worship passes
beyond the worshipper. In this it differs from
theology, which concerns itself with that side of the
god which is within the knowledge of man. The
Theology of one period may describe the gods, as the
Greeks did, even to the colour of their hair; the
Theology of another period may disprove such gods’
existence, substituting invisible Beings, as that of Paul
‘did. One Theology may build up a Trinity; another
may supersede it with a Quatemity or Unity. ‘ But it
would be an error to suppose that Religion is either
directly making those images, or directly replacing them.
These personifications are the successive inventions
of a changing science; they are utilised by priests who
support theologians to maintain them, or, when they
become discredited, to modify or replace them. But,
although the religious condition of man may be har
monious with such images at one time, discordant
with them at another, what human worship adores is
the unknown, the eternal, the vast, the perfect, all
expanding beyond its conception, but yet believed to
be powerfully existent.
' Thus Religion is different 'from Fear. Man would
never fear the Infinite. It is only when to its vastness
Theology adds a smallness like man’s own that men
begin to tremble. It is not J ove, the incomprehensible
�12
Heaven, man fears; but Jove, the comprehensible
Chieftain, going about with a thunderclub to kill him.
That Jove men fear, because they understand him;
they go about themselves with clubs less big but
equally murderous. That is not Religion—it is
Theology; a primitive speculative science of gods.
But we have reached now a Science of Religion, and
understand that its reverence, its devoutness, emotion,
love, so far as really awakened in man, were for what
rose above his own weakness, his passions, and his
sorrows.
What, then, does this apprehension (which must be
distinguished from comprehension) this feeling about
the Iniinite amount to ? Simply to man’s belief in
something better than himself. Man believes in a
Wisdom greater than his own. Theology may per
sonify it in Minerva, or in the Holy Ghost; but the
worship is not for the work of man’s wisdom—it is
for the wisdom ascending beyond man. So the forms
perish : the worship of wisdom perishes not. Man
adores a power beyond his own: theology may
identify it with mountain and lightning, sea and whirl
wind, and these may overawe his heart so long as he
knows nothing of them : but when the mountain is
climbed, and the sea voyaged over, the cloud seen as
vapour, the wind weighed, the lightning bottled and
sealed up, the ever-kneeling spirit of Religion passes
�i3
onward, and amid innumerable forms and names that
come and go, seeks still the better, the wiser, the >
more powerful and happy,—ever leading on from the
finite to the Infinite.
And this high seeking, born of each heart’s faith in
a better than, it knows, is the religious force, because
it is the controlling and creative force. It is idle to'
tell us, in face of the moral progress of the world,
that the life of man has been the result of correct
metaphysics, theological definitions, abstractions about
the Absolute and co-eternal Persons. The force that
is moving the world onward is the longing in each
human being for somewhat more perfect than what
they have or are. It is Maya in India praying her
babe Siddartba (Buddha) may be wise beyond all men
she ever knew; or Mary in Palestine praying the same
as she watches her baby Jesus ; or any mother that
hears- me, whose tender breast feels stirring within
hope that the new nature she has started on its career
may ascend till she can kneel in homage before it. It
may be the humblest workman dreaming of a more
perfect skill; the young artisan feeling after an inven
tion pregnant with results incalculable. Wherever
and however manifested it is the great vision of a
glory transcending our own; and though such ideals
are always being reached and passed by—infinites
becoming finites—so, endlessly the spirit grows, so
�14
immortal is its nature, so unceasing the work of
creation, the outline is never filled up. Over crumbled
gods and goddesses, religion ascends for ever, burning,
disintegrating, generating, regenerating,—Humanity’s
passion for the Perfect.
There is a danger in the method of the historian
and archseologist of religion. Because he must trace
the evolution of religion through its visible and
definable effects—fetish, shrine, dogma, temple—
there is danger that these may be regarded as types
and forms of religion itself. When a geologist walks
over hills, cliffs, rocks, he traces the path of drifting
glaciers scratched on rock; he finds sea-shells on
the hill-tops, boulders dropped in meadows, pebbles
rounded by waves long ebbed away to channels many
miles distant: he says, seas and rivers have smoothed
and deposited these shells and sands, and shaped
these undulations of hill and vale. Yet these are
not the sea,—they are but fringes and accidents in the
history of the sea. But in religion men still have the
habit of seeing the shards and shells of theory—the
pebbles of theology worn from crumbled temples—as
forms of Religion itself. They are but things which
Religion influenced, they report its ancient tides and
currents, but they are not—never were — religion
itself.
Having now detached the religious sentiment from
�i5
the forms which have borrowed its consecration;
having identified it as man’s impulse towards the
Perfect—which philosophy calls the Infinite—let us
ask whether we are genuine and true in calling this
religion. Or is our use of that word only a piece of
conventionality ? Does Religion mean anything diffe
rent from morality, or different from conscience ? If
not, then our use of it is mystification, conformity,
cowardice.
I believe Religion to be a different thing from
Morality. I understand by morality rules and stan
dards of conduct relating to recognised social duties.
But there is something in man which leads him to
defy the rules and standards around him. A bad man
violates moral rules for the sake of self: but another
man breaks them at the cost of self. What leads Jesus
to break the Sabbath, or Buddha to refuse offerings
to the gods ? Or what leads the reformer of to-day to
challenge the social and political order ?
Are such men seeking the benefit of the majority ?
The majority are against them. The majority is made
uncomfortable by them. Are they seeking general
advantages ? They are often plunging everything into
revolution, and doing it consciously. You might per
suade a freethinker that to disestablish the Church
would leave the majority poorer than now; or that
innumerable advantages to millions would be lost if
�t6
the Athanasian Creed were exploded. But would any
consideration of majorities make him support the
Church: would any advantages make him advocate
the Creed ? It may be said he is obeying the voice of
conscience. That explains nothing. Conscience is
an organ of forces beyond itself. It dictates war to
one tribe, peace to another. Conscience is a majestic
throne, but we search for the power behind the
throne.
Now, here we have a force in man which often
confronts customs, moralities, the social and political
order, which disregards majorities and their interests,
disregards self-interest also; and this force with
passion, enthusiasm and martyrdom, seeks something
it never saw, something that never existed. It is
manifested in all history, and is known in universal
experience; it actuates theists and non-theists; it is
especially visible in the overthrow of popular idols
and dogmas claiming its worship. Is that morality ?
Not a whit more than it is politics, or trade, or art, or
any one of the manifold human interests which slowly
but steadily follow the lead of that pillar of cloud and
fire.
I call it Religion, because that is a universal name
which no sect or nation has ever tried to monopolise :
but I do. not care for that name if any one has a
better. I do care that it shall not be confused with
�'1'7
wholly different things, with either morality, politics
or science. Much less, with Theology. For Theology
is the great enemy of religion. Morality, Society,
Science, are its ministers, but Theology is its rival,—
the Opposer that would arrest the current of its life,
and nail man down to bestow upon a fragment of his
universe and himself the passion born for aspiration
to the perfect whole. To call it ideality, poetry,
harmony, love of humanity, is to name the fruits by
which this religious life is known. To name it
Religion may, indeed, be very inadequate ; neither
etymologically or practically can that word do more
than preserve the distinction and witness the existence
of that which language cannot define; but as in
accuracy of words like “ sunrise ” and “ sunset ”
cannot now mar the glories they suggest, so no
etymologic fault can disparage that only catholic
name we have (Religion) so long as it is left
us by Sectarianism and Superstition to • designate
the universal aspirations of mankind. Christianity
can only claim to be a religion; it cannot claim
to be Religion. No sect can claim to be Religion
itself. That is an older banner than any existing
nation or church; under its broad folds and
heaven-born tints thousands of sects have perished;
it widens with the ages, blends with all grandeurs
without and within, leads onward the steady march of
�i8
man with his world to that supreme beauty which
enchains his senses and enchants his heart.
For essential religion no adequate word or definition
has ever been discovered, or is likely to be discovered.
If the lecturer’s statement there halts, it is because
the Infinite, the Perfect, cannot be defined. To call
it the Infinite leaves the moral sentiment unexpressed.
To call it “ morality touched with enthusiasm,” leaves
the progressive life untold. The philosophers of Germany
and America in the beginning of this generation called
it Transcendentalism;—but that white light wanted
fire, and faded. Some have called it absolute Being.
Jesus called it Love; and no fairer emblem of it was
ever named than that supreme glory which quickens
the world, from the marriage of flower with flower
which to-day clothes the earth with blossoms, to the
mother and her babe, and all the manifestations of
that unselfish joy which alone can transfigure human
passions. But man needs Light as well as Love.
And so it is that the highest in us is as ineffable as that
which it seeks. When we have dwelt on its varied
intimations ; when we have thought of Ideality and
Poetry, perfect Being, the Infinite, the Immortal,
Supreme Reason, pure Beauty, universal Love—even
then the wise heart is conscious that it has touched
but a few chords of the harp with a thousand strings ;
and when the thousand strings have all been swept,
�when human language has rehearsed all its concepts
and its dreams to the last accent, yet in the silent
heart the still small voice will go on sweetly singing of
a dawn fairer thap. all the rest.
Waterlow & Sons Limited, Printers, London Wall, London. '•
�•■9
•
WORKS TO BE OBTAINED IN THE LIBRARY.
BY M. 0. CONWAY, M.A.
PRICES.
The Sacred Anthology: A Book
of Ethnical Scriptures ..
The Earthward Pilgrimage
Do,
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Republican Superstitions..
Christianity
Human Sacrifices in England
David Frederick Strauss ..
Sterling and Maurice
Intellectual Suicide
The First Love again
Our Cause and its Accusers
Alcestis in England
Unbelief: Its nature, cause, and cure
Entering Society ..
The Religion of Children
The Peri! of War
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Idols and Ideals (including the Essay
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�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Victorian Blogging
Description
An account of the resource
A collection of digitised nineteenth-century pamphlets from Conway Hall Library & Archives. This includes the Conway Tracts, Moncure Conway's personal pamphlet library; the Morris Tracts, donated to the library by Miss Morris in 1904; the National Secular Society's pamphlet library and others. The Conway Tracts were bound with additional ephemera, such as lecture programmes and handwritten notes.<br /><br />Please note that these digitised pamphlets have been edited to maximise the accuracy of the OCR, ensuring they are text searchable. If you would like to view un-edited, full-colour versions of any of our pamphlets, please email librarian@conwayhall.org.uk.<br /><br /><span><img src="http://www.heritagefund.org.uk/sites/default/files/media/attachments/TNLHLF_Colour_Logo_English_RGB_0_0.jpg" width="238" height="91" alt="TNLHLF_Colour_Logo_English_RGB_0_0.jpg" /></span>
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Conway Hall Library & Archives
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2018
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Conway Hall Ethical Society
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What is religion?: a discourse given at South Place Chapel, May 5th, 1878
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Conway, Moncure Daniel [1832-1907.]
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Place of publication: [London]
Collation: 19, [1] ; 15 cm.
Notes: Morris Miscellaneous Tracts 2. 'F. Max Muller's First Hibbert Lecture' [From title page]. Publisher's list on back page. Printed by Waterlow & Sons, London Wall.
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[South Place Chapel]
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[1870]
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G4885
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Religion
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<img src="http://i.creativecommons.org/p/mark/1.0/88x31.png" alt="Public Domain Mark" /><br /><span>This work (What is religion?: a discourse given at South Place Chapel, May 5th, 1878), identified by </span><span><a href="https://conwayhallcollections.omeka.net/items/show/www.conwayhall.org.uk">Humanist Library and Archives</a></span><span>, is free of known copyright restrictions.</span>
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English
God (Christianity)
Moral Philosophy
Morality
Morris Tracts
Religion and science
Science and Religion
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GALILEO ANO THE INQUISITION.
EFFECTS
MISSIONARY
LABOURS.
W
'
BY ROBERT DALE OWEN.
LONDON:
Austin & Co., 17, Johnson’s Court, Ft,eft Street,
e.c.
PRICE TWOPENCE.
��GALILEO AND THE INQUISITION.
I am not at all surprised that the Florentine inquisitors im
prisoned Galileo, and forced him to recant and disavow’his astro
nomical heresies. I rather wonder how any one who reverences
the Bible, be he Jew or Christian, can tolerate modern astro
nomy.
So long as the earth was a stationary plain, and the firmament
a transparent reservoir, whose crystal gates could be opened to
drown the human race; while our world was the universe, and
the planets and stars only sparkling, accessory ornaments, hung
in the blue vault to please the children of Adam; so long was
there a locality for heaven above, and for hell beneath. Above
the firmament and the starry host was infinite, empty space.
There stood God’s throne, and thence proceeded God’s thunders.
Moses and his contemporaries had no idea of globes rolling
through space; so that in fixing the throne of the Deity above tho
stars, they never imagined that it might stand in the way of some
planet in its annual revolution, or of some comet in its eccentric
orbit.
In like manner,, below this earthly plain, through which of
course the sun’s rays could not penetrate, there was easily to be
conceived a region of darkness and misery, the entrance by some
bottomless pit, into which lost souls were thrown.
But what said the Italian astronomer ? The earth is not flat,
but round. The stars are suns and worlds. Our world is but a
speck in the universe. The sun does not revolve round our
earth; but our earth revolves round the sun. If we point up
wards to heaven at one moment, and again point upwards a
few hours afterwards, we are pointing in two opposite directions.
It might have been difficult for the inquisitors to prove the false
hood of all this, but there was no difficulty at all in proving its
heterodoxy; that is to say, its inconsistency with the Scriptures.
We are very apt, now-a-days, to slur over our astronomical
difficulties; and since the facts are proved, to hold that they are
not heterodox. The priests of the seventeenth century were
more consistent. They told Galileo that his theory was heretical
and unscriptura.1; and so it was; and so, but for our prejudices,
should we all see it to be.
Let us imagine Galileo before the Holy Tribunal of Florence,
seeing confinement or death before him, and interrogated by
the inquisitors.
Inquisitor. Ail Florence rings with your heresies, Signor
Galileo.
Galileo. I am no heretic, so piease your holy reverences, but
an humble disciple of science.
�4
GALILEO AND THE INQUISITION.
Inquisitor. ’Tis not the first time that science has played the
heretic ; nor, if we tolerate impiety like yours, will it be the last.
Galileo. I crave your patience, reverend fathers. God is my
witness that I have never strayed beyond the boundaries of my
own favourite studies, nor ever meddled with oqr religion and
her holy mysteries.
Inquisitor. The open enemy were less dangerous than the
secret foe.
Galileo. I pray your reverence to explain.
Inquisitor. Needs it explanation? Needs it to repeat all the
blasphemies you have uttered regarding this world which the
Son of God came down to save, and the sun and the stars which
God set in the firmament ?
Galileo. Blasphemies!
Inquisitor. Ay, blasphemies—and uttered publicly and shame
lessly too. But, Santa Maria 1 it shall be suffered no longer.
Galileo. I know not of what blasphemies you speak, holy
father.
Inquisitor. You know not? Have you not taught that the
earth is a globe, and revolves on its axis, and around the sun ?
■ Galileo. I have.
Inquisitor. And yet you ask what blasphemy I spoke of?
Does the word of the Most High tell us aught of this ?
Galileo. But it denies it not.
Inquisitor. Did Moses, the sacred historian, believe it ?
Galileo. I know not. I would not judge holy questions.
Inquisitor. Your modesty is assumed too late, / ignor Galileo.
It shall avail you nothing. Does not Moses tell us, that God in
the beginning created the earth ?
Galileo. He does.
Inquisitor. That the creation of the earth and its trees and its
plants and its living creatures, employed the Deity five days ? and
that in one day he made the sun and the moon and all the stars,
and set them in the firmament above the earth ?
Galileo. He does.
Inquisitor. That the sun and moon and all the stars were set
there expressly to light the earth ?
Galileo. Does he say so ?
Inquisitor. And you deny it.
Galileo. Nay, holy father, I have never said ’twas not so.
Inquisitor. Ay ’. but your system says it. Men are fools, ’tis
true; yet are there reasoning knaves among them. They cannot
believe both Moses and Galileo.
Galileo. I perceive not the discrepancy.
Inquisitor. You are wondrous short-sighted, Signor Astro
nomer. Must I repeat the heresy ? and oppose the inspired of
God to the professor of Pisa ? Thus, then, Moses speaks of the
world as of the especial object of God’s care, the especial work
of his hand; that to which all else in the universe was trioutary; that for which God made the s,un that it might light it by
�GALILEO AND THE INQUISITION.
5
day, and the moon and stars that they might shine on it by night:
Moses says this world was created by God in five days, and the
rest of the universe in one day, thus making the earth the first
and great object in creation, and all else but accessory and un
important. What says Galileo ? He tells us that this world is
but a speck, a grain of sand in God’s universe, one planet of one
System, while millions of similar systems exist around us, each
planet in the least of which claimed the divine care, in creation
and preservation, equally with ours. Shall we be told that God
gave one day only to the creation of the unconceivable mass,
and five to the creation of the grain of sand ? that the
millions of worlds were given solely to spangle and ornament the
nights of one little planet among those millions ? Yet Moses
says so. And Moses speaks truth. Galileo, therefore, is a liar
and a heretic. This world is the centre of the universe. All
other heavenly bodies revolve around it, at God’s command, to,
light and to heat and to adorn it. For our earth they were made,
on the fourth day of creation; and for us they perform their daily
journeys. Thus said Moses, thus says our holy church, and thus
say all true believers.
Galileo. Yet Moses says not that the earth is stationary, and
that the sun and stars revolve around it.
Inquisitor. This is child’s play, signor; unbecoming your
gravity, and unbecoming mine. If Moses says it not in these
very terms, is it not implied ?—expressly implied, in the whole
history of creation, almost in every page of the sacred volume ?
Is not the firmament placed above the earth, and are not all the
stars set in the firmament ? Is not the firmament called heaven ?
and have not holy men in all ages looked up when they would
look to God ? Is not the heaven God’.s throne, and the earth his
footstool? How then shall the earth be a globe always in
motion ? Does our world carry heaven along with her, at the
rate of one thousand miles a minute? Or if not, how shall
heaven remain above us ? And if not above us, why does Moses
say, “ God came down from heaven to see the tower which the
children of men builded ?” and why was Elijah carried upwards
in a whirlwind? and why did Jesus Christ ascend, when he
would go to his Father? You would pervert our whole faith,
signor. You would annihilate heaven and hell; for where is
there room for either in that space which is filled by millions on
millions of systems ? You would deny to the Almighty his
residence, whence he looks down on the inhabitants of this pros
trate world; for how shall any being look on the whole surface
of a globe at once ? Or how shall we imagine the Deity follow
ing the earth in her orbit, to see whether faith or wickedness pre
vail around her ? this is but atheism.
Galileo. Jesu defend me from the imputation!
Inquisitor. Abjure your system, then. When God tells us that
the sun stood still upon Gibeon. at the command of his servant
Joshua, let not Galileo tell us, that the sun does not move, and
�6
GALILEO AND THE INQUISITION.
therefore could not obey Joshua’s command. This is but a fight*
ing against God; a mockery of his word. It is to tell us that
the inspired penmen were deceived or deceivers. It is blas
phemy, clothed in the robes of science. Abjure ! abjure !
Galileo. I pray you, holy signors, to examine the proofs of what
I have taught.
Inquisitor. Proofs! proofs against God! proofs to show that
Galileo is wiser than his Maker 1 that a mortal can disclose to us
secrets which the great Architect himself could not reveal! Aw'ay
with him, guards, to his dungeon ! (Galileo is led off.)
Second Inquisitor. ’Tis a daring heretic.
First Inquisitor. Ay 1 and a dangerous.
Second Inquisitor. Marked you the suppressed curl of his lip as
you spoke of Moses and his astronomy ?
First Inquisitor. Do you ask ? I were unworthy else to fill
this chair. I can read hearts in faces; and that’s a stubborn
one.
Second Inquisitor. But we can break or bend it, an ’twere a
heart of steel.
First Inquisitor. See to it, brother—Yet stay! he is a favourite
with the Elorentines.
Second Inquisitor. I marvel not. He has that about him which
will command attention and win respect. And his theory is se
ducing.
First Inquisitor. It must not spread. It strikes at the very
root of the church’s faith. The Copernican system and the
Bible cannot stand together. The discrepancy is too gross.
Men, fools as they are, cannot help but see it.
Second Inquisitor. Yet are they wondrous blind.
I irst Inquisitor. But we must not tempt them too far. If they
begin to question and to doubt—
Second Inquisitor. I know not. I am the last to recommend
toleration to so heretical a theory as this of Galileo. Yet, if it
must be so—if we must yield to the presumptuous spirit of the
times thus far—
First Inquisitor. But the risk, brother—the risk. We can put
him down; we can destroy him and his theory; why then leave
the hydra, merely because we think ourselves an overmatch for
him ? If there were no alternative, then were I the last to de
spair of the result.. If we could no longer deny the truth of this
upstart system, we would boldly deny its heresy. We would
call it—ay, and men should believe it—only a confirmation of all
that Moses has written and the church has taught, Where we
cannot break, we must bend; where we cannot deny, we must
explain away; where we cannot destroy, we must win over.
But let us break and deny and destroy while we can. The other
is but a ventured game, and a hazardous. To the work, then.
Let us annihilate the enemy while we may. If we fail, let us
adopt him, and teach him to fight the church’s battles.
�I N
LAWRENCE AND GALILEO.
[The following article was published in the (London) Monthly
Magazine, about the time when William Lawrence, the
bold and fearless materialist, and one of the most eminent sur
geons and physiologists of Great Britain, being suspended, for the
heresy of his opinions, from the office by which he obtained his
living, was induced, like the persecuted Galileo, to sign a recan
tation of the truths he had once so ably propounded.]
From the Monthly Magazine.
“ When in our last we signalized the success of Mr. Lawrence,*
we had no suspicion that this worthy gentleman had been
seduced to publish the following extraordinary paper, a few days
before the election. In now giving it place as a document
worthy of being preserved, and which, in after ages, will mark
the year 1822, and characterize the age of George the Fourth, we
have judged it proper to annex, in parallel columns, the never-tobe-forgotten abjuration of Galileo. Every reader of the two
papers will, by his own comments, relieve us from the responsi
bility of making such as the circumstances deserve:
Mb. Lawrence’s Retracta
tion.
College of Physicians,
April 16, 1822.
Dear Sir—The renewed pub
lication by others, over whom
I have no control, of the work
which I suppressed three years
ago, induces me to offer a few
observations on the subject, and
to present them, through you,
to the governors of Bridewell
and Bethlem. The motives
and circumstances of the sup
pression in question, are de
tailed in a letter to Mr. Harri
son, through whose medium it
was communicated to the gover-
The Abjuration of Galileo.
I, Galileo Galilei, son of the
late Vincent Galileo, a Floren
tine, at the age of seventy, ap
pearing personally in judg
ment, and being on my knees
in the presence of you, most
eminent and most reverend
lords cardinal of the universal
Christian commonwealth, in
quisitors general against hereti
cal depravity, having before
my eyes the holy gospels, on
which I now lay my hands,
swear that I have always be
lieved, and now believe, and
God helping, that I shall for
the future always believe what-
Tn his election an surgeon of the Royal College,of Physicians.
�8
LAWRENCE AND GALILEO.
nors of the two hospitals; and
this letter, I conclude, is en
tered on the minutes of their
proceedings.
Further experience and re
flection have only tended to
convince me more strongly
that the publication of certain
passages in these writings was
highly improper; to increase
my regret at having sent them
forth to the world; to make me
satisfied with the measure of
withdrawing them from public
circulation • and consequently
firmly resolved, not only never
to reprint them, but also never
to publish any thing more on
similar subjects.
Fully impressed with these
sentiments, I hoped and con
cluded that my lectures would
in future be regarded only as
professional writings, and be
referred to merely by medical
readers. The copies which
have gone out of my posses
sion, from the time when the
sale was discontinued to the
late decision of the lord chan
cellor, which has enabled all
who may choose to print and
publish my lectures, have
therefore been granted only as
matter of favour in individual
instances to professional men,
particularly foreigners, or to
scientific and literary charac
ters. My expectations have
been disappointed by the pira
tical act of a bookseller in the
Strand, named Smith. When
his reprint of my lectures was
announced, I adopted the only
measure which could enable
me to continue the suppression
of the worx, namely, an appli
cation to the court of chancery
for an injunction against this
person, being encouraged by
ever the holy catholic and
apostolic Roman church holds,
preaches, and teaches. But be
cause this holy office had en
joined me by precept, entirely
to relinquish the false dogma
which maintains that the sun is
the centre of the world, and
immoveable, and that the earth
is not the centre, and moves;
not to hold, defend, or teach
by any means, or by writing,
the aforesaid false doctrine;
and after it had been notified
to me, that the aforesaid doc
trine is repugnant to the Holy
Scripture, I have written and
printed a book, in which I
treat of the same doctrine al
ready condemned, and adduce
reasons with great efficacy, in
favour of it, not offering any
solution of them; therefore I
have been adjudged and vehe
mently suspected of heresy;
namely, that I maintained and
believed that the sun is the
centre of the world, and im
moveable, and that the earth is
not the centre, and moves.
Therefore, being willing to
take out of the minds of your
eminencies, and of every catho
lic Christian, this vehement
suspicion of right conceived
against me, I, with sincere
heart, and faith unfeigned, ab
jure, execrate, and detest, the
above said errors and heresies,
and generally every other er
ror and sect contrary to the
above said holy church; and I
swear that I will never any
more hereafter say or assert,
by speech or writing, any
thing through which the like
suspicion may be had of me;
but, if I shall know any one
heretical, or suspected of here
sy, I will denounce him to this
�LAWRENCE AND GALILEO.
the decided favourable opinions
of the two eminent counsel
before whom the case was laid.
The course of argument adopt
ed by these gentlemen, in the
proceedings which ensued, was
that which they deemed best
calculated to attain my object
—the permanent suppression
of the book. It is not to be
regarded as a renewed state
ment, or defence, on my part,
of opinions which I had al
ready withdrawn from the
public, and the continued sup
pression of which, in confor
mity to my previous arrange
ment, was my only motive for
incurring the trouble and ex
pense of a chancery suit.
As to the charge of irreligion, again hinted at in the
court of chancery, I beg to
repeat what I have already ex
pressed in my letter before al
luded to—that I am fully im
pressed with the importance
of religion and morality to the
welfare of mankind—that I
am most sensible of the dis
tinguishing excellences of that
pure religion which is unfolded
in the New Testament; and
most earnestly desirous to see
its pure spirit universally dif
fused and acted on.
W. LAWRENCE.
R. C. Glynn, Bt., President
of Bridewell and Bethlem, &c>
9
holy office, or to the inquisitor
and ordinary of the place in
which I shall be. I moreover
swear and promise that I will
fulfil and observe entirely
all the penitences which have
been imposed upon me, or
which shall be imposed by this
holy office. But if it shall
happen that I shall go contrary
(which God avert,) to any of
my words, promises, protesta
tions, and oaths, I subject my
self to all the penalties and
punishments which, by the
holy canons, and other consti
tutions, general and particular,
have been enacted and pro
mulgated against such delin
quents. So help me God, and
his holy gospels, on which I
now lay my hands.
I, the aforesaid Galileo Ga- ■
lilei, have abjured, sworn, pro
mised, and have bound myself
as above, and in the fidelity of
those with my own hands, and
have subscribed to this present
writing of my abjuration,
which I have recited word by
word. At Rome, in the con
vent of Minerva, this 22nd of
June, of the year 1633.
I, Galileo Galilei, have ab
jured as above, with my own
hand.
�EFFECTS OF MISSIONARY LABOURS.
[ *** In this credulous age, whose very benevolence is whimsical
—when men subscribe thousands of pounds to send theological
students to Central Africa and farthest India, and think they
are thus doing their fellow-men a kindness, and their God a
service; it is worthy of earnest and serious inquiry, whether
money and exertions which are so much wanted to correct
the crying vices and relieve the hopeless misery that sur
round us at home, are not worse than lost abroad.
If the following article serve to awaken in the minds of those
who have conscientiously supported what they thought to be
the cause of Deity, a desire to examine farther into the
actual effects which missions too often produce, the object
for which it has been issued will be obtained.
R. D. 0.]
When infidels, as they are called, relate to us the adventures of
religious missionaries, and speak of the effects produced by mis
sionary exertions, we may, without imputing any dishonest mo
tive, suppose exaggeration or inaccuracy : upon the same princi
ple that even a sincere and conscientious believer seldom speaks
of a sceptic without misrepresenting his motive, and misjudging
his conduct. Now, though it be true, that the very principles of
a reasoning and consistent infidel teach him practical justice, and
tolerance and impartiality, yet do the effects of false principles
and prejudiced habits often remain, after the principles them
selves are disowned as baseless, and the habits condemned as
vicious. A man may thus lose his religion without losing many
a habit and propensity which thence derived its origin. Besides
all this, we must recollect, that man, as he is now trained, is a
being of prepossessions and of extremes. He frequently mistakes
the reverse of wrong for right; he often views the actions of those
whose opinions differ from his, through a partial medium; and,
thus viewing them, his sincerest impressions are, at times, preju
diced and false.
Thus, it is not to the narrations of the missionary’s opponents
�EFFECTS or IIISSICNAHY LABOURS.
11
Unit we may trust implicitly for an impartial view of his labours,
and their effects. But surely the missionary’s own word may be
taken against himself. Out of his own mouth he may be con
demned, without fear of false testimony. Let M. Dobrizhoffer,
then, tell us the particulars and the result of a missionary excur
sion which he made into the Guarany country, and let us observe
his reflections, and make our own. The narrative is from the
“ History of the Abipones,” an aboriginal nation of South
America.
“ I shall here record another excursion to the savages, which,
though completed in less time than the former, was productive of
more advantage. A company of Spaniards were employed in pre
paring the herb of Paraguay, on the southern banks of the river
Empalado. The trees from which these Laves were plucked
failing, they commissioned three men to seek for the tree in re
quest beyond the river. By accident they lit upon a hovel and a
field of maize, from which they falsely conjectured that the wood
was full of savage hordes. This occurrence affected them all
with such fear, that, suspending the business upon which they
were engaged, they kept within their huts, like snails in their
shells, and spent day and night in dread of hostile aggression. To
deliver them from this state of fear, a messenger was sent to St.
Joachim, requiring us to search for the savages abiding there,
and to remove them, when found, to our colony. I applied my
self to the task without shrinking, and, on the day of St. John the
Evangelist, commenced my travels, accompanied by forty Indians.
Having taken a guide from the Spanish hut, and crossed the river
Empalado, we carefully explored ail the woods and the banks oi
the river Mondaymiri, and discovering at length, on the third day,
a human footstep, we traced it to a little dwelling, where an old
woman with her son and daughter, a youth and maiden of twenty
and fifteen years of age, had lived many years. Being asked
where the other Indians were to be found, the mother replied,
that no mortal besides herself and her two children survived in
these woods; that all the rest who had occupied this neighbour
hood had died long ago of the small-pox. Perceiving me doubt
ful as to the correctness of her statement, the son observed, ‘You
may credit my mother in her assertion, without scruple; for 1
myself have traversed these woods far and near in search of a
wife, but could never meet with a single human being.’ Nature
had taught the young savage that it was not lawful to marry his
sister. I exhorted the old mother to migrate as fast as possible
to my town, promising that both she and her children should be
more comfortably situated. She declared herself willing to accept
my invitation, to which there was only one objection. ‘ I have,’
says she, ‘ three boars, which have been tamed from their earliest
age. They follow us wherever we go, and I am afraid, if they are
exposed to the sun in a dry plain, unshaded by trees, they will
immediately perish.’ ‘ Pray be no longer anxious on this ac
count,’ replied I; ‘ depend upon it, I shall treat these dear little
�12
EFFECTS OF MISSIONARY LABOURS.
animals with due kindness. When the sun is hot, we will find
shade wherever we are. Lakes, rivers, or marshes, will be always
at hand to cool your favourites.” Induced by these promises, she
agreed to go with us. And setting out the next day, we reached
the town in safety on the first of January. And now it will be
proper to give a cursory account of the mother and her offspring.
Their hut consisted of the branches of the palm-tree, their drink
of muddy water. Fruits, antas, fawns, rabbits, and various birds,
maize, and the roots of the mandio tree, afforded them food; a
cloth woven of the leaves of the caraquata, their bed and clothing.
They delighted in honey, which abounds in the hollow trees of
the forest. The smoke of tobacco the old woman inhaled, night
and day, through the reed, to which was affixed a little wooden
vessel, like a pan. The son constantly chewed tobacco leaves
reduced to powder. Shells sharpened at a stone, or split reeds,
served them for knives. The youth, who catered for his mother
and sister, carried in his belt two pieces of iron, the fragment of
some old broken knife, about as broad and long as a man’s
thumb, inserted in a wooden handle, and bound round with wax
and thread. With this instrument he used to fashion arrows with
great elegance, make wooden gins to take antas, perforate trees
which seemed likely to contain honey, and perform other things
of this kind. There being no clay to make pots of, they had fed,
all their lives, on roasted meat instead of boiled. The leaves of
the herb of Paraguay they only steeped in cold water, having no
vessel to boil it in. To show how scanty their household furni
ture was, mention must be made of their clothes. The youth
wore a cloak of the thread of the caraquata, reaching from his
shoulders to his knees, his middle being girded with little cords,
from which hung a gourd full of the tobacco dust which he
chewed. A net of a coarser thread was the mother’s bed by
night and her only garment by day. The girl, in like manner,
wore a short net by day, in which she slept at night. This appear
ing to me too transparent, I gave her a cotton towel to cover her
effectually. The girl, folding up the linen cloth into many folds,
placed it on her head to defend her from the heat of the sun, but
at the desire of the Indians wrapped it round her. I made the
youth, too, wear some linen wrappers, which in my journey I had
worn round my head as a defence against the gnats. Before this,
he had climbed the highest trees like a monkey, to pluck from
thence food for his pigs; but his bandages impeded him like
fetters, so that he could scarcely move a step. In such extreme
need, in such penury, I found them, experiencing the rigours of
ancient anchorites, without discontent, vexation, or disease.
“ My three wood Indians wore their hair dishevelled, cropped,
and without a bandage. The youth neither had his lip perforated,
nor his head crowned with parrot feathers. The mother and
daughter had no ear-rings, though the former wore round her
neck a cord, from which depended a small, heavy piece of wood,
of a pyramidal shape, so that by their mutual collision they made
�EFFECTS OF MISSIONARY LABOURS.
13
a noise at every step. At first sight I asked the old woman whe
ther she used this jingling necklace to frighten away the gnats;
and I afterwards substituted a string of beautifully coloured glass
beads, in place of these wooden weights. The mother and son
were tall and well-looking, but the daughter had so fair and
elegant a countenance, that a poet would have taken her for one
of the nymphs or dryads, and any European might safely call her
beautiful. She united a becoming cheerfulness with great cour
tesy, and did not seem at all alarmed at our arrival, but the
rather enlivened. She laughed heartily at our Guarany, and we,
on the other hand, at her's. For as this insulated family had no
intercourse with any but themselves, their language was most
ridiculously corrupted. The youth had never seen a female
except his mother and sister, nor any male but his father. The
girl had seen no woman but her mother, nor any man but her
brother; her father having been torn to pieces by a tiger before
she was born. To gather the fruits that grew on the ground or
on the trees, and wood for fuel, the dexterous girl ran over the
forest, tangled as it was with underwood, reeds, and brambles, by
which she had her feet wretchedly scratched. Not to go unat
tended, she commonly had a little parrot on her shoulder, and a
small monkey on her arm, unterrified by the tigers that haunt
that neighbourhood. The new nroselytes were quickly clothed in
the town, and served with the daily allowance of food before the
rest. I also took care they should take frequent excursions to
the neighbouring woods, to enjoy the shade and pleasant freshness
of the trees, to which they had been accustomed. For we found
by experience, that savages removed to towns often waste away
from the change of food and air, and from the heat of the
sun, which powerfully affects their frames, accustomed as they
have been from infancy, to moist, cool, shady groves. The same
was the fate of the mother, son, and daughter, in our town. A
few weeks after their arrival they were afflicted with a universal
heaviness and rheum, to which succeeded a pain in the eyes and
ears, and, not long after, deafness. Lowness of spirits, and dis
gust to food, at length wasted their strength to such a degree that
an incurable consumption followed. After languishing some
months, the old mother, who had been properly instructed in the
Christian religion and baptized, delivered up her spirit, with a
mind so calm, so acquiescent with the divine will, that I cannot
■doubt nut that she entered into a blessed immortality. The girl,
who had entered the town full of health and beauty, soon lost all
resemblance to herself. Enfeebled, withering by degrees like a
flower, her bones hardly holding together, she at length followed
her mother to the grave, and, if I be not much deceived, to hea
ven. Her brother, still surviving, was attacked by the same
malady that proved fatal to his mother and sister; but being of a
stronger constitution, overcame it. The measles, which made
great havoc in the town, left him so confirmed in health, that
there seemed nothing to be feared in regard to him. He was of
�14
EFFECTS OF MISSIONARY LABOURS.
a cheerful disposition, went to church regularly, learnt the doc
trines of Christianity with diligence, was gentle and compliant to
all, and in every thing discovered marks of future excellence.
Nevertheless, to put his perseverance to the proof, I thought it
best to delay his baptism a little. At this time an Indian Chris
tian, a good man, and rich in land, who, at my orders, had
received this catechumen into his house, came to me and said,
' My father, our wood Indian is in perfect health of body, but
seems to have gone a little astray in mind : he makes no com
plaints, but says that sleep has deserted him, his mother and sis
ter appearing to him every night in a vision, saying, in a friendly
tone, “ Suffer thyself, I pray thee, to be baptized; we shall return
to take thee away, when thou dost not expect it.” This vision,
he says, takes away his sleep.’ ‘ Tell him,’ answered I, ‘ to be
of good heart, for that the melancholy remembrance of his mother
and sister, with whom he has lived all his life, is the probable
cause of these dreams; and that they, as I think, are gone to
heaven, and have nothing more to do with this world.’ A few
davs after, the same Indian returns, giving the same account as
before, and with confirmed suspicions respecting the fearful deli
rium of our new Christian. Suspecting there was something in
it, I immediately hastened to his house, and found him sitting.
On my inquiring how he felt himself, ‘ Well,’ he replied, smiling,
* and entirely free from pain but added, that he got no sleep at
night, owing to the appearance of his mother and sister, admonish
ing him to hasten his baptism, and threatening to take him away
unexpectedly. He told me over and over again, with his usual
unreservedness, that this prevented him from getting any rest. I
thought it probable that this was a mere dream, and worthy, on
that account, of neglect. Mindful, however, that dreams have
often been divine admonitions and the oracles of God, as appears
from Holy Writ, it seemed advisable, in a matter of such moment,
to consult both the security and tranquillity of the catechumen.
Being assured of his constancy, and of his acquaintance with the
chief heads of religion by previous interrogatories, I soon after
baptized him with the name of Lewis. This I did on the 23rd of
June, the eve of St. John, about the hour of ten in the morning.
On the evening of the same day, without a symptom of disease or
apoplexy, he quietly expired.
“ This event, a fact well known to the whole town, and which
1 am ready to attest on oath, astonished every one. I leave my
reader to form his own opinion ; but in my mind I could never
deem the circumstance merely accidental. To the exceeding
compassion of the Almighty I attribute it, that these three Indians
were discovered by me in the unknown recesses of the woods ;
that they so promptly complied with my exhortations to enter my
town, and embrace Christianity; and that they closed their lives
after having received baptism. The rememo rance of my expedi
tion to the river Empalado, though attended with so many hard
ships and dangers, is sell must giau.i'ul to my heart; inasmuch us
�EFFECTS OF MISSIONARY LABOURS.
15
it proved highly fortunate to the three wood Indians, and advan
tageous to the Spaniards.”
What a lesson have we here! and how strangely perverted by
him who gives it! Is it not matter of marvel, that a man can
paint such a scene of misery and death in which he was the chief
actor, and then congratulate himself that he was so!
He found these Indians, he tells us, innocent and happy,
“ without discontent, vexation, or disease;” exposed, indeed, to
hardships, but accustomed to these, and enduring them with
cheerfulness. He removed them to his town ; he clothed them
decently, as he calls it; “ but the bandages impeded them like
fetters, so that they could scarcely move a step.” He fed them
daily: but they pined for their cool, shady forest. The old
mother languished some months in an incurable consumption,
and then expired. The poor girl, “who had entered the town full
of health and beauty, soon lost all resemblance to herself; till
withering by degrees like a flower,” she too fell a victim to the
spirit of proselytism. Her brother did not long survive the loss
of those who had so long been all the world to him. The forms
of his mother and sister haunted his slumbers, and called him
from a life that suited not the child of nature. He became deli
rious, was baptized, and died the same evening.
“The remembrance,” adds the missionary, “ of my expedition
to the river Empalado, though attended with so many hardships
and dangers, is still most grateful to my heart; inasmuch as it
proved highly fortunate to the three wood Indians, and advanta
geous to the Spaniards.”
Fortunate! Spirit of Mercy! Fortunate ! to be seduced from
their free, green woods, to droop and die in a missionary village!
Fortunate! to lose peace, health, contentment, and life, and to
gain Christian baptism ! It had been fortunate for them if the
tiger that tore the father to pieces, had spared neither mother nor
children; for then they would have perished at once, and escaped
the lingering miseries that awaited them.
I shall be told that I think and speak as one of the worldlyminded. I do so. I have no reference to heaven. When a man
loses his happiness here, in this worid, I consider that a positive,
lamentable loss. I do not stop to calculate what are the possible
chances of remuneration in another state of being; and 1 think
we should have a wiser and a better world of it. if others would
do the same. If, whenever we have clearly proved that any
action results in misery here, and is therefore wrong, we are to be
told, that all this misery will be made up to us in Paradise, and is
not, therefore, in itself, an evil—then we may as well give up all
idea of ever distinguishing good from ill, or right from wrong
What avails it, that we make the most just and accurate estimates
of earthly consequences, if these are all to be falsified in heaven ?
If to every calculation on this side the grave, there be an afterTeckoning, how can a single account be closed, or a single infer
ence drawn ? We might, in that case, as well be foolish as wise,
�to
EFFECTS OF MISSIONARY LABOURS.
be blind as clear-sighted. In short, earth were not worth study
ing, nor her thousand phenomena worth a moment’s examina
tion ; there were nothing to be termed right, for we cannot see
the end; nor any thing to be pronounced wrong, because what is
pain in time may bring bliss in eternity.
If this be so, it is indeed true that the wise and prudent have no
advantage over their neighbours. We must, in very earnest,
walk by faith and not by sight; and a dark, stumbling time we
shall have of it. As for our dictionaries and vocabularies, we
may as well make a great bonfire of them; for they will be of no
farther use. And we may add to the pile every other book but
the Bible and biblical commentaries. All other books speak of
this earth; make worldly calculations; draw worldly inferences ;
speak of actions as, from their consequences, good or bad ; make
comparisons between the earthly lives of men : and all these cal
culations and inferences and consequences and comparisons are
good for nothing; nay, worse, they mislead and deceive us.
As I said, I close the account in those regions where I can see
and estimate those consequences only which I can perceive and
judge; and therefore I am free to declare, that I think Dobrizhoffer, and his thousand(missionary brethren, who smite on earth
to save in heaven, are blind leaders of the blind, who destroy the
rude virtues and simple enjoyments of the savage, without sub
stituting in their place either true wisdom or enlightened happi
ness.
�
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Victorian Blogging
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A collection of digitised nineteenth-century pamphlets from Conway Hall Library & Archives. This includes the Conway Tracts, Moncure Conway's personal pamphlet library; the Morris Tracts, donated to the library by Miss Morris in 1904; the National Secular Society's pamphlet library and others. The Conway Tracts were bound with additional ephemera, such as lecture programmes and handwritten notes.<br /><br />Please note that these digitised pamphlets have been edited to maximise the accuracy of the OCR, ensuring they are text searchable. If you would like to view un-edited, full-colour versions of any of our pamphlets, please email librarian@conwayhall.org.uk.<br /><br /><span><img src="http://www.heritagefund.org.uk/sites/default/files/media/attachments/TNLHLF_Colour_Logo_English_RGB_0_0.jpg" width="238" height="91" alt="TNLHLF_Colour_Logo_English_RGB_0_0.jpg" /></span>
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Conway Hall Library & Archives
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2018
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Conway Hall Ethical Society
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Galileo and the Inquisition: effects of missionary labours
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Owen, Robert Dale
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Place of publication: London
Collation: 16 p. ; 18 cm.
Notes: From the library of Dr Moncure Conway. Date of publication from KVK. Three items: Galileo and the Inquisition; Lawrence and Galileo [pages [7]-9]; Effects of Missionary Labour. 'Lawrence and Galileo' was first published in Monthly Magazine (London).
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Austin & Co.
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[186-]
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G5324
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<a href="http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/mark/1.0/"><img src="http://i.creativecommons.org/p/mark/1.0/88x31.png" alt="Public Domain Mark" /></a><span> </span><br /><span>This work (Galileo and the Inquisition: effects of missionary labours), identified by </span><a href="https://conwayhallcollections.omeka.net/items/show/www.conwayhall.org.uk"><span>Humanist Library and Archives</span></a><span>, is free of known copyright restrictions.</span>
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Lawrence, William [Sir]
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Science
Religion
Astronomy
Conway Tracts
Galileo
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Religion and science
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b60a065228313d33b6afb7f8dd0d1950
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Text
Cr ■$<
THE ORTHODOX SURRENDER.
BY
M.A. Trin. Coll. Cambridge.
PUBLISHED BY THOMAS SCOTT,
NO. 11, THE TERRACE, FARQUHAR ROAD,
UPPER NORWOOD, LONDON, S.E.
1 8 7 6.
Price Threepence.
��THE ORTHODOX SURRENDER.
Y attention has recently been called to a remarkable
article in the Church Quarterly Review. The
article in question appeared in the number for October
1875—the opening number of the Review—and a notice
of it at this time may seem to come somewhat late.
All that I can say to this is, that it is a pity it has not
been taken in hand before now, and that, too, by some
more competent writer than myself, in the pages of this
series. Failing this, I do not consider that it can ever
be too late to expose such reasoning as I shall imme
diately refer to. I hear further that several influential
publications (amongst them, the Saturday Review)
have contained eulogistic notices of the . article. But
what has principally induced me to take up my pen is
the circumstance, above alluded to, that my attention
has been called to the essay by a letter from a friend, a
man of talent and reasoning powers, and an orthodox
Christian, not perhaps without some twinges of doubt.
It would almost seem that a perusal of it has relieved
his doubts,- and furnished him with an infallible recipe
for holding certain scientific discoveries in company
with the doctrine of plenary Biblical inspiration.
Doubtless many others, similarly circumstanced, have
taken the same rosy view. To me, on the other hand,
it appears to be absolutely suicidal, to contain the most
complete reductio ad absurdum of orthodox belief that
I have met with for many years. The reader will
directly have an opportunity of judging.
M
�4
The Orthodox Surrender.
First, one word as to this Church Quarterly Review,
a serial which contains some very able papers. It is a
publication evidently, and, it is to be presumed,
avowedly inspired by the Anglican or High Church
party in the Establishment. On all points in dispute
between High and Low, we should, of course, not be
entitled to accept its utterances as likely to represent
the sentiments of any other section than that with which
it is identified. But the case is obviously different
where doctrines held in common by High and Low are
defended against a common adversary. In all contro
versies directly affecting the undivided Christian faith,
we should accept the High Churchman as a champion
of orthodoxy. Indeed, considering that all the learning
in the Church has gravitated towards that portion of it,
we should accept him as the best and most efficient
champion to be found. I may take it, then, that the
tone of the article to which I am referring commends
itself to the orthodox generally ; while, as indeed we
have evidence to show, the particular views advocated
are sympathetic to, are held, if not in the exact form
there exhibited, yet in some kindred form by, a number
of persons—Evangelical, High Church, Ritualistic, or
even Roman Catholic. And it is a matter of some sig
nificance that they have been put forth in the opening
number of the new Review. No time is lost in attack
ing the stronghold of the infidel, and the train laid for
the purpose of blowing him up is one to which any
kind of Christian may, if he thinks fit, set his hand.
The article in question, the second in the number, is
entitled “ On Some Aspects of Science in Relation to
Religion.” The first part of it may be roughly de
scribed as an argument to the effect that Evolution, if
shown to be true, is by no means inconsistent with the
idea of a personal God. In this position I for my part
heartily concur, and it is not necessary to dwell on what
does not form the subject of my contention with the
writer. Yet I can’t help saying, by the bye, that it is
�The Orthodox Surrender.
5
a pity he did not end here. “ Prove Evolution (which
you have not done yet and perhaps never will) and even
then you have not disproved a personal Deity. Indeed,
in some minds, you will rather have strengthened the
belief, or, if you please, the hypothesis.” This seems to
me common sense. In other words, Evolution is by
no means fatal to Theism, as Mr J. S. Mill has
admitted. But I suppose it would hardly have suited
an orthodox writer to go no further than this. Having
taken up the ground that Evolution may possibly be
true, yet that religion, as he understands the term, has
nothing to fear from it, he must proceed to show fur
ther that it is not fatal to the plenary inspiration of the
Bible.
This he proceeds to do, more suo, in the second
part of his article, beginning at p. 58. In this he
makes the attempt, not to reconcile—that, it will be
seen directly, would not be the proper word—science
with revelation, but to justify the holding of certain
scientific views in conjunction with certain Scriptural
statements which he himself admits to be at direct
variance with them. Evolution (on the supposition of
its one day possibly becoming part of the armoury of
science) is still the main subject or illustration put
forward ; but the process recommended by the writer,
and indeed he distinctly affirms it, is applicable to
every passage of the Bible which stands in opposition,
not merely to ingenious hypotheses, but to the teach
ings of affirmed and established science. It is appli
cable to the account of the creation of the world
generally, to the circumstantial narrative of the Deluge,
the stopping of the sun by Joshua, and, we may
perhaps add, witchcraft, and the demoniacs of the New
Testament.
I have said that “ reconciling ” is not the proper term
to use with regard to this writer’s process. Indeed, he
expressly repudiates all attempts of the kind. He tells
us, over and over again, that certain passages in the
�6
The Orthodox Surrender.
Bible cannot be reconciled with science. He intimates
that in the present condition of our knowledge, it is
scarcely honest to make the attempt. Take the follow
ing extracts :—
“ It can do nothinglbut harm to attempt a compro
mise by such glosses either of religious or scientific
truth as bring them into apparent harmony, only by
leaving out of view the real points of difficulty.............
If it is not in our power at once to give a satisfactory
solution of the apparent discrepancy, surely the safer,
as well as the more honest course, is to admit the fact.”
(p. 60).
A little further on, he speaks with apparent approval
of “the more certain, but still much disputed point
(z.e., doctrine) of the existence of the human race
through long ages of pre-historic.time” (p. 61).
Further on, he tells us that the result of bygone con
troversies between science and theology has been “ the
full acquiescence of theologians in the scientific conclu
sions arrived at.” And again, “ If we now attempt to
inquire how this good understanding has been brought
about in any particular branch of science—as, for
instance, in geology—we shall see cause to refer it,
mainly if not entirely, to the conviction of the truth of
the scientific position, as established on independent
evidence proper to itself, and very little, if at all, to the
general acceptance of any interpretations of the sacred
writings, which would bring the letter of the Mosaic
account into harmony with such theories of geology as
will commend themselves to the students of that
science (p. 61).
The writer next notices with disapproval such
attempts as those made by Dr Newman, Hugh Miller,
Dr Pusey, and others, to reconcile the language of
Genesis with the teachings of geology, and endorses
with regard to them the words used by Mr Pritchard :
“ Speaking, I trust in a most reverential spirit, and with
that caution and humility which the case demands,
�The Orthodox Surrender.
7
I feel bound to say that no interpretation of the Mosaic
cosmogony, regarded as a description of the actual
order, and actual duration, of the creative steps, has
yet been proposed, which is at all satisfactory to those
who by study and preparation of mind are most cap
able of forming a correct opinion.” (P. 62.)
Now what does all this amount to ? But I prefer to
let the writer speak for himself. The italics are my
own: “ The principle here contended for is that our
acceptance of a scientific theory should be made de
pendent, not on our estimate of attempts to harmonize
such details,” i.e., scientific conclusions with scriptural
statements, “ hut on its own proper evidence.” (P. 62).
Here is a principle against which I have not a word
to say, but how about the unfortunate “ believer ? ”
What is the course recommended to him ? The bible
makes one statement, and science makes another state
ment, and these two (says the writer) cannot by any
exercise of ingenuity be brought into harmony. In
fact, they are contradictory statements; that of science
being such as, we are told, leads to “ a conviction of
its truth.” One would imagine that there is only one
possible answer to this question. “Accept the true
statement and reject the false one.”
The author’s method is this—and the reader who has
ever so small an acquaintance with the ways of theolo
gians will have perhaps divined it, from the preceding
extracts—“ Admit the truth of both ! ” “ If it is not
in our power,”—I have already quoted part of this, but
no matter—“ If it is not in our power to give at once
a satisfactory solution of the apparent discrepancy,
surely the safer as well as the more honest course is to
admit the fact, and refer it to its real cause,” (namely,
that the two statements are contradictory 1 Oh, no !)
“ the imperfection of our knowledge, and the limited
scope of our powers of reasoning ! ” Again, “We may
surely assent to the truth of a scientific statement, when
established on as satisfactory a basis as that kind of
�8
The Orthodox Surrender.
knowledge admits of”—by the bye, what kind of
knowledge rests on a more satisfactory basis ?—“ with
out either being able to show the manner of its accord
ance with the surface meaning of some scriptural state
ment, or discrediting the latter on this account.”
Before going further I should like to try this
remarkable method by applying it to some simple and.
familiar examples. Vague talk of the above description
is often most easily dispersed by bringing the matter to
a crucial test. Let us take what is commonly called,
the creation of the world. The bible tells us that it
was created in six days, days specially indicated as con
taining a morning and an evening a-piece. Science in
forms us that it was the work of many ages. “ How,”
asks the enquirer, “ am I to assimilate these two seem
ingly opposite statements, except on the supposition
that a day means a long period, and morning and even
ing the beginning and close of each such period, or by
accepting some other hypothesis which will bring them
into accord.” “ You can’t assimilate them,” replies the
author. “ All attempts at representing the days as so
many periods of great duration are unsatisfactory and
indeed disingenuous. And every other hypothesis is
equally valueless. Your way out of the difficulty is
much simpler. The scientific statement we admit to be
true. On the other hand, as we know that the bible is
divinely inspired, and consequently infallible in every
part, so the biblical statement must be true. They
must, therefore, be capable of being reconciled in some
way that we cannot dream of. In the meanwhile, your
duty is to believe both! ” “ How on earth am I to do
that ? ” asks the enquirer. 11 Consider the imperfection
of your knowledge,” retorts the writer. “ But the two
statements flatly contradict each other. How can they
both be true ? ” “ Oh, but bear in mind your limited
powers of apprehension ! ” Again, the second chapter
of Genesis tells us that the order of creation was (1)
man ; (2) beasts and fowls; (3) woman. Science informs
�The Orthodox Surrender.
9
us that this is not true. Believe both ! or rather, as the
first chapter gives a different account, believe all three !
The bible informs us that death came into the world as
a punishment for human sin. Science acquaints us with
the fact that death was in the world ages before there
could have been human sin. Believe both : that is to
say, believe that it was a punishment for sin, and not a
punishment for sin. The bible relates in the most ex
plicit terms that the deluge covered the whole earth.
Science informs us that there are portions of the earth
which have never been thus submerged. Believe both:
believe that the whole of the earth was covered by
water, and that only a part of it was covered. Of
course the same system will make short work of all in
ternal contradictions in the bible itself. If in one
place the Deity is spoken of as all-powerful, and in
another is represented as being unable to drive out the
inhabitants of the valley, because they had chariots of
iron—believe both ! Believe that he is all-powerful,
and that he is not all-powerful. It is all very well to
ride off on such convenient expressions as “ surface
meanings,” “ apparent discrepancies,” and the like : but
this is what the matter comes to, when fairly looked at.
Of course the method we are considering has one
advantage : it is thorough. It places every statement
in the bible under cover of any assault or criticism from
whatever quarter. “ I will grant you that 2 + 2 == 4,”
says the believer, “but if I find in my bible that
2 + 2 — 5, I shall believe that too. There must be
some way of reconciling the two additions that I don’t
know of.” This is evidently no exaggeration. Either
there was a universal deluge or there was not. Either
the sun was in being before the earth or it was not.
Either death came into the world by sin, or it came in
in some other way. If science has established one
alternative of any of these propositions, then, the other
is as absurd as that 2 + 2 = 5. Credo quia impossibile:
happy believer ! Erom this point of view the writer is
�IO
The Orthodox Surrender.
quite right in asserting that the doctrine of Evolution,
if ever proved to be true, need not frighten the ortho
dox—though his way of putting it sounds strange to
profane ears. “ It is worth while to point out that if
the literal phraseology of the bible is inconsistent with
some of the evolutionary theories, it is so in a much
more formal way with the geological antiquity of the
earth, a point now generally conceded.” “ Yet ” he adds
further on in the usual strain, “ We have come to be
agreed in admitting the truth of both ! ” i.e., we have
had worse difficulties than this of Evolution to swallow,
and have got over the process satisfactorily to ourselves.
But it will be desirable to enquire briefly at what cost
this immunity from attack of the sacred volume has
been purchased. •
Evidently, at the cost of the total surrender of
human reason: that faculty which, as Bishop Butler
has remarked, is the only thing whereby we can judge
of the truth of revelation itself. Here, however, it is
not the truth of revelation, as I understand the term,
which is in question, but the theory of the inspiration,
that is to say, the infallibility, of every verse in the
bible. The function of reason is perfectly clear in this
matter. Whenever the progress of knowledge has
established a proposition plainly contradicting some
biblical statement, we are bound to conclude that that
particular statement is not divinely inspired by the God
of Truth, inasmuch as it is opposed to the truth as he
has permitted it to reach us from another quarter not
open to doubt. This, I say, is the only reasonable
conclusion to be arrived at by one who, like the writer,
admits the contradiction, and admits that it is not to be
salved over by any process possible to human reason.
The writer’s method is simply this: “ First surrender
your reason to the dogma of the infallibility of the
Bible, and then consent to label every misstatement in
it as a mystery.” My answer is that I shall not sur
render that faculty, “ the lamp which God has lit within
�The Orthodox Surrender.
11
me,” to any book or man or body of men whatever. I
believe that to do so would be to sin grievously in the
eyes of my Maker. And what is this particular dogma
to which you call on me thus to surrender it ? Can
you produce any authoritative declaration on the part
of God himself to the effect that every line in the Bible
is infallibly true ? Have you even any plausible argu
ment to offer on the subject, from the Protestant point
of view 1 None whatever, that I have been able to
discover, except a tradition or superstition (not in the
least sanctioned by the Bible itself), with nothing to
be alleged in its favour, except that it has been held
for centuries by certain priest-governed bodies called
churches (not by your own, by the bye, as has been
established, on the strength of your own articles, by the
tribunals you are bound to acknowledge)—a superstition
assailable on many other grounds, and directly negatived
by these very passages. Consider your own position
for a moment. You admit that these passages are not
to be reconciled to our reason. You are too honest to
make the attempt. “ But I carit possibly give up my
dogma of verbal inspiration,” you cry, “ Bother reason ! ”
And when we attempt to argue with you on this
very dogma, you have nothing to offer. It is “ bother
reason 1” again. And this is the triumphant answer of
theology to scepticism in the year eighteen hundred
and seventy-five !
Surely those who can be induced to yield up their
minds to this authoritative method are victims to a
superstition in no degree more respectable than some
of the most abject superstitions of the lowest savages.
They worship a fetish in the shape of so many rags
converted into the leaves of a book, instead of being
dressed up as a doll. Popery in its worst form is only
another and hardly a more mischievous instance of this
prostitution of the faculties to an idol. The object is
different, the process is the same. “ Bother reason ! ”
And talking of superstitions, this remarkable “ method ”
�I2
The Orthodox Surrender.
would be good for bolstering up more than one of
them. Thus, a reasonable objection to some of the
Eastern religions lies in the absurd cosmogonies con
tained in their sacred books. In the Shastras, the
world is represented as having been produced by
Brahm out of an egg. Why should not the Hindoo
continue to believe in Brahm’s egg, as well as in the
teachings of science, consigning the discrepancy between
the two statements to that convenient limbo, “ the
imperfection of our faculties ? ”
As a specimen of the author’s mode of illustrating
and enforcing his method, the following may suffice :—
He has before him, as we have seen, the difficult task
of coaxing the reader into assenting provisionally to
two such propositions as these. “ The sun was made
before the world,” “ The sun was made after the world.’’
This, he says, does not seem such a wonderful feat
“ when we consider the difficulty of reconciling the re
sults of different lines of scientific enquiry.” Here
certainly “ results ” must mean, or ought to mean,
“ established scientific conclusions ; ” it cannot include
unverified hypotheses, because in that case there would
be no necessity imposed on us of reconciling two of
these that should contradict each other, inasmuch as
not only one, but both might be false. Now, here is
the author’s instance, given in a foot-note. “ The im
mense length of time, for instance, required for the
process of Evolution, in the view of some of its pro
pounders, which would exceed the limits of the possible
age of the sun, as estimated by Sir Wm. Thompson, on
physical grounds.” (Page 60.) I.e., some scientific
men have a theory which requires (on the part of only
a section of these) x2 years for the age of the world.
Some other scientific men see reasons for supposing the
world to have lasted only x years. To make this illus
tration worth anything, the possibility ought to be
indicated of our being one day called upon to hold that
the world has lasted only x years, and also that it has
�The Orthodox Surrender.
J3
lasted x2 years. Whereas, who does not see that if
neither of these be established as results, we simply
have to suspend onr judgments: as I have just said,
there is no case for reconciling (in the sense of reconcil
ing what we know to be true with what in the light of
reason is untrue.) And who does not further see that
no such case for “ reconciling ” can ever arise 1 For if
one of the two statements be established, the other is
ipso facto refuted.* Unless indeed (which has not yet
been the case), one scientific conclusion be found to
contradict another as distinctly and unmistakeably as
some of these conclusions have contradicted the text
of scripture. Then, indeed, the author’s illustration
will apply, and we shall find ourselves involved in the
same difficulties as beset the adopters of his method.
But perhaps it would be better to wait, before deciding
on our course, till the occasion shall arise.
Here is another of the author’s illustrations, which is
as bad as—it cannot be worse than—the preceding. He
instances the omnipotence of God and the free will of
man. “We may well be content to admit the truth of
each of these tenets, without being able to see how their
results fit into each other.” Admitting the omnipotence
of God and also the free-will of man, I would respect
fully ask, How do these dogmas contradict each other 1
For this is the point. Would there be any contradic
tion between (suppose) a scientific discovery of the
existence and omnipotence of God, and a biblical state
ment of free-will, or vice versa, between a scientific dis
covery of the freedom of the will and a bible declaration
of the omnipotence of God'? I apprehend that the
supporters of biblical infallibility would reply, with
perfect justice, that there was no contradiction whatever.
For that man being free, his freedom had been conceded
to him by the omnipotence of God. Of course an
* And, of course, everything that depends upon it; e.g., If
Evolution requires x2 years, proof that the world has only existed x
years, puts an end to Evolution.
�14
The Orthodox Surrender.
omnipotent Deity could break in upon this freedom at
any moment that he chose, but for wise reasons of his
own he does not appear so to choose.
I cannot help here ’briefly noticing how this writer’s
method might be worked on behalf of the Roman
Catholic Church. The ground taken up by Protestant
ism at its origin was that certain doctrines and practices
of Roman Catholicism were not to be found in Scripture
(which does not, I think, amount to much)—and also
(which is the point here), that they and others were
repugnant to scripture. But there are no passages in
the bible so plainly contradictory of any Roman
Catholic doctrine or practice, as there are scientific con
clusions flatly opposed to certain passages in the bible.
Indeed, the two former may be reconciled—every dis
passionate person admits that—but now we are told that
the two latter cannot. If then the two latter can be
held in conjunction, why not the two former ? May
not Roman Catholicism be right even where it is in
“ seeming contradiction ” (contradiction, I say, of a
comparatively trifling kind), with some “ surface
statement ” of the bible ? May there not be a way of
reconciling the two even although we cannot discover a
solution satisfactory to ourselves at the moment ? May
it not be our duty to “ believe both ? ” I have not
time or space to dwell further on this point, which I
invite the reader to ponder on. But it certainly seems
to me that this doctrine of certain things being perfectly
reconcileable with “surface meanings” in the bible,
which seem to say the exact contrary, is fatal to the
Protestant position.
To conclude these cursory remarks, this article seems
to me a significant “ sign of the end.” It is like an
army laying down its arms
“ Jam jam efficaci do manus scientiaa, ”
with a despairing cry to a “ Deus ex machina ” to help
them out of their difficulties. It was, I think, Professor
�The Orthodox Surrender.
J5
Agassiz who said that scientific discoveries usually
underwent three phases : Firstly, it was said they
were false; secondly, that they were opposed to the
bible; thirdly, when they had won their way to
acceptance over the carcases of slaughtered prejudices,
that they were quite true and quite in accordance with
the text of the bible. But there is yet another phase
into which they have entered in the minds of some,
viz., that they are true and not to be reconciled with
the text of the bible. This position, hitherto held by
sceptics only, we now see to be frankly admitted in the
11 Church Quarterly Review.” The admission seems to
me a fatal one. Religious beliefs, out of reach of veri
fication, may be held as long as the world lasts. Beliefs
founded on statements, which unfortunately for them
selves have lain in the way of advancing knowledge
and been worsted, may remain as long as a compromise
is admitted to be possible. But when their supporters
are obliged to come forward and acknowledge in all
honesty that no compromise is possible to our faculties
between their beliefs and established truths, and that
reason is to be discarded in favour of a baseless myth
upheld by mere sentiment, the victory is won : the
world will end by accepting the facts, and discarding,
not reason, hut the hazy beliefs and myths which have
crumbled under the facts. Hitherto the theologians, to
use the first Napoleon’s expression with regard to
British troops, have never seemed to know when they
are beaten. After reading this article, I cannot but
judge that some of them have an uneasy suspicion that
they are beaten. Surely to withdraw from the light of
reason into cloudland is to leave the enemy master of
the field. And this appears to me the latest “ Aspect
of Science in relation to Religion.”
TURNBULL ANU SPEARS, PRINTERS, EDINBURGH.
�
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The orthodox surrender
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Place of publication: London
Collation: 15 p. ; 18 cm.
Notes: A critique of article 'On Some Aspects of Science in Relation to Religion' in Church Quarterly Review. (October 1875). From the library of Dr Moncure Conway. Printed by Turnbull and Spears, Edinburgh.
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Thomas Scott
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1876
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Christianity
Atheism
Religion
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Christianity and Atheism
Conway Tracts
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Religion and science
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PNo. 2,-R.P.A. EXTRA SERIES.
The "Riddle” Vindicated
......... ......... .
........... —. . ............. *"*5^
Haeckel’s Critics
Answered
JOSEPH McCABE
(FORMERLY THE VERY REV. FATHER ANTONY, O.S.F., PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY AND
ECCLESIASTICAL HISTORY AT ST. ANTONY'S, FOREST GATE)
Author of “Twelve Years in a Monastery, ” “ Peter Abelard," “St. Augustine and
li is Age" etc.
WATTS & CO.,
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|^> tx
17, TOHNSON’S COURT, FLEET STREET, LONDON, E.C.
[issued
6
for the rationalist press association, limited]
No. 3 of this Series will be “ SCIENCE AND SPECULATION,” being the
Prolegomena to “The History of Philosophy,” by 0. H. LEWES.
�THE
Rationalist Press Association,
LIMITED.
Registered Office—V], Johnson’s Court, Fleet Street, London, E.C.
Chairman:
Mr. George Jacob Holyoake.
Honorary Associates:
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Mr. Edward Clodd
Mr. Leonard Huxley
Dr. Paul Carus
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Dr. Stanton Coit
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Major-General J. G. R. Forlong
A pamphlet fully describing the aims and methods of the Association and the conditions
of membership will be forwarded gratis on application to the Secretary at the above address. The
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THE
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to love, know, and do the right. (5) To emphasise the moral factor in all personal, social,
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For particulars of Leetures, Classes, and Circulating Library at 19, Bucking
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Moral Instruction League.
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�B1SH0PSGATE INSTITUIE
REFERENCE LIBRARY
Not to be taken away
HAECKEL’S CRITICS ANSWERED
�By JOSEPH McCABE.
Twelve Years in a Monastery.
A New Edition, Revised and Enlarged.
The first large edition was exhausted soon after publication, and it is now
issued, with additions, including an examination of Mr. Wells’s position on
the future of Catholicism, at the reduced price of 35-. 6d. net; by post, 3-f. io<Z.
By PROFESSOR HAECKEL.
The Riddle of the Universe.
Cheap Popular Edition.
Cloth il, by post il 2d. ; paper 6d., by post 3d.
By WINWOOD READE.
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Cheap Edition.
3l 6d., Post Free.
A very fine work, being a concise history of the world, written from a
Rationalistic point of view, and in a graphic and picturesque style.
By S. LAING.
A Modern Zoroastrian.
New Edition.
Cloth, 2s. net ;
by
Post, 2s. $d.
Price 6d. ; by post, 7|</.
The Agnostic Annual for 1904.
Contents : The Cult of the Unknown God, by Joseph McCabe ; The
Master-Builder, by Eden Phillpotts; Historic Christianity, by Charles T.
Gorham; The Position of Freethinkers in the Church, by John M. Robertson;
Towards Freedom, by Lady Florence Dixie ; A Rose, A Life (a poem),
by Henry Allsopp ; The Philosophy of the Human Mind, by Charles Watts 5
Can Man Know God ? by the Author of Mr. Balfour1 s Apologetics ; The
Poets and Rationalism, by Mimnermus; The Labour Movement and
Christian Orthodoxy, by F. J. Gould.
London : WATTS & CO., 17 Johnson’s Court, Fleet Street, E.C.
�NATIONAL SECULAR SOCIETY
HAECKEL’S
CRITICS ANSWERED •
BY
JOSEPH McCABE
(FORMERLY THE VERY REV. F. ANTONY, O.S.F., PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY AND ECCLESIASTICAL HISTORY
at st.
Antony’s,
forest gate)
AUTHOR OF “ TWELVE YEARS IN A MONASTERY," “ PETER ABELARD,”
“ST. AUGUSTINE AND HIS AGE,” ETC.
\Issued for the Rationalist Press Association, Limited.}
WATTS & CO.,
17, JOHNSON’S COURT, FLEET STREET, LONDON, E.C.
1903
�BISHSPSGATE INSTITUTE
REFERENCE LIBRARY
y.. 1 9 MAY 1987
k Ciassiflcat i&n .. H. hi?. §•
�CONTENTS
PAGE
I.
II.
Some General Criticisms, and
The Unity
of the
a
Lessonin Modesty........................................ 7
World, and the Lawof Substance
.
.
.
.18
III.
The Evolution of the Inorganic World....................................................... 29
IV.
The Origin of Life................................................................................................. 39
V.
The Ascent
of
Man................................................................................................ 49
VI.
The Immortality of the Soul...............................................................................61
VII.
God........................................................................................................................ 68
VIII.
IX.
X.
Science
and
Christianity....................................................................................... 80
The Ethic and Religion of Monism.............................................................. 91
Dr. Wallace and
his
Critics............................................................................... 99
XI.
Lord Kelvin Intervenes...................................................................................... 108
XII.
Mr. Mallock’s Olive Branch..............................................................................114
XIII.
Conclusion............................................................................................................... 123
Index........................................................................................................................127
�PREFATORY NOTE
WHILST these pages were in the press an interview with Mr.
F. Ballard, written by Mr. Raymond Blathwayt, has appeared in Great
Thoughts. The interviewer introduces his subject with the following
passage :—
“ None can deny Haeckel’s sincerity; few can deny a certain wistful eager
ness ; all must stand saddened at his pessimism. He himself, if report be true,
is shaken to the very core as to his own position. A friend of his, entering his
study a few weeks ago, found him in a somewhat mournful condition. ‘ What is
the matter ? ’ said he, and the great philosopher replied, ‘ I cannot feel certain of
my own position ,■ suppose all my theories should turn out to be false? So that
even Haeckel, whom most people regard as a blank materialist, is overshadowed
now and again by the spirit world which surrounds us all, and to him also come the
doubts and craven fears to which the strongest of humanity is liable now and again.”
I at once submitted this passage to Professor Haeckel, and he
replied :—
“The anecdote about the wavering of my Monistic position is a pure invention.
My views are firm as a rockj but they may, naturally, be only partly correct.
The reader will find from the following pages that this—whoever
was the “ inventor
is only one of a long series of untruths and mis
representations with which the distant Professor has been cowardly
assailed.
J. M.
�•ii'-il tbb:»w
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til jnt»
ifiiBik.-.
■
’
.
t_ <>.t \ nd jnjw jcH.'n
.,»..., fftr, hr. r
HAECKEL’S CRITICS ANSWERED
■ '
,• ••
■
. < . . J1I&' '
bXz?
Hi
J .
1881 L,* imL
Chapter 1
SOME GENERAL CRITICISMS, AND A LESSON IN
MODESTY
Some forty-four years ago a young
German medical man was spending
laborious hours in an effort to penetrate
the secret of the living organism. From
his earliest years he had been powerfully
attracted to the study of life. He had
written a small work on botany whilst
he- was yet a boy at the gymnasium. He
had then had the advantage of a train
ing for the medical profession under
such masters as Kolliker and Johannes
Muller. He had published an essay on
crabs in 1857, and in 1859 he was pur
suing a most important inquiry into the
microscopic life that fills the blue waters
of the Italian coast. But his many lines
of research had not as yet led to any
large conclusions. He stood perplexed
between the discarded views of the older
biologists and the dim vision that was
slowly breaking upon the scientific mind
of the time. His own revered master
had insisted on the fixity of the various
species of organisms, but it was an age
when every note of the time-spirit whis
pered “advance” in the ears of the
younger men. The despotism of Genesis
had been broken by the new criticism,
and the Mosaic barrier to research was
being trampled under foot. The young
scientist, then in his twenty-seventh year,
returned to Berlin in 1861, and heard
that during his absence an English
naturalist had published a startlingly
revolutionary view of the whole kingdom
of life.
He obtained a copy of The
Origin of Sfecies, and saw at a glance
that a great truth had been discovered.
In the light of the new theory of evolu
tion, fulfilling the intuitions of Goethe
and the speculations of Lamarck, the
vast realm of animals and plants began
to exhibit the order and rationality he
had so long sought.
The very valuable and brilliant work
he had done in Italy secured for him a
professorship at the University of Jena,
and he at once devoted himself to the
creation of the new biology. In 1863
(his twenty-ninth year) he gave an able
address on the new theory before a
congress at Stettin, where all the most
distinguished scientists of Germany were
assembled. It was his baptism of fire
in a life-long campaign against error and
prejudice.
The vast majority of the
scientists present scoffed at Darwin’s
idea, and said it was not a matter for
serious discussion.
“The harmless
dream of an after-dinner nap,” said one
distinguished zoologist; and another
said they might as well discuss “ tableturning.”
A famous botanist present
said there was not a single fact of
science in its favour; though Darwin’s
book alone contains an overwhelming
mass of evidence. In France the great
Cuvier was crushing the young theory
with the weight of his authority. From
the pulpit of Notre Dame the brilliant
Lacordaire was assuring men that “its
father was pride, its mother lust, and
�8
SOME GENERAL CRITICISMS, AND A LESSON IN MODESTY
its offspring revolutions.” The young
naturalist went back to Jena with a
stem and grim resolve to pursue truth
through fire and water, and, as Huxley
was putting it after a like experience,
to “smite all humbugs” that lent their
authority to error. Five years later he
published his Generelle Morphologie,
which Huxley calls “ one of the greatest
scientific works ever published,” and
which considerably advanced the libera
tion of Germany from the old error.
Two years afterwards he published his
Natural History of Creation, of which
Darwin said that, had he read it earlier,
the Descent of Man would probably
never have been written.
With phe
nomenal industry, with brilliant success,
and with a moral idealism of the highest
order, he continued his research into the
nature of life and the nature of man,
and long before the close of the century
he was in the foremost rank of men of
science.
His progress was impeded by the
usual conservative hostility. For years
the ecclesiastical party strove to drive
him from the university, and enforced
a boycott of him and his family. One
day a prelate approached the Grand
Duke of Weimar, and urged him to put
an end to the scandal of the heretical
professor. “ Do you mean to say,” asked
the Grand-Duke—for the spirit of Goethe
still lingered in the court of Weimar,
“ that the professor really believes these
things he teaches?”
“He certainly
does,” assured the cleric.
“Then the
man is only doing what you are doing
yourself,” was the amiable retort. At
another time the professor himself ap
proached the head of the university,
Dr. Seebeck, an orthodox thinker, and
offered to resign his chair, to end the
trouble, as he would never swerve one
inch from the path of integrity and
faithfulness to what he considered to
be the truth. Dr. Seebeck bade him
remain; and his name has, in return,
taken the name of Jena to the ends of
the earth. His books have been trans
lated into twelve languages. Flis name
will rise first to the lips of any informed
student in the civilised world, from
Yokohama to St. Petersburg, from San
Francisco to Calcutta, if you speak of
zoology or embryology. He holds four
gold medals for research, and more
than seventy diplomas from so many
academies and learned bodies all over
the world, who have desired to have his
name on their roll of members or asso
ciates. When, in 1881, the Asiatic Society
of Bengal resolved to nominate six special
“ centenary honorary members,” he was
the one chosen for Germany. On the
occasion of his sixtieth birthday, ten
years ago, the elite of the scientific
world sent their greeting to the man
“who has devoted his life in unselfish
devotion to science and to truth, who
has opened new paths and inaugurated
fresh knowledge wherever he has turned,
and who has ever given his best for the
moral welfare of humanity.”
That is the real Ernst Haeckel.
That is the man whom our ecclesias
tical M.A.’s and our D.D.’s have lately
been accusing of “scientific humbug”
and “insolent dogmatism” and “child
ish credulity” and “mendacities” and
“rhodomontade,” of being “an essen
tially ignorant guide,” “an atrophied
soul,” and “ a rude, ill-mannered, igno
rant child,” of “ poisoning the minds ”
of the people and leading them “back
into barbarism,” of “prostituting him
self,” of making “misrepresentations so
gross and glaring as to make it extremely
difficult to credit him at once with
mental ability and sincerity,” of “ having
forfeited all right to speak as a serious
scientific man,” and of being “so fla
grantly prejudiced, so false to fact, and
so insolent in tone, as to require much
self-control to keep one from flinging
the book away in disgust.” I am not
quoting itinerant Christian Evidence
lecturers, but the deliberately published
observations of Dr. Horton, Dr. Loofs,
and the Rev. Mr. Ballard.
We need not tender our sympathy to
Professor Haeckel. He has been listen
ing to language of this kind ever since
�SOME GENERAL CRITICISMS, AND A LESSON IN MODESTY
he published his famous General Mor
phology in 1866. He may have by this
time a kindly theory that it comes
naturally to a mind that breathes a
mediaeval atmosphere, and that still holds
the general principles on which the
Holy Inquisition was founded. But it
is worth while investigating how all this
lurid language is reconciled with the
culture and scholarship and tolerance
which are claimed for the modern
clergyman. The writers of these pic
turesque phrases would indignantly re
pudiate the notion that they were angry
merely because Haeckel’s views of the
nature of man and the constitution of
the universe contradict their own, and
tend to diminish the number of their
followers. They do, indeed, reject the
substance of his speculations, but their
quarrel is with the manner in which he
pursues and expounds them. A few
years ago he published a summary of
the opinions he had arrived at on a vast
number of problems of science, philo
sophy, history, and religion. As he saw
his great colleagues pass on one by one
to join “ the choir invisible,” he decided
to draw up this “last will and testa
ment ”; to look back over the sombre
fields of half-a-century of warfare, and
sum up the issues of the conflict. In
Germany his Riddle of the Universe
sold 9,000 copies in two months, and
has led to an appalling outpouring of
controversial ink. In England it was
eagerly and extensively welcomed in the
more expensive edition, and in the cheap
form it is circulating to the extent of
nearly 80,000 copies. I have waded
through the turgid flood of criticisms it
has called forth, and will deal first with
those charges which tend to palliate the
outrageous phrases I have quoted before
I proceed to the criticisms of its sub
stance. These ponderous names are
not flung out, we are told, from a secret
consciousness that sober criticism would
have little force. They are reluctantly
penned out of regard for the ethic
and aesthetic of controversy. Professor
Haeckel, whom Mr. Mallock has saluted
9
in the Fortnightly Review (September,
1901) as “one of the most eminent and
most thoughtful men of science in
Europe,” whom an antagonistic reviewer
in Knowledge describes as “ impelled by
no motive but a love of truth,” and says
that “ to know him is to love him,” and
“ there are few who have worked harder
and, at the same time, more brilliantly,
for their day and generation,” whom the
Westminster Review regards as “a great
biologist and thinker,” and whom even
Dr. Dallinger calls “a man of large
scientific attainments, a biologist of the
highest repute, and possessed of the
keenest acumen” (fThe Creator, p. 18)
—this Professor Haeckel has, it seems,
greatly violated the good taste and the
ordinary morality of literary work in his
Riddle of the Universe. Mr. Ballard
epitomises the charge very neatly in the
British Weekly. The book, he says,
“ teems with exhibitions of bitter pre
judice, arrant dogmatism, unwarranted
assumption, uncalled-for insult, logical
failure, and self-contradictions ”; and
the misguided British public calls for
five editions of it, in spite of all the
abuse that is heaped on it and all the
secret and public manoeuvres that are
directed against its circulation.
A desperate champion might ask the
reader to reflect on the atmosphere of
invective in which Haeckel has lived for
the last fifty years—from Lacordaire’s
tracing of the parentage of evolution to
Dr. Talmage’s sermons on the subject
only four years 'ago—and might recall
that even dainty prelates like Bishop
Wilberforce could utter bitter insults in
that charmed region. He might argue
that a Haeckel was not pledged to turn
the other cheek to the smiter. He might
point out that it is not soothing to have
had to spend half a life in overcoming
what is now acknowledged to be a foolish
resistance, yet see the same theological
forces arrayed at a more advanced
position to-day. But, in truth, we shall
do better to ask, what is the aesthetic
and ethical standard of controversy
cherished by Dr. Haeckel’s critics, and
B
�IO
SOME GENERAL CRITICISMS, AND A LESSON IN MODESTY
how: far does he really fall below their
shining example ?
There is Dr. Horton, for instance,
whose sensitive nature is outraged by
Haeckel’s rude comments on some of the
Christian beliefs. Now, I have been a
priest and I know how largely rhetorical
this kind of indignation is, and how
effective it is sometimes in preventing a
book from being read. As a fact, one
who was present when Dr. Horton
delivered his philippic tells how, when the
preacher read out in tremulous tones
the famous mother-in-law passage (and the
like) from the Riddle, his audience was
really shaking with suppressed laughter.
However, let us examine Dr. Horton’s
discourse,1 and learn the better manners
which he desiderates in Haeckel. He
opens with a reference to “ the depths of
degradation and despair into which the
teaching of Haeckel will plunge man
kind ; ” though, of course, to speak
of Dr. Horton’s views as degrading
would be considered insulting. Then,
though “ there has been no more diligent
and successful investigator of the facts of
nature than Ernst Haeckel during the
century that has passed,” he is a child
at moral and religious reasoning, “ a rude,
ill-mannered, ignorant child ; ” he is “ an
atrophied soul, a being that is blind on
the spiritual side.” The “ spiritual side ”
being a blend of moral and intellectual
faculty (if it is anything more than
imagination), this is grave; but Dr.
Horton says it <£in the interest of souls
and truth.” Presently he finds Haeckel
an ££ utterly unsatisfactory and essentially
ignorant guide,” an “ unthinking mind ”
with -whose “ obvious weakness and igno
rance ” and “ childish credulity ” “ the
rationalist press gulls the ignorance of
the public.” Dr. Horton admits that
modern science “ must gradually affect
the view of man, even the view of God,
which we drew from the matchless
revelation of the first chapters of
Genesis” [this in Hampstead, in the
1 It is published in the Christian World
Pulpit, June loth, 1903.
year of grace 1903 !], and must modify
“ the naive, but essentially correct, con
ceptions of our ancestors ”; but Haeckel
asks too much. I will touch in the
proper place Dr. Horton’s brief argu
mentation on the origin of life and the
origin of the mind,1 and will only admire
here the delicacy with which he points
out the spiritual consequences of monism.
“ Men who have no belief in God and
immortality sink to the level of the
brutes,” and Haeckel is “ anxious to
sweep us back into this barbarism under
the name of progress.”
Haeckel is not
conscious of the degradation that has
passed upon his spirit ” through rejecting
the particular solution of the world-riddle
which Dr. Horton recommends, but in
any one who does so “ the soul is shrunk,
the mind is warped, the very body must
carry its marks of degradation.” It is
true that the preacher’s sense of humour
awakes at one point, and he disavows
any intention of imputing these “ bestial
levels ” to Haeckel himself, but he seems
to forget the reservation, and ends in a
most ludicrous strain of commiseration.
There is nothing half so insulting and
offensive in Haeckel.
Passing by Dr. Loofs (whose little work
is one of the most spiteful and painful
diatribes that has issued from a modern
university), as he does not claim to be an
English gentleman, we may turn to the
Rev. F. Ballard for an exhibition of those
manners which Haeckel has neglected to
cultivate.
Mr. Ballard is said in the
religious press to have proved that
“ Haeckel doesn’t count,” and it will be
expected from the precision and force of
his indictment of Haeckel’s manner
(which I have quoted above) that this
1 Dr. Horton’s knowledge of the controversy
may be tested very well by his statement that
Bois-Reymond, Vogt, Buchner, and Baer, “per
haps four of the greatest men of science in the
nineteenth century in Germany,” came to “ the
recognition of spirit as the author of conscious
ness.” Not one of the four ever recognised any
thing of the kind, as we shall see. Bois-Reymond
and Baer remained agnostic, whilst Buchner and
Vogt were actually the leaders of German
materialism up to the moment of death.
�SOME GENERAL CRITICISMS, AND A LESSON IN MODESTY
scientific clergyman will be quite the
Beau Brummel of religious controversy.
He has written a chapter on The
Riddle of the Universe in his Miracles
of Unbelief, but this has been swallowed
up in his great attack in the columns of
the British Weekly. The later articles
of this series refer to the able editor of
the Clarion,, and Mr. Blatchford has
shown a sufficient command of appro
priate language to dispense with my
services. I confine myself to the first
three articles (July 23rd, 30th, and Aug.
6th). It proves, on examination, that
twelve columns out of the thirteen are
mainly preliminary comments on Haec
kel’s morals. I will deal with the thir
teenth column (which will turn out to be
very largely a question of Mr. Ballard's
morals) in its proper place, and will
here briefly examine the general criti
cisms.
Dogmatism and dishonesty are the
chief points Mr. Ballard charges, with an
infinite variety of phrasing, against the
absent Professor. Now, one would
really’ be disposed to see something in
the first point, since it is so persistently
urged by Haeckel’s critics. Unfortun
ately, when one looks closely into the
grounds of the charge it begins to totter ;
and when one compares Haeckel’s words
with those of his critics, one wonders
what dogmatism really is. There is, for
instance, that admirable writer of the
Christian World, Mr. J. Brierley (“J. B.”),
who stooped in some unguarded hour to
attack Haeckel. The Riddle is “ one of
the most amusing books this generation
has seen” because “its dogmatism is so
naive.” “ Professor Haeckel has found
everything out,” says Mr. Brierley. “ He
has exploded the old mystery, and found
it a bag stuffed with sawdust. There is
nothing to wonder at in suns and sys
tems. They are just matter and force,
and there is an end.” Now, the Chris
tian World is a fine paper, and “ J. B.”
is one of its sanest contributors, yet this
passage is astounding. Whence did a
hostile reviewer in the Sheffield Daily
Telegraph get the opposite impression
n
that Haeckel “is modest and unassum
ing in the claims he makes for his
system”? How came the Westminster
Review to call it “ a careful and conscien
tious endeavour to construct a theory of
the universe in harmony with the teach
ings of modern science”? Read the
second page of the preface to the Riddle.
“ The studies of these world-riddles which
I offer in the present work,” you read,
“ cannot reasonably claim to give a
perfect solution of them; they merely
offer to a wide circle of readers a critical
inquiry into the problem, and seek to
answer the question as to how nearly we
have approached that solution at the
present day. What stage in the attain
ment of truth have we actually arrived
at in this closing year of the nineteenth
century ? What progress have we really
made during its course towards that
immeasurably distant goal ? ”
Those
words—and you will vainly seek their
equal in modesty in any religious riddle
solver in the world—meet the eye at the
very opening of the book, and they are
substantially repeated at its close (p.
134).1 “The answer which I give to
these great questions,” Haeckel con
tinues, “ must naturally be merely sub
jective and only partly correct.” Was
there ever so singular a “ dogmatist ” ?
“ The one point that I can claim is that
my Monistic Philosophy is sincere from
beginning to end.” “ My own command
of the various branches of science is
uneven and defective, so that I can
attempt no more than to sketch the
general plan of such a world-picture,
and point out the pervading unity of its
parts, however imperfect be the execu
tion.” “ In taking leave of my readers,
I venture the hope that, through my
sincere and conscientious work—in spite
of its faults, of which I am not uncon
scious-—I have contributed a little to
wards the solution of the great enigma.”
If that is dogmatism, and the average
theological pronouncement is fragrant
1 I quote throughout from the cheap edition
of the Riddle.
�12
SOME GENERAL CRITICISMS, AND A LESSON IN MODESTY
with modesty, we shall need to recon
sider our moral terminology.1
But Mr. Ballard would tell us there
are other passages in which “ the most
arrogant dogmatism ” breaks out. Well,
Haeckel has told us the book is uneven
and sketchy, that its parts were written
at different times, in different moods;
and, knowing there was no inconsistency
of thought, he may have trusted to the
intelligence of his readers to adjust any
mere inconsistency of expression. But
the truth is, that Mr. Ballard’s choice
examples (given in his third article) of
“ unmitigated dogmatism ” are little short
of ridiculous. “ Thus we have got rid of
the transcendental design of the philo
sophy of the schools ” and “ The unpre
judiced study of natural phenomena
reveals the futility of the theistic idea ”
are two of the shorter quotations. Clearly,
Mr. Ballard must mean that Haeckel
should have interposed “ in my opinion ”
in these sentences. Does Mr. Ballard
do that? Does any sane and literary
writer do it who expects to have intelli
gent readers ? Professor Haeckel is by
no means a Social Democrat, but he
does credit “ the general reader ” with
intelligence enough to relieve him from
saying “ this is my opinion ” at every
third line. He has gone out of his way
to warn the reader from the beginning
that his conclusions are “ merely subjec
tive.” In not one of these cases does he re
present a conclusion as being unanimously
accepted. On the contrary, Mr. Ballard
and his friends are never tired of point
ing out how Haeckel, on his own showing,
1 An amusing feature of this delinquency of
Mr. J. Brierley’s—which I sincerely regret to
have to notice—is that it follows upon a fine
article on ‘ ‘ Candour in the Pulpit ’’—that is to
say, on the lack of candour in the pulpit and of
honesty in apologetic literature. So that, almost
side by side with this unhappy passage, one
reads : “A foremost modern theologian, by no
means of the radical school, has recorded his
significant judgment that one of the main charac
teristics of apologetic literature is its lack of
honesty; and no one who has studied theology can
doubt that it has suffered more than any other
science from equivocal phraseology” {Christian
World, August 20th, 1903 ; p. 10).
is contradicted by his own colleagues in
Germany. The whole matter is too ab
surd to prolong. Haeckel’s “dogma
tisms ” are the ordinary ways of expres
sion in adult literature. They shine with
modesty in comparison with theological
utterances, and they are guarded from
misinterpretation on the part of the unin
formed by a most rare and conscientious
warning in the preface.
Finally let us consider the charge of
misinterpretation, trickery (“jugglery,”
the Rev. Rhondda Williams says), and
general dishonesty of method. To deal
with this fully would be to anticipate my
whole book here; the reader will be
amply informed for judgment in the
sequel. But we may, in the meantime,
profitably run our eye over Mr. Ballard’s
twelve columns of moral censorship. In
the last chapter of Miracles of Unbelief,
Mr. Ballard says “ we find misrepresen
tations so gross and glaring as to make it
extremely difficult to credit the writer at
once with mental ability and sincerity ”
(p. 35°)- 1° immediate justification of
this, Mr. Ballard quotes Haeckel’s state
ment (p. 46 of the Riddle) that even
some Christian theologians deny the
liberty of the will. This Bachelor of
Divinity seems unaware for the moment
that the Calvinists notoriously denied
freedom on the very ground indicated
by Haeckel, and that the greater part of
the Catholic theologians (the Thomists
and Augustinians) are accused by their
colleagues of being, logically, in the same
predicament. A more paltry justifica
tion for so grave a charge it would be
hard to conceive. The only other point
in the chapter worth noting is the com
ment on abiogenesis, and this will be met
at a later stage.1 I turn to the pages of
the British Weekly, and their blush of
righteous indignation.
The only point that concerns us in
1 But the many admirers of Mr. Ballard who
wish to know the worst at once may refer now
to p. 40, and see how their apologist garbles
his quotation from Haeckel, misrepresents his
position, misstates the attitude of science, and
so wins a glorious victory—over the Decalogue.
�SOME GENERAL CRITICISMS, AND A LESSON IN MODESTY
the first article is a curiously spirited
attack on my opinion that the Riddle is
“unanswered because it is unanswer
able,” and it is instructive to consider
this. Take down your copy of the
Riddle—do not contract the slovenly
and expensive habit of trusting. a con
troversial writer; and I will give you
pages throughout, which Mr. Ballard
never does—and notice that I wrote this
in November, 1902. Mr. Rhondda
Williams had not then written his
pamphlet, Dr. Horton had not preached
his sermon, and Dr. Loofs’s book was
unknown in England.
The only
“ reply ” in the field was a hastily added
chapter to Mr. Ballard’s Miracles of
Unbelief, which one may be pardoned
for not having discovered by 1902.
Further, I wrote with pointed reference
to Dr. Beale’s pathetic promise of a
reply in the agony column of the Times,
Oct. 1st, 1900; a promise which he
withdrew by referring later (Dec. 19th)
to a tiresome collection of letters from
the Lancet which he had published in
1898. Moreover, I pointedly wanted
an answer to the most important thesis
of the book, the evolution of mind,
which, I find, even Mr. Ballard had not
met. Mr. Ballard’s selection of spon
taneous generation as the chief point —
whereas Haeckel only offers it as “a
pure hypothesis,” and it is only an
incidental (though necessary) conse
quence of his system—is unworthy of a
serious scientific man. So, brushing
aside criticisms of Haeckel’s views on
Christ and the Immaculate Conception,
which have nothing to do with the
integrity of his system, I deplored “ the
silence or triviality of his opponents.”
But note how Mr. Ballard manipulates
this innocent observation. Premising
that I am “ doubtless honest,” and that
“ the apostles of free-thought, of all
men, might leave others free to think
for themselves,” and so on, he tells me
it was answered by himself (in an
obscure corner of an obscure book) and
—by anticipation! That encourages
him to call my statement an “ untruth.”
13
In the second article my enormity
grows. Readers are told that I assert
the “ monistic mechanism ‘ has been for
ever established ’ as the all-sufficient
origin, means, and end of everything ”;
whereas I most clearly said only that
“ the case for the evolution of mind ”
had been “ for ever established.” Later
we have a reference to “ the reactionary
assurances of an ex-ecclesiastic to the
effect ‘ that all Christian faith is ship
wrecked and all Christian convictions
amongst the breakers.’ ” The unsophis
ticated reader will learn with surprise (in
spite of “ to the effect ”) that this, whether
reactionary or not, is not a quotation from
me. And finally the growth is complete,
and I am made to “sneer at the triviality
or the silence of the opponents of the
mechanical theory of the universe.” Mr.
Ballard, F.R.M.S., clearly makes a very
improper use of his microscope at
times.
So it is with my innocent remark that
in the Riddle we have a “ masterly treat
ment of the question of the evolution of
mind.” “ Masterly ” soon grows into
“ more masterly,” and Mr. Ballard airily
asks : “ I really want to know why, for
some of us who make no profession to
be experts, Dr. Haeckel’s treatment
should be more ‘ masterly ’ than that of,
say, Dr. Wallace ” ; and in the end :
“ May we not then ask Mr. McCabe, or
Mr. Blatchford, why, or by what
authority, they proclaim that Prof.
Haeckel’s treatment is so much more
masterly than that of all others as to
foreclose the question ? ” The perver
sion of my phrase into a comparison
and the implication that I fail in respect
for Dr. Wallace or any other dis
tinguished thinker come very oddly
from the pen of this literary censor
morum.
Yet this is a fair sample of Mr.
Ballard’s procedure—and is in fact a
great part of his procedure, or I should
not have dwelt on it. The only other
important element in Mr. Ballard’s
preliminary twelve columns is his
industrious collection of authorities to
�14
SOME GENERAL CRITICISMS, AND A LESSON IN MODESTY
oppose to Dr. Haeckel. I shall speak
presently of the proper merit of this, but
must touch a few points of it here to
finish the consideration of Mr. Ballard’s
standard of controversy. He constantly
affirms that Haeckel is opposed by the
majority of scientific authorities. We
shall see what this really amounts to,
but let us consider it here in the light of
the more important question whether
they support Christianity. I have care
fully examined the list of writers quoted
against Haeckel by Mr. Ballard, and
this is the result. In the front rank
are the three eminent scientists, Lord
Kelvin, Sir O. Lodge, and Dr. A. R.
Wallace. Their convictions every man
will respect who respects himself, but—
two of them are Spiritists (having there
fore, an alien and empirical source of
faith, and holding views on the future state
which Christian teaching rejects), and
Lord Kelvin gives a very slender support,
as we shall see. Then there are Dr.
Beale (who confesses in his latest book
that he is fighting a vast majority), Dr.
Croll (who denies the liberty of the
will), Dr. Stirling (whose contribution is
the same as Dr. Beale’s), Dr. Winchell
and Sir J. W. Dawson (geologists of a
past generation, who defend the literal
interpretation of i. Genesis : Sir J. W.
Dawson thinks geology only claims
7000 years for the life of man, and
that “ the deluge is one of the most
important events both in human history
and the study of the later geological
periods ”), Professor Flower (with ten
lines of qualifications, but whose only
contribution to the subject seems to be
an address at a Church Congress, in which
he sharply tells the clergy they have
done mischief enough in the past, and had
better leave evolution to men of science ;
two short phrases about an “ eternal
power ” and the “ Divine govern
ment of the world ” seem to constitute
his slender theology), Dr. A. Macalister,
Professor Le Conte and Mr. Fiske
(American evolutionists and Pantheists),
Mr. Row (the Christian Evidence
lecturer), Dr. Cook (the American
Christian evidence lecturer), and Lord
Grimthorpe (the Vicar-general of York,
whose “legal and scientific mind” may
be seen at work in his Letters on Dr.
Todd's Discourses on the Prophecies}. The
rest of Mr. Ballard’s list consists of pro
fessional theologians. “ Dr.” This, and
“ Professor ” That, usually turn out to be
graduates in divinity. I am not for a
moment slighting the scientific acquire
ments of men like Dr. Dallinger, Mr.
Newman Smyth (one of the few
apologists who retain the character of a
gentleman amidst polemical work), Dr.
Iverach, Mr. Ballard, Mr. Profeit, and
Mr. Kennedy; I am not so unintelligent.
But it would be absurd to say that the
publications of these professors of
apologetics and doctors of divinity have
the same value, as replies to Haeckel, as
those of scientific laymen. The result is
that Mr. Ballard’s list is totally and
gravely misleading to the uninformed.
Rubbish like the “ Present Day Tracts ”
and antiquated work like Winchell’s and
Dawson’s and Stirling’s and Wainwright’s
are mixed up with the good work of
Newman Smyth and Dallinger and
Kennedy.
Evolutionists and non
evolutionists, theists and pantheists,
Christians and non-Christians, are hastily
thrown together. He drags in Prof.
W. James to rebuke Haeckel; the
average reader will have little suspicion
that James rejects the title of theist,
speaks scornfully of Mr. Ballard’s God,
and is not sure of the immortality of the
soul. All this is gravely misleading.
Clearly, Mr. Ballard’s ideal of con
troversy is not much superior to that
of Dr. Horton. Yet this budding con
troversialist has the effrontery to tell
Haeckel that “if he has no sense of
shame, then we have a sufficient object
lesson as to the failure of ‘ monistic
religion ’ to develop even an elementary
degree of morality.” This is provoked
by statements which Haeckel quotes
with transparent honesty from writers
named in his book. We have seen
how an equally coarse outburst was
prompted by a statement (as to the free-
�SOME GENERAL CRITICISMS, AND A LESSON IN MODESTY
dom of the will) which is literally correct.
The only other specific criticisms offered
by Mr. Ballard relate to the nature of
matter and the origin of life. In both
cases he gives a mere travesty of
Haeckel’s position. We shall take them
in detail later (though the reader may
find them at once by means of the index,
if he desires). For the present we take
our leave of these graceful guardians of
the taste and ethic of controversy.
“ What sort of an age do we live in ? ”
asked the Prager Tageblatt, when it saw
the clerical and scientific Lilliputians
of Germany shooting their insults at the
distinguished scientist. We are living,
still, in an age when religion is made to
consist essentially in certain speculations
about the nature of the universe, which
were framed, in substance, thousands of
years ago ; an age when any independent
speculator on the nature of things must
expect to arouse a bitter antagonism if
his conclusions differ from those of
religious tradition. Religion is, in a most
important aspect, “ a cosmic doctrine,”
to quote the words of Mr. Mallock.
“Religion and science,”he says, “touch
and oppose each other primarily as rival
methods of explaining the .... universe
taken as a whole, man forming part of
it.” Until a short time ago theologians
held that their particular cosmic specula
tions had the distinction of a super
natural origin, and they damned people
-who called them into question. To-day
the gilt is wearing off the legends of
Genesis, but the hereditary spirit of
intellectual arrogance goes more slowly.
To-day there are many theologians who
call themselves truth-seekers, and there
are a few who write and speak as if
they were truth-seekers, and not truthfulminators. But the sad truth is that
the majority are morally hampered by a
conviction of the sacredness and the
exclusive truth of certain speculations,
about God and the soul, which they
have a corporate charge to defend.
Every man who opposes them is con
structed into a hater of their religion and
a menace to human progress. The
15
diminution of their followers seems
only to increase their violence. “Al
ready,” says Mr. Rhondda Williams, “ it
is the fact that the cultured laity on the
one hand and the bulk of the democracy
on the other are outside the Churches.”1
Yes, people are seeking the truth, out in
the light of day, and they distrust a
tradition that has broken down section
by section as the century advanced.
Haeckel, starting from a most compre
hensive knowledge of living nature, has
reached out to certain conclusions on the
cosmic mystery. It will not avail to
Caricature his conclusions and vilify his
person and motives and method. Neither
he, nor his translator, nor his publishers,
dreamed of thrusting his zoological
authority down people’s throats, except
in so far as his book deals with zoology.
His further conclusions must be met on
their argumentative merits. His whole
system must be judged by rational
evidence.
Dust-throwing and mud
throwing are not the methods of truth
seekers ; they are the devices of timid
or foolish partisans.
But before I enter upon a systematic
examination of Haeckel’s system and the
criticisms it has provoked, I wish to ex
pose one further misrepresentation of a
general character. Almost all the critics
endeavour to make us distrust Flaeckel
by attributing to him a solitary and
isolated position in the scientific ■world.
Even if this were the case, it would only
be an incentive to examine his views
with the greater care. Copernicus stood
alone throughout life. Darwin was op
posed by most of the scientists of his
time. Wolff enunciated a profound
truth which was not accepted until long
after his death. Robert Owen preached
a whole series of social truths that we
all accept to-day. Further, all writers
do not regard Haeckel as isolated. Mr.
Mallock, in his Religion as a Credible
Doctrine, not only takes him to be the
supreme living representative of scientific
philosophy, but says that he and his
1 Does Science Destroy Religion ? p. 29.
�16
SOME GENERAL CRITICISMS, AND A LESSON IN MODESTY
colleagues “ are correct in their methods
and arguments—that the attempts of
contemporary theologians to find flaws
in the case of their opponents, or to
convert the discoveries of science into
proofs of their own theism, are exercises
of an ingenuity wholly and hopelessly
misapplied, and exhibit too often an
unreasoning or a feverish haste which
merely exposes to. ridicule the cause
which they are anxious to defend.”1 Dr.
Lionel Beale speaks throughout his
Vitality of the majority being on
Haeckel’s side in that controversy. Dr.
Iverach speaks in his Theism of “ scien
tists,” in a general way, as refusing to go
with him. But the misconception it is
particularly needful to clear up is as to
the relation of Haeckel’s Monism to
Agnosticism. When Mr. Ballard speaks
crudely of the majority of modern scien
tists being opposed to Haeckel, the
uninformed will conclude that they are,
therefore, more or less with Mr. Ballard.
We have corrected that impression by
giving the list of all the scientific laymen
of England and the United States, of
recent years, that Mr. Ballard has been
able to get under one very broad religious
umbrella. It bears only a small propor
tion to the whole, even when we have
added Professor Henslow and a few
more later on. On the other hand, the
average educated man would say that
Haeckel is a materialist and atheist, and
the great bulk of our men of science
reject both names. Haeckel, it is true,
equally rejects the name materialist, but
we may defer that point to the next
chapter. Our average educated man
has no illusion as to Huxley, Tyndall,
Clifford, Darwin, Bain, Sully, Maudsley,
Spencer, Ray Lankester, Karl Pearson,
and scientists of that type (or those
types) favouring what Mr. Ballard would
call religion. These have professed
Agnosticism; and the silence on the
religious question of the vast majority of
our scientific men must—especially in
1 The Fortnightly Review, September, 1901 ;
p. 400.
view of the feverish alertness of the
Churches to drag them on to platforms
when they are known to be in the least
favourable—I should say, be construed
in the same sense.
Now, Agnosticism is held to be more
or less respectable. Mr. Ballard quotes
Huxley and Darwin and Tyndall with a
light heart and without the least recburse
to his red ink. Haeckel is abused be
cause of his “dogmatism.” But let us
refrain from raising dust, and see what
the difference really comes to. I might
quote Lord Grimthorpe, whose “legal
and scientific mind ” Mr. Ballard has
warmly recommended to us : “ As for
professing to believe neither alternative,
atheism or theism, . . . that is not only
probably but certainly wrong, and, in
deed, is so impossible that any man who
thinks he has come to that conclusion is
mistaken, and is at present an atheist.” 1
But I think a writer of that type ought
to be left in his grave. Listen, however,
to what one of the ablest living thinkers
of England says on the matter : “ The
Neutral or Agnostic Monism now in
vogue amongst scientific men ... is
scientifically popular mainly because it
is still essentially naturalistic, and dis
parages the so-called psychical aspect as
epistemologically subordinate to the
physical. . . This monism escapes the
absurdities of the old materialism more
in seeming than in fact . . it is material
ism without matter. . . In this monism
the mechanical theory is still regarded
as furnishing a concrete and complete
presentment of the objective world. . .
If dualism is unsound, there seems to
be no agnostic resting-place between
materialism and spiritualism.”2 I do
not subscribe to all this, but the high
authority of the writer encourages me
to say that the custom of opposing our
1 At the close of The Origin of the Laws of
Nature.
2 Professor J. Ward, Naturalism and Agnosti
cism, p. 207, vol. ii. So Professor Case, in the
article on Metaphysics in the tenth edition of the
Encyc. Brit, says Huxley, Tyndall, and Spencer,
only escape materialism by being inconsistent.
�'some general criticisms, and a lesson IN MODESTY
Agnostic scientists to Haeckel—especi
ally when fairly ancient quotations are
dug out of their works in support of it—
is totally misleading.
The difference between them is this
(setting aside for the manner the question
of idealism): Haeckel’s system is a
comprehensive theory covering the uni
verse, whilst they remain on ground
which they feel to be very solid. They
affirm the evolution of all things, of
matter, of solar systems, of species from
lower species, of man, of religion and
ethics. But they decline to skate at all
on thin ice. Whether the universe had
a beginning, whether evolution has been
purposively guided, whether or how life
arose out of non-life, whether conscious
ness is of the same texture as physical
force, whether death makes an end of it
—all these things they prefer to leave to
a later generation. Where they do
affirm, they agree with Haeckel; but
they consider his further affirmations
premature, to say the least. They
agree with him that the religious theory
is quite uncalled-for by the facts of
science ; but they think it too early to
frame counter-theories. This is the real
significance of those famous conversions
of German scientists of which every
critic of Haeckel has made so much.
Du Bois-Reymond, Virchow, Baer, and
Wundt spread their affirmations over
the universe in their younger days. At
a later period they restricted themselves,
like Huxley or Darwin, to positions
which seemed impregnable. They re
treated to Agnosticism on the more ad
vanced questions. It. is absurd to find
Haeckel’s critics representing them as
having gone over to theism or Christian
ity.1 Like Huxley and Tyndall (in his
1 Haeckel is read a ferocious lesson in
manners by all his critics for putting a certain
construction on their change. Let it stand. I
am chiefly concerned with the truth or untruth
of his ideas. I see, therefore, a far more griev
ous sin in the almost general misrepresentation
of the nature of these “conversions.” Dr.
Horton, we saw, slipped in Vogt and Buchner,
the most advanced materialists of Germany, as
converts to spiritualism. Mr, Ballard inserts
17
agnostic mood) they only decline to
follow Haeckel in a constructive theory
of the origin of life and the relation of
consciousness to brain, and the strenuous
denial of God and immortality; but they
shrink just as severely from the con
structive theories and the dogmas of
Haeckel’s critics.
In that sense Haeckel stands apart,
though far from alone. Is he justified
in leaping the abysses from which his
colleagues shrink ? Would it be wiser to
keep to the solid ground ? To put no
rounded system before the world ? We
can judge best when we have covered
the whole ground over which his system
extends. Meantime, remember three
things which are lost sight of in the dust
of this controversy. Firstly, Dr. Haeckel
does not claim anything like equal value
for his views on all points. He knows
perfectly well how the evidence differs,
and how at times he must bridge a chasm
with “a pure hypothesis,”as he calls his
theory of abiogenesis; though he does
not even put out a hypothesis without
sober ground.
His system is an
elaborate structure of demonstrated
truths, convincing theories, and rational
hypotheses of all grades of strength. The
critic who confuses the latter with the
former, and thinks he has destroyed
“ the fundamental axiom,” when he has
only shown that some outlying hypothesis
A only a hypothesis, does not evince
much discernment or a scrupulous desire
to let truth prevail. Secondly, dualism,
or theism, may not logically rush in if one
Romanes, of whose conversion Haeckel was
totally unaware when he wrote the book, and
whose change of views differs toto co:lo from that
of Virchow or Wundt. All essentially misstate
the real “ metamorphosis.” It was merely from
dogmatic monism to what Dr. Ward calls
“agnostic monism.” It lends no support to
theism or spiritualism. Prof. Haeckel assures me
that “even to-day these men are styled atheists
by German ecclesiastical writers.” Read Mr.
Kennedy’s attack on Du Bois-Reymond’s hetero
doxy, after his “ Ignorabimus-Rede,” in his
Natural Theology and Modern Thought, pp.
42-65. Darwin used stronger language about
Virchow than is to be found in the Riddle.
�18
THE UNITY OF THE WORLD, AND THE LAW OF SUBSTANCE
of Haeckel’s particular hypotheses breaks
down. Between Haeckel and Martineau
or Fiske lies the broad region of neutral
or agnostic monism. And thirdly, this
is the ordinary procedure of science. It
throws out the light bridges of its hypo
theses far in advance of its solid march.
They may be withdrawn later. More
probably they will gather strength as the
years roll on, and be at length absorbed
in the growth of the impregnable
structure of scientific truth.
Chapter II
THE UNITY OF THE WORLD, AND THE LAW
OF SUBSTANCE
What, then, is this monism which
has aroused so much bitterness and an
tagonism ? Once more, before we can pro
ceed to a sober and patient study of the
position of Dr. Haeckel, we find it
necessary to lay the dust which his
critics have raised. There is the defini
tion given by the Rev. Ambrose Pope,
who seems to have led the opposition
to Haeckel in the Clarion controversy.
Mr. Pope disposes of the system —
which it has taken Dr. Haeckel a
laborious life-time to construct—-with
a marvellous and quite papal facility.
It was made, he thinks, during three “half
day excursions” out of Haeckel’s own
province. From these he returned with
certain “assumptions” which contain,
with almost ludicrous clearness, the con
clusions he wanted to reach. We will
have a word on these “ assumptions ”
(which are really the conclusions of years
of observation and reflection) when the
time comes. But incidentally Mr. Pope
defines monism, or, as he calls it for
some occult reason, “ physiological
monism.”_ “Briefly,” he says, “the
universe is not dual in its ultimate
nature, viz., spirit (or soul) and matter;
but single (monistic), viz., matter (or
substance).” Mr. Pope goes on to say
airily that "this is another of those inno
cent-looking hypotheses” from which
Haeckel derives his atheism, &c. How
any man can fail to see that this is
not an assumption, but the most
laboured conclusion of Haeckel’s sys
tem—not the base but the apex of his
pyramid—passes comprehension. Mean
time, it is formulated in utter defiance
of Haeckel’s words, and one might think
Haeckel would be consulted on the
matter. He says (p. 8) that monism
does “ not deny the existence of spirit,
and dissolve the world into a heap of
dead atoms ” and that “ matter cannot
exist and be operative without spirit, or
spirit without matter.” Dr. Horton and
many others have the same confusion.
The Rev. Rhondda Williams says : “ He
recognises that there is something which
is not material (spatial) which we may
call mind, or soul, or spirit. But if this
spiritual something is treated as the
mere, product of matter, or the mere
function of the material organism, its
reality is denied, i.e., it has no real
spiritual nature.” But Haeckel has no
where said that spirit (or force) is a
product of matter. There are scientists
who resolve matter into force, but no one
ever attempted the reverse, except in
�THE UNITY OF THE WORLD, AND THE LAW OF SUBSTANCE
the sense of reducing force to motion,
which Haeckel certainly does not.
Monism is so clearly defined at the
very commencement of Haeckel’s book
(p. 8) that these gentlemen must have
convinced themselves he gave an im
proper definition in order to escape the
odious label “materialist.” Before we
proceed, let us be perfectly clear why
this odium does attach to the word
“materialism.” It is well worthwhile,
for here is one of the strangest and most
common sophisms
of the
hour.
Materialism is the name for two totally
different things, which are constantly
confused. There is, in the first place,
materialism as a theory of the universe—
the theory that matter is the source
and the substance of all things. That is
(if you associate “ force ” or “ energy ”
or “motion” with your “matter,” as
every materialist does) a perfectly
arguable theory. It has not the remotest
connection with the amount of wine a
man drinks or the integrity of his life.
But we also give the name of materialism
to a certain disposition of the sentiments,
which few of us admire, and which
would kill the root of progress if it
became general. It is the disposition to
despise ideals and higher thought, to
confine one’s desires to selfish and
sensual pleasure and material advance
ment. There is no connection between
this materialism of the heart and that of
the head.
For whole centuries of
Christian history whole nations believed
abundantly in spirits without it having
the least influence on their morals;
and, on the other hand, materialists like
Ludwig Buchner, or Vogt, or Moleschott,
were idealists (in the moral sense) of the
highest order.1 Look around you and
see whether the belief or non-belief (for
the Agnostic is in the same predicament
here) in spirit is a dividing-line in conduct.
There is no ground in fact for the con
fusion, and it has wrought infinite
mischief; while it has rendered, and
1 See sketches of their lives in Last Words on
Materialism,
19
still renders, incalculable service to con
servative religion.
In his Natural History of Creation
Professor Haeckel admitted that his
monism was not far removed, from
scientific materialism. But there is still
so gross a confusion on the subject
that it is very natural for him to refuse
the name.
Indeed, he could not
logically accept it, and no one who is well
informed in recent physics will accept it,
unless he is allowed to interpret it in his
own way; a right which seems to be
denied to men like Dr. Haeckel. Glance
at any scientific work, and you will
find that it speaks as much, if not
more, about force than about matter.
Hence if critics insist on calling
materialism a belief in “dead atoms”
and “ hard atoms,” and “ solid atoms,”
and nothing else, there
are no
materialists to-day, if ever there were?
We shall see more presently about
modern notions of matter and force, but
may take it that Haeckel, in proper
scientific spirit, attaches as much im
portance to force as to matter, and does
not make any absurd attempt to derive
force from matter.1 Further, he identi
fies “ soul ” or “ spirit ” with force. Mr.
Williams says this is a polite way of
denying its existence, and Mr. Pope
would say it is an assumption.
It is
neither one nor 'the other, but a most
serious and characteristic conclusion of
Haeckel’s researches.
I am now
stating his position, not the grounds for
it (which will come in due time). He
concludes that the thinking and willing
force in man—what we call his mind or
spirit—is identical with the force that
reveals itself in light and heat. In
other words, he is forced to think that
spirit and energy are one and the same
thing, and so he uses the names in
discriminately. But he is further con
vinced, on grounds we shall see
presently, that matter and spirit (or
1 Yet even the writer of the article on Meta
physics in the 10th edition of the Encyclopedia
Britannica, who devotes two columns to the
Riddle, joins in this general misrepresentation,
�20
THE UNITY OF THE WORLD, AND THE LAW OF SUBSTANCE
force) are not two distinct entities or
natures, but two forms or two aspects of
one single reality, which he calls the
fundamental substance.
This
one
entity with the two attributes, this
matter-force substance, is the sole
reality that exists—to use a Greek word,
the motion—the one nature that presents
itself to our contemplation in the
infinitely varied panorama of the
universe.
This position is logically, as I said,
the culmination of Haeckel’s system.
For the convenience of this brief de
scription I take it as the starting point
of that network of explanations, theories,
and hypotheses which constitutes the
monistic philosophy. There is a most
important school of philosophers who
will challenge even the existence of this
matter-force substance, as we shall see
presently, but for the vast majority of
men of science, as well as of ordinary
folk, this matter-force element is the one
obvious reality. In this Haeckel’s cri
tics are at one with him. It is when
Haeckel goes on to say it is the sole —
mon-on—reality that the conflict begins.
The view which Haeckel opposes is that
there is another element in existence,
totally distinct from this matter-force
reality : that the mind of man cannot be
an evolution from the matter-force sub
stance, and that this substance itself
could not have evolved into the orderly
universe about us except under the guid
ance of a still higher intelligent principle,.
God. Now, it would be quite legitimate
to say that we are as yet so imperfectly
acquainted with this matter-force reality
that it is premature to say what it can o<cannot do. That is the Agnostic posi
tion, rejecting alike the dualist theory of
Mr. Ballard and the monistic explana
tions of Dr. Haeckel.1 But monism is
more ambitious.
Science has now
1 But I must repeat—so persistent is the mis
representation—that this agnostic position is as
antagonistic to Christianity as monism is. Its
quarrel with what it calls the premature theories
of the monist is a purely scientific or philosophical
matter, and is totally unconnected with religion.
amassed enormous quantities of facts
concerning every part and aspect of the
universe. The monist believes we can
already, with this material, sketch in
broad outline, at least, the upward
growth of the great world-substance
until it is transfigured in the beauty of
the living organism, and becomes selfconscious in the mind of man. Every
body admits to-day, says Mr. Mallock,
that the inorganic world is “an absolute
monism.”
The monist proceeds to
bring the realms of life and conscious
ness into this matter-force unity, and to
show that we are not warranted in claim
ing that its growth needs a designer or a
controller. He will go on until he has
embraced the whole life of humanity,
science, art, religion, and ethics, in his
single formula.
Do not misunderstand me to the
extent of supposing, as so many strangely
do, that the monist is bound to have a
theory ready for every phenomenon
under heaven. We find even the ablest
of Haeckel’s critics claiming that monism
breaks down here, or fails to explain
there, and then with a chant of praise
fluttering the banner of dualism in the
breach. Such a course is absurd. If
the monistic theory fails anywhere, the
next attitude that logic enforces is agnos
ticism, or reserve of judgment.
If
Haeckel’s theory of the origin of life, or
of heredity, or of consciousness, or of
morality, or of Christ, will not stand the
strain of rational examination, this does
not impair the general system of monism.
The heart of the system is (i) the affir
mation that a great matter-force sub
stance (or nature) is unrolling its poten
tialities in the universe about us
(which no one denies), and (2) that we
have no rational evidence that there exists
any other substance (or super-nature).
To say that Haeckel is bound to explain
everything or die, is a grotesque assump
tion.
He has plainly disavowed so
foolish an ambition. It may be that
before the last red rays of our dying sun
fall upon the eyes of the last of our race,
some millions of years hence, the mon-
�THE UNITY OF THE WORLD, AND THE LAW OF SUBSTANCE 21
bundle of sense-impressions which he
istic philosophy will be complete. That
quite gratuitously supposes to be caused
is the “ infinitely remote goal ” he spoke
by a material object, and his stomach.is
of. But, as I said, science has already
accumulated so vast a library of know a fiction. So with the whole of material
life. It is a kinematoscopic display in
ledge that we may venture even now to
draw the outline of an extensive view of the mind—not, as far as we know, taken
from life. Berkeley opined that God
the universe in the monistic sense. That
was the operator of the instrument.
is what Dr. Haeckel does in the Riddle,
Idealists generally have dispensed with
of the Universe. He has spent half a
the operator now. The show unwinds
century in seeking truth. He has fought
itself by some occult law of the mind.
side by side with the finest scientific
thinkers of the last century in overcom In either case “ this too, too solid flesh ”
ing an historic resistance on the part of does melt, and thaw into something
the Churches. No one who is not con thinner than “an everlasting dew,”
Matter is a mental construction, force
vinced that humanity has already, at the
very beginning of its higher life, reached is the same, the world they make up
cannot be otherwise.
There is, of
the final truth, will be diverted by the
course, the agnostic position, that we
sneers and gibes of heated partisans
do not know whether this kinematoscopic
from a patient study of his conclusions.
No one who believes that truth is a panorama is a photograph, or a diagram,
of a real world, or no. But all idealists,
sacred possession, and the first condition
and they are the vast majority in philo
of lasting progress—no one who feels
sophy to-day, sternly insist that the
that dignity and sincerity are the first
matter and force which the scientist
qualities required in its pursuit—will
manipulates are mental counters; that
allow himself to be turned from the true
he is dealing with his idea of matter and
and vital issues by a petty and frivolous
force, whether or no an eternal reality
criticism of irrelevant details.
corresponds to these. Hence it is that
The plan I have adopted is to state
so many cultivated reviewers set aside
first the almost undisputed unity of the
inorganic world, then proceed to con Haeckel’s system with polite disdain.
sider its evolution, and pursue the pro His realism—his habit of talking of
cess of development through the suc matter and force as familiar objective
cessive stages of life, consciousness, and realities—is too naive.
Now this philosophy so obviously cuts
reason. But I have already said that
an important group of philosophers chal out the root of Haeckel’s system that
some of his clerical critics have put on
lenge our right even to the inorganic
superior airs and borrowed phrases from
world as a base of operations. Age
it. If the very existence of matter and
after age philosophy has rung the changes
on the familiar bells—materialism, ideal force is doubtful, clearly monism is in a
parlous state. They forget one thing.
ism, spiritualism, realism. To-day the
system in favour in the schools is ideal If idealism excludes, or throws doubt on,
the objective reality of matter, it in the
ism. According to the idealists the
same proportion destroys the Christian
naive belief of the average man that he
position. What is the meaning of the
lives in a material universe, which lay
Incarnation, or the death of Christ, or
here in space before humanity began to
the whole historic foundation of Chris
furrow its soil, and will lie there still
tianity, if the material world and its
when the last man has dropped into his
eternal tomb, is a delusion. The arch history are subjective ? Dr. Iverach sees
this very well, and warns his impetuous
sophist, Berkeley, comes along, and
colleagues. “In truth,’’ he says, “we
explains that the orange he thinks he
must arrive at a conception which leaves
is vulgarly injecting into a material
cavity he calls a stomach, is only a room for real individuality; that will
�22
THE UNITY OF THE WORLD, AND THE LAW OF SUBSTANCE
recognise the uniqueness of every person,
and yet place every person in relation to
every other person and thing that is, has
been, or will be. It must allow reality
to history, and permit a real progress
and real events in it. It must recognise
human activity as a factor in the world’s
history, and recognise somehow that
good and evil, happiness and misery,
righteousness and sin, are not appear
ance, but stern realities, which philo
sophy and theology must deal with.”1
There are, of course, important divines
amongst the idealists, such as Dr. Caird,
but they are neither consistent nor likely
ever to be literally adopted.
The
Catholic Church is intensely realistic.
Its philosophers, Dr. Ward, Dr. Mivart,
Father Maher, Father Clark, etc., have
never yielded a step to the reigning
fashion of idealism. In a word, the
defenders of religion whom Haeckel
opposes are as “ naive realists ” as he is.
It is only the more short-sighted who
meddle with the edged tools of the
modern metaphysician.
But the philosophers themselves, the
aristocracy of the intellectual world!
Are we to go on with our construction
in total disregard of their protest ? I
believe Haeckel is quite right in doing
so. As Mr. Mallock says, these idealist
dreams are not “ the mere raving
which at first sight they seem to be.”
On the other hand, the common fashion
idealists have of saying that the man
who refuses to take them seriously must
be altogether ignorant of their philo
sophy—a species of arrogance peculiar
to idealists and Roman Catholics—is
absurd. Few cultivated men are ignorant
of their arguments.
But the average
man of science, the average historian,
and the average man of affairs, sweep
away their theory as, in the words of
Mr. Mallock, “a fantastic, though in
genious and learned, dream.2 “ If phi1 Theism in the Light of Present Science and
Philosophy, p. 305.
2 Religion as a Credible Doctrine, p. 202.
Mr. Mallock gives an admirable summary of the
system, as presented by its latest and ablest
expositor, Professor James Ward.
losophers,” he says again, “instead of
confining themselves to the solemn alti
tudes of existence . . . would conde
scend to take their examples from the
common events of life, they would avoid
many of the mistakes which expose
them to the just ridicule of the vulgar.”
The historian is hardly likely to admit
that the stupendous drama he is engaged
in reconstructing is not the real play of
living passion. The astronomer is not
prepared to see in the vast expanse of
the heavens only the unreal mirage
of his ideas.
The physicist contemp
tuously repudiates the idealist’s interpre
tation of his matter and force.
The
question is raised, said Sir A. Rucker, in
his presidential address to the British
Association in 1901, “whether our basic
conceptions are to be regarded as accu
rate descriptions of the constitution of the
universe around us, or merely convenient
fictions,” and he gave an emphatic adhe
sion to the former. His speech ended
with a claim that ether and the atom are
not mere mental fictions, not mere “ work
ing hypotheses,” but “objective realities.”
His successor in the presidency, Pro
fessor Dewar, no less strongly repudiated
“ the ancient mystifications by which a
certain school shatter the objective reality
of matter and energy.” Indeed, signs
are not wanting of a coming change
amongst the metaphysicians themselves.
The immense difficulty of explaining how
we can perceive an external world is
familiar enough to every thinking man.
But philosophy must try again.
The
material world is more convincing than
all their difficulties.
The article on
“ Metaphysics,” by Professor Case, in the
latest edition of our greatest Encyclopaedia
is one long warning that the reign, or the
nightmare, of idealism is over, and that
we shall shortly return through “the
anarchy of modern metaphysics ” (as he
says), to a normal belief in the reality of
a material world, the reality of war and
disease and poverty and ignorance, and
the rationality and validity of social
enthusiasm and scientific investigation.
With Professor Haeckel, then, we pass
�THE UNITY OF THE WORLD, AND THE LA W OF SUBSTANCE
by our perplexed metaphysicians, and
smile at their supercilious comments.
We turn to the spreading panorama of
inorganic nature as the first embodiment
of the monistic substance.1
There
should be no criticism for us to meet
here, but the eagerness to deny and to
discredit and to score a point—as if we
were conducting a mimic Parliament in
some dull provincial town, instead of
being sober searchers for truth—has
been so feverish that we shall find it
breaking out into all kinds of frivolous
criticisms.
When you look up at night into the
heavens you see some three or four
thousand stars scattered through space.
Each is an incandescent sphere, rarely
less than three million miles in circum
ference, and usually separated from its
fellows by billions of miles of space. It
would take some 175,000 years to count
the distance in miles to the nearest of
them. Some of them can be proved to
be at least 1,500,000,000,000,000 miles
away. With the use of a good telescope
the number of these world-masses runs
up to more than a hundred millions.
Yet even then we seem to be only at the
fringe of the question of the magnitude
of our universe. When a telescope
containing a highly sensitive photo
graphic plate is directed to what seem to
be dark and empty parts of space, and
is kept in that position for eight or ten
hours, the plate is found to bear the
faint imprint of a fresh myriad of worlds.
They are so far distant that, though they
are 150 times more luminous than lime
light, and though the waves of light they
send us have been falling on the plate—
1 A certain school would have us admit that,
because our conviction of the reality of the
external world is incapable of demonstrative sup
port, we should grant the same privilege to the
belief in God. There is no analogy whatever.
We cannot get away from our belief in the real
world. The idealists themselves assume it in
their arguments—as when they take the physi
cist’s analysis of sound or light, to throw doubt on
our hearing or sight. There is not a particle of
this irresistibility about the idea of God. We
can trace its roots and reject it without the
slightest inconsistency.
23
a plate that would take a picture in the
merest fraction of a second in day-time
— at the rate of 700,000,000,000,000
per second, many of them fail to make the
least impression after six or eight hours’
exposure. We have no ground for sup
posing our most powerful instruments
bring us to anything like a limit to the
universe.
Is the universe infinite? Dr. Haeckel
speaks of it as infinite and eternal, and
this is just one of those typical cases
where the monist outruns the agnostic.
The criticisms which have been passed
on the phrase “ infinite ” (we shall speak
of eternity later), as applied to the
material universe, are not very dis
cerning. There are critics who imagine
that Haeckel must advance no statement
for which he cannot furnish empirical
proof; whereas he has told us from the
first page that, as a sensible thinker, he
employs his faculty of speculation
(taking care that it starts from facts) as
well as his power of observation. Then
there are critics who insist on thinking—
it is very convenient for their purpose—
that he lays the same stress on every line
of his system, and so cry “ dogmatism ”
wherever the evidence is slender. We
must approach the subject more reason
ably. The question is, does the evidence
of astronomy point in the direction of
limits or of illimitableness ? Philosophy
has nothing to say against the infinity of
the cosmos. “We have no evidence,”
says Dr. Ward, “of definite space and
time limits; quite the contrary. ... we
certainly cannot prove that the universe
as a whole is measurable and therefore
finite. And when we pass to more
purely a priori considerations, the case
against a universe with fixed and finite
limits is equally strong.”1 The idea of
a limit is in fact unthinkable, and the
evidence of astronomy is far from sug
gesting it. “Is the universe infinite?
Who can say ? ” asks Dr. Dallinger.
He refers to the fairly definite scheme of
1 Naturalism and Agnosticism, vol. i. p. 195.
Dr. Ward does not, of course, say the cosmos is
infinite.
�24
THE UNITY OF THE WORLD, AND THE LA W OF SUBSTANCE
our milky way, but says 11 it may be but
a complex particle in a universe of
universes, stretching on for ever and
ever over the bourneless immensity of
the unknown.”1 Briefly, what evidence
we have is totally against the idea of a
limit, and that idea is so unimaginable
that it would never have been suggested
but for theological considerations. Dr.
Haeckel prefers to rely on the scientific
indications. I reserve for a separate
chapter the discussion of Prof. Wallace’s
curious views on the subject.
The next step that science takes is to
establish the unity of this immeasurable
universe. There is no question to-day
about the identity of the matter which
composes these innumerable and widely
distant worlds. The spectroscope is a
more delicate analyst than the apparatus
of the chemist. It has detected poison
and convicted criminals where chemistry
has been mute. And the spectroscope
will tell us the chemical constituents of
Arcturus, 1,500,000,000,000,000 miles
away, as confidently as it ■will analyse
the matter in the laboratory. It needs
for its operation only a ray of light from
the matter in question. We have thus
learned that the material of the stars is
the same as that of our earth. We may
find different elements here and there;
we may find matter in states we cannot
detect or produce on earth. But the
ancient idea that the heavens were made
of a superior substance is totally dis
credited. From end to end of the
known universe matter is one. It is
also established that a more subtle form
of matter, called ether, fills the inter
stellar spaces and penetrates into the
very heart of the most solid substances.
Even the apparently rigid particles of a
1 The Creator, p. 14. Strange to say, Dr.
Dallinger immediately continues: “If that be
so, we can make no useful inference from our
finite universe ” : and shortly after actually infers
that the world was created on the ground that it
is “finite”! “What is finite begins to be,
must have been caused to be” (p. 14). If
Haeckel had proceeded in this slovenly fashion,
what an outcry there would have been.
block of iron are really swimming in
miniature oceans of ether.
But this is not unity, it is a wonderful
variety, some of the critics exclaim; you
give us ether on the one hand and some
seventy-four different kinds of ponderable
matter on the other. The latter part of
the objection is not now seriously urged.
For years the indications in chemistry
pointed towards a real unity of the chemi
cal elements, and to-day no one has any
doubt whatever that they are all multi
ples of some simpler form of atom. The
unity of oxygen, hydrogen, iron, gold, and
so on, is completely accepted. Astrono
mers have observed in some of the stars
matter which seems to be actually in a
transition stage; and physics, which has
made gigantic strides of late, seems to
have detected the same phenomenon in
its laboratories, as Sir O. Lodge points
out in his brilliant Romanes Lecture for
1903. The elements have been built
up by evolution from some simpler and
homogeneous substance. That is the
belief of all physicists and chemists, and
it is based on a mass of facts. Mr.
Ballard thinks it useful, or wise, to raise
the dust even here. He says (third
article—not the one in which he charges
Haeckel with dogmatism) that Haeckel
frankly confesses—as he does—his lack
of expert knowledge of physics, and adds
that these “ ultimate questions of mole
cular physics of necessity determine our
conceptions of the constitution of matter,
and so are fundamental to the whole of
his monistic theory.” This is mere dust
throwing. The unity of matter is a
necessary part of the monistic theory,
but this is given in the commonest and
the finest manuals of physics as an
established and accepted truth; how the
various elements arose from one form of
matter is a subject of merely speculative
interest to Dr. Haeckel, and is not yet
settled. But Mr. Ballard plunges deeper,
and says Haeckel’s confession of weak
ness in physics “ does not prevent his
recommending ‘ the brilliant pyknotic
theory ’ of J. C. Vogt to the acceptance
of every biologist.” Then he begs the
�THE LAW OF SUBSTANCE 25
THE UNITY OF THE WORLD, AND
reader to study the stale criticisms of
Mr. Stallo “before accepting the VogtHaeckel theory as final,” and later says
Haeckel “decides that the conception
which best suits his purpose is the one
to be generally received.”
He then
reads a lesson on the impropriety of
misleading people, and, finally, after a
bewilderingly tortuous run, appeals to
the expert physicists Stewart and Tait
and Lord Kelvin to prove—quite irrele
vantly—that there is a Supreme Being.
The whole passage is too ludicrous to
analyse in detail, but I must point out
two things. Firstly, Mr. Ballard has no
more doubt than I have of the unity, of
matter, which is the only serious point
in question; Haeckel can fit into his
system any theory of the. evolution of
matter that physicists decide to adopt.
Secondly, Mr. Ballard quite misrepre
sents Haeckel’s attitude towards the
“pyknotic theory.” He does not say
“it is the one to be generally received,”
but says (p. 78) he “thinks it will prove
more acceptable to every biologist who
believes in the unity of nature” than
the other theory. The foolishness of
the whole episode is seen when one
reflects that this somewhat old (1891)
theory of Vogt’s is infinitely nearer to
the theories which are being discussed
to-day than the “ kinetic ” theory which
he dislikes.
The unity of all ponderable matter is,
then, an accepted doctrine, but we meet
fresh difficulties when we turn to ask if
there is a unity of ponderable and im
ponderable matter (or ether). . Here, in
deed, we meet a critic of a friendly dis
position whom it is courteous to hear. A
writer in the Reformer says, “ it will be
news to most of us that the ether is. the
original and fundamental matter, since
it is in its properties, so far as known,
pretty nearly the antithesis of all we
understand by material ”; and he
describes ether as “a material substance
which has none of the properties of
matter, and has most of those usually
associated with spirit.” Whether ether
has the properties of spirit or no depends
on what we mean by spirit. Theologians
mean nothing like ether, but spiritists
(who seem to be generally materialists
unconsciously) frequently do.
In any
case both Sir O. Lodge and Sir A.
Rucker meet the objection for us. Sir O.
Lodge, in his Romanes Lecture (1903),
says some physicists admit two kinds of
inertia, and he himself boldly advocates
the unity of electricity and ponderable
matter. “ An electric charge,” he says
(p. 4), “ possesses the most fundamental
and characteristic properties of matter,
viz., mass or inertia.” Sir A. Rucker, in
his presidential speech (1901), sweeps
the objection away as unphilosophical.
“ We cannot,” he says, “ explain things by
the things themselves.
If it be true
that the properties of matter are the
product of an underlying machinery,
that machinery cannot itself have the
properties which it produces, and must,
to that extent at all events, differ from
matter in bulk as it is directly presented
to the senses.”1 The affinity of ether
and ponderable matter is not questioned
in science, whatever the actual degree
of affinity may prove to be. And the
proof is advancing rapidly. I have said
that the astro-physicist finds a . transi
tional matter in the heavenly bodies, and
now the terrestrial physicist announces 2
that in his experiments with the new
element, radium, he witnesses the actual
break-down of the ponderable atom into
a form of matter he associates with
electricity. In fact, every modern theory
1 These principles also dispose of the critic in
Light who finds Haeckel “very uneasy” at
having to fit ether into his scheme, and thinks
his “ annexing ” it is “desperate work at this
hour of the day.” Seeing that the whole trend
of physics has been ever since in the direction
which Haeckel follows, I should say the criticism
is “ desperate work.” Light thinks ether is
“ending the old materialism ” and making for
spiritist monism. As I said, it depends what
you mean by spirit. Religious philosophy has
always meant “ unextended substance.
Ether
is just as quantitative as the most ponderable of
the elements.
2 See Sir O. Lodge’s Romanes Lecture, 1903,
and the discussion at the recent British Associa
tion meeting.
�26
™E miTY 0F ™E WORLD, AND THE LAW OF SUBSTANCE
of the atom implies its origin from ether,
’
what does Haeckel mean by making this
or their common origin.
’
reality, or substance, of which they are
Haeckel is, therefore, fully justified in
the . manifestations, the central mystery
taking from physics and chemistry his
of life at one moment, and doubting its
thesis of the unity of matter. No man
very existence the next ? A patient ex
of science disputes it, and it is a purely
amination of what Haeckel says, and a
scientific question. With regard to the
little less eagerness to score rhetorical
unity of force, there is even less difficulty.
It is now notorious that the forces of the points, would have enabled Mr. Rhondda
Williams and other critics to see what
universe are interchangeable, and are
he meant. He warned them that the
regarded in physics as so many varieties Riddle'^ a sort of “sketch-book,” and
(chiefly differentiated by wave-movements
they might have expected a lack of com
of different lengths) of one fundamental
plete harmony of expression. Haeckel
energy. I am not, of course, including says (p. 134): “We must even grant that
here the disputed “ vital force ” and the
this essence of substance [more cor
human soul, which later chapters will
rectly, the essence of this substance]
discuss. But the unity of the forces with becomes more mysterious and enigmatic
which the physical sciences deal is beyond the deeper we penetrate into the know
dispute. We have thus so far simplified
ledge of its attributes, matter and energy,
the visible universe as to detect beneath and the more thoroughly we study its
its kaleidoscopic variety the operation of
countless phenomenal forms and their
one form of force and one form of matter evolution. We do not know the ‘thing
from end to end of the universe. The
in itself’ that lies behind these know
next and final step as far as the unity of able phenomena. But why trouble about
the material universe is concerned is to
this enigmatic ‘thing in itself’ when
bring together this matter and force
we have no means of investigating it,
themselves.
when we do not even clearly know
Dr. Haeckel has done this by saying whether it exists or no ? ” The Greeks
that matter and force (or spirit) are “ the long ago started the notion that the
two fundamental attributes, or principal properties or attributes of a thing were
properties, of the all-embracing divine
really distinct from its substance. The
essence of the world, the universal sub mediaeval philosophers made them as
stance.” He further admits that “ the distinct as the skin is from a potato, and
innermost character ” of this substance so it became a general custom to speak
is still totally unexplored; and in the end
of the essence or substance of a thing as
seems to question its existence altogether being hidden within or underneath a
(P- I34)- Here, of course, the critics
shell of properties. The senses stopped
are active. In the first place let us
short at the shell, but the intellect some
examine the alleged arbitrariness of this
how penetrated to the kernel. Kant’s
conjunction of matter and force. It is
critical philosophy destroyed this sup
a perfectly sound scientific and philo posed privilege of the intellect, but
sophic procedure. We not only know substituted for the substance-and-prono form of matter without force, but we perties idea the equally false and arbi
cannot imagine it. It could not act on trary notion of phenomena (qualities or
our organs of perception. On the other attributes that reach the senses) and
hand, we know no force apart from matter noumena (or “ things-in-themselves,”
(or ether). Force seems to be always which would be food for the intellect, if
embodied or substantiated in matter.
it could reach them). In both cases
Each is an incomplete reality; or, rather,
there is the veil of phenomena, or pro
they are two sides, or two different mani perties (colour, sound, shape, etc.), and
festations, of one reality.
That is in the veiled and inaccessible substance,
full accord with scientific teaching. But j <or essence, or noumenon. Now, many
�THE UNITY OF THE WORLD, AND THE LAW OF SUBSTANCE
of us deny to-day that there is any solid
ground for the distinction at all, and that
is what Haeckel means. You say, he
argues, that matter and force are only
phenomena, and that there is an under
lying “thing-in-itself.” If there is, he
says, it is as mysterious as ever; but I
see no good reason at all for thinking
that matter and force are a screen or
veil hiding something else. They are
the one eternal substance or reality. It
is a pure fallacy to say tnat in oidinary
experience we are dealing with a shell, of
properties or phenomena, and not with
the realities themselves.
Therefore—
logic sternly enjoining us never to multi
ply entities without necessity—I take it
that matter and force are the world-sub
stance breaking upon our perception in
two different ways.1
To illustrate the point , further, and to
meet a further class of critics, let us hear
what science says about these properties
or phenomena of things. Let us take
the familiar ones, sound and colour,
Are you unaware, we are severely asked,
that science has shown these to be
totally subjective ? Yes, I am quite un
aware ", though I know perfectly well
what science has done. I am writing
over a green table-cloth. Science tells
me that this really means that the
material covering my table, is of such a
molecular texture that it absorbs. a
number of the waves of sun-light which
fall upon it, and only reflects the blue
and yellow waves. These it sends to my
retina at the rate of some hundred
billion per second: they cause a
peculiar movement in my optic nerve,
and finally in my brain, and—I see green.
So, as I write, the clock strikes twelve.
That is to say, the metal molecules of
the bell are thrown into a violent
oscillation; they cause waves in the
surrounding atmosphere; and the in
tricate mechanism of the ear turns these
into a modification of my auscultory
nerve and brain. And all this elaborate
description of objective movements and
objective agencies is supposed, to.have
made colour and sound “subjective.!
In point of fact, it has done away, with
the old shell of properties (though, it is a
question how far people ever did say
their sensations of colour and sound
were objective) and brought us into
direct touch with realities. And as all
the unnumbered objects about us con
stitute, fundamentally, one matter and
one force, we are face to face with the
one fundamental reality. We do not
“ know all about it.”
That is the
grossest perversion of Haeckel’s words.
To borrow the fine metaphor of Sir A.
Rucker, we see it in a light that is still
dim, but we see it. It is for the future
to complete the outline and fill in the
detail, as the light grows.1
Thus we have given in terms of
science the world substance, the matter
force reality, which is the constructive
starting point of Monism. The res^
our work consists in eliminating the
additional substances or forces which
theists, spiritualists, or supernaturalists
would compel us to add to it. It only
remains here to say a word of what
Haeckel calls the fundamental “law of
substance.” And first as to Haeckels
idea of a “law.” A fair-minded re
viewer in the Inquirer (March 9, 1901)
says: “The distinguished author seems
to have failed to see that to imagine a
law as an active power is every whit as
‘ anthropomorphic ’ as to imagine a God
of manlike form as feeling.” A writer in
Knowledge (January 30, 1901)—from
whom the Inquirer probably borrowed—
1 From these principles the reader can answer
for himself the often-heard criticism : You build
up the universe by matter and force, but what
do you really know about matter and force themselves ? The answer is : Go to a good library,
and ask for a few recent manuals of astronomy,
geology, chemistry, physics, and physiology. If
they do not deal with matter and force,, they
deal with fictions. The fallacy of the criticism
1 And that is not only the literal, but the only
is, of course, that science deals with this lmposrational, meaning of “phenomenon.”
Prof.
I torly shell of “ phenomena,” and does not reach
Haeckel readily endorses my explanation of his
I the “ essence ” or the “ underlying reality.”
position.
�28
THE UNITY OF THE WORLD, AND THE LA W OF SUBSTANCE
puts it as strongly : “ To scientific minds
tion of energy—which are, said the
who regard laws of nature as merely con Manchester Guardian critic, “precisely
ceptual formulae summing up certain
the oldest of all man’s discoveries in
sequences of experience, it may seem
the cosmological field.”
No particle
that to replace a deliberate architect and
of matter is ever annihilated or created ;
ruler of the world by 1 the eternal iron
that is the first axiom. Recent experi
laws of nature ’ is to be guilty of an
ments have actually seen the break
anthropomorphism precisely analogous to down of what has been called the
those on which the illustrious author
atom, and have seen particles chipped
pours contempt,” and he says, “ evolution off it; but only another form of matter
travels through the book like a creator is produced. The observations have
in disguise.” It would be rather curious
been so broad that physicists have felt
if one of the ablest living scientists did justified in concluding that indestructi
not know what science means by “ a law.”
bility or permanence is a property of
I .say science, because there is here no
matter. The same has been experi
discrepancy of views. That “ law ” only mentally demonstrated of force.1 Both
means “a summing-up of experience,” a are constant in quantity, though ever
uniform mode of action of this or that changing in form and distribution.
force, is a platitude of natural science.
Since we have seen reason for associat
Said Professor Dewar in his Presidential ing matter and force so closely, it is
Speech: “ When the scientist speaks of necessary to combine the two axioms
‘ a law of nature ’ he simply indicates a likewise. The great fundamental reality
sequence of events, which, so far as his
is constant or permanent amidst all its
experience goes, is invariable, and which qualitative changes. That is the first
therefore enables him to predict.” But and firmest law or feature of the monistic
the “law,” or mode of operation, of an
substance.
agency is so closely connected in our
We have now seen that Professor
minds with the agency itself that we fre Haeckel is in full accord with the latest
quently substitute the one for the other.
scientific teaching in his doctrine of the
It is strange to hear that this deceives
unity of the visible world. We have
any one.1 When a scientist speaks of the
seen(i) that matter and force are
law of gravitation, or the law of evolution,
realities; (2) that there is at bottom one
producing or compelling certain results,’
supreme form of each; (3) that there is
he invariably means the force of gravita no reason for holding them to be
tion or the agencies of evolution.
distinct realities, and so we unite them
We come, finally, to what Mr. Ballard as aspects of one substance or reality;
strangely calls Haeckel’s “ irrational law and (4) that this substance is, as far as
of substance.” The law of substance is extended observation goes, constant and
one of the most undoubted truths of indestructible in its quantity. We may
modern science. It is merely the union
now proceed to consider the evolution of
in one sentence of two of the proudest this matter-force reality into the infinite
results of modern physics, the inde complexity of the visible universe.
structibility of matter and the conserva{( 1 Does any one quarrel with us for saying that
“the law” compels us to pay taxes, and so
forth ?
1.'^s 10 t^le difficulty alleged to rise from
radio-action, Sir O. Lodge says there was
“never any ground” for concern about the
theory.
�THE EVOLUTION OF THE INORGANIC WORLD
29
Chapter III
THE EVOLUTION OF THE INORGANIC WORLD
Dr. Iverach says, or it may have been one
hundred or more, as others think—the
part of space we occupy was filled with
a cloud (not necessarily a “ fire-mist ”) of
infinitely attenuated matter. By the
action of its inherent and natural forces
this nebular matter entered upon a pro
cess of condensation and disruption.
Portions of it—whether or no they were
cast off in the form of rings, which
broke into irregular masses—condensed
into the several planets of our system,
and were set in revolution round the
central mass. This central mass, the
sun, is still condensing and pouring out
the heat which its compression causes.
The smaller masses, such as the earth,
cooled in time and formed a solid crust
at their surface. This outline is
accepted by all educated people to-day.
Quibbles about the details of the pro
cess are best left to expert astronomers
to deal with.
Our solar system is as a single snow
flake in a shower, but we have already
seen that it in every verifiable way
resembles its fellow flakes. It is of the
same stuff as they, and is ruled by the
same laws or forces. We have un
deniable ground to extend our nebular
theory to other worlds than ours, and
take it as the key to the formation of
all the stars that fill the immeasurable
heavens.
Indeed, we find worlds in
every stage of development, as required
by the theory, when we sweep the sky
at night.
We find nebulse stretching
sometimes over billions of miles (as
the nebula in Orion), and patches cut
out of them, as it were, to form stars.
We find clusters of thousands of stars
(as the Pleiades) with the remnants
still clinging to them of the gigantic
nebula they were developed from. We
1 Theism in the Light of Present Science and
find nebulse and stars illustrating almost
Philosophy, p. 35.
Where shall we begin in a descrip
tion of the growth of the universe?
Can we go back' to a stage beyond
which the imagination cannot penetrate
with its ceaseless questioning? It is
impossible for us to hope ever to do
this. Wherever we start in our con
struction, we shall start with positive
building material, and the imagination,
if not reason, will ask endless questions
about its previous history. All that we
can do is to set out from a definite and
recognised point, the nebula from which
our particular solar system has been
formed. From this, once we have
traced the broad lines of the evolution
of our sun and planets, we may, in. the
light of the discoveries and speculations
of modern science, look back into the
appalling abysses of past time and out
over the boundless panorama of the
universe.
With what is known as the nebular
hypothesis we need not linger. Haeckel
has sketched the outline of the theory,
and there is no relevant criticism of it.
“ There is no doubt,” says Dr. Iverach,
“ that some form of the nebular theory
is true.”1 There are clerical writers
who seem to think it profitable in some
obscure way to point out defects in the
theory, or to prove that the evidence for
it is not overwhelming. What they
gain by such efforts is not clear. The
question has long since passed beyond
the sphere of theology. Catholic
astronomers like Miss Agnes Clerke
accept it as eagerly as atheists. No
man of science entertains the smallest
doubt to-day that it correctly describes
in outline the formation of our solar
system. Once upon a time—it may
have been fifty million years ago, as
�3o
THE EVOLUTION OF THE INORGANIC WORLD
every step of the process.
We find
dark stars, extinct suns, which point
to the complete accomplishment of
such a process.
Astronomers are of
late years disposed to think the number
of these extinct suns is enormous.
Moreover, at times a new star flames out
in the sky, announcing the recommence
ment somewhere of the familiar drama
of world-formation.
In a word, the evidence of astronomy
forbids us to look upon the evolution
of the material universe as a continuous
process in a straight line of which we
might picture a definite beginning
and for which we might anticipate a
definite end.
The life-force of the
great substance only dies down in one
corner of space to be relit in another.
The dark stars which indubitably have
run their million-year long course are
only waiting to be reanimated by collision
or some other cosmic accident.
The
nebulae are embryonic worlds before our
own eyes. The blue-white stars are in
the prime of life. The red stars (with
certain peculiarities) are slowly dying,
but may rise again any day from their
tombs. Science, as Dr. Mivart said in
Truth, “ points to no beginning.” Nor
does it help us to approach the subject
from another point of view. We have
not only the evolution of cosmic masses
to explain, but the evolution of the
chemical elements themselves, or of
ponderable matter, from the finer
medium from which all physicists
believe it has been developed. If we
had any scientific evidence which
justified us in going back to a stage
when ether (or whatever the “ prothyl ”
may turn out to be) alone existed; and
could then show how atoms of ponder
able matter arose by condensation of it,
or by the formation of vortices in it;
and could see these atoms being
grouped into the complex atoms of
oxygen, gold, sulphur, &c.; and could
further, trace their aggregation into
meteorites, and the meteorites into
nebulae, and the nebulae into solar
systems—even then we should in
reality be no nearer the beginning.
The “ prothyl ” (or “ first matter,” a
name which does very well to designate
the much-sought elementary substance)
might very well be only the last term of
a previous universe-drama. The cyclic
process may have gone on for ever as
far as science can tell. But in point of
fact the universe does not as yet give
indications of any such continuous
process.
The universe is developed
piecemeal, star by star. The hundred
millions that we see shining to-day are
by no means “the universe.”
We have here a drama of life and
death on an almost inconceivable scale,
but the point I want to bring out is that
even the most daring speculations of
science bring us no nearer to a begin
ning than we are to-day. Dr. Haeckel
has been roundly abused for speaking of
the universe as eternal. I think it is
quite clear that, if we confine ourselves
to scientific considerations, he is using a
very proper kind of language. Here is
a matter-force reality which is constant
and indestructible in its ultimate quan
tity ; and though we can go back millions
of years on solid evidence, and billions
of years on fair speculation, we find no
more suggestion of a limit in time than
we did in regard to space. Certainly,
the greatest number of billions of years
we could imagine would not be nearer
to eternity than a day is. I merely say
that if any one suggests a limit in time
for the cosmic process he will not find
the shadow of a justification in science.
Critics seem at times to employ a curious
logic in dealing with this question.
“Finiteness” and “infinity” are words
with a strong odour of metaphysics about
them. Let us take it that it is a question
simply whether the universe had a be
ginning.
Now, some critics naively
assume that it is our place to prove that
the universe, or matter, or force, or
motion, never had a beginning. That
is a novel kind of logic. Here is the
universe given, and if any one makes the
very pregnant and formidable assertion
that there was a time when it did not
�THE EVOLUTION OF THE INORGANIC WORLD
exist, and that it came into existence
out of nothing, he must have. a very
positive and firm ground for his asser
tion. As far as scientific experience of
matter and force (or motion) goes, they
are not entities that slip in and out of
existence, but are constant. Yet we
have Mr. Rhondda Williams talking of
“ the mystery of the primitive push ” as
having always been the great difficulty
of mechanism. He tries at first to make
a scientific difficulty of it: “ Galileo,
the founder of physical science, laid it
down as the first principle of dynamics,
that every movement of matter could
only be explained by another movement
of matter, and that has been a recognised
principle of science ever since.” 1 Well,
that looks like a very strong confirma
tion of Haeckel’s thesis that matter and
motion must be eternal. But Mr. Wil
liams goes on : “ The difficulty was to
explain how matter began to move, what
caused the first movement, what gave
the primitive push ? ” But science, we
have seen, knows nothing whatever about
any “ primitive push.” It is a purely
gratuitous assumption. Dr. Horton might
refer us to “ the matchless revelation of
Genesis,” and we might suggest that the
Babylonian astronomers of 6,000 years
ago are not very safe guides. Mr. Wil
liams is content to assume the fact of
this “primitive push” without saying
why he thinks there was one. More
than that, he is greatly excited because
Haeckel declines to attempt to explain
it until some good reason has been
shown for thinking there ever was such
a thing. He tell his admiring audience
that Haeckel says “ the origin of move
ment is no difficulty because it never did
originate, he explains by simply denying !
What evidence does he adduce ? Abso
lutely none.” Dr. Haeckel, one would
think, can hardly be expected to spend
time in finding scientific proofs for the
first chapter of Genesis. His position is
negative. Eternity is a negative concept.
We do not prove negations in logic, or
1 Does Science Destroy Religion? (p. 13).
31
in real life. Mr. Williams further says
he has no objection to Haeckel holding
this “as a belief,” but he “does object
to his contention that this type of monism
is based upon empirical investigation.”
This is an unfortunate confusion. The
essence of Haeckel’s position is negative.
But he goes beyond the agnostic chiefly
on the ground of (1) the astronomical
evidence, and (2) the constancy of
matter; and those constitute empirical
evidence.
But to take them as more
than suggestions, and to ask empirical
proof that the world is eternal is rather
funny.
Finally, Mr. Williams says
Haeckel is equally unsatisfactory, about
the origin of consciousness. This just
illustrates Mr. Williams’s essential con
fusion. We know that consciousness
had a beginning, so there is no analogy ;
and in point of fact Haeckel, as we shall
see, devotes whole chapters to the origin
of consciousness.
Now this is a fair illustration of the
dreadful confusion which rules in the
minds of the people who put on very
superior airs about Haeckel’s “ dog
matic ” affirmation that the universe is
infinite and eternal. They almost al
ways assume, often in sweet unconscious
ness, this most important thesis that
there was a time when matter or motion
was not. It is one of the largest asser
tions that was ever made on the poorest
of sophisms. The scientific evidence,
such as it is, favours Haeckel’s negative
attitude.1 Philosophy is equally mute.
1 It is true that Mr. Mallock thinks one might
plausibly infer from what is called the entropy of
the universe that it had a beginning. This is the
only case where Mr. Mallock allows that scientific
evidence even seems to help theism. But we
shall soon see that the theory of entropy is totally
unable to bear the strain of such an inference.
Sir J. W. Dawson, one of the scientists Mr. Bal
lard raises from the dead to answer the Riddle,
says science does not regard the universe as
eternal “because, when we interrogate it as to
the particular things known to constitute the
heavens and the earth, it appears that we can
trace all of them to beginnings at more or less
definite points of past time.” Even at the time
this was written it was false in fact and unsound
in logic.
�32
THE EVOLUTION OF THE INORGANIC WORLD
The Greeks held that matter was eternal.
“It is not more difficult,” says Mr.
Mallock, “to suppose an eternal, self
existing and self-energising substance
than it is to suppose an eternal and
self-energising God.” But Christian
scholars have, in the interest of dogma,
tried to prove that the universe must
have had a beginning. We have seen
how Dr. Dallinger skipped from “ bourne
less immensity ” to “ finiteness,” and
concluded that “ what is finite begins to
be.” The last link of his curious chain
is hardly better than the others. Dr.
Iverach suggests the argument, but
abandons it (Ch. I., Christianity and
Evolution}. Dr. W. N. Clarke says:
“The things that we behold, mutable
though magnificent, bear the marks, not
of original, but of dependent existence.
Somehow existence has been caused.”1
Such an argument could only be
elaborated with the aid of a mediseval
metaphysic which we do not take to-day
as a measure of things. Dr. Clarke,
indeed, retreats to the position that even
if it were eternal we should need a
“ character-giving Spirit ” along with it;
a point we shall discuss later.
To sum up: neither philosophy nor
science points to a beginning of the
scheme of things. In view of the con
stancy of matter and the inconceivability
of a creation out of nothing, very strong
evidence would have been required to
make us accept this beginning. As it is,
the only source of the assertion is the
first line of Genesis and a concern for
theistic evidence. Professor Haeckel
has preferred to be guided by the sug
gestions or indications afforded by
scientific evidence. “ Science points to
no beginning,” as Mivart wrote. “We
have no evidence of definite space and
time limits; quite the contrary. . . .
And when we pass to more purely
a priori considerations, the case against
a universe with fixed and finite limits is
equally strong.” 2 Every effort to assign
1 An Outline of Christian Theology, p. 109.
2 l’rof J. Ward, quoted previously.
a beginning fails. We should never have
heard of it but for “ the matchless reve
lation of Genesis.”
Let us now turn to consider whether
science has anything to say with regard
to the end of the universe. As far as
our solar system is concerned, the
teaching of science is firm. Our sun
can only sustain his terrible vitality by
shrinking a certain number of feet every
century. He is doomed, as far as
astronomy can see, to die, like the dark
stars that already lie in the vast cemetery
of space. The air and water will dis
appear from the surface of our planet,
and for a time the heat of the sun will
beat upon the white tomb of all the
hopes and all the achievements of
humanity. The moon is the skeleton
at our feast. Its yawning sepulchre
points out the fate that awaits us.
Thou too, oh earth—thine empires, lands, and
seas—
Least, with thy stars, of all the galaxies,
Globed from the drift like these, like these
thou too
Shalt go. Thou art going, hour by hour, like
these.1
Perhaps Jupiter and Saturn will even
then teem with life, and their astronomers
study nightly the scarred and silent face
of the planet we enliven to-day.2 But
from planet to planet the hand of death
will travel. Then one by one, astrono
mers believe, the planets will fall into
the shrinking bosom of the sun and eke
out its failing vitality. At last the
blood-red sun will die out, and continue
to speed through space at twelve miles
a second, a dark, solid, silent, and
gigantic sepulchre. Physicists talk of
ten million years. It is an hour in
eternity.
1 Mr. Mallock’s Lucretius.
2 When Prof. Lionel Beale says (Vitality,
p. 4) that “ the more recent discoveries as to the
constitution of our sun and the planets as well
as the fixed stars, render it most improbable that
life exists in these or other orbs,” one can only
gasp with astonishment. There is no truth
whatever in it; and the mere idea of people
living in the stars—at a temperature of several
thousand degrees—makes one uncomfortable.
�THE EVOLUTION OF THE INORGANIC WORLD
For this is only a relative end. The
whole hundred-million-year drama of our
history will be, in our present cosmical
perspective, only the subsidence of a
tiny ripple on the bosom of an illimitable
ocean. Millions of similar dramas had
been played out before ours began; and
when silence shall have fallen succes
sively on the planets of our system, the
great nebulae that lie against the back
ground of space will be but waking into
existence. Moreover, the dark stars, and
the new stars that appear at times in the
heavens, point to an indefinite prolonga
tion of the process. The colliding of two
of these extinct suns—two globes of per
haps 800,000 miles diameter (like the dark
companion of Algol)-—would generate
heat enough to reduce them to a nebu
lous mass, pouring out for millions, if not
billions, of miles ; and the force of gravi
tation would ensure a further condensa
tion and world-formation. Actual collision
is, indeed, net believed to be necessary ;
in cases an approach within a few million
miles is believed to have led to a stellar
conflagration. Moreover, there are stars
so stupendous (take Arcturus, for in
stance), and moving at such inconceivable
speed through the universe, that we can
only look upon them as destructive
anarchists.
The universe, taken as a
whole, has all the appearance and promise
of “ perpetual motion.”
Recent writers have, however, appealed
to the theory of entropy as a scientific
indication of an end of the process.
Briefly, all energy can be (and is daily)
converted into heat, but heat is not all
reconverted into electricity, &c. This
seems to forecast a time when all the
working energy of the universe will be
dissipated, or lost in a generally diffused
heat.
Mr. Mallock has pointed out
(though Lord Grimthorpe and others had
done so years ago) that if this were true
the universe cannot have been eternal.
We should have reached the final stage
long ago. Haeckel has described and re
jected the theory. It only remains for me
to show how the very latest pronounce
ments of science quite confirm his posi
33
tion. Physicists generally are by no means
disposed to allow that, because in our
laboratories a certain quantity of the heat
force cannot be reconverted, we may
jump to a cosmic conclusion on the
matter. Mr. Mallock admits that many
physicists reject it altogether, “ but
since others equally eminent maintain
that there is no escape from it—so far at
least as our present knowledge extends
—it is necessary to consider how it may
bear on the point at issue.”
The
parenthetic clause contains the essential
weakness of the theory. It assumes an
acquaintance with cosmic processes
which science is very far from possessing.
Sir O. Lodge deals with the point
incidentally in his recent Romanes
Lecture. “ So long,” he says, “ as there
is only a force of one sign at work it
would seem that ultimately the regenera
tive process must come to an end. The
repellent force exerted by light upon
small particles, however, must not be
forgotten ; and there are other possibili
ties.”
These possibilities have been
emphasised by the most recent discoveries
in physics, in connection with radio
action, so that Haeckel was more than
justified in declining to accept the hasty
and unwarranted conclusions of the
entropists.
Sir O. Lodge suggests an analogous
theory with regard to matter—a kind of
entropy of matter—but he suggests only
to reject it. He and many distinguished
physicists see in the phenomena of
radium, which have so greatly agitated
the world of physicists of late, an actual
breakdown of the atom. Electrons (units
of electricity) are detached from matter
at an electrode, and it is believed that
these electrons are really “ bits chipped
off” the .Acr'0 It is a “reasonable
hypothesis ” that an atom of ponderable
matter is made up of these electrons.
An atom of hydrogen is something like
the hundred-millionth of a centimetre in
diameter; yet an electron has only about
one-thousandth the mass of an atom of
hydrogen.
It is calculated that 700
electrons would go to make the hydrogen
c
�34
THE EVOLUTION OF THE INORGANIC WORLD
atom, 11,200 to make the atom of oxy
gen, and so on with the other elements.
Not that these electrons are to be pic
tured as locked in each other’s embraces
to form a solid atom. If the atom were
magnified to the size of the Sheldonian
Theatre, its constituent electrons would
be “ like full-stops flying about the
room.” They occupy the atom by their
forceful activity, not by bulk. These
electrons are thought to be the ultimate
units of which the atoms of ponderable
elements are built—though no doubt Sir
Oliver would allow that there remains
the question of the formation of these
electrons themselves from a continuous
medium.
But the most curious fact
is that in the experiments on radium
the atoms seem to disintegrate and give
rise to other forms of matter, which break
up in their turn. This seems to point to
a dissipation of matter into electrons cor
responding to the dissipation of force into
heat. But Sir O. Lodge reminds us at
once of the impropriety of founding such
large cosmic theories on our laboratory
experiments. ‘'‘There may be regenera
tion as well as degeneration,” he urges,
and he points to the analogy of the
collision of stars.1 Theoretical physics
is making rapid pace to-day—too rapid,
some physicists say. But the whole of
its recent discoveries and speculations go
to confirm those physical theorems which
Professor Haeckel took from the physics
of the time when he wrote (1890-5), and
built into the structure of his system—viz., the unity of matter and force, the
indestructibility of matter and conserva
tion of energy, and the evolution of the
ponderable out of imponderable matter
and its natural aggregation, by gravita
tion, into nebulae and solar systems.
Monism can easily acccrr.modace itself to
any rectifications of the details of these
theorems.
1 On the whole question see the Romanes
Lecture for 1903—which recalls the brilliant
expository work of Professor Tyndall—and the
proceedings of the Physical and Mathematical
Section at the meeting of the British Association,
September, 1903.
We are thus made acquainted with the
second great law of the universal matter
force reality—evolution. Avoiding meta
physical and abstract formulas, and keep
ing as closely as possible to the facts of
science, we learn from the study of in
animate nature that the life of this
great reality stretches as far behind and
before us in time as its substance
stretches over the abysses of space. We
find it in a condition of orderly and con
tinuous development. Chronologically,
we cannot reach back to any stage of the
process where we discover a continuous
and homogeneous form of matter and
force diffused through space.
But phy
sical analysis brings us almost within
sight of such a “ prothyl ” (first-matter)
and of the connecting link between
ponderable and imponderable matter.
If we can to-day witness the disintegra
tion of the atom, we are completely
justified in forming theories of its inte
gration ; and the theories find strong
empirical confirmation in the astro-phy
sical observations. We can trace the
upward growth of our “ prothyl ” into
the familiar chemical elements with their
immense variety of properties—and it
may be noted, in face of the recru
descence of old metaphysical theories
as to these new properties, that the new
elements (formed in radio-action, for
instance) sometimes only acquire their
distinctive qualities with very sensible
gradations. The titanic forces of the
universe—already differentiated into
heat, electricity, gravitation, &c.—mould
the new-formed matter into meteorites,
nebulae, stars, and solar systems. Man
looks about him on a vast and restless
ocean of being, on the surface of which
the life of his whole race is no more
than a momentary bubble.
There are two points to be considered
before we follow Dr. Haeckel into the
more contentious field of biological evo
lution in which he possesses an almost
unique authority.
We have to meet
the charge that Haeckel tries to bully
and depress us with the magnitude of
this “ cosmological perspective,” and we
�THE EVOLUTION OF THE INORGANIC WORLD
must see how far his opponents accept
this teaching of modern science. Mr.
Ballard declares that this “ latest pseudo
gospel from Jena is as miserably be
littling and depressing as it is intellec
tually invalid and practically unwork
able.” A^critic in the Daily Chronicle
expresses the same sentiment (as to
depression), and it has been repeated
by many of the reviewers. There is an
excellent English proverb about the
proof of a pudding which might have
saved these writers if they had heeded
it. Haeckel himself is by no means
depressed by his “ cosmological perspec
tive,” if he is saddened at times by the
slow progress of truth. No Rationalist
is ever heard to complain of or to betray
the faintest depression at his position.
Sometimes, indeed, with that marvellous
alacrity of his, the theologian flies to
the other extreme, and says the Ration
alist must infallibly come to the practical
conclusion to eat and drink and be
merry. It is curious that we, who are
credited at times with making too much
use of reason, should be held to make
so little use of it in the ordering of our
lives. Quite certainly one effect of this
perception of our infinite littleness in
the universe at large, with its yawning
cosmic sepulchres on every side, is to
make us eager to enjoy our present life.
Quite certainly we say to ourselves, in
the words of Omar,
“ Ah ! make the most of what we yet may spend
Before we too into the dust descend.
Dust into dust, and under dust to lie,
Sans wine, sans song, sans singer, and sans
end.”
«Ve have not the remotest idea of
being depressed or bullied by the im
mensity of the universe or its sepulchral
aspect. That would be folly, not ra
tionalism. Moreover, it would be equal
folly to plunge into those sensual depths
which are so strangely said to be the
alternative to depression. Life is too
precious a thing to be squandered on
every impulse. Its potentialities must
be reasoned out. The promise and the
35
prospect of developing its higher gifts
must be pondered. Science, art, litera
ture, social and political activity, refined
intercourse, and sweet homes—those are
the most precious gifts life offers to us.
We are rationalistic enough to prefer the
higher to the lower, to prefer gladness to
depression.
The objection is, in fact, a purely
captious one. Haeckel’s belittlement of
man is relative. It aims at discrediting
the traditional and arrogant doctrine of
man’s uniqueness, which has done so
much to obstruct the advance of truth
in the nineteenth century. Even if it
were depressing to learn that we are not
compacted of a special material, and that
the universe is not a toy-theatre for us to
play our parts on before the angels, we
should welcome the truth and speak it.
The code of morals that consults our
likes and dislikes does not find favour
amongst Rationalists. But depressing
the truth certainly is not; and it is only
belittling in a narrow, comparative sense.
One of Haeckel’s critics proceeds to
show that, “ if we look at evolution from
above downwards, man is still the chief
thing in the universe.” With a passing
reminder that we do not know the whole
of evolution—we do not know what the
process may have produced in other
planets—we need only say that here is,
of course, another aspect of the question.
But to suppose that it has been over
looked, and that the belittlement is other
than comparative, is quite gratuitous.
The last point we have to deal with
here is: What is the attitude of the
opponents of Monism on the teaching
we have seen thus far ? As far as the
inorganic universe is concerned, they
accept the teaching of science, and are
usually content to add to it a theistic
supplement. They generally deny, as
we saw, the infinity and eternity of the
universe; and we have discussed the
grounds of their denial. The more
impetuous and less informed of them
have some vague notion of rendering
service to religion by criticising (for the
edification of their followers) every
�36
*
THE EVOLUTION OF THE INORGANIC WORLD
advance of scientific theory. Even Dr.
Dallinger protests that the nebular
hypothesis is not “an undisputed and
established fact of modern science.”
Others, like Mr. Ballard, recommend the
study of sceptical writers like Stallo.
All these petty criticisms might profitably
be left out of religious controversy.
They tend to no conclusion now. There
was a time when theistic evidence meant
the detection of gaps in the scientific
view of the world, and a rush to fill up the
gap with supernatural action. It is be
ginning to dawn on the more enlightened
of our theists that this is weak in logic,
and dangerous in practice. Who could
number the gaps they have occupied
during the last two centuries—and
deserted ? They are beginning to see
at length—what they were begged to
consider from the beginning—that a gap
in scientific construction may only mean
our temporary (or even permanent)
ignorance, and does not necessarily
imply a real breach or defect in the
action of natural agencies. We shall
see more of this later. Meantime Mr.
Mallock says: “ If we compare the
evidences in favour of the monistic
doctrine generally with the objections
urged by religious dualists against it, the
great difference between the two is this :
that whilst the objections of the latter
are isolated, disconnected, casual, the ex
isting evidences of the former cohere and
dovetail into one another like numbered
stones designed for some vast edifice:
and whilst the missing evidences of the
monist are one by one being found, the
objections of the dualists are in daily
process of being discredited.” 1 Hence,
he says, “ educated apologists of all
schools accept evolution to-day,” and he
quotes Professor Ward as saying that, if
there has been any interference in the
cosmic process, it “ took place before the
process began, not during it.” And
Professor Le Conte, whom Mr. Ballard
recommends us to read, and who accepts
evolution from the atom to the human
mind, says: “ Evolution is no longer a
school of thought. The words evolu
tionism and evolutionist ought not any
longer to be used, any more than
gravitcitionism or grcivitationist; for the
law of evolution is as certain as the law
of gravitation.” 1
So theistic writers are beginning to
repudiate the theology of gaps. “ How
slow of spirit we have been to learn
that the Divine Spirit does not work
through gaps,” says Mr. Newman Smyth.2
Already we see a tendency to prove on
theological principles that the world
must have been evolved, from the
primary matter (and there is a disposition
to let this be eternal) up to the human
mind j that evolution is the one divine
process, and that the old idea of succes
sive interferences in the work is too
undignified altogether. This language
will be heard from every village pulpit in
fifty years’ time. We need not be spite
ful about it; but, on the other hand,
these advanced theologians, who know
it, might understand the irony and
humour of a great scientist who has
lived through the struggles of the last
fifty years. At present the spectacle we
witness is not unlike that of the competi
tors in a walking-match. In front are
a few laymen like Professor Le Conte
and Mr. Fiske (who have nearly
dropped their theism for greater lightness
on the way). Mr. Rhondda Williams
and Mr. Newman Smyth are not far
behind. Canon Aubrey Moore and Dr.
W. N. Clarke would be well in the
running if they were still here. Mr.
Ballard, who thinks “ Christian thinkers
have every reason for accepting evolution
as the general method of world-growth ”
(but makes a tremendous pother when
it comes to the evolution of life), and
Dr. Iverach, who is not anxious to
quarrel with evolutionary terms “ except
in so far as they become the symbols of a
mechanical evolution ” (but
raise much
dust as he goes along), are at a third
stage. Mr. Ambrose Pope, who thinks
*• Religion as a Credible Doctrine., p. 78.
1 Evolution and Religious Thought, p. 66.
2 Through Science to Faith, p. 20.
�THE EVOLUTION OF THE INORGANIC WORLD
“ the theory of evolution is a scientific
hypothesis, true only in the sense that it
explains all the facts to hand at present,
true in exactly the same sense in which
the theory of creation, as found
in Genesis, was at the time it was
written,” comes a bad fourth—in line,
however, with the average “ cultured ”
preacher and the leader-writers and
reviewers of the Tablet, Guardian, and
Church Times.
Then we have a
straggling line of Christian Evidence
Lecturers, tract-writers, preachers, and
leader-writers in the Methodist Luminary,
&c.; ending in bunches of suburban
curates and rural vicars, who are still
handicapped with heavy old copies of
the Bible.
All this puts a peculiar difficulty in
the way of the Rationalist. If he
attacks the attitude of the advanced
minority, Christianity at large repudiates
his criticism; if he tilts at the con
ventional beliefs, the little band of the
intellectuals use excited
language.
There is hardly a single question on
which we have anything like a solid
front to meet. This will be clearer as
we proceed. As regards the inorganic
universe, we may say that no Christian
scholar of any serious influence ques
tions its unity, its actual constancy (or
its first law—the law of substance), or
its formation by gradual development
(its second law—the law of evolution)
from a primitive matter. They rest their
dualism, as far as visible nature is con
cerned, on (i) the need for a creator of
matter and force, and (2) the need for a
directive intelligence. With the first
point—or with its groundwork—we have
already dealt, and will deal again in the
chapter on God. The second point
must be very clearly grasped. It is the
last conceivable quasi-scientific argu
ment for the existence of God. It will
confront us throughout the next three
chapters, and it will before long be the
only argument of “physical theology.”
In its general formula it runs:
Although science can assign the efficient
or physical causes of the complex
37
phenomena about us, it cannot say why
they produced just these phenomena and
not different ones ; and the more clearly
science shows that an elaborate pheno
menon—say, thought, or life—is only
the outcome of a long and intricate
evolutionary process, the more pressing
is the need to admit that the evolutionary
agencies were guided and controlled by
intelligence from the first. The argu
ment is not a new one, of course, but the
best-informed theistic apologists are
warning their colleagues to fall back on
it at once, and to abandon the defence
of temporary gaps and petty criticisms
of science. “We are not,” says Dr.
Iverach (though he will forget it later),
“of those who are constantly looking
about for imperfections in a mechanical
or other theory in order to find a chink
through which the theistic argument
may enter. If that were our position,
the argument for theism would soon be
a fugitive and a vagabond on the face of
the earth; each advance of science, each
discovery of law, would simply drive the
theistic argument to find a new refuge.” 1
So Mr. Newman Smyth says : “ The
assurance of faith cannot be maintained
from a fortified critical position outside
the province
of the evolutionary
science.” And
Mr.
R.
Williams
declares : “ I do not worship a God
who only fills gaps, nor hold a religion
whose validity depends on missing
links.” Teleology is the word. The
scientist will show you everywhere
certain forces co-operating to produce
certain complex results. Point out that
these “ blind ” erratic forces must have
been guided in their co-operation,
especially if the result is beautiful [or
orderly or beneficial or admirably adapted
to produce a certain further result.
The advantage of “ the new teleology ”
1 Christianity and Evolution, p. 26. Observe
the excellent description of what the theistic
argument has been for some time and the naive
proposal of this as a mere contingency. We
shall find, too, that the old Adam is still strong in
Dr. Iverach, and he is still keen on gaps in
practice.
Bishopsgate Institute*
�38
THE EVOLUTION OF THE INORGANIC WORLD
—which is the “old teleology” re
enamelled—is obvious. Science may
now strain its mechanical causes as it
pleases to explain the origin of life and
consciousness. The more stupendous
the results it claims for physical agencies,
the clearer will it be that there were
design, guidance, and control. More
over, the argument comes into play from
the very first step that evolutionary
science takes. The best illustrations of
its application will be found in Dr.
Iverach and Mr. Profeit.1 They follow
step by step the teaching of physics and
chemistry, and pause at the end of each
paragraph to admire the wisdom of the
creator with Paleyesque devotion. Be
hold the primitive matter mould itself
into electrons and atoms. Whence did
it get the power? How came a blind
force to put together the electrons in
such an orderly series of atoms with such
wonderful chemical adaptations to each
other? Behold the ponderable matter
grow into nebulae and solar systems.
Who distributed the elements so nicely
amongst the various nebulae ? Who
distributed the elements
the nebula,
and broke off the whirling rings at the
proper moment, and set the planets
going at the requisite speed, that a
system of perfect order resulted, and
was found to be just suited for the
sustenance of life ?
Now let us be perfectly clear. This
argument is to be the great reply to
Haeckel, and it will recur all through.
It thinks it differs from the old Paleyism
in this : it can grant science the power,
either now or in the future, to give a
complete explanation on physical lines of
the up-building of an atom or a world.
1 The Creation of Matter. Mr. Ballard tells
us this may count as a reply to the Riddle. It
has been published since the Riddle, but does
not seem to mention Haeckel’s book.
As it says, science may explain how
these things were done. It adds that
every thoughtful man must ask also
why—why the process took place at all,
and why it took this particular line, with
such a lucky termination for us, rather
than any one of a thousand others.
They say: Let Haeckel explain the
whole world-growth on mechanical
principles, from the formation of the
first atoms of hydrogen to the solidifica
tion of the last planet. That only tells
how natural forces built up the world :
we want to know why. So we can
allow the naturalist or mechanical view
to be complete in itself, yet leaving full
room for us. ■
In order to avoid the repetitions and
the confusion which this design
argument leads to, I propose to take the
hint offered and keep quite separate the
questions how the world was made and
why it was so made. In this and the
following three chapters we shall see
how the world was made ; in the seventh
chapter we shall discuss the teleological
argument in its principle. We shall see
that the theistic evolutionists are by no
means prepared in practice to allow that
science can explain how all things were
made, or to assign adequate efficient
causes
for
the
more
complex
phenomena. The first line of defence
had better hold as long as it can, in
case the second should be not quite
impregnable. As to inorganic nature,
however, there is no serious hesitation.
The inherent or native qualities of the
matter-force reality (I am not shirking,
but deferring, the question why it has
these qualities at all) are generally
admitted to be the adequate efficient
explanation of the formation of atoms
and stars. The first serious challenge
rings out when we come to the frontiers
of living nature.
�THE ORIGIN OF LIFE
39
Chapter IV
THE ORIGIN OF LIFE
No sooner do we pass from the con
sideration of inorganic nature to a
discussion of the origin of life than we
encounter in a severe form the per
plexity I have previously indicated. Do
theists or dualists deny that Haeckel
may legitimately extend the monistic
interpretation to the problem of life ?
At once we have to deal with a straggling
line of contradictory thinkers, instead of
the fairly solid front which we desire
to face.
A large number of the
authorities recommended to us as cor
rectives of Haeckel’s philosophy entirely
agree with him in his theory of the
spontaneous generation of life, and are
content to add, as before, the teleo
logical consideration. A large number
severely criticise his position—and
therefore that of their own advanced
colleagues—even from the point of view
of physical or efficient causation ; and
there is every grade of vacillation
between the two.
It will be interest
ing to see first how far the doctrine
of the first appearance of life by
abiogenesis is accepted by theistic
writers,
It is well known that Dr. Mivart
defended the doctrine with great ability
for the twenty years preceding his death.
To-day Father Zahm and other Catholic
scientists are no less willing to admit it.
That Professor Le Conte and Mr. Fiske
accept it goes without saying. Dr. W.
N. Clarke is disposed to grant it:
“Life, when its time came, may have
come in by direct creation; so may
human life or the life of other species;
or the whole process of unfolding may
have been continuous, impelled by only
one kind of divine movement from first
to last. Whether God has performed
specific acts of creation from time to
time is a question for evidence, which
lies outside the field of theology.”1
Mr. Newman Smyth admits that it is now
irresistible: “ While the fact is now
universally admitted that non-living
matter cannot now be organised into a
living form except through the prior
agency of life, on the other hand the
momentum of all our scientific know
ledge of the continuities of nature leads
modern biology to the assumption that
the organic substance at some time has
been raised and quickened from the
deadness of the inorganic world.” 2 Mr.
Profeit also is willing to admit the
evolution of protoplasm, though only
“as the result of working intelligence.” 3
Dr. Iverach, who is also anxious to
stress the teleological aspect, never
theless admits that life was “ implicit in
the whole ”; though we shall find him
raising superfluous difficulties later.
Thus in his allegation of the fact that
life was evolved out of non-life Professor
Haeckel finds himself in quite respect
able company. The sonorous philo
sopher of one of our dramatic and
sporting papers (the Referee} delivered
himself as follows some months ago
(March ist, 1903): “At the very
threshold of this great theme we
encounter the eternal question as to
how life began at all, and here the
scientist cannot help us.” It would be
1 Outlines of Christian Theology, p. 132.
2 Through Science to Faith, p. 17.
3 The Creation of Matter, p. 96 ; his proviso
is, of course, shared by all these evolutionists.
We are for the present concerned only with
efficient causation. When Mr. Profeit goes on
to tell us that when protoplasm appeared “the
stars clapped their hands for joy,” we can hear
the rustle of his surplice. The evolution must
have taken millennia, if not millions of years.
There was no psychological moment for applause.
�40
THE ORIGIN OF LIFE
interesting, and not a little enlighten
ing, for “Merlin” to investigate this—
under the circumstances—remarkable
phenomenon of a group of ardent
religious apologists subscribing to the
doctrine of abiogenesis. But “ Merlin ”
might quote a number of scientific men
(of ecclesiastical standing) who make
the same affirmation in yet stronger
language, and who denounce Haeckel
with some vigour for representing
abiogenesis as a scientific theorem.
There is Dr. Horton, the admirer of
Vogt and Buchner, who assures us
that “ no leading man of science treats
it [Haeckel’s theory of the origin of life]
seriously.” But the leading opponent
is Mr. Ballard, and we will treat his
criticism at respectful length. It will
lead us, sooner or later, into the heart
of the difficulty.
It will be remembered that in his
attack in the British Weekly, in which
he emulates the spirited Dr. Loofs in
literary manner, he devotes the bulk
of his articles (about twelve columns
out of thirteen) to preliminary obser
vations, and then turns, “ for sheer relief,”
to criticise Haeckel from the scientific
point of view. I will strike off super
fluous errors as I go along, and deal with
the essence of his objection afterwards.
“To begin with,” he says, “its funda
mental thesis is utterly unscientific, viz.,
the assumption of the actuality of spon
taneous generation.” To begin with, I
may repeat, this sentence contains three
grave and essential misrepresentations.
Spontaneous generation is very far from
being the “fundamental thesis ” (or the
“fundamental axiom” and “crucial
proof ” he elsewhere calls it) of the
Riddle, or of Haeckel’s system ; it is not
an “assumption,” but a serious conclu
sion ; and Haeckel does not claim that
spontaneous generation takes place to
day. It is preposterous to suppose that
Haeckel’s fundamental thesis should be
one that many Christian scholars accept,
and the reader will already understand
that, though it is necessarily involved in
Monism, it is no more “ fundamental ”
than ten other propositions. But Mr.
Ballard proceeds to make good his state
ment. He says Haeckel “frankly ac
knowledges that spontaneous generation
is ‘ an indispensable thesis in any natural
theory of evolution. I entirely agree
with the assertion that to reject abio
genesis is to admit a miracle.’ ” “ An,”
one may observe, is different from “the,”
and “ indispensable ” from “ fundamen-'
tai ” ; but that is a comparative trifle. No
page is given, but if you do look up the
passage (page 91) you find that Haeckel
is saying that Professor Naegeli represents
it as “an indispensable thesis,” and that
“the assertion” should be “his asser
tion.” It would not do, I suppose, to
let readers of the British Weekly know
that Haeckel does not stand alone, so
the quotation is manipulated. More
over, the phrase, “to reject abiogenesis
is to admit a miracle,” is quoted by
Haeckel from Naegeli, but the quotation
marks are omitted by Mr. Ballard. The
reader may judge if the fact of Haeckel’s
agreeing with Naegeli justifies this. I
know that Mr. Ballard quotes the passage
fairly in his Miracles of Unbelief My
second point, that it is not an “assump
tion,” will be clear when I come to resume
the evidence for it. The third point is
that if Mr. Ballard uses “actuality” in
the ordinary sense of the word, as the
ordinary reader will suppose, he gravely
misstates Haeckel’s position. That he
does imply that Haeckel claims spon
taneous generation to be “ actually ”
occurring is clear from his appeal to
those scientists (Tyndall, Pasteur, &c.)
who disprove no more than this. As a
fact Haeckel says (p. 91) : “ I restrict the
idea of spontaneous generation—also
called abiogenesis or archigony—to the
first development of living protoplasm
out of inorganic carbonates.” Further,
Haeckel refers the reader to his earlier
work for details, and Mr. Ballard himself
quotes therefrom that Haeckel only offers
the doctrine as “a pure hypothesis”
without experimental support.
Haeckel’s position is, then, properly
stated, that we have no evidence that
�THE ORIGIN OF LIFE
living things now arise by spontaneous
generation; that the monistic view of
the universe, which other scientific
evidence commends, requires the birth
of living things from non-living in the
beginning; that he finds no peculiar
qualities in the vital force which forbid
the extension of the law of evolution to
it; and that he therefore sketches a
purely hypothetical suggestion of the
mode of transition on broad lines. A
really careful and impartial inquirer
would see that the essential part of this
position, from the logical point of view,
is the third part of it—the conviction
that there is no peculiar feature of the
vital force which forbids us to assume
its evolution. Evolution is a known
law of the cosmos—or “ the general
method of world-growth,” as Mr.
Ballard says. We apply it until we are
pulled up by some phenomenon of a
specific nature that seems impossible to
have been evolved. But Mr. Ballard
utterly disregards this chief strength of
Haeckel’s position (supported by the
whole of this chapter of the Riddle),
proceeds to flourish weapons which do
not reach that position at all, and con
cludes that Haeckel is “ utterly without
scientific warrant,” or, as he has previously
said, he “ sets at defiance the latest and
most exact findings of science, and cuts
the Gordian knot by sheer assertion of
that which is essential to his hypothesis,
but is itself undemonstrated, and, we
may venture to add, on good authority,
undemonstrable.” His procedure is
so typical of the usual confused dis
cussion of the subject that we may
follow him to the end.
After saying that Haeckel offers no
proof—which we will discuss presently—
he goes on to overwhelm him with the
“ conclusions of experts.” G Between
the inorganic and the organic, there is,
according to all the facts now known
and the consensus of modern science
concerning them, a stage in which, to
quote Mr. Wallace, ‘ some new cause or
power must necessarily have come into
action.’ ” We are defending a gap after
4i
all, you see; though Mr. Ballard says it
is not essential to do so. Further, it is
not only “utterly without scientific
warrant,” but “ emphatically ” contra
dicted by “the conclusions of such
experts as Tyndall, Pasteur, Drysdale,
Dallinger, Roscoe, Kelvin, Beale, &c. ” ;
and “for modern science, speaking
generally and carefully, spontaneous
generation is as dead as Huxley’s
Bathybius.” One’s mind goes back
involuntarily to those clerical spontane
ous generationists and the horrible
levity with which they have deserted the
gap. The truth is, as those who know
anything of the controversy will have
seen long ago, Mr. Ballard is throwing
dust. He knows perfectly well that the
only point on which scientists are
agreed—and Haeckel is quite with them
—is that abiogenesis does not take place
to-day; that is a thesis which Haeckel
has explicitly disavowed. The experi
ments of Pasteur never purported to
prove anything else, and never could.
His favourite Professor Beale admits his
own solitude : “ Physicists and chemists
look forward with confidence ” to further
experiments, and “think to acquire a
knowledge of the manner in which the
first particle of living matter originated.”1
He cannot quote a single biologist to
say that his science is against Haeckel’s
“ hypothesis ” of abiogenesis in the past.
I will presently quote more than one in
favour of it, in the sense of endorsing
Haeckel’s most important point—that
there is no essential difference between
vital force and non-vital force. He, a
bachelor of science, has blurred the
distinction between actual abiogenesis
and archigony, which is essential, and
which has been pointed out for twenty
years by men of science. And this is
the culmination of his attack on Dr.
Haeckel, and, I suppose, the chief justi
fication for the gross epithets he has
showered on one of the most venerable
figures in the scientific world.
Mr. Mallock says : “ It was formerly
1 Vitality, p. 7.
D
�42
THE ORIGIN OF LIFE
supposed that they [life and manj were Mr. Ballard and others so confusedly
produced by isolated creative acts; but represent as opposed to Haeckel.
we now know that they are the results of Science draws no inference, and logic
an orderly process of evolution. The can draw no inference, with regard to the
theist of to-day admits this as fully as primeval origin of life from this negative
anybody.” Unfortunately, we see that evidence. This has been pointed out
there are theists, who are held to be men time after time, as it was by Sir W.
of scientific culture and liberality, who do Turner in his Presidential Address in
not admit it, and we must discuss the 1900.
subject patiently. This is largely the
Haeckel’s second point (in my analysis
result of people like Mr. Ballard, in their of his position) is that we have ample
eagerness to draw up a long list of reason to regard evolution as a law of
“ sound ” literature, recommending all substance, or a law of nature. We
kinds of antiquated works. For instance, have seen how completely scientific
one of the authors he urges us to read this thesis is.
“ Evolution,” said
on this question, “ Principal Chapman,” Canon A. L. Moore, sixteen years ago,
assures his readers that Buchner and “may fairly claim to be an established
Haeckel assert “life now can be repro doctrine.”1 And we have quoted the
duced out of inorganic conditions,” and Rev. Newman Smyth’s opinion that “ the
attacks the “asserted possibility of arti momentum of all our scientific know
ficially producing organic compounds” ledge of the continuities of nature leads
—which are produced artificially by the modern biology to the assumption that
score to-day ; whilst his general culture the organic substance at some time has
may be measured by his giving the been raised and quickened from the
motto of the Buchner school as : “ Ohne deadness of the inorganic world.” As a
Phosphor ohne Gedank.” This does matter of scientific procedure, then, we
not tend to the advancement of truth. are bound to assume that life arose by
Let us have a clear idea what the real evolution until it has been proved that
position of Haeckel’s theory is in the vital force is something specifically
science.
distinct from physical force, and could
I have stated it in four theses, and not have been derived from it. That is
will deal with these separately. In the both the scientific and the logical way of
first place, scientists of all schools are looking at the question. The scientist
agreed that we do not know a single case does not depart from his ordinary
of abiogenesis taking place to-day. methods without grave reason; nor does
Curiously enough, religious philosophers nature. Nature evolves, wherever evolu
in the Middle Ages believed that any tion is not impossible. The really im
number of highly organised forms of life portant point is, then, this question
(such as bees) were produced daily by whether there is something so peculiar
spontaneous generation. It was science about vital force that we cannot suppose
that first opposed them. However, a it to have been evolved; and we find
few decades ago a group of materialistic accordingly that Haeckel devotes several
scientists made a stand for abiogenesis as pages to the point. I will not repeat,
an actual occurrence, and there was a but only supplement these from other
fierce controversy. It was a purely scientists; though, as we will discuss the
scientific quarrel, Tyndall opposing them question of the nature of life more fully
as firmly as the semi-vitalist Pasteur. It later (in the chapter on Lord Kelvin’s
was abundantly proved that no living intervention), I will not say more than is
thing we are acquainted with to-day is necessary for our purpose here.
developed without living parentage.
This is that “ teaching of science ” (to
1 Science and the Faith, p. 162: one of the
which Haeckel fully subscribes) which works Mr. Ballard recommends to us.
�THE ORIGIN OF LIFE
Let me begin by quoting this admir
able warning to those who affirm that
nature could not have evolved life with
out a divine interference : “ In spite of all
present-day scientific generalisations, and
these based on the widest inductions
possible to us, we have no warrant what
ever for the assumption that the possi
bilities of the universe end where our
human apprehension of nature has
reached its ne plus ultra! Does Mr.
Ballard recognise the words ? They are
taken from his own preface to his
Miracles of Unbelief. A theistic phi
losopher, Professor J. Ward, also says:
“ Of the origin of life, if it ever did
originate, we have absolutely no know
ledge. But, on the one hand, there is
no definite limit to the possible com
plexity of mechanical processes, nor any
definite limit on the other, to the possible
simplicity of life.”1 These are timely
warnings to the theist not to build on
gaps in biology. Yet Dr. Horton tells
his trustful congregation that science has
“ not discovered what is that vast bridge
which spans the regions which, to the
eye, appear so near.” And a reviewer in
the Church of England Pulpit says the
gap between the living and the non-living
is “now wider than ever.” If you seek
the authority for these assertions, you are
generally met with a reference to Pro
fessor Lionel Beale. Now, Prof. Beale
is an able scientist and original worker,
and we will examine his claims about
protoplasm in a later chapter. Mean
time, we may recall that it was he who
so pathetically protested in the agony
column of the Times that Haeckel’s as
severations in this chapter were not in
accord with the teaching of science, and
later referred the anxious world to his
little work on Vitality. Now, when we
peruse Vitality we are given to under
stand almost from first page to last that
1 Naturalism and Agnosticism, ii, 262. Pro
fessor Ward, therefore, assumes life was evolved.
The Words, “if it ever did originate,” must be
understood in the idealist sense ; and the em
phatic denial of knowledge is grounded rather
confusedly on the Pasteur experiments.
43
Professor Beale is nearly contra mundum.
“ It must be admitted,” he says (p. v),
“ that few scientific men are quite satis
fied that vital phenomena may not yet
be otherwise explained ”; and we have
already quoted his admission (p. 7) that
“ physicists and chemists ” look forward
to a mechanical explanation of the origin
of life.
And in point of fact one can quote a
string of the ablest authorities against the
claim that vital force has so specific a
character that it could not have been
evolved. Says the theistic (or pantheistic)
evolutionist, Professor Le Conte, one of
Mr. Ballard’s chief authorities: “ Vital
forces are also transmutable into and
derivable from physical and chemical
forces . . . Vital force may now be re
garded as so much force withdrawn from
the general fund of chemical and physi
cal forces ... If vital force falls into the
same category as other natural forces,
there is no reason why living forms
should not fall into the same category in
this regard as other natural forms.”1
Says Professor J. Ward, another of Mr.
Ballard’s authorities : “ The old theory of
a special vital force, according to which
physiological processes were at the most
analogous to—not identical with—•
physical processes, has for the most part
been abandoned as superfluous. Step
by step within the last fifty years the
identity of the two processes has been
so far established that an eminent
physiologist does not hesitate to say
‘that for the future the word vital, as
distinctive of physiological processes,
might be abandoned altogether.’ ” 2 The
“ eminent physiologist ” is Sir J.
Burdon Sanderson, another able author
ity. In the article on zoology in the
Encyclopcedia Britannica, Professor Ray
Lankester says : “ It is the aim or busi1 Evolution and Religious Thought, p. 36.
2 Naturalism and Agnosticism, ii, p. 9. Ward
and Le Conte, while admitting the mechanical
theory as the explanation of “ efficient ” causa
tion, claim the action of a guiding intelligence.
That is a point we have reserved, and it does
not affect the present question.
�44
THE ORIGIN OF LIFE
ness of those occupied with biology to
assign living things, in all their variety
of form and activity, to the one set of
forces recognised by the physicist and
the chemist,” On the physical side Sir
A. Rucker, in his presidential speech of
1901, spoke of the recent rise of Neo
Vitalism as merely the result of “some
outstanding difficulties ” in biology, and
he protested that “the action of physical
and chemical forces in living bodies can
never be understood, if at every diffi
culty and at every check in our investi
gations we desist from further attempts
in the belief that the laws of physics
and chemistry have been interfered with
by an incomprehensible vital force.” His
successor in the presidential chair also
protested that science was “ not debarred
from speculating on the mode in which
life may have originated,” and he quoted
this splendid expression from Lord
Kelvin’s (then Sir W. Thomson) presi
dential speech in 1871: “Science is
bound, by the everlasting law of honour,
to face fearlessly every problem which
can fairly be presented to it.
If a
probable solution, consistent with the
ordinary course of nature, can be found,
we must not invoke an act of Creative
Power.” And, finally, when Lord Kelvin
recently declared that he understood
biologists were coming again to entertain
the notion of a specific vital force, he
was, as we shall see (or the reader may
see now in Chap. XI.), emphatically
contradicted by the representative biolo
gists of this country.
The authority of Dr. Haeckel himself
on this point is paramount.
He has
made a life-long study of it. But I have
shown that his conclusion is in accord
with the general scientific attitude to-day,
and that he is not giving us the “ science
of yesterday,” as the dilettanti of the
Pall Mall Gazette express it. I will
only add here a few further considera
tions that tend to make clearer the ques
tion of the primitive origin of life, and
will reserve the discussion of Neo-Vitalism until we come to deal with Lord
Kelvin and his critics.
It is a matter of some importance to
remember that we do not know the nature
of the earliest organisms. Living things
had to proceed very far in their develop
ment before it was possible for their
remains to be fossilised and preserved.
Palaeontology can give us no aid what
ever. It is generally assumed that the
monera and such simple forms—mere
tiny globules of protoplasm—were the
earliest in point of time. That they
must have been the earliest of existing
forms is obvious, but, as Professor Ward
suggests, it is conceivable that there were
many simpler forms of life before the
moneron. We had to wait for the
microscope to discover the protists. We
may make other discoveries yet; or there
may have been earlier forms too un
stable to persist. These are “ may be’s,”
but remember Lord Kelvin’s advice that
we must exhaust the possibilities of
nature before we invoke “ an abnormal
act of Creative Power.” Canon Aubrey
Moore said long ago in connection with
the evolution of species : “ In this pro
cess of evolution there are things which
puzzle us, though it would be quite true
to say there is nothing half so puzzling
as there was, if we had only thought
more about it, in the old theory of
special creation.” .That is peculiarly
applicable to the question of the origin
of life. The notion of a “ creative
act ”—the notion that, at the mere ex
pression of a wish on the part of some
infinite being, particles of “ dead ”
matter scrape themselves together with
out any physical impulse, and, though
they are incompetent to see the design
they are to execute or the end of their
individual movements, build themselves
up into the intricate structure of living
protoplasm—is a perfect world of mys
teries, instead of being an “explana
tion.” We can only have recourse to it
when every conceivable effort has been
made to explain the phenomenon by
the physical impulsion of the atoms by
natural forces and by a very slow and
gradual development; and science, we
saw, is by no means inclined to admit
�THE ORIGIN OF LIFE
that its possibilities have been exhausted
yet.
But if we cannot get any nearer to the
origin on the biological side, it may be
possible to do something on the chemical
side; and from this side, in point of
fact, the “gulf,” as preachers call it
(compare Huxley’s article on Biology in
the Encyclopedia, Britannica}, between
the organic and the inorganic is being
bridged. If you take down one of the
apologetic works of the last generation
(even some of those Mr. Ballard recom
mends to-day), you will find that the
writers lay great stress on the inability of
the chemist to produce artificially certain
compound substances which were then
only made by the living organism. To
day a large number of these are produced
by the chemist in his laboratory. This
branch of chemistry is advancing every
year, and last year was able to announce
the artificial synthesis of so complex an
organic substance as albumen. The
“gulf” is narrowing; it is very far from
being “wider than ever.” Dr. Iverach,
one of those hesitating teachers who are
continually criticising scientific results
with some vague notion of serving
religion, says these chemists only “ac
complish at great cost and labour and
with many appliances what life is doing
easily every moment.” Very true ; but,
pray, how long was nature in fitting up
her laboratory and making her appli
ances ? Possibly millions of years in
making the protoplasm of the first
moneron; certainly many millions of
years in evolving those higher organisms
which the scientist is set to emulate.
One does not see what liberal-minded
and scientific men gain by strewing the
path with little obstacles of this kind.
There are other writers who say che
mistry may produce organic substances
without number, but it cannot produce
an organism. Well, on the theisticevolution hypothesis, which the abler
apologists adopt to-day, it took God
hundreds of thousands, if not millions,
of years to make an amoeba, with all the
resources of nature completely known to
45
him. And man, with his dim knowledge
of natural forces, is to make one in a
few weeks, or years! Science is ad
vancing. Let us be patient.
We are now in a position, then, to
estimate the criticisms that have been
directed against this section of Dr.
Haeckel’s system. There are two aspects
of his position. On the one hand there
is the negative side, that we are not
justified in rushing into the present gap
(such as it is) of scientific knowledge
with a “ vital force ” or a “ creative
power,” which are specifically distinct
from the natural forces we have hitherto
studied; and there is, further, the posi
tive attempt to sketch a theory of the
way in which protoplasm was evolved.
The first part is essential to monism ;
the second is not, and may vary with
the progress of science. Both parts
are scientifically justified. How widely
Haeckel’s first position is shared by men
of science, and how it is forced on us by
the axioms of men so different as Lord
Kelvin and Canon A. L. . Moore, we
have already seen. It is the only logical
attitude. When science assures us that
it has acquired a perfect knowledge of
vital force on the one hand and physical
force on the other, and that the two are
so widely separated that it cannot con
ceive the one to have been evolved from
the other; then there will be time enough
to talk of gaps and gulfs and creative
power. In the meantime logic forbids
us to multiply agencies without need.
There is a plausible kind of critic—
usually a preacher—who says: Well,
Haeckel may enjoy his opinion as long
as he likes, and the agnostic may wait
eternally for the last word of science, but
I find this creator-idea very satisfying,
and you may keep your logic for the
school. That is the practical man—the
man who would think you a fool if you
reasoned like that in business. It must
be remembered that we are not playing
a parlour game with conventional rules.
It is a question of truth or untruth,
reality or unreality. It is a huge asser
tion, this of creative action, It at once
�46
THE ORIGIN OF LIFE
brings a new element into our cosmos.
We see that the material universe exists.
We must not recklessly affirm the exist
ence of anything beyond it; or if we do,
we have no guarantee of the truth of our
statements.
Now, until science has
shown that physical force and vital force
are not transmutable, and that no exten
sion of the former, even into the most
elaborate complication, could produce
the latter, you cannot extract from the
appearance of life a particle of evidence
fo,r an interfering cause other than
nature.
But Haeckel does not cease to speak
as a scientific man when he goes on to
offer a positive suggestion as to the
origin of life. Science advances com
monly by projecting hypotheses in
advance of its solid and established
positions, and if ever we are to under
stand the mode of the origin of life it
will be by such a procedure. No living
scientist is better acquainted with the
conditions of the problem than Haeckel,
and it would be preposterous to suppose
that he has not framed a theory con
sistent with the known facts. His theory
is directly grounded on the established
facts of the chemistry of protoplasm.
The only possible justification for the
criticism offered by scientists like Dr.
Horton would be if Haeckel had put it
before us as a sort of photographic
description of the primeval dawn of life.
As Mr. Ballard reminds us, Haeckel
only offers it as “a pure hypothesis,”
consistent with the facts as we know
them, and capable of any modification
new discoveries may entail.
Thus, when we have shaken off this
group of not very enlightened critics,
we see that we have advanced a step
in the evolution of the monistic uni
verse.
We had already followed the
great matter-force reality in its develop
ment as far as the formation of planets
with firm crusts, with heated oceans
and an enveloping atmosphere, and
provided by a shrinking central luminary
with a powerful flood of heat, light,
and electricity. Some time in the pre
Cambrian epoch living things appeared
in the primeval oceans. This was not
a sudden and dramatic entrance on the
stage of time, at which the morning
stars might clap their incandescent
hands ; it was the final issue of a long
course of evolution. It was the matter
force reality slowly groping upwards
through more and more elaborate com
binations of the
formed chemical
elements until a stage was reached
when a substance sufficiently plastic to
exchange elements with the environing
fluid and sufficiently stable to maintain
its integrity was formed. To-day this
substance (living protoplasm) is marked
off by several remarkable properties
from inorganic matter. Professor Beale
talks much of its “ structureless ” cha
racter. In view of the known extreme
complexity of its molecular structure, it
would be a miracle if it did not exhibit
functions widely removed from those of
simpler compounds. But the finding of an
actual divergence to-day is no obstacle
to our entertaining a theory of evolu
tion. No serious scientist questions to
day the evolution of the human body
from that of a lower animal species.
Yet the connecting links have disap
peared. It is a scientific truth that
intermediate forms do tend to disappear.
We see here, then, only another phase
in the unfolding of the cosmic substance,
or nature. Neither scientific evidence
nor logic compels us yet to admit a
fresh reality, a new form of being. We
are still monists. Whether nature has
needed the guidance of intelligence in
this evolution we need not consider
yet. First let us establish the fact that
nature evolves, from the first union of
electrons into an atom to the develop
ment of man, by means of its inherent
forces, and then we will consider
“ whence ” it got these forces and
whether they must have been guided.
Now, given the first tiny globule of
living protoplasm, there is no further gap
for the theologian to defend until we
come to the human mind. For the fifty
million years which extend from the
�THE ORIGIN OF LIFE
Laurentian epoch to the early Pleisto
cene we witness the natural evolution of
the cosmic substance without any plau
sible interference. Naturalists “ have
accepted Darwin’s idea,” Sir W. Turner
tells us in his presidential speech; and
he speaks with respect of Haeckel’s
great share in constructing our ancestral
tree. Huxley said a long time ago that
he “ refused to run the risk of insulting
any sane man by supposing that he
seriously holds such a notion as special
creation.” Canon Aubrey Moore wrote
sixteen years ago that “ every competent
man of science believes in the origin of
species by progressive variations.”1 “All
living nature is of one descent and con
stitutes one relationship,” says Mr.
Newman Smyth. “ Evolution as a law
of derivation of forms from previous
forms ... is not only certain, it is axio
matic,” says Professor Le Conte. “ The
immutability and separate creation of
species . . . are doctrines now no longer
defensible,” says Professor Ward. And
Professor Flower (to whose qualifications
Mr. Ballard devotes ten lines—much
more than Professor Flower ever devoted
to theology) told the Reading Church
Congress twenty years ago (1883) that
the doctrine of the evolution of species
was even then “almost, if not quite,
universal among skilled and thoughtful
naturalists of all countries,” and advised
the clergy not to burn their fingers again
with it.2 We might fill a book with such
quotations.
Happily, there is no longer the need
to do so. Darwin lies in Westminster
Abbey, and episcopal lips utter his name
without a tremor. No one now questions
the fact that the species have been
formed by evolution; but there are still
ecclesiastics who take this occasion to
show that they are of a critical rather
than a credulous temper. They quarrel
with the agencies which science assigns
to the task of the formation of species,
or with the mode in which science con
ceives those agencies to have acted.
1 Science and the Faith, p. 165.
2 Recent Advances in Natural Science.
47
They express an opinion that natural
selection and sexual selection could
not do this or the other; that the
question of the transmission of acquired
characters is very unsettled, and so
forth. Now, it is in itself a healthy sign
of the times that our theologians take an
interest in these scientific questions, and
as scientific men. But the cause of
truth and progress, and the placidity of
scientific workers, would be best con
sulted by keeping these criticisms out
of Christian evidence treatises, with
which, logically, they have 'nothing to
do. Thus Dr. Iverach discusses the
question at great length in his Theism in
the Light ofPresent Science and Philosophy.
He thinks that natural selection may
act on variations, but cannot initiate
them, and cannot show why some
organisms remain unicellular and others
become multicellular.
Biologists do
not, he urges, prove the indefinite ex
pansiveness of species, and do not
explain the special causes which check
expansion. In strict logic this has nothing
to do with “Theism.” If biologists
have not adequately explained the pro
cess of evolution, we must wait until
they have further knowledge.
His
point is, of course, that the triumph of
evolution only means “ to transfer the
cause from a mere external influence
working from without to an immanent
rational principle.”
He is pleading
again for that “ incomprehensible vital
force,” as Sir A. Rucker calls it, which
we have already discussed and will dis
cuss later.
If it is sufficient to admit natural
(physical and chemical) forces in the
first formation of protoplasm, we meet
nothing to turn us aside from these with
any plausibility until we come to con
sciousness, which I will treat in the
next chapter. With that reservation
Haeckel’s mechanical explanation of the
derivation of species is accepted. Pro
fessor Ray Lankester says, in the article
on zoology in the Encyclopedia Britan
nica : “ It was reserved for Charles
Darwin in the year 1859 to place the
�48
THE ORIGIN OF LIFE
whole theory of organic evolution on a
new footing, and by his discovery of a
mechanical cause actually existing and
demonstrable, by which organic evolution
must be brought about, to entirely
change the. attitude in regard to it of
even the most rigid exponents of scientific
method.” The recent letters of Pro
fessor Ray Lankester to the Times,
which I will quote later (Chap. XII.),
show that he has not departed from this
position. Dr. Croll also admits of the
derivation of species: “ At present
[1890] most evolutionists regard the
process as purely mechanical and physi
cal, the results of matter, motion, and
force alone.”1 And Mr. Fiske says:
“The natural selection of physical
variations will go far towards explaining
the characters of all the plants and all
the beasts in the world.” 2
But do not let us lose our way amidst
conflicting authorities. Two objections
are formulated, more or less vaguely,
against this phase of Haeckel’s position ;
or the two objections may be combined
into the general statement that the
mechanical explanation leaves some
aspects of the derivation of species
unaccounted for; and so we must admit,
besides the evolving matter-force reality,
a telic or purposive principle in the
organism and a general controlling in
telligence, or at least the latter (Fiske,
Ward, Le Conte, &c.). The second
opinion does not really conflict with our
present purpose, because it assumes that
this directing intelligence never takes the
place of physical agencies. It always
acts through mechanical causes, so that
science is quite right in expecting to
build up a perfect mechanical scheme of
the development of the world-substance.
With its further contention that this
mechanical scheme points to an initial
designer, we will deal later. It is only
the first opinion—that which postulates
a purposive principle in the organism—
which conflicts with the monistic view
at this stage. And this second opinion
1 The Philosophical Basis of Evolution, p. 2.
2 Through Nature to God, p. 81.
is, frankly, a philosophy or a theology
of gaps. It lodges in the breaches, or
supposed breaches, in our knowledge of
the evolutionary processes, and naively
takes these to be breaches in the cosmic
scheme itself. Remember Mr. Ballard’s
wise injunction that “we have no
warrant whatever for the assumption
that the possibilities of the universe end
where our human apprehension of
nature has reached its ne plus ultra ”—
for the time being, let me venture to
add. Which attitude is the more logical
and scientific, and the best accredited
by experience—this defence of gaps, or
the resolution to admit no aquosities or
vitalities, or other immaterial entities
until science has given a definite and
fully-informed decision ?
Professor Haeckel adopts the latter
attitude, and proceeds to reconstruct the
wonderful paths that nature has followed
in her journey from those ancient
Laurentian waters to the achievements
of man. We have three convergent and
consonant lines of evidence : the docu
ments of palaeontology, or the science of
fossils, the documents of zoology (to
speak of animals only), and the docu
ments of embryology. From them, as
from three synoptic gospels, we retrace
the upward growth of living nature.
The simplest organisms we can definitely
picture to ourselves are simple granules
of protoplasm, or structureless morsels
of an albuminous matter. In time some
of these are formed which live on their
fellow-protists, and the distinction of the
animal from the plant is adumbrated.
Later, some of them develop a nucleus
and form definite cells ; the cells cling
together in colonies and form multi
cellular organisms; these cells are dis
posed in a layer or skin with a central
cavity, and develop fine hair-like pro
cesses by which they can travel through
the water. As the ages advance some
of these beings fold their cell-layer in
wards and form the primitive gut. From
these, probably, the flat worms are
developed, with a primitive nervous
system and reproductive apparatus.
�THE ASCENT OF MAN
Higher worms arise with primitive
vascular and excretory systems, and at
length with a rude kind of breathing
apparatus. At the next stage the rudi
ment of a spinal cord appears, and
continues to develop until the lowest
vertebrates (such as the lampreys) are
seen, with their primitive crania, suctorial
mouths, and advancing ears. Then
comes a great development of fishes
with strong dermal armour and in
creasingly acute organs of sense. _ Am
phibious animals link the fishes with the
reptiles, which soon prowl over the
us
49
earth in huge and terrible forms.
Mammals,
or
warm,
red-blooded
animals, next appear in the Jurassic
strata, and slowly advance through the
forms of marsupials and placentals until
the lowest lemures, in the lower Eocene
strata (computed to be 3,000,000 years
old), bring us within dim and distant
vision of the human form. The man
like apes appear in the Miocene period
(about 850,000 years ago).
Some
600,000 years later the pithecanthropus,
or erect man-ape, is found to herald the
approach of our own race.
Chapter V
THE ASCENT OF MAN
When the third International Zoo
logical Congress met at Leyden in 1895
a Dutch military physician produced two
or three bones that he had discovered in
Java the previous year, which created a
lively sensation amongst the assembled
anthropologists. They were merely the
skull-cap, a femur, and two teeth of some
animal form that had been buried in the
upper Pliocene strata nearly 300,000 years
ago. The modern zoologist can recon
struct a skeleton almost from a single
bone, and the complete outline of the
being to which these scanty remains had
belonged was quickly restored. Science
found itself confronted with the long
sought missing link between man and his
pithecoid ancestors. The powerful form,
standing five feet and a half high when
erect, yet still much bent with the curve
of its prone ancestors : the great cranial
capacity (about 1,000 cubic centimetres),
much greater than that of the largest ape,
yet lower than that of man, and associ
ated with prominent eye-brow ridges and
heavy jaws; in a word, all its features
pointed very emphatically to a stage half
way between man and the earlier species
from which he and the apes had
descended. A loud and long discus
sion followed Dr. Dubois’ address. The
celebrated Dr. Virchow stubbornly op
posed the conclusion of Haeckel and his
colleagues, and was driven from point to
point by his opponents.1 In the end
twelve experts of the Congress gave a
decision on the remains. Three of them
held that they belonged to a member of
a low race of man ; three held that they
1 See the account of Virchow’s pitiful and
transparently prejudiced resistance to evolution
in Buchner’s Last Words on Materialism, p. 97.
At a scientific congress in the preceding year,
one of Virchow’s colleagues observed that his
behaviour was “quite enough to justify us in
paying serious attention no longer to the great
pathologist on this question.” In effect, Vir
chow’s opinions on the matter have died with
him.
�so
the ascent of man
had belonged to a huge man-like ape;
and six were convinced that they be
longed to an intermediate form, which
was rightly called the pithecanthropus
erectus (erect ape-man). The opinion of
the majority has now become the general
opinion in anthropology.
This was a dramatic intervention in
the standing controversy with regard to
the origin of man. Ever since Darwin
had, as Professor Dewar says, “ illumined
the long unsettled horizon of human
thought” with his theory of selection
and descent, anthropologists had foreseen
the extension of the doctrine of evolution
to man. Haeckel and Darwin had soon
effected that extension in theory. Now
the discovery of the pithecanthropus came
as a remarkable crown to the enormous
structure of evidence in its favour. But
a distinction had already been drawn
between the evolution of body and the
evolution of mind. Thinkers like Dr.
Wallace and Dr. Mivart offered no re
sistance, or, indeed, strongly defended,
the doctrine that man had inherited his
bodily form from a lower animal species,
but affected to see a gulf in mental
faculty which forbade us to derive man’s
mind from that of any animal. Since
those days the evidence for the evolution
of the mind has accumulated until it is
at least equivalent to that for the evolu
tion of the body. In the Riddle of the
Universe Professor Haeckel gives a mag
nificent summary of the evidence for
both theses, for the development of man,
mind and body, from an animal ancestor,
through which he is closely related to
the apes. The subject is one that be
longs to the science of which Haeckel is
one of the acknowledged masters. It was
thought that all serious criticism of the
work—all criticism that had the moral and
constructive aim of ensuring the triumph
of truth—would centre upon these first
ten chapters dealing with evolution. The
critics have acted otherwise, and we shall
see that there is little serious resistance
to our extension of the principle of
natural evolution to man, and bringing
him within the unity of the cosmos.
Let us see first, however, what is the
attitude of cultivated thought generally
on the subject. We have seen how the
defenders of gaps have surrendered the
inorganic world to the monist, how a
mere handful remain to defend the
dualistic theory of the origin of life, and
how they have fled before the advance
of the Darwinians. We shall now find
that they are fast deserting this last
breach in the evolutionary scheme. A
quarter of a century ago Tyndall shook
the world with his famous : “ We claim,
and we will wrest from theology, the
whole domain of cosmological theory.”
‘‘ His successors,” said Professor Dewar,
in the same city, last year, “have no
longer any need to repeat those signifi
cant words . . . The claim has been
practically, though often unconsciously,
conceded.”
Canon Aubrey Moore,
whose work Mr. Ballard recommends
us to read, urged his colleagues to
admit the claim nearly twenty years
ago. Wallace’s idea, he said, “has a
strangely unorthodox look.
If, as a
Christian believes, the higher intellect
who used these laws for the creation of
man, was the same God who worked in
and by these same laws in creating the
lower forms of life, Mr. Wallace’s dis
tinction of cause disappears.” Again :
“We have probably as much to learn
about the soul from comparative psychology, a science which as yet scarcely
exists, as we have learned about the
body from comparative biology.”1 He
concludes that the question has nothing
to do with religion. Dr. W. N. Clarke
is no less clear. “The time has come,”
he says, “ when theology should remand
the investigation of the time and manner
of the origin of man to the science or
anthropology with its kindred sciences,
just as it now remands the time and'
manner of the origin of the earth to
astronomy and geology . . . anthropo
logy and its kindred sciences will give
an evolutionary answer.” Again : “ But
though there is no reason against
1 Science and the Faith, pp. 203 and 211.
�THE ASCENT OF MAN
5i
an infirmary in travelling by rail across
admitting it if it is supported by facts,
special creation, whether of the spirit of Switzerland. Observations on the beauty
man or of other new elements of the of the mountains led to a discussion of
advancing order, may come to appear their natural growth, and the nun—little
improbable. The larger the sweep of suspecting his identity—informed him
one great progressive method, the more that she had obtained her sensible and
probable does it become that the method modern views from Haeckel’s Natural
is universal. The idea of unity in God’s History of Creation / We shall see in
the end that the religious opposition to
work and method is an idea that tends,
Haeckel’s teaching—his real teaching—
when once it has been admitted, to
is crumbling year by year. On our pre
extend over the whole field.”1
Dr.
Iverach and Mr. Newman Smyth desert sent question of the evolution of the
the gap, and refer us to science for the human mind, one may gather from this
solution; though, as before, we shall very general agreement of the cultured
find Dr. Iverach raising subsequent and defenders of Christianity that scientific
irrelevant difficulties.
Professor Le and expert opinion can be little short of
Conte and Mr. Fiske, whom we are unanimous. Dr. Wallace, with whose
views we shall deal separately, does in
told to read, are emphatic evolutionists.
Says Le Conte : “ I believe the spirit of deed stand out with a strange obstinacy
man was developed out of the anima or in the world of science—stands out as
conscious principle of animals, and that Virchow so long did in Germany, as
this again was developed out of the Cuvier did in France—but the doctrine
of the evolution of mind is now
lower forms of life-force, and this in its
turn out of the chemical and physical generally accepted by psychologists.
Professor J. Ward says “ the unanimity
forces of nature.” 2 Mr. Fiske sketches
with which this conclusion is now
a theory of natural evolution in his
accepted by biologists of every school
Through Nature to God (p. 94). Dr.
Dallinger allows it is “ not by any means seems to justify Darwin’s confidence a
other than conceivable that science may quarter of a century ago.”1 Another
psychologist, Professor
be able to demonstrate the actual distinguished
Miinsterberg, is equally scornful of those
physical line of man’s origin” (quoted
by Mr. Ballard). Even Mr. Rhondda who still linger in this breach.2 Sir W.
Williams believes “ evolution is com Turner closed his Presidential address
plete from the jelly-fish up to Shake to the British Association in 1900 with a
confident assumption of the general
speare” (p. 26), and says (p. 40):
“When evolution reached man she acceptance of the doctrine3—so far,
seemed not to be content with making indeed, as to evoke from a conservative
writer in the Athenceum a lament that
bodies, and devoted herself to the
development of intelligence and the he “ carried the evolutionary idea to its
logical conclusion with a most uncom
noblest feelings.”
Haeckel is, therefore, once more in promising materialism.” In fact, a cul
tivated and hostile reviewer in the Man
excellent and edifying company. He
chester Guardian dismisses the first and
tells in his latest work (Aus Insulinde)
how he found himself a few years ago
1 Naturalism and
p. 7face to face with the religious director of Ward is speaking ofAgnosticism, ii, doctrineDr.
the complete
of
1 An Outline of Christian Theology, p. 225.
2 Evolution and Religious Thought, p. 313.
And elsewhere he says that until recently “ the
grounds of our belief in immortality were based
largely on a supposed separateness of man from
the brutes—his complete uniqueness in the whole
scheme of nature. This is now no longer
possible” (The Conception of God, p. 75).
development.
2 Psychology and Life, p. 91.
3 I shall quote his words presently to show
that he held not only evolution, but evolution in
the same sense as Haeckel. I shall also quote
similar language from the speech of the President
of the Anthropological section at the Congress of
1901.
�52
THE ASCENT OF MAN
chief part of Haeckel’s book with an
assurance that “ nowadays you cannot
startle even the man in the street by tell
ing him the soul has been continuously
evolved from the souls of unicellular
protists.” For my part, I am not pre
pared to assign Dr. Wallace, or even
Dr. Horton, to a lower level of culture
than that of the man in the street. But
it would be difficult to draw up to-day
even a slender list of capable biologists
or anthropologists who deny the ascent
of man from the rest of the animal
world.
. This very general agreement of scien
tific men, accepted, as it is, by the ablest
theistic writers of the day, has a formid
able support in the facts and the justified
assumptions of science. Once it has
been proved that the whole development
of nature, from the formation of atoms
up to the formation of species, has pro
ceeded in a continuous manner; and
when it is known, as we do know to
day, that this law of natural evolution
applies also to the most elaborate of our
thoughts and institutions, to our art, our
language, and our civilisation; it becomes
clear that there is so strong a presump
tion for the natural evolution of man
that only the most explicit proof of
man’s uniqueness could prevent us from
applying the law to explain his origin.
When we find further that man is akin
to the lower species in a score of ways
which point to derivation, and are quite
unintelligible on any other theory, the
onus of proof lies heavier than ever on
those who resist. We should be scien
tifically and logically justified in assuming
the evolution of man, unless and until
some grave hindrance is pointed out
in. the nature of man’s structure or
spiritual powers. . But, as I said, the
positive evidence is enormous. As far
as structure is concerned we have no
reply to meet.
The proofs which
Haeckel has marshalled so ably in
Chapters II.-V. of the Riddle have
passed unchallenged; nor is there any
serious “answer by anticipation” which
we should be expected to consider. The
analogy of man’s structure and his phy
siological functions with those of other
mammals, the significant course of his
embryological development, and the
atrophied organs and muscles that are
still transmitted from mother to child,
have convinced a stubborn world at
length. . That gap has been deserted.
It is still thought by some that a gulf
remains between the mind of man and
that of the other animals, and that here
at least they still find their treasured in
tervention of an external power in the
orderly development of the universe.
They think that man’s mental powers,
and what he has achieved with those
powers, mark him off too sharply
from the psychology of the lower
animals for us to admit evolution.
Let us see first what distinctions are
alleged in support of this assertion,
and then we may study the force
of. the psychological evidence for evo
lution.
Now, when we turn to the critics of
the Riddle—either explicit critics or
critics “ by anticipation ”—we find we
have to deal with a very meagre group
of. not very clear or well-informed
thinkers. Such phrases as those which
Mr. Blatchford quotes from a sermon
delivered by Dr. Talmage as late as
1898, that the evolution of man is “con
trary to the facts of science,” and that
“natural evolution is not upward but
always downward ’’—only show the kind
of stuff that can be safely delivered
in tabernacles. Dr. Horton, another
preacher, complains that Haeckel “has
not been able to explain the origin of
consciousness,” or “how the rational
life we call spirit has been produced by
the physical ”; which is a complete
ignoring—probably ignorance—of" the
mass of evidence Haeckel has presented,
as we shall see.
Mr. Ballard hides
behind the respectable figure of Dr.
A. R. Wallace, though at other times he
seems indesirous to press the objection.
We are, in fact, left to face a medley of
small points made by the Rev. Rhondda
Williams (who admits the evolution of
�THE ASCENT OF MAN
the mind), Dr. Iverach, and the Rev.
Ambrose Pope.
Mr. Pope, you will remember, holds
that Haeckel collected the basic material
for his system during three “half-day
excursions.”
He himself admits the
sufficiency of evolution until we come
to the human mind, and then says:
“This is psychology, and, like all psy
chologists, Haeckel starts with certain
metaphysical hypotheses.
His hypo
thesis is that mental phenomena are the
effects of physical phenomena.” This,
he says, “ looks like an innocent assump
tion ”—to whom, we are not told—but
it contains the fatal conclusion, and is
“ opposed by nearly every psychologist of
repute in the world.” These men are
“ expert psychologists,” whereas Haeckel
is only making a “ half-day excursion ”
from his own province into “ another
subject entirely.” One really begins to
suspect that it was during “ a half-day
excursion ” that Mr. Pope studied
Haeckel.
A grosser travesty of his
system it would be difficult to conceive.
Serious students will not expect an
analysis of it, but I will briefly point
out its absurdities. This subject is as
much within the province of compara
tive zoology, of which Haeckel is one of
the greatest living masters, as it is in
the field of psychology. It is a border
question. There was, therefore, no ex
cursion.
Indeed, it is not too much
to say that this tracing of the upward
growth of mind has been one of
Haeckel’s most absorbing studies ; and
now his conclusion, based on a long
life of study and research, is to be
flippantly represented as an “assumption”
ignorantly and hastily stolen from a
province “ entirely ” different from his
own—a province, moreover, where we
are assured it did not exist. Further,
of the seven “ psychologists of repute ”
whom Mr. Pope quotes—Windt (Wundt),
Hoffding, Ward, Sully, Stout, Dewy,
and James—six at least admit the evo
lution of mind by purely natural pro
cesses. I have already quoted the ablest
ot them, Professor Ward, as a witness
53
to the unanimity of this conclu
sion.1
With the difficulties alleged by Dr.
Iverach we will not linger. He seems
not to insist on the impossibility of
evolution, but urges that man is actually
separated from the animals by several
marked prerogatives. One of these is
language; but as Dr. Iverach admits this
is “ manifestly a social product ”—that is
to say, evolved—one wonders why it is
adduced at all. Another difference is
in his relation to his environment, which
he can modify and turn to service ; that
also is clearly an acquired or evolved
faculty. Finally, Dr. Iverach urges man’s
distinction in the way of science,
religion, morality, civilisation, and so on.
Experts are agreed, and many theo
logians are with them, that these are all
evolutionary products. They did not
exist 300,000 years ago. Nor does Dr.
Iverach seriously urge them as objections
to the theory of evolution. On the other
hand, Mr. Rhondda Williams, who
“ believes ”—though it is “not proved
that man was evolved, soul and body,
makes a prolonged onslaught on
Haeckel’s position. Before we follow
him into his storm-cloud of rhetoric, let
us make clear what he hopes to gain by
it. He admits the fact of evolution.
He claims, of course, that the evolution
ary process was divinely or pantheistically
guided; a point we discuss later. The
only practical question is : Does he, or
does he not, admit that the agencies at
work in the uplifting of the human
species are the same agencies which we
have hitherto dealt with ? If he does, it
is of no real consequence to us that he
finds Haeckel’s theory of consciousness
or of memory at fault. The main point is
the exclusion of the new kind of force
which was supposed to enter the world
with the human mind. It is important
to remember—he seems to forget it
himself sometimes—that Mr. Williams
does not postulate the entrance of a new
1 In so far as Mr. Pope means that they differ
from Haeckel as to the actual relation of brain
and mind we shall meet the point presently.
�54
THE ASCENT OF MAN
force into the cosmos, but, like Le Conte to “ psychoplasm ” for more “conjuring.”
and Fiske, sees only a further unfolding
Haeckel is represented as “calling in
of the universal spirit. At the bottom
psychoplasm to account for what proto
his quarrel with Haeckel is not about the plasm could not do”—which is false;
evolution of the human soul, or the
psychoplasm being the same thing as
agencies which evolved it, but as to the protoplasm, but in a different relation,
relation of all soul to brain.
just as Dr. Lionel Beale speaks of
He promises us, then, that he is going
“bioplasm”—and then as saying that
to convict the distinguished scientist
“ what springs from it is declared to be
of “jugglery,” and to find him in only a name for what protoplasm does.”
“a perfect muddle,” and so on. The Mr. Williams foists on Haeckel a
first “conjuring trick” is produced by fictitious distinction, and then invites
a little conjuring on the preacher’s his admiring audience to make merry
own part. He cuts in two Haeckel’s over the confusion it involves. Any
reference (p. 94) to “ the transcendental student with a desire to understand,
design of the teleological philosophy of rather than to score rhetorical points,
the schools,” inserts a full-stop after will see at a glance that Haeckel’s termin
“design,” and then asks us to admire ology is perfectly consistent with itself
the stupidity or desperateness of a man and the facts.
Protoplasm is the
who first excludes purpose from the material substratum of all life; but
universe—“in order to shut out God” when it takes on the form of nerve
—and then finds it in the organic world tissue and becomes the base of nerveand calls it “ mechanical teleology.” If,
life (which we all agree to call psychic
moreover, Mr. Williams cannot see that life) it is described as psychoplasm.
the word “design” or “purpose” is Just as Mr. Williams’s procedure would
used only in a figurative sense in the be called clever from the intellectual
second application, he would do well to point of view, but by a different name
re-study the passage. A similar con from the moral standpoint.
fusion is found in his criticism of
As a last instance of this poor
Haeckel’s treatment of consciousness
“jugglery” I will quote one more
and memory. He labours to prove that passage. Haeckel, he says, “speaks of
Haeckel must take the word memory
certain parts of the brain as ‘the real
figuratively in its lower stages—which organs of mental life; they are those
is precisely what Haeckel obviously highest instruments of psychic activity
means. But the justification of apply that produce thought and conscious
ing the word “ memory ” to the function
ness ! ’ Look at the contradiction in
of a cell and to the human faculty lies
that statement. Certain parts of the
in the whole mass of proof Haeckel has brain are said to be at once the instru
accumulated to show that they are the ments and the producers of conscious
same function, and that the one passes
ness 1 Talk about a doctor using
gradually, as the nervous system develops,
instruments if you like, but do not talk
into the other. That is one of the
of the instruments producing the doctor;
most superficial truths of comparative and especially do not speak as if both
statements could be true at the same
psychology.1 Then Mr. Williams turns
time.” This is a bewildering sort of
1 We may compare Mr. Ballard’s eagerness to
point out that, whereas Haeckel grants zis no
souls or wills, he ascribes these even to the cells
and atoms. It is the same curious and wilful
misconstruction. Haeckel maintains that the
force associated with the atom or the cell is the
same fundamentally as that which reveals itself
in our consciousness. That is the logical con
clusion of all his proofs of continuous, natural
development. He is, therefore, logically correct
in speaking of the “soul” of the atom if we
insist on speaking of the “soul” of man. The
sensation and will he attributes to atoms are
obviously figurative, and merely reminders of his
doctrine of the unity of all force or spirit—a
unity which Le Conte and Fiske and even Mr.
Williams (when he is consistent) also admit.
�THE ASCENT OF MAN
criticism.
Organs, instruments, and
producers are clearly used by Haeckel
in much the same sense. None but a
pedant, or a desperate critic, would
abuse us for saying that the stomach
was the instrument and producer of
digestion; certainly no one would
misunderstand us. Thought is not a
substantial entity like a doctor. The
simile is totally misleading.
Happily, Mr. Williams finds we have
arrived at last at the crucial point, and
he says that it is : “ Does the mind use
the brain as an instrument, or does the
brain really produce the mind ? Haeckel’s
position is the latter. But do not sup
pose for a moment that he has any
scientific proof of it.” Anyone who is
acquainted with modern psychology is
aware that neither of the positions Mr.
Williams puts is held by anybody of
consequence nowadays.
Spiritualist
philosophers do not speak of the mind
using the brain; and Haeckel, when
you pay serious attention to all he says,
does not hold that the brain produces
the mind. Matter, he has said from the
beginning, never produces force or spirit.
They are two aspects of one reality, as
Mr. Williams himself holds (p. 8). The
sole question with Haeckel is whether
this force we call the human mind is one
with the force revealed in the animal
mind and also in inorganic nature. That
is naturally the first concern of a monist.
Force, it is a truism in science, varies with
its material substratum. When hydrogen
and oxygen are united the resultant force
has vastly different properties from what
it had before. When water unites with
fresh chemical substances, force takes on
again a wholly new set of properties ;
and the more elaborate the material
compound, the more elaborate the force.
Protoplasm is a most highly elaborate
chemical compound with a most intri
cate molecular structure. It is quite
natural to expect the force-side of it to
be very distinctive and peculiar; so we
agree to connect life with the lower
forces. But when protoplasm becomes
psychoplasm, the complication greatly
55
increases; the force varies in the same
proportion. The psychoplasm or proto
plasm of the higher animal brain ad
vances still further in complexity, and,
moreover, organic structure of the most
intricate kind is added. Hence in the
human brain, on physical principles, we
must expect a manifestation of force
vastly different from all that we find else
where. We find mind.
Haeckel, on
the strength of this very clear and
scientific reasoning, and of all the facts
as to the intimate dependence of mind
on nerve-tissue which he gathers into
several chapters, and all the facts as to
the gradual unfolding of this force we
call mind in exact correspondence to the
growth in complexity of the nervous
system, concludes that he sees no reason
for thinking that the mind-force is
specifically different from any other kind
of force. I will return to this very im
portant point presently. Meantime we
see what there is in Mr. Williams’s state
ment of Haeckel’s position and his
assertion that it is an idle assumption.1
1 I dare not risk fatiguing the reader with a
further analysis of Mr. Williams’s criticisms under
this head. I have treated them at some length,
because this is the chief section of his criticism
of Haeckel, and because, though this is the chief
section of Haeckel’s book, no other critic devotes
more than a paragraph to it. But I will briefly
point out some further instances of Mr. Williams’
peculiar method. He says that, “ as far as science
goes,” we are “quite free” to conceive the rela
tion of mind to brain as that of “ the musician
and his instrument.” That is gravely misleading.
Science permits no such substantial independence
of each other as there is between musician and
organ. The only proper metaphor science would
allow is the relation of music to the instrument;
which is by no means so accommodating to the
dualist. With the petty quibble about “ truth
I will not delay. But on the next page (23) you
will note how Mr. Williams quotes Haeckel’s,
saying that ‘ ‘ man sinks to the level of a placental
mammal ” (which no one questions, in substance),,
and in the next paragraph turns this into the
grotesque doctrine ‘ ‘ that human nature sinks to.
the level of tie lowest placental mammal ” (a,
very lowly beast)! Then he grumbles that
Haeckel is “ inconsistent in his estimates of
man ” ; though he must know that Haeckel only’
belittles man relatively to the old theology.
Then (p. 24), after a pedantic effort to make
Haeckel say the mind of Shakespeare may have:
rivals in the animal world, he credits him with.
Bishops gate Institnta?
�56
THE ASCENT OF MAN
Mr. Williams and his colleagues may
be advised to take to heart the words of
one of the ablest American psycho
logists, Professor Miinsterberg, who is
by no means a materialist. “ The
philosopher,” he says, “ who bases the
hope of immortality on a theory of brain
functions and enjoys the facts which
cannot be physiologically explained,
stands, it seems to me, on the same
ground with the astronomer who seeks
with his telescope for a place in the
universe where no space exists, and
where there would be undisturbed room
for God and eternal bodiless souls.”1
All this criticism is neither more nor less
than an attempt to defend gaps. If Mr.
Williams replies that it is rather an
attempt to point out gaps in Haeckel’s
system, the reply is obvious. The
essence of Haeckel’s system is monistic
or negative. Any positive theories he
may advance as to the relation of brain
to memory or cell to consciousness are
scientific theories, grounded on the best
available evidence, but not final and
unchangeable. If they prove inade
quate, or if fresh facts discountenance
them, they will be modified. But the
essential part of his position remains.
“The whole momentum of our know
ledge of biological continuities,” as
Mr. Newman Smyth says, the whole
momentum of our knowledge of cosmic
processes, indeed, impels us to suppose
the human mind was evolved. Where
are the obstacles to such an assump
tion ?
Where are the specifically
different—not merely very different, but
the opinion that the difference between the mind
of Plato and the animal is “slighter in every
respect than that between the anthropoid ape
and a bird”; whereas Plaeckel had said “be
tween the higher and the lower animal souls,”
which may mean the gorilla and the amoeba.
Then he finds a difference between the animal
and the human embryo in the fact that the
embryo will become a man and ‘1 the highest
animal never will ” ; which is begging the whole
question whether the highest animal has not
actually done so. Such is the farrago of rhetoric
opposed to us as the only and adequate reply to
the most important section of the Riddle.
1 Psychology and Life, p. 91.
different in kind—contents of the
human mind which forbid us to suppose
it ? They are disappearing one by one
as the sciences of comparative psycho
logy and comparative philology and
comparative sociology and comparative
ethics and religion unfold their several
stories. Everything has been evolved.
To talk blandly of the “vast difference ”
between mind and matter is “ an appeal to
the imagination ” and “ an insult to the
understanding,” says Mr. Mallock. He
goes on to censure the dishonest
practice of contrasting the mind of the
highest man with that of the lower
animals. That is not truth-seeking.
The truth-seeker will take the highest
animal intelligence (as discovered by
the observations of Darwin, Romanes,
Lloyd-Morgan, Lubbock, and so many
others) and the lowest human intelli
gence (as seen in the Veddahs or
Hottentots, or as indicated by pre
historic human skulls) and ask himself
whether he finds here a gulf which
evolution could not be supposed to
have bridged in something like 500,000
years. But if animals have the germ,
ask some, why can you not raise one to
a higher level ? Setting aside the actual
results of training, let us ask : Did it,
on the theistic-evolution theory of man’s
origin, take God 300,000 years or more
to raise the highest animal species to the
miserable level man occupied 50,000 or
100,000 years ago ? And do you ask
man to do more than this in a year or
two ?
But, though it is well to remember
that the essence of Haeckel’s position is
the reasoned exclusion of any new force,
we are bound to give serious attention to
the positive evidence he has accumu
lated.
The verbal quibbles of Mr.
Williams have not touched the structure
of evidence given in Chaps. VII.-X.
of the Riddle, and no other critic is in the
field. To resume it briefly, we have a
fourfold gradation of psychic force, or a
fourfold exhibition of the growth of
mind. In the first place, we may arrange
J all known organisms, from the moneron
�THE ASCENT OF MAN
to man, in a scale of mental faculty, or
vital faculty leading up to mental, and we
find a sensibly graduated development
of mind, corresponding rigidly. to the
growth of structure in complexity. In
the second place, we study the growth
of the individual human mind from the
impregnated ovum, and we find the
same gradual formation of nerve and
brain and the. same proportionate
unfolding of consciousness. In the
third place, we learn from palseontology
that living things have been developed
from each other in the order in which
the zoologist arranges his subjects, and
which is confidently anticipated by the
embryologist. In the fourth place, if we
arrange the brains of all known men in
a similar hierarchic scale, we find the
same rigid correspondence of function
and structure, or of mind-action and
brain. Then there are supplementary
and complementary lines of research.
There is the life of the sub-conscious
self, which Professor James says is a
great world we are only just beginning
to explore. Already the explorations
show conscious action to be only a
small area of mental action ; the larger
area is mostly mechanical, and the
conscious area passes gradually into it
and out of it. As Mr. Mallock says:
“ The human mind, like an iceberg
which floats with most of its bulk sub
merged, from its first day to its last, has
more of itself below the level of con
sciousness than ever appears above it.”
There are the facts of double and
abnormal consciousness, the. various
kinds of mental paralysis resulting from
lesion of the brain, the phenomena of
somnambulism and narcotic action and
artificial unconsciousness. There are
the voluminous determinations
of
psycho-physics as to the exact correspon
dence between purely physical and
chemical changes in the brain and
changes in thought or emotion. There
are the zealous investigations of the
modern students of child-life and child
brain, showing the same exact relation
of development. And there are the
57
most recent and largely successful
efforts to localise mental functions in
different parts of the brain.
Now, let us be perfectly clear what
this enormous mass of convergent
evidence really means. When we study
the stomach or the lungs in comparative
zoology, and perceive the close cor
respondence, from the lowest to the
highest forms, of structure and function,
we do not dream of concluding only
that the two have a very close con
nection : we say at once that they are
in the relation of organ and its function :
we say that the digestive force or the
respiratory-force is the same throughout,
and we can at the lowest end of the
scale connect it with ordinary natural
forces. Yet when we have this stupen
dous mass of evidence converging along
a dozen lines to the conclusion that the
mind-force is continuous throughout the
animal kingdom, and is rigidly and
absolutely bound up, as far as every
particle of scientific evidence goes, with
the nerve-structure., and is, at the lower
end, continuous with the ordinary force
of the universe, we are told we must
draw no conclusion whatever. We are
asked to believe that this mass of
scientific evidence is quite consistent
with a belief that some extraneous force,
distinct in kind from the ordinary force
of the cosmos, is “ using ” the nerve
tissue to manifest itself; and that the
highly complex force which must result
from the intricate molecular texture of
the human brain is nowhere discoverable.
On scientific principles “these facts,” as
Mr. Mallock says, “totally destroy the
foundation of the theist’s arguments.”
They teach us that, as he says again,
“each mother who has watched with
pride, as something peculiar and original,
the growth of her child’s mind, from the
days of the cradle to the days of the
first lesson-book, has really been watch
ing, compressed into a few brief years,
i the stupendous process which began in
the darkest abyss of time and connects
our thoughts, like our bodies, with the
primary living substance—whether this
�58
THE ASCENT OF MAN
be wholly identical with what we call
matter or no.”1 If it were not for the
presence amongst us of certain religious
traditions about the nature of man’s
“ soul,” or mind-force, no scientist would
ever hesitate for a moment to draw a
conclusion which would be justified by
every canon of logic and science—the
conclusion that in this vast hierarchy of
facts we see the world-force ascending
upwards until it grows self-conscious in
the human brain. Haeckel’s attitude is
the strictly and purely scientific attitude.
But, it is further urged, this is only a
description of the manner of growth, not
of the causes. “ Thus,” says Professor
Case, “ in presence of the problem which
is the crux of materialism, the origin of
consciousness, he first propounds a
gratuitous hypothesis that everything has
mind, and then gives up the origin of
conscious mind after all.” I have ex
plained in what sense Haeckel attributes
mind to “ everything ”—though a skilled
metaphysician might be expected to see
that. To the second point I reply that
the whole of this evidence is an explana
tion of the origin of mind. The whole
evidence points to the conclusion that
conscious mind is an outgrowth of un
conscious, and that this is the generally
diffused cosmic force. But you cannot
derive the conscious from the uncon
scious, say several critics. The objection
is childish. If we are to explain any
thing, as Sir A. Rucker said, we cannot
explain it in terms of itself: the conscious
must be derived from the unconscious.
And as a fact, Mr. Mallock points out,
you do get consciousness out of the
unconscious every day—in the growth of
the infant; or, as Lloyd Morgan puts it,
in the development of the chicken from
the egg. In any case, the critics plead,
you are only saying how and not why
mind was evolved. Now, in so far as
this is a plea for teleology, we remand it,
1 Religion as a Credible Doctrine, p. 77. The
last phrase is superfluous. No one “wholly
identifies ” the primary living substance with
“ matter.” Matter and force are two aspects of
it, as brain and mind are.
as before. If it is anything more than
this, it is a plea for gaps and breaches in
the mechanical scheme of the universe,
building. fallaciously (as usual) on the
present imperfection of science. Take
the development of the embryo. We
certainly can do little more as yet than
describe its stages. But no one now
doubts it is a mechanical process. The
assumption that some non-mechanical
force was grouping and marshalling the
molecules of protoplasm, according to a
design of which it was itself totally un
conscious, only plunges us in deeper
mysteries than ever. Moreover, the facts
of heredity, the transmission of bodily
marks and features and peculiarities,
point wholly to a mechanical or bodily
action. The development of the mind
on a cosmic scale is still more clearly
mechanical. There is not a single fact
that compels us to go outside of the range
of familiar cosmic forces to seek an
explanation.
I will add one or two illustrations from
recent science to show how its progress
tends more and more to confirm Haec
kel’s position. Sir W. Turner closed his
presidential address to the British Asso
ciation three years ago with these words
(which were duly censured as “ material
ism ”): “ At last man came into exist
ence. His nerve-energy, in addition to
regulating the processes in his economy
which he possesses in common with
animals, was endowed with higher
powers. When translated into psychical
activity, it has enabled him throughout
the ages to progress from the condition
of a rude savage to an advanced stage
of civilisation.” Thus is the very lan
guage of Haeckel used on our supreme
scientific solemnity. The following year
Professor D. J. Cunningham (M.D.,
D.Sc., LL.D., D.C.L., F.R.S.) was the
president of the Anthropological Section
of the Congress, and his presidential
address was devoted to “ the part which
the human brain has played in the evo
lution of man.” The whole speech was
a vindication of the purely mechanical ex
! planation of the rise of man. Instead of
�THE ASCENT OF MAN
seeking the influence of external powers,
Professor Cunningham looks for more
prosaic changes that may have led to the
segregation of man. The reader who is
only accustomed to rhetorical and
spiritualistic treatment of the theme will
learn with a shock that the mere forma
tion of a habit of setting the hands free
for other purposes than locomotion pro
bably had a profound effect on the brain
and intelligence. “ So important is the
part played by the human hand as an
agent of the mind, and so perfectly is
it adjusted with reference to this office,
that there are many who think that the
first great start which man obtained on
the path which has led to his higher
development was given by the setting
of the upper limb free from the duty or
acting as an organ of support and loco
motion.” It hardly needed divine inter
vention or guidance to suggest this
change. The hand-centre in the brain
is located in such a region that its de
velopment must react on the cortex.
Further it is “ the acquisition of speech
which has been a dominant factor in
determining the high development of the
human brain.” The centre for facial
expression is contiguous to that of the
hand, and, as communication began to
grow between the primitive men, much
facial expression would be used, giving a
still further stimulus to the brain. In
fine, not only is language shown by the
philologist to be an evolutionary product,
but the physiologist finds that the dis
tinctive structures in the human brain
(though they may occasionally be fairly
traced in the brain of the anthropoid
ape) which are connected with speech
are the outcome of “a slow evolu
tionary growth.” Thus is science coming
to determine the physiological line of
evolution which gave the first distinction
of brain-power, on which natural selec
tion has fastened so effectively.1
1 Let me quote Professor Cunningham’s con
clusion : “ Assuming that the acquisition of
speech has afforded the chief stimulus to the
general development of the brain, therebygiving it a rank high above any other factor
59
Thus are the mechanical methods of
science bridging the supposed gulf.
There is no longer serious ground for
claiming a unique position for man, and
it is not surprising to find the leading
theologians sounding the retreat once
more. We are, in fact, beginning to
realise that the dualist theory of man
never did afford any “ explanation ” of
anything. The connection of soul and
body was always incomprehensible;1
nor is there the slightest intellectual satis
faction in covering up the whole mystery
of the mind with a label bearing the
word “ spirit.” Psychology has deserted
its old ways and become a science.. The
theologians will do well not to wait until
they are again ignominiously splashed
by the advancing tide of scientific re
search. Their efforts to “ show cause ”
why we should not apply the mechanical
process of evolution (whether divinely
guided or not) to the growth of man
have hopelessly failed.
But before we leave the question it
is necessary to consider for a moment
the question of the liberty of the will.
Here Haeckel’s opponents are content
to appeal to what Emerson calls “the
cowardly doctrine of consequences.”
We shall consider the moral outlook of
a monistic world in a later chapter, but
which has operated in the evolution of man, it
would be wrong to lose sight of the fact that
the first step in this upward movement must have
been taken by the brain itself. Some cerebral
variation—probably trifling and insignificant at
the start, and yet pregnant with the most farreaching possibilities—has in . the stem-form of
man contributed that condition which has
rendered speech possible.
This variation,
strengthened and fostered by natural selection,
has in the end led to the great double result.of
a large brain with wide and extensive associa
tion-areas and articulate speech, the two results
being brought about by the mutual reaction of
the one process on the other.”
1 Compare Professor Herbert’s desperate pre
dicament in his Modern Realism Examined,
which we are urged to read : “We may regard
the material world as real, but if we do we must
deny the existence of all but Creative Intelligence.
... If the material world is as it seems, it
contains no minds” (p. 148). Mr. Mallock
points all this out to Father Maher.very forcibly
in his Religion as a Credible Doctrine.
�6o
THE ASCENT OF MAN
may observe in passing that all this kind
of reasoning is futile and insincere. It
will not make the least practical differ
ence to life whether psychologists do
or do not agree to leave unimpaired the
old formula of “ the liberty of the will.”
A man can control his actions to a great
extent, and will to that extent be re
sponsible for them. On that we have
the witness of consciousness. How this
apparent power of choice arises in a
mechanism like the mind we can hardly
expect to understand until the new
psychology has made some progress.
But the old idea of a “ self-determining
power of the will ” is now “ an unthink
able conception,” as Dr. Croll (who
is on the list of the sound scientists)
emphatically says. Mr. Mallock also
thinks that “every attempt to escape
from the determinism of science by
analysis or by observation is fruitless.”
No sooner do we begin to look closely
into our free-will than we find the sup
posed area of its action shrinking
rapidly : we find ourselves in a perfect
network of determining influences.
Our will is the slave to our desire; we
cannot will what we do not desire, nor
what we desire the least or the less.
Our desire can always be traced to
our circumstances, our education, our
character and temperament. And our
character and
temperament — here
modern science has had a great deal
to say—are determined by heredity and
environment. The attempt to break
through this network with a cry of alarm
about consequences is futile. There
will be no practical consequences of an
evil character; and the consequences
for good of the scientific attack on the
old doctrine, from the days of Robert
Owen down, have been incalculable.
The community is a self-conscious
determinism. Now that it knows how
much heredity and environment have to
do with character and desire, and with
the healthy balancing of desires, it will
take action. The whole of education
and social reform have benefited enor
mously by the overthrow of the old
scholastic notion of the will. Such
“ freedom ” as we now find we have—if
we may still use the word—is not differ
ent in kind from that which a cat or a
dog evinces every day.
We conclude, then, that Haeckel’s
opponents have shown no plausible
reason why evolution should not extend
to the origin of man. The great achieve
ments which distinguish man to-day from
the animal world—art, science, philo
sophy, religion, civilisation, language—•
are known to have been formed, from
very rudimentary beginnings, by a long
process of evolution. At their root, in
the men whose skulls and bones and
rude implements are unearthed to-day,
we find only a somewhat more elaborate
brain, with deeper furrows and more con
volutions, a somewhat higher grade of
intelligence and emotion, than in the
higher animals about us. There is no
gulf, no gap: but there is a period of
some 300,000 years for natural selection
to work in. Comparative anatomy is
beginning to trace the steps—quite
natural, if not at first casual, steps—by
which man ascended in this direction. A
chance variation in the use of the limbs
could, it seems, greatly stimulate the
most important part of the brain. Any
increase of brain-power would prove of
enormous advantage, and would be
“ selected ” and emphasised at once. In
any case the momentum of continuity
and the mass of evidence for actual con
tinuity are enormous. It is no less
scientific than philosophical to see in the
growth of the human mind a further ex
tension of the life-force of the cosmos, a
further embodiment of the great matter
force reality which unfolds itself in the
universe about us and in the wonderful
self-conscious mechanism of the mind.
�THE IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL
Chapter
61
VI
THE IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL
Until a few centuries ago a belief in have the same fate. Man now sees in
the immortality of the soul harmonised the universe at large no shadow of
so well with the prevailing conception support for that promise of unending
of the world at large that men were life he has entertained so long.
content with but slender rational proof “What! shall the dateless worlds in dust be
of it. Even then, it is true, the tragedy
blown
Back to the unremembered and unknown,
of death seemed to the eye so final—And this frail Thou—the flame of yesterday—
the curtain seemed to be rung down so
Burn on forlorn, immortal, and unknown ? ”
inexorably on the conscious soul—that
sceptics were not wanting. The Sad
Death is the law of all things. It is
ducees amongst the Hebrews, the true that the great reality that shapes'
Epicureans amongst the Greeks, and itself in a million forms never dies.
the materiarii of early Christian times, That is its first law. But of every
rejected the belief entirely. Some of single embodiment of its restless energy,
the ablest of the mediaeval schoolmen of every individual being that pours out
(such as Duns Scotus) went so far as to of its womb, the path is measured and
deny that any rational proof could be the fate is written.
devised in support of the belief. But ‘
“ Life lives on.
for most men the belief was credible
It is the lives, the lives, the lives, that die.”
enough, and not unwelcome. Immor
So rhe position of the belief in per
tality was a familiar idea to them. Not
only God and the angels had that sonal immortality has changed. The
prerogative, but the very stars they pretty thoughts that supported it, or
looked on night by night were believed accompanied it, in the mind of a Plato
to be of immortal texture. In a world or an Augustine, crumble beneath the
where the immortal outnumbered the burden some would lay on them to-day.
mortal, man could well convince him The cosmic odds are against it. It is
self that the tradition of his own immor now the assumption of a stupendous
privilege on the part of one inhabitant
tality was true.
But the world has grown into a of the universe, who flatters himself he
universe to-day, and from end to end of is exempted from the general law of
it comes only the whisper of death. death. We look up now to no immortal
The stars, that had been regarded as ■i stars for reassurance as we turn sadly
fragments of immortal fire, are known from the truthful face of the dead. The
to be hastening to a sure extinction. angels have retreated far from the ways
The moon stands close to us always of humanity. God has shrunk into an
as a calm prophet of death. Such as it intangible cosmic principle. If belief
is, the corpse of a world, will our earth in immortality is to be anything more
one day be. Such will our sun finally than a despairing trust, it must appeal to
become; and after him, or with him, the presence in man of some unique
the hundred millions of his fellows in power and promise. But we have seen
the firmament. Countless dead worlds that modern science completely dis
already lie on the paths of heaven ; and credits the “ supposed separateness of
the millions that are yet unborn will man from the brutes,” to use the words
�62
THE IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL
of Le Conte. The thinking force in him
is the same force that reveals itself in
the industry and ingenuity of the ant or
the affection of the dog. Why shall it
survive the corruption of the brain
in this case, yet in their case die
away as surely as the light dies when
the sun sets ? It would seem that it is
not so much a question of examining
Haeckel’s disproofs, as of asking where
we are to look for the ground of this
stupendous claim.
We shall fully consider both points in
the light of the criticisms passed on
Haeckel’s chapter on immortality and
the works on the subject which are
opposed to him. The actual criticisms
will detain us very little, for an obvious
reason. Haeckel has already destroyed
the ground for any claim of a unique
character of the human mind. We have
seen with how little success his oppo
nents have tried to impede or retard his
progress from point to point of the
evolutionary scheme. The very latest
researches of science confirm his theses.
The ablest Christian apologists yield
their arms and desert the long defended
breaches. We have been borne along
by the flood of scientific evidence,
philosophically considered, as far as the
closing thesis of our last chapter. Man
is the latest and highest embodiment of
the universal matter-force reality.
It
would seem that the acceptance of this
thesis is equivalent to an abandonment
of the belief in immortality, but we shall
see that evolutionists like Fiske, and Le
Conte, and Mr. Newman Smyth still
erect feeble barriers. Meantime, let us
dispose of the less advanced critics;
those who reflect the ideas of the average
church-goer and strive to offer some
defence of them.
There is Dr. Horton, for instance,
who pleads much for “ the naive, but
essentially correct, conceptions of our
ancestors.” Dr. Horton seems to think
it most effective to urge that men who
do not share the belief in God and im I
mortality live on “ bestial levels,” and [
are “ shrunk in soul, warped in mind, i
and degraded in body.” The “intel
lectual strain ” of Haeckel’s scientific
work is kindly said to relieve him
personally from these consequences, but
one gathers that we who are not great
scientists fall under Dr. Horton’s merci
less logic. “Accustom yourselves,” he
says, “ to believe that God and freedom
and immortality are hallucinations;
accustom yourselves to the idea that
this stupendous order of being in which
we live is not a rational order at all, but
the mere fortuitous concourse of atoms
[! ], and by an inevitable logic, as our
anarchist friends see, when you have got
rid of the first lie, which is God, you
quickly get rid of the second lie, which
is righteousness, and then you get rid of
all the other lies, which are love, and
truth, and peace, and joy, and civilisa
tion and progress generally, and poetry,
and life.” We will not stay here to
discuss this insincere rhetoric. It is too
great a libel on Dr. Horton himself, if
we take it seriously, and too insulting to
the intelligence of his readers—who,
one may assume, happen to know a few
agnostics. Nor need -we be detained
with the various criticisms in Light.
The chief of these articles states that
Haeckel relies on “physics ” to disprove
the immortality of the soul; more curi
ously still, a second writer in Light (Jan.
19th, 1901) does rely on physics (the
conservation of energy) to rehabilitate
the belief. The second writer, more
over, completely ignoring Haeckel’s de
liberate words, assures his readers that he
“is terrified at the thought of life beyond
the grave,” and adopts the grotesque
title of “ A Frightened Philosopher.”
We shall not get much light from that
side.
Most of the critics we have already
passed, attempting loyally to defend one
or other of the supposed breaches in the
evolutionary doctrine, so that they make
little resistance here. When, in the
course of the next ten years, they have
fallen back on this last position—probably discovering that, on theological
principles, man must have been evolved
�THE IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL
—they will begin to repeat the argu
ments of Fiske and Le Conte, which we
shall presently consider. But there are
several critics who, setting aside the
question of evolution as not essential to
defend, formulate their objection thus.
Science proves up to the hilt that brain
and mind are correlative. As brain
develops, the mind opens—and in strict
est proportion. Lesion or other affection
of the brain proportionately mars the
mental or emotional life.
Psycho
physical observations show that the in
tensity of brain-action quite corresponds
to the intensity of mind-action. Let us
grant all this. But, they say, all this
throws no light whatever on the question
whether the mind may not outlive the
brain.
“ It’s logic! ” exclaims Mr.
Brierley, contemptuously, when he
comes to this part of Haeckel’s scheme.
Mr. Williams and Dr. Horton, and
others, make the same reply. Indeed,
as accomplished rhetoricians, they offer
Haeckel a pretty figurative way of con
ceiving the relation, which may help his
sluggish imagination and correct his
logic. Mind-action is like the music a
master evokes from the piano or violin.
A musical instrument maker would, like
the psycho-physicist, find an exact cor
respondence between the ailments and
defects of the violin and the disorders of
the music, or between the violence of
the molecules of string and wood and
the intensity and tone of the music.
But—Haeckel has forgotten the player !
Brain and thought are instrument and
music. Where, in Haeckel’s philosophy,
is the instrumentalist?
A very singular omission on the part
of one of the keenest observers in the
world! Let us examine the matter.
We have seen in the preceding chapter
the immense mass of scientific evidence
which goes to show that there is an
exact correspondence between brain
action and soul-life. The correspondence
is just the same in man as in the ape or
the dog. As the shadow varies with the
object which projects it, so does thought
vary with the quality and action of the
63
brain. There is no dispute about this.
No induction is based on a wider and
more varied range of observations.
This correspondence is the same as we
find in the case of the heart and its
function, the stomach and digestion, or
the lungs and respiration. Now, in all
these analogous cases we do not seek an
instrumentalist.
The instrument is
automatic. For its formation we look
back along a process of natural evolution
which stretches over 50,000,000 years.
Whether the evolutionary agencies were
divinely guided or no will be considered
presently, but at all events in the heart
and lungs we have automatic instruments,
and we never dream of looking for a
present instrumentalist. It is the same
with the brain of the dog. When the
dog dies, we do not ask what has become
of the instrumentalist now that the
instrument (brain) is broken and the
music (thought) is silent. We never
dream of there being a third element.
But the mind of man is the same mind
more fully developed.
In a sense there is a third factor—
both in the stomach, the canine life, and
the human life—and this is the only
truth there really is in this very mislead
ing figure of rhetoric. I have already
mentioned a critic who endeavours to
deduce the immortality of the soul from
the conservation of energy, and this
gives us the clue. Critics very stupidly,
or very wilfully, represent Haeckel as
saying that thought is a movement of
the molecules of the brain, just as they
say he resolves all things into matter.
They ignore the fact that he lays as
much, if not more, stress on force than
on matter. He holds, of course, that
there is fundamentally only one reality,
but it is most improper to call that by
the name of one of its attributes (exten
sion). Thus we have, in a sense, three
elements : the instrument, the music, and
the soul or energy associated with the
brain. When Haeckel speaks of thought
as “ a function of the brain,” he means
the living brain—the incomparably intri
cate structure of material elements and
�64
THE IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL
the natural forces associated with them,
in which thought arises. We have no
scientific or philosophical ground what
ever for . postulating any further element
to explain the music. Is it scientific to
make an exception of this living brain,
and say it is the only non-automatic organ
in the body ? Does its relation to the
rest of the body give the least support
to the notion ? Is it scientific to say the
living brain is automatic in the whole
animal world, but cannot be so in man
because the music is finer and more diffi
cult ? Does embryology favour the idea ?
Does philosophy step in, and bid us sus
pend the scientific method and admit a
breach in the scientific continuity ?
Probably it is to philosophy they will
appeal. These ideas, Dr. Horton says,
“rest on the region of thought and con
sciousness ” to which Haeckel “ studi
ously closes his eyes.” By all means let
us go to philosophy. Kant will tell us
that these psychological proofs of immor
tality are quite discredited. Schelling
and Hegel and Schopenhauer will give us
the consolation of disappearing in the
world-process. Hume and Mill and Spen
cer will prove more than sceptical. Most
modern philosophers will tell us, as
Miinsterberg does, that “ the philosopher
who bases his hope of immortality on a
theory of brain-functions . . . stands
on the same ground as the astronomer
who seeks with his telescope for a place
in the universe where no space exists,
and where there would be undisturbed
room for God and eternal bodiless souls.”
Certainly one can quote thinkers who
wish mind and brain movements to be
left parallel, with the relation of the two
undetermined. But they advance no
reasons which arrest the application of
scientific method. Here in the mind
life are phenomena that we can examine
from two sides—from without and from
within. This may seem at first to give
a certain uniqueness to the soul-life.
But the only soul-life we can examine
from within is our own individual experi
ence. Every other man’s soul is a
matter of objective examination to us;
and by much of the same evidence which
convinces us of his similar experiences,
we are forced to extend conscious mental
action to the brutes. So the uniqueness
once more disappears. Philosophy will
not help or hinder us. Referring to the
work of Professor Royce, a distinguished
American philosopher and Gifford Lec
turer, Professor Le Conte says: “He
gives up the question of immortality as
insoluble by philosophy. Well—perhaps
it is.” i
Thus (reserving some further philo
sophic arguments for the moment) we
return unembarrassed to our scientific
procedure ; and “ science,” Prof. Miinsterberg says, “ opposes to any doctrine
of individual immortality an unbroken
and impregnable barrier.”2 The rigid
relation determined by psycho-physics,
the rigid relation observed in the evolu
tion of the thinking animal, the rigid
relation that is recorded by pathology
and ethnology, and that lies on the
very surface of life, means something
more than parallelism.
It is easy to
quote Huxley and Tyndall in opposition
to Haeckel’s formula. The one was an
idealist in metaphysics: the other has
said much more in the monistic sense
than he ever said in the agnostic. Pro
ceeding on realistic and scientific lines,
we are driven by the rules of induction
to regard thought as wholly bound up
with brain, and to look for no third
element beyond the matter and force of
which the brain is so intricately con
structed. The mysteries that still linger
about consciousness and memory, just as
about embryonic development, for in
stance, are scientific mysteries. To build
on them would be to repeat the discre
dited old tactics.
If the theories of
them which Haeckel offers are unsatis
factory, wait for better ones. They are
the light bridges of the monistic system,
forecasting the scientific advance. But
that, in whatever way, mind-force is an
evolution of the general cosmic-force,
1 The Conception of God, p. 752 Psychology and Life, p. 85.
�THE IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL
and that it therefore affords no more
promise of immortality in the individual
human mind than it does in the indi
vidual motor-car, is a scientific induction
resting on a mass of evidence and drawn
up in observance of the most rigid
rules.
Let us now consider the arguments
brought forward in favour of the belief
in immortality by 'those who have not
lingered to defend any evolutionary gap,
but who freely admit the evolution of
the human mind. These are the “ replies
by anticipation” which, we are told,
should have withheld Professor Haeckel
from his extreme conclusions. Let us
see how puny and fruitless are the efforts
they make to overleap the “ unbroken
and impregnable barrier ” that Professor
Miinsterberg speaks of. Miinsterberg
himself offers a curious example of the
way modern philosophers, especially
idealist philosophers, lend a nominal
support to religious doctrines, yet are
found to mean something totally different
from what the world at large understands
by those doctrines. As the words I
have quoted show, he is as hostile as
Haeckel to any belief in personal im
mortality. “ Only to a cheap curiosity,”
he says again, “ can it appear desirable
that the inner life, viewed as a series of
psychological facts shall go on and on ”;
and again : “ The claim that the deceased
spirits go on with psychological existence
is a violation of the ethical belief in
immortality.”1 Thus he rejects the only
notion of immortality which is in any
plausible way connected with those
moral consequences that are so much
urged upon us. However, he speaks of
an “ ethical belief in immortality,” and
so is gathered by controversialists into
the imposing category of “scientists
opposed to Haeckel.” The immortality
he promises us is no more consoling
than that offered by Comte or by
Haeckel himself. “Life lives on.” It
is a natural expression of his idealism.
“ For the philosophic mind,” he says,
1 Psychology and Life, p. 280.
65
“ which sees the difference between
reality and psychological transformation,
immortality is certain; for him the denial
of immortality would be even quite
meaningless.
Death is a biological
phenomenon in the world of objects in
time; how then can death reach a reality
which is not an object but an attitude,
and therefore neither in time nor space ? ”
He meets the scientific evidence by
getting rid of the body and death, and
the material world altogether.
Professor W. James, another able
American psychologist whom
Mr.
Ballard and Mr. Williams and several
ecclesiastical papers urge us to read, has
made his profession of faith at the close
of his recent Gifford Lectures, pub
lished under the title of Varieties of
Religious Experience. We shall see that
it does not include a belief in God.
On our present question it is little more
helpful to the Christian. Professor
James is convinced as a spiritist that
there are non-human intelligences in
existence, but he is not yet convinced
that these external intelligences are the
souls of men and women who have
“ passed beyond.” So far he lends no
real support to the doctrine of immor
tality. Professor J. Royce, another
distinguished American thinker whom
the Gifford Trust has invited amongst
us, “givesup the question of immortality
as insoluble by philosophy ”; so
Professor Le Conte assures us.
Mr. Le Conte himself, we saw,
follows this statement with a candid
admission that “perhaps it is.” But
he is not disposed to yield entirely as
yet. Where does so thorough an
evolutionist find ground for ascribing
this unique prerogative to the human
soul ? He professes to find it precisely
in the “evolutionary view of man’s
origin.” If that view of the world
process which we have hitherto sustained
is correct, it follows, he says, that the
human mind-force is “a spark of the
Divine Energy ” and a “ part of God.”
So is the force of a motor car, on his
principles. But, he says, the universal
E
�66
THE IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL
spirit (Haeckel’s universal substance on
its force side) has worked its way
upward through the hierarchy of evolu
tion, so that it (or God) “ may have, in
man, something not only to contem
plate, but also to love and to be loved
by ” ; and in view of that project, which
is not supposed to be a temporary pro
ject, man must be immortal.1 The
frailty of the position is obvious. It
assumes that the “ Divine Energy ”
(which is Haeckel’s substance) was
intelligent and had “designs” from the
beginning.
We shall consider the
grounds of this assumption in the
next chapter. But, granting it for the
sake of the argument, we are asked to
conceive this eternally intelligent prin
ciple going through a laborious process of
evolution in order to reach consciousness
in the human mind and admire itself,
and love and be loved by itself, in that
form; for the mind zs God, on these
pantheistic principles. Moreover, sup
posing that we could gather this remark
able project, it contains no promise
whatever of immortality for the in
dividual ; the “ Divine Energy ” is
incarnated in so many forms, and will
be throughout the eternal world-process,
that the perishing of one form or of one
world will hardly diminish its contempla
tion or its admiration. Further, if man
z's God, how comes he to be ignorant of
the project ?
What becomes (theo
retically) of moral distinctions ? But
this fantastic theory bristles with diffi
culties.
Mr. Fiske’s conclusion is very similar
to Professor Le Conte’s, as will be
expected from the similarity of his
premises. The doctrine of evolution,
he says, does not destroy our hope of
immortality. “ Haeckel’s opinion was
never reached through a scientific study
of evolution, and it is nothing but an
echo from the French speculation of the
eighteenth century ” ; and “ he takes his
opinion on such matters ready-made
from Ludwig Buchner, who is simply an
echo of the eighteenth century atheist
La Mettrie.”1 How Fiske could ever
pen such an egregious statement about
either Haeckel or Buchner is one of the
mysteries of religious controversy. After
our review of Haeckel’s arguments it
may very well be ignored. And when
Fiske has come to the end of this petty
and petulant criticism of Haeckel we
find him presenting a conclusion almost
less satisfactory than that of Le Conte.
The substance of his argument is that
“ there is in man a psychic ele
ment identical in nature with that
which is eternal” (p. 170). On the face
of it, that is just what Haeckel says.
Man’s mind-force is a little eddy or
focus in the eternal cosmic force.
There is no ground whatever for assum
ing that as such it will be eternal, and
will not simply sink back into the
eternal stream, like all other temporary
concentrations. The only difference is
that Fiske takes the eternal principle to
be conscious and intelligent from the
first—a point we discuss in the next
chapter.
There remains only the argumentation
of Mr. Newman Smyth in his able but
pathetic attempt to reconstruct Christian
belief on a scientific base.2 The argu
ment itself is an old one, but it is put
with some freshness.
He points out
that the evolutionary process has just
reached an important stage. Evolving
nature has at length passed beyond mere
animal life and reached the threshold of
the spiritual life. Since, then, we dis
cern an upward purpose in evolution, it
is impossible to suppose that the process
will end now that so promising a stage
has been reached. To this we need
only reply that, whether or no “ purpose ”
is discernible in nature (which we shall
deny), this further evolution will take
place in the race taken collectively. This
is so clear that Mr. Smyth makes a des
perate effort to apply his argument to the
individual. He says the “ last word of
organic development is the individual
1 The Conception of God, p. 77-
1 Through Nature to God, p. 144.
2 'Through Science to Faith, p. 265 and foil.
�THE IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL
and his worth,” and he appeals to
“nature’s increasing estimate of indi
viduality in comparison with the species.”
Now, if we take this in the only sense
in which it could be conceived to help a
belief in personal immortality, it is totally
opposed to the scientific evidence. The
only way in which nature seems more
concerned about the individual is in the
perfection which she gives to the indi
viduals of the later species; but this is
absolutely necessary if the species itself
is to advance. In all other respects
nature, as ever, is indifferent to the indi
vidual—or, for the matter of that, if we
take a long enough perspective, to the
species itself.
The
supplementary
consideration
which Mr. Smyth submits is still feebler.
He contends that, though evolution is
generally continuous, it shows what he
calls “critical periods.” He instances
the changes which take place in a drop
of water as it sinks to freezing-point or
rises to the point of evaporation. He
thinks science does not preclude the
possibility of some analogous “ critical
period ” for the human soul. Nay, he
says, getting bolder, biology favours such
a view.
Look how “very slight and
easily changed” is the connection be
tween mind and organism at certain
times—at conception, in sleep, and when
we near death. Biology, he says, shows
that “ the mind does not need for its
birth and its coming to its inheritance a
whole body, a complete brain, a fullyformed organ of sense, or so much as a
single nerve ; a few microscopic threads
of chromatin matter in the egg are
enough.” Hence, if at both ends of
life the bond that links mind and body
can wear so thin, it is conceivable that
it may be dispensed with altogether.
Now, this is a most perverse piece of
reasoning. At conception, and long after
conception, we have no right to say that
the mind is there at all. It appears and
grows with the brain—that is all the
evidence says.
The facts point to a
conclusion diametrically opposed to that
of Mr. Smyth.
They show complete J
67
and slavish dependence. As to heredity,
it is gratuitous to say it is the mind, and
not the body, that inherits. Even Dr.
W. N. Clarke (who, with many modern
theologians, does not believe that the
“soul” is transmitted from parent to
child) says the facts of heredity point to
the mechanical, not the spiritual, theory.
At death we see the same rigid depend
ence of mind on organism, instead of
finding anything like a token of an in
dependent mind. The mind flickers and
goes out—as far as evidence goes—in
exact proportion to the last spluttering
and extinction of the physical life of the
body. At both ends of life, as through
out its course, the correlation of mind
action and brain-action is rigid and ab
solute. And, finally, what Mr. Smyth
unfortunately calls “ critical periods ” in
nature have not the least analogy to the
notion of the mind-force existing apart
from its material substratum. A differ
ent grouping of the water-molecules
naturally gives rise to different properties ;
so does a different grouping of brain
molecules (in fever, under opium, &c.)
give rise to different mental qualities.
When we find a case of the properties
or forces of a substance parting company
from, or changing independently of, the
material substratum, we shall have found
some ground in nature for the conception
of a disembodied soul; but not until
then.
Such are the feeble defences which
are to-day set up by the apologists
who have scientific attainments in the
Christian body. On the strength of
these ethereal speculations we are asked
to resist the weight of the scientific
evidence as to the relation of body and
soul, and to admit for man a privilege
that is unknown from end to end of the
universe. We are asked to believe that
with the aid of a fantastic and desperate
philosophy such as this we can overleap
science’s “unbroken and impregnable
barrier.” We are asked to call Haeckel
“an atrophied soul” and “a child in
spiritual reasoning ” because he will not
abdicate his scientific method and
�68
GOD
procedure in the face of such specula
tions as these. I have not, it is true,
examined the argument for a future
life from the alleged exigencies of the
moral order; but this is little urged
to-day, and we shall see, when we come
to deal with the monistic ethics, that
it rests on a false conception of moral
’trw.1
I have sought, in particular, and
stated with perfect fidelity, the argu
ments of those modern scholars who
are opposed to him as being equally in
formed in science and equally convinced
of evolution. The reader may judge
whether he or they are the more
philosophic, logical, and scientific in
procedure.
Chapter VII
GOD
We now enter upon a new and almost
the final stage of our direct vindication
of monism. If we have succeeded so
far in warding off the objections which
have been urged against Haeckel’s
position, if we have shown that the very
latest scientific research increasingly
confirms his position, it is clear that we
have covered considerable ground. We
have discerned in the stupendous process
of cosmic evolution the growth or the
unfolding of one great reality that lies
across the immeasurable space of the
universe. An illimitable substance, re
vealing itself to us as matter and force
(or spirit), is dimly perceived at the root
1 Neither have I, it will be noted, referred to
the empirical or spiritistic evidence for the per
sistence of mind, which gains increasing favour
to-day. This is not due to any lack of respect
for the distinguished scientists who have admitted
such evidence, or for the sobriety and judgment
of so many about us to-day who receive it. It is
due to the utter futility of discussing evidence of
this kind. It is of such a nature, resting so
largely on delicate moral considerations, that it
must in my opinion be left entirely to personal
examination in the concrete. But that Haeckel
is right in saying the subject is obscured with
much fraud and triviality is admitted, not only
by life-long students like Mr. Podmore, but by
many earnest spiritists.
of this evolution as a simple and homo
geneous medium (prothyl), associated with
an equally homogeneous force. Then the
continuous prothyl, by a process not yet
determined, forms into what are virtually
or really discrete and separate particles
—electrons: the electrons unite to
build atoms of various sizes and
structures, and the rich variety of the
chemical elements is given, the base of
an incalculable number of combinations
and forms of matter. Meantime the
more concentrated (ponderable) elements
gather into cosmic masses under the
influence of the force associated with
them : the force evolving and differen
tiating at equal pace with the matter (with
which it is one in reality). Nebulse
are formed: solar systems grow like
crystals from them: planets take on
solid crusts, with enveloping oceans
and atmospheres. Presently a more
elaborate
combination of material
elements, protoplasm, with—naturally—■
a more elaborate force-side, makes its
appearance, and organic evolution sets
in. The little cellules cling together
and form tissue-animals, which increase
in complexity and organisation and
centralisation until the human frame is
�GOD
produced, the life-force growing more
elaborate with the structure, until it
issues in the remarkable properties of
the human mind.
The tracing of this picture is the ideal
that science set itself a quarter of a
century ago.
The success has been
swift and astounding. We are still, as
Sir A. Riicker said, living in the twilight;
but no man of science now doubts that
what we do see is the real outline of the
universe and its growth. But other and
different cosmic speculations held the
field, and these were ultimately con
nected with the powerful corporations
and the intense emotions of religion.
As science advanced theology began a
long process of adaptation to the new
thought. The ambition of science was
to cover the whole ground with a scheme
of mechanical and orderly explanation,
because the instinct of science felt that
the universe was an orderly and con
tinuous structure. The ambition of the
theologian was to detect and exult over
gaps and breaches in this mechanical
scheme, and introduce his supernatural
agencies by means of them. We have
seen that many of the ablest theistic
apologists of our day (Ward, Smyth, Le
Conte, Fiske, Clarke, &c.)—almost all,
indeed, of those who have scientific
equipment—grant the ability of science,
now or in the near future, to cover “ the
whole cosmological domain ” with its
network of mechanical causation. We
have seen that there is a general dis
avowal of “ a theology of gaps ” or of the
desire to build on the temporary igno
rance of science.
But a few heroic
souls still linger in the familiar trenches,
and we have fully considered what they
have to say. With Smyth, Le Conte,
and Fiske, we have been forced to con
clude that so far we have seen in the
cosmic process the orderly unfolding of
one sole all-diffused matter-force reality,
which we commonly call Nature.
But we have throughout, for the sake
of clearer procedure, reserved one con
sideration that these advanced evolution
ists have been urging on us at every
69
step—that is to say, the claim that the
evolutionary process must have been in
telligently set going and intelligently
directed. Haeckel is quite right, they
say, in claiming that science can give or
adumbrate a mechanical interpretation
of the whole process. Quibbles about
his particular way of conceiving the first
formation of life, or of consciousness,
and so on, are irrelevant and distressing
to the serious thinkers, as is the diver
sion of the issue by discussing his taste,
or his knowledge of history, or his
optimism or pessimism. The important
point is that he has proved his case so
far in its essentials. But he must now
meet this last position of his opponents.
Was this monistic cosmic process con
ceived and designed from the beginning,
and guided throughout, by an intelligent
being, or no ? 1 This is the question of
the hour, and especially of the coming
hour, in apologetics.
As I write a
journal reaches me containing an inter
view with Mr. Ballard. Asked whether
he thinks “the rehabilitation of religion
would come from the scientists,” he
replies: " I think that the theistic basis
of Christianity will have scientific support
more than ever.
Modern science is
pledged to evolution, and Christianity
can only be justified scientifically on
evolutionary lines.” And Professor Le
Conte says: “ Here is the last line of
defence to the supporters of supernatu
ralism in the realm of Nature ... it is
evident that a yielding here implies not
a mere shifting of line, but a change of
base: not a readjustment of details
only, but a reconstruction of Christian
theology.
This, I believe, is indeed
necessary.”2
And we have already
seen passages from Ward and others to
the same effect.
Here is a dramatic simplification of
the controversy, which every thinker
1 Let us note in passing that this is not neces
sarily a question of monism or dualism. Mr. R.
Williams and others expressly state they are
monists, that God is not distinct from Nature.
More about this presently.
2 Evolution and Religiozis Thought, p. 295.
�7o
GOD
will welcome. Theology will, as before,
spread itself over the whole cosmos, but
it will be with the repetition of a single
formula. There will no longer be cease
less quarrels as to whether science can
explain this or that phenomenon with
its natural or mechanical causes. The
new attitude. is that this mechanical
explanation is precisely the work of
science, and if it cannot give a mechani
cal explanation of a thing—say, con
sciousness—to-day, we will wait patiently
till to-morrow.
But, the new theolo
gians say, we want to know in addition
how these mechanical causes came to
co-operate in producing such remarkable
structures.
With this science has
nothing to do, so we close our thirty
years’ war and sign an eternal truce.
Nay, if we look at the matter rightly,
these theologians of the twentieth cen
tury say it is very desirable that science
should complete its mechanical interpre
tation of the cosmos.
An automatic
universe, evolving by inherent forces
from electrons to minds, would be the
most marvellous mechanism ever con
ceived. The mind would be forced to
look for the engineer. Those ancient
theologians who scoffed at Tyndall for
his Belfast address were too hasty; so
were those who caused Huxley to com
pare their dread of the mechanical
scheme to the terror of savages during
an eclipse of the sun; so are those who
beat their wings in vain against Haeckel’s
structure to-day. The materialist will be
the truest auxiliary of the theist. If he
can only show that the universe is the
unfolding of one form of matter and one
force (or one matter-force reality), he
has put before us one of the most
stupendous machines that ever bore the
mark of intelligence.
We are then, it seems, approaching
the psychological moment in the great
drama of the conflict of science and
religion. That I am indicating a true I
tendency will be perfectly clear from the •
preceding chapters.
We have rarely |
found men of ability or of complete i
scientific equipment defending the old !
trenches that barred the advance of the
mechanical system of science. We have
constantly heard impatient denials of a
love for “ gaps.” But before I proceed
to show how Haeckel has met this teleo
logical position, let me quote a few
recent writers, both to show that the
formula is as simple as I said, and that
concentration on this position is the
order of the day.1 I have quoted Pro
fessor Ward’s opinion that, “ if there has
been any interference in the cosmic pro
cess, it must have been before the process
began.’( Dr. Croll, in his Basis of Evolu
tion, distinguishes between producing
(mechanical) and determining (directive)
forces, and tells the theologian of the
future to confine his attention to the
latter : “ The grand, the difficult, though
as yet unanswered, question is this:
What guides the molecule to its proper
position in relation to the end which it
has to serve ? ” With Mr. Newman
Smyth the supreme question is: “ Is
evolution without guidance or with guid
ance ?” Mr. Fiske says: “There is in
every earnest thinker a craving after a
final cause . . . and this craving can no
more be extinguished than our belief in
objective reality.” 2 Dr. Dallinger says
that, if the mechanical philosophy is
true we have “ a more majestic design
than all the thinkers of the past had
ever dreamed.”
And the sermon
preached on the last Association Sun
day at Southport by the Bishop of Ripon
points unmistakably to the same tendency
—even to a pantheistic identification of
God with the forces at work in Nature.
1 There may be a few fond and admiring
souls who are looking out for a reference to Mr.
Ambrose Pope’s third criticism. Briefly, he
finds that Haeckel has got rid of God by a third
“half-day excursion,” in the course of which he
discovered a system of “ physiological monism,”
which, as before, contains the fatal germ under
an innocent exterior. The joke may be given
for what it is worth, but it gets stale. Mr. Pope
goes on to say that when you ask Haeckel about
the substance he puts instead of God, he says he
is not sure whether it exists. Tableau, and
exeunt omnes, of course. We have met this
point in the second chapter.
2 The Idea of God, p. 137.
�7i
GOD
The new teleology flatters itself it
differs very scientifically from the old;
for “ teleology ” had fallen into disrepute
during the period of “ gap ” theology
which followed the break-up of Paleyism.
It is true that there are differences.
Aubrey Moore points out that we now
do not forget the past (the evolution) of
the organ. Dr. Iverach observes that
the new teleologist. does not think so
much of an “ external artificer ” as of an
immanent directive principle, and that
we do not now attempt to deduce scien
tific knowledge from the “ purpose ” of
a thing. These differences, however, do
not alter the essential structure of the
argument, which remains the same as
when Kant rejected it and Paley drove
it to death. We may state it briefly in
abstract form to this effect: Wherever in
Nature we find several agencies co
operating in the production of a certain
result which is orderly or beautiful, we
see the guidance of mind. The under
lying assumption is that the unconscious
forces of the universe will only produce
chaos unless they are guided. Pre-con
ceived design followed up by directive
control, or else a “ fortuitous clash of
atoms,” is the alternative put before us.
The process of evolution taken as a
whole has been so orderly, and had such
marvellous results, that we must admit
the agencies at work in the process were
intelligently guided. To suppose that
this process should chance to culminate
in the appearance of man is said to be
incredible. So throughout the whole
process we find co-operations, adapta
tions, orderly and beautiful operations,
which speak eloquently of design and
control. From the very first step, the
making of the atom, to the last, the
making of man’s brain, we see the finger
of God.
A few extracts and references will
show that this is a correct summary. As
regards the inorganic universe a little
work recently published by the Rev. W.
Profeit well illustrates the argument.
The author starts with the principle that
“every form of being must act according
to its nature,” and goes on to say that
“ the particles of matter have not in them
conscious intelligence, and consequently
have not of themselves the power of
arranging, and so of producing complex
order.”1 He then reviews the teaching
of modern physics at length, pausing at
every few paces, in the familiar manner,
to admire the ways of the Creator.
“ To deal with every particle of matter
in the universe, so as to make it of a
special type, to order all, so that they
might come under types so few and
compact, demanded an amount . of
thought and work of overwhelming
greatness, and could not be the result of
chance.” Chemistry is “crowded with
adjustments, packed with adaptations.”
The moulding of matter into solar
systems of such marvellous symmetry
and adaptability to life occasions another
outburst. In short, theology can easily
run to volumes by repeating “ Great are
thy works” at every forward step in
evolution. Chance is out of the ques
tion. “ Ah ! what foolery it is to deem
that a mighty world has been produced
by chance.” Happily, there are no fools
of that particular type amongst us. But
“necessity” is equally impotent. “No
sane mind ’’—the young theology keeps
up the literary tradition, you see, which
made even Fiske exclaim against “the
intellectual arrogance which the argu
ments of theologians show lurking
beneath their expressions of humility ” 2
—“no sane mind can for a moment
imagine that from the nature of things it
was an eternal necessity that the seventy,
or thereby, different kinds of atoms
should all exist, or be formed in the
numbers and proportions of numbers, in
which they help to form our great system
obeying the orb of day.” So it is to be
either “ fortuitous concourse ” or mind ;
and as the universe is not a chaotic
mess, -we must admit it was presided
over by intelligence from the first.
Dr. Dallinger offers us the same
1 The Creation of Matter, p. 6.
2 Outlines of Cosmic Philosophy, p. 451.
�72
GOD
dilemma of chance or control, and urges
that to adopt chance “ is surely to trifle
with the fundamental principles of our
reasoning powers.” Rationalists, we
may say in passing, had a concern for
our “ reasoning powers ” in days when
doctors of divinity looked upon them as
mischievous.
Dr. Croll argues in the
same .way. Some principle, he says,
must determine why a natural force
takes direction A instead of direction B
or C. The determination of planetary
orbits is not so much due to gravitation
as to the way in which gravitation acted.
So in the formation of crystals or
organisms. “ Out of the infinite number
of different paths, what is it that directs
the force to select the right path ? ”
Dr. Croll seems to fancy that in this he
has suggested a new idea to the world.
Dr. Iverach, both in Christianity and
Evolution and in Theism, follows the
same line. For the pre-atomic mass to
be made atomic, and to produce the
orderly and periodic system of elements
with their affinities, the forces at work
must have been guided.
The argument does not differ in sub
stance when we pass to the organic
world, but, naturally, the notes of ex
clamation and edifying observations
increase. Biological science, says Dr.
Iverach, “must admit purpose in the
magnificent adjustments it points out.”
Mr. Newman Smyth gives an admirable
sketch of the evolution of the eye, and
pleads that the forces which have
gradually constructed it did not any the
less need guidance and control because
they took millions of years to do it.
Mr. Ballard takes the evolution of the
eye in the foetus, and says that if a child
were to repeat “ that God caused it so
to do, it is utterly beyond the power of
all modern science to contradict.”1
Embryology is, it is true, as yet very
imperfect.
However, other passages
make it clear that, though Mr. Ballard
may here be building on a “gap,” he
generally offers us the usual dilemma,
1 Miracles of Unbelief, p. 51.
design or “fortuitous concourse of
atoms,” and characteristically tells us
the latter is “fatuous.” In fact Mr.
Ballard tells even the agnostic, who
thinks there is not enough evidence
either for or against teleology, that his
hesitation is mere “childish fatuity.”
The Rev. R. Williams—not to neglect
him—tells his weaver-admirers that “the
solar system is really more wonderful
than a loom,” which is obviously de
signed, and that organisms are more
wonderful still. And Dr. W. N. Clarke
says “it is not probable that the most
significant elements in a world came
into it without having been entertained
during the process as character-giving
ideals.” He says Darwinism has modi
fied, but not destroyed, teleology. We
now know that needs, and contrivances
to supply them, “ grow up within the
universe,” but this power of adaptation
must have been given to organisms by a
purposive intelligence.1
The argument, therefore, on which
the fate of theism is finally to be deter
mined is now tolerably clear. Leave
Haeckel free to perfect his mechanical
monism ; when he has completed it, we
shall point out to the astonished pro
fessor that he has been proving the
existence of God all the time. If this
force which he traces for us in its
marvellous ascent through the atom, the
nebula, the cell, and the organism, was
unconscious from the start, and if it has
achieved all this progress in so orderly
and determined a fashion, it must have
been guided. Well, let us see whether
Haeckel is quite so naive and antiquated
as these good people assure the world.
To begin with, the flavour of antiquity
is quite clearly on the other side.
“ Chance ” and “ fortuitous concourse
of atoms ” are phrases which you will
not find outside theological schools for
the last 2,000 years. The early Greeks
used them. The constant reiteration of
them in our time is a grave piece of
insincerity, or else ignorance. How Mr.
1 Outlines of Christian 1'heology, p. 116.
�GOD
Profeit and Mr. Ballard come to use
these phrases in the year of grace 1903
is best known to themselves. Professor
Haeckel deals clearly with the point
(p. 97), and explains—as has been ex
plained innumerable times—the only
sense in which science admits “ chance ”
events. Mr. Profeit rightly indicates a
third alternative, necessity; and Dr.
Dallinger somewhat vaguely suggests it.
Haeckel and his colleagues hold that
the direction which the evolutionary
agencies take is not “ fortuitous ” : that
they never could take but the one
direction which they have actually taken.
A stone has not a dozen possible paths
to travel by when you drop it from your
hand. You do not seek any reason why
it follows direction A instead of direction
B or C. So it is, says the monist, with
all the forces in the universe. Some
day science will be able to trace a set of
forces working for ages at the con
struction of a solar system, or at the
making of an eye. The theist says the
ultimate object must have been foreseen
and the forces must have been guided,
or they would never have worked
steadily in this definite direction. The
monist says that these forces no more
needed guiding than a tramcar does;
there was only one direction possible for
them. Here is a clear issue, and in the
present state of apologetics, an important
one. It is useless to talk, as Fiske does,
of the “ teleological instinct.” “ The
teleological instinct in man,” he says,
“ cannot be suppressed or ignored. The
human soul shrinks from the thought
that it is without kith or kin in all this
wide universe.” This is not only “an
appeal to the imagination ”: it is utterly
opposed to the facts of life. Mr. Fiske
ascribes his own peculiar temperament
to the universe. The matter must be
reasoned out.
Now, it seems clear that if a man
asserts that the forces of the universe are
naturally erratic, and may go in any one
of a dozen directions unless they are
guided, he must show cause for his
Opinion. The man of science has never
73
discovered an erratic force yet. Force
always acts uniformly, always takes the
same direction. If you say this is only
because the natural forces are guided
and controlled, and is not their proper
and inherent nature, the man of science
naturally asks: How do you know ?
Science sees nothing in nature to suggest
such an idea. “ When we consider the
movements of the starry heavens to-day,”
says Mr. Mallock, “instead of feeling
it to be wonderful that they are ab
solutely regular, we should feel it to be
wonderful if they were ever anything
else . . . We realise that order, instead
of being the marvel of the universe, is
the indispensable condition of its
existence—that it is a physical platitude,
not a divine paradox, ”1 That is certainly
the feeling the universe inspires in men
of science. What is the ground for this
notion of the essentially erratic character
of natural forces ? One seeks it quite in
vain. Dr. Croll says : “ Though our
acquaintance with the forces of nature
were absolutely perfect, the question as
to how particles or molecules arrange
themselves into organic forms would
probably still remain as deep a mystery
as ever, unless we knew something more
than force.” 2 But he does not offer us a
single consideration to convince us of
this “ probability.” When Mr. Profeit
tries to bully us into admitting that “ no
sane mind can for a moment imagine
that from the nature of things it was an
eternal necessity that the seventy, or
thereby, different kinds of atoms should
all exist,” we timidly venture to inquire :
Why not ? Force, as far as our ex
perience goes, acts necessarily, inevitably,
infallibly. There could be no science if
it did not.
The only attempt made to escape this
initial difficulty of the teleologist is to
appeal to a number of totally false
analogies. The favourite is that vener
able and imposing sophism, that if you
cast to the ground an infinite (or a finite)
number of letters, they might after
1 Religion as a Credible Doctrine, p. 162.
a The Basis of Evolution, p. 24.
F
�74
GOD
infinite gyrations make a word here and
there, but we should think the man an
enthusiast who expected even a short
sentence, and a fool if he expected
them ever to make a poem. It is
absurd to offer us this as an analogy
to-day; or else it is begging the
whole question.
Take the case of
the eye. Quite certainly this is an
evolutionary product. Forces acting on
matter during millions of years have
evolved it. Each step in the process is
perfectly complete and intelligible in
itself. It is wholly arbitrary to suppose
the eye was in view when protoplasm
was first formed: or when the first
sensitive cells appeared on the surface of
the primitive animal body: or when
pigment-cells were developed at the fore
most part of the body : or when a sensi
tive nerve was formed under the skin;
and so on. Each structure was useful
in its turn ; and on that very account
natural selection fastened on it. It is
sheer imagination to suppose that the
ultimate form was foreseen: and it is sheer
scientific untruth to say the ultimate
form must have been foreseen or else the
earlier structures would be unintelligible.
Here is a plexus of natural forces acting
on matter, without, as far as we can see,
the possibility of their acting otherwise;
only one result was possible. And we
are asked to regard this as curious,
because, in the case of the imaginary
throw of type, natural forces will not lose
their uniform character and act miracu
lously. Finally, it is a colossal petitio
principii, because the question is pre
cisely whether Virgil’s Aeneid or Shake
speare’s Hamlet is not an evolutionary
product.
It seems, then, that the initial diffi
culty of the teleologist is insuperable.
He cannot give us a shadow of proof of
his assertion that natural forces are erra
tic. Haeckel is completely within the
right of science in speaking of the uni
verse as, in Goethe’s phrase, “ ruled by
eternal, iron laws ” (or forces). They
have wrought out a certain result—the
world we form part of. Until some good
reason is shown for thinking they could
have acted otherwise, we see no need for
designer, or guide, or engineer. Let us
put it another way. To an extent the
teleologists are playing on the present im
perfection of science, as Dr. Croll
innocently betrayed. Let us take them
at their word, and suppose science will in
time give a complete mechanical expla
nation of everything, for the good reason
that God, as they say, created a machine
that needed no mending or re-starting.
And let us suppose that he designed the
ultimate form of the cosmos. Is this
design communicated to the unconscious
atoms and their forces ? Clearly not; no
one would say that. Are these forces
which build up and impel the atoms
supernaturally inflected or modulated at
each step ? Again, no one would say
this. The only possible conception of
telic action on a cosmic scale is, when
we descend from grandiose phrases to
practical ideas, that from the start the
matter-force reality was of such a
nature that it would infallibly evolve into
the cosmos we form part of to-day. Any
other conception of “ guidance ” and
“control” is totally unthinkable. And
as a fact theists are settling down to
formulate their position in that way.
The interference, as Ward says, took
place before the process began.
But before we take up this last point
it is necessary to glance at another side
of the question. Haeckel has pointed
out that, not only do we see no ground
for believing in the presence of some
primitive design, but we see very con
siderable reasons for rejecting it. The
world is crowded with features which
forbid us lightly to admit a controlling
supreme intelligence. There is no an
swer to this. “ The fact stands inex
orably before us,” says Mr. Fiske, “ that
a Supreme Will, enlightened by perfect
intelligence and possessed of infinite
power, might differently have fashioned
the universe, though in ways inconceiv
able by us, so that the suffering and the
waste of life which characterise nature’s
process of evolution might have been
�GOD
avoided.”1 As to the waste, Dr. Iverach
ventures to say that “infinite precision
at one point is inconsistent with bad
shooting ”; but the infinite precision is,
we have seen, an assumption, whereas
the bad shooting is ubiquitous. At
every sex-act millions of spermatozoa are
wasted. Others say the glorious final
issue puts all right. But as Mr. Mallock
says, “ Whatever may be God’s future,
there will still remain His past.” Most
ideologists retreat into mystery. One
might unkindly remind them of their
great disinclination to let the monist
leave anything unexplained, but it is
better to say that when all the tangible
evidence is on one side and none on the
other, we do not regard it as a fair
dilemma. Listen to the impression of
a cultured defender of religion after a
study of the evolutionary process in
nature : “ We must divest ourselves of
all foregone conclusions, of;all question
begging reverences, and look the facts
of the universe steadily in the face. If
theists will but do this, what they will
see will astonish them. They will see
that if there is anything at the back of
this vast process with a consciousness
and a purpose in any way resembling our
own—a Being who knows what He
wants and is doing his best to get it—
he is, instead of a holy and all-wise God,
a scatter-brained, semi-powerful, semi
impotent monster. They will recognise
as clearly as they ever did the old familiar
facts which seemed to them evidences of
God’s wisdom, love, and goodness; but
they will find that these facts, when taken
in connection with the others, only sup
ply us with a standard in the nature of
this Being himself by which most of his
acts are exhibited to us as those of a
criminal madman. If he had been blind,
he had not had sin; but if we maintain
that he can see, then his sin remains.
Habitually a bungler as he is, and callous
when not actively cruel, we are forced to
regard him, when he seems to exhibit
benevolence, as, not divinely benevolent,
1 Outlines of Cosmic Philosophy, p. 462.
75
but merely weak and capricious, like a
boy who fondles a kitten, and the next
moment sets a dog at it. And not only
does his moral character fall from him
bit by bit, but his dignity disappears
also. The orderly processes of the stars
and the larger phenomena of nature are
suggestive of nothing so much as a
wearisome Court ceremonial surrounding
a king who is unable to understand or
to break away from it; whilst the thunder
and whirlwind, which have from time
immemorial been accepted as special
•revelations of his awful power and ma
jesty, suggest, if they suggest anything of
a personal character at all, merely some
blackguardly larrikin kicking up his heels
in the clouds, not perhaps bent on mis
chief, but indifferent to the fact that he
is causing it. . . . A God who could
have been deliberately guilty of them
[the evolutionary processes] would be a
God too absurd, too monstrous, too mad
to be credible.” 1
No one who has studied biological
evolution can fail to recognise these
facts. They make it impossible for us
to see a divine presence and guidance at
least during the process. The only
plausible theory is that God set the
machine going and left it to itself. If
we hold that he is guiding molecules to
“their proper place ” in the construction
of the tiger’s eye, we must hold that he
has some control of the molecules in the
cruelty-centre of the tiger’s brain. A
universe without carnivora is conceivable
enough. Professor Kennedy and others
would divert us from a consideration of
these facts to contemplate the beauty and
sublimity the universe exhibits. But the
beauty of the starry heavens is only the
effect of distance and position; the
beauty of the Bay of Naples could be
1 Mr. W. H. Mallock, Religion as a Credible
Doctrine, p. 177. Mr. Mallock has throughout
life been one of the ablest opponents of agnosti
cism, and he has been nothing less than scornful
of a profession of atheism. Does he not see
how natural and logical atheism seems when one
sweeps aside all theistic proof on the one hand,
and recognises these dark features of the uni
verse on the other ?
Bishopsgate InstitutSi-
�76
*
GOD
shown by science to be a purely acci
dental outcome of the action of natural
agencies. The beauty of the diatoms
that are brought from the lowest depths
of the ocean, the beauty of the radiolaria
that swarm about the coast, and the beauty
of a thousand minute animal structures,
are obviously not designed and purposed
beauties. They were unknown until the
microscope was invented : the polariscope
reveals yet further beauties : the tele
scope yet more. The idea of these
things being designed for our, or for
God’s, entertainment belongs, as Mr.
Mallock says, “ to a pre-scientific age
. . . an age which had realised the
spectacular unity of the cosmos, but had
very imperfectly realised the nature of
its mechanical unity : and which, more
over, had never grasped the fact that the
forces in virtue of which material things
move, such as energy, attraction, repul
sion, and chemical affinity, are as much
a part of the material things themselves,
and as much amenable to scientific ex
periment, as extension, or shape, or mass,
or softness, or hardness, or visibility.”
Once more we are thrown back on the
efficient, mechanical, producing causes.
The point we have reached, then, is
this: the notion that molecules are
“ guided ” to their “ proper position ” by
any other than a mechanical force—'the
notion of “guidance ” or “control ” dur
ing the cosmic process is unproved, is
unthinkable when examined in detail,
and is opposed by an appalling mass of
facts (waste, cruelty, suffering, &c.). It
starts from an assumption—the assump
tion that natural forces are erratic in
action—for which it does not offer any
justification, and which is directly op
posed to scientific experience. It rests
on a number of fallacious analogies and
poetical expressions, on a fallacious
application of the term “ blind ” to
natural forces, and on the as yet imper
fect condition of our scientific knowledge
of the construction of organisms. All
that remains, then, is to examine the
position of the really consistent evolu
tionary theist, who does not build his
belief on the temporary ignorance of the
scientist. This position, to which all
apologists are tending, is that “ the only
interference was before the cosmic pro
cess began ”: that God created a matter
force reality in the beginning of such a
nature that it should evolve spontane
ously into the universe we know and of
which we are a part. This is the ideal
and final position of the apologist.
Science will drive him back pitilessly
decade by decade until he adopts it.
Many of the best-informed apologists
already adopt it.
Let us see, then, where Haeckel and
what remains of his opponents are now.
Both admit that the universe is a
mechanical system, a great machine that
has worked from the first without control,
in virtue of its inherent character. But
the dualists say such a machine must
have been most skilfully designed and
constructed : it is, in Dallinger’s words,
“a more majestic design than all the
thinkers of the past had ever dreamed ”
—and therefore it will commend itself
more and more to theists.
The
position is—it is very important to
understand clearly—that God only
creates any particular content of the
universe—say Plato’s mind—in the
sense that he imparted to the primitive
nebula, or ultimate prothyl, a natural
force to evolve it.
The germ of
everything, the capacity to evolve every
thing, is in the great matter-force
reality.
Now, we have seen in the
third chapter that “ science points to no
beginning.” It is perfectly consistent
with the scientific evidence to say that
the universe is eternal. We saw that
those who attack Haeckel’s ascription of
infinity and eternity 1 to the basic sub
stance show no cause why he should not
proceed candidly on the astronomical
evidence. No better evidence is forth1 Note the remarkably different treatment of
Haeckel and Mr. Spencer. Mr. Spencer’s First
Cause cannot be distinguished from Haeckel’s.
Yet when he speaks of it With capital letters, as
an Infinite and Eternal Power, we hear nothing
but admiration.
�GOD
coming here. Dr. Croll says : “ If any
man should affirm that the succession of
events had no beginning, but has been
in operation from all eternity, it would
be difficult indeed to prove him to be in
the wrong; but, on the other hand, it
would be far more difficult, nay, utterly
impossible, for him to prove his as
sertion.” 1 But, as we saw, the scientific
evidence and the rules of logic and truth
seeking put the burden of proof dis
tinctly on the man who asserts there was
a beginning. Professor Ward attempts
to infer a beginning from the theory of
entropy; but we saw that this is dis
credited by the latest pronouncements of
physicists. “Our experience,” as Pro
fessor Ward says himself elsewhere,
“certainly does not embrace the totality of
things; is, in fact, ridiculously far from
it”; and so entropy is a “ridiculously”
hasty conclusion.
No, there is no proof whatever that
the machine ever began to exist at all.
As far as we can see, it has eternally
possessed those forces and properties
with which we have agreed to credit it,
and has been eternally evolving them.
And, as a fact, apologists are rapidly
moving on to the identification of God
with Nature, which means an abandon
ment of the idea of creation. A curious
symptom falls under my notice as I
write. An editorial article in the Daily
News, the distinguished organ of the
Nonconformist Churches, commenting
on the Bishop of Ripon’s sermon at
Southport, endeavours to reconcile
science and religion.
The laws of
science, it says, reveal the working of
force, and it goes on to ask: •“ What is
that power ? May it not be the syn
thesis of all the various forces and
vitalities which the universe contains;
and may not that synthesis be God ? ”
That is precisely what Haeckel says ; in
fact, in a late German edition of the
Riddle he calls his system “ the purest
monotheism.” So close are we to
“ reunion ” ! Take, again, the Anticipa1 The Basis of Evolution, p. 167.
77
lions of Mr. H. G. Wells. Looking
about on the cultured thought of our
time, he says that before the end of this
century educated men will have ceased
to believe in “ an omniscient mind ”—
“ the last vestige of that barbaric theology
which regarded God as a vigorous but
uncertain old gentleman with a beard
and an inordinate lust for praise and
propitiation ”—and a supreme “ moral
ist ” and prayer ; and will know God
only as “a general atmosphere of im
perfectly apprehended purpose.” Mr.
Rhondda Williams assures us that “it
is not for dualism I am arguing. I
believe in the unity of the world, and a
kind of monism is probably the truest
solution of the riddle ; but I must find
the unity in spirit, not in matter.” That
means, if it means anything, not only a
complete misconception of Haeckel,
but an identification of God with Nature.
Professor Le Conte says : “ God may be
conceived as self-sundering his energy,
and setting over against Himself a part
as Nature. A part of this part, by a
process of evolution, individuates itself
more and more, and finally completes
its individuation and self-activity in the
soul of man. . . . Thus an effluence
from the Divine Person flows downward
through Nature to rise again by evolution
to recognition of, and communion with,
its own source. . . . And the sole
purpose of this progressive individuation
of the Divine Energy by evolution is
finally to have, in man, something not
only to contemplate, but also to love
and be loved by.” 1 In another place
he says : “ The forces of Nature are
naught else than different forms of one
omnipresent Divine energy or will,” and
“ In a word, according to this view,
there is no real efficient force but spirit,
and no real independent existence but
God.”2 We have seen how Mr. Fiske
1 The Conception of God, p. 77. Le Conte
tells us, moreover, that he is almost using the
language of another “theistic” writer, Mr.
Upton, the Hibbert lecturer.
2 Evolution and Religious Thought, p. 301.
He frankly allows that he is here close to the
opinions of Berkeley, and even Swedenborg.
�78
GOD
claims immortality on the ground that
“ there is in man a psychic element
identical in nature with that which is
eternal ” ; and man’s psychic element is,
he allows, an evolutionary outcome of
natural force. Professor Royce, a recent
Gilford lecturer and distinguished Ameri
can thinker, says, when he comes to
distinguish man from God : “ We there
fore need not conceive the eternal
Ethical Individual, however partial he
may be, as in any sense less in the grade
of complication of his activity or in the
multitude of his acts of will than is the
Absolute. ... It may be conceived as
a Part equal to the whole, and finally
united, as such equal, to the Whole
wherein it dwells.”1 Professor W.
James, another Gifford lecturer, rejects
the title of theist altogether, and says
“we must bid a definite good-bye to
dogmatic theology.” The metaphysical
attributes of God (omnipotence, omnis
cience, omnipresence, eternity, &c.)
are, he thinks, “ destitute of all intelligible
significance,” and “ the metaphysical
monster they offer to our mind is an
absolutely worthless invention of the
scholarly mind.”2
We are advancing rapidly. To this
does a knowledge of science bring the
theologian. It is true that some of
these evolutionary theists, like Mr.
Rhondda Williams, regard it as a great
gain that science has destroyed the idea
of a “ transcendent ” God and forced
theology to recognise his “ immanence ”
in nature. This is very misleading.
The “ immanence ” of God in nature
has been consistently taught in Roman
Catholic theology for the last thousand
years. You will not find a single Roman
Catholic theologian who locates God
outside the universe. It is a common
place with them that God is more closely
present in every part of nature than
ether is, for instance. Nor do the great
1 The World and the Individual, vol. ii,
P-451Varieties of Religious Experience, pp. 445-8.
He adds that the “ moral attributes ” are just as
indefensible.
Anglican divines speak differently.
What, then is the new feature ? It is
that these modern apologists have been
driven to deny that there is any real
distinction between God and nature.
They talk of God “ sundering ” himself
and of nature being “ part ” of his sub
stance— which has a strange resemblance
to various ancient and mouldy Oriental
speculations (Brahmanic, Gnostic, and
Manichean)—but the gist of their posi
tion is that God and nature are one.
God is the “ pervading spirit ” and the
“ unifying force ” of the cosmos, or the
“Eternal and Infinite Energy” behind
phenomena, as Sir Henry Thompson
puts it. This is the kind of theology
which generally lies at the back of the
few theistic utterances which our anxious
bishops can wring out of men of science
to-day. It is the last page of a remark
able history. Man’s first idea of deity
was animistic and pantheistic, according
to one school of hierologists. In the
course of ages the shape of God was
disentangled from visible nature and
dramatically set against it. Now God
slowly sinks again into the life of nature.
Great Pan is alive once more.
How does this position compare with
that of Haeckel? We will not be so
rude as to suggest that if Haeckel used
capital letters, like Mr. Spencer, they
would greet him as a brother. Nor, on
the other hand, can we admit that, as
Mr. Williams claims, they find the unity
of the universe in spirit, while Haeckel
bases it on matter. We saw that
Haeckel does nothing of the kind.
Matter and spirit are to him two aspects
of one reality, and the unity of the
cosmos is the unity of that reality.
Spirit-force or energy emerging finally
as human thought-force is admitted by
Haeckel as freely as by Mr. Williams.
An idealist like Ward would very
naturally say that the unity of the world
consists in spirit, but we assume Mr.
Williams admits the existence of matter
and corporeal fellow-creatures. But
there is one further sense in which the
unity of the world could be said to
�GOD
consist in spirit, and in this lies the
final difference between Haeckel and
his critics on these cosmic speculations.
These theistic, or rather pantheistic,
monists hold that the cosmic energy is
essentially and from the beginning, or
from eternity, conscious and intelligent.
Haeckel holds that consciousness only
arises when a certain stage of nerve
formation appears. What evidence do
they offer for this? We may note in
passing that, when the real difference
between Haeckel and those scientific
writers who are the most zealously
pitted against him is so small, it would
have been better for his critics to say so
outright.
The average reader who
wades through the surging flood of
rhetoric will probably learn with aston
ishment that the chief champions of
reasoned Christianity to-day stand so
close to Haeckel’s position that only
one frail npetaphysical bridge divides
them.
Let us examine this last
division.
It is clear, in the first place, that the
evidence for the position of these evolu
tionary theists is not of a scientific
nature. Science does not find intelli
gence in the cosmos until a fairly
advanced stage of animal organisation is
reached. In fact, science finds conscious
ness so completely and rigidly bound
up with nerve-structure that it can only
listen with astonishment to the theory
of a vast consciousness existing apart
from nerve-structure and before it was
developed. One wonders, therefore,
what Mr. Ballard means when he
assured his anxious interviewer that
“the theistic basis of Christianity will
have scientific support more than ever.”
The reasons alleged for postulating this
intelligence at the “ beginning ” of
things are metaphysical. Mr. Rhondda
Williams formulates them more or less
clearly, as they are invented by
Dr. W. N. Clarke and Dr. Ward and
Le Conte. He says first—and this, I
believe, is an original contribution—that
science finds “ law ” in the cosmos ; but
“ law ” is a mental concept: ergo, science
79
finds mind in the cosmos. We will over
look that little weakness, and come to
the plausible arguments he has borrowed.
He says (after Ward) that the universe
must be the work of intelligence
because it is intelligible. The axiom
he rests on is that “ what is intelligible
must either be intelligent or have in
telligence behind it.” Now, on idealist
principles this is quite time; there being
no material world at all, if anything
exists, mind clearly exists. But, apart
from this denial of' a real ’world, the
axiom has no sense whatever; it is
simply an audacious assertion. Dr
Iverach {Theism) uses much the same
argument, and tries to give it a respect
able realistic air. “ A system,” he says,
“ which at this end needs an intelligence
to understand it must have something
to do with intelligence at the other.”
Many other writers say the same. To
show the inanity of the assertion, one
has only to ask Dr. Iverach whether
even a chaotic and disorderly uni
verse would not need “ an intelli
gence to understand it.” If he
means by “ intelligible ” that it is
orderly and systematic, he is simply
begging the whole question, and asking
us to swallow his position in the form of
an axiom, because he cannot prove it.
He says elsewhere {Christianity and
Evolution) that “ if thought has come out
of the universe, if the universe is a uni
verse that can be thought, then thought
has had something to do with it from
the outset.” That is the favourite form
of argument that “you cannot get out of
a sack what is not in it.” It is a longdiscredited fallacy. We have seen how
out of a simple matter and force have
come an immense variety of things.
These things were only implicitly in the
primitive prothyl. Similarly, the evolu
tion of thought only shows that thought
was implicitly in the first cosmic princi
ples. Moreover, consciousness evolves
out of the unconscious every day—in
embryonic development. Mr. Williams
finally urges that a thing which has not
been made by intelligence should be
�8o
SCIENCE AND CHRISTIANITY
reversible, and says : “ But it is the
essential principle of science that things
are not reversible; that they must be
where they are, as they are; the order
of nature is the greatest scientific dis
covery.” This is a curious confusion.
It is difficult to see why a thing con
structed by mechanical forces should be
immediately reversible, in any sense
which does not apply to an intelligent
construction; and in the long run the
cosmic process will be reversed, and
begun again, if the scientific evidence
counts for anything.
It is on the strength of such verbiage
and sophistry as this that Haeckel’s
critics assume airs of spiritual superior
ity and spatter his “ godless ” system with
contempt. He has followed up the
scientific evidence with a close fidelity.
He has not forgotten for a moment that
the unseen may be gathered from the
seen by valid reasoning (as he himself
has gathered many truths by inference
from the facts observed); he has not ex
cluded the sober and accredited use of
the speculative imagination. Professor
Henslow has recently, in a letter to the
daily Press, suggested that Rationalists
deny the existence of God because
it does not fall under observation or
experiment.
The
writer
Professor
Henslow quoted has himself repudiated
this interpretation of his words; and
certainly Haeckel has repeatedly en
dorsed the procedure of passing beyond
observation, when the inference is firmly
based on the facts and is logical in form.
Whether he is not justified in rejecting
as unsound these pseudo-metaphysical
arguments we have been considering,
the reader may judge for himself.
Whether his procedure is not more
scientific, more logical, and more philo
sophical than that of his opponents—
whose arguments I have, as far as possi
ble, given in their own words—may now
be determined. And if his procedure
so far is correct, and the objections of
his critics futile, we have established the
bases of monism. We have followed
the great matter-force reality through its
cosmic development until it breaks out
in the glory of the human mind and
emotions. And we have seen no reason
for suspecting the existence of any prin
ciple or agency distinct from it, or for as
cribing to Nature itself any feature that
would justify us in transferring to it the
title or prerogatives of the dying God.
Chapter VIII
SCIENCE AND CHRISTIANITY
As we have previously seen, the
cosmic speculations of the Monist find
themselves in antagonism with a set of
cosmic speculations
which
already
occupy, not merely the mind, but the
heart of a large number of people.
Whilst older religions, such as Confucian
ism and, to an extent, Buddhism, have
succeeded in effecting a separation
between ancient cosmological notions
and religion proper, so that the educated
Japanese, for instance, does not confound
theistic controversy with religion, Chris
tianity has retained the belief that man
is immortal, and that the universe has a
supreme controller as essential parts of
its framework.
Naturally, Christian
thinkers who are alert and informed are
�SCIENCE AND CHRISTIANITY
ity ; as if his critics were somehow
beginning to deny this. .Mr. R. J.
unable to understand a pure love of
Campbell, for instance, insists. that
truth or regard for its moral and social
Christianity is “not dogma, but life a
stimulus. However, it is on this
life lived in conscious union with a
chapter of his work that critics have
Divine Person.” But that is somewhat
fastened most eagerly and most ardently.
bewildering. In one phrase dogma is
Now, one cannot but protest in pass
disavowed, and in the next a dogma of an
appallingly metaphysical character is ing against the foolishness of such a
made essential to the definition.
A procedure. All the world knows that
Professor Haeckel is not an expert in
similar inconsistency is found in almost
every other ecclesiastic who speaks of ecclesiastical history. If he felt himself
constrained to warn his readers that he
removing the emphasis from dogma.
had no expert acquaintance with physics,
The two dogmas of God and the future
life are still essential to Christianity, and lest he might innocently induce the
it is precisely these dogmas which uninformed to attach undue weight to
conflict with the monistic conception of his judgment in that department, he
the universe. The few advanced think might in return expect from, them a
ers we have encountered represent, on reasonable sense of the proportion of his
book.
His authority lies chiefly in
the whole, only a small cultured minority.
The great bulk of the faithful cling to zoology. We saw that he built some of
the most important parts of his system
the old ideas in the old form. And it. is
because this mass of conventional belief on the facts of zoology, or biology, and
still exists that preachers find it possible it is to these that the honest critic will
and advisable to bespatter the reputa mainly address himself. We saw how
few of the critics did so. But the book was
tions of fearless and sincere speculators,
who seek to spread their views amongst intended, as he says, to stand in some
measure for the complete system of his
the people.
Such a thinker as Haeckel, who has thought, which he feared he could now
never give to the world. It, therefoie,
found his faith obstructed throughout
life in the supposed interest of Christian contained an expression of his opinion
ity, naturally turns to consider that great on a multitude of topics which it is not
religion when the solid frame of his essential for a Monist, as such, to pass
In this he naturally
monistic system is compacted. He judgment on.
challenges the criticism of his opinions,
finds four dogmas chiefly responsible for
and must meet it. But he had a right
that strong attachment to Christianity,
to expect that his book and his system
which seems to him to prolong the life
of the errors he has criticised and the of thought should be judged essentially
diversion of men’s interest to another by their essential positions; he had a
world. These are, briefly— a belief in the right to expect that no one who would
supernatural character of the Bible; a be likely to read ten pages of such a
book would be so unintelligent as to
belief in the divinity, or . the unique
extend his zoological authority into the
character, of Christ; a belief that there
domain of ecclesiastical history.
is something preterhuman about the
Further, no one who takes the trouble
historical progress and moral power of the
to understand Haeckel’s system of
Christian religion; and a belief in the
infallibility of the Pope. He therefore thought would expect him to devote very
considerable time to an examination of
seeks to discredit those beliefs, in order
to prepare the way for an impartial con the dogmas I have enumerated. If his
previous conclusions are true, these
sideration of the new conception of life
dogmas must be false. That is a logical
which he regards as true and valuable.
At once, of course, he is credited, with and proper attitude. The man who has
some mysterious “ hatred” of Christian ) spent a life in deciphering the message
�82
SCIENCE AND CHRISTIANITY
of the cosmos, and has been compelled
characteristic portion of his work. But
to. interpret it in a monistic sense, and it has been sought to bring the full
reject entirely the dogmas of God and
weight of expert, historical scholarship to
immortality, has reached a conclusion bear on this episodic chapter on Chris
which he may apply to Christianity with
as strict and full a right as the historian tianity, and to make any defect dis
who has devoted his life to the direct covered in it the occasion of a bitter
and violent attack on Haeckel’s general
study of it.. Theistic writers are too apt authority. The. trained thinker sweeps
to forget this. When a man has reached
aside such tactics as an impertinence.
a conviction that God is a myth, he is But the untrained and uninformed
neither logically, nor morally expected to
millions of the Churches are assured
ask . himself seriously whether Christ or that. Haeckel’s authority has been dis
Christianity is divine. And it is per credited. They are taught that his
fectly obvious to any one who reads this
rejection of Christian beliefs is traceable
seventeenth chapter of the Riddle that
to a “childish credulity” (Dr. Horton)
this has been Haeckel’s attitude. He
and is supported by “mendacities”
merely skims the surface of a vast his (Mr. Ballard). However, let us examine
torical subject. He abandons the rigid the allegations on which the grossest
method of the earlier part, with its diatribes against Haeckel have been
accumulations of evidence. He hesitates supported.
to “devote a special chapter to the sub
The Achilles of the critics in this
ject,” and refers to other works. He then department is Dr. Loofs, professor of
decides to “ cast a critical glance ” at it, ecclesiastical history at the University of
protesting that it is only the hostility of Halle, and from his Anti-Haeckel we
the Churches which provokes him to do
gather the most formidable censures.1
so. He is mindful of “ the high ethical This work I have already qualified as
value ”. of pure Christianity and “ its
one of the coarsest and most painful
ennobling influence on the history of publications that have issued from a
civilisation.”
But it still clings to modern university. The story of its
beliefs which Haeckel (and large num writing runs thus. Dr. Loofs tells us
bers of its own theologians) believe to
St. Bernard has the same artistic
have no more than a legendary founda exordium to his attack on Abe'lard—
tion, and which nevertheless give it an that he was dragged into the arena by
incalculable influence on the minds of friends and colleagues in Germany. He
millions. Haeckel, therefore, gathers read the seventeenth chapter of the
from a group of German works or trans Riddle, and at once wrote an “ open
lations (all of which are indicated in the letter ” to Dr. Haeckel on the errors it
German edition) points of criticism in contains. This “ open letter ” first saw
regard to these dogmas, and briefly, with the light in the pages of an Evangelical
a light satire that evinces the absence of weekly, Die Christliche Welt, which circu
prolonged research in this department, lates amongst some 5,000 pious readers
fires them at the popular beliefs.
in Germany, and is hardly likely to
These considerations, which will penetrate into a university. Its tone
readily occur to the impartial student, was bitter and scurrilous. However, it
are prompted by the tactics which have was copied by other periodicals, and
been largely employed in the criticism of Haeckel wrote a brief reply in a
the Riddle. What value there is in the scientific and serious review, the editor
attack on its main position we have of the review, Dr. E. Bischoff, supportalready seen. The epithets that have
1 An English translation is promised, but has
been showered on the distinguished
scientist recoil on their authors where not appeared at the time of writing. It will, no
i
doubt, temper the extreme coarseness and ugli
there is question of the essential and ness of the German original.
�SCIENCE AND CHRISTIANITY
ing Haeckel with his expert knowledge
and with a very plain but dignified
comment on Loofs’s procedure. At this
Dr. Loots seems to have lost all sense
of either humour or dignity, and
included these documents with his
reply in the brochure we are about to
examine. Its pages sparkle with in
candescent phrases, which are, more
over, usually italicised. “ Incredible
ignorance,” “crass stupidity,” “pure
folly,” etc., are amongst the milder
of these phrases. When, towards the
close, he looks back on his virulent
italics (or that larger type that serves
for italics in German), he says de
liberately: “It is not the ‘point of
view,’ not the ‘system,’ of Professor
Haeckel, but his scientific honour, that I
have attacked; and I have done it so
unmistakably that any court will convict
me of libelling my colleague of Jena, if
I cannot support my charges.” In a
word, he tells us (3rd edit., p. 52) that
the Press has ignored his precious
diatribe, and that a libel action.(though
he declines to “ provoke ” it) will bring
his grievance before the public. Such
is the famous rejoinder to Haeckel
which our ecclesiastical journals have
praised so highly.
After all this the reader will expect to
find that Haeckel has been convicted of
one of the most remarkable series of
controversial frauds and literary delin
quencies that a university professor to
say nothing of a man with four gold
medals and seventy honorary diplomas —ever stooped to. The reality would be
amusing if it were not for the vulgarity
and coarseness in which it is enveloped.
Leaving aside the pedantic discussion of
minor points (the date of the Council of
Nicaea, the authorship of the Synodicon,
and so on), and granting that Dr. .Loofs
abundantly proves that Haeckel is not
an expert in ecclesiastical history (if
there be any who did not know it),
we find that the two chief points are the
criticism of Haeckel’s observations on
the formation of the canon and on the
birth of Christ,
83
Haeckel, it will be remembered, states
that the canonical gospels were, selected
from the apocryphal by a miraculous
leap on to the altar at the Council of
Nicaea. At this the indignation of our
professor of church-history flashes forth.
Mr. J. Brierley alludes to this, saying :
“ He gives the story as though it were
the accepted Christian account of the
admission of the four gospels to the
canon. It is difficult to chaiacterise this
statement.” Well, it is foitunate that
some rationalistic Dr. Loofs does not have
to characterise this statement. Haeckel
does exactly the reverse of this. He
gives the “ leap ” story as a correction of
the “ accepted Christian account.” “ We
now know,” he says, in introducing his
version. Further, he gives the state
ment candidly on the authority of the
Synodicon j though he should have said
this was only edited by Pappus. His
own honesty in the matter is perfectly
transparent ; if his acquaintance with
ecclesiastical history is very far from
complete. The story in the Synodicon
is not to be taken seriously. The canon
of the gospels was substantially settled
long before the Council of Nicaea. It
is true that Dr. Loofs is himself accused
of error by Dr. Bischoff for stating that
the Nicene Council did not discuss the
canon, but we will keep to the main
issue. The story taken from the
Synodicon is not worthy of consideration
as an account of the forming of the
canon.
The reader will remember Haeckels
pointed warning in his preface that, not
only are his conclusions on all matters
“subjective and only partly.corrrect,
but his book contains “studies of un
equal value,” and his knowledge, of some
branches of science is “ defective.
In
the face of those repeated expressions it
is ludicrous to suppose that Haeckel
wished to employ his great authority as.a
man of science to enforce opinions in
ecclesiastical history. Here is, on the
face of it, a department of thought where
no one will suspect him to have spent
much of his valuable time, and the di§-
�84
SCIENCE AND CHRISTIANITY
covery of defects in this chapter was value of the Gospels.
He will learn
almost a matter of course. He has
with surprise that Dr. Loofs by no
acknowledged those defects, and has in
means shares the conventional rever
serted in the cheap German edition of his
ence for the New Testament.
The
work a notification that the authority he synoptic Gospels were written, he
followed on this and the following thinks, between the years 65 and 100,
question was unsound. That authority and the Gospel of “ St. John ” before
was an English writer, who had had a
I?5;
That is the general opinion of
theological training, and whose work had
biblical scholars to-day; but it is by no
been translated into German. Haeckel
means the general opinion of the readers
had been, wholly misinformed as to his
of Die Christliche Welt, or of religious
standing in this country, and thus had people in this country. What is more
been betrayed into a reliance on what he important, Dr. Loofs, as we shall pre
understood to be his expert knowledge.
sently see, rejects as worthless, if not
In the case of a writer who claimed dishonest, interpolations some of the
infallibility, or at least a uniform weight,
most treasured and familiar passages of
for the whole of his book, such a defect the New Testament. Let us remember
would be more or less serious. Whether what is really at stake in these con
it was in point of fact one-tenth as
troversies.
serious as some of the procedure of his
To come, then, to the cardinal offence
critics which we have reviewed, whether of Haeckel’s book—we will take a few
it is a matter for violent discussion at all,
detailed criticisms later—we find it in
and not one that might have been the statement that Jesus was the son
pointed out by a colleague without loss of a Greek officer of the name of
of dignity—I leave it to the reader to Pandera. Now let us approach the sub
say. The section in which the passage ject with some sense of proportion. For
occurs shows a fair average acquaintance
Haeckel it is (legitimately) a foregone
with its subject, but it is clear from the
conclusion that Jesus was a human being,
authorities explicitly mentioned in it
born in a normal manner. The conclusions
(Strauss, Feuerbach, Baur, and Renan)
he has already so laboriously reached
that it was written, or prepared, years
compel him to assume this. If there is
ago. Any modern expert would find it no God, Jesus was a man—a “noble
defective. Whether this defect is a prophet and enthusiast, so full of the
fitting.ground for Dr/Loofs’s structure of love of humanity,” Haeckel generously
rhetoric and scholarship may be called
describes him.. This is a standpoint
into question. But whether it is either which Haeckel is by no means alone in
sensible or honourable to seek to dis taking to-day.
The vast majority of
credit Haeckel’s earlier positions in
the cultured writers of every civilised
science, which we have reviewed, by a
country share it with him. It is very
microscopic examination of such a
largely held within the ranks of the
section as this, cannot long remain un Christian clergy themselves. Mr. Rhondda
decided.
Williams preaches it openly. The posi
Before we pass to a consideration of tion of our own Broad Church theolo
the second chief charge, there is one
gians is known.
Even Dr. Loofs—
more point that it is highly expedient
remember well—holds as frankly as
to make clear.
The average inexpert
Haeckel does the natural human parent
reader, about whom our ecclesiastical
age of Jesus, and has formulated his
writers have suddenly grown so con opinion, as the opinion of the average
cerned, will be apt to suppose that this
cultured theologian, in a German theo
deadly attack by the spirited theologian
logical encyclopaedia. He angrily resents
of Halle is prompted by a devotion
the imputation that he believes in the
to the current belief in the unique
virgin-birth, and says no historian of
�SCIENCE AND CHRISTIANITY
dogma can entertain it.
He affirms
that the birth-story in Matthew and
Luke is a late interpolation in the
Gospel, and is quite discredited.
What then is the great difference
between the two ? It is that Loofs
awards the paternity of Christ to Joseph,
and Haeckel assigns it to the Greek
officer of a Roman legion. Our average
Christian neighbour will probably feel
that in substance it is a case of the devil
and the deep sea.
Further, it is easy to see in what
frame of mind a scientist like Haeckel
would approach such a matter. . The
birth of a Saviour-God from a virgin is a
legend that we find in all kinds of
religions anterior to Christianity.
We
know that in all these cases the prophet,
or god—supposing his historical reality
—was awarded this distinction by later
admirers to enhance the repute of his
divinity. When, therefore, Haeckel is
commenting on the dogma of the Im
maculate Conception,1 he turns aside for
a moment to discuss the question of
paternity. Not attaching an overwhelm
ing importance to the question, Who was
Christ’s father? he does not make a pro
found inquiry into it. But in one of his
authorities—the English writer whom I
have mentioned—he finds the curious
statement that the father was a Greek
officer, and it seems to harmonise with
the other statements. He finds that the
Gospels emphatically exclude the notion
that Mary was at that time married to
Joseph, or that Joseph was the father.
He finds, too, that as a matter of history
these miraculously born children were
generally illegitimate. In fact, the intro
duction of a Greek strain would help not
1 Which he misunderstands. The dogma of
the Immaculate Conception does not refer to the
conception of Christ by Maty, but to the concep
tion of Mary by her mother. Dr. Horton is
astonished at Haeckel’s ignorance. For my part
I am astonished at Dr. Horton’s knowledge.
The version Haeckel follows is quite the ordinary
non-Catholic version of the dogma. You will
find it even in Balzac (£<z messe de PathPe}.
Nay, even Mr. Ballard, B.D., thinks it is
correct {Miracles of Unbelief, p. 348).
85
a little to interpret the scriptural figure
of Christ, if it is taken to be historical.
It has long been an argument for the
divinity of Christ that the figure de
picted in the New Testament is so very
un-Hebraic in many of its features. We
who know the composition of the Gospels
understand this Greek element, But the
supposition that Christ had a Greek
father is not a little attractive in the cir
cumstances. When, therefore, Haeckel
learns from his authority, or supposed
authority, that in one of the apocryphal
gospels (the Gospel of Nicodemus)
Jesus was said to be the illegitimate son
of a Greek officer, and that this is con
firmed by the Sepher Toldoth Jeschua, he
at once embraces it as the most plausible
explanation of the “ high and noble
personality” of the Galilean.
These
apocryphal Gospels are, he tells the
reader, no less and no more reliable in
themselves than the canonical Gospels,
but this version of the birth seems to
accord best with the general situation.
Now this is a perfectly honest pro
cedure for a man who makes no pre
tension to expert knowledge or research.
Haeckel has again been misled by his
authority, it is true. The sentence, he
quotes from “ an apocryphal gospel ” is
not found in any of those books in that
form. The Gospel of Nicodemus merely
states that the Jews declared Christ to be
illegitimate. The Sepher ToldothJeschua,
which gives the story, is an early
mediaeval Jewish work of no authority.
The story can, indeed, be traced back
well into the second century (to about
130 a.d.), since Origen gives it as being
told to his opponent Celsus by the Jews,
in his Contra Celsum (I, 32); but this
was unknown at the time to Haeckel
and his authority. Further, it is mis
leading to say “the official theologian”
burks the story. It is perfectly true that
the Sepher Toldoth Jeschua is little com
mented on, but it is a worthless docu
ment; and Strauss, the author of the
Zz/e ofJesus, had contemptuously rejected
the story. These are undoubted errors
on Haeckel’s part. But, after all, the
�86
SCIENCE AND CHRISTIANITY
radical error is that he took a superficial
and unreliable author as his authority.
To have been misinformed as to the
weight and qualifications of a foreign
writer on a subject completely outside
his own territory, and to have neglected
to verify his information, is the full
extent of Haeckel’s delinquency. Dr.
Horton, who gives Vogt and Buchner as
shining lights in the spiritualist firma
ment, pompously tells us this was
“childish credulity.” Mr. Ballard, who
deals in such a remarkable fashion with
Haeckel’s observations on the pyknotic
theory and abiogenesis and determinism,
says he is “ ashamed to put such men
dacities into print,” and that if Haeckel
is not ashamed of himself he has not
developed “ an elementary degree of
morality.” Dr. Loofs calmly pours out
such a stream of invective that he thinks
it well to remind Haeckel of the text and
section of the German law which covers
the case ! He is afraid, he says, that
Haeckel will not be stung into dragging
the matter into court, and so he
continues to the end to dredge up
the. strong sediment of the German
dictionary.
A more ludicrous situation it would be
difficult to conceive. Haeckel frankly
states that in his opinion this is a subject
on which none of the evidence is worth
much. But he finds one legend more
plausible than that given in the canonical
gospels, and he points out that it seems
to be the most plausible. There is not
the slightest deception, as he openly
relies on the intrinsic plausibility of the
story, and openly states the immediate
and the ultimate sources from which he
takes it. No doubt he should have
examined more closely into the subject,
and should have looked into more
weighty and more recent literature. He
would then have found that the pas
sages which deny Joseph’s paternity
“belong to the least credible of New
Testament traditions,” as Dr. Loofs
says.1 But that his opponents should
1 American Journal oj Theology, July, 1899.
attack him with this virulence and
viciousness on that account is one of
the most disgraceful episodes of this
dreary controversy.
. The other defects which Dr. Loofs
discovers with his microscopic eye in
this chapter of the Riddle are mostly
pedantic rectifications of minor state
ments, or corrections with which only an
expert would concern himself, and as to
which opinions sometimes differ. Many
of them are quite paralleled by Dr.
Bischoff’s examination of Loofs’s own
statements. The year of the Council of
Nicfca and the number of bishops
present are incorrect; the number of
apocryphal gospels and of the genuine
Pauline epistles is not according to the
latest vagary of the critics; the statistics
of religion are not up to date; the
Immaculate Conception and Immaculate
Oath are improperly described. These
are the other points of the indictment.
The reader may judge for himself
whether there is anything more than a
lack of expert knowledge in these things;
and whether Haeckel ever claimed, and
did not rather disclaim from the outset,
such expert knowledge.
But we now turn to another aspect of
the matter. Haeckel, I said, set out to
discredit four dogmas which he found
hindering the progress of scientific know
ledge amongst the people at large. The
serious reader, impatient of all this dust
throwing and mud-throwing, will ask
how far the substance of Haeckel’s
attack on these dogmas survives this
scrutiny, and how far it is supported by
sound historical research. The dogma
of the infallibility of the Pope does not
appeal to the sympathies of these
Protestant critics, so that Haeckel’s
attack on the papacy is allowed to stand.
Let us consider his position with regard
to the other points—the uniqueness of
the Bible, of Christ, and of the history
of Christianity. Whether Haeckel is
infallible or not is hardly a subject for
prolonged discussion, provided his
“ scientific honour ” and “ scientific
conscience ” are not involved in the
�SCIENCE AND CHRISTIANITY
manner that Dr. Loots would have the
readers of Die Chnstliche Welt to be
lieve. The serious question is : Can we
sustain his attack on these dogmas,
apart from the incidental errors into
which his unfortunate reliance . on
“ Saladin ” has betrayed him ? This is
a study in Church History, in the full
sense in which that science is under
stood to-day.1 We shall see that the
substance of Haeckel’s position is com
pletely supported by our present know
ledge of the subject.
In the first place, that implicit reli
ance on the statements found in the
Bible, which Haeckel set out to impugn,
is now wholly discredited. We need
not consider the Old Testament, and
Haeckel does not discuss it. _ The
cosmological speculations of Genesis are
now known to have been borrowed from
earlier religions : the historical books
are so full of error that we can only
trust them when we have independent
verification; whole books (Daniel, Es
ther, Tobit, etc.) are given up as wholly
unhistorical. This can be learned from
the works of Christian scholars to-day.
The Old Testament remains a work of
surpassing interest, containing some fine
literature and some of the highest moral
teaching of the ancient world. But it
no longer obstructs the path of the
scientist or the historian. As to the
New Testament, the work of recon
struction is not equally advanced.
Writers like Archdeacon Wilson confuse
the issue by taking “verbal inspiration ”
to be the butt of the rationalist attack.
No doubt one will still find many simple
believers in verbal inspiration, but that
is not the serious difficulty. The
opinion that the rationalist seeks to dis1 As a fact, the real secret of Dr. Loofs’s
bitterness and animosity seems to be that
Haeckel has laid a strong charge against Church
History. Apart from one historian, whom he
mentions by name, there was no reason for
thinking he included advanced writers like
Harnack and Loofs. But that his charge
against conventional Church History was solidly
grounded is well known to every student of
history, and will presently be fairly established.
87
credit—the opinion of the majority of
Christians to-day (solemnly propounded
to the world only a few years ago by
the official head of the Church of Rome)
—is the belief that the Bible contains
no error. Once the infallibility of the
Bible is abandoned, it ceases to be a
barrier to progress. The infallibility of
the Old Testament is not now held by
any Christian scholar; and the infalli
bility of the New Testament is rapidly
being expelled from the cultured Chris
tian mind. We have seen how Dr.
Loofs himself rejects the account of the
virgin-birth (Matt, i., Luke ii.) which
had worn itself into the very heart of
Christianity. “No well-informed, and
at the same time honest and conscien
tious theologian, can deny that he who
asserts these things as indisputable facts
affirms what is open to grave doubts,”
he says, significantly enough, in his
article in the American Journal of
Theology. In his article (“ Christologie
Kirchenlehre ”) in the Real-Encyclopadie filer Protestantische Theologie he
talks freely of “layers of biblical tradi
tion ” and their relative trustworthiness.
This statement, which has been taken
throughout the Christian era to be the
most characteristic and one of the most
important statements of the New Testa
ment, is now relegated to “ one of the
latest and least reliable ” of these
“layers.” The article on the Gospels
in the Encyclopedia Biblica, which re
flects the condition of cultured biblical
thought in England, is written entirely
in the same spirit; the author finds only
nine texts in the Gospels which are
“ entirely credible,” and without which
“ it would be impossible to prove to a
sceptic that any historical value what
ever was to be assigned to the Gospels.”
The inexpert reader is often misled by
statements to the effect that the critics
are returning on their traces, and are
denying the late dates assigned by the
Tubingen school to the Gospels and the
fewness of the genuine epistles of St.
Paul. The second point is not important
for our purpose, but the first statement is
�88
SCIENCE AND CHRISTIANITY
gravely misleading. When an ecclesias
tical journal or a tactical apologist re
produces Harnack’s saying that recent
criticism is vindicating “the essential
truth of tradition” about the Gospels,
one can only regret that one is incom
petent to borrow some of the phrases of
Dr. Loofs. The simple believer is en
couraged to think that the miraculous
life of Jesus is being fully rehabilitated.
The composition of the Gospels is being
put back to the period 65-125 : that is
to say, 65-70 for Mark, 70-75 for
Matthew, 78-93 for Luke, and 80-120
for John. It is not thought proper to
explain that the critics by no means
refer to the Gospels as we have them
to-day, and that these Gospels consist
of earlier and later “layers”—in plain
English, interpolations. It is not con
sidered necessary to explain that the
return to the Gospels only means, in
the words of Loofs, “ a return to the
sayings of Jesus in the synoptic gospels,”
and that the miraculous legends may be
sorted out as unprovable and incredible.
Well may the Christian World com
plain of “the lack of honesty” in
theological literature ! The truth is that
the historical value of the New Testa
ment is shattered, and Christian scholars
are, as in the case of the Old Testament,
retreating upon its ethical value. Thus
the putting back of the composition of
the synoptic Gospels into the first cen
tury does not save that popular reliance
on their legends which Haeckel solely
regarded.
This brings us to our second point,
the consideration of the person of Christ.
In this, as a matter of fact, Haeckel takes
up an exceedingly moderate position, and
falls far short of the advanced position
of many of the ablest recent Rationalist
writers. He assumes not only the his
torical character of Christ, but also that
we know enough about him to speak of
“ his high and noble personality ” and
to describe him as “ a noble prophet
and enthusiast.” He denies the divinity
of Christ, the miraculous powers that
are assigned to him in the Gospels, and j
the. originality of some of the chief
ethical sayings attributed to him. This
is not merely a position that will readily
be endorsed by numbers of Christian
theologians, but it is one that many theo
logians, to say nothing of non-Christian
writers, will regard as granting too much
to the religious tradition. How widely
the divinity of Christ is rejected to-day
few can be ignorant. The vague and
fluid phrases in which even the belief in
it is expressed very commonly now mis
lead only the inexpert. The older
Rationalistic attitude as to Jesus—that
we might omit the supernatural portions
of the Gospel narrative and take the
rest as historical—is giving way to a more
scientific procedure, and the figure of
Christ is dissolving into a hundred
elements. Comparative religion traces
numbers of the Gospel legends, such as
the virgin-birth, if not all the features of
the birth-story, to pre-Christian religions.
The death and burial, many incidents of
the life, and very much of the teaching,
are not more difficult to trace. Whilst
Christian scholars are separating the
Gospel-story into “layers of tradition”
(thus explaining the obvious contradic
tions), the study of the Greek, Egyptian,
Mithraist, and other religions, which
prevailed at the time and in the place
where the Gospels were written, is assign
ing their proper sources to the “ later
layers.” 1 The virgin-birth, which has
been so prominently brought before the
mind of English readers through the
famous denial on the part of a dignitary
of the Church of England, is only an
illustration of the process of dissolution
that is going on. When that process is
complete we shall see how little will be
left of the figure of the Crucified that
has been graven on the heart of Europe
for nearly 1500 years. Most assuredly
Haeckel’s position is a modest one. And
1 Read the able and learned efforts to trace
many of the gospel-elements in Mr. J. M.
Robertson’s Pagan Christs and Christianity and
Mythology. For the analysis of the Gospels read
especially Dr. Schmiedel’s article in the Encyclo-.
padia Biblica.
�SCIENCE AND CHRISTIANITY
to conceal the strength of his position (as
opposed to the conventional position) by
the dust of a heated conflict as to
whether Christ’s father was Joseph the
carpenter or Pantheras the Greek is only
another specimen of “the lack of honesty
in apologetic literature.”
The third point to which Haeckel ad
dresses himself is the belief that there
has been anything unique about the
history or power of the Christian religion.
Here not only is Haeckel’s position very
moderately expressed, but the belief he
attacks is dissolving more rapidly than
the preceding beliefs. The term “unique ”
is—people so often forget—a relative or
comparative term; yet nine-tenths of
the ordinarily educated Christians who
talk of the uniqueness of the Bible have
never read a line of the Babylonian,
Persian, Egyptian, Hindoo, or Chinese
religious literatures; nine-tenths of those
who talk of the unique character of
Christ are totally ignorant of the work
and (traditional) character of Zoroaster,
Buddha, Lao-Tse, Kung-Tse, Apollonius,
or the Bab ; and nine-tenths of those
who think the history of Christianity is
“ unique ” have never studied, even in
the most general way, the growth and
work of Buddhism, or Confucianism, or
Parseeism, or Manicheeism, or Moham
medanism, or Babiism.
They have
trusted their ecclesiastical historians—
not men like Loofs and Harnack, but
the “ popular ” writers and the apologetic
writers of the Churches. Through this
literature most of us have waded at one
time or other; we can appreciate the
justice of the heaviest censure that can
be passed on it. It is one of the most
questionable implements in the employ
ment of the modern Churches. Com
plaint is frequently heard that rationalist
writers are ever seeking to belittle and
besmirch a religion which, with all its
defects, has had, in Haeckel’s words,
“ an ennobling influence on the history
of civilisation ” (p. 117). The reason is
found in the gross mis-statement and
perversion of the moral and religious
life in Europe during the last 1500 years
89
which the ecclesiastical historians have
been guilty of.
I will take in illustration one of . the
most characteristic and interesting periods
of this history of which I chance to have
expert knowledge—the fourth century.
Not many years ago I taught in a semi
nary, and preached from a Catholic
pulpit, the conventional theory of a
spiritual conquest of the Roman world
by Christianity—of “Rome, oppressed
by the weight of its vices, tottering to
embrace the foot of the crucifix.” That
is the historical theory you will hear from
almost every pulpit in this land to-day,
and will find, not merely in Christian
Evidence and S.P.C.K. and R.T.S.
Tracts, but in Sheppard and Milman
and Villemain and Dollinger and other
standard authorities. It is a ridiculously
false picture. Schultze has shown1 that
in some of the most important provinces
of the Empire not more than two and a
half per cent, were Christian at the
beginning of the fourth century. The
old religion had almost lost all serious
influence, and a number of Oriental re
ligions were pervading the Empire with
an ascetic and spiritual gospel. Of these
religions Christianity was one—not the
most ethical or spiritual or most success
ful. When the persecutions ceased, and
the Christians came out into the light of
day, their spiritual poverty was—with few
exceptions—a notable feature. Until 323
they proceeded quietly with their proselytic work, like the Mithraists and the
Manicheans, whom they closely re
sembled, when the conversion of Con
stantine to Christianity suddenly gave
them an immense advantage.
The
emperor’s “ conversion ” is not claimed
to have been important either as an in
tellectual or a spiritual phenomenon, but
it was supremely important in the poli
tical sense. Courtly senators followed
his example. It became, as Symmachus,
one of the last of the great pagans, says,
“ a new form of ambition to desert the
altars ” of the gods. Successive Christian
1 Geschichie des Untergangs des Heidenlhums.
�90
SCIENCE AND CHRISTIANITY
emperors sat on the Western throne, but
preserved a political neutrality, so that
Christianity advanced slowly. The short
reign of Julian showed how far Chris
tianity was from a triumph, and his suc
cessors, though Christian, still declined
to interfere politically in the rivalry of
religions.
By the year 380 the overwhelming
majority of the people and “ nearly the
whole of the nobility ” (St. Augustine
says) were still Pagan ; and the letters
of St. Jerome show that the Christians
were less spiritual than ever. But in 382
the “ triumph of Christianity ” began ;
within twenty years it became the
religion of the Empire. How ? From
the accession of Gratian (aged sixteen)
and Valentinian II. (aged four) there was
a succession of youthful, weak, and
religious emperors in the West. The
court was at Milan; its spiritual director
was St. Ambrose, one of the finest,
strongest, and most ambitious (for the
Church) of the fathers. He used his
influence, threatened the boy-emperor
with excommunication, and soon decree
after decree went out in favour of
Christianity. The pagan revenues were
confiscated: then the pagan temples
were destroyed or sealed up : finally any
who dared to cultivate any other than the
Christian religion were fined, imprisoned,
and threatened with death. At the same
time the Christian Churches adopted, or
had already adopted, all the attractions'
of the temples. They had gorgeous
vestments and ceremonies and pro
cessions, aspersion with water, incense,
banquets and dancing in the Church on
feast-days (generally ending in drunken
revelry), and all that the Roman cared
for in “religion.” The pagan merely
walked over to the Christian temple,
when he found his own barred by soldiers
or razed to the ground, and took
with him his music and flowers and in
cense and wine and statues. There was
no great moral reform, no great spiritual
conversion, except in a few distinguished
cases like that of St. Augustine.1
This gross misrepresentation of his
torical truth by ecclesiastical writers is
the sole reason for the Rationalist’s
playing “ the devil’s advocate.” Almost
the whole period of Christian history has
been treated with similar untruthfulness.
The good has been greatly exaggerated :
the evil suppressed or denied. The
belief in the uniqueness of the growth
of Christianity and of its moral and
civilising influence rests on a mass of
untruth and of calumny of other religions
and sects. Christianity and its sacred
books take their place in the great world
process. We see them growing naturally
out of the older religions and literatures,
and linking us with thoughts of other
ages. When theological literature has
ceased to offend us and to mislead the
people with its “ lack of honesty,” we
will study them with impartial interest,
and seek to establish their influence for
good as well as their share in the de
gradation of Europe from the first
century to the twelfth. Until then the
work of the Rationalist historian is
bound to seem destructive and one
sided.
1 Fuller details may be found in the author’s
St. Augustine and His Age: or in Boissier’s
Fin du Paganisme, Beugnot’s Histoire de la
Destruction dit Paganisme, or Schultze’s Geschichte des Untergangs des Heidenthums.
�THE ETHIC AND RELIGION OF MONISM
9i
Chapter XI
THE ETHIC AND RELIGION OF MONISM
Mr. H. G. Wells, the accredited
prophet of these latter days, predicts in
his well-known Anticipations that by the
end of the present century Christianity
will have been wholly abandoned
by people of culture. There will be,
he thinks, “a steady decay in the
various
Protestant
congregations,”
whilst Catholicism will increase for a
time, but only amongst “ the function
less wealthy, the half-educated, in
dependent women of the middle class,
and the people of the Abyss.” Another
recent writer, Sir Henry Thompson,
says in his essay on The Unknown
God\ “The religion of Nature must
eventually become the faith of the
future; its reception is a question for
each man’s personal convictions. It is
one in which a priestly hierarchy has no
place, nor are there any specified
formularies of worship. For ‘ Religion
[in the words of Huxley] ought to mean
simply reverence and love for the
Ethical ideal, and the desire to realise
that ideal in life. ’ ” Recently, too, Mr.
J. Brierley wrote one of his widely-read
articles in the Christian World on the
theme that there is impending “ a more
radical and more effective attack on
Christianity” than any that have pre
ceded. Mr. Rhondda Williams says that
“ already it is the fact that the cultured
laity on the one hand, and the great
bulk of the democracy on the other, are
outside the Churches.” It is true that
Mr. Ballard wrote in the British Weekly,
in July of this year, that Christianity “ is
at all events larger in quantity and
better in quality than ever before, and has
a brighter promise than in any previous
period of its history.” But within two
months we find him expressing himself
as follows : “ The outlook is a serious
one ; but I am not a pessimist, although
too many of my colleagues regard me as
such. I am only sensitive to the danger
of the day. What they call pessimism
I call open-eyed honesty. We are enter
ing on a very grave and probably pro
longed struggle, as Dr. Flint has recently
stated. The modern atmosphere is in
general tending away from rather than
towards all that is distinctive of Chris
tianity.” 1
Many things happened during the
course of the last summer to elicit or to
confirm these vaticinations. Haeckel’s
Riddle of the Universe was circulating to
the extent of some eighty thousand
copies in this country alone. Ecclesi
astics affected to believe that it was only
ignorant and thoughtless workers and
clerks who were deluded by its show of
learning, but they must have known
that it was being eagerly read by tens of
thousands of thoughtful artisans and
middle-class readers.2 Letters began to
trickle into the religious Press, telling of
increasing secessions and expressing ex
treme alarm. Within twelve months the
Rationalist Press Association, labouring
under the usual disadvantages of an
heretical publisher, put into circulation
nearly half a million of its publications ;
1 See interview by Mr. Raymond Blathwayt
in Great Thoughts.
2 So much pity is expressed in this connection
for the poor artisan that I must make this
observation. I have had intimate knowledge of
the clergy—Roman Catholic clergy, who, as a
rule, have had more definite philosophical instruc
tion than their Protestant colleagues—and have
lately, in the course of lecturing and wandering,
made a fair acquaintance with the working and
lower middle-class readers, who so largely pur
chase sixpenny editions. I do not hesitate to
say that there are tens of thousands of the latter
in England who can read Haeckel more intelli
gently than the majority of the Catholic clergy.
�92
THE ETHIC AND RELIGION OF MONISM
and almost every journal in England was
disturbing the peace of the faithful with
a reminder that there was a riddle of the
universe.
A Socialist journal, the
Clarion, made a drastic and sustained
attack on Christianity, in spite of threats
and jeers, and immediately found itself
in touch with the predominant sentiment
of its readers.
Other working-class
organs found it equally safe to open fire
on the Churches.
Two independent
and rigorous inquiries were conducted
into the religious condition of London,
where the Churches display incalculable
wealth. Both inquiries—that conducted
by Mr. C. Booth and that conducted by
Mr. Mudie-Smith for the Daily News—
proved that the Christian Churches in
London do not attach to themselves
more than a quarter of the population,
and that the great majority of their
adherents are women. A census taken
in Liverpool was equally depressing;
and observations made in several small
provincial towns showed that the con
dition was very general in the country.
At the Trade Union Congress at
Leicester the representatives of several
million workers declared for the ex
clusion of religious instruction from the
schools. A superficial inquiry at New
York discovered the same condition in
America, and the latest Australian
census also showed a decay of the
Churches, especially the Catholic Church
and the Salvation Army. M. Guyau dis
covered that in Paris not one in sixteen
of the population attended church, and
Protestant ministers have reported that
scarcely 8,000,000 of the population of
France remain under the obedience of
the Roman Church. The Belgian elec
tions show that half the population of
that “Catholic” country has definitely
ranged itself against the Church. The
success of the Social-Democrats in
Germany, and the reports from Spain
and Italy, point to the same general
defection of the people from Church
influence.1
1 One of the points in which Dr. Loofs joins
issue with Haeckel is in relation to religious
With the various sources of consola
tion which the clergy point out to each
other we are not concerned. The chief
of these seems to be hope; and a com
plete ignorance of the grounds on which
it rests prevents me from discussing it.
We know that the Churches have enor
mous wealth; one secondary denomination
having recently collected a sum of a mil
lion guineas, and another having erected
a cathedral at a cost of a quarter of a
million.
We know that no odium
attaches to the defence of Christianity, if
a scientist or historian be disposed to
defend it. We know that no intrigue
or menace is directed against the pub
lication or circulation of Christian litera
ture.
We know that the wealthier
journals of this country and the general
cultured sentiment is averse to attacking
even when it does not believe. We know
that the clergy have made enormous
concessions to the secular spirit of the
age, until in places their definite reli
gious ministration can only be timidly
and apologetically slipped in between a
cornet solo and a phonographic entertain
ment. Yet “ the outlook is serious,”
and “the cultured laity and the great
bulk of the democracy are outside the
Churches.”
Mr. Ballard has made
merry over the fact that Haeckel opens
his work in a despondent strain, and
yet his translator prefaces this with “a
paean of triumph.” He forgets that
there is an interval of several years
(not two months, as in his own case)
between the two passages.
The
twentieth century opened with—most
Rationalists considered—a brighter pros
pect for the Churches. Already this
statistics. Haeckel had given (from another
writer) the number of Christians as 410,000,000.
Dr. Loofs quotes two recent authorities who give
the figures as 535,000,000 and 556,000,000,
respectively. This is a fair illustration of the
“ victories ” of our apologists. Everyone knows
that these figures are obtained by lumping
together the populations of what are called
“Christian countries.” So France and England
are each credited with about 40,000,000 Chris
tians instead of 10,000,000. Belgium and Italy
and other countries are similarly treated. The
figures are totally worthless.
�THE ETHIC AND RELIGION OF MONISM
has wholly faded, and it seems impos
sible for the Churches ever to regain a
foot of the lost territory.1
This is not a “ paean of triumph,” but
a statement of fact. In the days when
a profession of unbelief involved social
ostracism and malignant calumny, when
men were thrown into prison with the
dregs of society for selling critical litera
ture or uttering critical sentiments, when
nearly every advance of science was
opposed by ignorant clergymen, when
women were bade to see their husbands
and sons in Hell for refusing to fre
quent the church, and the mind of
England was enslaved to dogmas that
all abhor to-day, the attack on Chris
tianity was necessarily predominantly
negative and destructive. Growth was
impossible until the iron bonds were
broken. To-day Rationalism, still rightly
militant and critical, has a conspicuous
constructive side. It has a sociological
outlook and an idealist gospel. After
all, the life of Europe has rested on
doctrinal foundations so long, and has
grown so accustomed to the stimulus of
religious thought, that some idea must
be substituted for the sources of inspira
tion that are rapidly exhausting. Haeckel
turns, therefore, at the close of his
cosmic speculations and his historical
glance at the Christian Church to con
sider this question of the successor of
Christianity.
Years ago he offered
Monism as “ a connecting link between
science and religion ”; as a system that
could unite harmoniously the finest
ethical truths of the Christian religion
1 Mr. Campbell makes a rhetorical point by
challenging a comparison between the census of
church-goers and a census of “ all the professedly
atheistic assemblies in London, all the Hyde
Park atheistic platforms, and the people who
are listening to atheistic propaganda.” Such a
quibble is unworthy of a serious speaker. 1 lie
limitation to “professedly atheistic” gatherings
makes the comparison ludicrous and unmeaning.
Let me in turn issue a challenge. Let the
figures of the circulation of the sixpenny Chris
tian publications be honestly compared with an
equal number, in an equal time, of the Rational
ist sixpenny works. Rationalism, Mr. Campbell
knows quite well, is almost entirely unorganised.
93
with the unshakable truths of modern
science. Even the believer in Christianity
must at times contemplate with misgiving
the practice of grounding the moral life
on beliefs which are to-day disputed and
attacked in every workshop in the land.
The child who has been trained to
honesty and sobriety on the ground
of supernatural reward or punishment,
or on the mere ground of giving offence
to an injured deity, must be of a singu
larly robust character to withstand
entirely the sneers at Hell and Heaven
and the open disbelief in God that
will presently assail his ears. If it be
desirable to have a humane, temperate,
and honourable community, it behoves
every thoughtful man to cast about for
some other ground for the commenda
tion of these moral qualities than an
enfeebled and disputed dogma. In
creasing stress is, therefore, laid on the
ethical and religious aspect of Monism.
One result of this is that, although the
Churches of our day profess a tolerance
which would have outraged the feelings
of their earlier leaders, their apologists
have by no means ceased to gird at the
alleged disastrous consequences of ma
terialism and agnosticism. Mr. Ballard,
who is supposed to have studied “un
belief” and “unbelievers,” introduces
his study (Miracles of Unbelief} with this
amiable quotation:
“ Hold thou the good : define it well:
For fear divine philosophy
Should push beyond her mark and be
Procuress to the Lords of Hell.”
Mr. Rhondda Williams says “ ideal has
no place in Haeckel’s philosophy ”; and
that on his principles “ over the crimes
of a Csesar Borgia you must write a great
‘Can’t help it.’ . . . The sweater who
grinds the faces of the poor can’t help
it.” Dr. Horton says that “men who
have no belief in God and immortality
sink to the level of the brutes,” and
“ come down to the level of the stocks
and the stones ”; that their “ soul is
shrunk, the mind is warped, and the
very body must carry its marks of degra-
Bishopsgat® InfititutaJ
�94
THE ETHIC AND RELIGION OF MONISM
dation.” Mr. R. J. Campbell says that
if the soul is not immortal, then the
right philosophy is to “eat and drink
and be merry ”; that the real obstacles
to Christianity are the thirst for money,
sensual pleasure and entertainment; and
that atheism is “ the gospel of destruc
tion, disease, and death.”1 This senti
ment is repeated weelily from scores of
pulpits all over the country; it is a
commonplace of ecclesiastical literature
and of a certain type of fiction.
Such tactics are malignant and dis
honourable.
I remember reading an
article in the Daily News some months
ago by Mr. Quiller Couch—a religious
author writing in a journal with a pre
ponderantly religious following.
He
touched on the current calumny of the
man without belief in God and immor
tality, and he urged that his readers
knew as well as he that when they
wanted a man of honour and humanity
to confide in they most probably looked
to an agnostic. Without claiming so
much as this, without enumerating the
Stephens and Morleys and Harrisons
that for years have adorned our letters
and our public life, one asks oneself
whether these cultivated clergymen can
have had an experience of their fellows
so different from that of this candid
novelist and essayist that we can at least
credit them with sincerity. It is impos
sible. The statement is an argument, a
stratagem, a flimsy piece of theorising.
It overrides for the moment every gentle
manly impulse, and closes its eyes to the
pain and the heart-burn that many a
gentle Christian mother will suffer as
she broods over it and thinks of her
wandering son. It is a mighty palliative
—I will not say justification—of the
violent language which often returns to
these gentlemen. Did you ever meet a
Christian who felt a moment’s anxiety
about his own character in the event of
his ceasing to believe in Christian teach1 Sermon in -the Christian Commonwealth,
July 30, 1903. This was Mr. Campbell’s first
sermon in the City Temple, and must be regarded
as an exceptionally deliberate utterance.
ing ? I never did. They could not face
their fellows with an avowal that they
were humane (when not defending the
faith) and honourable only or chiefly
because of reward hereafter, or because
God willed it. They are proud of their
own manliness. Their anxiety is ever
for the welfare of others, for “the
people.”
What, then, is the ethic of Monism
which these rhetoricians so completely
ignore ? One does not need a profound
or prolonged research to find it. It
rises out of the very ground on which
they base their ignoble appeal. They
would have us retain the outworn creed
of Christianity because it has been an
inspiration to character-forming, and
because character and a quick sense of
honour are amongst the most valuable
qualities of life. They do not see that
if honour, and sobriety, and high aims
are of value in and for themselves,
humanity will not lightly part with them,
whether or no it reject the miraculous
setting of them which the preacher com
mends. If “ to eat and drink and be
merry,” to extinguish all ambition of
spirit, to forego the visions of an Emerson
or a Mazzini, to pour one’s whole energy
into money-making and sensual pleasure
—if all these are social dangers and
personal misfortunes, humanity will see
to it that they are restrained. The issue
is plain. If moral qualities may dis
appear without the faculties of man being
stunted and the grace and glory of life
being endangered, they will disappear.
No power on earth will prevent it, now
that man has begun to reflect. But if
justice, and honour, and truthfulness,
and self-control, and kindness are
qualities that enrich and gladden the
personal and the social life, they will be
cultivated on that account. And as a
fact, if we take a broad and true survey,
the world was never richer in those
qualities, yet the influence of dogma was
never less. What does the humanitarian
movement mean ? What the movement
for the extinction of the flames of war,
the increase in philanthropic effort, the
�THE ETHIC AND RELIGION OF MONISM
growing social service of the rich, and a
score of other movements ? What has
shattered the barbaric doctrine of hell,
and extinguished for ever the fires of
persecution? A development of men’s
moral and humane feeling, which has
proceeded simultaneously with a decay
of belief.
But, we are told, you are still so near
to the age of universal belief that the
Christian ethic is in your blood in spite
of you. You are severed twigs that are
still green with the sap of the tree. I
reply, firstly, that it is the modern
rationalist and humanitarian movement
that has reformed Christianity. Compare
the degraded condition of Spain, where
the Church has been able to stifle criti
cism, with England and Germany, where
a century of criticism has been directed
upon Christianity from the otitside. And
I reply, secondly, that we are perfectly
conscious that the sap of Christianity is
in our moral fibres. 11 We firmly adhere
to the best part of Christian morality,”
says Haeckel (p. 120): and “ the idea of
the good in our monistic religion co
incides for the most part with the
Christian idea of virtue.” Why should
we be so foolish as to set aside the moral
experience of the last 2000 years ? It is
the heritage of the race. We have been
lifted above that petty sectarian attitude
that distinguishes the church-member.
We survey the whole moral and religious
life of humanity as one broad stream.
Christianity is a stage, a phase, in the
continuous history of the world.
It
borrowed its ethic from Judaea, from
Greece, and from Egypt. It was made
in Alexandria, the centre at that time of
the civilised world, and the converging
point of three great spiritual streams.
There is not a single ethical element in
primitive Christianity that cannot be
traced to its predecessors. Moreover,
the notion that the Hebrews had a
“genius for morality” has no longer
even the semblance of plausibility.
Read the 125th chapter of confessions
or protestations in the Egyptian Bible,
and you will find, a great Egyptologist
95
(Budge) says, a system of morality
“second to none among those which
have been developed by the greatest
nations of the world.” And this chapter
was compiled, from very much earlier
teaching, fifteen centuries before Christ
appeared, and at a time when the
Hebrews were yet uncivilised. The
Book of the Dead, as Dr. Washington
Sullivan says, is so lofty that “ if every
vestige of Christianity were obliterated
from the earth, it would provide an ad
mirable ethical outfit for the reorganisa
tion of morality in Europe.” Further, we
have within the last two years discovered
the very source of that lofty morality with
which the Hebrew prophets lifted their
nation from its barbaric level. At a date
when the Hebrews were sacrificing
human victims to their idols, two thousand
years before the decalogue in the Old
Testament was written, the Babylonians
(from whom the Hebrews obtained their
wisdom and civilisation) were living at a
very high level of moral idealism. The
Code of Laws of Khammurabi—laws
promulgated between 2285 and 2242 B.c.
—is seen to be the foundation of the
“ Mosaic legislation.” We now know,
Dr. Washington Sullivan says, that the
Hebrews “ were positively the last of all
the peoples of remote antiquity to dis
cover those high truths of the moral life
which constitute the unchanging founda
tion of society.”1
But, while, in taking over from
Christianity the moral heritage of
humanity, we owe it gratitude for new
development in some directions, we
must with Haeckel acknowledge that it
has overlaid moral truth with false ideals
that must be set aside. I am not
speaking merely of those mediaeval
horrors which all Christians avoid and
evade to-day. I am thinking of some of
the most distinctive features of the
composite Christ-ideal. When Mr.
1 Ancient Morality. The reader will find in
this admirable booklet a fuller account of this
and the preceding point. It can be obtained at
a moderate price from “ The Ethical Religion
Society,” Steinway Hall.
�96
THE ETHIC AND RELIGION OF MONISM
Campbell
says that Christ “ has
manufactured more nobleness than all
the moral codes in all the world put to
gether,” we see at a glance how little he
knows of “all the moral codes” and
what they have done. We who watch
the advance of comparative religion and
ethics, and of the criticism of the New
Testament, know what will eventually
become of this kind of Christianity
which stakes its existence on the
historical truth of the Gospels. Christ
is dissolving year by year. But even
when apologists have removed the stress
from the (largely, at least) legendary
person of Christ to that moral teaching
which appears in the first century as
“primitive Christianity,” we still join
issue with them. Haeckel has indicated
several features of the Christian ethic
which we cannot receive. Some of
these features are already abandoned
by our Christian neighbours. There is
the ascetic principle, one of the most
prominent elements of the Christ-teaching, which even the Catholic Church is
quietly dropping. There is the Gospel
of opposing violence by submission and
Hooliganism by emptying your pockets,
which one honest Anglican bishop has
pronounced “ impracticable.” There is
the contempt of art and nature, which
follows from the ascetic principle. There
is the commendation of virginity, which
no one regards to-day, with its implica
tion of the inferiority of marriage, so ex
pressly preached by the Church fathers.
There is the suppression of woman, in
spired by the Old Testament teaching,
which, as Mr. Lecky has shown, put
back her emancipation (which the
Romans were initiating) for more than a
thousand years. All these were errors
of the enthusiastic but ignorant com
pilers of the Christ-ideal, and the modern
world agrees to abandon them.
We claim, further, that this moral
teaching must be set once for all on a
purely humanist ground.
“ With eyes
fixed on the future,” says the great
Mazzini, “ we must break the last links of
the chain which holds us in bondage to
the past, and with deliberate stages move
on. We have freed ourelves from the
abuses of the old world; we must now
free ourselves from its glories. . . To-day
we have to found the polity of the nine
teenth century—to climb through philo
sophy to faith ; to define and organise
association, proclaim humanity, initiate
the New Age.” The doctrine of Hell
and Heaven is no longer a fitting founda
tion for moral conduct, as most edu
cated Christians recognise to-day. But
the personality of God or the personality
of Christ is just as little fitted. Have
you ever seen how the little-minded
villagers, along those parts of our coast
where the sea is steadily invading the
land, build time after time close to the
edge of the cliff? “ My grandfather lived
there,” some old man will tell you, point
ing his lean finger out into the sea. And
he knows that in twenty years more the
cottage he has himself built will be un
dermined and swept away. That is
the procedure of those theologians who
base their ethic on the successively dis
solving dogmas of Christianity. Their
grandfathers staked the moral condition
of the community on a belief in Hell;
their fathers grounded it on faith in the
supernatural character of the Bible.
They are basing it to-day on belief in
God and the historical reality of Christ.
And year by year the waves of criticism
and the tunnels of research are under
mining their position. Let us retreat
once for all from the land of dogma.
Morality is too important a matter to be
left at the mercy of scientific or historical
controversies. Cling to your beliefs if
you must—if you can ; but in view of the
controversy that surrounds them, and
will soon thicken about them a hundred
fold, do not seek to bind up the moral
tone of the community with so frail a
speculation.
People who imagine that this pro
posal to transfer the moral interest
from the care of the Churches has a
violent and unnatural character are
little acquainted with the history of the
subject. The leading writers on com-
�THE ETHIC AND RELIGION OF MONISM
parative religion assure us that, in the
words of Professor Tiele, “ in the be
ginning religion had little or no con
nection with morality.” In other words,
morality had a quite different and inde
pendent origin from theology. It was
only at a fairly advanced stage in the
development of priesthood that the
notion was advanced of the gods being
the authors and the priests the guardians
of the moral law. We have seen how
Babylon had the decalogue and an
elaborate moral code centuries before the
supposed giving of the tables to Moses
on Mount Sinai. The existence of a fullydeveloped moral sentiment can thus be
discovered ages before the first claim of
a revelation. If, further, we study the
moral feeling of the lowliest tribes, and
ascend gradually through the semibarbaric peoples known to history, such
as the ancient Mexicans or our own
forefathers, we can trace clearly enough
the growth of the moral ideal. When
men began to live in community they
discovered that certain restraints must
be placed on individual impulses. They
saw the enormous advantages to each of
a communal life, of co-operation and the
division of labour, of mutual help and
service, of substituting trial or arbitration
for bloody combats, and of being able to
trust each other. In other words, they
discovered that, if they were to advance
in the construction of social life, which
promised so many advantages, certain
new habits or rules or qualities were
necessary.
Justice, kindness, respect
for age, care of youth, truthfulness,
sobriety, and self-control were necessary.
In proportion as they acquired these
qualities their social life was healthy and
effective.
The individual gained far
more than he had relinquished in the
occasional restraint of his impulses.
And in proportion as they fell away from
this ideal their social life was enfeebled
and disturbed. Thus there grew up a
sense of the importance of the moral
ideal—such a sense as we find, for
instance, amongst the ancient Germans
long before their contact with Chris
97
tianity. In this way the decalogue came
to be written. Man was its author.
The experience of 200,000 years was
his inspiration. And to-day, when we
see how vitally necessary moral fibre
is for progress in the exacting race of
our national and international life, it is
hardly likely that we shall return to the
lawlessness of prehistoric life. There came
a stage in the evolution of the moral ideal
when men considered it so wonderful
a thought that they hailed it as a gift of
the gods, just as the Hebrews did when
they composed, or borrowed, the legend
of the giving of the law on Sinai. In
this way morality became intimately
associated with theology. It is probable
that, whilst this association has hindered
moral development in some ways—com
pare the stagnancy of the “ages of
faith ” with the great ethical advance of
this “ age of unbelief ”—it has in other
ways greatly promoted it.
However that may be, the time has
come for humanity to claim its own from
the gods. There is an obvious danger
that, as the theological structure with
which morality has so long been asso
ciated breaks up, morality may suffer for
a time. Scepticism about the one natur
ally leads to scepticism about the other.
To say that we should on that account
refrain from hastening the dissolution of
theology is the very reverse of wisdom or
statesmanship. We must insist on the
formation of a purely humanitarian ethic.
We must jealously remove this deeply
important interest from the arena of
controversy. Our children must not be
taught, as they are still taught, to restrain
their impulses to lying, stealing, and
unhealthy practices, merely on the ground
of certain religious beliefs. In a few years
they will hear those beliefs ridiculed and
torn to shreds on every side, and it may
be that the whole structure of their
moral habits will be shaken to the ground.
This is a grave social and humanitarian
problem.
Our educational authorities
insist that moral training shall be given
by the teacher only in connection with
' the legends of the Old Testament, which
G
�98
THE ETHIC AND RELIGION OF MONISM
are not taken to Be historical by clerical
Scholars themselves to-day, or with the
stories of the New Testament that are
being rapidly reduced to myths. The
child is too unsophisticated to see what
is called a “symbolic truth” in these,
and it is well known that the teachers in
our schools, often with great repugnance
to their own feelings, have to treat these
stories as historical, or leave them to be
considered historical.
It is a pitiful
situation, and ought not to be tolerated
even by those who still adhere to
religious beliefs.
An organisation has been created to
meet this situation; to agitate for the
introduction of purely humanitarian
moral instruction for the children in our
elementary schools, and to formulate
schemes of such teaching and provide
model-lessons and expert teachers to
show its practicability. Already several
local educational authorities have adopted
the ideas of this organisation. But over
the country at large the moral instruction
of our children is still totally bound up
with that teaching of the Bible which is
to-day so seriously controverted. Every
man, and especially every woman, who
is alive to the folly and the danger of
our present system should consider the
aim and work of this organisation.1
A more difficult question arises when
we turn to consider moral culture
amongst the adult portion of the
community. Dr. Haeckel is of opinion,
as are very many rationalist writers, that
we need look forward to no substitute
for the Churches in this respect, except
for a certain minority of the community.
“The modern man,” he says, “who has
‘ science and art,’ and therefore ‘ re
ligion,’ needs no special church, no
narrow, enclosed portion of space. For
through the length and breadth of free
nature, wherever he turns his gaze, to
1 I am referring to the Moral Instruction
League. Its central office is at 19 Buckingham
Street, Strand, Loudon, W.C. ; any inquiries
addressed there will be promptly answered by
the secretary. Branches of the League have
been formed in various parts of the country.
the whole universe or to any single
part of it, be finds indeed the grim
struggle for life, but by its side are ever
1 the good, the true, and the beautiful ’
his church is commensurate with the
whole of glorious nature. Still, there
will always be men of special tem
perament who will desire to have
decorated temples or churches as places
of devotion, to which they may with
draw.” No doubt, - 'when we have
introduced an adequate scheme of
purely natural moral instruction into our
primary and secondary- schools instead
of leaving this most important section
of the child’s education to the casual
observations of a reluctant and untrained
teacher in the course of a Bible lesson,
there will not be the same need for
church-assemblies in later life. But it
would seem that the tendency to form
new groups and organisations for moral
and humanitarian culture is on the
increase. Already there is in the field
an important “ Ethical movement,” with
branches in America,' England, France,
and Germany, and with an international
organ (The International Journal of
Ethics) and international congresses.
The English branch includes some
fifteen societies in London and the
provinces, most of which are gathered
into a Union of Ethical Societies,1 and
is spreading rapidly. It has an organ
of its own (Ethics, one penny weekly),
and takes an active part in all social and
humanitarian work. There is also the
Positivist Movement; and there are num
bers of Humanitarian, Tolstoyan, and
other societies with similar aims. Even
churches and chapels are slowly casting
off their raiment of dogma and specula
tion, and restricting their aim to moral
culture. In many parts of England
this transformation has already com
pletely taken place. The tendency
everywhere is in the direction of an
abandonment of dogma, and a relin
quishment of cosmic speculation to the
philosopher and the scientist. Some
1 Central office at 19 Buckingham Street,
London, W.C.
J
�THE POSITION OF DR. A. R. WALLACE
day our Churches will perceive at length
that the belief in God is itself a cosmic
speculation, exposed: to a hundred
hazards of discovery and controversy.
Then, in the words of. Emerson, “there
will be a new Church, founded on moral
science ; at first cold and naked, a babe
in a manger again, the algebra and
mathematics of ethical law, the
Church of men to come, without
shawms, or psaltery, or sackbut, but it
will have heaven and earth for its beams
and rafters, science for symbol and
illustration; it will fast enough gather
beauty, music, picture, and poetry.”
That Haeckel is right in this, his final
judgment and expectation, none will
question who have long observed the
development of religious thought and
church life. Strong and eloquent voices
plead already within the Churches for
the elimination of dogma, for an ex
clusive concern for moral culture. If the
modem art of anticipation have any
validity, it is certain that theological
speculation and moral culture are
severing their long association. We are
taking the step that some of the great
religions of the world took ages ago.
Buddha, wiser in this than the founders
of Christianity, pleaded solely for moral
reform, and coldly discountenanced
theological speculation.
Enlightened
Buddhists hold to the spirit of his
teaching, though Buddhism has, as a
j
'
■ .i . J
99
whole, been unfaithful to his spirit. But
another great Oriental religion, Con
fucianism, the religion of the cultured
Chinese and Japanese, had taken the
step we are taking to-day centuries before
Christ was born. The followers of
Kung-Tse have for ages maintained
moral culture without dogma. Their
Bible, the Bushido, is the model
Bible of the world. It is the turn of
Christianity to make religion “ the service
of man ” instead of “ the service of God.”
If there be a God, he needs not the
sacrifices, and he must disdain the flattery
and adoration, of' a poverty-stricken
humanity. We must turn at length from
the land of shadows, where the super
natural lurks, and pour the whole intense
stream of religious emotion into the task
of uplifting ourselves and our fellows.
We must free the religious and moral
ideal from every entanglement of contro
verted dogma, and set it on a natural
base. Then will cease the long anxiety
and the foolish resistance to every ad
vance of thought. Then each new
discovery will shed new light on our
ideal, and science will be. eagerly
pursued.
“ Oh Science, lift aloud thy voice that stills
The pulse of fear, and through the conscience
thrills—
Thrills through the conscience with the
news of peace—
How beautiful thy feet are on the hills ! ”
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Chapter X
THE POSITION OF DR. A. R. WALLACE
The reader will probably remember
a famous passage in one of Huxley’s
essays where the anxiety that theologians
betray, as the mechanical interpretation
of the universe advances, is compared to
the terror which savages exhibit during
an eclipse of the sun. Whether Huxley
had had a rude experience of that
D 2
�IOO
THE POSITION OF DR. A. R. WALLACE
ecclesiastical rhetoric, of which we have
seen so much under the name of
“ criticism ” of Haeckel, and had yielded
to a malicious impulse in his choice of
an analogy, we need not inquire. We
have seen that the apologists are still
eager to. throw every obstacle they can
suggest in the way of the advance, or of
the acceptance, of the mechanical view.
We have encountered them at every step
in our course. Sometimes, indeed, we
have found ecclesiastics with scientific
qualifications desperately recommending
us to read criticisms that aim at dis
crediting scientific procedure; as when
Mr. Ballard tells his readers to study
Stallo s Concepts of Modern Physics, a
work “the.most of which,” says Sir O.
Lodge, “is occupied in demolishing
constructions of straw.” But these
tactics have long ago ceased to be
effective. Science has won too solid a
position in modern life to be shaken by
the ill-informed criticism of Stallo or the
academic subtleties of Professor Ward.
Nor is the general reader greatly moved
by the efforts of our modern theologians
to sit in judgment on science in its own
domain. The obvious plan for the
Churches to adopt with the largest hope
of success was to obtain, and give a wide
publicity to, utterances by prominent
scientists that tend to rehabilitate
theology. I am not suggesting that
these distinguished scientists only speak
out under a strong pressure from the
clergy. On the part of Sir O. Lodge, for
instance, and Dr. A. R. Wallace, there
is a very clear concern for religion,
which is entitled to our full respect.
But it cannot be denied that the use
which is made by the clergy of these
occasional utterances is gravely mislead
ing.
We have already seen this in
the case of those German scientists to
whom Haeckel refers as having changed
their views. The only statement that
Haeckel makes is that they have ceased
to defend the positive views which he
expounds in the Riddle • yet almost
every clerical writer represents them as
having, to use Dr. Plorton’s words,
“ come to recognise spirit as the author
of consciousness ”—this in spite of the
fact that Haeckel expressly mentions
Du Bois-Reymond’s agnosticism on this
point (p. 6). Dr. Horton, with his
inclusion amongst the elect of the most
notorious materialists that ever lived,
has a title to leniency, in a sense, because
of his obvious ignorance of the entire
subject. The position of those apologists
who have some scientific culture is more
serious. These German scientists—
Wundt, Baer, Virchow, and Du BoisReymond — are
agnostics. Professor
Haeckel assures me that in Germany the
clerical writers call them “atheists.”
They lend no support whatever to even
the. most advanced and liberal form of
theism.
Writers who so thoroughly
mi-lead the English public as to their
position have little right to discuss
the taste of Haeckel’s analysis of
his. colleagues’ views.
The oriental
saying about straining at the gnat
and. swallowing the camel is painfully
pertinent.
We have now to examine those utter
ances on the part of English men of
science which are so much quoted of
late, and we shall find how little support
they really give to the religious position.
Of the later views of G. J. Romanes I will
speak later, when we come to deal with
the somewhat similar ideas of Mr. W.
Mallock. Romanes saw to the end the
terrible strength of the scientific position.
It was only by an appeal to “extrarational ” and unscientific testimony
that he sought to evade it. With Sir O.
Lodge we need not deal in detail. His
chief line of argument is of a teleological
nature, and is exposed to the difficulties
we have already indicated. Nor do I
propose to deal with the spiritist convic
tions of Sir O. Lodge or Dr. Wallace, or
(if they still exist) Sir W. Crookes, or
(in a degree) Professor James. Spiritist
evidence is a subject for personal investi
gation. We may also hold ourselves
dispensed from dealing in detail with
the views of the late Dr. St. George
Mivart. They are not urged upon us to-
�THE POSITION OF DR. A. R. WALLACE
day.1 But there have lately been published
two remarkable pronouncements by dis
tinguished English scientists, Dr. Wallace
and Lord Kelvin, and these it is incum
bent on us to examine. It is chiefly on
the strength of these utterances, that
clerical apologists talk of a reconciliation
of science and religion, if not of “a
rehabilitation of religion. by science.”
These utterances have, in their bald
and misleading outline, been published
throughout the country. We shall see,
in this and the following chapter, how
wholly ineffectual they were, how swiftly
they were torn to shreds by the proper
experts on the subjects involved, and
how clearly the episodes show that the
science of to-day is overwhelmingly
favourable to the positions we have
defended against Haeckel’s critics.
Dr. A. R. Wallace, one of the most
distinguished naturalists of our time, has
long been famous for his opposition to
the doctrine of the evolution of the
human mind. This opposition, main
tained in face of a remarkable and
increasing consensus of scientists and
scientific theologians, is ceasing to im
press inquirers as it once did. The
opinions of a man of such ability, expert
knowledge, and candour, must always be
examined with respect. But we have
seen that the problem is very different
to-day from what it was thirty years ago.
To-day we all admit that evolution is a
cosmic law: Haeckel says it is “ the
second law of substance,” and the theo
logians say it is God’s way of making
things. We all admit the evolution of
matter and the evolution of solar
systems; and most of us admit the
evolution of life and the evolution of
species. On the other hand, we trace
back the distinctive human institutions
of to-day—art, civilisation, science, phi1 Had Mivart lived, the public would have seen
a sensational development in the exposition of
his later opinions. He told me, some years
before his death, that he intended to speak out
fully before he quitted the stage, and he frankly
admitted that his scepticism was deep and his
concern for religion little more than a belief in
its moral efficacy.
IOI
losophy, religion, moral codes, and lan
guage—along a line of evolution to very
primitive beginnings. Grant a glimmer
of intelligence and reason in early man,
and we can very well conceive the natural
development of these institutions in the
course of the last 200,000 years. We
must, indeed; because we know that the
prehistoric man, whose remains we un
earth to-day, had not these things. We
have, therefore, only to bridge the interval
between the brain of the Neanderthal
man and that of the anthropoid ape,
between the mind of the highest animal
and that of the lowest man. The dif
ference is one of degree, not of kind.
Comparative psychology finds in animals
the same emotions and reasoning power
as in man, only less highly developed.
Further, we have a period of at least
600,000 years in which the advance
might be effected. The anthropoid apes
appear in the Miocene period (about
900,000 years ago). Man is not held
to be developed from them, but from a
common ancestor with them; so that
from that period to the time when we
find unmistakable trace of man (250,000
to 220,000 years ago) natural selection
must have been at work.
Finally, we
have lately discovered a most important
link in the chain of development (the
pithecanthropus), and the study of the
brain is, as we saw, suggesting some very
remarkable and illuminating possibilities.
If Canon Aubrey Moore could say that
Mr. Wallace’s view “ had a strangely un
orthodox look ” sixteen years ago, it has
certainly not lost its singularity in our
day. When Dr. Haeckel went to Java,
two years ago, on a scientific expedition,
the Press assured us that he had gone to
search for more bones of the pithecan
thropus. As a fact, though his researches
and travels took him within a hundred
miles of the spot where Dubois found
the famous remains in 1894, he did not
go there. The evidence for the complete
natural development of man is so great
that such discoveries are unnecessary.
But Dr. Wallace has very recently
I entrenched his position with a very
�102
THE POSITION OF DR. A. R. WALLACE
remarkable attack on current scientific
conceptions. He purports to undo a
large and important section of the scien
tific procedure of our earlier chapters,
and we must enter upon a thorough
examination of his statements.1
He
says that the “ new astronomy ” entirely
disciedits that “ cosmological perspec
tive ” which we have taken from Haeckel
and supported with recent evidence.
Instead of finding indications of infinity,
he says, modern astronomers have dis
covered very definite limits to the
material universe. Instead of our sun
being a . neglected and unimportant
element in the stellar universe, it is the
very centre, or near the centre, of the
whole system. Instead of our earth
being a very ordinary fragment of matter,
torn, in some way, from the central mass,
and forming a casual crust at its cooled
surface, it. is a unique body in the uni
verse ; it is fitted to support life in a way
that no other planet of our system is,
and that most probably no other planet
in the universe is. Thus, instead of
man being a mere casual product of
natural development, he is the very
centre and culmination of its processes,
a unique creation, for whose production
the whole universe seems to be one vast
and orderly mechanism, set up for that
purpose by a Supreme Intelligence.
If this is true, it is one of the most
startling and dramatic discoveries ever
made. Let me point out at once that if
all this (except the last line) were estab
lished to-morrow it would not add one
grain of evidence to the religious position,
and would not break a line in the essen
tial structure of Monism. The universe
would still be a mechanism, with no
indication of ever having begun to exist;
and Dr. Wallace’s teleological plea for a
guiding intelligence would be as illogical
as we have seen that argument to be.
This new discovery would greatly impress
(because it would greatly unsettle) the
1 The book he announces is not published as
I write, so that I follow the two articles he wrote
in the Fortnightly Review (March and Sep
tember, 1903).
imagination, but would have no philo
sophical significance. Dr. Wallace says
we could no longer attribute the appear
ance of life to chance ; but we do not
attribute it now to “chance.”
We
attribute it to a mechanism which is not
erratic, but fixed, in its action. Setting
aside the imagination and the emotions,
there is no more philosophic significance
in the fact of the materials and conditions
of life being found in just one cosmic
body than in a million. Dr. Wallace
seem(> to make much of the “ re markable: coincidence” of these curious
privileges of our planet with the actual
appearance of life on it. Most people
will think there would be some reason
to use the word remarkable if the con
ditions were here and the life was not
forthcoming.
There is no religious
significance in all that Dr. Wallace urges.
But it is- in direct opposition to much
that we have established in the earlier
stages of .Haeckel’s position, and we
must examine the evidence adduced in
support of it. If it is true, Monism can
assimilate, it without strain. We shall
see that it is not only not proved, but
the attempt to prove it only shows again
the correctness of even Haeckel’s minor
positions, r
It is, naturally, to astronomy that Dr.
Wallace turns for evidence. He is not
an expert, in that science, but, of course,
every philosophic thinker must borrow
material from many different sciences.
The truth is, however, that no sooner
were Dr. Wallace’s views published than
there was immediately a loud and unani
mous condemnation of them on the part
of astronomers. The astronomers of
France and Germany were frankly cynical
about, them, two of the leading French
astronomers writing to combat them in
Knowledge. Our chief English astrono
mers, of all schools, at once repudiated
the alleged evidence. Professor Turner,
the Savilian Professor of Astronomy at
Oxford, said that Dr. Wallace had “ not
suggested, anything new which was in
the least likely to be true. He seems to
me to have unconsciously got his facts
�THE POSITION OF DR. A. R. WALLACE
distorted, and to indicate practically
nothing wherewith to link them to his
conclusion.” Dr. Maunder pronounced
the new theory “a myth,” and was not
sure if Dr. Wallace intended the article
to be taken as “a serious one.” A
number of other astronomers joined in
the discussion, and, apart from one or
two details in his evidence,,not a single
expert undertook to defend him. But
we must examine his several positions in
succession, so as to bring out once more
the fact that Haeckel is supported by
the most recent science.
The first point, and the most interest
ing for our purpose, is the contention
that the new astronomy discovers the
universe to have a d.efinite limit. We
have urged that Haeckel was in harmony
with the evidence when he spoke of the
universe as “ infinite,” so that here is a
clear contradiction. It need not be said
that the validity of Monism is not at
stake in the matter. Whether the uni
verse is limited or unlimited, it remains
a Monistic universe. The question is
whether Haeckel has misread the evi
dence of astronomy on this incidental
question of limit or no limit. It is well
to remember that “ infinity ” is a nega
tive idea. It merely denies that there is
a limit to the scheme of things. What
we have to see, then, is whether the most
recent investigations of astronomy point
to the existence of such a limit or not.
The evidence for a limit on which Dr.
Wallace lays most stress is, instead of
being a study in “ the new astronomy,”
a very old and threadbare fallacy.
Flammarion says1 it was “ the subject of
long and learned discussions during the
course of the eighteenth century and up
to the middle of the nineteenth,” and he
adds that “ it would not be difficult to
settle it to-day.” The argument is that
if the number of luminous stars were
infinite the sky would be at night as
bright as it is at noonday. The infinite
number would compensate for the dis
tance. But the actual star-light is only
1 Knowledge, June, 1903.
103
about one-fortieth the light of themoon,
and that is only a five-thousandth of the
intensity of the light of the sun. Dr.
Wallace has taken this specious calcula
tion from Professor Newcomb, but has,
as Dr. Maunder points out, omitted two
conditions which Newcomb carefully
gives, and which make the speculation
totally inapplicable to the actual uni
verse. Newcomb’s calculation assumed
that no star-light was lost in transmission,
and that “ every region of space of some
great but finite extent is, on the average,
occupied by at least one star.” Neither
of these conditions is found in our uni
verse. Light is absorbed in its passage
to us; and the stars are distributed with
nothing approaching the uniformity
which the speculation demands. The
second point needs no proof.
The
irregular structure of our stellar system
is familiar enough; and there is not the
slightest scientific difficulty about sup
posing that other stellar worlds may be
separated from ours by immeasurable
deserts of space. As to the absorption
of light, a number of causes are pointed
out. In the first place, we now know that
there are dark as well as luminous stars.
No astronomer supposes that these are
less numerous than the light stars. Sir
Robert Ball thinks they are so much
more numerous that to count the stars
by the light and visible spheres would be
like estimating the number of horse
shoes in England by the number of
those which are red-hot at a given
moment. These dark stars must inter
cept the light of their incandescent
fellows.1 Dr. Maunder says that if we
take them as a basis of our calculation
1 In his second article Dr. Wallace replies
that Mr. Monckhas shown that, even if the dark
stars were 150,000 times more numerous than
the light ones, the sky would, if these were in
finite, be as bright as moonlight. Once more
Dr. Wallace omits a condition stipulated by his
authority, who says this would be so- if they
“were distributed in anything approaching a
similar density.” For that we have no assurance
whatever. Moreover, Dr. Wallace almost ignore
the other and more important sources of absorp
tion.
�104
THE POSITION OF' DR. A. R. WALLACE
we could prove that “we are shut in by
a veil wnich no light from an infinite
distance could pierce.”
But in addition to these incalculable
dark stars there are other sources of
absorption. The astronomer to whom
Dr. Wallace appeals, Mr. Monck, holds
that ether itself absorbs light. At any
rate we know that space is full of cosmic
dust—meteorites, etc.—and that this
must be an important source of ab
sorption. Mr. Monck says that, “ if
sufficiently remote, the star would thus
for all practical purposes be blotted out.”
And Sir N. Lockyer also emphasises this
factor. Moreover, we have just learned
a further source. Before Newcomb’s
latest work was published, in February,
1901, a new cosmic element was dis
covered in the shape of a dark nebula.
Certain peculiarities of a new star led to
the discovery that it was surrounded by
a nebula that reflected its light. Thus,
we have the presence in space of another
and powerful screen in the shape of dark
nebulae, the number and distribution of
which we are unable to conjecture. Our
universe is something infinitely removed
from that theoretical system to which
Professor Newcomb’s calculations might
apply. Ihus, once more, does the very
latest science come to our assistance.
We may add that, even apart from the
absorption of light and the irregular dis
tribution of the stars, the calculation is
enfeebled by another possibility. We
have no proof that ether is continuous
throughout infinite space. There may
be several galaxies or stellar systems,
unconnected by ether, so that one would
not be visible to another. Assuming
that (according to a calculation of Lord
Kelvin’s) there are a thousand million
stars in our system, “there may be,”
says Flammarion, “ a second thousand
beyond an immense void, or a third, or
fourth or more.” And, finally, Professor
Pickering has shown that, even with a
continuous infinite ether, our present
star-light is quite consistent with the
existence of an infinite number of
luminous stars, “ if the distance between
the stars becomes (on the average)
greater the farther we go from the solar
system,” if we assume this to be central.
Thus the most emphatic of Dr.
Wallace s proofs has been absolutely
riddled by expert astronomical opinion.
It is “ founded,” says Dr. Maunder, “ on
a careless reading of Professor New
comb s book,” and cannot be sustained
for a moment.1 Nor is his other line of
argument more capable of defence. He
urges that, although up to a certain point
an increase in the power of the telescope
reveals new worlds in greater number,
this increase is not sustained in the case
of our largest telescopes; and, in the
case of photographs of the stars, an
exposure beyond three or four hours does
not bring us into touch with an increas
ing number of worlds. From this he
would infer that the powerful instru
ments we use to-day have exhausted the
universe and brought us to its extremities.
If the number of stars were infinite, an
increase of power or exposure should
always reveal new worlds. Once more,
Dr. Wallace has drawn his conclusion
too precipitately. In the first place, as I
said, there is the possibility of other
systems being cut off from ours by
empty space. But there is a simpler
and readier answer to his argument. The
fact to which he appeals—in so far as it
is fact; a study of the long-exposure
photographs of Dr. Isaacs by no means
sustains it 2—really means that we are
approaching the limit of the effective
range of the telescope, not the limit of
objective reality. Every increase in the
aperture of a refracting telescope means
1 Nor is Professor Newcomb’s book itself above
dispute, great as is the authority of the writer.
Mr. R. A. Gregory, reviewing it in Nature
(March, 1902), says that “ the outlook described
is not only limited, but imperfect,” and points
out a number of errors in it.
2 In his second article Dr. Wallace appeals to
these photographs, but makes it clear that he
has in mind photographs of nebulae and star
clusters. It is obvious that there must be a limit
to the number of stars in a given cluster or
nebula; but the eight-hour exposure photo
graphs of other parts of the heavens read
differently.
�105
THE POSITION OF DR. A. R. WALLACE
an increase in the absorption of light by
the lens itself. We are, Dr. Maunder
says, approaching the limit beyond which
the absorption will neutralise the advan
tage of a large objective. So in the case
of stellar photography, it is only when
we deal with “ medium luminosities ”
that a longer exposure avails. Thus Dr.
Wallace not only exaggerates the fact—
Mr. Monck, for instance, speaks of
“ the constant detection of additional
stars by more powerful instruments ”—
but he misinterprets its significance. He
has not, says M. Moye, “brought any
convincing proof against the universe
being infinite.”
“ Space cannot be
otherwise than infinite,” says M. Flammarion; a limit to either space or time
is unthinkable. The latest researches
of astronomers bring us no nearer than
ever to a limit of the material universe.
Dr. Wallace’s second point, that our
planet occupies a significant central
position in the universe, collapses of
itself when he fails to prove that that
universe is finite. There is no centre
in infinity. But, as Dr. Wallace has
committed the radical error of “ reason
ing from the area we see to the infinite,”
it is at least interesting to examine how
far our sun may be described as occupy
ing a central position in the vast stellar
combination we call the Milky Way.
Now, it has long been obvious that our
sun is roughly in the centre of this huge
system. We have only to glance at the
great belt of light the system forms around
us in the heavens to see this.
But
astronomers once more totally reject the
expression of this fact which Dr. Wallace
presents.
The system is so irregular
in structure that we could not with pro
priety assign a definite centre to it if our
knowledge were greater than it is. You
may talk of the centre of a bowl, says
Professor Turner, but you cannot talk of
the centre of a saucepan ; and there is
a projection of the system visible in the
southern heavens which answers to the
“handle” in this figure. Flammarion
believes there are clusters in the heavens
that do not belong to our system at all.
Moreover, even if we consent to speak
of a “ centre ” of this irregular structure,
with its clefts and projections, it is wholly
inaccurate to say that our sun is awarded
that position by astronomy. Mr. Monck
doubts “ if any astronomer could go
within one thousand light years of the
centre of the star system as at present
known ” ; that is to say, in non-technical
language, no astronomer would venture
to assign a centre within the broad limit
of 6000 billion miles ! Other astronomers
think it clear that we are nearer one side
of the system than its opposite, and
point out that if the motion of our sun
(about ten miles a second) is in a curve
determined by gravitation (as it surely is)
round the centre of gravity of the solar
system, it must be at an enormous dis
tance from that centre, as we can learn
from the analogy of motion in a globular
cluster.
All agree that we have no
greater right to consider ourselves in a
central position than are fifty other suns,
the nearest of which is twenty-five billion
miles away from us.
Thus Dr. Wallace has once more
considerably strained the evidence in
order to vindicate a central position for us.
But there is a further consideration
which must be taken into account.
Our sun is calculated by astronomers to
be travelling through space at about ten
miles per second. Dr. Wallace seeks to
enfeeble this doctrine of astronomy,
when it is turned against him, by urging
that the motion is relative; it may be
the stars that move while we remain
stationary. That is to say, he would
suggest an anomalous character for our
sun without a shadow of proof and
in direct opposition to the law of gravita
tion, which he himself invokes at other
times. The idea of a vast central sun,
round which all the stars in the Milky
Way would revolve, as planets do round
a sun, has been long since rejected by
astronomers. Its mass would have to
be incalculable; and the mass of our
sun is small compared with that of its
measurable neighbours. To save itself
) _ from being sucked in (or impelled
H
�106
THE POSITION OF DR. A. R. WALLACE
towards) its gigantic double and triple
neighbours it must move. It is probable
that it follows a curved path round the
common centre of gravity of our system
(not a central mass). In any case the
curve of its path is so great that
astronomers can as yet detect no curve
at all. It follows that, if to-day we
happen to occupy a central position, it is
only a temporary occupation. Many of
Dr. Wallace’s critics argued on the sup
position that our path lay in a straight
line through the universe, but others
pointed out the probable curve, so that
Dr. Wallace does not escape the point
by rejecting rectilinear motion. He had
argued that the special advantages which
this supposed central position gave to
our sun had been enjoyed by it during
the whole period of the evolution of
life. Astronomy wholly discredits that
assumption even when we bear in mind
all that he urges as to the relativity of
cosmic movements.
Let us next examine the advantages
which our planet is supposed by Dr.
Wallace to possess in the way of habita
bility. The conditions of life which he
enumerates are the usual conditions of a
certain temperature (say, between o° C.
and 75° C.), a circulation of water, and
an atmosphere of proper density and
extent to effect this. Our own distance
from the sun, with an atmosphere and
tidal movements to equalise the distri
bution of heat and cold, ensures a
moderate temperature. Our deep, per
manent oceans hold a supply of water,
which is admirably circulated by the
heat of the sun, controlled by the atmo
sphere, and assisted by the dust which
our deserts and volcanoes largely con
tribute.. Thus we have, he thinks, in
the position of our planet, its distribution
of land and water, its atmosphere, its
satellite, and its physical features, a com
bination of favourable circumstances
that is not likely to be found elsewhere,
The distance of the other planets from
the sun is either too great or too little.
Atmosphere is largely determined by
mass, and so Mars is in this respect dis
qualified. Venus has no moon, and
this “ may alone render it quite incapable
of developing high forms of life.” We
know, he says, with “ almost complete
certainty” that this combination of
favourable conditions is not found on
any other.planet in our solar system.
To this series of affirmations the
expert astronomical critics oppose a very
decided series of negatives. “In our
solar system,” says Flammarion, “this
little earth has not obtained any special
privileges from Nature.” M. Moye re
gards our earth and sun as “ very or
dinary orbs, having no special character
istics, and as no more suitable for life
than innumerable other suns and
planets.” Mr. Mo.nck has “sufficient
faith in the principle of evolution to
think that man might accommodate
himself to the conditions of life on
almost any of the planets, provided that
the change were sufficiently gradual, and
a sufficient time were allowed to elapse ”
It is true that Miss Clerke says, “ Dr.
Wallace’s contention, that our earth is
unique as being the abode of intellectual
life, corresponds in a measure with the
recent trend of astronomical research.”
Miss Clerke, it is not impertinent to
observe, approaches the subject with the
same prejudice as Dr. Wallace about the
uniqueness of man, but the phrase “ in
a measure ” saves the passage from in
accuracy.; and she later makes an ex
ception in favour of Mars. But the
whole, idea of seeking identical condi
tions in other planets is erroneous. “ To
limit the work of Nature to the sphere of
our knowledge is,” says Flammarion,
“to reason with singular childishness.”
They are of the same material as earth,
and have been evolved by the same
forces; there is likely to be a general
likeness of features, and that is enough
for our purpose, when we remember the
infinite adaptability of the life force.
M. Moye examines in detail the condi
tions Dr. Wallace lays down, and points
out many errors. To say that Mars is
disqualified on account of its smaller
mass than the earth is “ a purely
�THE POSITION OF DR. A. R. WALLACE
gratuitous assumption.” Aqueous va
pour has been detected by the spectro
scope in the atmospheres of at least
Venus and Jupiter. Tidal motion is
caused by the sun as well as the moon,
and may be so caused in Venus ; nor is
it essential to life. “ The distance from
the sun to the earth in the general, plan
of Our solar system is not peculiar or
extraordinary in any way.”
While,
as to deserts, each of the other planets
must, on Wallace’s theory, be one
vast desert; nor have we any ground
for thinking that deep, permanent
oceans are a peculiar feature of our
planet.
It would, of course, be no more than
an interesting discovery, of no grave
consequence to Monism, if our planet
were proved to be the only habitable
body in our solar system; but astronomers
utterly discountenance-the idea. “Life
is universal and eternal,” says Flammarion, almost in the words of Haeckel.
“ Yesterday the moon, to-day the earth,
to-morrow Jupiter . . . Let us open the
eyes of our understanding, and. let us
look beyond ourselves in the infinite
expanse at life and intelligence in all its
degrees in endless evolution.”
Professor Turner points out that Dr.
Wallace has completely failed to show,
after all his laborious proof of our central
position, that this would give our earth
any advantage in the way of habitability.
He says that Dr. Wallace, “with the
deftness of a conjurer,” has substituted
for this question a discussion of the
impossibility of there being life at the con
fines of the universe. It is true that Dr.
Wallace has since admitted that he had
no proof to offer at the time, but will
present one in his forthcoming work.
However, we may profitably close with a
glance at his attempt to prove that, life
is impossible towards the imagined
limits of our system. Even his fellow
io7
spiritualist, Miss A. Clerke, protests that
“ it cannot be reasonably supposed that
the conditions of vitality deteriorate with
remoteness from the centre ; and Dr.
Wallace has been forced to admit that
the reasons he suggested were ill-con
sidered and erroneous. He surmised
that gravitation might be less at the
verge of the system; which is not only
“ a pure assumption,” but is opposed by
our knowledge of the most distant
double stars. He compares the move
ments of the stars with the molecules of
a gas, and is eventually compelled to
acknowledge that “ there is probably no
justification for the idea.” And he quite
gratuitously supposes that. the action of
electric and similar rays is different at
the edge of our stellar system than it is
elsewhere.
■
We may conclude, then, that Dr.
Wallace’s excursion into astronomy has
been singularly and painfully disastrous.
In general and in detail his theory is
shattered to fragments by the criticisms
of all the experts who join in the discus
sion. The idea of man’s spiritual unique
ness obtains no support whatever from
the great cosmic investigations of ‘ the
new astronomy.” On the contrary, the
most recent discoveries and speculations
confirm the “ cosmological perspective
which Haeckel urges in his Riddle of the
Universe. We have no ground in
scientific evidence for assigning limits of
time or space to the material universe,
we have no ground for believing that
man is a unique outcome of natural
evolution, and that “ the supreme end
and purpose of the vast universe was
the production and development of the
living soul in the perishable body of
man”; and we have no. ground for
thinking there is so peculiar a combina
tion of circumstances in our planet as
to force us to appeal to a Supreme
Intelligence.
�LORD KELVIN INTERVENES
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Chapter
XI
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LORD KELVIN INTERVENES
Whilst this storm of astronomical
indignation was beating about the luck
less pronouncement of Dr. A. R. Wallace,
the second intervention on behalf of
religion, of which I spoke, took place.
Once more, it is important to observe,
the intervention consisted of a declara
tion by a distinguished scientist that
some science other than his own tended
to support conventional religion by its
recent investigations. Dr. Wallace, the
naturalist, purported to speak for as
tronomy ; and we have seen what the
astronomers themselves made of his
declarations. Lord Kelvin, the most
distinguished living physicist, assured
the world that biology was coming to
recognise a field of phenomena with
which it was so incompetent to deal that
it was retreating to the old notion of a
“vital principle” and the action of
“Creative Power.” We have now to
see what our biologists had to say about
this statement of their attitude.
The circumstances of Lord Kelvin’s
pronouncement will be easily recalled.
Certain of the students of the University
College, London, have formed them
selves, or been formed, into a “ Christian
Association,” and have lately set about
“ converting ” their less religious fellows
to the belief in their particular cosmic
speculations. A series of lectures was
arranged for the spring of this year, the
Botanical Theatre of the University
College was somehow secured, and a
certain show of scientific names was
scattered over the programme. The
first lecture was by the Rev. Professor
Henslow (M.A., F.L.S., F.G.S.), and
a vote of thanks was accorded to the
lecturer by Lord Kelvin for his “ examina
tion of Darwinism.” The second lecture,
on “ The Book of Genesis,” was given by
the Dean of Canterbury, and the chair
was taken by Sir Robert Anderson
(K.C.B., LL.D.). The Rev. Professor
Margoliouth gave the third lecture, on
“The Synoptic Gospels,” and was sup
ported by a distinguished physician (Sir
Dyce Duckworth) and a military man.
The other two lectures were also given
by reverend lecturers, and were supported
by Sir T. Barlow, M.D., and Mr.
Augustine Birrell. Lord Kelvin was the
lion of the display, and his few closing
words were at once published from end
to end of England. He claimed that
“modern biologists were coming once
.more to the acceptance of something,
and that was a vital principle.” He
asked : “ Was there anything so absurd
as to believe that a number of atoms by
falling together of their own accord
could make a crystal, a sprig of moss, a
microbe, a living animal?” And he
concluded that this was an appeal to
“creative power.” On the following day
he re-affirmed his opinion, with a distinc
tion, in a letter to the Times. He wrote :
“ I desire to point out that while ‘ fortui
tous concourse of atoms ’ is not an inap
propriate description of the formation of
a crystal, it is utterly absurd in respect
to the coming into existence, or the
growth, or the continuation of the
molecular combinations presented in the
bodies of living things. Here scientific
thought is compelled to accept the idea
of Creative Power. Forty years ago I
asked Liebig, walking somewhere in the
country, if he believed that the grass
and flowers which we saw around us
grew by mere mechanical forces. He
answered, ‘No, no more than I could
believe that a book of botany describing
them could grow by mere chemical
forces.’ ”
�LORD KELVIN INTERVENES
The echo of this sturdy utterance is
still reverberating through the provinces,
soothing the anxious feelings of thou
sands of believers, and being triumph
antly quoted against the unbeliever. In
London its echo was quickly drowned in
a chorus of condemnation.
Lord
Kelvin’s letter was at once followed in
the Times by letters from three of our
most eminent experts on the subject he
had ventured to touch, as well as by
letters from Mr. W. H. Mallock, Profes
sor Karl Pearson, and Sir O. Lodge.
The three experts unanimously con
demned Lord Kelvin’s statement, as did
also Mr. Mallock and Professor Pearson ;
and even Sir O. Lodge said that “ his
wording was more appropriate to a
speech than a philosophical essay,” it
had a “subjective interest,” but he
“ would not use the phrase himself.” Sir
W. T. Thiselton-Dyer, our most dis
tinguished botanist, complained that
Lord Kelvin “ wiped out by a stroke of
the pen the whole position won for us
by Darwin,” said that the reference to a
fortuitous concourse of atoms was
“ scarcely worthy of Lord Kelvin,” and
“ denied the fact ” that “ modern biolo
gists were coming to accept the vital
principle.” Sir J. Burdon-Sanderson,
the Regius Professor of Medicine at
Oxford, while resenting the strong terms
of Sir W. T. Thiselton-Dyer’s censure of
Lord Kelvin’s personal procedure, said
that it had been demonstrated to the
satisfaction of physiologists that “ the
natural laws which had been established
in the inorganic world govern no less
absolutely the processes of animal and
plant life, thus giving the death-blow to
the previously prevalent vitalistic doctrine
that these operations of life are domi
nated by law$ which are special to them
selves.” Professor Karl Pearson was
astonished that an institution with
accredited professors in biology “ should
open its doors to irresponsible lecturers
on ‘ directivity,’ ” and said that “ if Lord
Kelvin wishes to attack Darwinism, let
him leave the field of emotional theo
logical belief and descend into the plane
109
where straightforward biological argu
ment meets like argument.”
'
Professor E. Ray Lankester, from the
side of zoology, said : “ I do not myself
know of anyone of admitted leadership
among modern biologists who is showing
signs of ‘ coming to a belief in the exist
ence of a vital principle,’ ” and that “we
biologists, knowing the paralysing in
fluence of such hypotheses in the past,
are unwilling to have anything to do
with a ‘ vital principle,’ even though
Lord Kelvin erroneously thinks we are
coming to it,” and “ we take no stock in
these mysterious entities.” Sir O. Lodge,
drawn by an allusion to his belief in
telepathy, took occasion to disclaim and
deprecate Lord Kelvin’s use of the
phrases “ creative power ” and “ fortui
tous concourse of atoms.”
With these weighty and emphatic
pronouncements from some of the ablest
biologists in this country—without. a
single line in defence of Lord Kelvin,
either by himself or by any known ex
pert—we might dismiss Lord Kelvin’s
intervention as the most unfortunate
episode of his career, and as a pitiful
failure to give the slenderest support to
the reverend lecturers of the Christian
Association. But an appeal to authori
ties is a fallacious and unsatisfactory
settlement. We shall better vindicate
the strength of Haeckel’s position by a
brief analysis of this most recent attempt
to demolish it.
Let us see, then, first what truth there
is in the statement that “ modern biolo
gists are coming once more to a firm
acceptance of the vital principle.”
This three of our most representative
biologists, Sir W. T. Thiselton-Dyer, Pro
fessor Ray Lankester, and Sir J. BurdonSanderson, flatly deny. Clearly Lord
Kelvin was guilty of the gravest impro
priety in saying that “ modern biologists
are coming,” &c., and “scientific thought
is compelled,” &c. The implication of
these phrases is obvious, and it is totally
untrue. When Professor Ray Lankester,
one of the most distinguished biologists,
tells us he does “ not know of anyone
�IIO
LORD KELVIN INTERVENES
of admitted leadership among modern
biologists” who is accepting the vital
principle, it is clear that the statement
was gravely misleading. That there is
a certain revival of vitalistic ideas is
another matter. The clergy need not
have waited for Lord Kelvin’s assurance
to that effect. In the fourteenth chapter
of the Riddle of the Universe Professor
Haeckel long since informed us of that
revival. It would not be surprising—
ironic as the circumstance would be—to
learn that Lord Kelvin obtained the grain
of fact which underlay his assertion
from Haeckel’s book. In all countries
there have been of late years a few
scientific men of secondary rank who
have urged the acceptance of something
more or less resembling the old vital
force. Professor Lionel Beale and Dr.
Mivart are well-known advocates of
“ vitality” in this country; several French
biologists still speak of the vague idee
directrice which Pasteur imagined to
control the growth of the organism; in
America, Cope and Asa Gray advocate a
form of vitalism ; in Germany it is urged
by Nageli, Bunge, Rindfieisch, Dreisch,
and Benedikt, in Italy (more or less) by
Gallardi, in Denmark by the botanist
Reinke. The ideas of these writers
differ considerably, but they agree in
holding that some directive or “domi
nant ” principle must be superadded to
the physical and chemical forces of the
organism.
We have seen in an earlier chapter
how “modern biologists” as a class,
and “ scientific thought ” as a whole,
wholly reject the vitalistic hypothesis,
and maintain that we have no reason to
go beyond ordinary natural forces. We
have seen what Professor Le Conte,
Professor Ward, Sir A. Riicker, Sir J.
Burdon-Sanderson, Professor Dewar, and
others, say of the condition of “scientific
thought.” “For the future the word
vital, as distinctive of physiological pro
cesses, might be abandoned altogether,”
said Sir J. Burdon-Sanderson, and our
recent authorities fully concur with him.
Professor Beale is one of those scientists
who would sing a joyful Nunc Dimittis
if he saw any important sign of the
revival of vitalism. But if Lord Kelvin
consults his most recent publications
he will find only a deepening of the
pessimism which Professor Beale has
expressed on the matter for the last
twenty years. In Vitality— V, published
two years ago, he tells us the very
reverse of the assurance of Lord Kelvin.
“Probably no hypotheses or doctrines
known to philosophy or science,” he
says in his preface, “have been so
generally favoured, and more persistently
forced on the public by ‘Authority,’ and
therefore widely accepted and taught by
educated and intelligent persons, than
doctrines of physical life and its origin
in non-living matter ” (p. vii); and later
he says: “Purely mechanical views of
life are again, possibly for the last time,
becoming very popular” (p. 5). Further
on he quotes Professor Dolbear as say
ing (in his Matter, Ether, and Motion)
that “ there is little reason to doubt that
when chemists shall be able to form the
substance Protoplasm it will possess all
the properties it is now known to have,
including what is called life; and one
ought not to be surprised at its announce
ment any day”; and he refers us to the
appendix of Professor Dolbear’s book
for a long list of weighty pronounce
ments in favour of the mechanical hypo
thesis. We may, therefore, dismiss once
for all the attempt to commit “ modern
biologists,” as a class, to a belief in vital
principles and creative powers as a
serious, though unintentional, misstate
ment—one that it is painful to find over
the name of Lord Kelvin.
Haeckel was perfectly right. He
awarded a larger proportion to Neo
Vitalism than any of our own biologists
(even Dr. Beale) are prepared to do, but
he rightly claimed that the mechanical
view of life was the predominant one in
biology to-day. Sir W. T. ThiseltonDyer, writing of Huxley {Nature, June
5th, 1902), said: “Huxley was firmly
imbued with what is ordinarily called a
‘ materialistic conception’ of the universe.
�LORD KELVIN INTERVENES
I think myself that this is probably a
true view.” The representation that
Haeckel is alone, or almost alone, in his
view of life is a gross and audacious misrepresentation.
And when we come to examine on its
merits this revival of vitalism—such as
it is—we find it has no promise what
ever of gaining wide scientific recogni
tion, because it rests essentially on a
familiar fallacy. The reader who wishes
to study the grounds of it may consult
Professor Beale’s various editions of his
Vitality, or Reinke’s Welt als That, or
Dreisch’s Die organischen Regulationen,
where all the evidence of the NeoVitalists is ably mastered. Happily it is
not necessary for us to cover the whole
ground of this evidence even superfi
cially. As we saw in the case of teleology,
the principle of the argument is one,
however infinite may be its applications;
and it is the principle itself that lacks
logical validity. There are, the NeoVitalist urges, scores of features of the
life of the animal or plant that the
biologist cannot explain by chemical and
physical forces ; therefore we must have
recourse to a non-mechanical or new kind
of force—an idee directrice, a “ domi
nant,” a “ vital power,” and so forth.
What these inexplicable phenomena are
we need not consider at any length;
they are such phenomena as—the pro
cesses of segmentation and differentia
tion in the growth of the embryo, the
selection of food from the blood or sur
rounding media, the replacing of tissues
or organs that have been cut away (in the
hydra, the newt, and even higher
animals), the formation by an animal of
a protective anti-toxin, the acquisition of
protective mimicry, the power of adapta
tion in organs to changes in environ
ment, and so on.
There are, every
biologist admits, scores of phenomena
which are not as yet capable of ex
planation by mechanical forces ; and the
new vitalist urges that these point to the
presence of a specific principle in the
animal or plant. “ Up to this day,”
says Professor Beale, “ no cause, no ex
in
planation, can be found, and therefore
we attribute those vital phenomena to
Power—to Power which is special and
peculiar to life only, power which we
know cannot be derived from matter.
Is it not, therefore, perfectly reasonable
to believe that all vital power has come
direct from God?”1
The reader will at once recognise the
principle of the argument. It is that
familiar sophism which has made the the
istic doctrine “ a fugitive and vagabond”
(to borrow the words of Dr. Iverach) in
scientific territory for the last century or
more. It is the sophism that Laplace
expelled from astronomy, Lyell from
geology, Darwin from phylogeny, and
that we have found desperately clinging
to every little imperfection of our scien
tific knowledge of the universe. It is a
philosophy of “ gaps.” It is the familiar
procedure of taking advantage of the
temporary imperfectness of science. It
is an argument that has been wholly
discredited by the advance of science,
sweeping it from position after position;
it is as superficial philosophically as it
is unsound in logic and prejudicial in
science. “The action of physical and
chemical forces in living bodies can
never be understood,” said Sir A. Rucker,
“ if at every difficulty and at every check
in our investigations we desist from
further attempts in the belief that the
laws of physics and chemistry have been
interfered with by an incomprehensible
vital force.” “ The revival of the vitalistic conception in physiological work,”
said the president of the physiological
section (Prof. Halliburton, M.D., F.R.S.)
at the British Association meeting of
1902, “appears to me a retrograde step.
To explain anything we are not fully
able to understand in the light of physics
and chemistry by labelling it as vital, or
something we can never hope to under. )
1 Dr. Beale’s last conclusion is not, of course^
shared by the continental Neo-Vitalists. Even
if we were forced to admit a specific vital prin
ciple, it would not “come from God” any more
than other natural forces. But the analogy with
I Lord Kelvin’s vague phraseology is noticeable.
�112
lord kelvin intervenes
stand, is a confession of ignorance, and,
what is still more harmful, a bar to
progress. ... I am hopeful that the
scientific workers of the future will
discover that this so-called vital force
is due to certain physical or chemical
properties of living matter, which have
not yet been brought into line with the
known chemical and physical laws that
operate in the inorganic world. . . .
When a scientific man says this or that
vital phenomenon cannot be explained
by the laws of chemistry and physics, and
therefore must be regulated by laws of
some other nature, he most unjustifiably
assumes that the laws of chemistry and
physics have all been discovered.” “We
think,” says Prof. Ray Lankester, “ it is
a more hopeful method to be patient
and to seek by observation of, and ex
periment with, the phenomena of growth
and development to trace the evolution
of life and of living things without
the facile and sterile hypothesis of a
vital principle.” If we accepted it,
says Weismann, “we should at once
cut ourselves off from all possible
mechanical explanation of organic
nature.”
It is very difficult to reconcile Lord
Kelvin’s present attitude with the prin
ciple he laid down in 1871, and pre
sumably still holds. . “Science,” he said,
“is bound by the everlasting law of
honour to face fearlessly every problem
which is presented to it. If a probable
solution, consistent with the ordinary
course of nature, can be found, we must
not invoke an abnormal act of Creative
Power.” Prof. Dewar reproduced this
passage in this very application in his
presidential speech of last year; and
within a few months we find Lord Kelvin
approving the attitude of those few
biologists who depart from that principle
to-day, and, impatient at the slow growth
of our knowledge, rush to the conclusion
that science must abandon this portion
of the cosmological domain to the
theologian once more. Lord Kelvin
quotes Liebig, who was not a biologist,
and who lived in an earlier scientific
period.1 But immense progress has been
made since Liebig’s day in the mechani
cal interpretation of life.2 Lord Kelvin
also would have us think that the only
alternative to the “vital principle” is “the
fortuitous concourse of atoms.” Even
Sir O. Lodge is stirred to protest against
this descent from the level of science to
the level of Christian Evidence lecturing.
We have seen that science discovers
only the work of fixed, determinate
forces, not erratic and confused agencies.
“The whole order of nature,” says Prof.
Ray Lankester, “ including living and
lifeless matter—man, animal, and gas —
is a network of mechanism.” There is
nothing “fortuitous” whatever in the
concourse of atoms.”
We have, then, to set aside the un
fortunate and undefended utterance of
Lord Kelvin, and the claims of old3 It is not a little amusing to find that this
famous German chemist, whom Lord Kelvin
introduces as a friend to Christian Associations
in England, was regarded as an atheist by similar
bodies in Germany in his own time. When
Bishop Ketteler urged the Grand-Duke of Hesse
to take restrictive measures against materialists,
the Grand-Duke pointed out that Liebig had
recently undertaken to refute them. “ Don’t
make too much of that, your highness,” said
Ketteler; “ Liebig is a materialist himself at
the bottom of his heart.” (Buchner’s Last Words
on Materialism, p. 42.)
2 Dr. Horton assures us, about Haeckel’s
carbon-theory, that “ no leading man of science
treats it seriously, and it only has its whimsical
and uncertain place in the rationalist Press which
gulls the ignorance of the public.” One wonders
what it is not possible to say from a pulpit.
Compare the words of the expert reviewer of
Professor Ver worn’s Biogen-hypothese in Nature
(February 26, 1902): “ It seems quite clear from
the results of numerous investigators that, what
ever the nature of the sequence of chemical
events, the carbohydrates are proximately the
substances that are most intimately affected.”
Let me add here also a reference to a letter from
Sir O. Lodge to Nature (December 4, 1902)
in which he points out the possibility of germs
being preserved intact in the cold of space. It
was thereupon shown, not only that Lord Kel
vin’s old hypothesis of the origin of life assumed
a new importance, but that, as W. J. Calder
said, “if it is proved that vitality can survive
for a protracted period in such circumstances,
the conclusion that it is a molecular function
seems inevitable.” The most recent experiments
of life at very low temperatures confirm this.
�LORD KELVIN INTERVENES
11.3
those laws.” Thus life becomes “ some
thing the full significance of which lies
in another scheme of things, but which
touches and interacts with the material
universe in a certain way, building its
particles into notable configurations for
a time—oak, eagle, man—and then
evaporating whence it came.”
The objections to Sir O. Lodges
theory (which seems to be not unlike
that vaguely suggested by Pasteur.) may
be well indicated by following his own
words. He will not admit that life is a
form of energy (thus rejecting both the
old Vitalist and the Monistic theories)
because “ energy can transform itself
into other forces, remaining constant in
quantity, whereas life does not transmute
itself into any form of energy, nor does
death affect the sum of energy m any
way.” The sentence is hardly consis
tent. If death has not affected the sum
of energy it must have transmuted it, for
most certainly the energies in the dead
body differ from those of the living. To
assume that the energies are the same,
but that which differs is not. energy, looks
like a begging of the question. Indeed,
it is impossible to conceive life otherwise
than as energy. We might regard the
structure as a static force in. Sir Oliver’s
sense, but there must be a living energy
in addition. The death of the animal is
like the death of the motor-car. The
energy has been transmuted, or has re
turned into the elemental forms belong
ing to the several parts of the now irre
parable structure. Then,.as a later writer
in Nature points out, it is the place and
the ambition of science to explain the
direction or determination of working
energy as well as the origin of the energy.
Sir Oliver gives the illustration of a stone
falling over the cliff; it may make a
harmless dent in the sand, or it may be
guided to the firing of a charge of
1 At the eleventh hour I discover a lengthy
dynamite. So with the passage of a pen
reference to the Riddle of the Universe in an
over paper ; it may make a series of un-,
obscure corner (p. 65) of Dr. Beale’s Vitality ■ V.,
meaning daubs (if it rolls mechanically)
so that the announcement in the I'imes was not
or it may be guided in the signing of a
wholly in vain. But as the notice does not con
tain a line of definite and tangible refutation of
treaty of war or peace. But it is in each
any statement in the Riddle I am compelled to
one of these cases the function of scien-
fashioned Vitalists like Dr. Beale1 and
Neo-Vitalists like Reinke. Our knowledge
of vital phenomena, and of chemical
and physical forces, is as yet.very imper
fect. The vitalist hypothesis supposes
that our knowledge is complete, and that
we clearly see certain features of life to
be beyond the range of mechanical
explanation.
We see ourselves how
illogical and temporary such a position
is, and we are not surprised to find the
leading biologists standing solid with
Prof. Haeckel for a mechanical interpre
tation and mechanical origin.
Sir O. Lodge, the persuasive and able
and ever courteous leader of the
Birmingham University, offers another
version of Neo-Vitalism which it is
proper to consider. In a paper which
he read to the Synthetic Society at
London on February 20 of this year
(published in Nature, April 23) he
observes that “ if guidance or control
can be admitted into the scheme by no
means short of refuting or modifying the
laws of motion, there may be. every
expectation that the attitude of scientific
men will be perennially hostile to the
idea of guidance or control.” He there
fore proposes a theory of guidance (to
apply to the divine guidance of the
world, the human will, and the vital
principle) without interference. He dis
tinguishes between force and energy—or
static and dynamic power. A column
supporting a building, or a channel guid
ing a stream, is a force, but does not
produce energy. The action of life is to
be conceived as that, “of a groove, or
slot, or channel, or guide.” “ Guidance
and control are not forms of energy,
and their superposition upon the scheme
of physics perturbs physical, and
mechanical laws no whit, though it may
profoundly affect the consequences of
forego the pleasure of dealing with it.
Bishopsgate InstitntOo
�ii4
MR. MALLOCICS OLIVE-BRANCH
tific explanation to trace the energies
which determine the line of motion as
well as to trace their origin and proper
motion. We cannot conceive of energies
being directed except by energies. In
the case of the upbuilding of an organism
it is impossible to conceive the particles
being guided to their several places, or
the energies being impelled to put them
in their several places, by something
that is not an energy. In the parallelism
which Sir Oliver suggests we can only
see “ life ” as a superfluous partner. If
the mechanical scheme is complete, as
he seems to suggest it will be, it must
contain an explanation of the direction
of energy. To say otherwise is to declare
again the inadequacy of mechanical
theory (solely because its ever-growing
material is as yet comparatively scanty)
and to court the “perennial hostility”
of men of science.
Thus the second attempt to prove that
Haeckel’s views rest on “ the science of
yesterday,” and are contradicted by the
science of to-day, fails as ignominiously
as did that of Dr. Wallace. Our leading
biologists declare emphatically that they
and their science accept the mechanical,
if not (as Sir W. T. Thiselton-Dyer says)
the materialistic view of life. This inter
pretation of life must for some time to
come leave unexplained considerable
tracts of vital phenomena. Haeckel has
never pretended that he “ has explained
everything.” But so far as our know
ledge goes, we find only ordinary natural
forces at work in the living organism,
and we should be wholly unjustified in
the present condition of science in
assuming that they are incompetent to
explain the whole of life. We gain no
thing whatever philosophically by simply
sticking the label “vital” on these
mysterious phenomena, and we are
forbidden by the elementary laws of
logic and scientific procedure to bring
in such entities as “creative power”
and “vital principles” as long as
“a solution consistent with the or
dinary course of Nature ” can be
suggested.
:
• fl!
Chapter XII
MR. MALLOCK’S OLIVE-BRANCH
The last critic of Haeckel’s position
last, that is to say, in the logical order
which it seems expedient to follow—is
the distinguished essayist, Mr. W. H.
Mallock. Professor Haeckel, it will be
remembered, intended his work to be,
not only a comprehensive statement of
his views, but a summary of the issues
of the. many conflicts between religion
and science in which he had played so
conspicuous a part during the nineteenth
century. Mr. Mallock, declaring that
neither theologian nor scientist was
competent to analyse those issues quite
impartially, undertook, as a neutral
observer, to balance the controversial
ledgers of the departed century on his
own account. It may be granted that
Mr. Mallock occupies a position of some
advantage for the discharge of this
function. . He is adequately informed,
philosophic in temper, and neutral in
the sense that he clearly does not
believe in theology, yet strongly opposes
the final conclusions of the scientists.
To use an expressive colloquial phrase,
�MR. MALLOCK'S OLIVE-BRANCH
he has sat on the fence throughout the
last forty years, and shot his sharp
criticisms at the combatants on both
sides with a certain impartiality. . But
those who are acquainted with his at
tractive writings know that he has really
only riddled the theologians for their
ultimate advantage ; whilst he has at
tacked the Agnostics in the interest of
religion. However, an analysis of his
last publication, Religion as a Credible
Doctrine, will serve not only to clear up
the popular mystery about his position,
but to show us an interesting plea for
the retention of theology, even admitting
that we have fully established the theses
of the preceding chapter.
Mr. Mallock emphatically rejects the
idea of hampering scientists on their
own territory, and he fully admits that
H the whole cosmological domain ” is
their territory. ? He would have no
sympathy with efforts, like those of
Dr. Wallace and Lord Kelvin, to restrict
the ambition of the mechanical theory,
Or to try to wrest some shred of evi
dence for theism out of the teaching of
science. We shall see that he falls away
from his ideal here and there, but in his
deliberate mood he fully accepts the
conclusion that, on scientific and philo
sophic evidence, “the whole world”—
in the words of Huxley—“living and
non-living, is the result of the mutual
interaction, according to definite laws,
of the powers possessed' by the mole
cules of which the primitive nebulosity
was composed.” I have, in fact, freely
drawn upon Mr. Mallock s excellent
book for support in the vindication of
Professor Haeckel. He takes the Riddle
of the Universe as the finest summary of
the scientific hostility to religion. He
accepts Haeckel’s statement that the
three essential propositions in religion
are the belief in a personal God, the
liberty of the will, and the immortality
of the soul; and he assures Haeckel’s
critics, often in more vigorous language
than Haeckel presumes to use, that their
arguments are utterly fruitless and their
positions untenable.
After devoting
115
eight chapters to the struggle over these
doctrines, he concludes (p. 217): “The
entire intellectual scheme of religion—
the doctrines of immortality, of freedom,
and a God who is, in his relation to our
selves, separable from this [cosmic]
process—is not only a system which is
unsupported by any single scientific fact,
but is also a system for which, amongst
the facts of science, it is utterly im
possible for the intellect to find a place.
Yet Mr. Mallock has announced that he
is going to prove that these fundamental
doctrines of religion are “worthy of a
reasonable man’s acceptance.” How
will he accomplish this?
In the first place he does not intend
to evade the difficulties by an appeal to
the “ religious feelings ” or “ religious
instinct
at all events, not primarily ;
he is going to appeal to us “ as perfectly
reasonable beings.” He quite realises
that the growing habit of taking refuge
in the emotions is little more sensible
than the fabled practice of the ostrich.
He devotes three chapters to a closely
reasoned plea for the retention of the
doctrines, as to which he has so far
cordially endorsed Haeckel’s arguments.
Before entering on a careful analysis of
his reasoning I will state his.argument as
concisely as is compatible with justice to
it. These beliefs are to be retained on
the ground of their moral and spiritual
value to humanity. They are the chief
source of all higher aspiration and
effort, and are essential for the mainte
nance of our mental, moral, and social
progress. So far the argument is more
familiar than Mr. Mallock imagines.
The peculiarity of his position is that he
says they may be true, although they are
flatly and most properly contradicted by
science.
And he justifies this by
attempting to show that our accepted
doctrines, even in science, freely contra
dict each other, and that such contradic
tion is not at all an indication of falsity.
We may, and must, accept all that
Haeckel says, and then add to it all that
Dr. Horton says, without his “ worthless
and hopeless arguments.”
■!•.<
�MR. MALLOCK'S OLIVE-BRANCH
In an age of scepticism like ours such
peculiar evasions of the advancing
criticism are not infrequent.
Mr.
Balfour’s famous attempt to show the
rest of the world an escape from Ag
nosticism is still fresh in the memory,
though already too antiquated to detain
us. The later thoughts of G. J. Romanes
we will consider presently, as they are
much quoted in opposition to Haeckel.
Other singular attempts at pacification,
of a less distinguished order, are met
almost monthly. There is somehow a
conviction abroad that Agnostics are
languishing for some rehabilitation of
their old beliefs, or that humanity at
large always excluding the peace
makers themselves—cannot maintain
its advance without religious belief.
Hence arises the singular spectacle of
sceptical writers constructing elaborate
defences of the conventional beliefs,
which they do not share. The reception
of Mr. Mallock’s book hardly suggests
the belief that his olive-branch will be
respected by either group of combatants ;
but its ability and interest, and its indi
cation of a possible ground for religion
when all we have advanced has been
fully established, compel us to examine
it with respect.
Mr. Mallock begins with his proof
that all our knowledge ends in contradic
tions when we analyse it, so that we
may reconcile ourselves to Haeckel’s
disproofs. He first shows this in the
teaching of theology, where, as he
observes, the Monist will cordially agree
with him. But he goes on to say that
Haeckel’s “substance” is no less con
tradictory, yet we accept it. The ele
mentary substance (ether or prothyl)
either consists of minute separate par
ticles, or it is continuous. If ether
consists of disjointed atoms, separated
by empty spaces, all action must be an
“action at a distance,” which science
rejects as absurd and impossible. If
ether is continuous, yet the atoms of
ponderable matter arise from it by con
densation, then we are postulating
condensation and rarefaction in a sub
stance which has no particles to be
pushed closer together or thrust wider
asunder. But the elementary substance
must be either one or the other, so that
in either case we accept a contradictory
proposition. Further, when we say that
the nebula with its varied elements was
evolved out of a homogeneous ether by
a rigidly determined process, we are at
once saying the ether was simple and
homogeneous, yet was of so specific a
structure as to grow into an elaborately
varied cosmos. Again, we say time is
infinite, yet an addition is made to
it every moment; and we say space
is infinite, yet it is divisible, and each
part must be infinite (and so equal
to the whole), or else we make up infinity
from a finite number of finite quantities.
Thus our scientific doctrines hold innu
merable contradictions. Therefore, the
contradiction between religious and
scientific teaching need not deter us
from accepting both.
Now, in the first of these illustrations
Mr. Mallock has devised a fictitious
contradiction ; in the second he is fol
lowing the vulgar fashion of building an
argument on the imperfect condition of
scientific knowledge; and in the third he
is giving us some familiar metaphysical
quibbling. Dr. Haeckel inserted in his
work the theory of ether which was in
favour amongst physicists at the time he
wrote. Physics is changing yearly as to
such theories; all is as yet tentative and
provisional. But this is certain ; physi
cists will never adopt any theory of
matter that is self-contradictory. If the
pyknotic theory, or the vortex-theory, or
the strain-theory, of the atom reveals any
such contradiction, it has no chance of
acceptance. It is thus quite false to say
we here complacently accept contradic
tories. It is, moreover, clear that Mr.
Mallock’s dilemma is “lame in one
horn,” at least. It supposes that these
discrete particles are at rest. Science
on the contrary supposes them to be
eternally in motion, so that the empty
space only facilitates their impact and
mutual interaction. In the second case,
�MR. MALLOCK'S OLIVE-BRANCH
Mr. Mallock is, as I said, merely drawing
our attention to the acknowledged fact
that we have as yet nothing more than
vague conjectures about the origin of
atoms ; but we embrace no contradic
tion whatever, and no theory will be
received that contains such.
The
prothyl is conceived by scientists (apart
from philosophers) to be just as simple
and homogeneous as the scientific
evidence will allow it to be. There is
no disposition whatever to credit it
with contradictory attributes.
In the
third case, Mr. Mallock is serving up to
us metaphysical arguments, for theism
from those very theologians whose
methods he has so severely denounced.
Almost any recent Catholic apologist
gives these subtleties of word-play. The
contradiction is fictitious. When we say
that, as far as the astronomic evidence
goes, the universe is unlimited, we . do
not expose ourselves to this metaphysical
antithesis of finite and infinite. Both
as to space and time (in the concrete)
the argument makes us say far more
than we do.
Mr. Mallock thus entirely fails to
show that we accept contradictory
propositions as true. On the contrary,
in scientific procedure the emergence of
a contradiction is at once greeted as an
indication of falseness, and is forthwith
acted upon by the rejection of one of
the contradictory theses. The ground
work and most essential and novel part
of his structure of reasoning is invalid.
He proceeds, however, to show (ch. xii)
that science is not the only source, or
the only test, of our convictions. There
are as good grounds for accepting these
particular contradictions as for admitting
those of science.
It is at once apparent that we have in
fact a large number of convictions which it
is not the function of science to establish
or examine. Our comparative judgment
of conduct, of beauty, of spiritual values
generally, is not tested by standards that
the scientific reason sets up. Our belief
in “ the sanctity of human life ” does not
rest on scientific grounds; and the
117
influence of religious ideas—the truth of
which science criticises—is also a
subject for non-scientific . judgment.
We might, indeed, complain at once
that Mr. Mallock has here com
pletely lost his accustomed lucidity.
If he means by “ science ” the dis
ciplines
which
to-day bear
that
name, it is true that many of our
judgments lie outside them. But what
will lie outside the range of the
science of to-morrow it would be
difficult to say. The science of aesthe
tics and the science of ethics are
obviously creeping over much of that
territory which Mr. Mallock holds to be
extra-scientific. As a matter of fact the
very question he is leading us to—the
question of the mental and moral
influence of religious ideas—is mainly a
question for ethics and sociology to
determine by objective and scientific
standards. If Mr. Mallock means that
the ethical standard is not scientifically
determinable, he is begging an important
question. However, let us hasten to
examine the vital part of his eleventh
chapter.
He says that it “ has never occurred
to Haeckel ” to ask himself whether the
ethic of Christianity, which he accepts,
may not chance to be inseparable from
its dogmas. In face of the nineteenth
chapter of the Riddle this is a hard
saying. Haeckel cuts away most of the
ethic which is at all peculiar to
Christianity, and finds that the valuable
remainder is a purely humanitarian ethic.
We have already seen this. But Mr.
Mallock is thinking of that great
problem of his whole career—the
problem of free will or determinism—
and he holds emphatically that on
Haeckel’s principles morality is abso
lutely impossible. Suppose, he says,
that we in theory set up a world with
a general belief in the determinism of
the will. From such a world all moral
condemnation and all moral . appre
ciation must disappear ; in it vice and
virtue are indistinguishable ; men and
women are no more responsible for
�118
MR. MALLOCK'S OLIVE-BRANCH
their characteristics than the apple is
for its colour or shape. Now one of
the most effective parts of Mr. Mallock’s
book is that in which he shows that
scientific determinism is absolutely
irresistible. The contradiction he would
ask us to accept is therefore the
sharpest conceivable.
He asks us
to accept
this
contradiction—this
irrefutable proof that the will is not
free and this equally irrefutable proof
that it must be free—on account of the
moral importance of the belief in
freedom. On the same ground we are
to admit the beliefs in God and immor
tality which the scientific evidence has
wholly disproved; the effect of our
rejecting them would be “a shrinkage
in the importance, interest, and signifi
cance which we are able to attribute to
human life in general, and to the part
played in it by ourselves in particular;
and with the growth of scientific know
ledge, and the habit of completely
assimilating it, the shrinkage would
become more marked, and its moral
results more desolating.” . Hence, since
we are prepared in other cases to
swallow contradictories, we must yield
to these grave reasons and embrace the
contradictory theses of science and
religion.
The second fallacy in Mr. Mallock’s
procedure seems to be worse than the
first. Let us grant, for argument’s sake,
that these religious beliefs had all the
efficacy Mr. Mallock claims for them
whilst they were uncontradicted by
science and philosophy, were sincerely
and serenely held, and were thought to
be based on tangible cosmic evidence.
It is surely a monstrous fallacy to suppose
they will retain that power when their
position is so seriously changed; when
men are assured that, in Mr. Mallock’s
own words, “ it is utterly impossible for
the intellect to find a place for them
amongst the facts of science.” We are,
in fact, invited to regard these beliefs as
efficacious because they are really held,
and then to hold them because they are
efficacious. To say that these considera
tions—if they are correct—should dis
suade us from promulgating or defending
Haeckel’s views is an arguable, though a
mistaken, position.
But Mr. Mallock
has just concluded one of the most
vigorous and skilful attacks on the
evidence for these doctrines that has
appeared of late years. Does he imagine
that people who read that attack will be
disposed to cling to these beliefs because
it would be morally beneficial to hold
them ? that people are so simple as to
accept moral efficacy as the guarantee of
the truth of doctrines which can only be
morally efficacious when they are believed
to be true ? It reminds one of the
American critic who said that J. S. Mill
negotiated a certain difficulty by getting
under himself and carrying himself across.
Surely the simplest and the only possible
procedure is to fasten on this very im
portance of moral idealism as a humani
tarian gospel, and to show the world
that it will taste a very real hell, here on
earth, if it allows moral culture to be
swept away along with the cosmic specu
lations with which it has so long been
associated.
The difficulty about the
freedom of the will may turn out to be
largely due to our slavery to language.
That which formerly went by the name
of freedom is disproved by science. But
the fact remains—and it is a scientific, a
psychological, fact—that we are con
scious of being able to influence our
character and our actions, and so
we cannot deny our responsibility
within limits.
It is for ethics and
psychology to determine those limits
and to re-adjust our terms and con
ceptions.
I have only granted for the sake of
the argument that these doctrines have
all that moral importance which Mr.
Mallock claims for them. He says this
is clear from the attempts of Agnostic
thinkers to find a substitute for them.
Their ethical reasoning is irreproachable,
but they recognise that they must also
make “an appeal to the moral and
spiritual imagination of the individual.”
Prof. Huxley does this with a plea for
�MR. MALLOCPCS OLIVE-BRANCH
■lreverence and love for the ethical ideal,”
and Mr. Spencer urges reverence for
the Unknowable and recognition of
our unity with it. Mr. Mallock is very
scornful about both, and he may be right
that reverence of this cosmic order will
pass away with the passing of theology.
Haeckel has not appealed to such rever
ence, so that he may contemplate its
disappearance without undue concern.
He has urged us to find the practical
ground for moral culture in the future in
the recognition of its value to humanity.
No one recognises this value more clearly
than Mr. Mallock. It is the chief support
of his whole argument. The loss of the
higher aspiration would, he says, spell
ruin to a nation, and the “ belief in
human nature is as essential to civilisation
as is a good circulation to the healthy
body.” Now, if all this is true, as it is,
it seems perfectly obvious that, when
men have got over the confusion and
reaction caused by the decay of ethical
theology, they will turn to moral culture
for its own sake. It is inconceivable
how a subtle thinker, who believes men
are capable of continuing to worship
God and dream of immortality because
it is useful to do so, though contradicted
by the most solid evidence, cannot see
the possibility of setting up moral culture
on a sociological base. Confucians have
done it for ages, and with quite as great
success, to say the least, as Christianity.
The bulk of cultured people, like Mr.
Mallock, have done so for several
generations.
Theoretically, we should expect that
the transition from a divine to a humani
tarian ethic will be attended with a
certain amount of moral disorder. But
as a fact, the change is taking place
without any such disorder. The working
class, which is irreligious to the extent of
nine-tenths to-day, is no worse than it was
a century or five centuries ago; it is, in fact,
far nearer to “a belief in human nature.”
The middle-class, still largely religious,
is hardly likely to deteriorate. The
educated class—to ignore the money-line
—is almost wholly without those beliefs
119
in a personal God and personal im
mortality which Mr. Mallock thinks
essential, yet will compare very favour
ably with its class in almost any former
age. In a word, if we consult the facts
of ‘life instead of theory, we find no
ground for supposing that moral culture
—not to speak of intellectual, artistic,
and social aspiration—is bound up with
certain “cosmic speculations.” Under
neath all the transcendental imagery
with which the Churches have clothed
morality, there has always been an in
stinctive feeling that it was a very human
affair, and this feeling asserts itself as the
theological imagery passes away. There
will be changes, of course. The proud in
tolerance and arrogance of the old moral
ists, with the horrible persecutions they
inspired, have gone for ever; the ascetic
contempt of “the flesh” is going and
must wholly disappear; humility and
meekness have no sociological value;
virginity is a matter of taste, but marriage
is a more virtuous condition; the stress
on chastity (in a transcendental sense)
has led to an appalling amount of real
immorality in every age, because few
were prepared to respect it; the old
classification of virtues and vices, as so
many rigid moral boxes to put other
people’s conduct in, must go; the old
antithesis of selfishness and altruism
will be replaced by an organic conception
of man’s relation to his fellows; the
relation of the sexes will be subject only
to a purely rational ethic, grounded on
justice, not sentiment, and so there may
be at length some hope of putting an
end to hypocrisy and vice. When
writers like Mr. Wells, or Mr. G. B.
Shaw, or Mr. Karl Pearson, talk of the
disappearance of ethics, they are thinking,
of one or other of these changes. But.
ethics will only gain by such changes.
“ Many are called, but few are chosen,”
said the founder of Christianity. It was
a profound anticipation of the influence
of Christian morality throughout. the
ages. Apart from certain special periods,
apart from the relatively small areas that
could be reached. by a St. Bernard, or a;
�120
MR. MALLOCK'S OLIVE-BRANCH
St. Francis, Christian morality has been
a stupendous failure. It was too trans
cendental, too false to the natural moral
sense of the ordinary individual, to be
otherwise. The cultivation of a kindly and
humane disposition, of a sense of justice
and honour, of tolerance and broad
mindedness, of concern for health of
body and mind, of temperance and self
control, of honesty and truthfulness, is
what humanity really needs; and all this
it can and will have for its own inherent
worth.
Thus Mr. Mallock has failed to prove
that we anywhere complacently accept
contradictions in our beliefs; and that,
even if we did (to the utter confusion of
any notion of truth), there is any special
reason for retaining these theological
doctrines ; or that, if we did retain them
in the teeth of scientific teaching to the
contrary, they would be of the slightest
value. There are, however, one or two
confirmatory thoughts in his last chapter
which we may still consider. It follows,
he says, that our judgment deals with
two worlds, the cosmic and the moral,
the world of objective facts and the
world of subjective values. One is the
world of science, the other is reached by
some other faculty of mind. It would
be equally absurd to question the validity
of our judgment as to either. In fact,
there is, in the long run, a similarity in
the ground of judgment in both cases.
It is a mistake to suppose that in the
scientific world everything is “ proved.”
The fundamental belief, the conviction
that there is a material world at all, is
quite unprovable. If it is an inference
from our sensations, reason refuses to
ratify it. It is the outcome of “ an
original instinct”; and it is just such an
instinct that is at the root of our judg
ment of moral values. Science must
study the objective world; “ analytic
reason and a study of human character ”
must investigate the moral world. They
find these three beliefs essential to
progress, and their decision is as valid
as that of science in its own sphere.
The contradiction between the two need
not trouble us. The mind is limited,
and can “ grasp the existence of nothing
in its totality.” “We must learn, in
short,” is his closing sentence, “ that the
fact of our adoption of a creed which
involves an assent to contradictories is
not a sign that our creed is useless or
absurd, but that the ultimate nature of
things is for our minds inscrutable.”
. This reasoning is only a new formula
tion of the argument of his preceding
chapters, but one or two points call for
notice. In the first place, it is perfectly
true that all our convictions are not
capable of “proof,” because they cannot
all be inferences. Our knowledge must
ultimately be grounded on facts which
are directly intued. These are gathered
into general laws and principles, and
from these inferences are drawn. And
it is true that our perception of the
external world is—in its rudiments—
intuitive. It is not an inference from
our states of consciousness; it would
not be valid if it were. When meta
physics has grown tired of the current
idealism, it will probably tell us more
about this intuition. But Mr. Mallock’s
attempt to set up a number of little
oracles in the mind in the shape of
“ primitive instincts ” must be carefully
watched. Further, what he calls the
subjective or moral world is by no means
wholly subjective. It is useful for his
purpose to lead us on from sesthetic
judgments to moral. We may, fortu
nately, leave out of consideration the
difficulty of our sesthetic judgments,
because our moral judgment is purely
objective. The effects which Mr. Mal
lock anticipates from a Monistic ethic
are emphatically objective; and so are
the effects he claims for the Christian
ethic.
The determination of those
effects, and so of the relative value of
the two systems, is a study in objective
reality. “The sanctity of human life”
has nothing to do with it. The “ belief
in human nature ” is a conviction that,
of the various phases of life which
humanity has experienced—virtue and
vice, strength and enervation, social
�MR. MALLOCK'S OLIVE-BRANCH
order and anarchy, mental culture and
sensual dissipation—the former alter
natives are the most conducive to peace
and happiness, which we happen to
desire. That conviction is, therefore,
wholly based on an objective inquiry.
Hence the antithesis of the subjective
and objective worlds does not help Mr.
Mallock. And in point of fact the
sooner we apply scientific methods to
his second world, to the determination
of moral values, the better it will be for
us.
Finally, there is in Mr. Mallock’s closing
observations an important confusion of
ideas. That the mind is limited, that
we can only focus it on successive spots
in the great panorama of reality, is a
familiar truth. It is further true that
we may not be able to see the con
nection between our little areas of
knowledge, as they are often separated
by leagues of ignorance. In this passive
sense we may say we are unable to
reconcile ” them. But to admit two or
more statements that are clearly con
tradictory is quite another matter. To
do so in one single instance is to admit
the most radical and irreparable scepti
cism. Even the Catholic Church has
strongly denounced the principle that
“ a thing may be true in theology yet
false in philosophy.” If contradictories
may be true, we cannot rely on a single
affirmation of the mind. Some primi
tive instinct ” may yet find out that it is
also false. We should disci edit our
knowledge in its very source. Mr.
Mallock is likely to remain to the end a
Peri at the gate of Eden. Theology is
not more likely than science to give ear
to such a proposal.
I have said that Mr. Mallock’s theory
in some respects recalls the later
thoughts of Mr. Romanes, and as these
are much quoted in correction of
Haeckel’s procedure we may glance at
them in conclusion. In his later years
Mr. Romanes, once a thorough Monist,
jotted down some of his “ thoughts on
religion,” and they were published after
his ° death by Bishop Gore.
This
121
solitary “ conversion ” amongst the
scientific men of the last century has
naturally attracted some interest, but it
is not usually properly understood. In
the first place the works of both Mrs.
Romanes and Bishop Gore repel the
Rationalist inquirer by the offensive and
insulting insinuation that character had
anything to do with ■ the matter.
“ Blessed are the pure in heart for they
shall see God,” they both constantly
exclaim. The inference as to those
who do not see God is obvious. In the
second place, Mr. Romanes, though he
died in the communion of the Anglican
Church, seems to have reached a
theology of a very slender character.
His God is pantheistically immanent in
nature. All causation, he suggests, may
be Divine action, so that God melts into
the forces of the universe. The dis
tinction between the natural and super
natural he wholly rejects j and he thinks
the determinism of the will, established
by science, is consistent with the belief
that all causation is an act of Divine will.
And thirdly, without discussing the
illness which overcast the later years of
Mr. Romanes, these “thoughts, on
religion” contain some sorry sayings.
“ The nature of man without God is
thoroughly miserable,” he. says, pro
jecting his morbid condition on the
world at large; and “ there is a vacuum
in the soul which nothing can fill but
God.” Again, “ Unbelief is usually due
to indolence, often to prejudice, and
never a thing to be proud of.”. How
ever, let us examine his position in itself.
It may be said in a word that he
appeals to a religious instinct or intui
tion, which is independent of reason.
“If there be a God, he must be a.first
principle—-the first of all first piinciples
—-hence knowable by intuition and not
by reason.” Of the two temperaments
—the scientific or rational and the
“ spiritual ” or mystic—he says “ there is
nothing to choose between the two in
point of trustworthiness. Indeed, if
choice has to be made, the mystic
might claim higher authority for his
�122
MR. MALLOCK'S OLIVE-BRANCH
direct intuitions.” “ No one can believe
in God, or a 'fortiori in Christ, without
a severe act of will.” He shows how
often belief , is influenced by desire in
politics and is by no means an outcome
of reasoning, and adds: “ This may be
all deplorable enough in politics and in
all other beliefs secular; but who.shall
say it is not exactly as it ought to *be in
the matter of belief religious ? ” And,
speaking of “the continual sacrifices
which Christianity entails,” he says
“ the hardest of these sacrifices to an in
telligent .man is that of his own intellect.”
We will not do Romanes the injustice
of analysing in detail these sad reflec
tions of a suffering and diseased con
dition. . It is with reluctance that a
Rationalist approaches the question at
all, but it is forced on us. Just as I
write, an American correspondent sends
me a copy of the Literary Digest for
September 26.
It appears that Pro
fessor J. Orr, of the Glasgow Free
Church College, has been telling the
Americans that there is in England a
strong current from scepticism to faith.
He “claims to speak as an expert,” and
“ has in his possession a list of some
twenty-eight Secularist leaders in England
and Scotland who have become Chris
tians.” The truthfulness of this assertion
may be judged from the fact that he
only gives three names—Joseph Barker,
Thomas Cooper, and G. J. Romanes. The
former two were, I learn, men who were
associated with the Secularist activity
years ago, but were of no intellectual
standing and are hardly to be termed
“ leaders.” Romanes, he says, “ bit by bit
came under the power of the gospel, and
died a Christian in full communion with
the Church of England, avowing the
faith of Jesus, his deity and his atone
ment, and the resurrection of the dead,
and every other great article of our
faith.”1 We are thus forced to set in its
1 To finish with this miserable effusion—
quoted by the Digest from Zion's Herald—I
must add that he then goes on to speak of
Germany, where Haeckel’s Riddle “ has been
discarded for fully a quarter of a century” (the
true light the death-bed communion of
Romanes. As he says, it was by the
sacrifice of his intellect, by ignoring his
scientific temperament, by an effort of
will, that he succeeded in assenting to
what he calls “pure Agnosticism.”
In a sense, however, his idea of a
“ religious intuition ” is widely accepted
in the decaying Churches. Many dis
pense themselves on the ground of this
intuition or instinct from examining the
criticisms that are urged. We need only
make two observations on this last resort
of the theist. Firstly, this “ intuition ”
has, in the course of the last few thou
sand years, given men the most contra
dictory messages, and it is to-day sup
porting a hundred divergent beliefs
about. God and the future life. Its own
vagaries sternly condemn it as a channel
of truth. Secondly, modern psycholo
gists agree to regard instinct as an
inherited tendency or disposition.1 It
follows that if we have an “ original
instinct ” impelling us to accept religious
doctrines—I say if, because I am con
scious of no such instinct, nor is any
other person of whom I have inquired—
this is only the disposition towards them
which we have inherited, and has nothing
whatever to do with their truth or un
truth. It means, at the most, that our
fathers have accepted these beliefs for
many generations. We were aware of
that already.
first edition appeared a very few years ago).
Professor Orr says that “nearly all the great
scientific authorities that Haeckel quotes changed
their views some thirty or forty or twenty-five
years ago.” He will give “ the names of one or
two of them,” and out come the inevitable Vir
chow, Wundt, and Du Bois-Reymond. The
last-named “has reaffirmed the soul of man, re
affirmed the spiritual principle in man, and re
affirmed the supernatural element in man”—
compare what Haeckel does say of this Agnostic
writer on p. 6 of the Riddle. If these things are
not untruths, one wonders what is. One thinks
of poor Romanes’s awful statement that “ this
may be all deplorable enough in politics, but
who shall say it is not exactly as it ought to be
in religion ? ”
1 See Villa’s Contemporary Psychology, p. 292;
Sully’s Human Mind, I, 137 ; and Lloyd Mor
gan, Wundt, Ribot, and Masci.
�123
CONCLUSION
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CONCLUSION
We find, then, that the recent efforts
to evade the onward march of Monistic
science do not promise. any great
measure of success. Neither the specu
lations of Dr. Wallace, nor the assurances
of Lord Kelvin, nor the suggestions of
Mr. Mallock, provide a safe path of
retreat, if the positions of our earlier
chapters have been established.
As
long as scientists were willing to remain
silent on these cosmic speculations, it
was possible for ecclesiastical writers to
assume that they were not hostile, even
to assume that they were friendly, and so
to represent Professor Haeckel as a
Quixotic and isolated defender of an
extreme position which mature science
had deserted. It is certainly not pos
sible to do so with any regard for ac
curacy to-day. I have throughout sup
ported his positions with the most recent
utterances of scientific leaders, and the
excursions of Dr. Wallace and Lord
Kelvin have only served to show how
far science is to-day from lending sup
port to theology.
It may not be without interest, in conV eluding, to resume my work from the
point of view and in the order which one
finds in the Riddle itself. Chaps. II. to
V. are devoted to the proof that man is
descended, as regards his bodily frame,
from some earlier animal species. This
position is not now challenged by a
single anthropologist of the first or
second rank, and it is almost universally
admitted by cultivated theologians.
Chaps. VI. to X. are occupied with the
proof that the mind of man has been
developed from the mind of an animal
of an earlier species.
Dr. A. R.
Wallace is almost the only anthropolo
gist (if we may describe him as such) of
high rank who still questions that this
fact has been established, and we have
seen that theologians acquainted with
the facts began twenty years ago to
acquiesce in this truth. The majority of
the scientifically cultured apologists of
our day admit it. We have noticed the
overwhelming mass of evidence in favour
of it, and the fact that the most recent
researches of anthropologists tend to
elucidate it more and more. We have
seen that so critical a theist as Professor
J. Ward speaks of the doctrine of the
evolution of man, mind and body, being
“accepted with unanimity by biologists
of every school.”
When, however,
Haeckel goes on (Chap. . X.) to con
clude, in the purely scientific spirit, that
mind-force is therefore only an upward
and more elaborate extension of the
world-force that gradually advances from
the inorganic to the organic universe,
we find him denounced as “ crude ” and
“ unscientific.”
We have seen how
wholly logical and scientific his proce
dure is. When, further, he goes on to
say that this explanation of the origin of
the human soul leaves no room for those
claims of unique prerogatives on which
man once based his hope of immortality,
we again find the advanced company of
apologists at variance. Some think the
question is “ insoluble by philosophy ” ;
others elaborate novel speculations about
the aim of the cosmic process which we
have patiently considered.
The very
latest scientific researches, we saw, do
no tend to ascribe any peculiar signifi
cance to human life or to the planet we
inhabit.
Thus, in the first half of the book,
which deals with man, we find that all
Haeckel’s scientific assertions are sup
ported, almost without exception, by his
colleaguesin the anthropological sciences,
�124
CONCLUSION
and are admitted by most of the apolo
gists. . His conclusions from these facts,
touching the nature and the destiny of
the soul, are not denied by his colleagues
(who do not now, as a rule, trouble
themselves about the relation of their
knowledge to religious belief), but are
contested in the name of religion by the
theologians.. They appeal to philosophy,
and by philosophy we have judged
them.
The second half of the work deals with
a number of problems. Chaps. XII. to
XV. are occupied with the nature of the
cosmic substance, its unity, and its
evolution, through the inorganic world,
to the forms of living organisms. On
the nature of matter and force Haeckel
correctly gives the theories of the time
he wrote, and his system readily as
similates any modification of these which
the advance of physics may entail. The
unity he claims for inorganic nature is
undisputed, as is its evolution. When he
proceeds to unify the inorganic and the
organic worlds—to assume that life arose
by evolution, and that the life-force is not
of a specific or isolated character—he
has all the leading biologists and most
of the leading theists with him. We
have seen what befel Lord Kelvin when
he questioned this. He then (Chap. XV.)
attacks the question of the existence of
God. Here, save for a vague allusion to
a “creative power” or a “directive
principle” on the part of a few great
scientists and the fuller theology of a
small number of other Veil-known men of
science, he again advances beyond his
colleagues. Most of the scientists of our
day (including those German scientists
who are so much quoted) are Agnostics,
and do not concern themselves about
religion. Haeckel here speaks as a
philosopher. He is confronted with
certain metaphysical considerations which
purport to prove the existence of God.
We saw that for most of the cultured
apologists this merely means a principle
immanent in nature, and not distinguish
able from it.
In other words, the
ultimate question is : Is the evolution of
this Monistic universe of such a nature
that we are compelled to suppose there
was an intelligence guiding it from the
outset ? That is the problem on which
all forces are concentrating. The de
fence of gaps is falling into disrepute,
and, as a policy, is disdained by the very
men who practise it. We saw that the
forces which have evolved the world are
not erratic in their action, and so needed
no control; that science points to no
beginning of the scheme of things, and
so we need no creator; and that, on the
other hand, the cosmic process shows
many features which are inconsistent
with the existence of a supreme designer
and controller.
When Haeckel passes on to the moral
sciences, we saw that he is substantially
borne out by the latest research. Biblical
criticism and comparative mythology
have thoroughly shaken the belief in the
miraculous life of Christ; and whether
Haeckel has or has not the right version
of his paternity is not an important
matter. His judgment on the natural
growth and the limited influence of
Christianity is that of most historians.
His theory of a humanitarian ethic is in
harmony with the whole trend of ethical
discussion to-day.
We have seen, on the other hand,
how scattered and mutually conflicting
are the critics of Haeckel’s position.
We have been able, during quite twothirds. of our course, to silence the
majority of these critics with the weapons
of the minority. The majority of those
amongst them who have a wide scientific
culture are warning their smaller-minded
or less-informed colleagues to desert the
defence of gaps.
Almost the whole
library of apologetics up to within the
last ten years is useless to-day. The
apologists of yesterday mistook gaps in
scientific knowledge for gaps in the
course of natural development. A few
not very clear-minded theologians do so
still; and the old instinct is so strong,
and the fallacy appeals so strongly to the
imagination, that we have found even
the most advanced critics occasionally
�CONCLUSION
falling from grace. The tendency is,
however, to-day to allow that science
may build up a complete mechanical in
terpretation of the universe and all its
contents; the apologist is content to
hope that he may enter at the close with
his transcendental speculations on the sup
posed origin of the cosmic elements and
the alleged purpose of the cosmic process.
We have seen that already cultured and
sympathetic observers like Mr. Mallock
are telling them that this last position
will be no better than the first, and that
science allows them no foothold what
ever in the objective world.
That it is the ambition of science to
give a mechanical explanation of the
whole contents of the universe has been
made clear.
The dream of Tyndall
and Huxley is by no means abandoned.
For the inorganic universe no one
seriously doubts that this is only a ques
tion of time. And the angry resentment
by our leading biologists at Lord Kelvin’s
interference in their domain amply.shows
how little they are disposed to give up
the ideal of a mechanical interpretation
of life. So far the vast majority of the
leading scientists of the world are with
Haeckel. I do not say that they endorse
all his suggestions on points of detail.
His system, we saw, is not a rigidly
uniform structure, for all parts of which
he claims equal weight. He throws out
theories, and hypotheses, and suggestions,
in advance of the demonstrated conclu
sions. These are temporary and pro
visional.
That scientists reject or
dispute about any of these detailed
suggestions—whether it be on the evo
lution of ether, or the first formation of
protoplasm, or the fatherhood of Jesus—
does not affect his main position, or his
attitude towards religion. He frankly
says he may very well be wrong in these
details, and that he merely suggests that
the evidence so far seems to point in
this or that direction.
Whether the
advance of science proves or disproves
these suggestions does not affect the
main issue. The main issue is the unity
and evolution of nature. So far, as I
125
said, scientists in general are with him.
When he goes on to deal with conscious
ness, creation, design, and religion, it
cannot be said that they are with him.
But it is a gross deception to represent
that they are with his opponents. They
are Agnostics, as a rule. They prefer
not to concern themselves with these
subjects. They are Monists in the sense
that they accept the unity and evolution
of the cosmos, and refuse to see any
positive breach in the continuity of
nature. But they are, as Dr. Ward says,
“Agnostic Monists,” in the sense that
they are content with a negative attitude
on these later problems. The number
of great scientists who give a positive
and explicit support to personal theism
may be counted on one’s fingers.
In conclusion, I would respectfully
submit to these Agnostic men of science,
and the vast cultured following they
have in every educated country to
day, two considerations. The first is a
request that they will reflect on the spirit
and procedure of the apologists for con
ventional religion, as these are exhibited
in the attack on Dr. Haeckel, one of the
most distinguished and most honourable
of living scientists. If he cares to invade
every department of thought in search
of anti-theological arguments, and to
throw out scores of positive explanations
in the teeth of the theologians, he must,
of course, expect battle. It is just what
he desires. But he desires honourable
warfare. Truth is a frail spirit that must
be sought with patient and calm investi
gation. Its pursuit should be conducted
with dignity and especially with a scru
pulous honesty. We have seen that,
on the contrary, this campaign against
Haeckel’s views has been marked by
malignant abuse and persistent misrepre
sentation, by statements which cannot be
conceived as other than untruths, by
gross perversion of the teaching of modern
science, and by a score of devices and
stratagems that would disgrace the con
duct of a heated political campaign. It
is by these means that one-fourth of the
people are held attached to the old
�126
CONCLUSION
beliefs—people who, to a great extent,
would carry into the new humanitarian
religion a humane and proper spirit that
would enormously facilitate the transition
to a new inspiration. Is it conducive to
the interest of truth, or of science, or of
human welfare, that this corporation of
the clergy should continue in the twen
tieth century that mistaken conceit about
the truth of their cosmic views which
inspires them with such dishonourable
tactics ?
Secondly, I would ask whether it is
not too late in the history of the world
to be inventing fanciful theories for the
detention of the people in the Churches.
Three-fourths of the people are wholly
beyond the influence of the clergy, and
as these controversial devices become
known the defection is bound to increase.
It is too late to speak of the welfare of
the race depending on a religion which
the great majority have for ever aban
doned. Scepticism is in the atmosphere
of the world to-day.
The more we
educate the more we extend its influence.
If this is so the true humanitarian will
desire the change to be effected as
speedily as possible, and the moral ideal
to be swiftly disentangled from its decay
ing frame of dogma. In one respect the
world is in a pitiful plight to-day. Thou
sands of the clergy of all denominations
are only too eager to disavow the old
formulae and to devote themselves
to character-building alone. They are
prevented by the lingering concern of
the majority of church-members for
dogma. They are forced to utter un
truths (“ symbolically ”) at the very
moments when they are pleading for
truth, andhonour, and sincerity. We have
the spectacle of ecclesiastical scholars of
all denominations being forced to1
disavow the convictions which have
crept to their lips, and of Christian
journals complaining that the lack of
honesty is one of the most prominent?
features of theological literature. How
this state of things is held to be conducive
to the social good it is hard to imagine.
One of the great social needs of our
time is to sweep away the whole totter
ing structure of conventional religion and
worship. Whilst we talk of “ continuity ”
the world is deserting it altogether. The
moral tone of the clergy is lowered by
their corporate alliance with cosmic
speculations. The stream of enthusiasm
which has so long flowed through the
religions of the world is being dissipated.
Only one change will infuse new life into
the Churches and rehabilitate religion—
the swift abandonment to metaphysicians
of all these cosmic speculations. When
that revolution has been completed we
shall have given a new meaning to
religion that will change the present
contempt into concern. It will be an
affair of this world, a visibly important
element of this life. Men will turn their
eyes from the clouds to discover new
potencies in earth. That is the socio
logical basis of the work of the Rationalist
Press Association. Behind it are scores
of humanitarian constructive movements
ready to guide and inform the religious
or idealist ardour. Its work is the attack
on unthinking superstition, the war
against hypocritical professions, the
promulgation of a standard of intellec
tual honesty, the cultivation of a virile
and rational attitude on all the problems
of life.
It claims and deserves the sup
port of every man or woman who is sanely
and sincerely concerned for progress.
�INDEX
Christian World, the, 11, 12
Christianity, “triumph” of, 89, 90
Churches, advantages of the, 92 ;
decay of the, 92, 93
Clarke, Dr. W. N., 32, 39, 50, 67, 72 ;
on the origin of man, 50
Clarion, campaign of the, 11, 92
Colour, nature of, 27
Confucianism, 80
Consciousness, 54, 57, 58, 79
Constantine, conversion of, 89
Contradictions, alleged, in our know
ledge, Il6, 117, 121
Conversion of German scientists, 17 ;
Babylon, morality of ancient, 95
G. J. Romanes, 17, 121
Baer, K., 10, 17
Cook, Dr., 14
Bain, Prof., 16
Cooper, Thomas, 122
Balfour, Mr., 116
Creative action, 45, 77, 108, in, 124
Ball, Sir R., on dark stars, 103
Ballard, the Rev. F., criticisms of, 9, Croll, Dr. J., 14; on free-will, 60; on
the evolution of species, 48; on
10-14,16, 35, 36, 38, 46, 69, 79, 82,
teleology, 70, 72
85, 86, 93, 100; on determinism,
12 ; on evolution, 69 ; on physical Cunningham, Prof., on the evolution
of mind, 59
theories, 24, 25 ; on spontaneous
generation, 12, 13, 40, 41 ; on teleo
logy, 72 ; on the outlook of Chris Daily Chronicle, criticism of the, 33
Daily News, census of church-gomg,
tianity, 91
92 ; teaching Pantheism, 77
Barker, Joseph, 122
Beale, Prof. L., 14, 16, 32, 41, 43, 46, Dallinger, the Rev. Dr., 14, 23, 36,
70, 71 ; on Haeckel, 9; on the
iro; advertises in the Times, 13,
finite universe, 23, 32 ; on the origin
43, IX3
of man, 51
Beauty of the world, 75, 76
Beginning of the universe, 30-32, 76, 77 Dark nebulae, 104 ; stars, 30, 33, 103
Dawson, Sir J. W., 14, 31
Belgium, religion in, 92.
Design, 54, 58, 69-74 _
Belittling effect of Monism, 35
Determinism and morality, 117, 118
Berkeley, 21, 77
Bible, supposed uniqueness of the, Dewar, Prof., 28, 44, 50; on Dar
winism, 50 ; on idealism, 22
87, 88
Biologists and the vital principle, 199, Diplomas, Haeckel’s, 8
Dogma a dangerous base for morality,
iro
96 ; dangerous to religion, 15
Bischoff, Dr. E., 82, 83
Dolbear, Prof, (quoted), no
Blatchford, Mr., it, 13, 52
Dreisch, in
Blathwayt, Mr. R., on Haeckel, 6
Booth,Mr. C.,on religion in London, 92 Dualism, 20, 59
Brierley, the Rev. J. B., ri, 12, 63, Dubois, Dr., 49
Du Bois-Reymond, 10, 17
83, 9i
Duns Scotus on immortality, 61
Buchner, L., 10, 17, 19, 42, 49, 66
Buddhism, 80, 99
Ecclesiastical history, character of, 87,
Budge (quoted), 95
89, 9°
Burdon-Sanderson, Sir J., on Lord Egyptian Bible, the, 95
Kelvin, 109 ; on vitalism, 43, 109
Electrons, 33
Bushido, the, 99
Embryo, development of the, 58
Emerson (quoted), 99
Caird, Dr., 22
Encyclopaedia Biblica, the, 87
Campbell, the Rev. R. J., on Chris End of the universe, 32, 33
tianity, 81, 94, 96; on religious Entropy, theory of, 31, 33, 34, 77
statistics, 93
Epicureans, the, 61
Candour in the pulpit, theologians on, Eternity of the universe, 30-34
12
Ether, 24, 25, 30, 104, 116
Carbon-theory of Haeckel, 112
Ethic of Monism, the, 93-96, 117
Case, Prof., on Agnosticism and Ethical Movement, the, 98
Monism? 16 ; on consciousness, 58 ; Ethics, 98
on idealism, 22
Ethics, changes in, 119
Celsus on the fatherhood of Christ, 85 Evolution, 35-37, 41, 42, 101
Central sun, idea of a, 105
Eye, evolution of the, 74
Centre of the universe, 105
Chance, 71, 72-74
Facial expression, relation to mind, 59
Chapman, Principal, on the origin of Fiske, Mr., 14 ; admissions of, 48, 51,
life, 42
77 ; on immortality, 66 ; on teleo
Christian history, supposed uniqueness
logy 70, 73, 74
.
of, 89 ; morality, defects of, 96, 117 ; Flammarion on Dr. Wallace s views,
true conception of, 94, 96
103, 105, 106
Abiogenesis, 39-46
I
Action at a distance, 116, 117
j
Agnostic scientists, 16, 17, 20
_
|
Agnosticism, its relation to Monism,
16, 17, 20, 125
|
Ambrose, St., work of, 20
1
America, religion in, 92
Apes, the, and man, 49, 56, 101
Asceticism, 96
Atheism, 75
Atom, the, 28, 30, J3, 116
Australia, religion in, 92
Flower, Prof., 14 ; on evolution, 47
Force, unity of, 26
France, religion in, 92
Gaps, the theology of, 36, 37, 69, 124
Generelle Morphologic, the, 8
Germany, religion in, 92
Gore, Bishop, 121
Gospels, date of the, 84, 87, 88
Grimthorpe, Baron, 14, 16, 33
Haeckel, alleged dogmatism of, 11,
12, 23 ; pessimism of, 35 ; cardinal
offence of, 84; circulation of his
work, 91 ; early training of, 7 ; on
chance, 73; on Christian dogmas,
81 ; on Christian ethics, 96 ; on
the future of the Churches, 98 ; on
the person of Christ 84, 88; on
the validity of speculation, 80;
system of, 17-19
Halliburton, Prof., on vitalism, 111
Hand, connection of with the brain, 59
Harnack, 87, 88
Hebrews no genius for morality, 95
Henslow, Prof., 80
Herbert, Prof., 59
Heredity, 58, 67
Horton, Dr., criticisms of, 10, 17, 18,
40, 43, 46, 52, 62, 64, 82, 85, 86, 93,
100, 112 ; on Vogt and Buchner, 10,
17
Huxley, Prof., 16, 99
Idealism criticised, 21, 22, 120 ; and
Christianity, 21
Immaculate Conception, the, 85
Immanence of God in Nature, 78
Immortality of the sou , 61-68
Infinity of space and time, 116, 117
Infinity of the universe, 23,103-105, 116
Inquirer, criticism in the, 27
Instinct only hereditary disposition,
122
Intelligibility of the universe, 79
International Journal ofEthics, the,
98
Iverach, the Rev. Dr., criticisms of,
14, n6, 21, 29, 32, 36, 39, 45, 47, 50,
53, ?r, 72> 75> 79 > on idealism, 21
James, Prof. W., 14; on immortality,
65 ; on theism, 78
Kant, 26, 64, 71
Kelvin, Lord, 14, 44, 45 ; on vitalism,
108-114
Kennedy, the Rev. Mr., 14, 17, 75
Khammurabi, laws of, 95
Knowledge, review in, 9, 27
Language, 59
Lankester, Prof. E. Ray, 16, 43 ; on
Darwinism, 47; on Lord Kelvin,
109, in
Law, nature of, 28 ; of substance, 27,
28
Leap of the gospels, the, 83
Le Conte, Prof., 14, 50, 69 ; on evolu
tion, 36; on God and Nature, 77;
on immortality, 65 ; on life-force, 43
Leyden, congress at, 49
�128
Liberty of the will, 12
Liebig, 108, 112
Life, conditions of, 106 ; development
of, 48 ; in other worlds, 32, 106,
107 ; in space, 112 ; the nature of,
41, 42-44, 46; the origin of, 39-46
Light, criticisms of, 25, 62
Limits of the universe, alleged, 23,
103-105
Lodge, Sir O., 14, 24, 25, 28, 33, 100,
109, 112 ; on entropy, 33 ; on life
force, 113, 114 ; on the nature of
matter, 33
Loofs, Dr., criticisms of, 82-86; on
the birth of Christ, 85-87
Macalister, Dr. A., 14
Mallock, Mr. W. H., 9, 15, 20, 22, 31,
33, 4L 5.6, 73, 75 on design, 75, 76 ;
on dualist difficulties, 36; on free
will, 60 ; on Haeckel, 9, 15 ; on
science and religion, 114, 115; on
the credibility of religion, 115-121 ;
on the evolution of mind, 57 ; on
theological arguments, 15
Man, origin of, 50-60
Manchester Guardian, criticism in
the, 28
Manicheans, the, 89
Materialism, real nature of, 19
Materiarii, the, 61
Matter and force, 18, 19, 55; inde
structibility of, 28 ; nature of, 27,
28, 33, 116 ; unity of, 24-26
Maudsley, Dr., 16
Maunder, Dr., on Dr. Wallace’s
views, 103
Mechanism as the ideal of science,
48, 58, 68-70, 76, no, 125
Memory, 54
“ Merlin,” 40
Milky Way, the, 105
Mind and brain, relation of, 55, 5760, 63, 64, 67 ; evolution of, argu
ments for the, 56, 57, 101
Miracles of Unbelief, the, 11-13, 43
Mithraists, the, 89
Mivart, Dr., 32, 39, 50, 100, no
Moleschott, 19
Monera, 45
Monism, 17-20, 93
Moore, Canon A. L., 42, 45, 47, 51, 71 ;
on tbe origin of man, 50
Moral Instruction League, the, 98
Moral training for children, 97, 98
Morality of unbelievers, 93, 94, 118,
119; origin of, 97; real nature of,
94, 117, 118
Miinsterberg, Prof., 51 ; on immor
tality, 56, 64, 65
Music compared to thought, 63
Nageli, Prof., 40, no
Natural History of Creation, the, 8,
W
Natural selection, 47, 59
Nebular hypothesis, the, 28, 116
INDEX
Necessity, 71, 73
Neo-Vitalism, 42-45, 110-113
New Testament, criticism of the, 87, 88
Newcomb, Prof., 103, 104
Nicaea, Council of. 86
Species, origin of, 47-49
Spectroscope, the, 24
Spencer, Mr., 16, 76
Spiritism, 68
Spiritists, 25
Spontaneous generation, 39-46 ; in the
Middle Ages, 42
Old Testament, the, 87
Stallo, views of, 25, xoo
Organic substances produced, 45
Stars, distance of the, 23 ; distribution
Origin of Species, the, 7
of the, 104, 105 ; nature of the, 24,
Orr, Prof., on unbelievers, 122
6r ; number of tbe, 23, 104
Statistics of religion, 86, 92
Paganism and Christianity, 90; de Stettin, Congress at, 7
struction of, 90
Subconscious mind, the, 57
Paleyism, 71
Substance, the universal, 26, 116
Pandera, 84-86
Sully, Prof., 16
Pantheism of modern evolutionary Sun, motion of the, 105, 106
theists, 77, 78
Synodicon, the, 83
Pasteur, 41, 42
Pearson, Prof. Karl, 16; on Lord Tactics of religious apologists, 125
Kelvin, 109
Talmage, Dr., on evolution, 52
Phenomena and substance, 26
Teleology, 37, 38, 48, 69-74
Pithecanthropus erectus, the, 49, 50, Thiselton-Dyer, Sir W. T., on Lord
101
Kelvin, 109; on the materialistic
Planets, habitability of the, 106, 107
view of life, in
Pope, the Rev. A., criticisms of, 18, Thompson, Sir Henry, on God, 78 ;
36, 53, 70; on Monism, 18, 19
on the future of religion, 91
Profeit, the Rev. Mr., 14, 38, 39, 71, Thought as a brain function, 63
73
Turner, Prof., on Dr. Wallace’s
Prothyl, 30, 34, 116
views, 102, 105, 107
Protoplasm, .45, 46, 54, 55, no
Turner, Sir W., on Darwinism, 47 ;
Psycho-physics, 57
on the development of man, 51, 58 ;
Psychoplasm, 54
on life, 42
Pyknotic theory, the, 24, 25, 116
Tyndall, Prof., 16, 42, 50
Quiller-Couch, Mr., on Agnostics, 94
Radium, 33
Rationalist Press Association, 91, 126
Reformer, criticism of the, 25
Reinke, in
Religion, decay of, 93, 119, 126
Religious instinct or intuition, 122
Riddle of the Universe, circulation of
the, 9
Robertson, Mr. J. M., on Christ, 88
Romanes, 17 ; conversion of, 12 r, 122
Row, Mr., 14
Royce, Prof., on God and man, 78 ;
on immortality, 64
Rucker, Sir A., 25, 27 ; on idealism,
22 ; on the nature of matter, 25 ; on
vitalism, 44
Union of Ethical Societies, the, 98
Unity of the Universe, 24, 26, 27
Virchow, 17, 49
Vital force, 41, 42, 43, 109-113
Vogt, 10, 17, 19
Wallace, Dr. A. R., 14, 41, 50, 51,
101-107, 123 ; the recent articles of,
101-107
Ward, Prof. J., 16, 23, 36, 43, 47, 51,
70, 77 ; On Agnosticism and Monism,
16 ; on vital force, 43
Washington Sullivan, Dr. (quoted), 95
Wells, Mr. H. G., on the future of
religion, 77, 91
Westminster Review on Haeckel, 9,
11
Will, freedom of the, 59, 60, 118
Sadducees, the, 61
Williams, the Rev. Rhondda, criti
Schultze, 89
Scientists who support religion, 14
cisms of, 12, 18, 19, 26, 36, 37, 53-56>
69, 72, 78, 79, 93 ; on conscious
Schmiedel, Dr., on the Gospels, 87, 88
ness, 54; on the beginning of the
Sepher Toldoth Jeschua, the, 85
world, 31 ; on the decay of the
Sheffield Daily Telegraph, the, on
Churches, 15 ; on Monism, 18 ; on
Haeckel, 11
the origin of man, 51 ; rejects dualism,
Smyth, the Rev. Newman, 14, 36, 37,
47> 5L 7°, 72 >on immortality, 66, 67 ;
77
Wilson, the Rev. Archdeacon, 87
on tbe origin of life, 39
Soul of the atom or cell, 54
Winchell, Dr., 14
Woman and Christianity, 96
Sound, nature of, 27
Wundt, 17
Spain, condition of, 94
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Haeckel's critics answered
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McCabe, Joseph [1867-1955]
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Place of publication: London
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Ernst Haeckel
Evolution
Monism
NSS
Religion and science
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WHAT 18 RELIGION?
{F. Max Muller's First Hibbert Lecture)
A DISCOURSE
GIVEN AT
JSOUTH
J^LACE
JThAFEL,
MAY $th, 1878,
by'
MONCURE D. CONWAY, M.A.
LONDON :
SOUTH PLACE, FINSBURY.
PRICE TWOPENCE.
�LONDON:
PRINTED BY WATERLOW AND SONS LIMITED,
LONDON WALL.
�WHAT IS RELIGION?
The community may congratulate itself upon the fact
that the bequest of an advanced liberal man for the
promotion of free religious inquiry, should find its
fulfilment in the ancient chapter-house of Westminster
Abbey. It is probable that if the dogmas which
founded that Abbey still reigned, the first Hibbert
lecturer would have been sooner burnt than listened
to. But now, amid those historic walls are repre
sented ideas of religion which have been raised quite
out of the region of authority, and worthily claim only
to stand or fall along with the reason and knowledge
, of man,—acknowledging no revelation but the history
of man.
On Thursday last, in his second lecture, the Pro
fessor remarked that, even if the theory of human pro
gression could be proved in all other affairs of mankind,
that would not prove the same theory true of religion.
�4
This remark applied to the far past; and it is true
that what is called religion was for ages the unpro
gressive, the stationary institution of the world. And
this because the religious sentiment was confused with
theology,—identified with alleged revelations,—thus
removed from the normal current of human interests.
But the scene in the chapter-house marks a great
change. The Hibbert Trust is, I believe, outcome
of money earned by toiling negroes on West Indian
plantations. The House of Commons freed those
slaves. The wealth they coined comes back to the
room in which the House of Commons first sat.
There African degradation is turning to English cul
ture. The progress in civilisation represented in that
fact is not greater than ,the religious progress it
implies. The leading Unitarian (Martineau) and the
Dean of Westminster have united to bring a German
• liberal there to raise the standard of a human religion.
It is now a religious House of Commons. Four
centuries ago an old monk frescoed the walls of it
with the visions of the Apocalypse. The angels and
dragons are now fading around a wider apocalypse.
The Isle of Patmos sinks beneath the horizon. The
Isle of England rises from the night, its awakened eye
■ holding the Apocalypse of Man.
The eminence of Max Muller is the work he has
done in recovering the vast fields of human experi
�5
ence represented by the Aryan race. No West Indian
slave was more bound under his master than our
English brains under thraldom to ancient Semitic
notions. Hebraism waved its sceptre over European
culture, and excluded two-thirds of the world and of
history as heathenism and devil’s work. Many have
been our deliverers from that prison, but no one of
them has done more than our first Hibbert lecturer
to carry this liberation from the scholar’s study to
the layman’s home. It was because of this that he
was called to expound the religion of humanity amid
walls built to fortify the dogmas of one tribe against
the rest of mankind, and against universal progress.
Westminster Abbey has survived to hear sentence
passed upon every creed for which it stood. And so
at last even tardy religion is caught up into the great
loom of the world to be woven in with general civili
sation.
That is, so far as it is a sound thread. But is it
sound ? Is it real ? Some say it is rotten, some say
unreal: man’s childish awe of phantoms, conjured up
by his own ignorance. But Max Muller detaches re
ligion from all its special forms or accidents; maintains
its reality and vitality; rests it upon the universal human
sense and feeling of the Infinite. He appeals to the
broad facts common to the civilized man and the
barbarian, to East, West, North, South; and he thus,
�6
in laying his foundation, leaves out of sight those
facts not universal; such as the special and narrow
theories of which a Christian may feel conscious here
and a Buddhist there. His question relates not to
this so-called religion or that, but to religion itself.
All religions might perish, and this essential religion
still stand. That he declares to be a natural thing,
which has had natural evolutions comprehensible by
science. Supernaturalism may, therefore, so far as the
present atmosphere of Westminster Abbey is con
cerned, be regarded as a small way one religion’ has
of saying to another “ Stand aside, I am holier than
thou.” The interest of the human intellect has
passed beyond that pious egotism. It is now pro
foundly concerned to know, not whether Christianity
is true, but whether religion itself is real; or whether
our spiritual emotion is merely surviving emotion of
waves after the blasts of superstition have so long
swept over them.
The main principle affirmed is, that religion is man’s
apprehension of the Infinite. In searching the largest
and the smallest, man reaches an end of his com
prehension, the limit of the heavens he can see, the
limit of the atom he can divide; but where compre
hension ends, apprehension continues; imagination,
wonder, admiration, faith, hope, soar on into an immea
surable expanse; and the emotion awakened within
�7
for that transcendent immensity is the religious emo
tion.
Now there are certain inferences from this principle
which it hardly lay in the way of the lecturer to un
fold. It was intimated, however, in what he said
about the progressive development of conceptions of
colour, and I will use that to illustrate my own point.
In arguing that the ancient races of men apprehended
the Infinite vaguely, though they had no word for it,
he said, 11 We divide colour by seven rough degrees.
Even those seven degrees are of late date in the evolu
tion of our sensuous knowledge. In common Arabic, as
Palgrave tells us, the names for green, black and brown
are constantly confounded. In the Edda the rainbow is
called a three-coloured bridge. Xenophanes says that
what people call Iris is a cloud, purple, red and yellow.
Even Aristotle still speaks of the tricoloured rainbow,
red, yellow and green. Blue, which seems to us so
definite a colour, was worked out of the infinity of
colours at a comparatively late time. There is hardly
a book now in which we do not read of the blue sky.
But in the ancient hymns of the Veda, so full of the
dawn, the sun and the sky, the blue sky is never men
tioned in the Zendavesta the blue sky is never men
tioned ; in Homer the blue sky is never mentioned ;
in the Old, and even in the New, Testament, the blue
sky is never mentioned. In the Teutonic languages
�§
blue comes from a root which originally meant bleak
and black. The Romance languages found no useful
word for blue in Latin and 'borrowed their word from
the Germans.”
The Hibbert lecturer believes those ancients saw
the blue sky as we do, but they had no word
for it because they had not detached it mentally from
dark or bright. But whether the outer eye has un
folded or the inner eye,—visual power or the analytic
mind behind it,—-it is equally shown that the full
phenomena were not revealed j and we are again
reminded that in going back to the ancient world for
his beliefs man suffers a relapse from the height he
has attained. In the matter of blue sky the Bible is
as much a blank as the Vedas. So far neither was a
revelation—or unveiling—of phenomena. That know
ledge, by natural means and scientific culture, we have
reached, and see seven colours where our ancestors
saw three or four. Are we to suppose their spiritual
senses were finer, while their other senses were duller,
than ours ? Are we to suppose that their religious
analysis was more perfect than ours ? If so, it would
be a miracle; but where is the evidence of any such
miracle ? Compare the God of the Vedas or of the
Bible—Indra or Jehovah—with the God of Theodore
Parker, nay, of any living Theist, and only a blindness
worse than blue-blindness can declare those thunder-;
�9
gods equal to the Divine Love adored by the en
lightened heart to-day.
That conclusion is inevitable from the moment it
is admitted that religion is a subject for scientific
treatment. Once let it be admitted that religion is to
be dealt with by unbiassed reason,—by such calm
sifting of facts as if the subject were electricity,—and
from that instant every particular system of religion
must take its place in the natural history of mankind.
Be it Brahminism, be it Christianity, it comes down
from the bench and goes into the witness-box. Each
testifies what it knows, but it cannot coerce the judg
ment of Reason. Christianity may testify that it saw
miracles; Confucianism that it saw none; Islamism
that it was revealed from Allah; but it is no longer
the sword which determines their credibility; it is
Reason. So their testimony goes for precisely what
it is worth. If they saw only three colours where
there were seven, possibly they also saw miracle
where there was only natural fact. The world cannot
go back to the year One for its ideas of the Infinite
any more than for its optics. It may recognise in
Christ a great religious teacher, just as it recognises
in Aristotle a great scientific teacher; but as it
cannot diminish the known colours because Aristotle
knew only three, so it cannot deny religious facts
because unknown to Christ. But it may find fresh
�IO
reason for faith in science and religion in that, with
grand vitality, they far outgrow both Aristotle and
Christ, and all the systems that would confine them.
Now, as to this apprehension of the Infinite in
which the Hibbert lecturer finds the religious faculty ;
it souhds at first rather metaphysical. It is tolerably
clear that no abstract notions of the Infinite can have
any commanding power over the nature and passions
of mankind. We must, therefore, in considering
historic religions, think rather of the forms with which
human imagination has peopled the Infinite. The
Infinite in itself is metaphysical ; but its vault, popu
lous with gods, becomes practical. The creed which
has swayed the world has been in an Infinite just
transcending man’s finite in power or excellence ;
while it is finite enough to deal with him and feel
with him. The god or personality which man asso
ciates with infinitude may be of unknown strength,
so separate from finite man ; but he may be angry,
loving, ambitious, so linked on to the finite?
It is just in this twofold aspect of these images of
the Infinite that we may discover the reality and
meaning of religion. To which side of the god does
it belong—his finite or his infinite side ? his likeness
to man or his transcendency of man? his compre
hensibility or incomprehensibility.
Religion,—whether it be a sense of dependence, or
�II
awe, of emotion, or aspiration—whatever its aspect,
refers to that in which the object of worship passes
beyond the worshipper. In this it differs from
theology, which concerns itself with that side of the
god which is within the knowledge of man. The
Theology of one period may describe the gods, as the
Greeks did, even to the colour of their hair; the
Theology of another period may disprove such gods’
'existence, substituting invisible Beings, as that of Paul
‘did. One Theology may build up a Trinity; another
may supersede it with a Quaternity or Unity. But it
would be an error to suppose that Religion is either
'directly making those images,or directly replacing them.
These personifications are the successive inventions
of a changing science; they are utilised by priests who
support theologians to maintain them, or, when they
become discredited, to modify or replace them. But,
although the religious condition of man may be har
monious with such images at one time, discordant
with them at another, what human worship adores is
the unknown, the eternal, the vast, the perfect,—all
expanding beyond its conception, but yet believed to
■be powerfully existent.
Thus Religion is different from Fear. Man would
hover fear the Infinite. It is only when to its vastness
Theology adds a smallness like man’s own that men
beginto tremble. It is not Jove, the incomprehensible
�.12
Heaven, man fears; but Jove, the comprehensible
Chieftain, going about with a thunderclub to kill him.
That Jove men fear, because they understand him;,
they go about themselves with clubs less big but
equally murderous. That is not Religion—it is
Theology; a primitive speculative science of gods.
But we have reached now a Science of Religion, and
understand that its reverence, its devoutness, emotion,
love, so far as really awakened in man, were for what
rose above his own weakness, his passions, and his
sorrows.
What, then, does this apprehension (which must be
distinguished from comprehension) this feeling about
the Infinite amount to ? Simply to man’s belief in
something better than himself. Man believes in a
Wisdom greater than his own. Theology may per
sonify it in Minerva, or in the Holy Ghost; but the
worship is not. for the work of man’s wisdom—it is
for the wisdom ascending beyond man. So the forms
perish : the worship of wisdom perishes not. Man
adores a power beyond his own: theology may
identify it with mountain and lightning, sea and whirl
wind, and these may overawe his heart so long as he
knows nothing of them : but when the mountain is
climbed, and the sea voyaged over, the cloud seen as
vapour, the wind weighed, the lightning bottled and
sealed up, the ever-kneeling spirit of Religion passes
�T3
onward, and amid innumerable forms and names that
come and go, seeks still the better, the wiser, the,
more powerful and happy,—ever leading on from the
finite to the Infinite.
And this high seeking, born of each heart’s faith in
a better than it knows, is the religious force, because
it is the controlling and creative force. It is idle to
tell us, in face of the moral progress of the world,
that the life of man has been the result of correct
metaphysics, theological definitions, abstractions about
the Absolute and co-eternal Persons. The force that
is moving the world onward 'is the longing in each
human being for somewhat more perfect than what
they have or are. It is Maya in India praying her
babe Siddartha (Buddha) may be wise beyond all men
she ever knew; or Mary in Palestine praying the same
as she watches her baby Jesus ; or any mother that
hears me, whose tender breast feels stirring within
hope that the new nature she has started on its career
may ascend till she can kneel in homage before it. It
may be the humblest workman dreaming of a more
perfect skill; the young artisan feeling after an inven
tion pregnant with results incalculable. Wherever
and however manifested it is the great vision of a
glory transcending our own; and though such ideals
are always being reached and passed by—infinites
becoming Unites—so endlessly the spirit grows, so
�14
immortal is its nature, so unceasing the work of
creation, the outline is never filled up. Over crumbled
gods and goddesses, religion ascends for ever, burning,
disintegrating, generating, regenerating,—Humanity’s
passion for the Perfect.
There is a danger in the method of the historian
and archaeologist of religion. Because he must trace
the evolution of religion through its visible and
definable effects—fetish, shrine, dogma, temple—
there is danger that these may be regarded as types
and forms of religion itself. When a geologist walks
over hills, cliffs, rocks, he traces the path of drifting
glaciers scratched on rock; he finds sea-shells on
the hill-tops, boulders dropped in meadows, pebbles
rounded by waves long ebbed away to channels many
miles distant: he says, seas and rivers have smoothed
and deposited these shells and sands, and shaped
these undulations of hill and vale. Yet these are
not the sea,—they are but fringes and accidents in the
history of the sea. But in religion men still have the
habit of seeing the shards and shells of theory—the
pebbles of theology worn from crumbled temples—as
forms of Religion itself. They are but things which
Religion influenced, they report its ancient tides and
currents, but they are not—never were—religion
itself.
Having now detached the religious sentiment from
�i5
the forms which have borrowed its consecration;
having identified it as man’s impulse towards the
Perfect—which philosophy calls the Infinite—let us
ask whether we are genuine and true in calling this
religion. Or is our use of that word only a piece of
conventionality ? Does Religion mean anything diffe
rent from morality, or different from conscience ? If
not, then our use of it is mystification, conformity,
cowardice.
I believe Religion to be a different thing from
Morality. I understand by morality rules and stan
dards of conduct relating to recognised social duties.
But there is something in man which leads him to
defy the rules and standards around him. A bad man
violates moral rules for the sake of self: but another
man breaks them at the cost of self. What leads Jesus
to break the Sabbath, or Buddha to refuse offerings
to the gods ? Or what leads the reformer of to-day to
challenge the social and political order ?
Are such men seeking the benefit of the majority ?
The majority are against them. The majority is made
uncomfortable by them. Are they seeking general
advantages ? They are often plunging everything into
revolution, and doing it consciously. You might per
suade a freethinker that to disestablish the Church
would leave the majority poorer than now; or that
innumerable advantages to millions would be lost if
�the Athanasian Creed were exploded. But would any
consideration of majorities make him support the
Church: would any advantages make him advocate
the Creed ? It may be said he is obeying the voice of
conscience. That explains nothing. Conscience is
an organ of forces beyond itself. It dictates war to
one tribe, peace to another. Conscience is a majestic
throne, but we search for the power behind the
throne.
Now, here we have a force in man which often
confronts customs, moralities, the social and political
order, which disregards majorities and their interests,
disregards self-interest also; and this force with
passion, enthusiasm and martyrdom, seeks something
it never saw, something that never existed. It is
manifested in all history, and is known in universal
experience; it actuates theists and non-theists; it is
especially visible in the overthrow of popular idols
and dogmas claiming its worship. Is that morality?
Not a whit more than it is politics, or trade, or art, or
any one of the manifold human interests which slowly
but steadily follow the lead of that pillar of cloud and
fire.
I call it Religion, because that is a universal name
which no sect or nation has ever tried to monopolise :
but I do not care for that name if any one has a
better. I do care that it shall not be confused with
�i7
wholly different things, with either morality, politics
or science. Much less, with Theology. For Theology
is the great enemy of religion. Morality, Society,
Science, are its ministers, but Theology is its rival,—
the Opposer that would arrest the current of its life,
and nail man down to bestow upon a fragment of his
universe and himself the passion born for aspiration
to the perfect whole. To call it ideality, poetry,
harmony, love of humanity, is to name the fruits by
which this religious life is known. To name it
Religion may, indeed, be very inadequate ; neither
etymologically or practically can that word do more
than preserve the distinction and witness the existence
of that which language cannot define; but as in
accuracy of words like “ sunrise ” and “ sunset ”
cannot now mar the glories they suggest, so no
etymologic fault can disparage that only catholic
name we have (Religion) so long as it is left
us by Sectarianism and Superstition to designate
the universal aspirations of mankind. Christianity
can only claim to be a religion; it cannot claim
to be Religion. No sect can claim to be Religion
itself. That is an older banner than any existing
nation or church; under its broad folds and
heaven-born tints thousands of sects have perished;
it widens with the ages, blends with all grandeurs
without and within, leads onward the steady march of
�i8
man with his world to that supreme beauty which
enchains his senses and enchants his heart.
For essential religion no adequate word or definition
has ever been discovered, or is likely to be discovered.
If the lecturer’s statement there halts, it is because
the Infinite, the Perfect, cannot be defined. To call
it the Infinite leaves the moral sentiment unexpressed.
To call it “ morality touched with enthusiasm,” leaves
the progressive life untold. The philosophers of Germany
and America in the beginning of this generation called
it Transcendentalism;—but that white light wanted
fire, and faded. Some have called it absolute Being.
Jesus called it Love; and no fairer emblem of it was
ever named than that supreme glory which quickens
the world, from the marriage of flower with flower
which to-day clothes the earth with blossoms, to the
mother and her babe, and all the manifestations of
that unselfish joy which alone can transfigure human
passions. But man needs Light as well as Love.
And so it is that the highest in us is as ineffable as that
which it seeks. When we have dwelt on its varied
intimations ; when we have thought of Ideality and
Poetry, perfect Being, the Infinite, the Immortal,
Supreme Reason, pure Beauty, universal Love—even
then the wise heart is conscious that it has touched
but a few chords of the harp with a thousand strings ;
and when the thousand strings have all been swept,
�i9
when human language has rehearsed all its concepts
and its dreams to the last accent, yet in the silent
heart the still small voice will go on sweetly singing of
a dawn fairer than all the rest.
Waterldw & Sons Limited, Printers, London Wall, London.
�WORKS TO BE OBTAINED IN THE LIBRARY.
BY M. D. CONWAY, M.A.
PRICES,
s.
The Sacred Anthology: A Book
of Ethnical Scriptures ..
The Earthward Pilgrimage
Do.
do.
Republican Superstitions..
Christianity
.........................
Human Sacrifices in England ..
David Frederick Strauss ..
Sterling and Maurice
Intellectual Suicide
The First Love again
Our Cause and its Accusers
Alcestis in England
Unbelief: its nature, cause, and cure
Entering Society.........................
The Religion of Children
The Peri! of War
10
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2
2
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d.
0
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6
6
6
0
3
2
2
2
1
2
2
2
2
2
Idols and Ideals fincluding the Essay
on Christianity^, 350 pp............................ 7
6
NEW WORK BY M. D. CONWAY, M.A.
Members of the Congregation, can obtain this
work in the Library at 5/-.
BY A. J. ELLIS, B.A., F.R.8., &c., &c.
Salvation ..........
0
Truth
.......................................................0
Speculation
........................ ;
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0
Duty
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The Dyer's Hand ........
0
2
2
2
2
2
BY REV. P. H. WICKSTEED, M.A.
Going Through and Getting Over
..
0
2
BY REV. T. W. FRECKELTON.
The Modern Analogue of the Ancient
Prophet ..........
02
BY W. C. COUPLAND, M.A.
The Conduct of Life
Hymns and Anthems
..
..
..
0
2
V; 2f: 3/.
�
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Victorian Blogging
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A collection of digitised nineteenth-century pamphlets from Conway Hall Library & Archives. This includes the Conway Tracts, Moncure Conway's personal pamphlet library; the Morris Tracts, donated to the library by Miss Morris in 1904; the National Secular Society's pamphlet library and others. The Conway Tracts were bound with additional ephemera, such as lecture programmes and handwritten notes.<br /><br />Please note that these digitised pamphlets have been edited to maximise the accuracy of the OCR, ensuring they are text searchable. If you would like to view un-edited, full-colour versions of any of our pamphlets, please email librarian@conwayhall.org.uk.<br /><br /><span><img src="http://www.heritagefund.org.uk/sites/default/files/media/attachments/TNLHLF_Colour_Logo_English_RGB_0_0.jpg" width="238" height="91" alt="TNLHLF_Colour_Logo_English_RGB_0_0.jpg" /></span>
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Conway Hall Library & Archives
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2018
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Conway Hall Ethical Society
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What is religion? : a discourse given at South Place Chapel, May 5th 1878
Creator
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Conway, Moncure Daniel [1832-1907.]
Description
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Place of publication: London
Collation: 19, [1] p. ; 15 cm.
Notes: Part of Morris Miscellaneous Tracts 1. List of works to be obtained from the Library of South Place Chapel at end of pamphlet. Printed by Waterlow and Sons, London Wall. About F. Max Muller's First Hibbert Lecture on 'The Perception of the Infinite' given at Westminster Abbey in April 1878.
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[South Place Chapel]
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[1878]
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G3338
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Religion
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<img src="http://i.creativecommons.org/p/mark/1.0/88x31.png" alt="Public Domain Mark" /><br /><span>This work (What is religion? : a discourse given at South Place Chapel, May 5th 1878), identified by </span><span><a href="https://conwayhallcollections.omeka.net/items/show/www.conwayhall.org.uk">Humanist Library and Archives</a></span><span>, is free of known copyright restrictions.</span>
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Text
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English
God (Christianity)
Moral Philosophy
Morality
Morris Tracts
Religion and science
Science and Religion
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Text
RELIGION AND SCIENCE.
*
BY PBOF. J. D. BELL.
HAT do we know? This is the ultimate question in
speculation, and on its decision depends the future of
thought. To those unused to thinking it may seem
very simple and easily answered. But the more we reflect
upon it; the more we study its scientific, historical and social aspects;
the more are we convinced that it is the abstrusest and most farreaching inquiry ever put by man to himself or to his fellows; and
hence there have been (since it was first broached) almost as many
responses as thinkers. As only confusion and misunderstanding can
result from ignoring the real issue, let us formulate it in its full force.
It is as follows: Have we any real knowledge, either direct or inferen
tial, of the Supernatural, call it First Cause, Absolute, or Infinite ? In
$ word, have we any such knowledge as would warrant us in asserting
or denying the existence of such a being ? or in asserting or denying.
the existence of any or all attributes, which the reverential feelings of
humanity in times past have applied to the object of their adorations ?
Let it be noted that the argument does not now turn on whether or
not we have innate ideas—something in the mind antecedent to all ex
perience of the external world. Indeed, it is perfectly competent to
take the negative on the alleged knowledge of the Supernatural, while
at the same time fully accepting intuition.f Provided our innate ideas
be solely phenomenal, we can take whichever side we please in the
great controversy of Locke and Leibnitz. The question of the origin
of our knowledge is very important still'and was much more so in the
past, but this importance is secondary. The extent of that knowledge
is the prime question to which all others, must bow.
Upon reflection it must be evident that the question as above stated
W
* A Review of Herbert Spencer.
+ The current empiricism seems utterly unphilosophical. For the organization
of the brain must be antecedent to all experience whatsoever; even extending the
Lockeian conception to the race or to all life (as Mr. Spencer does), only pushes the
difficulty further back ; but does not solve it. The “ mirror,” “ slate,” and “ sheet
of white paper,” theories of the mind are mere verbal fallacies. Life, be it in a zo
ophyte or in man, must precede all experience; and as thought is but the highest
expression of life, this is the same as saying that our mental apparatus possesses
innate (organic) ideas.
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is capable of solution, and that that solution will rigidly exclude all
others. It is not meant that at a single sitting the question can be
settled. Men do not so give up cherished opinions. They are only
abandoned when seen to be contradictory to decisive experiences. As
long as they do not perceive the contradiction, men can sincerely hold
the most contradictory views. But when the discrepancy is perceived,
they never rest until it is removed. It must be noted, too, that in all
cases of psychological surgery the operation is not performed until a
new organ is prepared to take the place of the old; which- new organ
not only supplies the vacancy, but goes further, filling what was left
empty by its predecessor, and locating functions before almost useless
from positional instability. It was thus with Newton’s law of Gravita
tion ; with the great generalization of Dr. J. R. Mayer, Joule, Grove,
et al., known as the Conservation of Force; with the Darwinian law of
Natural Selection ; and it will be so with the relations of the natural
and the supernatural. And as in the former the explanation of other
wise inexplicable occurrences is easily obtained by means of the law, so
in the latter the difficulties inherent in every compromise will disappear
in the real solution.
I.
It is admitted on all sides that a controversy exists. Thinkers are
not so well agreed as to its nature or solution. The object of the
present essay is threefold. To briefly examine this controversy; the
compromises to which it has given rise; and the solutions proposed.
Many of the thoughts here put forth were suggested by the writer’s
opposition to Mr. Herbert Spencer’s Reconciliation of Religion and
Science, which he believes to be erroneous and misleading; the exposi
tion will consequently take somewhat of the form of an inquiry into
the truth of some fundamental assertions made by that philosopher.
As I shall, unfortunately, have more occasion for dissenting from Mr.
Spencer’s mode of reasoning than the reverse, it is the more directly
incumbent upon me to bear witness to the largeness of his views, and
to his acuteness in analysis and,extraordinary powers of co-ordination.
Though considering the task undertaken by him ifiipossible, and his
synthesis of the knowable far from being true as a whole and in many
parts totally false, I acknowledge that the world owes him a debt of
gratitude for provoking healthful speculation by the lucid expression
of his own suggestive thoughts.
When did the controversy begin ? " Of all antagonisms of belief,”
says Mr. Spencer, “the oldest, the widest, the most profound and the
*
most important is that between Religion and Science. It commenced
when the recognition of the simplest Uniformities in surrounding
* First Principles of a System
Part I. The Unknowable, p, 11.
of
Philosophy. 2ded. New York, 1868.
�RELIGION AND SCIENCE.
,
/
123
things set a limit to the previously universal fetishism. It shows itself
everywhere throughout the domain of human knowledge: affectingmen’s interpretations alike of the simplest mechanical accidents and
of the most complicated events in the histories of nations.” Is this
very comprehensive assertion true ? On its face it appears to be his
torical, but the sources of it are not indicated. It is to be regretted
that very many contemporary writers, and Mr. Spencer among them,
refuse their readers the privilege of checking their statements by
references to the authorities for their facts.
*
The practice of citation
'though onerous on the writer, should never be allowed to fall into
desuetude, as it saves him from hasty generalizations or at least guards
against their banefulness, while at the same time forming an admirable
logical exercise for the reader. In this case a search for such authori
ties would have preserved our author from a totally groundless state
ment. Faith other than that in evidence being out of place in his
torical discussions, let us apply some well-known facts to this very con
fident assertion.
1. The Bible being in every one’s hands will furnish a first test.
The Old Testament Scriptures show us a state of society in which the
recognition of uniformities had not only set limits to a previously uni
versal fetishism, but, according to Mr. Spencer himself, a state in
which this recognition had been carried so far as to differ in little but
name from what M. Comte designated as the perfection of the meta■ physical and positive (or scientific) systems respectively.! In this very
favorable case for Mr. Spencer, it is safe to say, after careful study, that
no such antagonism is found. Antagonisms did exist, but they were
political—questions of ethics and government, and not in any sense
discussions about the origin and extent of our knowledge.! For in
stance, men might and did deny that a certain man was sent by God,
but was it ever doubted that some men were sent by God ? Again, it
might be denied that certain rules of conduct were revealed by God,
but did any one ever doubt that God revealed some rules ? Finally,
men might deny the authenticity of certain traditions, said to have
been revealed, but did they ever doubt the existence of revelation ?
After this cursory vjew and argument which every reader can extend
and verify for himself, it is hardly presumptuous to deny that this assumed antagonism affects <( men’s interpretations alike of the simplest
. I mechanical accidents and of the most complicated events in the hisL tories of nations.” Both these and all such occurrences were believed
* “Many authors entertain,not only a foolish, but a really dishonest objection to
acknowledge from whence they derive much valuable information.”—Charles
Dickens—“ The Pickwick Papers.”
®
. f The Classification of the Sciences. 2d ed. New York, 1870, pp. 35, 36.
t Revue des Deux Mondes. 1867, t. LXIX,pp. 818-850 and LXX. pp. 147-179.
“ Les Prophetes d’Israel,” and Id. t. LXXXIII, pp. 76-112. “ La Religion primitive
d’lsrael,” Essays by Albert Reville, in review of Dr. Kuenen’s researches.
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RELIGION AND
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to be due to the anger of the deity,—the conception of Law versus
Miracle having never entered the Hebrew mind as far as can be gath
ered from their sacred books.
2. Passing over the Koran, which, with the Hebrew Scriptures, may
be said to contain the general speculation of the Semite man, and to
which an identical train of reasoning will apply, let us turn to the
Aryan man. The early thought of this race is preserved in three wellknown compilations: the Veda for the Hindus; the Zend-Avesta for
the Persians; and the Homeric Poems for the Greeks. A candid ex
amination of these works conclusively shows that this assumed antag
onism did not exist at the time they were composed. There is antag
onism in all, but it is person against person, and not ‘uniformities
against persons. In the Veda the Devas (or ‘bright ’ gods,) fight and
conquer their enemies—the ‘ dark ’ powers of nature; but he would be
a bold man who should assert that the former were laws and the lattei
persons. The bright gods are themselves superseded in the ZendAvesta ; but is it in favor of uniformities ? Not at all. The radiating
gods (Light, Fire, etc., conceived as persons) take their places; but
the mode of interpretation has not varied. Lastly: the Honieric
Poems are almost as well known as the Bible; has this antagonism
been found in them ? It will be perhaps a sufficient and conclusive
answer to this interrogatory to cite the opinion of Mr. Grote, the great
est living authority on “ the free life of Hellas.” Discussing this ques
tion in. the sixteenth chapter (Part I) of his “ History of Greece,”* he
reaches the conclusion that in the Homeric age “ no such contention
had yet begun,” though the elements of it seem to have existed, the
Moerse (or Fates) at rare intervals overruling the decisions of Zeus.
Unfortunately for Mr. Spencer’s argument, however, these Moerae were
not uniformities, but persons, like Zeus himself. As the world of
speculation may be said to be divided between the Aryan man and the
Semite, and as no such antagonism has appeared in the early specula
tions of either, Mr. Spencer’s account of the commencement of the
controversy must be rejected.!
The foregoing was written before the appearance of Mr. Herbert
* 3d Edition, London, 1851, Vol. I, p. 483. See also Chap. LXVIII (Part II)—
Sokrates.
f The following interesting diagram, showing the religions of the world whose
rites are found systematized in books, is transferred from the second of the “ Lec
tures on the Science of Religion,” by Professor Max Muller, which appeared in
“ Frazer’s Magazine ” for May, 1870, pp. 581-593. The whole six lectures of the
course, delivered last winter before the Royal Institution of London, will appear in
successive issues of “ Fraser,” commencing with April. The attention of thinkers
is invited to them, not indeed as being likely to contain anything very new, but as
showing the drift of even orthodox thought. Surely the world is not standing still
when an Oxford professor can coolly inform his brilliant Christian audience that to
the scientific man all revelation must stand on the same footing, and that the mere
assertion of its votaries that a religion is revealed affords no-presumption in its
favor, (p. 590.) These lectures can be very advantageously compared with six fine
essays by Simile Burnouf on “La Science des Religions ; sa Methode et ses Lim-
�RELIGION AND
SCIENCE.
125
Spencer’s paper “ On the Origin of Animal Worship, etc.,” * which Sug
gested the propriety of so far extending the limits of the present article
as to admit a few remarks on the interesting subject there discussed.
The ostensible aim of that essay is to give the genesis of the important
historical facts which Mr. J. F. McLennan had recently published in the
“ Fortnightly Review.”! This acute sociological observer collected from
all sources a mass -of data bearing on the early worship of our race; and
upon them, aided by the law of exogamy, viz.: that among savages, in
order to guard against incest, marriage only takes place between indi
viduals belonging to different "clans or stock families —all persons
*
having the same tribal name (“the lion,” “the turtle,” “the beaver,”
etc.) being considered of the same family,J founded an hypothesis or
ites.”—Revue des deux Mondes, December 1st and 15th, 1864; April 15th, August
15th and October 1st, 1868 ; and July 15th, 1869.
The diagram is as follows:
SEMITIC FAMILY .
ARYAN FAMILY.
Veda
Brahmanism
Old Testament
Mosaism
. Zend-Avesta
Zoroastrianism
TripiZaka
Buddhism
TURANIAN
New Testament
Christianity
|
Koran
ARYAN ________
|
Mohammedanism
The Professor adds that China became the mother of two religions at almost the
same time, each founded on a sacred code—the religion of Confucius and that of
Lao-tse; the former resting on the Five King and Four Shu, and the latter on the
Tao-tei King. The eight codes here given form the Sacred library of the world.
The diagram shows that each of the great families in which speculation is indig
enous has given birth to three separate forms of religion. Brahmanism and Bud
dhism are directly affiliated, as are Mosaism and Christianity, while Zoroastrianism
and Mohammedanism are only indirectly connected to the parent code. There is
another curious fact pointed out by Muller, that both Buddhism and Christianity
failed to take permanent root in their own families, and were compelled to abandon
the fruitless task of ‘ reformation ’ with which they both set out. It should be also
noted that the former went to a family lower than itself, cerebrally, while the lat
ter came to one higher. There is another interesting fact to be gathered from the
appended rough census of religions: it is that Christianity and Buddhism unite
’ noarly two thirds of the human race. As quoted from Berghaus’ Physical Atlas
by Max Muller, (“ Chips; from a German Workshop,” Vol. I, p. 158,) the figures ac
companying each form of religion indicate the percentage of the human race
swayed by its dogmas:—Buddhism, 31.2 per cent; Christianity, 30.7 ; Mohammed
anism, 15.7; Brahmanism, 13.4; Jews, 0.3 and Heathens 8.7.
* “ Fortnightly Review,” May, 1870, pp. 535-550.
f “ The worship of Animals and Plants,” Id., Oct. 1st and Nov. 1st, 1869, and
Feb. 1st, 1870. These essays will well repay perusal.
| “ Primitive Marriage,” by J. F. McLellan, 1865; also, “Kinship in Ancient
Greece,” by the same, “ Fortnightly Review,” April 15,1866, pp. 569-588; as well as
“ The Early History of Mankind,” by E. B. Tylor, London, 1865.
On “ Exogamy,” Mr. Darwin has the following remarks, which show how deeply
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RELIGION AND
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working theory. Briefly stated, it is as follows : All the ancient nations
passed through “ Totemism ” before attaining the higher religious rites.
' Totem is a name borrowed from the Indians of our continent, and sig
nifies a protecting spirit, or, as the Canadians call it, “ Medicine.” The
Totem may be either animal or vegetable. The permanent name of the
stock-tribe was derived from it, and it early became a kind of vague
sin, if an animal to kill it, if a vegetable to gather’it, and in either case
to eat of it. This prohibition, known as “ tabu,” is absolute among
the Fijians, it being criminal to partake of the Totem-god. In Egypt,
the deity side of the Totem was still more developed, live animals
having real religious rites in their honor. The same also occurred in
India, as is very conclusively shown in Mr. Fergusson’s magnificent
“ Tree and Serpent Worship.” In a word, traces of this embryo cultus
are found everywhere among even the most civilized nations of
antiquity—polytheism itself being apparently but a pantheon of Totems
derived from each of the separate stocks represented in the nation, and
modified by the increasing refinement of manners and advancement in
speculation. Mr. McLennan further believes that to Totemism, and
not to any pretended likeness, we can trace the names of the signs of
the Zodiac and of the constellations, Bear, Dog, Swan, etc.; these
designations being then given to new discoveries in the heavens, as
marks of the esteem in which the terrestrial animals so named were
held, just as, for some years, the planet discovered by the illustrious Sir
that illustrious biologist has penetrated into ancient thought. They fbnh a happy
contrast to the nonsense so current in relation to “ hygienic practices,” “ confusion
of descent,” etc., etc.:
“ It would be interesting to know, if it could be ascertained, as throwing light
on this question with respect to man, what occurs with the higher anthropomor
phous apes—whether the young males and females soon wander away from their
parents, or whether the old males become jealous of their sons and expel them, or
whether any inherited instinctive feeling, from being beneficial has been generated,
leading the young males and females of the same families to prefer pairing with
distinct families, and to dislike pairing with each other. A considerable body of
evidence has already been advanced showing that the offspring from parents which
are not related are more vigorous and fertile than those from parents which are
closely related; hence any slight feeling, arising from the sexual excitement of
novelty or other cause, which led to the former rather than to the latter unions,
would be augmented through natural selection, and thus might become instinctive;
for those individuals which had an innate preference of this kind would increase in
number. It seems more probable, that degraded savages should thus unconsciously
have acquired their dislike and even abhorrence of incestuous marriages, rather
than that they should have discovered by reasoning and observation the evil
results. * * * In the case of man, the question whether evil follows from close
interbreeding will probably never be answered by direct evidence, as he propagates
his kind so slowly and cannot be subjected to experiment; but the almost universal
practice of all races at all times of avoiding closely-related marriages is an argu
ment of considerable weight; and whatever conclusion we arrive at in regard to
the higher animals maybe safely extended toman.”—The Variation of Animals
and Plants under Domestication. 2 vols. New York, without date. Chap. XVII,
Vol. II, pp. 153, 154.
In connection with this question, it would be interesting to know on which part
of the system—the muscular or the nervous—close interbreeding reacts most unfa
vorably. From many well-known facts it would seem to be the latter—but it
should be experimentally settled.
�♦
RELICION AND
SCIENCE.
127
W. Herschel was named from him, and as many proposed' to call the
planet Neptune “ Le Verner,” in honor of one of its mathematical
discoverers. ■ •
In the development of his thesis, Mr. McLennan had taken for
granted that what is variously known as fetishism or animism repre
sented the view of the early men on the producing causes of phe
nomena ; in other words, that to savages, the conception of life and
volition was unlimited. A tree, a stone, the. wind, the earth, sun,
moon, etc., might have the one and exercise the other. He also
remarked, that Totemism, “ the worship of animals and plants,” pre
ceded in historical order anthropomorphism or the worship of man.
The former theory of early thought Mr. Spencer regards as totally
false; and to the latter statement he can only accord a qualified accept
ance. Dealing with it first, he says, that while if we restrict the word
worship to its present meaning, Mr.'McLennan’s theory is true, still, if
we go to the foot of the matter—to the very origin of this Totemism
itself—it requires great modification. “ The rudimentary form of all
religion,” says he (p. 536), “ is the propitiation of dead ancestors, who'
are supposed to be still existing, and to be capable of working good
or evil to their descendants.” This belief in everlasting life he thinks
generated out of the savage conception of present human existence as
double, which belief in its turn he traces to the following leading expe
riences: (1) The man’s shadow, which accompanies him continually;
r - (2) the reflection of his face and figure in water, which seems another
self, or rather an emanation from self; (3) echoes, which appear to be
voices eluding his search; (4) dreams—“the root of this belief in
another self lies in the experience of dreams;” (5) suspended anima
tion, apoplexy, catalepsy, etc. And from all these the savage view of
death is generalized, viz.: that the man has but abandoned his resi
dence and may return to it again; and, consequently, that having
given favors while present, he still remains capable of doing so in his
absence. The question at once arises, if this theory be true, how came
men to worship animals and plants, as, from the conclusive evidence
adduced, Mr. Spencer acknowledges they did ? Very simply, says our
author. Men named (or as he prefers to designate the process, “ nick
named ”) each other from the phenomena of nature, in accordance with
some real likeness between them; such as “the bear,” for a rough or
unmannerly person; “ the sly old fox,” for a cunning person; “ car
rots,” for a red-haired person; “ the mountain,” for a fat person, etc.
This is the sole origin of proper names which become surnames by
hereditary descent. Thus, in case the ancestor has done some notable
action, his children will be proud of it and retain it. Now, when once
two things have the same name, owing to the “ concreteness ” of primi
tive language, the distinction in nature is lost, and what belongs to the
one is unconsciously applied to the other. Hence comes the belief
that the animal is the ancestor of the tribe; hence worship is offered
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RELIGION AND
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to it; and hence, finally, there appears in history the semblance of
fetishness or animism. In a word, Mr. Spencer regards the embryo
religious cultus, Totemism; and the primeval scientific hypothesis,
fetishism or animism, simply as “ habitual misrepresentations,” caused
by words.
This extraordinary hypothesis attempts to account for three things
—(1) for men’s names; (2) for their “worship of animals and plants”;
and (3) for their fetishism. The following reasons show their incom
pleteness, even if they do not refute Mr. Spencer’s conclusions.
I. The slender evidence afforded by his Scotch excursion and by
the customs of some manufacturing districts, hardly warrants the
sweeping deduction that this “ bow-wow ” mode of naming men is the
sole and original one. All travelers inform us that the natives gladly
call their children after them. Among ourselves the same thing takes
plaoe. How many Washingtons, Lincolns, Jeffersons, Jacksons are
there ? We know that occupations gave names to men; as did their
places of residence. They were and are “ nick-named ” from the color
of their skin (“ nigger ”—Gr; Aithiops); from their gait in walking
(“limper”); from defects in pronunciation (“stutterer”); from im
portant events, either sad or joyful (“ Ichabod,” the glory is departed
from Israel, etc.); from acts, either voluntary or involuntary (“Jacob,”
supplanter; “ Karfa,” replacer); * from good or bad qualities; and it
is said that, in some parts of Ireland, servants often address each other
by their master’s surname. Mr. Spencer asserts that we must carry
back our present mode of “ nick-naming ” to the infancy of the race.
Very good! But the mode is not single (unfortunately for his hypo
thesis) but infinitely complex. To form a true conception of the sub
ject, therefore, we must take all the facts—not one. If we do so, a
glance will show how impossible it is to accept Mr. Spencer’s theory.
All the modes of naming here pointed out, and there are many more,
should have given rise, if the “ word ” be omnipotent, to the worship
of everything which ever gave a name to man. Has it done so ?
II. In the next place, even granting Mr. Spencer’s “ nick-name ”
theory (which we are far from doing), it leaves the real question with
out solution. What did men first name—those things which im
pressed them as most important or as least important ? Men are nick* “Travels in, etc., of Africa;” by Mungo Park. New Ed. London, 1823.
Ch. XX, p. 408, ff. Especial attention is called to this brief but suggestive sketch
of the Mandingoes, their mode of “ naming,” etc. He adds: “ Among the negroes
every individual, besides his own proper name, has likewise a Tcontong or surname,
to denote the family or clan to which he belongs ; . . . . and he is much flattered
when addressed by it.” This looks like the “ Kobong ” of the New Zealanders and
the “ Totem ” of our North American Indians. There is a good account of the In
dian mode of choosing an occupation, in the paper from the N. A. Review, referred
to on p. 132, note. See also “ Nouveau voyage dans le Pays des Negres, etc.,”
par M. Anne Raffenel. Paris, 1856. T. I, p. 403, on naming children; and p. 237,
ff., for an account of the Bambara god—Bowri. The whole volume is worthy of
attention.
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t RELIGION
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SCIENCE.
129
named from natural objects, but what were these objects named from ?
On this supremely important point our philosopher has thrown no light.
Now, no matter what theory may be held on the origin of language,
the thought of the name-giver, be it ever so crude, must have exercised
a preponderating influence in the formation of the symbol. Language
. in its beginnings is analytical; the name separates the thing receiving
it from certain other things. Dr. Latham thinks, correctly enough, ■
*
that it is the attribute creating the feeling which suggests the name •
and that the other attributes connected with the cause are practically
non-existent. But his opinion, that the intellect has little to do with
the operation, seems erroneous—as emotion is at least as strong in
animals as in ourselves, yet without producing articulate speech. If
we apply this view to the case in hand, we see that the fact (admitted
by Mr. Spencer) of external objects being first named, proves that,
whether really so or not, they were to men in that state more, import
ant than their fathers, who were only named after them. But as men in
all ages have really made deities of the objects most important to them,
and as philological research shows that naming followed a similar
course, it follows that Mr. Spencer’s hypothesis cannot be true. For,
if so, men would have named and worshipped the least important
things. While, secondly, if language be essentially analytical, the very
fact that no Word represented the inanimate as distinguished from the
animate, shows plainly that the distinction had not been perceived. It
is, indeed, somewhat surprising that Mr. Spencer should throughout
his paper have spoken as if words were like the “themistes” of the
old Greeks,—things breathed into man from without, and hence entirely
separate from his mental apparatus. It is conceded that there can be
thought without language, but can there be language without thought ?
It should never be forgotten that the world (objective to man) always
supplies the subject-matter of thought, while the mind itself con
nects these objects together. “ Things in motion,” said Shakespeare,
“sooner catch the bye than what not stirs.” Consequently, we find
the early men slaves to the dynamical aspects of nature,—all the oc
currences requiring explanation were explained by some force. Now,
it cannot be questioned that the force best known to men was the
organic feeling of life—vital force; nor can it be doubted that they
always explain the less known by the more known. Hence, the
fetishistic view of nature as alive, and the theological or volitional
hypothesis, of the universe, as created, supported, moved, etc., by the , I
will of a god. It is only much later that, by the progress of sci
ence, a more correct view of nature is obtained. Then comes into
view the great law, applied in physics by Bacon, and distinctly for
* “ Elements of Comparative Philologyby R. GE Latham, F. R. S., etc.
London, 1862 ; p. 737. See also the ninth of Max Muller’s “ Lectures on the Sci
ence of Language;” I. Series. New York, 1862; and the eleventh of Prof. Whit
ney’s “ Lectures on Language, etc.” New York, 1867.
*
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«
RELIGION AND SCIENCE.
mulated by M. Comte, as applicable to all phenomena,—that our
theories, the connections furnished by the mind itself, should be
subordinated to our objective materials. In a word, that observation
must be supreme; all theories not founded on observed facts and
against which any future observed facts can be opposed, must, ac
cording to it, be abandoned.
The assumed “ concreteness ” of words has, therefore, nothing to
do originally with the confusion, which modern thinkers have named
variously the fetishistic or animistic hypothesis. All words are by no
means ‘concrete’ (in Mr, Spencer’s sense) at the earliest period.
But even if they were, it could only show that, as the analytical
faculties and language are correlated, the correctness of the word
arose from confusion in the thought.
*
Its cumbrousness has not been urged against Mr. Spencer’s theory.
We do not know whether nature intended things to be simple or
not, and, therefore, complexity affords no presumption against a pro
posed scheme for connecting them. But there is one point which
cannot be passed over in silence. If men, when they first named
the phenomena of nature, , drew a perfectly definite distinction be
tween animate and inanimate, between human and merely animal,
and if they afterwards confused the two together, by “ the worship
of animals and plants,” imagining them to be their ancestors, then
it follows that, as men advanced in civilization, they retrograded in
powers of analysis. In other words, civilization (or progress) depends,
in part at least, on well directed emotions; to seek out this proper di
rection is a process of analytical reasoning; still, as man ascended the
scale on the one side, he was going down on the other. When it is re
membered that the lower races fail most-conspicuously in analysis,—
even among the Chinese, it is.said, there is not a single native mathema
tician,—such a deduction from a sweeping theory is likely "to give us
pause and make us rather bear the ills we have than fly to other that
we know not of.” Mr. Spencer thinks that his theory affords a better
explanation of the facts of mythology than the current hypothesis. If
the latter be taken with Mr. McLennan’s " totem” supplement, this does
not seem to be true. Nor do the instances given by him furnish con* Those wishing to follow up the subject of fetishism are referred to Mr. E. B.
Tylor, “ The Early History of Mankind ” (London, 1865), and “ The Religion of
Savages,” Fortnightly Review, Aug. 15, 1866, pp. 71-86; to Mr. G. Grote, “ The
History of Greece,” Part I, especially Ch. XVI, in which he endorses M. Comte’s
view (vol. I, p. 498); to R. F. Burton, “ The Lake Regions of Central Africa ”
(London, *1860), Ch. XIX, vol. II, pp. 324-378 ; and more especially to M. Auguste
Comte, Cours de Philosophie positive, lecjon 52, t. V, 1st ed., 1841, pp. 30-115, and
2d and 3d editions, edited by Littre, 1864, and 1869, pp 24-83. Now that the Sci
ence of Religions is taking its place in Sociology, the remarkable discussion of the
subject by M. Comte is worthy of attention. See work cited, lecons'52, 53, 54, con
tained in the fifth volume. The laws of mind, or the Philosophia primct, will be
found stated in Chapters III and IV of the fourth volume of the Politique positive.
Attention is also directed to the essays printed as an Appendix to that volume.
�HJiLlGIO.Y AND
SCIENCE.
131
vincing proofs of its truth—especially when coupled with the reasons
above given against its reception.
As to the unqualified assertion that, •“ the rudimentary form of all
religion is the propitiation of dead ancestors, etc.,” it is extremely rash
at the present day to decide such, a point ex cathedra. It must be ad
mitted that‘ propitiation ’ is one form, but it was totally impossible for
such a religion to become organizing. Until it superadds the ‘ thanks
giving’ form it remains always a rudiment, and hence merely merits
the name of one of the elements, out of which, when supplemented by
others, religious rites are developed. Propitiation is always joyless:
only when the man is sick and the family in distress is it thought
*
necessary. Being much more mercantile than religious, this propitia
tion belief, except in such moments, exerts little influence on its firm
est adherents. The mere make-shift for religion found among the
poorest and most degraded of humanity, it has the fatal want of contin
uity and reverence. Anything like a proper conception of religion
springs up only when men begin to be better fed. In such cases the
food presented to them appears a worthy object of reverence. And,
there can be little doubt that “grace before, meals” is a relic of Totem
ism still lingering among us, and one of the earliest real religious cus
toms of humanity. The numerous feasts of the ancient religions, and
the times they were held, “ harvest,” “sheep shearing,” etc., point to the
thanksgiving aspect of ancient faiths. While the traces of it, every
where apparent, demonstrate its greater importance in the immense
majority of cases. It can surely not be omitted in tracing the genesis
of religion.
As to the other part of the statement, the question at once arises, *
who in savage modes of thought were a man’s ancestors ? To the answer—solely his human progenitors—it may be objected, that though
this is the correct view and the popular one at present, nothing shows
it to have been held by the early thinkers. In their opinion, on the
contrary, all dynamical phenomena might produce men, and thus be
come ancestors of individuals or the race. Habitual misrepresentation
cannot account for such a belief. It is sui generis. In this connection
attention should be directed to two historical facts decidedly opposed
to Mr. Spencer’s hypothesis—(1) The religion of ancient Israel seems to
have been a nature worship in which the attributes of strength, stabil
ity, etc. (El, strong, Jahveh Zabaoth,pleader of the hosts of heaven),
were reverenced. The large element of fear in the primitive concep
tion, and which was never discarded, as its usual concomitant, led to
the most onerous propitiatory ceremonial.f But as far as can be gath
ered from the researches of the learned, no man-worship appears in it
from beginning to end. Indeed it is a well known historical fact that
* See a fine account of one of these ceremonies in “The Zulu-land,” by Rev.
Lewis Grout, Phila.: 1864, chap. xi. pp. 132-162.
+ See Reville’s Essay on “ The Primitive Religion of Israel,” mentioned above.
g
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the conception of a god-man, so familiar to the Greeks, was so utterly
distasteful to the Jews as to lead more than anything else to the
destruction of Christ. The second fact is still more germane to the
subject—“ In no Indian language could the early missionaries find a
word to express the idea of God. Manitou and Okie meant anything
endowed with supernatural powers, from a snake-skin or a greasy Indian
conjurer up to Manabozho and Jonskeha (kind of creator of the World).
The priests were forced to use a circumlocution, ‘ The Great Chief of
Men/ or ‘ The Great Manitou who lives in the Sky.’ Yet it should
seem that the idea of a supreme controlling spirit might naturally arise
from the peculiar character of Indian belief. The idea that each race
of animals has its archetype or chief, would easily suggest the existence
of a supreme chief of the spirits or of the human race—a conception
imperfectly shadowed forth in Manabozho. The Jesuit missionaries
seized this advantage. ‘If each sort of animal has its king/ they
urged, e so, too, have men; and as man is above all the animals, so is
the spirit that rules over man the master of all the other spirits.’ The
Indian mind readily accepted the idea, and tribes in no sense Christian
quickly rose to the belief in a one controlling spirit. The Great Spirit
became a distinct existence, a prevailing power in the universe, and a
dispenser of justice.” *
Mr. Spencer’s humanistic hypothesis seems utterly irreconcilable
with either of these facts. In this latter, each sort of animal had its
king, and still man had none. The author of the paper from which
the above extract has been made, shows very clearly the heterogeneous
elements out of which even so rudimentary a religion as these Indians
* had, Was formed. It seems not to be “ habitual misrepresentation ”
that leads men to worship the elements,—thunder, lightning,—but what
leads them in other circumstances to offer the best cow to the enraged
shade of their father, viz: the conception of power over their destinies
to be remorselessly used to their disadvantage. In a word, complexity
in genesis and. development is what above everything we must bear in
mind in tracing the history of religions.
Finally, on the subject of naming Mr. Spencer has adduced no proof
whatsoever that stock-names derived from Totems are the residua of
the nick-naming process which he so graphically describes. Indeed it
appears as if the stock-name stood on an entirely different footing,from what, by an anachronism, we may call the baptismal name. Park
and many other travelers show the way in which savages obtain the
latter, but they found the surname invariable,—each family being once
for all provided with such a designation. The whole subject deserves
careful study, but in the meantime a suggestion may not be out of
place. Recurring to Mr. Darwin’s acute hint on the subject of exogamy,
might not names have been originally given to men in order to guard
against the possibility of incest, and incidentally to. bind them together
* “Indian Superstitions," North Am. Review, July 1866 (N. S.), Vol. CIII, p. 10.
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in war, blood, feud, etc.? Would not these names be derived from
what was to them the most important of surrounding existences ? and
would not these in the very rudest times be their food—the animals
and plants on which they lived ? To the savage emaciated by hunger,
food-must have seemed the greatest of life-givers. He, who a few
hours before, was lying pale, listless, taciturn, with muscles relaxed,
and nerves unstrung, now on the reception of food and with a slight
interval.for rest, appears as a new man—his carriage erect, with ruddy
color, voluble tongue, and nerve and muscle a’ctive. The kind of food
which they ate, first permanently divided men, and united them. Can
we wonder that when their circumstances improved, they should regard
with reverence, what preserved them alive and separated them from
all others. To the savage, life is the greatest of boons; why should
he then deprive of life the being which was his early life-giver?
Hence the Fijian “ tabu.” As to the belief that men were descended
from their Totems, it may have arisen out of the idea pointed out
above, viz: that food was the greatest of life-givers. It can hardly be
a reminiscence of the occurrence of any such fact—that is even if we
accept the Darwinian theory.
As to religion, the more it is studied the more apparent it is that
the deities of every people are divided into two great classes—extra
human and human. The former are from the first separated into two
*
kinds—-the one, the powers of nature, remote, terrible, recurring only
at intervals, contains the rudiments of what we know as the supernat
ural ; the other, present, familiar, but still marvelous, softens down the
fearful side of the former, and if allowed to proceed ends by sapping
its vitality. The religion of Israel seems to have been of the former *
kind; while the joyful religions of the Aryan nations, (specially but
wrongly designated as polytheistic, as if all religions were not both
monotheistic and polytheistic,) seem to have been of the latter. The
limits of the present essay merely permit the indication of this point,
together with the remark that with the decay of the extra-human dei
ties has grown the dignity of the human. Nature was the enemy of
man in the early times, and was consequently propitiated. Through
man’s inquiries it has become his friend, and is now vaguely rever
enced. Hence the pantheism so apparent at the present day. The
same thing has in a somewhat different mode taken place with man
himself,—he is now reverenced as a member of the great human fam
“ Polynesian Reminisceflces,” by W. T Prichard, F. R. G. S., etc. London, I860,
chap. V, pp. Ill, ff. “ Fiji and the Fijians,” by Thomas Williams. New York, 1859,
chap. VII. By the.way, there is much in this chapter utterly irreconcilable with
Spencer’s hypothesis. “ New Zealand, etc;: ” by Dr. Ferdinand von Hochstetter,
(Eng. trans, by E. Sauter.) Stuttgart, 1867, chap. X, p. 209, and the opinions of
Schieren there referred to. See also “ The Lake Regions of Central Africa;’ by R.
F. Burton. London, 1860, Vol. II, chap XIX, pp. 324-378. He especially repudiates
the ‘euhemerism’ supported by Mr. Spencer. A work too little known should
also be consulted, “ The Rambles and Recollections of an Indian official,” by Lt. Col.
Wm. H. Sleeman. 2 vols. London, 1844.
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ily, and not, as in former times, because he holds sa high position.
Love has taken the place of fear. Indeed, so far has this view pene
trated even orthodox thought, and that too outside of Germany, that
it is being boldly claimed that religion is a psychological product, no
more revealed than language. Before resuming the argument proper,
it may be well to add that a great deal asserted by Mr. Spencer is admit
ted as both true and important; but from the considerations above ad
duced, it must appear that he has failed to support his hypothesis. In
such discussions as the present a thinker cannot too carefully guard him
self against the sarcasm of Xenophanes—that if horses had deities they
would have made them in their own likeness. This was partially true
as to the Greeks, but as to the lower races the reverse would be nearer
the truth. The best observers agree in asserting that there is no feel
ing of personal pride among the latter, and hence their great gods were
more likely to be taken objectively to the human race. Peoples proud
of their individualism seem alone to have what may really be called
human gods; but as such a feeling comes late in the race, Mr. McLen
nan’s assertion that the anthropomorphic gods succeeded to the animal
gods seems fully borne out. - The truth of the whole matter may be
thus expressed: the formative element of all religions is human, but
the matter varies with the people, its scale of civilization, physical sur
roundings, etc.
Who are Parties to this Controversy ?—Mr. Spencer, accepting the
popular opinion, answers, Religion and Science. In order to test the
truth of this response, let us place clearly before us what he and others
mean by these two terms. About Science there can be no difficulty. We
find spread out before us a universe, containing certain existences, mat
ter, life, society, exhibiting certain properties or forces, without which
we never find them. In order to predict their future manifestations,
which, theoretically and practically, contain matters of high interest to
us, we trace out their general facts or laws. Two things are to be
noted—subject-matter and method. The former, matter of various
kinds with its forces; the latter, a mode of investigating and classify
ing them, and a ctest of truth’for the conclusions reached. Now,
what is Religion ? This very important factor in Mr. Spencer’s alleged
antagonism is very vaguely dealt with. After following him carefully
throughout his exposition, the only inference to be drawn is that, hav
ing constantly heard from the pulpit and seen in the newspapers Reli
gion and Science pitted against each other, he accepted the statement
as true, and forthwith set about the task of reconciling them. He as
serts (F. P., p. 30) that “to the aboriginal man and to every civilized
child the problem of the Universe suggests itself;” and (p. 43) that,
“leaving out the accompanying moral code, which is in all cases a supple
mentary growth, a religious creed is definable as an A priori theory of
the universe.” Is the inquiry into the whence and whither of the uni
verse religious ? if so, what is scientific, as opposed to it ? Is a relig
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ious creed the.religion itself? if so, in what does it differ from science,
except that the creed of the one is subjective and the creed of the
other objective ? But if Mr. Spencer could escape from the difficulties
here raised (which he cannot), how can he reconcile these statements
with that on p. 17, that “Religion under all its forms is distinguished
from everything else in this, that its subject-matter is that which
passes the sphere of experience ? ” How further can he reconcile this
assertion with that on p. 44, that “"Religions diametrically opposed in
their overt dogmas are yet perfectly at one in the tacit conviction that
the existence of the world, with all it contains and all which surrounds
it, is a mystery ever pressing for solution?” If this mystery is ever'
*
pressing for solution, the Universe must be the subject-matter of relig
ious speculation, and consequently it is not “ that which passes the
sphere of experience.”
The Real Merits of the Case.—No matter how modified, no such
antagonism as Mr. Spencer conceives has existed; his definition of Re
ligion will not hold; and therefore no Reconciliation is called for.
What science has always opposed is religious creeds—not because they
asserted a mystery, but because they gave certain explanations of it.
Indeed, with the most unpardonable inconsistency, Mr. Spencer asserts
both and endeavors to reconcile them. But they are irreconcilable. It
is not about the subject-matter presented for interpretation, but about
the method of interpreting that subject-matter, that the controversy
originated and is now carried on by all those in earnest in the matter.
Further, as a statement of fact, we deny that the subject-matter of re
ligion has anywhere ever passed the bounds of -experience. Though it
may not be consonant to usage to so designate them, all religious creeds
whatsoever have been scientific—that is to say, attempts to explain the
*
Universe.
The idea of mystery, in Mr. Spencer’s sense, is not found
in ancient times; and the conception of an unattainable unknown, had
never presented itself to the primeval mind. How it could with a voli
tional (or, in Comtean phrase, ‘ theological ’) hypothesis, is a mystery
which no one until Mr. Spencer had attempted to solve. In the earli-‘
est times everything on which speculation was exercised was animated;
man’s theories did not rise above his feeling of power or muscular sen
sations. Then the fetish-man, the rain-maker, the medicine-man, the
sorcerer—each could do with nature as he wished: he could close the
windows of heaven that it should not rain, and open them again by in
cantation; he could literally kill and make alive. Later, gods had
large domains, they gave revelations, had prophets and oracles to clear
up the difficulties which should present themselves.f These it would
seem were very adequate precautions against the Unknowable.
This being premised, the controversy can be limited to the method
* Emile Burnouf’s essays referred to above—especially V, Rewe des deux Mondes,
Oct. 1,1868.
f On the subject of ‘ Prophecy ’ see Reville’s papers, referred to above.
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of explaining the facts presented by the universe. Now if we can in
terpret those facts in two opposed .modes there is hope of reconciling
the parties. How chimerical this is all thinkers know. The parties to
this controversy are not Religion and Science ; they are different phil
osophies or religious creeds. The whole war is carried on inside of
religion itself, the strife being for the chief place in its gift—that of
corner-stone of the great edifice, and, consequently, of being supreme
guide of mankind in all its relations, practical and theoretical, moral
and esthetic. The adversaries are three in number—theology, meta
physics, and science. The first, represented among us by Christianity
in all its varied forms, has in its hands nearly all the»machinery for
controlling men’s minds. It has immense sums of money; stately
churches; gorgeous ritual; eloquent, and in many cases honest preach
ers. But what is its record at the present day. It has been slowly
-giving way. It asserts that the world was created by-the deity’s voli
tion, and is still ruled by his ordinance—but how few of its intelligent
votaries dare state these things as they were ^stated in the past. The
six days of creation laid down in the Mosaic cosmogony are explained
away in such mode as to shock the moral sensibility of the conscien
tious, and provoke the questionings of the inquiring. Theologians
have for centuries defended their own doctrines very feebly; that task
has mostly fallen into the hands of metaphysicians, whose impress, in
the shape of ontological entities instead of the fine personal concep
tions of the older creed, is plainly ^visible. A metaphysical god has
taken the place of Jehovah; and we can even see, by the advance of
Unitarianism, etc., that these- conceptions, long masters of the indi
vidual in his closet, are endeavoring to become masters of society
through the pulpit. Both of these, though essentially disparate, regard
with fear the rise and steady advance of the scientific doctrine elabo
rated by the observational method. It asserts that we have been una
ble to reach any creation; and that far from any such event being
recent, as the ignorance of the past asserted, that of even our earth is
immensely remote. It further ‘shows that as far as we have gone laws,
not volitions, govern the universe; while (as indeed the scientific con
ception implies,) these laws do not depend upon any volitions. The
fecundity of this method and the sterility of that opposed to it; the
development of scientific doctrine and its continuous addition of new
domain, contrasted with the unprogressiveness of its opponents; and
its immense practical importance as opposed to their utter impotence
in the affairs of life, all point in the direction of its ultimate victory
Would it not be contradictory to all experience if such was not the
sure precursor of that end ? Here is one mode of explaining the uni
verse which asserts that man has had communion with God, and yet
has, in a modified form. Still we challenge it to show anything prac
tical ever thus reached. It was not surely by prayer that the Atlantic
telegraph was laid or the Pacific'railway built. Here is another that
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holds that man carries with him at all times a machine (mind) which
can inform him of absolute knowledge, ‘ the nature of things,’ etc.
But we did not go there to receive our oracles in relation to the proper
mode of laying that cable, or the proper route for that railway. Nor
do astronomers go there to learn the distances of the stars; nor chemioo-astronomers to learn their elements. Ancient traditions, dignified
as Revelation, but full of contradictions and notorious ignorance;
*
modern introspection, full of pretense and high-named “discoveries,”
but barren of result, have, forsooth, more titles to be called religions
than has science, with its homogeneous method, mutually verifying re
sults and immense practical importance. On the contrary it will be
found that in the present state of the human mind in Western Europe;
and America, science can do more to legitimately satisfy all its yearn
ings than the assertions of theologians or the reveries of introspectionists, no matter how sanctified by age or covered with words. If this is
not the object of religion, what is ?
It is currently supposed that this contention arose first and solely
in Greece, when physical speculation began. Kapila and Buddha, in
India, were at least as early as the sixth century before Christ, and possibly
earlier. These thinkers felt this contradiction^ and 'Buddha gave a so
lution of it, which is one of the most wonderful in speculative inquiry.
Kapila was the Hume of India, and it is doubtful if the subtile Scot
has improved much on the introspective Hindu. But no matter where
it arose, it is confined to the Aryan race; the observing race; the men
who prized knowledge, for that is the meaning of Veda, the title of
their Sruti (or revelation). This clash of methods continued in Europe
for some centuries, until Christianity finally put the old controversy to
rest. It slept for ages, but was resumed again on its ceremonial side
by the reformers of the fourteenth, fifteenth, and sixteenth centuries,
and on its speculative side by the physicists (more especially) after the
rise of the Italian school of scientists in the sixteenth century.
“ Clash of methods ” appears in the foregoing. To some readers it
may have occurred that not the methods, but the extent of our knowl
edge or assumed knowledge clash. This is true; but it is the method,
* The sterility of theological thought and the ignorance of Revelation is perhaps
shown by nothing more clearly than its account of a pretended fall of man. There
is almost complete certainty that it is just such a fiction as Rousseau’s ‘state of na
ture.’ Here are the remarks of Mr. E. B. Tylor: “The advocates of the theory
that savages are degenerate descendants _of civilized men have still full scope in
pointing out the imperfections of their adversaries’ evidence and argument. But
the new facts, as they come in month by month, tell steadily in one direction. The
more widely and deeply the study of ethnography is carried on, the stronger does
the evidence become that the condition of mankind in the remote antiquity of the
race, is not unfairly represented by modern savage tribes.”—“ Nature,” Nov. 25,
1869, p. 105-.
See also “ Pre-historic Times,” by. Sir J. Lubbock, Bart., F. R. S., etc. 2d Ed.,
London, 1869, passim.
Every intelligent reader is acquainted with the acute remarks of Thucydides on
the early state of man in the opening of his History.
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and the method alone which sets limits to our knowledge. With the
theological method—explanation by volitions—there can be no un
known ; it is only by means of the positive method—explanation by
law—that such an unknown arises as a definite conception. Kapila’s
dialectic limited the knowledge of men, subjectively considered, to the
most wonderful extent, and hence, on his acceptance of its results,
Buddha, in furtherance of its religious projects, was able to lopp off at
a single stroke nearly the whole ceremonial observances of India. The
(so-called) physical philosophers of Greece limited men’s knowledge,
objectively considered, and hence were able to overturn many of the
ancient idola of the human mind, and lay the foundation for future
*
progress.
II.
Having recognized that the controversy arose in India and in
Greece at least six centuries before Christ, and that the ultimate ques
tion is as to the extent of our knowledge, which is itself a question of
methods, let us now proceed to briefly review some of the compromises
to which it has given rise.
* . Kapila, with Kantian inconsistency, did not deny u revelation.”
He, an utter agnoiologist,f as much so as Buddha himself, accepted the
Veda. According to Max Muller, his arguments are very similar to
those used by Dean Mansel in his celebrated Bampton Lectures. Pass
ing into Greece, we find Anaxagoras supposing a controlling mind
(Nous) and matter. He forgets all about the mind, as was pointed
out by Plato and Aristotle, after formulating it at the beginning.
--------------------------------------------------- ?----- - ------------------------------ .
* Max Muller finely remarks (“ Chips from a German Workshop.” 2 vols.
New York, 1869. Vol. I, p. 65) that Hindu thought was a psychological experi
ment. The philosophers of India seem to have been impressed by the want of con
sonance between what they found in consciousness on mental examination, and
what should be in it according to the traditional theology. They reached as near
to a true psychology as unaided introspection ever can hope to do. Except within
very narrow limits introspection, no matter how honestly and carefully performed,
must be fallacious. Man, the individual, is there made the measure of the universe
of mind. But no proof has been adduced to show that any two men have con
sciousnesses alike, any more than they have feet, or hands, or eyes alike. In the
next place, consciousness improves with civilization and increased education; there
is, therefore, no reason to think that what a man in our day finds in his consciousness, was in that of his barbarous ancestor. The addition of opium and intoxica
ting liquors to nutrition shows how consciousness can be changed. How do we
know that it is not so, but less marked, with other articles of diet ? A breakfast
might, therefore, vitiate a whole psychological analysis. To obviate these diffi
culties, Psychology must be studied historically. The language, manners and
customs, religious ceremonies, laws, etc., must show us the ancient thought of the
race. The other view of the question seems to have struck the Greek—the extemal and not the internal, the historical and not the introspective. Hence the
fecundity of the beginning made by him. With the Hindu,. there was only a
subjective test of truth; the Greek founded an objective one—he declared in history
the omnipotence of evidence, and in physics the omnipotence of observation.
j- Gr. Agnoia, ignorance ; and logos, discourse. Applied to one who is ignorant
of the existence or non-existence of the gods.
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Sokrates * divided the universe into two parts; the physical half be
longing to the gods, into which men were interdicted from inquiring;
and the human half, which was open to their search. The Platonic
compromise was based on that great thinker’s mental analysis and his
torical inquiries; and is. presented to us in his abortive attempt at
social reform. When centuries afterwards Christianity put life into
this scheme—gave it an object around which to crystallize, a solution
and not a compromise was presented to the world. The Church was
very largely indebted to Greek thought for its speculative embodiment;
to Greek subtilty for the disgregation of thought which afforded its
doctrine such free scope; to the Greek genius of Alexander who placed
Greece beyond itself; and more than all, to Greece it was indebted for
its founder. The god-man is, as above remarked, Grecian, not Mosaic.f
But despite all this, the speculation of that great people, as far as or
ganization was considered, was a failure. They were, however, the
great seminal minds of the world. Much of the Church’s metaphysics
was borrowed from the dialectics of Plato and his followers; and
some of its rules bear the impress of “The Republic” and “The
Laws; ” and Aristotle’s philosophy, to a certain extent objective and
observational, served for ages as its physical dreed. Still we must re
member, neither the socialism of Plato coupled with his idealism, nor the
physicism of Aristotle coupled with his shadowy, metaphysical god,
were alone able to reconstruct the world. Christianity supplied the
emotional life, without which all the rest was vain.
Descending to modern times, we find the same desire as in the
ancient world to save some part of supernaturalism. Descartes form
ally abjured any social bearing which his “ Method ” might seem to
imply; and this abjuration evidently sprung from his desire to retain
his position in the Church. The powerful appeals of Bacon, together
with the discoveries of Galileo and the physicists, had compelled a re
adjustment of philosophy, and the “ Discourse on Method ” was the
result. The continued advance of observational science, the remark
able speculations of Thomas Hobbes and Locke’s celebrated “ Essay
upon Human Understanding,” called for another adjustment. The
task was undertaken by Leibnitz, one of the greatest, though unfor
tunately, too little unitary minds, the race has ever produced. His
compromise is scattered up and down through his works rather than
codified in any one. It is at present of only historical importance.
Again, the advance of science, both physical and historical, and the
powerful, though in many places self-contradictory, negative criticism
of Hume, called for a new metaphysical revelation.
Immanuel Kant presented it to the world. - In many respects the
* “ Xenophon’s Memorabilia,” “ Plato’s Apology,” and “ Grote’s Greece.” Part
II, ch. LXVIII.
f “ The Place of Greece in the Providential Order of the World,” by the Right
Hon. W. E. Gladstone. (An Address, etc.). London, 1865.
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“Kritik der reinen Vernunft” leaves little to be desired. He has
stated and defended the phenomenality of all' knowledge with an ex
actness and vigor which cannot be too highly praised. He has guarded
against Hume’s glaring error of denying the Unconditioned—a mis
take which must detract very much from his famed acuteness. But,
while gladly acknowledging this, we find: (1) that Kant, not satisfied
with showing that Hume’s position was suicidal, and not seeing that
the only true position was one of neutrality, goes beyond the limits of
our faculties in the opposite direction from that of the ’Scotch philos
opher. (2) That the great German thinker has not only “pure” reason,
but “practical ” reason ; and, consequently, what he rejects out of the
former, he takes into the latter. And (3) that its “ high priori ” ten
dencies afforded no barrier against the developments given to them by
Schelling, Hegel, and others. Kantism has taught the world something,
but has failed as a system. It had the seeds of decay too deeply sown
in it, to be long-lived. Even now, Dr. McCosh,.in his “Intuitions of
the Mind,” criticises and refutes some of Kant’s antinomies.
Until Sir W. Hamilton, the Scottish philosophy of the Superna
tural never had a defender worthy of it. He, too, presented the world
with a scheme for reconciling the chronic controversies of ages. Like
Kant’s^ it reposed upon a verbal distinction. The great metaphysician
thought he had discovered a difference between “ belief” and “ knowl
edge,” and on this his whole compromise rests. It is, however, now
well known that this distinction is purely hypothetical—thinkers of
the most opposite schools, as Mr. Mill, M. Paul Janet, of the Institute
of France, and Dr. McCosh, agreeing in repudiating it; both in its
metaphysical bearings as used against Cousin, and in its theological
consequences as developed by Sir W. Hamilton’s admiring disciple
(now) Dean Mansel. Knowledge is and must be considered ultimate;
and if we have no knowledge, we can have neither physical belief nor
theological faith.
Two celebrated contemporary naturalists, Dr. Hooker and Prof.
Huxley, hold an opinion the exact reverse of that, of Sokrates.’ Ac
cording to .them, the physical universe is open to the inquiries of sci
ence, while man belongs to the gods. The former says: * “ If in her
track, Science bears in mind that it is a common object of religion
and science to seek to understand the infancy of human existence,
that the laws of mind are not yet relegated to the domain of the
teachers of physical science; and that the laws of matter are not
within the religious teacher’s province, these may then work together
in harmony and with good will.” While to the same purpose, but
more definitely, the latter remarks: f “ Some, among whom I count my* “ President’s Address before the British Association, 1868.” Report, p. lxxiv.
The word “ yet ” is suggestive.
f “ The Scientific Aspects of Positivism.” “ Fortnightly Review,” June 1,1869.
pp. 663, ff.
�RELIGION AND
SCIENCE.
141
self, think the battle (between Theology and Science) will forever re
main a drawn one, and that for all practical purposes this result is as
good as anthropomorphism (or Theology) winning the day.” And still
the eminent professor just before speaks about .philosophers arming
themselves for battle on this last and greatest of questions. What is
the use if it cannot be decided ? It is apparent that this position, like
that of Sokrates, is one of unstable equilibrium—the question must
have a solution.
It now. remains to briefly examine Mr. Spencer’s compromise, or as
he calls it reconciliation. We have cursorily examined its historical
basis, let us now turn our attention to its metaphysical. Mr. Spencer
divides the Universe into two parts—the one Knowable by our facul
ties ; the other Unknowable. The former is the domain of Science;
the latter, that of Religion. (1) Mr. Spencer’s nomenclature is open to
the very gravest objection—an objection which goes to the very root of
his distinction. He has not very clearly defined his terms, but a little
reflection will show that if the Knowable means anything more than
the known, either by induction or inference, it overpasses the limits of
our faculties; necessitating the proposer of such a step to define how far
he intends to advance,, and his safeguards against error in that terra
incognita. Again, the Unknowable is not a negative conception, but a
positive one (F. P., p. 91). If it does not mean all that is beyond
knowledge, that is to say, unknown, it must be a known and not an
Unknowable. Otherwise how can its existence be asserted ? Mr. Spen
cer holds that we have an indefinite consciousness of this Unknowable
(p. 88). If this be so, we surely know we have this consciousness; and
knowing this, it makes no difference whether we can formulate it or
not, we must be said to know it. Can we formulate the force of grav
itation ? Not at all; we can only formulate the law of its manifesta
tions. That we lenow gravitation must be conceded. Just in the same
way, if this Unknowable is present as an ‘indefinite’ consciousness,
who can tell but at some future time, some one will formulate the laws
of its manifestations, and then it will be known in just the same way
as we know the forces of matter ? * .
* How little we have added to purely metaphysical inquiry will he shown on the
complete publication of the philosophical works of the Hindus. As pure (or intro
spective) thinkers, they stand unrivaled as far as can be judged from extracts and
the comments of the learned. When we once have a comparative science of meta
physics, the futility of it will more than ever appear—though where there was no
physical science, it was all which could be done to prevent the mind from stagna■ting. The indefinite consciousness which Mr. Spencer finds in himself, and called
by him the Unknowable, is apparently the same as that found by the ancient
Hindus, and called by them much more correctly, Brahman (or power). Both the
■ Hindi! philosophers and Mr. Spencer' end by projecting this conception into the
Universe. But if that consciousness does exist, how can we tell that it is the power
which presents the Universe to us? This is wholly illegitimate reasoning. If the
metaphysical conception of a god contained in man be true on the one hand, it is
no less true on the other, that man’s religious instinct always prompts him to sup
plement it by another beyond himself. May not this consciousness called the Un
�142
RELIGION ANU SCIENCE.
(2) In the next place, none of Mr. Spencer’s arguments demonstrate
his conclusion. His argument to show that everywhere we reach by
the limits of our faculties a boundary, is and must be accepted. But
the man who points out an insuperable barrier has no justification for
stepping over it, and giving “ a local habitation and a name ” to such
supposed existence. If we reach a certain point beyond which it is
absolutely- impossible to go at the present day, and beyond which no
one in_ the past has gone, what confidence can be put in any assertion
presuming to tell us aught -of anything outside of this limit ? It is
unknown, and that is all we can say. Mr. Spencer will, however, not
rest satisfied with this plain statement of the case. Everywhere his
argument presupposes, and Ije asserts in many places, that we only know
the Relative as an antithesis to the Absolute (F. P., p. 88); that this
Unknowable is the cause of the Knowable—that in fact the forces of
nature are effects (F. P., pp. 158-161); and that, in a word, it is the
source of things. Now if all this can be legitimately predicated of
it, the Unknowable is not destitute of attributes or relations. If the
Relative is known only by its antithesis to the Absolute, the Absolute
must be itself known, or this antithesis coiild not be perceived. Again.,
before it can legitimately be asserted that the Unknowable is the cause
of the Knowable, it must be known. Besides cause and effect being a
relation, and relations being Knowable, this highest of relations must
be so. Hence we know the Absolute in two ways: negatively, as dis
tinguished from the Relative, and positively, as its cause; in the same
way we know the Unknowable—negatively, as contrasted with the
Knowable, and positively, as its cause.
This is all contrary to Mr. Spencer’s hypothesis. Again, if Mr.
Spencer does not know the Unknowable, what right has he to define it
as a power ? He censures those who conceive the cause of the Uni
verse as a man I But if it be absolutely unknowable, we cannot tell
whether it is a man or not; and when once.this hypothetical power is
.admitted, it is impossible to prevent men from clothing it in what they
know and respect—goodness and knowledge. Mr. Spencer has been
eminently successful in showing that our knowledge is limited by an
unknown, but he has not shown that it is an Unknowable power. He
has utterly failed in showing the existence of such a power. His whole
argument presupposes that such ghosts of matter as w things in them
selves ” exist. Now if they do, by their very definition they are what •
Prof. Ferrier designated as those things which we can neither know
nor be ignorant of. As such they are of no momefrt to us; no matter .
how transcendent may be their importance to more favored beings than
knowable by Spencer, and Brahman by the Hindus, be the substratum of mind
itself, and nothing more—the ultimate fact of our psychological system, beyond
which we cannot go, and on which all our intellectual processes are built up ? In
a word, may it not be our gravitation, which needs a Newton to formulate its law ?
That it is God is unproved; and when examined, improbable. (See for ‘ Brahman ’
“ Chips,” Vol. I, p. 68.)
�RELIGION
AND .SCIENCE.
143
ourselves. But if an adversary should require Mr.. Spencer to show
their existence, before he gives them a name and assigns them as the •
object of the adoration of Humanity, in what manner could Jie do so ?
and yet the request seems legitimate.
(3) This brings us to the last point to which we will now advert.
Mr., Spencer holds that we must have something in the nature of a reli
gion, and he assigns this Infinite Unknowable as the object of religious
*
adoration.
Many will no doubt be a little curious to know what the
nature of such worship can be. A careful reading of “ First Princi
ples,” may perhaps satisfy their curiosity.- As it does not seem to have
received that attention which an indication of the duty of the religious
man of the future deserves, it is presented in full. “ Very likely,” says
he (p. 113), “ there will ever remain a need, to give shape to that indefi
nite sense of an Ultimate Existence which forms the basis of our intel
ligence. * * * Perhaps the constant formation of such symbols
and constant rejection of them as inadequate, may be hereafter, as it
has hitherto been, a means of discipline. Perpetually to construct ideas
requiring the utmost stretch of our faculties, and perpetually to find
that such ideas must be abandoned as futile imaginations, may realize
to us more fully than any other course the greatness of that which we
vainly strive to grasp. Such efforts and failures may serve to maintain
in our minds a due sense of the incommensurable difference between
the Conditioned and the Unconditioned. By continually seeking to
know, and being continually thrown back with a. deepened conviction
of the impossibility of knowing, we may keep alive the consciousness
that it is alike our highest wisdom and our highest duty to regard that
through which all things exist, as the Unknowable.”
The first thing that strikes one on reading this extraordinary pas
sage is, that the celebrated “ relativity of all knowledge ” is useless as a
guide in practice or speculation. If we have to be continually beating
against the bars, what need in telling us that they will not give way?
Such information would seem to warn us against wasting our strength
on them. Here; on the contrary, we find, after all, that it is very likely
the old contest will last forever. In what, more than in name, does this
position differ from that of the Supernaturalists ? But, moreover, think
of the enormous loss of mental power that this “ formation of symbols ”
will entail; and for no practical object. In a world cursed with misery
and ignorance, who can read such a proposition with any patience ?
He who considers- that the Supernatural can be known, and that the
Absolute ought to be worshipped, is justified in meditating upon the
conception. But that a philosopher who holds that our faculties con- .
fine us to the relative, that all beyond is absolutely unknowable, and as
a consequence that we can form no conception whatsoever of it; who
* “ The Classification of the Sciences,” 2d Ed., p. 41 ; and “First Principles,’
passim.
�144
RELIGION AND
SCIENCE.
besides holds that we know nothing of immortality or a place where
the Unknowable could punish us for not so meditating; that, in a
word, a thinker who deals with philosophy from the scientific stand
point should recommend us to waste our time and energies in this
fashion, is a monstrous inconsistency, which nothing but its existence
could render probable.
*
HL
Having devoted morn space than could well be spared to Mr. Spen
cer’s a Reconciliation,” let us now say a few words on a real solution of
the difficulty. The contrQversy is of old standing, and already two
solutions have been given; both being in operation for ages. The first
was the Buddhistic. Owing to the grinding of the rules of Caste, which
haunted a man even beyond the grave, Buddha denied eternal life.
He was perhaps' the first to preach the immortality of works, and no
finer system of ethics has yet been founded than his. The gods required
so much time and their servants so much money, that Buddha was led
to investigate their existence, and he came to the conclusion that no
one had proved this existence. Buddha, as Max Muller says, turned a
philosophical system into a Religion, but he seems not to have been
able to see his way to a substitute for the gods he declared unknown—
for in this as in so many other things wiser than Hume, Buddha did
not deny the existence of the gods. The common people, however,
solved the question. They worshipped Buddha himself, and installed
tq keep him company an innumerable company of Bodhisattvas (or
saints). That this was. a real solution is shown by the fact that Bud
dhism has existed for 2,400 years, and Max Muller (“ Chips,” Vol. I,
p. 250), no favorable judge, asserts that if the show of hands were now
taken, it would have a plurality over any existing religion. A great deal
is said about Nirv&na, or annihilation, the summum bonwm of the Bud
dhists. But if we consider the state of India in his time, no imaginable
need was at all equal to the rest there promised.
The Christian solution was the second, and is so well known as to
need few comments. It has many points in common with Buddhism.
Like it, it preached good works and the abolition of sacrifices. Its
founders did not go as far as Buddha, because there was not the same
* In the text no remarks have been made upon the extraordinary fallacies which
Mr. Spencer has borrowed from Hamilton and Mansel purporting to give an
account of Ultimate Religious and Scientific Ideas. The reader who wishes to see
them handled with deserved severity and unrivaled philosophical acumen, may con
sult Mr, Mills’ “ Examination of Sir W. Hamilton’s Philosophy,” especially Chaps.
IV, VI, XII and XXIV. It is a matter of doubt whether Mr. Spencer really holds the
relativity of knowledge more firmly than did Sir W. Hamilton. Dr, McCosh also
dissents from these errors, as might be expected. See his fine work/' The Intuitions
of the Mind,” 2d Ed., N. Y., 1867. At p. 169 of which he asserts that knowledge is
even the root of theological faith.
�RELIGION AND
SCIENCE.
145
necessity. It is really a “ stable ” compromise. It tried to accept both
the Semite tendency and the Greek. For ages it seemed a complete
fusion. But the Greek inquiring spirit was only sleeping; when it
awoke, the irreconcilability of these two tendencies appeared. The
struggle between them called for a new solution—a solution which
should remedy the defects shown in those of the past.
For ages there had been growing up slowly the belief in invariable
laws in the Cosmos. The last decades have witnessed the wide dissem
ination of it. In the physical domain, np thinker now denies their ex
istence, and on all sides of us we see philosophers, even against their
wishes, recognizing that to both life and society do they also apply..
As all the presumptions are in favor of its ultimate success, let us see
what results from it. I. All“ontology ” becomes impossible. It is the
very essence of the “ being ” with which this study deals to be absolute.
The domain of law is, however, of the phenomenally relative. Hence
with the advance of science these questions of absolute being are, in
one domain after another, abandoned; the completeness of a science
being shown by its studied ignorance of such questions. It seems but
a legitimate inference that the complete extension of scientific method
over the whole of human. thought, must end by showing the inanity
of such study, and the much better channels of speculation. It will
be seen that this “ reign of law ” does not deny the existence of Abso
lute being or beings, it merely declares any law of their manifestations
unknown; and from the failure of the greatest minds of the past,
though continuously engaged in the search, it draws the inference, ap
pearing more or less strong to different minds, that this knowledge is
unattainable. At the same time that our assumed knowledge of ab
solute existence has been fading away, our real knowledge of “infinity”
has been continuously expanding. The ancients who imagined that a
high mountain reached heaven, “ the starry-visaged home of the gods,”
or those who on the plains of Shinar attempted to build a tower with
the same view, had in reality no conception of the Infinite. While to
the modern astronomer it is ever present both in time and space. And
the researches on the “ Antiquity of Man,” not to speak of the utterly
inconceivable age of lower forms of life, are introducing the conception
into biological and sociological discussions. This infinity is objective
and impersonal, while the ontological is subjective and personal; the
first is real, the second illusory.
It has been remarked by M. lEmile Burnouf that there is a subtile
pantheism underlying Buddhistic (so-called) atheism, or rather agnoiologism. In the same way modern naturalism or Positivism is built on a
modified and tacit form of the pantheistic spirit—too absolute and in
finite for any symbols of either expression or thought to contain.
Sir W. Hamilton called this region, the Unconditioned. The name
is a good one: much better than the unknown or the Unknowable. For
in reality it is neither; being known as to its existence, but utterly in19
�146
RELIGION AND
SCIENCE.
scrutable in the laws of its manifestation. “ It is,” in the fine language
of M. Littre, “ an ocean washing our beach, for which we have neither
*
ship nor sail, but the clear vision of which is as salutary as formid
able.”
This is the speculative side of the solution. We owe the form -in
which it is here stated, to M. Auguste Comte. All other defenders of
the phenomenality of knowledge attempt to show it by an analysis of
man’s knowing faculty. Even granting that all which is claimed could
be shown in this way, it is proper to supplement objectively and exper
imentally the a priori laws of mind, by the a posteriori advance in spec
ulation from the lower forms of speculation to the higher. While this
will appear still more necessary when we remember that the transcen
dental laws of mind have failed to stand the test of time—those fully
admitted in one age being rejected in the next, and even between con
temporaries ostensibly holding the same views on such subjects, there
are startling discrepancies; f and in the second place being personal,
they can never carry conviction to the mind of a disbeliever. The
contrary is true of the objective method and the resulting doctrine.
II. There is a second result of this belief in invariable natural
laws. When it was established in India that the attributes of the gods
were unknown and their existence unproved, the abolition of propitia
tory rites was the immediate consequence. The same result followed
the advent of Christianity, but from different causes. The whole oner
ous ceremonial of “ sacrifice ” was swept away. It had completed its
part in the education of humanity. Founded in selfishness, it taught
men altruism. Originally men gave up their dearest objects to buy
* “ Auguste Comte et la Philosophie positive.” 2d Ed. Paris, 1864, p. 519.
“ Cours de Philosophic positive.” Par Auguste Comte. 6 vols, 8vo. 3d Ed.
Paris, 1869.
/
“Preface d’un disciple,” par E. Littre, 1.1., pp. xxxviii-xlvi. It was only after
the text of this essay was in type that I met this fine piece of criticism. Its essence
is as follows:
(1) This notion of the Unknowable (using Mr. Spencer’s word) belongs to M.
Comte. “ He was the first who, by extending the positive method to Philosophy,
has given philosophical consciousness this notion, withdrawing it at the same time
from the provisional adequacy of Metaphysic, and the provisional inadequacy of
Science.” * * * (2) Mr. Spencer has used Unknowable in two senses, and has
failed to show their identity or even connection. The Unknowable of the faith (or
God in the theological sense) served to organize societies so long as progress be
longed to theological doctrines. The Unknowable of science, on the contrary, can
take no part in the government of the social world; for it is truly unknown, and
upon the unknown nothing can be built. * * * (3) Admitting Mr. Spencer’s
principle as true, faith and science should agree ; and if they do not, some defect is
shown in the principle. At all times faith defines the Unknowable—teaches the
origin and end of things; but science declares it indeterminable. Either the
former must lose its character or the latter; or if neither, then eternal conflict.
“ If faith insists upon this determination, it breaks with the scientific definition of
the Unkuowable ; if it does not, it breaks with faith that requires at least this de
termination. The impossibility of the attempted reconciliation could not be more
plainly shown.” M. Littre calls all that is beyond'knowledge, Immensity.
f Witness Sir W. Hamilton, Mansel, Mr. J. S. Mill, Mr. Herbert Spencer—
all of whom hold the relativity of knowledge, and yet individually explain it so
differently.
�RELIGION
*
I
AND ' SCIENCE.
147
the favor of the god or appease his wrath; afterwards they gave them
up without expectation of a quid pro quo ; and later still they sacri
ficed their interests for the benefit of others. To us, sacrifice has no
other meaning; and all are aware how much we owe to this change
from an extra-human and selfish standard of morality to a human and
unselfish one. But with the conception of invariable laws in the Con
ditioned, there arises the at first startling conception that prayer, the
solace of so many afflicted ones in the past and one of the most touch
ing religious rites, must be abandoned. Weakness seems to be one of
the ultimate religious ideas. Prayer is suggested by it, and for the ig
norant alone produces results. As the reduction of phenomena to
*
law proceeds, one domain after another is given up. Asking- has been
transformed into seeking. Every probability is in favor of the final
universality of this mode of overcoming nature. We no longer expect
a law to be broken by a miracle, but we inquire into the order of the
phenomenon’s manifestation. Every research made in this way, contrary
to the old selfish prayer, not only is of benefit to the immediate seeker
at that particular moment, but also to him and to others in all future
time in like circumstances. It becomes, as Comte has finely said, one
of the logical powers of the human mind. We here again see that in
fecundity and simplicity, though not in obviousness, the new far sur
passes the old. The latter could be vitiated by a word pronounced
wrong; was only of moment at the time, and only succeeded by chance;
while with the latter, personal peculiarities have little to do; is useful
at all times, and even its failures are matters for future redress.
'
III. The belief in invariable natural laws leads to the further con
sequence, that as no religion exists without a Deity and Ceremonies,
however simple (God and the Rite), and no men without religion,
- that as from the earliest times there seem to have been two forms of
deities—extra-human and human, the latter coming into prominence
as the former faded away—so we may expect it to still continue. With
the decay of the propitiation of nature, real reverence for it has arisen;
and with the decay of the old degrading ceremonies before one man,
• there arises reverence for all. There seems to be another point worthy
of mention—that with every step in the scale of civilization, the relig
ious emotions have been more cast into the esthetic accompaniments,
as their dogmas have broadened into great moral rules. The religion
of the future will apparently have a mainly esthetic tendency; its doc
trines will be the generalization of science, and its deity the latent
pantheism of the Unconditioned in connection with the best type of
human excellence.
.* George Combe held and Prof. Tyndall apparently holds, that though prayer is
useless objectively, it may be a great subjective help. Only in one way, when men
believe that, what they ask will be given. “ He that cometh to God must believe
that he is,” is as true now as when St. Paul Wrote it.
�
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Conway Tracts
Herbert Spencer
Religion and science
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Text
RELIGION
AS AFFECTED BY
MODERN MATERIALISM:
AN
ADDRESS
DELIVERED IN
MANCHESTER NEW COLLEGE, LONDON,
At
the
Opening of
its
89th Session,
On TUESDAY, Oct. 6th, 1874.
by
JAMES MARTINEAU, LE.D.
PRINCIPAL.
WILLIAMS AND NORGATE,
14, HENRIETTA STREET, COVENT GARDEN, LONDON;
And 20, SOUTH FREDERICK STREET, EDINBURGH.
1874.
�PREFACE.
The following Address, published by desire of my College, was
much curtailed in oral delivery.
As somewhat more patience may
be hoped for in a reader than in a hearer, it now appears in full.
The position assumed in it, of resistance to some speculative tenden
cies of modern physical research, is far from congenial to me : for it
seems to place me in the wrong camp. But the exclusive pretension,
long set up by Theology, to dominate the whole field of knowledge,
seems now to have simply passed over to the material Sciences ;—
with the effect of inverting, rather than removing, a mischievous
intellectual confusion, and shifting the darkness from outward Nature
to Morals and Religion.
I cannot admit that these are conquered
provinces : and to re-affirm their independence, and protest against
their absorption in a universal material empire, appears to me a
pressing need alike for true philosophy and for the future of human
character and society.
London, Oct. 12, 18
7
*4.
�RELIGION AS AFFECTED BY MODERN
MATERIALISM.
The College which places me here to-day professes to
select and qualify suitable men for the Nonconformist
Ministry; that is, the headship of societies voluntarily
formed for the promotion of the Christian life. In carrying
out its work, two rules have been invariably observed:
(1) the Special Studies which deal with our sources of
religious faith—whether in the scrutiny of nature or in
the interpretation of sacred books—have been left open to
the play of all new lights of thought and knowledge, and
have promptly reflected every well-grounded intellectual
change; and (2) the General Studies which give the balanced
aptitudes of a cultivated mind have been made as extensive
and thorough as the years at disposal would allow. In
both these rules there is apparent an eager thirst for a
right apprehension of things,—a contempt for the dangers
of possible discovery, a persuasion that in the mind most
large and luminous the springs of religion have the freshest
and the fullest flow; together with the idea that the
Preacher, instead of being the organ of a given theology,
should himself, by the natural influence of mental supe
riority, pass to the front and take the lead in a regulated
growth of opinion.
A2
�There have never been wanting prophets of ill who dis
trusted this method as rash. So much open air does not
suit the closet divine; such liability to change disappoints
the fixed idea of the partisan; and the “ practical man”
does not want his preacher’s head made heavy with too
much learning, or his faith attenuated in the vacuum of
metaphysics. At the present moment these partial dis
trusts are superseded by a deeper and more comprehensive
misgiving, affecting not the method simply, but the aim
and function of our Institution. Side by side with the
literary pursuits of the scholar, the study of external nature
has always had a place of honour in our traditions and our
estimates of a manly education; and there is scarcely a
special science which has not some brilliant names that
range not far from the lines of our history; and from the
favourite shelf of all our libraries, the Principia of Newton,
the Essays of Franklin, the Papers of Priestley and Dalton,
the “Principles” of Lyell, the Biological Treatises of South
wood Smith and Carpenter, and the records of Botanical
research by Sir James Smith and the Hookers, look down
upon us with something of a personal interest. The suc
cessive enlargements given by these skilled interpreters to
our earlier picture of the world,—the widening Space, the
deepening vistas of Time, the new groups of chemical ele
ments and the precision of their combinations, the detected
marvels of physiological structure, and the rapid filling-in
of missing links in the chain of organic life,—have been
eagerly welcomed as adding a glory to the realities around,
and, by the erection of fresh shrines and cloisters, turning
the simple temple in which we once stood into a clustered
magnificence. Thus it was, so long as discoveries came
upon us one by one; nor did any Biblical chronology or
Apocalypse interfere with their proper evidence for an hour.
�5
But now—must we not confess it ?—certain shadows of
anxiety seem to steal forth and mingle with the advancing
light of natural knowledge, and temper it to a less genial
warmth. It comes on, no longer in the simple form of
pulse after pulse of positive and limited discovery, but with
the ambitious sweep of a universal theory, in which facts
given by observation, laws gathered by induction, and con
ceptions furnished by the mind itself, are all wrought up
together as if of homogeneous validity. A report is thus
framed of the Genesis of things, made up indeed of many
true chapters of science, but systematized by the terms and
assumptions of a questionable if not an untenable philo
sophy. To the inexpert reader this report seems to be all
of one piece; and he is disturbed to find an account appa
rently complete of the “ Whence and the Whither” of all
things without recourse to aught that is Divine; to see the
refinements of organism and exactitudes of adaptation dis
enchanted of their wonder; to watch the beauty of the
flower fade into a necessity; to learn that Man was never
intended for his place upon this scene, and has no commis
sion to fulfil, but is simply flung hither by the competitive
passions of the most gifted brutes; and to be assured that
the elite beings that tenant the earth tread each upon an
infinite series of failures, and survive as trophies of im
measurable misery and death. Thus an apprehension has
become widely spread, that Natural History and Science
are destined to give the coup de grdce to all theology, and
discharge the religious phenomena from human life, that
churches and their symbols must disappear like the witches’
chamber .and the astrologists’ tower; and that, as every
thing above our nature is dark and void, those who affect
to lift it lead it nowhither, and must take themselves away
as “ blind leaders of the blind.” Whether this apprehension
�6
is well founded or not is a very grave question for society
in many relations; and is emphatically urgent for those
who educate men as spiritual guides to others, and who
can invest them with no directing power except the native
force of a mind at one with the truth of things and a heart
of quickened sympathies. Hitherto, they have been trained
under the assumptions that the Universe which includes
us and folds us round is the Life-dwelling of an Eternal
Mind; that the World of our abode is the scene of a Moral
Government incipient but not yet complete; and that the
upper zones of Human Affection, above the clouds of self
and passion, take us into the sphere of a Divine Communion. Into this over-arching scene it is that growing thought
and enthusiasm have expanded to catch their light and
fire. And if “ the new faith” is to carry in it the contra
dictories of these positions,—if it leaves us to make what
we can of a simply molecular universe, and a pessimist
world, and an unappeasable battle of life,—it will require
another sort of Apostolate, and would make such a differ
ence in the studies which it is reasonable to pursue, that
it might be wisest for us to disband, and let the new Future
preach its own gospel, and devise, if it can, the means of
making the tidings “glad.” Better at once to own our
occupation gone than to linger on sentimental sufferance,
and accept the indulgent assurance that, though there is
no longer any truth in religion, there is some nice feeling
in it; and that while, for all we have to teach, we might
shut up to-morrow, we may harmlessly keep open still, as
a nursery of “Emotion.”* I trust that, when “emotion”
proves empty, we shall stamp it out, and get rid of it.
Though, however, no partnership between the physicist
* See Professor Tyndall’s Address before the British Association ;
with Additions, p. 61.
�7
and the theologian can be formed on these terms of assign
ing the intellect to the one and the feelings to the other,
may it not be that, in the flurry of exultation and of panic,
they misconstrue their real position ? and that their rela
tions, when calmly surveyed, may not be in such a state
of tension as each is ready to believe ? Looking on their
respective contentions from the external position of logical
observation, and without presuming to call in question the
received inductions of the naturalist, I believe that both
parties mistake the bearing of those inductions upon reli
gion; and that, although this bearing is in some aspects
serious, it is neither of the quality nor of the magnitude
frequently ascribed to it. I venture to affirm that the
essence of religion, summed up in the three assumptions
already enumerated, is independent of any possible results
of the natural sciences, and stands fast through the various
readings of the genesis of things.
The unpractised mind of simple times goes out, it is
true, upon everything en masse, and indeterminately feels
and thinks about itself and the field of its existence, the
inner and the outer, the transient and the permanent, the
visible and the invisible: its knowledge and its worship,
the pictures of its fancy and the intuitions of its faith,
are as yet a single tissue, of which every broken thread
rends and deforms the whole. Hence the oldest sacred
traditions run into stories of world-building; and the ear
liest attempts at a systematic interpretation of nature, in
which physical ideas were clothed in mythical garb, are
regarded by Aristotle as “ theological.” It must be ad-r
mitted that our own age has not yet emerged from this
confusion. And in so far as Church belief is still com
mitted to a given kosmogony and natural history of Man,
it lies open to scientific refutation, and has already re
�8
ceived from it many a wound under which it visibly pines
away. It is needless to say that the new “ book of Genesis,”
which resorts to Lucretius for its “ first beginnings,” to
protoplasm for its fifth day, to “ natural selection ” for its
Adam and Eve, and to evolution for all the rest, con
tradicts the old book at every point; and inasmuch as
it dissipates the dream of Paradise, and removes the tra
gedy of the Fall, cancels at once the need and the scheme
of Redemption, and so leaves the historical churches of
Europe crumbling away from their very foundations. If
any one would know how utterly unproducible in modern
daylight is the theology of the symbolical books, how
absolutely alien from the real springs of our life, let him
follow for a few hours the newest m ivement of ecclesiasti
cal reform, and listen to the reported conferences at Bonn
on the remedies for a divided Christendom. Scarcely
could the personal re-appearance of Athanasius or Cyril on
the floor of the council-hall be more startling, or the cries
of anathema from the voices of the ancient dead have a
more wondrous sound, than the reproduction as hopes of
the future, by men of Munich, of Chester, of Pittsburg,
and of the Eastern Church, of formulas without meaning
for the present, the eager discussion of subtle varieties of
falsehood, and the anxious masking of their differences by
opaque phrases under which everybody manages to look.
Such signs of strange intellectual anachronism excuse the
aversion with which many a thoughtful man, with a heart
still full of reverence, turns away from all religious asso
ciation, and lives without a church. It has been the in
fatuation of ecclesiastics to miss the inner divine spirit
that breathes through the sources of their faith, and to
seize, as the materials of their system, the perishable con
ceptions and unverified predictions of more fervent but
�9
darker times; so that, in the structure they have raised,
all that is most questionable in the legacy of the past,—
obsolete Physics, mythical History, Messianic Mythology,
Apocalyptic prognostications,—have been built into the
very walls, if not made the corner-stone, and now by
their inevitable decay threaten the whole with ruin.
Why indeed should I charge this infatuation on councils
and divines alone ? It is not professional but human; it
is a delusion which affects us all. We are for ever shaping
our representations of invisible tilings, in comparison with
other men’s notions, into forms of definite opinion, and
throwing them to the front, as if they were the photo
graphic equivalent of our real faith. Yet somehow the
essence of our religion never finds its way into these frames
of theory; as we put them together it slips away, and, if
we turn to pursue it, still retreats behind; ever ready to
work with the will, to unbind and sweeten the affections,
and bathe the life with reverence ; but refusing to be seen,
or to pass from a divine hue of thinking into a human
pattern of thought. The effects of this infatuation in the
founders of our civilization are disastrous on both sides,
—not only to the Churches whose system is undermined,
but to the spirit of the Science which undermines it.
It turns out that, with the sun and moon and stars, and
in and on the earth both before and after the appear
ance of our race, quite other things have happened than
those which the consecrated kosmogony recites : especially
Man, instead of falling from a higher state, has risen from
a lower, and inherits, instead of a uniform corruption, a
law of perpetual improvement; so that the real process has
the effect, not only of an enormous magnifier, but of an
inverting mirror, on the theological picture. Yet, notwith
standing the deplorable appearance to which that picture
�10
is thus reduced, it is exhibited afresh every week to mil
lions still taught to regard it as Divine. This is the mis
chief on the Theologic side. On the other hand, Science,
in executing this merited punishment, has borrowed from
its opponents one of their worst errors, in identifying the
anomalous or lawless with the divine, and assuming that
whatever falls within the province of nature drops thereby
out of relation to God. As the old story of Creation called
in the Supreme Power only by way of supernatural parox
ysm, to gain some fresh start beyond the resources of the
natural order, so the new inquirers, on getting rid of these
crises, fancy that the Agent who had been invoked for
them is gone, and proclaim at once that Matter without
Thought is competent to all. In thus confounding the idea
of the Divine Mind with that of miracle-worker, they do
but go over to the theological camp, and snatch thence its
oldest and bluntest weapon, which in modern conflict can
only burden the hand that wields it. How runs the his
tory of their alleged negative discovery ? The Naturalist
was told in his youth that at certain intervals—at the
joints, for instance, between successive species of organ
isms—acts of sudden creation summoned fresh groups of
creatures out of nothing. These epochs he attacks with
riper knowledge; he finds a series of intermediary forms,
and fragmentary lines of suggestion for others; and when
the affinities are fairly complete, and the chasm in the
order of production is filled up, he turns upon us and says,
‘ See, there is no break in the chain of origination, how
ever far back you trace it; we no more want a Divine
Agent there, and then than here and now.' Be it so; but
it is precisely here and now that He is needed, to be
the fountain of orderly power, and to render the tissue of
Laws intelligible by his presence; his witness is found not
�11
only in the gaps, but in the continuity of being,—not in
the suspense, but in the everlasting flow of change; for,
the universe as known, being throughout a system of
Thought-relations, can subsist only in an eternal Mind
that thinks it.
The whole history of the Genesis of things Eeligion
must unconditionally surrender to the Sciences. Not in
deed that it is without share in the great question of
Causality; but its concern with it is totally different from
theirs; for it asks only about the ‘ Whence, ’ of all pheno
mena, while they concentrate their scrutiny upon the ‘How:
by which I mean that their end is accomplished as soon
as it has been found in what groups phenomena regularly
cluster, and on what threads of succession they are strung,
and into what classification their resemblances throw them.
These are matters of fact, directly or circuitously ascertain
able by perception, and remaining the same, be their origin
ating power what it may. On that ulterior question the
Sciences have nothing to say. And, on the other hand,
when Eeligion here takes up her word and insists that
the phenomena thus reduced to system are the product of
Mind, she in no way prejudges the modus operandi, but
is ready to accept whatever affinities of aspect, whatever
adjustments of order, the skill of observers may reveal.
On these investigations she has nothing to say. If indeed
you could ever show that the method of the universe is
one along which no Mind could move—that it is absolutely
incoherent and unideal—you would destroy the possibility
of Eeligion as a doctrine of Causality: only, however, by
simultaneously discovering the impossibility of Science,—
which wholly consists in organizing the phenomena of the
world into an intellectual scheme reflecting the struc
ture of its archetype. That those who labour to render
�12
the universe intelligible should call in question its relation
to intelligence, is one of those curious inconsistencies to
which the ablest specialists are often the most liable when
meditating in foreign fields. If it takes mind to construe
the world, how can it require the negation of mind to con
stitute it?
It is not in the history of Superstition alone that the
human mind may be found struggling in the grasp of some
mere Nightmare of its own creation : a philosophical hypo
thesis may sit upon the breast with a weight not less
oppressive and not more real; till a friendly touch or a
dawning light breaks the spell, and reveals the quiet morn
ing and the bed of rest. Is there, for instance, no logical
illusion in the Materialist doctrine which in our time is
proclaimed with so much pomp and resisted with so much
passion ? ‘ Matter is all I want,’ says the Physicist: ‘ give
me its atoms alone, and I will explain the universe.’
‘ Good; take as many of them as you please: see, they
have all that is requisite to Body, being homogeneous
extended solids.’ ‘That is not enough,’ he replies; ‘it
might do for Democritus and the mathematicians, but I
must have considerably more: the atoms must be not only
in motion and of various shapes, but also of as many kinds
as there may be chemical elements; for how could I ever
get water, if I had only hydrogen molecules to work with ?’
‘ So be it,’ we shall say; ‘ only this is a considerable en
largement of your specified datum,—in fact, a conversion
of it into several; yet, even at the cost of its monism, your
scheme seems hardly to gain its end; for by what manipu
lation of your resources will you, for example, educe con
sciousness? No organism can ever show you more than
matter moved; and, as Dubois-Reymond observes, there is
an impassable chasm “ between definite movements of defi
�13
nite cerebral atoms and the primary facts which I can
neither define nor deny,—I fed pain or pleasure, I taste
a sweetness, smell a rose-scent, hear an organ tone, see red,
together with the no less immediate assurance they give,
therefore I exist“ it remains,” he adds, “ entirely and
for ever inconceivable that it should signify a jot to a
number of carbon and hydrogen and nitrogen and oxygen
and other atoms how they lie and move“ in no way can
one see how from their concurrence consciousness can
arise/’* What say you to this problem?’ ‘It does not
daunt me at all,’ he declares: ‘ of course you understand
that my atoms have all along been affected by gravitation
and polarity; and now I have only to insist, with Lechner,f
on a difference among molecules; there are the inorganic,
which can change only their place, like the particles in an
undulation; and there are the organic, which can change
them order, as in a globule that turns itself inside out.
With an adequate number of these, our problem will be
manageable.’ ‘ Likely enough,’ we may say, ‘ seeing how
careful you are to provide for all emergencies; and if any
hitch should occur at the next step, where you will have to
pass from mere sentiency to Thought and Will, you can
■again look in upon your atoms, and fling among them a
handful of Leibnitz’s monads, to serve as souls in little, and
be ready, in a latent form, with that Vorstellungsfahigkeit
which our picturesque interpreters of nature so much prize.
* “ Ueber die Grenzen des Naturerkennens,” p. 29. Compare p. 20.
“ I will now prove, as I believe in a very cogent way, not only that,
in the present state of our knowledge, Consciousness cannot be ex
plained by its material conditions,—which perhaps every one allows,—
but that from the very nature of things it never will admit of expla
nation by these conditions.”
+ Einige Ideen zur Schopfungs-und Entwickelungsgeschichte der
Organismen, §§ i. ii.
*
�14
But surely you must observe how this “ Matter” of yours
alters its style with every change of service: starting as a
beggar, with scarce a rag of “property” to cover its bones,
it turns up as a Prince, when large undertakings are wanted,
loaded with investments, and within an inch of a plenipo
tentiary. In short, you give it precisely what you require
to take from it; and when your definition has made it
“ pregnant with all the future,” there is no wonder if from
it all the future might be born?
“We must radically change our notions of Matter,” says
Professor Tyndall; and then, he ventures to believe, it will
answer all demands, carrying “the promise and potency
of all terrestrial life.”* If the measure of the required
“ change in our notions” had been specified, the proposition
would have had a real meaning, and been susceptible of a
test. Without this precision, it only tells us, “ Charge the
word potentially with your quaesita, and I will promise to
elicit them explicitly.” It is easy travelling through the
stages of such an hypothesis; you deposit at your bank a
round sum ere you start; and drawing on it piecemeal at
every pause, complete your grand tour without a debt. ■
Words, however, ere they can hold such richness of prero
gative, will be found to have emerged from their physical
meaning, and to be truly #eo</>6pa ovo/zara,—terms that bear
God in them, and thus dissolve the very theory which they
represent. Such extremely clever Matter,—matter that is
up to everything, even to writing Hamlet, and finding out
its own evolution, and substituting a molecular plebiscite
for a divine monarchy of the world, may fairly be regarded
* Address before the British Association; with Additions, pp. 54,55.
Compare the statement, by Dubois-Reymond, of the opposite opinion,
quoted supra, p. 13, note.
�15
as a little too modest in its disclaimer of the attributes of
Mind.
Nor is the fallacy escaped by splitting our datum into
two, and instead of crowding all requisites into Matter,
leaving it on its old slender footing, and assuming along
with it Force as a distinct entity. The two postulates will
perform their promise, just like the one, on condition that
you secrete within them in the germ all that you are to
develop from them as their fruit; and in this case the word
“ Force'’ is the magical seed-vessel which is to surprise us
with the affluence of its contents. The surprise is due to
one or two nimble-witted substitutions, of which a conjuror
■might be proud, whereby unequals are shown to be equals,
and out of an acorn you hatch a chicken. First, the noun
Force is sent into the plural (which of course is only itself
in another form), and so we get provided with several of
them. Next, as there is now a class, the members must be
distinguishable; and, as they are all of them activities,
they will be known one from another by the sort of work
they do : one will be a mechanician,—another a chemist,—
a third will be a swift runner along the tracks of life,—
a fourth will find out all the rest,—will do our reasoning
about them, and get up all our examinations for us. The
last of these, every one must own—at least every one who
has graduated—is much more dignified than the others ;
and all through we rise, at every step, from ruder to more
refined accomplishment. With things thus settled, we
seem to have found Plato’s ideal State, in which every
order minds its own business, and no element presumes to
cross the line and become something else. Not so, how
ever; for, after thus differencing the forces and keeping
them under separate covers, the next step is to unify them,
and show them all as the homogeneous contents of a single
�16
receptacle. The forces, we are assured, are interchange
able, and relieve each other; when one has carried its mes
sage, it hands the torch to another, and the light is never
quenched or the race arrested, but runs an eternal round.
But why then, you will say, divide them first, only to unite
them afterwards ? Follow our logical wonder-worker one
move further, and you will see. He has now, we may say,
his four vessels standing on the table; the contents of the
whole are to be whisked into one ; having them all, he has
more ways than one of working out their equivalence; and
it remains at his option, which he shall lift to let the mouse
run out. For some reason, best known to himself, he
never thinks of choosing the last; indeed it is pretty much
to avoid this, and obtain other receptacles empty of thought,
that he broke down the original unity. If he be a circum
spect physiologist, he will probably prefer the third, and
exhibit the universal principle as in some sense living; if
he be a daring physicist, he will lay hold of the first,
and pronounce mechanical dynamics good enough for the
kosmos.
Am I asked to indicate the precise seat of fallacy in the
hypothesis which I have ventured to criticise ? The alleged
division of forces, considered as something over and above
the phenomena ascribed to them, is absolutely without
ground; each of them, as apart from any other, has a
purely ideal existence, without the slightest claim to objec
tive reality. Science, dividing its labours, has to break
down phenomena into sets according to their resemblances
and the affinities of their conditions; it disposes them thus
into natural provinces, the laws of which, when ascertained,
give us the rules by which the phenomena assort them
selves or successively arise,— lut nothing more. But what
ever field we survey, we carry into it the belief, inherent
�17
in the constitution of the intellect itself, of a Causal Power
as the source of every change: we believe it for each, we
believe it for all: it repeats itself identically with every
instance; and when a multitude of instances are tied up
together in virtue of their similarity and made into a class,
this constantly recurring reference, this identity of relation
to a power behind, is marked by giving that power a sin
gular name ; as the phenomena of weight are labelled with
the title Gravitation, expressing unity in their causal rela
tion. Were we closeted with this group of facts alone, this
unity would live in our minds without a rival, and we
should have no numerical distinction in our account of
force. But, meanwhile, other observers have been going
through a like experience in some separate field; have
gleaned and bound into a sheaf its scattered mass of homo
geneous growths, and denoted them by another name—say,
Electricity—carrying in it the same haunting reference to
a source for them all. Now why is this a new name ? Is
it that we have found a new power ? Have we carried our
observation behind the phenomena, so as, in either instance,
to find any power at all ? Are the two cases differenced
by anything else than the dissimilarity of their phenomena ?
Run over these distinctions, and, when you have exhausted
them, is there anything left by which you can compare
and set apart from each other the respective producing
forces ? All these questions must be answered in the nega
tive ; the differentiations lie only in the effects ; the causal
power is not observed, but thought; and that thought is the
same, not only from instance to instance, but from field to
field; and by this sameness it cancels plurality from Force,
and reduces the story of their transmigration into a scien
tific mythology. The distinctive names therefore mark only
differences in the sets of phenomena; they are simply in
B
�18
struments of classification for noticeable changes in nature,
and carry no partitions into the mysterious depths behind
the scenes. The dynamic catalogue being thus left empty
and cut down to a single term, do we talk nonsense when
we attach qualifying epithets to the word Force, and speak
of ‘electric force,’ of ‘nerve force’ of ‘ polar force,’ &c. ? Not
so; provided we mean by those phrases, simply, Force,
quantum sufficit, now for one set of phenomena, now for
another, without implication of other difference than that
of the seat and conditions and aspect of the manifestations.
But the moment we step across this restriction, we are in
the land of myths.
Power then is one and undivided. As external causal
ity, it is not an object of knowledge but an element given
in the relations of knowledge, a condition of our thinking
of phenomena at all. Were this all, our necessary belief
in it would be unattended by any representation of it;
it would remain an intellectual notion (Begriff), and we
could no more bring it before the mind under any definite
type than we can the meaning of such words as “sub
stance ” and " possibility.” In one field, however, and no
more, it falls into coincidence with our experience; for
we ourselves put forth power in the exercise of Will and
are personally conscious of Causality; and this sample
of immediate knowledge because seZ/-knowledge supplies
us with the means of representing to ourselves what else
we should have to think without a type. Here accord
ingly we reach, I venture to affirm, what we really mean,
and what alone saves us from the mere empty form of
meaning, whenever we assent to the axiom of causality.
It is very true that the exercise of Will, having more or
less of complication, itself admits of analysis ; intention
may play a larger or smaller part, may leave less or more
�19
for the share of automatic or impulsive activity; and by
letting the former withdraw into the background of our
conception, we may come to think of causation apart from
purpose,—which, I suppose, is the idea of Force. But this
is a bare fiction of abstraction, shamming an integral real
ity;—an old soldier pensioned off from actual duty, but
allowed to wear his uniform and look like what he was.
Since we have to assume causality for all things, and the
only causality we know is that of living Mind, that type
has no legitimate competitor. Even if it had, its sole
adequacy would leave it in possession of the field. For
among the products to be accounted for is the whole class
and hierarchy of minds ; and unless there is to be more in
the effect than in the cause, nothing less than Mind is
competent to realize a scheme of being whose ranks ascend
so high. As for the plea,—which has unhappily passed
into a commonplace,—that, even if it be so, that transcen
dent object is beyond all cognizance,—I will only say that
this doctrine of Nescience stands in exactly the same rela
tion to causal power, whether you construe it as Material
Force or as Divine Agency. Neither can be observed; one
or the other must be assumed. If you admit to the category
of knowledge only what we learn by observation, particular
or generalized, then is Force unknown; if you extend the
word to what is imported by the intellect itself into our
cognitive acts, to make them such, then is God known.
This comment on current hypotheses refers to them only
so far as they overstep the limits of Science, and aspire to
the seat of judgment on ulterior questions of Philosophy.
So long as they simply descend upon this or that realm of
nature, and try their strength there in simplifying its laws
or rendering them deducible,—or, passing from province to
province, labour to formulate equations available for several
b 2
�20
or for all,—they must be respectfully left to pursue their
work; and whenever their authors present their demon
strated “ system of the world/’ all reasonable men will learn
it from them, whatever it may be, as scholars from a master.
In the investigation of the genetic order of things, Theology
is an intruder, and must stand aside. Religion first reaches
its true ground, when, leaving the problem of what has
happened, it takes its stand on what for ever is. I do not
say that it absolutely matters not to us how antecedent
ages have been filled, and have brought up the march with
which we fall into step to-day; for we are beings of large
perspective, concentrating in us many lines of distance and
images between the eye and the horizon. But still, if the
light were all turned off from the Past, and on facing it we
looked only into the Night, the reality for us is not there,
but here, where it is Day. However the present may have
come about, I find myself in it: in whatever way my facul
ties may have been determined, faculties they are, and they
give me insight into my duty and outlook on my position:
however the world, of Nature and of Society, may have
grown to what it is, its scene contains me, its relations
twine around me, its physiognomy appeals to me with a
meaning from behind itself. If these data do not suffice
to show me my kinship with what is above, below, around
me, and find my moral and spiritual place, I shall not be
greatly helped by discovering how many ages my constitu
tion has been upon the stocks, and its antecedents been
upon the way. The beings that touch me with their look
and draw me out of myself, the duties that press upon my
heart and hand, are on the spot, speaking to me while the
clock ticks; and to love them aright, to serve them faith
fully, and construct with them a true harmony of life, is
the same task, whether I bear within me the inheritance of
�21
a million years, or, with all my surroundings, issued this
morning from the dark.
Remaining then at home, and consulting the nature
which we have and which we see, we find that, far from
being self-inclosed, or related only to its visible depen
dences, it turns a face, on more than one side, right towards
the Infinite, and, often to the disregard of nearer things,
moves hither or thither as if shrinking from a shadow ad
vancing thence, or drawn by a light that wins it forward.
We are constantly,—even the most practical of us,—seeing
what is invisible and hearing what is inaudible, and per
mitting them to send us on our way. Not left, like the
mere animal, to be the passive resultant of forces without
and instincts within, but invested with an alternative
power, we are conscious partners in the architecture of our
own character, and know ourselves to be the bearers of a
trust; and this fiduciary life takes us at once across the
boundary which separates nature from what transcends it.
Seducing appetites and turbulent passions and ignoble ease
never gain our undivided ear; while we bend to them,
there are pleading voices which distract us, and which,
if they do not save us, follow us with an expostulating
shame. Nor, if ever we wake up and kindle at the appeal
of misery and the cry of wrong, or with the spontaneous
fire of disinterested affection or devotion to the true and
good, can we construe them into anything less than a Divine
claim upon us : we know their right over us at a glance; we
feel on us their look of Authority in reply : if, to our care
less fancy, we were ever our own, we can be so no more.
Once stirred by the higher springs of character, and pos
sessed by the yearning for the perfect mind, we are aware
that to live out of these is our supreme obligation, and that
for us nothing short of this is holy. To have seen the vision
�22
of the best and possible and not bo pursue it, is to mar the
true idea of our nature, and to fall from its heaven as a
rebel and an outcast. This inner life of Conscience and
ideal aspiration supplies the elements and sphere of Reli
gion ; and the discovery of Duty is as distinctly relative to
an Objective Righteousness as the perception of Form to
an external Space: it is a bondage, with superficial reluc
tance but with deeper consent, to an invisible Highest;
and both moral Fear and moral Love stand before the face
of an Authority which is the eternal Reality of the holy,
just, and true. On the first view, you might expect that
the stronger the enthusiasm for goodness, and the surer the
recoil from in, so much the fitter would the mind be to
stand alone in its self-adequacy; yet it is precisely at such
elevation that it most trusts in a Supreme Perfection to
which it only faintly responds, and leans for support on
that everlasting stay. The life of aspiration, attempting to
nurse itself, soon pines and dies; it must breathe a diviner
air and take its thirst to unwasting springs; and wherever
it settles into a quiet tension of the will and an upturned
look of the affections, it is sustained by habitual access to
the Fountain of sanctity, and by the consciousness of an
Infinite sympathy. Are not both the need and the exist
ence of this objective sustaining power acknowledged by
Mr. Matthew Arnold himself, when he insists on that
strange entity, “ That, not ourselves, which makes for right
eousness” ? By an abstraction, however, such a function
cannot be discharged; nothing ever “ makes for righteous
ness” but One who is righteous. To support and raise the
less, there must be a Greater; and that which does not
think and will and love, whatever the drift of its blind
power, may indeed be larger, but is not greater, than the
sinning soul that longs for purity.
�23
Now so long as the devotee of Goodness is possessed by
a faith, not only in his own aspirations, but in an Infinite
Mind which fosters and secures them as counterparts of
the highest reality, it is of little moment ethically what
theory he adopts of their mode of origin within him.
Whether he takes them as intuitive data of his Under
standing, or, with Hartley, as a transfiguration of sensible
interests into a disinterested glory, or, with Darwin and
Spencer, as the latest refinement of animal instinct and
discipline after percolating through uncounted generations,
•—that which he has reached,—be it first or last,—is at all
events the truth of things, the primordial and everlasting
certainty, in comparison with which all prior stages of
training, if such there were, give but dim gropings and
transient illusions. In Hartley himself, accordingly, a
doctrine essentially materialistic and carrying in it the
whole principle of Evolution, so far as it could be epitomized
in the individual’s life, easily blended with moral fervour
and even a mystic piety; and, in Priestley, with a noble
heroism of veracity and an unswerving confidence in the
perfect government of the universe. But what if the pro
cess of atomic development be taken as the Substitute for
God, not as His method ? if you withdraw from the begin
ning all Idea of what is to come out at the end,—all Model
or Archetype to control and direct the procedure, and re
strain the possible from running off indefinitely into the
false and wrong ? Do you suppose that the ethical results
can be still the same ? The inevitable difference, I think,
few considerate persons will deny; and without attempt to
measure its amount, its chief feature may be readily defined.
It was often said by both James and John Stuart Mill,
that you do not alter, much less destroy, a feeling or senti
ment by giving its history: from whatever unexpected
�24
sources its constituents may be gathered, when once their
confluence is complete the current they form runs on the
same, whether you know them or not. How true this may
he is exemplified by the younger Mill himself; who, while
resolving the moral sentiments into simple pleasure and
pain, and moral obligation into a balance of happiness, yet
nobly protested that he would rather plunge into eternal
anguish than falsely bend before an unrighteous power. If
so it be, then one in whom benevolence, honour, purity, had
reached their greatest refinement and most decisive clear
ness would suffer no change of moral consciousness, on
becoming convinced that it is a “poetic thrill” of his
“ ganglia”* induced by the long breaking-in through which
his progenitors have passed, in conformity with the system
of organic modification that has deprived him of his fur and
his tail. In spite of the apparent incongruity, let us grant
that his higher affections will speak to him exactly as
before, and make their claims felt by the same tones of
sacred authority, so that they continue to subdue him in
reverence or lift him as with inspiration. The surrender to
them of heart and will under these conditions, the vow to
abide by them and live in them, may still deserve acknow
ledgment as Religion; but, inasmuch as they have shrunk
into mere unaccredited subjective susceptibilities, they have
lost all support from Omniscient approval, and all presum
able accordance with the reality of things. For what are
these moral intensities of his nature, seen under his new
lights ? Whence is their message ? With what right do
they deliver it to him in that imperative voice ? and, if it
be slighted, prostrate him with unspeakable compunction ?
Are they an influx of Righteousness and Love from the
* Professor Tyndall’s Address, p. 49.
�25
life of the universe ? Do they report the insight of beings
more august and. pure ? No ; they are capitalized “ expe
riences of utility” and social coercion, the record of ancestral
fears and satisfactions stored in his brain, and re-appearing
with divine pretensions, only because their animal origin
is forgotten; or, under another aspect, they are the newest
advantage won by gregarious creatures in “ the struggle for
existence.” From such an origin it is impossible to extract
credentials for any elevated claim: so that although low
beginnings may lead, in the natural order, to what is better
than themselves,—as a Julia may be the mother of an
Agrippina,—yet in such case the superiority lies in new
endowment, which is not contained in the inheritance. For
such new endowment as we gain in the ascent from interest
to conscience the theory of transmission cannot provide;
if the coarse and turbid springs of barbarous life, filtered
through innumerable organisms, flow limpid and sparkling
at last, the element is still the same, though the sediment
is left behind; and as it would need a diviner power to
turn the water into wine, so Prudence run however fine,
social Conformity however swift and spontaneous, can never
convert themselves into Obligation. Hence arises, I think,
an inevitable contradiction between the scientific hypo
thesis and the personal characteristics of a high-souled
disciple of the modern negative doctrine. For his supreme
affections no adequate Object and no corresponding Source
is offered in the universe: if they look back for their cradle,
they see through the forest the cabin of the savage or the
lair of the brute; if they look forth for their justifying
Reality and end, they fling vain arms aloft and embrace a
vacancy. They cannot defend, yet cannot relinquish, their
own enthusiasm: they bear him forward upon heroic lines
that sweep wide of his own theory; and, transcending their
�26
own reputed origin and environment, they float upon vapours
and are empty, self-poised hy their own heat. One or two
instances will illustrate the way in which what is best in
our humanity is left, in the current doctrine, unsupported
by the real constitution of the world.
Compassion—the instinctive response to the spectacle of
misery—has a twofold expressiveness: it is in us a pro
testing vote against the sufferings we see; and a sign of
faith that they are not ultimate but remediable. Its singu
larity is, to be not one of these alone, but both. Were it
a simple repugnance, it would drive us from its object;
but it is an aversion which attracts: it snatches us with a
bound to the very thing we hate, and not with hostile
rush, but with softened tread and gentle words and up
lifting hand. And what is the secret of this transfigura
tion of horror into love ? It could never be but for the
implicit assurance that for these wounds there is healing
possible, if the nursing care does not. delay. Should we
not say then, if we trusted its own word about itself, that
this principle, so deep and intense in our unfolded nature,
is an evident provision for a world of hopeful sorrow ? It
is distinctly relative to pain, and would be out of place in
a scene laid out for happiness alone; yet treats it as tran
sient, and on passing into the cloud already sees the open
ing through. It enters the infirmary of human ills with
the tender and cheerful trust of the young sister of mercy,
who binds herself to the perpetual presence of human
maladies, that she may be for ever giving them their dis
charge. Compassion institutes a strange order of servitude:
it sets the strong to obey the weak, the man and woman
to wait upon the child, and youth and beauty to kneel and
bend before decrepitude and deformity. How then do the
drift and faith of this instinct agree with the method of
�27
the outer world as now interpreted ? Do they copy it
exactly, and find encouragement from the great example ?
On the contrary, Nature, it is customary to say, is pitiless,
and, while ever moving on, makes no step but by crushing
a thousand-fold more sentient life than she ultimately sets
up, and sets up none that does not devour what is already
there. The battle of existence rages through all time and
in every field; and its rule is to give no quarter,—to de
spatch the maimed, to overtake the halt, to trip up the
blind, and drive the fugitive host over the precipice into
the sea. Nature is fond of the mighty, and kicks the
feeble; and, while for ever multiplying wretchedness, has
no patience with it when it looks up and moans. And so
all-pervading is this rule, that evil, we- are told, cannot
really be put down, but only masked and diverted; if you
suppress it here, it will break out there ; the fire of anguish
still rolls below and has alternate vents; when you stop up
/Etna,, it will blot out Sodom and Gomorrha, and bury the
cities of the plain. Who can deny that such teachings as
these set the outer universe and our inner nature at its
best at hopeless variance with one another ? Do they not
depress the moral power to which we owe the most human
izing features of our civilization ? We have not to go far
for a practical answer. Within a few weeks the question
has been raised whether the recent flow of commiseration
towards the famine-stricken districts of India does not
offend against the Law of Nature for reducing a superfluous
population ; and whether there were not advantages in the
old method of taking no notice of these things, and letting
Death pass freely over his threshing-floor and bury the
human chaff quietly out of the way. Moral enthusiasm
makes many a mischievous mistake in its haste and blind
ness, and greatly needs the guidance of wiser thought; but
�28
this tone of moral scepticism, which disparages the very
springs of generous labour, and treats them as follies laughed
at by the cynicism of Nature, is a thousand-fold more deso
lating. For it carries poison to the very roots of good. It
is as the bursting out of salt-springs in a valley of fruits;
it soaks through the prolific soil of all the virtues, and
turns the promise of Eden into a Dead Sea shore.
Beyond the range of the merely compassionate impulse,
Self-forgetfulness in love for others has a foremost place in
our ideal of character, and our deep homage as representing
the true end of our humanity. We exact it from ourselves,
and the poor answer we make to the demand costs us
many a sigh; and till we can break the bonds that hold
us to our own centre, and lose our self-care in constant
sacrifice, a shadow of silent reproach lies upon our heart.
Who is so faultless, or so obtuse, as to be ignorant what
shame there is, not only in snatched advantages and ease
retained to others’ loss, but in ungentle words, in wronging
judgment within our private thoughts alone; nay, in simple
blindness to what is passing in another’s mind ? Who
does not upbraid himself for his slowness in those sym
pathies which are as a multiplying mirror to the joys of
life, reflecting them in endless play? And the grace so
imperfect in ourselves wins our instant veneration when
realized in others. The historical admirations of men are
often, indeed, drawn to a very different type of character:
for Genius and Will have their magnificence as well as
Goodness its beauty: but before the eye of a purified re
verence, neither the giants of force nor the recluses of
saintly austerity stand on so high a pedestal as the devoted
benefactors of mankind. The heroes of honour are great;
but the heroes of service are greater; nor does any appeal
speak more home to us than a true story of life risked,
�29
of ambitions dropped, of repose surrendered, of temper
moulded, of all things serenely endured,—perhaps un
noticed and in exile,—at some call of sweet or high affec
tion. Is then this religion of Self-sacrifice the counterpart
of the behaviour of the objective world ? Is the same
principle to be found dominating on that great scale ? Far
from it. There, we are informed, the only rule is selfassertion: the all-determining Law is relentless competition
for superior advantage; the condition of obeying which is,
that you are to forego nothing, and never to miss an oppor
tunity of pushing a rival over, and seizing the prey before
he is on his feet again. We look without, and see the
irresistible fact of selfish scramble: we look within, and
find the irresistible faith of unselfish abnegation. So here,
again, Morals are unnatural, and Nature is unmoral; and
if, beyond Nature, there is nothing supreme in both rela
tions to determine the subordination and resolve the con
tradiction, he who would be loyal to the higher call must
be so without ground of trust; if he will not betray his
secret ideal, he must follow it unverified, as a mystic en
chantment of his own mind.
Once more; the Sense of Duty enforces the suggestions of
these and other affections by an authority which we recog
nise as at once within us and over us, and making them
more than impulses, more than ideals, and establishing them
in binding relations with our Will. The rudest self-know
ledge must own that the consciousness of Moral Obligation
is an experience sui generis, separated by deep distinctions
from outward necessity on the one hand and inward desire
upon the other; and the only psychology which can bridge
over these distinctions is that which escapes with its
analysis into prehistoric ages, and finds it easy to grow
vision out of touch, and read back all differentiation into
�30
sameness. No one would carry off the problem into that
darkness who could deal with it in the present daylight:
so, we may take it as confessed, that to us the suasion of
Eight speaks with a voice which no charming of pleasure
and no chorus of opinion can ever learn to mimic. To
disregard them is a simple matter of courage; we defy them,
and are free : but if from it we turn away, we hear pursuing
feet behind; and should we stop our ears, we feel upon us
the grasp of an awful hand. Moral good would, in our
apprehension, cease to be what it is, were it constituted by
any natural good, or related to it otherwise than as its
superior. It is not a personal end—one among the many
satisfactions assigned to the separate activities of our con
stitution : else, it would be at our disposal, and we might
forego it. Others are our partners in it: for it sets up
JRiglits as counterparts to Duties, and widens by its reci
procity into a common element of Humanity. Is that then
its native home ? Have men created it, as an expression
of their general wish,—a concentrated code of civic police ?
We cannot rest in this : for no aggregate of wills, no public
meeting of mankind, though it got together all generations
and all contemporary tribes, could by vote make perfidy a
virtue and turn pity into a crime. Moral Eight is thus no
local essence; but by its centrifugal force, relatively to our
abode, slips off the earth and assumes an absolute univer
sality as the law of all free agency. That it should present
itself to us in this transcendent aspect is intelligible enough,
if it be identified with the Universal Mind, and thence
imparted to dependent natures permitted to be like Him :
for, in that case, the related feelings and convictions are
true; in the order of reality, Eighteousness is prior to the
pains and pleasures of our particular faculties and the
natural exigencies of our collective life; and our allegiance
�31
is due to an eternal Perfection which penetrates .the moral
structure of all worlds. How then does this intuitive faith
of our responsible will, this worship of an eternally Holy,
stand with the kosmical conceptions now tyrannizing over
the imaginations of men ? It encounters the shock of con
temptuous contradiction. Ethically, we are assured, the
known world culminates in us. Before us, there was
nothing morally good: over us, there is nothing morally
better: Man himself is here the supreme being in the
universe. In the just, the beneficent, the true, there is no
pre-existence : they are not the roots of reality, but the last
blossoms of the human phenomena. And even there, the
fair show which gives them their repute of an ethereal
beauty is but the play of an ideal light upon coarse mate
rials j—rude pleasures and ruder constraints are all that
remain when the increments of fancy have fallen away.
The real world provides interests alone; which, when ade
quately masked, call themselves virtues and pass for some
thing new: and, duped by this illusion, we dream of a realm
of authoritative Duty, in which the earth is but a province
of a supramundane moral empire. And so, we must
conclude, the Conscience which lives on this sublime but
empty vision has transcended the tuition of Nature, and,
in growing wiser than its teacher, has lost its foothold on
Reality, only to lean on a phantom of Divine support.
On the hypothesis of a Mindless universe, such is the
fatal breach between the highest inward life of man and
his picture of the outer world. All that is subjectively
noblest turns out to be the objectively hollo west; and the
ideal, whether in life and character, or in the beauty of the
earth and heaven, which he had taken to be the secret
meaning of the Real, is repudiated by it, and floats through
space as a homeless outcast. Even in this its desolation a
�32
devoted disciple will say, ‘I will follow thee whithersoever
thou goest;’ but how heavy the cross which he will have
to bear ! Religion, under such conditions, is a defiance of
inexorable material laws in favour of a better which they
have created but cannot sustain,—a reaction of man against
Nature, which he has transcended,—a withdrawal of the
Self which a resistless force pushes to the front,—a preser
vation of the weak whom Necessity crushes, a sympathy
with sufferings which life relentlessly sets up,—a recogni
tion of authoritative Duty which cannot be. Or will you
perhaps insist that, in this contrariety between thought and
fact, Religion must take the other side, discharge the Oeta
ovetpara as illusory, and in her homage hold fast to the
solid world ? This might perhaps in some sense be, if you
only gave us a world which it was possible to respect.
But, by a curious though intelligible affinity, the modern
doctrine allies itself with an unflinching pessimism; it plays
the cynic to the universe,—penetrates behind its grand and
gracious airs, and detects its manifold blunders and impos
tures : what skill it has it cannot help; and the only faults
and horrors that are not in it are those which are too bad to
live. Human life, which is the summit that has been won,
is pronounced but a poor affair at best; and the scene
which spreads below and around is but as a battle-field at
night-fall, with a few victors taking their faint shout away,
and leaving the plain crowded with wounds and vocal with
agony. Existence itself, insists Hartmann, is an evil, in
proportion as its range is larger and you know it more, and
that of cultivated men is worst of all; and the constitu
*
tion of the world (so stupidly does it work) would be an
unpardonable crime, did it issue from a power that knew
* Philosophic cles Unbewussten, c. xii. p. 598.
�33
what it was about.
*
How can these malcontents find any
Religion in obeying such a power ? Can they approach it
with contumely at one moment, and with devotion at the
next ? If they think so ill of Nature, there can be no
reverence in their service of her laws : on the contrary, they
abandon what they revere to bend before what they revile.
To this humiliation the more magnanimous spirits will
never stoop; they will find some excuse for still clinging to
the ideal forms they cannot verify; will go apart with them
with a high-toned love which stops short of faith but is
full of faithfulness; will linger near the springs of poetry
and art, and there forget awhile the disenchanted Actual;
and will wonder perhaps whether this half-consecrated
ground may not suffice, when the temples are gone, to give
an asylum to the worshippers. Such loyalty of heart towards
the harmonies that ought to prevail, with disaffection towards
the discords that do prevail, may indeed lift the character
of a man to an elevation half-divine; and in his presence,
Nature, were she not blind, might start to see that she
had produced a god. But, for all that, she is not going
to succumb to him; she can call up her lower brood to
suppress him, or monsters to chain him to her rock. He
contends with the lower forces, believing them to be the
stronger, and fights his losing battle against hordes of infe
riors ever swarming to overwhelm what is too good for
the world. Such religion as remains to him is a religion
of despair,—a pathetic defiance of an eternal baser power,
And if there be anything tragic in earth or heaven, it is
the proud desolation of a mind which has to regard itself
as Highest, to know itself the seat of some love and justice
and devotion to the good, and to look upon the system of
* Ap. Strauss ; der alte and der neue Glaube, p. 223.
0
�34
the Universe as cruel, ugly, stupid and mean. The most
touching episodes of history are perhaps those which dis
close the life of genius and virtue under some capricious
and ignoble tyranny,—asserting itself in the ostracism of
an Aristides, the hemlock-cup of Socrates, the blood-bath
of Thrasea; and no other than this is the life of every man
who, walking only by his purest inner lights, finds that
they illumine no nature but his own, and are baffled and
quenched by the outer darkness.
It cannot be denied that there does exist this contrariety
between the modern materialistic philosophy and religious
faith. It cannot be believed that this contrariety is charge
able on any mutual contradiction among the human facul
ties themselves. Were we really placed between two in
formants that said ‘ Yes ’ at the right ear and ‘ No' at the
left, we should simply be without cognitive endowment at
all, and all the pulsations of thought would cancel each
other and die. Can we end the strife by separating the
provinces of the two opposites, and saying that the func
tion of the one is to know, of the other to create ? Cer
*
tainly, “ creative ” power is something grand, and Theology
should perhaps feel honoured to be invested with it. But,
alas ! a known materialism and a created God presents
a combination which thought repudiates and reverence
abhors; and the suggestion of which must be met with the
counter affirmations, that the atomic hypothesis is a thing
not known but created, while God is not created but known.
The only possible basis for a treaty of alliance between the
tendencies now in conflict is not in lodging the one in the
Reason and the other in the Imagination, in order to keep
them from quarrelling, but in recognizing a Duality in the
* Professor Tyndall’s Address, p. 64.
�35
functions of Reason itself, according as it deals with phe
nomena or their ground, with law or with causality, with
material consecution or with moral alternatives, with the
definite relations of space and time and motion, or with
the indefinite intensities of beauty and values of affection
which bear us to the infinitely Good. When once this
adjustment of functions has been considerately made, the
disturbed equilibrium of minds will be reinstated, the panic
a.nd the arrogance of our time will disappear, and the pro
gress of the intellect will no longer shake the soul from her
everlasting rest.
C. Green & Son, Printers, 178, Strand.
��
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Victorian Blogging
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A collection of digitised nineteenth-century pamphlets from Conway Hall Library & Archives. This includes the Conway Tracts, Moncure Conway's personal pamphlet library; the Morris Tracts, donated to the library by Miss Morris in 1904; the National Secular Society's pamphlet library and others. The Conway Tracts were bound with additional ephemera, such as lecture programmes and handwritten notes.<br /><br />Please note that these digitised pamphlets have been edited to maximise the accuracy of the OCR, ensuring they are text searchable. If you would like to view un-edited, full-colour versions of any of our pamphlets, please email librarian@conwayhall.org.uk.<br /><br /><span><img src="http://www.heritagefund.org.uk/sites/default/files/media/attachments/TNLHLF_Colour_Logo_English_RGB_0_0.jpg" width="238" height="91" alt="TNLHLF_Colour_Logo_English_RGB_0_0.jpg" /></span>
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Conway Hall Library & Archives
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2018
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Conway Hall Ethical Society
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Religion as affected by modern materialism: an address delivered in Manchester New College, London, at the opening of the 89th session on Tuesday, Oct. 6th, 1874
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Martineau, James
Description
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Place of publication: London
Collation: 35 p. ; 22 cm.
Notes: From the library of Dr Moncure Conway. Printed by C. Green & Son, Strand. Includes bibliographical references.
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Williams and Norgate
Date
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1874
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G5357
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<a href="http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/mark/1.0/"><img src="http://i.creativecommons.org/p/mark/1.0/88x31.png" alt="Public Domain Mark" /></a><span> </span><br /><span>This work (Religion as affected by modern materialism: an address delivered in Manchester New College, London, at the opening of the 89th session on Tuesday, Oct. 6th, 1874), identified by </span><a href="https://conwayhallcollections.omeka.net/items/show/www.conwayhall.org.uk"><span>Humanist Library and Archives</span></a><span>, is free of known copyright restrictions.</span>
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application/pdf
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Text
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English
Subject
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Materialism
Religion
Science
Conway Tracts
Materialism
Religion and science
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UNSCIENTIFIC RELIGION;
OR,
REMARKS ON THE REV. J. M. WILSON’S
“ATTEMPT TO TREAT SOME RELIGIOUS QUESTIONS
IN A SCIENTIFIC SPIRIT”.
[Reprinted from
the
“National Reformer”.]
BY
s. s.
POPULUS VULT DECIPI, SED ILLUMINETUR.
LONDON:
fbeethought
publishing company,
63, FLEET STREET,
E.C.
1 8 8 7.
PRICE
FOURPENCE.
�UNSCIENTIFIC RELIGION;
OR,
REMARKS ON THE REV. J. M. WILSON’S
“ATTEMPT TO TREAT SOME RELIGIOUS QUESTIONS
IN A SCIENTIFIC SPIRIT”.
[Reprinted from
the
“National Reformer”.]
BY
s. s.
POPULUS VULT DECIPI, SED ILLUMINETUR.
LONDON:
fbeethought
publishing company,
63, FLEET STREET,
E.C.
1 8 8 7.
PRICE
FOURPENCE.
��N574-
TO THE READER.
Messrs. Macmillajst and Co. having published a volume
of Essays and Addresses by the Rev. James M. Wilson,
this opportunity is taken of reprinting some articles
that appeared in the National Reformer, after the first
appearance of the essays and addresses contained in the
volume referred to.
The second and third articles were written concerning
two sermons that Mr. Wilson preached in March, 1884,
and which are not included in the volume of essays and
addresses. They were published by Macmillan and Co.,
in pamphlet form, shortly after their delivery.
The paper of most interest in Mr. Wilson’s volume is
undoubtedly the “Letter to a Bristol Artisan” (p. 128175), which, though dated in 1885, is now for the first
time published. This letter (which has been recently
criticised with force and ability by Mr. J. M. Robertson
in the columns of the National Reformer} is Mr. Wilson’s
reply to the pamphlet (published by W. H. Morrish, 18,
Narrow Wine St., Bristol), wherein “ A Bristol Artisan ”,
took up the theme of Mr. Wilson’s two lectures to the
Secularists of that city, on the reasons why men do not
believe the Bible. These lectures are contained in the
new volume (p. 74-127), having previously been published
by the Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge. The
artisan had not the same facilities for making his views
known, his pamphlet appeared in modest guise, and a
small edition has not yet been sold. If, on our side, we
had a society for promoting Secular knowledge, it might
do well to bring out a second edition of this remarkable
�iv
TO THE READER.
essay, and to ensure that every thinking man and woman
in England should have a chance of mastering its contents.
But at present the want of such machinery is one of the
great difficulties we have to contend against. I may,
however, say that this pamphlet has extorted the approval
of those most opposed to the artisan’s views. Mr. Wilson
says of it: “ your pamphlet has deeply interested me, not
only from its singular directness, and lucidity, and general
moderation of tone, but because it is full of misconceptions,
etc.” Another clergyman says of it that “ it will probably
be widely read and influential both for good and evil”.
And the general opinion seems to be that no more discreet
and inoffensive statement of the higher secular philosophy
has ever been published.
Those who have read Mr. Robertson’s criticisms on Mr.
Wilson’s reply to the artisan will be prepared to hear that
no such complimentary language, can, in its turn, be used
of it. At the same time it seems to me that Mr. Robert
son has not fully realised the enormous advantage gained
for Secularism, by the admissions that the letter contains.
Mr. Robertson’s own mind is clear—his horizon free from
haze and mist; has he not forgotten that such clearness
of vision is rare in times of transition. One of our univer
sities, in its proud motto, offers lux and pocula, light and
ceremonials. But in these days the retention of the pocula
involves too often the darkening of the lux. And not
only do the traditionary status and ecclesiastical endow
ments of the Church of England, that Cambridge offers
to its graduates, tend to a frame of mind that shrinks
from the full blaze of the rays of truth, but other and
nobler ties are at work in the same direction—so noble
and so human that I should be sorry to cast up the charge
of nebulous inconsistency against the man whose light
faileth. Let us, however, thank Mr. Wilson for these
words: “It is absolutely necessary for you to grasp the
conception of religion, as being NOT a system of dogmas
about the being of God and his relation to man, revealed
by some external and supernatural machinery, but as
being an education, an evolution, a growth of the spirit
of man towards something higher, by means of a gradual
revelation.” Let us, I say, ponder well these words.
And let us ask Mr. Wilson to consider if he can put
bounds to this growth, and say, “ Thus far! ” or predict
�V
TO THE READER.
safely that at this time, or at that time, finality will be
reached.
If I were inclined to be critical, I would also ask Mr.
Wilson to reconcile his use of the word religion in the
above extract with the conception of it given in the
sermon he preached in St. Paul’s Cathedral, hereinafter
referred to.
But while anxious to award to Mr. Wilson all the merit
that is due to him, I am entirely at one with Mr. Robert
son in considering that this attempt to treat matters of
faith by the methods of science has been (as all such
attempts must be) a complete failure.
In conclusion I gratefully accept Mr. Charles Bradlaugh’s
permission to dedicate to him, as one of the leaders of
sincere and active freethought—active because sincere—
this attempt to state the issue between Materialism on one
hand, and the indefinite faltering neo-Christianity on the
other, which is clerical rather than agnostic, agnostic
rather than religious.
s. s.
July, 1887.
��UNSCIENTIFIC RELIGION.
I.—Mr. Wilson’s Bristol Lectures.
[From the National Reformer of 16th September, 1883.]
The late Archbishop of Canterbury, who combined the
shrewdness of a Scot with the tact of a courtier, said some
years ago that Atheism should not be regarded as a heresy
to be condemned, but met as an argument, to be seriously
and temperately answered. The attitude thus recommended
has been adopted by several enlightened clergymen, and
will probably commend itself to many more. But if gentle
men in “holy orders” quit the vantage ground of ortho
doxy, and meet Secularists on even terms, they must take
the chances of war. Real argument implies that the side
which has the best of it shall carry conviction to the other;
and if the clergy cannot convert us, they run the risk of
being themselves converted. The game is a perilous one
for the clergy, but none the less are they bound in honor
to play it out.
The lectures before us are the first fruits of Dr. Tait’s
remark. Mr. Wilson, head master of Clifton School, is
one of the most distinguished of that noble band of workers
in the cause of morality that the churches of to-day are
producing. It were presumption for me to speak of the
character and merits of such a man: if anyone wishes to
learn them, let him ask the poor of Bristol. He delivered
these lectures to audiences of the working men of that
city about six months ago, and they have now been repub
lished under the auspices of the Society for Promoting
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UNSCIENTIFIC RELIGION.
Christian Knowledge. The Spectator remarks that the
Society never did a bolder or a wiser thing than this ; and
many who take a broader view of the subjects discussed
than the Spectator does, will probably acquiesce in that
opinion.
Mr. Wilson addressed himself to the question, “ Why
men do not believe the Bible ”, and in the first lecture
considered the intellectual difficulties ; in the second, the
. moral difficulties. By intellectual difficulties, Mr. Wilson
means “ those which are the consequences of a particular
theory as to the necessity of a literal translation and the
verbal accuracy of the Bible”. This particular theory,
viz., that the Bible is verbally or mechanically inspired, is
not, Mr. Wilson asserts, laid down by the Church, nor
found in the Bible, nor was it taught by Jesus Christ or
his apostles. Up to the time that the Roman Empire
became Christian, and the Canon of Scripture was formed,
“ there was no thought of a divinely-guaranteed accuracy”.
Even after the Reformation, when the thirty-nine articles
were promulgated, “ there was no theory of inspiration”.
But as the study of the Bible became more popular, theories
of inspiration were started, especially that of Calvin, who
held “that from Genesis to Revelation the Bible is not
only the Word of God, but the words of God ; and it is this
theory that lands men in endless contradictions ”,
I will leave it to the followers and admirers of Calvin to
prove, as I expect they easily can prove, that the theory
of inspiration, which Mr. Wilson attributes to him, was
not his invention, but was commonly held in the Church
centuries before his time. This does not concern us much.
But before I pass on to what Mr. Wilson would have us
substitute for the Calvinistic theory of inspiration, I would
hint that he took an unfair advantage of us Secularists, in
saying that we have no warrant for putting into the mouths
of Christians a theory of verbal inspiration, when it is
notorious that his assertion that the Church of England
does not teach the verbal inspiration of the Bible, fell like
a thunderbolt on the Christian public. Nine-tenths of the
religious people in these kingdoms firmly believe the Bible
to be inspired. Secularists have to deal with popular
superstition, and not with the esoteric creed of a few
priests. The sixth article of religion is so worded that it
can perfectly cover, if needs be, the Calvinistic theory;
�UNSCIENTIFIC RELIGION.
9
and if it suits Mr. Wilson and his friends to say now that
“Holy Scripture” is not verbally inspired, he ought not
to blame Colonel Ingersoll for addressing himself to the
current belief. I strongly suspect that if these doubts as
to the authority of the Bible had not reached the great
mass of our countrymen, the doctrine now produced by
Canon Westcott and Mr. Wilson would not have been
much heard of. It is to be regretted that Archbishop
Benson has, in a letter printed in the preface to these
lectures, apparently supported Mr. Wilson’s complaint of
Colonel Ingersoll.
The fact is, that Secularists make little use of the
Calvinistic theory of the Bible. It is to the book itself,
and not to any theory of it, that their apprehensions point.
They regard it as the history, more or less authentic, of a
small nation whose social ostracism is a fitting reward for
moral delinquency, and who have made themselves more
detested than any other race of men. They cannot admit
that the history of such a race, curious and interesting as
it is, ought to be our guide and standard here and now.
It was a rhetorical artifice, and nothing more, to bring
into contrast Colonel Ingersoll and Canon Westcott; clever
and momentarily effective, but attended with no permanent
gain. Mr. Wilson’s subsequent admission (page 31), that
some of his friends urged “ You will unsettle more than
you will help; you will shake the faith of believers, and
not convert the sceptics ”, proves that Colonel Ingersoll
was right and Canon Westcott wrong, in their estimate of
popular theology.
Mr. Wilson would remove from the portal of the temple
the bogey of Calvinism ; unsuspecting worshippers are to
be invited to enter ; but once inside the temple, and belief
in inspiration is the atmosphere they breathe : “ Let men
read the gospels as they would read any other book, with
any theory of inspiration, or with none; with the one aim
of learning the truth about Jesus Christ ”, and if this is
done in a proper spirit, Mr. Wilson promises that they will
soon get the belief in inspiration, though they may not be
able to define it. Is this so? Does an absolute rejection
of the Calvinistic theory, followed by careful, patient,
honest study of the Bible, lead men to be Christians, or to
form such an estimate of the character of Jesus Christ as
enables them to recognise him as God ? Experience
�10
UNSCIENTIFIC RELIGION.
meets Mr. Wilson’s promise with, no dubious or uncertain
answer.
Mr. Wilson avoids any definition of that theory which
he would have us substitute for Calvin’s. He says he can
no more define inspiration than he can define “ God”, and
that he can no more prove inspiration than he can listen
to the colors of the rainbow. It is surely irrational and
immoral to believe a theory that can neither be defined or
proved. Some clearly defined theory may commend itself
as possibly credible, even if it cannot be proved, but it
seems romantic, if not impossible, to believe without defi
nition and without demonstration.
And here I would make a protest and an appeal. The
late Archbishop, and clergymen like Mr. Wilson, expect,
and invite us to meet them in discussion. Do they consider
that we do so with halters round our necks ? We may
freely discuss morality, and the non-essentials of religion,
but to deny by advised speaking or printing the truth of
the Christian religion, entails the penalties of that statute
of William and Mary, which Lord Coleridge termed
“ferocious” and “shocking”. Can not Mr. Wilson and
his friends help in getting the statute law and the common
law amended ? And cannot they give an earnest of their
sympathies, by signing the memorial to Mr. Gladstone for
Messrs. Foote and Ramsey’s release that is printed at the
head of page 265 of the Freethinker for 26tli August. Our
unhappy friends have now been thirty long weeks in gaol.
What is left of the “Christian religion ” that the statute
of William and Mary, joint defenders of the faith, so
jealously guarded? The Court of Queen’s Bench has by
mandamus lopped off the devil; Canon Farrar’s sermons
have eliminated hell; the Trinity is threatened when the
Athanasian creed is expunged; and now Mr. Wilson tells
us that inspiration is no part of it. Whatever happens,
let us hope that no blasphemous hand will touch the 36th
Article of religion that treats of the consecration of bishops.
So long as they are maintained in pomp and power,
Christianity has no cause to fear.
The moral difficulty in the way of belief in the Bible
with which Mr. Wilson’s second lecture deals, is thus
described: that as the Bible tolerates, or even approves
of, various forms of immorality, such as slavery, murder,
polygamy, cruelty, and treachery, it is hard to accept of
�UNSCIENTIFIC RELIGION.
11
the God of the Bible as an object of worship. I don’t
think that Mr. Wilson has fully guaged the depth and
strength of the moral difficulty felt by Secularists and
Freethinkers, but accepting his statement of it, as above
summarised, let us examine his mode of meeting it.
He admits that many of the persons mentioned in the
Bible as objects of God’s favor, are not fair examples of
moral goodness, and that some of their actions are unworthy
of our imitation. To get out of the Bible the moral teaching
that it contains, we must read between the lines, and dis
cover “the working out and the development of the idea
of the kingdom of God ”. From the history of the “training
of a typical nation ” (the Jews) we are to “ trace the growth
of a purer morality, of personal responsibility, of the
spirituality of God, of the thought of a future life”. He
thinks that “ facts point unmistakably to the Jews as the
nation that formed the chief channel for divine influence
in religion”, qualifying this by the proviso that “the
morality of the Old Testament is no pattern for us, except
so far as our own consciences, enlightened by the completed
revelation, approve ”. This, I take it, is a fair summary,
mainly in his own words, of what Mr. Wilson told the
working-men of Bristol.
Close observation of these two lectures will show that
Mr. Wilson avoided in the second the line of argument
adopted in the first. When discussing the intellectual
difficulty, he said the theory of inspiration that Secularists
attributed to the Church was neither taught by it nor
found in the Articles of Religion, but was a man of straw,
set up for the purpose of being knocked down. He might
have said the same of the theory of God’s providence and
moral government.
The words “Kingdom of God”,
“ Morality ”, and “ Providence ” do not occur in any of the
Articles. The word “ moral ” occurs only once, in the
seventh Article, which speaks of “ the commandments
which are called moral ”. Mr. Wilson might then have
spoken of the moral difficulty, in the same form of words
as he used for the intellectual difficulty: “What I say will
doubtless surprise some of you, both Christians and
Secularists, but it is an undeniable fact that the Articles
of Religion do not assert that the Bible contains a moral
standard, or that God governs as well as reigns ”. That
he has not adopted this line of reasoning proves the truth
�12
UNSCIENTIFIC RELIGION.
of the remark recently made in these columns : “ Religion
seeks to secure her frail tenure by grasping the skirt of
that holy piorality who was once but her timid and shrinking
handmaid”.1 Mr. Wilson had the same ground for treating
the moral difficulty as a man of straw, as he had in regard
to the intellectual difficulty; but instead of doing so, he
has eagerly enlisted him as a valiant champion on his own
side.
The future of human happiness and morality, Mr. Wilson
would have us believe, depends on the esoteric teaching
derived by learned men from a number of treatises, written
we know not by whom and know not when; in an ancient
language few can read; of which no original exists (save
for some possible speculation of a future Shapira); and
about whose text and interpretation the best authorities
seldom agree. We learn from the first lecture that their
claim to inspiration is shadowy, undefined, and incapable
of proof; and from the second lecture that they contain a
veiled, and not a revealed, record of the will of God as
governor of the world. When these treatises agree about
any moral law, or in their estimate of the moral worth of
any human action, we are by no means to accept this as a
guide or pattern, but we must try to ascertain what indi
cation is to be derived, from the history contained in the
Bible, of the general course of God’s providence in respect
to the Jews; and this indication, when obtained, is to be
subject to the veto of “ conscience ”. Is this a satisfactory
or practicable system of philosophy ?
What is conscience ? We may regard it as a knowledge
of, and fidelity to, the stored-up experience of generations
of men, as to what is best for human happiness on earth.
If Mr. Wilson accepts this definition of conscience, he
virtually accepts the secular philosophy. But whatever
definition he may give of conscience, why is it to have a
veto on the morality of the Old Testament, and not on the
morality of the New Testament ?
Let us apply Mr. Wilson’s system to a case of every day
life. The question arises whether a man may marry the
sister of his deceased wife. From a purely ethical point
of view the advantages preponderate over the objections.
But what does the Bible say ? is at once asked. The Bible
See National Reformer, 8th July, 1883, page 22.
�UNSCIENTIFIC RELIGION.
13
gives an uncertain sound, but its more weighty texts are
supposed to be against such marriages. But Mr. Wilson
says we may not be guided by texts, but by the “ history
of the development of the kingdom of God, as worked out
in the case of the Jews ”. Laymen are puzzled, and refer
the matter to divines. Divines differ—some say the pro
posed marriage accords with that development, some say it
does not. Eventually a clear majority decide one way or
the other, it matters not which. Even then Mr. Wilson is
not satisfied, but would appeal to “Conscience”. Why
not let conscience decide it at first without all this
ceremony ?
It is hardly necessary to observe that the theory of
Biblical morality set up by Mr. Wilson, is, like Canon
Westcott’s theory of inspiration, new to the religious
public. Both have been evolved by the “ struggle for
existence ”. But for the certain and now ra,pid action of
Ereethought, we should not have heard of either. A few
years ago, and anyone who said that Mooses and Abraham
and David were immoral characters deserving censure,
would have been treated as a blasphemer. Mr. Wilson
has discovered that it is right and just to submit the
character and deeds of these old Jews to a tribunal and a
test, that may possibly brand them as foul disgraces to
humanity, and confirm the hatred with which in all ages
the uncircumcised Gentiles have regarded God s chosen
people, which is nearly as strong now as in the days of
Pharoah, and of Nebuchadnezzar, and of Titus. Freethought has scored a considerable success in eliciting such
admissions as Mr. Wilson has made. Wb are almost pre
pared to concede to him the claim he made at last year s
Church Congres, that clergymen are Freethinkers. At all
events, some of them, if not actually Freethinkers, are not
unwilling captives at the chariot wheels of Freethought,
and will swell her approaching triumph.
In these remarks I have treated only of the more im
portant and essential parts of Mr. Wilson’s two lectures.
There is much in them, and especially in the second lecture,
for the adequate notice of which more space is needed than
the columns of a newspaper can afford. The lectures form
an important point in the struggle between Superstition
and Freethought, and ought to be studied by all, on both
sides, who are interested in its issue. May I express my
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UNSCIENTIFIC RELIGION.
admiration of the learning, liberality, and rare human
sympathy they breathe? In the knowledge and love of
of man, they recall some high exemplars. Even if Mr.
Wilson has not succeeded in the objects with which his
lectures were given, he has secured the warm thanks and
true well-wishing of all Secularists, not those of Bristol
only.1
II.—Religion v. Revelation.
[From the National Reformer, 16th November, 1884 J
The Rev. Mr. Wilson, whose two lectures on “Inspira
tion” were reviewed in these columns last year, has pub
lished two sermons that he preached some months ago.
The first, entitled “Opinion and Service”, was preached
in Westminster Abbey, and reminds us that the question
to be asked of us will be, What have ye done ? and not
What did ye think? The second sermon, entitled “Religion
and Revelation ”, was preached in St. Paul’s Cathedral.
Both sermons—but especially the second one—prove the
extent to which Church teaching has been influenced by
hostile criticism, and what is now thought on these con
troversial points by that section of enlightened Christian
men that Mr. Wilson represents.
In reviewing the Bristol lectures, we indicated the
following concessions that they made to Freethought.
(1) Mr. Wilson rejected the Calvinistic theory of inspira
tion, and condemned it as “landing men in endless con
tradictions”. (2) He professed himself unable to define
or prove the theory of inspiration which he would have
us substitute for Calvin’s. (3) He admitted that the Bible
revealed no immutable standard of morality, but that its
moral teaching must be sought for “ between the lines ”.
And (4) that, when found, it was not supreme, but sub1 Possibly this estimate of the value of the Bristol lectures may to
some persons appear too favorable, but I will leave unaltered the
terms in which I expressed the opinion that I originally formed of
them. Of course, my estimate refers to the lectures only, and does
not apply to the other writings included in Mr. Wilson’s volume
S. S.
�UNSCIENTIFIC RELIGION.
15
ject to the veto of conscience. Not only are these con
cessions still maintained in the sermon before us, but in
other directions a retreat is sounded, and vantage ground
gained for the implacable foe of theology.
Taking that which is known as “religion” in the popular
and vague meaning assigned to it, the preacher divided it
into the idea, power, or spirit, which he termed “revela
tion”, and the expression cultus or form to which he con
fined the word “religion”. He regarded revelation as
ever antagonistic to religion, describing the latter as a
universal human instinct common to all races, savage and
civilised; dark and terrible in its history; stained with
idolatry, cruelty, and lust. On the other hand, he would
have us regard revelation as a divine work, spiritual,
accumulative, and imperishable, ever striving with the low
religious instinct, and illuminating and guiding man.1
Here I must ask if history affords any trace of this
struggle between revelation and religion, or if it exists
only in Mr. Wilson’s imagination? We know of the strife
between the ideas of the divine and the human, between
Spiritualism and Materialism, and that for long ages it
has been one-sided and unequal; we know that the idea
of man and matter is at length superseding that of God
and spirit; that securing the happiness of man is of more
importance than ascertaining the will of God; that human
affairs depend on ourselves, and not on the moral govern
ment of a personal God. This great strife is tending to
the enlightenment and advancement of our race, but it is
not the strife described by Mr. Wilson. Revelation is not
mastering religion as he suggests, but religion and revela
tion combined are about to fade away before morality.
The revelation that is on the winning side is not the
revelation of God’s will, but the revelation of man’s
reason.
All so-called divine revelations rest on the religious
instinct, spring from it, and strengthen it. The two are
inseparable, and history gives no indication of an inter1 One great merit of scientific system is accuracy of definition and
rigid adherence t > a definition once laid down. If we compare the
meaning of the term “religion” given in the passages now referred
to with the conception of it that is inculcated in the passage quoted
in the introduction to this work we shall be able to estimate the
extreme tenuity of Mr. Wilson’s claim to scientific method. S. S.
�16
UNSCIENTIFIC RELIGION.
necine strife between them. On the contrary, they have
ever fought side by side against human reason and Freethought. Can Mr. Wilson find any instance of a stake or
rack or pillory having been used on behalf of revelation
against religion, or on behalf of religion against revela
tion ? It is surely vain for him to say that a sentence like
this: “To obey is better than sacrifice” is revelation,1
while this other is religion: “And the Lord spake unto
Moses, saying .... He among the sons of Aaron that
offereth the blood of the peace offering shall have the
right shoulder. For the wave-breast and the heave
shoulder have i taken of the children of Israel, and have
given them unto Aaron the Priest, and unto his sons by
a statute for ever.” By what process of reading between
the lines does he venture to designate Samuel’s words as
revelation, and God’s words as religion? Mr. Wilson says
that “the cry ‘crucify him, crucify him,’ is the climax and
acme of the ceaseless contest between the lower religious
instincts of the human race and the higher divine light
that pours on men”. But supposing that the crucifixion
really occurred, that the record of it is not (as Eobert
Taylor avers) a Gnostic forgery emanating from Egypt,
that old hotbed of superstition and lies, why should we
regard that crucified “blasphemer” as “the unique
revealer of God ” ? Why should we not regard him as a
son of man, himself the slave of religion, using such poor
reasoning faculty as he possessed to expose the fraud and
hypocrisy of a priesthood ? What Jesus Christ revealed
was human, and not divine; and he died, not as a revealer
at the suit of religion, but as a reasoner at the suit of
revelation. For our knowledge of divinity we are indebted
to the Comforter, who never died for us.
Let Mr. Wilson tell us in his own words what he means
by revelation:
“The word ‘revelation’ implies a theory; it is a way of
regarding and grouping facts. The facts are the history of
man, the development, continuous and discontinuous, of the
spiritual insight and forces of mankind. These facts are what
1 The 15th chapter of 1 Samuel, from which Mr. Wilson quote
these words, is one we should have expected him to ignore, lhe
obedience inculcated by Samuel was an awful crime, and Saul’s clear
duty was to have disobeyed the order.
d
�UNSCIENTIFIC RELIGION.
17
they are, and we may hope by study to arrive at some know
ledge of them. But we need theories to group facts; and the
theory which is expressed by the word revelation is this, that
man is, in his present condition, a partaker in some inchoate
manner of that controlling universal consciousness which we
call God; which illuminates the mind and conscience of man :
that man is, or possesses, a ^>avepwcri9, a manifestation of God.
The control of God is exhibited in its effects, and one of the
effects is the moral education and evolution of man. The
growth, then, and development of this manifestation of the
spirit of God in man, and by man, and to man, is revelation.”
I fear that Mr. Wilson’s attempt to construct a safe
theory of revelation is as unsatisfactory as his attempt to
deal with inspiration. Why should any “way of regarding
and grouping facts ” be styled revelation and not science ?
What facts are there to be grouped ? The history of man
is not a fact, but a theory resting on facts. The “develop
ment of man’s spiritual insight ” is not a fact, but a theory
resting on fictions. What is “spiritual insight”? from
what has it been developed ? what is it tending to ? Does
not the use of the word “spiritual” beg the whole question
of inspiration and revelation ? Mr. Wilson here seems to
fall into the same error that led Mr. Drummond to argue
for the existence of a spiritual world governed by natural
law.
Human history needs no belief in revelation for group
ing the facts it records. The best historians eschew all
reference to a controlling providence. Sir Archibald
Alison wrote twenty volumes to prove that Providence
was always on the side of the Tories; but who reads Sir
Archibald Alison ? Beal history (such as Gibbon’s) cannot
be written if any such theory as Mr. Wilson’s “Revela
tion ” is used to group its facts.
Let us continue our quotation from Mr. Wilson :
“ To those who are deeply impressed with God’s influence on
the hearts of man, to those who grasp this God-theory—this
revelation-theory—it carries conviction. They read and see the
history of man in its light—they see the Spirit striving with
man—the Eternal Consciousness more and more revealed in the
inchoate, time-bound individual. All the world of nature and
history speaks of God. It is a theory which man cannot per
fectly master, nor apply to every detail, nor prove conclusively
to all minds; but in spite of this it convinces such as grasp it,
�18
UNSCIENTIFIC RELIGION.
Discovery becomes indistinguishable from revelation.
the work of God.”
All is
Passing by those parts of this quotation that are to me
incomprehensible, I would ask if this reference to a “ God
theory ” is not either a palpable truism, or a misstatement
of facts. Those who worshipped the Olympian Zeus, or
Venus of the Myrtle-tree, or Diana of Ephesus; those who
built the great temples of Hindustan; the Mahomedans
who say that there is no God but Allah; were not all these
imbued with the God-idea, and did they know of this
eternal strife between revelation and religion ? If on the
other hand the idea of God to which Mr. Wilson refers
implies a being hostile to religion, and governing mankind
by a slow and partial process of revelation, then his sen
tence simply amounts to this, that those who believe it,
believe it. Does this carry conviction to the great and
constantly increasing mass of mankind who cannot grasp
the God-idea ? They cannot “ see the spirit striving with
man”, but they see man’s reason striving with religion
and superstition. Mr. Wilson elsewhere says that it is
found possible by experience “ to feel all human history
instinct with God”.
Does he realize the fact that
those who have once grasped the profound solace of
Materialistic philosophy see all theological dogma instinct
with man ?
With reference to such men, those “who have abandoned
our dogma and are indifferent to our cultus ”, Mr. Wilson
remarks as follows :
“It is perhaps our fault if they think that this is all that
Christianity has to offer. But they do not and cannot escape
from the Christian revelation, even though they call it by
another name. It is light; and in that light some of them live
and walk; and the cultus, the ritual, the OpytTKeia which they
adopt may not be wholly dissimilar to that ‘ pure ’ cultus or
ritual or 6pt}<TK£M of St. James, which consists in charity and
purity and unworldliness, and is, along with the sacraments,
the only Christian ritual ordained in the Bible.”
Here at least is consolation; whether we believe or
reject the dogma, the work of revelation will go on. Why,
then, should we force and strain our reason to accept a
theory which does not depend on our acceptance of it, but
which must remain true whether we accept it or not ?
�UNSCIENTIFIC RELIGION.
19
Better to maintain the rectitude and supremacy of our
reason, knowing that we shall not lose one iota of the
benefit of revelation. Is this Mr. Wilson’s advice? It
seems unanswerable.
Mr. Wilson’s own position as regards religion seems
to be delineated in the following sentences :—
“ But for the vast mass of mankind it is of far more import
ance to hand down to them and through them the leading
truths of revelation in any form, than to insist on the inade
quacy of the form. Of course men trained, as men ought to he
trained, to criticise and question everything, may feel that the
cultus and dogma of Christianity in its present form, if put
forward and insisted on as absolute, authoritative, exhaustive
truths, are a concealment of the higher light; and their honestyr
compels them to renounce and even to denounce them. But
when such men come in contact with their less critical brethren,
whose convictions and hopes and faiths must be clear, defined,
emphatic, dogmatic, to whom vaguer and more philosophical
expressions convey no meaning, they will discover that the
language in which revelation is transferable to them is, to a far
larger extent than they anticipated before trial, the current
language of cultus and dogma. They will be powerless.to find
another shell for the kernel. Nevertheless, such men will fear
lessly purify their teaching from the grosser dogmas from which
Christian teaching is by no means wholly free, and will try to
contend, to a certain extent, with the lower religious instinct
in the true spirit of their Master, educating their people to feel
the spirit, and not only see the letter.”
Some of this quotation describes the position of Secu
larists as well as of enlightened Churchmen. But in one
essential point our morality differs from theirs. Holding
as we do that the whole nut, shell and kernel alike, is
poisonous, we do not retain a worthless shell for the sake
of the kernel, but we boldly tell our less “critical
brethren ” to beware of both.
So far, therefore, as Mr. Wilson represents a distinct
school of thought, whose influence in the church is on the
increase, we may from this sermon, preached in our great
national cathedral, claim this further concession to Freethought, that religion is hateful, injurious, and of human
origin, and that it is committed to a long and eventually
losing strife. That is a clear advantage. It matters not
that Mr. Wilson would see a divine revelation in the power
that is to overcome religion. Let him cherish the delusion.
�20
UNSCIENTIFIC RELIGION.
—we know that it is man’s reason and not God’s spirit
that has maintained the glorious, and soon to be victorious,
conflict.1
III.—Religion
v.
Revelation.
[From the National Reformer of the 30th November, 1884.]
The theory of a ceaseless strife between the spirit of
God and religion, propounded in the remarkable sermon
preached at St. Paul’s Cathedral and recently reviewed
here, is so novel and startling as to justify a closer examination than was then attempted. It is with all the greater
pleasure that we again refer to it, because Mr. Wilson’s
opinions deserve, in no ordinary measure, our respect and
attention ; for no English churchman has made such efforts
as he has to understand the position of Secularists, or has
shown such a disposition to discuss philosophy with us on
terms of equality.
Freethinkers are in the habit of ascribing to human
reason the gradual illumination of man, and his liberation
from superstition. The claim, therefore, that these benefits
are due to the influence or spirit of a God who hates
superstition as much as any Secularist does, is well cal
culated to arrest our attention.
I have already quoted Mr. Wilson’s definition of the
revelation to which he attributes such vast results ; and I
have attempted to show that before his hypothesis can be
placed before us for acceptance he must state with greater
precision what facts there are for theorising about. Of
ourselves we have no knowledge of such facts, and are
entirely dependent on him for information about them.
He tells us the facts are “the history of man, and the
development of the spiritual insight and forces of man
kind ”, It is surely on the propounder of a novel theory
1 The words “Let him cherish the delusion” have a shade of
bitterness, and I should prefer to say * Let biw , if be can, prove
his new position; till it is proved we must hold that it is’man’s
reason, and not God’s spirit, that has maintained the conflict. ”,
S. S.
�UNSCIENTIFIC RELIGION.
21
that the onus lies of defining the historical facts on which
it rests. History contains many facts, but I can recall
none for the grouping of which this hypothesis is required.
Let us enumerate a few; the siege of Troy and the sacri
fice of Polyxena at the tomb of Achilles; the rape of the
Sabine women and the death of Lucretia; the invention
of printing and the discovery of America; the Oxford
movement and the establishment of the Divorce Court.
These facts lend themselves to scientific grouping in every
direction save one; they may be arranged in support of
theories in morals and politics, arts and science, educa
tion and political economy; they will even support Mr.
Wilson’s theory of religion; but the one thing on which
they have no apparent bearing is the ceaseless strife between
a divine revelation and religion.
As regards the so-called facts of spiritual development
on which Mr. AVilson relies, the sermon before us does not
furnish so clear a statement as is contained in a paper
which he read in 1882, before the Church Congress at
Derby, from which therefore we quote as follows:
“ Besides these facts of history and criticism, there are other
facts that cannot be traced to their ultimate origin ; the result
of the evolution of human nature under the influence, as we
believe, of God’s holy spirit; the facts of conscience and con
sciousness, of hope and aspiration and worship, spiritual facts
which have no verification but themselves. With these lies most
of our concern. They contain the germ of the spiritual life
and progress of every man, the inner life which Christian
teaching fosters and trains, till it is supreme. These facts lie
in a region equally beyond authority and Freethought.
I submit that every phrase here used—evolution, con
science, consciousness, aspiration, and worship—requires
definition. At first sight I should say that none of them
implied a fact; but it is possible I may be mistaken.
Still, without definition, we know not what facts are
implied and whether the facts are objective or spiritual.
Here again the onus of definition and proof lies on the
propounder. It is vain to tell men who profess to see no
phsenomena that prove the existence of a God that from
spiritual facts implied in such vague phrases as I have
quoted, and which “ have no verification but themselves ”,
they must admit not only the existence of a God but that
he has a spirit also.
�22
UNSCIENTIFIC RELIGION.
Having thus attempted to show that Mr. Wilson's
theory of revelation must remain in the hypothetical stage
until it is duly equipped with scientific definition and
demonstration, we will turn to his a posteriori sketch of
the history of revelation. The first instance he gives of
its existence is when it ‘ ‘ spoke in Moses and made the two
great commandments, love to God and man, stand out
above all else”. I am unaware of this event. Moses is
said to have received ten commandments, one of which
may be read as prescribing love to God (as if love
was ever a creature of command), but they contain
no trace of love to man. The precedence given by
Moses to an enforced and unnatural love of God.
and his silence about human love, far from illumi
nating our race, has caused much of the evil that Mi*.
Wilson attributes to religion. I have already referred to
the second instance of revelation mentioned in the sermon :
“when it spoke in Samuel and taught the nations” that
command which King Saul was dethroned for disobeying.
I am confident that an impartial consideration of the
chapter referred to will lead to the conclusion that Samuel’s
speech was the reverse of illumination. The third instance
is when “ it spoke in David and in the prophets again and
again in words too familiar to need quotation ” : I know
not what passages Mr. Wilson refers to. There are many
verses in David and the prophets that inculcate religion in
its worst form; 1 can recall none that have helped to
suppress it. Then, Mr. Wilson says, from the time of
Ezra, for four centuries “ the natural growth of thought
and revelation was strangled by the grasp of religion”.
Here surely is a new idea introduced into the theory by
the use of the words “natural” and “thought”. Is the
spirit of God a natural force; and has it, like man, the power
of thinking ? But passing this difficulty, methinks that in
these four centuries man’s reason achieved some deeds of
renown. Buddha, Socrates, and Confucius taught; the
Spartans fought at Thermopylae; Sophocles wrote the
“Antigone”; Euclid, the “Elements”; and Lucretius,
the “ Book of Nature ” ; and human art will never surpass
the unknown sculptors of the Venus and the Apollo. We
got on so well in those four centuries when revelation
was hushed that one is tempted to ask if its revival has
bettered us. Let the eighteen centuries of Christianity
�UNSCIENTIFIC RELIGION.
23
and the twelve centuries of Mahomedanism answer the
query.
After this pause a fresh impetus was given to revelation
by the life and teaching of Jesus Christ. “ Obedience to
the will of God, purity, gentleness, sympathy with all, with
the sinful and the suffering, these and such as these were
the lessons taught by his life.” But it has been asserted
that none of the lofty sayings attributed to Jesus in the
three synoptic gospels were original: they are all said to
have occurred in some earlier writing; and even if we
give him the credit of selecting the best sentiments of those
who went before him, we must not forget that it was he
who said : “ I came not to send peace, but a sword ” (Matt,
x., 44), and that this prediction has been fulfilled. Not
even to his own Church has he brought peace, still less to
the world. “He abolished ritual” ; so did Buddha. He
‘‘broke down barriers of race and caste” ; if so, why do
they still exist? “He introduced no new dogma”; but
the Comforter, that Spirit of God whom he sent—the same,
I presume, who works for our illumination through revela
tion—has introduced much dogma. Of this final effort of
revelation and its success Mr. Wilson says truly: “The
religious instinct is strong; it is deep in human nature,
and at times it would seem as if it had smothered the
revelation of Christ”.
Mr. Wilson has declined to define God. A God who has
a spirit engaged in a ceaseless strife against religion, and
which has been so near failure, suggests paradoxical ideas
that cannot be clothed in definite terms. But though he
does not define, he believes; and on this belief or con
sciousness he founds the theology that he preaches. Many
learned divines hold that a theology resting on conscious
ness is insufficient, and that it requires the support of the
understanding as well. Whether consciousness is of itself
an adequate basis for theology is a question for the theo
logian, and does not concern us. No consciousness or
belief, either in his own mind or the mind of others, can
Influence the earnest student of secular philosophy. To
him such a theory as this, that rests both in its d priori
aspect of hypothesis and in its a posteriori aspect of history,
on unverifiable faets and sentimental consciousness, must
fail to commend itself, even if without it the history of
man were inexplicable.
�24
UNSCIENTIFIC RELIGION.
But it is not so : we do not find in our history any
entanglement that is insoluble save by the theory of a
divine spirit; we can group all man’s varied story, by man
himself, his passions and desires, his conscience and reason.
Surely that theory is better which rests on facts that can
be verified, which explains our history, which solves past
difficulty and future doubt—better than one which sets up
an agency whose very existence is an emotion, and whose
interference in mundane affairs is a mystery, for the solu
tion of which we must eat of the fruit of the tree of knowledge of good and evil.
In these two articles I have tried to look at Mr. Wilson’s
theory from the point of view of a Secularist, and from the
point of view of a Christian. To a Materialist it must
appear illusory. But there are many Christians to whom
it will be welcome as a resting-place, or half-way house.
Those who recognise the hatefulness of religion, the hol
lowness of dogma, the impossibility of miracles, the con
tradiction of inspiration, the supremacy of morals, the
one-ness of human nature, the eternity of matter, and the
persistence of force; who cannot as yet relinquish the idea
of a personal God who takes some interest, however partial
and indirect, in our affairs, and who stands towards us in
some relation that implies mutual obligation—such men
may gladly accept the philosophy of this sermon. I should
be inclined, however, to predict that they will find it is but
a temporary refuge, and that the only secure citadel rests
on the everlasting rocks.
IV.—Authority
v.
Consent.
[From, the National Reformer of 14th December, 1884.]
The honest and persistent expression of secular opinion is
at length producing some effect on the public mind. We
address ourselves to all shades of religious thought. We
meet the unprincipled assertions of interested priests and
their too credulous flocks with satire and disapproval’;
those who show an inclination to argue we invite freely to
�UNSCIENTIFIC RELIGION.
25
discussion ; and the thoughtful men who see the instability
of the popular conception of religion and who desire to
understand the secular position are met half way, and are
sure of our best help to enable them to grasp those truths
which are our great consolation. As- befits the guardians
and expositors of truth, we strive to keep our walk and
conversation unspotted and free from reproach, so as to
show our fellows that morality is not dependent on belief.
We make all due allowance for the hereditary taint of
bigotry and intolerance, feeling that religion is an instinct
of primitive and uncivilised man, and that its errors arise
from no divine intervention, but from the ignorance and
weakness of our race. Though assured of the ultimate
triumph of truth, we accept with patience and forbearance,
while the contest lasts, the rude buffets, the social and
political disability which the laws of this country allot to
unbelievers, knowing that deep down in the heart of
England lies a feeling of justice, which must eventually
ensure for earnest men and women a fair hearing and no
disfavor. This is all we require; and when we obtain it
we shall gladly leave our own opinions and those of our
opponents to stand or fall by the test of truth.
I have been led to make these remarks on the present
position of Secularists by some statements in a paper on
the limits of Freethought and Authority read by the Rev.
J. M. Wilson at the Church Congress of 1882; because I
think that wide as is that gentleman’s charity, and broad
as are his views, he has failed to perceive that the weight
of authority is on our side, and not on that of his Church.
With much of Mr. Wilson’s paper we may agree. He
has accurately defined Freethought, and appreciates its
value ; he recognises its natural limits, and strongly depre
cates any artificial limits ; he properly urges that between
it and authority there is not a relation of mutual exclusion,
but of mutual inter-dependence ; but when he speaks of
the consent of the past as an authority, and claims for it
in religion and morals the weight of authority, we are
bound to express our dissent.
I shall first quote the sentences where expression is given
to those opinions that I differ from, and having done so I
will state my views as to the real meaning of the words
“Authority” and “Consent”.
After stating that no artificial limit can be imposed on
�26
UNSCIENTIFIC RELIGION.
the mind of man, and that even the creeds and tests of a
Church must from time to time be interpreted and revised
so as to bring them into accordance with progressive know
ledge, he proceeds :
“Nor, again, is there any limit to authority. Heredity,
education, the weight given instinctively to established beliefs’
the vast momentum of long-standing habits and institutions,
give to the past an influence on the present, which secures con
tinuity amidst change, and makes progress steady. In other
words, there exists a natural authority, subtle, groundless, far
stronger than any artificial authority, and resented by none.
NV e are held by the past, not to our harm, but our good:
nursed by it, trained by it, for growth and for the right use of
freedom.”
Further on, speaking of the weight of authority in dif
ferent branches of knowledge, he uses these words :
“We shall see that the weight to be assigned to a great
consensus of opinion in the past depends on the subject. In
objective fact it is nil............. In criticism the weight is very
small............. In theology it is far higher.................. In ethics it is
highest of all, because the axioms of ethics—honesty, justice,
patriotism, filial obedience, monogamy, purity—rest on such
an enormous mass of observed facts and experience in human
nature. In these subjects it is so high that we are right in
treating Free Thought, or rather its consequence, free action,
as a crime.”
It seems to me that Mr. Wilson has here confused the
two methods by which a man unable or unwilling to
investigate a subject for himself may arrive at an opinion
thereon without investigation. These methods are reliance
on authority, and reliance on consent. They are of very
different value, but are here treated as identical. We
may form an opinion on the authority of others, if we are
satisfied of the observance of three conditions: (1) That
their sagacity and intelligence is adequate ; (2) that they
have maturely studied the subject under consideration ;
and (3) that they are free from bias, interest, or compul
sion. Given these conditions, and we bow to trustworthy
authority; if they are wanting, we feel hesitation and
distrust. No one would trust the advice or opinion of a
professional man whose intellect, or acquirements, or
integrity was doubtful.
But this highest form of authority is ignored by Mr.
�UNSCIENTIFIC RELIGION.
27
Wilson. When he speaks of authority, he refers to such
influences as these,—heredity, education, long-standing
habits, consensus of past opinion, experience of human
nature. This is not authority but consent. Idle, in
different, or superficial men may use it as a guide, but no
earnest inquirer after truth can accept of it as a limit to,
or substitute for, Freethought. If the “consensus of the
past ” had continued to influence us, slavery would still
have been legal, and scores of wretches would have been
hanged every Monday morning at some modern substitute
for Tyburn. Fortunately, in some respects, we are a
practical people.
To secure the higher form of authority I have described,
absolute freedom of thought is indispensable; and no
thought is free that is bound by the weight of past con
sensus. Knowledge and experience are requisite, but they
must be used as guides and not accepted as limits. Other
wise the thought is fettered, and the opinion valueless as
authority.
In estimating the value of the opinion of another as
authority, the third condition—that of freedom from bias,
self-interest, and compulsion—is of such great importance
that there is apnma facie reason for preferring the opinion
of a Freethinker (I use the word in its common acceptation).
Given equal intelligence and study, the opinion of a man
who incurs obloquy by professing it, is more likely to be
authoritative than that of a man who conforms to Mrs.
Grundy and the “usages of society ”,
The higher form of authority is wanting in regard to
religion. Most dogmas are beyond human intellect, and
no man ever existed whose opinion is authority for be
lieving such a doctrine as the trinity. Nor is the study
that Churchmen bring to bear on religious matters such
as to command our confidence. It has no scientific value,
and is bound by foregone conclusions. I shall wait till
the third condition is seriously claimed for apologists
before I dispute it, merely remarking that martyrdoms do
not consecrate with the halo of authority the opinions for
which men and women have died deaths of agony.
Though every church has its martyr roll, it has also its
black list of those who have suffered for free or for
fettered thought, at its suit, and because they differed
from it. Our fellow men have been so ready to die for all
�28
UNSCIENTIFIC RELIGION.
sorts of irrational emotions that it is easier to inquire for
oneself than to decide which of the martyrs is worthy to
be followed as a guide.
I admit, therefore, all the influence claimed for Consent
in the first of the two extracts quoted above. The influence
exists, and has some good and some bad effects : we think
the bad effects preponderate, and we object to its being
elevated into the position of Authority.
Turning to the second extract above quoted, I shall very
briefly state three objections of a more formidable nature
than any hitherto made. Mr. Wilson seems desirous to
impose on Freethought, in regard to morals, far more
stringent bonds than he would impose in regard to religion;
a course that appears to me so dangerous that I shall be
very glad to learn that I have mistaken the drift of his
opinion. My objections are: (1) The six “virtues”
named by Mr. Wilson are not axioms of ethics nor axioms
at all; an axiom must contain a statement of fact or opinion.
(2) Not one of the virtues named implies an idea that can
be transformed into axiomatic shape, resting on past con
sent and adapted for future guidance. Let Mr. Wilson
try, as regards “Patriotism”, to construct an axiom for
the guidance of an Irish Nationalist, or, as regards
“Monogamy”, to construct one for a Turkish Pasha: he
will find that the light thrown by the past on the path of
the future is dim, indirect, and apt to mislead; and that
the “ authority ” of one man is more valuable than the
consent of millions. (3) So soon as Freethought condemns
an ethical rule that rests on past consent, then the crime is
not (as Mr. Wilson asserts) to translate the thought into
action, but to stifle the free thought by pretending that
consent is an authority that supersedes it.
In a word, I agree with Mr. Wilson in identifying
Authority and Freethought. We differ in this, that he
regards Consent as identical with Authority, and therefore
identical with Freethought, while I regard Consent as
opposed to and inconsistent with Authority and Freethought.
�UNSCIENTIFIC RELIGION.
29
V.—On Free Discussion.
[From the National Reformer of December 28th, 1884.]
The following extract from the Edinburgh Review of 1850
(vol. xci., page 525) will be read with interest. The work
reviewed is entitled “Influence of Authority in Matters of
Opinion”, and was published in 1849 by Mr. George
Cornewell Lewis, afterwards Sir G. C. Lewis, Bart., who
was a Cabinet Minister from 1855 till his death in 1863.
A second edition appeared in 1875, and was reviewed by
Mr. Gladstone in the opening article of the first volume of
the A^he^ew/A Century. A reply from the pen of Sir James
Stephen appears at page 270 ; and Mr. Gladstone s re
joinder at page 902 of the same volume. The opinions on
authority and consent which I recently expressed in these
columns were to a great measure based on Sir G. C. Lewis s
book.
Times have changed since 1850, and it can no longer be
said with truth that “public opinion exercises a formidable
repression of infidelity ”, or that “ the avowedly infidel
books that appear are few”. No dogma of religion.is
now so sacred, no pretention so vital, as to preclude dis
cussion from any point of view, however radical.
Mr. Gladstone has thus described Sir G. C. Lewis’ posi
tion : “As a Theist he did not recognise the ark of the
covenant, but he recognised the presence within it as true,
though undefinable ”. {Nineteenth Century, vol. i., p. 921.)
“ There is one circumstance which, in England, impairs
authority in matters of religion, to which Mr. Lewis has not
adverted. It is the state of English law and English opinion
on infidelity.
“ Christianity, we are told, is parcel of the law of England ;
therefore to ‘write against Christianity in general’, to use
the words of Holt, or ‘to impugn the Christian religion
generally’, in those of Lord Kenyon, or ‘ to impeach the esta
blished faith, or to endeavor to unsettle the belief of others,
in those of Justice Bayley, is a misdemeanor at common law,
and subjects the offender, at the discretion of the court, to fine,
imprisonment, and infamous corporal punishment. The statute
law is rather vague. By the 9th and 10th Will. III., cap. 32,
whoever, having been educated a Christian, shall bj writing,
printing, teaching, or advised speaking, deny any one of the
�30
UNSCIENTIFIC RELIGION.
persons in the Holy Trinity to be God, or assert that there
are more Gods than one, or deny the Christian religion to
be true, or the Holy Scriptures of the Old and New Testa
ment to be of divine authority, shall for the first offence,
be incapable of holding any office or place of trust, civil
or military, and for the second, be imprisoned for three
years, and be incapable of suing in any court of law or equity,
or of accepting any gift or legacy. The punishment for deny
ing the doctrine of the Trinity was repealed in our own times ;
but the remainder of the statute is in full force at this day. It
is true that, in these times, neither the common law nor the
statute is likely to be enforced against a sober, temperate dis
putant. The publisher of the translation of Strauss has not
been punished. But his safety is precarious. If anyone were
so ill-advised as to prosecute him, he must be convicted of libel,
unless the jury should think fit to save him at the expense of
perjury; and we doubt whether the court would venture to
inflict on him a mere nominal sentence.
“ But the repression of infidelity by law is far less formidable
than that which is exercised by public opinion. The author of
a work professedly and deliberately denying the truth of Chris
tianity would become a Pariah in the English world. If he
were in a profession, he would find his practice fall off; if he
turned towards the public service, its avenues would be barred.
In society he would find himself shunned or scorned —even his
children would feel the taint of their descent. To be suspected
of holding infidel opinions, though without any attempt at
their propagation, even without avowing them, is a great mis
fortune. It is an imputation which every prudent man care
fully avoids. Under such circumstances, what reliance can
an Englishman place on the authority of the writers who pro
fess to have examined into the matter, and to have ascertained
the truth? Can he say, ‘Their premises and conclusions are
before the public. If there were any flaw in them, it would
be detected and exposed ’ ? The errors committed or supposed
to be committed by writers on the evidences of Christianity
may be detected, but there is little chance of their being ex
posed. It may, perhaps be safe sometimes to impugn a false
premise, or an unwarranted inference, but never to deny a con
clusion. It is dangerous, indeed, to assert on religious matters
any views with which the public is not familiar. It is to
this immunity from criticism that we owe the rash assumption
of premises, and the unwarranted inferences, with which many
theological writings abound. Facts and arguments are passed
from author to author, which in Secular matters would be dissi
pated in the blaze of free discussion. Theological literature, at
least the portion of it which relates to the doctrines which ‘ are
parcel of the common law ’ has been a protected literature ;
�UNSCIENTIFIC RELIGION.
31
and much of its offspring has the ricketty distorted form which
belongs to the unhappy bantlings that have been swaddled by
protection.
“ To this state of things we owe the undue importance given
to the few avowedly infidel books which actually appear. They
are like the political libels which creep out in a despotism.
Their authors are supposed to be at least sincere, since they
peril reputation and fortune. 'What could have given popu
larity to ‘ The Nemesis of Faith ’ but the persecution of its
author ? To this also we owe the insidious form in which in
fidelity is usually insinuated—intermixed with professions of
orthodoxy, and conveyed by a hint or a sneer. If Gibbon could
have ventured, in simple and express terms, to assert his dis
belief in Christianity, all his persiflage would have been omitted ;
and the reader, especially the young reader, would have known
that his anti-Christian opinions were the attacks of an enemy—
not the candid admissions of a friend. To this also we owe
much of the scepticism which exists among educated English
men : usiug the word scepticism in its derivative sense—to
express not incredulity, but, doubt. They have not the means
of making a real independent examination of the evidences of
their faith. A single branch of that vast inquiry, if not aided by
taking on trust the results handed down by previous inquirers,
would occupy all the leisure which can be spared from a business
or a profession. All that they think they have time for is to
read a few popular treatises. But they know that these treatises
have not been subjected to the ordeal of unfettered criticism.
As little can they infer the truth of the established doctrine
from the apparent acquiesence of those around them. They
know that they may be surrounded by unbelieving conformists.
And thus they pass their lives in scepticism—in a state of in
decision— suspecting that what they have been taught may
contain a mixture of truth and error which they are unable to
decompose. If a balance could be struck between the infidelity
that is prevented, and the infidelity that is occasioned, by the
absence of free discussion, we have no doubt that the latter
would greatly predominate.”
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Dublin Core
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Title
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Victorian Blogging
Description
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A collection of digitised nineteenth-century pamphlets from Conway Hall Library & Archives. This includes the Conway Tracts, Moncure Conway's personal pamphlet library; the Morris Tracts, donated to the library by Miss Morris in 1904; the National Secular Society's pamphlet library and others. The Conway Tracts were bound with additional ephemera, such as lecture programmes and handwritten notes.<br /><br />Please note that these digitised pamphlets have been edited to maximise the accuracy of the OCR, ensuring they are text searchable. If you would like to view un-edited, full-colour versions of any of our pamphlets, please email librarian@conwayhall.org.uk.<br /><br /><span><img src="http://www.heritagefund.org.uk/sites/default/files/media/attachments/TNLHLF_Colour_Logo_English_RGB_0_0.jpg" width="238" height="91" alt="TNLHLF_Colour_Logo_English_RGB_0_0.jpg" /></span>
Creator
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Conway Hall Library & Archives
Date
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2018
Publisher
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Conway Hall Ethical Society
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Original Format
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Pamphlet
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
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Unscientific religion, or: remarks on the Rev. J.M. Wilson's "Attempt to treat some religious questions in a scientific spirit"
Description
An account of the resource
Place of publication: London
Collation: v, 7-31 p. ; 18 cm.
Notes: Reply to Essays and addresses of Rev. James M. Wilson (Macmillan, 1894). First published in the National Reformer. Printed by Annie Besant and Charles Bradlaugh. Part of the NSS pamphlet collection.
Publisher
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Freethought Publishing Company
Date
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1887
Identifier
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N574
Subject
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Religion
Science
Creator
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S.S.
Rights
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<a href="http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/mark/1.0/"><img src="http://i.creativecommons.org/p/mark/1.0/88x31.png" alt="Public Domain Mark" /></a><span> </span><br /><span>This work (Unscientific religion, or: remarks on the Rev. J.M. Wilson's "Attempt to treat some religious questions in a scientific spirit"), identified by </span><a href="https://conwayhallcollections.omeka.net/items/show/www.conwayhall.org.uk"><span>Humanist Library and Archives</span></a><span>, is free of known copyright restrictions.</span>
Format
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application/pdf
Type
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Text
Language
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English
James M. Wilson
NSS
Religion and science