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national secular society
BODY AND MIND.
&
DELIVERED BEFORE THE
SUNDAY LECTURE SOCIETY,
ON
SUNDAY AFTERNOON, 1st NOVEMBER, 1874.
BY
Professor W. K. CLIFFORD, F.R.S.
Reprintedfrom the ‘Fortnightly Review,' by kind permission of the Editor.
LONDON:
PUBLISHED BY THE SUNDAY LECTURE SOCIETY.
1875.
Price Threepence.
�♦
SUNDAY LECTURE SOCIETY.
To provide for the delivery on Sundays in the Metropolis, and
to encourage the delivery elsewhere, of Lectures on Science,
—physical, intellectual, and moral,—History, Literature,
and Art; especially in their bearing upon the improvement
and social well-being of mankind.
THE SOCIETY’S LECTURES
ARE DELIVERED AT
ST GEORGE’S HALL, LANGHAM PLACE,
On SUNDAY Afternoons, at FOUR o’clock precisely.
(Annually—from November to May).
Twenty-Four Lectures (in three series), ending 2nd May,
1875, will be given.
Members’ £1 subscription entitles them to an annual ticket
(transferable and admitting to the reserved seats), and to eight
single reserved-seat tickets available for any lecture.
Tickets for each series (one for each lecture) as below,—
To the Shilling Reserved Seats—5s. 6d.
To the Sixpenny Seats—2s., being at the rate of Threepence
each lecture.
For tickets apply (by letter) to the Hon. Treasurer, Wm. Henry
Domville, Esq., 15 Gloucester Crescent, Hyde Park, W.
Payment at the door :—One
(Reserved Seats) One Shilling.
Penny ;—Sixpence ;—and
�BODY AND MIND.
HE subject of this Lecture is one in regard to which
a great change has recently taken place in the public
mind. Some time ago it was the custom to look with sus
picion upon all questions of a metaphysical nature as being
questions that could not be discussed with any good result,
and which, leading inquirers round and round in the same
circle, never came to an end. But quite of late years there
is an indication that a large number of people are waking
up to the fact that Science has something to say upon these
subjects ; and the English people have always been very
ready to hear what Science can say—understanding by
Science what we shall now understand by it, that is,
organised common sense.
When I say Science, I do not mean what some people
are pleased to call Philosophy. The word “philosopher,”
which meant originally “ lover of wisdom,” has come in
some strange way to mean a man who thinks it his business
to explain everything in a certain number of large books.
It will be found, I think, that in proportion to his colossal
ignorance is the perfection and symmetry of the system
which he sets up; because it is so much easier to put an
empty room tidy than a full one. A man of science, on
the other hand, explains as much as ever he can, and then
he says, “ This is all I can do ; for the rest, you must ask
the next man.” And with regard to such explanations as
he has given, whether the next man comes at all, whether
there is any next man or any further explanation or no (and
we may have to wait hundreds or even thousands of years
before another step is made), yet if the original step was
a scientific step, was made by true scientific methods, and
was an organization of the normal experience of healthy
men, that step will remain good for ever, no matter how
much is left unexplained by it.
Now the supposition that this subject in itself is neces
sarily one which cannot be discussed to good purpose, that
is to say, in such a way as to lead to definite results, is a
T
�4
Body and Mind.
mistake. The fact that the subject has been discussed
for many hundreds of years to no good purpose, and with
out leading to definite results, by great numbers of people,
is due to the method which was employed, and not to the
subject itself; and, in fact, if we like to look in the same
way upon other subjects as we have been accustomed to
look upon metaphysics—if we regard every man who has
written about mathematics or mechanics as having just
the same right to speak and to be heard that we give to
every man who has written about metaphysics—then I
think we shall find that exactly the same thing can be said
about the most certain regions of human science.
Those who like to read the last number of the Edinburgh
Revieiv, for example, will find, from an article on “ Comets,”
that it is at present quite an open question whether bodies
which are shot out from the sun by eruptive force may not
come to circle about the sun in orbits which are like those
of the planets. Now that is not an open question ; the
supposition is an utterly absurd one, and has been utterly
absurd from the time of Kepler. Again, those who are
curious enough to read a number of pamphlets that are to
be found here and there, may think it is an open question
whether the ratio of the circumference of a circle to its dia
meter may not be expressed by certain finite numbers. It
is not an open question to Science; it is only open to those
people who do not know any Trigonometry, and who will
not learn it. In exactly the same way there are numbers
of questions relating to the connection of the mind with
the body which have ceased to be open questions, because
Science has had her word to say about them; and they are
only open now to people who do not know what that word
of Science is, and who will not try to learn it.
The whole field of human knowledge may be divided
roughly, for the sake of convenience, into three great
regions. There are first of all what we call par
excellence the Physical Sciences—those which deal with
inanimate matter. Next, there are those sciences which
deal with organic bodies—the bodies of living things,
whether plants or animals, and the rules according to
which those things move. And lastly, there are those
sciences which make a further supposition—which suppose
that besides this physical world, including both organic
�Body and Mind.
5
and inorganic bodies, there are also certain other facts,
namely, that other men besides me, and most likely other
animals besides men, are conscious. The sciences which
make that supposition are the sciences of Ethics and
Politics, which are still in the practical stage, and especially
the more advanced science which is now to be considered
■—Psychology, the Science of Mind itself; that is to say,
the science of the laws which regulate the succession of
feelings in any one consciousness.. Each of these three
great divisions began in the form of a number of per
fectly disconnected subjects, between which nobody knew
of any relation; but in the history of science each of them
has been woven together, in consequence of connections
being found between the different subjects included in it,
into a complete whole ; and the further progress of the
history of science requires that each of these great threads,
into which all the little threads have been twined, should
themselves be twined together into a single string.
Now with regard to the first, two groups, the group of
mechanical sciences as we may call them, or the physics
of inorganic bodies, and the group of biological sciences, or
the physics of organic bodies—the gulf between these two
has in these last days been firmly bridged over. A
description of that bridge, and an account of the doctrines
which form it, will be found in Professor Huxley’s admirable
lecture delivered at Belfast before the British Association,
which is printed in the November number of the Fortnightly
Review. That bridge, as we have it now, is, in the con
ception of it, mainly due to Descartes ; but parts of it have
been worked out since his time by a vast number of physio
logists, with the expenditure of an enormous amount of
labour and thought. Such facts as that discovered by
Harvey, that the movement of the blood was a mere question
of Hydrodynamics, and was to be explained upon the same
principles as the motion of water in pipes—facts like these
have been piled up, one upon another, and have gradually
led to the conclusion that the science of organic bodies is
only a complication of the science of inorganic bodies.
It would not be advisable here to describe in detail the
stones which compose this bridge ; but we have to ask
whether it is possible to construct some similar bridge
between the now united Science of Physics, which deals
�6
Body and Mind.
with all phenomena, whether organic or inorganic, in fact
with all the material world, and the other science, the
Science of Consciousness, which deals with the Laws of
Mind and with the subject of Ethics. This is the question
which we have now to discuss.
In order to make this bridge a firm one, so that it will
not break down like those which philosophers have made,
it is necessary to observe with great care what is the exact
difference between the two classes of facts. If we confuse
the two things together to begin with, if we do not recog
nise the great difference between them, we shall not be
likely to find any explanation which will reduce them to
some common term. The first thing, therefore, that we
have to do is to realise as clearly as possible how profound
the gulf is between the facts which we call Physical facts
and the facts which we call Mental facts. The difference
is one which has been observed from primeval times, when
man or his prehuman ancestor found it not good to be
alone ; for the very earliest precept that we find set forth
in all societies to regulate the lives of those who belong
to them, is, “Put yourself in his place;” that is to say,
ascribe to other men a consciousness which is like your
own. And this belief which the lowest savage got, that
there was something else than the physical organization in
other men, is the foundation of Natural Ethics as well as of
the modern Science of Consciousness. But in very early
times an hypothesis was formed which was supposed to
make this belief easier. If you eat too much you will
dream when you are asleep ; if you eat too little you will
dream when you are awake, or have visions; and those
dreams of savages whose food was very precarious led them
to a biological hypothesis. They saw in those dreams
their fellows, other men, when it appeared from evidence
furnished to them afterwards that those other men were
not there when they were dreaming. Consequently, they
supposed that the actions of the organic body were caused
by some other body which was not physical in the ordinary
sense, which was not made of ordinary matter, and this
other body was called the Soul. Animism, as Mr. Tylor
calls this belief, was at first, then, an hypothesis in the
domain of biology. It was a physical hypothesis to account
for the peculiar way in which living things went about.
�Body and Mind.
7
But then when people had got this belief in another body
which was not a physical body, after a long series of years
they reasoned in this way. It is very difficult indeed to
suppose that the ordinary matter which makes a man’s
body can be conscious. This Me is quite different from
the flesh and blood which make up a man; but then as to
this other body, or soul, we do not know anything about it,
so that it may as well be conscious as not. That hypo
thesis put upon the soul, whose basis was in the phenomena
of dreams, the explanation of the consciousness which we
cannot help believing to exist in other men. I have men
tioned this early hypothesis on the subject, because out of
it grew the almost universal custom of holding at this
time of the year the Festival of the Dead which we preserve
in our All Souls’ Day.
But now let us see what it is that Science can tell us,
and what we can believe in place of that early hypothesis
of our savage ancestors. In the first place, let us consider
a little more narrowly what we mean by the body, and
more especially what we mean by the nervous system ; for
it is the great discovery of Descartes that the nervous
system is that part of the body which is related directly
to the mind. This can hardly be better expressed than it
is by the first of that series of propositions which Pro
fessor Huxley has stated in his lecture.
I. “ The brain is the organ of sensation, thought, and
■emotion; that is to say, some change in the condition of
the matter of this organ is the invariable antecedent of
the state of consciousness to which each of these terms
is applied.” We may complete this statement by saying
not only that some change in the matter of this organ
is the invariable antecedent, but that some other change is
the invariable concomitant of sensation, thought, and
■emotion; and that is rather an important remark, as you
will see presently.
Let us now look at the general structure of the brain
and see what it is like. We can easily make a rough
picture of it, which will serve our present purpose (see
p. 12). A parachute is a round piece of paper, like the
top of a parasol, with strings going from its circumference
to a cork. Let us imagine a parachute with two corks, a
red and a blue one; each of these corks being attached by
�8
Body and Mind,
strings, not only to the circumference of our piece of
paper, but to innumerable points in the inside of it.
Moreover, let innumerable other strings go across from
point to point of the paper, like a spider’s web spun in the
inside of a parasol. And the corks themselves must be
tied to each other and to a third cork, say the white one,
while from all three streamers fly away in all directions.
This is our diagram. Now the sheet of paper repre
sents the cerebral hemispheres, a great sheet of grey
nervous matter which forms the outside of your brain, and
lies just under your skull. Our red and blue corks are two
other masses of grey matter lying at the base of the brain,
and called the optic thalami and the corpora striata
respectively. The white cork is another mass of grey
matter called the medulla oblongata, which is the top of
the spinal cord. Our strings which tie part of the para
chute together, and our streamers which go out in all
directions from the corks represent the nerves, white
threads that run all over the body. And they are of two
kinds; there are some which go to the brain from any
part of the body, and others which come from the brain
to it. As regards the position of the nerves this is the
same thing for both of them, but it is not the same thing
with regard to what they do. The nerves which are called
Sensory nerves, and which go to the brain, are those
which are excited whenever any part of the body is
touched. When your finger is touched a certain excite
ment is given to the nerves which end in your finger, and
that excitement is carried along your arm and away up to
the medulla, represented by our white cork. But when
you are going to move your arm the excitement starts from
the brain, and goes along the other set of nerves which
are called Motor nerves, or moving nerves, and goes to the
muscles which work the part of the arm which you want
to move. And that excitement of the nerves by purely
mechanical means makes those muscles contract so as to
move the part which you want to move. We have then a con
nection between the brain and any part of the body which
is of a double kind: there is the means of sending a
message to the brain from this part of the body, and the
means of taking a message from the brain to this part.
The nerves which carry the message to the brain are called
�Body and Mind.
9
the “Sensory nerves” because they accompany what we
call sensation; the nerves which carry the message from
the brain are called “Motor nerves” because they are the
agents in the motion of that part of the body.
All this is expressed in Professor Huxley’s second and
third propositions.
II. “ The movements of animals are due to the change of
form of the muscles, which shorten and, become thicker; and
this change of form in a muscle arises from a motion of the
substance contained within the nerves which go to the
muscle.”
III. “ The sensations of animals are due to a motion of
the substance of the nerves which connect the sensory organs
with the brain.”
I pass on to his fourth proposition:—
IV. “ The motion of the matter of a sensory nerve mag
be transmitted through the brain to motor nerves, and thereby
give rise to a contraction of the muscles to which these motor
nerves are distributed; and this reflection of motion from a
sensory into a motor nerve may take place without volition^
or even contrary to it.”
Let us take that organ of sense which always occurs to
us as a type, of the others, because it is the most perfect—
the eye. The optic nerve which runs from the eye towards
the brain may be represented by one of our streamers going tothe red cork, to which it is fastened by a knot that is called
the “ Optic ganglion.” Supposing that you move your hand
rapidly towards anybody’s eye, a message with news of this
movement goes along the nerve to the optic ganglion, and
it comes away back again by another streamer, not direct
from the ganglion, but from a point on the blue cork very
near it, to the muscles which move the eyelid, and that
makes the eye wink. You know that the winking of the
eye, when anybody moves his hand very rapidly towards it, is
not a thing which you determine to do, and which you con
sider about; it is a thing which happens without your in
terference with it; and in fact it is not you who wink your
eye, but your body that does it. This is called Automatic
■ or involuntary motion, or again it is called Reflex action,
because it is a purely mechanical thing. A wave runs
along that nerve, and comes back on another nerve, and
that without any deliberation; and at the point where it
�IO
Body and Mind.
stops and comes back it is just a reflection like the wave
which you send along a string and which comes back from
the end of the string, or like a wave of water which is sent
up against a sea-wall, and which reflects itself back along
the sea.
V. The. motion of any given portion of the matter of
the brain excited by the motion of a sensory nerve, leaves
behind it a readiness to be moved in the same way in that
part, and anything which resuscitates the motion gives rise
to the appropriate feeling. This is the physical mechanism
of memory.” We can, perhaps, make this a little more
clear in the following manner :—Suppose two messages are
sent at once to the brain ; each of them is reflected back,
but the two disturbances which they set up in the brain
create, in some way or other, a link between them, so that
when one of these disturbances is set up afterwards the
other one is also set up. It is as if every time two bells of
a house were rung together, that of itself made a string to
tie them together, so that when you rang one bell it was
necessary to ring the other bell in consequence. That, re
member, is purely a physical circumstance which we know
happens. There is a physical excitation or disturbance
which is sent along two different nerves, and which pro
duces two different disturbances in the brain, and the effect
of these two disturbances taking place together is to make
a change in the character of the brain itself, so that when
the one of them takes place it produces the other.
Now there are two different ways in which a stimulus
coming to the eye can be made to move the hand. In the
first place, suppose you are copying out a book; you have
the book before you, and you read the book whilst you are
copying with your hand, and consequently the light coming
, into your eye from the book directs your hand to move in
a certain way. It is possible for this light impinging upon
the eye to send a message along the optic nerve into the
ganglion, and that message may go almost, though not
quite, direct to the hand, so as to make the hand move, and
that causes the hand to describe the letter which you have
seen in the book; or else the message may go by a longer
route which takes more time. A simple experiment to dis
tinguish between these processes was tried by Donders, the
great Dutch physiologist. He made a sign to a man at a
�Body and Mind.
11
distance, and when he made this sign the man was to put
down a key with his hand. He measured the time which
was taken in this process, that is to say, the time which
was taken by the message in going from the eye to the gan
glion, and then to the hand. Measurements of the rate of
nerve-motions have also been made by Helmholtz. The
velocity varies to a certain extent in different people, but it
is something like one hundred feet a second. But Donders
also made another measurement. Suppose it is not decided
beforehand whether the man is to move the key with his
right or his left hand, and this is to be determined by the
nature of the signal, then before he can move his hand he
has to decide which hand he will use. The time taken for
that process of decision was also measured. That process of
decision, when looked at from the physical side, means
this. The message goes up from the eye to the ganglion.
It is immediately connected there with the mass of grey
matter represented by our red cork. From that mass of
grey matter there go white threads away to the whole of
the surface of the cerebral hemispheres, or the paper of our
parachute, and they take that message, therefore, which
comes from the eye to the ganglion away to all this grey
matter which is put round the inside of your skull. There
are also white threads which connect all the parts of this
grey matter together, and they run across from every part
of it to almost every other part of it. As soon as a message
has been taken to this grey matter, there is a vast inter
change of messages going on between those parts; but
finally, as the result of that, a number of messages come
upon other white threads to another piece of grey matter,
which is represented by our blue cork ; from that the
message is then taken to the muscles of the hand. There
are then two different ways in which a message may go from
the eye to the hand. It may go to the optic ganglion, and
then almost straight to the hand, and in that case you do
not know much about it—you only know that something
has taken place, you do not think that you have done it
yourself; or it may go to the optic ganglion, and be sent
up to the cerebral hemispheres, and then be sent back to
the sensory tract and then on to the hand. But that takes
more time, and it implies that you have deliberated upon
the act.
�12
Body and Mind.
and H is the hand.
The curve C C represents the
cerebral hemispheres, or the top of our parachute. If the
action is so habitually associated with the signal that it
takes place involuntarily, without any effort of the will,
the message goes from the eye to the hand along the line
E B B H. This may happen with a practised performer
when it is settled beforehand which hand he is to use.
But if it is necessary to deliberate about the action, to call
in the exercise of the will, the message goes round the
loop-line, E B C 0 B H ; from the eye to the optic thalami,
from them to the cerebrum, thence to the corpora striata,
and so through the medulla to the hand.
Besides this fact which we have j ust explained, the fact
of a message going from one part of the body to the brain
and coming out in the motion of some other part of the
body, there is another thing which is going on continually,
and that is this. There is a faint reproduction of some
excitement which has previously existed in the cerebral
hemispheres, and which calls up, by the process which we
have just now described, all those that have become
associated with it; and it is continually sending down
faint messages which do not actually tell the muscles to
move, but which begin to tell them to move as it were.
They are not always strong enough to produce actual
motions, but they produce just the beginnings of those
motions: and that process goes on even when there is
apparently no sensation and no motion. If a man is in a
�Body and Mind.
i3
brpwn study, with his eyes shut, although he apparently
sees and feels nothing at all, there is a certain action going
on inside his brain which is not sensation, but is like it,
because it is the transmission to the cerebral hemispheres
of faint messages which are copies of previous sensations ;
and it does not produce motion, but it produces something
like it; it produces incipient motion, the beginnings of
motion which do not actually take effect. Sometimes a
train of thought may so increase in strength as to produce
motion. A man may get so excited by a train of thought
that he jumps up and does something in consequence.
And the sensory impressions which are taken from the
ganglia to the hemispheres may be so strong as to produce
an illusion ; he may think that he sees something, he may
think that he sees a ghost, when he does not. This con
tinuous action of the brain depends upon the presence of
blood ; so long as a proper amount of blood is sent to the
brain it is active, and when the blood is taken away it
becomes inactive. And it is a curious property of the
nervous system that it can direct the supply of blood
which is to be sent to a particular part of it. It is possible,
by directing your attention to a particular part of your
hand, to make a determination of blood to that part which
shall in time become a sore place. Some people have
given this explanation, which seems a very probable one,
of what has happened to those saints who have meditated
so long upon the crucifixion, that they have got what are
called stigmata, that is, marks of wounds corresponding to
the wounds in what they were thinking about.
That, then, is the general character of the nervous
system which we have to consider in connection with the
mind. There is a train of facts between stimulus and
motion which may be of two kinds ; it may be direct or it
may be indirect, it may go round the loop-line or not; and
also there is a continuous action of the brain even when
these steps are not taking place in completeness. More
over, when two actions take place simultaneously they form
a sort of link between them, so that if one of them is
afterwards repeated the other gets repeated with it. That
is what we have to remember chiefly as to the character of
the brain.
Now let us consider the other class of facts and the con
�14
Body and Mind.
nections between them—the facts of consciousness. An
eminent divine once said to me that he thought there were
only'two kinds of consciousness—to have a feeling and to
know that you have a feeling. Now it seems to me that
there is only one kind of consciousness, and that is to have
fifty thousand feelings at once, and to know them all in
different degrees. Whenever I try to analyse any particular
state of consciousness in which I am, I find that it is an ex
tremely complex one. I cannot help at this moment having
a consciousness of all the different parts of this hall, and
of a great sea of faces before me; and I cannot help having
the consciousness, at the same time, of all the suggestions
that that picture makes, that each face represents a person
sitting there and listening or not, as the case may be. And
I cannot help combining with them at the same moment a
number of actions which they suggest to me, and in par
ticular the action of going on speaking. There are a great
number of elements of complexity which I cannot describe,
because I am so faintly conscious of them that I cannot
remember them. Any state of our consciousness, then, as
we are at present constituted, is an exceedingly complex
thing ; but it certainly possesses this property, that if two
feelings have occurred together, and one of them afterwards
occurs again, it is very likely that the other will be called
up by it. That is to say, two states of consciousness which
have taken place at the same moment produce a link
between them, so that a repetition of the one cafis up a
repetition of the other.
Again I find a certain train of facts between my sensa
tions and my exertions. When I see a thing, I may go
through a long process of deliberation as to what I shall do
with it, and then afterwards I may do that which I have
deliberated and decided upon. But, on the other hand, I
may, by seeing a thing, be quite suddenly forced into doing
something without any chance of deliberation at all. If I
suddenly see a cab coming upon me from the corner of a
street where I did not at all expect it, I jump out of the
way without thinking that it is a very desirable thing to
get out of the way of the cab. But if I see a cab a little
while before, and have more time to think about it, then it
occurs to me that it will be unpleasant and undesirable to
be run over by that cab, and that I can avoid it by walking
�Body and Mind.
!5
out of the way. You here see that there are in the case of
the mind two distinct trains of facts between sensation and
exertion. There is an involuntary train of facts when the
exertion follows the sensation without asking my leave,
and there is a voluntary train in which it does ask my
leave.
Then, again, there is this fact : that even when there is
no actual sensation and no actual exertion, there may still
be a long train of facts and sensations which hang
together; there may be faint reproductions of sensation
which are not so vivid as are the sensations themselves,
but which form a series of pictures of sensations which
pass continually before my mind; and there will be faint
beginnings of action. Now the sense in which there are
faint beginnings of action is very instructive. Any beginning
of an action is what we call a judgment. When you see a
thing, you in the first instance form no judgment about it
at all—you are not prepared to assert any proposition—
you merely have the feeling of a certain sight or sound
presented to you ; but after a very short space of time, so
short that you cannot perceive it, you begin to frame pro
positions. If you consider what a proposition means, you
will see that it must correspond to the beginning of some
sort of exertion. When you say that A is B, you mean
that you are going to act as if A were B. If I see water
with a particularly dull surface, and with stones resting
upon the surface of it, then, first of all, I have merely an
impression of a certain sheet of colour, and of ‘ certain
objects which interrupt the colour of that sheet. But the
second thing that I do is to come to the conclusion that the
water is frozen, and that therefore I may walk upon it.
The assertion that the water is frozen implies a bundle of
resolves ; which means, given certain other conditions, I
shall go and walk upon it. So, then, an act of judgment
or an assertion of any kind implies a certain incipient
action of the muscles, not actually carried out at that time
and place, but preparing a certain condition of the mind
such as afterwards, when the occasion comes, will guide the
action that we shall take up.
Now, then, what is it that we mean by the character of
a person ? You judge of a person’s character by what be
thinks and does under certain circumstances. Let us see
�16
Body and Mind.
what determines this. We can only be speaking here of
voluntary actions—those actions in which the person is con
sulted, and which are not done by his body without his
leave. In those voluntary actions what takes place is,
that a certain sensation is communicated to the mind, that
sensation is manipulated by the mind, and conclusions are
drawn from it, and then a message is sent out which causes
certain motions to take place. Now the character of the
person is evidently determined by the nature of this
manipulation. If the sensation suggests a wrong thing,
the character of the person will be bad; if the sensation
suggests in the great majority of cases a right thing, you
will say that the character of the person is good. So,
then, it is the character of the mind which determines
what it will do with a given sensation, and what act will
follow from it, which determines what we call the per
sonality of any person ; and that character is persistent in
the main, although it is continually changing a little.
The vast mass of it is a thing which lasts through the
whole of every individual’s life, although everything which
happens to him makes some small change in it, and that
constitutes the education of the man.
Now, then, the question arises, is there anything else in
your consciousness of a different nature from what we have
here described ? That is a question which every man has
to decide by examining his own consciousness. I do not
find anything else in mine. If you find anything else in
yours, it is extremely important that you should analyse it
and find out all that you possibly can about it, and state it
in the clearest form to other people ; because it is one of the
most important problems of philosophy to account for the
whole of consciousness out of individual feelings. It seems
to me that the account of which I have only given a very
rough sketch, which was begun by Locke and Hume, and
has been carried out by their successors, chiefly in this
country, is in its great general features complete, and
leaves nothing but more detailed explanations to be de
sired. It seems to me that I find nothing in myself which
is not accounted for when I describe myself as a stream of
feelings such that each of them is capable of a faint repeti
tion, and that when two of them have occurred together the
repetition of the one calls up the other, and that there are
�Body and Mind.
17
rules according to which the resuscitated feeling calls up
its fellows. These are, in the main, fixed rules which de
termine and are determined by my character ; but my cha
racter is gradually changing in consequence of the education
of life. It seems to me that this is a complete account of
all the kinds of facts which I can find in myself ■ and, as I
said before, if anybody finds any other kinds of facts in
himself, it is an exceedingly important thing that he should
describe them as clearly as he possibly can.
We have described two classes of facts ; let us now notice
the parallelism between them. First, we have these two
parallel facts, that two actions of the brain which occur to
gether form a link between themselves, so that the one
being called up the other is called up; and two states of
consciousness which occur together form a link between
them, so that when one is called up the other is called up.
But also we find a train of facts between the physical fact
of the stimulus of light going into the eye and the physical
fact of the motion of the muscles. Corresponding to a part of
that train, we have found a train of fact between sensation,
the mental fact which corresponds to a message arriving
from the eye, and exertion, the mental fact which corre
sponds to the motion of the hand by a message going out
along the nerves. And we have found a correspondence
between the continuous action of the brain and the con
tinuous existence of consciousness apparently independent
of sensation and exertion.
But let us look at this correspondence a little more
closely; we shall find that there are one or two things
which can be established with practical certainty. In the
first place, it is not the whole of the physical train of
facts which corresponds to the mental train of facts. The
beginning of the physical train consists of light going into
the eye and exciting the retina, and then of that wave of
excitation being carried along the optic nerve to the gan
glion. For all we know, and it is a very probable thing,
the mental fact begins here, at the ganglion. There is no
sensation till the message has got to the optic ganglion for
this reason, that if you press the optic nerve behind the eye
you can produce the sensation of light. It is like tapping
a telegraph, and sending a message which has not come
from the station from which it ought to have come;
B
�18
Body and Mind.
nobody at the other end can tell whether it has come from
that station or not. The optic ganglion cannot tell whether
this message which comes along the nerve has come from
the eye or is the result of a tapping of the telegraph,
whether it is produced by light or by pressure upon the
nerve. It is a fact of immense importance that all these
nerves are exactly of the same kind. The only thing
which the nerve does is to transmit a message which has
been given to it; it does not transmit a message in any
other way than the telegraph wire transmits a message—
that is to say, it is excited at certain intervals, and the
succession of these intervals determines what this message
is, not the nature of the excitation which passes along the
wire. So that if we watched the nerve excited by pressure
the message going along to the ganglion would be exactly
the same as if it were the actual sight of the eye. We may
draw from this the conclusion that the mental fact does not
begin anywhere before the optic ganglion. Again, a man
who has had one of his legs cut off can try to move his toes,
which he feels as if they were still there ; and that shows
that the consciousness of the motor impulse which is sent
out along the nerve does not go to the end to see whether
it is obeyed or not. The only way in which we know
whether 'our orders, given to any parts of our body, are
obeyed, is by having a message sent back to say that they
are obeyed. If I tell my hand to press against this black
board, the only way in which I know that it does press is
by having a message sent back by my skin to say that it is
pressed. But supposing there is no skin there, I can have
the exertion that precedes the action without actually per
forming it, because I can send out a message, and con
sciousness stops with the sending of the message, and does
not know anything further. So that the mental fact is
somewhere or other in the region B 0 0 B of the diagram,
and does not include the two ends. That is to say, it is
not the whole of the bodily fact that the mental fact cor
responds to, but only an intermediate part of it. If it just
passes through the points R B, without going round the
loop from C to 0, then we merely have the sensation that
something has taken place—we have had no voice in the
nature of it and no choice about it. If it has gone round
from C to C we have a much larger fact—we have that
�Body and Mind.
J9
fact which we call choice, or the exercise of vojition. We
may conclude, then—I am not able in so short a space as
I have to give you the whole evidence which goes to an
assertion of this kind; but there is evidence which is suffi
cient to satisfy any competent scientific man of this day—
that every fact of consciousness is parallel to some disturb
ance of nerve matter, although there are some nervous dis
turbances which have no parallel in consciousness, properly
so called ; that is to say, disturbances of my nerves may
exist which have no parallel in my consciousness.
We have now observed two classes of facts and the
parallelism between them. Let us next observe what an
^enormous gulf there is between these two classes of facts.
"The state of a man’s brain and the actions which go
•along it are things which every other man can perceive,
observe, measure, and tabulate • but the state of a man’s
own consciousness is known to him only, and not to any
other person. Things which appear to us and which we
•can observe are called objects or pAenomewa. Facts in a
man’s consciousness are not objects or phenomena to any
■other man ; they are capable of being observed only by
him. We have no possible ground, therefore, for speaking
of another man’s consciousness as in any sense a part of
the physical world of objects or phenomena. It is a thing
entirely separate from it; and all the evidence that we
have goes to show that the physical world gets along
entirely by itself, according to practically universal rules.
That is to say, the laws which hold good in the physical
world hold good everywhere in it—they hold good with
practical universality, and there is no reason to suppose
anything else but those laws in order to account for any
physical fact; there is no reason to suppose anything but
the universal laws of mechanics in order to account for
the motion of organic bodies. The train of physical facts
between the stimulus sent into the eye, or to any one of
our senses, and the exertion which follows it, and the train
of physical facts which goes on in the brain, even when
there is no stimulus and no exertion, these are perfectly
complete physical trains, and every step is fully accounted
for by mechanical conditions. In order to show what is
meant by that, I will endeavour to explain another supposi
tion which might be made ; that when stimulus comes
�20
Body and Mind,
into the eye there is a certain amount of energy transferred
from the ether, which fills space, to this nerve; and this
energy travels along into the ganglion, and sets the
ganglion into a state of disturbance which may use up
some energy previously stored in it. The amount of
energy is the same as before by the law of the conserva
tion of energy. That energy is spread over a number of
threads which go out to the brain, and it comes back again
and is reflected from there. It may be supposed that a
very small portion of energy is created in that process,
and that while the stimulus is going round this loop-line it
gets a little push somewhere, and then, when it comes back
to the ganglia, it goes away to the muscle and sets loose a
store of - energy in the muscle so that it moves the limb.
Now the question is, Is there any creation of energy any
where ? Is there any part of the physical progress which
cannot be included within ordinary physical laws ? It has
been supposed, I say, by some people, as it seems to me
merely by a confusion of ideas, that there is, at some part
or other of this process, a creation of energy ; but there is
no reason whatever why we should suppose this. The
difficulty in proving a negative in these cases is similar to
that in proving a negative about anything which exists on
the other side of the moon. It is quite true that I am not
absolutely certain that the law of the conservation of energy
is exactly true; but there is no more reason why I should
suppose a particular exception to occur in the brain than any
where else. I might just as well assert that whenever any
thing passes over the Line, when it goes from the north side
of the Equator to the south, there is a certain creation of
energy, as that there is a creation of energy in the brain..
If I chose to say that the amount was so small that none
of our present measurements could appreciate it, it would
be difficult or indeed impossible for anybody to disprovethat assertion ; but I should have no reason whatever for
making it. There being, then, an absence of positive
evidence that the conditions are exceptional, the reasons
which lead us to assert that there is no loss of energy in
organic any more than in inorganic bodies are absolutely
overwhelming. There is no more reason to assert that
there is a creation of energy in any part of an organic body,
because we are not absolutely sure of the exact nature of
�Body and Mind.
21
the law, than there is reason, because we do not know what
there is on the other side of the moon, to assert that there
is a sky-blue peacock there with forty-five eyes in his tail.
Then it is not a right thing to say, for example, that
the mind is a force, because if the mind were a force we
should be able to perceive it. I should be able to perceive
your mind and to measure it, but I cannot; I have abso
lutely no means of perceiving your mind. I judge by
analogy that it exists, and the instinct which leads me to
come to that conclusion is the social instinct, as it has
been formed in me by generations during which men have
lived together, and they could not have lived together
unless they had gone upon that supposition. But I may
very well say that among the physical facts which go along
at the same time with mental facts there are forces at work.
That is perfectly true, but the two things are on two
utterly different platforms—the physical facts go along by
themselves, and the mental facts go along by themselves.
There is a parallelism between them, but there is no inter
ference of one with the other. Again, if anybody says that
the will influences matter, the statement is not untrue, but
it is nonsense. The will is not a material thing, it is not
a mode of material motion. Such an assertion belongs to
the crude materialism of the savage. Now the only thing
which influences matter is the position of surrounding
matter or the motion of surrounding matter. It may be
conceived that at the same time with every exercise of
volition there is a disturbance of the physical laws; but
this disturbance, being perceptible to me, would be a
physical fact accompanying the volition, and could not be
the volition itself, which is not perceptible to me. Whether
there is such a disturbance of the physical laws or no, is a
question of fact to which we have the best of reasons for
giving a negative answer ; but the assertion that another
man’s volition, a feeling in his consciousness which I cannot
perceive, is part of the train of physical facts which I may
perceive, this is neither true nor untrue, but nonsense ; it
is a combination of words whose corresponding ideas will
not go together.
Then we are to regard the body as a physical machine,
which goes by itself according to a physical law, that is to
say, is automatic. An automaton is a thing which goes by
�22
Body and Mind.
itself when it is wound up, and we go by ourselves when*
we have had food. Excepting the fact that other men areconscious, there is no reason why we should not regard the
human body as merely an exceedingly complicated machine
which is wound up by putting food into the mouth. But
it is not merely a machine, because consciousness goes with
it. The mind, then, is to be regarded as a stream of
feelings which runs parallel to, and simultaneous with, a
certain part of the action of the body, that is to say, that
particular part of the action of the brain in which thecerebrum and the sensory tract are excited.
Then, you say, if we are automata what becomes of thefreedom of the will ? The freedom of the will, according,
to Kant, is that property which enables us to originate
events independently of foreign determining causes ; which,,
it seems to me, amounts to saying precisely that we areautomata, that is, that we go by ourselves, and do not want
anybody to push or pull us. The distinction between an
automaton and a puppet is, that the one goes by itself
when it is wound up and the other requires to be pushed
or pulled by wires or strings. We do not want any stimulusfrom without, but we go by ourselves when we have our
food, and therefore so far as that distinction goes we arc
automata. But we are more than automata, because we areconscious ; mental facts go along with the bodily facts.
That does not hinder us from describing the bodily factsby themselves, and if we restrict our attention to them we
must describe ourselves as automata.
The objection which many people feel to this doctrine is
derived, I think, from the conception of such automata as
are made by man. In that case there is somebody outside
the automaton who has constructed it in a certain definite
way, with definite intentions, and has meant it to go in
that way; and the whole action of the automaton is deter
mined by such person outside. Of course, if we consider,
for example, a machine such as Frankenstein made, and
imagine ourselves to have been put together as that fearful
machine was put together by a German student, the con
ception naturally strikes us with horror ; but if we consider
the actual fact, we shall see that our own case is not an
analogous one. For, as a matter of fact, we were not made
by any Frankenstein, but we made ourselves. I do not
�Body and Mind.
^3
mean that every individual has made the whole of his own
character, hut that the human race as a whole has made
itself during the process of ages. The action of the whole
race at any given time determines what the character . ot
the race shall be in the future. From the continual storing
up of the effects of such actions, graven into the character
of the race, there arises in process of time that exact human
constitution which we now have. By that process ot
Natural Selection all the actions of our ancestors are built
into us and form our character, and in that sense it may
be said that the human race has made itself. In that
sense also we are individually responsible for what the
human race will be in the future, because every one of our
actions goes to determine what the character of the race
shall be to-morrow. If, on the contrary, we suppose that
in the action of the brain there is some point where
physical causes do not apply, and where there is a discon
tinuity, then it will follow that some of our actions are not
dependent upon our character. Provided the action which
goes on in my brain is a continuous one, subject to physical
rules then it will depend upon what the character of my
brain is ; or if I look at it from the mental side, it will
depend upon what my mental character is; but if there is
a certain point where the law of causation does not app y,
where my action does not follow by regular physical causes
from what I am, then I am not responsible for it, because
it is not I that do it. So you see the notion that we. are
not automata destroys responsibility; because, if my actions
are not determined by my character in accordance with the
particular circumstances which occur, then I am not re
sponsible for them, and it is not I that do them.
Moreover, if we once admit that physical causes are not
continuous, but that there is some break, then we_ leave
the way open for the doctrine of a destiny or a providence
outside of us, overruling human efforts and guiding history
to a foregone conclusion. Now of course it is the business
of the seeker after truth to find out whether a proposition
is true or no, and not what are the moral consequences
which may be expected to follow from it. But I do think
that if it is right to call any doctrine immoral, it is right
so to call this doctrine ; when we remember how often it
has paralysed the efforts of those who were climbing
�24
Body and Mind.
honestly up the hillside towards the light and the right
and how often it has nerved the sacrilegious arm of the
society °r
adventurer wlao was conspiring against
I want now, very briefly indeed, to consider to what
extent these doctrines furnish a bridge between the two
c asses of facts. I have said that the series of mental facts
corresponds to only a portion of the action of the organism
Hut we have to consider not only ourselves, but also those
animals which are next below us in the scale of organisalon, and we cannot help ascribing to them a consciousness
which is.analogous to our own. We find, when we attempt
to enter into that and to judge by their actions what sort
of consciousness they possess, that it differs from our own
in precisely the. same way that their brains differ from our
rams. There is less of the co-ordination which is implied
by a message going round the loop-line. A much larger
number of the messages which go in at a cat’s eyes and
come out at her paws go straight through without any
loop-line at all than do m the case of a man ; but still there
is a Lttle loop-line left. And the lower we go down in the
scale of organisation the less of this loop-line there is; yet
we cannot suppose that so enormous a jump from one
creature to another should have occurred at any point in
the process of evolution as the introduction of a fact entirely
different and absolutely separate from the physical fact. It
is impossible for anybody to point out the particular place
in the line of descent where that event can be supposed to
have, taken place. The only thing that we can come to, if
we accept the doctrine of evolution at all, is that even in
the very lowest organisms, even in the Amceba which swims
about in our own blood, there is something or other, incon
ceivably simple to us, which is of the same nature with
our own consciousness, although not of the same complexity
that is to say (for we cannot stop at organic matter,
knowing as we do that it must have arisen by continuous
physical processes out of inorganic matter), we are obliged to
assume, m order to save continuity in our belief, that along
wit every motion of .matter, whether organic or inorganic,
there is some fact which corresponds to the mental fact in
ourse ves. The mental fact in ourselves is an exceedingly
■complex thing ; so also our brain is an exceedingly complex
�Body and Mind.
thing. We may assume that the quasi-mental fact which
corresponds and which goes along with the motion of. every
particle of matter is of such inconceivable simplicity, as
compared with our own mental fact, with our consciousness,
as the motion of a molecule of matter is of inconceivable
simplicity when compared with the motion in our brain.
This doctrine is not merely a speculation, but is a, result
to which all the greatest minds that have studied this
question in the right way have gradually been approxi
mating for a long time.
Again, let us consider what takes place when we perceive
anything by means of our eye. A certain picture is pro
duced upon the retina of the eye, which is like the picture
on the ground-glass plate in a photographic camera ; but
it is not there that the consciousness begins, as I have
shown before. When I see anything there is a picture
produced on the retina, but I am not conscious of it there ;
and in order that I may be conscious the message must be
taken from each point of this picture along the special
nerve-fibre to the ganglion. These innumerable fine nerves
which come away from the retina go each of them to a
particular point of the ganglion, and the result is that,
corresponding to that picture at the back of the retina,
there is a disturbance of a great number of centres of. grey
matter in the ganglion. If certain parts of the retina of
my eye, having light thrown upon them, are disturbed so
as to produce the figure of a square, then certain little
pieces of grey matter, in this ganglion, which are distributed
we do not know how, will also be disturbed, and the impres
sion corresponding to that is a square. Consciousness
belongs to this disturbance of the ganglion, and not to the
picture in the eye; and therefore it is something quite
different from the thing which is perceived.. But at the
same time, if we consider another man looking at some
thing, we shall say that the fact is this there is something
outside of him which is matter in motion, and that which
corresponds inside of him is also matter in motion. The
external motion of matter produces, in the optic ganglion
something which corresponds to it, but is. not like it.
Although for every point in the object there is a point, of
disturbance in the optic ganglion, and for every connection
between two points in the object there is a connection be-
�26
Body and Mind.
tween two disturbances, yet they are not like one another.
Nevertheless they are made of the same stuff; the object
outside and the optic ganglion are both matter, and that
matter is made of molecules moving about in ether. When
I consider the impression which is produced upon my mind
of any fact, that is just a part of my mind ; the impression
is a part of me. The hall which I see now is just an
impression produced on my mind by something outside of
it, and that impression is a part of me.
We may conclude from this theory of sensation, which is
established by the discoveries of Helmholtz, that the feeling
which I have in my mind—the picture of this hall—is some
thing corresponding, point for point, to the actual reality
outside. Though every small part of the reality which is
outside corresponds to a small part of my picture, though
every connection between two parts of that reality outside
corresponds to a connection between two parts of my picture,
yet the two things are not alike. They correspond to one
another, just as a map may be said in a certain sense to
correspond with the country of which it is a map, or as a
written sentence may be said to correspond to a spoken
sentence. But then I may conclude, from what I said
before, that, although the two corresponding things are
not alike, yet they are made of the same stuff. Now what
is my picture made of ? My picture is made of exceedingly
simple mental facts, so simple that I only feel them in
groups. My picture is made up of these elements ; and I
am therefore to conclude that the real thing which is out
side me, and which corresponds to my picture, is made up
of similar things ; that is to say, the reality which under
lies matter, the reality which we perceive as matter, is that
same stuff which, being compounded together in a particular
way, produces mind. What I perceive as your brain is
really in itself your consciousness, is You ; but then, that
which I call your brain, the material fact, is merely my
perception. Suppose we put a certain man in the middle
of the hall, and we all looked at him. We should all have
perceptions of his brain ; those would be facts in our con
sciousness, but they would be all different facts. My
perception would be different from the picture produced
upon you, and it would be another picture, although it
might be very like it. So that corresponding to all those
�Body and Mind.
27
pictures which are produced in our minds from an external
object there is a reality which is not like the pictures, but
which’ corresponds to them point for point, and which is
made of the same stuff that the pictures are The actual
reality which underlies what we call matter is not the
same thing as the mind, is not the same thing as our per
ception, but it is made of the same stuff. To use the wor
o/the old disputants, we may say that matter is not of
the same substance as mind, not Z^m^.but it is ot
ZiA-e substance, it is made of similar stuff differently com
pacted together, homoi-ousion.
, , , .,
~
With the exception of just this last bridge connec g
the two great regions of inquiry that we have been discuss
ing, the whole of what I have said is a body of doctrine
which is accepted now, as far as I know, by all compe e
people who have considered the subject There are of
course, individual exceptions with regard to particular
points, such as that I have mentioned about the possible
creation of energy in the brain ; but these are few, an
they occur mainly, I think, among those who are sa
exceedingly well acquainted with one side of the subJ
that they regard the whole of it from the pom o v
of that side, and do not sufficiently weigh what may come
from the other side. With such exceptions as those, and
with the exception of the last speculation of all,
&
doctrine which I have expounded to you is the doctrine of
Science at the present day.’
These results may now be applied to the considera
of certain questions which have always been 0 grea
interest. The application which I shall make is a pure y
tentative one, and must be regarded as merely indica ingthat such an application becomes more possible every day.
The first of these questions is that of the possible existence
of consciousness apart from a nervous system of mind
without body. Let us first of all consider the effect upon
this question of the doctrines which are. admitted by all
competent scientific men. All the consciousness
a we
know of is associated with a brain in a certain definite
manner, namely, it is built up out of elements m the same
way as part of the action of the brain is built up out ot
elements: an element of one corresponds to an element in
the other ; and the mode of connection, the shape ot the
�28
Body and Mind.
building, is the same in the two cases. The mere fact
that all the consciousness we know of is associated with
certain complex forms of matter need only make us
exceedingly cautious not to imagine any consciousness
apart from matter without very good reason indeed ; just
as the fact of all swans having turned out white up to a
certain time made us quite rightly careful about accepting
stories that involved black swans. But the fact that mind
and brain are associated in a definite way, and in that
particular way that I have mentioned, affords a very strong
presumption that we have here something which can be
explained; that it is possible to find a reason for this
exact correspondence. If such a reason can be found, the
case is entirely altered • instead of a provisional proba
bility which may rightly make us cautious, we should have
the highest assurance that Science can give, a practical
certainty.on which we are bound to act, that there is no
mind without a brain. Whatever, therefore, is the
probability that an explanation exists of the connection of
mind with brain in action, such is also the probability that
each of them involves the other.
If, however, that particular explanation which I have
ventured to offer should turn out to be the true one, the
case becomes even stronger. If mind is the reality or
substance of that which appears to us as brain-action, the
supposition of mind without brain is the supposition of an
organised material substance not affecting other substances
(for if it did it might be perceived), and therefore not
affected by them; in other words, it is the supposition of
immaterial matter, a contradiction in terms to the funda
mental assumption of uniformity of nature, without
practically believing in which we should none of us have
been here to-day. But if mind without brain is a con
tradiction, is it not still possible that an organisation like
the brain can exist without being perceived, without our
being able to hold it fast, and weigh it, and cut it up ?
Now this is a physical question, and we know quite enough
about the physical world to say, “ Certainly not.” It is made
of atoms and ether, and there is no room in it for ghosts.
The other question which may be asked is this : Can we
regard the universe, or that part of it which immediately
surrounds us, as a vast brain, and therefore the reality
�Body and Mind.
29
which underlies it as a conscious mind ? This question has
been considered by the great naturalist Du Bois Reymond,
and has received from him that negative answer which I
think we also must give. For we found that the particular
organisation of the brain which enables its action to run
parallel with consciousness amounts to this—that dis
turbances run along definite channels, and that two
disturbances which occur together establish links between
the channels along which they run, so that they naturally
occur together again. Now it will, I think, be clear to
every one that these are not characteristics of the great
interplanetary spaces. Is it not possible, however, that
the stars we can see are just atoms in some vast organism,
bearing some such relation to it as the atoms which make
up our brains bear to us ? I am sure I do not know. But
it seems clear that the knowledge of such an organism
could not extend to events taking place on the earth, and
that its volition could not be concerned in them. And
if some vast brain existed far away in space, being
invisible because not self-luminous, then, according to the
laws of matter at present known to us, it could affect the
solar system only by its weight.
On the whole, therefore, we seem entitled to conclude
that during such time as we can have evidence of, no
intelligence or volition has been concerned in events
happening within the range of the solar system, except
that of animals living on the planets. The weight of
such probabilities is, of course, estimated differently by
different people, and the questions are only just beginning
to receive the right sort of attention. But it does seem to
me that we may expect in time to have negative evidence
on this point of the same kind and of the same cogency
as that which forbids us to assume the existence between
the Earth and Venus of a planet as large as either of them.
• Now about these conclusions which I have described as
probable ones, there are two things that may be said. In
the first place it may be said that they make the world a
blank, because they take away the objects of very impor
tant and widespread emotions of hope and reverence and
love, which are human faculties and require to be exercised,
and that they destroy the motives for good conduct. To
this it may be answered that we have no right to call the
�3°
Body and Mind.
world a blank while it is full of men and women, even
though our one friend may be lost to us. And in the
regular everyday facts of this common life of men, and in
the promise which it holds out for the future, there is
room enough and to spare for all the high and noble
emotions of which our nature is capable. Moreover,
healthy emotions are felt about facts and not about
phantoms; and the question is not “ What conclusion will
be most pleasing or elevating to my feelings ? ” but “What
is the truth ? ” For it is not all human faculties that have
to be exercised, but only the good ones. It is not right
to exercise the faculty of feeling terror or of resisting
evidence. And if there are any faculties which prevent
us from accepting the truth and guiding our conduct by
it, these faculties ought not to be exercised. As for the
assertion that these conclusions destroy the motive for
good conduct, it seems to me that it is not only utterly
untrue, but, because of its great influence upon human
action, one of the most dangerous doctrines that can be
set forth. The two questions which we have last dis
cussed are exceedingly difficult and complex questions; the
ideas and the knowledge which we used in their discussion
are the product of long centuries of laborious investigation
and thought; and perhaps, although we all make our little
guesses, there is not one man in a million who has any
right to a definite opinion about them. But it is not
necessary to answer these questions in order to tell an
honest man from a rogue. The distinction of right and
wrong grows up in the broad light of day out of natural
causes wherever men live together; and the only right
motive to right action is to be found in the social
instincts which have been bred into mankind by hundreds
of generations of social life. In the target of every true
Englishman’s allegiance, the bull’s-eye belongs to his
countrymen, who are visible and palpable and who stand
around him ; not to any far-off shadowy centre beyond
the hills, ultra monies, either at Rome or in heaven.
Duty to one’s countrymen and fellow-citizens, which is the
social instinct guided by reason, is in all healthy com
munities the one thing sacred and supreme. If the course
of things is guided by some unseen intelligent person, then
this instinct is his highest and clearest voice, and because
�Body and Mind.
3i
of it we may call him good. But if the course .of things
is not so guided, that voice loses nothing of its sacred
ness, nothing of its clearness, nothing of its obligation.
In the second place it may be said that Science ought
not to deal with these questions at all; that while
scientific men are concerned with physical facts, they
are clans leur droit, but that in treating of such subjects
as these they are going out of their domain, and must
do harm.
What is the domain of Science ? It is all possible
human knowledge which can rightly be used to guide
human conduct.
In many parts of Europe it is customary, to leave a
part of the field untilled for the Brownie to live in,
because he cannot live in cultivated ground. And if you
grant him this grace, he will do a great deal of your
household work for you in the night while you sleep.
In Scotland the piece of ground which is left wild for the
devil to live in is called “ the good man’s croft.” Now,
there are people who indulge a hope that the ploughshare
of Science will leave a sort of good man’s croft around the
field of reasoned truth ; and they promise that in that
case a good deal of our civilising work shall be done for us
in the dark, by means we know nothing of. I do not share
this hope ; and I feel very sure that it will not be realised.
I think that we should do our work with our own hands
in a healthy straightforward way, and not leave any croft
to the good man from which his arrow may fly by night
and in which his pestilence may walk in the noonday. It
is idle to set bounds to the purifying and organising work
of Science. Without mercy and without resentment she
ploughs up weed and briar; from her footsteps behind her
grow up corn and healing flowers; and no corner is far
enough to escape her furrow. Provided only that we take
as our motto and our rule of action, Man speed the plough.
PRINTED BY C. W. REYNELL, LITTLE PULTENEY STREET, HAYMARKET.
��
Dublin Core
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Title
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Victorian Blogging
Description
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A collection of digitised nineteenth-century pamphlets from Conway Hall Library & Archives. This includes the Conway Tracts, Moncure Conway's personal pamphlet library; the Morris Tracts, donated to the library by Miss Morris in 1904; the National Secular Society's pamphlet library and others. The Conway Tracts were bound with additional ephemera, such as lecture programmes and handwritten notes.<br /><br />Please note that these digitised pamphlets have been edited to maximise the accuracy of the OCR, ensuring they are text searchable. If you would like to view un-edited, full-colour versions of any of our pamphlets, please email librarian@conwayhall.org.uk.<br /><br /><span><img src="http://www.heritagefund.org.uk/sites/default/files/media/attachments/TNLHLF_Colour_Logo_English_RGB_0_0.jpg" width="238" height="91" alt="TNLHLF_Colour_Logo_English_RGB_0_0.jpg" /></span>
Creator
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Conway Hall Library & Archives
Date
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2018
Publisher
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Conway Hall Ethical Society
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Original Format
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Pamphlet
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
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Body and mind, a lecture delivered before the Sunday Lecture Society, on Sunday afternoon, 1st November, 1874
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Clifford, William Kingdon [1845-1879]
Description
An account of the resource
Place of publication: London
Collation: 31 p. ; 18 cm.
Notes: Printed by G.W. Reynell, London. Part of the NSS pamphlet collection.
Publisher
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Sunday Lecture Society
Date
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1875
Identifier
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N091
Subject
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Science
Rights
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<a href="http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/mark/1.0/"><img src="http://i.creativecommons.org/p/mark/1.0/88x31.png" alt="Public Domain Mark" /></a><span> </span><br /><span>This work (Body and mind, a lecture delivered before the Sunday Lecture Society, on Sunday afternoon, 1st November, 1874), identified by </span><a href="https://conwayhallcollections.omeka.net/items/show/www.conwayhall.org.uk"><span>Humanist Library and Archives</span></a><span>, is free of known copyright restrictions.</span>
Format
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application/pdf
Type
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Text
Language
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English
Mind and body
NSS