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THE ITALIAN MOVEMENT AND
ITALIAN PARTIES.
TWO LECTURES
DELIVEEED AT THE
PHILOSOPHICAL INSTITUTION, EDINBURGH.
" *
SPEECHES
g
DELTVEBED IN
THE HOUSE OF COMMONS AND AT THE WAKEFIELD
MECHANICS’ INSTITUTE.
BY
JAMES STANSFELD, Esq., M.P.
PUBLISHED AT THE REQUEST OF THE GARIBALDI ITALIAN UNITY COMMITTEE.
LONDON:
JAMES RIDGWAY, 169, PICCADILLY,
EFFINGHAM WILSON, 11, ROYAL EXCHANGE.
EDINBURGH: ADAM & CHARLES BLACK.
��fenMbi (JMxmt Bnxtg gummite-
The following Lectures and Speeches are published at the request of
the Executive of the Garibaldi Italian Unity Committee, viz.:—
P. A. Taylor, M.P., Chairman.
W. H. Ashurst, Treasurer.
J. Sale Barker,
W. J. Linton.
W. T. Malleson, B.A.,
William Shaen, M.A.,
R. E. Wainewright, B.A.
J. M. Moir, M.A., Secretary.
March, 1862,
10, Southampton Street, Strand, London.
s
��TWO LECTURES,
&C.
■
LECTURE I.
It is not unusual, I believe, for a Lecturer to commence his
address by some prefatory remarks, intended to demonstrate
the interest and importance of his subject to his hearers. But
my subject needs no such introduction, and if I fail to make it
interesting, the fault will be my own.
Nevertheless, it may be well at the outset of what I have to
say, to endeavour not to prove the interest of my subject, but
to ascertain what are the essential elements and the attributes
of the Italian Question which make it one of so great interest,
of such special import to ourselves.
Tn the first place then Italy has the greatest past of any nation.
She has been mistress of the Pagan and of the Christian
world. She has suffered centuries of decay, of disintegration,
of what seemed death—and it was death—but death precedes
resurrection, and Italy is being born again and to a purer life.
How can we then choose but look upon her regeneration with
the interest which belongs to so great a past, and with that
mingled sense of veneration and of joy, with which we greet
the spectacle, with all its wondrous meaning, of a nation’s life
providentially renewed.
Let us descend from the height of this generality to think of
the living human tender interest inspired by a nearer view of
d;he more immediate past. Count, if you could count them,
B
�2
>
Italy’s martyr heroes in exile, in the dungeon, on the scaffold,
or dying on the field ; from Silvio Pellico to Petroni, from the
brothers Bandiera to Pisacane and Rosolino Pilo, from Joseph
Andreoli and Menotti to Ugo Bassi, Ciceroacchio and the
Canon Tazzoli. From those times so near us as some twenty
years ago, when Joseph Mazzini wrote “ The shadow of des
*
potism is cast on the whole land, on virtue as on vice, on life
and death; one would imagine that the very steps of the
scaffold were clothed with velvet, so little sound do those youth
ful heads make which roll down from them”—down to these
later days when the task of silent martyrdom is over and the
struggle is in the face of day.
And yet alas, even now how many are the noble men
who suffer death that Italy may be, and we know them not, or
their names die from us in the great whirl of time, save for the
few with whom the accidental privilege of personal relation
ship—sad and anxious privilege as it has often proved—has
made them rank us brothers. I have been of these few; for
this reason I am here to-night, for I may say that this Italian
Movement as far as their part in it has been concerned, has been
since 1848, a large part of my daily life. No forlorn hope has
since then been led—precursor of the successes which now fill
us with delight,—that has not numbered personal friends of
mine among its bravest leaders. The dungeons of the Pope
are still crowded with men whose crimes will rank as virtues
when her capital is restored to the Italian nation, amongst
whom I could name men of the highest character and of the
purest devotion, for whom, those whom I love have been pining
night and day for years. Let me recal two names, especially
dear to me of those who are no more. I knew Colonel
Pisacane the forerunner of Garibaldi, who fell in 1857 in an
unsuccessful attempt to raise the Neapolitan provinces against
their deceased king. He was a man of great military capacity,
of enlightened intellect, of high soul and of an absolute devo
tion ; and it was my privilege to call him friend. Rosolino
Pilo too, I knew, and cherish his memory with a peculiar'
affection. You may remember his name, though I know not,
* “ State and Prospects of Italy,” Monthly Chronicle, May, 1839.
�3
for he died too soon to reap the reward of an extended fame—
Rosolino Pilo, the gentle and the brave, without whom the late
insurrection in Sicily might have been crushed out at once, he
kept it alive in the mountains round Palermo until Garibaldi
could come to save it, with his genius and his prestige—and was
then wounded to the death. I might almost say that it was from
my own threshold that he went forth to buy with his life’s blood
the redemption of the country which had been his cradle, and
which was to become his grave.
But let us turn again to considerations of a more general
nature. The Italian movement is above all else one of
national reconstruction or rather of national regeneration.
A few years ago my first business would have been to
prove this, to show that this and not merely some portion
of liberty and reform was the goal towards which all Italy
was striving, and which she was destined to attain. Now
I may start with the assumption of that which all of us
believe, and, this brings me to the next attribute of special
interest in this Italian movement, which I desire to note.
By virtue of its national character, of which it has forced
the consciousness upon us, it has opened our eyes to the
fact that what we call the question of nationalities, is the
great European question of the day. The example of Italy is
contagious and acts directly on the peoples; wherever there is
a sense of national individuality unrecognized or oppressed, the
peoples are astir. I speak not merely of such well recognized
nationalities as those of the Polish and the Magyar races, but
of all those various tribes which people the South East of
Europe, and which are kept together for the time in unnatural
bonds, by the iron rule of Austria or the decaying empire of the
Turks. The organization of these minor nationalities is a
necessary work, perhaps of the immediate future. Italy tells us
so, she heralds and she hastens the advent of the problem to
be solved. The fact of Italy’s reconstruction has another prac
tical interest for us. She has been for centuries the battle-field
of rival ambitions in Europe, and the spoil of the victor. She
will now cease to be a cause of war; she should become a
guardian of the peace. One great element in the creed of
b 2
�modern European statesmanship, is what is called the “ Balance
of Power,”—a phrase dating from Richelieu, who feared or pro
fessed to fear the preponderance of the House of Hapsburg,
which was often used against France, during the wars about the
Spanish succession, and which is referred to in the treaty of
Utrecht between England and Spain (February 1713) as “the
best and firmest support of a mutual friendship and of a durable
understanding.”
Now this phrase the il Balance of Power ” is beginning to be
considered by some as the expression of a rather antiquated
doctrine. But the truth is that it is only the old methods,
dynastic alliances, or treaties to counteract them, that are be
coming out of date. A true “ Balance of Power” is still essen
tial to European peace, and to that confidence which should
save us the cost and the danger of constantly preparing for
war; but it needs to be constructed on some fixed and per
manent basis, and to have added to it, as an equally important
safeguard, the removal of occasions and temptations which lead
to war. Now the principle of the organization of European
states according to nationalities, would, as far as the’west and
centre of Europe are concerned, give us this fixed basis and this
additional safeguard,—an united Italy, and an united Germany,
would be France for all aggressive purposes disarmed.
An additional source of practical and immediate interest to
us in the Italian national movement, is to be found in the
influence it has had upon our own foreign policy, an influence
beneficial in two ways. In the first instance it has, I might
almost say, given us for the first time, a foreign policy based
upon an intelligible principle. The principle is that of “Non
intervention;” not the barren fact, without sympathy, or sense
of duty, or of right, but the principle, to be observed, to be
upheld, and as far as reason and prudence may allow, to be
enforced in the counsels of Europe. I may say that it is the
doctrine of Nationalities which has served to moralize the
doctrine of “ Non-intervention” and to elevate it to the height
of a principle capable of ruling the foreign policy of our
country.
A short time ago, some time in September I think, a well
�known statesman, and a brilliant writer and orator, Sir Edward
Bulwer Lytton, addressed the Hertfordshire Agricultural
Society, on the great political changes which had in the course
of the preceding year passed over both the old world and the
new. His speech was not a party speech, or I should not refer
to it here. He spoke for all Britain, and for statesmen of all
parties. He said that foreigners all misunderstood the foreign
policy of this country; and he undertook in a few words to
explain it. He said that England was a free nation, and that
therefore her Statesmen and her Ministers must consult popular
opinion, but popular opinion sided with the free; he said that
it was our interest that good government should be established
everywhere, because under good government the interchange of
commerce could be promoted, and the spread of freedom
abroad widened the market for English manufactures ; that we
had an interest therefore not in tyrannies and in revolutions,
but in the rise and prosperity of free peoples who would accept
our own temperate form of constitutional government; and if
we must further explain our policy, he added, it was that in the
rise of a free people we might expect an ally in our sympathies
for freedom, and a customer in that prosperity which is the
companion of free political opinions. “ There was the whole
key to the great principle of British foreign policy.”
Now I not only object to this as a definition of what our foreign
policy ought to be, but as a definition of what it is. I don’t think
tthat interest qualified by popular sympathies, is the key of the great
principle of British foreign policy. Iam sure that this is not what
is at the bottom of the mind and of the heart of Britain in the
matter. The leading doctrine of our foreign policy zof to
day is, as I have said “ non-intervention ” and thanks to Italy,
non-intervention in the sense in which I have explained it. Now
this doctrine was born of the desire of peace. We all desire
peace, for we know the cost of war; and England specially
desires peace, because if she were to find, in principle or in
sympathy, a righteous cause of war, she feels no sufficient
assurance that the war would be so conducted or would so
^eventuate as to serve the cause she might have it at heart to
aid. Non-intervention began then as a kind of rule for our
�selves. It was our interest for the sake of peace and it kept us
out of mischief’s way. But considered simply as a rule for
ourselves you will see that it tended logically and inevitably to
the negation of all foreign policy; and it has by some been
carried almost this length. But this was not what England
meant or what she ever would or ever will, I trust, accept. She
sought a foreign policy which should be intelligible, abiding and
at her own control; for this she had need of a principle, and
she found it in the doctrine of non-intervention elevated and
moralized, as I have said. And at the bottom of such doctrine
so accepted and imposed is I say not the notion of interest—that
would never lead us to a principle—but the notion of duty and
of right. We say that each people has the right to shape out
its own national life, and that no foreign power has the right to
interfere to prevent it. We sympathize with a people struggling
to liberate itself from domestic tyranny, but we believe that it
must effect its own emancipation. Where our consciences
point out to us a people dismembered, or partly, or wholly
under the rule of a foreign power, we recognise its right to
work out or to re-establish its national independent existence,
and we say that no other nation has the right to aid such foreign
power in forcibly retaining its wrongful rule. And we believe
it not only to be our interest but our duty, to do what we can
wisely do, to promote an acceptance of this principle and to
procure an observance of this rule of public right and wrong.
Our statesmen used to talk about non-intervention between the
different states of Italy, as if those states could have any rights
which were not subordinate to that of the whole Italian people.
“Non-intervention” led them some short time ago to the
absurdity of saying, that if Venice sought to free herself from
the yoke of Austria, she must do so without the aid of that
portion of Italy already free. We have widened the basis and
raised the level of our idea ; we now deny the right of Germany
to aid Austria, when Italy shall feel the time is ripe to claim
her own.
The Italian question has helped to moralize our foreign
policy in another way. It has roused us, the nation, to dictate
and to control that policy, and it inaugurates the new era, in
�7
which public opinion and public sympathy assert their supe
rior right to the secret or traditional diplomacy of statesmen or
of Courts.
Lastly, the Italian question is deeply, solemnly interesting to
us as a Protestant community. I use the word in no narrow or
antagonistic sense; I mean to us as a community believing in
freedom of conscience as between man and man. We have
not to wait for the destruction of the temporal power of the
Papacy; the temporal power that now supports the Pope is not
that of Papacy; it is that of France. The sham that still re
mains will ere long be swept away. But what we may with
confidence look forward to as a future result of the conflict
between Italy and the Papacy, as a first fruit of that new and
conscious freedom and responsibility which this national up
rising is already calling forth, is a Reformation of the Catholic
Church—not our Reformation, for history does not repeat her
self, and nothing spontaneous can be a copy of what has gone
before, but, nevertheless, a movement of religious reformation
pregnant with the most vital consequences to the Christian
world, and certainly beneficial in its influence on the spirit of
freedom and of faith; and this we shall owe to Italy—born
again into the world, not without purpose in the evolution of the
providential scheme.
We believe in Italy at last. We think that we understand her
movement, and that we can no longer be deceived. Indeed
since we have mastered the notion of national regeneration as
the aim of Italy, we rightly feel that we hold the clue to that
movement, the key to any phenomena it may present, the test,
largely speaking, of the accuracy of what people may wish to
persuade us of in point of facts. And, in truth, since this cha
racter of the movement has become patent to demonstration,
not only to us, but to Europe, none but a few Ultramontane
journals have ventured to dispute the right or the tendency of
the Italian people.
I need hardly say that success has had much to do with this;
there is indeed nothing which succeeds like it, as the French
say. It helped England to the completion of her faith in Italy
—it gave to her her faith in Cavour, in spite’of his French
�alliance and the sacrifice of Savoy and Nice. But the inB
fluence of this faith and of this success cannot alone lead
us to an accurate comparative appreciation of what I may
call the inner life of this movement, of the action and counter
action of the various parties in Italy, each, in their own
way, contributing to the solution of the national problem. Any
man, not somewhere behind the scenes, dependent on the
daily press alone for his impressions, must, if he endeavours
to form precise notions at all, become sadly perplexed by the
conflicting views presented to him. Newspaper corresponden
cies and leading articles, too often like multiplied addresses of
counsel learned in the law, skilled in the arts and trained to
the habit of advocacy, perplex the mind of the Jury of the
nation, if it has nothing else on which to build its verdict, until, like
common juries, it is apt to take refuge in mere impressions,
and almost to resent any appeal to its more careful discrimi
nation. Such task of careful discrimination indeed we cannot
undertake from day to day; we cannot always keep on guard
against the possibility of false impressions; and it is for this
reason that I think, and that I assume you think it to be of use
and of interest occasionally to compare notes, somewhat deli
berately, to endeavour again to build up the elementary outlines
of our knowledge, to refresh ourselves with a text-book of our
own making, and to renew our tests of truth.
In the outline which I shall now give of the Italian move
ment, I shall naturally, though without any very formal plan,
perform this office for myself as for those who hear me. I
shall do this from a certain point of view, for how can there be
opinions of any value without a certain point of view ? That
point of view, I believe, you know. My familiarity is not with
the Ministerial but with what is called the National party in
Italy ; my interest in the question dates from them ; you have a
right to say that my prepossessions will be in their favour; but
I do not think that they have met with such plentiful advocacy
of late as to induce you, on that account, to regret hearing me.
I shall state their case as I see it, but in doing so I shall ask
you to believe me when I say that I have never, in my own
mind, confounded retaliation with defence. I do not trace in
�9
myself the slighest predisposition to react against injustice by
the like. I have ever felt that true friendship never doubting of
itself or fearing doubt, pays its best homage in endeavouring to
be just. It is an homage undoubtedly due to the National
party of Italy, for, all things considered, it is a generous party,
and furnishes instances of the highest self-abnegation, of the
truest-minded self-devotion to the country and the cause.
What, however, I shall say of and for that party, I shall ask
you to depend upon, as knowledge, not opinion merely; for 1
have known that party, and some of its leaders, in the greatest
intimacy, for years.
Italy was one under the Romans, and yet it was not Italy but
Rome that ruled the world. In those days of universal
dominion, the principle of nationality had not yet begun to play
its part in the organization of the world. Then came the decay
of that mighty empire of the Romans, for its work was done,
and a new work was to begin. The northern hordes, migrating
en masse from northern Europe and from Asia, overran the whole
of Europe, sometimes sweeping away whole populations, some
times assimilating with them, remaking and redistributing the
material of European communities; modern nationalities, not
even yet all wrought out into an abiding harmony, being their
result. Two or three centuries of this work of assimilation
sufficed for Italy, and you already find her leading minds, Dante,
Machiavelli, with others of less note, dreaming of a Nation
to come. The first form of renewed life and progress in Italy
was, as elsewhere, municipal. In those barbarous and feudal
times industry collected itself in walled cities and organized for
defence. In Italy because, on the one hand, of the fecund
genius of the people, and on the other of the absence of any
great ruling central power, this new life of Europe had the
most brilliant results. Italy took the lead at once in com
merce and in arts; her merchant princes rivalled monarchs in
splendour and ambition, and excelled them in culture ; cities
became states, aimed at supremacy over their fellows, and in
dulged in the luxury of war. It has been, until a very recent
date, an almost universal habit to cite these wars and jealousies
�10
q
of the Italian Republics of the Middle Ages, as evidences that
Italy was not and could not be, even now, ripe to become a
nation. We borrowed this notion from M. Sismondi, the great
author of the “ History of the Italian Republics.” The destruc
tion of the republic of Florence, and the peace between
Charles V. and Pope Clement VII. in 1530, seemed to him the
death of Italy ; but we now know that neither Emperor nor
Pope, neither Guelph nor Ghibelline, neither foreign or priestly
rule, have any hold whatever on the mind or on the heart of the
Italian people. It was a question of faith or want of faith in
progress and the future. Was Italy, or was she not, at some
future time, again to take her place among the nations ? With
out such faith, the mind naturally, dwelt among the divisions of
the past—and none more likely to do so than the man who had
made of that past his special study—and found in it confirma
tion of its scepticism. But once given that general faith in the
future and a just retrospect of the past tells a very different
tale. The life of the Italian republics was not a national but a
municipal life, on however splendid a scale ; those wars and
jealousies were not between incipient nations but dominant
municipalities, Milan, Florence, Como, Pisa, Sienna, Venice,
Bologna, and so forth. And since those times these very
cities have for centuries been joined under successive though
varying territorial governments ; forgetting their rivalries under
centuries of common slavery, or giving a proof of their readi
ness to unite in a common national life, as when, for instance,
Napoleon included them all in the kingdom of North Italy in
1802. A nation wants good boundaries, an indubitable capital,
and a greater power of attraction of the whole upon its several
parts than any neighbouring national unit can exercise upon
them. This (or even less than this) gives you the virtual
nation, which once realized in fact, must hold itself together
and increase in its cohesive force. Italy has the Alps and the
sea for her boundaries, and Rome for her capital; and I confess
that from the first moment that I turned my thoughts to the
Italian question, it seemed to me clear that the problem was to
found the nation, but that once constituted, it would have the
elements of a nationality as compact and homogeneous as that of
�11
France herself. Napoleon himself said at St. Helena that
Unity of manners, of language, of literature, must at a future
more or less remote, end in bringing her inhabitants under
one government.” In 1814 Napoleon walking along the sea
shore of the island of Elba, with a young Italian, and looking
across to the peninsula, suddenly asked, “ What do the Italians
think of me ? ” “ They would love your majesty more had you
given them unity,” was the reply; “ they are right,” said the
Emperor; “ I did not think that they would go so far towards
that goal. They have exceeded my expectations.”
Immediately before Napoleon, Piedmont and Savoy belonged
to the House of Savoy, but Genoa was republican, and so was
Venice; then all the rest was Austrian, or under Austrian in
fluence ; the Pope at Rome, the kingdom of rhe Two Sicilies
reigned over by the Spanish Bourbons, Lombardy Austrian,
and the dukedoms of Modena, Parma and Piacenza, and Tus
cany ruled by princes of the House of Austria. You will mark
here sources of rivalry between Governments, but no element
beneath the surface likely to be antagonistic to the reconstitu
tion of the nation. The only indigenous governments were that
of the kingdom of Savoy, then a despotism, and the republics
of Genoa and of Venice; all other frontier lines marked out
simply the possessions or the indirect dependencies of Austria.
Then came the period of Napoleon—a step towards unity;
after various changes the kingdom of Italy down to Ancona
in the Papal States, except Parma in the hands of a sister of
the Emperor, Naples and Sicily ruled first by Joseph and then
by Murat, all, in fact, Napoleonic, with the nominal exception
of Rome.
The downfall of Napoleon and the treaties of Vienna of 1815,
brought Austria back in more than her former power. Venice
was given with Lombardy to Austria, with the right of garrison
ing Ferrara and Comacchio ; Tuscany, with the addition of
the island of Elba, to Ferdinand of Austria; Parma to Marie
Louise, who was Austrian ; Modena to the Austrian House of
Este ; Genoa was added to the territories of the House of
Savoy ; the Roman states of course went to the Pope; the two
Sicilies to the Bourbons again. The Allied Powers seemed to
�12
think only of dispossessing France ; they recognized no right
in the Italian people, I will not say to national unity, but to
Governments which should at least not be foreign to the soil.
And yet they had endeavoured to turn Italy against Napoleon
by promises of independence, and at the time of his fall they
had the ample evidence of addresses from the army and the
national guard, from commercial bodies of men, and from deputies
of the kingdom of Italy, sent to Paris immediately on the abdi
cation of Napoleon, to show them that what above all things
Italy dreaded and protested against was the being given back
to Austrian rule. In the report of those deputies to the Presi
dent of the Regency at Milan, I find that after fruitless commu
nications with the representatives of Russia and of Prussia,
they addressed themselves to our representatives, Lord Castlereagh and Lord Aberdeen. Count Frederick Confalonieri,
their spokesman, saying, “Although our country has never tasted
the advantage of a political and national existence, she has
been taught these twenty years to desire such an existence.
The sheer hope, and the bare name of nation have impelled
her to sacrifices of all kinds * * * we are not the men of
twenty years ago, and it is impossible for us to become so, save
by renouncing habits and sentiments grown part of our system
and dear to a nation endowed with intelligence, energy, and
passions, that has acquired a large experience of political mat
ters, and that has learnt also to war * * The best interests of
*
.
our nation (the Count is here in truth speaking of Northern
Italy, which Napoleon erected into a kingdom and which fur
nished him with some of his best troops), requires and demands
a king; and let this king be even an Austrian, our wishes will
be accomplished; all that we desire is to obtain an existence
independent of other states, and a Constitution or National
Representation.” But it was not to be; Italy was conquered
from Napoleon, and was parcelled out as so much booty in the
general spoil. From these iniquities sprang the partial revolu
tions of 1820, 1821, and 1831; the national rising of 1848, and
the late war, together with the number of minor or abortive
attempts, and the constant conspiracies which have followed
each other almost year by year since the Treaties of 1815.
�13
The insurrection of July 1820, took place in Naples, the
army bore part in it; in six days, without resistance or blood
shed, so universal was the movement, the king yielded, and
granted a Constitution. In March, of the following year, an
Austrian army entered the kingdom and despotism was restored.
The insurrection of March, 1821, was Piedmontese, it was
also the work of the army, and succeeded without bloodshed in
three days; on the fourth day the king, Victor Emmanuel, bound
by oaths to Austria not to grant a Constitution, abdicated, and
a Constitutional system was proclaimed. In April it was sup
pressed, and despotism and the king restored by Austrian arms.
Both of these movements were the work of the Carbonari,
amongst whom were enrolled Prince Francis, of Naples, and
Charles Albert, then Prince of Carignano, and heir to the
throne of Savoy. The former was a traitor from the first—the
latter having approved of the movement on the 8th of March,
prepared the next day to prevent it at Turin, but it broke out
on the 10th at Alexandria, and he was himself proclaimed
Regent on the abdication of the king.
The insurrection of Central Italy in 1831, had its source in a
conspiracy dating from the previous year, in Modena, which
had proposed to place the Duke of Modena at the head of the
Italian movement. But this part of the scheme was afterwards
abandoned. The conspirators, with young Menotti at their
head, were betrayed; on the 2nd of February the Duke sur
rounded his house—the conspirators resisted, cannon were
brought to play against them ; at the sound the people rose in
all the neighbouring towns, and in three weeks Parma, Modena,
and the northern half of the Papal States, embracing some two
million and a-half of inhabitants, were in arms. The instinct
of the people was already Italian, they sought to invade Tus
cany and Naples, and to bring about an insurrection at Genoa,
and to march on Rome ; but the Provisional Governments of
Parma, Modena, and Bologna, opposed and prevented all such
movements.
They were not men of revolutionary capacity, they did not
even take any efficient means to prepare for defence, they
sought to moderate the movement and to give it an inoffensive
�14
aspect to the powers of Europe, they believed that if they, not
the originators of the Movement, but being now placed at its
head, proved themselves peaceful and unaggressive. Austria
would not invade, and they knew that otherwise they had no
thing to fear. They had some plausible reasons for their belief.
France had just declared strongly for enforcing non-intervention
with a high hand. On Dec. 1, 1830, M. Lafitte president of the
Council, anticipating disturbances in Italy, had said in the
chambers, “ France will not allow the principle of non-interven
tion to be violated ; but she will labour to prevent peace being
compromised if possible, and if war becomes inevitable, it must
be proved that we had no choice between it and the abandon
ment of our principles.” A note was shown at Bologna, whose
authenticity has however been denied, signed by the French
Ambassador at Naples, pledging France beforehand “to support
Bologna on condition that the government should not assume
an anarchical form, and that it should recognize the principles
which had been declared in the face of Europe—true or not,
the provisional governments, on the faith of it, tempered or
rather emasculated the movement, and relied on France. It is
said that Louis Philippe, to avoid the fulfilment of his pro
mises, and to give time to Austria, kept back from his Minister
Lafitte for five days, the despatch of the French Ambassador
at Vienna, announcing the Austrian invasion. The Austrian
intervention took place first in Parma and Modena, Austria
declaring that she did so to protect her reversionary rights—for
these duchies you will remember were given by the treaties of
1815, to Austrian princes—and that if Bologna remained peace
ful she would be respected. This was in the beginning of
March—on the 20th, the Austrians were at the gates of Bologna
—on the 26th, the capitulation including an amnesty was signed,
to be# afterwards violated by Rome; then followed a mass of
proscriptions and imprisonments. Young Menotti died on the
gallows on March 23rd. He had been wounded on the 2nd
February at Modena, taken prisoner by the Duke, and dragged
away with him in his flight. Italy was again at peace,.
I must ask you to note here that with the failure of the move
ment of 1831 died out, in Italy, the institution, if I may say so,
�15
of Carbonarism. Our notions of Carbonarism have been, in
this country, of the vaguest. We have been accustomed to
hear of it as of a terrible system of secret societies, democratic
in their origin, anarchical in their views, shunned by all decent
men and yet hardly now extinct, and with the dagger as their
sole weapon and device. These notions of ours have not only
been vague, but also about as inaccurate as notions could be.
Carbonarism existed in Italy already in the time of Napoleon.
It was a system of secret societies without a positive political
programme of faith, and in this it was an offspring of the times ;
it was an expression of a state of mind whose function is to
render impossible an existing state of things and to destroy it;
analogous, I might say, to those periods of religious anarchy
and scepticism which precede the dawning of a new faith.
Italy had not yet begun to formalize the faith of her regenera
tion, though I have already given evidences of the existence at
that date of the germs of such faith. Carbonarism was an un
reasoning instinctive creation. Italy conspired a tout prix leav
ing to chance, opportunity, or the discretion of unknown leaders,
to decide the time and the aim : at any rate such action could not
be for the worse, must in fact, be for some measure of liberty
and independence. Then as to the method of conspiracy, this
also partook of the^nature of the times and the character of
the association. It was necessary to ensure secresy and fidelity,
and they were sought for in the modes which had been handed
down and familiarized to men’s minds by the secret societies of
the middle ages, by processes of initiation, by oaths and gro
tesquely fearful ceremonies, intended to impress the imagina
tion of the adept, and to ensure his blind obedience and his
faith. Terrible penalties hung over the heads of those who
should henceforth falter or betray ; and vengeance followed
treason, actual or supposed;—though the love of the -terrible
and the unknown has undoubtedly exaggerated the number of
such instances of vengeance or punishment. On the other hand
Carbonarism was not anarchical in its objects, because the
spirit of Italy was not anarchical, but was already, though half
iinconsciously, seeking a new and better, a more stable and
orderly as well as a freer life. The movements of 1820 and
�16
1821, which I have described, were entirely the work of Car-j
bonarism, that of 1831 also partially, although it was already on
the decline, and in those movements we have seen want of
national faith, want of energy and direction, and hence failure,
but of the spirit of anarchy, nothing. Lastly, Carbonarism
has been laid as a convenient reproach at the door of Italian
Democracy. Reproach or not, this is the greatest mistake of
all. Its great efforts were the movements of 1820 and 1821,
revolutionary but not democratic movements, the heirs apparent
of Naples and of Piedmont were its sworn adepts, the army its
instrument. The last effort, only partially its own, was the
revolution of the centre in 1831. Then it passed away, and
then, and not till then, appeared upon the scene the small be
ginning of that national democratic agitation, which has since
played so important and in some respects, I think, so little
understood a part in the reconstruction of the unity of the
Italian nation.
On the ruins of Carbonarism was founded the society “ La
Giovine Italia” (young Italy) the work of Joseph Mazzini.
Its initiators, with their chief, were all young men, full of the
enthusiasm of a national faith, deeply impressed with the
illusions and the failures of 1820 and 1831, and professing a
republican creed. There was nothing to hope from Italian
princes—they had ceased to conspire and betray: nothing to
hope from cautious diplomatic courses intended as in 1831, to
conciliate Europe, and to ward off the intervention of Austria;
everything to fear from the weak leadership of men, who from
motives of such sort would be certain to denationalize and to
emasculate any movement, the control of which should be en
trusted to their hands. No possible salvation save in proclaim
ing at once their great end, the liberty, independence, and
unity of the whole nation, and in setting themselves to the task
of arousing the whole nation to its conception and accomplish
ment. I will give you the creed and the policy of the new
association in the words of its author.
*
“They had examined
* Vide “ Letters on the State and Prospects of Italy,” by Joseph Mazzini,
Nos. I. to IV., Monthly Chronicle, 1839, from which much of this historical
sketch of the movements in which Carbonarism played out its part, is derived’
�17
| with care the movements of 1831, and had deduced from this
examination, that there was in Italy no deficiency of revolu
tionary elements but of a guiding spirit * * * they aspired to
be not simply revolutionary but regenerative * ** * to rouse
the different Italian States to revolt was not their object, their
sole endeavour was to create the nation * * * they felt that at
bottom the question was no other than the grand problem of
National Education, and arms and insurrection were for them
only the means, without which, from the state of Italy, it was
impossible to accomplish this * * * the Association resolved to
disguise nothing and to sacrifice nothing. It presented itself
as it was, as the tendencies and exigencies of Italy, it believed,
required it to be, an association republican and indivisible. * * *
It exposed the errors of 1831 ; it separated itself from the past.
It repeated everywhere that the salvation of Italy was in the
people, that the grand lever of the people was action; that it
El was necessary to act without ceasing, without discouragement,
without being intimidated by reverses at first, and always in the
name of Italy and for the whole pf Italy. “ It is possible,” it
said, “ that you will succumb, but even then you will instead of
falling basely and without effect, have educated the country; a
« great principle will survive you, and the generation which fol
lows you will read upon your tombs the programme of the Italy
to come.”
I I have read to you these words of Mazzini, at some length,
because, though written years ago, they continue to be the true
key of every movement of his party in Italy from that day to
the present. It is a programme so utterly at variance with our
ordinary, what we call practical notions, that I believe it to be
difficult for many of us even to realize and to comprehend it;
and yet it is of immense interest as the expression of the actual
I rule of conduct of the Party of Action in Italy for thirty years.
I It has educated the nation to the belief in Unity, and to the
needful determination of incessant action to attain it. Not
only Italy but Europe knows that there is no peace possible
till Italy be one. It is true that the practical accomplish
ment of this task has passed, not, however, as I shall hereafter
show, so largely as is generally believed, into other hands. But
c
�18
what higher tribute, I would ask, could be paid to the sound
ness of a principle or a faith, wThat more conclusive testimony
of the hold which it has obtained upon a nation, than that the
supposed decline of the party who originated it should date
from the adoption, more or less, of their principle and their
object by other parties in the state ? What is called the Pied
montese or Moderate Party dates its successes from the moment
when it also gave itself by its own methods to this nation’s
work ; and to pursue, in some manner, without ceasing, this
task, is even now the very term of its power and existence.
You will note that the republican creed of the founders of
Young Italy was not, if I may so say, of the essence of their
faith. It rather served to define their party; it represented the
actual tendency of the young and rising intellect of the day
in their country and the popular instincts of those most likely
among the people to aid them in their work. It was -well to
proclaim it, because there was then nothing to hope from
monarchy, and because its open avowal would give numbers,
enthusiasm, and unity to their ranks. But the object of their
faith, and the great aim of all their labours being the resusci
tated nation, they could not purpose to impose on it a creed,
which it might or might not accept, and it would always be
their duty to subordinate their special political views to the
accomplishment of the great object to which they had devoted
their lives. And I shall show you, I hope, before I have done,
that they have not failed in the observance of so clear a duty.
The Giovine Italia was, as I have said, reared on the ruins
of Carbonarism. The method of its organization, and of its
labours partook of the nature of the ideas on which it was
founded. I shall give you here again the very words of its
founder:—
“ Having principles and reckoning upon them rather than
on the power of mystery and of symbols, it rejected all the
complete machinery of the Carbonarian hierarchy and all the
pomp which was only calculated to hide the absence of real
purpose. It had a central committee abroad, and interior pro
vincial committees directing the ‘ practical conspiracy having
to initiate a work of education the Association only decreed
�19
' secresy as far as necessity required it, that is to say for its
interior operations; with respect to its existence, its object, its
.^hopes, its principles, it challenged publicity. The journal, La
Griovine Italia, was established at Marseilles, another journal in
Switzerland; catechisms of the new faith were printed and
clandestinely distributed with great labour, courage, and inged nuity throughout the peninsula. Their circulation was immense
and their effect also; organization commenced at every point,
and the first work of propagandism was an immense success.”
I quoted from the programme of Young Italy a few moments
ago, the doctrine of incessant action, of perpetually renewed
■ revolt. The party of Young Italy, or the Party of Action as
they came consequently to be called, have abided by that
doctrine; they have had some brilliant successes. I will in
stance the republic at Rome and the recent conquest of Sicily
and Naples to the new kingdom; but their career in action has,
as a logical and inevitable consequence of their fidelity to this
doctrine, been otherwise a succession of forlorn hopes ending
in temporary failure. Some of these have, within my know
ledge, only just escaped success; Austria could tell you how
nearly the attempt at Milan in February, 1853, succeeded in
■renewing the five days of 1848; but they did fail, and as failures
■they were judged, and not unreasonably judged by the world at
► large. But if we, outside of Italy, and only desiring rightly to
understand the regenerative movement of the country in all its
phases and in all its parts, would look this question more
closely in the face, we should have to remember that it is per| mitted to forlorn hopes, that it is of their very nature to be un
dertaken in the face of a preponderance of adverse chances,
because of the proportion ably great results of a successful issue;
and we, should recognise that these long series of attempts have,
after all, achieved their work of arousing the determined con
sciousness of the nation, and that the party which in accordance
with our naturally a priori unfavourable view, ought over and
over again, as, over and over again it has been said to have
been annihilated, has, nevertheless, gone on increasing in in.fluence and in boldness, and is only now less prominent and less
distinct because its preliminary educational task may be said to
c 2
�20
be complete, and it has but to share in the work to which all
parties in the nation havejiow set their hands.
The result of the labours of the Giovine Italia and the pro
gress of the Italian idea will be best understood by a short
reference to the movements of 1848 and 1849; they constitute,
too, the first chapter of the history of the relations of the
national party or party of action with the monarchy of Savoy,
now beginning to play its part also in the nation’s work. You
will remember that all Italy was already in a ferment in 1847,
before the revolution of 1848 in France which dethroned the
Orleans dynasty and gave the signal for the European move
ment of that year. Pius IX. had ascended the Papal chair in
1846, had granted an amnesty and promised administrative
reforms. The instinct of the Italian people seized upon the
occasion to further the national design. I will give you the
opinion of Prince Metternich of the nature and meaning of the
movement in the Roman states—it was afterwards amply veri
fied by facts. Writing to Count Dietrichstein, in a despatch
dated August 2, 1847, he says, “ Under the banner of Admini
strative Reform the factions are endeavouring to accomplish an
undertaking which could not be confined within the states of
the Church, nor within the limits of any one of the states which
in their ensemble constitute the Italian peninsula. The factions
seek to merge these states into one political body, or at least
into a confederation of states, subject to the direction of a cen
tral supreme power.”
The times were, indeed, evidently ripe for a great movement;
it was no longer a question of forlorn hopes; events might at
any moment precipitate the nation into the arena, and this
state of things brought a new party upon the field—the Mode
rate or Piedmontese party.
We left Charles Albert in 1821 affiliated to the Carbonari;
he had been a party to their conspiracy ; but with the weakness
peculiar to his character, he had sought at the last moment to
avert the insurrection. It succeeded, nevertheless, till Austria
intervened. Since his accession in 1831 Charles Albert had
reigned a despot; he, or those who represented him, for I donot wish to make him responsible for every mean or cruel
�21
act perpetrated in his name, had visited with a refined and
ferocious cruelty the insurrectionary attempts of patriots who
Still trod the path he had once professed to enter,—T allude
especially to the arrests of 1833. But the increasing ferment
of the Italian mind had taught him to look back upon the ambi
tion of his younger days, and to feel that the time was at hand
pwhen he might have, mutatis mutandis, to re-enact his part. The
idea of the Moderate party was to renewr the kingdom of Italy of
Napoleonic days, that is a kingdom of the north, to gain Charles
Albert to the cause by offering Lombardy and Venetia to be
snatched from Austria, as the price of his assistance, and thus
at the same time to stem the revolutionary tfde which might
unmake monarchy in building up the nation. I must ask you
to bear in mind this, the leading idea of the Moderate party of
a northern kingdom, for it is the key to the whole of their subse
quent policy. It was their aim in 1848—it ruined that move
ment, it ruined that campaign. It was the aim again of the
compact of Plombieres, and of the Franco-Italian campaign of
1859. That the nation went beyond it is due, not to the policy
of the Moderate party, but to the true instincts and the single
purpose of the Italian people. I shall proceed to illustrate the
truth of what I say. On the 18th March, 1848, Milan was in
insurrection against the Austrians, on the evening of the 22nd
Radetski fled, Charles Albert declared war against Austria on
the 23rd. Piedmont was already sharing in the excitement of
all Europe responsive to the revolution in France. On March
4th, the king having reigned seventeen years a despot, granted
a Constitution ; known as the statute, now the law, very inade
quate to its requirements, for a whole Italian people, for all
Italy save Rome and Venice- The king refused the first re
quest of Milan for his aid ; on the 21st he offered assistance on
condition that they should previously give themselves to him; on
the 23rd the Milanese had triumphed and he declared war;
on the same day Mr. Abercromby, our ambassador at Turin, re
ceived from the Foreign Minister a despatch stating the causes
and motives of the declaration of war. It justified that step on
the ground that the whole country was in insurrection, that
“ after the events in France the danger of the proclamation of a
�22
republic in Lombardy was imminent * * * that the situation of
Piedmont was such that at any moment, at the announcement
that the republic had been proclaimed in Lombardy, a similar
movement might burst forth in the states of his majesty, and
that the king thought himself obliged to take measures to pre
vent such a catastrophe for Piedmont and the rest of Italy.”*
When Charles Albert crossed the frontier the Lombard insur
rection was already victorious in every point. To the Austrians
remained only the Quadrilateral and 50,000 men, and all Italy
was hastening to the war; the Grand Duke of Tuscany, the
Pope, and the king of Naples, were compelled to furnish con
tingents for the crusade. Now, see the position; every other
ruler in Italy save Charles Albert was necessarily an unwilling
contributor to the common cause ; they had nothing to gain, for
if the north were freed it could not come to them, and with the
true instinct of self-preservation they feared the national move
ment which must ultimately sweep them away. The people,
with that weak faith in the professions of their princes, which
was one of the leading characteristics of the European revolu
tionary movement of 1848, believed them, in those moments of
common enthusiasm, to be sincere, but they did nothing wil
lingly against Austria, and, one by one, withdrew what troops
they could when dissension had crept in and the policy of the
monarchy of Savoy had chilled the enthusiasm and the hopes
of the nation.
Charles Albert, on the other hand, and his counsellors, had a
hope and a fear ; the hope was the kingdom of North Italy, the
fear was the republic. It w as this foolish fear which ruined the
campaign. Because of this fear the volunteers were dis
couraged, and the services of such men as Garibaldi and
Cialdini refused. Garibaldi summoned by Mazzini had already
sailed from Monte Video, before the news reached of any
Italian or European movement having taken place. When he
arrived Charles Albert was in the field, and his offers were
refused.
The provisional government of Lombardy, under the in
* Lord Ponsonby to Lord Palmerston.
Corr. Pt. II. p. 338.
Vienna, April 10, 1848.
Italian
�fluence of the King, refused to summon for a war of insurrec
tion in aid of the regular forces of Sardinia, the Italian exiles
who had gained their military experience in the insurrectionary
movements of Spain and Greece, and many of whom are now
to be found distinguished in the service of the present kingdom.
They said that no one knew where they could be found, Mazzini insisting, obtained authority to summon them. Among
them came Enrico Cialdini; he was refused, and said I “ will
not have journeyed here from Spain for nothing, before I
return I shall seek an Italian wound as a common soldier at
Venice”—he went there and was wounded in the ranks. Be
cause of this fear the king keeping near Milan and with his own
frontiers and capital protected by his rear, set himself to the
siege of the four fortresses, neglected the passes of the Alps,
which volunteers alone would have sufficed to seize and guard,
and kept altogether aloof from Venetia where the republican
flag was unfurled under Manin, even instructing his navy to
enter into no hostilities with Austrian men of war. He wanted
the courage to feel that if he trusted the nation and did the
nation’s work, his reward was assured. It was folly to fear
that a people which at the moment of a successful revolution
had abstained from pronouncing upon its future form of govern
ment leaving that to the nation after the successful termination
of the struggle, to decide, would have hesitated in accepting a
King who should have led them to victory.
The army of Radetsky though reduced to 50,000 was safe
within the Quadrilateral, and capable in any case of a prolonged
defence. If its communications were allowed to be kept up
with its base of operations, and reinforcements to be received,
it could only be a question of the time necessary for it to re
ceive sufficient reinforcements, for Radetsky again to take the
field with an army superior to any which the limited resources
of Piedmont could oppose. It was therefore vital to seize
Upper Venetia and the passes of the Alps, to cut off his sup
plies, and to isolate him within the line of his defences. In
that case, in the midst of a hostile population it could again
have been only a question of time, how soon he would have
been compelled to lay down his arms. These are of the very
�24
elements of strategy which any civilian may comprehend.
Charles Albert’s fearful policy made time the ally of his enemy
—and it was a fatal policy. In the beginning of August,
Charles Albert was already in retreat upon Milan, which under
a committee of defence of the nomination of Mazzini, accepted
by the provisional government, and of which General Fanti
was a member, in that moment of supreme danger, was making
most energetic preparations for defence. When Fanti and
Restelli went on the 3rd to Lodi to see the king and ascertain
his intentions, they were informed by General Bava, that the
king would march to the defence of Milan. The king entered
on the 4th, renewing the promise of defence—on the 5th, he
declared that the capitulation was already signed. The popu
lation incensed to fury, threatened his life—he declared that,
moved by their unanimous determination, he would remain and
fight to the death,—in the night he fled in secret and the cam
paign was at an end.
Of the events of 1849, I can hardly now stay to say a word.
We all know how republican Venice under Manin, continued
for a year to resist all the power of Austria by sea and land.
We can never forget the defence of Rome, whither or to Venice,
the republican volunteers repulsed from serving the country in
Lombardy repaired—the heroic defence of Rome under the
Triumvirate of which Mazzini was the chief—the brightest and
saddest page in the history of the Italian Movement. A defence
which, hopeless as it proved to be, was the greatest moral
victory, the most pregnant with consequences for the future,
which Italy has yet achieved. Rome fell after three months
siege, to the overpowering force and the matchless perfidy of
the French. I say that its hopeless defence was the greatest
of all moral victories for Italy. It was so, because it gave to
the unaided people a proof and a consciousness of its own
dignity and of its own faculties; it was so, because it upheld
for three months against the forces of France, Austria, Naples,
and Spain, the national flag in Rome, the future capital of the
nation, and because it shewed what Italian volunteers could do
against all present hope for the future of their country. Twice
were the French troops attacked at the point of the bayonet
�25
and repulsed far beyond the walls. The first occasion was on
the 30th of April, 1849; within a few days a Neapolitan army
of 15,000 men, led by the king in person, encamped at Albano,
some 15 miles from Rome, and on the 10th of May the French
troops again attacked and were again repulsed. On the 19th
of May an armistice was concluded, and negotiations com
menced with Lesseps the French envoy, pending which the
little army at Rome marched against the Neapolitan king at
Velletri, and put him ignominiously to flight; laying the founda
tion for Garibaldi of that wondrous prestige which enabled him
a year ago to free Sicily and Naples, with a handful of volunteers
opposed to an army of 100,000 men, to enter the capital alone,
and to drive the son of Bomba to seek refuge in an almost im
pregnable fortress. On the 31st of May the French envoy
signed a convention between the Roman assembly and himself,
on the ratification of which, by General Oudinot and the French
Government, the gates were to be opened to the army of France,
with a new armistice to be, in case of non-ratification of the
convention, prolonged for fifteen days. The General refused
his assent and produced private instructions of his own, but
promised not to recommence the attack before
the
*
4th of June.
To his eternal infamy, and that of the government which he
served, he forfeited his word, attacked by surprize in the night
of the 2nd and the defence was at an end. And throughout
the whole of this unequal struggle, not only Rome but all the
Roman states remained faithful to the Assembly and Govern
ment of their own choice, and to the flag of the nation which
they had commissioned them to raise and to defend. That
unanimity was the downfall of the temporal papacy, the
thunders of the Vatican were henceforth to rank as stage tricks
to an accustomed audience,—the papal chair must rest on
French bayonets or tumble to the ground. And the protest of
that sublime defence was more, it determined the nature of her
future efforts to all Italy, it rendered impossible at any moment
the adoption by Italy of any other goal but unity, it bound
Italy, without the possibility of being led, or driven, or com
pelled astray, to its accomplishment. Rome for her capital, the
sea and the Alps her frontier lines, were the inevitable future
�26
of the Italian people. And I beg you mark, as if to enhance
the value of this protest and this proof, the triumvirate of men
who ruled Rome during the defence, was chosen for this spe
cial task, on the receipt of the intelligence that Charles Albert’s
renewed campaign had terminated within a few days of its com
mencement, with the disastrous and fatal defeat of Novara.
And thus it was that Italy made her experience of Monarchy
and Republicanism, as agencies towards the achievement of
the national unity.
Such were the efforts, and such the
failures of 1848 and 1849.
My next theme will be the lessons which Italy thereby learned,
and the future action, and the future relation of parties, and of
the instinctive nation, to the present time.
�LECTURE II.
There were certain things made evident to demonstration
by the events of ’48 and ’49. I will clear the ground by stating
these results at once.
First, it was made clear that all Italy was, and would continue
to be, bent on driving out Austria and on accomplishing her
entire independence from foreign rule; and that Austria could
never hope to hold Venice and Lombardy save by the sword,—
in fine, that she was but encamped upon Italian soil, and that
it was a mere question of time and opportunity when the at
tempt to expel her would be again renewed.
Secondly, it was proved that the tendency, the instinct of the
nation was towards unity. To make this assurance doubly sure
there was the fact that with the exception of Piedmont, every
Italian government was necessarily pro-Austrian and antipopular, having nothing to hope and everything to fear from the
national tendency, bound therefore by the logic of its position
to suppress liberty even within its own territories at any risk;
and then there was also to be taken into account the fact of the
existence of a large, active, and restless popular party, with its
ramifications in all parts of the peninsula—the national or re
publican party, pledged and devoted ora e s&wpre to the accom
plishment of the unity as well as the independence of the
country.
Further, however weak and wavering might have been the
policy of Charles Albert, Piedmont stood alone as an Italian
state which had fought for Italy against Austria, and which could
be relied upon as hostile to Austria, which could afford to be
�28
faithful to the constitution which the events of ’48 had induced
it to accord to its own subjects, and which might have hopes for
the future in allying itself again with the nation’s cause.
Charles Albert had abdicated after the defeat of Novara, and
died broken-hearted in exile. His son, Victor Emmanuel,
reigned in his stead, a soldier of undoubted courage, loving
danger and the field, not indeed a man of high intellect or cha
racter, but without special kingly faults, and eager to avenge the
reverses which had brought his father to the grave. Then
there was the fact of the great emigration, especially from
Lombardy and Venice, of the youth who had fought as volun
teers, and who, establishing themselves in Piedmont, made that
state the home of the most eminently Italian element in the
country, and which constituted, or might be made to constitute,
a new link between Piedmont and the Italy which was to be.
All these were capabilities for Piedmont, and moving causes in
the direction of a national career.
There was another cause likely to induce constitutional Pied
mont with more or less of decision towards some sort of active
national policy. If Piedmont should refuse in any manner to
lend herself to the national cause, the nation would inevitably
throw herself into the arms of the republican party pledged to
action. Piedmont had to choose between abandoning Italy to
the republican party and ranking herself with the other doomed
princedoms of the centre and the south, or endeavouring, by a
possible active policy of her’ own, to draw the people to herself
and to centre their hopes upon her alliance.
Piedmont was bound, therefore, to some sort of Italian
national policy; and considering how much Italy has already
accomplished of her unity, so much so, indeed, that no policy
save that of an absolute completion of the task is any longer to
be dreamed of or suggested, and considering, too, how pre
dominately the credit and the practical fruits of that success
have, in the opinion of the world and in the possession of
power, enured to the benefit of the Moderate party, it would
seem natural to imagine that they, too, must have had the unity
of their country long in view, and that they can have differed
only from the National party as to the policy best adapted to
�29
the attainment of a common object; and yet I believe the ac
ceptance of the idea of Italian Unity, as an object of practical
statesmanship, by the leaders of the Moderate party, must be
admitted to be of a very recent date.
I will go back to Gioberti, who was the founder of that party:
in the Sardinian Chambers on the 10th of February, 1849, on
the eve of the short campaign which ended in the defeat of
Novara, Gioberti said—“ I consider the unity of Italy a chimera.
We must be content with its union.” And if you look to the
writings, the speeches, the acts, of all the leading men of the
Moderate party until a very recent period, you will find them
all, without exception, not only not propounding or advocating
unity, or directed to its accomplishment, but explicitly directed
to a different solution. You will find the proof of what I say
in Balbo’s “Hopes of Italy;” in Durando’s “ Essay on Italian
Nationality,” advocating three Italies, north, centre, and south;
in Bianchi Giovini’s work entitled “ Mazzini and his Utopias
and in Gualterio’s “Revolutions of Italy.” Minghetti, Ricasoli,
Farini, each and all have been the advocates of a confederation
of Princes rather than of a united Italy.
Let me come to Cavour. An attempt has recently been
made to claim for him the credit of having since the days
of his earliest manhood conceived the idea of making him
self the minister of a future united Italy. In an article in the
July “ Quarterly,” by a well known pen, a letter of Cavour,
written about 1829 or 1830, is cited in implied justification of
this claim. He had been been placed under arrest a short time
in the Fort de Bard, on account of political opinions expressed
with too much freedom. In a letter to a lady who had written
condoling with him on his disgrace, he says:—“I thank you,
Madame la Marquise, for the interest which you take in my
disgrace; but, believe me, for all that, I shall work out my
career. I have much ambition—an enormous ambition; and
when I become minister I hope to justify it, since already in my
dreams, I see myself Minister of the Kingdom of Italy.” Now
this is, I need not say, a most remarkable letter, and of the
greatest interest, as showing the confidence in his own future,
at so early an age, of one of the greatest statesman of our
�30
times. But no one acquainted with the modern history of Italy,
and familiar with its recognised phraseology, could read in this
letter the prophecy of that unity which is now coming to pass.
The “Kingdom of Italy” is a well known phrase, borrowed
from the time of Napoleon, and has always meant, until facts
have enlarged its significance, that kingdom of Northern Italy
whose precedent existed under Napoleon, which was the object
of Piedmontese policy in ’48 and ’49, and one of the explicit
terms of the contract of Plombieres in ’59. It is rather a
curious inconsistency in the article in question that it itself
furnishes ample evidence that the unity of Italy was no part of
the practical programme of the Moderate party. “ Cavour,” we
are told, “founded in 1847, with his friends Cesare Balbo,
Santa Rosa, Buoncompagni, Castelli, and other men of mode
rate constitutional views, the Risorgimento, of which he became
the editor, and the principles of the new periodical were an
nounced to be i independence of Italy, union between the
princes and peoples, progress in the path of reform, and a
league between the Italian States.’ ” Again, after saying that it
was Ricasoli and the leaders of the Constitutional party who
recalled (in ’49) the Grand Ducal family to Tuscany, and that
Gioberti himself proposed that the Pope should be invited back
to Rome, the writer goes on to say :—“ It was an immense ad
vantage to the restored Princes to have been thus brought back
by the most intelligent and moderate of their subjects. It
rested chiefly with them to render the reconciliation permanent.
The occasion was lost through distrust and fear of those they
governed (not an unusual accompaniment of restorations), and
by a reckless disregard of their rights and feelings. A mode
rate, conciliatory, and just policy might at that moment have
united princes and peoples. All that the wisest and most influ
ential men in Italy asked was a federal union of the different
states in the Peninsula upon a liberal and constitutional basis,
from which even the House of Austria was not to be excluded.
But concession was obstinately refused. The Italian States
again brought under the direct influence of Austria, were
governed in a jealous and severe spirit, and some of them with
a cruelty which aroused the indignation of Europe. In their
�31
bitter disappointment the hopes of the Italians were turned to
Piedmont, and that kingdom necessarily became the rallying
point for Italian freedom; so that the position which she has
since held was made for and not by her.”
I must trouble you with one more quotation. At the con
ference of Paris in 1855, after the Crimean war, Piedmont was
represented by Cavour, who brought before the assembled
statesmen the condition of Italy; but unable to enter fully
into the Italian Question at the conferences, he addressed two
state papers on it to Lord Clarendon. “ In them he proved,”
continues the writer, “by indisputable facts, how impossible
it was for Piedmont to develope her material resources, or her
free institutions, whilst hemmed in on all sides by Austrian
bayonets, exposed to endless intrigues, and compelled for her
own safety to make a constant drain upon her finances. It is
evident by his language in the Congress, and by those docu
ments, that Cavour still looked to a solution of the Italian
difficulty in the withdrawal of the French and Austrian troops
from the territories of the Pope, and in a reform of the Italian
Governments themselves. His plan—at any rate for the tem
porary settlement of the question—was a confederation of
Italian States with constitutional institutions, and a guarantee
of complete independence from the direct interference and
influence of Austria; and the secularization of the legations
with a lay vicar under the suzerainty of the Pope. At that
time he would have been even willing to acquiesce in the
occupation of Lombardy by Austria, had she bound herself to
keep within the limits of the treaty of 1815. Had Austria
shown more wisdom and moderation, there can be little doubt
that the excuse for French intervention would have been
removed, and that the great struggle which has since taken
place in Italy might have been deferred for many years.” *
Now, you cannot, I think, have failed to note the glaring
inconsistency of these praises of what is called the moderation
* Letters of Cavour recently published in the Rivisita Contemporanae,
and referred to in the Turin correspondence of the Times of February 11th,
1862, are quite inconsistent with the view of Cavour’s policy and ideas
in 1855.
�32
of Cavour, with the assumption to him and to his party of the
whole credit of Italian unity, and the theory, now too prevalent,
that no other party has contributed anything but follies and ex
cesses, impediments, not aids to the accomplishment of the
great task. I believe such ideas to be as profoundly unge
nerous and unjust as they are evidently self-contradictory, and
I believe that they will be adjudged by history to be, so far as
they are in any degree in good faith, superficial, partial,
and utterly incapable of serving as any explanation of the
method of the evolution of the great problem of Italian
nationality.
I can tell you something about the origin of these ideas—
they take their rise in the very nature of the policy of the
Moderate party.
The polioy of that party, dating from 1848, was based on a
necessity, a hope, and a fear. It was necessary for Piedmont
to play some part for the nation, or the nation would march
over Piedmont to its goal. It was possible to play that part and
to reap the reward of so doing. But it must either be played
boldly as a national revolutionary policy, or it must be played
in some sense, from the first, in opposition and in antagonism
to the policy of the national party. It would indeed have been
a grand and an inspiring spectacle could we have seen the
counsellors of the monarchy of Savoy, on the very morrow of
its great discomfiture, taking heart from the very depth of their
defeat, and giving themselves unequivocally to the service of
the entire nation. They would assuredly have met with their
reward, in the unquestioned and undivided leadership of a
national movement far higher than anything we have yet seen
in its moral meaning, and pregnant with infinitely grander
consequences to the civil and religious progress of the world ;
but I am not idealist enough to tax men or parties with not
accomplishing a miracle of self-transformation or of faith.
Another method was their inevitable choice ; without abso
lutely defining their ultimate aim, they had to bid against the
national party for the sympathies of the Italian populations,
and above all they had to secure the initiative for them
selves.
�33
This policy once entered upon begat unavoidably antagonism
and distrust, and made it more difficult than ever—though
mistakenly, as events have shown—for them to believe that
they could rely on the nation to accept monarchy when the
nation was once roused to arms. Choosing not to rest abso
lutely on the nation they—or I should rather say Cavour (for
from the moment he laid his hand to the work it became his
own) turned to Europe—to its constituted powers and its diplo
macy, and sought there to strengthen Piedmont for eventu
alities which must sooner or later arise. He concluded treaties
of commerce, he cultivated diplomatic relationships, and by his
successful home and foreign policy, and the general vigour of
his administration, he created a new feeling of confidence in
Piedmont as a well-governed, compact, constitutional govern
ment, the one bright spot in the otherwise sombre picture of the
foreign and domestic misrule of the peninsula.
But, in carrying out this vital portion of his policy, he came
to play a double part. And I ask you to note this, for it is the
key of that which I have now to explain. In Italy it was neces
sary to suggest hopes, however carefully undefined, which
should keep in check the influence of the National party;
abroad he had to protest not only against that party but against
those very popular aspirations which at home it was necessary
that he should be supposed to serve. Hence two languages;
one for the secret agencies, discrediting the National party, yet
whispering the same hopes—and one for state documents and
diplomatic communications, ignoring any thought of Italy save
as her condition imperilled or embarrassed the monarchy of
Savoy, and here again repudiating the National party, and
building up upon the fact of their existence and their restless
and troublesome activity, the most cogent arguments in his own
favour which could be addressed to the representatives of exist
ing monarchies in Europe.
Thus we may understand how it became literally a part of the
system of business, if I may so say, of the Moderate party to
discredit, in every way, the objects, the means, the doings, and
even the personal character of the leaders of the party of action.
If you think of the subsidizing of the press in which foreign
D
�34
governments delight, of the influence of the salons and the
ante-chamber on some purveyors of news, and of the instinctive
fear and hatred, of the prejudice devoid of conscience and the
enmity without law, with which anything linked with the names
of democracy or republic is regarded in the high places of
despotically monarchical Europe, you will not wonder when I
say that a measure of injustice has been dealt out to a deserving
party in Italy of which I have never known the parallel, and
which history will condemn as a calumny and a disgrace.
But I have no desire to retort injustice. It were an easy task
to oppose the diplomatic professions of Count Cavour to the
claims of an exclusive patriotism set up on his behalf and on
that of his party, and to leave the matter there. But I and you
are interested in arriving at a just appreciation of the policy and
of the man, and this is what 1 now proceed to attempt. First
then, I believe that Cavour had from his earliest days the idea of
independence firmly rooted in his mind, and that he never
wavered in the intent of driving Austria beyond the Alps. Any
expressions, any proposals of his to the contrary, at any time,
were mere diplomacy—into the morals of which I do not now
enter. If in 1855, he did, as the Quarterly Revieiver says, profess
“ a willingness to acquiesce even in the occupation of Lom
bardy by Austria, had she bound herself to keep within the
limits of the treaty of 1815,” I am not therefore disposed to
infer that he ever contemplated, much less accepted the possi
bility of the struggle which has ensued, being “ deferred for
many years.” Cavour knew too well that there was no real
danger to the speedy accomplishment of Italian independence
in any such professions. I will take another case, and shall
quote from the official correspondence published by the French
government. On the 10th September, 1860, after the invasion
by Garibaldi of the Neapolitan States, Cavour wrote to Baron
• Talleyrand, “ If we are not at the Cattolica before Garibaldi we
are lost; the revolution will invade central Italy. We are
forced to act.” Again, in a circular of M. Thouvenel, of
October, 1860, I find these words:—“Signor Farini (sent by
Cavour) has explained to the Emperor (at Chambery) the very
embarrassing and dangerous position in which the triumph of
�35
the revolution, to a certain extent personified in Garibaldi,
threatens to place the government of his Sardinian Majesty.
Garibaldi was on the point of freely traversing the Roman
States, raising the populations as he went; and had he once
passed that frontier, it would have been utterly impossible to
prevent an attack on Venice. The Government of Turin had one
mode left open to it in order to prevent that eventuality, and
that was to enter the Marches and Umbria as soon as the arrival
of Garibaldi had produced disturbances, and re-establish order
without infringing on the authority of the Pope, and if need
were to give battle to the revolution in the Neapolitan territory,
and request a congress to immediately decide the destinies of
Italy.” Now, certainly these professions of motive cannot be
said to be very creditable to Cavour, and they look as unlike as
possible to the arguments of a patriot having the accomplish
ment of his country’s unity above everything else at heart. And
yet I do not, therefore, argue that Cavour did not willingly take
advantage of that mighty step of Garibaldi, which gave half
Italy to the new kingdom, and which enabled him, despite his
own past professions, to lift his policy at once to the height of
an openly declared national policy. On the other hand, I be
lieve that neither he nor any other statesman actually in power,
in his own country or elsewhere, believed in Italy being as pre
pared for unity as she has proved herself to be. And although
his faith in Italy must have grown with the growth of his own
policy, and although he may from time to time have had visions
of its possible ulterior development, yet I also believe that up
to the close of the campaign of 1859 (and indeed after its close
and until, on his retirement from office, he saw the people of
Italy in the Duchies and in the Romagna, with a singleness
of purpose and strength of will which, under the influence of a
national faith, made them as one man, better his own policy at
the moment of its apparent defeat) his practical idea was a
kingdom of the north.
Now, I think there is abundant evidence in support of these
views. Cavour’s sense of personal mortification and of failure,
as well as his indighation at the peace of Villafranca, are well
known—he had no conception that Italy was in a mental condin 2
�36
tion to take up the diplomatic game at the very moment of that
seeming checkmate, and by the passive resistance of an abso
lutely unanimous population, to defeat the purpose of their too
powerful ally. A curiously-worded telegram has lately been
brought to light, I think, by Guerazzi, in which Cavour notified
to Ricasoli the conclusion of the peace. If its curt picturesque
ness be not quite suitable for ears polite, you will forgive
me, for the interest which attaches to it as part of the res gestae
of the time. This, then, is the telegram:—“ Cavour to Ricasoli,
—Peace with Austria. I resign. Dukes back. All to the
devil.” Fortunately, Cavour was wrong in the direction in
which all was going, as he soon discovered, returning then with
greater energy, and, can we doubt it, with greater confidence
than ever to his task.
But we have better evidence than this. We know the terms of
the compact of Plombieres. You will think, perhaps, that I speak
with too great confidence in saying that we know the terms. I
will tell you the grounds, then, of that strength of assertion.
You will remember when, on January 1, 1859, the Emperor
Napoleon spoke those words of startling import to Baron
Hiibner, which first gave the alarm of war in Europe. Already
before that day particulars of the compact and the general plan
of the campaign had reached this country from two different
but most reliable sources; they were essentially the same par
ticulars as those which were first published, as a revelation in
the columns of the Times sometime not earlier than the follow
ing month of March; and everything that has since happened
or come to light has only tended to confirm their accuracy. A
cause of war was to be sought with Austria, she was to be
tempted to take the offensive, the campaign was to be a short
one—if necessary peace on the Mincio. If Venice and Lom
bardy were gained to Piedmont, Nice and Savoy were to be
yielded to France. Napoleon, the cousin, married to the king’s
daughter, was to find a kingdom in Tuscany.
And now mark, all these particulars reached here, as I have
given them, not as conjectures or beliefs, but as the reports,
coming from two different sources, of what had been actually
agreed upon between the Emperor and Cavour. I need hardly
�37
tell you that Napoleon, Jerome’s son, with his separate corps
d'ctrmee operating across the Duchies, found that there was no
hope for him ; I need hardly remind you that peace was made
upon the Mincio, and that Venice not being gained, Nice and
Savoy did not become, by virtue of the bond, the due of France,
but were claimed because the Duchies and Romagna persisted
in giving themselves to the king.
I ask then, first, is this not sufficient evidence that a king
dom of Northern Italy was the limit of the practical conception
of the great statesman of the Moderate party; and in the
second place, I would also ask whether the complete success of
the programme of Plombieres in its original entirety, would
not, in establishing a northern Italy, and interposing a French
Prince between it and the centre and the south, have rendered
more distant and more difficult the attainment of a united
national existence ? And if the partially defeated programme
has been made to be more fruitful than could have been the
whole, once again I would ask you whether there is even com
mon honesty or common sense in persistently heaping the
whole merit of Italian unity upon one party and one man, and
in refusing to the true instinct of the nation and to the self
abnegating fidelity to their great aim of the National or so called
Republican party, the credit of having contributed to a result
greater than was the aim of the Moderate party itself, and higher
than the limits of its faith ?
Let me borrow an illustration from the science of Dynamics.
The Italian problem may be likened to that which in Dynamics
is explained by what is known as the parallelogram of forces.
Cavour’s policy alone would carry the question to A, the end of
the shorter side,—A being a kingdom of Northern Italy for the
House of Savoy; the national instinct and the National party
would carry it the longer side to B—the nation indivisible per
haps republican. By the resolution of forces, the diagonal is
taken toC, national unity, monarchical, and Piedmontese. Now
it is not unreasonable to think the diagonal the safer course, or
if you will the only possible course to unity, but it is not allow
able to ignore the existence of a force without whose contributed
impulse that point could not have been attained.
�38
But we are not dealing with unreasoning forces; such has
not been the force of the Republican party. This party an
nounced itself as republican at a time (in 1838) when there was
nothing to hope from monarchy, when the necessity, in an edu
cational sense was felt, of a definite Unitarian programme. I
do not mean to say that this was the only cause of the republi
canism of the party; but it was the justification of inscribing
the republican motto on their national flag. But the Republican
party have never for a moment been guilty of the inconsistency
of even desiring to force their creed upon an unwilling people.
Their aim was to constitute the national sovereignty, and the
sovereign nation must decide upon the form of its own future.
And thus it is that the royal House of Piedmont, always the
only possible Ralian monarchy, has had but to give itself to the
nation to have the certainty of being accepted by the nation ;
for who could dream that the nation ever would refuse the
crown to the soldier king who should unite his fate with theirs,
and with them achieve the independence of his country ? Is
not the instance of Garibaldi enough ? Does not the monarchy
know, has not the monarchy always known, that at the moment
of action it might ever rely upon him to lead the youth of Italy,
call them republican or not, to die for it and Italy upon the
battle field ?
But I will not leave the matter here with Garibaldi, the man
of instinct and action rather than the man of thought. I will
speak of the organized party not upon the field of battle. What
has their course of action been ? I assert then, and I speak
here what is matter of my own knowledge, that there never has
been a time since the movement of 1848 inclusive, in fact, since
Piedmont, an exception to all other Italian governments, be
came constitutional and ceased to be the bounden tool of
Austria, that this party has not been ready practically to
accept monarchy, provided always that monarchy committed
its fortunes to those of the unity of the country. And further, I
say that from the moment when it became possible—after the
peace of Villafranca—by a mere act of adhesion so to commit
monarchy, such act was accomplished with an active aid from
them, which should have been held convincing proof of the
�39
^singleness of their devotion to the one great aim of a recon
stituted nation.
k I will give you irrefutable proof of what I say. There is a
man whom I have named as the founder of this party, and who,
though continuing in exile, or traversing Europe or even re
visiting his own country at the risk of his life, has still re
mained its acknowledged head. I speak of Joseph Mazzini,
long my revered friend, whom I, in intimate daily life, know
perhaps better than any other living man, English or Italian,
knows him, of him whom calumny the most unscrupulous and
systematic, so long continued and so incessant as to have
deceived many _of the most liberal minded and justly meaning
of my own countrymen, has made it suffice to name, to suggest
ideas of anarchy and civil war, of ruin to all wise counsels, and
to Italy’s best or only hopes. I will show you his part towards
monarchy, in the pursuit of that which is now, but only now, a
common aim.
During the Lombard campaign of 1848, before the Decree of
Fusion, proposals were made to Mazzini in the name of
Castagneto, the king’s secretary. It was proposed that he
should constitute himself patron of the monarchical fusion,
that he should endeavour to draw over the republicans ; that he
should have in return as much democratic influence as he
could wish in the construction of the Articles of the Constitu
tion which would be given, and an interview was suggested
with the king. Mazzini replied that to assure the independence
and unity of the country he would sacrifice not his republican
faith, but all action for it, and that already the republicans were
silent upon it for the sake of independence and the war. But,
he said, that they regarded the “Italy of the North” as a fatal
conception, too ambitious for their princes and diplomacy,
and not sufficient for the people of Italy. Thanks to this,
popular enthusiasm was beginning to be extinct, the govern
ments were already showing their hostility, and the chances of
war were turning against them. To turn them in their favour
Charles Albert must dare all, raise the banner of Unity, and call
the nation to arms. When asked what guarantees the king
�40
must give of his devotion to unity, he hastily drew up the
terms of a proclamation containing these words :—
“ Ifeel” the king should say, “ that the time is ripe for the unity
of our country; I hear the shudder which thrills and oppresses
your souls. Up, arise ! I lead the way ! Behold, I give you
as the gage of my good faith the spectacle, hitherto unknown to
the world, of the priest king of the new epoch ; an armed
apostle of the idea-people; architect of the temple of the nation !
In the name of God and Italy, I tear the ancient treaties which
kept you dismembered and which are dripping with your blood 1
I call upon you to overthrow the barriers which still separate
you, and to group yourselves into legions of free brethren
around me, your leader, ready to conquei' or to die with you!”
How magnificent a trumpet call to a revolutionary war! I
cite it not, however, you will understand, as showing what
monarchy might then reasonably have done. I fear that at
that time it was already too late for such a policy; but I adduce
it as evidence of the truth of what I said that Mazzini and his
party had always been ready to act with monarchy for unity.
My second proposition was that as soon as monarchy was, or
rather as soon as she could be, by the people’s act, committed
to unity—the National party helped to accomplish that act, and
for the sake of unity gave themselves to monarchy.
I will call into court the testimony of deeds, not words alone.
On the eve of the campaign of ’59, leaving and even desiring
the bulk of their youth to give themselves to the war under
Garibaldi, Mazzini, with certain of the party, stood professedly
aloof, exposing and protesting against the scheme of Plombieres,
the details of which he knew and published, and preparing the
mind of the country to defeat when the time came, so much of
the compact as opposed itself to the unity of the nation. The
time did come, with the peace of Villafranca. Was a single
voice raised to say
royalty has betrayed us, away with
royalty?” Was that moment, when Cavour despaired, seized
upon to undermine his party, and sow dissension in the camp ?
I will tell you. Immediately after the peace of Villafranca on
the 20th of July, in the Pensiero ed Azione, Mazzini wrote,
�41
“ jLwerty and National Unity. Let this be the sole cry that
bursts from those who will not allow Italy to be a dishonoured
slave. * * * What was the aim of those who separated
themselves from us, and gave themselves to the French alliance ?
Their aim was like ours, one free Italy independent from all
foreigners * * * Now circumstances point out the same
ground for us all; now there is no hope left save in the people.
Let all disputes cease. In the name of the honour of Italy let
us unite. Accursed be he among us who cannot cancel the
memory of all mutual reproaches and accusations in the great
principle that by uniting we may and ought to save our country.”
And he and his party have remained absolutely true to this
programme; they co-operated in those acts of adhesion, deeds
not words alone, by which the Duchies and the Romagna per
sisted in giving themselves to the king, who had to play the
part of an ungracious unwillingness to accept this adhesion—
they planned, and urged, and discussed with members of the
government—I speak of Mazzini himself—Garibaldian expedi
tions upon Naples. These expeditions were ultimately for
bidden and prevented for the time ; but they were bent on that
union of the south which, while it gave Italy to the monarchy of
Piedmont, would conclusively Italianize the policy of that
monarchy, enlarge its dimensions, and be another step tending
to emancipation from the thraldom of a too subservient alliance
with France. It was Mazzini himself who planned the Sicilian
[.insurrection in the following year. Rosolino Pilo, of whom I
spoke before, kept up that movement until Garibaldi could
arrive. It was the same party who prepared the way for Gari
baldi’s entrance into the Neapolitan capital alone—the same
party who furnished and organized and despatched the greater
part of those volunteers who gained Naples and Sicily to the
new kingdom.
And all this they did for monarchy, or rather, through
monarchy, for Italy. Truly it has been a wonderful and an un
accustomed spectacle to see a party called revolutionary and
republican, heaping provinces upon a kingdom, and giving to a
policy which was not their own, a success and a justification
which it could not have earned alone. It has been a miracle of
�42
devotion to a great aim. Each fresh triumph for their great
principle and aim has been cutting ground from under their own
feet for their rivals to stand upon. And on the day of complete
emancipation they, the first teachers, the great martyrs, the in
cessant agitators, the forlorn hope of Italian unity, before
fortune’s smiles were won, will disappear and merge into the
common nation.
There is a curiously interesting estimate, though not from a
favourable point of view, of the two rival policies which I have
been discussing, and of the remarkable men with whom they
are identified. It is in M. Guizot’s recent work on Society and
the Church. He says :—“ The Italian movement * * * has only
burst forth and is only being accomplished under the impulsion
and with the alliance of the republican and democratic party,
which has been pursuing in Italy an end much more advanced,
a revolution much more profound, than the mere expulsion of
the foreigner and the reform of established governments * * *
It is the republican party which has been in Italy the first
patron and the ardent propagandist of Italian unity; it is by the
incessant action of M. Mazzini and his adherents that this idea
has been spread and has been accepted. * * * Cavour—had he
from the first a preconceived determination in favour of Italian
unity ? Has he constantly desired and constantly pursued, as
his aim, Italian royalty, one and constitutional, as M. Mazzini
has desired and pursued the Italian republic, one and demo
cratic ? I know not; but it matters little, for if Cavour did not
premeditate all that he has done, if he has been drawn on to more
conquests than those he sought, he has at least resolutely ac
cepted the impulsion, and if he has only reached the end im
pelled by his rival, he has at least conquered his rival by
robbing him of his arms.”
There is much in this passage of keen and true perception,
but M. Guizot fails to see that the arms were not stolen, but
were heaped upon the victor that he might have no choice,
accepting them, but to conquer in the common cause.
There is then now but one great aim, one common cause in
Italy—henceforth no party, no man, can be permitted to intrude
a less or a divergent purpose—and that purpose is the nation
�43
reconstituted in its entirety, from the Alps to the sea. The
question of policy, of method of accomplishment, alone re
mains. The Moderate party, in power, naturally desire to keep
the control of the movement in their own hands, and to go
to Venice and to Rome only when and how they may think
good policy allows. And in this desire they are justified, and
more than justified, for if they are not capable of exercising
such supreme direction and control, they are no fit government
for renascent Italy. But, in endeavouring to exercise it, they
are, as I think, under two influences, which have tended to en
feeble and to lead them astray. The first is their’ old fear of
the so-called Republican party—now a foolish fear but still fed
by the always exaggerated antagonism of parties in a revolu
tionary era, and by the jealousies and petty personal ambitions
which belong to a successful political coterie. Secondly, they are
hampered in their policy and confirmed in their antagonism to
the National party, by their alliance with France. The National
party naturally chafes, as Garibaldi is known to chafe, under
the policy dictated by that alliance. Rome is still held by the
French, and Italy is kept from the easy conquest of her natural
and necessary capital, by her own ally. How can you expect
the Italian people in a revolutionary time—how especially can
you expect that southern population which does not owe its
liberty either to France, or to Piedmont, but to Garibaldi and
his volunteers, and which only gave itself to Piedmont in order
to give itself to a united Italy,—to be content that the destinies
of its country should hang expectant on a policy dictated from
Paris through Turin ?
But enough of these differences and these difficulties, through
which Italy has yet to work her way,' and in spite of which she
will, it is my profound conviction, conquer her salvation. These
are not the features of the great whole, on which I care to
dwell, or on which I shall ever speak unless it be to defend men
who have wrought, and suffered, and accomplished, and merited far
more than the world will yet acknowledge, for their country.
There are men—but few I am proud to say in our own
country, who, not loving Italy as I do, would, if the temper
of the times allowed, gratify their despotic instincts by easy
�criticisms on the morality of the policy of Cavour, and who
would like to see, and to make us see, nothing in this great
Italian movement but the ambition of a dynasty and the
rivalries and jealousies of parties and of public men. But
for me, when I look, endeavouring to raise myself—as it is
the grand merit of some leaders of the National Italian
party to have raised themselves—above all such considerations,
when I look at the grand and glorious outline of this mighty
movement, when, resolutely closing my eyes to all that is
petty and personal and transitory in the immediate present,
I seek to penetrate to the very soul of this great argument,—
I see not the ambitions of dynasties, not the rivalries and
jealousies of parties or of public men—these are but the
exhibition of human passions and human interests working in
subservience to a great and a providential aim ; but I do see, and
Britain sees, with joy and with reverence she sees, the grandest,
the most hopeful, the most inspiring spectacle which this earth
can furnish forth—the regeneration of a people.
�45
MR. STANSFELD’S SPEECH
On
Italian Question, delivered in the House of
Commons in the Debate of July 19th, 1861.
the
Sir,—If this discussion were one which had been, or which
could be confined to the question which has been directly raised by
the hon. member for Bridgewater (Mr. A. W. Kinglake), I should
not propose to myself to take any part in it. Not that I doubt the
importance of the question ; on the contrary, I think it would be
difficult to exaggerate its importance ; for, if the fears which the
hon. member entertains—if the possibilities which he suggests
*
«were unfortunately ever to be realized in fact, it might well be
no less than the shipwreck of that great policy of non-interven
tion which we have done so much to uphold in Europe, in the
jcause of peace. Nor is it, Sir, that I can pretend to say that I
|fcave been entirely reassured by the statements of the noble Lord,
for I fear that 1 must still attach some credit to those sources of
information which revealed in this country—and here I can more
than confirm the statement of the noble Lord (Lord John
Russell)—the compact of Plombieres, and the very plan of the
Lombard campaign, even before those memorable words were
ispoken to Baron Hiibner, which first roused Europe from her
fdream of peace. But, Sir, the truth is that the question cannot
so confine itself—the truth is that it could not even arise for
discussion, were it not for the existence in Italy of a fact and
of a policy which it is of the deepest interest and moment for
us, not only as well-wishers of Italy, but as Englishmen and as
members of the European community, to take into account. Sir,
the policy is that which has hitherto obtained too exclusively in
�46
Italy, of too absolute and too subservient a dependence on
one foreign alliance; the fact is the long standing and anomalous
fact of the occupation of Rome by the troops of the French
empire. Sir, I will address myself to the question of this policy,
which so deeply concerns us. What ought to be, what ought
we to desire to be, the policy of Italy at the present time ? Sir,
Italy has recently lost a great statesman. I have not been one
of his indiscriminate admirers, but this is not an occasion on
which I ought to enter upon any lengthened criticism of his
policy. Suffice it for me to say that, after his great labours and
his great successes, he is gone, and that with him perhaps we
may be permitted to hope are also gone personal engagements
or at least personal entanglements which it would be well for
the honour and welfare of Italy, for the welfare and peace of
Europe, that they should be buried in his grave. What should
be the policy of his successors ? Italy must have Venice and
she must have Rome, nor can she pause or dally long upon the
road which leads to Venice and to Rome, at the risk of fatal
internal dissensions and of national suicide. In pursuit, then,
of these objects which she cannot relinquish, and which hei’
ministers explicitly avow, what is the policy which it is for us a
matter at once of the highest interest and of the strictest duty—
for I hold that in this matter the interests of Italy, of England,
and of Europe are identical—to induce, and, if we may, en
able her to pursue ? Sir, there are but two policies open to the
counsellors of the new kingdom:—The first is the policy of
Plombieres. Sir, I have to confess that that policy—thanks to
the indomitable spirit of unity of the Italian people—has so far
been productive of beneficial results which at the time of its
inception I did not anticipate as possible. But this I think I
may safely say, that not a single member of this House will be
found to rise in his place to night and to recommend us to ap
prove a repetition of that policy. Well, then, what is the only
alternative policy before the kingdom of Italy ? Is it not, I ask,
simply a truly national Italian policy, resting in absolute depen
dence on no single alliance, but, supported by the sympathies
and the moral aid of all free peoples, multiplying and organiz
ing its own forces, so that in due time Italy may suffice to her
�47
self for the completion of her emancipation ? Sir, there are
great dangers to Europe in a Franco-Italian war of indepen
dence—dangers of cessions of territory, suggested in the speech
of the hon. member for Bridgewater, which might sweep away
that last poor remnant of confidence, on which, as on a slender
thread, hangs suspended the peace of Europe—dangers of
dei many being brought into the field, and of our witnessing an
active alliance between Italy and France, not only on the plains
of Lombardy, but on the banks of the Rhine. But, Sir, there
aie also gieat dangers to Italy, and therefore to Europe, in an
exclusive Franco-Italian alliance, things remaining as they
are. We all know that Rome, in the occupation of the soldiers
of the Empire, is the focus of all reactionary intrigues and
attempts. But this is not all. There is some truth in the
statements of disaffection in the south, which have come from
the other side of the House to-night—disaffection on the part,
not of the adherents of the exiled dynasty, but amongst the
ranks of the patriots themselves, and which all the absolute
fidelity to the cause of Italian unity, and all the unexampled
self-abnegation of their leaders has not sufiiced to dispel or to
prevent. Sir, I do not desire to criticise in a hostile spirit the
faults of judgment or of intention on the part of the ministers
of Turin which have caused this disaffection. I wish simply to
indicate the sole remedy, which consists—I say it without fear
of contradiction—in the pursuit of a truly national and indepen
dent policy, in trusting and not fearing the people, in rallying
them to the aid of the Government, and not, in obedience to the
exigencies of an exclusive and subservient alliance, refusing to
utilize and to organize the immense willing force of a nation
which desires to be free. Sir, there are three practical bases on
which such policy should rest. The first is friendly and open
negotiations, in the face of Europe, with the French Emperor
for the withdrawal of his troops from Rome. Secondly, in order
to dispel the feeling in the south, that whereas of their own will
and by volunteer force alone, they freed themselves and gave
themselves to Italy, they find themselves treated as provinces of
Sardinia ; for such purpose, a clearly expressed understanding
that, her capital once regained to the Italian nation, a national
�48
assembly seated at Rome shall revise in a national sense the
laws of the country, in order that the “ statute” of Piedmont,
borrowed for a time, may not permanently remain without re
vision and modification the law of the reconstituted nation. And
lastly, the multiplication and the organization of the armed
forces, regular and irregular, of the country. At present, spite
of protestations and declared intentions, Italy, with already
twenty-two millions of inhabitants, with nothing to live for, or
to dream of, or to make sacrifices for, but the completion of her
own independence, can place no more armed men in line than
the little neighbouring republic of Switzerland, with less than
one-eighth of her population ; and of the 150,000 men she can
so place in a line, 60,000 are required to restore order in the
south ; while of the volunteer element there is no organization
whatever at all worthy of the name. And thus it comes to pass
that Italy is kept in absolute dependence—in wrongful, foolish
dependence—whatever confidence her ministers may have in
his intentions—on the will and the power of her great ally.
Sir, before I sit down, I desire to say something of a party
in Italy of which I have some special knowledge—the party
originally known as the party of Young Italy, then as the
Republican, then as the National party, and now as the party of
Action. Sir, I have never known, I have never heard or read of
any party in any country or in any time which has been so per
sistently misrepresented and maligned. In the ranks of that
party was born the idea of Italian unity ; by them that idea wras
nurtured into a faith. It was their faith, I may say that it was
my faith, when not a single English statesman could be found
to believe in the possibility of its realization. But, Sir, that
party not only created the idea and nursed it into a faith, but
they supplied also the motive power without which its realiza
tion so far would have been impossible. Trace back step by
step the policy of Count Cavour, and at each of such steps,
whether in argument before the assembled diplomacy of Europe,
or in act upon the field of Italy, eliminate the element of the
existence, of the determination, of the restless enthusiasm of
this party—and you will find the step in argument would have
been impossible as it would have been abortive in point of fact.
�49
The latest is the most brilliant and themost convincing illus
tration of the truth of what I say. The House should know, if
the House does not already know, that by far the greater part
of the volunteers who under Garibaldi won Naples and Sicily—
half Italy—to the new kingdom, sprang from the ranks of this
party—men called republicans, led by one of themselves to die
upon the battlefield that monarchy might rule the future desti
nies of a united Italy Sir, this party—I know it well—has
a policy and programme of its own, to which I invite the
attention of the Government and of the House. It is a policy
consistent with the declarations of the present first minister of
the king. He has but to do, what he has not yet done, to carry
out his words in acts, and he will rally this party round him;
he will have with him all the active forces, all the vital elements
of the country, and the moral unity of Italy will be at once and
for ever assured. And, Sir, this programme and policy is neither
more nor less than that truly national and independent pro
gramme and policy, good for Italy and good for Europe, which
I have endeavoured to lay before the House.
E
�MR STANSFELD’S SPEECH
Delivered
at the
Annual Soiree of the Wakefield
Mechanics’ Institute,
on the
31st October, 1861.
■ Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen,—The most natural
topic for discussion upon an evening like the present, is- evi
dently the practical progress of the institution whose anniver
sary we are met together to commemorate; and the persons
most likely to be able to address you with interest and advan
tage to yourselves upon such a topic, are those who have been
practically concerned, during the past year, in the work of
that Institution. But it has come rather to be the habit of
Mechanics’ Institutes, upon these anniversary occasions, to
summon to common council with themselves those also without
their own body who are locally connected with themselves,
or who may be known as taking an interest in all sub
jects bearing upon the question, and ask them to address them
on such occasions as these. Now when that is so, it follows, as
a matter of course, that those who have not been practically
acquainted with the working of the institution are obliged to
fall back upon generalities. They talk to you of the necessity
of education, of the duty of self-education, of the duty of assist
ing in the education of your fellow-men, and they, perhaps, lay
before you the statistics of education in this and other countries.
But information and arguments of this description, although
very true and very well worth hearing, have become by repeti
tion somewhat trite, and hence we have seen of late years, as
�51
your chairman has already said, in meetings of this description,
as well as in agricultural meetings, that speakers are apt to
wander to any kind of subject, however remote it may appear
to be from the objects or institution in connection with which
I they were assembled, but which they think may prove interest
ing to those whom they may have to address. Now your chairI man has referred to a question in which he has been kind
enough to say that I have taken considerable interest, and with
which I have perhaps some special means of familial’ acquaint
ance. And with reference to that remark of your chairman I
have to note, and I think you must have noted, that of all those
questions of general interest which have of late years been
brought to the attention of public meetings of this descrip
tion, no questions have been found more universally interesting
than what we call foreign questions. I think it is not difficult to
understand why this should be so. You have heard from your
chairman a very eloquent and very accurate description of the
foreign question now so deeply interesting to us as a manufac
turing people—the American question, and I would ask you
what have you there ? You have there what I might call an
agglomeration of States—a kind of partnership of populations
not having the natural unity of purpose and of character which
belongs to an old and well-established nationality like our own
I —having, on the other hand, causes of dissension within its
bosom amply sufficient to rend the strongest nation, and at the
bottom of them all that great question of negro slavery,—a
question which I trust, will meet with some solution consistent
with the liberty of men, be they white or be they black, before
the war now commencing between the North and the South
shall be completed. Then, there is another vast nationality in
the East of Europe to which reference is not so often made—
not so often as it appears to me it would be well to make it—I
allude to the mighty empire of the Russias. There is no grander
spectacle, no more magnificent subject for our consideration in
these recent times than that which has been taking place in
Russia. You have there an internal revolution—you have the
emancipation of a serf-nation—you have Russia, thrown back
upon herself after her conflict and defeat in the Crimea, seeking
�52
to raise herself towards the same level of civilization as that on
which we stand in the west of Europe, and to hold her part with
us in the common progress of the civilized world. Then, turn to
Italy; what have you there ? You have a nation which has been
greater than any other nation—you have a nation which has
suffered more than any other nation—which, perhaps, has been
more degraded than any other nation—but which is now rising
to a unity and to a national life which promise to be second to
the nationality and to the life of no other nation in the world.
I need not ask you whether subjects of this description are not
of the deepest interest to all reasoning and thinking men. What
indeed can be more interesting to us in these days of extended
sympathies and of wider views, than what I may call the bio
graphy of nations ? But these questions are not only of interest
to us—I am entitled to say that if, upon these occasions, we
venture beyond the sphere of what we might strictly call educa
tional questions, there are no questions of general interest more
akin to the purposes of your Institution, more fitting as subjects
for your consideration and your study. For what are all these
questions of national movements, properly considered, but
educational phenomena upon the grandest scale—what are they
all but phases and steps in the life and progress of nations—
what are they all but partial evolutions in time and in space of
that great problem of all problems—the problem of the educa
tion of humanity, which in its complex unity contains the whole
progress of individual and collective man. Now, if I take a
view,—perhaps you may say so general, but I say so true of
this class of questions,—I ask whether it does not justify me
in saying that they are subjects for consideration and for study,
not only upon these anniversary meetings, but in the night
meetings of the members of your institutions. What subjects
can be more elevating, or more interesting, or more instructive
than those great national questions ? I would not deal with
them as I would deal with questions of party politics. I would
have you address yourselves to such questions as students, and
endeavour to seize upon their great outlines and to penetrate to
their very core. If you do so, one of the very first conclusions
you will come to, and a conclusion fitted to inspire you with
�53
,
confidence and courage in all the labours and sacrifices of life,
F will be this—that the great law of humanity is the law of pro
gress. I will take even the case of America—with respect to
which, as your chairman has said, there are many in this
country ready enough to say that it is the bursting of the bubble
r of Republicanism. If you will look at that question in the
student-like truth-seeking aspect which it demands, I ask you
whether you will not say there must be deeper causes there
than any question as to the form of government at stake ; and
whether—the North be entering upon a war with the South
blindly and foolishly or not—it is not evident that they are
at least instinctively endeavouring to cut the Gordian knot
of that past relationship between the South and the North,
which rendered the progress of liberty and which made
national dignity impossible in the United States. Now, let me
turn again for a moment to Ttaly. How interesting to look back
upon the Italian movement, and to trace its character from
former times down to this very day. How interesting to ask
ourselves what it is that Italy and the Italian movement have of
late years done for us as a nation 1 Why, all those who are
actively concerned in political life, and who deal at all with
the foreign policy of this country must know that the Italian
question has given us I might almost say a foreign policy. It
has taught us a new code of the rights and duties of nations—
it has done more than that, it has compelled us, somewhat slow
as we are to take any ideas from abroad, to become conscious
of the fact and to take cognizance of the fact, that what is called
j the question of nationalities is one of the greatest, if not the
most important question which is likely to occupy public
councils during the remainder of our lives. Then what is Italy
doing and hoping to do for herself ? Is it a question, however
great that question may be, simply of liberty or internal reforms,
which is being -worked out; is it simply that the Italians prefer
the Constitutional government of Cavour to the government of
the Pope ; or is it simply a question of independence—inde
pendence from all foreign influence, whether that influence be
&e influence of despotic and hostile Austria, or the influence of
a perhaps too powerful French ally ? Tf you look closely into
�54
the Italian question, and if you study its history, you can only
come to one conclusion, which is this—that the Italian question
is not simply a question of liberty—is not only a question of
independence, but that it is really a question of existence. “ To
be, or not to be ; that is the question.” I could trace to you,
did time afford, the history of Italy from former ages, and show
you the march of the nation towards the conception and the
realisation of its unity;—I could take you back to the days
of ancient Rome, and then on to the time of the Papacy,
when the Papacy had yet a mission to fulfil in Europe, and
show you Italy mistress of the Pagan and the Christian world ;
I could bring you down then to the days of the municipal re
publics of the middle ages—that bright period brilliant in arts,
in war, and in commerce; I could tell you that in those days
and from those days downwards, Italian minds, from Dante
and Machiavelli, to the present time, have dreamt of the
unity of their country; I could bring you next to the days of
the Great Napoleon and show you how, under his mighty
despotism even Italy had a foretaste of nationality, and began to
feel her strength upon the field;—I could tell you then of the
treaties of Vienna—those treaties to which it is a disgrace to us
that we were a party—I could tell you of their blasphemous
dividing of God’s heritage and of His people amongst the
scions of their different houses—I could tell you of the futile
protests of the representatives of the North Italian kingdom—
I could describe to you the revolution of 1821 in the North and
the South, and of 1831 in the centre—the institution of “the
Carbonari,” and that other institution much more potent, much
more pure in its objects and efforts—“ La Giovine Italia;”—I
could tell you of the forlorn hopes which were led, and of the
campaigns and movements of 1848 and 1849. I could show
you that even twelve years ago Italy was ripe for unity, and that
the people of every Italian state rose and proclaimed the inde
pendence and unity of their country—I could explain to you
how the jealousy of the different states of which Italy is com
posed frustrated the accomplishment of that idea,—then I
could show you the growth of that idea, and the fixity of pur
pose with which the Italian people have adhered to it down to
�the campaign of 1859, I could explain to you the compact of
Plombieres and the peace of Villafranca, and how the steadfast
ness of the Italian people snatched from a peace which disap
pointed their fondest hopes, the unity of their nationality—■
and having done this, you could come to no other conclusion
than that the object of Italy, that which they think of by day and
dream of by night is the existence of a free, a great, a united
and an independent people. If you were to go into such a
bourse of history you could not fail to feel as deeply as I feel
that unity is the great object of the Italian people, and that
from that unity would result advantage to Europe—the advantage
of that balance of power of which your chairman has spoken,
which ought to find its reality in the natural distribution of
nationalities—and that in the resuscitation of a people, which
has been great and which would yet be greater, there must be
involved a future hopeful and useful to humanity at large. For
if you look beyond the field of the immediate present—if your
eyes could pierce the intermediate haze of mere party questions,
the war of statesmen and the rival ambitions of contending
dynasties, or if amaster-hand in historic and philosophic art could
trace it to you, believe me, that no fairer or more immortal form
could be revealed unto your gaze than that of “ Italia risorta,”
crowned with the Capitol, girded by the Appenines, with
the blue waters of the Mediterranean smiling at her feet, and
holding in her hand the Book of Life, inscribed with a new and
higher moral code of a nation’s duties and a nation’s rights !
��
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The Italian movement and Italian parties: two lectures delivered at the Philosophical Institution, Edinburgh. Speeches delivered in the House of Commons and at the Wakefield Mechanics' Institute
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Stansfeld, James
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Place of Publication: London and Edinburgh
Collation: 55 p. ; 22 cm.
Notes: From the library of Dr Moncure Conway. Published at the request of the Garibaldi Italian Unity Committee.
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James Ridgway, Effingham Wilson, Adam & Charles Black
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[1862]
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Politics
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Conway Tracts
Italy
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Text
ITALIAN UNITY
AND THE
NATIONAL MOVEMENT IN EUROPE.
*
�*** These Lectures were lately delivered at Brighton. The intention of the Lecturer was to explain the nature of the national idea, now
feimenting in the minds of so many European populations ; an his
torical sketch of the movement in Italy, from its rise to the present
time, being given as affording the best practical illustration of the
principle at work. The subject derives, perhaps, more interest from
the recent visit of Garibaldi, and from the remarkable discussion which
took place in our House of Commons, concerning the character and
doctrines of Mazzini, as the friend of a member of the Government.
A few additions have been made in preparing the Lectures for
publication.
London, June, 1864.
�/
LECTURE I.
Prevalent Mistakes concerning the Movement—True Character of the National
Idea—This Idea best illustrated in the Italian Movement—Rise of the National
Feeling in Italy—Mazzini, the Apostle of Unity—His Teaching—The Giovine
Italia—The National Party—The Moderate Party—Revolution, at Milan andVenice—Charles Albert—His Vacillation and Defeat—Flight of Pius IX._
The Roman Republic—Mazzini, Saffi Armellini, Triumvirs—The French Inva
sion-Garibaldi—Fall of Rome—This Epoch misunderstood in England—
Prejudice against Mazzini,
In addressing you upon the Italian question and the National move
ment in Europe, my only claim to your attention consists in my
acquaintance with a subject which has become one of deep and general
interest. The views I am about to express are founded upon observa
tion during many years passed in Italy, and upon much study of the
general question of nationality.
Italian unity,—that is to say, the formation of Italy into one state,—
which for so many years we were accustomed to regard as a mere
Utopia, a dream of the enthusiast, is now generally accepted as a pro
bable reality of future European history ; and even beyond Italy, in
other populations, we recognise the same aspiration to national ex
istence growing up and gaining strength continually. Hence the
Italian movement has a double claim upon our interest and upon our
study. It has a claim for Italy’s own sake : Italy, that has twice given
law to Europe, and rises now to new life amid the ruins of two epochs
of the .world’s history—the Rome of the Cassars, the Rome of medieval
Christianity: Italy, upon whose brow may still be traced the radiance
of imperishable genius. But it has yet a stronger claim ; if we study
the rise and development of the national sentiment among the Italians,
as an illustration of the nature and working of a great power which is
already acting in a wider sphere ; and which heralds the approach of a
new era for Europe as well as Italy.
One glance over Europe at the present moment shows us the national
idea, the form of its expression varying from local circumstances,
manifesting itself in the aspirations or the struggles of more than half
the people of the Continent. In softe countries, as in Germany and
Italy, it is tending to the amalgamation of many states into one ; in the
Austrian and Turkish Empires it acts, on the contrary, as dissolvent,
and is likely to separate those great empires into several tates. In
Poland it takes, the simple and direct form of a struggle against a
foieign domination; and, turning at the cry of agony which reaches us
from that country, we behold a spectacle of sublime energy and indomi
table courage. Hungary has gone through one contest already, and is
preparing for another, to win for herself a perfect and independent
B2
�4
Prevalent Mistakes concerning the Movement,
national existence. In Italy there are signs indicating that a fresh
advance will soon be made for the completion of unity by the acquisition
of Venice and of Rome. In the Ionian Islands our government has '
lately recognised and acceded to the desire of the people to form one
nation with those of their own race and language. Even the war in
Schleswig-Holstein was first entered upon in the name of German
nationality ; while, in reference to Denmark, we have heard prophecies
of a future Scandinavian nation comprising that country, Sweden, and
Norway.
But what is the real nature of this great motive power at work in
Europe, and tending to such gigantic changes?
I think English impressions generally concerning it may be thus
described. Until the year 1859 or 1860 we never thoroughly believed
in it; since that time we have believed in it, but still very imperfectly
understanding it.
It is better to begin by clearing the ground of obstructions which
impede the view of the question in its true and grand proportions, and
I will strike at once at what I conceive to have been oui’ chief source
of disbelief or error. I mean the practice of applying to other countries
opinions derived only from the traditions, oi’ founded on the wants of
our own.
England and France are almost the only countries not likely to be
affected by this great movement; hence we have not felt its force oi’ its
necessity. In all the revolutionary agitation and tendency to change
pervading Europe, we saw only political questions, restiveness under
oppression, a question, in short, of good or bad government. If Poland
rose in insurrection, we thought of no way of accounting for it but by
the tyranny of the Czar, as if the Poles, but for this tyranny, would
neither have a claim to national existence, noi’ desire it. If Hungary
was in revolt, it was in our eyes simply the result of the bad govern
ment of Austria. If the Christian populations of the Turkish Empire
were discontended or rebellious, we imputed it only to the insupportable
oppression of their Turkish masters. It 'was the same in regard to
Italy; for nearly half-a-century that country had presented to us a
picture of continued revolutionary agitation. In the intervals between
the more marked and important insurrections, repeated conspiracies still
showed the volcanic fire smouldering under compression ; and periodi
cally our sympathy and indignation used to be raised at once by be
holding the flower of Italian manhood, intelligence, and worth, perishing
on the scaffold, cast into dungeons, or driven into exile. But while we
contemplated the outward form of the struggle, the hearts of the
Italians were a sealed book to us, we knew nothing of the thoughts,
hopes, and aspirations that were written there. While they were
*
yearning for national existence, and for redemption from the yoke of
the foreigner and the priest, they used to hear from England only the
reiterated recommendation to imitate the English form of government.
And Englishmen, generally impressed with the practicability of so
simple an antidote to tyranny on one side and revolution on the other,
used to marvel at the blindness both of the people and their rulers.
By our indiscriminate recommendation of constitutional government
we used to appear in the eyes of European people like a charlatan,
�True Character of the National Idea.
o
who has the same remedy for every disease. The question never
seemed to occur to us; if all this discontent and this tendency to change
in Europe are caused only by bad government, how is the bad govern
ment itself to be accounted, for ? Have so many European sovereigns,
without any motive whatever, adopted and resolutely persevered in
a system of oppression that endangers their own thrones? Such a
theory could not be accepted. Self-interest is clear-sighted; and,
though some princes may play the tyrant for love of the part, still, as a
general rule, each adopts the system dictated by his interests or his
safety. Those sovereigns were trembling in the presence of a danger
we did not believe in, or could not see. All that revolutionary ferment
was to them prophetic of a reconstruction of the map of Europe; and
their tyranny, like most tyranny, was the offspring of fear. In Italy,
for instance, the national idea obviously excluded the possibility of
retaining more than one, if any, of the seven Italian monarchies; and
circumstances had long ago pointed to the sovereign of Piedmont as
the one who, if he chose, might profit by this door of escape. What
chance of safety then had the other six but in resistance ? in either
crushing put this great hope from the hearts of their subjects, or holding
them chained and prostrate, powerless to work out in action the aspira
tion of their souls ?
The year 1860 may, I think, be taken as the epoch when we awakened
to the conviction of the reality of the national tendency. The events
of that year in Sicily and Naples could not be misinterpreted ; and our
diplomatists, enlightened in their views of other countries by this tardy
discovery of the truth in Italy, began then to recognise this national
aspiration as a great European question and difficulty. .
But truth still contends with error; some of the old mistakes or
prejudices.linger. Either our statesmen do not grasp the full meaning
of the national idea, or they shrink from following it out to its logical
consequences, and from entering, even in discussion, upon a region so
vast and unexplored. Whenever the state of those countries which are
agitated by this great hope, is under discussion in our Parliament, the
debates still turn upon the merits or demerits of the governments; as if
the root of the question, and the solution of the problem, were to be
found in the mode of governing.
Now, a desire to be better governed is one thing; the aspiration to
national existence is another. No doubt, good government, material
prosperity, the gradual perfecting of society, are all comprised in the
anticipated results of the realisation of national existence; but they do
not constitute the direct aim that is worked for; they do not form the
banner that is fought under. This aim is something loftier and more
ideal ; something from which a peo'ple would not be turned aside by
beneficence in its government, as we have seen in the case of the popu
lation of the Ionian Islands; something that has even been pursued, in
certain instances, deliberately at a sacrifice for a time of material pros
perity, or with the consciousness that governments were thus being
driven.into oppression that might otherwise be endurable. The national
aspiration is a tendency in European populations to form themselves into
groupssuch as are dictated by an awakening consciousness that each
people, in its collective or national life, has a distinct phase of humanity
�6
The Idea best Illustrated in the Italian Movement.
to represent, and, beyond the question of its rights or interests, has a
duty to fulfil to humanity, and a special mission in the work of Euro
pean civilization. The phenomena of the movement are not consistent,
as I apprehend I shall be able to show you, with the theory of a less ideal
or elevated aim.
In giving our sympathy or compassion to the Poles, Italians, Hun
garians, or other European peoples suffering under oppression, and in
expressing our indignation against their oppressors, we have done well.
May Englishmen ever feel thus for the oppressed on one side, towards
the oppressor on the other. But let not this compassion or this'indigna
tion divert our attention from the higher meaning of the European move
ment ; neithei’ the suffering nor the tyranny constitute the true question
of nationality; they have been only incidents—and incidents inevitably
occurring—in the course of the great work of change, as the Europe of
the future began to clash with the Europe of the past.
In inquiries of this kind, much depends upon the extension of the
view over a wide expanse of time and space. If the view is contracted,
events are taken in isolation, and each is imputed to some local or
transitory source. A pervading principle is manifest in the whole, not in
the fragments. There is a story told of Rembrandt, that he reproved
some one who examined closely the details of his picture piece by piece,
saying, “ Pictures are not painted to be smelt, but to be looked at.”
And he was right. The details which, examined closely and separately,
have no meaning, seen from the point of view at which the eye takes
in the whole, blend harmoniously together to form one great design;
and each has its signification and importance in conveying the idea of
the artist’s mind.
I shall now present to you an historical sketch of the movement in
Italy from its rise to the present time. Italy affords the most complete
and advanced manifestation of the principle. And, slight as my sketch
must necessarily be, it will enable you to embrace in one view the
whole movement in that country: and you will clearly see the great
thought or purpose th>t pervades it all.
More than six centuries ago Dante, had a presentiment of a future
Italian nation—of the unity of Italy ; and from time to time this
national thought revived in the minds of the profoundest thinkers
among the Italians. But it remained an abstract idea, a theory of the
philosopher, a poet’s dream, till Mazzini transported it from the sphere
of imagination to the ground of reality; and, wedding action to thought,
made its practical achievment the subject of teaching and of contest
*
This great idea was like some sacred fire kept unextinguished for six
centuries, passing from hand to hand, guarded in succession by the elect
among the priesthood. The symbol of a future faith, and preserved in
the holiest recesses of the temple, it remained a secret or a mystery
for the multitude; waiting in the fulness of time, the coming of its
apostle, and the maturity of the people to receive it.
And in the interval between the prophecy of Dante, and the apostle
ship of Mazzini, a change was gradually working in the populations of
Italy, preparing them for their future destiny.
Wherever the love of liberty prevailed in Europe during the middle
ages, it seems to have been associated with a municipal spirit; there
�Rise of the National Feeling in Italy.
7
was, besides, among the Italians an excess of vitality and an individual
energy all tending to impede their union by the formation of many
distinct centres of activity. In some other parts of Europe, as the
feudal system declined, vast military despotisms were gradually forming
by conquest or absorption, out of more passive or servile materials ; and
in the sixteenth century the three great European powers, Austria,
France, and Spain, eager for conquest, burst at once upon Italy—a fresh
irruption of barbarians attracted by a wealth and civilisation superior to
their own. In the same century, Clement the Seventh commenced the
alliance of the Papacy with European despotism ; and this may be said,
speaking generally, to be the epoch of the loss of independence for the
Italians. Italy writhed and struggled for a time under the iron heel of
her tormentors, then sank into the apathy of exhaustion or despair.
For nearly three centuries her populations seemed resigned to be alter
nately torn as a prey and distributed as prizes by foreign powers, with
scarcely vitality enough remaining for a sense of their degradation. But
it was the stillness of a trance, not death; under this seeming apathy
the germs of a new life were forming. As foreign domination fell upon
them, it crumbled by its weight their old animosities into dust, and the
work of amalgamation into one people instinctively and rapidly pro
ceeded. After the last arbitrary partition of spoil and distribution of
populations by the great powers at the Congress of Vienna, Italy
awakened from her trance, palpitating with an undefined sense of a new
life.
.No sooner were the arrangements decreed by the treaties of 1815
carried into effect in Italy, than it became apparent that there prevailed
throughout the country a general restlessness. In the course of a few
years three distinct insurrections were each for a time completely suc
cessful: in Naples in 1820; in Piedmont during the following year,
and in Central Italy in 1831. In each instance the reins of govern
ment passed for the moment into the hands of the iusurgents ; but
when insurrection had triumphed and revolution should have begun, all
enthusiasm, vigour, or even union disappeared, and the impotence of
the movement revealed itself. The leaders raised the banner of consti
tutionalism ; but the people looked upon it with indifference; it did not
image to them their own unshaped thought, nor interpret the vaguo
longing in their hearts. All these insnrrections were prepared by the
sect of the Carbonari. The programme of this sect was—Independence,
Liberty ; but it put forth no definition for either one or the other. It
fitly personified the general state of feeling in Italy at the time—hostility
to the governments and to the whole system as it was, without any
distinct consciousness of what it wished for in its place. Yet it seems
strange that the very existence of such an association, spread as it was
over the whole of Italy, and thus showing the community of interests,
affections, tendencies throughout, did not reveal to its members the
secret of the future.
But the genius destined to initiate the new epoch was waited for,
While yet a student at the University of G-enoa, Mazzini entered
earnestly, both as a writer and an actor, into the political agitation of
the time ; and in 1831, at the age I believe of twenty-dwo, he was a
political prisoner in the fortress of Savona. But he had already seen
�8
Mazzini, the Apostle of the Unity.
enough of the movement as it then existed, to discover the impotence of
all that spirit of hostility to Austria, that hatred to despotism, that aver
sion to priestly rule, without a regenerating and reconstructing force.
He saw that the true source of strength would be found less in the
hatred that disturbs or destroys, and which had produced only isolated
and fruitless insurrections, than in the love that associates, combines,
and creates ; he saw that it was necessary to work for a revolution more
profound, for a larger and sublimer aim, than reforms and constitutions;
to concentrate every ray of Italian patriotism upon one focus—a great
hope representing a new creation—a simple and grand idea that would
be intelligible to the multitude, would attract and elevate them, appealing
to a national or patriotic instinct, and would excite the enthusiasm of
the more enlightened youth. When Mazzini’s imprisonment was ex
changed for exile, he had resolved to make the realisation of the pro
phecy oi' dream of Dante the labour of his life.
When forming this design he took a very different view of human
nature from those who believe that men are to be moved only by interests,
by the hope of redressing some grievance, by impatience of suffering, or
by some prospect of advantage to themselves. “ It needs,” wrote
Mazzini, “ the religious thought which gives the sense of duty and power
of self-sacrifice, to produce those great changes which mark the pro
gressive steps of humanity.”
That you'may understand how Mazzini could believe that in working
to create an Italian nation, he was fulfilling in a certain sensea religious
mission, and how he could inspire with the same faith, and with a
sublime spirit of devotion and self-sacrifice, as he did, thousands of his
countrymen, I must endeavour to give you in few words a general
idea of his teaching. The Italian question cannot be thoroughly under
stood without it; for the self-devotion and enthusiasm which were based
upon his appeal to what I can only call the religious element in man’s
nature, have been the true source of the vitality of the Italian struggle.
The fortress of Savona in which he was imprisoned is situated on the
shore of the Mediterranean, near Genoa. His cell was in the highest
tower of the castle; the window towards the sea—I am giving his own
description of his prison. The earth beneath was invisible to him ; he
was reminded of it only by the voices of the fishermen on the beach,
which occasionally, when the wind was favourable, rose so high; but he
could see the distant Alps—the grandest things of earth, and the sea
and the sky, both symbols of the infinite. With these before him, in
unreleaved solitude, almost unbroken silence, for many months, he
meditated on God’s law of progress for humanity as manifested through
put its history, and on the mission of Italy in connection with this law.
His whole political religious creed rests on the theory of human
progress. To explain more clearly, its foundation is this:—That God
has decreed that his design or idea, which is incarnated in humanity,
shall be continuously and progressively developed by humanity’s own
efforts. Hence, to aid in this development, to work for human progress,
is to identify oneself with His design, to do His will on earth, and the
aspiration towards the infinite which sustains the spirit here in suffering
and self-sacrifice, is in effect, according to this doctrine, a sense in the
individual being, that its own progress, its own movement towards God,
�His Teaching.
9
which will take place elsewhere than here, is to be advanced its first
step by aiding, while here, in the improvement and progress of the
collective being—humanity, the scene of whose development must always
be on earth.
This theory of progress once admitted, it follows necessarily that the
dominant thought which gives the form or character to the progressive
movement must change—perhaps I should rather say, must be enlarged
from time to time. In Mazzini’s own words, “ Our view will extend
with our discoveries, our mission increase with our strength, advancing
from age to age towards destinies yet unknown, for ever purifying and
completing the formula of devotion, as star after star shall be unveiled
for man in the heaven of intelligence.”
In order, then, to direct the religious aspirations in the individual to
its practical labour for humanity in fulfilment of God’s design on earth,
the form which the progressive movement is assuming must be under
stood : it ought, indeed, to find some embodiment in the faith of the
period. This form is to be ascertained by interrogating the wants of the
age. Mazzini did so ; and came to the conclusion that the form which
European civilisation and improvement would take in the epoch th en
approaching was the development of the principle of nationality. He
supported this opinion by reasoning somewhat as follows.
We need not follow him through the tradition of humanity further
back than to the Christian era. Then the principles of liberty and
equality—which is but liberty for all—of which antiquity had in some
instances a presentiment, received the sanction of religion ; and our
Saviour completed and crowned these principles by teaching us our
divine origin and the sublime doctrine of fraternity. It was the
emancipation of the individual man by giving him a sense of power and
dignity, and of a great destiny hereafter. As Christianity has triumphed
and spread, Liberty and Fraternity have necessarily come to be
recognised as abstract principles representing a sort of ideal to be
approached; although their practical realisation is contested, except to
a very limited extent, on the ground of inexpediency or impracti
cability.
Now liberty means freedom to act; and man emancipated, with a
sense of power and responsibility, and having freedom to act, must have
an object to act for. Liberty never can be realised so long as men are
inclined to use it for their own advantage only ; and religion sanctions it
evidently with the intention that it should be used for some high and
unselfish purpose. But man, isolated, cannot act for good in a wide
circle; he may practice charity to his neighbour, but before he can work
in a grander sphere and extend the action to humanity, there needs
a power derived from a combination of individual forces—a combi
nation of the forces of men each having freedom to develope and use all
his faculties. The principle of Fraternity implies the creation of this
power, for it gives the means of association among those who are free.
And this association or organisationj intermediate between the indi
*
vidual and humanity, formed spontaneously by those who, are conscious
that they represent a special group of the human family, conscious that
they have common tendencies and a common mission confided to them
by God for the good of mankind, at which they are to woi’k together—'
�10
Mazzini, the Apostle of Unity.
this is the nation in the high and true sense of the word ; the nation
such as, according to Mazzini, God intends that it should be.
And thus the chain of human progress is continued link by link ;
Liberty and Fraternity, which have been established as abstract prin
ciples in a former epoch, advancing towards their practical realisation
through the development of the principle of nationality. Liberty being
possible without anarchy, association without despotism, only when they
are sought for as a means, not as an end; sought for more in a sense of
duty than with a thought of self-interest. And the very construction of
the nation upon this principle implying an aim beyond itself, so it
becomes but another link in the chain ; it is in effect a division of labour
for human civilisation and improvement, each group taking the work that
it is fitted for, as each country has its products, and all harmonising
together in a common aim.
I need hardly point out how different this is from what the nation has
hitherto usually been ; how different from what monarchs and diplo
matists have understood it, or treaties between governments have made
it; how different from a mere aggregation of human beings held together
by the sword, without community of language, faith, traditions, or
tendencies; how different from any state where the will of an absolute
sovereign supersedes the collective thought and life of the people. But
the truly progressive element in this principle of nationality resides in
the idea which floats over all—that the nation is no association formed
only for the sake of interests or to gain strength for aggression, but that
the right to national existence is inseparable from a duty to humanity.
Now you see the train of reasoning which led Mazzini, more than
thirty years ago, to proclaim that the national movement would be the
form taken by European progress in its advance; and you see how
working for the unity of Italy assumed in his eyes the character of a
religious mission. “ When in my solitude and imprisonment,” he
wrote, “ the thought came to me that Italy might perhaps be destined
to initiate this new epoch, this faith of progress, this new life and fra
ternity for the nations of Europe, the immense hope shone like a star to
my soul.”
In attempting thus briefly to give you an idea of his political faith,
which he unfolds in many volumes with force of argument and eloquence,
and supports by evidence drawn from history, I know I am doing him
injustice, and giving you a very imperfect conception of his teaching.
But it is an essential part of my subject, no description of the Italian
movement can be complete without it, and I have done the best I could
in so few words.
Some years ago it might all have been condemned by an English
audience as visionary. Now the test of the future can to a certain
extent be applied, and his prediction of the tendency of the epoch—the
rising up of nationalities, and his assertion that in the Italian people
there was an instinct of national unity which needed but to be
awakened, are no longer ridiculed as wild and silly theories.
His teaching infused an enthusiasm into many of the youth of Italy
which enabled them to meet with a smile of faith persecution and
reiterated defeat; they taught, conspired, fought, and died on the
scaffold and the battle-field, acting not only without a thought of self
�His Teaching.
11
interest, but influenced, even beyond the sentiment of patriotism, by the
conviction that they were working for the triumph of a principle that
involved the good of mankind.
If the movement had been based only on a sense of interests, every
failure would have had a damaging effect, and it would have been
abandoned altogether, whenever the danger or suffering of perseverance
outweighed the advantage anticipated from success. But the Italian
cause has won its way, especially during its earlier period, as Christi
anity was propagated, by martyrdom. Whenever some patriot suffered
persecution or death for teaching the national programme, whenever
any little band of heroes perished as a forlorn hope in some attempt at
insurrection, for every one that fell on the field or on the scaffold, there
rose up a hundred converts ready to follow his example. And you will
see, throughout the narration of events, how this appeal to what I call
the religious element in man’s nature, has been the Promethean spark,
drawn from Heaven, that has given life to Italy.
It is startling to compare the immensity and splendour of the aim
Mazzini formed for himself—and still more so if we think how far it is
already accomplished—with his position at the time, his imprisonment,
his youth, the slenderness of his means. It is curious too, as a coinci
dence, that at the very time, the year 1831, when he was forming this
great design which was eventually to concentrate every ray of Italian
patriotism to one focus, and give to the revolutionary spirit that already
- prevailed an irresistible force by directing it to its true aim, a severe
political prosecution was going on in Central Italy. An insurrection
had just been subdued there, the executioner was standing sentinel by
the side of every throne, and the governments seemed resolved to crush
out the very germs of the revolutionary agitation. They thought they
had their enemy in their grasp; they saw him bleeding on their scaf
folds, they imagined him groaning in their dungeons, or driven to the
distant shores of England or America there to linger in the privations
of exile, and in all this they read theii’ own security and repose. Their
fears never carried them to that cell in the highest tower of the fortress
of Savona; they thought not of that youth there, gazing through the
grating of his prison window upon the Alps, the sea, the sky; they saw
not in the solemn meditation of his soul, the birth of the great power
that in its irresistible growth would change the face of Italy.
When Mazzini’s imprisonment was exchanged for exile, he began his
labour by addressing a letter to Charles Albert, who had just mounted
the throne of Piedmont, inviting him to identify himself with the Italian
aspiration to freedom from Austria and unity as a nation. “ You can
lead us to it,” said Mazzini, “ if you choose, and we will follow, grate
fully ; if you renounce this leadership, we will press onwards without
you ; if you oppose us, we may die, but our children will snatch the
sword falling from our grasp, and sooner or later our aim will be
achieved, for it is a God-given aim.” The whole sense of the letter
I was a reiteration of the motto at its head, “ Se no, no,” If no, no. If
you are not with us, we are against you.
*
* This motto is derived item the form of the declaration which was used by the
nobles of Arragon at the coronation of their kings. <» Nos, que cada uno somos
�12
The Giovine Italia—the National Party.
In addressing this letter to Charles Albert, Mazzini certainly could
not have expected that he would take up what every Italian statesman
looked upon as the wildest possible Utopia of a young enthusiast; but at
all events such a letter afforded at the time the best practical means of
setting before the Italian people the idea of unity. It was circulated
openly or clandestinely throughout Italy. The answer vouchsafed by the
King to Mazzini, was simply exclusion from the political amnesty which
he had just granted on coming to the throne.
Mazzini then, with a few friends, founded the association of the
Giovine Italia. It soon counted in its ranks hundreds of young men,
chiefly of the middling class, of all parts of Italy ; and absorbed the
best elements of the old sect of the Carbonari. Its aim was distinctly
defined and promulgated in the three words, Unity, Independence, Liberty.
Upon the two first it admitted no compromise. In regard to the last,
although the members of the association were all republicans, and pro
fessed to be so, it was considered that they had no right to decree before
hand under what form of government the future nation should exist,
substituting their own banner for that of the entire people; and that if
Italy willed monarchy, it would be for them to respect the decision of
the majority ; retaining always the right of expression of opinion. So
while they drew the sword for unity and independence, they would use
only the weapon of persuasion for the republic. Thus at the present
time, in submitting to Victor Emmanuel, these workers for Italian unity
do not violate their original programme; and Mazzini, Garibaldi, and
many others, we know still profess themselves republican in principle
and at heart. Indeed, the doctrines of Mazzini, as I have explained
them to you, are clearly democratic; but the monarchy may be sub
mitted to, though not sanctioned as an enduring principle.
The first efforts of the Association were directed to awakening the
national sentiment in the Italians. Writings, printed generally at
Marseilles or in Switzerland, were spread by the members of the Asso
ciation throughout the Peninsula. The governments soon became aware
that they had now a more formidable danger to encounter than before.
An energetic and relentless persecution commenced, and it was even
punishable with death to be found in possession of a writing of the
Association.
The Giovine Italia was not intended, however, to be educational
alone. Thought can be completed only by action; besides there is a
language in action which speaks to all. In the year 1833 insurrection
was attempted in Savoy ; and a simultaneous movement was to have
taken place at Genoat The first failed through treachery or mismanage
ment ; the second was discovered and prevented. Among those con
demned to death for this attempt was Garibaldi; condemned though,
like Mazzini, in his absence, for he escaped. He was one of the earliest
members of the Giovine Italia, and here we see these two young men,
nearly of the same age—Garibaldi is, I believe, a few months the
eldest—first acting together, who were destined at each great crisis of
tanto como vos; y todos juntos mas que vos; os hacemas Rey: si rispectais
nuestras leyes y privilegios, os obediceremos; si no, no.” “ We, each of us being
equal to you; and all together greater than you; take yod for King: if you
respect our laws and privileges, we will obey you ; if no, no.”
�The Moderate Party.
13
the movement, at intervals of years, to work again in concert, as they
are working now. The one, the hero of Italian unity on the field of
battle; the other, the great teacher and the warrior in the mental
contest.
This failure did not check the progress of the cause. Propagandism
went on, and other attempts were made at action. The brothers
Bandiera, who, with seven companions, were executed in 1844 for
attempting insurrection in Southern Italy, answered those who remon
strated with them on the rashness of their enterprise, “ That Italy may
live, we must show the Italians how to die.” And in saying this, they
expressed the very spirit in which many of these attempts were made.
In the course of a few years many perished on the scaffold with the cry,
Viva VItalia I on their lips as the cord tightened round the throat
or the bullet pierced the heart, and thousands were exiled or imprisoned.
But as the rage of persecution increased, the fervour of apostleship grew
also.
Thus the word Unity was cast upon Italian soil, thus it was watered
by blood and tears, and kept taking root deeper, deeper, and spreading
over the country from the Alps to the furthest shores of Sicily.
When Pio Nono ascended the Papal throne in 1846, Italy seemed on
the eve of a general outbreak. The national party, into which the
Giovine Italia had by that time expanded, was growing continually
stronger under persecution, and Pio Nono determined to try a new
policy with his subjects—a policy of conciliation. Supporting him in
this policy, and encouraging other Italian princes to follow his example,
there rose up at this time the moderate party. It represented essentially
conservative and aristocratic interests ; but was supported by all the
timid and the indolent, who were appalled at the gigantic changes con
templated by Mazzini. Now, within the last few years, the moderate
party has accepted the programme of unity ; but at the time I speak of,
it was the avowed opponent of that doctrine, and raised in opposition
the banner of constitutionalism. While the national party necessarily
looked to the overthrow of the governments that held Italy in division,
the moderates condemned revolution altogether, and intended to ame
liorate and support these governments. They strove to allure the people
by the prospect of reforms and other present advantages, from devotion
to the great hope of existing as a nation ; and used to accuse Mazzini of
forcing the sovereigns to be tyrannical by alarming them, and turning
the people aside from seeking real advantages for the sake of a dream.
Such was the state of parties when in March, 1848, revolution sud
denly triumphed in the Austrian States of Northern Italy. In the
course of some fifteen or twenty days Austria lost the whole of the
Lombardo-Venetian kingdom, except Mantua and Verona ; and this
solely through popular insurrection, without encountering one battalion
of professional soldiers.
Six thousand Austrians capitulated at
Venice ; four thousand fell at Milan during a struggle which raged
for five days in the streets of the city ; some were cut off in almost
every town, and Hungarian and Italian soldiers in the Austrian service
deserted, whole companies at a time. The loss of Austria in those few
days is estimated at between 20,000 and 30,000 men. The insurrection
burst forth at Milan immediately after some constitutional concessions
�14
Revolution at Milan and Venice,
had been granted ; it was promoted and led by a nucleus of young men,
most of whom had been members of the Giovine Italia ; and the people
rose to the cry which symbolised Italian unity—“ Viva l’Italia! ” And
“ Viva l’Italia ! ” resounded throughout Italy from Milan and Venice
to Messina and Palermo. While in almost every Italian city little bands
of young men began to arm themselves, and to start off to help their
brethren against Austria.
*
The teaching of the Giovine Italia was bearing fruit.
The Italian princes trembled at this evidence of national feeling ; they
dared not openly oppose the general enthusiasm, and to save their own
thrones they mostly professed for the moment to yield to the desire for
war against Austria. The moderates also gave in to the irresistible
attraction of the national idea, so far as to propose a sort of league
among Italian princes, and a crusade in common against Austria.
Among the chief promoters of this project were Gioberti and D’Azeglio.
But the princes saw the goal to which such a path must tend : they
knew their power had no root in Italian soil, nor was there one among
them whose throne had not, once at least, since the Congress of Vienna,
required the presence of Austrian bayonets to prop it up. They pre
tended to yield only to pervert, delay, or in some way paralyse every
effort. Charles Albert alone made real war, and even he was only
half sincere. When the insurrection broke out in Lombardy his
position was full of danger; the excitement of his subjects, and their
sympathy with the insurgents, were intense ; besides, the cry, Viva la
Republica! had been coupled with that of Viva I'Italia, on the barricades
at Milan. When the news reached Turin that the Austrians had been
driven from Milan by the citizens, he saw thathis only safety from revolu
tion at home was to be found in immediately declaring war and crossing
the frontier. He acted from a double motive ; from hope and from fear.
On the one hand he saw a prospect of aggrandisement for Piedmont;
and possibly a crown of Northern Italy glittered to his imagination in
the distance. But he also entered upon the war, in order to put down
or supersede revolutionary or popular action, and to check that sense of
their own power in the people, with all its democratic tendencies, which
their recent triumph would excite. The diplomatic correspondence of
the time shows that this was the motive he put forward to all European
governments, and pleaded as his justification for declaring war. He
was acting, his ambassadors declared, for the safety of all monarchial
states.
The entrance of the King into Lombardy changed the aspect of the
movement: it lost the character of a war of the Italian people against
Austria for their own independance and existence as a nation, and be
came simply a war by a king of Piedmont, to be fought by a royal
Piedmontese army, Lombardy being the prize contended for. The men
of the national party who had led the insurrection gave place to a pro
visional government composed of Milanese noblemen of the moderate
* An interesting account of this insurrection, and the war which followed, was
written by Carlo Cattaneo, himself the president of the committee of the barricades
during the insurrection. He was a professor at the University of Milan, and a
man of European celebrity for literary and scientific attainmenta.
�Charles Albert'—His Vacillation and Defeat.
15
party, who had had no share in the insurrection. The formation of
volunteer hands was discouraged, everything was done to cheok enthu
siasm, and lull the people into inertness ; the national idea began to fade
into the background, while the Royal army during three months did little
else than occupy Lombardy; neither opening communications with
Venice, nor attempting to intercept the reinforcements which Radetski
was receiving through the Tyrol.
At length Radetski, having reorganised and reinforced his army, issued
forth from Mantua and Verona, gave battle to the Piedmontese army,
and defeated it at Custoza.
When the news reached Milan the population rose up like an enraged
lion; what they had won by their own heroism and their blood was now
lost by the King and the moderate party. The provisional government
in dismay begged Mazzini, who had arrived at Milan from England, the
country of his exile, to counsel and assist them. Under his direction the
population was armed, volunteers were enrolled, and in three days the
city was in an excellent state of defence. The heroes of the Five days
re-appeared ; the people felt it was their own battle coming over again,
and saluted it with joy.
Such was the aspect of affairs when Charles Albert reached Milan in
his retreat. He beheld the popular or revolutionary element, which he
had taken such pains to check and subdue, once more in action. By
allying himself with it he might yet retrieve his defeat. But he hated
or feared it more than he feared or hated Austria ; he wavered for a few
days and ended by rejecting it. Before he entered Milan an armistice
with Radetsky and a capitulation for the city had been already signed ;
yet, in the city, whether drawn for a moment into sympathy with the
enthusiasm he saw around him, or whether trembling at the sight of it;
either sincerely or not, .he publicly declared that he would perish beneath
the ruins of Milan before it should be delivered up to Austria. The
people trusted him. Mazzini then saw that his own presence there was
useless ; that all would depend on the firmness or sincerity of the King ;
and he hastened to Begamo to join Garibaldi, who was advancing with
about 4,000 volunteers. A few days afterwards Charles Albert left
Milan almost secretly, and his troops immediately delivered up the gates
and outworks of the city to the Austrians, in accordance with the capi
tulation.
Garibaldi had, a few weeks before this occurred, returned from South
America; where, an exile since 1833, he had taken part in the wars in
those countries, fighting always on the side of liberty; and had obtained
renown as a daring and successful leader. The movement in Italy drew
him back to his own country, where he arrived with about a hundred
companions, Italians, and mostly exiles like himself. Charles Albert
hesitated to employ him, and he immediately collected volunteers to act
for the cause as he best could. When the King made the armistice with
Radetsky, Garibaldi at once repudiated it; and prepared to advance to
the support of Milan, hoping it would be defended. Mazzini having
joined him carried the banner of the little force. Arriving at Monza
they heard that Milan was already in possession of the Austrians ; they
were attacked and almost surrounded by superior numbers of the enemy,
�16
Flight of Pius IX.— The Roman Republic.
but defended themselves in their retreat as far as Como, where they found
shelter in the mountains.
*
All this time Venice held out under Manin, but the scene of the next
great struggle made by the national party was at Rome.
But I must pause here for a moment to point out some conclusions
which may be drawn from these events, to apply to the present time.
First, we see in this insurrection an answer to those, whether in Italy
or England, who think, or pretend to think, that popular insurrection
* A short account of this affair of Monza was written by Jocopo Medici, one of
Garibaldi’s companions, and now a general in the Italian army. The following
e extract may interest the reader:—
“ After the engagement of Custoza, at the end of which Charles Albert fell baok
upon Milan, General Garibaldi, then at Bergamo, with a small body of republican
Lombard volunteers, about 4,000 altogether, believing that the King of Piedmont,
who was still at the head of an army of 40,000 men, would have defended to the
utmost, as he had promised, the capital of Lombardy, conceived the bold project of
pushing forward and marching towards Milan. His object was to harass the left
flank of the Austrian army in its pursuit of the Piedmontese army, and thus to come
in aid of the future operations whioh the king’s resistance in Milan might bring
about.
“ It was on the morning of the 3rd of August, 1848, and Garibaldi was just about
to quit Bergamo, when we saw appear among us, carabine on shoulder, Mazzini,
asking to join our ranks as a simple soldier of the legion I commanded, whioh was
to form the vanguard of the division of Garibaldi. A general acclamation saluted
the great Italian, and the legion unanimously confided its banner, which bore the
device 1 God and the people,’ to his charge.
ct As soon as Mazzini’s arrival was known at Bergamo, the population ran to see
him. They pressed around him; they begged him to speak. All those who heard
him must remember his discourse. He recommended raising barricades to defend
the town in case of attack, whilst we should march upon Milan; and he conjured
them, whatever might arrive, to love Italy always, and never to despair of her
redemption. His words were received with enthusiasm, and the column left amid
marks of the deepest sympathy.
“ The march was very fatiguing; rain fell in torrents; we were drenched to ihe
skin. Although accustomed to a life of study, and little adapted to the violent
exercise of forced marches, his constancy and serenity never forsook him for an
instant; and notwithstanding our counsels, for we feared for his physical strength,
he would never stop, nor leave the column. It happened even that seeing one of
our youngest volunteers clothed merely in linen, and who consequently had no
protection against the rain and the sudden cold, he forced him to accept and wear
his cloak.
“ Arrived at Monza, we learned the fatal news of the capitulation of Milan, and
heard that a numerous body of Austrian cavalry had been sent against us, and was
already at the other side, at the gates of Monza.
“ Garibaldi, very inferior in forces, not wishing to expose his small body to a
complete and useless destruction, gave orders to fall back upon Como, and placed
me with my column as rearguard, in order to cover the retreat.
“ For youthful volunteers whose greatest wish was to fight, the order to retreat
was a signal of discouragement, and in the first moments was accompanied with
some disorder. Happily, this did not occur in my rearguard. From Monza to
Como, my column, always pursued by the enemy, menaced with destruction at
every moment by a very superior force, never wavered, remained compact and
united, showing itself always ready to repulse all attack, and kept the enemy in
check to the last.
“ In this march full of danger and difficulty, the strength of soul, intrepidity,
and decision of Mazzini, were the admiration of the bravest among us. His pre
sence, his words, the example of his courage, animated our young soldiers, who
were besides proud of partaking such dangers with him; and all decided to perish
to the last man for the defence of a faith of which he had been the apostle, and for
which he was ready to become the martyr.”
�Mazzini, Saffi, Armellini, Triumvirs.
17
and the volunteer element can do nothing against Austria. Secondly,
we see the paralising effect which naturally follows when a revolutionary
movement, after its first successes, passes under the guidance of those
who did not prepare it, and not thoroughly identified with its object
either by their past acts or by their wishes for the future.
When Pius IX. fled from his dominions to Gaeta in November,
1849, the Republic quickly sprang up from the ruins of the Papal Govern
ment ; and it seemed as if the future Italy had found a cradle where all
the vigorous elements of true national Italian life might draw together;
With Rome, the national party had won the key of the position in the
struggle for nationality ; the centre, through which there might be union
between north and south. In the deliberations in the assembly for the
election of a triumvirate, while Armellini was chosen to represent
Rome, and Saffi, the Legations, Mazzini was chosen professedly as the
representative of Italy—the incarnation of the idea of Italy, one and
free. And by this election Italian unity may be said to have been
inscribed on the banner of the infant state, as it actually was upon its
coin. Energetic preparations were set on foot to carry this banner into
the Lombardo-Venetian kingdom ; it was calculated that by the end of
May 45,000 men would be armed and organised; these would have
entered the Austrian States, not to act alone as the Piedmontese army
had done, but to act in alliance with Venice, and in concert with the
popular insurrection. Such were the hopes of the national party when,
in the month of April, these preparations being still incomplete, the
French Government decided upon sending an expedition against Rome.
We must glance for a moment however at events occurring in other
parts of Italy, and bearing upon the position of Rome. In the month
of February, the Grand Duke of Tuscany had followed the example of
Pio Nono, fled from his dominions, and joined the Pope at Gaeta. The
national party immediately agitated for the amalgamation of Tuscany
with the Roman States, thus to commence the unification of Italy; and
there seemed a good prospect of success. The Piedmontese Government,
Gioberti being minister, then formed the injudicious design of restoring
by an armed intervention, both the Pope and the Grand Duke to their
dominions ; a design which, if carried into effect, would inevitably have
lighted up the flame of civil war. But those princes rejected such
assistance; they regarded the Piedmont Government with no friendly
feeling, and considered that, by making real war against Austria, it had
separated itself from the common cause and interests of Italian sovereigns.
While, at the same time, the national party was indignant that such a
design should have been cherished for a moment; and its distrust of
Piedmont was increased. This project falling to the ground, Charles
Albert, on the 12th of March, suddenly put an end to the armistice with
Austria, and renewed the war. No doubt lie was induced to take this
step by the preparations for war which the Roman Republic was making ;
and he acted wisely as far as his own interest and safety were con
cerned. It would have been dangerous, perhaps fatal, to the Piedmontese
monarchy for a new crusade against Austria to be initiated and led
under the Republican banner. It would have been impossible for Charles
Albert to hold back, and humiliating to the monarchy to follow in the
c
�18
French Invasion—Garibaldi—Fall of Rome.
wake of the Republic. He resolved either at once to gain a victory over
Austria, and render his throne secure by surrounding it with the prestige
and the glory thus acquired; or else to find, through defeat, an excuse
for retiring from any further contest. When the unexpected renewal of
the war was known at Rome, a generous spirit towards the monarchy
pervaded all the councils of the Republic. Mazzini said in the chamber,
“ Let us think no more about forms of government; there is now but
*
one real distinction among Italians: it is between those who join in the
war of independence against Austria, and those who do not.” A pro
clamation was issued, which thus concluded : “ The legions of the Re
public will combat side by side with those of the Subalpine Monarchy;
there shall be no contention between them save in valour and in sacrifice;
may he be cursed who would promote discord between brother and
brother.” But before the Roman troops could reach the North of Italy,
the campaign was ended. It lasted but a few days; and, after the
defeat of Novara., Charles Albert abdicated in favour of his son Victor
Emanuel.
On the 18th February, a note had been addressed to the diplomatic
body at Gaeta by the Pope, publicly requesting the armed assistance of
France, Austria, Spain, and Naples, for his restoration. It was soon
known, or rumoured, that France was about to enter the field as a new
enemy for the Roman Republic; and the timid began everywhere to
hold back. The moderate party in Tuscany, headed by the chief nobility
of Florence—Ricasoli among the number—took advantage of this state
of the public mind, and also of the discouragement which the Austrian
victory at Novara had just produced, to bring about a reaction. They
promised in the name of the Grand Duke, though, as it afterwards
appeared, without his authority, that, if recalled, he would govern con
stitutionally, and that no foreign soldier should enter Tuscany. A pro
posal made in the Chamber at Florence for union with Rome, was
negatived ; and the Grand Duke recalled by the acclamations of the
populace of Florence. One of his first measures, however, was to invite
an Austrian army to enter Tuscany; and it met with no resistance \
except at Leghorn.
The battle of Novara had also the effect perhaps of hastening the
French expedition against Rome. The French Government had
already promised to restore the Papal sovereignty, but it wished for
some veil which might soften the harsh and unjust features of the
measure in presenting it for the approval of the Chamber at Paris.
The Chamber was given to understand that the object of the expedition
was merely to support the interests and influence of France in the
Peninsula in opposition to those of Austria ; as if a French army on
the Tiber were calculated to counteract the influence of Austria, whose
forces were on the Mincio and Adige ; for it was not until the French
were besieging Rome that the Austrians either entered Tuscany or
invaded the Legations. And when they besieged Bologna, although the
forces of the Republic had been drawn away for the defence of the
capital, still it was defended heroically for a time by the citizens alone.
It would take too long to enter upon the details of the drama that was
acted before the walls of Rome. Perhaps most of you remember how
the first expeditionary force of 10,000 men was defeated under the walls
�This Epoch misunderstood in England.
19
of the city by Garibaldi, who issued forth with his volunteers and gave
it battle ; how Oudinot, in his retreat towards Civita Vecchia, proposed
an armistice; how Lesseps was sent to Rome to open sham negotia
tions, and, while they were going on, the French army was gradually
increased to nearly 40,000 men; how the attack was then renewed, and,
after an heroic resistance that lasted for a month, during which nearly
3,000 of the truest, noblest, bravest, hearts of Italy gave their life's
blood, the city was surrendered.
To appreciate the grandeur of this defence, we must bear in mind
that those who fought or died at Rome, did so without any hope of an
immediate favourable result, without any expectation of victory against
the French. They fought for a victory in the future ; that future which
is coming now. They fought or died to afford a great moral teaching
to the people, and to call forth reverence for the sanctuary of Italian
nationality, the future capital of Italy. They gave their blood that in
it the Italian people might be baptised at the font of unity ; and,
although the Papal government was restored, the true lasting victory
was with the Italian national party. It was the climax to all that series
of acts of self-devotion by which for eighteen years it had been working
out its mission. The moral teaching for the Italians was complete, and
their education to the idea of unity, was advanced beyond the possibility
of future reaction or decline. Although the weight of France was then
added to that of Austria to keep Italy prostrate, it became a certainty
that sooner or later the innate vitality of the tendency to unity must wear
out all artificial external pressure.
It is remarkable how little this epoch was understood either by our
statesmen or our press ; they appeared to see only a meaningless struggle
without system or object, where in reality a great purpose was being
resolutely and irresistibly worked out. In the Roman Republic they
saw only the form of political liberty—the republic; they were either
ignorant or incredulous of its higher meaning in the national sense, and
judging Italy of to-day by her history in the middle ages, they used
often to condemn or lament the incapacity of the Italians for union
among themselves.
*
* Mr. Gladstone did much to retard the enlightenment of English public opinion
as to the true character of the Italian movement, by giving the authority of his
name to the translation of Farini’s Roman History. That history is of some value,
on account of the numerous diplomatic and other documents it produces 5 but the
English reader is led astray, who studies it without being aware that it expresses
exclusively the views of the Italian moderate party of that day. None can read it,
I apprehend, without receiving the impression that something is kept back, without
feeling that they are introduced into a labyrinth to which no clue is presented.
They read of a prolonged revolutionary or popular movement without any explained
or apparent object, and of tyranny without a cause. The fact is, Farini syste
matically keeps in the background the tendency to unity, and diminishes the
importance, or distorts the meaning, of all those events in which this tendency was
manifest,. The translation of his work into English was the more unfortunate,
because the error pervading it is precisely the one to which we were already
predisposed.
At the time Farini wrote, the leaders of the moderate party had discovered the
impracticability of their own programme—that of converting the reigning princes
into constitutional sovereigns, but they had not acquired faith in the possible
c 2
�20
This Epoch misunderstood in England.
In this slight sketch I have necessarily omitted the mention of many,
important events occurring during this period, and which bore more or
less visibly the impress of the national tendency. My subject has re
quired that I should follow the course of those in which the prominent
actors were professedly working for this great aim of unity. Sicily was
in revolt during 1848 and 1849, and in Naples there were revolutionary
movements, but the national feeling was partially concealed in these
states by a thin veil of demands for constitutional government. Venice
held out against Austria for seventeen months under. the direction of
Manin; but the Venetians followed his views, and, at that time, his idea
of the future Italy was that of a federation of republican states.
Thus I have shown you throughout the sequence of events from 1831
to 1849, how a nucleus of young patriots, which expanded gradually into
a great political party, embracing the flower of Italian manhood and
intelligence, and working always under the influence of one master
spirit, succeeded by resolute propagandism, by a series of daring enter
prises, by failures and martyrdoms, and by glorious though momentary
victories, in converting the programme of the G-iovine Italia—Italy one
and free—into a distinct hope irrevocably awakened in the Italians.
In the second period of the Italian struggle, which will be the subject
of my second lecture, Garibaldi and some other actors are more promi
nent on the scene than Mazzini; though his influence is still omnipresent,
and his labour unceasing though silent : but during the whole period
embraced in my present lecture, he has been the necessary hero of the
scene throughout. Now it is not that I assume you to be particularly
interested in a fair appreciation of him for his own sake, but up to this
achievement of unity. Materialists themselves, without enthusiasm, love, or
genius, they were slow to believe in the devotion of the multitude to a grand and
unselfish idea. They saw only that the programme of the national party had so
far triumphed over their own in the hearts of the people, as to constitute a danger
sufficiently formidable in the eyes of the Italian rulers, to deter these from relin
quishing any part of that despotic power which supplied the most efficacious means
of defence against it. The leaders of the moderate party could not forgive the
authors of their defeat, and their bitterness is illustrated in the tone of alternate
sarcasm and anger which Farini adopts, in writing of Mazzini or others who had
joined in teaching the unity of Italy. He speaks of unity as a crochet of Mazzini,
and declares it to be an aim which is neither good, nor grand,.
Four years ago Farini proclaimed his own acceptance of unity as the tie goal
u
*
of the Italian movement, and his doing so was a severe comment on his Roman
history.
It would appear, also, from Mr. Gladstone’s pamphlet upon the State prosecutions
in Naples, published in 1851, that he was not himself aware of the real character of
the movement in Italy. He evidently fancied the Neapolitan government actuated
in these prosecutions only by an unreasonable suspicion or hatred of constitutional
ideas. He claims our sympathy for Poerio, and other prisoners, on the ground that
they were constitutionalists, aud that their only object had been to establish in
Naples a government resembling our own. Now Poerio himself had been a member
of the Giovine Italia, and the charges against him at his trial were these : that he
had, while minister, corresponded with Mazzini, and joined in the formation of a
secret society at Naples, having the unity of Italy for its object. Whether the
charges were true or false, it is surprising that they did not enlighten Mr. Glad
stone as to the direction taken by the fears of the government, and give him an
insight into the real danger which the widely spread system of political persecution
Was intended to guard against.
�Prejudice against Mazzini,
21
time he so completely personified the national aspiration, that to mis
understand his teaching and action is to misunderstand the movement
itself. And because I have been obliged to say so much concerning
him, I must yet in concluding add another word.
Mazzini has encountered, as all teachers of new truths or introducers
of great changes have encountered for a time, prejudice, misrepresenta
tion, calumny; all which has found an echo in England. Completely
merging all thought of self in the great aim of his existence, seldom has
he replied to, or protested against, this disloyal mode of warfare.
Among other charges, his enemies used to cast upon his head the blood
of all the patriots who from time to time perished on the field or on the
scaffold, because his teaching had urged them on. And although he
had deliberately relinquished fortune, and all the joys of life, for exile,
danger, and incessant toil; although the risks he has incurred of arrest
and death have been so numerous, and his escapes so marvellous, that
his friends have believed that a special providence watched over him;
although, in a word, he has suffered a life of martyrdom, his enemies
have charged it against him as a sort of crime that he happens to have
escaped a martyr’s death.
In some moment, when writhing perhaps under this cruel injustice, or
when possibly repeated failures made him doubt for an instant his own
power of perseverance, or even his own faith, he wrote these touching
lines I am about to read to you, in the preface to his memoirs of the
brothers Bandiera. I have already spoken of the brothers Bandiera,
who were executed in 1844. In writing their memoirs he appropriately
dedicates them to Jacopo Ruffini, who had been one of the first victims
of the persecution against the Giovine Italia. When Jacopo Ruffini
was imprisoned at Genoa, the police authorities, in order to make him
confess who were the members of the Association, showed him a forged
document purporting to be a confession by others, who, they told him,
were in prison, and had bought their lives by this confession. Then
they urged him to do the same. He begged for a day to consider ; and,
in the agony of this great trial, tore a nail from his prison door, opened
a vein with it and killed himself, writing with his blood upon the wall:—
“ This is my answer.” In the dedication of the memoirs to Ruffini,
Mazzini thus addresses the spirit of his friend :—
“ Help me; oh, help me that I do not despair! From the sphere
where you now live a life more powerful in intellect and love than the
earthly can be, and into which new martyrs to the Italian faith have
just risen up to meet you, pray with them to God that He will hasten the
fulfilment of the destinies that He has ordained for Italy. But if,
indeed, this uncertain light, which I have saluted as the dawn, should
be only the light of some falling star, and long years of darkness and
suffering must yet pass over Italy before the ways of the Lord shall be
revealed to her ; then, for the love I bear you, help me, your poor friend,
that I may think and act, live and die, uncontaminated; that I may
never relinquish, either through insupportableness of suffering or bitter
ness of disappointment, the worship of the eternal idea, God and
Humanity; God the Father and Educator—Humanity the progressive
interpreter of His law. So that when we meet in the future life assigned
�22
Prejudice against Mazzini.
to us, you may not have occasion to veil yourself, blushing, with your
wings, and repent of the affection you bore to me on earth.”
What bitter moments of trial in the life of the Apostle, what strug
gling against despair or doubt do these lines reveal. They were written
in 1845.
I have now shown you how the national idea took root in Italian soil;
in my second lecture we shall see how it has flowered and borne fruit in
the events of the last few years,
�LECTURE II
Terms of the Alliance between France ancl Piedmont, 1858—Peace of Villafranca
—National Party re-organised as the Party of Action—Policy of the Moderates
—Sicilian Insurrection—Garibaldi lands—His Victories—Cavour sends an
army to the South—His motive—The Movement arrested—Cavour’s Policy
—The Party of Action in the Italian Chamber—An Attempt on the Venetia
stopped by the Italian Government—Garibaldi prepares to move on Rome—
Aspramonte—Future Prospects of the Italian Movement—Louis Napoleon’s
position in Italy—The Papal Church at Rome—Concluding Remarks on the
National Idea—Our own Attitude and Policy towards the National Movement
in Europe.
In my first lecture I traced the progress of the Italian national move
ment to the fall of Rome in 1849, which concluded, what may be called,
the educational period £of the mission of the Giovine Italia. The con
sciousness of nationality had then become so thoroughly awakened in the
Italians, that it was certain to be the true lever of every future move
ment. Rome and Venice fallen, the leaders of the national party went
into exile, but undaunted. If the edifice they had begun to raise was
shattered, they felt that they had laid the foundation for a new one in
the hearts of the people ; and in spite of France and Austria, they could
say of the national cause, as Galileo said of the earth when before the
Inquisitors, “ Eppur si muove.”
For ten years, however, the cold hand of Louis Napoleon on the heart
of Italy seemed to paralyse her action. The most daring and most enthu
siastic sacrificed their lives, or lost their liberty, in several vain attempts
at insurrection; the many held back, appalled at the prospect of encoun
tering Austria and France at once. The most important of these
attempts were an insurrection in Milanin 1853; and an expedition which,
starting from Genoa, where it was organised, landed in the South, and
attempted to promote insurrection there. Both failed, and both were
condemned; yet the former was but an attempt to repeat what had
succeeded in 1848, and the latter to anticipate the movement which was
successful in 1860. At the head of this expedition were Pisacane and
Nicotera: Rosolio Pilo was to have taken part; he was in another
vessel with men and arms, but by some accident the vessels did not
meet; so he was reserved for a more successful enterprise, and was the
leader of the Sicilian insurrection three years later. He fell at Palermo.
These three young men were among the most devoted and the bravest
of the Italians; all belonged to noble and influential families in the
south ; the two former Neapolitans; the latter, Sicilian. Pisacane was
killed during the expedition, in an encounter with the Neapolitan troops
—Nicotera alone remains ; he was taken and condemned to perpetual
imprisonment. Released by Garibaldi, in 1860, he was afterwards
�24
Alliance between France and Piedmont.
elected a deputy to the Italian Parliament by the very city—Salerno—
which had been the scene of his trial. For the latter attempt, Mazzini
was among those condemned to death by the Piedmontese government.
He was at Genoa when the expedition started, and with difficulty
escaped. He had been condemned to death also in 1833, for the insur
rection in Savoy; and as from that time to the present, he has been
excluded from every political amnesty, two sentences of death hang over (
his head. Hence his life is one of exile ; he frequently visits Italy, but
while there is obliged to be concealed.
At length, in 1859, the weight of France was partially removed. It
was not removed, however, that Italy might rise. Italy did rise; but
this was not the intention of the Emperor of the French.
It has often been assumed that the advance which the Italians subse
quently made towards unity, was made in consequence of an impulse in
that direction given by Louis Napoleon and the Piedmontese govern
ment. This was not the case. When the alliance was formed between
France and Piedmont against Austria, neither Louis Napoleon nor
Cavour contemplated any such advance; all that has been won in that
direction, has been won, I may almost say, in spite of the Emperoi’
of the French. As for the Piedmontese government, it has simply
floated on the summit of the wave, moving with it, but the wave has
advanced by a power within itself. If I should appear to take pains
to establish this, and to direct your attention to it, it is because the con
clusions I would draw concerning the nature of the movement, the great
issues, the vast and lasting changes which I believe it is leading to in
Europe, evidently depend on the fact that it is not stimulated, or
brought about, by any government; but springs from the instincts, or
the ideas, which are in the hearts of the people.
The terms of the alliance between France and Piedmont, as arranged
by Louis Napoleon and Cavour at Plombieres in October, 1858, were
simply an aggrandisement of territory for each: Piedmont to be
aggrandised at the expense of Austria, France to have Savoy and Nice.
Besides this, Prince Napoleon was to marry a Sardinian Princess, as
he did, and in case the Grand Duke of Tuscany, who was an Austrian
Prince, should be dethroned during the war, then Prince Napoleon was
to have the crown of Tuscany. It is true, independence and nationality
for Italy, served as a war-cry against Austria; but the nationality
intended was a sham; it meant merely a federation of States, a sort of
diplomatic league among Italian sovereigns under the Presidency of the
Pope, who would himself necessarily be still under the protection of
the Emperor of the French. And by independence was meant only
independence of Austria, to be purchased by a more humiliating, a
moral as well as material, dependence upon France.
When the war broke out, the national party became for a time, to
a certain extent, disorganised. Cavour, dreading any independent
revolutionary action by this party in Italy during the war; dreading
lest the cry of unity should be raised, which, in the councils of the
Piedmontese Government and in the ministerial organs of the press,
was condemned at the time as a cry subversive of European order,
invited Garibaldi to act under the King; permitting him to summon
volunteers, and promising that he should have the command of 30,000,
�Peace of Villafranca,
25
if so many obeyed his call. More than that number flocked to Piedmont
from different parts of northern and central Italy, generally in the
hope of serving under him. Of these, however, he was allowed to have
about 3,000 only, without cavalry or artillery. The rest were sent
to the depots of the regular’army in Piedmont, and took no part in the
war. But thus a portion of the enthusiastic youth—the revolutionary
element in fact—-was removed from the cities of northern and central
Italy.
The Italian people generally, and indeed many of the national party,
at the outset, applauded this war, and this alliance; influenced at the
moment, I think, less by any thought whether the alliance or protection
of a foreign despot was likely to lead either to independance or liberty,
than by an intense hatred of Austria. Mazzini protested against the
alliance, but at the same time, he prepared to ward off the danger it
might bring, and to turn the opportunity for acting, which it afforded, to
good account. A secret committee of the national party already existed at
Florence, composed of Dolfi, a baker, whose name was often mentioned
in our papers at that time; a man of immense influence -with the
Florentine people; Piero Cironi, a well-known literary man, and two or
three .others. This committee wrote to Mazzini in England, immediately
the war broke out, telling him that Tuscany was ripe for revolution and
asking for his counsel—I am telling you now something of the inner life
of the movement—Mazzini, in reply, advised them to promote revolution
by all means, only to be careful that nothing was done, no cry raised,
which could possibly serve as a pretext to Louis Napoleon for saying
that the people of Tuscany were willing to accept his cousin as their
Prince. Thus this danger was guarded against from the commence
ment ; and, when the Grand Duke fled from Tuscany, the scheme of
placing Prince Napoleon on the vacant throne, was defeated by the
resolute attitude of the population.
It may be doubted if Louis Napoleon ever intended to drive the
Austrians out of Italy, but, probably, the conclusion of peace was
hastened by his finding that his cousin had but little prospect of an
Italian throne ; and that revolution was extending into the Roman States.
Indeed, he frankly declared afterwards at Paris to the ambassadors and
great bodies of the state, when they met to thank him for the restoration
of peace, that he concluded it in order to avoid the dangerous co-opera
tion of the revolution.
The position of Austria in Italy was not really weakened by this war;
she lost only a part of Lombardy, with the city of Milan—an open
country with a large city containing a hostile population, which, in a
military sense, were only an embarrassment. Thus the direct conse
quence of the war and the alliance with the Emperor of the French,
amounted to but a small gain for Piedmont; especially as the cession of
Savoy and Nice was afterwards sternly exacted according to the original
compact. But there was an indirect consequence of immense value ;
a consequence which was never intended by Louis Napoleon, and for
which, therefore, no debt of gratitude was due. Revolution had been
suffered to raise its head in Tuscany and the legations; free popular
action had commenced, and here was a field for the national party
to work unon. After the peace of Villafranca this party began to
�26
Party of Action.
reorganise itself, and Garibaldi and Mazzini once more to act together.
In answer to a letter from Mazzini about this time, Garibaldi wrote:—.
“ Hence forward let us work together as brother and brother.” And
they have done so.
Throughout all the subsequent events there has been going on a con
stant struggle, more or less beneath the surface, between the policy of
Louis Napoleon on one hand—a policy absolutely adverse to the realisa
tion of unity—and, on the other, the irresistible aspirations of the
Italian people in that direction; guided and inspired still by the same
party, for the most part even by the same men, that had been working
for unity from the commencement.
I think it will help you to understand the events that followed the
peace of Villafranca, if I describe more clearly than I have done, the
two great Italian parties. Each of them has always acted under the
influence of one dominant idea, and a knowledge of this, affords the key
to all their policy. The national party, or, as it began to be called at
this time, the party of action,—but I must pause for a moment to ex
plain this change of name. When the Piedmontese government and the
moderate party gave the name of nationality to their project of a league
among Italian princes or a federation of states, and especially when
some of this party, going further, accepted, as a theory, but -without
acting for it, the doctrine that Italy might become one nation, the true
national party began to distinguish itself by this new name. Thus it was
first the Giovine Italia, then the national party, and, during the last few
years, the party of action; by which name I shall in future call it. For
thirty years then, this party has worked unceasingly to make Italy one
and independent; and although the members of the party are thoroughly
democratic in principle and feeling, all question of the form of govern
ment—republican or monarchical—is kept secondary or subservient to
the accomplishment of this great aim of unity.
The dominant idea which has always influenced the policy of the
moderate party, may be defined to be—Hostility to revolution; that
is to say, hostility to free popular action, to any movement not initiated
or controlled by some established government. The shifting policy of
this party in regard to the question of nationality, is to be accounted
for by its consistent adherence to this dominant idea. Thus in 1848
and 1849, when unity meant revolution throughout Italy, it condemned
and opposed this doctrine, and counselled the governments to grant
reforms and constitutions as the surest way of warding off revolution.
In 1860, the moderate party, as we shall see, definitively proclaimed
its adherence to the programme of unity; but still a spirit of hostility
to all free popular movements had much to do -with this decision; for
Garibaldi had just revolutionised Southern Italy in the name of unity,
and it was only by taking possession as it were of Garibaldi’s banner,
that the control of the movement could be transferred from him to the
Piedmontese Government, and so completed, if completed at all, by
the government and not by popular and revolutionary action. This
party represents generally aristocratic and conservative interests, and
its hostility to revolution is chiefly based on a dread of the democratic
tendency of popular movements. But its numbers and its strength
are augmented by all the timid and the indolent throughout the country,
�Policy of the Moderates.
27
and it finds adherents too wherever there exists a remnant of that old
stain upon the Italian character—the preference for working by crooked
ways, by statesmanship and cunning rather than by courage, through
others rather than by oneself.
Between these two parties, inclining sometimes to one, sometimes to
the other, there is the multitude, with the instinct of national unity in
their hearts, and with tendencies generous and good, as the multitude
always has, but wavering and uncertain; capable of being roused into
enthusiasm and heroism by the party of action, or lulled into apathy by
the soporific influence of the moderates.
To return now to the state of Italy after the peace of Villafranca.
The policy then adopted by the party of action was this :—to persuade or
to compel Victor Emanuel to co-operate with them for unity. Mazzini
published a letter to him immediately after the peace. He exhorted him
to continue the war against Austria, and, in place of the alliance of
Louis Napoleon which he had lost, to accept the alliance of twenty-six
millions of Italians. He said, “You have but to utter one word—unity;
and you have them with you sublime in enthusiasm, faith, and action.”
He assured Victor Emanuel that five hundred thousand volunteers would
flock to his standard, and he said, “If you have a soul capable of loving
or understanding the Italian people, you know that you may trust to
their gratitude for your reward.”
Soon afterwards—to encourage the king to enter on this path—the
populations of Tuscany and the Legations voted their annexation to
Piedmont.
1
The first project of the party of action after the peace of Villafranca,
was to spread revolution throughout the Roman and Neapolitan states,
by the passage of Garibaldi at the head of his volunteers from the Lega
tions southward. This was the project of Mazzini, who was there in
Italy, unseen, but organising and influencing all; he sent arms to
Ancona, and prepared insurrection there and in Sicily, the signal foi
*
whose outbreak was to be the advance of Garibaldi. The Italian hero
and his volunteers entered into the project with enthusiasm. Ricasoli
and Farini, then at the head of the provisional governments in Tuscany
and the Legations,—it was just before the annexation of those provinces
—yielded a reluctant consent, and they required that Mazzini himself
should not come forward. On the eve of his advance Garabaldi was
stopped by an order from the king.
In the following year, 1860, Mazzini planned and prepared the
Sicilian insurrection; though he remained in the back ground during the
movement that followed, because it was thought that by coming for
ward, he would increase the risk of open hostility from the Emperor of
the French. Sicily was chosen as the scene for initiating a general move
ment having Italian unity for its scope. Rosolino Pilo and Crispi were
the principal agents in organising the insurrection; both were Sicilian
refugees; they went disguised from England to Sicily for the purpose,
and the former was in effect the chief of the insurrection until Garibaldi
arrived. He was killed just before the taking of Palermo., The plan of
the intended movement was this:—“It was proposed that revolution, be
ginning in Sicily, should pass thence into the kingdom of Naples; all
Southern Italy once gained over to the national cause through popular
�28
Sicilian Insurrection—Garibaldi lands.
action, the Venetian states would be attached by sea and land, in concert
with internal insurrection. It was hoped that Victor Emanuel would
be then forced to cast in his lot unreservedly -with the Italian people,
lest he should lose the prospect of the Italian crown; and the people of
the North and South thus united, would say to Louis Napoleon, “ Now
deliver up our capital. You may remember how the Sicilian insurrection,
which broke out prematurely, maintained itself for about six weeks un
til Garibaldi landed at Marsala from G-enoa with just a thousand volun
teers. On his march towards Palermo he first encountered four thou
sand Neapolitans whom he defeated at Calatafimi. His little force was
then joined by two or three thousand of the insurgents under Posilino
Pilo. As he advanced towards Palermo, an army of twelve thousand
men issued forth to meet him; and here Garibaldi made use of a strata
gem which just illustrates his genius. Out of the direct road to Palermo,
a road branches off leading to the mountains and the ulterior of the
island; but Garibaldi knew that out of this road, at a distance of some
twenty or thirty miles, there branched another which returned to Palermo
on the other side. Instead of meeting the twelve thousand Neapolitans,
Garibaldi took the road leading into the interior, and they immediately
followed in pursuit of him. When he arrived at the branch road which
led back to Palermo, he with his little army turned into that, sending on
his artillery, however—he had two guns—still upon the road into the
interior. The twelve thousand Neapolitans, following the track of the
guns and other signs of the march of troops which were purposely placed
to mislead them, went on into the interior; and were still pursuing these
two guns, thinking they had Garibaldi before them, after he was in
possession of Palermo. By this stratagem he got rid of nearly half of
the garrison of the city.
’
At Palermo, Garibaldi was soon joined by thousands of volunteers
from Northern Italy. With nearly thirty thousand men he arrived at
the Straits of Messina, and gained another battle over a Neapolitan
army at Milazzo. But the Piedmontese Government dreaded the
spreading of revolution, and made an effort to prevent Garibaldi from
crossing into Naples. Victor Emanuel himself wrote to him desiring
him not to cross, while at the same time severe measures were taken
to prevent anymore volunteers from embarking in the ports of Northern
Italy. Garibaldi, however, was firm, and crossed the Straits.
From Calabria he advanced without resistance to Naples. The
Neapolitan soldiers on his road seemed awe-struck. As the vanguard
of the volunteer army approached, bodies of troops joined in the shout
—“Viva l’Italia! Viva Garibaldi!” and eithei' fraternised with the
volunteers or retired and let them pass. Once, a few officers, Mario,
Missouri, and some others, miles in advance of their army, came sud
denly upon a force of six thousand Neapolitans. They expected to be
made prisoners, but they cried—“ Viva l’ltalia ! Viva Garibaldi! ” There
was magic in the sound. Six thousand, men laid down their arms, and
the shout—“Viva Garibaldi! Viva l’ltalia!” was echoed to the skies
*
One may almost imagine that these men heard the voices of the martyrs
who for so many years had been dying for the great hope of national
unity, saying to them, '“ Ye, also, are Italians : stand by ; let Italy’s
deliverer pass!”
�His Victories.
29
The King dared not wait for his approach, but fled from Naples to
Capua-, taking with him the remains of his army, about forty thousand
men.
What military pomp, what glitter of royal ceremonial, can compare
with the glory of that heart-felt enthusiasm which saluted the entrance
of Garibaldi into Naples ! He came worn and ragged; his army was
miles behind ; he was accompanied only by half-a-dozen officers as
ragged as himself. No glittering epaulets, gold lace, or plumes. But
the Neapolitans beheld him in his old red shirt with a radiance around
him ; he was encircled to their eyes by the bright and glorious aureole
of the Italian idea.
Soon afterwards, on the 1st October, was fought the battle of Maddalena, or of the Volturno, near Capua. There eighteen thousand volun
teers completely defeated the entire army of the King of Naples. The
battle was obstinate and bloody ; it lasted from dawn till evening. In the
army of the King of Naples remained his choicest soldiers. There were
his guards and his Swiss battalions ; and Garibaldi said of them after the
battle, that they fought better than he had ever seen French or Austrians
fight. It was the last battle of this marvellous campaign. The original
plan of the movement, as it was projected when the Sicilian insurrection
was prepared, had so far been carried out precisely as it had been in
tended, but it was only half completed; and now it was arrested; not
by the force of the King of Naples—his last effort in the field was made
at the Volturno, and ho could only hold out for a time at Gaeta or in
other fortresses ; not by the power of Austria or of France ; but by the
Piedmontese government and the moderate party, simply through fear
of the democratic tendencies inherent in popular insurrections and in
these volunteer forces.
I have told you how Cavour tried to dissuade Garibaldi from crossing
the straits into the kingdom of Naples. Failing in this, he foresaw
that Garibaldi would triumph throughout the South, and would advance
through the Roman States along the shores of the Adriatic to Venetia.
Then Piedmont would be forced into war with Austria, not in alliance
with a foreign power, but in alliance with the revolution. At all risks
he determined to avoid this ; he hated or feared the revolution more
than Austria. Fie took a bold step ; he resolved to anticipate Garibaldi
and. the revolution, and to occupy the ground before them, by sending
a Piedmontese army into the Roman provinces on the Adriatic, so to
enter the north of the Neapolitan kingdom. The diplomatic documents
of the time show the motives by which Cavour professed to be influenced
in explaining the step to the French Emperor. Baron Talleyrand, the
French Ambassador at Turin, reporting a conversation with Cavour,
thus repeats his words :—“ If we are not in Umbria and the Marches
bexore Garibaldi we are lost; the revolution will invade central Italy :
we are forced to act.” And Thouvenel, the French Minister, in a
diplomatic circular of the I Sth October, thus reports Cavour’s own
exposition of his motives, made to the Emperor at Chambery, by the
Italian envoy Farini:—
e< Signor Farini has explained to the Emperor the very embarrassing
and dangerous position in which the triumph of the revolution, to a
certain extent personified in Garibaldi, threaten to place the Govern-
�Cavour sends an Army to the South—His Motive.
ment of his Sardinian Majesty. Garibaldi was on the point of freely
traversing the Roman states, raising the populations as he went, and,
had he once passed that frontier, it would have been impossible to
prevent an attack upon Venice. The Government of Turin had but one
mode left open to it to prevent that eventuality, and that was to enteri
the Marches and Umbria as soon as the approach of Garibaldi had
pioduced disturbance there, and then advancing, without infringing on
the authority of the Pope, to give battle, if it should be necessary, to the
revolution in the Neapolitan territory. Afterwards to request a con
gress to decide upon the destinies of Italy.”
ko, you see, this army which was sent to invade the Roman provinces
and enter the kingdom of Naples, was sent not so much for the sake of
completing Garibaldi s victories—Cavour did not doubt his triumphant
advance—as to supersede him and the revolution ; to give battle to him
if he persisted. Garibaldi yielded, as he afterwards told Cavour in the
chamber at Turin, to avoid the risk of civil war; and retired broken
hearted to his little Island of Caprera. He was even insulted by the
offer of pensions and a dukedom; it seemed as if the men of the govern
ment were as incapable of understanding him as of imitating him. The
remnant of his glorious and now veteran army of volunteers dispei'sed.
Apostles of an idea, they had fought neither for gold, nor a decoration,
nor the smile of a prince. On the long road from Marsala to the
Volturno how many of them had fallen 1 At Calatafimi, Palermo,
Melazzo, and on the Volturno. When, after his last battle, Garibaldi
decreed a medal for the thousand who started with him from Genoa,
little more than four hundred were found alive to receive it.
Before Garibaldi gave place to the royal army and the royal govern
ment, he. did the best he could, however, to place the King under a
moral obligation to continue and complete the work himself, in which
he was thus superseding his, Garibaldi’s, own action. The election
of the King by the population of the South was certain, Garibaldi had
inscribed the name of Victor Emanuel on his bannei’ in association with
that of Italy. Now he took care that the form of the plebiscite should
be no unconditional election; no mere annexation of the South to the
Kingdom of Piedmont. The form was as follows :—We vote that Italy
be one and indivisible, with Victor Emanuel and his descendents for
constitutional kings. This clearly signified that the South united with
the North under his rule, in order to accumulate the force of twentytwo millions of Italians in his hands, and render him strong enough to
make Italy, one, by driving the Austrians from Venice, and the
French from Rome.
When Cavour, in the Parliament at Turin, announced the King’s
acceptance of this vote, he for the first time proclaimed the adhesion of
the Government to the principle of unity; but while doing so, there
w’as some sign of evading the obligation of practically completing this
unity ; for he said that wai’ for the Venetia would at that moment be
displeasing to the great powers, and that, though Rome would, no doubt
be theirs, it must be with the consent of the Emperor of the French.
I do not condemn Cavour that, up to this period, he, or the Pied
montese government, did not work for unity. True nationality resides
in the hearts of a people, and the effort to constitute themselves as one
�Cavour’s Policy.
31
State should come from them, and be the expression of their conscious
ness that they form together one collective life. If this movement for
unity had been fomented by a Prince or his minister, it would have
sunk from being the assertion of a right, and from the dignity of a
principle, into the vulgar wickedness of royal ambition and State
aggrandisement. But though a Prince cannot initiate a truly national
movement, he may obey the call of a people whose aspiration to
national existence is manifest, and help them in the struggle : and I
do condemn Cavour that, after 1860, when the king might have said to
European Governments:—“Behold, I am not led by ambition; I but
obey the call of the Italian people : ”—he then evaded or indefinitely
postponed the fulfilment of the implied condition of Victor Emanuel’s
election. I know it may be argued with some show of reason that
postponement might be the wisest course, the surest path to eventual
success. But then it should have been postponement for a few months
only, postponement for the sake of preparation. Whereas Cavour,
instead of arming the country, encouraging the formation of more
volunteer forces, making all possible naval and military preparations,
showed the old spirit of subserviency to Louis Napoleon, and distrust
of the Italian people generally, but especially of all those who had
been instrumental in the revolutionary changes that had made Victor
Emanuel already king of three-fourths of Italy.
It is a common mistake in England to suppose that Cavour worked
for the unity of Italy ; and, as he represented the influence and action
of the Piedmontese Government, it is important to correct this mistake.
It originated, I imagine, in this way :—After the banner of unity had
proved in the hands of Garibaldi to be that of victory, and the
Piedmontese Government accepted it as their own; the moderate party
and the members of the Government, in their eagerness to identify
themselves with this banner, began to speak and write of it as if it
had long 1 epresented their aspirations and their aim. This tone was
natural enough, and to be expected, in the ministerial press of Italy;
but it was curious to observe how an influential portion of our own
pi ess blindly followed the example; and many of our newspaper
correspondents in Italy adopted this tone after 1860, whose letters of a
year or two before remained to show, that, at that time, it never
occurred to them to connect the policy of Piedmont, or of Cavour, with
what they then still considered a dangerous and Mazzinian Utopia.
The truth is, that, up to I860, the policy of Cavour, as far as it
extended to Italy generally, was in favour of a settlement of the
countiy on the basis of a federation of States; and whenever he
spoke of Italian nationality, he meant no more than this. Indeed, at
the Congress of Paris, in 1856, he proposed a still further division of
Italy,.by forming the Legations into an eighth Italian State. His great
ambition, and his aim, almost from his first becoming minister, had
merely been to form Piedmont into a kingdom of Northern Italy by the
acquisition of Lombardy, and, perhaps, some further aggrandisement at
the expense of Austria. And, to carry out this aim, he had always
looked to the help of France. It was but a repetition of the old policy
begun by Ludovico Sforza, imitated by many Italian statesmen, and
condemned by almost every historian—that of bringing in the French
�32
Cavour's Policy.
against the Germans. This help, of course he knew, was to be pur
chased only by concessions, either to France or to the Imperial Family J
and it was at length so purchased in 1859. Two years previously, he
had encouraged intrigues and conspiracies for revolutionising Naples,
and placing a Murat on the throne ; always with a view of obtaining
the favour of the Emperor of the French ; and the proposal to form the
Legations into a separate State, was probably made with the idea of
giving a throne to a Buonapartist Prince.
One circumstance alone seems to connect Cavour’s policy with a
thought of unity. He was supposed to give secret encouragement
to a society called the National Society, formed in Piedmont two or
three years before the war, by La Farini and a few of the more
advanced moderates. This association acquired some importance
by enrolling Garibaldi for a short time among its members, though
he separated from it after the peace at Villafranca. Its programme
may be. thus described:—Independence, Unification. The substitution
of the latter' word for unity, signifying that Italy was to be made
one as by some agency acting upon her; it pointed to the exclusion
of revolutionary or popular action in the work, and implied rather
the operation of regular armies. The idea of the association appeared
to be the extension of Piedmont, little by little, as any combination
in European politics might give help from without. Such support as
Cavour gave to this association was no doubt given in part because it
opposed Mazzini’s teaching of popular action ; and also because, in case
the tendency to unity proved a reality, it would attract that tendency to
Piedmont as a centre. Still, not only his avowed policy, but his actual
efforts were directed to a settlement of Italy as a federation of States.
And it is remarkable that after Garibaldi was in Sicily, at the time when
Cavour hoped he would not extend the revolution beyond that Island,
negociations were going on between the Piedmontese and Neapolitan
governments for a settlement of Italy as three States ; a kingdom of the
North, one of the South, and the papacy in the centre; with some sort
of federation or alliance between the three. I confess, my own opinion
is that Cavour was one of the last among the Italians to acquire faith
in the achievement of unity. He represented essentially the views and
feelings of the moderate party; and the leaders of that party, material
ists themselves, without enthusiasm, love, or genius, were slow to believe
in the devotion of the multitude to a grand and unselfish idea. Cavoufll
had faith in the power of interests rather than ideas ; and was not the
man to devote the energies of a life to realise a great conception of uni
certain practicability. And when the events of 18G0 had convinced the
most sceptical that unity was the true goal of the movement, instead of
looking to means corresponding in grandeur with the aim, instead of
stimulating the enthusiasm and developing all the powers of the country,
his plan for working in the direction of that aim, was a revival of the
French alliance against Austria of 1859. In the meantime he tried to
lull the people into inertness by vain hopes, teaching them that if they
remained tranquil all might be done for them by their great protector^
Negociations were undoubtedly going on continually for such an alli
ance ; the terms discussed were a cession of the island of Sardinia, and
co-operation with France in a war for the provinces on the Rhine in
�Party of Action in the Italian Chamber.
33
case Prussia came to the aid of Austria ; as Prussia probably would do
if Austria were attacked in Italy by the French. Such negociations
might or might not have come to any thing, they terminated at the
death of Cavour; though subsequent Italian ministers have been
inclined to the same policy.
Even if independence of Austria could be thus achieved, what wellwisher to the Italians would desire it? Independence and unity for
Italy form one of those aims whose value depends upon the manner of
achieving it. The limbs might be put together; the form might be
complete in all its fair proportions, and Italy remain a corpse. The
consciousness of independence, the sense of theii’ own power and dignity,
all that constitutes a nation’s life—the spirit that should animate the
body—might yet be wanting. I confess, for my own part, had I the
power now by merely opening my hand, to give the Italians at once a
complete and independent national existence, I would not do it. For
their own sakes, and because I wish them well, I would not do it. Let
them win it for themselves. Let them obey God’s law—fulfil the duty
first, then enter on the enjoyment of the right.
When the Giovine Italia first raised the banner of unity, their expec
tation of practical success was logically founded on the conviction that
a people of twenty-six millions can be independent and united, if they
resolutely will it. During a long apostleship of thirty years, they have
striven by precept and example to rouse the Italians to a new life of
enthusiasm and energy. They intended that the Italians should deserve
and become fitted for national existence by the very struggle to obtain
it. I remember in one of his earliest addresses to his disciples, the
founder of the Gio vine Italia thus wrote :—
“ Think how grand,, how religious, and holy, is the work that God
confides to us ; the creation of a people! It never can be done by
crooked ways, or court intrigues ; nor by doctrines invented just to meet
the circumstances of the moment; but only by long struggles, by the
living example of austere virtue set to the multitude, by resolutely and
unceasingly teaching the truth, by the boldness of faith, by the expen
diture of our blood, and by such a solemn, undying, never-failing
enthusiasm, as should be stronger than any suffering or misfortune
that can afflict the heart of man.”
Who can dispute either in a practical or a moral sense the soundness
of this teaching ? Who can deny that it was the very way to accomplish
unity ? And even whenever the monarchy and its regular forces have
come in and taken part, it has been because the people were acting
without them.
When the North and South were first united under the sceptre of
Victor Emanuel, the party of action had resolved to give the monarchy
a fair trial as a means of completing unity. In assembling the first
Italian Parliament, Cavour applied to the elections for Italy the electoral
suffrage in use in Piedmont. This suffrage is so narrow that probably,
on the average, the sitting members have not polled more than three
hundred votes apiece. The use of this suffrage, together with the exer
tion of Government influence, had the effect pf introducing into the
chamber a large majority of the moderate party. This result was
assisted Ho doubt by the fact that the candidates of this party were as
D
�34
Attempt on the Venetia stopped.
loud in their expressions of devotion to unity during the elections, as
if they had been working for it all their lives. Thus a state of things
which had been brought about by the people acting under the influence
of the party of action, was to be regulated in its development by the
moderate party ; and here was an inevitable source of future discord and
confusion. Nevertheless the party of action, represented by about a
sixth of the entire chamber, acted loyally, and laboured constitutionally
to obtain the arming of the country, and a development of all its powers
to bring to a completion the great national work. First, they endea
voured to obtain the introduction into Italy of a system of militia,
resembling that in Switzerland ; where, out of a population of a million
and a half, it supplies two hundred and fifty thousand armed and trained
men. It would have given more than two millions in Italy. Failing in
this, they struggled for permission to form volunteer regiments as in
England. But these and other efforts which they made for arming the
people were all made in vain; and even the regular army was but very
gradually and slowly increased.
When the party of action, after nearly two years of patient trial,
found that the monarchy would not spontaneously continue the move
ment, it turned again to work out its mission in tho old way. Prepara
tions were made in the spring of 1862, for a movement in the Tyrol,
and the Italian provinces of Austria. Insurrection and an invasion of
volunteers were to take place at once. Some twenty or thirty thousand
volunteers would have entered those provinces at four different points,
and communications were established with Hungarian troops in Italy.
While these preparations were in progress, both Mazzini and Garibaldi
appealed to Rattazzi, then Minister,—the one appealing to him in
writing from England, the other personally—in this sense:—They
entreated him not to check such a movement, if only in the interest of
the monarchy itself. A Government, they said, based upon a half
accomplished revolution, cannot remain secure if it ceases to identify
itself with the aim of the revolution ; and the continued postponement
of any preparation for accomplishing this aim, must eventually lead to
anarchy and civil discord. They promised him that if the attempt
should fail, the party of action would take the whole responsibility,
and the Government should not be compromised; but that if the
insurrection maintained itself successfully for two or three weeks, the
Italian Government could then step in, and the leadership of the war
with Austria should be abandoned to it. Rattazzi seemed half to
acquiesce.
Before these preparations were mature, all was stopped by the Italian
Government. It was said, and probably with reason, that Louis Na- 1
poleon, informed of what was going on by his spies or those of Austria,
sent orders to Ratazzi to do so. Volunteers were flocking towards the
Austrian frontier’ in small separate bands. Suddenly, four hundred
were arrested at once at Sarnico ; others at Brescia. Two officers,
Colonels Nullo and Catabene, were arrested in the presence of Gari
baldi, who had just arrived at Sarnico himself. It was during an
impulse of indignation at this check, which he imputed to the orders or
the influence of the Emperor of the French, that Garibaldi went to
Sicily, and commenced the movement against Rome which terminated
at Aspramonte.
�Garibaldi prepares to move on Rome.
85
When Garibaldi conceived this project of attaking the French in
Rome, Mazzini was not at hand to counsel him; and when he wrote
from Sicily to Mazzini in England, to say what he was doing, the latter
answered:—“ You know I thought it would be wiser to organise a new
attempt on the Venetia rather than to move on Rome, but now you
have raised the cry, ‘ Rome or Death,’ and the people of Sicily have
responded to it, we must go on. I am with you with my whole heart,
and hope to meet you at Naples.” He left England and was already
in Italy, on his way to join Garibaldi, when he heard of the disaster at
Aspramonte.
No doubt this enterprise of Garibaldi was imprudent. What then ?
Have not all freedom’s battles been fought against fearful odds ? Had
not Greece a hopeless cause against Persia ; has not Poland against
Russia ? But however imprudent this enterprise may have been, it was
not so desperate as our newspapers seemed to think it. It was under
taken in the hope that the Italian army would refuse to act against
him. Nor was this hope altogether unreasonable, for until he reached
Aspramonte, it had refused to do so ; and the regiments which acted
then, had been selected and brought from Northern Italy on purpose.
If he had approached Naples, that city would undoubtedly have declared
for him. Then, the country with him, and the army not against him,
the king must have changed his ministers and joined him too. There
would have been people, army, prince,—all the powers of the country
combined in the great enterprise. When Garibaldi found the troops
prepared to act, his hope of success was extinguished in a moment; he
never dreamt of civil war. And what can be grander than his majestic
figure when he was a target for the bullets of the royal soldiers, and
exclaiming to his volunteers “ Non fate fuoco ? ”
I must say I rejoiced to see that in judging this attempt, public opinion
in England, after vibrating for a few days, took the nobler side. Let a
man conquer, thousands glorify his name, be his cause divine or devilish;
but most among us visited with our sympathies the conquered, the
wounded, the imprisoned. We told the down-fallen that he was still a
hero for all who love a righteous cause.
Under the Government of the Italian kingdom—a kingdom brought
into existence by the movement for unity—a Government identifying
itself by its professions with this principle—we see the two men who
have been the Apostle and the Warrior of the movement; one an exile,
the other wounded.
And in my opinion, the policy of tbe Government, or the moderate
party, is as unwise as it is ungenerous. The national movement is from
its nature essentially democratic in every country; it is the first great
step on the true path of democratic progress in Europe ; but when
Mazzini, after the peace of Villafranca, invited the King to identify
himself unreservedly with the national aspiration; when Garibaldi a
year afterwards dragged him into connexion with it, by coupling the
name of Victor Emanuel with that of Italy in all his proclamations in
Sicily and Naples, they were drawing him into the only path for the
safety of his throne. Mazzini told him the truth when he said:—“If
you have a soul capable of loving or understanding the Italian people,
you know you may trust to their gratitude for your reward,”
D 2
�36
Future Prospects of the Italian Movement.
I imagine your sympathies have been raised during this narrative in
favour of the party of action ; and this, not merely because in this party
has resided the whole initiative of the movement, but because it includes
all that is most generous and manly among the Italians; all that gives
hope of the uprising of that people to a nobler character and a better
life. And this party in Italy is but the type of such parties which exist
elsewhere. In Poland, it has suffered as in Italy; in Hungary too ;
wherever this national aspiration exists, or is growing up, such a party
is formed or forming. Its members are the three hundred of Ther
mopylae; the forlorn hope of the movement.
In every country the many, high or low, rich or poor, are incapable
of sustained devotion to an unselfish object. For the poor, there are
daily wants, and daily wants are selfish counsellors ; the rich are often
frivolous, corrupt, and sensual. The many may be roused from time to
time into enthusiasm and heroism, but they sink again into intervals of
apathy and inertness. The party of action represents in each country
the sustained, unflagging, active devotion to the cause. Theirs is not
merely the courage of the warrior, which has led them often, few in
number, badly armed, undisciplined, to confront numerous and disci
plined legions; but the courage of the apostle; the devotion to a
cherished faith, which lias led them to encounter imprisonment, exile,
death—and death called ignominious—by the executioner or the hang
man, even before their cause was thought noble by the many. When
unsustained by applause or sympathy, they suffered, supported only by
the conscience, and by the glorious faith, >that the truth they proclaimed,
however condemned it might be then as a folly or A, sin, would one day
triumph ; the seed they died to sow, sooner or later, would bear fruit.
In regard to the future prospects of the Italian struggle, it would, of
course, be idle to speculate beyond the anticipation of certain general
results. I have no doubt, however, that the party of action will, before
long, succeed in producing a movement in the Venetia and the Italian
Tyrol, which will drag the government into war with Austria. A war
so initiated, would be a war by the Italian people, not for themselves
alone, but in the name of the principle of nationality ; and would
necessarily be carried on in alliance with what is called the revolution.
There would be insurrection in Hungary; perhaps in other parts of the
Austrian Empire. The movement in Poland would revive; and the
three nationalities which are preparing to rise upon the ruins of the
Turkish Empire, would probably begin the struggle. These three
nationalities are—the Greek, which would extend beyond the limits of
the present kingdom ; a Roumaine nationality, forming round the
Danubian principalities, and which ought to take in some territory
belonging now both to Russia and to Austria; and a Sclave nationality
of which Servia would be the. nucleus.
The leaders of the national parties in all these countries are in com
munication with each other, and a general and simultaneous movement
has been for some time in contemplation. It was the knowledge that
such a movement was preparing, which induced the Russian government
to order the forced levy in Poland in the beginning of last year, which
drove the party of action in that country into a premature and separate
insurrection, Many circumstances combined with the want of prepara-
�^^Future Prospects of the Italian Movement.
37
tion to prevent the example of Poland from being followed at the 'time.
Among these were the slowness of Garibaldi’s recovery, which made it
impossible for him, last summer, to take part in a campaign ; and the
prudent attitude of neutrality assumed at first by Austria towards Poland,
which assisted the moderates of Hungary in checking insurrection in
that country.
The result of such a war by the Italians against Austria for the
Venetia, can scarcely, I think, be doubted. Austria is strong in a con
test with any great military power ; in such a contest her armies will
hold together, and the question of success becomes little else than a dry
calculation of mere material elements; the comparative strength of the
artillery, and the numbers of the men, who are influenced on one side
by no higher motive than on the other, and are scarcely less machines
than the muskets that they bear. But Austria is weak against insur
rection of her own subjects; then there are moral elements at work,
which give enthusiasm to one side and paralyse the other. For evi
dence of this, we need but compare the power she displayed, in 1859,
against France and Piedmont, with her feebleness in 1848, in the contest
with popular insurrection in Hungary and the Lombardo-Venetian pro
vinces. But, besides all the power of revolution, of volunteer forces, and
popular insurrection, there is now a regular force of three hundred thou
sand soldiers at the disposal of the Italian Government; and, large as is
the army of Austria, still, from the extent of her dominions, no part of
which can be denuded of troops, she never has been able to bring more
than one hundred and seventy or one hundred and eighty thousand men
into Italy.
Perhaps it may be asked;—If the Italian Government disposes of an
army capable of carrying on war successfully for the. Venetia, why
should it be assumed that the initiation of the war will come from the
party of action, instead of from the Government? The answer to such
a question may be found in much I have already said, but, at the risk
of repetition, I reply:—The Italian Government, by postponing any
advance for four years, has not only shown that it has not the desire to
advance, but may be said to have lost the right to do so. The king is
bound by his relations with other governments, and it is only under
manifest pressure from his subjects that he has a right to act.
Without such pressure, it would be but a war of aggression, and a viola
tion of treaties on his part; and the government of Victoi Emanuel has
*
now contrived to keep his subjects tranquil for four years without either
Rome or Venice. In the meantime, it has accepted—and with rejoicing,
too—the recognition of his dominions, as they are, from France, Russia,
and other Powers ; this recognition being given, professedly, on the
supposition that the government would not attempt to extend those
dominions. The attitude of the moderate party, which holds the reins
of government, is now what it has always been. It opposes every
attempt to advance, but whenever insurrection succeeds and an advance
is made, it advances too, in ordei' to secure what is gained to the mo
narchical interest; then its opposition is directed against the next step.
And now both the practical and moral requirements of the problem
demand that a fresh initiative of action should come from the people.
Of course the result of such a war would depend much upon the
t
�38
Louis Napoleon’s Position in Italy.
neutrality of the Emperor of the French. But so long as the Italians
made no attack on Rome, he could scarcely find a pretext for acting
against them; and Austria once driven out of Italy, or weakened by
internal revolution, they might turn to Louis Napoleon, and treat with
him on a footing of equality for the evacuation of their capital. Let the
Italians but have a chance of taking their two enemies in turn, and if
they do not win their national existence, they do not deserve it. The
power of either France or Austria to retain its hold on Italy, is derived
from the presence of the other in the country.
My sketch of the Italian question would be incomplete, did I not
devote a few words expressly to an estimate of the past and present
attitude of Louis Napoleon towards Italy. And whether I look to the
past, or endeavour to raise the veil of the future, the Emperor of the
French appears always to me the worst enemy of Italian unity, indepen
dence, and liberty. The Emperor of Austria and the Italian Princes
inherited their positions in Italy. In struggling to maintain their power,
they have been defending what they considered rights. They have been
the necessary and open enemies of the national movement, which grew
up among the Italians always with a knowledge that these enemies must
be encountered and overcome. But Louis Napoleon created his position
in Italy for purposes of his own ambition : he came, a new, unexpected,
unprovoked enemy.
Those among the Italians, whose policy it has been, of late years, to
persuade their countrymen that he is at heart not unfriendly to the
Italian cause, generally assert that he is not altogether responsible for
the restoration of the Papal Government, in 1849 ; they say, too, that
Austria might have restored it if he had not; and then they point
triumphantly to Solferino and Magenta. These views have even some
times found an echo in England. Now, the expedition to Rome was
sent in consequence of an agreement entered into with the Pope by the
French Government—Louis Napoleon being President of the Republic—
that the Papal sovereignty should be re-established. The Roman Re
public was destroyed as a preliminary step to the destruction of that of
France; French soldiers were to be taught at Rome to fire upon a
republican flag; and Louis Napoleon was sagacious enough to foresee
that the Papacy, restored by him, would be for ever dependent on him
for its existence at Rome; and might become a great power in his
hands, both to forward his designs on the French crown, and for future
influence in Europe. Nor was therein Italy, at the time of the French
invasion, any power that was capable, as far as we can judge, of over
throwing the infant republic of Rome. You may remember, I told you
that the Romans, so far from fearing Austria, were making preparations,
before the French invasion, to take the offensive against her, and to
send an army to act in concert with the Venetians, and with renewed
popular insurrection in Lombardy. Even during the armistice with the
French, the triumvirs appealed to Oudinot to make the armistice certain
for fifteen days—it could be broken at twenty-four hours’ notice—that
their forces might go out from Rome and give battle to the Austrians.!
“ If you will grant this,” said the triumvirs, “ we are convinced we shall
as easily drive the Austrians from our territory as we have driven the
Neapolitans.” And there can be little doubt but they would have done
�The Papal Church at Rome.
39
so. We must bear in mind that the Austrian armies always dwindled
as they approached Central Italy; every city taken had to be garrisoned, and the force was but small which was advancing in the Roman
States. Oudinot, however, refused, and a few days afterwards received
an order from Louis Napoleon to put an end to the armistice and take
possession of Rome at once.
Nor was Louis Napoleon more a friend of the Italians in 1859, when
he declared war against Austria in the name of Italian independence—
why did he not make them independent of himself ?—and received gravely
and self-complacently the acclamations of the people, hailing him as their
“Magnanimous Liberator,” than he was in 1849. There is a fable, per
haps familiar to most of you, of a wolf and a shepherd. The wolf,
feeling disposed to vary the mode of his depredations on the sheepfold,
took an opportunity, when the shepherd was asleep, to steal his hat and
cloak, and, putting them on himself, in this costume gained easy access
to the sheepfold. This wolf, I think, must have been at a school kept
by a fox, he was so cunning. But the wolf, though he had on the shep
herd’s cloak, was the wolf still, with all his wolfish instincts; and when
Louis Napoleon, in 1859, put on the hat and the cloak of a “ Magnani
mous Liberator,” he was the same Louis Napoleon, with the same in
stincts and interests of a despot, as when, in 1849, he sent word to
Oudinot to put an end to the armistice and enter Rome.
The national movement never incurred a greater risk of having its
course perverted or arrested for years, than it did in 1859, through that
scheme for a federation of States under the Presidency of the Pope, and
with a Buonapartist Prince on some Italian throne. It would have
been a condemnation to perpetual feebleness and dependence upon Louis
Napoleon. And he now holds the capital of Italy, keeping the country
in confusion and the movement in suspense, stimulating discord, and
striving to keep the Italians in both moral and material weakness.
Connected with the subject of the French occupation, there is a ques
tion which occurs to the minds of most people :—What will become of
the spiritual authority of the Popes in Italy, when the temporal power
falls with the retirement of the French ?
It was always evident that with the realisation of unity, the temporal
sovereignty of the Popes must cease; it did not necessarily follow, how
ever, that the spiritual authority would fall too. But the spiritual
power, as’an influence on the religious feelings and the minds of men,
has long been dying in Italy, whatever may be its prospect of duration
in other countries. If, however, it had any vitality remaining a few
years since, it certainly received its death-blow by the French invasion,
and restoration of the temporal sovereignty. Oudinot took Rome at
the cost, not merely of the blood of three thousand of the noblest,
bravest hearts of Italy, but at the cost of the last chance for the con
tinuance in that country of the spiritual authority of the Popes.
The Papal Church in the Middle Ages, as a religious agency, helped
the nations of Europe in their moral development, awoke in the soul a
feeling of human dignity, protected the humble and defenceless, and
fostered the noblest creations of the human mind in that age; but its
temporal power acted always in an opposite sense. A struggle gradually
ripened between the liberty which the Church herself had fostered in
�40
Conchtding Remarks on the National Idea.
the hearts of Christian peoples, and the local temporal despotism for
which she strove ; till at length, in the sixteenth century, she abandoned and sacrificed her religious mission for the sake of this local
political power; she sought foreign aid to prop it, and the alliance then
commenced between the Papacy and European despotism for mutual
support. From that time, the influence of the Church upon the Italian
people began to decay, and, in 1848, the truth became at once apparent,
that the Papal power in Italy had no hold on the sympathies or real
religious sentiments that were in the hearts of the multitude. Never
did revolution express more clearly the will of an entire people. No
arm among the subjects of the Pope was raised to support his government. In a population of less than three millions, three hundred and
forty-three thousand men voted in the elections for the Assembly,
though knowing that excommunication hung over the heads of all who
voted ; and the abolition of the temporal power of the Popes was decreed
by this Assembly with only five dissentient voices. Yet there are living
elements of religious life among the Italians, and perhaps some new
organisation of the Church will arise from the links of charity and goodwill which bind the people to the parochial clergy in contradistinction
to the Roman Hierarchy.
Let us now, in concluding, return to a consideration of the Idea
which produces and regulates these attempts—the great Thought that
floats over Europe.
The sketch I have given you of the Italian movement has been presented chiefly to illustrate the nature of this Idea, and throughout the
narrative I have taken pains to show that the movement has arisen
from no artificial impulse given from without, and that the Government
has exercised no real leadership, for here lies the whole question of the
nature of the motive-power at work. The probable vitality of the
movement, the grandeur of its results, its beiug a movement of creation
introducing a new system and a new era, all evidently depend upon the
fact that it represents a force coming from within, and is the expression
of feelings and ideas in the people’s hearts. So I have taken pains to
place in their true light the respective positions held by the moderate
*
party and the national party, or party of action; and to show clearly
the parts played in the great drama by Cavour on one side, and by
Mazzini and Garibaldi on the other; for while the former represents
only the influence and action of the Piedmontese Government, the two
latter represent the aspirations and the action of the Italian people,
As often happens at any great crisis, before a great coming change,
there rose up in Italy the representative man—the O
genius who peneX
J
X
trated the secret of the future, and with his breath wakened into life
and into flame the smouldering fire. Then by his side there gradually
appeared the yet more dazzling figure of the warrior; the two together
incarnating the force, grandeur, and devotedness of the popular aspiration.
The definition which I gave you of the national idea towards the
opening of my first lecture, corresponds, as you may have observed,
with the general views concerning it expressed by Mazzini more than
thirty years ago ; and you have seen how his views have been confirmed
by the course of events. He who could discern the coming movement
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�Concluding Remarks on the National Idea.
41
while yet preparing in the world of thought, before it had shaped itself
into facts which all can see ; who could detect, so long ago, what was
real and living, and contained the germs of the future, in the political
agitation of the time, and, identifying himself with it, become instru
mental in the fulfilment of his own predictions, ought now to be accepted
as an authority for the real signification and future tendency of the
movement. And those who for so many years were accustomed to call
him prophet in derision, because he foretold the rising up of nationali
ties, and declared there was an instinct of national unity in the hearts of
the Italians, which needed but to be awakened,—now, that they can no
longer dispute the truth of his predictions, ought in fairness to hail him
prophet in another sense.
I believe all that vague feeling of love of country, which throughout
history we find manifesting itself almost like an instinct in the heart,
and which has led so often to sublime acts of heroism and self-devotion ;
which gives a sense of wrong and degradation under a foreign rule, and
makes each man feel himself a participator in the greatness or glory of
his country,—I believe all these feelings, to which we give the general
name of patriotism, are developing into a purer and higher sentiment,
and taking a more definite form, in this great idea of nationality ; this
idea raising the conception of the nation by connecting it with the sense
of a duty owing by the nation to humanity. And those populations
which are agitating to break through the arbitrary and artificial arrange
ment of states created by conquest or diplomacy, in order to define and
constitute their own collective or national lives,—whether they are
forming according to race, language, religion, historical traditions, or
geographical boundaries which sometimes mark a country as by the hand
of nature for the abode of one people,—are guided above all, in the
groups they form, by an instinctive sense of having common tendencies,
and a common aim or mission, at which they are to work together in the
organisation and division of human labour.
One word now as to our own attitude and the policy of our Govern
ment towards the movement.
With this grand European problem before us; this immense hope of •
national existence fermenting in the minds of European peoples, and
the soil of Europe upheaving with the germs of young nations bursting
into life to replace the old empires that are dying,—with all this
before us, let us no longer dream that there is only a malady that may
be cured by some doses of constitutional liberty, or local concessions of
semi-independence. Those who always counsel moderation, or gradual
and prudent change, may give us excellent advice. Ours is a normal
state of healthy existence and pacific progress ; there is no question of
our national existence, or of defending or recovering our independence ;
but while moderation may be wisdom or virtue in one case, it may be
folly or cowardice in the other. If you are satisfied from what you
have heard, that the movement corresponds with the wants of the age,
and that it must advance by revolution ; that is, by the efforts and
struggles of the populations themselves; then revolution in those
countries ought to be for us a subject not of apprehension but of hope.
We are ready enough to applaud or sanction accomplished revolution,
revolution that is successful ; but this is not enough, it is revolution yet
E
�42
Our oum Policy towards the Movement.
to come, and attempts at revolution, we should approve. The move
ment is in its infancy. That which is right when achieved, it is right
to endeavour to achieve ; yet think how apt we have been to condemn
the actors in unsuccessful attempts, as silly or wicked disturbers of the
public order ; but, let success once crown their efforts, we have hailed
them as wise, and virtuous, and heroic. This acceptance of the accom
plished fact is but the cowardly and atheistical worship of success; it is
the very spirit which on Mount Calvary would have joined in the cry :—
Crucify Him ; Crucify Him I and a few centuries later, would have
bowed down to kiss the foot of the representative of Christianity, when
he sat in royal robes upon a gilded throne. In the everlasting battle of
good with evil, truth with falsehood, failures precede success ; martyrdom
, , paves the way to victory ; and the martyr is as great as the conqueror.
1 Among the great Powers of Europe, our Government is the only one
which can at all be said to represent the people, or to be the expression
of their collective thought and feeling. Hence, ours is the only one
from which any good will towards this movement might be expected.
The principle of non-intervention has often been proclaimed by Eng
land : this principle is susceptible of two interpretations. If it means an
isolated policy, adopted by ourselves alone, it is simply indifference to
all that may be going on in Europe, which does not touch our own im
mediate interests ; in effect, neutrality between good and evil. But, if
it means a principle of policy to be recognised in common by the great
Powers, as binding upon others as ourselves, and which would give us
the right to say,—“ If you interfere for evil, we will interfere for good,”
—it is the best general principle we could support in favour of the move
ment. Hitherto, apparently, we have scarcely understood it in this sense.
The Austrian empire was saved, and the national movement arrested
in 1849, by flagrant violations of the principle ; by the intervention of
Russia in Hungary, and France in Italy. And during the war with
Russia, we seemed rathe’’ to repudiate than to support it: we might
have said to Russia,—“ Let the elements of dissolution the Turkish
empire contains within itself, work as they may; we will not suffer
intervention on your part, either to hasten her dissolution, or replace
her domination by your own.” Instead of this, we proclaimed the
existence of the Turkish empire to be necessary to the balance of
power. It was a policy calculated to help the designs of the Czar, by
making the young nations which are preparing to rise upon the ruins of
that empire, look to him as their protector; for let the slave once
despair of freedom, and he may accept a new master only from hatred
of the old.
The policy of our Government has generally been little else than
making head against the necessities of the day : but if, once comprebending where there is life and where death in Europe, it should rise
abo/e the political combinations of the day, and extend its views to the
future; it might, without plunging into any revolutionary crusade,
create for itself the sympathies of those peoples destined to rise, win a
moral supremacy in Europe, and prepare a wreath of new and true
alliances for England’s brow.
*I
*
�
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Victorian Blogging
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A collection of digitised nineteenth-century pamphlets from Conway Hall Library & Archives. This includes the Conway Tracts, Moncure Conway's personal pamphlet library; the Morris Tracts, donated to the library by Miss Morris in 1904; the National Secular Society's pamphlet library and others. The Conway Tracts were bound with additional ephemera, such as lecture programmes and handwritten notes.<br /><br />Please note that these digitised pamphlets have been edited to maximise the accuracy of the OCR, ensuring they are text searchable. If you would like to view un-edited, full-colour versions of any of our pamphlets, please email librarian@conwayhall.org.uk.<br /><br /><span><img src="http://www.heritagefund.org.uk/sites/default/files/media/attachments/TNLHLF_Colour_Logo_English_RGB_0_0.jpg" width="238" height="91" alt="TNLHLF_Colour_Logo_English_RGB_0_0.jpg" /></span>
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2018
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Conway Hall Ethical Society
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Italian unity and the national movement in Europe
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Barker, John Sale
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Place of publication: [s.l.]
Collation: 42 p. ; 21 cm.
Notes: "These lectures were lately delivered at Brighton". [From preliminary page]. From the library of Dr Moncure Conway. Author not given on title page, taken from KVK. Date of publication deduced from author's preliminary note dated June 1864.
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[s.n.]
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[1864?]
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G5249
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Italy
Politics
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Conway Tracts
Europe-Politics and Government-19th Century
Italy-History-1849-1870
Italy-Politics and Government-19th Century
Nationalism
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Text
ADDRESS
TO
PJ)PE PIUS IX.
ON HIS
ENCYCLICAL LETTER.
BY
JOSEPH MAZZINI.
LONDON:
TEUBNER AND CO., 60, PATERNOSTER ROW.
1865.
PRICE
SIXPENCE.
�M m im w
—
�ADDRESS TO
POPE
PIUS
IX.
i.
By your last Encyclica you have flung your Anathema
over the civilized world, over its movement, over the
life which inspires it, as if the world, life, and move
ment were not things of God. As the tempest-tossed
mariner, seeing the waves rising higher and higher
around him, despoils himself, in desperation, even of
the things most needful to man, so you* maddened
by the restless terrors that surround the death-agony
of a despairing sinner, have thrown aside all spirit
of love, all sense of the sacredness of this Earth,
providentially designed to perfect litself, all idea of
progress defined or indicated by Christianity, all the
traditions which for eight centuries have constituted
the Papacy’s right to live, all that can make Authority
revered, and powerful for good.
The tone of those ill-advised pages is one of grief
and anger; but it is a dry and barren sorrow breathing
the egotism of one who sees his power threatened,
1—2
�4
assailed, condemned, the pitiful anger of one who
longs to doom his assailants to the faggot, but knows
himself powerless to do so.
Lost for ever in the judgment of mankind, unable
to rule a single day unsustained by the bayonet;
abandoned by the world which no longer recognizes
its spring of life in you—incapable either of self
transformation or of resignation, you expire—saddest
of all deaths—with a curse upon your lips.
Tempered by Nature to surround every great ruin
with a lingering affection, reverencing the Tradition of
Humanity and all the elements that compose it, pre
cisely because I long for and have faith in the Future,
—I had dreamed of a different death for the Institution
whose last days you are now hastening. Seventeen
years ago, you were surrounded by an applauding
Europe bidding you 11 Onward.” Before you was a
people, the Italian people, newly awakened to con
sciousness of their high destiny, who would have
served you both as arm and lever in the great work of
transformation. A single word of love from you, a
blessing called down upon Italy—so long unlooked for
from a Pope—would have been sufficient. Millions of
souls, forgetting the profanations, persecutions, and
corruptions of four centuries, would have rallied round
you, thrilling with expectant hope and blind belief.
At that time, although incredulous of any revival
of the past, yet thinking a benediction and a word of
new life from the dying Institution might prevent long
years of anarchy and rebellion,—I wrote to you:
“ Believe, and unify Italy. If God wills that old faiths
should now transform themselves; that, .starting from the
�5
foot of the Cross, dogma and worship should purify them
selves, and advance one step nearer to Cod the Father and
Educator of the World—you may, by placing yourself
between the two epochs, lead mankind to the conquest and
practice of religious truth.”1
I should have wished that mindful of the words of
Jesus :—Howbeit when He, the Spirit of truth, is come,
he will guide you unto all truth: for he shall not
speak of himself; but whatsoever he shall hear, that
shall he speak; and he will show you the things to
come,1 and understanding their sublime presentiment
2
that for direct revelation through the individual, sub
stitutes the continuous collective revelation through
Humanity—you might have said to the peoples, “ The
Spirit is with you if only you will seek after and
hearken unto it: it is where universal Tradition and
individual conscience accord; most gloriously revealed
where Genius and Virtue unite, and I am nothing
but one believer among millions.”
I could have wished that an Institution beneficent
and life-giving in the past, should have blessed in
dying the emancipation of souls, and taught that death
in the future will be the consummation of one mission,
and the initiation of another.
I could have wished that as men bow the head
before the death of Genius, and are moved to poetry
by the sinking of the sun into the invisible infinite, so
might they have learned through you to hail with
solemn and reverent affection the going-down of the
past.
1 Lettera a Pio IX., 8 Settembre, 184=7.
2 John xvi. 13.
�It was an illusion. It is decreed, perhaps to pre
vent mankind, ever unstable in their conception of
life, from losing themselves in the worship of the
dead past, that the last inheritors of worn-out Insti
tutions should present the hideous spectacle of one
who in dying clings convulsively to life, and resists in
impotent blasphemy God’s law of transformation.
So dies the Papacy. So will you die: powerless
to resuscitate life; unable to comprehend the solemnity
of death.
II.
Look around you. To whom do you speak?
Who now has faith in your words ? Foreign soldiers
protect you from the anger of your own subjects, and
those soldiers are the children of Voltaire, unbelievers
and materialists like their Master. They protect you
as the tools of a policy of dominion, seeking to gain
credit with the French Clergy, and to keep open the
way for the division of Italy into three. Were they
to leave you, you would have to try to defend your
self with a*rabble rout of mercenaries from every
country in Europe, or you would have to leave with
them. Your allies are the Neapolitan brigands; they
wear your crosses and your indulgences upon their
breasts; but cease to pay them for a single month, and
suppose that we could sink so low as to hire them in
our turn, and they would fight against you. The men
who hedge themselves around you, who flatter you,
and hail you as Pope, King, and Father of Souls,
would desert you; denying both you and your faith,
�7
the day on which you should’ remain without Princely
aid, alone with the people you call yours. I heard
that people’s curses upon your madness some sixteen
years ago, when we inhabited your rooms in Rome;
and there was one who, while the French hemmed us
in, secretly conspired for you, and was afterwards con
demned for theft by your own judges, came to me,
terrified by the solitude in which he found himself, to
reveal his three or four accomplices. I smiled, and
let him go free.
Of such stamp were then and are now the
believers in you, whilst those. of our faith died cheer
fully with the words “ God and the People,” on their
lips.
Some among the reigning ones of the earth, also
threatened by their dissatisfied subjects, send their
ambassadors to pay you hypocritical homage as Christ’s
Vicar, because their authority is founded upon the
same basis as yours; but no sooner does Christ’s
Vicar venture to interfere even in the most timid and
hesitating manner in their affairs, than they doff their
hypocrisy and prohibit their! bishops from publishing
your Encyclica. Numbers of those who were formerly
believing Catholics in Europe, still preserve the old
habits, and follow the rites and discipline of your
Church, partly because even the dead forms of a
Great Religion that is past, exercise a prestige over
the mind; and partly because mankind—which has
and always will have need of religion—abhors the
barrenness of scepticism, and clings to the Traditions
of the past rather than be driven into mere negation.
But when, in 1849, we aroused the people of Raly
�to a sense of their dignity as men, and called upon
them to elect an Assembly to represent them and
decree your fate, they sent a Republican Assembly to
Rome, which unanimously abolished your power.
And when you and yours endeavoured from Gaeta
to raise up the populations against that Assembly in
the name of the Catholic faith, it was only at
Ascolani—where escape into the Neapolitan territory
was certain—that you found some who for a few
days were willing to risk their lives for you.
An echo of the Catholic Tradition still lingers in
the souls of men, but faith in it is dead for ever. You
cannot yourself rekindle it even in your own heart.
The virtue of sacrifice has left you. Your Church has
lost the power of suffering, and of dying, if need be,
for the salvation of mankind. Before the dangers of a
difficult position created by yourself, your adherents
concealed themselves : you fled, and fled in disguise.
Who henceforth would die for a Pope transformed into
the lackey of the Countess of Spaur ?
Faith is dead. Your Authority is but the ghost of
Authority, and the terror inspired by the spectre has
been diminishing for four centuries. It is for us now,
free from every doubt, strong in the irrevocable assent
of Humanity, to take up the gauntlet with the
certainty of Victory.
In saying “for us,” I include all who, like me,
reject alike the barren negations of the unreflectingly
rebellious, who, because one form of religion is
exhausted, imagine that the eternal religious Life of
Humanity is destroyed, and the inefficacious preteUces
of a Church which has neither knowledge, will, nor
�9
power any longer to direct that Life; I include all
vvho, like me, abhor the loathsomeness of materialism,
and are ready to do battle against it in the name of
the Ideal; all who reverently seek the City of the
Future, a new Heaven and a new Earth destined to
gather together in the name and in the love of God
and of man, and in faith in a common aim, all those
who now wander through your fault, mid fear of the
present and doubt of the future, in moral and intel
lectual anarchy : I include those who know that from
epoch to epoch God utters a new syllable of eternal
Truth to Humanity that every religion is ah initiation
towards the one destined to succeed it; and that an
educational revelation ceaselessly descends in manner
varying with the times upon the Nations J that to
arbitrarily seek to limit that revelation to a given
fraction of time# to one sole people, or to a single
individual is the only heresy essentially denying God,
the' manifestation of His Life, and the unbroken and
continuous link existing between the Divine Thought
and Humanity, which is destined gradually to discover
and to incarnate that Thought upon earth.
I include all those whoianxiously interrogating the
signs of the Times, and observing on the one hand
the constant increase of egotism, the dissolution of
every Power, the impotence of every ancient authority ;
and on the other the universal agitation of the peoples,
the growing though confused aspirations of intel
ligence, the apparition of new elements demanding
admission into the social edifice, and. of new words
potent to move the multitudes, the tendency towards
a new morality vaster than the former, and recognize
�10
in all these things the indications of a new epoch, and
therefore of a religious transformation.
Finally, I include all who hail with me the idea
that the initiative of that inevitable transformation
may sooner or later be taken by a People now for the
first time called to National Unity.
We take up the gauntlet flung down to the world
by your Encyclica. We take it up, not in the name of
a blind misguided analysis which . confounds the
Thought with its manifestation, and Life with the
organs by which it is revealed ;—not in the name of
a philosophy that presumes to substitute itself for the
Religious Synthesis, while its true historic office is
merely that of verifying the exhaustion of one belief
and preparing the way for another ;—but in the name
of Religion itself, which you would annihilate by
dooming it to immobility,—of Morality, which should
be enlarged from epoch to epoch, and which you
destroy by enchaining it to a dogma, the narrowness
and imperfection of which has been demonstrated by
four centuries of discovery;—in the name of the
teachings of Tradition, showing that the Religious
Idea assumes different forms and a different worship
at each stage of the education of Humanity;—in the
name of Jesus who foretold the future triumphs of the
Spirit1 through his own death, and whom you would
degrade from the “ Master ” to the tyrant of man ;—
in the name of Human Life which has need of harmo
nization, unification, and sanctification through Reli
gion, of all of which you deprive it by condemning its
1 John xvi.
�11
I*
i
progressive manifestations, and maintaining a fatal
duality between Earth and Heaven ;—and in the name
of God Himself who is eternal Life, Thought, Motion,
and Enlightenment, and to Whose power of revelation
you would assign a limit and a date.
Religion is with us, not with you. You mate
rialize it by the exclusive adoration of one of its forms,
as if the living God could be enchained in a single
form ; as if any form of Religion could ever be other
than a finite symbol of the Truth which He dispenses
in the chosen measure of time > as if when one form
were exhausted, it were possible that God should
perish, or withdraw Himself from the world which is
naught other than a manifestation of His Thought;
as if it were possible to assign ^limit to the Thought
of God; as if any people, any epoch, or any religion
might presume to have comprehended that Thought
entire ; as if Humanity were not bound constantly to
labour and to advance in order to acquire a knowledge
of, and identify itself with, that portion of the Divine
Idea destined to be realized on earth.
III.
We believe in God, who is Intellect and Love,
Educator and Lord:
We believe therefore in a sovereign Moral Law,
the expression of His Intellect, and of His Love:
We believe in a law of Duty for all of us, and that
we are bound to love, to comprehend, and, as far as
possible, to incarnate that law in our actions :
We believe that the sole manifestation of God
�12
visible to us is Life, and in it we seek the evidences of
the Divine Law:
We believe that as God is one, so is Life one, and
one the Law of Life throughout its twofold manifesta
tion in the Individual and in Collective Humanity:
We believe in Conscience—the revelation of Life in
the Individual—and in Tradition—the revelation of
Life in Humanity,—as the sole means given to us by
God by which to comprehend his Design,' and that
when the voice of Conscience and the voice of Tradi
tion are harmonized in an affirmation, that affirmation
is the Truth, or a portion of the Truth.
We believe that Conscience and Tradition, if reli
giously interrogated, will reveal to us that the Law
of Life is Progress, progress indefinite in all the
manifestations of. Being, the germs of which, inherent
in Life itself—are gradually and successively developed
throughout the various phases of existence :
We believe that as Life is one, and the Law of
Life is one, the Progress destined to be wrought out
by Collective Humanity, and gradually revealed to us
through Tradition, must be equally wrought out by the
individual, and since that indefinite progress forefelt
and conceived by Conscience and proclaimed by Tradi
tion, cannot be completely realized in the brief ter
restrial existence of the individual, we believe it will be
»
fulfilled elsewhere, and we believe in the continuity of
the Life made manifest in each of us, and of which our
terrestrial existence is but one period:
We believe that as in Collective Humanity every
presentiment of a vaster and purer ideal, every earnest
aspiration towards Good, is destined—it may be after
�13
the lapse of ages—to be realized,—so in the indi
vidual, every intuition of the Truth, every aspiration—
even if at present inefficacious—towards Good, and
towards the Ideal, is a pledge of future development,
a germ to be evolved in the course of the series of
existences constituting Life:
We believe that as Collective Humanity in its
-advance gradually acquires a knowledge and compre
hension of its own past;—so will the individual in
his advance upon the path of Progress acquire in pro
portion to the degree of moral education achieved, the
consciousness and memory of the past stages of his
existence:
We believe not only in Progress, but in Man’s
solidarity in progress: that as in Collective Humanity
the generations are linked one with the other, and the
Life of the one fortifies, assists, and promotes the life of
the other—so, also, is individual linked with individual,
and the life of one is of benefit to the life of the rest,
both here and elsewhere :
We believe that pure, virtuous, and constant affec
tion is a promise of communion in the future, and
a lint—invisible but powerful in its effect upon bn man
action—between the dead and the living :
We believe that Progress, the Law of God, must
infallibly be achieved by all, but we believe that we are
bound to work out the consciousness of that progress
and to deserve it through our own efforts, and that
time and space are vouchsafed to us by God as the
sphere of free will, wherein we merit or demerit in
proportion as we accelerate or delay it:
We believe, therefore, in human free will, the
condition of human responsibility:
�14
We believe in Human Equality, that is to say, that
God has given to all mankind the faculties and powers
necessary to the achievement of an equal amount of
progress; we believe that all are both called and
elected to achieve it, sooner or later, according to their
own works :
i
We believe that all that tends to impede Human
Progress, Equality, and Solidarity, is Evil, and that all
that tends to promote them, is Good.
We believe in the duty of each and all ceaselessly
to combat evil, and to promote good by thought and
action ; we believe that in order to overcome evil and to
promote good in each of us, it is necessary to overcome
evil and to promote good in others and for others : We
believe that no man can work out his own salvation
otherwise than by labouring for the salvation of others:
We believe that the sign of Evil is egotism, and the
sign of Virtue, sacrifice:
We believe our actual existence to be a step towards
a future existence, the earth to be a place of trial
wherein, by overcoming Evil and promoting Good, we
are bound to deserve to advance : We believe it to be
the duty of each and all to sanctify the earth by
realizing here as much as it is possible to realize of
the Law of God: And from this faith we deduce our
Morality:
We believe that the instinct of Progress innate in
Humanity from the beginning, and now become a
leading tendency of the human intellect, is the sole
revelation of God to mankind ; a revelation vouchsafed
to all, and continuous :
We believe that it is in virtue of this revelation
�15
that Humanity advances from epoch to epoch, from
religion to religion, upon the path of improvement
assigned to it:
We believe that whosoever presumes at the present
day to arrogate that revelation to himself, and declare
that he is the privileged intermediate between God
and man, is a blasphemer.
We believe that Authority is sacred when, conse
crated by Genius and Virtue,—sole Priests of the
Future—and made manifest by the greatest power
of sacrifice,—it preaches Truth, and is freely accepted
by mankind as their guide to Truth; but we believe
that we are bound to combat and exterminate as the
offspring of Falsehood and Parent of Tyranny, every
Authority not invested with these characteristics :
We believe that God is God, and Humanity is His
Prophet.
Such, in its broad outlines, is our faith. In that
faith we reverentially embrace—as stages of the pro
gress already achieved—all the manifestations of Religion
in the past, and—as symptoms and previsions of future
progress—every earnest and virtuous manifestation of
religious Thought in the present.
In that faith we recognize God as the Father of
all; Humanity as one in community of origin, of law,
and of aim; the Earth as sanctified by the gradual
accomplishment of the Divine Design, and the indi
vidual—blessed with immortality, free will, and power
—as the responsible Artificer of his own progress.
In this faith we live; in it we will die; in it we
love, labour, hope, and pray.
In the name of this faith we bid you : Descend
�16
FROM THE SEAT
YOU USURP AT
THE PRESENT DAY ,*
and, verily, you will descend before this age has run
its course.
The faith promulgated in your Encyclica of the
8th December, 1864, renounces alike Earth and
Heaven, Humanity and the individual.
God is Affirmation, absolute : You pretend to sub
sist upon negatives alone.
With the errors against which you cry Anathema
in the 1st, 2ncT, and 3rd of the articles annexed to the
Encyclica, we have naught to do. We believe that the
sole source of Sovereignty is in God, and in His Law,
and we therefore reject alike the Pantheism that con
founds God with the manifestations of His Power, and
every Authority.which is not the realization of the Law
of God on earth.
Neither have we aught to do with those articles
among the long series you have published, which treat
of the old question—consequent upon the Christian
duality—between the Temporal and Spiritual Au
thority.
We believe in one sole Power, the dominion of the
Moral Law, and from it we deduce the legitimacy or
illegitimacy of every temporal Authority.
We believe in the Church, the fraternity of
believers, guardian and progressive discoverer of the
Law. But is that Church your Church ? Are you
the Depositary of that Authority which all of us
invoke as Supreme over every Power ?
�17
IV.
No : your Church only gathers around it a fraction
of mankind, a fraction diminishing daily. For six
centuries past, your Authority has neither generated,
directed, nor promoted Life. You deny the faculties
you are bound to direct; you deny—by denying the
work to be accomplished on earth—the instruments
given to us by God for its accomplishment. You
deny the initiation contained in Christianity towards
higher things. You deny the free action of Man,
without which there is neither merit nor demerit.
You deny (Art. 80) that you have any mission to
promote the civilization and progress of mankind.
You deny the giftfe of God to us all by substituting
for them a grace arbitrarily bestowed upon a few. You
deny the immortality of the life given by God, by
the decapitation of the Soul in Hell. You deny the last
ing communion of God with His creatures by decreeing
a dual Humanity, the Humanity of the Fall, and the
Humanity of the Redemption. You deny Morality
by denying our power to constitute—as far as in us
lies—the Kingdom of God on earth, and by allowing
our brother men to remain a prey to tyranny, misery,
ignorance, and injustice. You deny to the Nations
their right of affirming their own free life, of frater
nizing for mutual benefit with their sister Nations,
and of choosing Rulers deserving of their Trust.
You do but affirm one thing—that you have a
right to be a Prince, and to possess—without incurring
any responsibility towards Humanity—those worldly
goods which you bid us despise.
2
�18
There was a time—a time I regard with reverence
—when the Papacy did affirm and guide. Depositaries
and Guardians of the Moral Law; believing in their
mission of Justice and Liberty for all; intrepid against
all who sought to violate their power,—and ready to
suffer for their faith, which then was the faith of the
peoples,—the Popes, from the fifth to the thirteenth
century, aided and promoted the progress you now
condemn.
In that Rome they had taught the barbarian to
respect, they represented the Ideal of the Epoch, the
dominion of spirit over matter; love, opposed to brute
force; the equality of souls,—individual merit set up
against arbitrary power ;—election against birth; justice
against feudal and monarchical rute. They watched
over and preserved the relics of ancient Learning in
their Convents, they protected Art, consoled and
alleviated suffering, educated antagonistic races, and
called them to brotherhood in the name of God and
Jesus.
Then might Leo truly declare to Rome, the centre
of a second civilization :—“ Although thou hast by thy
many victories extended thy empire over land and sea, thou
hast conquered less by valour in war than by the spirit of
Christian peaces”^ -V
' X
Then did Nicholas I. write word to the Bishops:—
‘‘ Observe whether the Kings and Princes be truly such;
if they govern rightly, first themselves, and then the peoples:
Observe if they reign according to justice ; because if they
do not, we must view them not as Kings, but as Tyrants,
and arise against them, and against the vices by which
they are corrupted.”
�19
Then did Innocent III. dare to declare to a power
ful Seigneur :—“ Were we but to take into consideration
your crimes, we should not only cry Anathema upon you,
but should call upon your people to arm themselves against
you;” and the Seigneur humbled himself before the
menace.
And before these, a man of gigantic heart and
mind—though misunderstood even yet by the majority
amongst us—the son of the people, Gregory VII., had
declared to the world that “ the sword of the Prince
must be laid doivn, as all human things bow down, before
the Church of God ; the King owes obedience to the Pope.
The Apostolic Authority is as the Sun ; the regal power is
as the Moon, illumined by the reflection of its ray;” and
the people hailed that lofty doctrine with applause,
and the Teutonic Monarchy prostrated itself in peni
tence for its attempted resistance, before the Italian
Pope in Canossa.
But the Popes of that day were the representatives
of a Duty. A Bishop then declared, in Orleans, that
“ the rich and powerful were bound to recognize the equal
nature of the poor and servile, because one sole God reigned
from on high over all.”
Gregory VII. justified the boldness of his acts
by the holy confession that “ the Church had sinned,
because it had allied itself to the world and to worldly
men, because its ministers had sought to serve the Church
and the world at the same time;—that Churchmen were
culpable and unworthy; and that they were bound to
correct and convert themselves £ that regeneration must
begin from the highest among them; that he felt bound to
declare war to vice, and to unmask it to the world; to
�20
protect all who were persecuted for justice and virtue’s
sake; that all belonging to the Church were bound to show
themselves pure and irreproachable ; and that it was
reserved for the Pope to achieve the great work of esta
blishing the reign of Peace on Earth.”
But you are both a Prince and the servant of
Princes at the present day; the bayonets that con
ducted you back through blood to Borne belong to
the man of the 2nd of December. You reign through
force, not through faith : your party is corrupt and
corrupting ; the Sanctuary is surrounded by Neapolitan
brigands upon whom you confer your blessing, while
you have no word of comfort for the peoples who
invoke God’s liberty and equality.
Therefore do the peoples look, not to you, but to
us; to us, the Precursors of the New Church; to us,
who teach them both by word and example, that it is
possible to fulfil God’s Law on earth.
Your predecessors conquered the Nations in the
name of a Religion of spiritual liberty and equality;
you do but persuade, from time to time, some unhappy
maiden to accept the death of the Cloister while
yearning for life, or steal some neglected son of Israel
and display him in triumph to the multitude as a
Convert.
I know that Gregory VII. failed to realize his
sublime conception of the triumph of the ideal over
the material on earth. I know that the instruments
he sought to employ were unequal to the aim. ' The
cardinal point of the dogma upon which he leaned
for support was the duality, the antagonism between
Earth and Heaven, and it was impossible to found
Human Unity upon that dogma.
�21
Instead of teaching that Religion is Life itself, it
made of Religion a compensation for life, and taught
the individual that he must achieve his salvation
independently of the earth, and set before him an
ideal impossible of realization in the brief years of
terrestrial existence. It can only be realized progres
sively through Association, and that dogma in no way
contemplated association; it contained no conception
of the Collective Life of Humanity, nor of the law of
Progress we now recognize.
Gregory VII. was therefore compelled to have
recourse to despotic means: he failed in his en
terprise, nor could it be successfully renewed by any
Pope.
But though it was forbidden that the Popes should
guide the world upon the path indicated by the vaster
and more unifying dogma now dawning upon us, they
might have accompanied the world in its advance
towards it; they might and ought, like Gregory«¥II.,
ever ready to suffer martyrdom, to have remained the
Representatives of that portion of the Truth contained
in their own dogma, which owes its actual triumph to
its incarnation in us. Christianity did not ordain
association on this earth, but it laid the foundations
for it by declaring: “ There is neither Jew nor Greek,
there is neither lond nor free, there is neither male nor
female ; for ye are all one in Christ Jesus.”1
Jesus did not institute any Government of the
things of this world, but He laid down the principle
of all legitimate Government when He said : “ WhoPaul: Galatians iii. 28.
�22
soever will be great among you, let him be your minister;
and whosoever will be chief among you, let him be your
servant.”1
Jesus commanded endeavour and research,2 He
promised all things to labour,3 He understood and
reverenced the power of man,4 He foresaw the future,
the Epoch of Truth freed from every earthly symbol.3
Your predecessors might and ought, you might
and ought to have accompanied us upon the path
of discovery and advance, in order to have left us,
as Moses left his people, on the borders of the pro
mised land, and have blessed us in dying even as a
dying father blesses the children who are to survive
him. You expire cursing the spirit of inquiry, cursing
the power of intellect, cursing faith in the discovery of
the Truth, cursing the peoples who seek their freedom,
cursing mankind and Life itself^ An Apostate from
Jesus and Humanity, you condemn yourself to expire
in isolation, deprived of all communion with your
brother men. We are compelled mournfully to cast
back the Anathema upon yourself. We may say to you
—as the French Bishops said to Gregory IV.—you
came to excommunicate us, return excommunicated.
No : Religion is no longer with you. Before the
Popes were, before Jesus came, God was with us.
God is with us, the servants of His Law, who carry
out the Tradition which is the revelation of His
Design. From the days of Innocent III., the Papacy
renounced alike life and mission, to worship self, its
1 Matt. xx. 26, 27, 28.
2 Matt. vii. 7; x. 26, 27, 28.
3 Matt. xxi. 43.
4 Matt. xxi. 21, 22.
5 John xiv. 16, 17, &c.
�23
own Power, the World. From the days of Innocent
III., Knowledge is ours, Art is ours, Progress in
intellect and in the purer adoration of God, is ours.
In the face of your decrees, and cancelling the sen
tence of your Inquisition, we discovered the laws that
rule the Stars, the ages of the earth’s existence
anterior to the Biblical hypothesis, the continuity of
Creation, the Unity of the Law that links earth to
Heaven, the chain of progress extending without inter
ruption from the earliest generations to our own.
Without you, against you—dissolving the dark
ness of the past, we discovered a portion of God’s
revelation in all those religions which you have stig
matized as impostures, a portion of the Design of
God in those epochs anterior to the Cross, upon
which you had cried Anathema, a portion of God’s
power in Worlds of the existence of which you were
ignorant.
Without a word of inspiration or encouragement
from you, and often condemned by you, we, the men
of Progress, did battle against Mahometanism in the
East of Europe, called back Greece to life, diminished
the sufferings of the multitudes, raised the banner
of Liberty among the oppressed Nations, and now,
emancipate the Negroes of America, and create Italy
in the face of your opposition.
Not to you, but to God do the Peoples look for
courage in the struggle, and faith to meet death with
smiles. The martyrs of Duty are found amongst
those whom you term unbelievers: the comforters of
the poor amongst those whom you doom to damna
tion to serve the Princes whose support you seek.
�Naught is left for you but undignified lamentation,
to live a mendicant, and to die cursing, unheeded, and
despised.
Descend then from a throne on which you are no
longer a Pope, hut a vulgar tyrant, upheld by the
soldiers of tyrants. You know that, were not those
soldiers ranged around your Conclave, you would be
the last Pope of Rome. Humanity has worshipped
in the Religion of the Father, and in that of the Son.
Give place to the Religion of the holy Spirit.
V.
*
As Pope, six hundred years of impotence,—the
betrayal of every precept of Christ,—your Church’s
adultery with the wicked Princes of the earth,—the
idolatry of the form substituted for the Spirit of
Religion,—the systematic immorality of the men who
surround you, and the negation of all progress sanc
tioned by yourself as the condition of your existence,
rise in judgment against you.
As Prince, the blood of Rome, and the impos
sibility of your remaining there a single day other than
by brute force, rise in judgment against you.
Reconcile yourself with God. With Humanity
you cannot.
JOSEPH MAZZINI.
January, 1865.
�
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Victorian Blogging
Description
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A collection of digitised nineteenth-century pamphlets from Conway Hall Library & Archives. This includes the Conway Tracts, Moncure Conway's personal pamphlet library; the Morris Tracts, donated to the library by Miss Morris in 1904; the National Secular Society's pamphlet library and others. The Conway Tracts were bound with additional ephemera, such as lecture programmes and handwritten notes.<br /><br />Please note that these digitised pamphlets have been edited to maximise the accuracy of the OCR, ensuring they are text searchable. If you would like to view un-edited, full-colour versions of any of our pamphlets, please email librarian@conwayhall.org.uk.<br /><br /><span><img src="http://www.heritagefund.org.uk/sites/default/files/media/attachments/TNLHLF_Colour_Logo_English_RGB_0_0.jpg" width="238" height="91" alt="TNLHLF_Colour_Logo_English_RGB_0_0.jpg" /></span>
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Conway Hall Library & Archives
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2018
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Conway Hall Ethical Society
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Pamphlet
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Title
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Address to Pope Pious IX on his encyclical letter
Creator
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Joseph, Mazzini
Description
An account of the resource
Place of publication: London
Collation: 24 p. ; 22 cm.
Notes: Quanta cura was a papal encyclical, issued December 1864, that was prompted by the September Convention of 1864 agreement between the then newly emerging Kingdom of Italy and the Second French Empire of Napoleon III. France had previously occupied Rome with French troops in order to prevent the Kingdom of Italy from defeating the Papal States with the Capture of Rome. From the library of Dr Moncure Conway. Includes bibliographical references.
Publisher
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Trubner and Co.
Date
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1865
Identifier
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G5253
Subject
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Papacy
Catholic Church
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<a href="http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/mark/1.0/"><img src="http://i.creativecommons.org/p/mark/1.0/88x31.png" alt="Public Domain Mark" /></a><span> </span><br /><span>This work (Address to Pope Pious IX on his encyclical letter), identified by </span><a href="https://conwayhallcollections.omeka.net/items/show/www.conwayhall.org.uk"><span>Humanist Library and Archives</span></a><span>, is free of known copyright restrictions.</span>
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application/pdf
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Text
Language
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English
Conway Tracts
Italy-Politics and Government-19th Century
Pope Pius IX
Roman Catholic Church