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WHAT IS AGNOSTICISM ?
WITH OBSERVATIONS ON
'
HUXLEY, BRADLAUGH, AND INGERSOLL
AND A REPLY TO
GEORGE JACOB HOLYOAKE
ALSO A
DEFENCE OF ATHEISM.
BY
G. W. FOOTE,
PRICE
THREEPENCE.
LONDON
THE FREETHOUGHT PUBLISHING COMPANY, LIMITED,.
2 NEWCASTLE-STREET, FARRINGDON-STREET, E.C.
igO2.
�PRINTED BY
THE FREETHOUGHT PUBLISHING COMPANY, LTD.,
2 NEWCASTLE-STREET, FARRINGDON-STREET, LONDON, E.C.
�ß 2SiO
NATIONAL SECULAR SOCIETY
AGNOSTIC PRETENSIONS.
\
I happened to say once that an Agnostic was an Atheist
with a tall hat on. Many a true word is spoken in jest,
and I believe this is a case in point. It may be my
■obtuseness, but I have never been able to discover any
real difference between the Atheist and the Agnostic,
■except that the latter is more in love with respectability ;
■or, if not exactly in love, is anxious to contract a
marriage of convenience. In the old Hall of Science
days, I noticed that sturdy Freethinkers used to come
and sit under Bradlaugh, and proudly call themselves
Atheists. That was while they were comparatively
poor, and free from domestic embarrassments. When
they became better off, and their children (especially
their daughters) grew taller, they gradually edged off
to South-place Chapel, sat under Mr. Conway, and
■called themselves Agnostics. They did not pretend
that their opinions had changed, and they were glad to
sneak into the old place (minus wife and family) on a
stirring occasion ; but they had drifted, and they knew
why, though they never liked to say so. Bradlaugh’s
strength lay amongst those who could, for one reason
or another, afford to defy conventions; such as the
skilled artisans and the lower-middle classes, with a
dash of professional society. Two hundred a year was
fatal to his front-seat people. When they reached that
income they emigrated (with their womenkind) to a
more 81 respectable ” establishment.
�4
I do not shrink from the consequences of the foregoing;
observations. Indeed, I will speak with the utmost
plainness. Charles Bradlaugh was an Atheist becausehe was a man of invincible courage, and did not care:
twopence for the frowns of the Church or the sneers of
Society. Professor Huxley was an Agnostic because he:
had» over a thousand a year, and moved in the “ upper
circles,” and filled certain “ honorable ” positions. He
was too honest to say that he believed what he dis
believed, but he could not afford to bear an odiousname. So he coined the word “ Agnostic,” which wasnewer, longer, and less intelligible than “ Atheist.” And
having got a label that suited him entirely, he devised
many subtle reasons why other Freethinkers should,
wear it too. A number of them jumped at the oppor
tunity. They were delighted to be at once heterodox;
and respectable. It was a new and unexpected sensa
tion. They were able to criticise orthodoxy with great,
freedom, providing they did not touch upon the twovital points of all supernatural faith — namely, the:
belief in God and the doctrine of a future life ; and.
they were also able to chide the Atheist for his vulgar
dogmatism in calling certain religious ideas false, when,
the true philosopher knew that it was impossible todemonstrate the negative of anything.
I used to think that Mr. Holyoake was an Atheist.
At any rate, he wrote a Trial of Theism, in which he
made that ancient faith look a frightful old impostorj
But I conclude that he now wishes this work to b<&
regarded as an academic exercise, a playful effort of
the theoretical intelligence. Many years ago—and still
for all I know—he offered the British public the story
of his prosecution and imprisonment for “blasphemy’'
under the title of The Last Trial for Atheism. He wasreally not tried for Atheism at all, and most of us took
the word as a defiant expression of his principles* Buhl
�5
we were mistaken. Mr. Holyoake explains in a recent
publication that he is not an Atheist now, what
ever he may have been when he was young, ignorant,
-and impulsive. He says that the Atheist is guilty of
■“ preposterous presumption ”—which I think I under
stand, although it is a very loose expression. He calls
Atheism a “ wild assumption.” He professes himself
an Agnostic ; which, as he explains it, is our old friend
Sceptic alive again from the pages of David Hume.
“Theism, Atheism, and Agnosticism denote attitudes
of thought in relation to the existence of a Supreme
Cause of Nature. The Theist declares, without mis
giving, that there is such an existence. The Atheist,
without misgiving, declares there is no such existence.
The Agnostic, more modest in pretension, simply says
that, having no information on the subject, he does not
know.”
Mr. Holyoake says, further on, that the Theist and the
Atheist alike have “ no doubt that they knew the solu
tion ” of the “ mighty problem of the cause of eternity.”
Well, I beg to tell him that I am acquainted with at
least one Atheist who does not affect to know this
“ solution.” This particular Atheist does not so much
asknow the meaning of “the cause of eternity.” To
him it is—as Hamlet says—words, words, words!
But this is not enough. I will go further, and
ask Mr. Holyoake to refer me to one Atheist who
denies the existence of God. Of course there are
many Atheists who deny the existence of this or that
God, because the definition of such alleged beings
involves a contradiction to obvious facts of universal
■experience. But what Atheist denies the existence of
■any God ; that is to say, of any superhuman or super
mundane power ? All the Atheists I know of take the
position that there is no evidence on which to form a
valid judgment, and that man’s finite intellect seems
�6
incapable of solving an infinite problem. And as I
understand Mr. Holyoake this is the very position taken
by the Agnostic.
Etymologically, as well as philosophically, an Atheist is.
one without God. That is all the “A” before “Theist”'
really means. Now I believe the Agnostic is without God
too.
Practically, at any rate, he is in the same boat
with the Atheist.
Atheism may be called a negative attitude. No doubt
it is so. But every negative involves something positive..
If the Atheist turns away from the “ mighty problem ”
as hopeless, he is likely to tackle more promising pro-«
blems with greater vigor annd effect. But it is admitted
by Mr. Holyoake that Agnosticism is a negative attitude
too. Wherein, then, lies the justification for all the super
fine airs of its advocates ?
When you look into the matter closely, you perceivfl
that Atheism and Agnosticism are both definite in the
same direction. Bradlaugh and Huxley were at one in
their hostile criticism of Christianity. Keeping the mind
free from superstition is an excellent work. It is weeding
the ground. But it is not sowing, and still less reaping.
It merely creates the possibility of sound and useful
growth. We have to fall back upon Secularism at the
finish. Nor is that a finality. Secularism is the affirma
tion of the claims of this life against the usurpations of
the next. But the affirmation would be unncessary if
the belief in a future life disappeared or radically changed..
Secularism itself—whatever Mr. Holyoake may say—is.
an attitude. The face that was turned from God is.
turned towards Man. What will follow is beyond the.
range of Atheism or Agnosticism.
Presently it is.
beyond the range of Secularism. It is not to be deter
mined by any system. It depends on positive knowledge
and the laws of evolution.
�7
AGNOSTICISM AND ORTHODOXY.
During the most vigorous part of his life Mr. Holyoakepassed as an Atheist, but in his old age he prefers to call
himself an Agnostic. Now this is a change that might
be allowed to pass unchallenged, if it were not made the
occasion of an attack on others who elect to remain
under the old flag. Old age is entitled to comforts, or
at least to shelter from hardships ; and if a veteran of
over eighty finds any advantage or convenience in adopt
ing a more tolerable designation, without any actual
renunciation of principle, it is only a curmudgeon that
would deny him the luxury. But when we are practi
cally asked to share it with him we have the right tomake an open refusal. When the fox, in the old story,
lost his tail, and then tried to persuade his brethren that
they would look much handsomer if they dispensed with
theirs, it was time to tell him that the appendages were
both ornamental and useful. If “ Atheist ” is in Mr..
Holyoake’s way, by all means let him get rid of it. Butwhen he advances a reason why others should follow his
example, it is permissible to tell him that his reason is
insufficient. Mr. Holyoake’s reason is this—in brief.
Theism says there is a God, Atheism says there is no
God, and Agnosticism says it does not know. Agnosti
cism, therefore, is modest and accurate; it does not
dogmatise, and it keeps within the limit of its informa
tion. Such is Mr. Holyoake’s argument, and his con
clusion would be sound enough if his premises were not
faulty. But they are faulty. Mr. Holyoake declared
that Atheists, like Theists, had “ no doubt that they
knew the solution ” of the “ mighty problem of the
cause of eternity.” “Well,” I said in reply, “ I beg to
tell him that I am acquainted with at least one Atheist
who does not affect to know this ‘ solution.’ To him it
�is—as Hamlet says—words, words, words ! I will go
further,” I added, “ and ask Mr. Holyoake to refer me
to one Atheist who denies the existence of God.**
He has not, however, deigned to reply to this perfectly
legitimate question.
Atheists may, just like Agnostics, deny the existence of
this or that God. It all depends on definitions. A
quarter of a century ago, in criticising a book by Pro
fessor Flint, I wrote as follows :—
“ There be Gods many and Lords many; which of the
long theological list is to be selected as the God ? A
God, like everything else from the heights to the depths,
■can be known only by his attributes; and what the
Atheist does is not to argue against the existence of any
God, which would be sheer lunacy, but to take the
attributes affirmed by Theism as composing its Deity,
and to inquire whether they are compatible with each
other and with the facts of life. Finding that they are
not, the Atheist simply sets Theism aside as not proven,
and goes on his way without further afflicting himself
with such abstruse questions.”
This is precisely the position I took in replying to
Mr. Holyoake recently, and it is the position of all
the Atheists I know or have ever known. Moreover, it
was, as far as I understood him, the position of Mr.
Holyoake himself while we all thought him an Atheist.
During his debate with Mr. Bradlaugh, some thirty
years ago, it was admitted that both were Atheists;
the question in dispute was whether Atheism was
involved in Secularism. I do not recollect that there
was so much as a suggestion that a difference existed
between them as to the meaning of Atheism. Their
difference was over the meaning of Secularism.
I am well aware that persons of a metaphysical turn
of mind, and a good knowledge of the dictionary, can
argue with each other on all sorts of subjects, and keep
�9
it up till death or the day of judgment. But the troublecomes when they have to meet the practical man, the
average man, the man in the street. He has his living •
to get, and lots of things to attend to ; so, instead of
beating about the bush, he goes straight to what seems,
to him to the kernel of the question—the real point at
issue. He may be mistaken, of course ; but that is his
method, and you will never wean him from it. All the
“ revelations ” in the world have been got up for him.
It was found that no impression was made upon him by
Platonic or other long-winded ratiocinations; so specu
lation was presented to him as fact, and fancy as history ;
and in that .way he was nobbled, because he did not
perceive the cheating—though he is beginning to see it
now. Well then, let an Atheist and an Agnostic stand
together before this gentleman; and what difference
will he discover between them ? “ Have you got a
God?” he asks in his blunt way. The Atheist plainly
answers “ No.” The Agnostic hums and ha’s. “ Come
now, straight,” says the questioner, “ have you got a
God?” The Agnostic says : “Well, I------.” “ Here^
that’ll do,” says the man in the street, “ I see you
haven’t got one. You’re just like the other fellow, only
he’s straighter.” And really that practical man, that
average man, that man in the street, is right. He has
' got hold of the substance. All else is shadow. You have
a God, or you have not. There is really no intermediate
position. If you have a God, you are a Theist; if you
have no God, you are an Atheist. Let your reasons be
few or many, plain or subtle, this is what it comes to at
the finish. “ I am the Lord thy God,” cries some Deity
or other through the mouth of a priest. “Not mine,”
says the Atheist. - “ Not precisely mine,” says the
Agnostic, “ at least at present; these things require a
great deal of consideration ; but I promise to keep an
open mind.” Now if the offended Deity were to box.
�IO
the ears of one of them, which do you thin it would
be ? I fancy it would be the Agnostic, for all his
ii reverence.”
Mr. Holyoake’s new attitude is likely to procure him
fresh friends in the fold of faith—which he will probably
not find annoying.
One announced himself in the
Church Gazette, and this is what he said :—
“ One is glad to see that Mr. Holyoake has renounced
the title of ‘Atheist’ in favor of that of ‘Agnostic.’
The Freethinker deprecates his doing so on the ground
that the two terms imply exactly the same thing. We
cannot admit that they do. An ‘ Atheist ’ properly means
a person who positively denies the existence of a God,
while an ‘ Agnostic ’ is simply one who does not know,
but who very often is strongly inclined to believe in a
Deity. Between these attitudes there lies a vast interval.
The first is as dogmatic as that of a Cardinal; the
second is philosophical, and of one who adopts it there is
always a good deal of hope.”
Without inquiring what right a Christian paper has
to define “ Atheism ” for Atheists, I may observe
how consoling it must be to Mr. Holyoake to be told by a
■Christian that he is “ philosophical,” that there is “ a
vast interval ” between himself and a wicked, dogmatic
Atheist, and that there is “ a good deal of hope ” for
him! My own criticism is nothing to this. This
orthodox editor greets Mr. Holyoake’s one leg over the
fence, and “ hopes ” for his whole body. Other orthodox
.editors in the course of time, either before his death or
.after, will perhaps argue that Mr. Holyoake really saw
the error of his ways and probably “ found salvation.”
�11
MR. HOLYOAKE’S VINDICATION.
Mr. Holyoake’s article on “ Agnosticism Higher than
Atheism ” in my own journal, the Freethinker, for
January 6 (1901) opened with a warm defence of his
■own consistency.
Personally, I may say that I do not care two pins, or
■even one, whether Mr. Holyoake has or has not made
or undergone a change in his opinion, his attitude, or
"whatever he or anyone else may please to call it. He
:seems to be quite passionate about it, but it is
really of no importance to anyone but himself.
The only important question is whether he is right in
what he says now. All men but the fossilised have
•changed intellectually, as they have changed physically.
““ In a higher world,” said Newman, “ it is otherwise,
but here below to live is to change, and to be perfect
is to' have changed often.” Emerson stated the same
truth with scornful relation to human vanity. “ A
foolish consistency,” he said, “is the hobgoblin of little
.minds, adored by little statesmen and philosophers and
•divines.” It may be telling in political debate, where
there is ever a hundred grains of nonsense to one grain
■of sense, to reply to an opponent out of his own mouth,
and show that what he says to-day is answered by what
he said several years ago. Vain politicians fall into this
trap, because they fancy their own consistency is somethingiof infinite moment; not their consistency of prin
ciple or intention, but their consistency of mental
■conclusion. But now and then a stronger politician
laughs at the trap which is laid for him. Some persons
thought it was mere cynicism on Beaconsfield’s part
when he declined to argue a question before parliament
in the light of certain “musty old speeches” of his,
which had been quoted against him in the debate. But
f-
�12
it was sanity and wisdom. It was a personal question1
whether he was right or wrong twenty years before; it
was a public question whether he was right or wrong at
that moment.
Mr. Holyoake, as I understand him, says he never wasan Atheist. He has always an Agnostic, but he lacked
the word to express his attitude. The term he did
suggest was Cosmism as a substitute for Atheism. In
connection with it he quotes the words—from ThomasCooper, I believe—“ I do not say there is no God, but.
this I say—I know not.” Perhaps it will surprisehim to learn—or to be reminded of it if he has forgotten
it—that Charles Bradlaugh, both in print and on theplatform, was fond of quoting those very words asindicating the essential attitude of Atheism. Are we
to conclude, then, that Bradlaugh, too, was an Agnostic
without knowing it ? Are we also to conclude that not
a single Atheist during the past forty years understood
Atheism, and that the only person who did understand it
was Mr. Holyoake, who was never an Atheist at all ?
“ Agnosticism,” Mr. Holyoake says, “ relates only toDeity.” Does it indeed ? Its meaning and application
were not thus restricted by Professor Huxley. This is
what he said in his essay on “ Agnosticism ” (Collected
Essays, vol. v., p. 245) :—
“ Agnosticism, in fact, is not a creed, but a method»,
the essence of which lies in the rigorous application of M
single principle. That principle is of great antiquity;
it is as old as Socrates; as old as the writer who said
‘ Try all things, hold fast by that which is good’; it is the
foundation of the Reformation, which simply illustrated
the axiom that every man should be able to give a reason
for the faith that is in him; it is the great principle of
Descartes; it is the fundamental axiom of modern
science. Positively the principle may be expressed : In
matters of the intellect, follow your reason as far as it
will take you, without regard to any other consideration-
�i3
And negatively: In matters of the intellect do not
pretend that conclusions are certain which are not
demonstrated or demonstrable. That I take to be the
Agnostic faith.”
This is stated even more compendiously in a later essay
on “Agnosticism and Christianity” (vol. v., p. 310) :—
“ Agnosticism is not properly described as a ‘ negative ’
creed, nor indeed as a creed of any kind, except in so
far as it expresses absolute faith in the validity of a
principle, which is as much ethical as intellectual. This
principle may be stated in various ways, but they all
amount to this: that it is wrong for a man to say that
he is certain of the objective truth of any proposition
unless he can produce evidence which logically justifies
that certainty. This is what Agnosticism asserts ; and,
in my opinion, it is all that is essential to Agnosticism.”
These are, I believe, the only two definitions of Agnos
ticism to be found in Huxley’s writings; and, so far
from restricting the application of the term to the
question of the existence of Deity, as Mr. Holyoake
:says it should be, its inventor does not so much as
allude to that question in either of these passages. He
presents Agnosticism as a general method or attitude in
relation to all propositions, and therefore to all subjects
whatsoever.
Mr. Holyoake goes on to say that Agnosticism—his
Agnosticism—“ leaves a man to reason, to con
science, to morality, to nature, to the laws of truth,
of honor, and the laws of the State.” Yes, and it also
leaves him, if he prefers, to the opposite of these—to
folly, vice, and crime, to the workhouse, the lunatic
asylum, and the prison. What Mr. Holyoake says of
Agnosticism is simply an echo of what Bacon said of
Atheism. “ Atheism,” that philosopher said, in the Essay
Of Superstition, “ leaves a man to sense, to philosophy, to
natural piety, to laws, to reputation.”
�When Bacon wanted to dig the Atheist in the fifth
rib with a dirty dagger, he treated Atheism as a denial
of God. “None,” he said, “ deny there is a God but
those for whom it maketh that there were no God.’”
Which is equivalant to saying that no one denies God.
but a scoundrel. But when he talks like a candid philo*
sopher his language is very different. “It were better,’”
he declared, “ to have no opinion of God at all, than
such an opinion as is unworthy of him.” That was.
the real difference between Atheism and superstition.
“ No opinion of God at all.” Bacon regarded that
as philosophical Atheism. Mr. Holyoake regards it as
philosophical Agnosticism. Well, this is a free country,
at least to that extent, and I prefer to side with.
Bacon.
It seems to me that Mr. Holyoke’s philosophy of
“disbelief” and “ non-belief ” is a sad confusion, abound
ing *in arbitrary statements. Take the following passage»,
for instance :—
“‘Disbelief’ is the state of mind of one who hag;
evidence before him, but finds it so insufficient that ha
disbelieves the proposition to which the evidence:
relates. ‘ Non-belief’ expresses that state of mind whefft
all relevant evidence is absent, and he is therefore in ft.
state of non-belief or absolute unknowingness.”
Now the first sentence is but a pretty waste of wordsRepetition is not definition. It enlightens no one to say
that “disbelief” is the state of mind of a person who
“ disbelieves.” Nor is it true that one who disbelieveshas always evidence before him. He may have none at
all. I disbelieve in the existence of dragons and
centaurs, but I am not aware that there is a scrap of
positive evidence on the subject. On the other hand,
there may be “relevant evidence”—can there be any
irrelevant evidence ?—in the case of “ non-belief,” which
is precisely the same thing as unbelief. My own position
�i5
with regard to the “ microbe theory ” of disease is oneof “ non-belief,” but I should be very ignorant or foolish
to say that “ relevant evidence ” was totally “ absent.”'
And how on earth can “ absolute unknowingness ” haveany relation to belief at all? It is simply a blank.
Nothing is there, and no room exists for any form o£
opinion.
Mr. Holyoake’s “ non-belief ” seems to be a nonentity.
The remaining term is “ disbelief.” This he does not
really define, but he evidently means it to connote a.
state of mind following the recognition that the evidenceadvanced in favor of a proposition is “ insufficient.”
Now I venture to say that this is unbelief or disbelief
simply according to the balance of the evidence. Mr,
Holyoake speaks as though evidence were always for
and never against, whereas it is usually of both kinds.
If the evidence is unsatisfactory, we say we do not
believe the proposition. If the evidence is very unsatis
factory, we say we disbelieve it. The two words
express different degrees of the same general state of
mind.
This view has fbe countenance of common usage, asit certainly has the countenance of etymology. And a.
very remarkable fact may be cited in this connection.
The orthodox term for all sceptics, from the mild.
Unitarian to the terrible Atheist, is “ unbelievers.”
Mr. Holyoake goes to the length of saying that “ Todisbelieve is to deny.” I say it is not. Mr. Holyoakehimself disbelieves the theory of a future life, but he
does not deny it. Denial, in the strict sense of the word,
presupposes knowledge. It is not a mere question of
opinion—like belief, unbelief, or disbelief. < If you say I
have done a certain thing which I know I have not
done ; if you say I was at a certain place yesterday
when I know I was not there ; I deny your assertion.
But if you say that a friend of mine has done a certain
�i6
thing, or was at a certain place yesterday, when I was
not there myself, I cannot deny your assertion. Yet I
may not believe it from what I know of my friend’s
■character and movements, and I may disbelieve it when
I have heard the evidence on both sides.
It seems to me that Mr. Holyoake made this arbitrary
•affirmation about disbelief and denial because it served
the turn in his argument against Atheism. He proceeds
to say—and with plausibility if his theory of disbelief is
.accurate-—that if you “ take denial out of the word ”
Atheism you “ take the soul out of it.” “ Atheism,” he
repeats, “ which does not deny God is a corpse.” All
this, however, is repetition on repetition of what he is
asked to prove. The idea seems to be that saying a
thing over again, with fresh force and point, is a good
substitute for “ relevant evidence.”
Mr. Holyoake says there are “ brave spirits ” in the
Atheistic camp “ who believe that the existence of God
<an be disproved, and say so.” “ To them,” he adds,
“Atheism, in its old sense—of denial—is the only honest
word.” Of course it is. But who ave, these Atheists ?
AVhy does not Mr. Holyoake give us a little informa
tion ? What is the use of argument without facts ? I
■admit there are Atheists who believe that the reality of
some conceptions of God can be disproved. If reason
is to be trusted—and we have no other guide—it is
perfectly clear that a God of infinite power, infinite
wisdom, and infinite goodness, does not exist. John
Stuart Mill was as firm as a rock on this point, and he
was the author of a classical treatise on Logic. Mr.
Holyoake himself, I believe, would not deny that
Science has practically disproved the existence of the
God of Miracles.
It seems to me that Mr. Holyoake plays with the
word “ God.” He treats it is a definite word, with one
invariable meaning. But it means anything or nothing,
�.according to definitions. Without a definition, you
might as well pronounce it backwards. It may be true
that the Atheist “ denies the existence of God,” if you
■define God to mean Thor, Jupiter, Jehovah, or Christ.
But is it true that the Atheist denies the existence of
any possible God ? This is a point to which Mr.
Holyoake does not address himself. Nor is he likely to
■ do so while he uses the word “ God ” as loosely as any
^shuffling theologian.
Some conceptions of God are flatly contradicted by
the most familiar facts of experience. These are as
much to be denied as a round square or a bitter sweet.
Some conceptions of God are not contradicted by any
facts of experience. They may be true, and they may
Be false. In the absence of “ relevant evidence,” there
is no way of deciding. It is all a matter of conjecture.
And both information and. denial, in such cases, are
mere expressions of personal preference.
But behind all the metaphysics of this subject there
is a Science of which one could hardly surmise from his
writings that Mr. Holyoake had ever heard. I mean
the Science whith the great David Hume inaugurated
in his Natural History of Religion. Not to go beyond
•our own country, the researches of Spencer, Lubbock,
Tylor, Frazer, Harland, and other workers in this
fruitful field, have thrown a flood of light upon the
.genesis and development of religious belief. The facts
.are seen, and they tell their own tale. And when it is
•once perceived that the “highest” ideas of modern
theology have their roots in the lowest savage super
stitions, the old disputes about the existence of God
.seem almost fantastic.
This is a point, however, which it is not my object to
press. Some of my readers will understand ; others,
perhaps, will take the hint. I wish to conclude this
■criticism by showing that what Mr. Holyoake means by
�Agnosticism, is what Atheists have always meant by
Atheism.
The shortest way is the best. Let us take the most
conspicuous, the most hated, English Atheist of thenineteenth century ; one who was supposed — and
especially by those who knew least about him—to beas extravagant in his speech as he was shocking in his.
character. I refer to Charles Bradlaugh. He was am
Atheist of Atheists, and this is what he wrote:—
The Atheist does not say ‘there is no God,’ but hesays, ‘ I know not what you mean by God; I am with
out idea of God; the word “ God ” is, to me, a sound
conveying no clear or distinct affirmation.
I do not
deny God, because I cannot deny that of which I haves
no conception, and the conception of which, by its.
affirmer, is so imperfect that he is unable to define it to
me.’ ”
Now let us hear the Agnostic.
Mr. Holyoake says
“ The Agnostic assertion of unknowingness is far
wider, far mo.e defiant and impregnable than the deniaL
of the Atheist who stands upon the defective evidence.
Agnosticism is a challenge. It says: ‘ I do not know J
do you ? Your assertions have no force. Evidence from
the field of facts is wanted’....... the very idea of an
originating Deity has no place in the understanding.’*
Mr. Bradlaugh’s language is that of clear thought..
Is Mr. Holyoake s so ? It is hard to see how an asser
tion of ignorance can be “ defiant,” though it may be
“ impregnable ” because there is nothing to attack. If
the Atheist stands upon the defective evidence, what
else is the A gnostic doing when he says that evidence iswanted ? And is not the last sentence on all-fours with.
Mr. Bradlaugh’s last sentence ? What difference there
is seems in favor of the Atheist. It is one of carefulnessand modesty. Mr. Bradlaugh speaks for himself. Mr.
Holyoake speaks for everybody.
�i9
What substantial difference, I ask, can anyone find,
between these two quotations? Mr. Bradlaugh was asmuch an Agnostic as Mr. Holyoake, and Mr. Holyoake
is as much an Atheist as Mr. Bradlaugh. It is therefore
evident, as far as this particular discussion goes, that
Agnosticism is a new name for the old Atheism.
After repeating that Agnosticism “asserts that theexistence of Gcd is a proposition of utter unknowing
ness,” Mr. Holyoake declares that it “leaves Theism,
stranded on the shores of speculation.” What more
has been asserted by any Atheist ? Does it not provethat the Agnostic is “ without God in the world ”? And.
does not this illuminating phrase of the great Apostle
show the real parting of the ways ?
INGERSOLL’S
AGNOSTICISM.
Mr.. Holyoake, I believe, has a great admiration for
the late Colonel Ingersoll. I have a great admiration
for him too. He was a splendid man, a magnificent
orator, and a deep thinker. This last fact is too little
recognised. Many take the clear for the shallow and.
the turbid for the profound. Others love decorum even
though it drops into dulness. Ingersoll’s brightness, noless than his lucidity, was detrimental to his reputation..
It is commonly thought that the witty man cannot be
wise. But a minority know how false this is. Shakes
peare was the wittiest as well as the wisest of men.
Be that as it may, the point is that Mr. Holyoake and.
I both admire Ingersoll. We may therefore appeal tohim on this question of Atheism and Agnosticism. Not
that he is to decide it for us, but it will be profitable tohear what he has to say.
Ingersoll published a lecture entitled Why Am I
An Agnostic ? This was during his mellow maturity,.
�when some hasty persons said he was growing too
■“ respectable.” He was perfectly frank, however, and
even aggressive, on the question of the existence of
Deity. Here is a passage from the very first page of
this lecture :—
“Most people, after arriving at the conclusion that
Jehovah is not God, that the Bible is not an inspired
book, and that the Christian religion, like other religions,
is the creation of man, usually say : ‘ There must be a
Supreme Being, but Jehovah is not his name, and the
Bible is not his word. There must be somewhere an
•over-ruling Providence or Power.’
“ This position is just as untenable as the other. He
who cannot harmonise the cruelties of the Bible with
the goodness of Jehovah, cannot harmonise the cruelties
of Nature with the goodness and wisdom of a supposed
Deity.”
After giving several illustrations of the Deist’s diffi
culty, Ingersoll proceeds as follows, introducing for the
first time the word Agnostic :—
“ It seems to me that the man who knows the limita
tions of the mind, who gives the proper value to human
testimony, is necessarily an Agnostic. He gives up the
hope of ascertaining first or final causes, of compre
hending the supernatural, or conceiving of an infinite
personality. From out the words Creator, Preserver,
and Providence, all meaning falls.”
Mr. Holyoake might reply that he endorses every word
of this paragraph ; but I should have to tell him that
there are much stronger things to come. My point for the
present is that Ingersoll in a lecture on Agnosticism makes
it look remarkably like Atheism. Certainly he dismisses
the only idea of God that a Theist would ever think of
•contending for.
Let us now turn to the last address that Ingersoll ever
■delivered, before the American Free Religious Associa
tion at Boston, on June 2, 1899, only a few weeks prior
�21
to his sudden death. This lecture is published under thetitle of What is Religion ? Curiously it sums up all that
he had ever taught on the subject. There is an autumn
ripeness about it, and its conclusion has the air of a
final deliverance in sight of the grave. Nor is this
astonishing ; for he knew the nature of his malady, and
was aware that death might overtake him at any
monent. It should be added that Ingersoll read this
address, which was printed from his manuscript.
Now this lecture on What is Religion? contains a care
ful and elaborate statement of the speaker’s Materialism.
It runs as follows :—
.
“ If we have a theory we must have facts for the
foundation. We must have corner-stones. We must
not build on guesses, fancies, analogies, or inferences.
The structure must have a basement. If we build, we
must begin at the bottom.
“ I have a theory, and I have four corner-stones.
«The first stone is that matter—substance—cannot
be destroyed, cannot be annihilated.
► The second stone is that force cannot be destroyed,
cannot be annihilated.
“ The third stone is that matter and force cannot
exist apart—no matter without force; no force without
matter,
“ The fourth stone is that that which cannot be destroyed
could not have been created; that the indestructible is
the uncreateable.
** If these corner-stones are facts, it follows as a
necessity that matter and force are from and to eternity ;
that they can neither be increased nor diminished.
“ It follows that nothing has been, or can be,
ereated; that there never has been, or can be, a
creator.
“ It follows that there could not have been any intel
ligence, any design, back of matter and force.
'¿/‘There is no intelligence without force. There is no
force without matter. Consequently there could not by
�22
-any possibility have been any intelligence, any force,
back of matter.
'
’
It therefore follows that the supernatural does not,
•and cannot, exist. If these four corner-stones are facts,
nature has no master. If matter and force are from
and to eternity, it follows as a necessity that no God
exists.”
Here is an argumentative denial of the existence of
'God, as the term is generally understood. It is true
that Ingersoll says, a little later on, that he does not
-pretend to know, but only states what he thinks. This
■qualification, however, while it is a sign of modesty, is
not necessary from a philosophical point of view, since
no man who is not inspired can possibly advance any
thing on this subject but his opinions. This is so from
the very nature of the case, for there is no certainty
• about the strongest argument in the world unless its
•conclusion can be submitted to the test of verification.
According to Mr. Holyoake’s criterion, therefore,
Ingersoll had no right to call himself an Agnostic. He
was not merely a doubter, but a denier, and should
have called himself an Atheist. Not that he denied
any possible God, for no Atheist does that. He denied
the God of Christianity and the God of ordinary Theism.
Now if Ingersoll s statement of the Agnostic position,
thus qualified and understood, is one which Agnostics
m general are ready to endorse, it is perfectly clear that
the only difference between Agnosticism and Atheism is
one of nomenclature.
There is evidence that this was Ingersoll’s own
•opinion. The complete “ Dresden ” edition of his
works contains an important “ Inverview ” headed M My
Belief” (vol. v., pp. 245-248). It is in the form of
•Question and Answer. We will take the following :—■
Question. Do you believe in the existence of a
Supreme Being ?
�23
Answer*—I do not believe in any Supreme personality
or in any Supreme Being who made the universe and
governs nature. I do not say there is no such Being—
all I say is that I do not believe that such a Being
exists.
This is precisely the position taken by all the Atheists
T ever knew. If this is Agnosticism, every Atheist is
Agnostic, and every Agnostic is an Atheist.
■Let it not be said that this is only my inference. It
was Ingersoll’s own view, as is shown by the following
extract:—
Question. Don’t you think that the belief of the
Agnostic is more satisfactory to the believer than that of
the Atheist ?
Answer. There is no difference. The Agnostic is an
Atheist. The Atheist is an Agnostic. The Agnostic
says: “ I do not know, but I do not believe there is any
God.” The Atheist says the same. The orthodox
Christian says he knows there is a God ; but we know
that he does not know. He simply believes. He can
not know. The Atheist cannot know that God does not
exist.
I have given the whole of this Question and Answer
do avoid any possible misunderstanding. The pertinent
>nd decisive words are in the first half of the Answer.
Ingersoll is not with Mr. Holyoake, but against him.
'We have only to reverse the order of three short
sentences to feel the full force of his conclusion. The
^Atheist is an Agnostic. The Agnostic is an Atheist. There
is W difference.
�24
WICKED OPINIONS.
Mr. Holyoake seems to be turning his back upon a prin
ciple which he has often expounded; a principle which
in the justification of Freethought, and without which
persecution is honest jurisprudence. He refers very
strangely to certain “ Atheists whose disbelief in born of
dissoluteness, and who conceal vice by theological outrage
of speech.” This is followed by a scornful reference to“ pot-house Atheism.”
I am not well acquainted with pot-houses, but I should'
imagine that Atheism is not prevalent in them. I have
seen the pot-house people at large on certain holidays,,
but I never noticed much Atheism in their conversation..
Vulgar, malignant Christians, of course, have often
suggested that Atheists hold their meetings in public
houses ; but I hope Mr. Holyoake does not wish tocountenance this calumny.
I should imagine, too, that if a man wanted to
“ conceal ” his “ vice ” he would be a very great fool toresort to “ theological outrage of speech.” It would
pay him better, or rather less badly, to be outrageous
in any other direction. This is precisely the way to
excite odium, to attract hostile regard, and make him
self an object of general suspicion. That a vicious man
should wear a mask of piety is sufficiently intelligible..
Myriads have done it, and many still do it, as we learn
every now and then by the police news. But for a.
vicious man to range himself on the side of an odiousand hated minority, to affront the prejudices of the very
people he wishes to impose upon, and thus to invite a
scrutiny where he desires to practice concealment, would
be an amazing display of imbecility.
But it is still worse to hear Mr. Holyoake stigmatising;
the “disbelief” of certain Atheists—not their affecta-
�25
lions or pretensions, but their disbelief—as “ born of
•dissoluteness.” If this has any meaning at all, it implies
that belief is amenable to volition. If it be so, you
•can change a man’s belief by punishing him ; that is, by
.•giving him a strong inducement to believe otherwise;
and, in that case, the Christians were quite right when
they fined, imprisoned, tortured, and burnt heretics as
.guilty of moral perversity. Such offenders could believe
the orthodox faith, but they would not, and force was
«employed to overcome their obstinacy. But the truth
is, that men do not think as they would, but as they can;
that is to say, as they must. The intellect may be
.affected by the emotions, but not directly. The wish is
:sometimes father to the thought, but it must necessarily
be a case of unconscious paternity. We may be
blinded by passion, but when the mist disperses the
mind’s eye sees the facts according to its capacity and the
laws of mental optics. I do not merely “ disbelieve,” I
deny ” that Atheism ever was, ever is, or ever could
be, born of dissoluteness. “ The fool,” according to the
Psalmist, “ hath said in his heart, there is no God.”
Mr. Holyoake substitutes sinner for fool, and thinks he is
philosophic. I think that he and the Psalmist are in the
.same boat.
Let us take an illustration. A burglar is going to
break into a jeweller’s shop, but he sees a policeman
looking at him from the opposite corner. He wishes to
•crack that crib, he came out to crack that crib, he is
there to crack that crib. Why should he not do it ?
There is a policeman over the way. What of that ?
-Can he not wish the policeman were not there ? Can
be not believe the policeman is not there ? We know he
■cannot. We know the shop is safe for the present.
Now the God that Mr. Holyoake refers to in this con
nection is the heavenly policeman. A vicious man wishes
this God were not looking on, then he believes this God
�26
is not looking on, and thus he becomes a full-blown
Atheist! Could there be a greater absurdity ?
It should be recognised that the human intellect acts
(or functions) according to necessary laws. Given
certain information, and a certain power of judgment,,
and a man s conclusion follows with mathematical pre
cision. His desires, and hopes, and fears have nothing“
to do with the matter. They do not govern his opinions.
His opinions govern them. Our ideas do not accom
modate themselves to our emotions: our emotions
accommodate themselves to our ideas. Love itself,
which is supposed to be absolutely blind, walks with,
some degiee of rationality in the light. Peasants do
not fall in love with a princess. Why ? Because they
know she is beyond their reach.
Actions may be wicked, and intentions may be wicked..
But there cannot be a wicked opinion. An opinion has
only one quality; it is true or false—or, to be still,
more strict, it is accurate or inaccurate. The quantity
of accuracy and inaccuracy may vary, but the quality
is unchangeable.
An opinion may always be reduced to a proposition..
Now if you apply the word “wicked ” to a proposition
you will immediately see its grotesqueness.
It is true that a man may neglect to inform himself
on a subject, either through indolence or wilfulness ; and
his opinion will suffer in consequence. He may even
be dishonest, if inquiry devolved upon him as a duty..
But his opinion cannot be dishonest. You might say it
was born of dishonesty, but that is a very forced
metaphor, and not the language of philosophy. An
opinion is always born of two parents ; a man’s natural,
faculty of judgment and the information on which it
operates.
If there cannot be a dishonest opinion, of course there
cannot be an honest opinion. It is nonsense to talk of
�27
a man’s “honest belief” unless you simply mean that
the belief he expresses is the belief he entertains.
Strictly speaking, the honesty is not in the belief, but in.
the man. He may believe what he says or he may
not; in either case his belief is his belief. He knows
it, if you do not.
Mr. Holyoake, if I recollect aright, has championed,
the cause of “honest disbelief” in his former writings..
The expression was unfortunate, because it was unphilosophical; but I always understood him to mean that
the sceptic had the same right to his thought as a.
believer, So far I agree with him. In any other senseof the words I profoundly differ. And I deeply regret
that Mr. Holyoake has given the sanction of his name
to a view of the formation of opinions which is calcu
lated to serve the cause of bigotry, if not of active per
secution. I fear that the sentence I have specially
criticised will be quoted against Atheists ad nauseam, and
will be a fresh stumbling-block in the path of Freethought advocacy.
BLANK ATHEISM.
Mor® than twenty years ago I was personally acquainted',
with the late Mathilde Blind. James Thomson (“ B.V.”),
the author of that sombre and powerful poem, The City
of Dreadful Night, was with me on more than one occa
sion in her rooms, which were then the centre of some
distinguished intellectual society. Swinburne used
to call there occasionally, though it was never my luck
to meet him. Professor Clifford was another visitor,,
and with him I came into fairly close contact. One
evening I had a little party, consisting of Miss Blind
and a few of her friends, at my own bachelor diggings,
where by request I read them Thomson’s masterpiece..
�28
It was not then published, in the ordinary sense of the
word. I had it as it appeared in the National Reformer—
•a presentation copy from Thomson himself, with the
■omitted stanza added in his own handwriting. It had
Teen a good deal talked about in select circles, and the
members of that little party were very glad to make its
'Complete acquaintance in that fashion. When the flood.gates of criticism were open, one young poet suggested
some rather fatuous improvements. All admired the
work very much, or said they did ; but I noticed that
they all regarded it as a literary curiosity, a striking
poetical /w de force, and not at all as the life-agony of a
man of genius minted into golden verse by his unsubduable art. That aspect of the case did not seem to strike
them a bit, and I felt considerably disappointed at their
■dilettante observations.
But why do I go back to that long-ago ? Why open
and deliberately shut doors of old memories ? Why let
the daylight of recollection into ancient disused chambers,
where the only footfalls are ghostly, and even these are
•deadened by the dust of many years ? Because I cannot
help it. Because a sentence in a book, casually meeting
my gaze, has done it in my despite.
“ What took this soul of mine on the verge of a blank
Atheism, of utter denial and despair; what took it and
led it out of itself to the calm and awful centre of
things ?”
"This was the sentence that arrested my attention in the
Memoir ” which Dr. Garnett contributes to the new
•edition of Mathilde Blind’s Poetical Works. The sentence
is hers. And having raised the question, she supplies
.the answer.
“ It was Buckle. I verily think I owe to him what I
owe to no other human being—an eternal debt of
gratitude for the work he has left. It was the right
book at the right time, the serene proclamation of law
�29
o he unrolled the history of humanity before me from.
, its earliest germs.”
Now I confess to a certain sense of confusion in reading
all this- In the first place, Buckle did not do what he
is alleged to have done. He did not unroll the history
of humanity from its earliest germs. His work was a
great one, but that is not a proper description of it. In
the next place, I can hardly conceive that Mathilde
Blind had not read Buckle when I knew her, and she
was certainly an Atheist then. Clifford was so far from
being ashamed of the designation that he gloried in. it,
and we all understood that Mathilde Blind’s attitude
was precisely similar. What on earth then could she
mean by saying that Buckle saved her from “blank
Atheism ” ? What, indeed, is there in Buckle incom
patible with Atheism ? Did not his orthodox critics call
him a teacher of the Atheistic philosophy? Not that
Le W® fin Atheist, but as far as his book went it was
not unnatural that they (at any rate) should think him
It does not appear that Mathilde Blind herself ever
became a positive Theist. I fancy she called herself to ■
the end fin Agnostic. Her own poetry is not the work
of a believer in God. What on earth then, I repeat,,
did she mean by the statement that she had been saved
from * blank Atheism” ? And what is the meaning of
the words that follow ? “ Utter denial ” of what ? And
44 despair ” of what ? The whole thing is like a Chinese
puzzle.
I cannot help thinking that Mathilde Blind,, writing
perhaps in after years, when Clifford was dead, and
when perhaps the great Bradlaugh struggle had
rendered ® Atheism ” more odious than ever to the great
mob of “ respectable ” people, used the word with that
looseness which is only too common, but of which she
ought »ot to have been guilty. It is curious how so.
many persons, and orthodox teachers especially, are loth
�30
to let “Atheism” stand by itself, and tell its own
story. They seem to feel the necessity of prejudicing
the reader (or hearer) against it at the very outset.
So they hasten to put a suggestive, or even a sinister,
adjective m front of it, as a kind of warning herald.
Sometimes it is “ downright ” Atheism, sometimes it is
utter ” Atheism, sometimes it is “ grovelling ” Atheism
.sometimes it is “ blatant ” Atheism. This, by the way,'
is the favorite adjective of gentlemen like the late Rev.
Mr. Price Hughes. But “ blank ” Atheism is perhaps the
most ingenious form of depreciation. The horrified
imagination of piety is free to fill in the “ blank ” accord
ing to the instant movement of the spirit. Then it has
at least a suggestion of swearing. It sounds like a
polite or fastidious form of “ damned Atheism,” or even
■one of those stronger expletives which are so common
in the streets of Christian cities. Yes, “ blank Atheism ”
is distinctly good, and may be recommended to the
average apologists of religion, who might blunder into
obvious bad language if left to their own resources.
When one comes to think of it, however, it is per
fectly clear that Atheism is only “ blank ” in the sense
that it is not Theism. Atheists dispense with what they
regard as fictions, but they retain what they (and every
body else, for that matter) regard as facts. They dismiss
dreams, but .they cling to realities. They roam the
■ earth, though they believe in no hell under it. They
admire the ever-shifting panorama of the sky, though
they believe in no heaven above it. They breathe the
universal air, though they do not believe it is peopled
with invisible spirits. All that anyone is sure of is
theirs. The “ blank ” in their minds and lives only
relates to the unknown, the incomprehensible, and perhaps
the impossible.
What is it that the Theist knows and the Atheist does
not know? Nothing. Absolutely nothing. To the
�greatest minds, as well as the smallest, God is at the
best an inference ; and the doctrine of a future life can
only be verified (if at all) by dying. In this world, there
fore, and on this side of death, the Atheist has, or may
have, as much information as any religionist. Nor has
he fewer sources of enjoyment, or fewer means of per
sonal development and elevation, or fewer opportunities
-of social usefulness. The “ blank ” only means that he
does not burden his mind with the contradictory fancies
of theology. He objects to wasting his time in trying
to find the value of the infinite X. And he has learnt
from history that the pursuit of such chimeras has pro
duced a very decided “ blank ”—as far as secular science
and civilisation are concerned—in the minds and lives of
many men of genius, and of whole societies of inferior
mortals.
�SOME PUBLICATIONS BY G. W. FOOTE.
Bible Romances.
Cloth.
160 pp.
2s.
Bible Heroes.
200 pp.
Cloth.
2S. 6d.
Bible Handbook
Paper Covers, is. 6d,
Cloth, 2s. 6d.
The Book of God
In the Light of the Higher Criticism.
Paper, is.
Cloth, 2s.
Flowers of Freethought.
FIRST AND SECOND SERIES.
Cloth, 2s, 6d. (each).
Scores of Essays and Articles on a vast variety of
Freethought Topics.
Crimes of Christianity.
Hundreds of References to Standard Authorities.
Cloth, 2S. 6d.
Theism or Atheism?
Public Debate with Rev. W. T. Lee.
Boards, is.
Christianity and Secularism.
Public Debate with Rev. Dr. McCann.
Paper Covers, is. Cloth, is. 6d.
Comic Sermons & other Fantasias
Paper Covers, 8d.
Darwin on God.
Paper Covers, 6d.
London : The Freethought Publishing Company, Ltd..
2 Newcastle-street, Farringdon-street, E.C.
** A
�
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What is agnosticism? with observations on Huxley, Bradlaugh and Ingersoll, and a reply to George Jacob Holyoake; also a defence of atheism
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Foote, G. W. (George William) [1850-1915]
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Place of publication: London
Collation: 31 p. ; 20 cm.
Notes: Selective list of author's other works on back page. Part of the NSS pamphlet collection.
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Freethought Publishing Company Limited
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1902
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N268
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Agnosticism
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English
Agnosticism
Charles Bradlaugh
George Jacob Holyoake
NSS
Robert Green Ingersoll
Thomas Henry Huxley
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PDF Text
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Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Victorian Blogging
Description
An account of the resource
A collection of digitised nineteenth-century pamphlets from Conway Hall Library & Archives. This includes the Conway Tracts, Moncure Conway's personal pamphlet library; the Morris Tracts, donated to the library by Miss Morris in 1904; the National Secular Society's pamphlet library and others. The Conway Tracts were bound with additional ephemera, such as lecture programmes and handwritten notes.<br /><br />Please note that these digitised pamphlets have been edited to maximise the accuracy of the OCR, ensuring they are text searchable. If you would like to view un-edited, full-colour versions of any of our pamphlets, please email librarian@conwayhall.org.uk.<br /><br /><span><img src="http://www.heritagefund.org.uk/sites/default/files/media/attachments/TNLHLF_Colour_Logo_English_RGB_0_0.jpg" width="238" height="91" alt="TNLHLF_Colour_Logo_English_RGB_0_0.jpg" /></span>
Creator
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Conway Hall Library & Archives
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2018
Publisher
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Conway Hall Ethical Society
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Pamphlet
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
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"The War-Path of Opinion": a reply
Creator
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Bonner, Hypatia Bradlaugh [1858-1935]
Description
An account of the resource
Place of publication: London
Collation: 33 p. ; 22 p.
Notes: A reply given to George Jacob Holyoake's pamphlet "The Warpath of Opinion".
Publisher
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A. & H. B. Bonner
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1902
Identifier
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G4339
Subject
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Free thought
Rights
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<a href="http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/mark/1.0/"><img src="http://i.creativecommons.org/p/mark/1.0/88x31.png" alt="Public Domain Mark" /></a><span> </span><br /><span>This work ("The War-Path of Opinion": a reply), identified by </span><a href="https://conwayhallcollections.omeka.net/items/show/www.conwayhall.org.uk"><span>Humanist Library and Archives</span></a><span>, is free of known copyright restrictions.</span>
Format
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application/pdf
Type
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Text
Language
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English
Free Thought
George Bradlaugh
George Jacob Holyoake