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2.S2..4, f*)o<
ON DISCUSSION
AS A MEANS OF ELICITING
TRUTH.
A PAPER
READ BEFORE
THE LONDON DIALECTICAL SOCIETY,
On We d n e s d a y , Oc t o b e r
i,
1879.
BY
ALEX. J. ELLIS, B.A., F.R.S., F.S.A.
PUBLISHED BY THE
LONDON DIALECTICAL SOCIETY,
LANGHAM HALL, 43, GREAT PORTLAND STREET, W.
Price Threepence.
�VNWIN BROTHERS,
PRINTERS.
�ON DISCUSSION
AS A MEANS OF ELICITING TRUTH.
Ra t h e r more than twenty years ago, as I was strolling
down the chief street of St. Bees on a sultry Sunday
afternoon, a cottage door stood open, and showed a
decently-dressed man and his wife taking their Sun
day’s meal, and, in their way, discussing some apparently
important matter at the same time as their food.
Their voices were raised and their tones eager, and as
I passed by I heard their argument, and being an out
sider literally as well as metaphorically (for I had not
the least idea what they were talking about), I had
ample opportunity of seeing most of the game. And
it was simply this : “ Yes, you did I ” “ No, I didn’t! ”
“ Yes, you did ! ” “ No, I didn’t! ” and so on, repeated
at least half a dozen times as I passed by, in tones of
unmistakeable obstinacy. Here was a case of typical
dialectics,—I don’t mean a specimen of argument by
philosophical discussion, but a truly typical specimen
of the usual argument by reiterated assertion.
Assertion without reason assigned, assertion from
intuition, from feeling, from the vaguest and most in
�complete knowledge of a subject, is so sweet and easy,
that we are all only too ready to fall into it ourselves.
Positive assertions, indeed, generally relate to matters
about which we are very ignorant. A physician told
me the other day, that his sister had passed through
an ambulance class, and now laid down the law on
anatomy and physiology in a way which he, who had
studied the subjects for twenty years, instead of six
weeks, could not venture to imitate. Some assertors
frequently venture on argument which, when analysed,
amounts to saying : “ It is so, because it is so, because
I know it is so, because I feel it is so, because it can’t
be otherwise, because it stands to reason, because every
schoolboy knows it, because I’m certain I’ve seen it
scores of times, (at least I know I did once,) and besides
every fool knows it must be so, and that’s enough.’’
Certainly, quite enough. Every wise man, of course,
endorses what every fool knows.
But there’s another side to the question, which I will
also illustrate by a perfectly authentic anecdote. A
carpenter in a village at the North of Yorkshire, when
my late brother-in-law proposed that he should under
take some job, would say : “You’ll excuse me, sir,”
with a deferential touching of his cap, coupled with an
unmistakeable emphasis on the personal pronoun,
“ You’ll excuse me, sir, but there’s a deal of things as
goes to everything. You’ll excuse me, sir.” Now this
pithy remark sums up nearly every point which has to
be borne in mind in making assertions, and which
gives value to discussion. There is indeed “ a deal,”
�an inconceivable quantity of circumstances and con
siderations, which “ goes to everything ” on which we
have to make an assertion, and we cannot by possibility
be acquainted with more than a very minute fraction
of them, unless we have the brain capacity of the rustic
that learned all about the steam-engine in five minutes,
and never forgot what he heard, though his instructor
would perhaps hardly recognise the lesson in the
abridged report. The very fact, however, that most
people have not thought of circumstances which may
prove of the utmost importance in forming a judgment,
but which spontaneously occur to others, shows the
great value of discussion, in which these circumstances,
or at least many of them, are immediately adduced.
We have thus a greater chance of arriving at a correct
notion of what is really the case,—the truth as it is
commonly called,—supposing that, and not the uphold
ing of our own assertions, to be our real purpose.
Now, the Dialectical Society aims at arriving at the
truth by means of discussion, and as I was asked to
open the present session by a paper, it occurred to me
that there was no subject more important for the
Society to consider than that which they look upon as
the very charter of their existence.
When a person reads a paper on which a discussion
has to be raised, it is to be presumed that he has
thought it well over, that the statements he makes are
the result of study, examination, or experiment, but
that he acknowledges that of “ the deal of things that
goes to everything” many may have escaped him,which,
�6
when presented, may induce hixn. to modify his state
ments partially or wholly. In fact, it is a condition
that whoever presents his judgments for criticism, ad
mits that they may be criticised. We recollect the
barrister turned parson in Theodore Hook’s novel,
who found it so comfortable when he got into his
pulpit, that there was no one to rise on the other side.
But a more sober judgment would be, that that is the
most unfortunate position for men to occupy, and the
acts of the uncontradictable bear out this view. But as
to eliciting truth by discussion—well, I should have to
pause a little before I saw my way to giving an opinion
on the subject. Let me explain some of my difficulties.
We all know Pilate’s petulant remark, “ What is
—t r u t h ? ” and really, when we hear so much called
“the truth” in one generation which will be looked
upon as dreams, or worse, in the next, we begin to
appreciate the mind-weariness of a Roman who knew
philosophy, and was bothered by a Jew’s telling him that
he had come into the world to bear witness unto “ the
truth,” and that everyone that was of “ the truth ”
heard his voice (John xviii. 37) ; and we can readily
understand his finding no fault in the dreamer. At any
rate, even if the scene be, as it may be, a mere dramatic
invention, it is well conceived and conformable to
nature as we know it now. The truth ! what is it ?
What can we mean by it? How is it that for thousands
of years the business of every philosopher has been to
show that his predecessor had not found it out ? Let
me take a matter as far removed from the heats of
�political and religious discussion as possible, and ask,
are mathematics sublimated physics or intuitions ? are
they founded upon recollected and combined experi
ences, or axiomatic assertions, whose proof is in them
selves ? Now here's a subject, the very simplest in
existence, appealing, one would think, to no one
human passion, on which all the world acknowledges
that exact notions are to be found if anywhere, and yet
what is the truth already elicited by discussion ? And
you will perceive that I do not confine myself to extem
pore discussion by word of mouth, such as goes on in
this room, which can at the very most be considered
as preliminary, as suggestive, as giving ground for re
flection. On the point I have raised the profoundest
thinkers have laboured for years. They have read and
re-read the discussions, they have proved the forensic
weapons and armour at every conceivable point, and
the result is, there are still two parties, the physicists
and the intuitionists, and they are likely to remain, so
far as I can see, for the difference is the fundamental
one between those who found knowledge on experience,
and those who spin it as a cobweb from their own
brains.
But the world says, what does it matter ? We know
what a straight line is, and what an angle is, and
whether we know it by experience or by intuition, what
does that concern the business of life ? Well, at any
rate, the Association for the Improvement of Geo
metrical Teaching, in their syllabus, lately published,
do not attempt to define a straight line or an angle,
�8
and the late Prof. De Morgan said the best definitions
were “ a straight line’s a straight line, and an angle’s
an angle.” So people would seem to be independent
of the controversy. But what becomes of truth ? And
may we not apply the same process to other matters,
cease to inquire into origins or reasons, and take re
sults with nothing to check them, just as a well-known
musician said lately that music was better without
acoustics ? But in this case, again, what becomes of
truth ? and how is it to be elicited by discussion ?
Such subjects as I have mentioned are, however,
usually left to adepts. Geometrical conceptions and
arguments are about the simplest in the world, but
just for that reason, may be, the general public takes
slight interest in them, and they are so little a matter
of common experience that those who know nothing
of them, really know that they are ignorant, though
a few will persist in squaring the circle. If pressed
they may say, “ Oh ! the truth’s long been known
about such things” (I’m afraid they would really say,
“ those sort of things,”) “and they are of little use in
practical life ; we want to find the truth on matters of
high import.” And then, leaving the simplest, they jump
at the most complicated. They will open up questions
of right and wrong, society, government, religion,
deity, atheism, eternal life, the soul, spirits, angels,
devils, responsibility here and hereafter, inspiration,
phenomena and noumena, metaphysics of all kinds, in
short the vague, the difficult, the intangible, the inac
cessible, the unintelligible, or at least the unknown.
�9
These are what charm the general mind. To prove
that God exists, to prove that there’s no proof
that God exists—some even try to prove that God
does not exist, the admitted impossibility of proving
a negative adding to the zest of the argument—
to alter the whole system of government, to invent
governments for people that they know nothing
of, to recast legislation, to alter property relations,
to reform everything; these are the questions
about which discussion waxes interesting and eager,
where no one can know much, and most know nothing,
and truth remains quiet at the bottom of her well.
You will think that I am in the reversed case of
Balaam, and being asked to bless have remained to
curse. But that would be a mistake. Such subjects
as I have named may even be discussed with
advantage, if the discussion only succeeds in showing
us how much more need we have of further thought,
further inquiry, further knowledge, before we can
reach a result. But it must not be expected that in
the excitement of speaking at the moment, after merely
hearing a paper, and with necessarily an imperfect
recollection of its contents, any great advance can be
made towards the settlement of a difficult question.
This fact has been duly recognised in this Society by
the rule (xv.) that no vote be taken with reference to
the subject of the paper read, or discussion which may
have taken place. Yet we can do much which is
valuable. We can, by a small sample, gauge current
opinion upon the subjects mooted. That will often
B
�IO
give us much to think over, especially in endeavouring
to account for this current opinion, and in estimating
what amount of knowledge it represents, and hence
what amount of permanence it is likely to possess. It
is especially valuable to those whose judgments run
counter to general opinion, because it may lead them
to consider matters and arguments which have
entirely slipped their attention, and must be satis
factorily disposed of, before they can feel any certainty.
But as for truth— !
But if truth cannot be discovered by discussion, how
can it be attained ? I do not know that it can ever be
attained. I do not know that we have any test by
which we could know that it had been attained. The
test that we cannot conceive the contrary is individual,
varying from man to man, and in the same man from
one state of knowledge to another, and has entirely
different meanings in different mouths. Yet at present
it is held to be the best test by at least one of our best
thinkers. Take an example from, the axioms of Euclid,
which are generally supposed to satisfy this test com
pletely. “ If equals be added to equals the sums are
equal.” Does not your assent to that depend upon
your conception of the words “ equal, add, and sum ” ?
Giving them the only meanings most of you probably
know, the only meanings known to Euclid—even to
him each word had several meanings—you might
accept the dictum, but even then you must qualify it
and verify it for each particular case, as straight lines,
angles, areas, circles, curved lines. But there are
�such things as “directed lines.” Does it apply to
them ? How can those who know nothing of the pro
perties of directed lines and the nature of their addi
tion, deny or accept the axiom ? For directed straight
lines on a plane it holds, for directed arcs of great
circles on a sphere it does not hold, unless it is quali
fied with the words “ in the same order,” and those
words need farther explanation. I am not going to
demonstrate the fact, which is one of the fundamental
propositions of SirW. Rowan Hamilton’s Quaternions.
It is quite enough to state it, in order to show how
inconceivability is as a test limited by our knowledge
of the factors of thought.
My own practical test of a theory enunciated as true,
that is of a truth in common parlance, rests not on
inconceivability but on conceivability, thus : Conceive,
or if possible, try experimentally, the effect of the joint
action of this theory with others regarded as established,
and see whether the result agrees with experience.
This is mererly a test, not a proof. For example, the
undulatory theory of light bears this test ve y well.
Yet, I can by no means regard it as established. Such
theories are merely as good as true within certain
limits. And none of our theories seem to be established
beyond those limits ; scarcely any even can be fully
established within those limits It is frequently not
even possible to experiment. A medicine cures a
patient, we think. But we cannot restore him to his
condition before taking the medicine, and see what
would have happened had he not taken it, or had he
�12
taken some other. We are driven to the very loose
analogies of patients in what may appear similar cases,
but are different in many secondary peculiarities, and
the truth is very doubtfully elicited. Hence the great
faith of people in doctors and nostrums,—in barbarous
language, medicine-men and fetishes,—of whose real
knowledge and action they are most profoundly
ignorant.
Now in all such matters dicussion is of great impor
tance, because it supplies omissions, and causes conse
quences and connections to be viewed with different
lights. Whenever we make subjective experiments we
are apt to be blinded to exceptions, and see only what
we wish to see. One who takes iip the subject afresh,
and views it from the side of his own environment, and
the training of years that this has given him, which
will almost invariably have been very different from
those of the first propounder of the theory,—will be sure
to find out the weak points and make the apparently
substantial edifice totter to its base. But will he assist
in erecting a firm edifice in its place ? Will he have
built a palace of truth ? The most he usually does, at
any rate, is to destroy an enchanted castle of error.
And this to my mind is the greatest use of discus
sion. It is negative not positive, destructive not con
structive. It shows points of weakness, it does not
build points of strength. It pulls to pieces, it does not
re-create. Perhaps after any verbal discussion no one
goes home convinced who has previously thought on
the subject, least of all the propounder and his chief
�opponent The utmost gain of either is generally
less security in his own opinion. Those who are con
vinced straight off are seldom worth convincing at all.
How many votes in Parliament—our great dialectical
society—are obtained through the speeches heard ?
Many persons may be shaken in their opinions, but
there is generally a strong motive in the background,
the support of party, which carries the day. In the
smaller society here present—the great merit of which
is that it is able to discuss subjects of all kinds with
calmness and propriety, that it does not find it neces
sary to exclude those explosive subjects of religion,
politics, and sex, which are generally tabooed—there is
fortunately no party to support, there is a unanimous
desire to find out what the reader of a paper means,
by help of a rattling fire of questions, which are
sometimes pretty difficult to answer, and then to state
opinions from individual thought andknowledgeforand
against, to which the reader briefly replies. Now, there
is no doubt in my own mind, that all this is admirable
exercise for the discussers, that it greatly opens their
eyes, clears their understanding, and makes them more
fit to think. But that it after all elicits truth, at least
directly, I must beg leave to doubt Indirectly, no
doubt, it does much towards helping a thinker forwards;
directly, it does very little. There is necessarily no
co-operation, no taking of a great subject to pieces,
and working at the details separately, so as ultimately
to form a perfect whole, like the large woodcuts of our
periodicals, engraved by different hands on small
�14
blocks of wood ultimately screwed together. Even the
papers which are read are not parts of some great
whole, but rather unconnected screeds of private
thought on the most diverse subjects.
Thus in looking over the subjects of papers which
have here been read and discussed during the last two
years, I find them so unconnected that they can
scarcely be classed. Religion occupied six papers,
from Mr. Bradlaugh, Dr. Brydges, Mr. Picton,
Mr. Foote, Mr. Parris, and myself, very far from
beginners on the subject certainly, but as certainly
unconnected by any common train of thought. Social
arrangements—I can hardly say sociology—occupied as
many evenings ; two led by Mr. Coupland, and others
by Mr. Rigby Smith, Mr. Fisher, Mr. Parris, and
Mr. Montefiore. Mr. Conway gave two papers dealing
with the Woman Question in different aspects. Three
papers dealt with politics, under the leadership of
Mr. Biggar, M.P., Mr. Probyn, and Dr. Drysdale.
Four papers were devoted to matters of legal enact
ment, introduced by Mr. Tailack, Mrs. Lowe,
Rev. Dawson Burns, and Professor Hunter, the last of
which gave rise to a special committee. The other
papers cannot easily be classed, but Mr. Levy spoke
of his “Utopia,” Mrs. Hoggan, M.D., on how to meet
chronic illness, Rev. H. N. Oxenham on vivisection,
and probably other subjects were also started, but this
is enough to show the great variety and complexity of
the matters brought before the Society to discuss. It
is evident that unprepared discussions upon such
�subjects could not lead to any elicitation of truth; they
could at most be gymnastics of thought, excellent
preparation, but necessarily unfinished work.
Might I suggest, by way of an experiment, your
taking of a leaf out of the book of the Education
Society ? A variety of individual papers on uncon
nected branches of education, followed by discussions,
used to take place before this Society, which has this
year carried out a connected series of discussions upon
one book, written by its president, Professor Bain, on
^ Education as a Science.” Might not the Dialectical
Society with advantage set apart, say one evening in
each month, for connected discussions upon some such
work as Spencer’s “ Data of Ethics ”? Each chapter or
section might be made the subject of a paper and dis
cussion. Such a book is full of matter for discussion,
and the discussers would have had the advantage of
seeing the whole argument of the original writer col
lectively, before beginning to argue, together with the
peculiar views of the opener. I throw this out merely
as a suggestion for co-operative thinking and directed
discussion. But to my mind such discussions would
after all be only admirable exercises. They would not
produce philosophic results, they would only enable
those who take part in them more fully to appreciate
the real work of philosophers, and hereafter, may be,
really to play their part in advancing the thoughts of
mankind.
The only discussion which in any way elicits an
approximation to truth, that is, which gradually brings
�i6
men’s thoughts into a juster conception of the objects
of thought and their mutual relations, as evinced by
greater security of prediction, is not the verbal discus
sion of an hour or the paper discussion of a lifetime.
It is the discussion of one life’s thought on another’s,
and lasts for ages, leaving its impress on the race, not
the individual. It is at first sight surprising how much
thought, carefully written out and even printed, never
finds an echo in another century, when the individuals
are gone, and other knowledge has grown up in the
race. Even the raw form of that knowledge has only
an antiquarian interest. The knowledge itself has
become part of the race, and we forget the discussion
which often cannot be unravelled without great difficulty.
What man now cares to read of perpetual motion and
the philosopher’s stone? Who cares for judicial
astrology? Who, beyond priests, care for patristic
theology ? The questions which fired thousands as to
the books of Moses and Joshua, when the first volume
of Colenso appeared, were scarcely heard when the
seventh volume came out, though the man is happily
still alive to do good. Why this fire and this apathy ?
An established Church was concerned in discussing
away the first, which appealed to popular knowledge
of the English Bible, and threatened to shake the
edifice to its base by rending the rock on which it
stood. The last volumes were learned discussions, into
which no one cared to enter, for everyone was already
convinced. No one now considers the books of Moses
and Joshua to be verbally inspired—even the Establish
�ment has given them up, and although some of the
ministers of other sects may yet feel sure that they are,
such a fact only shows how little suited the teachers
are to teach. This result, of course, has not come
from one man, although I have referred to one man
alone as a modern typical illustration. It has resulted
from a discussion of four centuries, begun by men like
Wycliffe and Luther, who thought they were merely
dispersing the clouds of papacy, but who were
establishing those negative principles, which have
done much other work, and have still much work before
them. But these men taught us nothing of what they
purposed. They merely rubbed out ; they did not
draw in. Their work was like those who remove the
accumulated whitewash of centuries on the walls of a
church to show the old fresco below. But they believed
in the old fresco, and were themselves as intolerant as
their predecessors of any suggestion that it was out of
drawing, out of taste, or false in conception.
The history of religion in Europe and on the shores
of the Mediterannean has been a succession of nega
tives. When and how the positive form of Egyptian
worship came in, or the rude worship of the North of
Europe, we know not. Even the Greek and Roman
gods, although so far from primitive, are but indis
tinctly traceable. But Judaism was a negative form
of polytheism. It made no new god, but it wiped off
many. And round its one God grew a poetic literature
due to great men and great thinkers, which was dis
tinctly positive in character. But these men, and more
�especially their interpreters, were intolerant of criti
cism. It came, many times in vain, at last in the form
of Jesus, who merely scraped off the whitewash and
endeavoured to exhibit the old conception of the one
Judaic God (Matthew v. 17-20). Round this work,
especially through the action of Paul of Tarsus, grew
a new and very remarkable, I might almost say very
strange, roll of doctrine, and finally to the old Judaic
book was added the new Christian book. But so little
did this form of Christianity revolutionise Judaism, that
it absolutely incorporated it, and made the Jewish book
the corner-stone of the Christian edifice to such an
extent, that theoretical Christianity crumbles to dust
when the legendary character of the two principal
Mosaic histories of creation has been established.
Then round this pair of books grew a new literature,
offering much that was positive, a priesthood, an inter
pretation of tradition, oftentimes irreconcilable with
the books, but none the worse for that, and an in
tolerance of criticism to the extent of burning the
critic. Then came another negative revulsion, another
scraping off of the new accumulation of whitewash,
and Protestantism bore aloft the old old fresco, much
the worse for its continual overplastering, but still un
altered. “ The books, the whole books, and nothing but
the books !” was its motto. But that meant, the right of
everyone to read the books,—granted,—and to criticise
them,—oh, dear, no ! It was only the new teachers who
could interpret ; what business had Tom, Dick, and
Harry, who knew nothing of the matter, to put in a
�word ? or what business had a pale scholar, who had
thought over the subject, who had investigated every
trace and weighed every argument, to controvert the
opinions for which the scrapers had given their life’s
blood ? If he were a laic, it was impertinence ; if he
were an ecclesiastic, it was heresy. And heresy had
its limits. Paul might “ confess that after the way
which they called heresy so worshipped he the God of
his fathers, believing all things which were written in
the law and the prophets.” (Acts xxiv. 14), that is,
believing in the fresco, but not the whitewash. But
when it came to criticising the fresco itself, Paul
thought very differently. “ These things teach and
exhort,” says he ; “ if any man teach otherwise, and
consent not to wholesome words, even the words
our Lord Jesus Christ, and to the doctrine which is
according to godliness, he is proud” (or a fool, says the
marginal reading of the authorised version, the original
word means ‘ smoked,’ as in ‘ smoking flax shall he not
quench’ (Matt. xii. 20), a sufficiently expressive term
of abuse ; but it is only the first of a long series, for
Paul proceeds), “knowing nothing, but doting about
questions and strifes of words, whereof cometh envy,
strife, railings, evil surmisings, perverse disputings of
men of corrupt minds, and destitute of the truth” (poor
truth !) “ supposing that gain is godliness : from such
withdraw thyself.” (Tim. vi. 3-5 ) It is clear that Paul
would not have tolerated a Dialectical Society, with its
“ perverse disputings of men of (as a matter of course)
corrupt minds.”
�20
\
It is evident, then, that Paul and Luther, the two
typical reformers, did not seek to teach anything new, but
merely to restore the old, and the work they did was
exactly opposite to what they proposed : it was nothing
less than to establish the right of discussion, the right
of criticism, the right of everyone, learned or unlearned,
to say his say. It is of the utmost importance that we
should not limit criticism to those who have the re
quisite knowledge. (Our reviews, by the by, would be
sadly blank if that were the case.) We have quite a
right to turn a deaf ear to the words of a man who
clearly knows nothing about the matter he is speaking
about. But if we once attempt to prejudge his know
ledge and keep him silent, we jeopardise the whole
right of free discussion, and although free discussion
will not elicit truth, there is no other means for elimi
nating error.
And these words contain the very pith of the
observations which I have to make to you this evening.
Discussion never has elicited truth, and there does not
seem to be the slightest probability of its ever doing
so. Approximations to truth arise from painfully
evolved hypotheses of thinkers, who endeavour to form
the simplest possible representations of all the facts
they can manage to collect. But these collections are
generally deficient, these representations frequently—
but of course in typical cases always involuntarily—■
leave out of consideration important factors, or distri
bute the weight of facts injudiciously. Here steps in
discussion and criticism, and puts its finger on the
�2I
blot. Even the veriest ninny who knows nothing about
the matter may blurt out some fact which has es
caped the philosopher’s notice, although he may not
have the least conception of what he is really saying.
But everyone must have a right to speak, and we must
leave it to their own good sense or modesty, based on
consciousness of ignorance, not to speak unless they
feel that they have something to say which has a
bearing on the question. The function then of dis
cussion, that is, of criticism, is the elimination of error,
an extremely different thing from the elicitation of
truth, but an essential part of the process. Without
discussion, error is inevitable ; with discussion, truth
is by no means certain, but it is rendered possible.
There is, however, another kind of discussion,
which is meant to take place, for example, on a great
scale in Parliament, and is daily taking place in small
committees appointed to deliberate and advise on a
course of action. Here each member is selected
generally, or theoretically, with a view to his know
ledge of the matter in hand, and although such bodies
usually appoint one of their number, whom they are
supposed to consider best qualified for the purpose, to
draw up a scheme, the others in reviewing it are sup
posed not merely to criticise, but to amend, to make
suggestions, to do positive as well as negative work,
and, if they cannot agree, to draw up alternative
schemes. A remarkable instance of this kind of dis
cussion came under my notice a few years ago. The
Association for The Improvement of Geometrical
�22
Teaching, to which I have already had occasion to
allude, appointed a committee (of which I may as well
state I was not a member) to draw up a scheme for
teaching Proportion, notoriously the most difficult
subject in elementary mathematics. The committee,
consisting of five excellent mathematicians, met,
talked, and appointed one of their number to draw up
a scheme to submit to them at their next meeting.
The day came, the scheme was read, talked over, and
put to the vote, when four voted against it, and one,
the scheme-drawer himself, for it. That would never
do. So another reporter was appointed to draw up
another scheme, which was submitted to the next
meeting, and with the same result, four against and
one for, only the distribution of the voters was dif
ferent. It was clear that no one scheme could come
from these five competent men. So they agreed that
each one should present his own report, and the As
sociation had absolutely to select from among five
different schemes, and they actually did select one
and a-half, the meaning of which I could not make
clear to you without entering into a mass of details
quite unsuitable to a general audience. But the fact,
of which I am personally cognisant, serves to exem
plify, what will probably be within the experience of
all, that even deliberative discussion does not gene
rally lead to universally acceptable proposals, but
usually ends in compromise, or, to put it in other
words, does not really lead to positive truth, but at
most to less error.
�23
In such a society as the present, no one of course
suspects that the discussions raised will have any im
mediate or wide influence on public opinion. The
very fact that public opinion is very intolerant, and
thinks that many subjects should never be discussed,
which this society does not shrink from discussing, is
enough to discredit its work in the eye of “ the world.”
But, nevertheless, the members of this Society are
also members of the great body social, and will form
efficient units of that body in any deliberative act,
while the training which they receive from frequent
and animated discussion of topics which have the
most important bearing upon acts of the community,
cannot fail to enable them to sustain their part in a
way which is not only creditable to themselves, but
advantageous to the public. Especially would I
reckon among the great advantages of such discus
sions as here arise, the opportunity which each
member has of measuring his own strength. This
may be very different on different subjects, and the
result may be, I hope is, to lead them to increase their
strength upon those matters where they are strongest,
and to repair their weakness in others.
There are several pitfalls in discussion societies
which have to be avoided. There is a great danger
in mistaking readiness for depth, fluency for argu
ment, and self-sufficiency for power. But the greatest
danger of all is arguing for the sake of victory, of
taking part for or against any opinion, no matter what,
because there is somebody to oppose, not because the
|;
�speaker’s own deliberations have led him to the ex
pression of opinion. Still, with all such drawbacks,
a well-conducted discussion society is an excellent
school, by which a man may be led to the great work
of life, the advancement of the race, physically,
intellectually, and socially, not merely eliminating
error, but eliciting truth.
�NOTES.
As the Council of the Dialectical Society have resolved to
print the preceding paper, which I felt at the time, and still
feel, had not been sufficiently considered to deserve preserva
tion. in such a form, I take the opportunity of saying a few
words on points which were raised on the discussion that
followed.
The difficulty of following a written paper when read out,
sufficiently well for discussing its principles, was well exempli
fied by one speaker, who appeared to suppose that I deprecated
discussion, and considered it useless. Those who have read
the paper will see how far from correct was any such con
ception.
Another speaker stated that discussion on paper was much
inferior to discussion viva voce. For many purposes oral
discussion is most important, especially as a preliminary,
and discussion on paper is very tedious. But when we wish
to arrive at precise notions, and not to omit arguments of
importance, or to overlook what has been advanced through
a lapse of memory, oral discussion necessarily fails. Again,
oral discussions live in memory alone, unless reported
verbatim, and are consequently rapidly forgotten, leaving
only an impression, and often an incorrect impression, of
what was said, entirely insufficient for anything approaching
to the elicitation of truth.
Another speaker thought that I was wrong in deprecating
speaking for the sake of speaking, or defending an opinion
which the speaker did not entertain. He thought that both
gave readiness and facility of language, and at the same time
�26
an aptitude for considering objections. This may be fully
granted, and in mere discussion classes, such speaking has it
value. Especially it is useful to be able to call to mind all
the objections which may be raised to an argument in which
the speaker himself believes. But speaking without know
ledge, without examination, without any further desire than
to speak, and to raise arguments in which the speaker has
himself no faith, is certainly not a way of eliciting truth.
The same speaker found that my anecdote respecting the
committee on Proportion did not apply, because he supposed
that there was a mere disagreement as to method and none
in principle on such a subject. There happened to be
widely diverse views on principle, and comparatively little
difference on method. But the point of my anecdote was that a
deliberative discussion of adepts will frequently end in com
promise, and not in the ascertainment of “truth.” The
same speaker, however, touched upon the question of what
is “ true,” and said that a distinction must be drawn between
noumenal and phenomenal truth, that we must be satisfied
with what is true “for general purposes,” and not strive
after the absolute. “Noumenal truth ” did not form part
of my argument. It is very difficult to conceive what is
meant by it, and I did not intend to express myself in such
a way as to lead to any supposition that I referred to
noumenal truth at all. The expression “ true for general
purposes,” used by the speaker, implied a distinct “com
promise.” And in all physical investigations, which are
purely phenomenal, we are obliged to take “means” or
“averages,” which are all “compromises” in fact. The
whole of science is based upon such “ means,” and no one
dreams of being able to reach absolute exactness. But there
are numerous inquiries—by far the most numerous and the
most desired as subjects of discussion—which have not
reached a scientific stage proper, so as to be reducible even
approximatively, to arithmetic, and in these we must be
�satisfied with very rough compromises indeed, although it is
just in these that speakers are apt to assume the absolute
correctness of their own views.
To another speaker it seemed that I had much underrated
the power of discussion in eliciting truth, and he considered
that there was a distinctly positive side to discussion. My
paper certainly did not assert the contrary, for I gave due
place to the positive suggestions which might be made, and
often are made. But such suggestions are rather points of
departure than anything else, and their immediate action is
generally to divert the stream of another person’s thoughts,
and hence to eliminate error. If they really help to elicit
truth, it is possibly always by giving a speaker matter
to think over.
My suggestion for devoting one evening in a month to a
systematic discussion of one book, did not meet with much
favour. All that spoke on it, spoke against it. There seem
to be practical objections arising from the working of the
Society, from a desire for novelty, and from the impossibility
of regular attendance. But by saying one evening a month,
I intended to leave the other evening disposable for these
discursive subjects, and by proposing that each part should
be introduced by a paper, I intended to give each evening
thus devoted an individual character, and not to partake of
the nature of a six nights’ unreported debate, where absence
on two or three nights would prevent proper understanding
of the arguments advanced when the intending debater was
at last present. Also I hoped that each person who came
would have had time to look over the whole of the book
bearing upon the particular part to be there discussed,
which would in some respect stand in place of reports of
previous debates. Nor was it my intention that the series
of debates should run over half of a whole session. It might
be quite enough at first to set apart three or four monthly
meetings for such a purpose. But the idea pre-supposed
�28
that the Society was really desirous of eliminating as much
error and eliciting as much truth as was possible upon certain
subjects, or at any rate of discussing fully important theories
and arguments which had been raised by profound thinkers.
This supposes a very advanced stage for any society, and
probably it is only adapted for a smaller body of very earnest
thinkers. I think I remember how much good resulted from
adopting a similar plan, to the members of a small debating
society of which John Stuart Mill, George Grote, and others
belonged when young men. There is a good deal about it
in Mill’s autobiography.
To show how oral discussion is apt to swerve from the
point, it may be noted that on one speaker referring to
Auguste Comte’s hierarchy of the sciences, another instantly
asked what single ‘ ‘ truth ” Comte had ever discovered, and
the discussion threatened to become one on Comte’s Philo
sophy and Polity, which, even if the speakers had thoroughly
studied them, could not have been discussed in one evening,
and had no connection however slight with the subject of my
paper. But I may mention incidentally that Comte con
sidered that the great merit of his religion over that of all
others was that it was always discussible, although perhaps
no person was ever more impatient of having his opinions
called in question by a disciple, or formed an ecclesiastical
system which would have more completely excluded discussion.
This tendency in a discussion to fly off to some other
subject is very strong. In my former paper, the speakers
constantly referred to religion as it should be, instead of the
connotation of the English word religion, and supposed that
I desired to lay down a definition of religion, instead of
endeavouring to ascertain the common area of the numerous
areas of thought it actually expresses. In a discussion I had
lately to conduct concerning the especial use of classical over
other languages as an instrument of education, the speakers
continually complained that I checked them when speaking
�29
of the general use of language as an instrument of education,
which being admitted by the opener, had nothing whatever
to do with the matter on which a discussion was sought to be
raised. This is one of the great difficulties of oral discussion.
A speaker is struck by a sudden thought in the course of
speaking and follows it out, quite unaware that he is wasting
valuable time set apart for one particular object, in dealing
with another. One way which this acts is to induce a speaker
to introduce his own pet theory on every occasion, as one of
the speakers on my paper pointed out,reminding one of the way
in which advertisements begin by talking of the Afghan or
Zulu Wars in large letters, and glide off ingeniously to a
recommendation of Eno’s Fruit Salt or Moses’s Boys’ Suits.
If this tendency is not at once checked by the chairman the
discussion becomes abortive.
My chairman spoke especially upon the value of the
negative character of discussion. It was Comte’s opinion
that no theory is really snuffed out unless it has been replaced
by another, and hence he fulminated against the Reformation,
and denied Luther a place in his calendar, although he
admitted Paul. Mere negation, nothing but nihilism, is of
course self-destructive, ending in a by no means desirable
nirvana. But the air is full of theories which cry out for
annihilation, and the people who hold them are generally
quite unreachable by other theories, at least until the first
have been strangled by appeals to the most every-day
knowledge. When these unfortunate theories have the
further misfortune of subserving the material interests of
large bodies of men, as the scribes and pharisees of preChristian Judaism, then they are far more difficult and far
more necessary to be exterminated. These are the points of
course to which the chairman’s laudations of negation were
directed, and some of them were alluded to in the paper.
But the principle of discussion is mainly negative. As these
Notes will show, the speakers generally take exception to
�3°
some views enunciated, and seldom if ever advance in
dependent theories, unless they dart off to something irrelevant.
Hence discussion is mainly critical, not co-operative. It might
surely become more co-operative, but perhaps that is not to
be expected in a Society so large and so constituted as the
Dialectical.
These remarks touch upon nearly every point raised, and
will I hope tend to render the paper more complete, although
it remains in a far more imperfect state that I could have
wished.
A. J. E.
�I
1
�Inntrnn gxalatual Snddg,
LANGHAM HALL,
43, GREAT PORTLAND STREET, W.
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Victorian Blogging
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A collection of digitised nineteenth-century pamphlets from Conway Hall Library & Archives. This includes the Conway Tracts, Moncure Conway's personal pamphlet library; the Morris Tracts, donated to the library by Miss Morris in 1904; the National Secular Society's pamphlet library and others. The Conway Tracts were bound with additional ephemera, such as lecture programmes and handwritten notes.<br /><br />Please note that these digitised pamphlets have been edited to maximise the accuracy of the OCR, ensuring they are text searchable. If you would like to view un-edited, full-colour versions of any of our pamphlets, please email librarian@conwayhall.org.uk.<br /><br /><span><img src="http://www.heritagefund.org.uk/sites/default/files/media/attachments/TNLHLF_Colour_Logo_English_RGB_0_0.jpg" width="238" height="91" alt="TNLHLF_Colour_Logo_English_RGB_0_0.jpg" /></span>
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Conway Hall Library & Archives
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2018
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Conway Hall Ethical Society
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On discussion as a means of eliciting truth: a paper read before the London Dialectical Society on Wednesday, October 1, 1879.
Creator
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Ellis, Alexander John [1814-1890]
Description
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Place of publication: London
Collation: 30, [1] p. : 15 cm.
Notes: Author cited as Alex. J. Ellis on title page. Printed by the Gresham Press, Unwin Brothers. Information on the Society's aims and officers on back page. Part of Morris Miscellaneous Tracts. 2.
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London Dialectical Society
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[1879]
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G3360
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Rationalism
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<a href="http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/mark/1.0/"><img src="http://i.creativecommons.org/p/mark/1.0/88x31.png" alt="Public Domain Mark" /></a><span> </span><br /><span>This work (On discussion as a means of eliciting truth: a paper read before the London Dialectical Society on Wednesday, October 1, 1879), identified by </span><a href="https://conwayhallcollections.omeka.net/items/show/www.conwayhall.org.uk"><span>Humanist Library and Archives</span></a><span>, is free of known copyright restrictions.</span>
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application/pdf
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Text
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English
Debates and Debating
Discussion
Morris Tracts
Truth