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A
PHILOSOPHICAL CONVERSATION.
TRANSLATED •
FROM THE FRENCH OF DIDEROT.
■ !
*
• By E. N. -
PUBLISHED BY THOMAS SCOTT,'
NO. II THE TERRACE, FARQUHAR ROAD, UPPER NORWOOD,
LONDON, S.E.
----1875.
v
Price Sixpence. '
z.
■
'
‘
�LONDON :
PRINTED BY C. W. REYNELL, LITTLE PULTENEY STREET,
HAYMARKET, W.
�PREFACE.
This dialogue, entitled ‘ Entretien d’un Philosophe avec la Marcchale de * * * ’ was originally
published in Italian and French, professing to be
translated from a posthumous work of the poet
Crudeli. It is written in the most natural style,
and few dialogues in the French language give
such a perfect illusion of two persons conversing.
But, under a style worthy of the best writers of
comedy, the most powerful arguments are to be
seen, and a volume might be written in develop
ment of the points touched upon in these few
pages. Except in a few instances where expla
nation or reference seemed desirable, I have
refrained from adding notes ; the thinking reader
will be able to apprehend the arguments, even
those which, latent in the dialogue, would
develop most brilliantly under dramatic inter
pretation.
Diderot’s writings are too little known in
England; he is hardly ever mentioned; but his
thoughts may be traced in more than one modern
work. Apart from the errors common to all
social philosophy before Malthus wrote, and a
�4
Preface.
style perhaps too much seasoned with Gallic salt
for English taste in the present day, Diderot
stands in the first rank of philosophers and lite
rary men. To none does Humanity owe more.
As a writer, he excelled in lifelike dialogue ; an
admirable specimen of it, 1 Le Neveu de Rameau ’
was recently translated in the Fortnightly
Review; his ‘ Paradoxe sur le Comedien,’ a most
artistic production, will, I hope, soon find a
translator capable of doing justice to it. In the
piece now translated, the nature of the subject
compels rather strict adherence to the letter of
the author, and prevents his spirit from being
conveyed as well as it might be in a purely lite
rary compositiom
�DIDEROT’S
PHILOSOPHICAL
CONVERSATION.
AVING some business with the marechai de
* * * I called on him one morning ; he was
,
out, but I waited for him and was shown in to the
marechale. She is a charming woman, an angel of
beauty and piety; sweet temper is depicted on her
countenance, the tone of her voice and the simplicity
of her conversation agree perfectly with the expres
sion of her features. She was still at her toilet table;
I was asked to sit down, and we began to talk. At
some remark of mine which edified and surprised her
(for she believed that a man who denies the Holy
Trinity is a rogue who will end at the gallows), she
said:—
La Marechale. Are you not Monsieur Crudeli ?
Crudeli.—Yes, Madam.
L. M.—Then you are the man who believes in
nothing ?
Cr.—The same.
L. M.—Nevertheless you profess the same moral
principles as a believer.
Cr.—Why should I not, if I am an honest man ?
L. M.—And do you put these principles in prac
tice ?
Cr.—As well as I can.
L. M.—What! you never steal; you are neither a
murderer nor a robber ?
H
�6
Diderot's Philosophical Conversation.
Cr.—Very rarely.
L. M.—Then what do you gain by your unbelief ?
• Cr.—Nothing ; is one to believe because of some
thing to be gained thereby ?
L. M.—That I can hardly say ; but the motive of
personal interest is not amiss in the business either
of this world or of the next. I am rather sorry for
the credit of poor humanity; it is not saying much
for us. But, really ! do you never steal ?
Cr.—Never, on my word.
L. M.—If you are neither a murderer nor a thief,
you must own that your conduct is unreasonable and
inconsistent.
Cr.—How so ?
L. M.—Because it seems to me that if I had
nothing to hope or to fear when I am out of this
world, there are many little indulgences which I
should not deprive myself of now that I am in it. I
own to investing my good works in expectation of
repayment with enormous interest.
Cr.—You think you do.
L. M.—I do not merely think so; it is a fact.
Cr.—And might I ask you what things you would
permit yourself if you were an unbeliever ?
L. M.—If you please, no ; I keep that subject for
the confessional.
Cr.—My investment of good works is a poor specu
lation ; I shall never see my capital again.
L. M.—That is an unthrifty investment.
Cr.—Would you rather I should be a usurer ?
L. M.—Well, yes; you may practise usury to any
extent in your dealings with God, you cannot ruin
him. I know that it is a rather shabby proceeding,
but what does that matter ? The point is to get into
heaven by hook or by crook ; we must make the best
of everything and neglect nothing which can bring
us in a return. Alas ! whatever we do, our invest
ment will always be pitifully small in comparison with
�Diderot's Philosophical Conversation.
7
the handsome return we expect for it. And so you
expect no return ?
Cr.—Nothing.
L. M.—How sad! You must own that you are
either very wicked or very foolish ?
Cr.—Indeed I cannot say which.
L. M.—What motive for being good can an unbeliever
have if he is in his right mind ? Please tell me that.
Cr.—I can tell you.
L. M.—I shall be glad to know.
Cr.—Do you not think it possible that one may be
so fortunately born as to find a natural pleasure in
doing good ?
L. M.—I think it is possible.
Cr.—That one may have received an excellent
education which strengthens the natural inclination
towards good deeds ?
L. M.—Certainly.
Cr.—And that in after-life experience may have
convinced us that, taking everything into considera
tion, it is better for one’s happiness in this world to
be an honest man than a rogue ?
L. M.—Yes indeed; but can one be honest sup
posing that bad principles combine with the passions
to lead us towards evil ?
Cr.—One may not act in consequence ; and what
do we more commonly see than actions at variance
with principles ?
L. M.—Alas ! it is unfortunately so ; believers con
stantly act as if they did not believe.
Cr.—And without believing one may act nearly as
well as if one believed.
L. M.—I am glad to hear you say so; but what
inconvenience would there be in having a reason the
more, religion, for doing good, and a reason the less,
unbelief, for doing evil ?
Cr.—None, if religion were a motive for doing
good and unbelief a motive for doing evil.
�8
Diderot's Philosophical Conversation.
L. M.—Can there be any doubt on that point ?
Does not the spirit of religion incessantly thwart the
promptings of this vile corrupted human nature, and
does not the spirit of unbelief abandon it to its evil
ways by relieving it from all fear ?
Cb.—Madame la marechale, this will lead us into
a long discussion.
L. M.—And what if it does ? The Marshal will
not be back for some time, and we are better em
ployed talking sense than taking away our neigh
bours’ good names.
Cr.—You see that I shall have to take up the
subject rather far back.
. L. M.—As far back as you like, provided I under
stand you.
Cr.—If you do not understand me it will certainly
be my fault.
L. M.—I thank you for the compliment; but you
must know that I have never read anything but my
prayer-book, and that my occupations have been
exclusively confined to putting the gospel in practice
and looking after my children.
Cr.—Two duties that you have well fulfilled.
L. M.—Yes, as regards the children. But begin.
Cr.—Madame la marechale, is there in this world
any good without some drawback ?
L. M.—Kone.
Cr.—What, then, do you call good and evil ?
L. M.—Evil must be that in which the drawbacks
are greater than the advantages, while good must,
on the contrary, be that which has advantages
greater than the drawbacks.
Cr.—Will you please to bear in mind your defini
tion of good and evil ?
L. M.—I will remember it. Do you call that a
definition ?
Cr.—Yes.
L. M.—This is philosophy, then ?
�Diderot’s Philosophical Conversation.
9
Cr.—Excellent philosophy.
L. M.—The last thing I should have thought
myself capable of.
Cr.—So you are persuaded that religion has more
advantages than drawbacks, and that for this reason
you call it good ?
L. M.—Yes.
Cr.—For my own part I do not doubt that your
steward robs you somewhat less on Good Friday than
on Easter Monday; and that now and then religion
prevents a number of little evils and produces a num
ber of' little benefits.
L. M.—Little by little, the sum mounts up.
Cr.—But do you believe that such wretched little
advantages can sufficiently compensate the terrible
ravages which religion has caused in past times, and
which it will still cause in times to come ? Consider
the violent antipathy which it has created between
nations, and which it still keeps up.
There is
not a Mussulman who would not imagine he was
doing an act agreeable to God and the holy
prophet in exterminating all the Christians, who, on
their side, are hardly more tolerant. Consider the
dissensions which it has created and perpetuated in
the midst of nearly every nation, dissensions which
have rarely been stifled without bloodshed. Our own
history offers us examples which are only too recent
and too disastrous. Consider that it has created, and
still keeps up the most violent and undying hatred
between the members of society, between the indi
viduals of a family. Christ said he had come to
divide the man from his wife, the mother from her
children, the brother from his sister, the friend from
the friend, and his prediction has only been too com
pletely fulfilled.
L. M.—That may be the abuse of the thing without
being the thing itself.
Cr.—It is the thing itself, if the abuses are insepar
able from it.
B
�io
Diderot's Philosophical Conversation.
L. M.—And how can yon show me that the abuses
of religion are inseparable from religion ?
Cb.—Very easily. Tell me this : supposing a manhater had desired to render the human race as unhappy
as possible, what could he have invented for the pur
pose better than belief in an incomprehensible being
about whom men could never be able to agree, and
whom they should regard as more important than
their own lives ? * And is it possible to form a con
ception of a deity without attaching to it the deepest
incomprehensibility and the highest importance ?
L. M.—No.
Cr.—Then draw your conclusion.
L. M.—I conclude that it is an idea not without
serious consequence in the mind of fools.
Cr.—And add that fools always have been and
always will be the majority of mankind, that the
most dangerous fools are those rendered so by
religion, and that these are the men whom the dis
turbers of society know how to work when they have
need of them.
L. M.—But we must have something to frighten
men from such bad actions as escape the severity of
the law; and, if you destroy religion, what can you
substitute for it ?
Or.—Even if I had nothing to substitute for it,
there would be always a terrible prejudice the less,
without counting that in no age and in no country
have religious opinions formed the basis of national
manners. The gods adored by the old Greeks and
Romans, the finest people on earth,f were a most
dissolute set of rascals; a Jupiter who deserved the
faggot and the stake, a Venus worthy of the House
of Correction, a Mercury whose proper place was
in jail.
L. M.—And so you think that it is quite a matter
* See Appendix, Note I.
t See Note II.
�Diderot's Philosophical Conversation,
11
of indifference whether we be Christians or Pagans ;
that as Pagans we should be equally good and that as
'Christians we are no better ?
Cb.—Indeed I am convinced of it; excepting that
as Pagans we should be rather merrier.
L. M.—It is impossible.
Cr.—But, Madame la marechale, are there any
Christians ? I have never seen any.
L. M.—That is a nice thing to say to me.
Cr.—I am not saying it to you: I was thinking of
a lady who is a neighbour of mine, good and pious
as you are, and who believed herself in all sincerity
to be a Christian, just as you do.
L. M.—And you showed her that she was mis
taken ?
Cr.—At once.
L. M.—How did you manage that ?
Cr.—I opened a New Testament, a well-read one,
for it was considerably worn. I read her the Sermon
on the Mount, and at each article of it I asked
her:—“ Do you act up to this ? ” I went on
further. She is a beautiful woman, and although
very pious she is not unconscious of her attraction;
she has a most delicate fair complexion, and although
she does not attach much value to this perishable
charm, she is not displeased if it excites admira
tion ; her bust is perfect, and, although very modest,
she is not averse to its beauty being observed.
L. M.—Provided, of course, that she and her
husband should alone be aware of this.
Cr.—I believe that her husband knows it much
better than any one else; but for a woman who
prides herself on high Christian principles that is
not enough. I said to her :—“ Is it not written
in the gospel that he who has coveted his neigh
bour’s wife has committed adultery already in his
heart?”
L. M.— I suppose she answered yes ?
�12
Diderot’s Philosophical Conversation.
Cr. I said to her:—“And does not adultery
committed in the heart damn as surely as a more
complete adultery ? ”
R- M.—I suppose she answered yes ?
Cb. I said, “ And if the man is damned for
adultery committed in heart, what will be the fate of
the woman who invites all those who come near her
to commit that crime?
This last question rather
embarrassed her.
C. M.—I understand ; she did not cover up that
perfect bust as completely as she might.
Cr.—Not quite. She answered that it was a
custom, as if nothing was more customary than to call
oneself Christian and yet not to be so; that it was
wrong to dress in a ridiculous manner, as if there
could be any comparison between a petty ridiculous
act and the eternal damnation of one’s self and one’s
neighbours ; that she did not interfere with her dress
maker, as if it were not better to change one’s dress
maker than to be false to one’s religion ; that it was
her husband’s fancy, as if a husband could be mad
enough to demand that his wife should push obedi
ence to a wrong-headed husband so far as to disobey
the will of God and to contemn the threats of her
Redeemer I
L. M.—I was well aware of all those childish
reasons; I might even have answered as your neigh
bour did; but both she and I would have been taken
at a disadvantage. However, what conduct did she
adopt, after your remonstrance ?
Cr.—-The day after this conversation was a holy
day ; I was going upstairs to my room, when my
neighbour was coming downstairs on her way to
mass.
L. M.—Dressed as usual ?
Cr.—Dressed as usual. I smiled, she smiled ; and
we passed one another without speaking. This was
a good woman ! a Christian ! a pious woman ! After
�Diderot's Philosophical Conversation.
13
this example and a hundred thousand others of the
same sort, what real influence on conduct can I grant
religion, to have ? Hardly any: and so much the
better.
L. M.—How so much the better ?
Cr.—Yes, I mean it. Supposing that twenty
thousand of the inhabitants of Paris took it into
their heads to conform strictly to the precepts of the
Sermon on the Mount. . . .
L. M.—There would be some ladies’ shoulders
better covered than at present.
Cr.—And so many lunatics that the police would
be at their wits’ end to find room for them all in the
madhouses. In all inspired books there are two kinds
of morality; one general and common to every
nation, to every religion, and which is followed pretty
nearly ; another peculiar to each nation and to each
religion, in which men believe, which they preach in
their churches, which they teach in their homes, and
which they do not follow at all.
*
L. M.—What is the reason of this contradiction ?
Cr.—In the impossibility of subjecting a people to
a rule which only agrees with a few melancholy men
who have diawn it from a model found in their own
character. Religions are like monastic rules; all
become relaxed in time. They are follies which can
not hold ground against the constant efforts of nature
to bring us back to her laws. Let the statesman take
care that the welfare of individuals should be so
bound up with the common weal that a citizen can
hardly harm society without hurting himself; let
virtue be rewarded as certainly as wickedness is
punished; let merit, in whatever position it exist,
and without distinction of sect, be eligible for state
employment, and only count as wicked the small
number of men whom an incorrigible perversity of
* * See Note III.
�14
Diderot's Philosophical Conversation.
nature has dragged into vice. Temptation is too
near and hell is too far off; it is not worth the while
of a legislator to take in hand a system of crooked
opinions which can only keep children under its yoke,
which encourages crime by the facility of its expia
tion ; which sends the culprit to ask pardon from
*
God for the injuries inflicted on man, and which
degrades the order of natural and moral duties by
making it subordinate to an order of chimerical
duties.
L. M.—I do not understand you.
Cr.—I will explain ; but I think I hear the Mar
shal’s carriage coming, just in time to prevent me
from saying something which you might think
impudent.
L. M.—If what you are about to say is impudent, I
shall not hear it; I have a good habit of only hearing
what I choose.
Cr.—Madame la marecliale, ask the curate of your
parish which is the more atrocious crime : to defile
one of the eucharistic vessels or to blacken the good
name of an honest woman ? He will shudder with
horror at the first, he will cry sacrilege ; and the
civil law which takes hardly any notice of calumny
while it punishes sacrilege by the stake,f will finish the
confusion of moral ideas and the corruption of the
public ’mind.
L. M.—I know more than one woman who would
scruple to eat meat on a Friday, and yet would . . .
I was also going to say my piece of impudence.
Continue.
Cr.-—But, Madam, I must really go and see the
Marshal.
L. M.—Another minute, and then we will go
together and see him. I don’t know how to answer
you, and yet you do not persuade me.
* See Note IV.
t See Note V.
�Diderot's Philosophical Conversation,
15
Cr.—I had no intention of persuading you. It is
the same with religion as with marriage. Although
marriage has caused misery to so many others, it has
given happiness to you and the Marshal. Religion
which has made, which still makes, and will yet
make so many men wicked, has rendered you better
than before ; you do well in keeping to it. It pleases
you to imagine, above your head, a great and power
ful being, who 'watches your journey through life ;
this idea strengthens your steps. Continue, Madam,
to enjoy the thought of this august keeper of your
mind, at once a spectator and a sublime model of
your actions.
L. M.—I see that you are not possessed by the
mania of proselytism.
Cr.—By no means.
L. M.—And I esteem you the more for it.
Cr.—I permit every one to think in his way, pro
vided he does not interfere with mine ; and, besides,
those who are destined to deliver themselves from
these prejudices have no need of being catechized.
L. M.—Do you think that man can do "without
superstition F
Cr.—No ; not as long as he remains ignorant and
timorous.
L- M.—Well then, superstition for superstition, as
well ours as another.
Cr.—I do not think so.
L. M.—Tell me truly, have you no repugnance for
the idea of being nothing after death F
Cr.—I would prefer to retain my existence'; not
withstanding that I see no reason why a Being who
has already been able to render me unhappy without
any reason, might not amuse himself again in the
same way.
*
L- M.—If, notwithstanding that drawback, the
* See Note VL
�16
Diderot's Philosophical Conversation.
hope of a life to come appears sweet and consoling,
even to you, why teai’ it from us F
Cr.—I have no such hope, for my desire does not
imply an expectation which I know to be vain; but
I take it away from no one.
*
If any person can
believe that he will see when he has no eyes, that he
will hear when he has no ears, that he will think when
he has no brain, that he will love when he has no heart,
that he will feel when he has no sensation, that he
will exist when he will be nowhere, that he will be
a something without measure or place,—I have no
objection.
L. M.—But this world, who made it ?
Cr.—Perhaps you can inform me.
L. M.—God.
Cr.—And what is God ?
L. M.—A spirit.
Cr.—If a spirit can make matter, why should not
matter make a spirit ?
L. M.—And why should itp
Cr.—Because I see it do so every day. Do you
believe that animals have souls ?
L- M.—Certainly I believe so.
Cr. And could you tell me what becomes, for
instance, of the soul of the Peruvian serpent which
is hung up in a chimney to dry, and remains in the
smoke for one or two years ?
L. M.—Let it go where it pleases ; what does that
matter to me ?
Cr.—You are probably not aware that this serpent,
smoked and dried, revives, and comes to life again.f
L. M.—I don’t believe it.
Cr.—Nevertheless, a clever man, Bouguer, asserts
that it is so.
>
’
, ,
* The terseness of the original deservesnotice. “Je n’ai pas cet
,e,sP°\r> Parceclue le desir ne m’en a point donne la vanite; mais je ne
lote a personne.” Another reading gives “derobe” instead of “ donne
the translation would then be, “for my desire has not deceived me as
to its vanity.”
t See Note VII.
�Diderot's Philosophical Conversation.
17
L. M.—Your clever man has told a story.
Cr.—Suppose what he says were true ?
L. M.—Well, I should have to believe that animals
are machines.
Cr.—’Remembering that man is only a rather more
perfect animal than the rest. . . . But I think
the Marshal is . . .
L. M.—One more question; the last. Are you at
ease in your unbelief F
Cr.—-Impossible to be more so.
L. M.—Yet, if it turned out that you were mis
taken ?
Cr.—Well, and if I were mistaken ?
L. M.—All that you believe to be false would come
true, and you would be cast amongst the damned.
Monsieur Crudeli, it is a terrible thing to be con
demned to.hell, to burn there for all eternity I
*
Cr.—La Fontaine believed that we should be as
comfortable there as fish in the water.
L. M.—You may laugh now ; but remember that
La Fontaine became very serious at his last moments ;
and this is the point where I make my stand against
you.
Cr.—I answer for nothing when my head will be
no longer right; but if I die from one of those
diseases which leave the expiring man his whole
reason, I shall not be more disturbed at the moment
you mention than I am at present.
L. M.—I am confounded at your boldness.
Cr.—I think there is much more boldness in the
man who dies believing in a severe judge who weighs
our most secret thoughts and in whose scales the
most upright man would be lost through vanity, did
he not tremble through fear of being found wanting;
if this dying man had then the choice either of anni
hilation or of judgment, his boldness would impress
* See Note VIII.
3
* v
�18
Diderot’s Philosophical Conversation.
me more should he hesitate to choose the former
alternative; unless he were more insane than the
companion of St. Bruno, or more intoxicated with
his own merits than Bohola.
L. M.—I have read the story of St. Bruno’s com
panion, but I have never heard of Bohola.
Cr.—He was a Jesuit of the college of Pinsk in
Lithuania, who left at his death a coffer full of money,
with a memorandum which he had written and
signed.
L. M.—And what was the memorandum about ?
Cr.—It ran thus : “ I request the dear brother to
whom I have confided this coffer, to open it when I
shall have performed miracles.' The money which it
contains will pay the expenses of my canonization.
I have left some authentic memoirs for the confirma
tion of my virtues and the guidance of those who
undertake to write my life.”
L. M.—What a ridiculous story !
Cr.—It may be so to me, Madam, but in your case
a joke on such a subject may offend God.
L. M.—Indeed, you are right.
Cr.—It is so easy to sin grievously against your
law.
L. M.'—I admit that it is.
Cr.—The justice which will decide your fate is
very rigorous.
L. M.—True.
Cr.—And if you believe the oracles of your religion
on the number of the elect, it will be very small.
L. M.— Oh ! but I am not a Jansenist; I only look
at the consoling side of the question; the blood of
Jesus Christ covers, in my eyes, a multitude of sins ;
and it would seem to me very singular if the Devil
had the best share of mankind, although he did not
give up a son to death.
Cr.-—Do you damn Socrates, Phocion, Aristides,
Cato, Trajan, Marcus Aurelius ?
�Diderofs Philosophical Conversation.
19
L. M.—Certainly not; no one but a wild beast
could think of such a thing. St. Paul says that
every man shall be judged by the law which he has
known, and St. Paul is right.
Cjb.—'And by what law is the unbeliever to be
judged ?
L. M.—Your case is rather different. You are one
of the accursed inhabitants of Chorazin and Bethsaida, who shut their eyes to the light which shone
on them and stopped their ears so as not to hear the
voice of truth speaking to them.
Cr.—The people of Chorazin and Bethsaida were
men such as never existed elsewhere, if they were
free to believe or not to believe.
L. M.—They saw mighty works which would have
made sackcloth and ashes more valuable than gold,
had they been done in Tyre and Sidon,
Cr.—Well, you see, the inhabitants of Tyre and
Sidon were clever people, while those of Chorazin
and Bethsaida were fools. I told you a story just
now, I should like to tell you another. Once upon a
time, a young Mexican . . . But, the Marshal . . .
L. M.—I will send and find out if he is disengaged.
*
Well what about the young Mexican ?
Cr.—Peeling weary of his work, was walking one
day along the sea-shore. He saw a plank, one end
of which was floating while the other was aground.
He sat down on the plank, and then, gazing over the
vast expanse of sea, said to himself:11 My grandmother
must be doting when she tells that story about those
people, who at some long time ago landed here from
somewhere or other beyond the seas. What nonsense I
is it not plain that the sea and the sky join in the
distance ? Can I believe, against the evidence of my
senses, an old story the date of which is unknown,
which every one tells in his own fashion, and which
is nothing but a tissue of absurd traditions about
which people tear their own hearts and one another’s
�20
Diderot's Pkilosophical Conversation.
eyes ?” While he was thus meditating, the rippling
waters were rocking him as he lay on the plank and
he soon fell asleep. The wind rose and the tide
carried the plank out to sea with our young reasoner
still lying asleep on it.
L. M.—Alas1 that is a true image of mankind :
we are each of us floating on a plank, the wind rises
and the tide carries us out to sea.
Cr.—When he awoke he was already far from the
land. Much as he was surprised to find himself out
at sea, he was still more surprised when the land dis
appeared and the sea joined with the sky over the
place where he had not long ago been walking. Then
he began to suspect that he might very possibly have
been mistaken in his incredulity, and that if the wind
continued from the same point, he might perhaps be
carried to the coast inhabited by the people of whom
his grandmother had so often spoken to him.
L. M.—You say nothing about the anxiety he
must have felt.
Cr. He had none. He said to himself:—“ What
does it matter provided I get to land. I have
reasoned rather clumsily, I must own; but I was
sincere, and that is all that can be expected of me.
If cleverness is not a virtue, stupidity cannot be a
crime.” In the meantime the wind continued to
blow, the plank and its freight floated on, the
unknown shore soon began to appear, and before
very long he arrived there and landed.
L. M.—We shall meet on that shore one day,
Monsieur Crudeli.
Cr.—I hope so, Mhdcwne la marechdle; wherever
it be I shall always be delighted at an opportunity of
paying my respects to you. Scarcely had he left the
plank and set foot on shore, when he perceived a
venerable old man standing at his side. He asked
where he was and to whom he had the honour of
speaking. “I am the sovereign of this country,”
�Diderot's Philosophical Conversation.
21
replied the old man. “ You denied my existence ? ”
—“True, I did.”—“And that of my empire ? ”—“ True, I did.”—“ I pardon you, because I am He
who sees to the bottom of hearts, and I have read in
yours that you were in good faith; but all your
thoughts and deeds have not been so innocent.”
Whereupon the old man took him gently by the ear,
recalled to him all the faults of his life, and at each
one the young Mexican bowed down, beat his breast,
and asked forgiveness. How, Madame la marechale,
put yourself for a moment in the place of the old
man and tell me what you would have done ? Would
you have seized this young fool and taken a pleasure
in dragging him round the beach by the hair for all
eternity P
L. M.—Indeed, no.
Cr.—If one of those pretty children of yours had
escaped from the house, and after doing all sorts of
foolish things, came back repentant ?
L. M.—I should rush to meet him, I should take
him in my arms and embrace him with tears. But
his father, the Marshal, would not take things so gently.
Cr.—The Marshal is not exactly a tiger.
L. M.—Not by any means.
Cr.—He would require a little persuasion, but he
would certainly end by forgiving.
L. M.—Certainly.
Cr.—Especially if he came to think that, before
causing the birth of this child, he knew its whole life,
and that the punishment of its faults would be use
less, either for himself, for the culprit, or for the
other children.
L. M.—But the old man and the Marshal are two
very different persons.
Cr.—Do you mean that the Marshal is kinder
than the old man ?
L. M.— God forbid ! I only mean that if my jus
tice is not the same as the Marshal’s, his may not be
the same as the old man’s.
�22
Diderot's Philosophical Conversation.
Ce.—Ah ! Madam, you do not foresee the conse
quences of that answer. Either the general defini
tion of justice is equally applicable to you, to the
Marshal, to me, to the young Mexican and to the old
man, or else I don’t know what justice is and am
totally in the dark as to the means by which the old
man is pleased or displeased.
At this point of our conversation, we were told
that the Marshal was waiting for us. As I shook
hands with the marechale, she said :—It is enough to
make one giddy, isn’t it ?
Ce.—Why should it, if the head is firm ?
L. M.—After all, the shortest way is to behave as
if the old man existed.
Ce.—Even if one doesn’t believe it.
L. M.—And if you do believe it, not to count on
his goodness.
Oe.—If that is not the politest conduct, at least it
is the safest.
L. M.—By the way, suppose you were taken before
the magistrates to give an account of your religious
principles, would you confess them ?
Ce.—I should do my best to save the authorities
from committing an atrocious act.
*
L. M.—Ah! you are a coward ! And if you were
at the point of death, would you submit to receive
the sacraments of the church ?
Ce.—I would not fail to do so.
L. M.—Eor shame! you wicked hypocrite !
* See Note IN.
�APPENDIX.
Note I., page 10.
Compare the opinions of James Mill, as recorded in his
son’s Autobiography, Chapter II. “His aversion to religion,
in the sense usually attached to the term, was of the same
kind with that of Lucretius ; he regarded it with the feelings
due, not to a mere mental delusion, but to a great moral
evil. He looked upon it as the greatest enemy of morality ;
first, by setting up fictitious excellences—belief in creeds,
■devotional feelings and ceremonies, not connected with the
good of human kind,—and causing these to be accepted as
substitutes for genuine virtues : but above all, by radically
vitiating the standard of morals. . . . He was as well
aware as any one that Christians do not in general undergo
the demoralising consequences which seem inherent in such a
creed, in the manner, or to the extent which might have been
expected from it. The same slovenliness of thought, and
subjection of the reason to fears, wishes, and affections, which
enable them to accept a theory involving a _ contradiction in
terms, prevents them from perceiving the logical consequences
of the theory.”
Note II., page 10.
Exception may possibly be taken to the Greeks and Romans
being called “ les plus honnetes gens de la terre.'’ I apprehend
that°Diderot’s meaning will be understood from the following
remarks of John Stuart Mill. “We greatly doubt if most of
"the positive virtues were not better conceived and more highly
prized by the public opinion of Greece than by that of Great
Britain . . . and it may be questioned, if even private
duties are, on the whole, better understood, while duties to
the public, unless in cases of special trust, have almost
dropped out of the catalogue ; that idea, so powerful in the
free states of Greece, has faded into a mere rhetorical
ornament.”—(Review of Grote's ‘History of Greece.’)
Speaking on the use of the Greek and Roman literatures,
Mill also says, “They exhibit, in the military and agri
cultural commonwealths of antiquity, precisely that order of
virtues in which commercial society is apt to be deficient; and
�24
Appendix.
they altogether show human nature on a grander scale ; with
less benevolence but more patriotism ; less sentiment but more
self-control; if a lower average of virtue, more striking
individual examples of it; fewer small goodnesses, but more
greatness and appreciation of greatness ; more which tends to
exalt the imagination and inspire high conceptions of the
capabilities of human nature.”—(Review of De Tocqueville on
‘ Democracy in America. ’)
It is possible that European society may have become more
honest since the middle of the eighteenth century, but at that
time Diderot might with reason regret the ancient standard
of virtue.
Note III., page 13.
This passage is developed by John Stuart Mill, in his Essay
‘On Liberty’:—“Towhat an extent doctrines intrinsically
fitted to make the deepest impression upon the mind may
remain in it as dead beliefs, without being ever realised in the
imagination, the feelings or the understanding, is exemplified
by the manner in which the majority of believers hold the
doctrines of Christianity. By Christianity, I here mean what
is accounted such by all churches and sects—the maxims and
precepts contained in the New Testament. These are con
sidered sacred, and accepted as laws, by all professing Chris
tians. Yet it is scarcely too much to say that not one Christian
in a thousand guides or tests his individual conduct by
reference to those laws. The standard to which he does refer
it is the custom of his nation, his class, or his religious pro
fession. He has thus, on the one hand, a collection of ethical
maxims, which he believes to have been vouchsafed to him
by infallible wisdom as rules for his government; and on the
other a set of every day judgments and practices, which go a
certain length with some of those maxims, not so great a
length with others, stand in direct opposition to some, and
are, on the whole, a compromise between the Christian creed
and the interests and suggestions of worldly life. To the
first of these standards he gives his homage ; to the other his
real allegiance. All Christians believe that the blessed are
the poor and humble, and those who are ill-used by the
world ; that it is easier for a camel to pass through the eye of
a needle than for a rich man to enter the kingdom of heaven ;
that they should judge not, lest they be judged: that they
should swear not at all; that they should love their neigh
bour as themselves ; that if one take their cloak, they should
give him their coat also ; that they should take no thought
�15
Appendix:
for the morrow ; that if they would be perfect they should
sell all that they have and give it to the poor. They are not
insincere when they say that they believe these things. They
do believe them, as people believe what they have always
heard lauded, and never discussed. But in the sense of that
living belief which regulates conduct, they believe these doc
trines just up to the point to which it is usual to act upon
them. The doctrines, in their integrity, are serviceable to
pelt adversaries with ; and it is understood that they are to
be put forward (when possible), as the reasons for whatever
people do that they think laudable. But any one who
reminded them that the maxims require an infinity of things
which they never even think of doing, would gain nothing
but to be classed among those very unpopular characters who
affect to be better than other people. The doctrines have no
hold on ordinary believers—are not a power in their minds.
They have an habitual respect for the sound of them, but no
feeling which spreads from the words to the things signified,
and forces the mind to take them in, and make them conform
to the formula. Whenever conduct is concerned they look
round for Mr A. and B., to direct them how far to go in
obeying Christ. ”
Note IV., page 14.
See in Voltaire’s ‘Philosophical Dictionary’ the article
“Kavaillac.” It is in the form of a dialogue between a
doctor in theology and a page of the Duke of Sully. The
dialogue begins thus : ‘ ‘ Thank God, my dear boy, JRavaillac
died in holiness. He made his confession to me ; he repented
of his sin, and made a firm resolve not to fall into it again.
He wished to receive the holy communion, but that is not
allowed here as at Borne; his repentance stood in place of it,
and it is certain that he is now in paradise. . . . He was
most contrite, and contrition, combined with the sacrament of
confession, effects salvation, which leads straight to paradise,
where he is now praying to God for you.”
Note V., page 14.
This dialogue was written within a few years of the con
demnation of La Barre and D’Etallonde for sacrilege. They
were accused of having insulted a crucifix set up in a public
thoroughfare; the alleged offence was committed at night, and
the evidence was far from satisfactory. D’Etallonde fled, and
was provided for by Frederick the Great at Voltaire’s request;
La Barre was condemned by the Parliament of Abbeville ; he
was racked, his tongue was torn out, and he was then be
headed.
C
�26
Appendix.
Note VI., page 15.
The desirability of a future life is well treated in the West
minster Review for April, 1873 (Mr Gladstone’s “Defence of
the Faith.”) I will only quote the following sentence for
comparison with Diderot: “No doubt the prospect of future
non-existence may not be an altogether pleasant element to
mingle with our ideas for a few short years to come ; but by
no ingenuity can non-existence itself be represented as
unpleasant.” Compare also Mill’s ‘Three Essays,’ page 118.
Note VII., page 16.
The serpent was adored in Peru, as it is in other parts of
the world, as an emblem of eternity and of resurrection, as
well as of destruction and of regeneration. This incident in
the dialogue is evidently an allusion to the idea of resurrec
tion; Diderot, without entering into the hopeless labyrinth of
a discussion on the soul, contents himself with leading his
interlocutor into a dilemma and leaving her there.
Metaphysicians have successively given animals souls, de
graded them to machines (as compared with soul-possessing
man), and finally, perceiving the awkwardness of either posi
tion, decided on allowing them a compromise called instinct.
Note VIII., page 17.
The expediency of “hedging,” so frequently urged on
waverers in faith, is apparently an argument not confined to
modern Evangelical Christians.
Note IX., page 22.
It must not be thought that Diderot was himself so cautious
as he represents his philosopher. Although he had. with the
tolerance which was his characteristic, confided the article
Soul in his Encyclopaedia to a theologian of well-known ortho
doxy, he was attacked for the materialistic tendencies of this
very article, and the work was proscribed. His prospects
were looking gloomy ; Voltaire begged him to leave his un
grateful country, and to accept the noble hospitality offered
by Catherine of Russia; he was in vain reminded of the fate
of the Chevalier La Barre. But Diderot scorned to seek safety
in flight, and, with the scaffold before his eyes, answered Vol
taire in the following terms : “I know that when a wild beast
has tasted human blood it can no longer do without it; I know
that this beast, having devoured the Jesuits, is about to spring
on the philosophers ; I know that it has cast eyes on me, and
that I shall perhaps be the first devoured. . . I know that
one of them has had the atrocity to say that nothing will be
done as long as only books are burnt. ... I know that
before the end of the year I may remember your advice, and
�Appendix.
27
cry Solon! Solon! . . . What is existence to me if I can
only preserve it by renouncing all that is dear to me ? And
then, I rise every morning with the hope that the wicked have
repented during the night, that there are no more fanatics. . .
If I meet the fate of Socrates, remember that it is not enough
to die like him in order to merit comparison with him. . .
Illustrious and tender-hearted friend of humanity, I salute
and embrace you. No man with a spark of generosity but
would pardon fanaticism for cutting a few years off his life if
those years could be added to yours. If we do not join in
your efforts to crush the beast, it is because we are within
*
reach of its claws, and if, knowing its ferocity, we yet hesitate
to retreat, it is from considerations of which the supremacy
influences every upright and sensitive nature.”
P08TCRIPTUM.
Since writing these notes I have observed some remarkable
coincidences between the opening of the argument in Diderot’s
‘ Conversation ’ (page 8) with that in Philip Beauchamp’s
‘ Analysis of the Influence of Natural Religion on the Tem
poral Happiness of Mankind.’ The latter, published in 18221
*
under an assumed name, is generally understood to be the
work of George Grote, and it is acknowledged by John Stuart
Mill to have had great influence on his intellectual develop
ment. At pages 1 and 2 are the following passages :—
‘ ‘ The warmest partisan of natural religion cannot deny that
by the influence of it (occasionally at least) bad effects have
been produced; nor can any one, on the other hand, venture to
deny that it has, on other occasions, brought about good effects.
The question, therefore, is throughout only as to the compara
tive magnitude, number, and proportion of each.”
“The injurious effects have avowedly been thrown aside
under the pretence that they are abuses of religion; that the
abuse of a thing cannot be urged against its use, since the
most beneficent preparations may be erroneously or criminally
applied. ”
‘ ‘ By the use of a thing is meant the good which it produces;
by the abuse, the evil which it occasions. To pronounce upon
the merits of the thing under discusssion, previously erasing
from the reckoning all the evil which it occasions, is most
preposterous and unwarrantable. ”
Chapter VI. is a development of Diderot’s argument at
page 14—“Temptation is too near,” &c.
. * The bete was fanaticism, that referred to in Voltaire’s watchword J
“ Ecrasez I'infame."
t It has recently been reprinted by Truelove, 256 High Holborn.
��“ADDITION
TO THE PHILOSOPHICAL
THOUGHTS”
OF
DIDEROT.
A very rare little work has fallen into my hands,
entitled ‘ Various Objections to the Writings of dif
ferent Theologians.’ Curtailed, and written with a
little more vivacity, it would form a very good sequel
to the ‘ Philosophical Thoughts.’ I give here a few
of the best ideas of the anonymous author in ques
tion :—
1.
Doubts, in matters of religion, far from being acts
of impiety, should be looked upon as good works,
when they are those of a man who humbly acknow
ledges his ignorance and when they arise from the
fear of displeasing God by the abuse of reason.
2.
To admit some conformity between the reason of
man and eternal reason, which is God, and to pretend
that God exacts the sacrifice of human reason, is to
lay down that He at once will and will not.
3.
When God, from whom we have our reason, re
quires the sacrifice of it, He becomes a juggler who
artfully takes away what he has given.
4.
If I give up my reason, I have no longer any guide.
�30
a Addition to The Philosophical
I must blindly adopt a secondary principle and suppose
what is in question.
5.
If reason is a gift of heaven, and if we can say
the same thing of faith, heaven has made us two pre
sents which are incompatible and contradictory.
6.
To remove this difficulty, we must say that faith is
a chimerical principle, and that it does not exist in
nature.
7.
Pascal Nicole, and others have said, “ That a God
should punish with eternal torments the fault of a
guilty father in his innocent children, is a proposition
above and not contrary to reason.” But what then
is a proposition contrary to reason if that which evi
dently asserts a blasphemy is not so ?
8.
Wandering about an immense forest during the
night, I have but a feeble light to guide me. A
stranger approaches and says to me, “ Blow out thy
candle, my friend, in order better to find thy way.”
This stranger is a theologian.
9.
If my reason comes from on high, it is the voice of
heaven which speaks to me through it; I am bound
to listen to it.
10.
Merit and demerit cannot apply to the use of
reason, because all the goodwill in the world cannot
avail a blind man to discern colours. I am forced to
perceive evidence where it is, and the want of evi
dence where it is not, unless I be an imbecile,—now
imbecility is a misfortune and not a vice.
11.
The author of nature, who will not reward me for
�thoughts ” of Diderot.
31
having been a man of sense, said M. Diderot, will
not damn me for having been a fool.
12.
And He will not damn thee even for having been
a wicked man, for hast thou not already been suffi
ciently unhappy in having been wicked ?
13.
Every virtuous action is accompanied by inward
satisfaction, every criminal action by remorse ; now
the mind owns without shame and without remorse
its repugnance to such and such propositions; there
is then neither virtue nor guilt either in believing or
in rejecting them.
14.
If we still need grace in order to do well, what
was the use of the death of Jesus Christ ?
15.
If there are a hundred thousand damned for one
saved, the devil has still the advantage without having
abandoned his son to death.
16.
The God of the Christians is a father who sets
great store by his apples and very little by his chil
dren.
17.
Take away from a Christian the fear of Hell and
you will take from him his faith.
18.
A true religion interesting all men in all times and
in all places must have been eternal, universal, and
evident; none has these characteristics ; all then are
thrice demonstrated false.
19.
The facts of which some men only can be witnesses
are insufficient to demonstrate a religion which ought
to be equally believed by the whole world.
�32
“Addition to The Philosophical
20.
The facts by which religions are supported are
ancient and marvellous; that is, the most doubtful
possible to prove the most incredible thing.
21.
To prove the Gospel by a miracle is to prove an
absurdity by a thing against nature.
22.
But what will God do to those who have never
heard speak of His Son ? Will He punish the deaf
for not having heard ?
23.
What will He do to those who, having heard tell
of His religion, have not been able to comprehend
it ? Will he punish pigmies for not having been
able to walk with the steps of a giant ?
24.
Why are the miracles of Jesus Christ true, and
those of Esculapius, of Apollonius and of Mahomet
false ?
25.
But all the Jews who were at Jerusalem were pro
bably converted at the sight of the miracles of Jesus
Christ ? Not at all. Ear from believing in him^
they crucified him. We must agree that these Jews
are unlike all other men; everywhere we have seen
people carried away by a single false miracle and
Jesus Christ was unable to make anything of the
Jewish people with an infinity of true miracles.
26.
It is this miracle of incredulity on the part of the
Jews which should be placed in the strongest light,
and not that of his resurrection.
27.
It is as true as that two and two make four that
Caesar existed ; it is as sure that Jesus Christ existed as
�Thoughts” of Diderot.
33
Csesar. It is then, as sure that Jesus Christ rose again
as that he or Csesar existed. What logic! The
existence of Jesus and of Cassar is not a miracle.
28.
We read in the life of M. de Turenne, that a house
having caught fire, the presence of the Blessed Holy
Sacrament suddenly arrested the flames. Well, but
we read also in history that a monk having poisoned
a consecrated host, an Emperor of Germany had no
sooner swallowed it than he expired.
’29.
There was something more there than the appear
ances of the bread and wine, or we must say that the
poison had incorporated itself with the body and the
blood of Jesus Christ.
30.
This body becomes mouldy, this wine becomes
sour, this God is devoured by mites upon his altar.
Blind people, imbecile Egyptians open your eyes !
31.
The religion of Jesus Christ announced by ignorant
persons made the first Christians. The same religion
preached by the learned and by doctors now only
makes sceptics.
32.
It is objected that submission to a legislative
authority dispenses one from reasoning; but where on
the surface of the earth is the religion without such
an authority?
33.
It js the education of his childhood which pre
vents a Mahometan from being baptized; it is the
education of his childhood which prevents a Chris
tian from being circumcised; it is the reason of the
grown man which equally despises baptism and
circumcision.
�34
“Addition to Phe Philosophical
34.
It is said in Saint Luke, that God the Father is
greater than God the Son. Pater major me est. Yet,
in spite of a passage so express, the Church pro
nounces anathema on any scrupulous believer who
adheres literally to the words of his father’s testament.
35.
If authority has been able to dispose at its pleasure
of the sense of this passage, and as there is not one
in all the Scriptures more precise, neither is there
one that we can flatter oursfelves we understand, and
of which the Church may not make what it pleases
in future.
36.
“ Tu es Petrus, et super hanc petram cedificaho ecclesiam mean.” Is that the language of a God, or a
medley worthy of the Seigneur des accords ?
37.
ilIn dolore paries.” “Thou shalt bring forth in
pain ” said God to the prevaricating woman; and
what have the females of animals done to offend
Him which also bring forth in pain ?
38.
If we are to understand literally Pater major me
est, Jesus Christ is not God. If we are to under
stand literally hoc est corpus meum, he gave himself
to his apostles with his own hands, which is as absurd
as to say that Saint Denis kissed his head after it had
been cut off!
39.
It is said that he retired to the Mount of Olives,
and that he.prayed, and to whom did he pray ? He
prayed to himself!
40.
This God who causes God to die in order to
appease God is an excellent saying of Baron de la
�Thoughts’" of Diderot.
11
35
Houtan. Less evidence results from a hundred folio
volumes written for or against Christianity than from
the absurdity of these two lines.
41.
To say that man is a compound of strength and
weakness, of light and blindness, of littleness and of
greatness, is not to state his case, it is to define it.
42.
Man is as God or nature has made him, and God
or nature makes nothing evil.
43.
What we call original sin, Ninon de Lenclos
called Ze pecihe original.
'
*
44.
It is unexampled impudence to cite the conformity
of the Evangelists, since in some of them there are
very important facts of which not a word is said in
the others.
45.
Plato considered the Divinity under three aspects,
goodness, wisdom, and power. One’s eyes must be
closed not to see in this the Trinity of the Christians.
It was nearly three thousand years since the philo
sopher of Athens called Logos what we call the
Word.
46.
The divine persons are either three accidents or
three substances. There is no medium. If they are
three accidents, we are Atheists or Deists; if they
are three substances, we are Pagans.
47.
God the Father judges man worthy of His eternal
vengeance ; God the Son judges them worthy of His
* There is a pun here ; originel is the French for ‘‘ original,” while
original means “ queer.”
�36
“Addition to The Philosophical
infinite mercy; the Holy Ghost remains nenter.
How can this senseless Catholic verbiage be recon
ciled with the unity of the divine will ?
48.
Theologians have long been asked to reconcile the
dogma of eternal torture with the infinite mercy of
God, and they are just where they were.
49.
And why punish a culprit when there is no longer
any good to be derived from his chastisement ?
50.
He who punishes for his own sake alone is very
cruel and very wicked.
51.
There is no good father who would wish to resemble
our heavenly Father.
52.
What proportion is there between the offender and
the offended ? what proportion between the offence
and the punishment ? What a heap of absurdities
and atrocities!
53.
And at what is this God so angry ? Would not
one say that Zcould do something for or against His
glory, for or against His peace, for or against His
happiness ?
54.
It is asserted that God causes the wicked man,
who is powerless against Him, to burn in a fire
which will endure everlastingly, yet scarcely would a
father be permitted to give temporary death to a
son who should compromise his life, his honour, and
his fortune !
55.
0 Christians! you have, then, two different ideas
�Thoughts ” of Diderot.
37
of goodness and of wickedness, of truth and of false
hood. You are, then, the most absurd of dogmatists
or the most outrageous of Pyrrhonists.
56.
All the evil of which one is capable is not all the
evil possible ; no it is only he who could commit all
the evil possible who could also deserve eternal
punishment. To make of God an infinitely vindic
tive being, you transform a worm of the earth into
an infinitely powerful being.
57.
That which these atrocious Christians have trans
lated by eternal, signifies in Hebrew only durable.
It is from the ignorance of a Hebrewism and from
the ferocious disposition of an interpreter that the
dogma of the eternity of torment proceeds.
58.
Pascal has said, “ If your religion is false, you risk
nothing in believing it true; if it is true, you risk
everything in believing it false.” An Imaun can say
just as much as Pascal.
59.
That Jesus Christ, who is God, should have been
tempted by the Devil, is a tale worthy the Thousandand-one Nights.
60.
I should be very glad if a Christian, particularly a
Jansenist, would make me feel the cui bono of the
incarnation. Again, would it not need to swell to
infinity the number of the damned if one desires to
turn this dogma to any advantage.
61.
But why do Leda’s swan and the little flames of
Castor and Pollux make us laugh ? and why do we
not laugh at the dove and the tongues of fire of the
Gospel ?
�38
“Addition to The Philosophical
62.
In the first centuries there were sixty Gospels
almost equally believed. "Fifty-six of them have been
rejected as containing puerilities and folly. Does
there remain nothing of all that in those which have
been preserved F
63.
God gives a first law to men; he then abolishes
this law. Is not such conduct a little like that of a
legislator who has been mistaken and discovers it in
time ? Is it like a perfect Being to change his
mind ?
64.
There are as many kinds of faith as there are
religions in the world.
65.
All the Sectarians in the world are but heretical
deists.
66.
If man is unhappy without having been born guilty,
may it not be that he is destined to enjoy eternal
happiness without being able, by his nature, ever to
make himself worthy of it ?
67.
What I think of the Christian dogma, and saying
but one word of its morality, is this: that for a
Catholic father of a family, convinced that the
maxims of the Gospel must be carried out to the
letter, under pain of what is called Hell, seeing the
extreme difficulty of attaining to that degree of per
fection of which human weakness is incapable, I see
no other expedient than to take his child by the foot
and to dash him to the earth, or to stifle him at birth.
By this act he saves him from the danger of damna
tion, and insures him eternal felicity; and I maintain
that such an act, far from being criminal, should be
esteemed infinitely praiseworthy, since it is founded
�Thoughts ” of Diderot.
j9
on the motive of paternal love, 'which demands that
every good father should do for his children all the
good possible.
68.
I ask whether the precept of religion and the law
of. society, which forbid the murder of the innocent,
are not in reality very absurd and very cruel, when,
by killing them, we insure to them infinite happiness,
whereas, in suffering them to live, we devote them
almost certainly to eternal misery ?
69.
How! Monsieur de la Condamine. Can it be allow
able to inoculate one’s son to save him from the small
pox, and not allowable to kill him in order to save
him from Hell ? You are jesting.
PRINTED BY C. W. REYNELL, LITTLE PULTENEY-STREET, HAYMARKET.
�
Dublin Core
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Title
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Victorian Blogging
Description
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A collection of digitised nineteenth-century pamphlets from Conway Hall Library & Archives. This includes the Conway Tracts, Moncure Conway's personal pamphlet library; the Morris Tracts, donated to the library by Miss Morris in 1904; the National Secular Society's pamphlet library and others. The Conway Tracts were bound with additional ephemera, such as lecture programmes and handwritten notes.<br /><br />Please note that these digitised pamphlets have been edited to maximise the accuracy of the OCR, ensuring they are text searchable. If you would like to view un-edited, full-colour versions of any of our pamphlets, please email librarian@conwayhall.org.uk.<br /><br /><span><img src="http://www.heritagefund.org.uk/sites/default/files/media/attachments/TNLHLF_Colour_Logo_English_RGB_0_0.jpg" width="238" height="91" alt="TNLHLF_Colour_Logo_English_RGB_0_0.jpg" /></span>
Creator
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Conway Hall Library & Archives
Date
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2018
Publisher
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Conway Hall Ethical Society
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Original Format
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Pamphlet
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
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A philosophical conversation
Creator
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Diderot, Denis [1713-1784]
Description
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Place of publication: London
Collation: 39 p. ; 18 cm.
Notes: Includes bibliographical references. Translated from French by "E.N." From the library of Dr Moncure Conway. Printed by C.W. Reynell. Includes Appendix (5 p. of notes on the text) and additions.
Publisher
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Thomas Scott
Date
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1875
Identifier
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CT136
Subject
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Philosophy
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<a href="http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/mark/1.0/"><img src="http://i.creativecommons.org/p/mark/1.0/88x31.png" alt="Public Domain Mark" /></a><span> </span><br /><span>This work (A philosophical conversation), identified by </span><a href="https://conwayhallcollections.omeka.net/items/show/www.conwayhall.org.uk"><span>Humanist Library and Archives</span></a><span>, is free of known copyright restrictions.</span>
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application/pdf
Type
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Text
Language
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English
Conway Tracts
Diderot
French
French Philosophy
Philosophy