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SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.
DECEMBER TERM, 1808.
William Wiswell
William Greene,
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William Goodman, and Others. /
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ARGUMENT FOR THE PLAINTIFF.
This action was brought to restrain the Trustees of the
First Congregational Church of Cincinnati from selling its
real estate (house of worship) and dividing the proceeds
thereof in pursuance of certain resolutions alleged to have
been adopted at a meeting of the corporators, April 11th,
1859.
The Church was incorporated by a special act of the
General Assembly, passed January 21st, 1830. (Local
Laws, vol. 28, pp. 28, 29).
Section first enacts that Elisha Brigham, William Greene,
and three others, “ and their associates for the time being,”
shall be a body corporate, with perpetual succession, etc.
Section second authorizes the corporation to sue and be
sued, plead and be impleaded, etc.
Section third authorizes it to acquire any estate, real or
personal, by purchase or devise, and to hold the same; but
the net annual income of all such property, except the
house of worship and the parsonage-house, shall not exceed
four thousand dollars. “And provided, also, that all such
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�[ 2 ]
property, with the house of worship and parsonage-house,
shall be considered as being held in trust, under the manage
ment and at the disposal of said corporation, for the pur
pose of promoting the interest of their church, defraying
the expenses incident to their mode of worship, and main
taining any institutions of charity or education that may
be therewith connected: Provided, moreover, that when
money or other property shall be given, granted, or be
queathed, or devised to said corporation for any particular
end or purpose, it shall be faithfully applied to such end or
purpose.”
Section fourth provides for the election of five trustees,
annually, on the first Monday of April.
Sec. 5. “All elections shall be by ballot, and deter
mined by a majority of votes; each member of the corpo
ration being entitled to one vote in this as in all other
matters touching the interests of the corporation.”
Sec. 6. “ That an owner of a single pew, in the house
of worship, shall be entitled to all the privileges of mem
bership.”
Sec. 7. “ That extra meetings of the corporation may
be called by the trustees, at any time, on their giving five
days’ previous notice in any one of the newspapers of Cin
cinnati.”
Section eighth defines the powers of the trustees; but
provides “that they shall make no by-law or pass any
order for the imposition of any tax, or the sale of any
property, on account of the corporation, unless by the
consent of said corporation, expressed by a majority of
the members present, legally assembled.”
':
The other sections have no especial importance.
On the 23d of March, 1830, Elisha Brigham conveyed
•' to the Church, by its corporate name, for a valuable consid
eration, the real estate now in- controversy, at the south
west corner of Race and Fourth streets, Cincinnati.
�[ 3 ]
On the 19th of July, 1855, the Society adopted a preamhle,za constitution, and certain by-laws. (Printed Rec
ord, pp. 22, 23.) Very few attendants at the Church
omitted to sign these. Agreed Case, clause 12. (Printed
Record, p. 15). The constitution, article second, declares:
“In addition to those persons who are qualified to be
members under the act of incorporation, all who sign these
articles shall become members; but any person may withe
draw from the society by filing a notice to that effect with
the secretary.”,
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Article fourth declares “ the duty of the members and
officers to co-operate together in promoting the objects of
the society, as specified in the preamble, by a regular at
tendance on its meetings ” and observance of the by-laws.
On the 26th of February, 1859, thirteen^ members ad
dressed a letter to the trustees (Printed Record, pp. 34,
35) requesting them “to call a meeting of the Society to
consider the propriety of a change for another pastor.”.!
The petitioners say, in this letter, that they differ “widely”
from Rev. Mr* Conway, the pastor in office, with regard to
his views of Christian truth, and believe that his influence
over them, “ for good,” as a clergyman and a pastor, is at
end.. . . i. < i -xh Thereupon, March 21st, the trustees called a meeting
of the “pew-owners and pew-renters” only, for the 28th
of March, “to consider the question of further retaining
th$ services of Rev. Mr. Conway as pastor of the church.” .♦
(Printed Record, p. 25).
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At that meeting, March 28th, a-resolution was offered,
by Mr. Greene, in these wordsr .
•' -if.,
“ That it is desirable to retain Mr. Conway as pastor of
this church, and that his services as such are acceptable.”
Pending the discussion of which, a question arose as to
the qualification for suffrage; whereupon the chairman, Mr.
Hosea, decided that only “ pew-owners ” could vdte.
(Printed Record, p. 29).
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�[ 4 ]
Mr. Goodman then moved that each “pew rented or
sold ” should be entitled to one vote; which Mr. Kebler
moved to amend by adding that no member should have
more than one vote—which amendment was adopted by
twenty-one to twelve.
“ The vote was put to pew-owners only, by direction of the
Chair, against the protest of Mr. Iioadly and others.”
(Printed Record, pp. 29, 30).
The question then recurred upon Mr. Goodman’s motion
as thus amended, and it was lost (on two trials) by a tie
! vote.
This question, also, by direction of the Chair, “under
protest as before,” was put to the pew-owners only.
(Printed Record, p. 30).
The meeting, after some ineffectual discussion, adjourned
until March 30th.
At the adjourned meeting, Mr. Hoadly moved to
amend Mr. Greene’s resolution by substituting what fol
lows :
“ Whereas, this Society is so divided in sentiment that
the members can no longer work and worship together as
one harmonious whole,
“ Resolved, that--------- be a committee to draft a plan
for a just division, and report the same to the annual
meeting.”
The substitute, after several preliminary votes, was
adopted—Yeas, 27; Nays, 9. But, on each vote, the
Chair allowed only “pew-owners” to be called, and Mr.
Hoadly protested against the limitation.
Four of the defendants, William Greene, George Car
lisle, William Goodman, and Jeremy Peters, were appointed
the committee to report a plan of division. (Printed Rec
ord, pp. 31, 32).
At the annual meeting, April 4th, the Committee “ re
ported, verbally, that it would be advisable to dispose of the
church-property, and, if legal, to divide the proceeds in the
proportion of the interest of the pew-owners, the proceeds
�[ 5 ]
to be used for the purpose of establishing two churches,
but doubts having arisen as to the legality of such a
proceeding, they had decided to report their doubts and
$sk instructions.” Whereupon the subject was re-commit
ted to the same gentlemen, with authority to employ
counsel and take legal advice. (Printed Record, pp. 32,
33).
At the same meeting, and preliminary to a choice of
trustees for the ensuing year, Mr. Greene moved that pew
venters be authorized to vote upon all questions. “ Carried
unanimously.” (Printed Record, p. 33).
At an adjourned meeting, April 11th, these resolutions '
were adopted:
1. “That Messrs. Greene, Carlisle, Goodman, and Peters
be appointed a committee with power to sell the Church
real estate, at private sale or public auction, or to lease the
same perpetually, at their discretion, and that the trustees
convey the same by deed of general warranty when sold,
or, if leased, that they execute the necessary lease.”
2 “That the trustees, after paying the debts of the
church, transfer and hand over to a new board of trustees
of a new religious society, to be formed by part of the
members of this, such a proportionate part of the proceeds
of said church-property as fairly may belong to such mem
bers forming a new church, reckoning according to the
valuation of the pews, including sums now standing to the
credit of parties which are not represented by pews.”
The vote upon these resolutions was submitted to the
“ pew-owners ” only, and was carried in the affirmative.
“A committee of two [Messrs. Anthony and Kebler]
was then appointed,” says the record, “ to wait on the sev
eral pew-owners, and obtain their directions, in writing, as to
the corporation to which they desired their respective in
terests to belong.” (Page 37).
At another adjourned meeting, April 25th, the commit
tee in reference to the real estate reported that they had,
as yet, been unable either to sell or let the same; where-
�[61
upon Mr. Force moved that they be required to advertise it
for sale, at auction, on the 16th of May, unless previously
sold or let by private contract, and at such terms as the
committee might prescribe.
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At this stage of proceedings, the plaintiff interposed—and
the Court of Common Pleas enjoined the trustees then in
office (Messrs. Greene, Goodman, Allen, Harrison, and
Hoadly) as well as Messrs. Carlisle and Peters, together
with the corporation by name, from selling the church
property as proposed.
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Meanwhile, a number of the members had formed a sep"
arate religious society, ^Church of the Redeemer,” and
adopted a covenant as well as a constitution and certain
by-laws for themselves. (Printed Record, pp. 20, 21, 22).
These define the qualification of membership in the new
society, provide for the election of its trustees, etc.
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■ I. - We insist that the resolutions of April llfh, 1859,
were'toot adopted by the First Congregational Church in
the mode required by the Sth section of its charter.
The letter of February 26th requested the trustees to
call a meeting of the “ Society ” to? consider the question
of discharging Mr. Conway from his pastoral office; instead
of which, the trustees called a meeting of the “ pew-oWners
and pew-renters” only, and thus, by the terms of their
notice, excluded all other members from participation or
even attendance.
At that meeting (March 28th) the chairman, Mr. Hosea,
directed every question to be put to the “pew-owners”
only, and thus excluded a portion of those (pew-renters)
whom the trustees had summoned.
It seems that the “pew-owners” present, thirty-two,
were divided in opinion, equally, as to the right of “ pew-
�[7 ]
renters ’’ to vote; and by that equality of division, in which
his own vote was counted, the mandate of the Chairman be
came conclusive.
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We acknowledge that li pew-owners ” were members of
the corporation: the 6th section of the charter so declares
in express terms. But they were not the only members.
The corporation was created, in presenti, by the first sec
tion of the charter:
“ That Elisha Brigham, William Greene, Nathaniel Guil
ford, Jesse Smith, Christian Donaldson, and their associates
for the time being, be and they are hereby created and
declared a body corporate and politic, by the name of the
First, Congregational Church of Cincinnati, and, as such,
shall remain and have perpetual succession; subject, how
ever, to such future regulations as the Legislature may
think proper to make touching their matters of mere tem
poral concernment.’’
. v....p,,
When this charter was granted, January 21st, 1830, the
First Congregational Church had no house of worship: it
had none, as appears by. , the record, until after the deed
from Elisha Brigham, March 23d, 1830, and until the pres
ent building was erected and completed. There could be,
of course, not a single pew-owner. But there was, never
theless, a body corporate and politic—composed of Messrs.
Brigham, Greene, Guilford, Smith, Donaldson, and “ thenassociates ” at that time. And this body corporate and
politic,“ as such,” was to remain, and to have perpetual
succession. It was to consist of all who, from time to time,
should be associated, by the name of the First Congrega
tional Church of Cincinnati, for public worship. (Milford
and Chillicothe Turnpike Co. v. Brush, 10 Ohio Rep. 113,
114; Fire-Department of New-York v. Kip, 10 Wendell,
269; Lessee of Frost v. Frostburg Coal Co. 24 Howard,
278). i Jt was not merely a corporation in abeyance until
a house of meeting had been erected; else how could it
receive any title, as grantee, by the deed of Brigham?
Nor will its corporate existence be determined, or impaired.
�[ 8 1
by the destruction or sale of its church-edifice; else how
can the resolutions of April 11th, 1859, be any thing less
than an act of suicide ?
And yet, as all must agree, the destruction of the
church-building would extinguish, utterly, the title of the
pew-owners. (Price v. Methodist Episcopal Church, 4 Ohio
Rep. 541; Freligh v. Platt, 5 Cowen, 496; Voorhees v.
Presbyterian Church of Amsterdam, 8 Barbour, 151, 152;
Matter of the Reformed Dutch Church, 16 Barbour, 240,
241; Wheaton v. Gates, 18 New York Rep. 404, 405;
Wentworth v. First Parish in Canton, 3 Pick. 346, 347.
See, also, Pawson v. Scott, Sayer, 177, 178).
The design of section sixth, in the charter, is only to
confer upon a pew-owner the privileges (temporal) of mem
bership, without his being a member in fact. It can have
no other meaning consistent with legal principles.
As to pew-renters, merely as such, they are not corpor
ators. (Leslie v. Birnie, 2 Russell, 114.) The “associates”
of the Church, as a religious society, are the persons who
hold the corporate character by succession from those named,
originally, in the charter. (Robertson v. Bullions, 1 Ker
nan, 247, 248, 249, 250; Wyatt v. Benson, 23 Barbour,
327.) And it is for the Society to declare, in the form of
a constitution or by-law, who shall, and who shall not, enjoy
the right of suffrage. Or, if there be no express rule, the
question must be determined by a reference to past usage.
(The State v. Crowell, 4 IJalsted, 411.)
But we have, in the present case, an express rule. The
constitution adopted by the society, on the 19th of July,
1855, declares that “in addition to those persons who are
qualified to be members under the act of incorporation
pew-owners) all who sign these articles shall become
members.”
That leaves nothing to doubt or argument, and even
precludes any question of usage. It is said that Messrs.
Greene, Stetson, and Walker expressed the opinion, pri
vately, at some time or other, that only pew-owners could
�L 9 1
vote; but, with all respect to those gentlemen, their
opinions, in this regard, are inadmissible. Opinions do
not even tend to prove the usage in such cases. (Attor
ney-General v. Drummond, 1 Drury & Warren, 353).
That the exclusion of a number of members, and es
pecially of a whole class, from voting upon any question
where the consent of the corporation, as such, is requisite,
will avoid the proceeding utterly, seems not to be dis
putable. (Case of St. Mary’s Church, 7 S. & Rawle, 530;
1^.543).
II. It is said, however, that on the 23d of May, 1859,
the First Congregational Church adopted other resolutions
to the same effect:
“ Whereas, it is for the interest of this church that its
property should be sold, and the proceeds distributed to
the two bodies into which the membership is divided, if the
same can legally be done,
“ Resolved, that we consent to a sale of the real estate
of the church upon the following terms: one-fourth cash,
balance in one, two, and three years, with interest from the
day of sale, payable annually, the deferred payments to be
secured by mortgage on the premises, the proceeds to be
equally divided between this Church and the Church of the
Redeemer.
* Resolved, that the trustees be instructed to enter their
appearance in the Court of Common Pleas, in the suit
brought by William Wiswell against them and others, and
ask that Court to give judicial sanction to, and to direct the
trusts of the charter to be carried out by, such sale and
division.”
These resolutions constitute no defence to the plaintiff’s
action: they were not passed, or even proposed, until after
the action had been commenced, and the injunction al
lowed. Can the Court give them any “judicial sanction ?
�[ 10 ]
(JI. We answer (first) not in this form. The act of
March 11th, 1853, “ to authorize religious societies to dis
pose of real estate in certain cases,” Swan & Critchfield,
vol. 1, p. 371, declares:
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Sec. 1. “That when any real estate shall have been,
or may hereafter be, bequeathed [devised] purchased, do
nated, or otherwise entrusted to any religious society in this
State, or to any of the trustees or officers of any such
society, for the use and benefit of any such society, or for
any other purpose, and such society shall be desirous to
sell, exchange, or incumber, by mortgage or otherwise, any
such real estate, it shall be lawful for the Court of Common
Pleas of the proper county, upon good cause shown, upon
petition of any such society, or some person authorized by
them, to make an order authorizing the sale or incum
brance of any such real estate; and said Court may include,
in such order, directions how the proceeds of such sale or
incumbrance shall be appropriated or invested: provided
such order shall, in no case, be inconsistent with the
original terms upon which such real estate became in
vested in or intrusted to such religious society.”
A"
Sec. 2. “ That where any religious society shall petition
as provided for in the preceding section, all persons who
may have a vested, contingent, or a reversionary interest
in the real estate sought to be sold or incumbered, shall be
made parties to said petition, and such parties shall be
notified of such petition in the same manner as is or may
be provided for in cases of petitions for partition of real
estate: provided, that the provisions of this act shall not
extend to any grounds used or occupied as burial-places
for the dead.”
The act to provide for the partition of real estate, passed
Feb. 17th, 1831, section third, requires notice, by publica
tion or personal service, for a term of forty days. (Swan
& Critchfield, vol. 1, pp. 895, 896).
There are four classes of persons to whom (as defend
ants) the second section of the act passed March 11, 1853,
�L 11 ]
may -refer: 1. The heirs of Brigham. 2. Pew-owners and
lessees. 3. Corporators as such. 4. Mortgagees and other
incumbrancers. We need not inquire which of these, or
whether all of them, should have been cited; for nobody
was cited ; by the answer ot cross-petition, and no process
ever issued.
♦
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f It is not a case in which some of the pew-owners or cor
porators dould, as defendants, represent the rest: the statute
requires that “all ” of them (if any) shall be made parties.
If it be alleged that the corporation could file a petition,
ex parte,in this instance, as representingall the corporators
(pew-owners included) and that the heirs of Brigham have
no. reversionary estate, and; there are no incumbrancers,
we answer that such a petition must be filed separately,
and proceeded with, as far as possible, according to the
terms of the statute.
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Aitiall events, inasmuch as they constitute no defence to
; the*original action of the plaintiff, and as they can not be
the foundation of a counter-claim against him, except as
one pew-owner in many, the resolutions of May 23d are
wholly beside the present case. (Code, sec. 94. Hill v.
Butler, 6 Ohio State Rep. 216, 217).
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2u;The resolutions never were adopted by the Trustees
of the church.
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Th£ Trustees ould not sell the property without the con
sent of. the corporators legally assembled; but that is in
tended by the charter (section eighth) as a restraint upon,
and not as a substitute for, their separate discretion. The
minority of the Church can not be deprived of the right to
have a (subject < of such’ importance considered by the
trustees, in their distinctive capacity, as the guardians of
its temporalities. (The People v. Steele, 2 Barb. S. C.
Rep. 397, 398).
•
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Nor can the votes of the trustees, individually, given at
a meeting of the corporators, and in that character, supply
this defect. (Rex v. Mayor and Aidermen of Carlisle,!
�[ 12 ]
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Strange, 385, 386. See, also, Commonwealth v. Cullen, 13
Penn. State Rep. 133).
3. The meeting of the corporation at which those reso
lutions were passed (May 23d) had not been legally con
vened.
It was not a regular meeting, but was called by the
trustees, as an “ extra ” meeting, in virtue of the seventh
section of the charter. The usual rule is that such meet
ings require notice to each corporator, personally, as well
of the time and place as of the particular business to be
considered. (Rex v. Langhorne, 6 Nev. & M. 203). We
agree that personal notice, in this instance, was unneces
sary—the charter having authorized “ extra ” meetings to
be called by an advertisement in one newspaper. But the
charter has not dispensed with the necessity of specifying,
in such advertisement, what particular business is to be con
sidered. (Rex v. Mayor of Doncaster, 1 Burrow, 738;
Rex Faversham Fishermen’s Co. 8 Term Rep. 356).
A general statement would suffice, perhaps, for the trans
action of ordinary business, but not for the election of an
officer, the imposition of a tax, the sale of lands, or
(especially) the transfer of corporate property to some of
the members. (Savings Bank of New Haven v. Davis, 8
Conn. Rep. 191,192).
There is no presumption that all the members attended
at such a meeting, nor that they understood (except as
particularly stated in the notice) what business was to be
transacted or proposed. (Wiggin v. Freewill Baptist
Church in Lowell, 8 Metcalf, 312).
The advertisement (Printed Record, p. 40) was in these
words:
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“ To the Members of the First Congregational Church of
Cincinnati:
“ You are hereby notified to attend an extra meeting of
the Church, to be held on Monday evening, May 23d, 1859,
�at 8 o’clock, at the church edifice, corner of Fourth and
Race streets, for the purpose of considering the propriety of
selling the real estate of the corporation, and for other purThe sufficiency of this may be determined by asking
whether it contains a suggestion that the proceeds of the
sale, if made, would be applied to other than the ordinary
corporate uses.
' That was the essential part of the business’which actually
transpired. Many corporators may have regarded it as a
question of indifference whether the society retained the
present church and premises, or sold them and purchased
another lot, in some other neighborhood, for the purpose of
building a larger house, or of building a smaller house and
devoting a larger sum to the maintenance of the pastor, or
to the endowment of such “institutions of charity or educa- >
tion ” as the charter contemplates; and being indifferent, as
between those alternatives, may not have cared to vote or
attend. But the same corporators would have attended
and voted (as we may well assume) if they had been
warned that one-half the proceeds of sale, or anything like
it, would be given to another religious society, and thus
forever placed beyond their control.
In the case of the Mayor and Aidermen of Carlisle,
1 Strange, 385, which was a mandamus to restore one
Poulter to the office of capital citizen, it appeared that the
corporation consisted of a mayor, aidermen, bailiffs, and
capital citizens, together composing a common council and
having the power of election, but that the power of amotion
was in the mayor and aidermen only; that, on such a day,
the common council was assembled, and Poulter,. being
summoned, would not attend; whereupon, for a cause con
fessedly legal, the mayor and aidermen made an order for
his amotion. Pratt, C. J., said:
“An aiderman, when he receives a summons to appear at
the common council, considers with himself that they are a
�[ H ]
great many ©f them, and probably his single voice will not be
wanted, and therefore he stays at home; but when he is
summoned to meet withnthe mayor and other aidermen
only, then, says he, there are but twelve of us in all, and
therefore my voice and advice (which the others have a
right to) may goda great way: besides, the powers lodged in
us, as a court of mayor and aidermen, are of an higher nature
than our other powers; and therefore, upon both aecounts>
my presence may be necessary, and I will bo--sure to. be
there. All this is natural enough, and is it then reason
able the others should proceed to act as mayor and aider
men only, when they come together in common council?
* * * (It weighs nothing with me that the cause .of
removal happened sitting that assembly; for they ought to
have broke up, and summoned him again to appear before
them in tiieit J distinct capacity.”
mandamus
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In Wheaton y. Gates, 18' New York Rep. 395, 396; <a
case parallel with this, and hereafter to be speciallymentioned, the Court observed' a wide distinction between the'
sale of its lands, by a religious society, with intent tor em-;
ploy the proceeds for some Corporate purpose^ and a sale in
order to divide the proceeds among the corporators
.
“ The scheme of the trustees, conceding that the applica
tion to the County Court was made by the authority! of the
, board, was an entire one—to sell the church-lot, and-dis-1
pose of the proceeds in the manner stated in the petition
and in the order; They did not ask to sell in order to pay
the debts, and that the balance of the proceeds might
remain in the treasury, subject to future appropriation for:
the purposes of the society. Upon the statement in the
petition, th©' debts amounted to only a small proportion of
the value of the property; and if we look to the auction-sale
which was actually made, it will be seen that there was a
surplus of nearly $9,000 after providing for the mortgage
of $2,700; and the remaining debts were trifling, not much
exceeding the value of the personal property. It is not
�represented, in the petition, that a sale was necessary for
the payment of the debts, and the referee has found that
such a necessity did riot in fact exist. The petition asked
that this considerable surplus should?' be distributed among
the pew-holders, and the Court so ordered. The general scope
and object of the proceeding, it appears to me, was the
division of the property of the society among the owners of
pews. The- sale was sought for that purpose, and the pay
ment of the debts was only incidental.” (Pages 402,403).
The answer, in this case, dees riot pretend there is any
necessity of a sale for the payment of * debts, nor for any
other purpose than a division of the proceeds.
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III. The resolutions'of'May 23d, as well as those’of
April 11th, are illegal in assuming to direct an application ’
of the proceeds of Corporate’ properly to other than cor
porate uses. i •.<"
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The charter (section third) declares that all the property
acquired by the corporation, including the house of worship
and the parsonage-house, u shall be considered as held in
trust, under the management and at the disposal of said
corporation, for the purpose'-of promoting the interest of
their church, defraying thf'expenses incident to their mode of
worship, and maintaining any institutions of charity or edu
cation that may be therewith connected”
i
u ;':
The resolutions*of April 11th direct the trustees, after
paying the ;debts Of the church, to “ transfer and hand
over to 'aneurboard of trustees ofia new religious society, to
be formed by part of the members of this, such a propor
tionate part of the proceeds of said church-property as fairly
may belong to such members forming a new church, reckon
ing according to the valuation of the pews,” etc. v*aw * /
Those of May 23d direct the proceeds “to be equallydivided between this Church and the Church'of the Re
deemer.” And they ask the Court for judicial sanction,
�[ 16 ]
and that, “by such, sale and division” the “trusts of the
charter ” may be rendered effectual.
We answer that “ such sale and division ” will destroy
the trusts of the charter; and, therefore, no Court can
authorize, or even tolerate, the scheme. (Case of St.
Mary’s Church, 7 S. & R. 558, 559; Milligan v. Mitchell,
3 M. & Craig, 83, 84).
The term “ interest of their church ” in the charter (sec
tion third) is explained and limited by the words which
immediately follow it—“ defraying the expenses incident to
their mode of worship, and maintaining any institutions of
charity or education that may be therewith connected?
Copulatio verborum indicat acceptationem in eodem sensu.
(Broom’s Legal Maxims, 450, 451).
The corporation has no power to hold, or even to acquire,
lands or money for the support of any religious society
except its own; and, a fortiori, can not devote to the sepa
rate use of another society, religious or secular, the lands
or the money, or any portion of them, acquired for its own
use. A single corporator may object, and the assent of all
the corporators would not legalize such an act. (Bagshaw
v. Eastern Union Railway Co. 7 Hare, 114).
Wheaton v. Gates, 18 New York Rep. 395,396, was the
case of a Congregational Church which had fallen into dis
order, and some members of which had constituted a new
society, called a pastor, and separately organized them
selves. The trustees of the old corporation agreed, by
a vote of two-thirds, with the assent of the corporators,
“almost unanimously,” after two re-considerations of the
subject, to disband its membership, sell the church-propperty, and apply the proceeds, after payment of its debts,
to the use of the several pew-owners. The County Court,
under a statute similar to our own, had sanctioned this
agreement, and it had been partially carried into effect.
But some of the members brought an action to restrain the
trustees from any further proceeding in that direction, and
to have the entire agreement annulled.
�[ 17 ]
Per Curiam. “ The trustees had no authority to dis
tribute the property of the society among its individual
members, or any class of them. Their duty was to preserve
and administer it in the promotion of the purposes for
which the corporation was created. The Court could not,
according to the statute, approve of a plan for any applica
tion of the moneys arising upon a sale, except one which was
considered to he for the interest of the society as an associa
tion which was to continue. organised for the purposes of its
creation. There is a sense in which it might promote the
interests of the individuals composing this religious organ
ization to dissolve their connection, and establish new rela
tions ; but this is not what is meant by the statute. It was
not in the power of the trustees, or a majority of the
members of the society, or the County Court, or of all
these authorities together, to abolish the corporation, or
dissolve the society. If every individual having any in
terest in the matter should concur, it might be done;
because there would be no one to question the act. But
while any number of the members desire to continue the
connection, all the others can not, by their own act, dissolve
it. Now, it is not possible that it could be considered to
be for the interest of the society, in the legal and proper
sense of that expression in the statute, to dissolve it, and
distribute its property among its individual members.”
(Pages 403, 404).
The distribution attempted by the resolutions of April
11th, 1859, was to be “ according to the valuation of the
pews,’’ and without any regard to the corporators at large.
This would be clearly illegal; inasmuch as the owners of
pews have no right, as owners, or part-owners, in the land,
or in the church-edifice. (Wheaton v. Gates, 18 N. Y.
Rep. 404, 405; Matter of the Reformed Dutch Church,
16 Barbour, 240, 241; Price v. Methodist Episcopal
Church, 4 Ohio Rep. 540, 541).
*
The resolutions of May 23d, 1859, are quite as objec
tionable. They propose a division of the proceeds, “equally,”
2
‘ '
I
�[ 18 1
between the members of the Church who remain and those
who have seceded from it. That is only a gift of a part of
the corporate property to a part of the members, and for
their separate and individual use.
Of what consequence can it be, in a legal point of view,
that the seceding members intend to endow another church,
even of the same persuasion ? That might, or might not,
be for the interest of religion, but can not be for the inter
est of the old corporation as such. It diminishes the
property of the corporation, and disables the corporators
who remain (by so much) to defray the expenses incident
to their mode of worship, or to establish and maintain
institutions of charity and education.
As truly observed by the Court of Appeals, in Wheaton
v. Gates, 18 N. Y. Rep. 404, there is no “legal and proper
sense ” in which it can be for “the interest’’ of the First
Congregational Church, as a corporation, to distribute the
proceeds of this land, upon a sale, or any portion of the
7 proceeds, to the members of the Church as individuals, or
as divided into two societies; and this whether the mem
bers apply their respective shares to secular purposes, or,
by applying the means thus obtained to the foundation and
maintenance of a “ new ” religious society, relieve them
selves from an expenditure otherwise unavoidable.
The gentlemen who constitute the Church of the Iter
deemer deny that they have seceded from the First Con
gregational Church. IIow can it be otherwise ?
We engage in no discussion whether the “views of
Christian truth ” inculcated by Rev. Mr. Conway be, or
be not, in accordance with those entertained by the found
ers of the First Congregational Church. There is a way to
ascertain that, but not in the present action, or upon the
pleadings hitherto filed. By the discipline of such soci
eties (Keyser v. Stansifer, 6 Ohio Rep. 365) a majority
of the members decide all questions of faith and prac
tice—as effectually as, in other religious organizations,
�[19 ]
they are decided by bishops, presbyters, and priests, or by
convocations, synods, councils and conferences.
The gentlemen who signed the letter of February 26 th,
1859, commenced by arraigning Mr. Conway before the
proper tribunal; but instead of persevering in that course,
and abiding the result, abandoned the Congregational
Church and founded the Church of the Redeemer.
It is not material to inquire what differences, if any, can
be predicated of the “preamble ” in one and the “ coven
ant” in the other. We take the seceders at their own
word: that they differed “ widely ” from Rev. Mr. Conway
“ in his views of Christian truth.” They refused, for that
reason, to attend upon his ministry, and have organized
“ a new religious society ” in which their own sentiments
are to be inculcated. No man denies their right to do
this; but, in doing it, they can not destroy the identity,
nor impair the usefulness, of the Church which remains.
(Trustees of the Presbyterian Congregation of Fairview
v. Sturgeon, 9 Penn. State Rep. 321, 322; lb. 329, 330;
Attorney General v. Hutton, Drury, 520, 521; Smith v.
Smith, 3 DeSaussure, 557 ; lb. 582, 583, 584).>
Nor is it material whether the seceders were a majority
or a minority of the old organzation. They left it; and
that is enough. (Baker v. Fales, 16 Mass. Rep. 503, 504 ;
Den v. Bolton, 7 Halsted, 214, 215; Cammeyer v. Cor
poration of the United German Lutheran Churches, 2
Sandf. Ch. Rep. 214).
Where dissensions have arisen, and schism follows, al
though it be decided, judicially, that there is no intelligible
difference in doctrine or opinion, those who adhere to the
old organization are,, entitled to its property in exclusion
of all others. (Craigdallie v. Aikman, 2 Bligh, 529; Same
Case, on former appeal, 1 Dow’s Pari. Cas. 15, 16 ; Foley
v. Wontner, 2 Jac. & Walker, 247. See, also, Field v.
Field, 9 Wendell, 394).
It is said that the members of the Church of the Re-
�[ 20 ]
deemer are yet corporators in the First Congregational
Church. Then they ask of the other corporators a right to
use, separately^ one-half the corporate property, and to
retain, at the same time, a proportionate interest in the
residue. It must be so; or else they regard themselves as
no longer connected with the old organization.
Nor is it material whether a majority of those who re
main have, or have not, consented to such an arrangement,
although nothing of that sort appears. It would be none
the less illegal, and any corporator has a right to object.
(The State v. Steele, 2 Barb. 397, 398; Stebbins v. Jen
nings, 10 Pick. 193, 194; Attorney-General v. Hutton,
Drury, 507).
It may be said that this separation was made necessary
by reason of the personal objections which Mr. Conway had
provoked against himself, involving questions somewhat
more of a social than theological character. Whilst this
was, perhaps, an element that entered into the programme
of those who withdrew from the church, at the same time
it is perfectly obvious that they did not subscribe to the
theological doctrines taught by Mr. Conway as the pastor
of the First Congregational Church, and that was the con
trolling motive for the separation on their part. This is
shown in several ways: 1st. The paper of the 26th of
February, 1859, signed by thirteen of those who were dis
satisfied (Printed Record, pp. 34, 35) is designed to
effectuate his removal, for the sole reason of their “ widely
differing from the Rev. Mr. Conway, our pastor, in his
views of Christian truth” 2d. The attempt to depose
Mr. Conway, without any other accusation against him.
3. The Covenant which they adopted when they formed
the “ Church of the Redeemer.” (Printed Record, p. 20).
We do not profess to enter into an examination of the
the theological evidences at hand to prove that Mr. Conway
taught the true doctrines of the Unitarian Church. A
�[ 21 ]
careful examination and consideration of these evidences,
to be found in the printed works of such lights of the
church as Dr. Chalmers, Clark, Bellows, Martineau, Fro
thingham, Higginson, Longfellow, Furnace and others, have
left us no room to doubt that Mr. Conway preached the
Unitarianism of the First Congregational Church, and of
those whose munificence founded it, and sustained it for
so many years in its infancy, and remained its steadfast
t friends in all its years of poverty and prosperity. If, then,
they went off because they could not agree with the major
ity who remained, on theological questions, they became
seceders, and, by retiring, lost all the interest they may
have had in the church-property, and the right to partici
pate in the management of the affairs of the church, both
secular and ecclesiastical.
If the court will carefully consider the Covenant of the
Church of the Redeemer and the other papers (to be
found in the Printed Record) which were, from time to
time, adopted by the First Congregational Church as
declarations of religious principles, and Mr. Conway’s
pastoral letter, to be found in the Printed Record, commen
cing on page 26, they will be able to appreciate the theo
logical difference to which we have referred. But as we
have said elsewhere, we do not wish to enter upon this
discussion.
The error of the defendants consists in supposing that
the corporators of the First Congregational Church have
some right, as individuals, in its property, and, therefore,
may disband it, or divide it, in order to obtain their re
spective shares. They have no right except as corporators;
and that must be enjoyed within the corporation, and ac
cording to the charter, by-laws, and established usage. It
can not be enjoyed as members of another religious so
ciety, corporate or unincorporated, nor as individuals.
(Methodist Episcopal Church v. Wood, 5 Ohio Rep. 287).
�[ 22 ]
Nor is it possible to suppose that two religious societies,
with different constitutions and by-laws, each with a board
of trustees and a pastor, can co-exist under one form of
incorporation. That allegation was made in the same case
(Methodist Episcopal Church v. Wood, 5 Ohio Rep. 287,
288) but was totally rejected.
. ’ !
It is argued that a division of the corporate property
would be for the spiritual welfare of all the members (as
well those who remain as those who have seceded) and
examples are cited in proof and illustration. That may be
true; but, as yet, Courts of civil jurisprudence have not
attained such heights of enquiry.
But, whatever the advantage to corporators, temporal or
spiritual, we must again specify a distinction between their
interest and the interest of the First Congregational Church
as a body politic and corporate. For the corporation is
quite another thing, in law, than the mere aggregate of its
members. (Society for the Illustration of Practical Know
ledge v. Abbott, 2 Beavan, 567 ; Bligh v. Brent, 2 Y. &
Collyer, 295). It is an artificial person, and has the fac
ulty of using its own property and funds. The charter
requires it to use them, in this instance, for particular pur
poses, and under its immediate supervision :
“ All such property, with the house of worship and the
parsonage-house, shall be considered as held in trust, under
THE MANAGEMENT AND AT THE DISPOSAL OF SAID CORPORATION,
for the purpose of promoting the interest of their church,
defraying the expenses incident to their mode of worship,
and maintaining any institutions of charity or education
that may be therewith connected.” (Sec. 3).
How can the “ trust ” be fulfilled, as the Legislature com
mands, after the First Congregational Church shall have
transferred, irrevocably, to the Church of the Redeemer
as well “ the disposal ” as “ the management ” of one-half
its wealth ? And yet the Court is asked to “ sanction ”
a sale of the house of worship, at public outcry, and with
out any other necessity or cause, in order to accomplish a
�[ 23 ]
result so illegal. Baker v. Fales, 16 Mass. Rep. 496, 497,
deserves to be read in this connection.
Smith v. Swormstedt, 16 Howard, 288, contravenes no
part of our argument. That was a case of trust for the
benefit of individuals — “traveling, supernumerary, and
worn-out preachers, and the widows and orphans of such
preachers” — and not of trust for an object beside the
interest of individuals. The property had been created
by the efforts of the beneficiaries themselves, and was
wholly subject to their disposition in General Conference
assembled. They had agreed upon a plan of administra
tion resulting from their own schism, and yet perfectly in
accordance with the original design; to which plan, for
the reasons we have just indicated, the Court gave its coun
tenance. (16 How. 304, 305, 306).
The error of the Circuit Court was in confounding such
a case with one like the present. (5 McLean, 369, 370).
Nor do we question the authority of Keyser v. Stansifer, 6 Ohio Rep. 363, in any particular. That was a bill
exhibited by a trustee who, “in a course of discipline,”
had been expelled from a Congregational society, “ Partic
ular Baptists,” and other members who had seceded from it,
charging the officers and members who remained with cer
tain errors in religious faith and practice. “ This claim is
not set up,” said Judge Lane, “ because the minority are
excluded, but because it is asserted the majority have
* deserted the principles under which the association was first
organized.” (Page 365). The decision would be conclu
sive in a similar suit by the members of the “ Church of
the Redeemer” against the First Congregational Church
and its adherents.
Much has been said, by opposing counsel, as to the
advice of Courts in other religious controversies ; but those
controversies differed, all of them, in some essential partic-
�lar, from the present one. We find no instance in America,
nor in Great Britain, where judges have spoken with toler
ance of selling a house of worship, “ at auction,” peremp
torily, in order to relieve gentlemen who desire to establish
a new church from the usual expense of such an enterprise.
R. M. CORWINE.
GEO. E. PUGH.
�
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A collection of digitised nineteenth-century pamphlets from Conway Hall Library & Archives. This includes the Conway Tracts, Moncure Conway's personal pamphlet library; the Morris Tracts, donated to the library by Miss Morris in 1904; the National Secular Society's pamphlet library and others. The Conway Tracts were bound with additional ephemera, such as lecture programmes and handwritten notes.<br /><br />Please note that these digitised pamphlets have been edited to maximise the accuracy of the OCR, ensuring they are text searchable. If you would like to view un-edited, full-colour versions of any of our pamphlets, please email librarian@conwayhall.org.uk.<br /><br /><span><img src="http://www.heritagefund.org.uk/sites/default/files/media/attachments/TNLHLF_Colour_Logo_English_RGB_0_0.jpg" width="238" height="91" alt="TNLHLF_Colour_Logo_English_RGB_0_0.jpg" /></span>
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Conway Hall Ethical Society
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William Wiswell v. William Greene, William Goodman, and Others. Argument for the plaintiff.
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Place of publication: Cincinatti
Collation: 24 p. ; 21 cm.
Notes: Plaintiff R.M. Corwine and Geo. E. Pugh. From the library of Dr Moncure Conway. Hearing held December Term, 1862. "This action was brought to restrain the Trustees of the First Congregational Church of Cincinnati from selling its real estate... and dividing the proceeds". [Front page]. Compare 'William Wiswell against William Greene et al' in Conway Tracts 6.
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Unitarianism
Conway Tracts
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Text
Tl'.RM, Igga
WILLIAM WISWBLL against WILLIAM GREENE, et al.
Reply to the Argument of II. C. Whitman, Esq., Counsel for the
Church of 4m Redeemer.
Counsel for tlie defen dmtsBffimt treiwif those memllrs who
went off because of their “ widelyWfferin|H’ with the pastor in
his religious views, are secederslthey lose all legal right to the
Church property. But he .says they are not seceders, because
they did not go off of “ their own motion.” Here he has mis-'
taken the facts. Let us see how they are. When this suit was '
brought, there was no agreement to divide and separate. There
was no second or independent organization formed, but Messrs
Hosea and associates, refused to attend the preaching of the
pastor, and kept up a constant clamor for a sale and division
or the unconditional deposition of the pastor. After this suit
was brought, they organized another religious society, called
the Church of the Redeemer. Notwithstanding the injunction
herein granted, and the pendency of this suit, they continued
to agitate in the Church until they succeeded in getting the
resolutions of 23d of May passed.
. Did they go off with the consent of those who remained?
Was it intended that they should Constitute a branch of the f
First Congregational Church, Averned by its Trustees, the A.
funds to be invested-by them and the new oiBanization con- ,
trolled by them? Was it a society organized Unfhin the juris
diction and under the control of those trustees y Was the Firs®P*'
�V
Congregational Ohtirch to control and mafiago it in any way
whatever ? The record answers all these questions in the neg
ative ? Again: those members went off before there was any
division, some before the litigation and some after it was com
menced. No sale could be had until the Court sanctioned it,
and yet long before they filed their answer in this case, the
Church of the Redeemer was organized, an antagonism of the
old ChurchHand to all intents and purposes they ceased to be
members of the First Congregational Church. They were not
driven out of the Church, but left of “ their own motion.”
They voluntarily withdrew, organized another, and independ
ent society, without respect to the one they withdrew from,
proclaimed a new covenant or creed and completely ignored
the First Congregational Church, the doctrines therein taught
having become heresies Po them. If this is not seceding, it is
difficult to understand what state of case will make it out.
II. Counsel for the Church of the Redeemer admits that if
this is a case of a division of the Church property among
individual members, it would not be valid, but he denies that
it is such a case. Let us see.
• 1st. When this suit was brought to restrain the sale of the
property, there was no separate organization. 2d. When the
resolution of the 11th of April was adopted there was no such
organization. The demand on the part of these gentlemen,
who went off, that Mr. Conway should be dismissed, because
they could not accord to his religious views, coupled with the
threat, which they instantly executed, that they would no
longer worship under his administration, all took place before
they procured the passage of the resolutions of the 23d of May.
These were steps taken by them, as individuals, as pew-owners,
and predicated of what they called their personal rights as
such, viz.: their ownership in the Church property as pewowners. They desired to retire from the First Congregational
Church, and to take with them their respective shares of the
property as measured by the value of their pews.
They did nothing afterwards that was not predicated of this
claim. Counsel speaks of an equitable rule of division, i. e.,
that the property should be equally divided. That rule was
�[ 3 ]
*
k
i
t
,
proposed by these dissatisfied gentlemen because they claimed
their pews in value represented about one-half of the value of
the whole church property.
III. I am not able to perceive Hie force of the counsel’s
proposition, that the cause of religion in this Church will be
promoted by granting the prayer of his clients to divide this
property, Ho speaks of the impossibility of his clients longer
remaining in that Church, because if they do it will be filled
with “ discord and strife.” To avoid this, he eloquently appeals
to the Court to let them take one-half of the property and
“ depart in peace.” How far this condition of things accords
with what the counsel says al*n«r place in his brief, when
speaking to the proposition of secession, it is not worth while
here to speak : nor do I stop to inquire who is responsible for
this 11 discord and strife.” I may remark that this state of
things is not exactly consistent wit»S|laiouM tMmngs. It
may be inquired if a division is made, how the First Congrega
tional Church is to be benefitted, or the cause of religion, in that
Church, promoted, by giving these gentlemen, who will, counsel
fears, “agitate” if they stay, one-half of the property to go away.
The resolutions do not contemplate,. nor do the parties
expect, that they are in any way to be held awountable by the
First Congregational Church, for the disposiwn they may make
of the funds so to be paid over to them. TItom ch^^tc^md they
will take the money, by force of their ownership as pewowners, and will do wit™ it whatever they may choose, which
may be to build up another Church, or divide it among them
selves, and use it for any other purpose. The moment the
Church property is divided, the tHu^Bcontemplated by the
Charter and the founders of thoMiurch ceases to control such
of it as is given to these scceders.
IV. Counsel claims that it would promoffl the interest of the
First Congregation® Church, to give these dissaj^^ed pew
owners one-half of the property, and let them go off and form
another Society. Not being able to see that, ^raqui™whether
it can seriously be claimed that this Church can divide up its
property, and give one-half of it to establish another Society,
for the promulgation of different religious tenets and doctrines
�than those taught in the Church? Nay, more: is it claimed
that this property can be used to establish another Society,
outside of this one, beyond its control, having no connection
with it? Counsel is not very explicit in this; occurrent nubes;
and yet the case shows that these gentlemen want the property
to set up an independent Society, beyond the jurisdiction of
and having no connection whatever with, the First Congre
gational Church. I know he claims that unless it is done,
there will be “ bitter feelings,” and a wreck of the Church.
How can that be ? These malcontents have left it, have formed
another Society, and, it is to be hoped, are in the full fruition
of that peace and calm which they could not find with their
late co-worshipers in the old Church. Of course they would
not return to “stir up the strife,”.which drove them from it.
How, then, can such dreadful things befall the “ old church.”
“ Peace and concord^ reign there now. I will not say it is
because these gentlemen have left the “ old church.” However
that may be, I am not prepared to believe that they will
voluntarily return there, if they apprehend a renewal of the
terrible scenes which the counsel so elegantly depicts and so
mournfully deplores.
I have examined the cases cited by counsel for the Church
of the Redeemer.
The case in 21 Conn, does not sustain the point for which it
is citedw
There is no such case as that of Uckerly v. Leyer, cited as
being in 2 Serg. & Rawle, 38.
The case referred to in 2 Wendell has no bearing whatever
on the proposition for which it is designed to use it; and the
paragraph particularly referred to is wholly outside of the
case, and the mere obiter dictum of the judge who drafted the
opinion.
The case in 23 Barb, is directly adverse to the proposition
for which counsel cites it. So, too, of the case of the Methodist,
Church v. Remington, 1 Watts, 227; and, also, the case in 1
Watts & Serg.
�[ 5 ]
,
■ f*
4
i
j)
MOTION TO DISMISS.
I call the attention of the Court to the motion to dismiss
this suit. It will be observed that the suit was instituted to
prevent a sale of the Church property as was contemplated
by the resolutions of the 11th of April and the 23d of May,
1859.
It will also be observed that the Church has repealed those
resolutions, and all others, which were designed to provide for
a sale of the Church and a division of its property. It like
wise appears that the trustees who filed an answei’ in the
case, in the Common Pleas, by their counsel, Messrs. Taft and
Perry, have requested their answer to be withdrawn, as they
no longer desire to sell the Church property. I, also, file the
letter of Messrs. Taft and Perry, requesting the answer to be
withdrawn; also the notice served on the counsel of the Church
of the .Redeemer, and Taft and Perryjadvertising them that
this motion would be made by the plaintiff. Copies of the
Church resolutions and the order of the Trustees, were served
«n the counsel of defendants. This motion is made, because
there now remains no necessity for pursuing this suit fur
ther. The object being to restrain the sale of the Church
property, now that there will be no sale, the further prosecu
tion of this suit is rendered superfluous. The right to dismiss
a pending suit, before final action, I suppose will not be ques
tioned, unless new rights have supervened, and that will not be
seriously contended in this case. In the first place, supposing
the resolutions to divide the property had been legally passed,
and gave any of the parties a right which they did not enjoy
before this suit was brought, having been passed “lis pendens,”
they can claim nothing through these resolutions. In the second
place, the power of the Church which passed the resolutions,
to elect to repeal them, and to decline to sell the property, can
not be questioned. That power is reposed in them, to be exer
cised only within the Charter. Supposing that the Chureh
may sell and divide, they may elect to sell or not sell, at a par
ticular time, according to their discretion. But if it can be
�done at all, it can be done only by the sanction of the Court.
2 Kents Com. 314; 3 Barb. Ch. 122. At common law it
could not be done at all, and it is by no means clear that it can
be done in Ohio, except upon the precedent consent of all the
members, under the statute of March 11th, 1853, Swan, 247,
which must be strictly pursued. It is very clear that the
Court will not require the corporation to sell its property.
16 Barb. 241; also, 23 Barb. 335. ,
If these gentlemen, who claiifi to be participants in the
fund, acquired any new rights by the resolutions of the 23d of
May, it was to enjoy them when the property is sold, but they
can not compel a sale against the judgment of the Church and
the Trustees. The sale is one thing and the division of the
proceeds another and very different thing.
There is no decree or judgment in this case. The one ren
dered by the common pleas was vacated by the appeal, and the
case comes into the court by reservation. It is, as if this suit
was now to be heard for the first time.
The case of Wyatt v. Benson, 23 Barb. Sup. C. II., 339, de
cides that no intervening or precedent action of the Church or
the Board of Trustees can impair the plaintiff’s right to ques*
tion the validity and legality of any order of sale made by
them. The order’ of sale and the declaration as to the dispos
ition of the proceeds, are yet in fieri, not having been, exe
cuted, and no rights having been acquired under th pm, it is
not only in the power of the corporation to rescind such order
of sale, etc., but the Court will refuse to act when the Trustees
ask to withdraw their application for a sale. The application
can be made by none but the Society itself, or by some one
authorized by them. Swan, 248. The supplemental answer
now filed by the Trustees takes away from the Court all power
to order a sale.
R. M. CORWINE,
*
Attorney for the Plaintiff and the Trustees.
�SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.
WILLIAM WISWELL against WILLIAM GREENE, et al.
Reply to some of the Points made by Mlsrsl Whitman & Collins, in
their Oral Argument.
1st. Counsel for defendants say that the opinion of the
lawyers given to the Trustees, (Printed Record, page 3G), was
followed inEMJpassage of the resolutions of the 23d of May*
Thisd® a mistake. An examination of that paper will show
that they advised that the division should be made in such a
way as that thcTcharter should be complied with: that is, that
no second organization could be made, except it was a part of
the First Congregation®. Church. That is the fair interpreta
tion of it. See the last paragraph in that opinion, and note its
guarded language.
2nd. On the application to withdraw the answer of the
Trustees, counsel say that the court should not entertain it,
because thewesolutions of the 2Gth May, 1862, were not passed
by a legal body, and because they were passed after this case
was reserved. I answer if that is true, it does not help the
resolutions of the 23d of May, 1859, since they weHpast after
this suit was brought. The one is no bettei’ than the other, so
far as this objection is concerned.
3d. The resolutions of the 23d of May do not pretend to
dispose of the question, but leave the whole matter to 'the
Court, to whom it is referred for “Judicial /Sanction.” How
could those membersBwho withdrew, after their adoption,
claim that they gave them any rights, or conferred upon them
�any privileges until the court
them? ^he whole
question was purposely left in abeyance. They could have
taken no steps in the purchase of property predicated of these
resolutions. It is not, therefore, a case of vested rights, as the
counsel suppose. No legal rights could intervene by reason
of what these resolutions contain. The Corporation could do
nothing in the way of disposing of the property, or dividing
the proceeds without the sanction of the Court. So that the
whole thing was immature—was in fieri.
CORWINE.
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Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
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Victorian Blogging
Description
An account of the resource
A collection of digitised nineteenth-century pamphlets from Conway Hall Library & Archives. This includes the Conway Tracts, Moncure Conway's personal pamphlet library; the Morris Tracts, donated to the library by Miss Morris in 1904; the National Secular Society's pamphlet library and others. The Conway Tracts were bound with additional ephemera, such as lecture programmes and handwritten notes.<br /><br />Please note that these digitised pamphlets have been edited to maximise the accuracy of the OCR, ensuring they are text searchable. If you would like to view un-edited, full-colour versions of any of our pamphlets, please email librarian@conwayhall.org.uk.<br /><br /><span><img src="http://www.heritagefund.org.uk/sites/default/files/media/attachments/TNLHLF_Colour_Logo_English_RGB_0_0.jpg" width="238" height="91" alt="TNLHLF_Colour_Logo_English_RGB_0_0.jpg" /></span>
Creator
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Conway Hall Library & Archives
Date
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2018
Publisher
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Conway Hall Ethical Society
Text
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Pamphlet
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
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William Wiswell against William Greene et al: reply to the argument of H.C. Whitman, Esq., Counsel for the Church of the Redeemer
Creator
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Corwine, R.M.
Ohio. Supreme Court
Description
An account of the resource
Place of publication: [Cincinatti]
Collation: 8 p. ; 21 cm.
Notes: From the library of Dr Moncure Conway. Hearing held December term, 1862. The case concerned a schism in the First Congregational Church, part of the congregation disapproved of Conway and left; questions arose of dividing church property. Compare 'Ohio. Supreme Court of Ohio. William Wiswell v William Greene, William Goodman, and others' in Conway Tracts 10.
Publisher
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[s.n.]
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
[1862?]
Identifier
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G5614
Subject
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Unitarianism
Rights
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<a href="http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/mark/1.0/"><img src="http://i.creativecommons.org/p/mark/1.0/88x31.png" alt="Public Domain Mark" /></a><span> </span><br /><span>This work (William Wiswell against William Greene et al: reply to the argument of H.C. Whitman, Esq., Counsel for the Church of the Redeemer), identified by </span><a href="https://conwayhallcollections.omeka.net/items/show/www.conwayhall.org.uk"><span>Humanist Library and Archives</span></a><span>, is free of known copyright restrictions.</span>
Format
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application/pdf
Type
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Text
Language
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English
Conway Tracts
Court cases
First Unitarian Church
Moncure Conway