1
10
35
-
https://d1y502jg6fpugt.cloudfront.net/25778/archive/files/f029ee05a67a134a4e03f3c70daa64e8.pdf?Expires=1712793600&Signature=QEAwjwJW4Hb5-g4mZjgeLUJfLX8w90sx8an%7EhZ%7EmUni%7E9u-ulwnNyZk5YXjvpd0iSFx3J0JECuSNvFcOaNm1JCHU5uHReAMFoZu7vjZG2MydgcYUARSlLHEQJfrm3ZWur-bjq3jKEQwkWn1WnDZQLHqf8Vvl4ijRby0gJeKFdfX25G8QPhqcbVHz7ncMMTEPUJLC%7E-XgkwnAhklJ4r1IUU5mmod68QOZ88bbOPrsKThgfxONOOpVJChOF0bH%7ErcC6yy-Q%7EqSelg4wJE1OFvy4ncxsvJG8Dsfz1yUM9wBfu04v7qkZH7UQrqTrtX%7ESmDNVleMAspGCb9JeXTRwNwh5Q__&Key-Pair-Id=K6UGZS9ZTDSZM
a1ccf7f0621ae49e9d7be6d96ddfc2fc
PDF Text
Text
“ATHEIS M.”
I.
A SERMON,
PREACHED AT ST. GEORGE’S HALL, LANGHAM PLACE,
JANUARY 12th, 1873, by the
REV. CHARLES VOYSEY.
From the Eastern Post, January Y&th, 1873.
On Sunday'(Jan. 12th) at St. George’s Hall, the Rev. C. Voysey
took his text from Ephesians ii., 12., “ Having no hope and without
God in the world.”
I was speaking last Sunday of our special mission to the
Orthodox Christians, and how it lies in our power to liberate them
from their present position of doubt and dissatisfaction, by winning
them over to our more rational, simple, and consoling belief in God.
But we have another high duty to perform, another mission to
fulfil. There are around us on every hand, almost in every home,
men who are practically Athiests, who ■without actually denying,
in open speech, that there is a God, yet are totally indifferent to
the subject, and care nothing at all whether there be a God or not.
Some of these have joined the school of thinkers who look upon
one question at least as definitively settled; who, at all events, have
satisfied themselves that if there be a God it is impossible for man
to know anything about him ; and who, therefore think it is a
waste of time, energy, and thought to pursue any enquiry into
things Divine. I believe that by far the largest number of
Atheists are men of this school, and the obvious causes of. their
Atheism may be found in the wide-spread diversity of religious
opinion, which shows that even those who believe m a God cannot
agree among themselves as to his nature, or attributes, or dealings
with mankind'; and also in the entire failure of Christianity to
present us with a religious belief in harmony with the Reason, the
Conscience, and the Affections of man,
�The breaking up of their old belief has landed them in a waste
howling wilderness. They have nothing in exchange for what they
have lost, They are “ Without hope and without God in the world. ”
Now it is a fact which I never contemplate without the deepest
delight, that there are some amongst us, some even of our most
devoted friends and supporters, who were for a time Atheists, and
whose hearts were clouded over by utter infidelity, but who
recovered for themselves the blessed solace of a firm faith in a good
God, and whose religious instincts have found new life and fresh
occupation.
Years and years ago many of us must have foreseen what one
of the immediate consequences of the downfall of Orthodoxy
would surely be, viz. : “ The temporary but total eclipse of faith
in the hearts of thousands.” Francis W. Newman, foreseeing this,
prefaced all his work of destruction by sending forth his book
entitled, “The Soul; Her Sorrows and Aspirations,” which was, in
reality, an “ Essay on the Positive Foundations of Practical
Religion.” And his instinctive desire to furnish a. foundation for
true faith in place of the old one, which he was about to remove,
has been shared by other great reformers in this age. In the
works of Theodore Parker and of Francis Power Cobbe, and even
in the purely critical works of Bishop Colenso, the same desire to
establish a pure and true faith is everywhere manifested. The
spirit which has animated the movement with which we are
specially connected is essentially the same, and no libel could be
more unjust than to say we only want to pull down errors and
have nothing to put in their place.
I conceive it to be, then, a very important part of our work to
endeavour to stop the further progress of that Atheism -which
threatens to become so popular, and to win back the poor
wandering souls who have no Divine shepherd to feed, to guide, and
to defend them.
But before we can undertake such an important task we must
carefully consider how it is best to set about it. There are always
two or more ways of doing everything, and we may do more harm
than good if we adopt the wrong method.
Experience of certain wrong methods will furnish us with
one or two excellent cautions -which I will now briefly touch
upon.
�o
1. It was the custom for religious people to approach the un
believing and the hetrodox with an air of superiority; to treat
them as if they were wicked, or, at least, greatly to blame for their
unbelief or their heresy. Now, if we would do any good, if we
wish to be true to our own principles, we must forswear such a
grave mistake as that. The Atheist is, for the most part, on a level
with ourselves, morally and intellectually, not unfrequently our
superior in what is noblest in man. He, at least, has made the
greatest sacrifice which a human heart could make for the sake of
Truth. In his loyalty to what he believed to be true he gave up
all the bright possibilities of a believer’s joy, and abandoned all
hope of a life to come.
We cannot, without folly, as well as impertinence, lecture such a
man as a missionary lectures his idolatrous savage. We cannot,
without indecency, approach such a man with our patronage and
address him with a lofty commiseration.
'lire best attitude we can wear is that which most truly accords
with our inmost humility as seekers after truth. What are we
ourselves but learners 1 We may be very sure that the highest
truth we clasp to day with fond and grateful emotion will one
day have to give place to a truth far higher still, and we may be
sure that if we are ever so much nearei’ to the truth than the
Atheist is, we must have some admixture of error. So if we betake
ourselves to the Atheist it must be to hear and to learn quite as
much as to speak and to teach.
Even granting that the truth is on our side, we may be very
sure that he has some truth to tell, some correction of error to
impart which is of priceless value. Let us argue with him (and
argument means fair play on both sides), and not dictate to him.
Let us remember that our dogmatising is just as unwelcome and
useless to him as his dogmatism is to us. We must not be afraid
to argue even -with the Atheist; for an opinion or belief that will
not bear hard reasoning is in a rapid decline and will soon have to
be buried. If our Faith be true, it will out-match all falsehood.
If our belief in God be worth anything it will be armour-proof
against the most subtle denials. So dearly, so intensely, do we love
truth, that we would give up God Himself if God were a lie, and
we would hug our own despair rather than be the dupes of a fake
hope. Let the Atheist see, then, that we arc quite as much in
�4
earnest as lie is; quite as desirous of learning from him, as that he
should learn from us. Such respect given can only win respect in
turn. It is painfully true that many Atheists are the most vain
and conceited of men—quite as pharisaical as the old chief priests
and scribes down in Judea—quite as scornful in their pity of us
“ blind believers ” as we have ever been towards them. But what
has made them so ? And who is to blame for it ? Why, the
scornful attitude of religious society during the last hundred years.
Voltaire, Tom Paine, and the long list of their successors,
though falsely called Atheists, were considered by Christians as
the offscouring of the world, and a disgrace to mankind, not for
blemishes in their lives, but for heresy in their opinions ; and the
real Atheist, in the present day, is, by religious people, looked
down upon as contemptible, or dreaded as dangerous. It is,
therefore, the fault of believers if Atheists have grown vain and
conceited. False blame always tends to exaggerate the sense of
our own importance, while merited praise tends to remind us of
our shortcomings. If possible, we must change this state of
irrational hostility, and drive out the pharisaism of Atheism, by
first expelling the pharisaism of Belief. Mutual respect is the
key to mutual understanding, and, without that, discussion and
argument are vain.
(2) Another caution I would mention is that against supposing
that modern Atheism is necessarily connected with domestic im
morality or social anarchy. I would not, myself, dare to prognos
ticate the results were the belief in God entirely to fade out of
the hearts of our nation. There might be, for a time, a most fear
ful insurrection of men and women against the moral laws by which
Society is bound together ; but it is impossible to say with accuracy
what would be the result, because men and women are so illogical.
Believing, as I do, in God, and assured, as I am, by the past history
of our race thatwe are ever going forwards, I should expect that God
would provide in the future, as he has ever done in the past, for
the moral government of his children. At all events, so far, the
modern A theist is no ruffianly breaker of laws, or violator of the
sanctity of human rights. Some of them, indeed, are among the
world’s most righteous men, most fond and affectionate husbands
and fathers, most true and generous friends of mankind. Most of
them are lovers of order as well as of freedom, and “ use their
�5
liberty ” as if they believed themselves to be the servants of God.”
It will not do, then, to make the mistake of assuming that the
Atheist is at all our moral inferior. It is false in fact; and to go
upon that assumption is not only to insult a body of highly honour
able men, but to ruin our own work at the outset.
(3.) In the third place, we cannot be too candid in our discus
sions. It is a very common fault in theologians to shut their eyes
to unpleasant facts, and to refuse to draw obvious conclusions.
If we desire to influence reasoning men we must show our own
knowledge of the laws of the game, and use skilfully and fairly
the weapons of logic. Nothing helps sooner to confirm any one
in his own opinion than to hear it feebly assailed, or unfairly
opposed. The weapons of modern Atheism are very powerful and
finely tempered. We cannot, with a wave of the hand, or a shrug
of the shoulders, get rid of the army of unpleasant facts and
stubborn difficulties in the condition of humanity and of nature
around us, which will be arrayed against our belief. AVe must
ignore nothing, we must not gloss over a single flaw in our
reasoning, or make any leaps such as delight theological con
troversialists. The battle of argument must be fought inch by
inch, and there must be no strategem, no surprises.
(I.) As our real aim must be the discovery of the truth,
it will never do to give undue weight to the personal value
of our own convictions. That value is enormous, and of its
weight, as an argument, I shall presently speak ; but it must not
be used in its wrong place. The pleasantness of a conviction, by
itself, is no more proof of the truth of that conviction than the
pleasantness of an action is a proof that that action is right.
<•' Pleasant but false ” is quite as good a proverb as “ pleasant but
wrong.” To believe a doctrine only because it consoles, is to
confess that it has no other logical basis, and therefore is not to
be accepted by reasonable men. We must be prepared to be
utterly loyal to reason and truth, remembering that if there be no
God it is our manifest duty to ascertain and prove the fact, and
if there be a God—a God of truth and equity—it will not please
Him to deceive ourselves, or to prop up our belief by false argu
ments. If there be a God, the very Atheist commends himself to
the Divine approval whenever he is true tq himself.
For what other purpose was our Reason given us than to be
�6
supreme in all intellectual inquiries. It was surely intended to
raise us into a condition superior to all fear, and far above all
bribes. It was given to be the master of our spiritual emotions as
well as the governor of our animal passions, and we cannot,
honour God by renouncing our own Reason, or suffering ourselves
to be carried away from the stern truth, however terrible, by the
allurements of a false hppe, or by the terrors of a dismal certainty.
But, then, if truth be our chief aim, and not our own mental
enjoyment, we must gain by it in the end ; it will make our souls
more heroic ; it will prepare us the better for that clearer know
ledge of God Himself, which may await us as our reward, But if,
on the other hand, we let the Atheist see that we only believe in
God because we want to be comfortable, we put a stumbling block
in his way, and shew ourselves to be unworthy and selfish in
our aims, and no true seekers after truth. The moral effect
upon him, of such a discovery, would be quite fatal to his
conversion.
(•5) The last caution I would name is that against mistaking the exact limits of our inquiry. It must ever be borne
in mind that the Atheists and ourselves stand on the same ground
in denying that the existence of God can be demonstrated in the
same way as we demonstrate a mechanical fact or a scientific
proposition.
Time and breath would be spent in vain if the disputants were
to miss the main point of the question. We do not want to do the
impossible task of demonstrating or defining the existence of God.
We w^nt only to make it clear that the balance of probability is on
the side of Belief—that it is far more likely that 'there is a perfectly
good and capable God, in whose hands every real oi’ apparent evil
is sure to issue in final good to every conscious creature who is the
subject of that evil, than that there is no God at all; Stillmore
probable than that there is a God to whom the sufferings and
failures of his creatures is a matter of unconcern.
If we will only bear in mind that the Atheist can never prove
that there is no God ; and that we can never prove to him that
there is one, we shall more easily confine our discussion to the
balance of probalities, and that, in all conscience, is wide enough to
occupy the deepest and most laborious thought.
It is the province of Reason to examine these probabilities
�awl con; it is not the province of Reason to believe anything.
That we have, most of us, a faculty of believing in God which is
not mere credulity but a reliance of a dependant creature on the
goodwill of its Creator, is one of the facts of the universe which
it will be impossible for the Atheist to ignore ; but that faculty is
not called upon to reason about its object any more than the eye
is called upon to reason about what it sees.
We may first reason upon probabilities and thus call into exer
cise onr sense of Faith ; or we may first believe and then justify
our faith by the exercise of our Reason.
In conclusion, I will say a few. words on the immense value of
our personal convictions as to the existence of God and the hope
which they inspire. Having in the most unqualified manner
asserted that truth must stand first in our regard, that all ease and
comfort and even hope itself must be given up if they clash with
the claims of truth, I trust I shall not seem inconsistent if I say
that the joy and consolation of believing God is one of the strongest
arguments in favour of His real existence. For this joy and
consolation, this perfect peace in the present and hope for the
future, are exactly what we needed to make us to bear up under
the pains and evils of our mortal life, and to watch with submissive
hope the fearful sufferings in the world around us. The strongest
argument the Atheist has against our belief lies in the sin and
misery which abound. I do not see how men and women can
behold all this, believing it to be the work of blind Nature, and yet
preserve their reasons. To take such a view of life, as that described
in the last pages of the Martyrdom of M an, by Mr. Winwood
Reade, and to have no God in whose good purposes to confide, no
hope for a future in which present evil shall work itself out in
everlasting good, would be to darken the whole atmosphere of life
and thought, to paralyse moral energy, and never to smile again.
What conclusion could we draw from all we see and suffer, if there
is to be no beneficent issue to it all, but that we are the sport of a
malignant fiend who has not only amused himself thus at our
expense but mocked at us with false hopes and fond delusions,
creating us, indeed, unspeakably nobler than he is himself, and
worthy to put our feet upon his neck.
If there be no redress, if all these woes, and stragglings, and
sorrows, and irreparable losses are purposeless, the universe itself
�8
is cursed ; it has stultified aud degraded itself by evolving such a
creature as man, who can sit in judgment on the morality of its
course. All its starry gems, its gorgeous drapery, its siren songs,
its fascinating forms, its entrancing magic, its lustrous light and
heat all those, its enticements and allurements, testify, not to the
benevolence, but to the infinite perfidy of the whole design. They
are no better than the deadly gaze of the venomous snake, or the
treacherous blandishments of the harlot. All nature is a foul
cheat, if the aspirations of moral man are false. But I turn from
this dark picture, which is, after all, but a hideous passing dream,
to the fact that under all trials, under every degree of suffering,
physical and moral, men and women have been sustained by a
belief in a God who is filled with all the tenderest and purest
feelings of humanity without sharing any of its faults or ignor
ance. Their minds resting on God, they have not only borne
unspeakable tortures, but they have looked full and steadily in the
face of the world’s worst moral corruption, and their hearts have
told them, “ Bear it all; it will all yet turn to good. Be patient;
God’s ways are mysterious and, to our eyes, often entangled, but
good shall come at last to all. We know not how, or when, or
where. But He who made us what we are, to long only for good
—not for mere happiness but goodness—must Himself do good,
and only good. And in Him wc rejoice. Yea ! and will rejoice
with joy unspeakable and full of glory.” Without God we are
without hope, and the whole world is “a blunder infinite’ and
inexcusable
but with God we can abound in hope, and the
mysterious dealings of God with us and with nature are made, not
only bearable, but even appear as steps unto Heaven for every
suffering creature. Verily, God is as real a necessity to the life of
reasoning moral men as the glorious sun to the planets around
him.
Let us not, then, forget the enormous value of this personal
experience as an argument to meet the strongest arguments on the
other side. The world is only seen to be hopelessly wretched and
base where the Light of God’s righteousness has been shut out
from the soul of man. But everywhere and in everything there
is ground for hope when the fearful shadow has been withdrawn,
and the beams of His Eternal Love burst forth upon us once more
and turn our night into day.
�A SERMON,
PREACHED AT ST. GEORGE’S HALL, LANGHAM PLACE,
JANUARY 19th, 1873, by the
REV. CHARLES VOYSEY.
From the Eastern Post, January 25th, 1873.
------ -c -----*
On Sunday (Jan. 19 th) at St. George’s Hall, the Roa-. C. Voysey
took his text from Psalm viii., G., “Thou rnadest him to have
dominion over the works of thy hands; thou lust put all things in
subjection under his feet.”
In undertaking a task of such magnitude and difficulty as that
of supplying reasonable grounds for belief in a Perfect God, I am
deeply conscious of the inadequacy of my own powers and know
ledge ; and it is only natural for me to approach the work with
fear and trembling lest through my feebleness or errors I should
give a new occasion for the Atheist to triumph. But while I thus
flinch, and am full of diffidence, I am unspeakably consoled and
strengthened by the fact that whatever is really true will prevail
at last, and cannot suffer permanently from the strongest opposition,
or from the feeblest support; it is also an encouragement to remember
that mine is only one poor voice out of many; that no one is pledged
or compromised by what I may say; that I speak for myself alone;
and that, should I fail in my effort, the only logical'conclusion to
be drawn from it by the Atheist is, that one man has tried with
out success to convince the unbelieving world of the reasonableness
of his faith, not that his faith is unreasonable. My failure will
not prove that Atheism is true, though it might in the eyes of
sowe persons be thought to damage Theisrri,
�2
iTow, our first step must be to describe, if possible, what we
mean by the term God. The Christian, the Theist, the Pantheist,
all use the same term, but each in a different sense. I pass over
the first, with which all of us are familiar, to notice the difference
between the Theistic and Pantheistic senses of the term God.
The Pantheist denies self-consciousness to God, while the Theist
affirms it. The Pantheist affirms, not merely the co-extension of
God with the universe, but their absolute identity • the Theist,
denying this identity, affirms that God is distinct from the universe,
however inseparably they may be united. The Theistic idea of God is
of a Being without form, without material substance, one whole and
indivisible; a Being who is self-conscious, and who possesses
intelligence, power, and love, only in a degree far more exalted
than we can comprehend or describe ; and who, therefore, exercises
will and works from design. The Theist confesses that he has no
other means of gaining a conception of God than that which is
affordedhim by the contemplation of the works of God, and
especially of His noblest work—man. Prom a contemplation of
the highest part of man’s nature, viz., his intellect, conscience, and
affection, he rises by a single step into a conception of a Being who
possesses all these faculties in their fullest perfection, without any
of the limitations of matter, time, and space.
It is in vain that an opponent hurls at us his taunts about
anthropomorphism. It cannot be avoided. We have reached the
loftiest peak on which human feet have stood, when we have found
what man can do and be. Man is our only key to the problems
of nature, our only ladder from earth to Heaven. And in no
other way is his present greatness attested, or his glorious future
promised, so distinctly as in his own power to make, as it were, a
God in his own image and after his own likeness, and yet One,
stripped absolutely of every flaw and defect, and even of the
remotest tendency to human weakness. Men have never invented
a God morally inferior to themselves, the idols have only outlasted
*4r.
�3
their time, and have become anachronisms.
As men grew loftier
in mind and morals, the once revered images became first grotesque
and then hideous. I therefore defend the anthropomorphism of
the Theist as a merit, and do not apologise for it as a defeat, of his
system. Used with fidelity to the principles of progress m which
he believes, his anthropomorphic conception of God is a constant
guarantee of higher and higher knowledge, till he shall arrive at
the innermost sanctuary of the Divine presence. . At all events, if
there be a God, it is clear enough that He has given us no other
means of conceiving of Him at all. Man knows his own superiority
to the beasts of the field, the fowls of the air, the fishes m the
sea; to the trees and flowers, the rocks and hills, the towering
mountains and the foaming sea. He knows his own superiority
of nature, even in his extremest physical helplessness, to the wild
and fierce forces which play about him. The winds and the waves,
the roaring cataract, and even the burning lava, he turns to his
own service and becomes their lord; the very lightning becomes
the swift messenger of his thoughts, and the blazing sun itself,
though enthroned afar in unapproachable glory, is made to unfold
the secrets of its awful flame. A human mind which has mastered
its subtle beams, draws them through a fragment of crystal, and
reads the chemistry of the stupendous conflagration. Wonderful
as are the resources, even in organic matter, yet . with
our little fragment of knowledge, and our sense of spiritual
activity we have come to call the great masses of worlds around us
“ inert matter,” and to regard the physical forces every where in
operation as inferior to the emotions and aspirations of the human
soul. From all this, but one conclusion can be drawn, viz., that
there is something even in ourselves radically superior to that
visible universe, from which we, ourselves, were evolved. Man is
thus forced to feel the gulf between the seen and the unseen—
between the grandest exhibitions of power in the world of nature
and the spiritual forces at work within his own soul. It is m vain
that you tell him how he has been evolved m the natural course of
things from the simplest form of animal life, you will only increase
�4
Ills wonder at tlie powers thus originated without shaking for ohe
moment his confidence in their possession, or his faith in their
grandeur. He does not care, except as he may care for every grain
of true knowledge, how he came to be what ho is, what chemical
or molecular changes in inorganic matter produced his compound
and complex organism j but he docs care supremely to know hiraself
as a man, and to wield the royal sceptre over that portion of the
visible universe in which he woke up—a king.
In vain, too, will it be to show him the dissected brain of one of
the world’s great teachers and say, “ We cannot find anything but
wbat you see. All that made the man what he was lies now in
those bony hemispheres; in a few days it will rot and be dissolved
for ever.” He will turn round upon you and say, “This is only
what I expected you would find in the noblest head that lifted itself
proudly above the intellects of men; what I have felt all my life,
is that I am not identical with my body or any of my organs • that
I am something superior to what I see and feel, and that this body
is nothing more to me than the house in which I have dwelt, and
shall dwell till I die. Even, if I never live again, it cannot alter
the conviction of my life; that I have had a something, either the
product of my brain, or the impalpable and nndiscoverable germ
from which my brain was produced, which is myself, as dis
tinguished from the body in which I now speak and hear.
All that can be handled with your forceps, and seen through your
microscope is, of course, doomed to utter and irrevocable dissolution
—the particles will never again be united in their former con
dition. But if they sprung but yesterday from a mollusc, and are
doomed to utter dispersion to-morrow, one fact remains, I am that
I am. I have come into possession of these batteries of cerebral
matter, and I shall have to lay them down ; but they and I are
not one and never were. However essential to our speech and
action upon earth—to our communion with each other as fellow
beings, I have always felt that I was something greater than thev,
that by my will I could keep them in health, give them rest when
weary, and alas make them ache with pain by over-exertion, or by
senseless folly.”
�•J
Should this seem to be a digression, let me remind yoti
of what I am driving at, I want to state with emphasis
the fact, not merely of man’s superiority to the visible Universe,
but also of his own consciousness of his superiority.
With
the materialist he can go all lengths in the admission of the
entirely physical origin of his bodily frame, and of all its organs,
and consequently he can go all lengths with the materialist in
saying that there is nothing discoverable by the eye as a basis of
immortality. But he is no less certain that he is superior to the
body in which he dwells, than certain that he is superior to the
sun, without whose beams his body could not have come into
being at all.
' Now, if this superiority, which is instinctive in thousands and
millions of our race, and in the highest portion thereof, be
admitted, we haVe ground for justifying our search for God by
studying man. Of course, it would not do to study man alone
without studying also the othei’ and inferior works of God, foi that
*
would make our conclusions too visionary and speculative; but it
would be more erroneous still to study only the physical phenomena,
and leave the soul of man out of the range of our enquiry. If
we studied only the physical phenomena we could hardly come to
any other than the conclusion of the modern Pantheist, whereas,
if we study both the phenomena and the human soul, we naturally
arrive at Theism. There is not much, if any, token of conscien
tiousness in the outei world. Individuals are simply ignored by
*
the forces of nature, pain and pleasure are scattered about in what
seems to be wild caprice, i.e., in utter disregard of the merits or
demerits of the individuals on whom they fall. But the whole
thing apparently works pretty well so as to produce a constant
supply of flowers and butterflies who are not expected to stay too
long in their little patch of sunshine, and who must always be
expecting to be done to death at any moment by a sudden change
in temperature, oi' downfall of rain and hail. Still, no matter, a
thousand dead things are soon replaced. The laboratory is always
open, resources are abundant, the workmen never rest, and so far
as a perpetual transformation-scene is the order of the day,
nature certainly does her work with infinite skill and industry.
But you don’t want a moral God to do all this, it does itself
�6
apparently; once set going—no one cares to enquire how—it can’t
help going, till some fine day it will, perhaps, go to pieces and
begin all over again, taking the first employment that offers
itself.
I, for one, do not wonder at the Pantheism or, as
it may truly be called, the Atheism which comes of regarding
only the outside of things, i.e., of studying only physical
phenomena with a determined blindness to the moral and
spiritual nature of man. If nature outside of us were all we had
to lean upon for instruction concerning God, I confess we should
be driven eithei’ to attribute to Him frightful want of conscien
tiousness, or—what is more logical—to do without the hypothesis
of a God at all.
On the other hand, if we take both together, and explain the
one by the other, searching for all that nature has to tell, and
remembering that if God works there, he also works in human
hearts and souls, we shall be able at length, if not to explain
every seeming moral anomaly, at all events, to give Him as much
credit for good intentions, as we do to our fellow-men when we
cannot exactly see what their aims really are, and when we cannot
help finding fault with their methods.
The old maxim “Never let children or’fools see half-done deeds,”
should have its weight in the correction of any impatient
a
*gainst
murmuring
the course of Providence. To Him we are
but as children; by the side of His wisdom, our greatest knowledge
is but folly; and therefore, if we arepermitted to stand by His side,
and follow His dealings as the world’s great artificer, a becoming
silence should mark our reverence, and a patient watchfulness
should be our tribute to His wisdom and skill. “ God is in
Heaven, and thou upon earth, therefore let my words be
few,” contains a profound caution, which we shall do well to
remember.
Having attained a clear perception of the superiority of man—
as the highest product of nature yet known to us—our first
question must be “ Is there, or is there not, some Being higher
still 1” Now, most men, and even Atheists, readily admit the
possibility of the existence of creatures higher than man. They
do not know what other worlds contain, of course, but they think
it quite possible, if not probable, that there are highei’ intclli-
�gences, some where but still evolved like ourselves from the
Universe. They will not take the next step, and say with me
that it is possible that there is one Being, not evolved, but the
source of evolution, above all other Beings, who has perfect
knowledge of the Universe; but it seems to me but a very short
step indeed, from the admission that possibly higher intelligences
than our own exist somewhere. But if they have a right to
assume there are higher intelligences, we surely have the right to
assume that there is one Highest and Supreme.
Here, however, we must use the method of balancing proba
bilities. Supposing that there were no supreme and perfect intelli
gence, then as fax' as we know, man would be the Supreme Being
of the universe—the one intelligent creature who stands on the
highest, pinnacle of knowledge. He knows more about the world
than any other being. Bnt what does he know as yet ? He is only
just beginning to find out how little he knows by comparison with
the sum total of things actually present and visible. He knows
very little about the past, next to nothing about the regions of the
world which are invisible, and nothing at all about the distant
future. A creature only of yesterday, not so long ago an ignorant
savage, a little earlier still only an ape, how should he know more
than he knows at present? But he has, nevertheless, learnt that
there are system and law prevailing in every part of the universe,
that invariable sequences attend given actions and mutations of
force. Man has at least learnt to banish from scientific language
the names of “accident” and “chance,” and he has tacitly admitted
the presence of active intelligence in the evolution of all things.
Nature has taught him all he knows. All his sciences, of which
he is justly proud, are records of facts and phenomena actually
observed, discoveries on his part of what had been done, or is now
being done, without his aid, not inventions of his own or results of
his interference. Nature is so manifestly controlled by intelligence,
that the mind of man has its most exquisite delight in reading the
secrets of nature, and watching her wondrous developments.
Man further admits that we ourselves are products of this care
fully designed whole. That we are the latest, noblest, and fairest
fruit of Nature’s skill; and yet some men will hesitate to confess
that the intelligence which arranged this grand evolution is grander
�far than one of its products. If there be no higher mind than the
mind of man, how could man have ever been evolved ? ‘
nihilo
nihil Jit' stands good yet, and we can never be persuaded that the
intellect of man is the offspring of that which had no intelligence.
A perfect knowledge of all the sciences, and of thousands of things
yet unknown to us, was required to produce even this little globe
on which we live. Had there been false Chemistry, or deficient
Mathematics, or ignorance of the laws of Astronomy, or of Optics,
what hopeless chaos would have ensued ! One false step would
have ruined the whole. Can we then, who attach so much
importance to our own tiny share in this knowledge, pretend that
no knowledge at all was needful to produce the stupendous whole?
It must be infinitely more probable that a Supreme mind is in
existence who knows the whole, while we only know a small part,
than that man is the supreme intelligence himself.
Moreover, if there were no such supreme intelligence, the universe
supposing it to be self-evolved (and of course unconscious, since it is
not intelligent) has only just come into self-consciousness through
one of its parts, viz., man. It had been, so to speak, asleep all these
eycles of ages till man was born, and his intellect dawned upon
the world, and for the first time the Universe realised its own
existence through the intelligent consciousness of one of its pro
ducts I I do not think absurdity could go further than that. If
there be no God then man is the supreme intelligence, and the
product of what vye must admit to be the most profound wisdom
must then be wiser than the wisdom from which he sprang. And
if there be no self-conscious intelligence but man, then the
Universe is only just now, through man, becoming aware of its
own existence.
I throw out these fragmentary hints for abler men to take up.
They are only a specimen of what may be said for and against the
probability that there is a self-conscious supreme intelligence at the
root of, and behind, all visible and invisible things. But, if we
take man as our key to the solution of the problem, we shall find
much more in him than his mind, which justifies his belief in God;
and of this I will speak another day. I conclude by saying that
I shall be thankful to any one who will write to me, to correct my
errors and to point out any flaw in my arguments,
�“A T II E I S M.”
III.
A SERMON,
PREACHED AT ST. GEORGE’S HALL, LANGHAM PLACE,
JANUARY 26th, 1873, by the
REV. CHARLES VOYSEY.
From the Eastern Post, February Is#, 1873.
......
On Sunday (Jan. 26th) at St. George’s Hall, the Rev. C. Voysey
took his text from Psalm xl., 10., “Thy law is within my
heart.”
He said :—Last Sunday we were considering the argument for
the existence of a Supreme intelligence, which may be drawn from
the intellectual part of man’s nature. Our next step is to examine
the moral part, and to endeavour to show that the Conscience of
man furnishes strong ground for our belief in a Perfectly Good
God.
Let us first inquire what is the proper function of the Con
science. In the first place it seems to be a faculty distinct from
the ordinary reflective powers of the mind, which we sum up
under the term Reason. I do not now enquire how Conscience is,
in the first instance, generated, or whether or not it be some
phrenological organ, more or less conspicuous as a bump on the
human head. It is neither my province, nor within my grasp, to
settle such questions as to its origin or physical construction, I
have only to deal with it as it seems to most men to act- a part in
our complex nature, and to influence our conduct. In affirming,
then, the distinctness of Conscience from the Reasoning faculties,
I only speak of it as it appears -to my thought. It does not, and
cannot, teach me what is right or what is wrong. Only my
�2
Reason can tell me that, but as soon as I perceive what is right
my Conscience commands me to do it; as soon as I perceive what
is wrong, my Conscience forthwith commands me not to do it.
Many have been the strifes in the world owing to the confusion
between Conscience and Reason. Our knowledge being defective,
our reasoning must be sometimes fallible, our conclusions as to
right and wrong, must be sometimes false, and yet the Conscience
only sanctions what seems to be right, and forbids only what seems
to be wrong. It follows, as a matter of course, that people will
sometimes do wrong conscientiously, i.e., not as wrong, but believing
it to be right.
“ The time will come when he that killeth you
will think that he doeth God service,” is a good illustration of this
perversion of mind. Many persons will thereupon jump at the
conclusion that Conscience is not to be trusted, and that it must
be over-ruled by superior authority external to itself—whereas the
fault lies not with the Conscience but with the Reason which is
imperfectly enlightened. The Conscience has nothing whatever to
do with drawing the conclusions of the Reason; its only function
is to endorse with all the weight of its sanction whatever the
Reason has pronounced to be right. Conscience, even in its
apparently worst perversions, is not perverted at all, is still loyal
to the best that is put before it. It cannot help us to makeup Our
minds in the least degree ; it waits quietly till this process is com
pleted by the Beason, and then steps in with its powerful mandate,
to demand that the best alternative should be adopted and pursued.
It has always seemed to me a great mistake to blame the Con
science for those moral errors which have been perpetrated in its
name. Conscience is evex loyal to duty as duty, never sanctions
*
any "wrong as wrong, is a perpetual witness in the soul of man for
all righteousness, and it differs in different men only in strength
and intensity, in its power to control the life ; it does not differ in
being morally inferior and superior.
If my Conscience sanctions what another man’s Conscience
�3
would condemn, tliat only shows that there is a moral difference of
opinion in our respective minds, not that his Conscience is more
loyal to what is right than my Conscience, nor mine than his.
Looseness of language is largely responsible for many popular
errors. We often speak of one man as conscientious, and another
as unconscientious, when the real difference we wish to describe is
the difference of their moral opinions. We ought never to use
these terms “ conscientious and unconscientious,” except to dis
tinguish between the man who obeys his Conscience and the other
who disobeys it. W e take too much for granted that our estimate
of what is right and wrong is shared by every one else alike; and
then come to the false conclusion that those who do not do what we
believe to be right are acting against their' Consciences.
Whole races of men we have heard stigmatised as wanting in
conscientiousness because they are remarkably untruthful; othei’S
because they are habitual thieves ; others because they love to
shed innocent blood and their land groans with murder ; others
because they are frivolous, fickle and vain ; others because
polygamy is their law ; others because they practice polyandry.
In all these cases you find conscience quite as much at work as in
ourselves, commanding what is believed to be right, for bide, ing
what is believed to be wrong. They lie, and steal, and murder,
&c., through their want of clear and vigorous perception that lying,
stealing, and murder are wrong. Their education has been defi
cient, and the inherited tendency to these habits has not been
resisted; they are ever ready with reasons to justify their conduct,
or to make very light of it. Otherwise, it would have been
impossible for whole populations to connive at these outrages, and
to shield the guilty heads from the penalties of the law. But
these same people taught from their youth up to regard some act
of religious observance as the highest of all duties, and the neglect
of it the most wicked of crimes, are very very conscientious in the
discharge of that duty, and manifest the functions of Conscience
in that particular, in a striking degree.
�4
If ever the question is raised ‘‘ Why does the Conscience bid
you do this,” the sole answer always is, “ Because it is right.”
Never in any case is it “ Because it is wrong, ”
The Conscience is, I grant, not equally strong in all men. In
some natures it has more, in others less, power to influence the
conduct. But this is only like all other faculties in man. The
Reason, the imagination, the affections, the hopes, and the fears
vaiy considerably in strength and degree in different men, and so
also the Conscience varies; in some it is the lord of the whole
life, in others it is hustled into a corner and seldom suffered to raise
its voice. But it is sufficiently universal to be argued from as
the common property of human nature, and in reasoning about the
source and fountain of all things, the Conscience is as much entitled
to be considered as the intellect.
Moreover, if we would argue fairly, wo must take the average
quality of the Conscience rather than the mor® rare instances of
those who hardly exhibit any Conscience at all. In a treatise
on the Reason of man, it would be manifestly unfair to
take only the undeveloped state of it, as it appears in a
child, 01 the diseased condition of it as it appears in an idiot; so
in speaking of the Conscience of man we ought to take it in
its more complete and perfectly healthy development, in the
noblestmoral examples, rather than its earlier and undeveloped
state.
We are searching for indications of a Divine Being among the
works of the universe, we have found, so far, that man is the
noblest of them, by Reason of his Intellect alone, but we find that
he has something else, which, in his own estimation, he reckons
nobler still than Intellect—viz., Conscience, or the faculty which
urges him to do what is right and avoid what is wrong, and this
faculty is, In its normal exercise, one of the greatest blessings
which man could possess.
In thd first place, it marks afresh our superiority to the physical
world. While everything around us is by the laws and constitution
of its nature designed for selfishness, to win its way, if it can, in
the struggle for existence ; while even the body of man, with all
its functions, has precisely the same nature, and might lawfully
(were it not for the Reason and Conscience) study its own comfort
�and well-being alone, and without the smallest scruple, enrich
and adorn itself at the ruin of others ; while the unbridled indul
gence of our physical instincts would lead us to the most profound
animalism and beastiality, the Conscience is the chief faculty of
our being, which rescues us from this degradation, and actually
alters the whole natural course and tendency of our lives. That
we should, to some extent, lead animal lives is not merely inevitable,
but necessary and good, and, therefore, we find the Conscience, duly
enlightened by Reason, sanctioning a certain degree of animalism
for the very purpose of carrying out a benevolent design; but the
checks and limits, which the Conscience puts upon our indulgence,
are of a nature to cause us, at times, positive pain and annoyance.
We cannot obey the Conscience in everything without trampling
on our physical nature, and sometimes not without permanent
injury to our health and brain. Self-denial and mortification of
the flesh, (and I use this term in the very widest sense, and not
merely in the sense of asceticism) are absolutely necessary to the
perfect supremacy of the Conscience when enlightened by Reason,
If my Reason tells me that such and such a thing is wrong, i.e.,
will inflict, injury on others, that does not necessarily prevent my
wishing to do it. I cannot help wishing to do it, if the gratification
be very great, and do it I should to a certainty, but for that
wonderful monitor within, who says “ How can I do this great
wickedness and sin against God.”
The collision is so complete between the higher voice and the
impelling instinct, that one can only feel that the two are radically
different in nature, and must have had a different source. This
struggle between a strong desire and a higher law within the same
breast if it gives any witness, bears testimony to the exalted
nature of man, and almost drives him in thought to the threshold
of that Heavenly Home, where he was born and cradled. To have
the power of doing intentionally what one shrinks from doing, and
to deny oneself the pleasure which is so fascinating, and which one
longs to do, is to prove the immense superiority of our inner selves
over the visible universe.
Here I must pause to notice an objection which may be urged,
that whenever we obey the Conscience we only do so to gain a
greater pleasure than we relinquish. It is said that we are still
�6
selfish after all, and dread remorse more than the present pain of
self-denial. Now I cannot, of course, speak for others, but for my
self I deny this with my whole soul. I am perfectly certain that
it is neither fear of greater pain, nor hope for greater joy, that
makes me endeavour to obey my conscience. Many a time in my
life I have had nothing at all but pain for doing what I thought to
be right, and I did it too, grudgingly, half regretting my own self
denial, at the time wishing that I had not been so Conscientious.
It is unfair to mankind to put such a construction upon their sub
mission to that imperious call of conscience. To us, perhaps, the
hope of being perfectly conformed to God’s will, in some far-off
future, may be an attraction entering into more than half our
moral struggles but nothing can be more false than to say it is
always so, or to deny the possibility of a man doing what his
Conscience demands from the most disinterested motives. For does
not Conscience itself sit in judgment with Reason upon motives as
well as conduct ? Does it not condemn, as unworthy, all motives
of action, the. core and kernel of which is selfishness ? No doubt in
our imperfect state our motives are not always pure and perfectly
disinterested, but the soul of man has at all events risen up to
that height in which it deliberately distinguishes pure from impure
motives ; and while she gives her solemn approval to the nobler,
she condemns and denounces the baser. There is all the difference
between seeking to be true to one’s higher nature and seeking
greater happiness. It is true we cannot avoid the happiness, but
we disqualify ourselves for its attainment the moment we fix upon
it a longing eye. What often determines our choice is the strength
of our conviction that a thing is right, not the possibility of our
being the happier for it afterwards. The efforts made by some to
depreciate the force and value of Conscience are unworthy of men
who profess to be students of facts and phenomena; for if there
had been no cases of genuine disinterested doing of duty for duty’s
sake, we should never have been able to discover the difference
*
between that and seeking our own happiness. Man has detected
the superiority of the one motive over the other, only after having
witnessed or experienced the higher motive in himself. Had it
never been done, man would never have imagined that it could be
done.
�I
And this brings me to notice that the Conscience, enlightened by
Reason, always urges us to do good to our fellow-men, rather than
to make them happy. An unenlightened benevolence, such as the
animal instinct of an indulgent parent, which leads to the spoiling
x of a child, is a mere impulse to give happiness, and is on that
grouud actually condemned by the enlightened Conscience, because
that happiness not only does not tend to the child’s real and lasting
good, but tends to his present and future degradation. In its
higher state the Conscience bids us aim exclusively at the culti
vation of all virtue in ourselves and in others. It teaches us
always to subordinate happiness to holiness, and often deliberately
to forego and withhold happiness, that goodness may ensue. Truth
and righteousness would be preferred, not only before wealth and
comfort here below, but even before an eternity of mere enjoyment
without personal holiness. Thus, on every side, it seems that the
superiority of our inner nature becomes an antagonism to the out
ward and visible. “ The flesh warreth against the spirit, and the
spirit against the flesh, and these are contrary the one to the other.”
The contrast and hostility between them we all feel, but which of
the two do we reckon the higher, the nobler, the truer part of
man 1 Surely the Conscience—the Conscience which makes us
mortify our flesh with its affections and lusts, which often and
often mars our happiness and embitters our pleasure, upbraids us
with reproaches, and stings us with remorse—that voice which
hushes our cry for happiness, which will not endure a single selfish
plea, but demands unquestioning obedience, and bids us fall down
in the very dust before the majesty of duty. We all in our secret
hearts revere this power, whether or not we obey it as we should.
At least we pay it the homage of our inmost souls and feel how
great and grand it is to be its slave.
We have here, then, something in man which we cannot find in
the physical universe, where happiness is the aim of every living
thing. Every single being in every class of animal life, including
the body of man, is constituted to seek its own happiness first, but
in man we find a principle entirely at war with this universal
instinct, a power that forces us to break the natural law of mortal
life, and to seek for that which is supremely higher than mere
animal safety and enjoyment. For the sake of goodness, men have
�learnt, not merely to suffer pain and loss themselves, but to
undergo the still worse pain of inflicting suffering upon others.
We would deliberately hurt their bodies and mortify their
desires, if by so doing we could raise them into the exalted con
dition of goodness.
Now to me, I confess, this fact is a greater revelation of a Divine
Being than even the intellect of man. For ignoring altogether
the fact that men have almost universally regarded the Conscience
as the vicegerent of God—the mere possession of a power which
claims the mastery over our whole natures, which disturbs our
animal repose, and which demands the deliberate surrender ot
happiness for the sake of truth, righteousness, and every form of
duty, brings us face to face with a power—call it human oi
*
Divine—which, whatever it be, is absolutely transcendent over
nature, and suggests to our minds the existence of another world
altogether, in and around us, in which the laws and forces of the
visible universe have no place. Were we to grant that our intellect
is only an animal organism, we should still be at our wits’ end to
account for the Conscience on purely physical grounds; and we
would never get over the anomaly and absurdity of the Universe
evolving and evolving itself cycle after cycle till it produced an
element at variance with its own laws, a power and a force which
deliberately set them at defiance, and a conscious being who calmly
rejected, for the sake of virtue, the most enticing happiness placed
in its path. If we could get over the intellectual difficulty of
Atheism, we could never get over the difficulty which is presented
by the Conscience. I do not den> that there is antagonism in the
physical universe ; it abounds everywhere ; it is in accordance with
its own principle of “ Everyone for himself;” but that antagonism
is wholly different from that which exists between two distinct
portions of one and the same being; greater still is the difference
when we observe that the higher law often condemns as morally
wrong what nature herself tempts us to do.
I cannot pursue the enquiry further at present, it is enough that
the human Conscience is not merely superior, but antagonistic, to
the selfish principle in nature, to prove that if we would search for
indications of the Deity, we must make man the field of our
enquiry.
�“ATHEIS M.”
IV.
A SERMON,
PRE ACHED AT ST. GEORGE’S HALL, LANGHAM PLACE,
FEBRUARY 2.nd, 1873, by the
REV. CHARLES VOYSEY.
From the Eastern Post, February 8th, 1873.
On Sunday (Feb. 2nd) at St. George’s Hall, the Rev. C. Voysey
took his text from 1 John iv., 16, “God is love; and he that
dwelletli in love dwelletli in God, and God in him.”
He said—We now come to the third branch of our enquiry into
the nature of man, in search for indications of a Supreme and
Perfect Divine Being.
We have perceived, in the intellect of man, manifest tokens of
a supreme intellect from which it sprang. AVe have discovered in
the Conscience a power, not only superior, but antagonistic, to the
forces in Natureand we must now direct our attention to Human
Love.
What is Love ? This sacred name has alas ! been shamefully
misapplied. It has been made t^stand for its very opposite
selfishness. It has been used to denote the most imperious of our
animal instincts, the gratification of merely physical desire j even
the mere desire to attain such enjoyment, has been profanely called
Love. Far be it from me to deem anything which God has placed
in the nature of man as unholy or unclean. The animal instinct
referred to is exquisite and sacred, the source of untold happiness,
and the fountain of domestic virtue, but then it is not Love.
When people talk of “ making Love ” and “ falling in Love,” they
are using expressions of profound inaccuracy, for which the
poverty of our language is the only excuse. The affection which
�2
subsists between lovers, husbands and wives, parents and children,
brothers and sisters, is
nothing more than a merely
animal attachment to each other, which they share in common with
the birds of the air and the beasts of the field. It is - all called
“ Love,” and we cannot in a day—no, not in a generation—change
its name. But the time seems to have come for us to make long
and loud our protest against the use of ambiguous terms. Words
do re-act more or less upon those who use them, and if we persist
in applying one and the same term to two or more absolutely
distinct things, we shall come in time to lose sight of the distinc
tion between them, and in that case the higher sense will be
forgotten, and the lower one alone remain.
Now, to discern what Love is, we must contrast it with what it
is not.
We find everywhere reigning in nature the law of self-love, of
self-preservation, self-indulgence, and self-advancement. We own
its necessity. No living thing is safe without it. It is given to
us that we may live as long and as happily as we can, and that we
may promote our own earthly advantage. In the struggle for
existence this law bids us without scruple trample on the rights
of others if they have any, and then might becomes right. In
reference to self-indulgence, it bids us get all the pleasure we
possibly can; it takes no account of the pleasure of others, except in
so far as it may minister to our own. And as for self-advancement
its maxim is to be first in the race if we can. Its cry is, “ Every
man for himself.”
Now it is easy to see without illustration that were this the
only law which governed humanity our time would be divided
between avarice, lust, and war. We should have nothing else to
do but to give free play to our appetites and to smite and murder
every one who stood in the way of our gratification. Supposing
that a certain amount of civilisation had been reached by mutual
concessions for the attainment of happiness, then you would have
�still a state of soiety, if society it might be called, in which selfish
ness would prevail, only somewhat refined and gilded over by
conventionalities. You would still have men seeking to make
themselves rich at the ruin of others, to indulge their animal
passions at the cost of their neighbours’ felicity, and to do each
other to death only in a slower and less brutal manner than by
bloodshed. They would still unscrupulously push themselves to the
front if possible, not caring whom they crushed or trampled under
foot in the struggle.
Bret Harte, an author to whom I shall again presently refer,
among other' writers has given pictures of life in the Far West of
America, wherein all that we could imagine of such a state of
society has been enacted within this century. Lawless, ruffianly,
selfishness has been the rule, because most of the men gathered in
those regions were mere animal men, carrying their whole animalism
with them into a district where they had no law but themselves.
This was the coarse and brutal picture of the reign of selfishness.
But we need not go so far as to San Francisco to see the same
selfishness under a more refined aspect. There are men and women
in all our great cities, aye, and in the country too, (let us hope
there are but few of them), who behave as if they were animals
and nothing more—human animals with the cunning and resources
of human skill, education, and prudence—who live for themselves
alone, and who seldom feel what it is to love. They follow their
strong instincts for pleasure and ease, their unscrupulous desire to
enrich themselves on the race-course or at the gambling tables,
their studious regard for their own health and the supply of every
luxury; and they do not hesitate in the pursuit of their own
indulgence to force their rivals or dependents down into unspeak
able misery, or leave others to die in disease and poverty, rather
than forego one of their accustomed pleasures. •
We may fairly hope that such are extreme and most rare
instances ; but dress it up as finely as you can, you will only get
�4
one result out of entire obedience to the natural law of selfishness,
you must have avarice, lust, murder, and all manner of crime.
Now true Love is that principle which we find almost universal
in human nature, which impels us to resist in a measure this law
of selfishness, to overcome its dictates whenever they tend to
entrench on the rights and welfare of others. Love will go long
lengths in sanctioning the law of selfishness j but there is a point
where it will stand up and resist it. It will sanction self-preservation
until another’s life is in peril. It will sanction self-indulgence
until that indulgence becomes robbery of the happiness or
well-being of another. It will sanction ambition, and even
gathering of gold, so long as the means employed do not hinder a
companion in the race.
Love will hide itself beneath an apparently selfish disguise, and
all at once it will leap out upon you in all its glory, melting your
eyes and your heart. It is that in man which redeems him from
being a beast—for man without Love is worse than any beast which
Lord God hath made; and when he Loves he becomes more than
animal, more than man, I had almost said, and stands forth in the
very image of God.
With the world so full as it is of real Love, if we will only look
for it, illustrations would be endless. But every wish felt, every
word spoken, every deed done for the sake oj others is a witne s
of true Love.
Some may say this is only the function of conscience over again.
But, in reply, I say that the brilliancy of Love outshines that of
conscience as the sun outshines the moon. Love is conscience in an
ecstasy—it is a perfect enthusiasm of goodness, because it does not
stop to reason out with itself, and to balance the pros and cons of
right and wrong, but with eager bound rushes to its goal and acts
without reflection, the slave of inspiration. Conscience says, 11 Do
this because it is right.” Love says, “ I will do this for you.”
Conscience mercifully keeps us mindful of oui’ responsibility when,
�Love is absent or cool. But Love has no responsibility, and acts
upon its own Divine impulse, needing no reminder, no prompting,
no command. We fall back upon Conscience, only when deficient
in Love.
By Love, we pass out of ourselves into our object, as it were;
we seem to have merged almost our own consciousness, sympathies,
and desires, in the soul of another ; till we live a new life in hers,
and become her saviour and her shield. When Paul said, “ Love
worketh no ill to his neighbour, therefore Love is the fulfilling of
the law,” he stated feebly and negatively the exact truth, fie
should have said, “ Love worketh all possible good to his neigh
bour, therefore Love is the fulfilling of the law.” It will not do
to leave our neighbour alone, and do him no harm ; love bids us
be active and attentive, and do him all the good we can. Then
Love is the fulfilling of all human obligations. If we were wholly
and continually under the influence of Love, and not sometimes
under the sway of selfishness, our whole lives would be blameless,
sin would be no more, and human life—ah ! it would be too sweet
ever to lay it down.
But Love teaches us that goodness is identical with the supremest
happiness of man. It is not identical with physical happiness, it
is often at war with that, and its terms with our animal nature are
unshrinking submission, and if need be, the self-sacrifice of life
itself. Yet strange—-most strange—when we suffer most for one
we love, we reap our highest joys, every wound is a healing of the
spirit, and as we lie on Love’s altar, bleeding, gasping, dying, v e
reach the sublimest region of human joy.
Think what the old poets have sung, what the Bibles of all lands
have enshrined, what tradition prizes as its noblest treasure. They
all sing in praise of Love—Love which began by heroic self-con
quest and ended in death. But one and all bear the same testi
mony, the joy of dying for Love was worth all that life itself
CQuld ever purohase.
�6
In those tales of the Far West, by Bret Harte, to which I have
alluded, there is unfolded a perfect gospel of this human triumph.
Amidst scenes of appalling horror, of the most brutal savagery,
and the most abandoned lawlessness, he brings to view this one
exquisite flower of humanity, and shows how Bove was at the
bottom of these fierce hearts; how it stayed the murderer’s hand ‘
how it softened the impious tongue; and brought men whose lives
had been fouled by the worst of crimes to die the noblest martyr
death. No Christ could do more than those and hundreds and
thousands of our fellow-men have done for each other, and are doing
daily—and all for Love.
That fearful catastrophe to the Northfleet, off Dungeness, which
has awakened so much sympathy throughout the land, brought
out afresh the glorious powers of self-sacrifice which belong to man.
To some, the touching incidents of the Captain’s farewell of his
wife might seem a conflict between Love and Duty. But Love and
Duty are one, they can never clash. It is always a duty to
do what Love desires. And Love itself is best proved by
doing oui Duty. Just think of those few minutes of parting
agony.
Amid the roar and screaming of rough men and women, all
struggling for their lives, some so fierce and frantic in their terror
that they must be kept back from swamping the boats by the cap
tain’s revolver, his young wife, a bride ef seven weeks, pleads to
be allowed to stay and die at her husband’s side. Her Love, how
ever, made her lose herself in him, and to make him happy she
would do his bidding, and live in bitter grief all her days. Her
Love and duty were one. She would have stayed and died for
Love; she left him for a life of woe—no less for Love. It was all
she could do for him, to live because he asked it; and he, in his
keen sense of duty, knew that to desert his ship even for his
wife’s sake would have been no act of Love to her. To bring with
him into safety a soiled reputation and an honour stained would
�7
have been far more cruel than to have bid her farewell for ever.
So for Love of her, as well as for duty’s sake, he stands firm as a
rock ; and fighting God’s battle for the weak, against the strong
until the surging waves engulph him, he dies a hero and a martyr,
and around his cross let us say in solemn reverence, “ Truly this
was the Son of God.”
Are there no more like him ? Yea ! thousands on thousands.
The earth is full of such heroes, though we know them not,
and their lives and deaths have been done in secret—no
plaudits to give them courage; no eulogies spoken over their
graves. Ask the generals who lead armies, the captains who
carry their vessels all over the world, search the records of
the Royal Humane Society, look into the hospitals, the theatres,
and the homes of the poor. Enquire at the police stations; yes,
and search the gaols and the galleys. Everywhere you find such
Love as makes men and women Divine; raises them above them
selves, i.e., above all that selfish nature would make them. If
you will only look for it, I believe every one you meet can show
it, or has some heavenly story to tell of how it was shown to
them. Let us not say, then, that God has deserted his world,
while he has given us love. “ He left not himself without wit
ness in that he did us good,” says the Apostle. But he
goes on to say, “ in giving us rain and fruitful seasons,
filling our hearts with food and gladness.”
I will not
question the general benevolence of the arrangements of nature;
but they are not worth looking at by the side of the marvellous
gift of Love which God has given to men to make them fruitful in
all virtue, triumphant over all appetites and passions, and full of joy
unspeakable, and full of glory. This great gift, I say, is so
antagonistic to the laws and forces of nature that it cannot have
had its origin in the visible universe whose laws it sets at defiance.
It cannot be “ of the earth, earthy,” it must be “ the Lord from
Heaven,” it must be an afflatus which is Divine, We
�8
cannot deny the influence winch, it wields. To see and hear
of any noble act of Love warms and melts the most frozen
nature, and breaks the heart of stone. All mankind, in various
ways, bears testimony to the supremacy of Love. Just as we admire
a conscientious fool more than a clever rogue, so do we admire him
who is impelled by Love more than one who is only guided by a
cold sense of duty. Among the faculties of man, then, Love holds
the very highest place. It is the instinct of doing the best possible
good. "While conscience is our authority for doing it, Love leaps
into the act without needing any sanction at all. To do anything
for Love is to justify the deed without any further plea.
I have only then to urge once more, that as man is the noblest
work in the universe, and as Love is the noblest part of man, so
we must infer that God cannot be a Being inferior to the most
Loving of men. He may be, and to our adoring eyes of faith He
really is, far and high exalted ovei his noblest creature ; but less
*
than that He cannot be. Whenever, therefore, we would conceive
of Him, we must make the noblest part of the noblest man’s
character our starting point, or else we shall do violence to the first
principles of Reason, and contradict the universal testimony of the
human Consciousness.
I believe it can be shown that, with the light of human Love
shed upon the scene, all that is most dark, and sad, and dismal in
the world can be reconciled with the existence of a Perfectly Holy
and Loving God; and more than that, the miseries of the world
become proofs and tokens of what God is, and unfold to us His
nature in a more complete and intelligible manner than had we
been living in a fairyland, or had we been all our lives happy
citizens of some Golden Jerusalem. If you shut out sorrow you
shut out the highest, purest, forms of Love. And if you shut out
Love you shut out God. So we come back, out of our clouds
of sorrow, to praise His glorious Name for every wounded heart,
for- every scalding tear, for every last farewell I
�■k
“A T H E I S M.”
V.—ON
£
“THE MARTYRDOM OF MAN.”
A SERMON,
PREACHED AT ST. GEORGE’S HALL, LANGHAM PLACE,
FEBRUARY 16th, 1873, by the
R EV. CHARLES VOYSEY.
From tits Eastern Post, February 22nd, 1873.
On Sunday (Feb. 16th) at St. George’s Hall, the Rev. C. Voysey
took his text from Hebrew xii, 11, “ Now no chastening for the
present seemeth to be joyous but grievous j nevertheless afterward
it yieldeth the peaceable fruit of righteousness unto them which
are exercised thereby.”
He said :—In my last sermon I endeavoured to describe what
true Love is ; how it differs from merely animal attachment, how
complete is its triumph over the natural desires, and how it raises
us into the highest happiness in the supreme act of self-sacrifice.
It is my purpose now to point out the process by which Love is
venerated or brought out into manifestation j to show that Love
cannot be developed at all except under the conditions of suffering
or sin, and therefore that that which we deem the most beautiful
flower of humanity Is the result of those very conditions on which
the Atheist bases his strongest arguments against the existence of
a Good God. The Atheist, as represented by Mr Winwood
Reade in his Martyrdom of Man, argues thus :—
“ The conduct of a father towards his child appears to be cruel
but it is not cruel in reality. He beats the child but he does it
I
�2
for the child’s own good; he is not omnipotent; he is therefore
obliged to choose between two evils. But the Creator is omnipotent;
He therefore chooses cruelty as a means of education or develop
ment ; He therefore has a preference for cruelty, or He would not
choose it; He is therefore fond of cruelty, or He would not prefer
it; He is therefore cruel, which is absurd.”
“ Again, either sin entered the world against the will of the
Creator, in which case He is not omnipotent, or it entered with His
permission, in which case it is His agent, in which case He selects
sin, in which case He is fond of sin, in which case He is sinful,
which is an absurdity again.”—(pp, 518-519.)
It would be easy to dispose of this argument by at once disputing
the hypothesis that God is omnipotent. The so-called “ omnipo
tence” of God has assumed the most extravagant shapes in the
human imagination. We could name a score or two of things
inherently impossible, which God Himself has no power to do
He cannot make the phenomena of noon and midnight to coincide.
He cannot so alter the nature of a thing as to make it at the same
moment both a cube and a sphere. He cannot confound the parts
of a thing with each other, or put any part for the whole. God
could not make my hand to be my eye j nor my eye to be my handNever could a single limb be a whole human body. Never can
God undo the past or break the sequence of time. God Himself
could not make any material thing to be in two places at once.
God’s power is limited—by what, we do not know—possibly bv
His own will; i.e.—if he wills a thing to be such and such, He
cannot at the same time make it to be absolutely different. We
have no difficulty whatever in giving up the notion of God’s
omnipotence, when the idea of that omnipotence is stretched
beyond the limits of common sense. But this is not quite the
point in the passage quoted from Mr. Reade’s book which I desire
to take up. He manifestly assumes and elsewhere affirms, that if
there be a God, He cannot be either cruel or sinful. Mr. Reade
�3
calls it “ an incontrovertible n axim in morality that a God has no
right to create men except for their good.” We would go further
still, and say, “ God has no right to create any self-conscious
creatures at all, except for their good.” The author then turns to
man and nature, and finds visible tokens of suffering and sin;
from which he draws the conclusion that there is no God. It is
perfectly logical, because his suppressed premiss is, “ that suffer
ing and sin are evils per se, and what is more, they are unnecessary
evils”
If this were true, then with the facts before us, we could draw
no other conclusion than that an evil God caused the unnecessary
evils; but when we confront this conclusion with the axiom that
an evil God is a contradiction in terms; or more plainly, that “ if
there be a God, lie must be good,” it follows at once that if
suffering and sin are unnecessary evils, there is no God at all.
What, then, we have to dispute is the assumption that suffering
and sin are evils, per se, and unnecessary evils.
If we can show that suffering and sin are not evils, per se, but
only relatively evils compared with other conditions ; and further,
that they are not unnecessary, but absolutely indispensable to our
highest good, then, instead of going to prove that there is no God,
suffering and sin will go far to prove that there is a God; and
moreover, a good and holy God, who would not create any creature
except for its good. Now, as I must not attempt too many things
at once, I must leave on one side for the present the sufferings of
the lower orders of animals, and confine myself only to the subject
of the sufferings and sin which are endured by man.
Of the various functions which suffering and sin serve in the
economy of the moral world, I have elsewhere written at some
length ; I now only desire to dwell upon one function, the chiefest
of all, viz.,—they are the agents by which the purest Love is called
forth. If they do originate or call into activity this noblest, most
beautiful part of man’s nature, they cannot be evils per se; and if
�as far as we know, such Love could never have birth apart from
suffering and sin, then they are necessary.
You will remember that true Love is the very opposite of
selfishness—it makes us do sometimes the most painful things ; it
is most exalted and supreme in a perfect self-sacrifice.
Now, what do we find, e.g., in the relations between husband
and wife. Granted that there has been much animal attachment
between them, and that true Love has not been yet elicited. Let
one or the other be in sickness or pain, or in any trouble of mind,
body, or estate, and then, if there be a germ of Love in the other,
it will come forth in thoughts, words, and deeds, of exquisite
sympathy and self-devotion. We need not lift the sacred veil
which covers wedded life, but surely all husbands and wives must
know that their real Love first made itself heard and seen in some
season of suffering and pain; they know what holy sacrifices it has
demanded and received. Suffering is the cradle of Love.
See, too, how the mother’s love, even as a mere animal affection,
surpasses the Love which first made her a bride; and how it quickens
her into activity of devotion; giving, and toiling, and watching;
watching, and toiling, and giving, day and night, to her own cost
of health, rest, and ease; and why ? because her infant is feeble,
dependent, suffering. Its cries lacerate the mother’s heart, and fill
her eyes with tears ; but the same sting kindles a Love which is
Divine, making her ready to give her life for her babe.
You see the same thing in the family. How selfish, how
quarrelsome, children often are; till the hour comes when there
is an accident, a terrible bruise, or a broken bone; and up the
little wranglers run and are like ministeiing angels to the sufferer.
Toys that were once fought for are now heaped on the sick-bed
without being asked for, and the dreariness of the siek-chamber is
willingly endured by sturdy ruddy boys who would ten times
rather have been out at play. But Love has made them stay by
the sick-bed, drawn thither by her handmaid—Suffering. It is
�5
almost invariable that the weakest, sickliest, membei of a family
receives the most love, and is served with the greatest self
sacrifices. And it often happens that a son who has brought the
family into trouble, or a daughter who has put it to shame, is the
object of the parent’s tenderest, most anxious, self-denying Love.
The old story of the Prodigal Son is not only exquisitely true to
nature,but a most powerful illustration of the theory that suffering
and sin are the very cradle of the Highest Love.
By very instinct we look on sin as a terrible kind of suffering
—a fearful moral disease—and it hag a tendency to call out Love,
in spite of its first tendency to call out hatred. We are angry
and indignant if any injury be done to ourselves it is true, but the
highest and rarest forms of Love—viz., mercy and forgiveness,
are very often developed by the wrong doing of others. What
sight more pretty among children than the making up of some
quarrel, the sweet overtures of tiny arms around tiny necks, and
the smothering kisses all wet with tears, which tell of the birth
of the highest Love in their little souls !
In domestic life it often happens that sin, as well as sorrow, calls
forth this noblest virtue. Neglected duties, careless accidents,
even want of fidelity and honesty on the part of servants, have
been overlooked, or forgiven and forgotten out of true pity and
charitv, which “ hopeth all things.” In like manner lovingservants have borne long and patiently with the provocations of
of their masters, forgiving their harsh and inconsiderate treat
ment and their surly tempers, and covering with a sacred privacy
their worst failings. Old and young, all around in turn, have to
bear and forbear, i.e., to bear gently the injuries cf others and to
forbear from revenge, to return good for evil, and thus to rise into
man’s most exalted condition because of the sin which is being con
tinually committed. Love cannot rise higher than this—to render
good for ill, to overcome all evil with good. And where, we ask,
would such Love be but for the evil which calls it into exercise ?
But go abroad and look on men and women beyond the home
which is but a microcosm, and you will see the same beautiful
sights if you knew how to look for them. Sin and sorrow every
�where—but sin and sorrow followed by the holiness and joy of
Heaven-born love. What man or woman who had ever felt the
bliss of it would wish it had never been ?
To have received an injury, and yet to have pardon freely, and
to have turned our foe into a friend, is unspeakably better than to
have received no injury at all. To have kindled Love—true Love
in the breast of another, is worth doing at the cost of much
suffering. And although no one would be so mad as to incur
disease on purpose to arouse sympathy, or so idiotic as to commit
an injury for the sake of being forgiven; yet, for all that, the
suffering and the sin do raise the hearts of those who come in
contact with them, and teach them what they could not otherwise
learn. As Miss Cobbe says in her Intuitive Morals. “ Instead of
an evil nature, oui' lower nature is a necessary postulate of all
our virtue.” Every word you use to denote the highest human
qualities implies the conditions of pain and sin. You speak of
patience ? How could you be patient if there were no trials to
bear, no cruel suspense to undergo, no provocation to irritate your
temper, or to prompt your revenge? You speak of mercy and
forgiveness ? How could you be merciful to those who have done
you no wrong, or forgive those who have never sinned ? You
speak of generosity of heart and hand ? What generosity of
heart could you feel for those who never failed in duty, who never
transgressed the exact limits of their own rights ? What
generosity of hand could you show to those who never needed
your bounty, and what happiness was already full ? You speak
of sympathy, but sooner could the light be severed from the sun
than sympathy be detached from suffering. How could you know
what this perfectly holy feeling is, had there been no suffering to
feel for, no pains to lament, no sin to degrade and distress ? And
you speak of Love—the word which gathers up patience, mercy,
forgiveness, generosity, sympathy, and surpasses them all ? How
could you have known the bliss of it unless human feeling had
been, as it were, bruised and trampled on, to spread its fragrance,
and to shed its life-giving wine? Humanity has indeed been
martyred. Its flesh has been given for the life of the world. Its
sacrifice was needed before men could grow out of the human into
the Divine. Sin and sorrow must rend it, pain and shame must
�7
tread it down, before Love can grow out of it. Your animal
affections, mis-called Love, are only the products of physical ease,
of undisturbed selfishness ; but you had to mortify the flesh with
its affections and lusts before true Love could take its throne in
your soul. You must see and feel what sin and suffering are ;
you must feel them in your own proper person that you may
know what they mean in others, and then you shall enter by that
gate through which all must pass who would fain be Divine. As
fast as one set of sins and sufferings are overcome, new ones arise
in their place. Generation succeeding generation finds the
martyrdom of man taking new shape ; but this is only that man
may not die eternally, but share the life which is endless and
divine. Each age must bear and be hung upon its own cross, that
everyone may learn how to love and be loved.
Evils, you call them ? Well 1 so they are, if, by evil, you mean
that which makes one uncomfortable, The rod, the medicine, and
the surgeon’s knife, are, in this sense, evils. But not so do I
define evil. I call that an evil which works only for harm and
incurable misery ; and of such kind of evil I do not know one
single specimen in the whole universe. Relatively, many things
are evil, nay, almost all things but Love, because they are
imperfections, and constantly under the correction of something
better; but so long as they are working for final good, all things
are good, and to dispense with any one of them while it thus works
would be our bitter loss.
But granting that sin and suffering are evils—not absolute but
relative, we must admit that they are necessary to the development
of that which is highest and most lovely in man’s nature. Because,
as I have tried to show, Love in its highest and purest forms has
no existence apart from the conditions of sin and sorrow which
call it into exercise.
I do not say that this, therefore, proves the existence of God,
but it removes one of the most common and powerful arguments
against it. It destroys the objection of the Atheist which is based
on the sin and misery of the world.
There remains one more objection to meet, and that is contained
in Mr. Reade’s question, “ If God is Love, why is there any bad at
all ?’ Because, I answer, there would have been no more love in
�8
God than love in man, but for the bad. Had there been no
conditions like ours in the universe, the Creator’s heart could have
known nothing of that feeling which we call Love.
Rightly or wrongly, we ascribe to the Divine Being a divine
conquest of Love over what are to us the difficulties and obstacles
in nature. We believe He is taming and subduing all things to
His purposes, and making all things work together for good
to every creature which He has made. Our own highest attitude
in our difficulties of sin and sorrow is that of patient, untiring
Love; and this it is, only in its supremest exaltation that we
ascribe to Him when we say “ God is Love ”
To do the final good at once, instead of to prolong the precess
through painful stages, even if it were possible, would be to achieve
something quite foreign to our best conceptions of good. But it is
a begging of the whole question to imply that it could- be done
*
To make men good at once, without the intermediate processes of
pain and sin, would be to make another kind of creature altogether,
of whom and of whose happiness we have neither experience nor
conception. As well might you try to imagine a man who had
*
never been a child, as a man made perfect without the discipline of
sin and sorrow.
I rejoice in it all, as I have often said, with unspeakable and
glowing delight. My frail flesh would fain escape some of its
dreadful pangs, would fain lay the heavy burden of its cross upon
the shoulders of others. I shudder when I see and think of the
martyrdom of pain, and the worse crucifixion of shame, which
have been the portion of some, and might have been my own •
but I would not have one grain of the world’s burden lightened
by evasion, or one pang dulled by the deadly anodyne,''' so as to
■miss the Heaven-sent blessing which comes to us in disguise,
or to interfere even in thought with the perfect arrangements of
the most Loving Will. I would still say of it all,
“ It is the Lord, let him do what seemeth him good.”
* In the present controversy about Euthanasia, I wish it to be understood that
the term “deadly anodyne” has na reference to the humane and perfectly
justifiable methods of preventing or alleviating physical suffering. I have been
for years an earnest advocate of Euthanasia, and I deem it right to use all means
in our power to diminish or prevent pain. Pain and sin are things to be conquered
and got rid of by all means short of injury to others, or to our higher nature;
but not to be considered unr.ecessarj/ when they are inevitable.
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Victorian Blogging
Description
An account of the resource
A collection of digitised nineteenth-century pamphlets from Conway Hall Library & Archives. This includes the Conway Tracts, Moncure Conway's personal pamphlet library; the Morris Tracts, donated to the library by Miss Morris in 1904; the National Secular Society's pamphlet library and others. The Conway Tracts were bound with additional ephemera, such as lecture programmes and handwritten notes.<br /><br />Please note that these digitised pamphlets have been edited to maximise the accuracy of the OCR, ensuring they are text searchable. If you would like to view un-edited, full-colour versions of any of our pamphlets, please email librarian@conwayhall.org.uk.<br /><br /><span><img src="http://www.heritagefund.org.uk/sites/default/files/media/attachments/TNLHLF_Colour_Logo_English_RGB_0_0.jpg" width="238" height="91" alt="TNLHLF_Colour_Logo_English_RGB_0_0.jpg" /></span>
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Conway Hall Library & Archives
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2018
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Conway Hall Ethical Society
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Pamphlet
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Atheism
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Voysey, Charles [1828-1912]
Description
An account of the resource
Place of publication: [London]
Collation: 5 parts ; 19 cm.
Notes: 5 pamphlets on Atheism delivered at St. George's Hall, Langham Place and printed by the Evening Post. 1: January 12th, 1873 from the Evening Post, January 18th, 1873. II. January 19th, 1873 from the Evening Post, January 25th, 1873. III. January 26th, 1873 from the Eastern Post, February 1st, 1873. IV: February 2nd, 1873 from the Evening Post, February 8th, 1873. V: subtitled 'On the Martyrdom of Man' February 16th, 1873 from the Eastern Post, February 22nd. 1873. Part of Morris Tracts 6.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
[Eastern Post]
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
[1873]
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
G3412
Subject
The topic of the resource
Atheism
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
<a href="http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/mark/1.0/"><img src="http://i.creativecommons.org/p/mark/1.0/88x31.png" alt="Public Domain Mark" /></a><span> </span><br /><span>This work (Atheism), identified by </span><a href="https://conwayhallcollections.omeka.net/items/show/www.conwayhall.org.uk"><span>Humanist Library and Archives</span></a><span>, is free of known copyright restrictions.</span>
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
application/pdf
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Language
A language of the resource
English
Atheism
Morris Tracts
-
https://d1y502jg6fpugt.cloudfront.net/25778/archive/files/b88ce7217689650045ca54e0a8687f16.pdf?Expires=1712793600&Signature=u4JZsMJ4GQeYFBdtB%7EwyV7YYCHMfeWJcMFqay3Sqk9j6PEwhSyW4KgFJp26QIIrLAWKe3yBdefTG1G4c4hnRAW5RfU0BmSYjFi8sZexR33RtT13rY2jHim6jmQ6DYGm5abUe2Y1qKhSRjZlj1%7Ep6s4qRCND43SoVQyhHv20DfSvIGrlWe4WYosJ%7EOtCqOGFqckXtsqToYJ7pQUCRf5UB03JVFcAPyHFU6gH3czuJHQTlG2FJ-zRE2N6-kV-FShso%7E9e0zx2j4EWg-RwhhENDWu4EnEUQRX1uoB8ZWozZCvzd7qH4sHFzlzgnOlwL7HvCoPFvYLXmcTwnF7pqf2fxWQ__&Key-Pair-Id=K6UGZS9ZTDSZM
bc08f5dcb47a7e1d6ef2ad9d1a0f7169
PDF Text
Text
NATIONAL SECULAR SOCIETY
THEISM OR ATHEISM:
WHICH IS THE MORE REASONABLE?
A
PUBLIC
DEBATE
BETWEEN
MR. W. T. LEE
(Lecturer to the Christian Evidence Society)
AND
MR. G. W. FOOTE
(President of the National Secular Society)
Held
in the
Temperance Hall, Derby, May 15
and 16, 1895
Chairman : J. W. PIPER, Esq.
(Editor of “ The Derby Daily Telegraph”)
Revised by Both Disputants
London :
R. FORDER, 28, STONECUTTER STREET, E.C.
1896
�THEISM OR ATHEISM:
WHICH IS THE MORE REASONABLE ?
FIRST NIGHT.
The Chairman : Ladies and Gentlemen,—Allow me, in
the first place, to express my indebtedness to the members
of the local committee who are charged with the manage
ment of this meeting, for having bestowed upon me the
compliment of inviting me to preside over this meeting. In
the next place, I should like to assure you of the deep sym
pathy I feel in every honest effort to get at the truth with
regard to matters vitally affecting the peace of mind and
happiness of the people. Believe me, I have as little sym
pathy or patience with the gay trifler who, referring to
matters of this importance, insists that ignorance is bliss, as
I have with those persons who blindly take their orders from
the priests and from the bookmen. Let me again frankly
admit that I have little sympathy with a reckless and indis
criminate discussion on topics of this sacred character • I
hold that the truth can best be arrived at, and a satisfactory
solution of difficulties best secured, by temperate and
orderly discussion. Happily for us to-night, we are sur
rounded by all the elements of profitable debate. The con
tending champions are gentlemen of acknowledged ability,
and, I believe, of sterling honesty of purpose. In Mr. Lee—
•(loud applause) we have a powerful and high-minded expo-
�THEISM OR ATHEISM?
5
And now, ladies and gentlemen, I have only to express
the hope that this discussion throughout may be charac
terised, both on the part of the disputants and on the part
of the audience, with good temper, so that we may hope for
profitable and useful results. In accordance with arrange
ment, I propose sounding a bell three minutes before the
expiration of the allotted time to each . speaker—you will
quite understand what that signifies—and again at the com
pletion of the allotted time.
I will now, then, in accordance with arrangements made,
ask Mr. Lee to open the real business of this debate.
Mr. Lee : Mr. Chairman, Mr. Foote, Ladies and Gentle
men,—The question we have met to discuss will necessitate
the use of four very important words. These words I
propose defining as follows : First, by the word “ universe ”
I mean the sum-total of all conditioned existence. Second,
by the term “ reasonable ” I understand what is in accord
ance with the logical demands of the mind. Third, by the
word “ Atheism ” 1 understand that doctrine which rejects
the idea that the universe was produced by a Being called
God, and, in denying His existence, goes on to show that the
universe is eternal, or is the necessary outcome of the neces
sary working of the substance it calls matter, and speaks of
as eternal. Fourth, the term “ Theism,” the name of that
doctrine which regards the universe as the consciously-willed
production of the unoriginated Being, who is absolute in
wisdom and power, who was before all things, and by whom,
and in whom, all things exist and consist. This Being is
spoken of by Theists as God.
These being my definitions, I must ask Mr. Foote to
accept them as true, or to show them to be untrue by
appealing to the great masters of lexicography, whose busi
ness it is to treat of the origin, history, and meaning of
words. This is due to me, his opponent, and also to you,
our judges.
�THEISM OR ATHEISM ?
7
this proposition will sound like a truism ; but in this debate
we must take nothing for grantedj therefore it is clearly my
duty to prove, as it will be clearly Mr. Foote’s duty to
analyse, and, if possible, disprove, the proposition which I
now advance. Until this is done, nothing will be gained by
Mr, Foote, nothing will be lost by me. I assert, then, that
the universe is not the eternal existence for which we seek,
because the universe has not always existed. There was a
time when this universe was not; a time when this earth,
the sun, and all the orbs of heaven were non-existent; a
time when the substance of all material things existed in a
highly-attenuated and gaseous state. And not only are we
scientifically sure that this universe has not eternally existed
■—we are equally certain it will come to an end. For, just
as our world is slowly but certainly approaching the sun, so
all the moving bodies of the sidereal heavens are making for
a common centre; every star and sun is getting cooler, and
energy, in the form of heat, is being dissipated, and an end
to the universe must be acknowledged.
Under these circumstances, to speak of the universe being
eternal, as Professor Haeckel does, is to lay one’s self open
to the slashing reply of Herbert Spencer : “ Haeckel is unphilosophical; it is the indestructibility of force and the
eternity of motion which are a priori truths, transcending
both demonstration and experience.”
But I expect before this debate closes to have the
pleasure of showing that Herbert Spencer is as unscientific
as Haeckel.
We must, then, admit, from numerous scientific facts and
inductions from them, that our universe has not always
existed; and, if this universe is not eternal, its present
existence must be an effect due to some cause. But what
do we mean by the term “ cause,” and what by the word
** effect ” ? By the former we understand something which
really exists, something which has power, something which
has power enough to account for the existence or happening
�THEISM OR ATHEISM ?
9
as a vehicle of energy with the two attributes extension and
inertia, he cannot conceive of matter at all.
Let us see how the Atheistic position is stated, and then
how much this position is worth.
Professor Haeckel, the high priest of Monism, tells us
that the universe is both eternal and infinite, and that
matter and motion, inseparable from matter, remain eternal
and indestructible. Now, you will remember what Herbert
Spencer said about the statement of Haeckel’s—he said it
was utterly unphilosophical ; and now we will prove this
statement of Herbert Spencer’s to be true, for, “ if matter be
Infinite in extension, the universe must be full of matter,
find if the universe be full of matter, there can be no attrac
tive force ; every spot being equally full, no particle can
draw closer to another, and there can be no rotatory motion,
for there would be no reason for turning one way more than
another, neither would there be any primitive heat, for heat
is motion, and no change of place is possible in a plenum
where no particle has any place to move into that is not
already full.” So, then, matter fails to explain itself, while,
if it be infinite, motion and the origination of the universe
become philosophically impossible. Atheism, then, fails to
explain the existence of matter and the possibility of motion,
<nd, failing here, it must fail everywhere ; for, if it cannot
account for matter, how shall it account for life ? If it fails
to account for motion, how shall it account for mind ? If
it fails to explain the atom, how can it explain the universe ?
If it fails to account for motion, how can it account for that
mighty power of human reason which climbs the starry
stairs of the universe and reads the history of stars and suns,
projects itself into the very heart of things, and then con
fesses the presence of a power greater than itself, and a
reason higher than its own ? (Applause.)
Thus far, then, we have shown Atheism to be utterly
unreasonable as a doctrine of the universe, and that it
always gets more into each succeeding effect than can be
�THEISM OR ATHEISM ?
11
men resemble each other in this one general characteristic,
will not this experience warrant us in ascribing to both a
similar, though, of course, a proportionate, cause ?” Admit
the facts, and the induction from the facts is amply justi
fied. But the question naturally arises, Do the facts of
Dature agree with the productions of men in the manifesta
tion of aim, intention, purpose ? I believe they do, and
here are my reasons for so believing. Whatever our theory
Of the origin of the universe may be, we must admit that
the earth, the sea, and the sky are full of beauty. From
far-off space, where the unresolved nebulae float, in all the
millions and millions of suns and systems of suns which
glitter in the brow of night, and here, even in this tiny speck
we call our world, order is everywhere manifested, order
everywhere known. In the midst of numberless varieties
there is a deep-seated unity, vast worlds and systems of
worlds, the marshalled battalions of heaven, alongside of
which our earth and our planets are as nothing, are rolling
through space in orbits millions and millions of times greater
than that of our solar system ; but everywhere the same laws
Of gravitation, the same laws of light, of heat, of motion, are
found. From speck of dust to blazing sun and floating
nebulae, order and law everywhere prevail. But order and
law are the manifestation of power guided by intelligence.
Nowhere do we discover order and law apart from intelli
gence, and, therefore, I hold that the cause of the universe
must not only have power, but also mind and intelligence.
(Cheers.) To put this another way, one great irrefutable
fact of the universe is this, it is a gigantic intelligible unity,
all its laws are mathematical relations, and can be expressed
in mathematical formula. This is undoubtedly true of the
law of gravitation, and of chemical combinations, the law of
colour and of music, the facets of crystals, the pistils of
flowers, the feathers of birds. Now, I put this question to
Mr. Foote. If it takes the intellect of a Copernicus, a
Kepler, and a Newton years upon years of anxious study to
�THEISM OR ATHEISM ?
13
gent, or it could not have put thought into the universe.
Thus our third proposition is established ; this universe is
the manifestation of power directed by intelligence. In
Others words, we have proved these four facts—first, the
existence of an eternal substance ; second, the possession
Of power by this substance; third, that this eternal substance
is the cause of the universe ; and, lastly, that the order, law,
purpose, intention manifested in nature are a proof that the
cause of the universe is possessed not only with power,
but with intelligence. In so far as these propositions are
established, in so far is Theism shown to be true, and in
proportion to the proof of the Theistic doctrine of the
universe is the Atheistic doctrine disproved.
And now I come to my fourth proposition—that the facts
Of man’s mental, moral, and religious nature cannot be
explained on the principles of Atheism, but are easily
accounted for by the doctrines of Theism. Every man has,
tn his own consciousness (the mind’s knowledge of its
own states) the evidence of the existence of mind ; in
other words, all of us are conscious of ourselves—we know
we exist, and we know we think. We also know that the
Blind is altogether other than the body; in a word, that
mind and matter are not only distinct, but different sub
stances, manifesting themselves to us by sets of different and
totally incompatible attributes. If Mr. Foote denies this, I
must ask him to show that the attributes of mind and matter
are alike. Until this is done, we shall continue to believe
that we have two sets of incompatible attributes ; and, when
we find that this belief is not peculiar to ourselves, but is
held in some form by all the peoples of the earth, we not
only feel that our belief is justified, but we believe that
it brings us into the presence of a fact which calls for
explanation ; and we turn to those who hold the Atheistic
position, and ask, How is the existence of this thinking sub
stance, which we call self, to be accounted for ? That it has
not always existed is undeniable ; and, if it began to be, it
�THEISM OR ATHEISM ?
15 "
I shall stop by submitting to my friend a few questions,
and the first is this: What is the substance of which
this universe is composed ? |How could an ordered
universe arise from an unordered state of physical
units ? How could an intelligible universe arise out of a
mindless physical condition ? How could an universe mani
festing law have arisen from a condition where no law can
be found ? How could an universe without a moral nature
produce beings with a moral nature ? How could a number
of elementary substances called atoms have produced the
unity everywhere manifested in nature? How could life,
the power which moulds and builds] up organisms, and
preserves them from the disintegrating influences which act
on mere matter, have been produced from the non-living ?
And, in the last place, how could a universe which, according
to Atheism, excludes the possibility of God have produced
a number of beings, the very flower of that universe, who
have become thoroughly persuaded there is a God? (Loud
tpplause.)
The Chairman : I have now, ladies and gentlemen, to
bfispeak,'on the part of Mr. Foote, the same conscientious
attention that you have given to his opponent, Mr. Lee.
Mr. Foote : Mr. Chairman, Mr. Lee, Ladies and GentleMen,—It would be absurd for me to assume that anything
more than an encouraging percentage of this audience was
in toy kind of agreement with my ideas ; and as Mr. Lee,
in bis otherwise extremely temperate speech, was good
enough to say that the Atheistic position was an outrage on
human intelligence, I must warn you, if that be correct, that
I am likely to say things which will be regarded as an out
rage on human intelligence. (Laughter and cheers.) You
will, therefore, from that point of view, grant me the indul
gence which we always expect from an educated, an
intelligent, and honest English audience. (Hear, hear.)
�THEISM OR ATHEISM?
17
In the next place, Mr. Lee was good enough, not only to
define Theism, but to define Atheism, and in a fashion
which suited himself. When this debate was being arranged,
it was suggested that the proposition for discussion should
be, ’‘Theism or Atheism : Which is the more reasonable
theory of the universe?” and Mr. Lee is quite well aware
that I insisted upon the words “theory of the universe”
being struck out, because Atheism per se does not affirm a
theory of the universe. An Atheist like the late Charles
Bradlaugh may affirm, as a personal thinker, his theory of
th® universe ; but Atheism per se simply means, not denial,
but rejection, in the sense of not accepting the Theistic
theory of the universe which Mr. Lee has put forward to
night. I suppose everybody will admit that Charles
Bradlaugh, whose name was mentioned in such honourable
terms by our Chairman, was an eminent, and, in a certain
sense, a typical, Atheist. When I am told that I must go to
the lexicographers for a definition of terms, I reply that I
decline to do anything of the sort. Lexicographers all work
on their own individual responsibility. Webster will define
a wrd in one way, Richardson in another, Latham in
another ; and how can I accept the meaning of important
terms on the authority of these conflicting lexicographers ?
If I want to know what is Christianity, I am bound to find
OUt what Christians mean by the term ; if I want to know
what Buddhism is, I am bound to have the term explained
by Buddhists ; and if Mr. Lee wants to know what Atheism
is, for the purpose of discussion, he must discover what
Atheists themselves mean by that term. Now, Charles
Bradlaugh, in the very first sentence of his pamphlet, Is
there a God ? says : “ The initial difficulty is in defining the
Word God. It is equally impossible to intelligently affirm or
deny any proposition unless there is at least an under
standing on the part of the affirmer or denier of the meaning
Of every word used in the proposition. To me, the word
God, standing alone, is a word without meaning.” I endorse
�THEISM OR ATHEISM ?
19
of the old raw material of theology, or, as I should call it,
superstition. There is, in this respect, even in modern days,
nothing new; it is but a fresh presentation of old material
in a new form. The masses of the people never believe
religion upon grounds of reason, but upon grounds of
authority and early education. The grounds of argument
are only adopted by the apologists of religion when they are
hard pressed by the critics of religion. (Applause.)
I deny, therefore, that Atheism per se denies the existence
Of God j I deny that Atheism per se affirms the eternity of
Matter; and I decline to accept responsibility for any theory
Of the universe. I tell Mr. Lee that, notwithstanding his
ability, his mind is not large enough to comprehend the
universe—(“Oh, oh”)—or to formulate a satisfactory theory
about It Further, I say that there is no intelligence on this
earth adequate to form a satisfactory theory of the universe.
And why ? Because, in the very language which Mr. Lee
has employed, infinity is predicated; and how can the mind
of man, which is admittedly finite, formulate a satisfactory
theory of an infinite existence ? The thing is a contradic
tion in terms—(applause)—and it is no insult to Mr. Lee to
say that his powers are inadequate to an infinite task.
(Hear, hear.)
I noticed that Mr. Lee fell into, what seemed to me, at
any rate, a confusion about the universe. He spoke of the
universe and of the matter composing it. Are they two
distinct things ? The universe simply means the whole, and
the whole is made up of what composes it. You cannot
have the universe separate, and the matter which composes
it separate. The universe is simply a term for the total
quantity of its composition. When Mr. Lee said that this
universe was not eternal, he took an illustration from our
solar system. Does Mr. Lee mean, because there is a dis
sipation of energy from our planet, that energy is lost?
Does Mr. Lee mean, if a planet should ultimately, in some
Sidereal cataclysm, become broken and scattered through
�THEISM OR ATHEISM ?
21
and, if you predicate a mind in the universe outside ours,
you must either endow it with the essential powers of our
own mind, or you must give some reason for believing that
it belongs to an entirely separate category of intelligence,
Now, I ask anyone to inquire of himself what he knows of
creation. We say the poet creates, the artist creates. But
what does he create ? He does not produce something out
of nothing. He works with matter that existed before he
was born, and will exist after he is dead. He changes
matter from one combination into another, but he cannot
create an atom of matter, and he cannot destroy an atom of
matter. I, therefore, say the term creation, in the meta
physical sense of producing absolutely out of nothing, or
out of something discrete, is, to my mind, utterly unintelli
gible ; and I cannot possibly accept what conveys no reality
to my own intelligence.
Mr. Lee says that the Atheist begins with matter and ends
with mind. Then he talks about the grave, and says the
Atheist begins with dust and ends with dust. But we all
have to pass through the same stages of being. Mr. Lee
was born as I was ; Mr. Lee will die as I shall, for the
age of miracles has passed. What is the use of com
plaining of the Atheist, when the Theist has to go through
exactly the same career? You may tell me, of course, that
after you are dead something very agreeable is going to
happen to you ; but I will wait until I know it before I
assume it as a fact which should serve as the basis of a
discussion.
We came eventually to that something which was the
cause of this material universe, and that something is intelli
gent, and that something is eternal; that is, this something
eternally existed before it made up its mind to create the
material universe. Has Mr. Lee any idea of what could
have occurred to put a new thought into an infinite mind ?
Why, an infinite mind must live in an infinite now. Being
infinite, there is neither past, present, nor future to it; for
�THEISM OR ATHEISM ?
23
ness. As a matter of fact, very few of us are as goodlooking as we could wish to be, and I don’t really think that
you can ground the existence of God upon the argument of
beauty. You yourself will admit that man has existed for
thousands of years ; surely by this time his Creator, with
that high sense of beauty, ought to have made him a more
presentable object than he is.
Then we are told there is intelligence because there is
law and order. I have to complain that Mr. Lee has used
for metaphysical purposes two terms which are commonly
used in another sense—in political and social conversation.
We speak of law and order in the political and social world,
and what do we mean ? By order we mean good behaviour ;
by few we mean edicts, decrees, or acts promulgated either by
the king or the parliament of the country, and for the in
fraction of which there is a prescribed penalty. I deny that
you have any right to use the word law in nature in any
such sense as that. All you mean by law is a certain
ffiethod in which things occur, and the question behind that
which Mr. Lee is asking is this, Is that method in which
things occur settled by intelligence, or is it the result of the
absolute, unchangeable, inherent properties of matter ?
When you use the word ■“ law ” in a metaphysical sense, you
are begging the very question at issue; for under cover of
the term “ law ” you introduce the law-giver, which is the
very subject we are met this evening to discuss.
Mr. Lee says that he can think about the stars, and that
ht can get thought out of them. (A laugh.) He cannot.
Let an idiot look at a star for a thousand years, if he lived
so long, and what thought would he get out of it ? (Hisses.)
Let a poet look at a star, and he might, to use this fashion
Of speech, get thought out of it; but the thought is not in
the star—the capacity for thought is in the poet’s brain.
(Applause.) Mr. Lee did not get thought out of the star;
he got it out of his own active intelligence.
Mr. Lee says that there is thought in the universe, and
�THEISM OR ATHEISM ?
25
that the best way to answer a prophet is to prophesy the
opposite. As a matter of fact, one of our greatest jurispruclists, Sir Henry Maine, in his powerful work upon
Popular Government, argues that there are perceptible limits
to man’s intellectual capacity for improvement ; and, in the
face of this, it is idle to ask me to accept as an established
fact what is only a conjecture about the future on the part
of Mr. Lee himself.
Then man has aspirations for the true, the holy, and the
eternal, and there must therefore be the true, the holy, the
eternal! But does the Atheist say there is nothing true ?
Surely the Atheist can aspire to truth as well as the Theist.
The motto of the National Secular Society, which does me
the honor to elect me President, is “We seek for Truth.”
It is again idle to tell us the aspiration after truth involves
the existence of the Being whom Mr. Lee is endeavoring to
establish. And what do you mean by the word holy ?
Holy, as generally used, is something connected with
religion. A clergyman is “ a holy person,” a church is “ a
holy building,” and a Church festival, or Sunday, is “a holy
day.” Very well; if you use the word in that sense, I will
leave you its full possession. But if by the word holy
you mean anything which is dignified, honest, or pertains to
the highest moral nature of man, then we aspire to the holy
quite as much as any of the Theists who speak from the
platforms or preach from the pulpits of the world.
A word, in conclusion, about man’s moral sense. It is
imposed from without by God, says Mr. Lee. I say that
even men in your own Church, like Professor Henry
Drummond, contend that morality is a natural evolution,
without anything supernatural in it from beginning to end.
God imposes morality upon us 1 Then why did he not
impose it so that in all parts of the world it was understood
alike ? You say we know when we do right and when we
do wrong. Do we ? If you commit bigamy in England,
you will get seven years’ imprisonment; but if you commit it
�THEISM OR ATHEISM ?
27
of Atheism, no matter what you say against Theism. Theism
tnay, or may not, be true; but, if you say nothing in favor
of Atheism, you have not established your position.
Our friend said I defined the universe as the sum-total of
all conditioned existence. I did; and I abide by that.
Bat Mr. Foote says I assume to know something of an un
conditioned existence. I do; and Mr. Foote cannot think
Of any material object without thinking of that object as
Conditioned ; and he cannot think of the conditioned with
out being driven to the recognition of the unconditioned—
you arc bound to go on to the unconditioned. Mr. Foote
may say there is nothing but the conditioned. I say there
are the conditioned and the unconditioned.
But our friend went on to say that I defined reasonable
aS that which conforms to human intelligence. I did
«©thing of the kind. Mr. Foote has managed to leave out
two very important words. I defined reasonable as that
Which conforms to the logical demands of man’s mind. This
is not saying that what is reasonable is reasonable, but that
that is reasonable which is in harmony with the logical
demands of the mental life we all possess.
But Mr. Foote says I defined Atheism and Theism to suit
I did not. I defined them in harmony with the
great masters of language; and I say, when we come to
debate terms which stand for great doctrines, we must use
those terms, not as any individual wishes them to be used,
but as the great masters of speech everywhere use them.
But he went on to say : “Atheism does not affirm per se
a theory of the universe.” Will Mr. Foote kindly tell me
how Atheism can affirm anything per se ? Mr. Bradlaugh
said that, to him, the word “ God ” was a word without
Waning. Then how could Mr. Bradlaugh justify his
attempt to get rid of an affirmation which has a great deal
Of meaning to others, but none to himself? But Mr. Foote
says he will quote Mr. Bradlaugh’s words : “ The Atheist
does not say there is no God.” I admit that. Mr. Bradlaugh
�THEISM OR ATHEISM ?
29
God, we must have a knowledge of God. This Mr. Foote
regards as impossible. But I would remind Mr. Foote that
some of the great German philosophers hold that, before we
can say anything is unknown and unknowable, you must be
above and beyond it. But, if you are above and beyond it,
you make it known ; and so you destroy your doctrine that
it is unknown. Thus, in getting rid of my proposition, Mr.
Foote has got rid of his own contention that God is un
known and unknowable.
But Mr. Foote says I fell into a mistake when I spoke of
matter and of the universe as different. I did so purposely
—in other words, I was dealing in the first part of my
remarks with the visible universe ; but the matter which
makes the universe, though a part of it, is not visible ; and,
when I used these two terms, I meant by the universe that
which we can see, and by matter that which is resolvable
into the atom, which we cannot see. I fail to see any
difficulty in this position. Then as to the atoms which I
referred to as bearing the marks of manufactured articles.
Mr. Foote says this is a metaphorical expression, as nobody
has seen them. Very well. If these atoms have not been
seen, how do you know they do not bear the marks of being
manufactured ? In other words, Mr. Foote has to go
through a process of reasoning in order to say these atoms
do not bear these marks, just as great physicists like Clerk
Maxwell have gone through processes of reasoning and say
they do bear the marks. Personally, I prefer taking the
statements of the physicists before those of Mr. Foote.
But, says our friend, if we think of this universe as the
outcome of an existence which is eternal, and which is
related to this universe as cause to effect, we are face to
face with this difficulty : we cannot possibly conceive of
creation. If by that you mean I cannot form an idea or
image in my mind as to the way in which it was done, I
agree with you ; but if you say I cannot understand or
apprehend the bringing of something into existence by a
�THEISM OR ATHEISM ?
31
sensation are abolished unilaterally ; but mental operations
are still capable of being carried on in their completeness
through the agency of one hemisphere.”
Mr. Foote : Mr. Lee demands—(“ Oh, oh ”)—I repeat
that Mr. Lee demands what he has no power to exact. I
have already declined, as any man of sense would decline,
to answer questions read out to me, and not furnished to
me. Mr. Lee, by his own act, robbed himself of the right
to put questions. In the original conditions, as the Joint
Committee know, there was to be a certain space of time—
a quarter of an hour or so—allowed for questions between
the disputants. It was Mr. Lee’s own suggestion that the
time for questions should be struck out.
Mr. Lee : I rise to a point of order. The part that was
Struck out was the part relating to a Socratic method of
debate, in which the question should be put and immediately
answered ; but that does not rob me of the right to put
questions in the course of my address. In every debate in
which I have taken part these questions have always been
recognised and answered.
Mr. Foote : Then, with whatever explanation Mr. Lee
Hiay qualify the statement, the statement is accurate, that at
Mr. Lee’s suggestion the time allotted for questions and
answers was struck out from the original articles of debate ;
and I decline altogether to come here with the responsi
bility of answering questions that have not been furnished
to me—questions that no memory could charge itself with
the task of accurately retaining. If Mr. Lee wants questions
of that kind answered, he shall furnish them beforehand, so
that one could get an acquaintance with their terms and
bearing. Every man knows that you can ask more questions
in a couple of minutes than the wisest man on earth can
answer in twenty-four hours. At any rate, Mr. Lee may
�THEISM OR ATHEISM ?
33
Sistent with those facts, then Atheism would have a perfect
right to deny the existence of that God so defined. That
is what Atheism does. If Mr. Lee tells me there is a God
att'fowerful, all-wise, and all-good, I tell him that the facts
of life contradict the existence of such a being. (“ No, no.”)
We have heard the names of scientific men. Well, the
|pWtest naturalist that ever lived, Charles Darwin—(a laugh)
pMhe man that smiles at that name cannot know what he
is smiling at—I say, the greatest naturalist that ever lived,
Charles Darwin, said there is too much suffering in the
world ; and he, the greatest scientific intellect since Newton,
in face of the facts that science has revealed, felt himself
Utterly unable to accept the God that Mr. Lee has put forward
tonight, and predicated as absolutely necessary to logical
human thought.
Now, we had a little merriment about “Atheism per se?
but there is really nothing metaphysical about that. “Per se ”
simply means, as Mr. Lee knows, “ by itself.” You cannot
ttink of a thing in universal connections. Man’s powers
being finite, he must isolate, for purposes of convenience,
th# objects of his thought; although, in external nature, they
are all in infinite relations to each other. Thus, when
you define a line, owing to the imperfection of human
powers, you define it as “ length without breadth
but you
IWVer find this in actual experience. It is a device you
have to resort to ; you take the idea of length separate from
theidea of breadth, although the two things are never found
except in conjunction with each other. Very well. Atheism
in itself, apart from the personal notion of individual
Atheists—or, as I expressed it, “ Atheism per se ’’—does
•not affirm a theory of the universe. I said that individual
Atheists, like Mr. Bradlaugh himself, might affirm Monism
(lite Spinoza, who was charged with Atheism, but affirms
Bantheism); but that is a different thing altogether from
What are the logical contents of the term Atheism. I deny
that Atheism affirms a theory of the universe. And if Mr.
�THEISM OR ATHEISM ?
35
than the atom itself; and how can this mystery explain the
other? I will tell you how a thing is explained. A thing
is explained when Science shows us exactly its origin, its
glWth, its development, and possibly its decay and dis
appearance ; tracing it from its initial stage to the completion
of its, career. . That is a scientific explanation; and, when
Science explains a thing like that, we understand it; but it
fe
a scientific or a rational explanation of a thing to say,
‘<Gocl did it.” That is what ignorance has said in all ages’
(Applause.)
It used to be asked, “Who made the world?” until the
nebular hypothesis explained to us the history of worlds.
Tten the question was shifted farther back, and it was
asked, “ Who made all the various species of life upon this
planet ?” Darwin explained the Origin of Species—I will
Bpt say to the satisfaction of all parties, but to the satisfac
tion of scientific men. And now the question is put farther
back—“Who made life? Or who made the atoms ?” In
Other words, the banner of Theology is always planted at
the point where knowledge ends and ignorance begins. It
IS driven farther and farther back. It is the banner, not of
Knowledge, but of Mystery. It is the flag of Superstition,
wider which all the priesthoods of the world have gathered
for the exploitation of the people. (Applause.)
„ Mr. Lee said that he used the word universe to signify
visible matter. Now, there is no distinction between visible
attd invisible matter, except in Mr. Lee’s powers of percep
tion ' Visible matter means matter large enough to be seen.
But if you have millions upon millions of invisible atoms
forming a visible combination of matter, there is no difference
in the condition of the atoms because they are in collection,
and large enough for our organs of vision to perceive them.
That is a distinction without a difference.
A word about brain and thought. Who ever said that
man—who has two brains working in combination, though
sometimes not in entire harmony—who ever said that he
�THEISM OR ATHEISM ?
37
OS it is a question of conviction. Mr. Foote tells us the
Wational Secular Society is in search of truth. We Theists
believe we have found it. (Cheers.)
Mr. Foote says, no matter what Mr. Lee demands, Mr.
Lee struck out the part of the conditions of debate which
referred to a Socratic debate, and, therefore, has no right to
ask questions. The reason I struck that part of the con
ditions out was this. I do not believe in mixing up things
that differ. If we want a Socratic debate, we will have it;
b«t I object to wedging in half-an-hour of Socratic debate
in a debate of another character; but I still have the right
to ask questions respecting matters which are fundamental
to my position and to Mr. Foote’s. If we have no right to
ask such questions, why are we here to discuss ?
But Mr. Foote says that I have not been able to produce
a single fact in favour of Theism. Well, now, I have pro
duced a series of propositions ; I have shown that some
thing must be eternal. Mr. Foote has not attempted to
deal with that. I have shown you that that something must
have power; Mr. Foote has not attempted to deal with that.
I have shown you that something must be the cause of the
changes in this universe; Mr. Foote has not attempted to
deal with that. I have shown you that the different move
meats going on in this universe are going on in accordance
With law; Mr. Foote has not attempted to deal with that.
And I have shown you that we have reason, mind, a religious
and moral sense ; but Mr. Foote has not attempted to deal
With that. The whole of my propositions stand untouched
—(applause)—and not only untouched, but the banner of
theology, which Mr. Foote has spoken of as floating above
the place where ignorance begins and knowledge ends—this
banner of theology—this banner, sir—floats high above our
beads, not as the symbol of “ we do not know,” but as the
sign of a coming victory which has already been shown to
fee ours by your refusing to deal with these questions.
(Loud applause.) Ah, Mr. Foote says, “ the banner of
�THEISM OR ATHEISM ?
39
do not believe in fighting definitions, unless I know that
those definitions are part and parcel of the thing I fight. I
have not attempted this evening to give you a definition of
God ; I have given you a few suggestions as to what I under
stand God to be. I told you I believe him to be an eternal
something, having power and intelligence, and such-like.
But, while I do not know all about God, I know something
of God; I do not know all about Derby, but I know some
thing of Derby. Still, I have often said—I said it three
months ago—I am not one of those who say they believe in
God ; I have got a knowledge of God. I go beyond belief
—I know God.
Our friend talked to us about the defects of definitions
tfid such-like, and went on to say that the atom is some
thing, and that the universe is only a bigger atom. Well,
now, I object altogether to this position of Mr. Foote’s,
because he said that an atom is something which cannot be
seen. Now, not only is an atom that which cannot be seen
“he has told us that—but he went on to say that this world
of ours must be the same as the matter which is unseen.
Now, if that is so, then the unseen atom must be under
the same conditions as this seen table; and, as this seen
table cannot move itself, how came the atom to move
itself ?
But our friend says that I simply get rid of one difficulty
—the origin of the atom—in order to bring in a greater
difficulty—God. No, I do not. Mr. Foote has told us that
an atom is that which is so infinitely little that it cannot be
seen ; yet Mr. Foote must, if he is logical, seek to build up
this wondrous universe, with its teeming forms of living
activity, from a thing that cannot be seen, and that is so
infinitely powerless that it can do nothing of itself—because
“the unseen must be the same as the seen.” Then he says
I Bring in another subject which is equally unthinkable;
Did I not show you that something must be eternal ? Does
Mr. Foote believe the atom is eternal ? If so, he is opposed
�THEISM OR ATHEISM?
41
there is food, if your mental hunger proves that somewhere
there is knowledge, the hunger of the soul proves that some
where there is God. Mr. Foote may say, “ I have not got
this appetite, I know nothing about it ”; but, as we do not
trust a blind man when we wish to know something about
the sun, neither do we trust an Atheist when we want to
know something about God. (Cheers.)
The Chairman : Ladies and Gentlemen,—I am sure
you must have undergone considerable inconvenience in the
heat of this crowded hall, especially those of you who are
standing; but it seems to me so in harmony with the instincts
of fair play that Mr. Foote should have a full, a fair, and
impartial hearing to ?he end that I trust no one will leave
the meeting until Mr. Foote has finished his concluding
address.
Mr. Lee expressed a similar wish.
Mr. Foote : I am extremely obliged for the kindly spirit
which was manifested in the hint just given, but I hardly
think it is necessary. I do not feel so profoundly upon the
matter as it seems to be imagined, and if any lady or gentle
man, at any time, does not want to hear me, I really do not
Object to their withd«awing. On the other hand, I do not
think it is a right thing to assume that anybody would leave
the meeting. Personally, I think we ought to accept people’s
innocence until there is reason to believe they are guilty.
(Dissent and interruption.) Apparently one disputant is
free to introduce a matter which the other disputant is not
to say anything about. Is that fair play?
Mr. Lee said that the child and the fire meet, and the fire
burns, and what I have got to do is to explain why it burns.
(“ No, no.”) I repeat that Mr. Lee said I was bound to
explain how it came to burn. Now, I say I am under no
such necessity. All I am obliged to do, if I want to be
�THEISM OR ATHEISM ?
43
to convert me, and, if I had answered all his propositions to
his satisfaction, he would not become an Atheist. What is
the use, then, of his saying I have not answered his ques
tions ? All I can do is to reply. I do not expect Mr. Lee
to think that I have shattered all his positions.
Mr. Lee says he knows the unconditioned ; but I deny
that he knows, or can know, the unconditioned. He is
himself distinctly conditioned, every moment of his life
being absolutely dependent upon his environment. When
he talks about matter being incapable of moving itself, I
tell Mr. Lee that he himself, except in relation to external
Mature, would lose all capacity of thought. Mankind can
only work under the stimulus of the external universe. We
begin with sensations, perceptions; we weave them into
ideas ; but it is the stimulus of the external universe that
furnishes us with the sensations, and it is the stimulus of
that external universe that keeps alive the activity of our
powers.
. Mr. Lee said it was no use fighting definitions. What
else can we fight in a discussion ? It is idle to talk about
fighting God : we are here to fight over the defined God. If
God exists, he does not require any man’s defence ; and if
God do not exist, no man’s defence can establish his exist
ence. Our object is discussion, and discussion can only
proceed upon definitions ; consequently it is really defini
tions that we are here to debate.
We were told that the religious banner is a sign of victory.
Not necessarily. Both armies carry banners into the field,
and in general it is only one side that wins. And banners
are not confined to battle; they are floated in times of
peace as well as in war. I do not think it is right to found
an argument upon a metaphor. A metaphor is a very good
thing as an adornment, a help, an illustration—but no more.
And when you say your banner is triumphant, I say the
very fact that, after thousands of years of priestly teaching,
and! of the authority of religion over the child’s mind—I
�THEISM OR ATHEISM ?
45
of Matter than any common man that walks the streets. He
can tell you how atoms combine, and how they divide; he
can show you their chemical properties ; but he has no
knowledge whatever of their creation or origination. The
doctrine accepted by all scientists is that man cannot
create an atom, man cannot destroy an atom ; and I say
that, arguing from analogy, it is reasonable at any rate,
more reasonable—to suppose that what cannot be destroyed
will never cease to be, and that what cannot be made never
began to be.
Finally, we were told, in poetical language, about God’s
kindness; and we were given a poetical recitation, which I
h©pe Mr. Lee did not think was any contribution to the
debate. I might cite poetry, but then is that discussion ?
Shelley said the name of God has fenced about all crime
with holiness. You talk of the kindness of your God ! I
fail to see the kindness when I look at the history of the
world. The great Cardinal Newman, the keenest theological
intellect that this country has produced in the present
century, said that, although his being was full of the idea of
God, yet when he looked into the universe the impression
made upon him was as though he had looked into a mirror
and saw no reflection of his face. What he saw in the
world was incompatible with the doctrines of theology in
which he had been educated. The kindness of God and
religion 1 The kindness of the auto-da-fe! The kindness
of the thumb-screw, the rack, the torture chamber! The
kindness of the heretic’s dungeon ! The kindness of per
verting and distorting the mind of the child ! I prefer the
kindness of Humanity to the kindness of all the gods the
world has ever known. (Loud applause.)
�THEISM OR ATHEISM ?
47
course, had the opportunity of deciding the direction of the
SWhing’s debate. To-night that opportunity lies with me.
I do not suppose that anybody who differs from me (and
in this I will include my opponent) will be quite satisfied
with the direction I take; but I am in the conduct of my
Own case, and I intend to do what I consider to be justice
fc> it, quite irrespective of the opinions of anyone else.
(Hear, hear.)
Now I wish, at the outset, to say just a few words about
the direction the debate took last night. It was mainly of
a HWtaphysical character, and chiefly turned upon the
problem of the origin of the universe, if I may express it in
that summary fashion. Mr. Lee told us a great deal about
matter and atoms, and the whole argument really turned
upon what is admittedly incomprehensible—that is, incom
prehensible in the present state of our knowledge. I am
not one of those who say that no particular problem will at
Some future time be solved ; but one zk entitled to say that a
pertain specified problem is insoluble in the present con
dition of human knowledge ; and, as a matter of fact, when
you discuss the origin of matter, you are discussing a thing
which, from the very nature of the case, you are not in a
position to determine. And it appears to me that you may
mix up with a discussion of that kind a great deal of very
questionable physics. For instance, we were told last night
that, if the universe were full of matter, there would be no
possibility of motion ; but, of course, that overlooks the fact
that combinations of matter are of various degrees of density.
Every time Mr. Lee and I walk along the street we walk,
aS it were, through matter, for the air around us is as much
matter, although in a gaseous condition, as this table or the
floor upon which we stand. To illustrate this from another
Standpoint: if you were to take a bottle and put half-aifozen marbles in it, and then fill the bottle right up with
wtter, and hermetically seal it, you would find that, as you
moved the bottle about, the marbles, under the law of
�THEISM OR ATHEISM ?
49
words, that Atheism does not explain the universe. Well,
no Atheist attempts to explain the universe. He is more
modest than to pretend to do anything of the kind. The
Atheist declares that the finite intelligence of man is not
Capable of solving the infinite problem of the inconceivably
distant origin of this universe. (Cheers.) But if you pressed
and said that, as a thinker, I must have some idea upon
the subject, I should say : “ Very well; I am not prepared
to assert that matter is either eternal or not eternal; I am
not in a position to make a positive assertion where I have
no positive evidence ; but it is as open for me to conjecture
as for any man, and perhaps my conjecture would be as true
as his; and, if you tell me there must be an eternal some
thing, I should start from what I know, for I would rather
believe in the eternity of what I know than in the eternity
of something that I have not been able to discover. And
W, I say, matter exists ■ matter is all about us ■ our bodily
organism, at any rate, is material ■ and I would prefer to
believe that the matter which, according to physical teaching,
’\by us at any rate, indestructible in its atoms, is essentially
indestructible; that it never began to be; that, as it existí
now, and did exist eternally in the past, so it will continue
to exist eternally in the future.” In other words, if there is
t0. be an eternal something, I prefer an eternal something
which I know, to an eternal nothing which is only the postu
late of an opponent in a discussion. (Applause.)
Atheism and Theism, except they come into dogmatic
relationship to morals and conduct, are speculations, and it
is well known that speculations-the very same speculations
—can be entertained by men of all varieties of moral chá
mete and condition. Indeed, when one speculation is
e ore the world, and another is opposed to it, and when
the world has been discussing these speculations for thou
sands of years, and is still discussing them, with no hope of
smving at a satisfactory conclusion, an impartial, honest,
and careful thinker is tempted to ask himself, What is the
�THEISM OR ATHEISM ?
51
of the universe ; and, when the words were put down for
discussion, I declined to admit them. The Atheist has no
such theory. He does not set out to explain the universe;
he tries to learn as much as he can about it; and, if he learns
any new truth to-day, there is more to be learned to-morrow.
As long as man’s mind is finite, and he has to inhabit this
world—which is really but as a speck of dust in the infinitude
of space—however far he advances, there will be the same
old horizon of knowledge. However we may gather know
ledge in the years to come, our far-off posterity will have a
similar opportunity, and may they put it to a similar use !
(Applause.)
Now, if we have to enter upon a trial of Theism, we must
understand what Theism is. Mr. Lee, last night, refrained
from defining God. His God accounts for everything, but
the very thing which was all-important in the case was never
defined,
I shall define Theism as. “that form of belief which
declares that the visible, tangible, conditioned universe is
created and governed by infinite intelligence, which belongs
to an infinite personality, which is characterised by infinite
power and infinite wisdom ; nay, more—it is characterised,
according to Theistic teaching, by infinite goodness or
benevolence.” What I am going to do in the trial of Theism
is to ascertain whether the facts fit in with the theory. I
am not going to rush off to a supposed centre, to which the
sun, with all our system, is hurrying. I am not going to
peer with the microscope in the vain hope of discovering
the origin of the atom. I am going to speak about what
we know of the facts of life, instead of rushing off into
infinite space. I am going to see what can be found in this
world, the world in which we live. (Applause.) I submit
that, if Theism can be proved at all, it ought to be proved
from what we thoroughly know, rather than from what we
are only inadequately acquainted with.
Now, what is the great teaching of men of science—a
�THEISM OR ATHEISM ?
53
Now, what does this struggle for existence mean ? It
means that the world, ever since the rise upon it of organic
life—at least, ever since the advent of beings who are capable
of feeling pleasure and pain—has been one great cock-pit,
running red with the blood of mutual slaughter. In this
Struggle for existence there is no quarter given. You are not
let off to fight another day. As Professor Huxley says, the
result for the vanquished is death. And this red cock-pit,
which the world has been ever since sentient organisms
appeared upon it, I am told by the Theists was designed,
and that the Being who designed it foresaw all that would
happen, sees wrhat does happen, and, in spite of all our
efforts to improve it, continues it as it is. I say that this is
too hard for common flesh and blood to believe, if we realise
What it means. I would rather be an Atheist, who says, “ I
knpw nothing of God, and your definition of God does not
Commend itself to my intelligence, in the face of the facts of
existence,” than be a Trieist, believing in a God who permits
—nay, as Creator, ordained—that which every tender-hearted
mao and woman would put a stop to, if possible, to-morrow.
(Applause.)
What is human history? Looked at through the long
records that have come down to us, it is more or less a long
succession of quarrelling, largely about religion, and wars of
dynasty and ambition, and the sacrifice of the lives, liberties,
and happiness of the great masses of the people, in the
interests of those who leaped into the seats of power, and
used mankind for their own purposes. Why, it is only
within recent memory that the people, even in civilised
countries, have been brought within the pale of a free con
stitution. Their whole lives were previously decided for
them by a handful of upper classes. I can no more see in
human history, than I can see in Evolution, the signs of an
fotClligent and moral governor. Even when we take man as
he bow is, where and how does Theism justify itself? The
human organism is extremely imperfect. Take the most
�THEISM OR ATHEISM ?
55
responsible for them, then God is responsible for them. If
God produces eyes that cannot see, or eyes that can only
See very inadequately, it is idle to tell me that his wisdom
and power are infinite; for infinite wisdom would know how
to produce better eyes, and infinite power would be able to
second the designs of infinite wisdom.
Then look at the disasters that occur in the world. Man
fe encouraged to build his house, to found his home, and
suddenly, without warning, the earthquake shatters it and
Mils him ; or, if he is spared himself, perhaps his dearest are
buried beneath its ruins. Do you mean to tell me that an
infinite intelligence is responsible for this ? Do you mean
to tell me that the work of that infinite intelligence is
prompted by infinite wisdom, and is carried out by infinite
power ? I say that these disasters that are constantly
desolating the world, that these pestilences, these blightings
of crops, are all confutations of your Theistic theory. Here
in England we send missionaries out to India, and when a
famine occurs in India through the failure of the harvest
we subscribe money in order to save from starvation the
people who, if left to providence, would starve by the action
of this God of infinite wisdom and goodness and power.
How, upon the Theistic hypothesis, can you reconcile
yourself to the fact of disease ? Disease is ever baffling the
man of science. Often, as we master one disease, another
becomes more malignant. As we learn how to treat fevers,
Cancer becomes more severe in its ravages ; and, as we
manage, by improved sanitation, to get a better condition
of general health among the people, we suffer from that
disease which is known as insanity, and which is gaining
ground in every civilised country. Now, what is the cause
of these diseases ? You may tell me it is the microbes ; but
who made the microbes to produce diseases ? Your infinite
deity planned the microbe and planned the man; he
arranged it so that the microbe would get into the man’s
blood, and set up an action there which produces terrible
�THEISM OR ATHEISM ?
57
champion will, in due course, have the opportunity of
replying. I must, further, press this point, because, with
©very desire to be impartial, I cannot be blind to the fact
that the majority of persons present are in distinct opposition
to the views expressed by the gentleman who has just sat
down.
I will take the liberty of saying that the attribute of fair
play demands that the courage he displays in standing
before an hostile audience, and so fearlessly expounding his
principles, should secure for him a patient and respectful
hearing.
I make these observations in good faith, and I also
bespeak for Mr. Lee your kindly consideration, as he has
been seriously indisposed to-day, and I can only regard his
presence here to-night as an indication of his pluck and
determination in carrying through his part of the program.
Mr. Lee : Mr. Chairman, Mr. Foote, Ladies and Gentle
men,—I have listened to the address which Mr. Foote has
given us with a very great deal of attention, but, I must say,
with a very great deal of disappointment. I gathered that
Mr. Foote wished us to understand that Atheists had no
theory of the universe; but, before Mr. Foote sat down, he
showed us that they have a theory of the universe; that
they are able to judge of the Theistic theory, and declare
it to be bad, and speak of another—the Atheistic—as better.
In spite of these facts, Mr. Foote has repeated his state
ment that Atheism does not deny God, and that Atheism
has no theory of the universe. I hold in my hand Mr.
Charles Bradlaugh’s debate with the Rev. T. Lawson, of
West Hartlepool, on Is Atheism the True Doctrine of the
Universe ? Mr. Foote quoted Mr. Bradlaugh several times
last night; I am therefore appealing to his own authority to
refute his statements. Mr. Bradlaugh says : “ By Atheism
I mean the affirmation of one existence. This affirmation
is a positive, not a negative, affirmation, and is properly
�THEISM OR ATHEISM ?
59
observations on the phenomena of disease and accident in
man, that the substance of the cerebrum is itself insensible
—that is, no injury done to it, or physical impression made
upon it, is felt by the subject of it.” And Dr. Carpenter
goes on to say: “ It is clear, therefore, that the presence of
the cerebrum is not essential to consciousness
So much for Mr. Foote’s contention that, where he finds
a certain physical condition, there he finds thought. Dr.
Carpenter distinctly opposes that view. Indeed, it is agreed
by all great mental physiologists that it is impossible for us
to explain the passage from the physics of the brain to the
facts of self-consciousness ; while Professor Tyndall assures
us that self-consciousness is the rock on which Materialism
splits.
But Mr. Foote says that he denies my right to assert that
matter has originated. I repay the compliment by denying
his right to assert that it did not originate.
But what does Mr. Foote mean by the word “ matter ” ?
He has used the term several times. Every word I used I
defined as I used it. I therefore demand an explanation of
this word “ matter.”
Mr. Foote last night denied that he is compelled to think
of something as eternal, and he spoke of the changing
phenomena of this earth and the worlds around us, implying
that an infinite series of causes and effects is the explanation
of the evolution of the visible universe. That was the
implication ; or, if it was not, what was the implication ?
And if it was, then Mr. Foote can think of the eternal, for
he speaks of an eternal series of causes and effects. But if
we carefully analyse what is meant by an infinite, or eternal,
series of causes and effects, we find it means that a long
series of finite changes can make up a total which is infinite.
This is opposed to common sense, educated reason, and the
first principles of scientific induction. You cannot get an
infinite total by the multiplication of finite units. Mr.
Foote may try, but he will fail.
�THEISM OR ATHEISM?
61
of intellect with intellect, and mind against mind, we shatter
the beliefs of those who say there is no God. (Applause.)
In reference to my statement that we have certain bodily,
mental, and spiritual appetites, Mr. Foote says : “ Yes, I
admit we have these appetites for knowledge; but have we not
room enough in the universe to satisfy these appetites ?” I
say, No; and the fact that all the progressive races of the
earth have not been content to rest in the universe is a
proof that man is not satisfied with the universe. When
he looks upon this universe, as it comes within the field of
his vision, he sees upon its face the indications of a Being
behind and above the universe—a Being to whom he must
go on, and before whom he must bow’. No, our friend has
not shown that we must be satisfied with the universe which
is around us ; rather, we rise “ through nature up to nature’s
God.”
Our friend has referred to a sentence-which occurred in
the little poem* which I recited to you last night, in which
the “ sweet kindness ” of God is spoken of. He said (and I
think I never heard a more illogical argument in my life)—
“ Kind,” said he, “ when this God has designed thumb
screws and racks to tear and rend men ?” God designed
thumbscrews and racks 1 Why, it is man who has done
this, not God. No, not God, but man, on the nature of
whom Mr. Foote builds his philosophy, saying there exist
guarantees of morality in human nature. Guarantees of
morality in human nature ! History and experience refute
the statement, and show that, when man is astray from the
moral Governor of the universe, these guarantees become
guarantees of so many ferocious appetites, which wreak
themselves on the weak, the defenceless, the poor, and the
holy. The fact is, no trust can be put in man ; our trust
must be in the living, eternal God. (Applause.)
* This poem will be found at the end of this report, the reporter
having omitted to take it down in its proper place.
�THEISM OR ATHEISM ?
63.
until our friend shows this to be impossible, our position is
unshaken.
But Mr. Foote says: “ Can God have designed this
universe, when the law of it is ‘ eat or be eaten ’ ?” I will
deal with this doctrine in a few minutes, and probably I
shall be able to eat it before I have done.
Our friend says, when I speak of motion being impossible
in an infinitely extended universe of matter, I forget the
different densities of matter. I do not. I say that you
cannot have different density in matter where you have a
perfect vacuum. Every particle of matter must be of the
same weight in a perfect vacuum. If, however, the universe
be full of matter, every point of space must be occupied.
Therefore, there can be no space unoccupied. To talk of
the different densities of matter is to say there is room in
space, points where matter is not.
Our friend says he is not prepared to say matter is eternal
or not eternal. That is standing on the edge—not going
one way or the other; and, if Atheism is in that position, I
do not envy it.
Our friend says he would rather believe in the eternity of
something which he knows than of something he does not
know. But he does not know matter; he knows only his
sensations. In other words, he can think of matter only in
terms of mind. Now, Sir, if you can think of matter only
in terms of mind, the most certain fact is mind, and you
reach matter by inference. You really know mind; you
only infer matter.
Our friend says we have these perpetual discords and
debates because we have not got at the facts; but the
universe is all around us, and we are seeking to understand
it. Men have understood it, and, in proportion as they
have understood it, they have risen above the universe, and
found themselves in the presence of One “ greater than I,
and holier than thou.”
But our friend says he falls back upon the fact that man
�THEISM OR ATHEISM ?
65
out teleology there would be no mechanism, but only a
confusion of crude forces; and without mechanism there
would be no teleology, for how could the latter effect its
purpose?” Against Mr. Foote’s statement I place this
quotation from Dr. Welsmann.
But our friend says he cannot imagine a God designing a
world in which “ eat or be eaten ” is the law of existence.
Our friend forgot to tell us how he gets this fact of “ eat or
be eaten.” In other words, he got the eater before he got
the life to eat; and I want to know where he gets the life
before he gets the eater. But if this universe, or this world,
is, as he described it, “one great cock-pit, running red with
human slaughter,” I ask him how he can reconcile this with
his coming here to-night and advocating the teaching of
Atheism, when this blind, mindless, cruel, biting, slaying
machine, which he calls the world, grinds the lives, and
blasts the hopes, and crushes the affections of those whom
it has produced, only to destroy. No future life, no future
good; but blindly, aimlessly, uselessly, simply to play with,
it produces men only to destroy them, only to crush them,
only to make them suffer. That, Sir, is the teaching of
Atheism. But we Theists believe that, through these
sorrows and sufferings, there is a great purpose being
worked out—that God is working out a plan; and, until
our friend can show that the plan is not being realised,
he has no right to reject the belief that there is such a
plan.
Now, if Evolution means anything, it means that everything
which is, and which has been, has a purpose and a function;
and therefore Evolution itself witnesses to the great Being
who has arranged it thus and thus.
But is it true that this universe is a great, brutalising,
“ eat-or-be-eaten ” machine? (“Yes,” “No.”) There are
more smiles than tears in the world, more days of sunshine
than rain; and, on a mere balance of probabilities, there is
more good in God than evil. So that our friend has not in
�THEISM OR ATHEISM ?
67
that, When Helmholtz had pointed out what he regarded as
«^rfeetions in the eye as an optical instrument, he con
cluded his address by saying that, if every improvement
which he had suggested were put into the eye, it would
render it less fit for its purpose than it now is; and he went
on to say that no sane man would think of taking a razor
to cleave blocks—he would take an axe; and that for the
rough-and-ready work which the human eye was called
to perform, it could not be improved. So, then, our friend
has his own authority with whom to settle. But I want our
friend to answer this : If it is necessary for an optician to
make my glasses and his glasses (which cannot be comta-ed to the wondrous mechanism of the human eye), does
not the human eye itself demand a maker who shall be
greater in wisdom and power than all the opticians on
earth?
But our friend says we see men destroyed all around us.
es,. but there is this difference between the position of the
Thet« and that of the Atheist. The Theist does not say the
man is destroyed. God has given him life, and God has a
right to remove that life to any other sphere He pleases.
He does not destroy the being of man, He simply changes
the place of being, and, therefore, He has a right, if a man
does net square with His demands, or if He thinks fit to
i
. m t0 SOme other condition, to do it, because He
is the originator of all life, and in Him only can life exist.
. ut our friend says there are diseases. Yes, even
microbes Again, I ask you to think. If we were travelling
Midland Railway, so long as the engines kept theiT
proper lines we should say the powers in the engine were
a fl, lf tW° en§ineS C°ming in 0PP0site directions
wkid’4hat P°Wer WhlCh Was g00d would become an evil.
Why
Because the arrangements which had been laid
flown for their safety had been violated, either by the care
lessness or wickedness of man. Now, the vital' forces of
our body and of all living organisms God intended should
�THEISM OR ATHEISM ?
69
should have been disappointed had it been so, because my
estimate of Charles Bradlaugh was that, whether right or
wrong, he was one of the most careful thinkers and one of
th® most careful expressers of his thought. Now, Charles
Bradlaugh says in explicit terms, as I read to you last night,
that Atheism does not say there is no God; and I submit
that a man’s explicit statement to that effect is of more im
portance than any inference which Mr. Lee or anyone else
may derive from some other passage which he has penned or
spoken, in written or oral debate. Here is a man’s written
aod explicit declaration which cannot be evaded : “ The
Atheist does not say there is no God.” The Atheist takes
the definitions of God which are laid before him for his
acceptance, and, finding that they do not fit in with the
faetg of existence, he contradicts them, because the facts
Contradict them. Now, if that is not an intelligible position
foe a man to take up, then we must admit that we use
Words in a totally different signification, and any further
discussion, at least upon that point, is simply a waste of
time.
But we were told that what Mr. Bradlaugh’s statement
came to was that Atheism denies Theism, including Pan
theism, Polytheism, and Monotheism. Well, I admitted as
much in my opening speech, and there was no occasion to
elaborate what was admitted.
It was stated by my opponent that Atheism had no
foundation. It has the same foundation that anything else
has, or possibly can have. The only foundation for anything,
M Mr. Lee knows well, is man’s knowledge. Mr. Lee also
knows that there have been Atheistic scientists, like Professor Clifford, and that there have been Agnostic scientists
(which comes to the same thing), like Charles Darwin, Pro
fessor Huxley, and Herbert Spencer, whose names will stand
as high as any upon the Theistic roll that Mr. Lee can
produce.
Mr, Lee wants to know what I mean by “conditioned,”
�THEISM OR ATHEISM ?
71
made Theists before they are able to judge for themselves.
I WS charged with “ robbing the community of its faith
in God.” Robbing ! that is a term from the Old Bailey.
Mr. Lee : I did not wish to use it in that sense, and, if it
is repugnant to Mr. Foote, I will withdraw it.
Mr. Foote : Every man who thinks he has a glimmer of
truth not only has the right to present it to his fellow-men,
but is under a duty to do so. If a man finds, in listening
to another man, that a belief which he thought true is only
half true, or not true at all, instead of being deprived of
anything valuable, he is deprived of something which occu
pied the door of his mind, and kept the truth out of it.
When this intruder is removed, the truth can enter in the
plane of the falsehood that usurped its situation. (Applause.)
We were told, too, that there was no guarantee of morality
in human nature, and that we must trust entirely to God;
yet I find that some of the most notorious villains of our
time have been well-known professors of religion. I do not
say they were so because of their religion, but in the face of
their profession, and in the face of the statistics of crime, it
is idle to tell me we must trust to God for morality. Wher
ever a human heart beats with sympathy ; wherever mothers
love their children ; wherever fathers protect them ; wherever
parents will, with their own lives, save the lives of their dear
ones; wherever one man will rush to the aid of another—
then is the guarantee of morality. Your argosy of faith
floats upon the great sea of humanity. You declare that
the water would dry up without your fleet; yet, if your fleet
were to sink, the mighty ocean of humanity would roll on
the same yesterday, to-day, and forever. (Applause.)
Now, we come to what has been said about my opening
speech. Mr. Lee quoted from Weismann, and said that
he put against Mr. Foote’s views of design the words of a
great German. But there is no particular sanctity about a
�THEISM OR ATHEISM ?
73
apparatus to inflict agony upon every part of their being—
if I could not stop it, I would denounce it, and disown all
responsibility for it. Such things were done in the name of
your God, yet he never stopped it, but let it go on. It is
science and humanity that have put down the brutalities of
your religion. (Applause.)
There are, says Mr. Lee, more smiles than tears in the
world, and so he strikes a balance in favour of his God. A
balance in favour of infinite wisdom, infinite power, and
infinite goodness ! And man strikes it! I can understand
a balance to a man’s credit; but a balance to God’s credit!
And this is the God I am asked to believe in. I cannot
believe in a God like that.
If God makes poor eyes, and the oculist sees their defects,
how is it—Mr. Lee asks—that the oculist cannot make
better ones ? Why, “ making ” is a term of art, and not a
term of nature. Eyes are not made; human beings are not
made; lower animals are not made; plants are not made;
you cannot even make a crystal; you cannot make the
crystallised frost upon your window-pane. The word in
nature is “ growth,” and, if the eye has grown, it is God’s
method, according to Mr. Lee’s argument, of bringing it
into existence; and God is responsible for his handiwork.
It is idle to say we have not the right to point out errors in
a theory unless we have a better theory of our own. We
have such a right. I may not be able to explain the
universe, and I admit I cannot; yet, if you put forward
ft theory that is contradicted by facts which you and I
alike admit, I have a right to say that, whatever may be
the true theory, yours is false; because a theory which does
not fit the facts is false, according to the canons of logic.
(Cheers.)
Mr. Lee: You will observe that the questions which I
put to Mr. Foote in my last speech have not been dealt
with. Mr. Foote has not told us what he believes or under-
�THEISM OR ATHEISM ?
75
tion is. I am bound to say that Mr. Bradlaugh himself
Seems to me to fail to construct anything, and all Atheists
must share in the same fate.
Our friend says I used, last night, the word “conditioned.”
Yes. And I also said what I meant by it—(cheers)—
namely, that which witnesses to something other than itself,
and demands for its existence some other thing. Now, Mr.
Foote has no right to say that we do not explain our words
where we take every care to explain them. But Mr. Foote
says that by conditioned he means “ existing in relation to
Other things
but this universe is one, not many. Then
what does this witness to, what is it in relation to ? If in
relation to something, what is that something ? If not in
relation to something, then it has no relation at all; and,
if it has no relation at all, then it is not conditioned, and
you do not know it, for you know only the conditioned.
Our friend quotes a number of scientists, Darwin and
Others, and he says these men were men who believed in
Atheism or Agnosticism. I say that these men, almost
Without exception, repelled the charge of Atheism. Tyndall
Said that this word was affixed to him unfairly, and repelled
it. Huxley has rejected the name again and again, Darwin
never said he was an Atheist, and not one of the men to
whom reference has been made ever said he was an Atheist.
In order to show their humility, they took up the position
that they did not know whether there is any God, but they
did not say there is none, and they did not try to prove
there is none ; they simply said they did not know. So our
friend failed altogether even in his references to these men.
But our friend says, in reference to the problem of know
ledge, that knowledge is only relation. Very well. If know
ledge is only relation, and this universe is one, and, therefore,
according to your position, is not relative to any other thing,
how can you, a part of the universe, be conscious of another
part, unless that other part be other than yourself; and if
that Other part be other than yourself, then you are in
�THEISM OR ATHEISM ?
77
to this earth, and this earth alone, and fixing their affections
and their minds on things of time and sense alone, they
have thought themselves to be part and parcel of a brutal
ising world; and so they have crushed and tom each other,
not because of God, but because their hearts have been
opposed to God.
God, our friend says, has allowed this to occur, and, in a
very thrilling statement, he said: “Now, if any man were
to injure another in my name, if I could not stop it, I would
denounce it.” Yes, and the great God has put into men a
power of mind which we call conscience, and that power of
mind has bitten men like a serpent when they dared to
break the law of God’s world, “Love thy neighbour as
thyself.” (Applause.)
Our friend says God has not interfered in this world. We
have no right to go into the question of revelation to-night,
but we believe God has interfered. But our friend, Mr.
Foote, does not believe in God because he has not interfered
to stop certain cruelties ; and when he did interfere for the
Salvation of man from sin, our friend denied that he had
interfered at all 1 This is a very strange contradiction, and
a very strange position to be in. (Derisive laughter.)
Mr. Foote referred to Weismann, and seems to imagine
that I thought there is a strange charm in a German scientist.
Mr. Foote : I said there is no magic in a German name.
Mr. Lee : That implied the same. The reason I empha
sised that Weismann was a German was that a great deal
of our philosophy and science comes from Germany. The
foremost thinkers in Europe to-day are to be found in
Germany; great experimenters and observers in Germany
have given to the world facts, and inferences from facts,
which English and other thinkers have been careful to follow
out. That is why I emphasised German.
But our friend says that these quotations from Weismann
�THEISM OR ATHEISM ?
79
A word as to Darwin and his Descent of Man. Dr.
Alfred Russel Wallace, the co-discoverer with Darwin of
the principle of Evolution, has gone into the question of
Buffering very thoroughly, and, in his work on Darwinism^
he shows, in some three or four pages, that what Mr. Foote
has attempted to establish on that point to-night is not what
is in nature, but what exists only in Mr. Foote’s mind.
(Applause.)
The Chairman : We have now reached the final stage
Of this debate. I am about to call upon Mr. Foote to give
us his last contribution to it; and I would take the liberty
Of again saying that he is entitled, and I hope will receive,
your careful and courteous attention. It is more than pro
bable—I do not say I expect it—that he will adduce
arguments and make statements which may trouble the
minds of some who listen to them ; but I will again remind
guch persons that they will, on this occasion, have the oppor
tunity of hearing the final word from their own champion.
Mr. Foote : My attention is drawn to the fact that no
H®w matter is to be introduced into the last speech. That
is a point which my opponent must be careful about, as he
has got the last speech, not I. My position is one which I
generally find the Atheist has to accept. Theism, of course,
is true, and Atheism, of course, is false ; yet Theists usually
fed the advantage, even in the case of truth against error,
of having the last word.
Now, with respect to Germany, I do not object to
Germany; my only surprise was that “ German ” should be
put before “science,” as it was. Science is not English,
French, German, or of any nationality. Science is universal.
Science speaks an universal language when it speaks fact
and truth. And I deny that all our English science and
philosophy comes from Germany. It is a libel upon
England. Charles Darwin, the greatest biologist of this
�THEISM OR ATHEISM ?
8l
Then, again, Mr. Lee says that Atheism and Agnosticism
are different. What is the difference ? It is very largely
the difference between courage and timidity. I have
defined—rather ironically, it may be, but I may repeat it as
I have said it before—I have defined an Agnostic as an
Atheist with a tall hat on; and really Agnostics, who, as
Mr. Lee says—giving the names of Huxley and Spencer—
declare they do not know there is a God, are, to all intents
and purposes, in the same position as the Atheist. If they
do not know there is a God, it is clear that they are without
God, and to be without God is to be an Atheist.
Then we were told that God made man, but man’s heart
went astray and was opposed to God. (“ Oh.”) I should be
sorry to misrepresent Mr. Lee.
Mr. Lee : The words were “ but man has sought out
many devices.”
Mr. Foote : That is not the expression I was referring
to, Mr. Lee said that man’s heart had got opposed to
God I should be sorry to misrepresent him, but that is
Wfcat I have written down, and what, I think, I heard—at
any rate, it is the substance of what Mr. Lee said upon this
point. Jost take a human father and his child. If a child
of mine go astray, and I have fulfilled all my duties towards
him, I am not responsible for his wandering; because, in
bringing him into the world, I was not able to determine
absolutely his intellectual and moral character. But if a
father could absolutely determine the intellectual and moral
character of his child, and that child went astray, the
father Would be responsible for not exercising his power.
(Applause.) God is not in the position of an earthly father.
An earthly father works under what to us, however inscrutable, are laws of heredity; for a child is not simply the
child of his father, he is a child of his father’s father, and
his mother s father, and their mothers and fathers. Heredity
�THEISM OR ATHEISM ?
83
parposes, and we are striving to abolish it, and so to prevent
the ethical education which you say God intends by his in
flictions.
God, we are told, has a right to take the life he sends.
For the sake of argument I will not impugn that. There is
no time to discuss it. But, assuming that God has the right
to take life, let us see how it works out. Under the law we
have a right to take life. A criminal is tried and sentenced
to execution. But society insists that, if he is to be killed,
he shall be killed in the most painless manner possible.
We insist that the hanging shall be done with the utmost
dispatch. In America they are trying whether electricity is
not even less painful than hanging. In short, although we
must (as we say) kill (though I doubt if anybody has that
right), still, if we must kill, we are refined enough to say we
must kill swiftly and painlessly. But that is not God’s
method; what we see in nature is not swift killing; it is
slow killing. When man is killed by “the act of God,” it
is often done very slowly ; not in a moment as by’the
hangman’s noose or by electrocution. A lingering disease
comes on and kills him week by week, month by month,
ahd year by year. It is an agonising form of cruelty. If
God has the right to take life, I deny that he has the right
to take it in that way. If life must be taken, it should be
taken swiftly and painlessly. All this cruelty in nature, all
this killing of human beings by slow disease and long agony,
gives the He to the statement that your God is a being of
¡»finite kindness and love.
&
Mr. Lee says that I object to revelation because I am
told that God does interfere in the world, and that I object
to Theism because God does
interfere in the world. He
says that is a contradiction. There is no contradiction; it
is a harmony. I object to Theism, because God does not
interfere to prevent injustice, cruelty, and suffering. You
try to justify his non-interference. Afterwards you offer me
a revelation, in which he does interfere. The contradiction
�THEISM OR ATHEISM ?
85
(so far as I am concerned) must be brought to a close. I
do not expect that what I have said in this debate will
haw pleased everybody. All I can say is that it was my
duty to say what I thought necessary. I took my own
position and defended it, and attacked what Mr. Lee himself
advanced. The world moves by this constant agitation.
You find sound water in the eager, flowing current. The
Still pool is stagnant and loathsome. And when the air
gets overcharged at times, we see the beautiful spectacle
of the lightning. But you cannot have the lightning without
the dash of the thunder-clouds. And when we differ in
opinion we have these friendly meetings, so that out of the
thunder-clash of debate there may leap forth the lightning
of truth. (Loud applause.)
The Chairman : In fifteen minutes more this debate
will be brought to a close. That space of time will be
occupied by Mr. Lee, whom I now call on.
Mr. Lee : I do not know whether I understood Mr. Foote
to say that Theists like the last word. If I did understand
him to say that, may I remind him that he suggested that I
should open the first night, and he would open the second
night ? That is not my arrangement, but his. So, then,
our friend has made a mistake in saying I like the last word.
Our friend says that the putting of the word “ German ”
before the word “ science ” was what he quarrelled with,
because science is universal. It does not belong to Germany
or Bngland; it is universal. If science is universal, then
knowledge is universal, and the great Scientific Being—if
you will allow me to use the word—must be an universal
Knowing Being ; and that Being can be no other than God.
The truth is that, out of all the scientific facts to be found
everywhere in nature, we can get lines of evidence which
lead up to one great fact—God is, and God reigns.
But our friend says it is an insult to England to say most
�THEISM OR ATHEISM ?
87
to ask for a definition ; and Mr. Foote, in answer to my
request, ought to have given me a definition. But we have
it now, and it comes to this—matter is the substance of all
the phenomena which come under his sensations. But
what are your sensations ? Sensations are not matter; they
are the mind's recognition of material existences and con
nections. Then there is something other than matter j and
the thing for which I have been contending, the recognition
Of mind as a separate entity and substance, is now estab
lished in the confession of Mr. Foote. (Applause.)
Mr. Foote says that Atheism does not construct, any
more than Theism constructs ; it is a speculative system.
But the speculation has shown itself in this way—that, while
I have been brave enough to lay down a series of given
propositions, each of them leading up to another, and to
construct an argument on definite propositions and evi
dences, Mr. Foote has not constructed any argument, but
has simply been criticising the ideas and theories which he
fancies represent Theism. So, then, Atheism, in the person
of Mr. Foote, has not constructed anything. Theism, in
the person of Mr. Lee, has constructed something; and
that something has not been touched. (Applause.)
But Mr. Foote admits there is a difference between
Atheism and Agnosticism. The one, he would say, re
presents courage, and the other timidity. But is it not
funny that some of the men to whom he has referred as
not believing in God are the men who write themselves
down Agnostics, and, therefore, are characterised by Mr.
Foote as being too timid to say what their belief is ? Not
by any means a flattering position to be in.
But Mr. Foote objects to the statement that man’s heart
is opposed to God. I am not sure whether I made use of
those words—probably I did; but, whether I used them or
not, they describe a great fact, and facts are stubborn things.
Man’s heart is opposed to God, for what has Mr. Foote
Shown us to-night ? “Tell me,” he said, “ that a God like
�THEISM OR ATHEISM?
89
Our friend says that the idea of God was of slow growth,
and he gave us a remarkable history as to how the idea of
God grew; but, while the story was pretty, it was opposed
to ascertained facts, for we know, by the science of com
parative religion, that the first form of religion known
to man was not belief in many Gods, but belief in one
God.
Ah, says our friend, but in battles of this nature clouds
gome together, and in the shock the lightning flash of
truth comes forth. Yes, yes; but what is truth ? I feel
sometimes, as I think of the sufferings through which I have
seen some small section of the human race pass, that I also
know something of suffering. I have seen my little ones
taken out of my home and hidden in the earth; but to tell
me5 Sir, that I have been produced by a mindless, brainless,
purposeless, heartless universe, only to have affections
qwcteied in my heart, only to have children born and
placed in my arms, and then for this blind, ruthless thing
you call the universe to wreck those affections and destroy
those lives, is to say that your universe is an incarnate fiend.
But if there be a God, and that God possesses mind, intention, heart, my children are not dead—they live. And out
of the shock of brain with brain, and heart with heart, there
©om® this truth: “Thank God, heaven is above all yet,
and there lives a Judge whom no king can corrupt.” (Much
applause.)
Mr* Lee, again rising, said : It is now my duty, my
pleasurable duty, to move that the very best thanks of this
meeting be given to our worthy chairman for so generously,
patiently, and ably presiding over our meeting on these two
evenings of debate.
Me. Moote : I beg, with the most profound sincerity, to
seccmd that vote of thanks.
Upon being put, the vote was carried by acclamation.
�(Poem omitted through Reporteds error (see page 61).
Who shall say that to no mortal
Heaven ere ope’d its mystic portal ?
Gave no dream or revelation,
Save to one peculiar nation ?
Souls sincere, now voiceless, nameless,
Knelt at altars, fired and flameless ;
Asked of nature, asked of reason,
Sought through every sign and season,
Seeking God. Through darkness groping,
Weeping, praying, panting, pining
For the light on Israel shining.
Ah, it must be God’s sweet kindness
Pities erring human blindness ;
And the soul whose pure endeavor
Strives toward God shall live forever—
Live by the great Father’s favor,
Saved by the all-sufficient Savior.
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Victorian Blogging
Description
An account of the resource
A collection of digitised nineteenth-century pamphlets from Conway Hall Library & Archives. This includes the Conway Tracts, Moncure Conway's personal pamphlet library; the Morris Tracts, donated to the library by Miss Morris in 1904; the National Secular Society's pamphlet library and others. The Conway Tracts were bound with additional ephemera, such as lecture programmes and handwritten notes.<br /><br />Please note that these digitised pamphlets have been edited to maximise the accuracy of the OCR, ensuring they are text searchable. If you would like to view un-edited, full-colour versions of any of our pamphlets, please email librarian@conwayhall.org.uk.<br /><br /><span><img src="http://www.heritagefund.org.uk/sites/default/files/media/attachments/TNLHLF_Colour_Logo_English_RGB_0_0.jpg" width="238" height="91" alt="TNLHLF_Colour_Logo_English_RGB_0_0.jpg" /></span>
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Conway Hall Library & Archives
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2018
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Conway Hall Ethical Society
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Pamphlet
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Theism or atheism : which is the more reasonable?
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Foote, G. W. (George William) [1850-1915]
Lee, W.T.
Description
An account of the resource
Place of publication: London
Collation: 90 p. ; 18 cm.
Notes: Report of a public debate between Mr. W.T. Lee and Mr. G.W.Foote held in the Temperance Hall, Derby, May 15 and 16, 1895. Part of the NSS pamphlet collection.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
R. Forder
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1896
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
N266
Subject
The topic of the resource
Atheism
Theism
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
<a href="http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/mark/1.0/"><img src="http://i.creativecommons.org/p/mark/1.0/88x31.png" alt="Public Domain Mark" /></a><span> </span><br /><span>This work (Theism or atheism : which is the more reasonable?), identified by </span><a href="https://conwayhallcollections.omeka.net/items/show/www.conwayhall.org.uk"><span>Humanist Library and Archives</span></a><span>, is free of known copyright restrictions.</span>
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
application/pdf
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Language
A language of the resource
English
Atheism
NSS
Theism
-
https://d1y502jg6fpugt.cloudfront.net/25778/archive/files/c6a19ffa2e2f0d9b5c745afd123ec47a.pdf?Expires=1712793600&Signature=G61Gvh3ktpCP92Blpf9nGLzTjzCnPpDO480ZR9d00DOlsywy6CjKdbyD1Io5lYyP2p%7E3QCzaCudocV3ITkBGCSqnlfgk9WmQB22VF2fLfSndobAhJTajKIRDkdEZG14WoM2d8yGvzAS4k2PNl7sM4fGQlZisLLjIDaJlOvNeG2W7SzpSfwJ5EqfkLNQrMSUPIq2BN8CyuuBUqCXrkR9AP-b9OSLTic-t4tpB8GGdMOuvRe8r0gNmvOU18Gipq0%7E1cTz9k6vkNo1SgazzHv56oCAhQ3MtV3ibR9X7%7Ew3tWjhRMEKNoa2rotZe7hlEbS552P8zyCoHjz9enXgie9Sjdg__&Key-Pair-Id=K6UGZS9ZTDSZM
2e40d1304edd82a4c61b8e9046f485e8
PDF Text
Text
������������������
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Victorian Blogging
Description
An account of the resource
A collection of digitised nineteenth-century pamphlets from Conway Hall Library & Archives. This includes the Conway Tracts, Moncure Conway's personal pamphlet library; the Morris Tracts, donated to the library by Miss Morris in 1904; the National Secular Society's pamphlet library and others. The Conway Tracts were bound with additional ephemera, such as lecture programmes and handwritten notes.<br /><br />Please note that these digitised pamphlets have been edited to maximise the accuracy of the OCR, ensuring they are text searchable. If you would like to view un-edited, full-colour versions of any of our pamphlets, please email librarian@conwayhall.org.uk.<br /><br /><span><img src="http://www.heritagefund.org.uk/sites/default/files/media/attachments/TNLHLF_Colour_Logo_English_RGB_0_0.jpg" width="238" height="91" alt="TNLHLF_Colour_Logo_English_RGB_0_0.jpg" /></span>
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Conway Hall Library & Archives
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2018
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Conway Hall Ethical Society
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Pamphlet
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
The myth of the resurrection
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Besant, Annie Wood [1847-1933]
Description
An account of the resource
Place of publication: London
Collation: 133-144 p. ; 19 cm.
Series title: Atheistic Platform
Series number: No. 9
Notes: Extensive annotations in ink. Short pieces from other journals or pamphlets cut out and stuck in. Donated by Mr Garvey. Publisher's series list on preliminary pages. Printed by Annie Besant and Charles Bradlaugh, 63 Fleet Street, London.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Freethought Publishing Company
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1884
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
G5084
Subject
The topic of the resource
Christianity
Atheism
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
<a href="http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/mark/1.0/"><img src="http://i.creativecommons.org/p/mark/1.0/88x31.png" alt="Public Domain Mark" /></a><span> </span><br /><span>This work (The myth of the resurrection), identified by </span><a href="https://conwayhallcollections.omeka.net/items/show/www.conwayhall.org.uk"><span>Humanist Library and Archives</span></a><span>, is free of known copyright restrictions.</span>
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
application/pdf
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Language
A language of the resource
English
Atheism
Resurrection
-
https://d1y502jg6fpugt.cloudfront.net/25778/archive/files/03e743b506736ffd0e0fa2bd8beea1c0.pdf?Expires=1712793600&Signature=Zwlz9tKuuIKmWnbpXoipuO10L8VJY9b5-PkVdwL-c1Os4wqjLl4qX3NFrAu7onBS0X5rLbOiPT9BSjDsUebBHs2%7E6%7EVw5Vrp2A9a8j-NZC8oISHeep7x%7EsEqpnbA%7EUB-320s-3A-9JVTycq6qz4xbSL86AQrokbCse54U04-nJ4JtfcLvvmLz3mBnRjt6yaL5YiuBUbGSJ3nlk54D%7EqbgwQT8CjZ59pSViPTgJH%7EdC-W5bJCyQ93P2Ec-cyK1FdGPxqRXR2Ysde2NOXvBh4fWX-0VgCGNDboD-ezp0XrJTE9ji3AJUIXeyQjMCP9AL-B6ksciJNqmN%7EC-ILrwcDstQ__&Key-Pair-Id=K6UGZS9ZTDSZM
c285cf878d4fb538f7a81e1b1ceb654b
PDF Text
Text
NATIONAL SECULAR CWW A Y
DISCUSSION BETWEEN MR. THOMAS COOPER AND
MR. CHARLES BRADLAUGH.
FIRST NIGHT.
On Monday, the 1st ofFebruary, a discussion was begun at the Hail
of Science between Mr. Thomas Cooper, some time Freethinker,
and recent convert, also the well-known author of the “ Pur
gatory of Suicides,” and Mr. Charles Bradlaugh, who has, for
some years past, acquired a very wide spread reputation as lec
turer under the name of “ Iconoclast,” and has devoted the time
which is not occupied by his professional avocations in the elimi
nation of secular and religious anomalies.
The chair was occupied by James Harvey, Esq. The fo-low
ing was the order of the discussion as stated in the published
programme :—
1. Mr. Cooper to state the Argument for the Being of God, as
the Maker of the Universe, on the First Night—and the Argu
ment for the Being of God, as the Moral Governor of the Uni
verse, on the Second Night; and each statement not to extend
beyond half-an-hour.
2. Mr. Bradlaugh to state the Argument on the Negative side,
each night; and each statement not to extend beyond half-anhour.
3. Not more than a quarter of an hour to be allowed for reply
and counter-reply, to the end.
4. No written speeches to be delivered, and no long extracts
from printed books or papers to be read on either side.
5. The chair to be taken at seven o’clock, and the Discussion
to conclude, as nearly as possible, at ten, each evening.
The Chairman said : I have consented to take the chair to-night,
both by request of Mr. Cooper and some friends, and with the
consent of Mr. Charles Bradlaugh; and I think I shall have your
consent also during the discussion which takes place this evening.
You well know that the duty and power of a chairman is very
limited, being entirely confined to the preservation of order; and
unless he has the support of those over whom he presides, his
authority is of little avail. I trust, therefore, that you will listen to
the arguments that will be addressed to you to-night. There must,
of course, be great difference of opinion on every abstract question,
�2
otherwise there would be no reason for discussion ; so that every
lady and gentleman who comes here may be presumed to have
formed an opinion beforehand ; but trusting^ your forbearance, I
have no doubt that we shall be able to get through the business of
the evening without any unseemly interruption. I feel it is a very
important matter that we have under discussion, respecting not
only us who have met to take a part, but humanity in general.
It is “ Whether there be a God ?” And I hope that whatever
arguments may be adduced, you will patiently hear the
speaker to the end (hear, hear), that a speech shall not be inter
rupted in the middle of a sentence; that you will listen thought
fully and decide candidly. If we act on this principle, if we en
tertain this spirit, we shall be conscious that we have not
lost our evening. I am sure that you will hear both parties fully
out, and support any decision at which I may arrive under the
circumstances (hear, hear.) Mr. Cooper will occupy half-anhour in introducing the subject—“For the Being of God, as
Maker of the Universe, and for the Being of God as the Gover*
nor of the Universe.” Mr. Bradlaugh will then state the Argu
ment on the Negative side, and will also occupy half-an-hour.
After that each speaker will occupy a quarter of an hour, or as
much less time as he pleases. In that case, it is the more neces
sary that a speaker should not be stopped in the midst of a sen
tence which the argument may require to be completed; nor
should be be called to time at the exact moment the quarter of
an hour has elapsed. I mention this that no gentleman may
think I am dealing with one more favourably than the other. I
now call on Mr. Cooper, who will take the affirmative of each
statement, to sta*e the case on his side, but not to exceed a period
of time beyond half-an-hour. (Hear and cheers.)
Mr. Cooper then rose, and was received with cheers. He said :
Eight years have elapsed since I stood in this Hall. It was on
the 13th of February, 1856, when I told my audience that I
could not lecture on Sweden, the subject which had been an
nounced. I told them that my mind was undergoing a change.
This hall was closed against me. I need not say why. Mr. Bendall
was ill, and the Hall in John Street was shut, so I was left without
the means of earning bread. After awhile I was allowed to
go down into the cellar of the Board of Health and copy letters
—seventy words for a penny. It was drudgery, and poor Frank
Grant, who is since dead, and a well known person also since
deceased, said to me—“ Why, it is enough to madden a man like
you 1” But a man who could undergo two years’ imprisonment
in the cause of truth, was not to be deterred by drudgery. Mr.
Bendall applied to me. It was before he was struck down with
paralysis. I did not apply to him, but he came to me, and told me
I must come to this Hall. Now, during the years I lectured
�3
here, there were few men whom I respected more than Mr. Ben
dall, so I recommenced here on the 21st of September, 1856, and
concluded on the 13th of May, 1858. I began with the “ Design
Argument,” and continued to lecture in this hall for a year and
nine months. An hour was allowed for discussion. For five
years and eight months. I have maintained my convictions : one
year and eight months I was in Scotland, and four years in Eng
land. I have lectured in chapels, on platforms, in churches and
in pulpits. Owing to the kindness of Mr. Bendall. who has given
the use of this hall for two nights—this night and Wednesday night
—I am again enabled to addiess you. I am accompanied by some
Christian friends and ministers of the gospel. I assure you I
address you in the spirit of kindness, although I think some of
you have not said the best things of me, or allowed the best
things to be said of me (hear and dissent.) I come, then, out of
kindness to you to propose this argument for the being of God.
It is an argument carrying me to the very door of the proposi
tion that accompanies it, and one which I have revolved in my
mind during the five years and eight months that I have been
absent from you. It has been repeated to you so often, it has
been talked about so constantly, that there can be no mistake
about it. I am. I know that I exist; I am conscious of it. I, a
reasoning, conscious, intelligent, personal existence. But I have
not had this personal, conscious, intelligent existence very long.
I have not long existed, but something must have existed before
me. Something must have always existed ; for if there had been
never anything in existence, there must have been nothing still,
and because nothing cannot make something—something alone
makes, originates, causes something to exist. Thus far, then, I
think we are all agreed. I have said I am a personal, conscious,
intelligent existence. Now either this personal, conscious, intel
ligent existence has always existed, or it began to be. If it began
to be, it has had a cause—indeed, if it has not always existed,
but began to exist, it must have had a cause, and must have been
either intelligent or non-intelligent. But non-intelligence can
not create intelligence. You might as well tell me that the
moon is made of green cheese, or the sun of Dorset butter, that
an oak leaf is the Atlantic ocean, or that Windsor Castle is London
Bridge, as to tell me that non-intelligence can cause to exist a
thoroughly conscious, perfect intelligence. Therefore, this per
sonal, conscious intelligence is itself the result or the effect of
an intelligence pre-existing, which is the cause from which I derive
my existence, the same to which men make reference when
they speak of God. But I discern that there is everywhere
not only something that has always existed everywhere,
I discern also that there is no such a thing as “ nowhere
there never was “nowhere,” there cannot be “nowhere.”
�4
Do you feel inclined to dispute this proposition ? Try, then,
to imagine ‘nowhere.” Where will you go?—beyond the
great solar system ? You may go on for millions and
millions of miles, still there is somewhere. If you try to imagine
nowhere, you gradually begin to apprehend that there is “ every
where,” and that intelligence always has existed everywhere.
You say, then, that something has always existed everywhere.
Can you conceive of that something having existed for nothing ?
Then there is no such thing as nothing; there never was nothing ;
there never could have bern nothing. Something must always
have been, and been everywhere. If we decide thus, we have a
right to say that something is not only everywhere, but on every
point of everywhere; and if this chain of reasoning be broken,
there is no line of demarcation to separate one part from the other.
So we come to the idea of motion. I am gifted with certain
senses, and I come to discern motion by a comparison of the
relation of different objects to each other. I observe motion to
be an attribute of master. By a conscious intuition, we are able
to perceive, and, by the aid of reason, to discern that this personal
existence, this preceding cause, is everywhere present, that it is
an eternal, conscious, nnderived, uncreated, uncaused Being whom
men worship and call God. (Cheers.) So by this personal, con
scious intelligence, men have communication with, and can per
ceive the outward features of this natural universe. But this
material universe is not the something that has always existed,
because it is in parts, because it is divisible, and the parts are
moveable one among the other, and not only moveable in the
sense of motion, but separable in the sense of change. Thus
the fleshly clothing of this body is constantly changing. Our
bodies are not now the bodies we had in infancy, nor those
which we had ten years ago the same as we have now. But by
the exercise of the will, which is a part of intelligence, and thia
wifl'Ucting on matter—matter is separable and moveable. So that
man is not one underived, uncreated, eternal existence. Yet
by his intelligent will, with the assistance of his organised
body, which of itself cannot move matter, he can mould it into
various shapes and perform wonderful results—fitting, shaping,
adapting; aud although we judge by these results that a man is
exercising the power of intelligence, we cannot see him exercising
it. You never saw a man contrive. You never saw a man
design. Yon cannot see that. It is only by analogy that you
can judge of it. There are three forces by which he acts—know
ledge, consciousness, and testimony, and by the aid of these
be is constantly designing and contriving. If you come
to observe the fashion of an object, although you see no maker,
yet when you inspect it and observe the various parts of which
it is composed, their suitability and fitness for the purpose they
�fulfil, then you presume that intelligence has been at work there,
and you recognise its operation, although you could not see it
contrive or design. If I come to a piece of a fashion apparently
the most complicated, yet more remarkable when you understand
it, seeing how simple are the principles of its construction, then
is my admiration called forth. And when I look on the curiously
wrought body, and mark all its various parts ; when I examine
this eye with its wonderful lenses and pulleys, when I look over
this hand with all its wonderful contrivances of adaptation and fit
ness, as to render man lord of the endless plain and the wide
mountain--even of the universe; and still when I look on the
wonderful contrivances in the forms of the animals in creation, and
wonder at their entire adaptation to the wants of each—eyes and
lungs fitted to changes of the atmosphere, and yet so little change
in the atmosphere itself, and when I look at “ this brave over
hanging firmament fretted with golden fires,” and see their
systems extend for millions and millions of miles pursuing their
several ends, and going their refulgent round—I am filled with
thoughts which make me humble, and I come to the conclusion
that this universe has its conscious, personal, and intelligent
designer; that he exists, that he is the author of my intelligence,
that he is the author of the intelligence of the millions that sur
round me. He exists. I did not always exist, that, therefore, he
is all-intelligent, and must be the author of the universe.
Finally, that since my will has such power over matter that he
must be uncontrollable, and, therefore, all-powerful, since he has
been able to produce this universe, he is over my existence, over
your existence, and over every existence; that he is the great un
created, underived cause whom men reverence, and whom I call
God.
Mr. Cooper resumed his seat amidst very warm plaudits.
Mr. Bradlaugh rose and said : Sir, I have listened with con
siderable attention, and with some disappointment, to the brief
address which has been delivered to us in proof of the position
which Mr. Cooper has taken upon himself to affirm this evening,
which position, if I understand it rightly, is that there is an all
wise, all-existent, all powerful, underived, uncaused, personal,
conscious, and intelligent being whom he (Mr. Cooper) calls God.
If saying it amounts to proof, then undoubtedly Mr. Cooper has
demonstrated his position ; but if anything approaching to logical
demonstration be required here this evening, then I shall respect
fully submit that it has been utterly and entirely wanting in the
speech to which we have just listened. (Cheers and dissent.) Mr.
Cooper tells us that something has always existed everywhere—
some one thing, some one existence, some one being. All his
speech turns upon that. All his words mean nothing, except in
so far as they go to support that point. Just notice the conse-
�quenceg involved in the admissions contained in his affirmation
that there is only one existence. If God always was one exist
ence, one eternal, omnipresent existence, beside whom nothing
else existed, what becomes of the statement made by Mr. Cooper
to-night, that the material universe is not that infinite existence,
but exists biside it ? There are thus two existences—the one
everywhere, and the other existing somewhere, although nowhere
remains for it. The one infinite is everywhere, beyond it there
cannot be any existence, and the finite universe has to exist out
side everywhere where existence is not. I will take it to be true
as put by Mr. Cooper, that this same one existence, which has
existed everywhere from eternity, is without motion, because, as
he says, motion implies going or moving from point to point:
existence being everywhere has nowhere to go; because it is
always everywhere, and it cannot move from point to point any
where. Just see, then, the lamentable position in which he
places Deity. If Deity be everywhere, and Deity, as he puts it
to you, made the universe, if made at all, it must have been
somewhere, it cannot have been on one of the points occupied by
Deity, for Mr. Cooper would hardly argue that two existences
can occupy the same point at the same time, from which it would
result that it cannot be in everywhere, and it cannot be anywhere
else, because there is nowhere else for it. There can have been no
making, because there was nothing to be made, everything being
already in existence, and there being not the slightest vacuum
for anything more. But the difficulty is more apparent when
you come to weigh his words. Surely if the word making means
anything, it involves the notion of some act; and if so, how can
you have an action without motion ? I should, indeed, like my
friend to explain this. He has evidently some very different
notions from those which I have. I want to know how we can
have the action of making without motion. I want to know how
Deity, which as Deity has been always motionless, has ever
moved to make the universe. We will examine the position still
further. My friend says that these are arguments derivable from
the fact of consciousness, and in illustration of this, he says—“ I
exist. I am a personal, conscious, intelligent being. I have not
been always, and, therefore, there must have been some time i
when I began to be. I am intelligent^ but have not been always,
and, therefore, I must have been caused by an intelligent being,
because non-intelligence cannot originate or create intelligence.”
Whether he meant non-intelligence and intelligence as positive
existences, it is exceedingly difficult to understand, and it would
be worth while, if we are to follow out the argument, that Mr.
Cooper should explain that to you, or else you will perhaps make
some mistake about it. What does he mean, I ask, by non-intel
ligence ? So far as I understand intelligence, it is a quality of a
�4
mode of existence varying in various modes of existence, and we
only know mode of existence as finite. We cannot conceive the
quality to be infinite, which we only know as appertaining to a
mode—that is, to the finite. I want Mr. Cooper to tell me how I
can reason from such a premiss, which only regards intelligence as
a quality of mode—of the finite, up to what he puts to you as a
quality of the absolute. I confess that on a subject like this some
difference may be expected, and my opponent may rely on the
authority of great names ; but I say that I have not relinquished
my right to examine these great problems, and work out the
result if it be possible for my reason to attain them. He says,
then, that non-intelligence cannot form intelligence. I don’t
wish to make mere verbal objections, or I might put it to him
that I do not understand what he means by intelligence being
formed at all. I must trouble him to make this point as clear to
my mind as it is to himself—before such an argument will con
vince me much more is required. I have no doubt that such an
argument must have come to my friend’s mind in some clearer
form before it carried conviction to him. He says, “ This personal,
intelligent, conscious being had a cause.” Yes ! I suppose every
effect must have had a cause. He tells us that analogy is a good
guide in working out a reasonable result. He uses it himself,
but he does not mean to say that by analogy, he argues back
from effect to cause, and that, from himself, he would go back to
an uncaused cause. “What exists merely as a cause exists for
the sake of something else, and, in the accomplishment of that
end, it consummates its own existence.” “ A cause is simply
everything without which the effect would not result, and all
such concurring, the effect cannot but result.” According to
these passages from Sir William Hamilton, “that which exists
as cause exists for the sake of something else.” Effect is thus
the sequel to cause, and causes are but the means to ends. The
only way of dealing with this question of cause and effect is to
put it frankly that every cause of which we can take cognisance,
is, at the same time, effect and cause, and that there is no cause
on which we can lay a finger, that is not the effect of cause pre*
cedent, to it—yon have an unbroken chain. I defy my friend to
maintain the proposition that, without discontinuity, there can
be origination. If he doesnot, his argument falls to the ground. But
I really labour under considerable difficulty arising from the fact
that my friend has used a large number of words and terms without
explaining to you or to me what he meant by them ? I really
must trouble him by pleading my ignorance as to the meaning
which he attaches to the word uncaused caudb, for I frankly allow
that my reason doesinot enable me to comprehend the word un
caused as applied to existence. I conceive existence only modal
of existence itself—the absolute I cannot conceive. I am not
'
&
1
a
1
I
1
�8
enabled by my reason to go beyond modes of existence. I am
not able by the aid of my intelligence to go beyon'd phenomena,
and so reach the noumenon. Until he has enabled me to attach to
these words, which he has used so gliby, a meaning of a definite
kind, I must confess my inability to appreciate his reasoning.
He would say that there is non-intelligence as well as intelli
gence. If he does not mean that, his words have no meaning. He
has said that non-intelligence could not produce intelligence.
That God by his will caused it. But how if intelligence be
everywhere—infinite, one, eternal—if you cannot limit its dura
tion in point of time or its extent in point of space, if it is so in
definite that to follow it as far as the faintest trace of it can be
observed, it is. infinitely intelligent, how can you talk about
non-intelligence at all ? If intelligence is everywhere, then nonintelligence is not possible. My friend worked up his argument
to a strange sort of climax, that the personal, conscious, eternal,
infinite, omnipotent, intell'gent being was what most men wor
shipped and called God. I take exception to that, and say that
the word God does not, in the mind of any one, express that, and
that in the minds of the majority of men it exprtsses something
very different from that. Indeed, so far as I have been able to
ascertain, the great mass of human kind have precisely opposite
notions when they are using the word God. All their ideas
concerning God comprehend the idea of human and fallible
action, and are held in connection with creeds involving contra
dictions innumerable. The word God is the result of old tradi
tions coming from one generation to another, from father to son,
from generation to generation. In no case is it the out-growth
of the unaided intelligence of the man who makes use of it. To
put it further. I say there are no two men who use the word
God in the same sense, and that it is a mere term which expresses
no fixed idea. It does not admit the preciseness of a definition,
nor can it be explained with an accuracy to admit the test of in
quiry. The idea expressed by the word bears in most cases some
relation to what has gone before, and is useful when appealing
to the popular mind to cover deficiencies in the illogical argu
ments addressed to it to account for the universe. Our friend
passed from the argument from consciousness to what is generally
known as the argument from design. He said that, having seen
the result of man’s contrivance, if he met with a piece of work
fashioned after a peculiar mariner with a view to a particular end,
he should expect from analogy some contriver for it. But sup
pose he had never seen any result of contrivance at all—how
much would his argument help him ? In that case he must en
tirely fail, and in this how little does design help him here ? To
affirm origination from design of already existing substance, and
by analogy it is only of this he can give us any illustration, in
�9
volves a manifest contradiction. The argument distinguishes not
the absolute from the material, the conditioned. It is the finite
which he tells you is God, and yet cannot be God. There is
an utter want of analogy. It is impossible to reason from design
of that which is already existing, and thus to prove the creation
of that which before did not exist. There is not a particle of
analogy between these two propositions. But further, if it were
needful to argue on it, if our friend had put before you the
design argument, it is still utterly wanting as an argument for
an infinite Deity, being "one entirely from analogy. Analogy
cannot demonstrate the infinite wisdom, or the infinite, the
eternal existence of God. It cannot demonstrate infinity of sub
stance, for to reason from finite effects as illustrations, analogy
only takes you back by steps each time a little way, and to a
finite cause. To assert an origin is simply to break a chain of
causes and effects without having any warrant for it, except to
cover your own weakness. The argument falls with this; you
cannot demonstrate the infinity of Deity ; for, admitted a finite
effect, how can you from it deduce an infinite cause ? Thus the
omnipresence of Deity remains unproved. If the substance of
Deity cannot be demonstrated infinite, neither can his attributes;
so that, so far as the proof goes, his wisdom and power may be
limited ; that is, there is no evidence that he is either omniscient
or omnipotent. When our friend talks about having, proved an
all-powerful, all-wise self-existence, he simply misrepresents
what he has tried to do, and he should not use a phrase which
does not, and cannot bear the slightest reference to the argu
ment. So far, then, we take exception to the speech which he
has given us to-night. By whatever means my friend has at
tained his present conclusions, he must surely have gained the
convictions upon some better ground than those which he has
expressed here to-night, unless, indeed, we are to suppose him. to
have changed without any reasoning at all. (Cheers.) I wish,
before concluding, to point out to you that in the position I
have taken up I do not stand here to prove that there is no God.
If I should undertake to prove such a proposition, I should de
serve the ill words of the oft-quoted psalmist applied to those
who say there is no God. I do not say there is no God, but I
am an Atheist without God. To me the word God conveys no
idea, and it is because the word God, to me, never expressed a
clear and definite conception—it is because I know not what it
means—it is because I never had sufficient evidence to compel
my acceptance of it, if I had I could not deny it—such evidence,
indeed, I could not resist—it is for these reasons that I am
Atheist, and ask people to believe me not hypocrite but honest,
when I wtell them that the word “ God ” does not, to my
mind, express an eternal, infinite, omnipotent, intelligent, per
�10
Sonal, conscious being, but is a word without meaning and of
none effect, other than that it derives from the passions and
prejudices of those who use it. And when I look round the
world, and find in one country a church with one faith, in another
country, another creed, and in another a system contradicting
each—no two men agreeing as to the meaning of the word—but
cursing, clashing, quarrelling, and excommunicating on account
of its meaning, relying on force of arms rather than on force of
reason—I am obliged to suppose that deficiency of argument has
left them no other weapon with which to meet the power of
reason. In this brief debate, it would be folly to pretend while
we may combat the opposite opinion we shall succeed in con
vincing each other; but let me ask that to which ever side we
may incline, we may use our intelligence as free from pre
judice as possible, so that we may better understand what
force of each other’s reasonings. Let us agree, it we can, in the
clear and undoubted meaning expressed in the terms we use.
There was a time when men bowed before the word God with
out thought and without inquiry. Centuries have gone by, and
the great men of each age have cast light on what was hitherto
dark. Philosophy has aided our intelligence, and stripped from
the name of God much of the force which it had previously held.
It is in the hope that this progress of human thought may be
more rapid and of higher use, and that, from out of debate, fresh
truths may be gained, that it may teach men to rely upon them
selves, and so make their lives better the longer they live.. It is
with this hope that I have taken the position of to-night.
Mb. Bradiaugh resumed his seat amidst general applause, and
some manifestations of dissent, which lasted for several seconds.
Mr. Cooper : I am very sorry to see all that—I am very sorry
to hear it. I do not want any man to clap his hands for me. I
came here to reason. I did not come here simply to meet Mr.
Bradlaugh. I wished to see appointed representative men. It
is to them and to you that I want to speak. I have nothing to
do with Mr. Bradlaugh’s personal opinions. He says he is not
here to take the negative—to prove the non-existence of God. If
he reads the bill which I hold in my hand, it will tell him that
Mr. C. Bradlaugh will take the negative. But he says he is not
here to take the negative—that he is not here to produce an
argument that there is no God. He knows nothing about God.
(Hear and cheers.) Now, what is the meaning of that cheer ?
(Cries of go on with your argument.) Now, I am afraid it is of no
use : you are not disposed to argue—to reason, but the argument
remains, notwithstanding—(cries of question.) This is the ques
tion. I want you to be less excited. We are here to form some
opinion as to the truth, and not to be crowing over ^ch other.
Mr. Bradlaugh said that I said there was only one existence
�11
always—T never said eo. Then, according to him, “he talked
about millions of existences without motion.” But I said with
out motion such as matter has. I suppose the meaning of what
he said was, There may be many kinds of motion beside the
motion of matter.” Then Mr. Bradlaugh said that I talked of
more than one existence being on one point. There may be a
thousand existences on one point for anything that I know. I
do not know why there cannot be only one existence on one point,
I did not say there could be only one existence on one point.
Expressions of the kind I never used. Then, he said, action
implies motion; but what I Baid was, that God had no motion
such as matter. He was kind enough to tell us what existence
and non-existence were—what intelligence and non-intel
ligence meant—but I thought we all knew these things pretty
well before. Then, he says, existence is a quality of a mode. Man,
he says, is fiuite; he cannot perceive that existence can be infinite.
That is a kind of Spinozaism. I wish he would tell me what he
means by “mode.” He says that I said non-intelligence could
form intelligence. I never used such a word—(cries of oh ! oh!)
I never said anything so nonsensical—(loud cries of oh ! oh !) I
said that non-intelligence could not create—that it could not
originate. I never used the word form. Then again, “ Analogy
was a good guide ”—but he said no more about that, and then ha
quoted Sir W. Hamilton to the effect, that cause was that with
out which effect would not result. “ There is no cause,” he says,
“ on which you can lay a finger, aud not say that it is both cause
and effect,” and he defies me to break the chain of causation
cause and effect I suppose he means. He next quotes from Samuel
Taylor Coleridge, a passage which says—there is an infinite chain
of finite things. Why, it is an utter contradiction. Every man
has intelligence enough to perceive that. What we mean by
uncognised is that there is something unknown, uncognised if
you please. There can be no question about that. He com
plains of the time being taken up with such words, and he goes
on to say—“ My reason does not enable me to comprehend the
uncognised.” Certainly it don’t. More than that, I am very
sorry he cannot comprehend it. But there are many things which
we cannot comprehend. The light for instance. We cannot com
prehend what it is to be everywhere present, but we apprehend
it. There are millions of things which we cannot comprehend,
but we can apprehend them. Then, he says, we talk about nonmtelligence and intelligence, because he contends God does not
exercise any amount of ability. Among men, he says, God means
something that is traditional, and which has no reason to support
it. That has nothing to do with the question. Suppose, he says,
I had never seen the result of design—how could I, by the help
of reason, arrive at it ? It cannot, he says, be. No cause, he sayq
�12
can exist without causing a result. The result of design is part
of our intelligence and experience. There is a modification of
existence only—it is not proved that everywhere existed. But
Mr. Bradlaugh knows that existence is being, and he knows, he
says, that, unless you can substantiate the assertion that it has
always existed, it does not show that he was all-wise. We reason
from this personal, conscious intelligence of man, to the fact that
God had created millions of conscious, intelligent beings—that he
was the author of all existence—that he was intelligent—we do
not reason from man’s finite nature. We see in the manifestations
of his will the type of a higher will, of a nature that is supremacy.
The argument is untouched. Something has always existed, as
personal, conscious, intelligent beings exist—either intelligence or
non-intelligence must have produced them : but non-intelligence
cannot create, cannot originate. You might as well tell me that
there is no such thing as existence, as to try by sneers, and ask
ing me what I mean by intelligence, to say that God does not
exist. I say that I exist—that the world exists—that God made
it. We have come here to establish this. We come here to
reason for the existence of God. It is of no use to say that there
was never nothing to make it out of. Our argument is mistaken.'
Mr. Bradlaugh has not taken up the argument. The bill is
before me in which he is stated to take the negative, but he
has not taken the negative; he simply says he knows not whether
there is a God or not. (Cheers.)
Mr. Bradlaugh : We want the argument for the existence of
God! He (Mr. Cooper) is quite right. We do want it. We
have not had it yet. He says I am bound to prove a negative,
and relies on the wording of the bill. This is hardly fair. The bill
is Mr. Cooper’s own fram ng, unaltered by me. I only tried to
have one word different, and that was refused.
Mr Cooper : You should not want to hide your name.
[Some disorder occurred at this point of the debate, when]—
The Chairman interposed and said : I beg that no reference
may be made to anything which might lead to any wrong feeling.
Mr Bradlaugh : My friend, if he wishes the argument ad- ■
hered to, should have himself made no reference to matters which
were altogether beside it. Let him remember what is the
subject chosen for discussion, and adhere to that alone. He says
that, according to the bill, I am to take the negative side. It
has been my lot in life to be present at the trial of many issues, but I
never heard that the defendant had more to do than rebut the
case sought to be made against him. I will take, as example, an
instance, such as when a man had stolen any article, or committed
some act for which he might incur penalties. It was the duty of
the counsel employed in such a case simply to negative the
evidence which was brought to support the case. The onus pro-
�13
bandi to-night lies with my friend, and the only task that lies
upon me here is to show that he has not succeeded in performing
the duty which he came here to perform. He has declined to
explain certain terms used by him, on the ground that everybody
knew them. Surely he might have enlightened my ignorance;
and, at any rate, he had no right to assume that everybody un
derstood them after my declaration to the contrary. He has used
words on the construction of which the whole argument depends,
and he has failed to explain to us the meaning he intended to ex
press. He might have enlightened my ignorance as to the mean
ing of words he used ; but, instead of that, he has called on me
by way of retort to explain some words used by myself. Now,
by “mode,” I mean a phase of conditioned existence. This glass is
cne mode Of existence, and the water, which I have poured out of
it, is another mode of existence. “ Quality” is an attribute or
characteristic. It is some characteristic, or number of charac
teristics, which enables or enable me to distinguish one mode
from another. If he wishes any better explanation that it is
possible to give, I shall be happy to supply him with it. When
he was asked for explanations, he said it was sufficient that he
had said it. Now if non-intelligence cannot create intelligence,
how do you come to the conclusion that intelligence can create
non-intelligence ? Why is one less possible than the other, or
why is one less reasonable than the other ? If intelligence be
everywhere, then non-intelligence—where is that ? In this kind
of argument, by asserting without warranty that intelligence is
everywhere, and non-intelligence somewhere, you contradict your
self. Then, my friend says, “create” is a word everybody under
stands. He confesses that he did not understand me in quoting
from Hamilton, or when I urged that creation and destruction
were alike impossible. Now we are utterly unable to construe it
in thought as possible, that the complement of existence has
either been increased or diminished—we cannot conceive no
thing becoming something, or something becoming nothing.
The words creation and destruction are, to me, without mean
ing. When our friend uses these words, he should not pre
sume that the majority of the audience comprehend the
meaning he wished to put upon them, or still less that they
apprehended it- He says he does not come to speak to me but to
you; but, for such as have elected me to appear on their
behalf, I ask for those definitions. But Mr. Cooper says he
never did assert that there was only one existence always. Well,
then, does he mean that his argument admitted the possibility of
two existences occupying the same space ? And if one be every
where, where can the other be 1 Oh ! says my friend, there may
be a thousand existences of different natures on one point, though,
if one be all-powerful, it is hard to imagine it exercising power
�14
over other existences having nothing of common nature, and
with which it can have no relativity. Will he tell me how this
can be ? He puts the matter thus to you, and he is bound to
give you some explanation of it. He says, with regard to
motion, that he did not say that one existence had no motion. I
must trouble him, when he rises again, to tell me what he means
by motion, for I really do not know. I thought I had some
notion of it when he began his speech, but now I think he has no
meaning for it. I am bound to concede to him that the words
represent in his mind some ideas he intends to express; but
when I question him on the words he uses, they represent simply
confusion of thought. When I ask him the meaning of uncaused
cause, he says he cannot comprehend it, but can apprehend it like
light and life ; and he asserted that you can no more comprehend
light and life that you can uncaused cause. If he wished to
choose illustrations destructive of his own argument, he could
not have adduced one better adapted to that purpose. He says
that I cavil with words, but the argument is made up of words.
If you knock all these words to pieces, where does the argument
lie 1 If there be your uncaused cause at all, according to you it
is substance, which substance I define as being that existence
which we can conceive per se, and the conception of which does
not involve the conception of any thing else as antecedent to it.
Life may be defined as organic functional activity. You cannot
give any definition of uncaused cause—you might as well say a
square triangle, or a triangular circumference, or sweet number
three. Now, I am placed in this difficulty, that Mr. Cooper,
not prepared to prove his position, calls on me to take up the
attack. We want, he says, the demonstration of God’s non-existence. There is always a great difficulty in trying to do too
much ; but I will endeavour to do what is possible—i.e., to demon
strate to you that there is no such being as the God my friend
argues for—namely, a God everywhere, whose existence being in
finite, precludes the possibility of conceiving any other ex’stence,
but in proof of whom is involved the conception of another
existence created in addition to everything, and which exists
somewhere beyond everywhere—a God who, being infinitely
intelligent, precludes the possibility of conceiving existence with
out intelligence, and yet beside whose infinite intelligence, nonintelligent substance exists. Nothing is easier than to prove the
negative of this, if that is what my friend means. I will endea
vour, for a moment, to do so. I may be ineffective. Our friend
says that God is all-powerful and all-wise. Now either intelli
gence manifests power and wisdom, or it does not. My lriend
says that it does, because he seeks to demonstrate power and
wisdom from the intelligence he discovers in existence. Surely
if it be assumed that intelligence is evidence of power and
�15
wisdom, the lack of or absence of intelligence must be evidence
ot deficiency of power and wisdom. My friend says there is nonintelligence, and I say that non-intelligence demonstrates want
of power and want of wisdom in creating substance without in
telligence. Intelligence is either good or bad. Our friend savs
it is good because it helps him to make out God’s attribute of ail
goodness. If it is good, then the absence of intelligence must be
the reverse; and if non-intelligence is bad, it must be that the
Creator either had not the will or desire to make existence infi
nitely intelligent. My friend says that there is non-intelligent
existence, and he says that God had all-power and all-knowledge.
God must, therefore, have been without the desire, in which case
he would not be all-good. Our friend says I have misquoted
Coleridge. Coleridge says, without discontinuity, there can be
no origination, and my argument is that you are lost in the con
templation ot the chain of causes and effects, and that you can have
no conception of creation or of origination, and, therefore, must
be without the conception of God. (Cheers.)
Me. Cooper : Mr. Bradlaugh has told us that it has been his
lot in life to be at the trial of many issues. Now we are not
lawyers, and cannot say how far this experience may serve the
argument. My friend said there was one word which he had tried
to get in the bill. He should never put on a great hat, and put
on a great name if he did not earn it. I never called myself by
a great name in my life. If I have had a name, I was content
to receive it from others. I never called myself either Icono
clast or I fiddlestick—(Cries of order, oh I oh 1 and cheers.)
Well, if you do not like this, you should not have encouraged it.
He says I should have enlightened his ignorance. I have often
stooped to enlighten him. When he was only a boy here of
eighteen years old, I had marked out his course. He asks how
we come to the conclusion that non-intelligence does not create.
I did not think that Charles Bradlaugh would have asked a ques
tion of that kind, I thought he had more sense. I did not sup
pose that any one in this assembly—any man of common-sense,
had need to ask such question. I said I should teach him. I am
doing my best to teach him. “ Everybody cannot judge well the
reason why he contrives.” But I should have thought that all
reasonable men would have seen that clearly enough. They
have personal intelligence. But, then, he says non-intelli rence
annihilates intelligence which is everywhere. That is not so.
He says also that creation is a word without any meaning for
him. It means, however, an act of God—of the great existence.
But he wants definitions; and, again, he says since there has been
that intelligence existing everywhere, there must have been two
existences occupying the same space. I never indicated such an
argument in the slightest way. I simply spoke of all other
�16
existences being moved, separate from, and derived. I have not
spoken those words that have been imputed to me. I never
said such words. He wants to know what is the motion of
matter. He cannot conceive what matter is and what is motion.
But why has he been talking about motion if he does not understand
it ? He has given us his ideas of motion. He fails to perceive
what is matter, and what is meant by the motion of matter.
But there is matter enough in this room—there is matter enough
before us. If he does not understand what is meant, I go further
and ask what it is ? I am. to understand by a definition which
he has given of life, that it is organic functional activity. He
has explained to me that this was life. He said the remark that
it was uncognised cause, could not be apprehended. Will he
define what he means by organic functional activity? He is
not bound to believe me, but if he does not give some more pre
cise explanation, it simply comes to nothing. He has not come
to any conclusion. He says there cannot be an uncognised cause ;
that it is as unmeaning as a triangular square, or a triangular
circumference, or sweet number three. He has mentioned Sir
William Hamilton and others. I should have relied upon
such men as Butler, Sir Isaac Newton, L .eke, Samuel
Clarke.
When these great men spoke, I should have
thought it might be admitted that it would do. ’ Oh I no.
This was certainly a modest way of talking. Well, it was the
wrong way. It is the wrong sort of modesty. He says I have
endeavoured to prove the possibility of any other existence. I
have not. I have proved that something also is in existence—that
it must be intelligent, and must exist in part everywhere. Stop.
Take the argument—take hold of it—take it to pieces. It con
vinces my own mind. It has passed through my mind fully and
clearly. I said that God was all-powerful and wise. I do not
want to misrepresent, but I want to tell you what Mr. Bradlaugh
did say, and my reply to it. He says that either there is
everywhere intelligence, or that there is somewhere where there
is no intelligence. He says that non-intelligence cannot create
intelligence. He says that in some part of everywhere, there is
non-intelligence. Because I had said that non-intelligence exists,
he denies that God exists everywhere intelligent. But he
must be intelligent, because he created all the intelligence
that exists—because He created every derived intelli
gence. Now, with regard to the moral argument of God’s
goodness, we have nothing to do with that to-night. If we come
to that, it must be on Wednesday. Then his goodness as a moral
governor of the universe comes into question. Now, I did not
say that Mr. Bradlaugh had misquoted Coleridge, What I said
was, that Coleridge never taught me that an infinite chain of
finite intelligences could have existed. I say that Samuel Taylor
�17
Coleridge never maintained any such thing in his life. Coleridge
was a great believer in God. (Hear and laughter.) No sneer or
laughter, I assure you, disturbs me. I exist ; and I have not al
ways existed. Something has always existed. I am conscious
of an intelligent existence. If it began to be, it was caused to be
by some other existence, and must have been so caused. If any
person can persuade himself that non-intelligence can cause
existence, intelligent, personal, conscious existence, let him show
me that he believes, and that he maintains such a doctrine. I
need go no further at present—-there are just these steps in the
j argument. Here is the argument, and if our friend does not give
us the argument for the non-existence of God—that is, the nega
tive of the question—I have shown that I exist, and that, having
begun to exist, something must have existed before me. I am
intelligent, personal, conscious, and so the something which al
ways has existed was personal, conscious, intelligent. It has
always been or began to be. If it began to be, it has cause, and
the cause must be either intelligent or non-intelligent. I say
that non-intelligence cannot be an intelligent creator, an origina
tor, has no reason, will, judgment, can’t contrive, cannot be a cause.
Therefore, I know that my existence, that personal, conscious, in
telligent existence proceeds from that uncaused, underived, un
created intelligence, whom all men reverence and I call God. I
want that disproved. (Applause.)
Mr. Bradlaugh: Were the Danes and the Germanic forces
on either bank of the river Eider to turn their backs to each
other and fire, they would stand in about the same relation as
Mr. Cooper and myself. He will not give definitions, and he
attaches different meanings to the words he uses to those which
I attach to them. How are we, therefore, to arrive at any con
clusion that will be instructive or useful ? He says that he has
often been able to teach me, and if this is so, he should not
have relinquished the office of teacher to-night; but I confess that
if he has taught me, it has been at the greatest possible distance
between himself and myself. The opportunities have certainly
been often sought by myself for instruction at Mr. Cooper’s
hands, but I have only been favoured once or twice. My friend
urges that he does not put himself forward under a name he has
not won, and though these topics have but little to do with
to-night’s debate, I can say that I have fairly won the right to
use my nom de guerre Iconoclast. I have won fame for it with
d fficulty, and maintained my right to use it despite many a pang.
My opponent, though but one consequence can arise from his
stipulation, has compelled me to print my name—that consequence
is an increased difficulty in my business life. But for this I
do not care. Though, unfortunately, placed in this disadvantage,
I print my name and answer for myself, although I am really
�18
surprised that a man with the love of God and strength of truth,
with ability, with learning all upon his side, cannot allow me
my poor folly, if folly it be, and bear with me and my nom de
plume. He says, “ I will not give definitions.” I say, in reply,
you cannot—that you do not know the force and relevance of the
words you use, and you simply don’t tell us because you do not
know. I tell you in the clearest manner that, from your last
speech, you have no notion of the accurate meanings of the
words you used—you talk about “ other and separate, and
derived,” and seem not to know that the words are contradictory.
Derived existence must be relative, cannot be separate iu sub
stance. At least a teacher in using philosophic language to a
scholar ought to have put it more clearly. Let us see. He says
there is one existence, infinite, intelligent. He says everybody
knows that it is more possible for intelligence to create nonintelligence, than for non-intelligence to create intelligence. I say
sthis has no meaning. I defined intelligence as a quality of a
|mode of existence, and cannot understand quality creating subIstance. He has not told us what was meant by uncaused cause;
|and if he will not take intelligence to be a quality of a mode of
| existence, he has not told us what it is. He says there is intel| ligent existence now, therefore its cause is intelligent. You
j might as well tell us for our information that this glass is hard,
| and, therefore, its cause must be a hard existence, and then you
I might as fairly say that because that glass is hard, its cause is
i eternal hardness. There is no relevance whatever between argu| ments founded on phenomena and the noumenon which it is
sought to demonstrate. It is no use my friend denying the
> truth of any one definition, unless he is prepared to give us a
I better, so that you can compare the one with the other if you please.
? Our friend says that intelligence can create non-intelligence, but
| this involves a contradiction of the most striking character. For
I if intelligence is infinite, non-intelligence is impossible, and for
1 infinite intelligence to create non-intelligence is for it to annihi* late itself. My friend appeals to everybody’s knowledge, but the
I whole force of his appeal lies in his confusion of existence and its
J qualities. Intelligence is a quality of a mode—mode is neither ing finite nor eternal, and the attribute cannot be greater than the
I mode it pertains to. You can have no knowledge of existence
§ other than by mode, and can have no knowledge whatever of
I different existences of which one is all-powerful, all-wise, and
| everywhere present; and the other is, or others are, somewhere
| where this one is not. My friend calls on me to prove that difg ferent kinds of existence do not exist at the same time upon the
1 same point. I think it is for the man who talks about these
| existences, and not for me, to show what he means. By Creation
s Mr. Cooper says he means an act of God; if this is what “ create -
�19
*
*
*
>
means, and if he explains it to you in such terms, then is every act
of God a creation ? Our friend surely won’t say that, and if he
means some one particular act of God, he must enable me to
identify it. I am not dealing with the moral argument as to God
as Governor, but if the argument on design as manifesting intel
ligence is relevant, so far it strikes at the want of power,
want of wisdom of God. Is it not an illustration of the poverty
of my friend’s logic, and the weak efforts that are made to sustain a weak case, when an argument is attempted to be conveyed
in such terms as I fiddlestick (cheers), although a pretty tune
might be played on it ? He says he does not know what I
mean by organic functional activity, and asks me to explain.
Well, suppose I could not tell, that would not explain what is an
uncaused cause, I will, however, try to show that I have not
given an improper definition of life. By organic functional activity,
I mean the totality of activity resulting from or found with the
functions of each organism. My friend comprehends that which I
term organism in the vegetable and animal kingdom. If he tells
me that he does not know what I mean by organism, I can
only refer him by way of illustration to the organism of a tree or
of a man ; and by organism I mean the totality of parts of such
tree or man. It is possible that a better versed man than my
self might make this more clear; but it is not for my friend to
shelter himself under my want of knowledge, and to say he will
not give definitions while he requires them from me. Well,
he says, “ I exist; something has existed. It has not existed
always. It has been originated.” I take exception to the word.
I do not understand the word origin in reference to existence.
He says he will not define it. I do not know whether he means
by origination coming into existence where it was before. If so,
I tell him that the conception of this is impossible, that the ap
prehension of it is impossible, that he has used a form of words
which convey nothing of meaning either to you or to me. But
when we tell him that we do not understand an uncaused
cause, he says he don’t understand a scholar without modesty.
Well, then, Locke understood it, he says, and a great many other
great names understood it. Will he tell us how they understood it 1
Surely I have a right to ask him how they apprehended it. He
uses the phrase, and I have surely a right to assume the onus of
proof to be with him. When he does not or will not give us a
lefinition, I believe it is because he cannot. If he has a great
-esson to teach, I cannot suppose that he would be guilty of the
folly of withholding from you all the information that he had, or
could obtain ; but I am bound to suppose it is from his utter
inability to give you any, that he is wholly unprepared, either
with facts or arguments. If intelligence be a quality of mode,
then in so putting it you have entirely overridden the question of
�intelligence as existence, or as infinite attribute of existence. It
is for my friend to make clear his position to you. I know
that to many of you it may seem mere word play, but it is word
play which strikes at the root of the question. What does he
mean, when he says there may be a thousand existences beside
God 1 Does he mean that there may be a thousand existences
scattered and separate ? What does separate mean? It means clear
from, and distinct, and having no link in common with. If there
are a thousand such existences separate, then God is not infinite ;
and if not, our friend’s argument comes to nothing. I find it
difficult to see how my friend can understand that he has proved
his case. I find it more difficult still to conceive how holding at
one period other opinions, he could have been carried away from
those other opinions by such arguments as these. Surely we have
a. right to ask him to make this matter as clear to us as it is to
himself. The argument which convinced him, should convince
us, each individual here. God is personal ? What does this word
personal mean in relation to the infinite 1 God conscious ? Con
scious of what ? Has he an immutable consciousness? Was he
always conscious of the existence of the universe ?—that is, did
he know it to exist before it was created, or has his consciousness
been modified by the creation?
Was God conscious of the
material universe when it yet was not ? If yes, how could he
e know a thing to be which was not yet in being ? If God’s consciousness was once without the fact of the universe, and if God’s
f ‘ consciousness is capable of change, what becomes of the immu| tability of God ? Tell me how it was supplemented since ; tell me
| how something has been added since? You dexterously play
| with terms which you cannot explain, and hope to affirm by asser
tion what you cannot demonstrate by argument. (Cheers.)
Me. Cooper: I have a note about teaching Mr. Bradlaugh. Well,
I am teaching him now, I cannot help it. He d;d not care ! Well,
a quee” word that for young lads. I do not wonder that he is
unfortunate. Most people are unfortunate who do not care. He is
unfortunate, now where is the worst misfortune, I cannot say.
One does not like to talk about these things. Well, he wants to
know why he should be compelled to believe in God, and why
his little folly should not be granted to him ? Well, he wil find
that out some day (cheers and hisses), he must expect it (renewed
expressions of dissent); now do not get into a bad temper ; he
complains that he cannot demonstrate, that I do not know the
use of the terms I use. Then he says derived from, and separate
cause. Really, I thought I saw a great many persons sepa
rate from one another before me, and we separate from them. I
cannot understand this curious kind of definition. I cannot.
Then again, intelligence is a quality of personal, conscious
existence. Well, I spoke of it so. You may call it an attribute,
�or use the word how you please. Why did I say that God could
create ? Because his will must be all powerful. I was talking of
our intelligence, of our will. We have intelligence. I talked about
the power of man’s will as a part of bis personal, conscious, and
intelligent existence. It is therefore a power in G d, and must
be uncontrollable. That power, therefore, must be all powerful.
I have not confused the quality of existence. I never did. But
I want Mr. Bradlaugh to answer the arguments adduced. The
question, he says, is an attribute or mode, and not of existence.
What is the meaning of that ? I said it was not an argument for
to-night. For the moral argument,*lhe right time will be Wednes
day night. I said we must not bring it on to-night. I said it ia
impossible for a thing to come into exis ence when it was not
before. Has he not come into existence, and have not millions of
people come into existence where they were not before ? Now, I
do not know whatryou mean by this :—“ Is it reasonable to sup
pose something separate over which no power can be exercised ?
That glass is separate from me, aad yet I can exercise power over
it.” (Cries of prove it, cheers and dissent). I wish you would rea
son and would not clap your hands. If you do, I can only say
it is sheer nonsense. What does personal, eternal, infinite consci usness mean ? Has God’s consciousness ever changed ? All
things are present to his mind, and always must have been
present to him from his very nature. But I must ask my friend
what life is. He has not made me to comprehend what life is,
although he defines it as organic functional activity. There is no
man can comprehend life. What is man’s life ? What is angel life ?
—it is in vain to tell me about organic functional activity—what is
vegetable life ? And now, since you twit me with absence of
duration where it was never before, am I to understand that in
telligence is a quality of mode, and not a quali y of substance, or
that separate means something over which no power can
be exercised ? Where is the sense of it ? How am I to understand
it? I believe now I have mentioned every thing of importance.
Mr. Bradlaugh : My friend’s last question is, where was the
sense of it ? If it applies to his own speech, I will tell him nowhere—
it really displayed none from beginning to-end. Our friend must
have ability to know the difference between unconditioned exist
ence and modal existence; or if he has not the ability he
is not justified in championing the cause for which he is argu
ing. What he argues for, is not conditioned existence, but for
God, the absolute. If he does know for what he is arguing, or
knows and will not explain—or if he has not the ability to define
my terms, he should not have come here to teach you. In other
words, he should not, if wise, pretend to an ignorance which seta
before us incoherent statements like those he has made in lieu of
the proof he was bound to furnish. I will show you presently
�22
how little he was able to take the part as affirming the being of God
as maker of the universe; and how much he attempts to conceal
in taking that part. He says that God is immutable, and all
(things are now present to him, and ever have been present to
; him. He says this must have been according to God’s very
i nature, but he did not trouble us with a word of reason for this
I startling statement. His affirmation is, that God was as equally
I conscious of the universe before the creation, as after. But to
| say there was a time when the material universe did not exist, f
? and yet that at that time God was conscious of its existence—is »
absurd, and an utter contradiction. How could God be conscious !
that the universe was when it was not ? The phrase is so ludicrously
self-contradictory, that my friend could not have thought at all
when he u*tered it. If God were at any time without conscious
ness of the material universe, and afterwards became conscious
of the new fact of the origination or creation of the universe,
then there was a change in God’s consciousness, which could
not be immutable, as my friend contends. It would be supple
mented by the new fact. I cannot understand what he means
when he talks of the immutability of God’s consciousness being
a necessity of his nature. Surely such a word as nature implies
the very reverse of immutability. And if not, I should be glad
to know in what meaning my friend used a word which in com
mon acceptation implies constant mutation. In dealing with
the question of separate existence, Mr. Cooper says, that you and
I are separate from each other. We are separate modes of the
same existence, but are not separate existences. Does he mean
that the universe is separate from God in the same way that we
are from each other ? If not, this is a subterfuge. He does not
seem to know himself where the sense of his argument lies.
Then he says, “ I am separate from this glass, but I can exerc se power over it.” Here is the illustration of mode—of mode,
in whica there is common substance, common existence, but it
is not an illustration having any analogy. It is only because
he will not think that there is a difference between relative and
absolute terms, or see that we are each using words in opposite
senses. This discussion is degenerating into talk on one side, and
repetition on the other. He says again he is an existence, I say '
he is a mode of existence. I have already defined existence as ’
identical with that substance, which is that which exists per se, ■
and the conception of which does not involve the conception of
an.y other existence as antecedent to it. Mr. Cooper has not dis
puted this definition. He claims for God such existence, and yet
says he himself is an existence. If he means that he is a separate
existence from God—if he says that he is separate and exists
per se, then I do not, I repeat, understand his meaning. I want
an explanation from him. He cannot exist per se, for he says
�23
that he did not always exist, He cannot urge that he came
into existence from himself, or he would argue that he existed,
and did not exist at the same time. His existence can only be
conceived relatively as a mode of existence, such existence
being in truth before its mode, and existing after this mode shall
have ceased. He is not existence, but only a condition of exist
ence, having particular attributes by which he is distinguished
from other conditions of the same existence. He says that it is
nonsense when two men stand on the same platform to discuss an
important matter, and use the same words in a different sense’.
It is undoubtedly nonsense, when one of the disputants passes
over all the definitions of the words without disputing them, or
supplying others. Does he mean to say that he admits the defini
tions I have given ? If he does, the way he speaks of them clearly
shows that his arguments are based on, and prove only modes of
existence, and do not prove existence absolute, so that he has
admitted the whole point for which I am contending (cheers).
He says separate existences can exercise power over each other.
I ask him to show me how, because I have told him it is im
possible to think of two existences distinct and independent of each
other—that it is equally impossible to conceive that two sub- ,
stances having nothing in common, can be the cause of or affect Eone another. He says then that man’s will has furnished him t
with the basis for arguing for God’s power. He reasons up to the |
will of God from the will of man. But if man’s will be, as 1?
declare it to be, the result of causes compelling that will, and
if God’s will is to be fairly taken as analogical to man’s will, then|
God’s will also results from causes compelling his will. But in
this case, the compelling cause must be more powerful than God,
and thus the supremacy of God’s power is destroyed (cheers). &
I know that in this it is possible I may be arguing beside |
the question, because our friend does not take reasonable pains |
to make any explanation as to the value which he attaches to =
the meaning of his words. Le* us see how his demonstration
breaks down:—God’s will and consciousness are identified by
my friend. God’s consciousness, according to him, has never
changed, and never can change. God belore creation must have
been conscious that he intended to create, but if his conscious-,
ness has never changed, he must have been always intending to ;
create, and the creation could never have commenced. Or, Gocl .
must have been always conscious that he had created, iD which
case there never could have been a period when he had yet to
create. He must either at some time have been conscious that
the material universe did not exist, or he must have been con
scious that it always existed. In the last case, there could be no
creation ; and in the first, if God’s consciousness were unchangedJ j
the universe would not yet exist to him. I am not responsible?;
�24
for the peculiar absurdity of this sentence. God either always
willed to make, or he never willed to make. But he could not
have always willed to make, because otherwise there would have
been some time in existence preceding the act of making, which
there could not have been, because God is immutsne, and could
not have changed—there could never have been making without
change—without change there never was intention preceding act,
nor act preceding intention, and there could never have been
manifested that power which he argues for as demonstrating
Deity. I appeal to the audience to think for themselves, and I ask
them whether our friend has adduced any reasonable evidence for
God as the maker and creator of the universe ? I ask whether
he has not put before you an unintelligible jumble of words
without any relation to the question ? I ask you whether he can
fairly be regarded as presenti’ g the united intellect of that
muster-roll of names which he has given as arguing from design
in favour of Deity. How can he claim to be a teacher, who
cannot explain words he uses, or does not know the meaning of
the words his opponent uses ? I simply claim to be a student.
I admit I have not that confidence in myself that enables Mr.
Cooper to regard himself as impregnably entrenched and en
camped, so secure that nobody can touch him. When one sends
a stone through the window of his argument, he says it is not
broken, and when the doors are battered down he declares that
they still stand. I admit so far he is better off than I am. If
he can convince you, and if that conviction be worth anything,
I can only ask when he taunts me about the trial of issue, whether
this is not the most momentous issue that man can have to try ? I
ask not as a lawyer, but as a man. He must meet the question
fairly and honestly, and without a taunt, or before I have done
he will have full payment for all the taunts he gives. (Loud
cheers.)
Mr Cooper: When Mr. Bradlaugh says that the doot-s have
been battered down, and a stone sent through the window—I
say I never said a word about doors or windows. When he says
I will not teach—I say he will not learn. (Cheers and confusion.)
When he says I wish he would not fling such big words at me
—I say his words are so big they split my ears, as they make
such a terrible noise. (Cheers and hisses.) I hardly know what
be was saying when he was talking—(loud cries of question)
Now we are all to the question. (Laughter and oh ! oh !) Who
is that silly man that says question ? You should have
brought your brains in here, and not come without them. (Hisses
and confusion.) Mr. Bradlaugh says I ought to know there is a
difference in condition. That is what I argue for. He says I
have not the ability to discern it, and, therefore, should not have
come here. He says I know it all or 1 conceal it. I have never
�been in the habit of concealing things in my life. “All,” he
repeats, “ is present to the mind of God, that is his conscious
ness.” I said it was present to his mind because he is always.
If my friend tries to show that it is not, let him show it. Pre
sent to his consciousness! He asks—How can it be present to his
consciousness when it has not existed—how can anything be
present to my conscience that has passed away from existence?
There is memory, and he knows that must exist to all eternity—
that is how it is present to his consciousness, so that his immut
ability and his consciousness are essential, he being perfectly wise.
Show me how that can be, says Mr. Bradlaugh. We are separate
modes of the same existence; that glass is a mode of existence.
What is separate 1—the mode ? A jumble of words—indeed, I call
this gibberish. What is this eibberish that tells us that intel
ligence is a mode, or rather a quality of existence ? Show what
is mode ? How are we the same existence as that glass ? Please
to enlighten me. He talks of those listening to mere talk from
me. I really do not know what he is talking about sometimes.
Then he says it is nonsense for two men on the same platform to
use two words in a different sense. Why there is no debate if
we can agree. I don’t want to use words in the sense that myself
and a glass are the same substance. If there are two existences,
one acting on the other, you say it is an affirmation and was not
proved. .Well, but it did not follow, he says, that God was al
ways creating because his conscience was immutable. “ It don’t
show that he should do anything ; acts of will are not tied to the
proof of his consciousness; that can be consciousness something
else, not will, that may be done.” Why that is playing with '
words. Then, again, he says because conscience is immutable
— make affirmation that bis will is immutable. Now I want
my argument answered. (Cheers and hisses.) He asks what we
mean. Why, if he cannot bring forward a better argument than
he has afforded us to-night, he cannot argue it. I exist; but
something must have always existed. I am a personal, conscious,
intelligent existence. You know what it is, or you could not
ask such a question. You did so for a puzzle, perhaps. It is
an act of intelligence to ask the question. Oh ! but I am asked
to define what intelligence is, and when I define it, then to define
the definition. Organic functional activity, he repeats. I have
no explanation of it. Did you define that definition ? (Cries of
yes, yes, and no, no.) Well, you know there is a personal, con
scious intelligence—either there was always existence, or it began
to exist. Then whatever has come into existence must have a
cause. Non-intelligence can’t create intelligence. Conceive it, if
you can. That which can’t be needs no proof. Justas if one could
perceive than a thing can’t be, and yet it necessarily exists. So
non-intelligence cannot create intelligence. “Our friend has not
�26
A
|
|
/
'
shown that it can.” He says he does not know the meaning of
the word create. “He has not shown what he means,” Mr.
Bradlaugh says, “ by personal, conscious, intelligent existence.”
That it has always been, that it is derived from some personal,
conscious, intelligent always existent being. Well, I mean that,
if you like. (Cheers.)
Mr. Bradlaugh : My friend, in conclusion, said I had not
shown that non-intelligence could create intelligence. Consider
ing that I have repeatedly declared that I do not know the mean
ing of the word create, I think my friend must be rather san
guine to suppose that I would undertake to enlighten him upon
this point. It does not lie upon me to prove that non-intelligence
can create intelligence, but on my friend, who affirmed a con
tradiction in terms, to prove it. This statement of my disincli
nation does not help his inability. If I am lame, it don’t prove
that he can walk without crutches. But Mr. Cooper says that
in representing to you God’s consciousness as immutable, I do
injustice to his views; that, although all things are perpetually
present to God's consciousness—God need not, and does, nut, he
says, always will to create. But surely such a declaration is
entirely without evidence, and nowise improves Mr. Cooper’s
position. If there was any period when God did not will to
^create, then he must have changed when he varied his will to the
act of creating. But I want to know how a thing can be present
'when it is non-existent ? If all things were always present to
God, all things must have always existed. To God there never
could be a time when they did not exist. There never was to
him a time when it was necessary to create—he could not have
created that which to him had ever existed. He said, he did not
understand what I meant, when I talked of intelligence being
quality of mode. He said it is a quality of existence, a quality
of substance, and therefore God, who created substance, must be
intelligent, his intelligence was a quality of all existence. Not
all, for he says there are some existences, or some parts of sub
stance that are not intelligent. Then intelligence is a quality of
existence, and it is not! Because existence, according to Mr. Cooper,
may be, and is with it and without it. Now, I say that intelli
gence being a quality of mode of existence, that in various modes
we find varying qualities. All intelligence is not of the same
degree, but varies as the modes differ. They differ as by their
Various characteristics. It is by difference of quality that you
distinguish the one mode from the other. If intelligence b’e infi
nite, there can be only one kind of it, and of one degree; it can
never be lesser or greater. But intelligence varies according
tv mole. You find different degrees or ii te’ligence ma ues" . * different organisations. (Heat, hear). It must therefore be, if
Mr. Cooper’s logic be worth anything, that one kind of intelli
�27
gence creates like ; then, seeing that no two men are alike
organised or intelligent, there must be as many different Gods to
create as there are different intelligences. I am driven to this
line of argument by the absurdity of my friend’s speeches. I can
not believe but that he must know better ; if he does not, little
indeed can he have read the elaborate essays of modern
thinkers—little can he have examined the terms used by great men
from whom he professes to quote. Little indeed can he have
read either the volumes of Hamilton or Berkeley, or of the men
whose ideas be professes to put before us. Surely the philoso
phy of the unconditioned has formed, at some time or other, a
reading lesson for my friend. He declares that he has the ability of
teaching one so ignorant as he believes myself to be ; but
when he uses words so irrelevant and so void of meaning, I am
obliged to assume that he uses them ignorantly, or he would be
more heedful of giving their meaning. He says that the glass
and himself are different existences : he cannot understand their
being different modes of the same substance. His understand
ing must be sadly deficient, if he cannot distinguish between
the characteristics of this mode and that one and that each
mode has more or less different qualities with the same substance.
Here, theD, in each quality my friend will have something by
which he can in thought separate modes, but he cannot in
thought give a separate existence to the substance of each mode,
because he well knows that the same substance as this glass, in
another mode, might have gone to form an intelligent being at
some period of existence. If he says he does not know what he
means by his own words, then, by obtuseness of intellect
he is incapacitated as a public teacher, or it is evident he
dare not use the plain meanings of technical language, because
he is afraid of its logical consequences. Then he says that God,
who is everywhere present, yet besides whom there is somewhere
where he is not—that he has a consciousness of existence
passed away. I deny that there ever was existence which
has since passed away. I take a firm stand on this, and I sub
mit that the two phrases, “ creation,” and “ existence or substance
passed away,” are utterly without meaning. Our friend, surely
if he meant anything, cannot have meant existence that had
ceased to be—that something could never become nothing, yet he
alks of existence passed away—he speaks of existence as no longer
existing. If he means that God’s range of observation is limited,
and that it did not come within his range of observation, then I
can understand it; but if he means this, then he abandons the
attribute of omniscience for Deity. It is difficult really to
guess what interpretation he wishes to be put upon his words.
If there is anything which does not exist always to God, it can
never have existed, as my friend denies the possibility of anything
�23
beaming n th’ng, Therefore, to speak of anything which has
passed out of existence, is to use words without sense or relevance.
(Laughter and cheers.) Our friend says that he did not know
that the window was knocked out and the portal carried away. I
am afraid he is the only one in this room in so blissful a state of
ignorance. He complains of my loud voice. I am always desirous
to limit my voice to the place in which I speak, and not to give
offence. But I am apt to remember my subject rather than my
voice. I am apt to remember alone the cause in which I am
speaking rather than the manner of speech. I know that there
is much in my address capable of improvement; and if my friend
wishes to reprove me, let it be by the contrast between us. His
better chosen phraseology, courteous and patient demeanour, quiet
and kindly bearing, will, coupled with his calmness while I
am replying, be more effective than any verbal rebuke. (Loud
cheers.)
It was now a quarter to ten, Mr. Cooper begged to be informed
by the chairman as to a point of order. He said that, in his discus
sion with Joe Barker, the order was that the person who opened
the discussion for the night closed it.
The Chairman, in reply, said :—I think that the best way is
to adopt a rule. I understand from the paper, the order of
speaking is to be alternate speeches of a quarter of an hour each. I
think it best that the person opening should not speak last. There
will be two more speeches. Mr. Cooper will speak for a quarter
of an hour, and Mr. Bradlaugh will speak for the following
quarter of an hour, when the discussion will terminate to-night.
Mr. Cooper : I told you I came here in a friendly spirit, but as
this is the last time I shall have to address you, I must say I
have been grieved to observe a contrary spirit in you. I wish
that you could behave not like an audience of bagmen, and could
sit without clapping hands or making ejaculations, and crying up
some person, whether he' has sense or not. (Cheers, hisses, and
confusion.) Why need you come her'e? You say you want
truth, then why can’t we discuss truth with all proper patience
and kindness, and not be clapping each other, with jeers, because;
I suppose our friend understands sarcasm, which you Londoners ‘
like so very much ? I am old and used to you. I used to see
all that thing before. (Cheers, shouts, and hisses.) Well, I will sit
down if you do not want to hear me. (Cries of sit down, go on
with your argument.) I discovered that sauce for goose was not
sauce for gander here. (Cheers, hisses, and laughter.) Do not
be so very hard on a poor man. “He cannot understand a word
of Greek,” I thought every body knew that. “But it was
wrong to bring into existence that which had no existence before.”
Mr. Bradlaugh c nnot understand, and as he does not, he wants .
a definition.^ I did not say that God was always willing. I did
�29
not say there never was a period when he did not will a certain
thing. He may will something at one period, and some'hiag at
another period. But, then, we are told it did not follow that he
either should or did exist always. I repeat, that things may
have been present to his conscious intelligence before he created
them. It happens not to be mine, but Plato’s universe, that is,
Plato’s language—“ all things are present to his conscious intel
ligence before he created them.” Our friend goes on, “ I am an
old fashioned reader of old fashioned men.’’ He tells me “ if it
be a quality of existence, it is a quality of all existence.” There
are different qualities of the same existence, there is only one
intelligence ; but, says Mr. Bradlaugh, if God be infinite, there
must be different Gods. If there be different men and different
intelligences, if he can create them anywhere, does it follow that
they do not understand ? Does he not understand this logic ? He
must know better than I speak that it must be so. (Hear.)
Some poor man said “ hear.” Well, I came to you as friends, I
came maintaining your sincerity. I never called you infidel, because
that term is generally used to signify blackguard. I never spoke
ill of you, I never questioned your sincerity, I do not question Mr.
Bradlaugh’s sincerity. We come with the belief that God exists.
We believe it to be a most important belief, and most important
it is if it be true. I see no reason for calling this glass and my
self different modes of the same existence. There may be some
men here who think otherwise, but that is not proving they are
modes of the same existence. Well, existence that has passed
away may yet exist somewhere, although it is not present to my
vision. It is in my conscious intelligence, everything I have been
acquainted with. That is my meaning. I think it is clear enough,
but before I sit down, I will re-state my argument. I am told
that I argued inconsistently and unmeaningly. I will try again,
while I am in possession of the time, as it is the last opportunity
I shall have to-night. I exist. I say it for yourself now. I exist.
I have not always existed. Something must have always existed.
If there never had been a period when nothing existed, there must
have been nothing still. I am conscious of a personal, intelligent
existence, which must have always existed, otherwise it began to
be. It must have had a cause, and that cause must have been
intelligent or not; non-intelligence cannot create intelligence.
Show me how it was. “ Show me how you can infer the possi
bility of intelligence,” &c., is what I have been asking every time
I rose to speak to-night. But he has not done it. I cannot see
how he can perceive that non-intelligence could bring intelligence
into existence. Since there was that always in existence, I must
have belief in another act of consciousness that I have exercised,
for I am certain from the observation of my own intelligence,
that something has always existed everywhere, in every, part of
�So
everywhere. Therefore, there are no lines of demarcation—it has
no motion such as you affirm of matter. I do not say that it has
no motion at all. It don’t need to move to one point of every
where, that is already in every part of everywhere, and there is
everywhere. And now I have clearly arrived in my own mind,
at the knowledge of an uncaused existence. It has become
clear to my perceptions that as this existence was everywhere,
it was omni-present, all-powerful, uncreated, underived, per
sonal, conscious, reasonable existence. Then, I turn even towards
J this material universe. It cannot be the something that always was.
I know that I exist now. I know that at two years old I existed.
I recognise change, and I know that I have changed ; that this
universe changes, and therefore it can’t be that which has always
existed. I said I could move, mould, shape, fit, and design
matter. I can recognise the results of design, although I cannot
see the act of the mind. I reason by analogy, from my personal,
conscious existence, that men are contriving and designing; if I
find their composition to consist of parts and peculiar fashions
adapted and fitted for the purpose it fulfils, and if the principle
on which it worked were simple, I should admire it, and by the aid
of reason, conclude that it had a personal, conscious, and intelli
gent existence for its designer and contriver. Then, I look at
this curiously formed body, the bodies of animals; and I remem
ber the power of this hand, and when I look through a telescope
at those shining bodies in the heaven, and see their immensity,
and recognise them by the light of reason to be themselves the
suns of other systems, I then say he is al'-intelligent, since all
intelligence must have come from him—he only existed from all
eternity—he is the author of all things. Whatever exists must
have been by his will, and by his power, therefore he is uncon
trollable by aDy other will, and therefore he is maker of this
universe. I have said that he is not the mode, but that he exists
simply by his will, and in him we live, move, and have our
being—therefore, in him is my being and your being, and the
being of every animal, and that they can be kept in existence only
by One Almighty, all-wise, and everywhere present, self-existing,
self-created, underived, uncognised, personal, conscious, intelligent
being, whom I worship, and men call God. I have re-stated my
argument. If any one seeks to overturn it, let him go through it
step by step. No person has done so here. No person can do it.
It is an argument that shall not pass away, but must come every
day before your eyes, and possibly to your minds. (Cheers.)
Mb. Bradlaugh : Our friend says something exists, that the
universe exists. I reply, that if something now exists, you cannot
conceive when it did not exist. The supposition that there ever
was a period when the universe began to be, is introduced and
assumed without the slightest warrant for such an assumption.
�31
You cannot limit its existence, you canmt limit its duration. He
says something is everywhere, but that the universe is finite in
extent, as it is, according to his view, finite in duration. He can
not in thought put a limit as to how long the universe has existed,
or how far it extends. The duration and extent of existence are
alike illimitable. Then, he says that substance is not naturally
intelligent, and that the intelligence we find must result from
infinite intelligence. I have endeavoured during this argument j
to explain to him that intelligence was a word that could only be j
properly used in the sense of a quality of a mode, in the same way i
that you would use the word hardness, broadness; and that as
you could not say it was all broad, or all hard, no more could
you say it was all intelligence, or without intelligence. I must
confess that I have never listened to any argument more pre
tentiously and less ably put, than that of my friend to-n’ght.
There was only one part of it that would, if complete, have
deserved any reply, and that he took imperfectly from Gilles
pie, where you may see what his argument ought to have been,
for it is there put as clearly and comprehensively as possible.
He says, he comes here to talk to us in a friendly way. He
would assume that we had imported into this debate that which
lacks friendliness. If it be so, I regret it. But, when he is
asked the meaning of one term, he says he was not bound to tell
us that, and when a definition is given by me, and the argument
is approached on that basis, he says hemeant no such thing. He has
said he will not reproach you as infidels, for that infidels are iden
tified with blackguards. Infidel does not mean blackguard. It means
without faith, outside the faith, against the faith. Mr. Cooper is
infidel to every faith but his own. I am but in one degree more
an infidel, and surely we are none the more blackguards because
we are opposed to the faith which he preaches. I am not ashamed
of the word infidel. Nobler men than ever I can hope to be,
truer men than I in my highest aspirations can pretend to be,
have been content to be classed among those who had that name
applied to them, and they have won it proudly in the age in which
they lived. There have been heroes in every age—infidels, if you
please —but I declare them heroes in the mental battle fields who
have been able to hold their own in life, assailed though they were
by calumny when the grave had received them. Our friend says
that he cannot tell why I speak of a glass and myself as different
modes of the same substance, but in my first speech I took pains
to define what I meant by substance. If he had a better defini
tion, he should, in justice to his subject, have presented it to us ;
it was not for him to say he would not give it, and then to say
“ I don’t understand my opponent.” But he says that “ some
thing could never have been produced from nothing. Intelligence
exists, and must therefore have been created by an all-wise intelli-
�32
| gent Deity.” “ TV ere is either no existence without intelligence,
|or there is existence without intelligence.” My friend declares all
|existence is not alike intelligent, but that some is unintelligent,
|and in this I urge that he contradicts himself. If Mr. Cooper
gis right in declaring that there is any substance non-intelligent,
[(then it can only be (on the hypothesis that God is infinite intelli| gence) by supposing God in such case, and so far, to have anni^■hilated his intelligence. But, if there is anv substance non- (
intelligent, then intelligence is not infinite, and the God my friend I
' contends for does not exist. If God brought into existence that
f which was not himself, but something different from himself, he !
■ must have brought something not out of himself, but something
; out of nothing! He contradicts his own argument, and indulges
in the strangest assertions The universe is moveable, God is not.
He does not give us the slightest reason for this statement. He
declares that God is the master of the universe, but does not even
show you that he understands the relevancy of the argument
addressed to him. When he used the phrase, he must have
meant either that what God created was the same as himself, or
different from himself. It could not have been the same as him
self, otherwise there would have been no discontinuity, no break—
there would have been, nothing to distinguish the creator from
the created—no break of continuity to enable us -to conceive
creation possible. Nor could that which God created have been
different from himself, unless my opponent is prepared to con
tend that things which have nothing in common with each other can
be the cause of, or affect one another.. This shows that Mr.
Cooper has not well considered the terms he employs. If our
friend bases any argument for God’s existence upon his intelli
gence, let him explain what he means. It is not enough for him
to take cognisance of the universe, and so cognise certain effects.
All those finite effects do not aid him one step towards the infi
nite. His design argument was a structure without a founda
tion. You have seen how little our friend can understand the
meaning of his own words. He has talked about his trials, and
yet he asked how I could talk about my misfortunes. I have
not yet talked of them. I have not said how men, when I was
yet at an early age, for these opinions drove me out from home,
, and from all that I loved and was dear to me, and threw me within
! eight of the truth, where I have had since the happiness of striv
ing for that truth—lifting up the banner of our cause, showing
that true men may be made truer, and the world be better worth
living in than it was before the struggle. (Cneers.)
|
�SECOND NIGHT.
ON GOD AS MORAL GOVERNOR OF THE UNIVERSE.
At seven o’clock precisely Mr. Harvey, the Chairman, accornp^
nied by Mr. Cooper, Mr. Bradlaugh, and several representative
friends, came upon the platform, and were received with loud
cheers. The Hail was not quite so crowded as on the first night,
but was well filled in every part.
The Chairman : I have to announce that the discussion will
now commence. With your permission I willread the subject from
the printed progran&rie. The argument on the first night was
as to the Being of God, to-night -it is for the Being of God as
Moral Governor of the Universe. As before, each speaker will
occupy half-an-hour and no more for his first speech, or as much
shorter, a period as he may think proper, and afterwards a
quarter of ap hour each. I must again ask the audience to give
me their confidence. I hope they will abstain from unnecessary
cheering or calls of time. If either speaker should get out of
order, I will remind him of it. I have no doubt, if you will
listen to the speakers tilt they have concluded, you will have an
evening of instruction, and be able to appreciate their arguments.
Mr. Cooper : If there is one word of more importance to me
than any*other that could be mentioned—one word of more im
portance to me—to human beings, than any other, that word is
duty—duty, a word, I say, that is all-important to me. We are
not talking of the duty of pigs, of dogs, of rabbits, weasels, snails,
butterflies, bullocks, or elephants—duty belongs to man. Crea
tures have no duty. We never talk of the duty of a snail, of a
horse, of a cat, of a bullock. Duty belougs to man. (Cries of
yes, yes, and question.) Well, the parties of your side who pro
fess a philosophic duty, seem to think that there is no such thing as
duty connected with religion. ‘Who told them so? We believe
that there is a duty of religion, though we ought to obey our
own convictions. Well, but you say we are as moral as you are
on the other side—we follow duty. My question is to, a person
who talks about moral duty as a result of philosophy. Is he a
perfect mau? Is any of you a perfect man? If you are, send
your name to the Times, and be sure you have it put in the
second column, where they put all the curious advertisements—
�34
indeed, you might take a house in Belgrave Square, and people
would come to see you if you were a perfect man. But no;
really I am not a perfect man, nor you. There are none of you
perfect men. Then, I say you, each of us, breaks his sense of
duty again and again. You get out of temper with your wives
and children—you ill use them very likely—you say something
that grieves them very much. Oh, it’s all right—you were out
of temper ! You wonder at yourself for striking her; well, but
whenever any one has struck, or ill used, or trampled on you, you
come to a conviction of another kind. In two or three days,
perhaps, after you have been guilty of this misconduct, you are
sorry. You say, “ what a scandal to have used my wife so.” I
should not have done so. But you have done this often. You
say, I must not do these things again. You accuse yourself, you
threaten to flog yourself. What is all this ? But perhaps you
are a shopkeeper; no matter what the article is that you sell.
A.person comes into your shop: perhaps he is fastidious. You
think he has come in to get something as cheap as he can. There
is nothing doing. You show your articles. You say to your
self, what am I to do with this man ? He has spent a quarter of
an hour in your shop, you seem to have had some time waiting
upon him. Something begins to say to you, “ rent and taxes
must be paid.” He seems to want the article. Yes, it’s a very
well manufactured article. Yes, is the reply, what will you take
for it ? You hesitate; you say to yourself, “I must, I will have
as much as I can get for it.” He pays you your price, and you
are struck with wonder. So off he goes. You have charged
him pretty well. It comes up in your mind that day. You
say to yourself, I have to support a family—it is very difficult to
support a family, also to pay rent and taxes. So you reason
against rates and taxes—wife and children—it beggars you—and
so on. Again, you fall into habits of drink. Some sensible
fellow said to you one day—Turn teetotaler. Depend upon it
he was a sensible fellow who said that—gave you that advice.
You thought it was rather hard at first; you tried it, however,
and you found how effectual it was. When you got up in the
morning you said, “ How light I feel—how comfortable I am.
I am not a slave to drink, I do not wallow in the sty,
a sleep does not oppress me now as it did before. One
day last summer, wnen it was very hot, there was an excur
sion to Gravesend. You wanted relaxation. Young people
are rather fond of that, so you went on the excursion, and
you stopped now and then to see the country. At last you saw
somebody take a glass of porter. You were thirsty. He asked
you to have one, as you were one of the party. Well, you are
over-persuaded. You take one You felt it was wrong, a bad
step. But why, how could this be ? I need take no more. But
�85
you do drink another glass, and your thirst is not slaked. Then
somebody said to you, take a drop of something short, that will
queneh your thirst. And so you do, and your senses come short.
You get into bed. You have burning; a great drum thunder
ing through your head. But conscience comes up, and then you
say—“ I am a brute again. I have gone into drunkenness
again.” How was it that you felt condemnation ? How was it
you felt condemnation as a husband, a father, or a man—all that
condemnation ? Iam sure you could not help it. I do not,ear®
whether you call yourself Atheist, Deist, Sceptic, Freethinker, or
whatever you call yourself, you could not help it. It is a part
of your nature, of a moral nature that you have different from
the inferior animals, that you should have remorse for doing
wrong. You threaten to flog yourself, to lacerate yourself for it.
A man may continue to offend against this something. Stop,
what do you mean by a moral nature ? We talk about defining
words. It is quite necessary to define this word. I remem*
her Robert Cooper being present here so long ago as March,
1856, about the time that I was avowing a change in my
opinions, and another time in John Street. He did notreply to me in a speech, but he did so in a pamphlet. In that
pamphlet, he showed that he did not understand what I have
said. “ Man has an immoral nature, and, therefore, he has a
moral government where he has an immoral nature.” If that
was the amount of his acquaintance with the form of moral
philosophy, it showed he knew nothing about the matter in the
philosophic sense. Man has not an immoral nature, but a moral
nature. It is called “ moral Bense ” by Shaftesbury, “ moral
reason ” by Reid, consciousness by Butler, and is a power within
man which warns him of what is right and what is wrong. It
don’t matter where he is—where he lives—what land he possesses
—what language he speaks, or what colour he is—he is sure to
ask of it, and the reply is infallible, What is right and what is
wrong ? Oh ! but that is not consciousness, says the other side.
We say there is no such power.* It is a thing of education, you
say. It depends on how a man has been instructed. “ Your
conscience is not my conscience, one man’s conscience is not
another’s.’’ The conscience of a Jew is not that of a Christian ;
the conscience of a civilised man is not the same as that of a
savage. “ It is a thing of education.” To be sure ! Well, but
somebody says I cannot understand what conscience is. What
is this moral nature ? Let us try to understand. It is a faculty
in man that discerns that there is right and wrong, and testi
mony is infallible—a faculty, no doubt, that needs to be educated.
You cannot educate it in animals—it is not there. There must
be a right for a man to do right, a wrong to do wrong, each of
which his spiritual nature recognises and distinguishes. I shall,
�36
of course, contend!, that we have in this Christian country the
highest moral teaching in Christianity itself; and if this were
denied, a high moral sense, which some of my friends would attri
bute to the discernment of reason. Moral sense, I say, is the
clearest and strongest discernment of moral nature—it discerns to
practise what is right; that virtue, truth, honour, and so on de
serve praise, and in their very nature confer their own reward;
that the practise of vice, error, which we call wickedness, sin,
and trangre^sions deserve punishment. Man has this moral sense.
He has not an immoral nature, which says that virtue deserves
punishment and error reward. Robert Cooper, therefore, did
not know what he was talking about. There is this faculty in
man—it is part of his intellectual nature. Conscience responds to
it more or less ; and as he is a free agent, so he can resist and sin
against it, which he does easily, so that he sears it as with a red hot
iron, and he may sin on till he is steeped to the lips in vice;
still there it is. For instance, a man meets another who
looks very hard at him in the street. He bolts down the next
entry. He says, “ that man knows me.’’ He wishes it was dark
so that nobody would know him, and when it is dark, and he is
in bed, he pulls down the sheet over his face. Criminals have
made these confessions. Oh ! says somebody, you don’t call that
conscience; didn’t Palmer, that Rugby fellow, die as hard as
iron ; he could not have what you call conscience ? Now, I wish
you would listen to a person of extreme credibility, who had it from that criminal himself—viz., Mr. Goodacre, the clergyman
who attended Palmer every night in the gaol. When Palmer
went back to the gaol after the trial, he was as hard as iron. But
the last night came—he was in the condemned cell. The chap
lain spoke to him, but it was, so to speak, like pouring water upon
a duck’s back. There was no conversion. The clergyman goes to his
lodgings, and prays to bring the unhappy criminal to a sense of his
situation. He felt also that he could not go to bed; doubt pressed
upon his mind as to whether he had said all that he ought to
have said, for before eight o’clock the next morning all would be
over. “ I may not,” said this gentleman to himself—“I may not
have said all that I ought to say—I must say all that I can.” He
went back and knocked at the prison door—by law the chaplain
can get admission into the gaol at any hour. This is the rela
tion given by the gentleman, which exactly illustrates the case in
point. He entered the cell where the wretched man was. “I
am come to speak to you,” said the chaplain. “ I must come and
speak to you. You are a great sinner. I am come to say that
there is pardon for you,” and he alluded to the thief who was *
pardoned on the cross. “ Will you try,” he exclaimed, “ and con
fess your sin, and you may yet find pardon.” It had such an effect
on Palmer that he asked—“ How pardon ? If I should confess about
�37
my wife, I should have to confess about my brother too.” Why,
returned the chaplain, and did you murder your brother also ?
And Palmer clung to the bed stock with both hands, and groaned
as if he would rend his soul. That groan was the voice of con
science. He had sinned against his conscience. But you say
this was not remorse for crime, for this was nor. in his character.
Just imagine to yourself an old lion who entered into a corner of
the wilderness, and groaning because he had killed so many
antelopes, or a cat into the chimney corner, because she had
killed so many mice! How does this happen but because we
have this moral nature ? What does it tell us that vice and
wickedness are wrong, that untruthfulness, tyranny, despotism,
sensuality, all deserve blame and punishment—that virtue, honour,
goodness, self-denial, benevolence, deserve praise and reward—in
a word, it is a dictate of the mind of man ? How comes this to be,
but that there is a moral governor to whom we are accountable ?
We cannot get rid of the responsibility. Deny it as we please, it
is there ; it follows the moral governor exists. We look on his
moral government. We see organic law punishing man for sin.
We sin; punishment fearfully suddenly overtakes the wicked.
Men speak and talk about it. We see vice triumphant, men
wading through blood and gaining a throne ; kings grasping
liberty by the neck, and as each moment rolls on dishonesty,
violence, and weakness successful. Well, say you, is it part of
the moral government that we see the rich getting wealth and
the poor growing poorer, and virtue and poverty suffering to
gether? You look on the great man. There is happiness, you
exclaim, and you say, “ this is not right according to the principles
of your moral government.” You can only come to this conclu
sion at last, and that is my conclusion, that he could only resist
the sense of moral conviction, he could only disobey this sense of
responsibility, because God’s moral government has only begun,
and is not completed. There must be a state where wrong will
be righted—where no four millions of black slaves shall be
lorded over by white men—no bad men sit on thrones, no good
men be imprisoned. There must be a state of equality. What
we see in progress here must be worked out finally. We see in all
these things around about us proof that man i° a being of pro
gress, and which shows that he cannot be limited to this state of
existence. This cannot be the be-all and the end-all. I con
clude that this is only the beginning, and that we are going on;
that this life is not the conclusion of our existence—that a moral
governor exists, that his moral government has begun progressing
« towards perfection. We cannot deny that it is here. You say
there is no moral government. Then why are you punished :
has not sin its penalty ? Why this discontent, this uneasiness, if
there be no hereafter, no accountability ? When you see a throne
�88
like Louis Napoleon’s, who will say there is no hereafter ? If
there were not, why not act like great Caesar himselt ? Cato
could have aided him, and Caesar drove him to suicide. Why is
all this if there be no moral government ? What does it prove ?
This, that a moral governor exists. (Cheers.)
Mr. Bradlatjgh : I am delighted to be able to pay the speaker
who has just sat down, the only compliment that has seemed his
due during the time he has spoken since the commencement of
this discussion. It is that he has occupied, with a degree of skill
which I am utterly unable to imitate, a large portion of your
time, but without the slightest relevance to the question which we
are met to discuss. It says a great deal for the presence of mind
of any speaker, seriously to address an audience not in the spirit
of comedy, but in all solemnity, for so long a period without
touching the subject. It says a great deal for his tact when he
can get through twenty-eight minutes of the time in talking
altogether beside the question, and put into the last two minutes
a sort of preface to the topic for debate in lieu of a serious argu
ment. Last evening we had but little approach to discussion, and
were I content to leave the question where my friend has left it
this evening, we should have no discussion at all. There has not
been a particle of evidence adduced by him for the existence of a
moral governor of the universe (hear, hear, and cheers). In all
that he has said there is not a scintilla of evidence, but in lieu we
have some hopes, but however patent his hopes, and however
certain his prophecy, the facts he has stated are evidence only to
himself and not to me. I fancied that my friend was to state the
argument for, and affirm the being of God, as moral governor of
the universe. If he has done anything at all, the most that he
has effected was to allege, without evidence, that there was such
a person or being as he called moral governor of the universe ;
some such thing as that which he called a moral nature, and that
is some evidence for the existence of some being who gave that
moral nature to the individual possessing it. That is the fullest
possible extent to which he has carried his argument. He was
obliged to qualify it, such as it was, with numerous admissions.
He admitted that this faculty which he callad moral sense or
conscience, was a faculty requiring education ; but then he says—
“ It is a faculty which discerns that there is right and that there
is wrong.” I submit, on the other hand, that a man has no
separate faculty, but that his conscience is the result of the
education of the whole of his faculties—that man has no sepa
rate conscience other than is the result of the condition in which
all his faculties may be at any one time of his life, none certainly
that would enable him to judge right and wrong independently
of his education. I submit that a child newly born is without
any such faculty, that it is entirely destitute of any faculty that
�39
would enable it to judge right and wrong, and that that which
my friend calls moral nature, I repeat, is but the result of the
education of all the faculties in man—further, that what he calls
man’s moral nature, if any one chooses to examine the matter
closely, will be found to vary with tribes, countries, and climates,
vary even with the same individuals at various periods of their
lives, and from such a varying, shifting standard you are to pro
duce the evidence of an immutable Deity as moral governor of
the world. If it be po-sible to effect such a demonstration, my
friend will have to display a talent for logic which he has not
manifested during this debate. Let us see whether his facts were
correct. I submit, even if they were, they were worth nothing,
as being irrelevant; that if everything he said were true, from
Alpha to Omega, then it is not worth anything. But I submit
that what he alleged as facts, are not so. “ Did you ever hear,”
asks my friend, “ of a lion that was stricken with remorse over
the numerous animals he has slaughtered ?” Did you ever hear of
a Thug who, having committed murders by the score, felt joy rather
than remorse for his conduct ? What conscience taught him that
he was more sacred to his deities for the skill displayed in his mur
ders ? Our friend, who certainly manifested a more philosophic
conception of words than he w as able to manifest on the last
night of discussion, might have given us a novel definition of
conscience had he read some essays on the practices of Thuggee,
which he might have found in some of our old review—I have
several of these passing through my mind at the present moment
—he would have also found some extremely serviceable evidence
taken before a parliamentary commission, upon the terrible prac
tice of strangling prevailing among the Thugs of India. He
would have found how faithful wives and good mothers to their
children could regard the taking away human life as a positive
virtue, and a matter deserving praise and reward, and that the
more murders they committed, the holier the devotees of Bowanee
regarded themselves. So far from being like Palmer, groaning
as though he would rend his heart, these Thugs regarded murder
as matter of absolute virtue, making them better men and women
than, according to their belief, they could be otherwise. If this
stood alone it would be enough to at least neutralise all that our
friend put before you, but we shall be able to deal with this
question of the moral governance of the universe hereafter more
effectually than this. The whole of our friend’s argument was
founded on what he calls man’s moral nature. I submit that if
his facts had been true, they would not be much evidence on the
subject. But he has cleverly tried to turn the tables on myself.
He said, if there were not this remorse, this uneasiness, this
misery, what inducement would you atheists have to be virtuous 1
But suppose I showed this was not the subject for debate—sup
�40
pose I should urge, as I might have done, that it was only to
introduce an excuse for the occupation of time, that this point was
urged, and suppose I did not choose to take up the question, how
much would that advance my friend’s case ? He was to prove the
existence of a moral governor for the universe. And as he has not
chosen to battle on his own ground, he requires that I should
breach his fortress, aud storm it for him. I will therefore accept
the issues that he has laid before you. But before doing so,
permit me to point you to one or two matters that seem to strike
against the moral governance of God. Is there a moral governor
rewarding virtue. How then is vice in luxury while virtue is
starving ? How can you account for this, that when two thousand
women kneel in one church, that he permitted them to be burnt
and suffocated there ? If you cannot deal with these two thousand,
I will put before you millions instead of thousands. Instead of
these women dying in sudden anguish, rushing round the church,
and crying out to God for mercy, who showed them none, I will
point to millions in the world dying slowly from poverty, that
strikes them down in lingering misery, and whom God pities no".
This gr -at fact meets you in the face, that if there be a governor,
he allows human beings to come into the world faster than food
for them, and that starvation and misery strike myriads down
to die of disease amidst squalid misery. You may tell me that
poverty constituted a crime; it is a disgrace to the world that
it is so. God the moral governor of the universe ! When in the
square of Warsaw women and children prayed to God for help,
for life, for moral strength, when they besought him to hear
their prayer for liberty, and to alleviate their sufferings, you will
hardly tell me that God was moral governor of the universe
when he permitted the Cossack’s lance point to drink the blood
from their breasts as answer to their praying. You will not say
that God is governor, and yet that this happened without punish
ment on the guilty. But you say that because these wrongs are
not redressed here, they will be hereafter. Who made you prophet
for kingdom come? Who gave you the right to require us to
look mildly and contentedly upon all evils here, on the ground
that they will be put right in another world ? You tell me that
when a man is starved to death in this world, he will be led in the
next, when he can eat no longer ; or that if he is unjustly put
here in the prison cell, that it is what God pleases, and that God
will set all this right at some future time. Set it right 1 How
can you hope that ? He it is, if governor, who causes the child
to be born in poverty and misery, and without power to extricate
itself, and helpless to contend against the woe surrounding it.
He kept its parents starving, that they might give the unfortunate
babe a wretched physique. It was he who made the only instructor
of the child, the police or the magistrate. He brought the child
»
�41
from the cradle to the gallows, with a hempen cord round its neck
—he who initiated it into the world helpless to avoid the crime—
he who ended its career there, helpless to escape the retribution.
You make God do all this ill, then you tell me I am a blasphemer
(loud cheers and hisses, which were protracted for some time).
It is you, and not I, who is blaspheming—you, whenyouaffirm that
God rules and that innumerable wrongs result; it is you and not
I who affirm that God rewards vice with imperial purple, virtue
with threadbare fustian; it is you, and not I, who affirm that
God deals thus unfairly with his people.. And when the earth
quake—as that at Lisbon—comes, when it rends not merely the
mansion of the rich but the hovel of the poor, and when after
rending these, it leaves thousands dying from plague and starva
tion in the streets of a great city whose inhabitants it thus
steeped in ruin and misery, by that which you say is the act of
God—don’t tell me of one or more acts apparently beneheent as
illustrating his goodness and sense, until you deal with th&se acts
so clearly malevolent. Do not tell me that God punishes the
wrong-doer here, or if you do, I will ask you why you drag
another world of punishment out of the future ? Don’t tell me
of some wicked men stricken dowu in the streets to die by God’s
decree, for if you do, then do I sav, that God is unjust in smiting
a few and sparing the majority. Your argument lor God’s moral
power is at an end unless you can explain why the imperial mur
derer is spared and the ragged wretch is stricken. (Cheers, hisses,
and confusion). If you want to hiss, wait till I have said some
thing better to deserve it.
The Chairman: I beg that you will keep Order.
Mr. Bradlaugh : You shall have enough to hiss for when I
shall have said what I wish to say against your threadbare
theology, and it is indeed that wh ch I impeach. (Cheers, and cries
of question and time).
The Chairman : It'gentlemen will be quiet and not cheer so or
cry question, all will be able to hear. I will call time when it is
proper to call time (Cheers)
Mr. Bradlaugh: You ask me why I do not steal; why I do
not lie; why I do not, like a neighbouring scoundrel, aspire to a
kingdom, bieaking oaths and shedding Mood togain my point.
I will endeavour to tell you why, but to do this, I must take
up your position that vice must be punished and virtue rewarded
in some future .state. I will say that from the Atheist’s point
of view that is not so. All mere punishment for crime past is
in itself a crime, a wrong, and is omy to be defended in so far
as it goes to the prevention of crime future, but not in so far
as it can be regarded as vengeance lor crime past. The Atheist
view is not that crime should be punished by some overlooking
judge, but that it carries with it its own punishment in limiting
�42
man’s present happiness and increasing his present misery. The
Atheist does not argue that virtue will gain him Heaven hereatter, but declares that it spreads happiness around the virtuous
doer here, and makes happiness for him because it makes hap
piness amongst his fellows—honesty, truth, manhood, virtue,
work their own reward in rendering happy the doer of them,
and in spreading pleasure in the circle in which he moves. You
admit that God suffers rascals to climb into thrones, and permit
his clergy, who at least should know his will, to pray to him to
keep them there. You who know that God has permitted a
great country to be heavily taxed for the support of a clique of
rascals who perpetrated the coup d'etat, and inaugurated the
reign of the imperial scoundrel who now rules in God’s
name, aad as God’s anointed. You say he is going to punish in
the next world the man who thus climbed into a throne in
this, when we know, if your argument be true, he could not have
ciimbed there without G >d’s help. God knew beforehand the
designs of the man "ho broke his solemn oath to the young
Republic; but this man could not have perjured himseli without
God’s permission, if he be 'he omnipotent governor you say,
any more than he could have climbed to a thione without his
aid. God then, according to you, must have helped this cri
minal here in order to punish him some other time. Is that so ?
If these are your views of God as moral governor of the
universe, I give way at once. They are unanswerably absurd.
But does this dispose of the question ? I do not think it does. I
should like our friend, when he pleases to deal with the
question in vyhat he calls its philosophic sense, to be a little
more profuse of his explanations than he was inclined to be
during the discussion of last evening. As to the moral teaching
of Christ, he will find no one more ready than I am to con
sider that question. But we have nothing to do with Christ
here to-night, any more than we have to do with Mahomet,
Moses, or Zoroaster. If he wants to tell me that Christ has
given us a moral system without reproach, I will reply that
under no system of morality which can pretend to be without
blemish, is so much vice permitted. Christianity is a system
which teaches submission to injury; courting wrong, and volun
teering yourself for oppression. I will tell him, that at present
I pa^s it by, because it is not the subject of our argument; it
is no part of the argument, and is at least a mistake, unless
he introduces it for the purpose of evading the real question, as
also the question arising on his allegation of man’s free agency.
If he would discuss to-night Christian morality, he might have
put it forward fairly as a subject for disenssion, when I should
be ready to meet him. He tells me that he is a free agent. He
had much better have supported his argument on both evenings
�43
by some facts, instead of relying on naked allegations. I will
endeavour to show him the most convincing testimony of free
agency that could be required. He says that man is a free agent,
for he can sin against his conscience. I say that he cannot sin-rman cannot resist the circumstances that result in volition. As to
this he has had no freedom of selection. What are these cir
cumstances ? First his org nisation, then the education affect
ing that organisation to the moment of volition. I say that
no man is perfectly free to choose his education, or the organi
sation educated up to the moment of volition. To talk, there
fore, of man sinning against his conscience—itself the result of
education—is to tell you the grossest absurdity that could be
put before you. Well, Samuel Taylor Coleridge says that any
act to be a sin must be originated in the will entirely apart
from and independent of all circumstance extrinsic to the will.
I say there is not this volition preceding any act resulting from
the will, but that all volition is the result of various circum
stances conducing to the wil’.
Then our friend somewhat
abruptly refers to the thief on the cross who got into paradise.
I will admit, if he wants to try the question according to Bible
Christianity, the greatest rascals on earth are the most likely
to be rewarded in heaven ; and if that establishes anything in
favour of moral governance of the world by God, then the New
Testament, corroborated by the Old, shows that those who have
been liars, thieves, and murderers, have got into heaven by God’s
grace, while some of those who have been especially truthftal and
honest became the others’ victims on earth, and were kept out
of heaven. If any of you doubt that, however, I will abandon it, as
the only evidence is that of the Bible, which for me is indefensible,
though for him it is unanswerable. God is an immutable being,
our friend says, and yet declares that his moral government is
begun but not completed. He urges that because vice is
triumphant here, that this must be set right hereafter, that God
the immutable will change his mode of governance, that slavery
he e is to be compensated by eternal freedom hereafter. If this
is to be taken as evidence of future and more complete moral
governance, it must also be taken that the moral government is
at present incomplete, and therefore is no evidence of ability in
the governor to govern more perfectly. He either lacks desire or
ability. One supposition denies his goodness, the other his power.
Then you say, “ that the wicked who escape here shall be sent to
hell fire hereafter.” I am obliged, you add, to admit that the
moral government is incomplete, but these rascals will be punished
by and by, though before this takes place, though before this
retribution comes, they will be dead. Good men will be rewarded
in the next world who have starved in this. Have not men who
made the world resound with the fame of their intellect and utility
�44
of their philosophy, died in garrets neglected and uncared for!
Have they not been villified and calumniated for centuries—men
whose brows were bound with laurel, the fruit of their own selfreliant genius in this world, and oh, by-and-by, God will reward
them. The men who have struggled for liberty have been stricken
down, and have died despairing, while you have been obliged to
admit vice triumphant, despite the moral governor. What, I ask,
is the object of the war that is raging only a few hundred miles
from where we stand ? Does it rage for the rights of man, for
his liberties, for any great principle, or for the purpose of setting
up one piece of state tinsel against another ? Who is it that keeps
this strife up—who starves to pay for this—the people, those whom
you tell me are God’s people, whom God cares for, whom God
helps ? Never till they help themselves—never till they are able to
strike for themselves—never till they upraise themselves. For
those who tell me of a moral government by God, I will turn to
them the whole map of the world, each page of its history, and I
challenge you to show me any people whom God ever helped
until they helped themselves. (Cheers.) Amongst the tribes of
uncivilised people, or even amidst more favoured nations, where
there was the more ignorance the people were more on their knees
praying and less on their feet thinking. It was there where men
were more trodden down, were more serfs, more slaves; there
was always a priesthood to help the king, but never the people.
Where then is the moral government of the universe ? Not by
God. Where even the governance of society ? Not by God but man,
by human intellect; not by Church edict, but by human thought;
not by a moral government outside the world, which teaches right
and wrong according to a standard that can never be altered; but
rather by the advancing knowledge of each hour which, with
better in f ormation, discovers evil to -morrow where it is yet unseen
to-day, and finds truth to-day where yesterday belief bad found
no trace of it. Mankind must be saved by the development of
its common humanity, and we strive in this to advance with
certain steps to the great truths scattered in the depths of the
mighty unknown around us. We seek to gather not pearls,
sapphires, rubies, and diamouds, but truths, that we may build
them into a priceless moral diadem, and therewith crown the
whole human race. (Loud Cheers.)
Mb. Cooper : (Cries of “ go on, Tommy.’’) I will be very much
obliged if you will never clap your hands any more when I rise. I
feel really tired of complaining thus, and I might as well not occupy
your time in this matter, for I am tired of this childish sort of
work, and if anything could disgust me more it would be this silly
laughter. Thomas Cooper is not a man to be laughed at. I have
been a long time on this platform £.I. was never a disgrace to it
(nor any other) when I was on it. Tnever deserted a good prin-
�45
ci pie that once impressed me; I do not know why you are to treat
me in this manner. I think a man of fifty-nine years of age ought
to have some reverence. You have (turning to Mr. Bradlaugh)
just complained before sitting down that every speech delivered
by me as yet was beside the mark—as if a man could live fiftynine years and then argue as if he talked nonsense whenever he
opened his mouth. I have not heard an argument—not a frag
ment of an argument, in answer to what I have stated. Mr.
Bradlaugh says the most I have done is to affirm that man was
not a moral nature. There are many faculties, he says, but the
child has no faculty. That is no argument. In answer, I say the
child has faculties, but does not display them, that everybody
knows, and no one can deny it. Then “God cannot be immutable
because he creates mutable creatures.
He must be mutable
because the creatures must be mutable.” Where is the contradic
tion ? Then he proceeds, “ If what I said were facts, they were,
not facts.” How has that been shown? Because something wa^z
done amongst Thugs. I have not heard about the Thugs. I know
nothing about these young women who were glad they had com
mitted more murders than others. They exulted in it. Now if
any man says there is no moral sense in Thugs, I should like to
have some conversation with him before I believed him. I appeal
to you and not to Thugs. He said, I cleverly tried to throw my
friend off, to turn the tables on him, and some person imme
diately said “ hear.” Do you mean to call me a liar ? I never had
Mr. Bradlaugh in my thoughts. I will re-affirm that he said
that I would introduce anything to occupy the time. He com
menced by stating that I had manifested something like a philo
sophic apprehension of the meaning of words which had no mean
ing, and that I was trying to keep your attention from the ques
tion. Well, there are only the Thugs’before us at present. There
is only an appeal to persons’ nature—we are talking of acts ; we
are going to what our friend says appears to be complete disproof
of the moral government of the universe. He has not dealt with
that fact, that great fact, which you must feel to be fact yourself.
I mean conscience. Can any one of you tell me that he does not
feel when he is sinnin'g against his conscience ? Why then do you
read with such zest the confessions of criminals, the workings of
the human mind, the convictions of a marl that he is a scoundrel,
a bloodthirsty villain? “ Oh, sinning against conscience is the
greatest absurdity that can be mentioned.” Is it ? Strange procla
mation this in the middle of the 19th century. If this is philoso
phy, I do not know what the world will say to it. Abolish all
the laws of government! What is the use of them ? Well, a
man cannot sin against conscience. Do you see what it is you
defend (hear, hear). Will you have the kindness not to cheer a
sentence of that sort without thinking ? Then we heard about
�46
2,000 women whom God shut in and delivered up to the most
terrible of deaths. Then again, I was esteemed a person who had
pretended to look into the future. Will our freind say that God
showed them no mercy ? That is a very large undertaking for my
friend. Then there is the poverty of millions born into the world
and no food to support them. I say plenty of food, but men are
bad one to another. Man is an enemy to man. What sort of
government would you have ? Had you rather that man had
been a moral agent and have no choice ? But you know that you
have a choice, you feel that you can choose, you are sensible of it.
“ God cannot make us free.” Indeed. And you say, “ subject at
the same time.” You allude to the punishment which is inflicted
upon men by God in conformity with the organic formation of
their bodies. “ Millions in poverty.” Yes, indeed, many of them
suffering deeply. Some, however, are poor by their own fault.
Some men are idle and will not work, others spend their wages,
others beat their wives, and others are dishonest. Among the
rich there are dishonest also, so there are dishonest among the poor,
and so suffering comes by a man’s own fault, folly, or vice, as the
case may be. But, says Mr. Bradlaugh, there were 2,000 women
burnt out of existence. The attention drawn to that topic was
something extraordinary to be addressed to men’s judgments.
He says, did moral government exist then, but then 12,600 persons
have died since we came into this room, 84,000 odd, or 32 millions
eyery year. Men die in suffering and great pain. Those 2.000
left children, brothers, relatives, so have the 2,000 that die hourly.
But who complains of the order of life ? Can you tell me of any
particularly good son that would like his father to live for ever ?
How can we believe in a world constituted as this is of men and
animals—who will say that life should be perpetual 1 Now think
of these 2,000 poor women, they were free beings, those priests also,
whom they say acted so cruelly, delivered them over to the Virgin,
and all that sort of thing, but God is not to force man to be good
if he be a free agent. I am asked who made me a prophet of the
moral nature as well as of God’s declaration ? I feel this con
demnation, and I know by it what is wrong. I feel some great
constitutional disease. In the progressive nature of men there must
be moral disease. They would not be governed without it. God
does not train up children to be slaves. I am not to talk about
blasphemy, for there was a hiss when it was mentioned, and you
cheered Mr. Bradlaugh in his sallies against Deity, so that I
should not wonder to hear a hiss when you hear it affirmed that
God trains up a child for happiness. I say God has a moral
government, and that he makes free beings. Men act on each
other’s circumstances. The mere talk about they could not choose
where they were born, that they could not choose their food, that
they were under the control of circumstances, is mere talk and
�nothing more. Circumstances do not altogether control me. I
have trampled on circumstances a hundred times. Men do right
and wrong, we are actuated by it. We sin against our conscience,
where should be the absurdity of God’s government being begun
and net completed? If God exists,he exists from all eternity, and
he has made millions of beings who exist also. Is it to be denied
that one object of his government is that he purposes these beings
for a higher state? This higher state stands before them an
eternity of happiness if they will conduct themselves properly in
this state of trial. I may here take notice that I have been
faithful to my part of the engagement. Mr. Bradlaugh has some
times spoken so loudly I never thought I had a right to say that
has nothing to do with the question. But I see my time is gone
by, and I must reserve what I have to say.
Mr Bradlaugh : I frankly and unreservedly retract the com
pliment I paid my friend for his ability in evading the subject.
It would be improper in me to persist in tendering him a compli
ment which he repudiates. I also frankly confess I now do not
know for what purpose the first speech was delivered at all, and
this the more because the second speech has not improved the
position. Our friend has been kind enough to express his opi
nion, that it is hardly fair towards a speaker to urge that his
speech has nothing to do with the question. Surely my friend
wants me to offer my opinion on his speech. I have done so; and
if any ot the audience agree with my view, so much the worse
for the speech, because it would show that it produced on the
mind of more than one person an impression, that our friend had
not proved anything which he had proposed to affirm. As to
the moral faculty in a child, Mr. Cooper says the child has no
faculty for some years. I ask whether children up to a certain
ace are without aid from the moral government, and whether
they are not in more need of it than men with matured faculties ?
I ask him whether his argument does not altogether break down
when needed most ? He says that I based an argument on the
fact of man being mutable, whilst God is urged to be immutable.
This is not so. Our friend had urged that men were imperfect—
and I put it to you that we con d hardly expect an imperfect
result from a perfect creation and a perfect creator—a being with
ability to make perfect if he pleased. If I have not made this
clear to you before, I hope I have done so now. Mr. Cooper
declares that he has not heard much about the Thugs hugging,
and that I must bring this hugging business closer to you. My
friend boasts that this argument is very wide and without effect.
I cannot very well oblige my friend by dwelling at any great
length on this phase of human error and crime; for I cannot
do him the injustice to suppose that, in hw endeavours to judge
fairly of moral nature, he should purposely have left out the
�48
history of a large portion of mankind when generalising on the
whole, so that he might make out an argument for the moral
government of the world, 14 The Thugs,” he says, “ are a
long way off.” So was Jesus Christ a long way off. If any ad
verse argument is implied in being a long way off. I retort’ that
they are not so far away as Moses, so distant as David, so far
away as Jonah or Jeremiah. I am not quite so far off as these,
and I must tell him if he will dispute the fact of Thugee strang
ling, he must do so boldly. I will undertake to affirm it. If he
does not know whether the facts he talks about are facts,
he ought not to challenge them by inuendo. The audience will
be able to judge for themselves, whether my friend did not leave
them with an equivocal sort of denial which may mean either
admission of their verity or allegation that they are not correct.
Say you do not know anything about these facts, or that you do
not believe; if you say you do not believe them, I will undertake
to prove them. It may fairly be that, however well a man may
be read, be cannot be presumed to know everything, and your
ignorance is no weapon in my hand. Does he take pains to tell
you what he means by the word sin, or what he means by the
word conscience ? He has not done so, yet persists in speaking
of morality, as though it always and everywhere had one meanir g. Here it is immoral to have two wives. In Turkey it is
not immoral to have two wives. The consciences of the men
who commit polygamy in Turkey, do not burthen them with re
morse, because they have committed what we here should term
a crime. I object to the word sin, because theologians have at
tached a cant meaning to it which I deny. My friend has not
told you his definition. He uses it as though it conveyed a
meaning in which you are all agreed. An act which a man could
not help committing, is not a sin. The wretch who steals a loaf
of bread because starvation, ignorance, poverty, misery, squalor,
and degradation have surrounded him, is not even in your eyes
so guilty as a person of better education and better circumstances.
I will put it to you further, that there are many cases in every
day life, when the same act condemned in one instance, so far
from being regarded as culpable, finds precisely the contrary ver
dict in another. If this be so, our friend’s d:scernment of the
moral government of God is exceedingly short-sighted. How, •
then, does he speak of a common standard for judging right and •
wrong ? I will take you to a great many decent men and women
who would rather prefer stealing to being atheists, and who
would regard it as a greater crime to entertain such opinions as
I hold than to be guilty of theft. To me it is no sin against my
conscience. It reproves me not; on the contrary, the mode in
which my faculties have been educated makes me believe it an
honour to hold and avow these views. He is not dealing with
�49
you fairly when he puts it that men have a common standard of
right and wrong. He said, why deal with the two thousand sq
sadly burned, and not with millions dying around us ? That was
what I did. It was only in one or two short sentences I referred
to the Chili catastrophe, in a few words that I dealt with the two
thousand, and then especially commented on the millions killed by
poverty and disease. My friend replies—the case of the two
thousand poor women startles us from the relief in which it
stands out from the great picture of millions that are stricken down,
that are crushed by poverty—which poverty, he says, only exists
by men’s misdoings, but which I say exists, if there is a moral
governor of the universe, because he keeps it there. For whose
misdoing is a poor child born of weak parents, for whose mis
doing are the parents starving in an unhealthy home with in- 1
sufficient clothing, wretched surroundings, squalid, and with
teaching worse than none ? On whom are we to charge
all this? On the father, on the mother? This cannot be,
because both father and mother are but a part of the squalor,
wretchedness, and misery that existed before them. Then does
God the moral governor of the universe allow all this, never
stopping the pain—never checking the evil ? Our friend has
made a most extraordinary admission. He says these things
result from man’s misdoing. We will take it that a man does
wrong'sometimes—he does it, then, in spite of God or by his
permission, or by his instigation ; but he cannot do it in spite of
God, for Mr. Cooper says that God is omnipotent, therefore it is
impossible to do anything against his power—against his will.
The wrong doer must either be instigated to the wrong doing by
God, or permitted by God to do it; but God being infinite in his
will to permit, would be to compel. It is the same to instigate
as to leave the path for a man to do wrong, who without this
could not help but do right. All wrong and misery exist by
God’s wish or against it. But it cannot exist against God’s wish
if he be all-powerful; nor does Mr. Cooper think ev.il exists
against God’s wish, for he makes God remedy hereafter that
which he might prevent here. God, all-powerful, has the ability
to prevent misery; God, omniscient, knows how to exercise this
ability; and God, all-good, would desire to exercise it. The
population problem, which would take too long to fairly examine
in this debate, is pregnant with weighty arguments on this head.
Poverty exists; and God’s existence, or his power, or his wisdom *
or his goodness stands impeached by it. It would take many
evenings to debate this point fairly, but he does not go beyond
bare assertion, or advance one word of argument about it. He
could not conceive how a good son could wish his father to live
forever. If I understand the meaning of this aright—it would
be that all who wished their fathers to live for ever must be bad
�50
gons. (Hear and laughter.) He says, this life is a probation for
some other state. Which other ? What has he to say except
that the present state is so terribly wicked, so full of treachery
and bloodshed and evil, that he is not heard to express a hop®
to make it better, but is obliged to go to some other world as an
.«
escape from this ? (Laughter and cheers.)
i
Mr. Cooper : So in spite of all I have said about the impropriety
jf of it, the want of wisdom of the thing, the decency of doing it,
I i Mr. Bradlaugh commences again in the same manner. He must
II retract his compliment. He is utterly at a loss to account for the
I,1! first speech; he passes on to say that he must chastise me. I
should say, that that was consummate impudence. Seeing that he
approved of the hisses, he must have great confidence in his powers
of effrontery in conduct like this. (Cries of no, no, he told you to
be less excited)—and he turned round and told this person who
cheered me that he was wrong. (Cries of no, no). I did not say
the child had no moral faculty. I said he did not display that
faculty. He said that an imperfect man was hardly to be ex
pected from an imperfect maker. If he could conceive God at all,
he must be a perfect God, and he could not wish any other God,
but if he saw anything bad, he would say that he was not com
petent to be the framer of the universe. I say there is only one
framer of the universe, God invisible, everywhere present,
all-wise, existent always, an almighty, all-holy being. He knows
that that all-wise and holy being cannot make a being as
perfect as himself. You might as well expect him to make a
triangular circumference. “All-being,” he says, “would be perfect.”
Why waste time on words of this sort ? Our friend then said,
he would make it clear what he meant, when he said, there
was no sinning against conscience. Then he told me about
men having two wives in Turkey; that men had no sense of mora
lity, and that there were men in England who had two wives and
did not think it immoral. We think they do wrong. He says an
act which man cannot help committing is no sin. If I were
disposed to indulge in humour, I should exclaim, a Daniel come to
judgment. A man cannot commit a sin in doing what he cannot
help ; if it is no law to him, he cannot transgress the law. It is
no sin to commit an act. (Cries of question). I did not say that
»il men and women in England had the same standard of judging
of right and wrong. I said no to that, and I said the moral faculty
had to be educated. Every faculty has to be educated. I was
not talking about the millions who suffer death through poverty.
* was talking of the millions that die naturally in an hour. There
such a thing as memory. I did not attribute evil to God because
He never limited or checked it. He talked of weak parents and
the injustice of punishment of sin. Do we not see reasons in the - organic punishment for moral crimes that man can bring disease
�on his children and on himself? Yon say why does God dothat?
Does not vice visit itself? What do you do with that fact ? You
say you cannot take a fact out of the world. Well, it is there.
God says that sin is sinful, that it is abominable in his sight, it is
unholy ; he gives it strong punishment here and everywhere. If
man will not regard himself, he may as regards his children.
Give me an idea whether or not there can be any moral government
where there is no freedom, no will, no possibility of transgression.
Show me that. I cannot understand it. I understand moral
government to mean a government of moral agents by a moral
governor. Moral government means that there are laws to observe,
he must have special rules, that is, the governed must know he
has a government, that is to say, there must be law. What is the
sanction of law ?—punishment. Abolish punishment, and you
abolish law virtually. Just conceive that the Queen abolished
all punishment for crime. Let recognised justice go on. Well,
there is a trial to-night, there is the judge in his scarlet robes, the
barristers in their wigs and gowns, the jury in the jury box. It
is a murderer that is to be tried. He is convicted—what follows ?
The judge puts on his black cap, and sentences the murderer to
death. The keeper then lets him go into the street. A robber is
sentenced to ten years, or twenty perhaps ; he rushes out of the
box and joins his companions in the streets. Then at nisi prius,
it is a horse case, lying seems inseparable from a horse case.
Throughout the whole case there is lying, sticking to your false
hood throughout. You are convicted of perjury, and there is no
punishment. How long will this go on ? There is law then, and
there is a penalty which is the sanction of law. Then there is a
governor, good government if there is a law, and if you abolish
law you abolish government. For God to permit suffering and
wrong is not for him to will or to wish it. I may permit several
things, I do not will them. The father does, the mother does,
the wife does—in all relations of life we often permit that which
we do not will in the active sense. If we come to the philosophic
nature of things, yes; and in the broad sense of language we
permit many things that we do not will. So it is from the moment
that life commences, and for ever. Mr. Bradlaugh knew very
well what I meant. (Cheers.) Why do you clap your hands at my
saying this ? Is it a dignified way to come here ? I expected to
have something like reasonable discussion, and I have to complain
that the argument was never touched. (Hear, dissent, and cries of
“not by you.’’) If any one of you will tell me where the argu
ment was touched, I will be much obliged to him. (Cheers and
hisses.) What is the use of encouraging all this vulgar stuff?
(Hisses.) It is not like reasonable men that want to come to the
truth. There was something that Mr. Bradlaugh said before, that
I meant to touch upon, but had not time. He said, that from the
�52
Atheist’s stand-point, vice should not be punished or virtue
rewarded. Punishment was only to be inflicted so far as it is
preventive. It is to be remedial. May it not be so when he
visits the sin of the parents upon the children 1 Is there not 3
warning ? But then we are told that vice works its own punish
ment and virtue its own reward. Why then complain of Louis
Napoleon ? Should he not be punished according to that theory ?
I cannot see that vice works its own punishment there. I love
Mazzini with all my heart. He is the greatest man I have ever
known in my life. Is virtue rewarded in his mournful life ?
Tyrants on thrones and clergy to help them 1 What does Louis
Napoleon care about clergy?—he makes instruments of them. He
does not believe them any more than did the first Napoleon.
There was also some observation in a former speech about the
ignorant being oftener on their knees than on their feet. The
Kaffirs and the lowest races in the world. But that is not in
the round of my reasoning even if it were true.
Mr. Bradlaugh : Our friend puts it that he did not say the
child had no moral faculty, but he said the child did not display
it. I am sorry I misunderstood him. I will wait for the present
till the report comes out, but I fancy that my comment upon the
old man as upon the child did not misapply. How do you know
that the child has got this faculty before it is manifested ? By
what fact do you discover what is not displayed ? You certainly
have not displayed that faculty of putting things clear, or you
would have tried—
Mr. Cooper : That is your impudence.
Mr. Braelaugh:—Tried to give us some reasons for
supposing that a child has what you call the faculty for judging
what you call right and wrong, and yet having this faculty disp!ays it not. You said that God cannot make another being as
perfect as himself, because you say he is infinite—and he cannot
make another infinite. If that is a fair argument, it destroys
the doctrine of creation altogether. If God cannot create another
infinite, neither can he add to his own infinity. To add a finite
universe to infinity is equally as absurd as to add an infinite.
If God’s ability to create a being as perfect as himself is limited,
then he is not omnipotent. If he is omnipotent, there can be no
such limitation. You say that sin is a transgression of law;
law has two meanings, one scientific as expressing invariable
sequence, and the other moral, as command. You cannot trans
gress the one and the other ; you can the right or duty to dis
obey ; command depends upon who gives the command—with
what sanction it is given—whether it be good or bad to obey or
not to obey. There are many statute laws at the present time
which it is perfect virtue to break, and no sin to disobey.
Mr. Cooper : That won’t do.
�53
i
{
•j
f
i
?
?
Mb. Bradlaugh : Then my friend says vice visits itself on
children, and asks, How does the Atheist deal with that ? He
finding, whether there be a God or not, a moral governor or not,
that children begotten of diseased parents are born in a diseased
state ; strives to educate the parents to observe physical laws—
to know the sequences on which health depends, and to carry
out this law so as to ensure health as the result of the physical
law. As an Atheist, he knows that where there is a child born
into the world and the conditions of health have been known
and observed by its parents, the child is more healthy, whether
there be a God or not. You say that moral government implies
that there are special rules established by the inoral governor.
If a man break these rules unconsciously, is there a penalty?
My friend contends, as I understand him, that those who sin not
knowing the law, escape the penalty. The rules of God—do all
know them ? Yes or no. If all do not know them, what
becomes of this special government ? Some are ignorant. Again,
is God able to make all know them ? If yes, and he only teaches
partially, he is unjust, for He requires from one a higher duty
than from another. You say there is a difference between per
mitting error and willing it. The illustration of the father or
mother permitting without willing has no analogy. No argument
founded on man can conduct you to a demonstration for the
character of Deity. If your assertion of God’s will as infinite
betrue, there is no permission without his will, and the will of
any other cannot be in opposition, because he is omnipotent. If
all things be from God, is it not a fair query how augjht can exist
except by God’s will? He says ihe good are to live for ever :did
he say where or how ? Is it to be in the moon for ever, or in the sun
for ever, or where ? My friend simply appealed to your prejudices,
the prejudices created by your religious education, when he spoke
this. He knew that he meant nothing by it— he did not know any
thing about living for ever anywhere. When he says that his
moral nature leads him to hope that when he fiuds that this life
is imperfect—that God is able to make another, which he hopes
will be better, but he don’t know how it is to be, where it is to
be, or indeed whether it is to be at all, he has not given us a partide of information about it. Now, however, he finds it convenient, having said that he was going to take the broad view of
the question, to take you abroad altogether—and he desires to
take you into the next world, which he would have you examine
in preference to the subject, but we have not that before us, but
tojudge of his Deity as moral governor. He could not have been
more unfortunate than wheu he went to the Kaffirs in his speech,
who have no knowledge of this moral government which he sets
up. There are the Kiffirs, the Dyaks of Rajah Brook, and
many other nations of the world, who have no conception of a
�54
future state of existence, who have no conception of God as sepa
rate, apart, and distinct from the universe, and who, therefore,
they do not pray to. He has used such a defence to-night as
will rather defeat his argument for the existence of God. It is
either good or bad that men should know ot God’s existenceIf it was good, then God should give all men that knowledge ; if >
he did not, he himself was not all good—that is, was not God. I
admit that my friend is right when he says I did not hit his argu- J
ment. I tried as hard as I was able, but it is hard to hit nothing.
- (Cheers.) Why blame Louis Napoleon, and praise Mazzini ? I
complain of him whom I hold to be a scoundrel, because I hope
to make the rest of the world avoid his vices—and because I
dare to wake up a nation to a desire for liberty, whom God lets
sleep in political slavery. Mazzini, whom I love and honour as
much as you can—whose truth I have learned to revere as much,
as you have learned to revere it—when you ask me what reward
this man has, I say that his reward is in his own honour, in his
honest truthfulness, in the love for humanity he expresses, which
makes thousands love him. He has no fears such as possess that
man, that vagabond of the Tuileries, with his baud against
every man ; but this exile, almost prisoner, this recluse, this man
shut out from the world, his life of truth gives me the highest
hope, for he gains and gives sympathy forth to the world and to
the noblest in the world. You tell me of your God. Why does he
allow one to be hunted by police, and keep the other in a posi
tion to drive Europe before him with the edge of his sword ?
Why doesjiGod permit the armies of this crowned scoundrel of
France to protect those Roman bandits, who keep daily open the
bloody wounds of wretched Italy ? I did not bring Napoleon
or Mazzini into the debate, but if you want an argument against
God’s moral government, take that sink of vice and crime, Rome,
the birthplace of your Christian faith, and source of all your
Christian frauds ; Rome, the cancer in the womb of Italian liberty.
You shall have my sympathy with liberty and truth wherever
needed, but we rather forget in this the subject for debate. We
come here to discuss one theme which our friend has entirely
neglected. We ought to have some evidence of God’s moral
- government of the world. So far as our friend is concerned,
every theme has been selected but this, and except reading from
his memorandum book the pencil notes which he has made,
my argument he has met by simplv saying that “he cannot
understand." He cannot understand the meanings of the words
he uses himself, any more than the argument which he heard
used against him. And he tells you of my weakness and
my impudence, but each man has the right to say his b st in his
own way. Age carries with it no respect here, other than it
Warrants by matured thought. Mr. Cooper’s past service carries
�55
with it no respect here, unless he continues it by present duty.'
The speech which must not provoke laughter is sober and earnest
utterance, and the service which finds respect is sterling honest i
work. Let our friend rely not on the past, not on old certificates
of respect, but on the services he performs now, in bringing truth
before you, speaking to your hearts and educating your brains,
developing your intellects, and enlarging your humanity. When
he does this he will have done something entitling him to reproach
you if you fail in respect, and he will save himself the need of
reproaching you at all, for he will win, as I do now, your warmest
sympathy. (Loud Cheers.)
Mr. Coopee : I go on to follow the plan which I suppose to
be the right one. He claims to do the same thing. I think this
the right plan to take up every sentence uttered, and to show
that they are not to the point, that they are instead, great non
sense, and don’t bear on the argument, and are simply false con
clusions. I suppose that to be my plain duty. I come here to
argue for the being of God as moral governor of the universe;
Mr, Bradlaugh comes here to argue that there is no moral govern
ment. I spoke of children having a faculty. He asks how I know
that children have a faculty? Isav by watching its develop
ment. He says sin is not transgression of the law, for law con
sists of command and sequence. What has that to do with the
position ? I know that law is command, and there is sequence,
which is punishment, if you do not obey. But how does that
■overthrow the truth of sin being a transgression of the law ? If
children are born without a faculty, how come they to ever dis
cern whether there is a God or not ? Indeed, that is?the question
between us—whether there is a God or not. Do not all men
know God’s laws ? If he says we see this inequality of punish
ment, he would ask what is God ab mt 1 I say that all human
beings know more or less of God’s law. He says that of some,
more than others, God requires duty without reason. I say no:
where precept has not been given to man, God does not expect
him to fulfil. There is no teaching of any sort that I am aware
of against this. I never learned among any class of persons any
other belief in God, but that he dealt with all al ke. Io that
sense, there was no such inconsistency of philosophy. But Mr.
Bradlaugh said I was not to talk of myse.f. When I was talking
cf permission, I did not mean instigation. I did not mean any
•such thing as “to will it.” I was not also to talk of analogy
between men’s nature and God’s, between toe intelligence of man
and that of God. I say again that permission does not mean
instigation. He says it does. I say it don’t. He 3aid something
about “ living forever.” Why does he affect not to know what
every one else knew, why affect to be so stupid ? “ How
ndid I know that there was an hereafter ?” Because life is not so
�56
perfect as my moral nature. I call will choice, and my moral
nature is so strong on these points that I am obliged to attend to
them. All men are aware of this hereafter, and their conscience
in regard to it troubles all. But then he says, “ Where is this
future life to be ? Is it to be here or elsewhere ?” I am not
anxious about that; I know that the judge of all the earth will do
right. I am sure that the God who made me will do right ; I
am, therefore, not anxious. I am sure that it will be right. I
cannot speak to what will be appointed to me. I may particu
larly call your attention to the strange remark made by Mr.
Bradlaugh, when he instanced what he called a fact, that the
Kaffirs had no hope of a future state, and . that all ignorant peo
ple are oftener on their knees than on their feet. He says he has
proved such a deficiency as will overthrow my argument for
God’s existence. I showed that man is forgetful, and he says
that overthrows my argument. I said that the argument had
not been met, and he said he had nothing to meet. Here are
those representative men on this platform. Is the argument to
he dismissed in this manner ? Is that to go forth from this plat
form as an argument ? And then what he says about the glass
being of the same existence as that of man. (Cries of no no.)
I cannot help being surprised at all this gibberish. (Cries of
question, hisses, and cheers.) Why, you are not fit to listen to the
question. (Hisses, and some confusiou.) I am appealing to
representa'ive men What is the use of argument, if this is argu
ment ? He treats the question as he likes. He tells us that he
had a mission, and he said that all precognition was an utter
absurdity. But the argument of the moral sense was the greatest
argument that could be brought for the existence of a moral
government. It has convinced others, and it has convinced me.
That was the way in which such men as Clark and G Hespie, to
whom Mr. Bradlaugh referred, arrived at the knowledge of moral
governance. He said “that I said what I said before was there,
only that it was not there.’’ But if these great men held those
doctrines which I defend, if thousands of other great men have
held them ; if these arguments have passed through rhe strongest
minds of Englishmen, men who have done such mighty things in
mathematics, men of such disciplined intellect, that there is a God *
as maker and moral governor of the universe, I am compelled ,
to remind him that the argument was neither touched nor
answered, and that all this “flibertigibbet ” is not argument. Is
this to be the close ? Can you offer no further argument? Are
you who assemble here to accept that as argument ? Will you try
to argue thequestion out or—(Cries of hear and his-es ) Thankyou
for nothing. He complains of the order of moral government, and he
talks of L >uis Napoleon as having been success'ul while Mazzni ishunted by police, and he says the reason he does so is to rouse the
�57
nation. It is a queer nation that—when one reflects on its meanness,
its littleness, its lickspittleness, one feels contempt instead of admi
ration for a Frenchman at this time of day. (Cheers and hisses, which,
lasted for some seconds). Show me any six men whom you talk
about—you may tell me that I am talking of the body of Frenchmen in the streets of Paris, but I say that they are unworthy as a
nation to enjoy liberty. But in reply to my question, how is
Mazzini rewarded ? You say by his own sense of honour and truth.
Why do you then say that he is neglected ? What is there to
complain of that things were not right ? Why, according to this,
it is right after all. But no, says my friend, it is not right. My
friend blows hot and cold at the same time. Either the con
science of such men is guilty, and that things are not right in this
world, or they are. Which will he have ? He has chosen to
take the latter conclusion with respect to these two cases. Why
do such things exist, but because there is a moral government and
we are moral agents ? Then he talks of Rome, or rather he says,
“We can talk about Rome.” That is not my religion, that is not
where I am. I always hated her for her bigotry and her tyrannies,
and if I were a Roman Catholic and wished to put down Freethought, I should perhaps have to arrest you first. But that is
not my religion. I do not come from Rome. He then complains
of my reading notes. But please come to this fact, that you have
a conscience. I say you know it, and that you cannot conceal the
fact from yourselves, that when you do wrong there is an inward
chiding; you cannot shake it off. How came you to have it there?
and for the future if there is no moral government, all will soon,
be over. “Men reasoned,” and we are told further, that all
sensible men laughed at the notion of immortality I professed.
But he was sure that he would enjoy this world and everything
that he could have in it as well, whether there was no future, and
he referred to broad history But whatever he may say, I say you
sin against conscience, and you are rebuked by your moral sense.
Oh, but he says “ There is no such thing.” I say there is, that if
you do harm to your wife and children, or to your neighbour; if
you commit d shonesty, you know that you blame yourself—the
faculty, the moral faculty blames you. How could yon have it if
there were no accountability—no moral government? How comes
it there ? It has not been esteemed so very ridiculous by some of
the greatest men that ever lived. It was said that when argu*
ments would not convince Pascal, the moral feeling did. It is ou
record of Emmanuel Kant, the great German philosopher, that
when the design argument, and the argument a priori failed to
convince him, the moral sentiment convinced him. It was the
testimony of Liebig that he was convinced by the moral argument
When nothing else could convince him. “ I feel this moral power
Within me, he said; “ I cannot destroy it, I cannot see it, it
"
•
:
i
•
<
>
�58
impels me, it controls me, it blames me. Why is it so, if this be
the be-all and end-all, and there is no moral government ?”
(Hear, and cheers.)
Mr. Bradlaugh : It is not true that it convinced Locke,
Newton, or Samuel Clarke. They take lines of argument opposed
to each other. The illustration is not a fair one, any more than
the quotation from Plato was a correct one. I am surprised at
Mr. Cooper’s lamentable blunder as to laws, as denoting in
variable sequence, telling me that law means command, and that
the sequence follows the breach as punishment. Now, with fiftynine years of experience, to make such a sad blunder when his
distinction of law as command and law as sequence were put before
you in my speech, is at least most extraordinary. I cannot believe
that he has been serious. He surely cannot be so ignorant of the
commonest terms with which thinkers deal; or, if he is so igno
rant, I am justified in standing up in this debate and saying that
he has no right to discuss these subjects at all. If he does not
understand the argument, if he does not understand the ipeaning
of words, then I say that he is unfit to argue; and if he does un
derstand them, his speech is worse than worthless, because wil
fully evasive.
Mr. Cooper : I do not know what you are referring to.
Mr. Bradlaugh : I will do him the justice to say that he did
not, in his last speech, refer to the subject we have met to discuss.
I think I will also do him the justice to say that it was the strangest
and most incoherent speech I ever heard, and I am free to add
that in his attempts to demonstrate Deity he has broken down
lamentably. (Hear, and cheers.)
Mr. Cooper rose, and was understood to say that this was
downright impudence.
Mr. Bradlaugh : I did not interrupt when he was talking
about gib' erish. I have a right to comment on his speech in my
own way—in the way that seems to me best. I asked him how
he knew that the moral faculty existed in children. He says by
watching its development. He took no pains to tell you what
he meant. I will try to do so. The basis for this so-called
faculty is organisation, differing in each individual—that organi
sation is educated, and this education also varies with each.
Therefore this so-called faculty is ultimately resultant from
development of organisation. That basis must be limited and
varied.
It varies perceptibly in different races of mankind.
There is a different development to each individual, and this
education of organisation helps to make up what we call con
science, this conscience varying in its exercise in different
spheres, and by different individuals. Faculty I say it is not,
it is only a condition, the result of all these circumstances, but
-is never independent of them. This alleged moral laculty never
�59
existed without these, either in children, men, or women, at any
age. Then our friend said that all human beings knew more or
less of God’s laws—some knew more, he says, some knew less.
Well, if that is so, if some had abundance, and some were deficient,
then God has been unkind either to them to whom he has given
but little knowledge, or to those to whom he has given much.
The knowledge of God’s laws must be either good or bad. If it
is good for all to have a complete knowledge, then there is in
justice in giving to some more, to some less: if it is bad to have
the knowledge, then there is injustice in giving it to any. In
either case you have an argument against the moral government.
Then our friend goes on to say, “ The future does not trouble
me.” He knows what kind of service will be allotted to him by
God or by any one competent to make the allotment. I can tell
him one kind of service which will certainly not be allotted to
him, and that is, the task of proving that there is a God—or the
moral character of his government. (Cheers.) That duty will
never more be allotted to him. (Cheers.) Our friend was good
enough to tell us that it was the strongest effort of his mind this
demonstration of moral sense, and that he had made it so clear
that there was hardly any use in his arguing the question with
me about it. I will wait till the report shall be in print—that
will speak for itself. I did not refer to last night till he took the
opportunity of introducing it. I would not have brought it
forward because there remained no point needing comment. I
can well conceive a man lamenting during the day over a defeat,
and trying again to-night to talk it into a semblance of victory.
You referred to Mazzini, and asked why I complained. You say—
“ Oh, but it is right or it is wrong.” Why use this term right er
wrong ? If you use them, the one as conducing to happiness,
the other as producing a state of pain, I can unde’-stand what you
mean. It is a state of happiness for a man to work for good—to
work for truth—the development of truth amongst his fellows ;
he finds happiness in so doing. But it is a source of pain to him
to know there is so much evil yet to be undone You can believe
the man more happy who does right than he who commits a
wrong, and this whether there be a God or not. But God, my
friend says, is all-good—that which results from him is there
fore all-good—it must be all-good, as no tvd can come from an in
finite God. Adieism is in the world, and it mu-t come from some
source, as out of nothing nothing can come. God is the source
of all, it must therefore come from God, therefore Atheism is
from God ; but God is good, therefore Atheism i< good. And n w
for the French. They are a queer nation, says our friend He
has been told so perhaps, but those who bave been am mg them
think otherwise. Queer they are, but the men who are most
queer amongst them are the men who are most under the domi-
�60
Stance of theology, and least under the influence of Freethought.
I have found that men who are least under the influence of the
priest are the men who have been best d'spnsed to bring about a
better state of things for their country. These are not the men
you speak of in such unwarrantable language. There are men who
bend before the rising sun, who bow before the crown, but these
are not the men developed by thought and truth. There are men
■who have been mbdeveloped by the misgovernment of kings and
priests ordained by God, who left them without moral thought,
and destitute of manhood. Those men whom you call lick
spittles—men in Paris, men at Lyons, men at Bourdeaux, in the
North and in the South—are men speaking for their country, men
working for liberty, hoping to attain it for their own country and
for others. Men are now striving for liberty again in France.
(Cheers.) Then you come to Borne. Is that so far from your
religion that you can afford to attack it ? Rotten branch, you do
well to shun the stem from which you spring (Loud cheering.)
Matricidal son, you do nobly to plant the dagger of calumny in
the breast of the mother church which bore you How well
pleased her son should be to cover her with odium; but where
would be your church without its early gospel forgeries—where
your Christian establishments, your bishoprics, your evidences,
your prisons, your revenues, all things that go to make up your
faith, if they bad not been treasured up, garnished, furbished in
Rome ? You say you are not Roman Catholic, and that Roman
Catholics will burn men—so will Protestants. Protestants have
burned Roman Catholics. There is a place not so far as
Caff'rar'a, there is Newgate, where Protestant Christian noble
men piled up stones on men of the Romish faith until the blood
gushed from their forehead and finger-ends because they would not
plead before judges who had pre-determined to condemn them.
You tell me you do not—I answer, you do not, because you dare
not do such things now. It is within the brief span of your own
lifetime, when you were but little older than I am now, that
dissenting clergymen sentenced Richard Carlile and Robert
Taylor to Oakham, Giltspur Street, and Newgate, and harassed
Carlile’s family with starvation for holding such opinions I now
hold. (Loud cheers.) You could not do all this to-day, because
the stream of human thought is rushing onward, and would
drown your fires if you dared kindle them. You are only losing
|; time in advocating the past, because new thought is more powerful thau old faith—it has trampled out your faggots. Make not
J a boast over Roman Catholics, both fruit of one tree—rotten fruit
I admit; both are laden with poison, both have given to the
world a heritage—slavery, tyrants, and chains. It is left for the
republic of human intellect to erect a better state of things.
(Loud and protracted cheering.)
*
1
�61
Mb. Cooper : I am returning to the affirmation with which he
sets out. He says that Locke, Newton, and Clark oppose each
other upon this question. I say they don’t. He said what I
quoted from Plato is not in Plato. I say it is. What use in
trying to persuade people that I do not understand my own
argument ? I said I did not understand what Bradlaugh said
about command and sequence. He knew he said that I did not
, understand my own argument. He asked me how did I know
i that men in this world in various nations and situations had
i; more or less knowledge of God’s law ? I said I knew it by their
acts, and then he said it was unkind that God did not reveal to them
the law. He could not; and only when this great moral world
should be destroyed, would there be justice done. If men
transgressed the law, says Mr. Bradlaugh, they should not be
punished for it in this state, he will have no doubt about it in the
next state. So my friend will argue that the virtuous are more
happy even in this world, and yet nothing is right. Can you
understand this reasoning ? He asked me not to blow hot and
cold. It is the most stupid talk I ever heard in the world. He
first tells me that it is right, and then that it is wrong. I cannot
understand all this- The men in France and the priests are so
and so. Yes. Why? Because they bowed to the dominance of
the priests, and not because of theology in general I have it on
the testimony of a gentleman who went to live in a house in
Bordeaux to commence an undertaking as an agriculturist. He
commenced by giving some books to the peasantry on bis estate.
They bowed as they received them, and appeared thankful. In
three days, however, they came back to him, and politely re
quested that they might see the governor of the farm. The Pere
[Mr. Cooper pronounced this word with accent on the last syllable,
a circumstance which caused some laughter and surprise, which
it is necessary to explain, that a portion of the following speech of
Mr. Bradlaugh’s may be understood.] The Pert was a priest in
the village, who, he said, told him that they did not read such
books because of their religion, and they very seldom made acquain
tance with anything beside theology. The great mass of them
bow to the domination of the priest; and so these lickspittles
exist in France, and are, according to my friend, made under God’s
moral government. Has he shown that any other government
will account for the various arguments that have been adduced?
As this is the last time I shall address you, I will simply appeal
to your consciences again. You have a conscience, every man
has a conscience, to which he is responsible in the first instance.
You need not smile—it will not be a smiling matter if, on your
death-bed, your conscience tells you that I am right and that you
are wrong. We will all have to meet it. Every one of us. I
have talked before of death-beds, and there was no indisposition
�62
to listen to me then. If morality is not taught in this room now,
it ought to be. It used to be. You have a conscience which has
dictates, and which, if you do not obey it, flogs you. If you vio
late conscience, on your death-bed it will not be a happy one.
You say there is no future. You may contrive to allay the
gnawings of conscience in some degree—you will not kill them.
They will be there up to the last. You had better listen to con
science before it is too late. The more you ponder on this fact,
the more you will begin to see that there is a moral nature, and
the more clearly you will apprehend that there must be a moral
governor. I wish I had pondered more on this fact in my early
life. It began with that point of government—it began in John
Street in a discussion upon one of Mr. Owen’s propositions, that
man is the creature of circumstances. He was laughed at when
he said there was no praise or blame. In the controversy, I
began to blame myself and praise others. Why, I began to ask,
do you praise such men as Louis Blanc, Mazzini, and Kossuth
when their name is mentioned, and execrate Louis Napoleon?
Praise and blame I We cannot help it. It is no use telling me
there is no such thing as sinning against conscience—there is
something which you cannot get rid of, which cannot be sot out of
the mind, which cannot be got out of the heart. You go about
with this conscience, with the certainty that it is there perpetually
—a tribunal within you. If you reflect on it, the more you will feel
convinced that moral government exists. I reflected, and I said,
what I have ever since maintained, that there exists a moral
government for man, whose head is the Governor and Creator of
the Universe. (Hear, hear.)
Mr. Bradlaugh: It would be impossible to demonstrate to
night that my remarks, in reference to Locke, Newton, and Samuel
Clark, were well founded. A quarter of an hour will not suffice
for that purpose. But I will take occasion to say something in
respect of what has been said to come from Plato. It is very
curious that, in the “ Timaeus ” which I hold in my hand, there is a
passage precisely the opposite to that which my friend quoted,
and I have not been able to find any thing like the sentence he
quoted from Plato. What I do find is in opposition to what he
has attributed to Plato. I take pains to be moderately correct
before I challenge an assertion made in this way. (Mr. Cooper
here interrupted ) He tells me the passage is there, and when I
discover a passage having an opposite meaning, he "a;ks me where '
it is. You first quoted the passage which you say is in J^'ato, and f •
it is for you to point it out.
Mr. Cooper : I don’t know what you are talking about.
Mr. Bradlaugh : You soon will know what I am talking
about if you are indecent enough to continually interrupt. If i
you do not begrudge me this last speech, at least keep quiet. If
>
1
�63
fifty-nine years have not taught you the advantage of imitating
younger men by listening patiently to opposite opinions, such a
lesson may be taught you here to-night.
Mr. Cooper: Hold your impudence. (Loud cries of “Keep
your temper.”)
r
Mr. Bradlaugh: With regard to the agricultural population,
that of England would be as little likely to preserve and read the
works of Paine or of Cobbett, as were the agriculturists of the
South of France to read works that were not recognised by the
Roman Catholic Church. I submit that no greater illustration
in favour of my friend could be drawn from the conduct of the
agriculturists in France, than I could draw, on the contrary, from
the agricultural population in this country, and even in the
counties of Essex, Suffolk, and Norfolk, where the people are
ignorant in the extreme, many of them in these enlightened days
being unable to read or write. They have plenty of clergymen—*
take Harwich and for miles round, it is a place where you will find,
an agricultural population as ignorant, as pious, and as poor as any
in England. Our friend again appealed to conscience, without
having devoted one thought to the way in which he accounted
for conscience. Never having permitted himself to explain one
of the points challenged by me, he talks about conscience as if it
had never been referred to in my speeches. Feeling that his posi
tion was weak, and knowing that he had made nothing of it, he
comes to the old and oft-tried death-bed argument to frighten
those whom he cannot convince. (Cheers.) I ask you, will you
think yourselves the better men that you are frightened into this
conscience dogma, which you could not reasonably believe, and
which you are asked to accept from fear, though you rejected it when
you said there was not evidence enough to convince you ? When
he thus deals with death-beds, is it, does he think, to have some
effect on the conclusion of the debate ? If he search for death
bed arguments, he may find enough for his own refutation. He
has appealed to the cross, and I accept his challenge, and ask him
what were the dying words of Christ himself? “ My God! my
God ! why hast thou forsaken me ?” If he who claimed to be
God and man was so deserted in his dying moments, what hope
? Better recommend salvation by your own manly
thought your own efforts for the development of human hap
piness. My friend says that morality used to be taught in this
room when he was here, and implies that the reverse is now the
case. What call you morality ? Is that a moral act which tends
to the greatest happiness of the greatest number according to the
knowledge of the actor ? No other definition can you give. I
challenge all of you who stand before me whether in every lecture,
teaching, or preaching by me—if you will have it so, whether the
burthen of my lecture has not been the inculcation of morality ?
j
�64
c
II
3
s'
t
t
S
n
b
b
d>
v
I
tj
S<
tl
V
C(
v>
g
tl
Hi
C
ft
r<
ci
P
al
T
h
W
h
d
J it
•' it
The Freethinkers have not fallen away from the cause of truth
and morality. When you presume to deal with myself and my
audience her -, as if we were schoolboys still and you teacher,
you should be prepared with solid instruction as justification for
your presumption, and when you wish men not to laugh at you,
you should have some reason better than your age—something
more argumentative than impudence. You should, at least,
km w better what you are talking about. (Loud cries of question,
question, hear, hear, and cheers.) When the construction of
terms is referred to, and you tell me more than twice that you do
•«. not understand the difference between sequence and command, I am
obliged to tell you that you do not understand the commonest rudimeuts of language, and are unfitted to conduct a grave discussion ;
and when 5 ou say you “ never did say so and so,” that you have a
short nn mory. I can only add that you are either unable to
argue at ail, or you are disingenuously concealing what you know
would be fatal to your position. (Cheers.) There has not been,
I repeat, an attempt by you at logic or argument. How is it that
the friends whom I saw around Mr. Cooper last night have this
evening fled from his flag ? I saw la^t evening, and I was pleased to
see sitting on that side, men of intellect, men of talent—equal to
the task of weighing the force of an argument, addressed to them,
and. knowing the exact value of words. How is it that they
were brought here to wait on victory, but have not returned here
to witness the fray, now the hope for victory has become defeat ?
Is it because there was not on the part of the Chr.stian
advocate even the shadow of a pretence of having advanced any
thing in favour of his side the question ? It is because they came
here seeking in me one who was, as you have declared, too igno
rant to meet you, but notwithstanding I am now here to fulfil
my part, and show that even my ignorance transcends your
knowledge.
"
Mr. Cooper : Is that argument ?
Mr Bradlaugh : I know it is not argument, but it is as good
argument as “gibberish;” it is as good argument and quite as
forcible as the “ impudence,” or that you did not come here to
meet Charles Bradlaugh; that you are not to be answered because
you are fifty-nine years of age. It would have been better for both
of us to have discussed carefully, and to have reasoned together
step by step till we reached the height of this great argument which,
deserves great discussion; but when an attempt is made to override
discussion, I am obliged to turn round, and to show thecause of such
hardiness which lies either in his utter inability or his desire to
avoid the question altogether. (Cheers). I leave the matter in your
hands. I admit that I am not the ablest or the fittest represen
tative the Freethought party might have put forward. But
although I am not the best I have honestly upheld the principles
�/
-of those who trusted their cause to me, and if I have failed, I
have failed in consequence of the weakness of th* advocate; but
you, with the cause of God on your side, and boasting of your
great intellect, you thinking you had only a poor piece of igno
rance to combat—I say you have only made a shadow of a de
fence. On your side has been all the pretence. I remember
when at the Wigan Hail, at the U. P. Kirk, Glasgow, at Man
chester, and here you refused to meet me. (Loud cries of question,
question, cheers, and hisses ) Why, there is not a shred of the
question left. (Great cheering.) I say again it was in the public
Hall at Wigan, it was in the U. P. Kirk, Glasgow, in this Hall of
Science, in the chapel at Manchester, that you told me I was too
ignorant to be met, that I could not understand the meaning of
a&s®
AStow, I words. We have to-night an illustration of your learning when,
sdj .hi ■_ I in the language most commonly spoken throughout Europe and
edF I the world, we hear the word p'ere (father) pronounced pary
rfjae^ I (laughter), proving the extent of your erudition. It would
have been improper for me to deal with this stupid blunder if he
had not been used to boast of the acquisition of fourteen lan
guages, and summoned the world as scholars to hear his champion
■wnttw’ | lectures. Are you then the Christian who placards the walls of
r*®?drio I cities professing to meet all Freethinkers in England with a view
3V!TOOtjf’ | to convert their doubts ? Are you^ar excellence the person who
&MT«Sif': I has read every book carefully to find evidence and argument for
sow -sift I the existence of God, who claim to be teacher and preacher of
■shgfirf-9- I Christian doctrine, bridging over centuries of history with irre
f4d;«»S# | fragable evidences ? It is to be hoped that when it is necessary
i ,m»* o* I to find a champion for the tottering orthodoxy and an argument
MOV-S^Ilf I in favour of a blind belief, some abler representative will be found
i .atflWB
by the Christian body to whom to trust the marshalling of its
forces for another defeat.
----- o----a .tM .
Mr. Bradlaugh sat down amidst loud cheering, which was re
newed again and again. This concluded the discussion, and a
yyMhi'dT
formal vote of thanks having been passed to the chairman, the
meeting separated.
^aimp
�’T-
APPENDIX*
e
f
j
(
1
*
t
5
d
S
1
J
3
ft
rl
c
P
a
£
.
n
hd
dj|
it|j
A PLEA FOR ATHEISM,
CrTTLESPiE says that £*an Atheist propagandist seems a non*
descript monster created by nature in a moment of madness.” Despite this opinion, it is as the propagandist of
Atheism that I pen the following lines, in the hope that I
may succeed in removing some few of the many prejudices
which have been created against not only the actual holders
of Atheistic opinions, but also against those wrongfully suspected of entertaining such ideas. Men who have been
famous for depth of thought, for excellent wit, or great
genius, have been recklessly assailed as Atheists, by those
who lacked the high qualifications against which the spleen
of the calumniators was directed. Thus, not only has
Voltaire been without ground accused of Atheism, but
Bacon, Locke, and Bishop Berkeley himself, have, amongst
others, been denounced by thoughtless or unscrupulous
pietists as inclining to Atheism, the ground for the accusation being that they manifested an inclination to improve
human thought.
It is too often the fashion with persons of pious reputation
to speak in unmeasured language of Atheism as favouring
immorality, and of Atheists as men whose conduct is necessarily vicious, and who have adopted atheistic views as a
desperate defiance against a Deity justly offended by the
‘ badness of their lives. Such persons urge that amongst
< the proximate causes of Atheism are vicious training, im- ■
; moral and profligate companions, licentious living, and the <
like. Dr. John Pye Smith, in his “ Instructions on Christian Theology,” goes so far as to declare that“ nearly all
the Atheists upon record have been men of extremely
debauched and vile conduct.” Such language from the
Christian advocate is not surprising, but there are others
who, professing great desire , the spread of Ereethought,
�A PLEA FOR ATHEISM.
.
:
■
r
3
and with pretensions to rank amongst acute and liberal
thinkers, declare Atheism impracticable, and its teachings
cold, barren, and negative. In this brief essay I shall
except to each of the above allegations, and shall en
deavour to demonstrate that Atheism affords greater possi
bility for human happiness than any system yet based on
Theism, or possible to be founded thereon, and that the
lives of true Atheists must be more virtuous, because more
human, than those of the believers in Deity, the humanity
of the devout believer often finding itself neutralised by
a faith with which it is necessarily in constant collision.
The devol ee piling the faggots at the auto da fe of an
heretic, and that heretic his son, might, notwithstanding, be
a good father in every respect but this. Heresy, in the
eyes of the believer, is highest criminahty, and outweighs
all claims of family or affection.
Atheism, properly understood, is in nowise a cold,
barren negative; it is, on the contrary, a hearty, fruitful
affirmation of all truth, and involves the positive assertion
and action of highest humanity.
Let Atheism be fairly examined, and neither condemned
—its defence unheard—on the ex parte slanders of the professional preachers of fashionable orthodoxy, whose courage
is bold enough while the pulpit protects the sermon, but
whose valour becomes tempered with discretion when a free
platform is afforded and discussion claimed ; nor misjudged
because it has been the custom to regard Atheism as so
unpopular as to render its advocacy impolitic. The best
policy against all prejudice is to assert firmly the verity.
The Atheist does not say “ There is no God,” but he says,
“ I know not what you mean by God; I am without idea
of God ; the word ‘ God ’ is to me a sound conveying no
clear or distinct affirmation. I do not deny God, because
I cannot deny that of which I have no conception, and the
conception of which, by its affirmer, is so imperfect that
he is unable to define it to me.” If you speak to the
Atheist of God as creator, he answers that the conception
of creation is impossible. We are utterly unable to construe
it in thought as possible that the complement of existence has
been either increased or diminished, much less can we con
ceive an absolute origination of substance. We cannot con
ceive either, on the one hand, nothing becoming something,
■■
.
-
’
�A PLEA FOR ATHEISM.
or oil the other, something becoming nothing. The Theist
who speaks of God creating the universe, must either sup
pose that Deity evolved it out of himself, or that he pro
duced it from nothing. But the Theist cannot regard the
■ universe as evolution of Deity, because this would identify
Universe and Deiiy, and be Pantheism rather than Theism.
There would be no distinction of substance—in fact no crea1 tion. Nor can the Theist regard the universe as created
out of nothing, because Deity is, according to him, necessa
rily eternal and infinite. His existence being eternal and
infinite, precludes the possibility of the conception of
vacuum to be filled by the universe if created. No one can
even think of any point of existence in extent or duration
and say, here is the point of separation between the creator
and the created. Indeed, it is not possible for the Theist to
imagine a beginning to the universe. It is not possible to
conceive either an absolute commencement, or an absolute
termination of existence; that is, it is impossible to con
ceive beginning before which you have a period when the
universe has yet to be; or to conceive an end, after which
the universe, having been, no longer exists. It is impos
sible in thought to originate or annihilate the universe.
The Atheist affirms that he cognises to-day effects, that
these are at the same time causes and effects—causes to the
effects they precede, effects to the causes they follow.
Cause is simply everything without which the effect would
not result, and with which it must result. Cause is the
means to an end, consummating itself in that end. The
Theist who argues for creation must assert a point of time,
that is, of duration, when the created did not yet exist. At
this point of time either something existed or nothing;,
but something must have existed, for out of nothing no
thing can come. Something must have existed, because the
point fixed upon is that of the duration of something.
This something must have been either finite or infinite
if finite, it could not have been God, and if the something
were infinite, then creation was impossible, as it is impos
sible to add to infinite existence.
j
If you leave the question of creation and deal with the
‘ government of the universe, the difficulties of Theism are ?
by no means lessened. The existence of evil is then a
terrible stumbling-block to the Theist.
Pain, misery,
�A PLEA FOR ATHEISM.
crime, poverty, confront the advocate of eternal goodness,,
and challenge with unanswerable potency his declaration of
Deity as all-good, all-wise, and all-powerful. Evil is either
caused by God, or exists independently; but it cannot be
caused by God, as in that case he would not be all-good;
nor can it exist independently, as in that case he would nofe
be all-powerful. Evil must either have had a beginning,
or it must be eternal; but, according to the Theist, it can
not be eternal, because God alone is eternal. Nor can it
have had a beginning, for if it had it must either have ori
ginated in God, or outside God; but, according to the
Theist, it cannot have originated in God, for he is all-good,
and out of all-goodness evil cannot originate; nor can evil
have originated outside God, for, according to the Theist,
God is infinite, and it is impossible to go outside of or
beyond infinity.
To the Atheist this question of evil assumes an entirely
different aspect. He declares that evil is a result, but not
a result from God or Devil. He affirms that by conduct
founded on knowledge of the laws of existence it is possible
to ameliorate and avoid present evil, and, as our knowledge
increases, to prevent its future recurrence.
Some declare that the belief in God is necessary as a check
to crime. They allege that the Atheist may commit murder,
lie, or steal without fear of any consequences. To try the
actual value of this argument, it is not unfair to ask—Do
Theists ever steal? If yes, then in each such theft, the
belief in God and his power to punish has been inefficient
as a preventive of the crime. Do Theists ever lie or mur
der ? If yes, the same remark has further force—hell-fire fail
ing against the lesser as against the greater crime. The
fact is that those who use such an argument overlook a great
truth—i.e., that all men seek happiness, though in very
diverse fashions. Ignorant and miseducated men often mistake the true path to happiness, and commit crime in the
endeavour to obtain it. Atheists hold that by teaching
mankind the real road to human happiness, it is possible to
keep them from the by-ways of criminality and error.
Atheists would teach men to be moral now, not because God
offers as an inducement reward by and by, but because in
the virtuous act itself immediate good is ensured to the doer
and the circle surrounding him. Atheism would preserve
�A. PLEA FOR ATHEISM.
man from lying, stealing, murdering now, not from fear of
an eternal agony after death, but because these crimes make
this life itself a course of misery.
While Theism, asserting God as the creator and governor
- of the universe, hinders and checks man’s efforts by de. daring God’s will to be the sole directing and controlling
j power, Atheism, by declaring all events to be in accordance
with natural laws—that is, happening in certain ascertain
able sequences — stimulates man to discover the best condi
tions of life, and offers him the most powerful inducements
to morality. While the Theist provides future happi
ness for a scoundrel repentant on his death-bed, Atheism
affirms present and certain happiness for the man who does
his best to live here so well as to have little cause for re
penting hereafter.
Theism declares that God dispenses health and inflicts
disease, and sickness and illness are regarded by the Theist
as visitations from an angered Deity, to be borne with meek
ness and content. Atheism declares that physiological
knowledge may preserve us from disease by preventing our
infringing the law of health, and that sickness results not
as the ordinance of offended Deity, but from ill-ventilated
dwellings and workshops, bad and insufficient food, exces
sive toil, mental suffering, exposure to inclement weather,
and the like—all these finding root in poverty, the chief
source of crime and disease ; that prayers and piety afford
no protection against fever, and that if the human being be
kept without food he will starve as quickly whether he be
Theist or Atheist, theology being no substitute for bread.
J* *
Iconoclast.
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Victorian Blogging
Description
An account of the resource
A collection of digitised nineteenth-century pamphlets from Conway Hall Library & Archives. This includes the Conway Tracts, Moncure Conway's personal pamphlet library; the Morris Tracts, donated to the library by Miss Morris in 1904; the National Secular Society's pamphlet library and others. The Conway Tracts were bound with additional ephemera, such as lecture programmes and handwritten notes.<br /><br />Please note that these digitised pamphlets have been edited to maximise the accuracy of the OCR, ensuring they are text searchable. If you would like to view un-edited, full-colour versions of any of our pamphlets, please email librarian@conwayhall.org.uk.<br /><br /><span><img src="http://www.heritagefund.org.uk/sites/default/files/media/attachments/TNLHLF_Colour_Logo_English_RGB_0_0.jpg" width="238" height="91" alt="TNLHLF_Colour_Logo_English_RGB_0_0.jpg" /></span>
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Conway Hall Library & Archives
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2018
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Conway Hall Ethical Society
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Pamphlet
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Discussion between Mr Thomas Cooper and Mr Charles Bradlaugh
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Cooper, Thomas
Bradlaugh, Charles [1833-1891]
Description
An account of the resource
Place of publication: [London]
Collation: 65, [5] p. ; 18 cm.
Notes: Includes appendix: A plea for atheism / "Iconoclast" i.e. Charles Bradlaugh. (5 unnumbered pages at end). Annotations in pencil and crayon. Part of the NSS pamphlet collection.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
[s.n.]
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
[1864?]
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
N083
Subject
The topic of the resource
Atheism
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
<a href="http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/mark/1.0/"><img src="http://i.creativecommons.org/p/mark/1.0/88x31.png" alt="Public Domain Mark" /></a><span> </span><br /><span>This work (Discussion between Mr Thomas Cooper and Mr Charles Bradlaugh), identified by </span><a href="https://conwayhallcollections.omeka.net/items/show/www.conwayhall.org.uk"><span>Humanist Library and Archives</span></a><span>, is free of known copyright restrictions.</span>
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
application/pdf
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Language
A language of the resource
English
Atheism
God-Proof
NSS
-
https://d1y502jg6fpugt.cloudfront.net/25778/archive/files/d7fabba33d420f3b21b52a83c00b9e9f.pdf?Expires=1712793600&Signature=dlB7OnSoFqeL71nb%7Eq7DZ2uaokcviJ6Zrn9vSBlCjGyVx08zyOEFdwEWmmBF%7ENHng3m4%7E%7E7lOyj%7EFUWfPNn%7ExTVY3gvOhBazhpnArTseK0prntDrj9bi4vB1HJcUXtBDElU4JJ2NoR3JpctDFvmV77Cz87i8EQdg1zeTP0%7E5oc5gCK26gBReuk7Dx%7EszNsJab9QIfY5N%7EtWr%7ErRNY2KDPNV2gT%7E9xQXZE2Hhy78DxkXvV6gD694SjIimuJnjxAdkDmZ4P%7EvEvFtmRsUFP8tMfkqhG9fep219YR-fUFYTLBlcx18n558d-32y-mUL4oL5-HspquY5gmtL6kHrRjsvUw__&Key-Pair-Id=K6UGZS9ZTDSZM
9877653859fc94ca5edecb2cd871bac2
PDF Text
Text
����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Victorian Blogging
Description
An account of the resource
A collection of digitised nineteenth-century pamphlets from Conway Hall Library & Archives. This includes the Conway Tracts, Moncure Conway's personal pamphlet library; the Morris Tracts, donated to the library by Miss Morris in 1904; the National Secular Society's pamphlet library and others. The Conway Tracts were bound with additional ephemera, such as lecture programmes and handwritten notes.<br /><br />Please note that these digitised pamphlets have been edited to maximise the accuracy of the OCR, ensuring they are text searchable. If you would like to view un-edited, full-colour versions of any of our pamphlets, please email librarian@conwayhall.org.uk.<br /><br /><span><img src="http://www.heritagefund.org.uk/sites/default/files/media/attachments/TNLHLF_Colour_Logo_English_RGB_0_0.jpg" width="238" height="91" alt="TNLHLF_Colour_Logo_English_RGB_0_0.jpg" /></span>
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Conway Hall Library & Archives
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2018
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Conway Hall Ethical Society
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Pamphlet
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
False divinities or, Moses, Christ & Mahomet
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
A Foreign Theolologist
Description
An account of the resource
Place of publication: London
Collation: 83, [1] ; p. 22 cm.
Series number: no.7
Notes: Annotations in ink. Donated by Mr Garley. Published anonymously by 'A Foreign Theologist'.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
F. Truelove
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1870
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
G5082
Subject
The topic of the resource
Atheism
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
<a href="http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/mark/1.0/"><img src="http://i.creativecommons.org/p/mark/1.0/88x31.png" alt="Public Domain Mark" /></a><span> </span><br /><span>This work (False divinities or, Moses, Christ & Mahomet), identified by </span><a href="https://conwayhallcollections.omeka.net/items/show/www.conwayhall.org.uk"><span>Humanist Library and Archives</span></a><span>, is free of known copyright restrictions.</span>
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
application/pdf
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Language
A language of the resource
English
Atheism
Deism
Jesus Christ
Moses
Muhammad
-
https://d1y502jg6fpugt.cloudfront.net/25778/archive/files/417362b5bae2c2c155247f731a21750e.pdf?Expires=1712793600&Signature=h4MsPP465YickcV2XNO9fRBiK9y9Bhj5pg6u9ghYSe-7ztpBcM5yGQ6ybeFPNNFldi1gWjd8ZTY3XlrncHHoiy-ZXxStzrYSI9z3UndT50aM6y90WFk21ERx71FHlvvOUFd5iNbsywYVSYZ7cEyRdlXrtQOCC-bx3dCNGbw68bdYuc%7EWUbEvY2OifCumLtfHX55vHuqGAsA5tqtthf8ddOl7zrrwQrhMIEQQxbcTptgDs6sutNeNdxHOXNq%7ErcDYmsBDmfCgT2mHqDeqQKWkT2QYZJ7LkeLmNdgHLOkZlFx-MoNNbCUeG30uRxfC8caSw7UkCW%7EfDlB-EoQYdUwIVQ__&Key-Pair-Id=K6UGZS9ZTDSZM
530f04f501cc89b6dab557a131082bb8
PDF Text
Text
■
--------- ~
V,
Tlut^Js k^w?i> tX-| tvJ<Si>,
“IS IT REASONABLE
TO
WORSHIP GO D?”
VERBATIM REPORT
OF
TWO NIGHTS’ DEBATE AT NOTTINGHAM
BETWEEN
THE REV. R. A. ARMSTRONG
AND
CHARLES BRADLAUGH.
LONDON:
FREETHOUGHT PUBLISHING COMPANY,.
28, Stonecutter Street, E.C.
1878.
I
�LONDON :
PRINTED BY ANNIE BESANT AND CHARLES BRADLAUGH
28, STONECUTTER STREET.
�PREFACE.
I have been invited to prefix a few sentences to this
debate in its published form, and I am glad to avail myself
of the opportunity so courteously accorded.
Many have criticised my conduct in consenting to meet
in public debate one whose teachings, both theological
(or anti-theological) and social, they and I alike regard as.
in many respects of pernicious tendency. My reply is, that
those teachings are influencing large numbers of men and
women; that to denounce them, is simply to intensify their
influence in some quarters; and that they must be met
face to face if their force is to be diminished. I regard oral
public discussion as one of the least efficient methods for
the discovery of truth; but I cannot blind myself to the
fact that it is almost the only method by which what I hold
to be true, can get the ear and the attention of some classes
of the community; and I perceive that if a man can trust
his temper and is also interested in his cause and not in
himself, he may in this way do some good which he can do
in no other. If it be given him to touch one heart or
enlighten one soul, it is a cheap price to pay, that a laugh
may go against him, or even that some good and sincere
persons may think he has acted wrongly.
The debate itself can only touch the edge of subjects so
stupendous as Theism and Worship. But some may be
�IV
PREFACE.
led by it to thought or to study, on which they would not
otherwise have entered.
I select three points in this debate for a further word or
two :
(i.) I said Mr. Bradlaugh could not “ conceive a better
world.” The expression is ambiguous. He and I both con
ceive and strive to promote a better state of things than that
now existing. But we can conceive no better constitution
for a world than that of a world so constituted as to evoke
the effort of mankind to advance its progress and improve
ment. The evil is not in itself good; it is only the
necessary condition of good. The moment you conceive
a world existing from first to last without evil, you conceive
a world destitute of the necessary conditions for the
evolution of noble character; and so, in eliminating the evil,
you eliminate a good which a thousand times outweighs
the evil.
(2.) “ Either,” argues Mr. Bradlaugh, in effect, “ God could
make a world without suffering, or he could not. If he could
and did not, he is not all-good. It he could not, he is not
all-powerful.” The reply is, What do you mean by allpowerful? If you mean having power to reconcile things
in themselves contradictory, we do not hold that God is
all-powerful. But a humanity, from the first enjoying
immunity from suffering, and yet possessed of nobility of
character, is a self-contradictory conception.
(3.) I have ventured upon alleging an Intelligent Cause
of the phenomena of the universe; in spite of the fact that
in several of his writings Mr. Bradlaugh has described
intelligence as implying limitations. But though intelli
gence, as known to us in man, is always hedged within
limits, there is no difficulty in conceiving each and every
limit as removed. In that case the essential conception of
�V
PREFACE.
intelligence remains the same precisely, although the change
of conditions revolutionises its mode of working.
The metaphysical argument for Theism, though I hold
it in the last resort to be unanswerable, can never be the
real basis of personal religion. That must rest on the facts
of consciousness verified by the results in character flowing
from the candid recognition of those facts. It is useless, as
well as unscientific, for the Atheist either to deny or to
ignore those facts. The hopeless task that lies before him,
ere Theism can be overturned, is to prove that experiences
which to many a Theist are more real and more unquestion
able than the deliverances of sight, of hearing, or of touch,
are mere phantasies of the brain.
I addressed the following letter to the Editor of the
National Reformer after the debate.
TO THE EDITOR OF THE “ NATIONAL REFORMER.”
Sir,—Some of those who heard or may read the recent discussion
between Mr. Bradlaugh, and myself may be willing to pursue the
positive argument for Theism and Worship which I adopted—-as distin
guished from and supplementary to the ordinary metaphysical argument
—at greater length than the limits of time permitted me to expound it in
the debate. Will you allow me to recommend to such persons three
works which will specially serve their purpose ? These are—Theodore
Parker’s “Discourse of Matters Pertaining to Religion” (eighteenpence, British and Foreign Unitarian Association, 37, Norfolk Street,
Strand) ; F. W. Newman’s “ Hebrew Theism ” (half-a-crown, Triibner);
and the Rev. Charles Voysey’s “Mystery of Pain, Death, and Sin”
(Williams & Norgate, 1878). I would gladly add to these Professor
Blackie’s “ Natural History of Atheism ”—a book of much intellectual
force—were it not that he indulges too often in a strain of superior
contempt with which I have no sympathy.—I am, &c.,
Richard A. Armstrong.
Nottingham,
Sept, <pth, 1878.
�vi
PREFACE.
I only now further desire to refer the reader to Mr. Brown
low Maitland’s “Theismor Agnosticism” (eighteen-pencer
Christian Knowledge Society, 1878).
Tennyson shall utter. for me my last plea with the
doubter to throw himself upon the bosom of God in
prayer:—
“Speak to him, thou, for he hears, and spirit with spirit can.
meet,—
Closer is he than breathing, and nearer than hands and feet.”
R. A. Armstrong.
Nottingham,
Sept. 23rd, 1878.
�Is it Reasonable to Worship God?”
The first of two nights’ debate in the Co-operative Hall,
Nottingham, between the Rev. R. A. Armstrong and Mr.
Charles Bradlaugh; G. B. Rothera, Esq., in the chair.
The Chairman : Ladies and Gentlemen,—I have had
the pleasure, during the last few weeks, of spending a very
pleasant holiday on the heather-covered mountains of
Scotland. On reaching Edinburgh on my way homeward,
I received a letter from my friend, Mr. Armstrong, inform
ing me of the arrangements for to-night’s debate, and
of the wish that was felt that I should preside. Though a
private communication, yet as it contains the grounds
upon which the request was made, and in part also
those upon which I was induced to comply, I shall
be glad if Mr. Armstrong will kindly give me per
mission to read that letter to you. It is as follows :—“ My Dear Sir,—I have obtained your address from your
son, and you must blame him for enabling me to molest you
with my importunities in the midst of your holiday.
“ Circumstances have led to my receiving an invitation from
the local branch of the National Secular Society, and from Mr.
Bradlaugh, to debate with the latter on the reasonableness of
religious worship. At first strongly disposed to decline, I have
been led, together with the friends whom I have consulted, to
believe that it was my duty to accept the task, and, however
distasteful, I am now in for it.
“ It is to take place at the Co-operative Hall, on two consecu
tive nights, Thursday and Friday, September 5 and 6, and we
are most anxious to secure the services—which I hope will be
chiefly formal—of a competent chairman who will possess the
respect of both parties. My own friends and the Secularists
independently suggested your name, and we all feel that we
should be deeply indebted to you if you would preside over us
on the two nights. My earnest desire is to throw such a tone
into the meetings as shall make them really helpful to genuine
�8
truth-seekers, and I have good ground for believing that manysuch will be present.
■ “ I sincerely hope you will do us all this favour. I do not
know where else to turn for a chairman that will be so acceptable
to all concerned. Your speedy and favourable reply will be very
welcome to yours truly,
R. A. Armstrong.
“Burns Street, Nottingham, Aug. 24, 1878.
“ G. B. Rothera, Esq.”
Now, ladies and gentlemen, on receiving that letter my
first impulse was, I think naturally, to decline, and that
for two reasons—first, I find that as one gets on in life there
is a stronger and stronger disposition to avoid the excite
ment of public meetings, to seek more and more the ease
of one’s own arm-chair, and to enjoy that best of all society,
our books (hear). Beyond this I had real misgivings as to
my ability to fill, as I ought, the duties sought to be put upon
me. Nevertheless, on slight reflection, these difficulties
vanished. I felt that there were occasions, of which this,
probably, was one, when it becomes us to lay aside con
siderations of personal ease and convenience in the hope to
meet the wishes of, and to be useful to, one’s neighbours
and friends. Now, in occupying this position I must not
be considered to identify myself with either the one party
or the other (hear). I may agree with either, or with
neither. I am here, as I believe you are here, interested in
a question of the gravest concern to all of us, as an earnest
inquirer, anxious to learn and not afraid to hear (applause).
My position, I take it, is very much akin to that of the
Speaker of the House of Commons. I have simply to
regulate the order of debate, and to ask at your hands
—what I am sure I shall receive—such orderly and consis
tent behaviour as will become an assembly of English gentle
men. Now,in those who have charged themselves with the
responsibility of this debate we have men of acknowledged
ability and high culture (applause)—men who, I am sure
will know well how to reconcile the duties of courtesy with
the earnestness of debate. In addressing themselves to the
present question, it must, I think, be clearly understood
that the question, as it appears upon the paper, is not to be
narrowed to a simple inquiry whether it is reasonable that
we should worship God. A much wider issue must be
covered by the debate, if it is to satisfy the expectations
of this audience. The question is one, I take, it between
�9
Theism and Atheism. It is not enough to postulate a Deity,
and then ask whether it is reasonable or not to worship him.
What I think we have a right to ask is, tfyat the gentle
man charged with the affirmative of the proposition
shall adduce such evidence as will establish satisfactorily
the conclusion that there is a Deity to worship.
The
position of the Atheist, I take it, is not one of disbelief,
but of simple unbelief.
He does not say that God
is not, but he affirms the lack of evidence for the
position that God is (hear). He does not even say
that there may not be a God. What he does say is that
if there is a God he has failed to manifest himself, either by
the utterance of his voice, in audible revelation, or by the
impression of his hand upon visible nature. I take it, there
fore, and think Mr. Armstrong will be prepared to
accept the position, that it will be incumbent upon him, at
the outset of the discussion, to address himself to a con
sideration of the proofs in favour of the position that there
is a God to worship. If he succeed in this, then, I
think, there will be a very difficult and trying ordeal before
Mr. Bradlaugh to prove that, God, being existent, is not
entitled to the reasonable worship of his creatures (applause).
Pardon me these remarks by way of introduction. Before
calling on Mr. Armstrong to open the debate, I may just say
that, by arrangement between them, Mr. Armstrong, upon
whom the affirmative rests, is to be allowed half-an-hour
to open the discussion; Mr. Bradlaugh half-an-hour in
reply ; that then the next hour will be divided into quarters,
each speaker having a quarter of an hour alternately
(applause). The result of this arrangement will be that
Mr. Armstrong will open the debate to-night, which will
be closed by Mr. Bradlaugh, while to-morrow night Mr.
Bradlaugh will open the debate and Mr. Armstrong will
■close it. This, I think, you will regard as a satisfactory
arrangement, and a liberal one, inasmuch as Mr. Bradlaugh
concedes to Mr. Armstrong the advantage of the last word
(applause).
Mr. Armstrong, who was cordially received, said : Mr.
Chairman and friends—I wish to say two or three words at
the outset of this debate as to its origin. You are many of
you aware that a short time ago Mr. Bradlaugh visited this
town, and gave a lecture in defence of Atheism, from this plat
form, in answer to Professor Max Muller’s Hibbert lectures.
I was led to be present then, and I offered some remarks
�IO
at the close. Mr. Bradlaugh rejoined, and in the course of
his rejoinder threw out, in a courteous manner, a challenge
for me to meet him and discuss these weighty matters at fur
ther length. I thought no more of it then, not conceiving it
to be my duty to take up that challenge. A few days after
wards, however, I received a letter from the Secretary of
the Nottingham branch of the National Secular Society
stating that many persons had been much interested in the
words that fell from me, and that they would consider it an
obligation conferred upon them, and others earnestly in pur
suit of truth, if I consented to meet Mr. Bradlaugh in this
manner. I replied, that for my own part, I was but little
sanguine of any good effects, or a balance of good effects,
resulting from such a meeting; but that the invitation being
couched in such courteous and earnest terms, I would con
sult with friends on whose judgment I placed reliance, before
finally replying. I consulted these friends, and at the same time
thought the matter over further; and I came to the conclusion
that, though it has undoubtedly happened that on too many
occasions theological debates have been the root of bitter
ness and strife, yet, nevertheless, two men really in earnest
about what they have to say, and speaking to persons also
in earnest, who have come neither for amusement nor ex
citement—-I came to the conclusion that a debate, con
ducted with tact and temper on both sides, might (may I
say by the blessing of God ?) conduce rather to good than
to evil (applause). Under these circumstances, I accepted
the challenge. I did so, though, as I said in my letter to
the chairman, it is distasteful to me, because if I make any
thing of this occasion it can only be by exhibiting to you
my inmost heart. We are not going to talk in a superficial
manner—we are not going to bandy compliments, nor, I
hope, exchange rebukes; but, each of us is going to search
his inner consciousness, and try to express to the audience
that which he finds therein. It is, perhaps, more distasteful
to me on this occasion than to Mr. Bradlaugh, since I find,
or believe myself to find, in my inner consciousness certain
facts which Mr. Bradlaugh will no doubt tell you he does
not find in his inner consciousness. These facts are to me
of the most solemn and sacred nature conceivable, and to
expose them before a large and public audience is a thing
very like a sort of martyrdom. If I were not confident
that, however little you may sympathise with what I say,
you will treat it with respect or consideration, I woul
�11
never consent to drag the sacred thoughts of my soul before
you to hold them up as an exhibition (hear). I am to
maintain to-night—not to demonstrate (as you will see
if you look at the bills)—the proposition that it is
reasonable to worship God. Mr. Bradlaugh has not
necessarily to disprove, but to impugn, that proposition.
Now, all I have any hope of doing to-night is this—to
show that it is reasonable for me and for others conscious of
mental phenomena in themselves more or less akin to those
of which I am conscious, to worship God. Would that I
could touch you with the beauty and the sweetness
of this belief—would that I could hold up before you, in all
its glory and sublimity, in all its strength and holiness, the
beauty and the sweetness of the worship of God. Could
I succeed in doing so, I should take your imaginations
captive. I think I should get the suffrage of your reason.
It is as though, sir, to-night, I had been called upon to
prove that my dearest friend is worthy to be loved—ay,
•even that my dearest friend exists; for, if God is aught to
us, he is our dearest, nearest friend—present when all
others are taken from us, a sure refuge in every moment of
temptation and of woe ; the very highest and most intimate
reality of which the mind can conceive—the sum and sub
stance of all existence. Well, now, how do I know this
God ? Who is this God of whom I speak ? Let me try to
tell you how it seems to me that I have made acquaintance
with him. I find that at certain moments of my life there
is that which I can best describe aS a voice—though it is a
metaphor—addressed to me, influencing largely my conduct.
I find that there are in me, as in all men, strong instincts,
strong desires, strong self-interests—some lower, some
higher, some less worthy, some more worthy, than others.
I find that but for this voice of which I speak I should be
entirely swayed thereby, as, so far as I can see, the brutes
of the field and the forest are swayed thereby. But I find
that sometimes, at moments when these instincts are the
very strongest within me, and when I am about to throw
myself into their realisation and give them expression in
■fact—I find, sometimes, at these moments that there comes
to me somewhat which, so far as my consciousness delivers,
is not myself. There comes to me somewhat stopping me
from indulging these instincts and bidding me to curb them.
Ifindatothertimesthatmyinstinctsof self-preservation, of self
regard, of pleasure-loving, and so forth—my appetites—
�12
would lead me to hold back from a certain course of action.
So far as I can judge, looking into my own mind, myself is
against that course of action. It appears to my reasoning
powers and inclinations that I had better keep out of it.
But there comes now somewhat which comes from outside,,
and which is no part of myself, which says, “ Go and do it.”
That was so when I received the invitation to this debate.
Again, I find that on certain occasions—alas! that I should
have to say it—I have defied this monitor, I have done that
which it told me not to do, or not done that which it bade
me to do. I find then that there enter into me from some
where—I know not from whence—pangs of remorse keener
than ever came from any personal sorrow, more biting than
ever came from any physical pain. There have been times,
however—let me thank God I can say so !—when I have
obeyed this voice, followed its dictates in spite of all myself
seeming to drag me from it; and my experience is that on
these occasions there has entered my soul, from whence I
cannot tell you, a peace surpassing that given us in any
other circumstances—a peace in the light of which the
sorrows that at other times might cut me to the heart seem
light and small, a peace in the beauty and holiness of which
these'sorrows seem wonderfully diminished. I will tell you what
I call the source of that voice which I fancy speaks to me
in that fourfold manner. I call the source of that voice
“ God,” and that is the first thing I mean by God. I call the
source of all these monitions and admonitions, these ex
hortations and rebukes, this voice of reproval and of
approval, the voice of God; because I must give it some
name, and that seems to me the simplest and the truest name
I can give it. I might, perhaps, be inclined to doubt
whether all this was not fancy (though I hardly think I
should) if, so far as I could gather, it were an unique experi
ence of my own; but I find that it is not so. I find that
this voice is recognised by every true man and woman I
meet. They may obey it or not, but they recognise it, and
allow that it is there. I behold the picture by Millais
of the day before the awful massacre of St. Bartho
lomew. I see the maiden leaning on her lover’s bosom
whilst he looks down upon her with looks of love and
tenderness, and she strives to tie around his arm a scarf.
She knows of the impending massacre, that all Protestants
are to be slaughtered, and she would fain put this badge
upon his arm as a secret signal to preserve him from the
�13
sword. Does he accept this method of escape ? Although
his inclination is to remain with his beloved, the strength of
his right hand is given to tear the badge from his arm, and
he faces death, not with joy, but with an exceeding bitter
sorrow for the moment—he faces death in simple loyalty
and obedience to the voice which has spoken to his heart.
That is an experience which you will all recognise—one
which, in less or in greater force, we have all had. What
ever explanation may be given—and, doubtless, Mr. Brad’
laugh has an explanation of his own—this voice of con
science is to me one of the primary evidences of the exist
ence of God. Nay, I will not call it an evidence; it
is God speaking to me (applause). This conscience
has been described by Mr. Voysey, in his recentlypublished sermons in refutation of Atheism, as fol
lows : “ The collision is so complete between the higher
voice and the impelling instinct, that one can only feel that
the two are radically different in nature, and. must have had
a different source. . . .To have the power of doing
intentionally what one shrinks from doing, and to
deny one’s self the pleasure which is so fascinating,
and which one longs to do, is to prove the immense superi
ority of our inner selves over the visible universe.”
To have the power, as that man, that Huguenot, must have
had it, to deny one’s self the pleasure which is so fascinating,
and for which one longs, is to prove the immense superiority
of our inner selves when hearing the voice of God over the
visible universe. Again, speaking of conscience, Voysey says :
“The conscience which makes us mortify our flesh with its
affections and lusts, and which often mars our happiness and
embitters our pleasure, upbraids us with reproaches and
stings us with remorse, that voice which hushes our cry for
happiness, which will not endure a single selfish plea, but
demands unquestioning obedience, and bids us fall down in
the very dust before the Majesty of Duty—we all, in our
secret hearts, revere this power, whether or not we obey it
as we should. At least, we pay to it the homage of our inmost
souls, and feel how great and grand it is to be its slave.”
Now, sir, I desire to pass on to another method, by which it
seems to me that I apprehend this being. Having made the
acquaintance with this awful voice—and the philosopher
Kant said two things filled him with awe, the starry
heavens and the moral nature in man—I pass on to another
matter. Behold the starry heaven itself. I know not how
�14
it is with you, but I will tell you my experience—and we are
told by scientific men that we must bring everything to the test
of experience. Sometimes when I have been out oftemper—as I
am sometimes, like other people—sometimes, when I have been
much distracted with cares, when troubles and pains have
been thick upon me, it falls to my lot to go out beneath the
starry heaven. What is it that I experience in my soul ? I
go through no process of metaphysical reasoning, I do not
argue with myself, but I simply feel that there is a Divine
presence there, in whose hand are all these stars and all
these worlds—a great voice singing, “ I am strong and I am
good, and you are safe nestling in my hand.” I know not
if that corresponds with the experience of all here,
but that it corresponds with the experience of many, I
feel sure ; and let me ask such not to drive away these
holy feelings, but to trust them as the assurance which
God gives of his presence. It may be that in those lakes
and mountains which you, sir, have seen of late, you
may have heard a message whispering to your soul of a
peace beyond the peace of earth—of a presence before
which all things are well. In others, not so sensitive per
haps to the beauties of natural scenery, such experience
comes in the tones of music—in some grand symphony or
some sweet song; and they feel lifted away from the things
of earth,' and they feel lifted into some presence in which it
is a joy to be, and which fills their soul with peace. That
presence I call, having no other name for it, the presence of
God. Observe, that in this I am not philosophising about
the cause—I am not saying that God is the cause and so
on; I am only relating the experience of my consciousness,
reported to you as faithfully and truly as I can read it. Let
me read what Professor Blackie wrote the other day:
“ Many things can be known only by being felt, all vital
forces are fundamentally unknowable.” And, says Francis
Newman, that arch-heretic : “ The astronomer is ever aware
of the presence of gravitation and the electrician sees all
things pervaded by electricity—powers descried by the mind,
unwitnessed by any sense, long unknown to the wise, still
unknown or undiscerned by the vulgar j yet this percep
tion of things hidden is not esteemed cloudy.” Now,
having made some acquaintance with this awful, inscrutable
something, to which I venture to give the name of God, I
venture to lift up to it the voice of my soul, and strive
to throw myself towards that Being. And what is my
�i5
experience ? Let us go to experience again: I find
when my mind is bewildered and in doubt, when it
is all involved with difficulties, that somehow, when I
address that Being, there comes to my soul . “ clear
shining,” and I see things plainer and more beautiful than
before. I appeal to him in pain and sorrow—not with the
coward’s prayer, but simply asking that I may feel his pre
sence, to endure it j and the pain and sorrow have become
light on the instant assurance that God is there to comfort
and console. I pray to him in weakness, when my strength
fails, and what is the result? That a new manhood
comes to me, and I feel that wondrous power which
over-arches all the worlds, and I feel that I have in me
also somewhat of his strength. I appeal to him, last of all,
in temptation, when the wrong deed presses closely on my
inclinations, and what do I find ? That strength is given
me to stand up against temptation, and he answers
according to the immemorial prayer of Christendom:
deliver us from temptation, This is experience, or I fancy
it is. It is not theory. Again, I am in gladness. When
is my gladness greatest, and when is it richest? Why,
when it flows up and out, in thankfulness and adoration, to
the source to which I trace it. Then my gladness seems to
receive an influence which lifts it up above. No gladness
is the true gladness without that. Let me conclude this
half-hour by reading a very short extract from Professor
Newman. Speaking of the instincts of mankind, he says:—
And the instinct of Religion is the noblest of them all,
The bravest, the most enduring, the most fruitful in mighty
deeds,
The source of earliest grandeur, unitress of scattered tribes ;
Even in the crudeness of its infancy,when unpurified by science,
Yet teeming with civilisation, with statesmanship, with letters.
Mistress of all high art, and parent of glorious martyrs.
And if from it have come wars, and bigotries, and cruelties,
Through infantine hot-headedness and unripeness of mind,
We take your aid, O Sceptics ! to purge it from all such evils,
And kindly honour we pay to you for your battles against super
stition ;
Yet the very evils ye deplore, prove Religion’s mighty energy,
And the grasp deeply seated which she has within human
hearts.”
(Loud applause.)
Mr. Bradlaugh : Thanking you, sir, for acceding to the
request which I would have gladly joined in had I had any
�right of acquaintance to entitle me to make it; thanking you
for undertaking what is always a troublesome duty, however
well a debate may be conducted, of presiding over a dis
cussion, permit me to say one word only as to the opening
which fell from your lips. There is only one phrase in that
which I desire to note, so as to save myself from the possi
bility of misapprehension. I quite agree with the view you
put of the position the Atheist takes, except that if Dualism
be affirmed, if more than Monism be affirmed, if more than
one existence be affirmed, and if it be the beyond of that one
existence which is called God, then the Atheist does not
say there may be one, but says there cannot be one; and
that is the only distinction I wish to put as against the very
kind words with which you introduced the speakers this
evening The question for our debate is : “ Is it reasonable
to worship God ?” and to determine this question it is
necessary to define the words “worship” and “God,”and next
to decide whether belief in God is reasonable or unreason
able ; and, secondly, whether worship is, under any, and
if any, what,. circumstances, reasonable or unreasonable.
And I am afraid I must here except that, in the speech to
which I have just listened, and which, from its tone and
kindly style, is perfectly unexceptionable, there is not one
word at present—it may possibly come later on—which may
fairly be taken as approaching a definition either of the word
“ God ” or the word “ worship. ” By worship I mean act of rever
ence, respect, adoration, homage, offered to some person.
According to this definition, worship cannot be offered to the
impersonal, and according to this definition it would be
unreasonable to advocate worship to be offered to the im
personal. Under the term “worship” I include prayer—which
is, evidently, from the opening, also included in the term
“worship” by the rev. gentleman who maintains the opposite
position to myself—praise, sacrifice, offerings, solemn ser
vices, adoration, personal prostration. For the word “God,”
not having a definition of my own, I take—not having yet
gathered, in what has fallen from Mr. Armstrong, enough to
enable me to say that I understand what he means by it—I
take the definition of “ God” given in Professor Flint’s Baird
lectures ; not meaning by that that Mr. Armstrong is bound
by that definition, but asking him to be kind enough to note
where he thinks that definition is incorrect, and to kindly tell
me so, for my guidance in the latter portions of the debate.
By “ God,” for the purpose of this debate, I shall mean a self-
�i7
existent, eternal being, infinite in power and in wisdom, and
perfect in holiness and goodness ; the maker of heaven
and earth. And by “self-existent" I mean, that, the con
ception of which does not require the conception of
antecedent to it. For example, this glass is phenomenal,
conceived, as all phenomena must be conceived, by the
characteristics or qualities which enable you to think
and identify it in your mind, but which cannot be con
ceived except as that of which there is possible ante
cedent and consequent, and which, therefore, cannot be
considered as self-existent according to my definition. By
“eternal”and by “infinite” I only mean illimitable, indefinite,
tome—applying the term “eternal ” to duration, and the word
“ infinite ” to extension. I take Professor Flint, or whoever
may hold the definition I have given of God, by “ maker ”
to mean originator; and then I am in the difficulty that the
word “ creator,” in the sense of origin, is, to me, a word
without meaning. I only know creation as change ; origin
of phenomena, not of existence; origin of condition, not
origin of substance. The words “ creation ” and “ de
struction ” are both words which have no other
meaning to my mind than the meaning of change.
I will now try to address myself to some of the argu
ments that were put forward by Mr. Armstrong. He
said that to him the notion of entering into this debate was
distasteful to him, and he addressed somewhat of an in
quiry as to my own feeling on the matter. No ! the dis
cussion of no one subject more than any other is distasteful
to me, unless it be of a personal character, in which it might
involve my having to say things upon which I should not like
to mislead and upon which it would be painful to me to
state the facts. Then a discussion would be distasteful to
me; but such a discussion as this is not any more distaste
ful to me than the discussion of an astronomical or geolo
gical problem; and I will urge to those who go even further
and say, that not only is such a matter distasteful, but that the
discussion of Theism is really immoral, to such I would read
from a recent volume entitled “ A Candid Examination of
Theism”:—“If there is no God, where can be the harm
in our examining the spurious evidence of his existence ?
If there is a God,- surely our first duty towards him must
be to exert to our utmost, in our attempts to find him, the
most noble faculty with which he has endowed us—as care
fully to investigate the evidence which he has seen fit to
�furnish of his own existence, as we investigate the evidence
of inferior things in his dependent creation. To say that
there is one rule or method for ascertaining truth in the
latter case which it is not legitimate to apply in the former
case, is merely a covert way of saying that the Deity—if
he exists—has not supplied us with rational evidence of
his existence.” Now, that is the position I am going to
put to you; and there ought to be nothing distasteful
to anyone in proving most thoroughly the whole of the
evidence upon which his supposed belief in God’s existence
rests. The grounds of his belief ought to be clear to him
self, or they are no sufficient grounds for his belief, even to
himself. If they are clear to himself they ought to be
clearly stateable to others; because, if not, they lie under
the suspicion of not being clear to himself. That which is
sufficient to him to convince him, is either capable of being
clearly stated—although it may not carry conviction to
another—or it is not. If it is not capable of being clearly
stated, I would suggest it is because it does not clearly exist
in his own mind. Now Mr. Armstrong says that he feels as if
called upon to prove that his dearest friend ought to be
loved, as if called upon to prove that his dearest friend
exists. He spoke of God as being to him his dearest
friend, and he followed that with some words as to which I am
not quite sure whether he intended to use them in the sense in
which they fell upon my ears. He described God as “ the
sum and substance of all existence.” I do not want to
make any verbal trick, and if I am putting more on Mr.
Armstrong than he meant to convey I should like to be put
right when he rises again, and I will ask him if he considers
God to be the sum and substance of all existing; and, if
he does not, I will ask him in what respect he distinguishes
between God, in his mind, and the sum and substance of
all existence ; because clearly, when he used those words he
had some meaning in his mind, and I should like to know
these two things : First, do you identify God in your mind
with the sum and substance of all existence ? If not, in
what respects do you distinguish God in your mind from
the sum and substance of all existence ? If you say that
you identify God with the sum and substance of all exist
ence, then I ask, are we included in that, sum and substance
of all existence ? And if we are included in that sum and
substance of all existence, is it reasonable for one phe
nomenon or for a number of phenomena, to offer worship
�T9
to any of, and to how much of, what remains ? Then he
addressed himself to the very old argument, which he put
so beautifully, when he said : “How do I know God?” and
launched into what is known as the argument from conscience,
an argument very fully stated by Professor Flint in the
Baird lectures to which I have referred. Mr. Armstrong
said, and here I will take a little exception; he said : “ In
me, as in all men here, are strong instincts; in me, as in all
men, there are strong desires; in me, as in all men, there is
a voice.” That is just the blunder; that is not true. I do
not mean that in any sort of disrespectful sense. If you
take a volume like Topinard’s “ Anthropology ” you find
that men’s desires, men’s emotions, and men’s instincts all
vary with race, all vary with locality, with type, all vary with
what Buckle called “Food, climate, soil, and life surround
ings and I ask, if there be this variance in individuals of
different races, nay, more, if there be this variance in in
dividuals of the same race at the same moment, and if the
members of the same race vary in different places and ages,
as to their instincts, desires, and emotions, I ask you whether
there has been the same variation in the source of it? You
say the source is God, and if so, how can a variable source
be a reliable object of worship ? Then let us see a little
more. “ I do not desire to do something, but my monitor
says ‘ Do ” or the reverse; and thus voice is the evidence
of Deity. I should have been obliged if Mr. Armstrong
had defined exactly what it was he meant by conscience,
because here we are going terribly to disagree. I am going
to deny the existence of conscience altogether, except as a
result of development upon organisation, including in that,
transmitted predisposition of ability to possible thought or
action. But if that be so, what becomes of this “ still small
voice,” of those desires and instincts? The mere fact
that the mother may have worked in a cotton-mill while
childbearing and have had bad food, or that the father may
have beaten her—his brutality may result in the awakening
of a desire and instinct exactly the opposite of that which Mr.
Armstrong has, and the organisation fitted for repeating
which may be handed down through generations. I stood
this morning for other purposes at the doors of Coldbath
fields Prison. One man who came out gave a sort of shrill
whistle and plunged into the crowd with a defiant and a
mocking air, showing that his conscience, his monitor, said
nothing to him except that he was glad he was outside, and
�20
ready to war with the world again (applause). I am not
wishing to press this view in any fashion unkindly or unfairly; '
I am only wanting to put the thing as it appears to me. I
want to.know: “ Does Mr. Armstrong contend that there is a
faculty identical in every human being which he calls con
science, which does decide for each human being, and
always decides, in the same manner, what is right and what
is wrong ? Or does he mean that this ‘ monitor,’ as he calls
it, decides differently in different men and in different
countries ? And if ‘ yes,’ is the source different in each case
where there is a different expression ? And if ‘ yes,’ is it
justifiable and reasonable to offer worship to an uncertain
source, or to a source which speaks with a different voice, or
to a source which is only one of a number, and of which you
do not know how far its limit extends, and where its juris
diction begins or ends ? ” Let us follow this out a little
more. We have not only to define conscience, but we have
also to define right and wrong, and I did not hear Mr. Arm
strong do that. I did hear him say that when he had done
something in opposition to his monitor he felt remorse. I
did hear him say there was struggling between himself and
his monitor, and here I had another difficulty. What is the
himself that struggles, as distinguished in his mind from the
monitor that he struggles against ? If the struggle is a
mental one, what is mind struggling against ? and if it is not,
how does Mr. Armstrong explain it ? Let us, if you please,
go to right and wrong. By moral I mean useful. I mean
that that is right which tends to the greatest happiness of the
greatest number, with the least injury to any. I am only
following Jeremy Bentham. That is my definition of right.
Many matters which have been held to come within that
definition in one age have been found in another age not to
come within it, and the great march of civilisation is that
from day to day it instructs us in what is useful. I submit
that instead of adoring the source of contradictory verdicts
it is more reasonable to find out for ourselves some rule we
can apply. For example, here Mr. Armstrong’s conscience
would not raise any particular objection to his taking animal
food, unless he happens to be a vegetarian, and then, I am
sure, he would conscientiously carry it out; but the majority
of people’s consciences in England would raise no great
objection to taking animal food. Yet in China and in
Hindustan hundreds of thousands of human beings have
died because vegetable food was not there for them, and
«
�21
their consciences made them prefer death to tasting
animal food' I want to know whether the conscience is
from the same source here as in Hindustan, and I want to
know, if that is so, which people are justified in worshipping
the source ? Take the case of murder. Mr. Armstrong’s
conscience would clearly tell him that it was wrong to murder
me. And yet there are many people in this country who
would not go to that extent. But I am going to take a
stronger illustration. There are a number of people who
think it perfectly right to bless the flags of a regiment, and to
pray to the God whom Mr. Armstrong asks me to worship,
that a particular regiment, whose flags are blessed, may kill
the people of some other particular regiment as rapidly as
possible. This shows that there are confusions of mind as
to what is meant by murder, and a like confusion exists on
a number of other matters on which the monitor is
misrepresenting.
And then Mr. Armstrong has said^
“ I mean by God the source of admonition, rebukes,
remorse, trouble,” and he says: “ It is a conscience-voice
which is recognised by every true man and woman.”
I am sure he would not wish to put any position
stronger than it should be put, and he put it, too, that this
was the feature in which man differed from the brutes. I
am inclined to tell him that not only there is not that recog
nition to-day amongst the physiological and psychological
teachers, but that we have a number of. men whose re
searches have been collected for us, who show us that what
you call the “ still small voice,” this monitor, these desires,
instincts, emotions, are to be found—varied, it is true
—right through the whole scale of animal life. Whereever there is a nervous encephalic apparatus sufficient
you have—except in the fact of language—wider distinc
tion between the highest order of human race and the
lowest, than you have between the lowest order of human
beings and those whom you are pleased to call brutes. I
will now only take the illustration of the eve of St. Bartho
lomew, which is fatal to the argument of Mr. Armstrong.
He gave the Protestant lover—a very fine character—reject
ing the symbolic bandage, and preferring to die for his faithy
or, .as Mr. Armstrong put it, “ to face death in simple
loyalty rather than play the hypocrite, and the source of that
feeling was God.” Was that the source of the feeling
which led Bruno to be burnt at the stake as if for Atheism,
or for Vanini, burnt for Atheism ; or for Lescynski, burnt
�for Atheism; or for Mrs. Besant, robbed of her child because
of her avowal of Atheism (hisses) ? You are hissing ; wait
whilst I answer. Is the source of your hissing, God ? Then
what a cowardly and weak thing, and little fitted for worship
must be that source (applause). I desire to deal with this
subject in all gravity, in all sincerity, in all kindness, but I
plead for a cause—weakly, it is true—for which great and
brave men and women have died, and I will permit no insult
to it in my presence—(cheers)—knowingly I will pass none.
I believe my antagonist to meet me loyally, honourably, and
honestly, and I believe him to meet me earnestly and
sincerely. I believe he has no desire to wound my feel
ings, and I 'do not wish to wound his ; and I ask you, the
jury here, to try to follow the same example set by him
in this debate (cheers).
Mr. Armstrong, being received with cheers, said:
It is very difficult indeed to think on these deep
problems under consideration with excitement amongst
the audience present, therefore I hope that you will be as
quiet as you can. I will begin at once with a confession
—and this, at any rate, will be a testimony of my candour—
by saying that the moment I had spoken certain words in
my opening speech I thought: “'Mr. Bradlaugh will have
me there;” and he had me (laughter). The words
were those in which I spoke of God as the sum and
substance of all existence. Now, to me, God is a much
simpler word than the phrase, “ sum and substance of all
existence.” Whether God be the “ sum and substance of
all existence ” I know not, for those words convey to me
less clear meaning than the word “God” conveys to me. The
source, moreover, of my immediate knowledge of God is
such that it can make no asseverations whatever upon deep
questions of metaphysics, as to what the “ sum and sub
stance of all existence” may consist. Mr. Bradlaugh has taken
a definition of God from Professor Flint. He is a Scotchman,
and Scotchmen are very fond of definitions (a laugh). Very
often, too, their definitions obscure their subject-matter, and
it is far harder to get any proper significance from them than
in the thing which they intended to define. I am
utterly incapable of saying whether that definition of Pro
fessor Flint’s is an accurate definition of God or not. What I
mean by “God,” and perhaps Mr. Bradlaugh will take it as the
best definition I can here give, is the source, whatever it be, of
this metaphorical voice—of these intimations or monitions,
�23
that come to me in certain experiences which I have. Mr.
Bradlaugh, of course, devoted much time to answering Pro
fessor Flint. He asked whether God was the source of that
loyalty with which the Atheists he mentioned went to the
stake, and’I say from the bottom of my heart, that he was. God
knows the Atheist though the Atheist knows not him. God
is the source of loyalty of heart, in whomsoever it may be.
If others are led to propound propositions which I believe
to be false, and if they dispute other propositions which I
believe to be true, do you think that God is going to judge
them for that, so long as they have been true and faithful to
their own reasoning powers (applause) ? Mr. Bradlaugh
noticed the phrase which fell from me, about a discussion
like this being distasteful to me. I did not say that the
matter under discussion was distasteful to me. I did not say
that a discussion under other conditions would be distasteful
to me. I did not say that it was at all distasteful to me to
search the grounds of my own belief, for my own belief
would be poor indeed were not such search my constant
practice (hear, hear). Mr. Bradlaugh laid great stress,
during the greater part of his speech, upon what
appear to be, in different races and in different
climes, the different and contradictory deliverances of
conscience. That difficulty is one which has been
felt by many persons, and dealt with, well and ill, by
various writers. The difficulty is one of importance, and it
arises, perhaps, from the word “ conscience ” being used in
various different senses. My use of the word “ conscience ” is
simply as being that voice of God (as I still call it) which says,
“Do the right; don’t do the wrong.” It does not in anyway say
what is right or what is wrong. That which I call the right,
like so much of our manhood, is the gradual development
and evolution of history, and it is largely dependent, as
Mr. Bradlaugh, says, upon climate and other external sur
roundings. We have to reason about what is right and wrong.
We must have gradual education of the individual and
of the race to get a clearer and more worthy conception of
the right and wrong ; and all I claim for conscience is that
the man, having resolved in his own mind what is right and
what is wrong,this conscience says, “Do the right,and do not
the wrong.” Therefore, instates of barbarous society, where
misled reason has induced persons to think certain things
were right which we look upon as crimes, still the voice of
conscience must necessarily tell them to do the right. The
�24
thing is right to the individual if he thinks it right. It may
be a terrible mistake of his—it may be a terrible mistake to
believe or teach certain things; nevertheless, the voice of
conscience says, “ Do the rightit does not define what
the right is. That is one of the things which God leaves to
be developed in humanity by slow degrees. Thank God, we
see that the idea of the right and the wrong is purifying—is
clarifying in the course of history. The conception of what
is right and what is wrong is better now than it was a
hundred years ago; the conception of what is right
and what is wrong is better still than it was a thou
sand years ago.
Many of the things then considered
laudable are now considered base; and many of the things
then considered base are now considered laudable. This
voice of which I speak, however, like all other voices, may
not be equally perceived at all times. Supposing that you
were at school, and a certain bell rang at six o’clock every
morning. If you accustom yourself to rising when the bell
rings, you will naturally enough go on hearing it; but if you
get into the habit of disregarding it, and turning over on the
other side for another nap, the bell may sound loudly but
you will cease to hear it. So it is, I take it, with the voice
of God, which ever speaks—which ever pleads—but against
which man may deafen himself. He may make himself so
dull of understanding that he may not hear it clearly. Not
only the individual man’s own obstinacy may make
him dull of hearing, but it must be conceded that this
dulness of hearing may descend to him from long
generations of those from whom he proceeds. It may
be a part of his inheritance. But it does not follow that
this voice does not exist, and that it does not still plead with
him if he had the ear to hear it. No man is so lost but that
if he strives to hear, that voice will become to him clearer and
more clear. I ask you here whether you find any difficulty
in deciding what, to you, is right or wrong? Mr. Bradlaugh
is very fond of definitions. The words “right’’and “wrong’’are
so simple that any definition of them would only obscure
them. I know, andyou know, what you m ean by right and wrong.
If I say of a thing, “ That is not right, don’t do it,” you know
what I mean. Can I speak in any plainer way than to say
of a thing, “ That is not right ” ? If there is no better way
of explaining what you mean than this—if there is no plainer
way—it is best not to attempt to define the word, because
the definition would only tend to obscure it. Not being
4
>
�25
much accustomed to debates of this description, much of
what I desired to say in the first half-hour was not said. I
am told that all this experience which I have been trying
to relate to you is fancy, and I am asked to prove that there
is some being who can be imagined to be this God whom I
believe I hear speaking to me. I might ask : “ Is it not
enough that not only do I think I hear this voice, but that
so many hundreds and thousands of the great and good
have also thought so ? Is it not enough that many of the
great reformers, many of the great leaders in the paths of
righteousness and mercy, in this England of ours, tell us that
they hear this voice ? You must, if you deny it, either think
they lie or that they are deluded. When Newman, Voysey,
Theodore Parker—the glorious abolitionist of America—
say that it is their most intimate experience, it is somewhat
shallow to assert that there is nothing in it. I am not one
of those who think that the existence of a God can be
proved to the understanding of every one in a large audience
on a priori grounds. At the same time the balance of
probability on a priori grounds seems to be, to me, strongly
in favour of Theism. I find that there is, in my own.
mental constitution, a demand for cause of some kind for
every phenomenon. I want to know what has led to thephenomenon, and I find a good many other people are apt to
inquire in the like direction. Even very little children,
before they are sophisticated by us teachers and parsons,
want to be informed as to the causes of things. Another
point — I cannot help believing that all cause must beintelligent. Yes, I knew that would go down in Mr. Brad
laugh’s notes; but I say again, I cannot conceive of any
cause which is not intelligent in some sort of way (applause).
Mr. Brad laugh : There are two things which are evidently
quite certain so far as my opponent is concerned; one is that
we shall have a good-tempered debate, and the other that we
shall have a candid debate. Mr. Armstrong has said frankly,
with reference to the definition of God, that he is perfectly in
capable of saying whether the definition of Professor Flint is
correct or not, and he has, I think I may say, complained that
I am too fond of definitions. Will he permit me on this to read
him an extract from Professor Max Muller’s recent lecture :
“ It was, I think, a very good old custom never to enter
upon the discussion of any scientific problem without giving,
beforehand definitions of the principal terms that had to be
employed. A book on logic or grammar generally opened
�with the question, What is logic? What is grammar ? No
one would write on minerals without first explaining what he
meant by a mineral, or on art, without defining, as well as
he might, his idea of art. No doubt it was often as trouble
some for the author to give such preliminary definitions as
it seemed useless to the reader, who was generally quite
incapable in the beginning of appreciating their full value.
Thus it happened that the rule of giving verbal definitions
came to be looked upon after a time as useless and obsolete.
Some authors actually took credit for no longer giving these
definitions, and it soon became the fashion to say that the
only true and complete definition of what was meant by
logic or grammar, by law or religion, was contained in the
books themselves which treated of these subjects. But
what has been the result ? Endless misunderstandings and
controversies which might have been avoided in many cases
if both sides had clearly defined what they did and what
they did not understand by certain words.” I will show you
presently where this need of accurate definition comes so
very strongly. Mr. Armstrong is quite clear that he knows
what right means ; he is also quite clear that you know
what he means. That may be true, but it also may not, and
I will show you the difficulty.
Suppose there were a
thorough disciple, say of some bishop or church, who thought
it right to put to death a man holding my opinions. That
man would think the capital punishment for heresy right,
Mr. Armstrong would not. That man’s conscience would
decide that it was right, Mr. Armstrong’s would decide that
it was not. What is the use of saying you both know what
is right ? The word right is a word by which you label
certain things, thoughts, and actions, the rightness of which
you have decided on some grounds known only to yourselves.
It may be they are pleasant to you or disagreeable to your
antagonist. I, in defining morality, gave you my reason for
labelling the thing with the name “right.” Mr. Armstrong has
given you no reason whatever. Mr. Armstrong says that
conscience is the voice of God which says : “ Do that which
is right, don’t do that which is wrong.” Yet the divine voice
does not tell you what is right and what is wrong. Hence
that conscience talking to the cannibal: “ It is right to eat
that man, he’s tender; it’s wrong to eat that man, he’s
tough ”—(laughter)—and the voice of God says : “eat the
tender men because it is right; don’t eat the tough men
because it is wrong.” I ask how that illustration is to be
�27
dealt with? If the voice does not in any way enable you to
determine the character of the act, then it simply means
that what you call the voice of God asks you to continue
committing every error which has been bequeathed you
from past times as right, and to avoid every good thing
because in past times it has been condemned and is yet con
demned as wrong. If that is to be the conclusion, then
I say that the voice of God is not a voice to be worshipped,
and that it is not reasonable to worship such a voice
and taking that to be the definition I submit that upon
that a negative answer must be given in this debate.
Mr. Armstrong very frankly and candidly says that the
conception of what is right and wrong is being cleared
and purified ‘ day by day. That is, the conception now is
different to what it was one hundred years ago, and better
still than it was a thousand years ago; but the voice of
God, a thousand years ago, told the Armstrong and Brad
laugh then living, to do that which conscience said to them
was right, and which the conscience to-day says is wrong.
Was God governed by the mis-education, the mis-informa
tion, and the mis-apprehension of the time ? If the God
was outside the ignorance of the day, why did he not set the
people right ? Was he powerless to do it ? In which case,
how do you make out that he is God ? Or had he never the
willingness to do it ? In which case how do you make out
that he was God good ? And if he preferred to leave them
in blindness, how do you reconcile that? Then we are told
the voice is not always clear, but that you may make it more
clear by a habit of obedience. That is so I suppose. And you
may transmit the predisposition to the habit of galloping tohorses on this side the ocean, the predisposition to the
habit of trotting to horses on the other side the ocean;' tothinking MahommedanisminTurkey,and to thinking another
“ ism ” in England, and some other “ism” in Hindustan.
You do not transmit the actual thought any more than you
transmit the actual gallop or trot, but you transmit the pre
disposition, given the appropriate surroundings to reproduce
any action physical or mental. And the source of this is
God, is it ? I vow I do not understand how the Theist is to
meet the contradiction thus involved. Then, Mr. Arm
strong says that when he uses the word “ right,” he defies
anyone to make it plainer. Let us see what that means :
I forge a cheque; Mr. Armstrong says that’s wrong. Why?
Oh ! it is a dishonest and dishonourable thing, it tends to
�28
injure, and so on. But let us see whether you are always
quite clear about these things ? When you are annexing a
country, for example; praying to your God that you may
annex successfully, and that he will protect you when you
have annexed, does not your conscience run away with you,
or does not God mislead you in some of these things ? Is
it not true that the moment you get outside the definition
of the word “ right,” and the moment you say : “ I have a
standard of right which I will not tell you, because nothing
I tell you will make it clear ” you are launched at once into
a heap of absurdities and contradictions ? You think it is
right to have one wife, the Turk thinks it right to have two.
How are you to determine between them ? It only means,
that one of you has labelled bigamy “ right ” and the other
has labelled it “ wrong.” You must have some kind of ex
planation to justify what you are talking about it. We had
an argument offered by Mr. Armstrong which, if it meant
anything, meant that the voice of the majority should pre
vail. Mr. Armstrong said, that it was not only his experience
but that of thousands of others. Does he mean to tell me
that problems of this kind are to be determined by an un
trained majority, or by the verdict of a skilled minority ?
If by a majority, I have something to say to him, and if by
the skilled minority, how are you to select them ? In his
first speech, which I did not quite finish replying to, we
were told that God’s peace and beauty were apprehended in
lakes and mountains. But I have seen one lake—-Michigan—
the reverse of peace and beauty; I have seen little vessels
knocked about by the waves, and dashed to pieces ; and I
have seen Mount Vesuvius when it has been the
very opposite of calm and beautiful, and I have
heard of the houses at Torre del Grecco—though I
have never seen it—being burned in the night by the fiery
lava stream. Where is the peace and beauty of that scene ?
You can take peace. Given a lake, and I can show you a
tornado. Given a mountain and I can give you Vesuvius
with the fiery stream burning the huts of the fishers on the
slope of Torre del Grecco. Did God do this ? Did God
run the two vessels into one another on the Thames and
have those hundreds of people drowned? If you take
credit for the beauty you must also take debit for the
pain and misery (applause). Well, then, I am told that re
ligion is the noblest of all instincts. Max Muller tells us—
whether that be true or not, as Francis Newman puts it—that
�29
religion is a word about which people never have agreed in
any age of the world; about which there have been more
quarrels than about any other word, and about which people
have done more mischief than about any other word; and
I will ask our friend to explain, if it be the noblest of all
instincts, how is it that people have racked each other, and
beheaded each other, and tortured each other by, or in the
name of, this religion ? We are told, and I am thankful to
hear it, that we sceptics have purged it of a great deal of
mischief, and we hope to do more in that way as we go on
(applause). And here—and I want to speak with as much
reverence as I can on the subject of prayer, and it is ex
tremely difficult to touch upon it without giving my oppo
nent pain—so I will deal with it as a general, and not a
personal question. Mr. Armstrong said, after speaking of
how he prayed against temptation : “ He answered me as he
has answered the immemorial prayer of Christendom and
delivered me from temptation.” Why does he not deliver
from the temptation that misery, poverty, and ignorance
bring to the little one who did not choose that he should be
born in a narrow lane, or a back street, in an atmosphere
redolent of squalor and filth ? This little one, whom God
can lift out of temptation, but whom he lets still be cold and
miserable, whom he sees famishing for food, him whom he
sees go famishing to the baker’s, watching to steal the
loaf to relieve his hunger—why won’t he deliver this little
one ? Does Mr. Armstrong say: “ Oh, the little one must
know how to pray before God will answer him ” ? Oh, but
what a mockery to us that the source of all power places
within the reach of the temptation—nay, puts as though
surrounded by a mighty temptation trap, so that there should
be no possible escape—that little one, and then gives way to the
skilled entreaty, high tone, habit-cultured voice which Mr.
Armstrong uses, while he is deaf to the rough pleading of the
little one, and allows him to sink down, making no effort
for his recovery ! I have only one or two words more to
say to you before I again finish, and I would use these to
ask Mr. Armstrong to tell me what he meant by the word
“ cause,” and what he meant by saying “ cause must be
intelligent ” ? By cause, I mean, all that without which an
event cannot happen—the means towards an end, and by
intelligence I mean the totality of mental ability—its activity
and its results in each animal capable of it.
Mr. Armstrong: Mr. Bradlaugh has just been re-
�3°
buking me for my laxness with respect to defini
tions, and has come down upon me with a great autho
rity. Now, it is a habit of mine not to think much
of authorities as authorities, but rather of the value
of what they say. Mr. Bradlaugh came down upon
me with Max Muller, and read a sentence in reference to the
value of definitions, to the effect that they were wonderful
things for preventing and avoiding controversies and dis
putes. Is it, I ask, Mr. Bradlaugh’s experience that the
number of definitions given from public platforms in his
presence has tended to less controversy or to more ? Has
there been more or less talk with all these definitions, than
there would have been without them ? I fancied that Mr.
Bradlaugh’s career had been one very much connected with
controversies, and that the definitions which he has been ac
customed to give have not had the effect of leaving him in peace
from controversy. I am perfectly amazed at Mr. Brad
laugh’s memory, at the wonderful manner in which he
manages to remember, with tolerable accuracy, what I have
said, and to get down as he does the chief points of my
speeches.
I have, unfortunately, a miserable memory,
although I have an excellent shorthand which I can write,
and I cannot generally read it (laughter). Trusting, however,
to those two guides, I must endeavour to reply. Mr. Brad
laugh unintentionally misrepresented me when he alleged
that I had said that the voice of God, called conscience, was
not always clear. I did not say that that voice was not always
clear -—- what I said was that it was not always clearly
heard. I illustrated this by the simile of the bell, the sound
of which was perfectly clear of itself, but which was not
heard by those who would not heed.
Mr. Bradlaugh
also accused me of going in for the authority of majori
ties, because I quoted a number of names and said
that I might quote many more who concurred in the
belief in Deity grounded upon the sort of experi
ence which I said that I had myself enjoyed. Now, the
opinions of the majority have no authority—at least they go
for what they are worth, but are not a binding or an absolute
authority. But the experience of a majority, or of a minority,
or of a single individual, has authority. The experience
of a single man is a fact, and all the rest of the world not
having had that experience, or thinking that they have not
had it, does not make it less the fact. Therefore, if you
have half-a-dozen men upon whose words you can rely, who
�3i
say that they have had a certain experience, because Mr.
Bradlaugh says he has not had such experience, that makes
it none the less the fact. Now I approach that awful question
which stares in the face of the Theist—and which
ioften seems to stare most cruelly—this question of the evil
in the world. It is a question upon which the greatest
intellects of mankind have broken themselves, one which
has never been really explained or made clear, either by
the Theist or the Atheist, but which is probably beyond the
solution of the human faculties. All that we can do is to
fringe the edge of the mystery, and to see whether the best
feelings within us seem to guide us to anything approaching
a solution. Do you think that these things of which Mr.
Bradlaugh has spoken do not touch me as they touch
him ? Look, say, at the poor child born in misery, and
living in suffering; it would absolutely break my heart if I
thought that this could be the end of all. I believe that it
would weigh me down so that I could not stand upon a
public platform, or perform the ordinary business of life, if I
believed that there were beings in the world of whom misery
and sin were the beginning and the end. But I thank God that
I am enabled to maintain my reason upon its seat, and my
trust intact. I know, or I think I know, God as a friend. If he
be a friend to me, shall he not be a friend to all ? If I know
by my own experience his wondrous loving kindness, can I
not trust him for all the rest of the world, through all the
ages of eternity ? You may see a son who shall be familiar
with his father’s kindness, who shall always be kindly treated
by his father ; and there shall be a great warm love between
them. But the child sees certain actions on the part of his
father which he cannot explain. He beholds suffering
apparently brought by his father upon others, and is,
perhaps, inclined to rebel against his father’s authority. But
which is the truest child—the child who, having himself
experienced his father’s love, says : “ Well, this is strange, it
is a mystery; I would it were not so, but I know that my father
is good, and will bring some good out of this which could
not have been obtained otherwiseor the child who says :
“All my experience of my father’s goodness shall go to the
winds. I see a problem which I cannot explain, and I will,
therefore, throw up my trust, rebel against the paternal
goodness, and believe in my father’s love no more ! ” It
would be base in such of you as may be Atheisst
to rest in such a trust, since vou do not know the
�32
love of God; but were you touched with that love
this trust would come to you. It would come to you in
your best and truest moments, the moments when you feel
that you are most akin with all that is good and holy, and
when you feel, as it were, lifted above what is base. ’ This
problem of the evil in the world, I have said, surpasses the
faculties of humanity to solve, either from the platform of
the Theist, the Atheist, or the Pantheist. . I ask you what
you conceive to be the highest good to humanity ? Is not
the highest good, virtue ? You say, it may be, happiness is
better. Take the Huguenot. One way, with him, led to
happiness, the other to destruction. Was the choice he made
the better or the worse ? You say the better ? Then you
hold that virtueis betterthan happiness. Withregardto virtue
imagine, if you can, a world free from every sort of suffer
ing, from every sort of temptation, every sort of trial, what
a very nice world to live in, but what very poor creatures we
should all be ! Where would be virtue, where valour, where
greatness, where nobility, where would be all thos’e high
functions which call forth our reverence, and make
us look up from men to the God of man ? The world
is not made of sugar-plums. I, for my own part, can
not conceive how virtue, the highest good which we can
conceive, could possibly come about in human character
unless human character had evil against which it had to
contend (applause). If you can tell me how we could have
a world in which men should be great, and good, and
chivalrous, and possess all such qualities as raise feelings of
reverence in our bosoms, where nevertheless all should be
smooth and easy, you will have told me of something which,
I think, has never been told to any human being (applause).
Mr. Bradlaugh : A large number of definitions lead to
more controversy or to less. If the definitions are offered
to the minds of people well educated, and thoroughly
understanding them—to much less controversy and to more
accuracy; and when they are offered to people who are yet
ignorant, and have yet to understand them, then they lead
to more controversy, but even there, also, to more accuracy.
I am asked: Can you tell me how to make a world ? I
cannot. Do you intend to base your conclusions on my
ignorance ? If there be an onus, it lies on you, not on me.
It is your business to show that the maker you say ought to
be adored, has made the world as good as it can be. It is
not my business at all to enter upon world-making. Then
�33
I am not sure—while I am quite ready to be set right upon
a verbal inaccuracy—I am not sure there is very much dis
tinction between the voice not being heard, and not being
clearly heard. It is said to be the voice of God that speaks;
but he made the deafness or otherwise of the person to
whom he speaks, or he is not the creator, preserver, “ the
dearest friend in whom I trust, on whom I rely”—these
are Mr. Armstrong’s words. If God cannot prevent the
deafness, then the reliance is misplaced; if he made rhe
deafness, it is of no use that he is talking plainly; if he
has made the person too deaf to hear his voice, then the
voice is a mockery. Then I had it put to me, that the
opinions of majorities were not binding as authority; they
only had their value as expressions of opinion ; but that i
the experiences of individuals are binding. What does
that mean? Is there such a certitude in consciousness
that there can be no mistake in experience ? What do
you mean? When you have a notion you have had an
experience, and I have a notion you have not had it?
Supposing, for example, a man says : “ I have ex
perience of a room which raced with the Great Northern
train to London ; it was an ordinary room, with chairs and
tables in it, and none of them were upset, and it managed
to run a dead heat with the Great Northern express.” You
would say : “ My good man, if you are speaking seriously,
you are a lunatic.” “ No,” he would say, “ that is my ex
perience.” Mr. Armstrong says that that experience de
serves weight. I submit not unless you have this : that the
experience must be of facts coming within the possible range
of other people’s experience; and mustbe experience which is
testable by other people’s experience, with an ability on the
part of the person relating to clearly explain his ex
perience, and that each phenomenon he vouches to you, to
be the subject possible of criticism on examination by your
self, and that no experience which is perfectly abnormal,
and which is against yours, has any weight whatever with
you, or ought to have, except, perhaps, as deserving ex
amination. When it possibly can be made part of your
experience, yes; when it admittedly cannot be made part
of your experience, no. A man with several glasses of
whisky sees six chandeliers in this room ; that is his ex
perience—not mine. I do not refuse to see; I cannot see
more than three. Mr. Armstrong says the problem of evil
never has been made clear by Atheist or Theist. There is
D
�34
no burden on us to make it clear. The burden is upon
the person who considers that he has an all-powerful friend
of loving kindness, to show how that evil exists in con
nection with his statement that that friend could prevent
it. If he will not prevent it, he is not of that loving
kindness which is pretended. Mr. Armstrong says: “My
dear friend is kind to me, shall I not believe that he is
kind to the little lad who is starving?” What, kind
to the lad whom he leaves unsheltered and ill-clad
in winter, whose mother is drunken because the place
is foul, whose father has been committed to gaol ?
Where is the evidence to that lad of God’s loving kind
ness to him ? God, who stands by whilst the little child
steals something; God, who sets the policeman to catch
him, knowing he will go amongst other criminals, where he
will become daily the more corrupted; God, who tells him
from the Bench through the mouth of the justice, that he
has given way to the temptation of the devil, when it is the
very God has been the almighty devil (applause). That
may be a reason for Mr. Armstrong adoring his friend, but
it is no reason for this poor boy to adore. “ Ah,” Mr.
Armstrong says, “ my reason for homage is this. I should
be dissatisfied if this were going to last for ever, or if this
were to be the whole of it; that is so bad I should be in
anguish were there no recompense.” You condemn it if it
is to continue. How can you worship the being who allows
that even temporarily which your reason condemns ? Has
he marked his right to be adored as God by the
little girl who is born of a shame-marked mother in the
shadow of the workhouse walls, who did not select the
womb from which she should come, and whose career, con
sequent on her birth, is one of shame and perhaps crime
too. Ah ! that friend you love, how his love is evidenced
to that little girl is yet to be made clear to me. Then
comes another problem of thought which I am not sure I
shall deal fairly with. Is the highest good virtue or happi
ness ? But the highest happiness is virtue. That act is
virtuous which tends to the greatest happiness of the greatest
number, and which inflicts the least injury on any—that
which does not so result in this is vice. When you put happi
ness and virtue as being utterly distinguished, in your mind
they may be so, but not in my mind. You have confused
the definition of morality which I gave on the first opening;
you have, without explaining it, substituted another in lieu
�35
•of it. You would be right to say my definition is wrong,
■and give another definition, but you have no right to ignore
my definition and use my word in precisely the opposite
sense to that in which I used it. A very few words now will
determine this question for this evening, and I will ask you
to remember the position in which we are here. I am
Atheist, our friend is Theist. He has told you practically
that the word “ God ” is incapable of exact definition,
and if this is so, then it is incapable of exact belief. If it is
incapable of exact definition, it is incapable of exact
thought. If thought is confused you may have prostration of
the intellect, and this is all you can have. Our friend says
that he prays and that his prayer is answered daily, but he
forgot the millions of prayers to whom God is deaf. In his
peaceful mountains and lakes—Vesuvius and Lake Michi
gan escaped him. The fishers in Torre del Grecco, they on
whom the lava stream came down in the night, had their
lips framed no cry for mercy ? Did not some of those
hundreds who were carried to death on the tide of the muddy
Thames, did not they call out in their despair ? and yet he
was deaf to them. He listened to you, but it is of those
to whom he did not listen of whom I have to speak. If
he listens to you and not to them he is a respecter of
persons. He may be one for you to render homage to, but
not for me. First, then, the question is : “ Is it reasonable
to worship God?” and the word “worship” has been left
indistinctly defined. I defy anyone who has listened to
Mr. Armstrong to understand how much or how little he
would exclude or include in worship. I made it clear how
much I would include. Our friend has said nothing
whatever relating to the subject with which we have had to
deal.. His word “God” has been left utterly undefined;
the words “ virtue ” and “ happiness,” and the words “ right”
and “ wrong,” are left equally unexplained; the questions I
put to him of cause and intelligence have been left as
though they were not spoken. I do not make this a re
proach to him, because I know it is the difficulty of the
subject with which he has to deal. The moment you tell
people what you mean, that moment you shiver the Vene
tian glass which contains the liquor that is not to be touched.
I plead under great difficulty.
I plead for opinions that
have been made unpopular; I appeal for persons who, in
the mouths of their antagonists, often have associated with
them all that is vicious. It is true that Mr. Armstrong has
B 2
�36
no such reproach. He says that God will only try me
by that judgment of my own reason, and he makes my
standard higher than God’s on the judgment day. God
made Bruno; do you mean that Bruno’s heresy ranks as
high as faith, and that Bruno at the judgment will stand
amongst the saints ? This may be high humanity, but it is
no part of theology. Our friend can only put it that because
in his own goodness he makes an altar where he can worship,
and a church where he would make a God kind and loving
as himself, and that as he is ready to bless his fellows, so
must his God be; but he has shown no God for me to
worship, and he has made out no reasonableness to wor
ship God except for himself, to whom, he says, God is kind.
Alas ! that so many know nothing of his kindness (applause).
I beg to move the thanks of this meeting to Mr. Rothera
for presiding this evening.
Mr. Armstrong : I wish to second that.
Carried unanimously.
The Chairman : Permit me just to express the obliga
tions I feel under to you for having made my duty so
simple and pleasant. My position as chairman necessarily
and properly excludes me from making any judgment what
ever upon the character and quality of what has been
addressed to you. Notwithstanding that, I may say this i
that it is, I believe, a healthy sign of the times when a num
ber of men and women, such as have met together in this
room, can listen to such addresses as have been made to
night, for it will help on our civilisation. And if you want
a definition of what is right, I say that our business is to
learn what is true, then we shall do what is right (applause).
�37
SECOND
NIGHT.
The Chairman, who was much applauded, said : Ladies
and Gentlemen—It is with much satisfaction that I re
sume my duties as chairman this evening. No one occupy
ing this position could fail to be gratified with the high tone
and excellent temper of the debate which we listened to
last night (hear, hear), or, in noting as I did, the earnest,
sustained, and intelligent attention of a large and much
over-crowded audience (applause). I regard this as a health
ful sign of the times. There are those who look upon such
a discussion as this as dangerous and irreverent. I do not
share in that opinion (hear, hear). There is an intelligence
abroad that no longer permits men to cast the burden of
their beliefs upon mere authority, but which compels them
to seek for reasons for the faith that is in them (hear, hear).
To those, I think, such discussion as this, maintained in the
spirit of last evening, cannot fail to be useful. It is obvious
that the first requisite of religion is, that it be true. Fear of
the results of investigation, therefore, should deter no one
from inquiry. That which is true in religion, cannot be
shaken, and that which is false no one should desire to pre
serve (applause). Now, as you are aware, Mr. Armstrong in
this discussion is charged with the duty of maintaining the
proposition that it is reasonable in us to worship God. The
negative of that proposition is supported by Mr. Bradlaugh.
Under the arrangement for the debate, Mr. Bradlaugh is to
night entitled to half-an-hour for his opening, Mr. Arm
strong to half-an-hour for his reply. After that a quarterhour will be given to each alternately, until Mr. Armstrong
will conclude the debate at ten o’clock. I have now great
pleasure in asking Mr. Bradlaugh to open the discussion
(applause).
Mr. Bradlaugh, who was very warmly received, said :
In contending that it is not reasonable to worship God, it
seemed to me that I ought to make clear to you, at any
�38
rate, the words I used, and the sense in which I used them,
and to do that I laid before you last night several definitions,
not meaning that my definitions should necessarily bind
Mr. Armstrong, but meaning that, unless he supplied some
other and better explanations for the words, the meaning
I gave should be, in each case, taken to be my meaning all
through. I did not mean that he was to be concluded by
the form of my definition if he were able to correct it, or if
he were able to give a better instead ; but I think I am now
entitled to say that he ought to be concluded by my defini
tions, and this, from the answer he has given (hear, hear).
The answer was frank—very frank—(hear) and I feel
reluctant to base more upon it than I ought to do in a dis
cussion conducted as this has been. If I were meeting an
antagonist who strove to take every verbal advantage, I
might be tempted to pursue only the same course; but
when I find a man speaking with evident earnestness, using
language which seems to be the utter abandonment of his
cause, I would rather ask him whether some amendment
of the language he used might not put his case in a
better position. His declaration was that he was perfectly
incapable of saying whether the definition, which I had taken
from Professsor Flint, of God, was correct or not (hear,
hear). Now, I will ask him, and you, too, to consider the
consequence of that admission. No definition whatever is
given by him of the word “ God.” There was not even the
semblance, or attempt of it. The only words we got which
were akin to a definition, except some words which, it
appears, I took down hastily, and which Mr. Armstrong
abandoned in his next speech, the only words bearing even
the semblance of a definition, are “ an awful inscrutable
somewhat” (laughter and hear, hear). Except these words,
there have been no words in the arguments and in the
speeches of Mr. Armstrong which enabled me, in any
fashion, to identify any meaning which he may have of it,
except phrases which contradict each other as soon as you
examine them (applause). Now, what is the definition of which
Mr. Armstrong says that he is incapable of saying whether or
not it is correct? “ That God is a self-existent, eternal being,
infinite in power and wisdom, and perfect in holiness and
goodness, the maker of heaven and earth.” Now, does
Mr. Armstrong mean that each division of the definition
comes within his answer ? Does he mean that in relation to
no part of that which is predicated in this definition is he
�39
capable of saying whether it is correct or not ? Because, if
he does, he is answered by his own speech, as a portion of
this defines God as being perfect in holiness and goodness,
in power and wisdom; and it defines him as eternal in
duration and infinite in his existence; and also defines him
as being the creator of the universe. Now, if Mr. Armstrong
means that “ as a whole, I can’t say whether it is correct or
not,” or if, in defending his position, he means that, haying
divided the definition in its parts, he cannot say whether it is,
in any one part, correct or not, then I must remind him that,
in this debate, the onus lies upon him of saying what it is he
worships, and what it is he contends it is reasonable of us
to worship (hear, hear). If he cannot give us a clear and
concise notion of what he worships, and of what he says it
is reasonable for us to worship, I say that his case has fallen
to the ground. It must be unreasonable to worship that of
which you, in thought, cannot predicate anything in any way
—accurately or inaccurately (applause). Mr. Armstrong
evidently felt—I hope that you will not think that the feel
ing was justified—that there was a tendency on my part to
make too much of, and to be too precise as to, the meaning
of words used. Permit me to say it is impossible to be too
precise; it is impossible to be too clear ; it is impossible to
be too distinct—(hear, hear)—especially when you are dis
cussing a subject in terms which are not used by everybody
in the same sense, and which are sometimes not used by the
mass of those to whom you are addressing yourself at all
(applause). It is still more necessary to be precise when
many of those terms have been appropriated by the teachers
of different theologies and mythologies, such teachers having
alleged that the use of the words meant something which, on
the face of it, contradicted itself, and by other teachers who,
if they have not been self-contradictory, have attached meanings
widely different to those given by their fellows (hear, hear).
I will ask you, then, to insist with me that what is meant by
God should be given us in such words that we can clearly
and easily identify it (hear, hear). If you cannot even in
thought identify God, it is unreasonable—absolutely un
reasonable—to talk of worshipping “ it ” (applause). What
is “ it ” you are going to worship ? Can you think clearly
what it is you are going to worship ? If you can think clearly
for yourself what it is, tell me in what words you think it.
It may be that my brain may not be skilled enough to fully
comprehend that, but, at any rate, we shall then have an
�4°
opportunity of testing for ourselves how little or how much
clear thought you may have on the subject (laughter and ap
plause). If you are obliged to state that it is impossible to
put your thoughts in words so clear and so distinct that I may
understand the meaning of it as clearly as you do, or that
a person of ordinary capacity cannot comprehend the words
in which you describe it—if that is impossible, then it is un
reasonable to ask me to worship it (loud applause). I say it
is unreasonable to ask me to worship an unknown quantity
—an unrecognisable symbol expressing nothing whatever.
If you know what it is you worship—if you think you know
what it is you worship—I say it is your duty to put into
words what you think you know (hear, hear). We have had
in this debate some pleas put forward, which, if they had
remained unchallenged, might have been some sort of pleas
for the existence of a. Deity, but each of those pleas has in
turn failed. I do not want to use too strong a phrase, so I
will say that each in turn has been abandoned. Take, for
instance, the plea of beauty, harmony, and calmness of
the world, as illustrated by lakes and mountains, to
which I contrasted storms and volcanoes. Mr. Arm
strong’s reply to that was: “ But this involves problems
which are alike insoluble by Theist and Atheist.” If it is
so, why do you worship what is non-capable of solution ?
If there be no solution, why do you put that word “ God ”
as representative of the solution which you say is unattain
able, and ask me to prostrate myself before it and adore it ?
(applause).
We must have consistency of phraseology.
Either the problem is soluble—then the onus is upon you
to state it in reasonable terms; or it is insoluble, and then
you have abandoned the point you set out to prove, because
it must be unreasonable to worship an insoluble proposition
(applause). Howdoyou know anything of that God you askus
to worship ? I must avow that, after listening carefully to what
has fallen from Mr. Armstrong, I have been unable to glean
what he knows of God or how he knows it (hear, hear). I
remember he has said something about a “ voice of God,”
but he has frankly admitted that the voice in question has
spoken differently and in contradictory senses in different
ages (loud cries of “no, no,”)—and those who say “no,”
will do better to leave Mr. Armstrong to answer for him
self as to the accuracy of what I state (hear, hear). I say
he frankly admitted that the voice he alluded to had spoken
differently and contradictorily in different ages. (Renewed
�4i
cries of “ no ”). I say yes, and I will give the evidence of
my yes. (Cries of “ no, no,” “ order,” and “ hear, hear.”)
I say yes, and I will give the evidence of my yes (hear,
hear, and applause).
Mr. Armstrong said that in one
hundred years there had been a purification, and an
amelioration, and a clearing away; and that that change
had been vaster still since one thousand years ago (ap
plause). He is responsible for admitting what I said
about the definition of morality being different in one
age and amongst one people, to what it is in another
age and amongst another people; and if that does not mean
exactly what I put substantially to you, it has no meaning
at all (loud applause).
I strive not to misrepresent
that which I have to answer; I will do my best to under
stand what it is that is urged against me. Those who hold
a different judgment should try, at least, to suspend it until I
have finished (hear, hear, and applause). In the Baird
Lectures, to which I referred last night—and let me here
say that I don’t think that any complaint can be fairly made
of my quoting from them—something was said last night
about my using great men as an authority. Now I do not do
that; but if I find that a man, whose position and learning
gave him advantages with regard to a subject upon which
I am speaking, and he has expressed what I wished to say
better than I can do—if I use his language it is right
I should say from where I have taken my words (hear, hear)
And if I remember right, we had, last night, quotations from
Charles Voysey, Professor Newman, Professor Blackie, and
a host of similar writers on the other side. I take it they
were given in the same fashion that I intended in giving the
names of the writers of the quotations I have cited—not for
the purpose of overwhelming me with their authority, but
simply to inform me and you from whence were got the
words used (hear, hear). Now, Professor Flint, in his book
on Atheism, directed against the position taken up by men
like myself, says : “ The child is born, not into the religion
of nature but into blank ignorance; and, if left entirely to
itself, would probably never find out as much religious truth
as the most ignorant of parents can teach it.” Again, on page
23 he says : “The belief that there is one God, infinite in
power, wisdom, and goodness, has certainly not been
wrought out by each one of us for himself, but has been
passed on from man to man, from parent to child: tradi
tion, education, common consent, the social medium, have
�42
exerted great influence in determining its acceptance and
prevalence.” Now, what I want to put to you from this is
that, just as Max Muller and others have done, you must try
to find out whether what is to be understood by the word
“ God ” is to be worshipped or not, by tracing backwards
the origin and growth of what is to-day called religion. You
will have to search out the traditions of the world, should
there fail to be any comprehensible meaning come from the
other side. Now, what God is it that we are to worship ?
Is it the Jewish God? Is it the Mahometan God? Is it
the God of the Trinitarian Christian ? Is it one of the
gods of the Hindus ? Or is it one of the gods of the old
Greeks or Italians, and, if so, which of them ? And in each
case from what source are we to get an accurate definition
of either of those gods ? Perhaps Mr. Armstrong will say
that it is none of these. He will probably decline to
have any of these Gods fastened upon him as the proper
God to worship ; but the very fact that there are so many
different gods—different with every variety of people—contra
dictory in their attributes and qualities—the very fact that
there is a wide difference in believers in a God makes it but
right that I should require that the God we are asked to
worship should be accurately defined (applause). In
the current number of the /Jonteinporary Review, Professor
Monier Williams, dealing with the development of Indian
religious thought, has a paragraph which is most appro
priate to this debate. He says, on page 246 : “ The early
religion of the Indo-Aryans was a development of a still earlier
belief in man’s subjection to the powers of nature and his
need of conciliating them. It was an unsettled system,
which at one time assigned all the phenomena of the uni
verse to one first Cause; at another, attributed them to
several Causes operating independently; at another, sup
posed the whole visible creation to be a simple evolution
from an eternal creative germ. It was a belief which,
according to the character and inclination of the
worshipper was now monotheism, now tritheism, now
polytheism, now pantheism.
But it was not yet
idolatry. Though the forces of nature were thought of as
controlled by divine persons, such persons were not yet
idolised. There is no evidence from the Vedic hymns that
images were employed. The mode of divine worship con
tinued to be determined from a consideration of human
liking and dislikings. Every worshipper praised the gods
'
�43
because he liked to be praised himself. He honoured them
with offerings because he liked to receive presents himself.
This appears to have been the simple origin of the sacrificial
system, afterwards closely interwoven with the whole re
ligious system. And here comes the difficult question—
What were the various ideas expressed by the term sacrifice?
In its purest and simplest form it denoted a dedication of
some simple gift as an expression of gratitude for blessings
received. Soon the act of sacrifice became an act of pro
pitiation for purely selfish ends. The favour of celestial
beings who were capable of conferring good or inflicting
harm on crops, flocks, and herds, was conciliated by offerings
and oblations of all kinds. First, the gods were invited to
join their worshippers at the every-day meal. Then they
were invoked at festive gatherings, and offered a share of
the food consumed. Their bodies were believed to be com
posed of ethereal particles, dependent for nourishment on
the indivisible elementary essence of the substances presented
to them, and to be furnished with senses capable of being
gratified by the aroma of butter and grain offered in fire
(homa); and especially by the fumes arising from libations
of the exhilarating juice extracted from the Soma plant.”
I will allege that .you cannot give me a definition of
God that does not originate in the ignorance of man as to
the causes of phenomena which are abnormal to him, and
which he cannot explain. The wonderful, the extraordinary,
the terrific, the mysterious, the mighty, the grand, the
furious, the good, the highly beneficent—all these
that he did not understand became to him God. He
might have understood them on careful investigation
had his mind then been capable for the search,
but instead of that he attributed them to huge per
sonifications of the Unknown—the word behind which
to-day is God, and it is the equivalent for all he observed,
but did not comprehend, for all that happened of which he
knew not the meaning (applause). It was not education but
ignorance which gave birth to the so-called idea of a God
(hear, hear). And I will submit to you that, in truth, all
forms of worship have arisen from exaggeration and mis
application of what men have seen in their fellow-men and
fellow-women. A man found that a big furious man might
be pacified and calmed by soothing words; that a big
avaricious man might be satisfied and pleased with plenteous
gifts ; that this one might be compelled to do something by
�44
angry words or harsh treatment; and that this one could be
won by supplications to comply with his wishes—and what
he imagined or observed as to his fellows he applied to the
unknown, thinking, no doubt, that that which he had found
efficacious in the known experience, might also be efficacious
in that in which he had no experience. And what did you
find ? You found the sailor at sea, who’did not understand
navigation, offering candles to his Deity, or special saint,
and promising more offerings of a similar character if the
Deity brought him safe into port. I say it is more reason
able to teach him how to steer than how to worship, and also
more reasonable to know something about the science of
navigation. That would prove much more serviceable than
worship, for when he relied upon candles, he ran upon rocks
and reefs, but as soon as he understood navigation, he
could bring his own ship safely into port (applause).
Prayer is spoken of by Mr. Armstrong as an act of wor
ship. What does it imply ? It implies a belief held on the
part of the person who prays, that he may be noticed by the
being to whom he prays; and it also implies that he is
asking that being to do something which he would have left
undone but for that prayer. Then does he think that he can
influence the person whom he addresses by his rank or by his
position ? Does he think he can influence his Deity by his
emotion ? Does he think that as he would win a woman’s
love, so he would gain God, by passionate devotion ?
Does he think that, as he would frighten a man,
so he would influence God through fear ? Does he appeal
to God’s logic, or to his pity? Does he appeal to his
mercy or to his justice ? or does he hope to tell God one
thing he could not know without the prayer ? (loud applause.)
I want an answer, here, clear and thorough, from one
who says that prayer is a reasonable worship to be offered to
God (renewed applause). Something was said last night
about a cause being necessarily intelligent, and I think, in
my speech afterwards, I challenged the assertion. Nothing
was said to explain what was meant, nothing was done to
further explain the matter, and although I defined what I
meant by cause, and defined what I meant by intelligence,
no objection was taken. Now, I have seen a hut crushed
by an avalanche falling on it, as I have been crossing the
Alps.
Does Mr. Armstrong mean to tell me that the
avalanche which crushed the hut was intelligent, or that it
had an intelligent wielder? If the avalanche is intelligent,
�45
why does he think so ? If the avalanche has an intelli
gent wielder, please explain to me the goodness of that
intelligent wielder who dashes the avalanche on the cottage ?
(applause). If you tell me that it is a mystery which you
cannot explain, I say it is unreasonable to ask me to worship
such a mystery—(renewed applause)—and as long as you
call it a mystery, and treat it as that which you cannot explain,
so long you have no right to ask me to adore it. There was
a time when man worshipped the lightning and thunder,
and looked upon them as Deity. But now he has grown
wiser, and, having investigated the subject, instead of
worshipping the lightning as a Deity, he erects lightningconductors and electric wires, and chains the lightning and
thunder God; knowledge is more potent than prayer (ap
plause). As long as they were worshipped • science could
do nothing, but now we see to what uses electricity has been
brought. When they knew that the lightning-conductor
was more powerful than the God they worshipped, then
science was recognised the mighty master and ruler, instead
of ignorant faith (applause). I have already submitted that
there has not been the semblance of proof or authority for
the existence of any being identifiable in words to whom it
would be reasonable to offer worship, and I will show you
the need for pressing that upon you. A strong statement
was made last night which amounted to an admission that
there was wrong here which should not be, and that, but for
the hope on the part of the speaker that that wrong would
be remedied at some future time, he would be in a state of
terrible despair. He gave no reason for the hope, and no
evidence why he held the hope. He only contended that
things were so bad here that they would be indefensible
except for the hope that they woutd be remedied. This
admission is fatal to the affirmation of God to be worshipped
in the way here mentioned.
Then we had something said
about experience. All experience must be experience of the
senses : you can have no other experience whatever. To
quote again from Max Muller: “ All consciousness begins
with sensuous perception, with what we feel, and hear, and
see. Out of this we construct what may be called con
ceptual knowledge, consisting of collective and abstract
concepts. What we call thinking consists simply in addi
tion and subtraction of precepts and concepts. Conceptual
knowledge differs from sensuous knowledge, not in sub
stance, but in form only. As far as the material is con
�46
cerned, nothing exists in the intellect except what existed
before in the senses.” It is the old proposition put in
different, forms , by Locke, Spinoza, and others, over and
over again, but it has to be taken with this qualification that
you have innumerable instances of hallucinations of the
senses. Delusions on religious matters are open to the re
mark that of all hallucinations of the senses—as Dr H
Maudsley shows in the Fortnightly Review—all halluci
nations of the senses those on religious matters only keep
current with the religious teachings of the day. Sight, touch
smell, hearing, feeling—all are the subject of illusion as is
shown over and over again. Any man bringing as evidence
to us the report of experience which is only of an abnor
mal character, is bound to submit it to a test which is some
thing beyond in severity that which we should apply to
normal events. . The more abnormal it is the more par
ticularity in detail do I wish, in order to examine it, so that
I may be able to identify it; and the more curious the state
ment the more carefully do I wish to test it. Loose words in
theology will not do, and here I submit that at present
we stand, with, at any rate, on one side, nothing whatever
affirmed against me. I gathered last night—I hope incor
rectly—I gathered last night—I hope the words were spoken
incautiously—that Mr. Armstrong held it to be natural that
a man should have to struggle against wrong, vice, and folly,
for the purpose of bringing out the higher qualities, and that
it was alleged that it was to that struggle we were indebted
for our virtue. If that were a real thought on the part of
Mr. Armstrong it is but a sorry encouragement to any
attempts, at reformation and civilisation. Why strive to re
move misery and wrong if the struggle against them is con
ducive to.virtue ? It would take a long time to bring about
any ameliorating change in society if such doctrine were
widely held (loud applause).
The Rev. R. A. Armstrong, who was applauded on rising,,
said : Mr. Chairman and Friends—I wish, in justice to
myself, to say that I freely offered Mr. Bradlaugh the choice
of parts as to the order of speaking. I know not which way
the balance of advantage lies; but after the speech we
have listened to, I think you will agree with me that he who
speaks, first the second night has a considerable pull (laughter).
Last night as I passed down that awful flight of stairs, which
they must climb who, in this town, would soar from the nether
world to the celestial realms of Secularism, I heard many
�47
•comments, and among others one man just behind me said:
“Oh ! Armstrong is nowhere in Bradlaugh’s hands. Bradlaugh
can do just what he likes with him ” (laughter). Now, my
friend said the very truth in a certain sense. As a debater
I am nowhere compared with Mr. Bradlaugh. He has
fluency-—I compute that in thirty minutes I can string
together some 4,000 words, while, I fancy, Mr. Bradlaugh’s
score would be just about 6,000—so that to equalise our
mere mechanical advantages I ought really to have three
minutes to every two of his. If I have omitted many things
which I ought to have said, it is due to this reason (laughter
and hear, hear)—for I have not been silent during the time
assigned to me. Of course, I do not complain of this.
Then, to say nothing of Mr.'Bradlaugh’s powerful intellect, to
which I do not pretend, and his wide reading, he is in
constant practice at this work so new to me, so much so that
I find almost every thought he expressed last night, and in
almost—sometimes precisely—identical language, printed in
his pamphlets, and much of it even spoken in one or other o
his numerous debates. Take this, along with his prodigious
memory, and you will see that the doctrine of Atheism has,
indeed, in him, the very ablest defender that its friends could
wish. And if what he says is not enough to demolish
Theism, then you may be sure that Theism cannot be
demolished (applause). But then, friends, I do want you not to
look on this as a personal struggle between Mr. Bradlaugh
and myself at all. I no more accept it in that light than I would
accept a challenge from him to a boxing match, and I think
you will all agree with me that in that case, in discretion I should
show the better part of valour (hear, hear, and laughter).
We are both speaking in all earnestness of what we hold to be the
truth. Neither of us, I presume, in the least, expects to make
converts on the spot: converts so quickly made would be
like enough to be swayed back the other way next week.
But we do desire that the seed of our words should sink
into your minds; that you should give them your reverent
attention, that, in due season, so far as they are good
and true, they may ripen into matured convictions of
the. truth (applause). And now let me look back at the
position in which this conference was left last night. I am
the more at liberty to do so, as to-night Mr. Bradlaugh has
only—or chiefly—done two things, namely, repeated some
things whichhe saidlast night, andanswered certain arguments
of Professor Flint. That is perfectly fair, but it is equally fair
�48
for me to leave Professor Flint to answer for himself (hear
hear, and applause). And I complain that Mr. Bradlaugh
either did not listen to, or did not understand, what I
endeavoured to put in plainest words about the function of
that voice of God which we call conscience (hear, hear).
Observe, that while in different climesand ages, ay, in the same
manat different times, the conceptions of the particular deeds
that come under the head of right differ, the idea of rightness
itself, of rectitude, is always and invariably the same, from its
first faint glimmer in the savage little removed comparatively
from the lower animal, from which he is said to be
developed, to the season of its clear shining, luminous and
glorious, in hero, prophet, martyr, saint—in Elizabeth Fry,
in Mary. Carpenter, in Florence Nightingale. To speak
metaphysically, the abstract subjective idea of right is the
same and one, but our ideas of the concrete and objective
right develop and progress ever towards a purer and more
beautiful ideal. We have by our own powers to satisfy our
selves as best we can what is right. But when we have
made up our minds, the voice of God sounds clear as a
bell upon the soul and bids us do it (applause). This I
stated again and again last night, yet to-night again Mr.
Bradlaugh has confounded the two things. Mr. Bradlaugh
raised a laugh with his story of the cannibal objecting to the
tough, and choosing the tender meal. That cannibal, in so
far, does but illustrate how a man is swayed by those lower
instincts and desires which I rigorously and definitely'dis
tinguished and separated from conscience. Why Mr. Brad
laugh confounded this with a case of the deliverance of
conscience I cannot think, because I am so sure it wasneither to make you grin nor to confuse your minds (hear,
hear). The latter part of the first night’s debate turned on
the mystery of evil. But Mr. Bradlaugh did not then ven
ture to allege the possibility of a world in which noble character
could be developed without the contact with suffering and
pain (hear, hear). He said he was not called upon to make
a world ; happily not; but at any rate he should not question
the excellence of the world in which he lives unless he can at
least conceive abetter—(loud applause)—and I say that where
evil had never been, or what we call evil, manliness, bravery,
generosity, sympathy, tenderness, could never be (applause).
A world without temptation would be a world without
virtue (hear, hear). A world all pleasurable would be a
world without goodness, and even the pleasurable itself
�49
would cease by sheer monotony to give any pleasure at all. A
world not developed out of the conflict of good and evil,
or joy and pain, would necessarily be an absolutely neutral
world, without emotion of any sort. Unless the whole
tint is to be neutral, you must have light and shade; and the
only test by which to judge whether the power controlling the
world is good or evil—God or Devil, as Mr. Bradlaugh says—
(applause)—is to note whether light or darkness preponderates;
and not only that, but whether the movement, the tendency,
the development, the drift of things is towards the gradual
swallowing up of darkness by the light, or light by darkness;
w'hether freedom, happiness, virtue, are in the procession
of the ages losing their ground, or slowly, surely wanning
ever fresh accession (applause). I take it, then, that if we
are to have a final predominance of goodness—nay, even of
happiness, if you make that the highest good—it can only be
by these things winning their way by degrees out of the evil
which is their shadow. And I invite you once more to test
this from experience. My own experience, clear and sure,
and that of every other devout man, is simply this : that
whatever sorrow, whatever pain we suffer, though it wring
our very heart, the time is sure to come when, looking back
thereon, we thank God that it was given us, perceiving that
it was good, not evil, that befel us, being the means, in
some wray or other, of our further advance in happiness or
goodness, or nearness to our heavenly Father. You tell meit is
all very well for me; but you point to those whose lot is cast in
less pleasant places, and ask me what of them ? Is God
good to them? Well, I will take you to a dark and dismal
cellar beneath the reeking streets of a mighty city. And
this picture is not drawn from fancy, it is a photograph
from the life of one I know of. In that dark and poor abode you
shall enter, and you shall see an aged woman to whom that
spot is home. She is eaten up with disease, the inheritance,
doubtless, of her forefathers’ sin. For fifty years her simple
story has been of alternations between less pain and more.
Beside her are two orphan children, no kith or kin of hers,
but adopted by her out of the large love which she nurtures
in her heart, to share the pence she wins from the mangle,
every turn of which is, to her, physical pain. Well, surely,
she knows nought of God, has none of those “ experiences ”
which Mr. Bradlaugh treats as if they were luxuries confined
to the comfortable Theist in his easy-chair, or on his softlypillowed bed. Ay, but she is rising from her knees to
�5°
turn to the dry crust on the board, which is all she has to
share with the children. And what says she as you enter ?
“ Oh, sir, I was only thanking God for his good
ness, and teaching these poor children so.” Now,
if Mr. Bradlaugh is right in declaring we can know
nought of God, then that old woman ought never
to have eased her laden heart by the outburst of her prayer,
ought to have cast out of her as a freak of lunacy the peace
that stole upon her there as she rose from her knees, ought to
have shunned teaching those children, whose lot was like to be
as hard as hers, one word about the reliance that she had
on God (applause). Instead of that she taught the pros
perous man who stumbled down the broken stair into her
abode, a lesson of trust and faith in the goodness and pre
sence of God, which he never forgot as long as he lived
(hear, hear and applause). I sat the other day beside a
dying girl. Her body was in hideous pain, but her face was lit
with a light of beauty and of love which told a wondrous tale of
her spirit’s life. She died, and her mother and her sisters
weep to-day. But a new love, a new gentleness, a new
sense of the nearness of the spirit - world has already
blossomed in their home, and, I am not sure that they
would call her back even if their voices could avail. So it
is; this woe which we call evil is the sacred spring of all
that is beautiful and good (hear, hear). To the Atheist the
world’s sorrow must, indeed, be insupportable. If he be
sincere and have a heart, I do not know how he can ever
eat and drink and make merry, still less how he can make a
jest and raise a titter in the very same speech in which he
dwells with all the skill of practised eloquence upon that
woe (applause). If I were an Atheist I hardly think I could
ever throw off the darkness of this shadow. But, believing
in God, whom I personally know, and know as full of love,
I am constrained to trust that, though this evil be a mystery
the full significance of which I cannot understand, and
though relatively to the little sum of things here and now it
seem great, yet that relatively to the whole plan and sum of
the universe it is very small, and that that poor child, born
of sin and shame, who knew no better than to steal the loaf,
shall one day wear a diadem of celestial glory, and be by no
means least in the Kingdom of Heaven. And when I see
the Atheist smiling, laughing, having apparentlya lightheart in
him, I am bound to suppose that he too, somehow, trusts that
..goodness and happiness are going to win in the end—that
�is, that goodness is the ultimately overruling power. And.
if he believes that, he believes in the power which men
call God (applause). Now, Mr. Bradlaugh has casti
gated me with some severity for not obliging him
with definitions. It is impossible, he says, to be too
precise in the use of words, and I agree with him.
But by definitions I cannot make the simplest words
in the English language more plain to you (hear, hear).
He, himself, has given us some . specimens of defini
tions which I do not think have made things much clearer
than they were before. There are three words of import
ance in the title of this debate, and I will try, since Mr.
Bradlaugh has experienced difficulty in understanding me,
whether I can tell him more distinctly what I mean by them.
Those three words are “ reasonable,” “ worship,” “ God.”
When I say it is reasonable to do a thing, I do not mean
that I can demonstrate to you with the precision of, mathe
matics that every proposition, the truth of which is assumed
in that act, is true; but Ido mean that the propositions, on the
assumption of which the act proceeds, are, at least, sufficiently
probable to win the verdict of an unbiassed judgment, and
that the act itself is likely to be found to be a good. Mr.
Bradlaugh himself has defined “ worship ” as including
“ prayer, praise, sacrifice, offerings, solemn services, adora
tion, and personal prostration.” If Mr. Bradlaugh will kindly
occupy his next fifteen minutes by defining to me exactly
what he means by each of those terms, I may be better able
to tell him whether I include them all in worship, and
whether he has left anything out. But at present I do not
find that any one of them is simpler or more comprehensible
than the term worship, while “prayer, praise, sacrifice, and
offerings,’’each might mean at least two very different things
“ solemn services ” is hopelessly vague ; “ adoration,” as I
understand it, is included in some of the others; and before
we know what “personal prostration” means, we must
define “ person ”—no easy matter—and then explain what'
we mean by the “ prostration ” of that person (laughter and.
applause). Meanwhile, I have described, at the very outset,
that energy of my soul which I call worship, namely, that in
which I address myself to God as to one immeasurably sur
passing me in goodness, in wisdom, in power, in love (hear,
hear). I don’t think this is plainer than the good old Saxon
word “worship;” I think that word conveys a pretty clear
meaning to most men. But Mr. Bradlaugh finds it easier to
�52
understand long phrases than simple Saxon words; and my
. only fear now is that he will want me to define all the
words in my definition—(laughter)—and though I am ready
enough to do that, I fear it would take a week (renewed
laughter, and hear, hear). God:—You ask me to define God,
and you say I have not in any way done so. You quote
the metaphysical definition of Flint, and want me to enter
into metaphysics. What do you mean by defining ? Do
you mean to draw a circle round God, so as to separate him
from all else ? If you do, I reply, I can’t; because, as far as
I can see, or my imagination can extend, I discern no
boundaries to God. But if you mean to ask simply what I
mean by God, I mean—and I said this again and again
last night—the source of the command that comes to me
to do right, to abjure wrong ; the source of the peace
that comes to me even in pain, when I have done right,
and of the remorse that comes to me even in prosperity
when I have done ill. I mean also the source—which
I believe to be identical — of the wondrous sense of
a divine presence which seizes me in the midst of
nature’s sublimest scenes — ay, and even of nature’s
awful catastrophes. I mean also the source of the
moral and spiritual strength that comes to me in response to
the worship which my soul pours forth; and if you want to
know what I mean by my soul, I mean myself. What else
besides the source of these things God maybe, I cannot tell you.
It is only so—in his relation to me—that I directly know him.
Beyond that he is the subject of philosophy, but not of im
mediate knowledge. I believe him to be very much more;
but that does not affect the reasonableness of worshipping
him, and that is the subject of our debate (hear, hear). So
that I cannot define God in the way I can define Notting
ham, or Europe, or the earth (hear, hear). I cannot tell
how much is included in his being \ how much, if any, is
excluded. I can tell you what he is to me, in relation to me—
and that is the only way in which any entity can be defined—
and I can tell you what other men testify by word, by deed,
by martyrdom, he is to them (hear, hear). Beyond that I
have no instruments by which to measure; and therefore
I take up no pen with which to write down the measure
ments, or define (applause). But Mr. Bradlaugh says if
we cannot exactly define an object we are incapable of exact
thought or belief concerning it. Did Mr. Bradlaugh do al
gebra at school ? That most exact and prosaic science con-
�•sists largely in reasoning about unknown quantities ; that is,
about some x or_y, of which you only know that it has some
one or perhaps two definite relations to certain other things.
You don’t know what x or y is in itself—only some function
by which it is related to a and b and c. From that relation you
reason, and sometimes from it you get by subtle processes
to infer a vast deal more, and it will perhaps prove just from
that relation that x must be such and such a number, or that
it must be infinite. Does Mr. Bradlaugh say we can have
no exact thought about the x in the algebraic equation,
before we have worked out the whole sum ? Yes, we know
it in its relations or some of them. Yet the very essence
of algebra is that x is undefined. The human soul is the a, b,
•or q the well-known, the familiar; God is the x, related wondrously thereto, yet none has ever yet worked out that sum.
The supremestphilosophers, who hereare school-boys indeed,
have only displayed workings on their slates which, to
use again mathematical language, show that x approaches
towards a limit which is equal to infinity (hear, hear). But
Mr. Bradlaugh says there should be no belief in that which we
•cannot define. Now, I challenge Mr. Bradlaugh in all re
spect and sincerity to define himself (applause). If he de
clines or fails, I will not say we must cease to believe in Mr.
Bradlaugh, but that is the necessary inference from his
maxims. Mr. Bradlaugh says all experience must be the
experience of the senses. By which sense does he experience
love, indignation, or all the varied sentiments which bind him
to his fellow-men and women (applause) ? Mr. Bradlaugh
told us in his concluding speech last night that no ex
perience of another man’s can be anything at all to him
until tested by his own. Is, then, a man born blind un
reasonable if he believes that others have experience of
some wonderful sensation, making objects very vividly
present to them, which they call sight ? Shall the man born
■deaf say he does not believe there is such a thing as sound ?
I know not whether Mr. Bradlaugh has any personal ex
perience of the heat of the torrid zone. Does he believe
it ? Has he tested the height of Mont Blanc ? If not, does
he hold his belief in suspense as to whether it is 15,000 feet
high or not ? The fact is the enormous majority of the
beliefs on which we act every day of our lives with perfect
•confidence are founded either on sheer Faith, untested and by
us untestable, or on Testimony, that is the recorded experience
■of others which we have not tested. But Mr. Brad
�54
laugh says that if the alleged experience of another
is “ abnormal ” we must not believe it. He did
not define “abnormal,” and I want to know who is
to be judge whether my experience of the command that
comes to me in conscience is abnormal or not. Mr. Brad
laugh ? This audience ? With confidence I accept the ver
dict of any gathering of my fellow-men and women, knowing
that my experience herein has a sure echo in their own. But
Mr. Bradlaugh says, if someone said a room ran a race,
you would call him a lunatic. That argument means
nothing, or else it means that Martineau and Newman, and
all great and good who have recognised God—ay, and Voltaire
and Thomas Paine—Theistsboth—are to be counted lunatics
(hear, hear). Time has prevented—I hope it may not still
prevent—my stating clearly what I mean, when I proceed on
philosophical grounds to allege my belief that there is an
intelligent cause. “Intelligent ” I shall not stop to define,
unless I am challenged to it, because I presume intelligence
in you (applause). “ If there were no such supreme intelli
gence,” says Mr. Voysey, “ the universe, supposing it to be
self-evolved (and of course unconscious, since it is not intel
ligent) has only just come into self-consciousness through
one of its parts—viz., man. It had been, so to speak,
asleep all these cycles of ages till man was born and his
intellect dawned upon the world, and, for the first time, the
universe realised its own existence through the intelligent
consciousness of one of its products. I do not think
absurdity could go further than that. If there be no self
conscious intelligence but man, then the universe is only
just now, through man, becoming aware of its own exist
ence ” (hear, hear, and applause). “ Cause,” Mr. Brad
laugh, I think, has defined, in language which in
cluded the words, “ means towards an end.” A mean o:
means, however, is, by the very conception of the word, the
second term in a series of three of which the end is the
third, and “means” implies some power making use of
those means, and that power is the first term in the series.
Now, I claim that cause is that first term, whether there be
two more, or only one. By “ cause ” I mean—and you
mean, if you will search your thought—the initiating power,
that which begins to produce an effect. Now, my mind is so
constituted that to speak to me of a power which initiates
effects, yet is not conscious, intelligent, is sheer nonsense;
therefore I hold the power which displays itself as one in the
�55
%
uniformity of the laws of nature, and lies behind all phe
nomena—the growth of the grass, the rush of the cataract,
the breath of the air, the stately sailing of the stars through
their geometric paths, to be intelligent, conscious, to do it
all by distinct purpose; and I can in no way otherwise con
ceive. I conceive this source of the geometric motion of
all the spheres and of the minutest dance of protoplasm in the
nettle’s sting as always, everywhere, ofpurpose producing these
effects. And the worship which I gave God as I know him
in relationship to me is refined and glorified by the conception which thus dawns on me of his being. And in the
words of Francois Marie Arouet Voltaire, I commune thus
with myself: “ Where,” says he, “ is the eternal geometrician ?
Is he in one place, or in all places without occupying space ?
I know not. Has he arranged all things of his own sub
stance? I know not. Is he immense without quantity
and without quality ? I know not. All I know is, that we
must adore him and be just ” (loud applause).
Mr. Bradlaugh : It is perfectly true that what I have said
here I have said before, and very much of what I have said I
have printed before. I am quite sure that Mr. Armstrong
did not intend that as any blame upon me. [Mr. Arm
strong : Certainly not.] In fact, if any advantage accrued,
it would accrue to him, because, having what I had to say
on the subject to refer to, he would be better able to answer
it by previous preparation. Why I mention it is because
one person seemed to think that it was very reprehensible on
my part to say here anything that was not perfectly new.
I make no claim to originality, but try to say the truest
thing I can in the clearest way I can (hear, hear, and
applause). Then I am told that I did not pay attention
enough to what was said last night about the functions of
the voice of God. I have been told to-night that the idea of
righteousness and rectitude has always been one and the
same amongst all human beings, from the savage to the
highest intellect. If telling me so is evidence of it, then,
of course, I must be content. But, unfortunately, I am not
content, but say that the evidence is all the other way (hear,
hear, and a laugh). I have read carefully Wake’s latest book
on the evolutions of morality, tracing out the growth of
notions of morality amongst savages. I have read Tylor,
Broca, Lubbock, Agassiz, Gliddon, Pritchard, Lawrence,
and I think I am familiar with the best of ancient and
modern authors on the subject; and I say it is
�56
absolutely contrary to the fact that the notions of
morality are, and always have been identical from
the lowest savage to the highest intellect. It is abso
lutely contrary to the fact that one and the same idea of
right always and everywhere prevails (hear, hear). It is not
a question of my opinion ; it is a question of the conclusive
evidence laboriously collected on the subject, and I am
sorry to have to put it in that plain and distinct way (hear,
hear). Then I am told, and I am sure Mr. Armstrong
would not have said that unless he thought he did, that he care
fully separated last night the lower instincts which were not
included in conscience from the higher mental qualities.
But to my memory this was not so, and I have read the
whole of the speeches to-day in the reporter’s notes, and I
must say I found nothing of the kind. Now we have a.
greater difficulty. How much and how many—how much
of the mental instincts, and how many of the mental faculties
—are we to class as going to make up conscience, and how
much not ? I do not pretend to make the classification.
It rests upon the person who has the burden of proof here..
I deny there has been, as yet, even an attempt at classifica
tion, and I call for some statement which shall enable me
to understand that; without it is to be foregone. Then I
had it returned upon me that I had no right to criticise this
world unless I could conceive a better. The very act of
criticism involves the conception of the better. When I
point out something insufficient or wrong, that criticism
implies the conception of something conceivably better if’
that were changed. If you want, now, an illustration of
something possibly better, I would point to the famine in
China. There, actually, millions of people are dying for
want of food, and, for the purpose of sustaining life a little
longer in themselves, the members of families are eating
their own relations. If I were God I should not tolerate
that—(applause)—nor could I worship a God who does.
Mr. Armstrong, in his speech, pointed out what he terms an
intelligent purpose. It may be for an intelligent purpose that
millions of the Chinese should die of starvation, and actually
eat one another for want of food ; but if it is, I cannot
understand the goodness of the intelligent purposer. You
cannot take one illustration and say that it is the work of an
intelligent person, and then take another and say that it is.
not. If it is the intelligence of God displayed in one caseit must be in another, unless Mr. Armstrong contends that
�57
there are a number of Gods, amongst which number there
must be a good many devils (laughter and loud applause).
There are many things of a similar kind I could point out,
and ask the same question with regard to; where is the intelli
gence of God as displayed in permitting the Bulgarian
atrocities, the Russo-Turkish war, the Greek insurrection—
or in the world nearer home, its crime, misery, and want
(hear, hear, and applause). I do not draw the same moral
from the story of the starving woman that Mr. Armstrong
would draw. While you thank God for the crime, pauperism,
misery, and poverty, I say that you are degrading yourself.
The Atheist deplores the misery, the poverty, and the crime,
and does all he can to prevent it by assisting the sufferers to
extricate themselves, instead of spending his time in blessing
and praising a God for sending the woe and attributing it to
his superior intelligence (applause). Then there was an
astounding statement which came more in the sermon part
of the speech than in the argumentative portion of it
(laughter). Perhaps that may account for the wealth of its
assumption, and also for deficiency of its basis. It was that
freedom, happiness, and virtue, through the power of God,
were continually winning their way. How is it that an intelli
gent and omnipotent God does not look after them more,
and see that they overcome opposition a little faster than
they have done ? Mr. Armstrong says that I fight shy of
experience. I don’t do anything of the kind. I fight shy of
experience which will not submit itself to any test; I fight
shy of experience which cannot bear examination and
investigation; I fight shy of such experience only. Our
friend gives us the experience of a dying girl. Now, I do
not mean to say that every religion in the world has not
been a consolation to dying people—that belief in a God
has not been a consolation to persons who have enjoyed the
full power of their mental faculties on their death-beds. Since
I was in America some time ago I saw a copy of a sermon
preached by a New York clergyman, who had attended,
what he believed to be the dying bed of an Atheist, and he
said that he hoped that Christians would learn to die as
bravely and as calmly as the Atheist seemed prepared to
die. Luckily that Atheist did not die. He is alive to
night to answer for himself (applause and hear, hear). I
don t think an illustration of personal experience in that way
can go for much. The man and woman who die in possession
of their faculties, with strong opinions, will generally die
�strong in those opinions. Men have been martyred for
false gods as well as for the one you would have me worship.
It is useless to make this kind of an appeal in a discussion,
in which there was room and need for much else. Heavenly
stars, a crown, and that kind of thing are not as certain as
they ought to be in order to be treated as material
in this discussion. And then Mr. Armstrong says what he
would do and how he would feel if he were an Atheist.
Charles Reade wrote a novel, which he entitled “ Put yourself
in his Place.” Mr. Armstrong has been trying to put him
self in the Atheist’s place, but he has not been very success
ful (hear, hear). The Atheist does not think that all the
evil which exists in this world is without remedyj he does
not think that there is no possible redemption from sorrow,
or that there is no salvation from misery (hear, hear). He
thinks and believes that the knowledge of to-day a little,
and to-morrow more, and the greater knowledge of the day
that will yet come, will help to redeem, will help to rescue
the inhabitants of this world from their miserable position ;
and further, that this is not to be in some world that is to
come, but in the world of the present, in which the salva
tion is self-worked out (loud applause). The Atheist will
not make promises of something in the future as a compen
sation for the present miseries of man. Instead of saying
that for prayers and worship the poor woman or man will
have the bread of life in future, he tries to give her and him
the strength to win bread here to sustain and preserve life as
long as it is possible to do so (applause). The diadems,
too—which our friend has to offer to the poor—which are to
be worn in heaven by those who have had no clothes here
—possess no attraction to the Atheist; therefore he does nor
offer them, but, instead, tries to develop such self-reliant
effort as may clothe and feed those who are naked and
hungry while they are here. He directs his efforts towards
human happiness in the present, and believes that in the
future humanity must be triumphant over misery, want, and
wrong (applause). A diadem of celestial glory may or may
not be a very good thing; of that I do not look upon my
self as a judge, so long as I have no belief in its possibility.
That there is much misery and suffering in the world I
know, and it rests with Mr. Armstrong to prove whether it
is better to try and remedy it here or to worship its author
in the doubtful endeavour to obtain as recompense a crown
of celestial glory (hear, hear, and applause). But which
�59
God is it that we are to worship ? Is it the Mahometan
God, or the Jewish God? Is it one of the Gods of the
Hindus ? Is it the Christian’s God ? If so, which sect of
Christians? You must not use phrases which mean
different things in different mouths (hear, hear). Then we
come to definitions, and, having objected that there was
no necessity for defining, or having objected that defining
would not make things more clear, with the skill and tact of
a practical debater, my friend goes through every word
(laughter). Prayer, we were told, has two distinct meanings.
Might I ask in which sense it was used in the first speech
made last night? You did not tell us then that prayer had
two senses. I ask why you did not tell us ? I might have
thought it was one fashion when you meant another. I ask
what meaning you meant when you used it ? What two
senses has prayer towards God ?—in which of the two senses
did you use prayer—and, knowing it had two meanings,
why did you not tell us in which sense you used it ? Then
praise, too, you said, is to thank God for his goodness; and
as you used the word many times last night you knew what
you meant by it, having relied upon it so firmly that it
seemed to be an evidence of God’s existence (applause).
By sacrifice I mean an act of real cowardice. The coward
does not dare to pay in his own person for the wrong which
he has done, so he offers something or somebody weaker in
his stead. He tries by offering a sacrifice to avert the ven
geance which would fall—and, according to his creed,
ought to fall—upon himself. Sacrifice is the act of a
coward (applause). Offerings are of flowers, of fruits;
offerings of young animals, lambs, kids; sometimes the
offerings are things which come the nearest to their hands;
sometimes the sacrifice consists of inanimate things which
had a special value to the worshipper; sometimes the
first fruits of their fields or flocks, which they offer
to the source, as they think, of the plenty in those
fields and flocks.
In later times, offerings have got
to be much more complex; but even now you will still find
them, in modified fashions, in the Churches of England
and Rome. The mutual system is that which operates in
every form of worship which makes any sort of claim to re
ligion. The word “ worship ” was only used as a general
word which covers the whole of those forms, leaving our
friends to select and repudiate, and in any case the burden
is on Mr. Armstrong to make the meaning clear (hear,
�6o
hear). I read the whole of the speeches of last night with
out finding any repudiation or question about the definitions
I presented ; and I submit it is scarcely fair, after what has
passed, to ask me to further define them at this late stage
of the debate. I should have had no objection had it been
invited at the earliest outset (applause). Well, now, we
have worship defined as “ the energy of my soul.” Well,
but you have not explained your soul. Why do you call it
soul ? Where is its place in your body ? Is there any
thing about soul you can notice so as to enable me to know
anything at all about it ? Will you take your definition of
soul from Voltaire, whom you have quoted against me?
When you reply, will you tell us what Voltaire, Professor
Newman, Paine, or Martineau say upon the subject of God,
and in which of their writings you will find that which all
the others would accept as a definition ? You must
remember the Theist of Paine’s time is not the Theist of
to-day, and I want you to tell us what are the specific
opinions of each of those you have quoted—of Francis
William Newman, of John William Newman, of Martineau,
of Thomas Paine, of Voltaire—as to the questions I have
asked (applause). Which of the Gods is it that I am to
understand Mr. Armstrong as defending and asking me to
worship (loud applause) ?
Mr. Armstrong : Mr. Chairman, Ladies, and Gentle
men,—I am somewhat at a loss as to which of the numerous
questions I am to answer first. I shall not take them in
any logical order, but simply pick out of my note-book
the most important of them. Mr. Bradlaugh has said
that the act of criticism of the world implied the conception
of a better world. Mr. Bradlaugh has tried to describe his
conception of the better world, and I have tried in my pre
vious speeches to show that he would not make it better.
And I again submit that, instead of being better, it would
be worse (hear, hear). He says he does not draw the same
conclusion from that poor woman in the cellar that I
do. He says that while you are content to suffer, you de
grade yourself. Now, there are two kinds of content.
You may be content like the sloth or the sluggard, or you
may be content like that poor woman, who while trying to
improve her position, still remained poor to the end of her
days, and yet at the same time felt the peace of God in
her heart.
Does the belief in a God, as a fact,
make men less energetic and vigorous in improving
�6i
their own condition, or trying to improve that of
others ? I don’t believe it does (applause). I believe you
have Theists as well as Atheists, who devote their kindly
sympathies to the good of their fellow creatures. They are
content in one sense and discontent in another sense.
They have that holy discontent which makes them anxious
to remedy the world’s evil, and that content which makes
them see God, who is working from evil to good (applause).
We have been told by Mr. Bradlaugh what the Atheist will
do ; how he will give the bread of this life to the hungry
child; the Theist will do the same (applause). The
Theist will—but no, I will not institute these comparisons ;
we are each, I feel sure, striving to do our best; so I won’t
enter into comparisons (rounds of applause). He says it
is unreasonable to worship an insoluble proposition. A
proposition is a grammatical term signifying a statement,
and I am not aware that I asked anyone to worship a
statement or proposition at all. I have called upon you
to worship God (applause). He says I did not separate
the lower instincts from the higher mental qualities in
man. I do not say I did. But I did separate the lower
instincts from the voice of God in conscience. I said that
it was entirely distinct from the lower instincts in man. I
said that the voice had a right to command and rule these
lower instincts (hear, hear). He asks me which God it is
that I am preaching. I will tell you what God I ask you to
worship—the best that you can conceive, whatsoever it is
(applause). I want you all to worship the best that you can
conceive (rounds of applause). If the Hindu’s idea is the
best he can conceive, let him, by all means, worship it
(hear, hear). If the Jew’s God is the best he can imagine,
let him pay homage to it. If the Christian’s idea of God
is the highest he can conceive, let him be true to it and
worship it, and it will make him a nobler man (applause).
It is not mere names which signify in a matter of this
kind. Though each sect may give him different names,
it is still the same God (hear, hear). Mr. Bradlaugh
wants to know which of them all I uphold as God ;
which of the different types I acknowledge, or ask you
to acknowledge.
Is it the God of Martineau, of New
man, of Parker, or of whom else ? I say it is that which is
common among them all—namely, the conception of good
ness and excellence which you will find in every one
of their definitions.
It is that God which they
�62
-all recognise, and concerning which they only go wrong
when they begin to try and define it metaphysically
{hear, hear). Mr. Bradlaugh wants me to define God;
further than I have done so, I cannot. In the words of
the Athanasian Creed an attempt is made to define the undefinable. The Athanasian Creed tries to explain the whole
of that which overrules the universe instead of describing
simply that which is in relationship to you. I have always
been under the supposition that that was a practice of the
theologian which had greatly retarded the progress of the
world. Mr. Bradlaugh spoke of prayer as implying a hope
—a hope to induce God to do what he would not do with
out prayer; and he wanted to know in what sense I used
the word “prayer” in my speeches. I have not used the
word “ prayer ” without describing what I meant. At least,
I have not done so to my knowledge ; if I have, I am
sorry for it (applause). Mr. Bradlaugh says that prayer im
plies a hope of inducing God to do what he would not do
without it. For my part, I doubt whether some things
that have been called prayers, such as the prayers for the
recovery of the Prince of Wales—(loud hisses and laughter)
—for wet weather, and for fine weather, have very much
influenced the divine counsels (hear, hear and applause).
But what do I mean by prayer ? As I have said before,
the addressing of my soul to this power which I feel and
recognise above me; and the law of the answer of prayer—
and it is as much a law as any law of nature—is that they
who do thus energise themselves towards Godbecomethereby
more susceptible to the energising of God towards them. The
law is that he who energises or addresses himself towards
God, consciously, reverently, and of set purpose, thereby sets
at motion a law by which he becomes more susceptible to
God’s addressing of himself to him, and so he gains to him
self the strength, moral and spiritual, which we find in prayer
(hear, hear). Mr. Bradlaugh picked out one of the words from
his own definition of worship. By sacrifice he said he meant
the act of a man who was too cowardly to bear the result of his
own actions. As far as that definition goes, I may say I do
not include it in my idea of worship (applause). Now, sir,
I have striven to the best of my power to be precise and
clear in my words. It is true I have not dealt with the
matter from a platform purely metaphysical. lama positivist
in most things, understanding by a positivist one who founds
his philosophy on observed phenomena. I have passed out
�63
of the stage in which men believe that theological theories
will solve all the problems of the universe. I have passed
out of the stage in which Mr. Bradlaugh now is, in which
metaphysics are looked upon as the best ground of reason
ing we can have. I have passed into the stage in which
positive thought, the recognition of phenomena, is recog
nised as the best starting-point we can have from which
to get at the truth. Auguste Comte traces the progress of
the thought of the world and of the individual from the
theological stage to the metaphysical stage, and from that
to the positive stage. I invite Mr. Bradlaugh to look
at things from that stage, and to see whether he cannot
make his thoughts clearer by the use of the positive method
than by the use of the metaphysical (loud applause).
Mr. Bradlaugh : The curious thing is that I have never
used the word metaphysics, and I have offered to affirm no
proposition that does not relate to phenomena. I am as
tounded to hear that I am a metaphysician (laughter and
applause). Is it because I only used language which I can
make clear that my opponent gave me that title ? It is
because he does not use language that is related to phe
nomena that he is obliged to commend his Theism by
speaking of it as a problem which is insoluble (applause).
I have not done anything, as far as my case is concerned,
except use language relating to phenomena. Now, I have
only a few moments, and this speech will be my last in this
debate. I would, therefore, like you to see the position in
which we stand. I am told that the improvement I would
suggest would in no sense tend to virtue. I must refer again
to the state of things in China, where the members of the
same family are eating each other for want of food. Would
it not tend to virtue if their condition was remedied (ap
plause) ? I wish my friend and myself to look at things
from this point of view, and, as he is in the positive way of
thinking, let him put himself in the same state as they are,
and then ask whether an amendment of the condition
would not tend to greater virtue (renewed applause). What
God is it that we are to worship ? Oh, the God it is reasonable
to worship is the best we can conceive—but no conception has
yet been put before us. You have been told a great deal
about stars, but the more important facts and arguments
still remain unchallenged (hear, hear). Now, I am asked,
does belief in God hinder philanthropy ? Yes, when it is
held as those do hold it in some parts of the world, who.
�64
think that God has designed, in his thought and intelligence,
and for good purposes, that a famine should take place, such
as the one in China (hear, hear). There are at least people
among the Mahometans and the Hindus whose virtue has
been clearly shown to have suffered much more from religion
than from civilisation (applause). The case put as to prayer is
one which I think has something peculiar about it. We are
told first of the law of prayer, which is said to be as much
a law of nature as any other law. Well, now, by law of
nature (Mr. Armstrong : Hear, hear)—I don’t know if I am
misrepresenting you—I only mean observed order of
happening (pouring water from glass); I do not mean
that there has been some direction given that this water shall
fall, but that, given the conditions, the event ensues. Law
of nature is order of sequence or concurrence, the observed
order of phenomena. What observed order of phenomena
is there in the order of prayer ? When the prayer prays
“ himself he sets a law in motion.” Is this so? We are
told that the prayer for the recovery of the Prince of
Wales did not much tend to alter the divine counsel. Mr.
Armstrong did not tell you how he knew that.
His
own admission here proves that prayer is sometimes
offered in vain, taking the observed order of its phenomena
(hear, hear). He spoke of the holy discontent in pious
men which set them to seek to remedy evil. Holy discon
tent against the state of things which God in his intelligent
purpose has caused ! Then the holy discontent is dissatis
faction with God’s doings. How can you worship the God
with whom you are dissatisfied (applause) ? But what is the
truth of the matter ? In the early ages of the world man
saw the river angry and prayed to the river-god; but science
has dispelled the river-god, and has substituted for prayer,
weirs, locks, dykes, levels, and flood-gates (hear, hear). You
see the same thing over the face of nature wherever you go.
What you have found is this : that in the early ages of the
world gods were frightful, gods were monstrous, gods were
numerous, because ignorance predominated in the minds of
men. The things they came in contact with were not under
stood, and no investigation then took place ; men wor
shipped. But gradually men learned first dimly, then more
clearly, and god after god has been demolished as science
has grown. The best attempt at conception of God is
always the last conception of him, and this because God
has to give way to science. The best conception of God is
�65
in substituting humanity for deity, the getting rid of, and
turning away from, the whole of those conceptions and
fancies which men called God in the past, and which they
have ceased to call God now (applause). Mr. Armstrong
thought that it was because men had given different names to
God that I tried to embarrass him by bidding him choose
between them. It was not so; it is the different characteristics
and not the different names that I pointed out as a difficulty.
We have gods of peace, gods of war, gods of love, a god of
this people, or of that tribe, a god of the Christians, a
god of misery, of terror, of beneficence—these are all
different suppositions held by men of the gods they have
created. It has well been said that the gods have not
created the men, but the men have created the gods, and
you can see the marks of human handicraft in each divine
lineament (applause). I cannot hope, pleading here to
night, to make many converts. I can and do hope that all
of you will believe that the subject treated wants examina
tion far beyond the limits of this short debate. I have a very
good hopeindeed,and reallybelieve thatsome good has been
done when it can be shown that two men of strong opinions,
and earnest in their expressions, can come together without
one disrespectful word to each other, or want of respect in
any way; without any want of due courtesy to the other;
and with a great desire to separate the truth and the false
hood (applause). If there has been unwittingly anything
disrespectful on my part, I am sorry for it. I have to thank
Mr. Armstrong for coming forward in the manner in which
he has done, and I can only ask all to use their services in
making the spread of virtue, truth, and justice easier than
it has been. I am aware that I have nominally a vast
majority against me, but I do not fear on that ground, and
still shall continue to point out falsehood wherever I may
find it. At any rate, the right of speech is all I ask, and
that you have conceded. I have only an earnest endeavour
to find out as much as I can that will be useful to my
fellows, and to tell them as truly as I can how much I
grasp. It is for you—-with the great harvest of the unreaped
before you—who can do more than I, to gather and show
what you have gathered; it is for you who have more truth
to tell it more efficiently; and when you answer me I put it
to you that so far as the world has redeemed itself at all, it
has only redeemed itself by shaking off in turn the Theistic
religions which have grown and decayed. So far, it seems
c
�to be a real and solid redemption (applause). When re
ligion was supreme through the ignorance of men, the people
were low down indeed, and a few devoted men had to
grapple with the hereafter theory and all the content with
present wrong which the belief in it maintained. Take a
few hundred years ago, when there was little or no scepticism
in the world. Only a very few able to be heretical—the mass
unable and too weak to doubt or endure doubt. Look at the
state of things then, and look at it now. Could a discussion
like this have taken place then ? No. But it can since the print
ing-press has helped us; it can since the right of speech has
been in good part won. Two hundred years ago it could not
have been. Two hundred years ago I could not have got the
mass of people together to listen as you have listened last night
and to-night, and had not men treated your religion as I treat it,
we should not have therightof meeting even now (applause)’
If you want to convince men like myself, hear us; answer
us if you can—say what you have to say without making it
more bitter than we can bear. We must believe it if it is
reasonable, and if not we must reject it. So long as there
is any wrong to redeem we shall try to redeem it our■selves (applause). We may be wrong in this, but at
least we do our part.
I do not mean that in the same
ranks as my friend there are not men as sincere and as earnest,
men as devoted, men as human-redemption seeking as myself,
but I, or the best of those for whom I plead, urge that their
humanity is not the outcome of their theology (applause).
Then their experience of right, their hope of life, and their
experience of truth rest entirely on what they do here. And
I will ask you this : do you not think it is quite possible, as
Lessing says, that he who thinks he grasps the whole truth
may not even grasp it at all ? like the one deceived by the
juggler's trick, he may think he holds something in his hand,
but when it is opened it is empty (hear, hear). Take the
truth as you can—not from me, not from him, not from any
one man. There is none of the bad which is all bad, none of
the good all good, none of the truth all true: it is for you to
select, to weigh, to test for yourselves (hear, hear). Many
of us stumble in trying to carry the torch in dark places in
the search for truth, but even in our trembling steps the
sparks we scatter may enable some to find the grains of truth
we miss ourselves (loud and prolonged applause).
Mr. Armstrong : Mr. Bradlaugh, the body to which I
belong also have the majority against them; over that
�we can shake hands. Let us try, each in our own way, as
may best seem to us, to serve what we hold to be true (ap
plause). Depend upon it, whether there be a God or
not, we each shall do best so. If there be no God, then
you tell me I shall still do well to serve humanity. And
if there be a God, he will gather you also, my brother, to
his arms, so long as you are true—true and absolutely sincere
in those convictions which come to you from the reason
which he has given you (loud applause). You have
told us that while religion held sway men were down-trodden.
While superstition held sway it is true they were (applause) ;
while false ideas of a cruel and lustful God held sway, it is
true they were (applause); but just in proportion as men’s
thoughts of Godt have purified and clarified, just in pro
portion as they have restored to Christianity its sweet
meaning, just in that proportion religion has risen to be a
power in the world of all that is good and sweet and holy
(applause). Now, sir, to speak of what I said about the
prayers for the recovery of the Prince of Wales. I said I
thought they had been of little avail.
But the prayer for
spiritual purity from a Christian man does win its answer by
a law—a law of nature, I will now say, since you have defined .
a law of nature as the observed sequence of phenomena;
but I dared not so call it until I knew what your definition
■of nature might be. But let us come back from these philo.sophisings, in which it is so easy to go wrong, to the test of
experience. Mr. Bradlaugh says I do not submit the ex
periences of which I have spoken, to the test. I invite you to
test them, and see whether Mr. Bradlaugh has upset them
or not. If you test them fairly and then find them false,
then come and tell me so. They are neither uncommon
nor abnormal experiences, but the experiences of nearly every
man and woman. It may be that their hearing is dull, but
still they know the voice. You all know those in which the
initiative comes from God, the voice of conscience, of which
I spoke ; you all know the solemn feeling which comes over
you in the presence of the majesty of nature. You all may know
the other things in which you have to take the initiative.
Heed those things whether you believe they come from God
or not, and you all may know the other—that of worship
—and its answer. My contention solely is, that it would
be reasonable for you to seek for that experience, that it is
reasonable in us to practise it (hear, hear). And now I will
tell you a little story for the end of this debate, of a little
�68
family of children; and as I shall not found any argument upon
. it, I do not think it will be unfair. They sat one Christ
mas Eve in a chamber where the wintry gloom of early
twilight fell. The eldest son sat and talked of the good
ness of their father, and how, from the earliest days he
could recollect, his tenderness had sheltered him, and how
he seemed to have a heart to love every little child all
through the world, and how he was surely even now prepar
ing some sweet surprise for them every one But John, the
second boy, had lived all his life at a school on the far sea
coast, where he had been sent, that rough ocean breezes might
strengthen his weakly frame, and now, tanned and burly,
he had just come home for Christmas, and he had not even,
seen his father yet. And he said he did not believe they
had a father ; that Theophilus, declaring he had seen him,
was nothing to him, for if there was one thing he had learned
at school, it was not to trust the experience of other people
till tested by his own. But Edward said he, too, knew they
had a father; he, too, had seen him, but he was very stern,
and he thought they could all do as well without him, and
what could be more unkind than to leave them there in
. twilight solitude on Christmas Eve. And little Tom sat
apart in the very darkest corner of the room, with a tearstained face, crying as if his heart would break, over
the hard sums set him there to do, and thinking that
his brothers were a selfish lot of fellows, to talk and talk, and.
not care for him and his hard task. And Theophilus had
just come to steal his arm around little Tom’s waist, and dry
his tears, and try if he could not help him to do his sum,
when the door of the next room was thrown open and a
blaze of light flashed upon their faces, and one after the other
they all rushed in and beheld their father standing by such a
glorious Christmas-tree as boys never beheld before. And
for each and all there were gifts so rare and precious—the
very things they had longed for all the by-gone half. And for
John, who had been so far away and had not known his father,
there was a grasp of the father’s hand so strong and tender,
and a kiss from the father’s lips so sweet and loving, that he
felt as if he had known that dear father all his life ; and as
for little Tom, all his tears were dissolved in rippling
laughter, and he quite lorgot his sum, for on his brow was
set the brightest coronet on all the tree, and they told him
he should be king through all the long Christmasday to follow. And now, dear friends, may the peace of
�69
God which passeth all understanding, that peace which the
perishing things of the world can neither give nor take away,
that peace promised to the weary by our dear brother,
Jesus Christ, even in the midst of all his suffering and woe,
be with you for ever. Amen (applause).
Mr. Armstrong having sat down, rose again and said,
—And now, Mr. Chairman, I desire to move to you the
hearty thanks of this meeting for your conduct in the chair,
for your impartial manner of ruling over us, and the kind
words you have spoken. I thank you, Mr. Bradlaugh, for
the courtesy and fairness with which you have conducted
your part in this debate; and I thank you, sir, for presiding
over us (applause).
Mr. Bradlaugh : I second that motion. I cannot say
that we can thank you for your fairness, for, fortunately, you
have had no opportunity of showing it. But I thank you most
heartily for accepting a position which might have been one
of great difficulty and the taking of which may cause you
to be misrepresented. I also thank Mr. Armstrong for having
met me, and for the kindly manner in which he has spoken
(applause).
The vote of thanks was put and carried unanimously.
The Chairman : Ladies and Gentlemen,—the thanks
which have been given to me are due rather to the gentle
men who have spoken. I cannot but praise the admirable
way in which they have rendered my position almost a
sinecure. This debate has shown that a subject of such
great importance can be discussed fairly, liberally, honestly,
as this has been, and that no danger threatens him who
occupies the chair, or those who lay their honest and earnest
views before you. I feel that I have derived much know
ledge from the truth which has been laid before us ; and I
do feel that there is a growing interest in things of this
sort, which is itself a proof that discussions of this kind are
very useful (applause).
�•wk
$
X
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Victorian Blogging
Description
An account of the resource
A collection of digitised nineteenth-century pamphlets from Conway Hall Library & Archives. This includes the Conway Tracts, Moncure Conway's personal pamphlet library; the Morris Tracts, donated to the library by Miss Morris in 1904; the National Secular Society's pamphlet library and others. The Conway Tracts were bound with additional ephemera, such as lecture programmes and handwritten notes.<br /><br />Please note that these digitised pamphlets have been edited to maximise the accuracy of the OCR, ensuring they are text searchable. If you would like to view un-edited, full-colour versions of any of our pamphlets, please email librarian@conwayhall.org.uk.<br /><br /><span><img src="http://www.heritagefund.org.uk/sites/default/files/media/attachments/TNLHLF_Colour_Logo_English_RGB_0_0.jpg" width="238" height="91" alt="TNLHLF_Colour_Logo_English_RGB_0_0.jpg" /></span>
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Conway Hall Library & Archives
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2018
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Conway Hall Ethical Society
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Pamphlet
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Is it reasonable to worship God?
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Armstrong, R.A. [Rev.]
Bradlaugh, Charles
Description
An account of the resource
Place of publication: London
Collation: 69 p. ; 18 cm.
Notes: Verbatim report of two nights' debate at Nottingham between the Rev. R. A. Armstrong and Charles Bradlaugh. Inscription in ink: "Mr M.D. Conway, with RAA's kind regards." From the library of Dr Moncure Conway.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Freethought Publishing Company
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1878
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
CT78
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
<a href="http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/mark/1.0/"><img src="http://i.creativecommons.org/p/mark/1.0/88x31.png" alt="Public Domain Mark" /></a><span> </span><br /><span>This work ("Is it reasonable to worship God?"), identified by </span><a href="https://conwayhallcollections.omeka.net/items/show/www.conwayhall.org.uk"><span>Humanist Library and Archives</span></a><span>, is free of known copyright restrictions.</span>
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
application/pdf
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Language
A language of the resource
English
Subject
The topic of the resource
Atheism
Free Thought
Theism
Apologetics
Atheism
Conway Tracts
Free Thought-Controversial Literature
Religious Disputations
Theism
-
https://d1y502jg6fpugt.cloudfront.net/25778/archive/files/4e88ff4d4e364f07f976dbccb68c73ee.pdf?Expires=1712793600&Signature=sE2oUZgJ8JrSf1Od7zlSq-deZy6f4XEfBgPjvyxf4GjL586yVR-VL16ZaN%7EdrSmdmjKBjv9aEx9ImH3jfKTUzeFlD30CrCiYOWYd3h0O9MUPHSEx1tW80NjXtIW8PZ0Vz8CuRcT7q3Gm5p-EYvev7yxBu7oJSibMSf0XycfJ4BXFAAHJbEJHMbuqWHmsmya9Kr1myGoOx9o9MkGO4YJstv774vlBcfcNAHIEUwqDl0VGRW2NQL6VojUIPy3STzdaJaKzLRzExtKdAAOHIHFr6DZTvFuAFdrSGzifFUI0vdbtONdcw5Sqp9pPK1BFsPMJN0wToS453YbbjulVU1muQQ__&Key-Pair-Id=K6UGZS9ZTDSZM
9db2f61f8ff05d532a98a682eb7001e5
PDF Text
Text
NATIONAL SECULAR SOCIETY
ATHEIST SHOEMAKER
AND THE
REV. HUGH PRICE HUGHES
OP.
A STUDY IN
LYING
WITH
*
!
A FULL AND COMPLETE EXPOSURE
BY
G. W. FOOTE
President of the National Secular Society
AND
I
Editor of the “ Freethinker
LONDON:
R. FORDER, 28 STONECUTTER STREET, E.O.
Q
f
�his pamphlet is written gratuitously by Mr. Foote, and the expense
of printing one hundred thousand copies, for free distribution, has been
met by a public subscription raised in the Freethinker. This journal is
published every Thursday at the price of twopence. It is sold by many
newsagents in all parts of the country, and can also be obtained, post
free for twopence halfpenny, from the publishing office, 28 Stonecutter
street, London, E.C.]
�THE ATHEIST
SHOEMAKER
Introduction.
ONE of the leading religious agencies in the metropolis
is the West London Mission, and the leading spirit of
this mission is the Rev. Hugh Price Hughes. The
reverend gentleman is specially told off for this work
by the Wesleyan Methodist body ; he discourses on
Sundays in the great St. James’s Hall, Piccadilly ; and
the record of his labors is published in a journal which
he edits, and which belongs to him, called the Methodist
Times.
Five years ago the West London Mission was in
financial difficulties, and fervent appeals were made on
its behalf. Apparently by way of stimulating the
generosity of the Wesleyan Methodist public, Mr.
Hughes printed in his journal, in the months of July
and August, 1889, a long, circumstantial, and vivid
story, entitled “ The Atheist Shoemaker.” It was
afterwards published in book-form at the price of
eighteen-pence, with a Preface, setting forth that the
narrative was “ a true story, and not fiction,” being
indeed “ a literal illustration of the spirit and work of
the West London Mission.”
This “ true story ” was that of a young shoemaker,
who was “ brought to Christ ” by the said Mission. He
had been a famous advocate of Atheism, lecturing to
“ atheistic assemblies ” on Clerkenwell-green, in Vic
toria Park, and apparently at the Hall of Science.
During his last illness, which carried him off at the
age of twenty-eight, he was befriended by the Mission,
and, under the persuasive influence of Sister Beatrice,
he renounced his Atheism, and took the communion.
�( 4 )
which was administered to him by Mr. Hughes.
Finally, he died in Devonshire, making a most edify
ing end, so that “ the last year of his life was full of
instruction for every class of readers.”
Mr. Hughes stated that he had been “urged” to
publish this story. The convert himself had “ willingly
consented” to this being done, and there was “no
reason for concealment.” On the contrary, there were
“ many reasons for publicity.” But the story as pre
sented to the reader was tantalising. The “ publicity ”
was remarkably like “ concealment.” Mr. Hughes gave
his own name, but that could not be avoided. All the
other characters were given fictitious names, and no
clue was afforded to their addresses. Everything, in
short, seemed designed to baffle investigation.
This was strange enough to require as apology, or
at least an explanation. Accordingly it was stated
that “ some of those who must appear on the scene
shrink from publicity.” Now the only prominent
characters were Mr. Hughes himself, whose name i&
given ; the convert, who was dead, and had no feeling*
in the matter ; his widow, who must have furnished
many of the details ; and the “Sister” of the West
London Mission, who was instrumental in his “ con
version.” It was these two ladies, then, who shrank
from publicity; and that they had strong, if not good
reasons for “ shrinking ” wi.l be seen hereafter. Suffice
it to say, for the present, that the convert was called
“ John Herbert ” in the story, while the lady of the
paission was called “ Sister Beatrice.”
The Story Challenged.
Immediately on the first publication of “ The Atheist
Shoemaker ” in the Methodist Times it was criticised
in the columns of the Freethinker. The present
writer (who will henceforth speak in the first person)
saw at a glance that the story was very largely
fictitious. When a narrative begins with “ One dark
night last winter,” one feels it is not history, but the
work of a novelist. But the worst of it was, that no
person answering to the description of John Herbert
was known to the Freethinkers of London. In one
�( 5 )
respect the description was precise enough. John
Herbert died in the spring of 1889, at the age of
twenty-eight; he was by trade a shoemaker ; he had
“ delicate, intellectual features and deep, inquisitive,
penetrating eyes ” ; he was a person of great natural
eloquence ; he was “ a well-known London Atheist ” ;
he used to lecture on Clerkenwell-green and in
Victoria Park, where his voice was drowned by “ con
tinuous cheering”; one of Mr. Hughes’s informants
thought Herbert would get the best of it in a debate
with “ Bradlaugh,” and exclaimed, “Why, everybody
knows Herbert ” ; he was very happy at repartee, in
which “ his public discussions as an Atheist had made
him so expert ” ; and we are told of “ what he used to
say in the Hall of Science,” where Mr. Hughes hoped
to hear him tell the story of his conversion. All this
made a very recognisable portrait—if the original ever
existed, which it never did. I was myself in a position
to deny its existence. As President of the London
Secular Federation, and editor of the Freethinker, and
being intimately acquainted with the propaganda of
Freethought in London, I was prepared to challenge
the substantial truth of Mr. Hughes’s story, Still, I
did not act in a spirit of infallibility. I made inquiries
of others, including those who had carried on the
work of Secularism in the places mentioned by Mr.
Hughes ; and one and all were positive that no such
lecturer as John Herbert had ever been known there.
It must be recollected that they had only to tax their
memories for a year or two, and that no mistake could
arise from the mere lapse of time in this instance.
My own view was thus confirmed, and I felt justified
in severely criticising the story of John Herbert’s
conversion. I declared that it bore every appearance
of a lie ; yet I added that, if Mr. Hughes would give
the real name of his convert, and prove the substantial
truth of his story, I would not only confess my mis
take, but “ apologise for throwing a doubt upon his
honor.” Mr. Hughes took no notice of this appeal,
and when he published his narrative in a volume I
felt bound to publish my criticism as well in a separate
form. It was therefore issued as a penny pamphlet,
under the title of “ A Lie in Five Chapters.”
�( 6 )
Mr- H ughes Keeps Silence.
Several other persons tried to draw Mr. Hughes.
Amongst them was a friendly critic, the Rev. C. A.
(Spurgeon, who noticed Mr. Hughes’s volume in the
Sword and Trowel, and advised him to give the names
and addresses of his characters. The great Baptist
preacher, who was a straightforward man in his way,
could not understand all the mystery of “ The Atheist
Shoemaker.” He thought the “ feelings ” of the
persons concerned were as nothing to the gain to the
cause of Christ, if the conversion were established to
the satisfaction of believers and the confusion of
infidels.
Mr. Charles Bradlaugh, the leader of the English
Secularists, plainly told Mr. Hughes that his story was
clearly untrue in many respects, and invited him to
have an inquiry made into its evidences. The follow
ing paragraph appeared in the National Reformer for
February 2, 1890, soon after Mr. Bradlaugh’s return
from India :—
“ The Rev. Hugh Price Hughes publishes, as if true, a story
of a converted Atheist shoemaker. As Mr. Hughes repeatedly
mentions me by name, and as many of the incidents in his
volume are clearly untrue, I invite him in common decency
to give me the means of judging for myself how far he has
been misled. I hesitate to suppose that he can be the wilful
misleader.”
This was plain enough, and it was written by one
who had a right to intervene. Mr. Bradlaugh was
not only the natural but the official leader of Freethought. He was President of the National Secular
Society, whose headquarters are in London ; and he
was therefore in a position to know whether the
eloquent hero of Mr. Hughes’s story had any real
existence.
Mr. Hughes took no notice of Mr. Bradlaugh’s state
ment and invitation. The burning love of truth,
which he professes, did not lead him to see whether he
had been misled himself, and had consequently misled
others.
The reverend gentleman’s obstinate silence provoked
the publication of a correspondence between him and
�( 7 )
Mr. Robert Forder, secretary of the National Secular
Society, who has an exceptionally intimate acquaint
ance with the iiersonnel of the Freethought movement.
Mr. Forder wrote to Mr. Hughes on September 5,1889,
soon after the completion of “ The Atheist Shoemaker ”
in the Methodist Times, and the following is an
extract from his letter “ As I have been personally acquainted with all the Atheist
lecturers at the Hall of Science, Clerkenwell Green, and
Victoria Park during the last twenty-five years, and have
been secretary of the National Secular Society for the last
fifteen years, you will understand my curiosity to know
which one of my old friends and companions abandoned his
opinions prior to his death. I therefore take the liberty of
asking you the name of the Atheist lecturer, feeling sure you
will be glad to oblige one who must have known him for many
years.”
Mr. Hughes, being away on the continent, did not
reply until October 4. He referred Mr. Forder to the
Preface of “ The Atheist Shoemaker,” where it was
stated that some of the characters shrank from “ pub
licity,” and said in conclusion—
“ I am sorry that passage escaped your notice, for it would
have saved you the trouble of writing to me. Any informa
tion about our work that can be made public with due regard
to the wishes and feelings of others I shall always be happy
to give you.”
Mr. Hughes must have penned the last sentence with
his tongue in his cheek. He knew very well that all
Mr. Forder wanted to know about “ our work ” was the
name of the converted Atheist Shoemaker.
This correspondence appeared in the National
Reformer for February 16, with a note on the opposite
page by Mr. Bradlaugh :
“ In another column I insert a communication from Mr.
Forder as to the falsehood of the story of ‘ the converted
Atheist shoemaker.’ As the Rev. Mr. Hughes has not hesi
tated to increase the commercial value of his romance by
repeatedly using my name, I should have supposed thatcommon decency would have required him to give me the
means of testing his accuracy, especially as he knows I
challenge the main allegations in his story.”
Mr. Bradlaugh wrote another paragraph on February
23, remarking that the Daily Chronicle, the Pall Mall
�( 8 )
Gazette, and other papers, were giving publicity to the
fact that Mr. Hughes would not have his story investi
gated. “ The excuse,” said Mr. Bradlaugh, “ that
publicity might hurt the feelings of the dead shoe
maker’s surviving friends should have been considered
before Mr. Hughes published my name in his story.
Are my feelings and those of my friends of no account
to Mr. Hughes ?”
A final note from Mr. Bradlaugh’s pen was printed
in the National Reformer for March 2 :—
“ The story contains some statements which I know to be
untrue, and contains other statements which I believe to be
untrue. I leave to Mr. Hughes the responsibility of having
published these as parts of what he describes as ‘ a true story.’
Mr. Hughes, although he made his story more saleable by its
references to me, denies my right to inquire into the matter.
Mr. Hughes holds very curious notions of what a religious
man may do against an infidel.”
Now I ask the reader to consider this situation
Would any man of honor have kept silent in the face
of Mr. Bradlaugh’s appeals ? Mr. Bradlaugh was an
eminent man, enjoying at that time almost universal
respect, and he regarded himself in “ common decency ”
as entitled to satisfaction. He had also stated his
knowledge that much of Mr. Hughes’s story was untrue.
In these circumstances, Mr. Hughes ought surely to
have made inquiries, if only to satisfy himself. But
the sequel shows that he did nothing of the kind. He
wilfully closed his eyes to the evidence that would
have proved his inaccuracy.
A Little Speech.
Throughout this dispute Mr. Hughes has displayed
a certain consistency. His policy has been to ignore
all the leaders of Secularism, doubtless on the ground
that their appeals and challenges would not be seen or
heard by his own party. Whenever he has broken
silence, it has been in consequence of something that
his own party could see, in the columns of some
political organ of great influence and circulation.
Accordingly he was stung into saying something by
a leaderette in the Daily Chronicle, the “ motive and
animus ” of the writer of which he complained of.
�( 9 )
just as he has since complained of everyone who has
desired him to put his cards upon the table.
After scolding this writer, Mr. Hughes wrote as
follows in the Methodist Times for February 27, 1890 :
“We are at a loss to understand what right either Mr.
Bradlaugh or the Secretary of the National Secular Society
has to demand the name of ‘ The Atheist Shoemaker,’ which
is suppressed for the reason given in the preface of the
book. The narrative makes no attack whatever, either on
Mr, Bradlaugh or on the National Secular' Society. The
Secretary of that Society says no professional Atheist
lecturer in London has died during the last ten years in the
way de scribedin ‘The Atheist Shoemaker.’ Mr. Price Hughes
never said that ‘ The Atheist Shoemaker ’ was a professional
lecturer of the National Secular Society. He simply said
that he had spoken in advocacy of Atheism in public halls
and in the open air, and that he had spoken with great
eloquence and effect.”
This is no answer at all to Mr. Bradlaugh, Mr. Forder,
or myself. Mr. Hughes did not state that his “ John
Herbert ” was a lecturer for the National Secular
Society ; but, as a matter of fact, it has a monopoly of
the “ Atheist ” platforms in London, and the Atheist
Shoemaker could not have spoken from them “ with
great eloquence and effect,” yet be absolutely unknown
to the Society’s officials, and even to the rank and file
of its members. Mr. Hughes had been informed that
his convert was unknown ; his story, therefore, could
not be true as it stood ; yet he refused to lift a finger
in the way of correction. He continued to advertise
and sell the volume as though nothing had happened.
Goaded into Action.
My criticism of Mr. Hughes’s story, which I entitled
“ A Lie in Five Chapters,” was extensively circulated.
Freethinkers sent copies of it to Mr. Hughes anl his
friends and colleagues, to the chairmen of his meetings
in the provinces, and to various influential Wesleyan
Methodists. The pamphlet gave him a considerable
amount of trouble. He almits this in the Methodist
Times for January 18,1894 “ Christians of a feeble and
melancholy type ” could not realise the “ absurdity ”
of supposing that the “true story” was “ fiction.”
�( 10 )
“ Moreover, some ministers of religion, local preachers,
and private Christians, deficient in the ever-blessed
sense of humor,” urged Mr. Hughes to publish the
name of the Atheist Shoemaker. One letter “ touched ”
him. It was an appeal from “ the great Anglican
missioner,” the Rev. W. H. Aitken, who said that
“ young fellows who consulted him in the inquiry
room were troubled by fellow-workmen who showed
them Mr. Foote’s pamphlet.” Mr. Hughes was ready
to do anything in reason to “ satisfy the scruples of
the inexperienced, the prejudiced, and the melan
choly ”—of all, in short, who could not take his bare
word in the face of circumstantial contradictions. He
.was “ especially willing ” to give “ every information
in his power to Atheists and Agnostics who treated
their opponents with justice and courtesy”—although
he had refused this information to Mr. Bradlaugh, the
“ courtesy ” of whose appeal he has admitted to a
Morning interviewer (Feb. 10, 1894). Evidently the
time had come to do something. But what? The
proper method was to submit to a Court of Honor.
Mr. Hughes, however, preferred to appeal to one man,
and he cleverly chose a Secularist—Mr. George Jacob
Holyoake, on the pretended ground that he could
investigate “without prejudice and without passion.”
Mr. Holyoake says he applied to Mr. Hughes. Mr.
Hughes says he applied to Mr. Holyoake. It is un
certain, therefore, how the little scheme originated. At
any rate it was carried out with profound secrecy. Mr.
Holyoake was a personal friend of mine as well as a
personal friend of Mr. Hughes. He was also a VicePresident of the National Secular Society, of which I
am President. But he never gave me a hint of what
he was doing. The first intimation I had Of it was a
public announcement in the Daily Chronicle for
January 11,1894, that Mr. Holyoake’s report on the
Atheist Shoemaker case would appear simultaneously
in the next issues of the Methodist Times and the
Freethinker. Subsequently I saw a flaming advertise
ment of this fact in the Methodist Times. I had to
learn from foreign sources what was to appear in my
own paper.
Now I ask any candid reader what is the value of
�(11)
an “investigation” conducted in this manner ?
I
wrote a letter of complaint to Mr. Holyoake, but he
gave me no reply. The whole matter, indeed, compels
me to give my opinion of why Mr. Hughes sought the
aid of Mr. Holyoake.
Mr. Bradlaugh had too much iron in him, and could
not be imposed upon ; he had also a legal mind, and
knew how to take evidence ; besides, he was the leader
of organised Freethought in England, and conversant
with the practical details of its propaganda in London.
It would not do, therefore, to take him into confidence.
Mr. Holyoake, however, was more obliging and suscep
tible to Christian compliments ; he was almost eighty
years of age, and his eyesight was nearly gone, at any
rate for the purposes of investigation, in which so much
depends on the expression on the faces of witnesses ;
besides, he had lived for a long time at Brighton, and
was out of touch with the details of Freethought pro
paganda in London. Mr. Bradlaugh was in a position
to test the truth of Mr. Hughes’s story, Mr. Holyoake
was not, and there is the explanation.
Mr. Holyoake’s Report.
Mr. Holyoake’s report was printed in full in the
Freethinker. Most of it was beside the purpose.
Profuse compliments were paid to Mr. Hughes, who
was described as a gentleman “ entitled to be implicitly
believed on his word ”—a sentence which damns the
whole investigation. Nothing but a sham inquiry was
possible when the investigator started with that
assumption.
The substantial part of Mr. Holyoake’s report is as
follows :—
“ As soon as he knew that I was wishful to investigate the
facts, he placed at my disposal the means of doing so, and
volunteered the real name of Herbert. I have seen an d con
versed separately with ‘ Sister Beatrice ’ and ‘Sister iJthel,’
from whom Mr. Hughes derived many of his statements. I
was shown the private Diary of ‘ Sister Beatrice,’ giving con
temporary documentary evidence of the minute accuracy of
her statement. Their entire veracity seems to me unques
tionable. They had not only sincerity, but that cultivated
sincerity which is without exaggeration. They said Mr.
�( 12 )
Herbert had a vivid faculty of speech and a brightness of
conversation which compelled interest and attention. Of that
they must be good judges, for their own grace and precision
of speech showed that they understood those qualities.
Opportunity was given me of seeing Herbert’s widow, who
has since married again. She appeared an interesting person,
clear, frank, and decisive in her statements. She said she
had been with Mr. Herbert, her former husband, to the Haji
of Science, but had never heard him speak there ; in Victoria
Park she had often heard him. She had been with him there
six hours at a time, he speaking at intervals to groups o
persons all the while. He had sometimes been met on enter
ing the park by persons who would say, if he seemed to wish
to pass them, ‘ Come, give us a few words.’ She had seen
him kicked on the shins by policemen, whose object was to
cause resistance, that they might arrest him; and on one
occasion two gentlemen gave him their names and addresses,
saying if he brought an action against the police they would
give evidence on his behalf. He was very earnest in his
opinions, and had little meetings of persons in his house, to
whom he would produce books and facts in defence of the
opinions he then held. He was very ardent for what he then
thought to be the truth. His wife said he disbelieved in
Christianity because of the cant and, as he said, ‘ the humbug
of those who preached one thing and did another.’ It is
clear to me that Mr. Herbert was for truth and proof, and
was not only ready to offer it when asked, but made occasions
to present it. He was an enthusiast, entitled to the respect
of his former colleagues, since he shortened his life by ?eal
which exceeded his strength.”
Some of these statements arc ridiculous, especially the
one about the Atheist shoemaker’s “ former colleagues,”
who never knew him. But it is needless to expatiate
on this aspect of this report. What I wish to empha
sise is the fact that Mr. Holyoake simply interviewed
the concocters of the Atheist Shoemaker story and
asked them “Is it true?” They said “Yes,” and he
gave it his certificate. He made no attempt to see if
there was another side to the case
Mr. Hughes returned Mr. Holyoake’s compliments,
printed his portrait in the Methodist Times, and called
his report a “ vindication.” Mr. Holyoake had been
put in possession of the real name of the convert, he
had made a “careful” inquiry, and had declared his
belief in the “ substantial truth ” of the Atheist Shoe
maker story. Mr. Hugbes was in raptures. He hoped
�( 13 )
it would be “a lesson” to me. “ We trust,” he said,
“ that Mr. Foote will now, for his own sake, withdraw
his accusation.” Meanwhile the “ vindication ” was
scattered broadcast over the kingdom.
A Rea! Investigation.
Happily I was soon able to make a real investiga
tion. The relatives of “ John Herbert,” who live at
Northampton, put themselves in communication with
me. It may be asked why they never communicated
with Mr. Hughes. The answer is that they tried to.
“ Herbert’s ” father went to one of Mr. Hughes’s
meetings at Northampton a d said he wished to speak
with him on the subject. Mr. Hughes replied that he
was in a hurry. He gave the father his card, and said
“ Call on me.” I have seen that card, and the address
on it is in London. How could a shoemaker pay
“ calls ” like that ? And how much desire had Mr.
Hughes to be well-informed ?
I went down to Northampton and interviewed the
family—the father and two brothers of the Atheist
Shoemaker. They had important documents in their
possession, which they have since left in my custody.
They also gave me a mass of verbal information. The
father is a devout Christian, and has conducted a
Methodist mission at Northampton. He is a man of
simple, honest manners, and strong feelings. Having
just read Mr. Holyoake’s report and my pamphlet, he
deemed it wrong to let the world be longer abused.
“ Herbert’s ” brothers are also Christians, and have
never been otherwise. There was never a Freethinker,
in the family. They are satisfied that the dead son
and brother was never an advocate of Atheism. His
real name was CHARLES ALFRED GIBSON.
The Gibsons in London.
The Gibsons were so indignant at Mr. Hughes’s
conduct that they declared they would do anything I
thought advisable. On my invitation they came up to
tLondon on Sunday, February 4, and appeared on the
^platform at the Hall of Science before a very crowded
assembly. Several reporters were present, and reports
�of the meeting appeared in London papers the next
morning. Half way through my own speech I paused
to let Mr. Gibson senior give his own testimony.
He
said that he was there as a Christian man in the
interest of truth, and he branded the Atheist Shoe
maker story as “ a damnable lie.” Mr. Stephen Henry
Gibson, the “ Atheist brother ” of the story, said
to have been converted by the “ seraphic death ”
of Charles Alfred Gibson, also stood up at my request.
“ Were you ever an Atheist ? ” I asked him, and he
answered “Never.” “Have you ever been anything
but a professed Christian ? ” Again he answered
“Never.” “Have you ever had any communication
with che Rev. Hugh Price PIugh.es or the Sisters of the
West London Mission ? ” And once more he answered
“Never.”
“ Herbert’s ” Identity.
There is no necessity to reproduce the elaborate
proofs I gave in the Freethinker that “ John Herbert”
was really Charles Alfred Gibson. Mr. Holyoake has
admitted that “ Gibson ” was the name disclosed to
him. Mr. Hughes himself also, in reply to the
Morning interviewer (Feb. 10), said, “ Oh, yes, it was
Mr. Gibson’s son undoubtedly who was the subject of
my book.”
“Herbert’s” Career.
Charles Alfred Gibson was born on May 14, 1861.
The date is in the family Bible. He died on March 27,
1889, nearly twenty-eight years of age. His death
took place at Sidmouth—Mr. Hughes’s “ pleasant
home on the Devonshire coast”—and he was buried
there on March 31.
“ Bit by bit,” Mr. Hughes says, “we came to know
his history.” Well, the bits were mostly wrong.
“ Herbert ” is stated to have “ taught himself to read
by a strange device.” The names at the corners of the
streets were “ his reading book.” Then follows a
sample of the Bunyan vein which Mr. Holyoake so
admires in Mr. Hughes.
“ When quite a little lad he would run alongside a gentle
man and say in a casual tone, ‘ Excuse me, sir, but what’s the
�( 15 )
name of that street ?’ Then he would read it and spell it
over and over again for about ten minutes. On the next day
he would return to that street and see if he had learned the
name correctly. Board schools, happily, leave the children
of the poor no room for such pathetic ingenuity now.”
It is a pity to spoil this pretty little story, but there
is not a word of truth in it. It is unadulterated
romance. Charles Alfred Gibson was not a child of
destitution. His father was always able to support his
family as a sober, industrious working-man. His
“ privations,” therefore, are all imaginary. And the
same must be said of his street-corner schooling. He
was at school for five years altogether—when the
Gibsons were in America —at Philadelphia, at Toronto,
and in New Jersey He was also a Sunday-school
scholar at Grace Church, situated at the corner of
Twelfth-street and Race-street, Philadelphia. A faded
portrait of his Sunday-school teacher is still preserved
in Mr. Gibson’s album, and on one of his walls are
hung the three American prints that were presented to
his three boys over there as school prizes.
“As soon as he could read,” says Mr. Hughes,
“ he began to accumulate books.” This also is news to
Mr. Gibson, who describes his dead son as intelligent,
and fond of an argument, but not exactly bookish,
Mr. Gibson stoutly denies that his son could possibly
have uttered many of the things that Mr. Hughes puts
into his mouth. He says they were quite beyond him,
and that “ Tom Paine couldn’t ha^e written them
better.”
Mr. Hughes apparently does not know that Charles
Alfred Gibson served in the Fifth Lancers, in Ireland,
under the assumed name of Cartwright. It was there
that he made the acquaintance of the girl he after
wards married in England.
Another fact that Mr. Hughes seems to be ignorant
of is, that his “ convert ” was in the Salvation Army at
St. Albans. He and Julia both wore the “Army”
uniform. After that he was in the Salvation Army at
Camberwell. Mr. Gibson heard him speak once in the
Camberwell barracks, and was greatly surprised at
some of the things he said.
Julia, the good Christian, who helped to bring her
�( 16 )
husband to Christ—from whom his relatives were not
awa e that he had ever departed—caused an estrange
ment between Mr. Gibson and his son. I had better
be silent about the cause of this division. Suffice it
to say that Mr. Gibson never heard from his son for
two years and a half prior to his death. Even after the
alleged “ conversion ” by Mr. Hughes the son does not
appear to have written a line to his father. Julia did,
but not until her husband was dying in Devonshire.
Mr. Gibson reckons that his son was in London
about eighteen months altogether. During a part of
the time, at any rate, he worked at Ford’s, in the Gray’s
Inn-road. Mr. Gibson never heard of his lecturing,
even from Julia', until he read Mr. Hughes’s book. He
does not believe that his son could ever have *been an
orator, and certainly the space of eighteen months is
too short for his acquiring such distinction in that line
as Mr. Hughes alleges.
Mr. Hughes is good at pathetic stories—true or false.
He tells us that when “ Herbert ” went down to Devon
shire he was “ so ill that it was necessary for his wife
to accompany him.” Yet in a letter from Julia to Mr.
and Mrs. Gibson, written at Sidmouth, she says, “ he
was down here a month before I was sent for.” She
also says that she “ had to leave a good place ” to go,
and adds, “ I was then a cook.” This is very circum
stantial, and it is in absolute contradiction to Mr.
Hughes’s no less circumstantial story. Somebody must
be lying. If the liar is Julia, it shows what her word
is worth. It also shows her power of neat invention.
But if the liar is not Julia, the story shows another
person’s powers of neat invention, and what that
person’s word is worth.
Death of “ Herbert.”
Charles Alfred Gibson died at Sidmouth on March 27,
1889, and was buried in the Sidmouth cemetery on
March 31. Mr. Gibson senior has a letter from the
doctor who attended his son. There was bad disease
of the heart and lungs, and no hope of recovery.
Mr. Hughes devotes several pages to a regular
novelist’s account of “ Herbert’s ” death. The reverend
gentleman was not present at the scene. All the little
�fieath-chamber touches are therefore,imaginary. Julia
must have told him, if anyone did, that the dying
man’s last words were a “ touching tribute ” to Sister
Beatrice, who “ led him to Christ.” Julia stated at
Northampton, however, that his last words were “ Go
to Steve he will look after you”—“ Steve ” being his
brother Stephen Henry, who had also been a soldier.
This is how Mr. Hughes, in his fine, calm, restrained
style, describes the fall of the curtain.
“ He lay for a long time so still that the watchers began to
think they would never hear his voice again. But he was
yet to speak, and to speak a sentence which was destined to
be read in every land in which the English language is
spoken.
“ He was evidently gathering his ebbing strength together
for a great final effort.
“ His hand tightened. He opened his lips; and in startling
contrast with his previous whisper, in clear, ringing, exult
ing tones, he exclaimed :
“ ‘ Tell Sister Beatrice and the Sisters that now when I
have come to the end I fear no evil, for God is with me.’ ”
This is what Mr. Holyoake politely calls “ brilliant
coloring.” But it is not history. I put it to any doctor
whether a man dying of consumption and heart dis
ease, after many months of suffering and slow decay,
could possibly cry out in “ clear, ringing, exulting
tones ” with his very last breath. I have myself seen
cases of death from consumption, and all power of
motion and speech have gone for hours before the final
release. If medical men tell me I am wrong, I will
give in ; but until then I must take leave to regard
“ John Herbert’s ” dying oration as apocryphal.
Was He a Lecturer?
Mr. Hughes represents his convert as a young man
of extraordinary eloquence, and almost a match for
Mr. Bradlaugh. “ I’ve been a ringleader,” he is made
to exclaim to Sister Beatrice. “ I have even cheered
men when they were dying,” he continues, “ and en
couraged them not to give in.” He lectured as an
Atheist on Clerkenwell-green and in Victoria Park.
He was “a well-known London Atheist.” “Why,
everybody knows Herbert ! ” exclaims “a journeyman
�shoemaker in Soho”—where, by the way, this marvel
of eloquence could not have been specially famous.
The journeyman shoemaker is himself but one of Mr.
Hughes’s inventions. His tribute to “ Herbert’s ”
oratory is tremendous. “ When he used to speak in
Victoria Park,” says his Soho eulogist, “ there was such
continuous cheering that you could scarcely hear what
he was saying.”
In a long wrestle between the Devil and “ Herbert ”
after his conversion, the former reminds him of
“ What you used to say in the Hall of Science.” Not
at the Hall of Science, but in the Hall of Science. Of
course it was Mr. Hughes who invented all th®
dialetical points of that “wrestle,” for he never saw
“ Herbert ” after it. Still, words have a definite
meaning, and if Mr. Hughes did not wish to signify
that “ Herbert ” had spoken in the ‘Hall of Science,
what on earth was he driving at ? Nor is this all.
“ It seemed to us of such immense importance,”
Mr. Hughes writes, “ that he should himself go to his
old workshop, and to the Hall of Science, and to
Clerkenwell-green, and to all his former haunts, and
with his own lips tell the story of his conversion.”
Now if this does not mean that he was a speaker on
Atheism in the Hall of Science, the language of Mr.
Hughes is no better than thimble-rigging.
But this does not end the matter. Mr. Hughes
must be attacked in his last entrenchment. I there
fore ask the question, Was his convert ever a lecturer
at all ?
Personally, I never heard the name of Gibson in
connection with Freethought lecturing in London.
Mr. Holyoake said he never heard it, and the same
answer is given by every Freethinker I interrogate.
He could not, therefore, have been “ a well-known
Atheist.” The description is an absurdity. Certainly
he could not have lectured in Victoria Park amidst
thunderous applause. That Soho shoemaker who said
so was a thunderous liar, unless he is, as I conceive, a
mere invention of Mr. Hughes’s.
Charles Alfred Gibson was in London about eighteen
months altogether. He was not a lecturer when he
went there.
His father and brothers never heard of,
�his lecturing after wards—until they read Mr. Hughes’s
book. Not an Atheist in London that I can hear of
has the faintest recollection of this oratorical prodigy.
Mr. Hughes never heard him lecture. The Methodist
Sisters never heard him lecture. Who did then?
Why Julia. The whole fabric of ‘‘Herbert’s” fame
is based upon that one woman’s word.
Mr. Holyoake says he has seen “ Herbert’s ” widow,
who has since “ married again.” That is, Mr. Holyoake
was told so. She has not been seen or heard of by the
Gibsons for two years and a half. Would it not be
well to produce her again for a little cross-examina
tion ?
“ Herbert’s ” widow told Mr. Holyoake that she had
been with her husband in Victoria Park “six hours at
a time, he speaking at intervals to groups of persons
all the while.” Mr. Holyoake may believe it. I do
not. Nor do I believe that “Herbert” or any other
Preethought speaker in Victoria Park was “ kicked on .
the shins by policemen.” As far as I am aware, our
speakers have for a long time been on very good terms
with the police. But be that as it may, I wish to point
out that Mr. Holyoake, as well as Mr. Hughes and the
Sisters, obtained his information from the inevitable
Julia. However many links are put on the chain, they
all hang upon her ; and I venture to say she is not
Strong enough to bear them. We shall see more of her
presently. Meanwhile I have to say that the Gibsons
do not believe her statements on this head. They feel
sure that Charles Alfred Gibson was never a lecturer.
Their opinion is—and, after what they told and showed
me, it is my opinion too—that Julia deceived Mr.
Hughes and the Sisters, and kept up the deception
when introduced to Mr. Holyoake.
There is not the smallest scrap of real evidence that
Charles Alfred Gibson ever lectured at all as an Atheist,
and the negative evidence that he did not is simply
overwhelming. Yet this is the very pivot of Mr.
Hughes’s story. It was nothing to convert an obscure
young man from his atheistical opinions. Such a trivial ‘
incident would not afford substance enough for an
tighteenpenny book. It was necessary to magnify the
convert’s importance, and the thing was done. He was
�( 20 )
represented as noble, intellectual, eloquent and famous.
In other words, his status is the very essence of the
story. It is now demonstrated that he was not, and
could not have been, a notorious Freethinker, and Mr.
Hughes’s story is therefore a lie in its deliberate exag
gerations. To declare that “ Herbert ” was a real per
sonage is no answer to the charge of fraud. It is the
description of him that has to be vindicated, and Mr.
Hughes knows the task is impossible.
Was He an Atheist ?
Three weeks before leaving his father’s house at
Northampton, Charles Alfred Gibson knelt down
and prayed in the passage. He was not an Atheist
then. But did he become an Atheist during the
eighteen months he lived in London ?
In considering this question, it is requisite to bear
in mind the silence of Mr. Hughes as to “ Herbert’s ”
having been in the Salvation Army. If the fact was
known to Mr. Hughes, he acted dishonorably in keeping
it back, and making it appear that “ Herbert ” had never
“ known Christ.” If the fact was not known to Mr.
Hughes, nor even to Sister Beatrice, it must have been
kept back by “ Herbert ” himself, or by his wife ; and,
in that case, the witness of both of them lies under a
very grave suspicion. It would seem that they wished
to let it be thought that “ Herbert ” became a Christian
for the first time through the agency of the West
London Mission. I may be asked, What could be their
motive in this deception ? Well, a very simple one.
They were dependent upon the Mission for the com
forts, if not the necessaries of life.
There is another thing that should be borne in
mind ; namely, the statement of Mr. Hughes as to
“ the privations of his youth ” and his street-corner
schooling. Both are falsehoods, and the first is a cruel
reflection on Mr. Gibson senior, whose indignation at
it is shared by his sons. Now if Mr. Hughes did not
invent these falsehoods, they must have been invented
by “ Herbert ” or his wife; and in either case the
story of his being an Atheist at all is damned—unless
we have independent evidence of its truth. For, if
Mr. Hughes is the liar, how can we believe anything
�( 21 )
he says they told him ; and if they were the liars,
how can we believe what they did tell him ?
Bearing these points in mind, let us proceed with
our inquiry. We are told by Mr. Hughes that
“Herbert” had “old Atheistic comrades,” with whom
he and his wife sometimes took a day’s excursion.
How was it then that he never applied to the National
Secular Society for any assistance in his distress, before
his conversion ? Could none of them tell him of the
Society’s Benevolent Fund, if he was ignorant of its
existence himself ? I have had the books searched,
and his name does not appear in the list of persons
relieved, nor is it in the list of members.
As for the long conversations between “ Herbert ”
and Sister Beatrice, there can be little doubt that they
are literary performances. Sister Beatrice told Mr.
Hughes something, and Mr. Hughes worked it up into
telling dialogues. Still, it may be said, Sister Beatrice
could scarcely be mistaken as to the bare fact of his
Atheism. Well, I am not so sure of that. Her word,
apart from Julia’s, is all we have to go upon ; and we
shall now see how an emotional lady like Sister
Beatrice (or Miss Lily Dewhirst) can be guilty of the
wildest inaccuracy.
“Herbert’s” Converted Atheist Brother.
On the last page of his pious concoction, Mr. Hughes
regrets the loss of “ that eloquent tongue ” of “ Her
bert’s” to the cause of Christ, but believes that his
death (as dressed up by Mr. Hughes) may be “ more
potent even than his life would have been.” Then he
winds up the story with a final falsehood. It is told
in the form of a question—“ Has not his Atheist
brother at Northampton already turned to God under
the influence of his seraphic death ?” Northampton,
of course, was Bradlaugh’s borough ; and the question,
put in this way, would deepen the impression that
“ Herbert ” belonged to an Atheist family.
There is not a word of truth in the “ conversion ” of
that brother. Stephen Henry Gibson, who is the
person referred to, has always been a professed Chris
tian. He has said so himself, and the statement is
�( 22 )
corroborated by his brother Frank, as well as by Mr.
Gibson senior. Consequently there was no “ atheist
brother ” at Northampton to “ turn to God.”
Mr. Hughes, I believe, did not invent this yarn,
although I believe he did invent that Soho shoemaker.
What he did was to publish it as though he knew it for
a fact. He committed the same crime throughout the
story, giving his own authority to mere hearsay, with
out the slightest investigation. He did this as a public
man, in the interest of the West London Mission. It
is impossible, therefore, to exonerate him from respon
sibility. He did not care whether the story was true
or false so long as he could make it useful, and that
is the twin brother of lying. There are very few
persons who lie merely for the exercise of intellectual
ingenuity.
I believe this yarn of the converted Atheist brother
was retailed to Mr. Hughes by Sister Beatrice, and I
will give my reasons.
Stephen Henry Gibson has a letter from Sister
Beatrice, dated May 28, 1889. It is a very sentimental
composition, with ecstatic references to the dead
brother, and a fervid appeal to Stephen to come over
and help the cause of Christ. I asked him how he got
this letter. Was it sent to him through the post ? Did
he answer it ? And had he written to Sister Beatrice
previously ?
He replied that he had never written to Sister
Beatrice at all, and had never had any sort of commu
nication with her. The letter was handed to him by
Julia, who was then living in Northampton.
At the bottom of nearly everything we find Julia.
She was in communication with Sister Beatrice, from
whom, I am told, she sometimes obtained money. It
seems to me highly probable, as it seems to the Gibsons,
that she fooled the Sister with a yarn about Stephen’s
being an Atheist; that the sentimental Sister jumped
at the bait, and wrote that letter to the young man,
sending it through Julia as she did not know his
address ; that Julia informed the Sister that her letter
had brought about Stephen’s conversion; that the
Sister conveyed the glorious intelligence to Mr. Hughes;
and that the reverend gentleman took it without the
�(23)
least inquiry, and worked in this “ crowning mercy ”
as the climax of his narrative.
This is how I believe the story of the converted
“Atheist brother” was developed; and, supposing
Sister Beatrice to be honest, it shows how easily she
may be taken in. She utterly misled Mr. Hughes as
to Stephen Gibson, and she may have utterly misled
him as to Charles Alfred Gibson. At any rate, it is
impossible to take such a lady’s evidence without
cross-examination, and therefore the Atheism of
“ Herbert ” has yet to be established.
Mr. Hughes’s Little Trick.
I say that Sister Beatrice’s evidence on the point of
Charles Alfred Gibson’s Atheism is of no value without
a cross-examination. Now let the reader see what
pains were taken to save her from this ordeal. Her
name is just as imaginary as that of the converted
Atheist. It is now admitted that her real name is
Sister Lily. Had the name she is known by in the
West London Mission been given in the story, she
might have been troubled by inquisitive Methodists.
Mr. Hughes very kindly veiled her identity to guard
her even against her friends. Indeed, his whole
method was one of politic confusion. Feigned names
were substituted for real o^nes at every point where the
story was liable to investigation, and mystery was only
abandoned where there was no danger in openness
and precisiop.
Julia.
The Christian wife of the Atheist shoemaker in Mr.
Hughes’s story is “ a daughter of Erin.” So is Julia,
whom Charles Alfred Gibson married in England,
after forming her acquaintance in Ireland, while he’
was serving in the Fifth Lancers. Judging from the
story (it is an excellent word !) of her husband’s con
version, and the report of her made to me by the
Gibsons, I should say she had extracted the very
quintessential virtue of the Blarney Stone. And
whenever we probe to the bottom of this matter we
come to Julia. It is another case of Cherchez
la femme!
�( 24 )
It is evident that a great deal of Mr. Hughes’s story
must have been furnished by Julia, either directly or
through Sister Beatrice, particularly the account of his
exploits as a propagator of Atheism. We have seen
how she managed that little affair of the “ conversion ”
of Stephen Gibson, and it enables us to estimate the
value of her statements about his dead brother. She
knows the weakness of religionists on the look-out for
converts; and, whatever she may be now, she was
formerly by no means averse from using them to her
own advantage.
When the Gibsons asked how Mr. Hughes came to
tell such falsehoods about her husband, she gave them
the airy reply—“ Oh, they make it up as they like.”
Some of the information I possess was given to me
in confidence. Nevertheless I am free to say that if
Mr. Hughes will divest himself of his “ dignity,” and
condescend to make an investigation, he will learn
whether Julia Gibson was all that his fancy painted
her.
At the same time, I cannot find it in my heart to
blame Julia Gibson overmuch for romancing in order
to obtain assistance for her dying husband. I blame
the Rev. Hugh Price Hughes for working it up into a
“ true story ” without the least investigation.
“ Herbert’s” Old Shopmates.
Mr. Frank Trasler, a member of the National Secular
Society, introduced himself to me and the Gibsons
on Sunday evening, February 4. He had worked in
the same shop with Charles Alfred Gibson, and was
still working there. He remembered the young man
well, and advised us to call on his old shopmates.
On Monday morning, February 5, the Gibsons and
I entered Ford’s establishment. We went down
into the very room where Charles Alfred Gibson made
shoes in 1888. The men laughed when I read to
them what Mr. Hughes says about it in “ The Atheist
Shoemaker.” According to the reverend gentleman’s
account, his convert's health was ruined by working in
“ a sweating den,” and when the Factory Inspector
called, his “ Christian employer ” took the official up
stairs, and treated him to sherry, to keep him from
�( 25 )
“ putting Ills no3e ” in ths basement. “ Rubbish !” the
men said. The Factory Inspector would come when
ever they liked to call him, and as a matter of fact he
made his inspections without the employer. Charles
Alfred Gibson could not have said what Mr. Hughes
had put into his mouth. One of the men had worked
there fifteen years, and still looked sound. “ Herbert ”
was not “ killed by a Christian employer.” The truth
is, the young man inherited heart disease from his
mother, and it killed him as it killed her.
Charles Alfred Gibson’s old shopmates remembered
him well. He had worked with them about twelve
months. Before that he had worked at Lilley and
Skinner’s, Paddington-green, and while there he had
belonged to the Church Army. Within twelve
months, that is, of his conversion by Mr. Hughes 1
“Did you ever know my son to be a lecturer?”
asked Mr. Gibson. One and all answered “ No,” and
declared it an utter absurdity. “ Did you ever know
him to be an Atheist ?” One and all again answered
“No” A shopmate said that he was rather fond of
arguing, in which he shifted about, taking all sorts of
sides, in opposition to the person he argued with. But
he was never to their knowledge an unbeliever ; in
fact, he was always hostile to Atheism in his conversa
tion.
So much for the Atheism of “John Herbert” in the
minds of his old shopmates. I have seen them, and
Mr. Hughes has not. He preferred to spin his history,
spider-like, out of the bowels of his own imagination.
“John Herbert’s” Landlady.
While talking to these shoemakers, I learnt that
Charles Alfred Gibson had lived not far off, in the
Caledonian-road. One of them thought he could
remember the house, and after some tickling of his
recollection he brought out the number, though he was
not quite sure of it. I don’t wish to trouble the land
lady of the house, so I refrain, from disclosing the
number.
Mr. Hughes seems to have do e all he could to baffle
investigation. He represents his convert’s lodgings as
being in Islington. The real place is at the south end
�( 26 )
of the Caledonian-road, between King’s-cross and the
canal. The description of the landlady is equally
faulty. I do not wonder that the reverend gentleman
or the Sisters never sent her a copy of the story of
Charles Alfred Gibson’s conversion, as they promised
to do. The book would have opened her eyes very
considerably.
The landlady confirmed Julia Gibson’s statement
that she did not accompany her husband to Sidmouth,
where he died, but joined him there a month later,
when he was pining for her society. Mr. Hughes is
therefore wrong on a matter where it was so easy to be
right.
Charles Alfred Gibson had no large collection of
books, as Mr. Hughes again and again declares. He
was fond of reading, but his books were generally
borrowed. She spoke, however, in the highest terms
of his transparpnt character, which is a point of agree
ment between her and the Sisters. She also said that
the Sisters were extremely kind, which I can well
believe.
Charles Alfred and Julia Gibson lodged with her for
six months, from July 1888 to January 1889, as she
showed by the rent-book. They had a furnished
front room at the top of the house, which is the second
floor. Here again Mr. Hughes’s account is incorrect.
The room was carpeted, and the narrow stairs the
reverend gentleman “climbed” were like Jacob’s
ladder—imaginary.
The landlady remembered her lodger’s taking the
communion. It was administered by Mr. Hughes,
and this is one of his few accuracies. She joined in
it, though belonging to a different Church ; so it is
nonsense to talk about her narrow school of theology.
She stated that Charles Alfred Gibson was at first
greatly vexed with professed Christianity, because no
one had called on his wife when she was ill. “ But
was my son an Atheist ?” asked Mr. Gibson. “ Oh no,”
she replied, “ not an Atheist.” “ Did he disbelieve in
God ?” “ Oh no, he always believed in God,” she
answered, and added, “ It was the Christianity of the
day he was set against.” In fact she heard him say,
“ I’m not against Jesus Christ.”
�( 27 )
“ Did you ever hear of his lecturing ?” asked Mr.
Gibson. “ No,” she replied, “ he didn’t lecture.” And
she said it with a smile, which showed her sense of
the idea’s absurdity.
A good deal more came out in conversation, but it
will keep. It is enough to say that Charles Alfred
Gibson’s landlady denies his Atheism,^ and never
heard of his being a lecturer.
Mr. Hughes’s Shuffling.
The case against Mr. Hughes is complete and over
whelming. I have followed the track of Charles
Alfred Gibson, and the testimony of all the persons
who knew him—his father, his brothers, his shopmates,
and his landlady—is that he was not a lecturer, and
none of them believe that he was even an Atheist.
Mr. Hughes therefore looks around for some line of
retreat. First of all, he stops the circulation of his
book, which is no longer obtainable for love or money.
Secondly, he seeks to minimise his convert’s import
ance. Having formerly declared that “ Herbert ” was
not a lecturer for the National Secular Society, he now
declares that he did not describe him as a “ lecturer ”
at all. He said this to the Morning interviewer, and
added that I had destroyed a man of straw.
What wretched cavil is this! It is true that Mr.
Hughes did not use the particular word “ lecturer.”
But his Atheist Shoemaker spoke “ amidst continuous
cheering ” in Victoria Park; he had advocated
Atheism “ in public halls and in the open air, with
great eloquence and effect ” ; he was used to addressing
“Atheistic assemblies”; he had experienced “the
exulting glow of the orator who has conquered his
audience.”
The reverend gentleman's convert was not a
“ lecturer.” He was only an “ orator.” Such is the
sum and substance of the denial; and it shows the
shifts this man is reduced to in the effort to save his
blasted reputation.
A Court of Honor.
Partly to set myself right before the public, and
partly to drive Mr. Hughes into the last corner, I
�( 28 )
wrote the following letter, which appeared in the Daily
Chronicle for Friday, February 9 :
MR. G. W. FOOTE AND THE REV. HUGH PRICE
HUGHES.
TO THE EDITOR OE “ THE DAILY CHRONICLE.”
Sir,—As the reputation of public men is of some importance,
if only to the world’s common sense of self-respect, I venture
to make an offer through your columns for the termination
of this dispute between the Rev. Hugh Price Hughes and
myself—a dispute, unfortunately, in which a third public
man, Mr. G. J. Holyoake, has become to a certain extent
involved.
I am willing to let the whole dispute be adjudicated upon
by a Committee of Honor. Two persons might be nominated
by Mr. Hughes and two by myself, with a fifth person agreed
upon by both sides to act as chairman and umpire.
Should the Committee of Honor be constituted, I under
take to prove (1) that the “ John Herbert ” of Mr. Hughes’s
story was Charles Alfred Gibson; (2) that everything is
false which Mr. Hughes states about the young man’s early
training and privations; (3) that there are many similar
inaccuracies and exaggerations in the narrative; (4) that
Charles Alfred Gibson was never a lecturer on Atheism, or
even against Christianity; (5) that he was.never a lecturer
at all; (6) that he was never an Atheist or any kind of
Freethinker; (7) that he had been in the Salvation Army
and the Church Army; (8) that he had no “ Atheist brother ”
at Northampton to be converted to Christianity; and (9)
that the brother referred to, who has ai ways been a professed
Christian, never had any communication whatever with Mr
Hughes or any sister of the West London Mission.
When I say that I will prove these things, I mean that I
will produce documentary evidence and the testimony of
living witnesses, including the members of Charles Alfred
Gibson’s family and all sorts of persons who knew him
intimately while he was working and living in London—the
place which Mr. Hughes represents as the scene of his
exploits as a propagator of Atheism.
Mr. Hughes must be infatuated if he fancies he can find
refuge in the “ dignity of silence,” and if he declines my
present offer I may safely leave him to the judgment of
honest and sensible men and women.
G. W. Foote.
Mr. Hughes did not accept my offer. He preferre
to stand upon his “ dignity.” His reply appeared th
next morning
�( 29 )
REV. HUGH PRICE HUGHES AND MR. FOOTE.
TO THE EDITOR OP “ THE DAILY CHRONICLE.”
Sil,—For some years past Mr. Foote has been trying to
force me into a personal controversy with him. If he had
simply assumed that I was mistaken, or had been misled, he
might have had what he wished. But his carefully-guarded
letter to you is not a specimen of his usual style. He has
again and again insinuated or asserted that I am a deliberate
and systematic liar. With a disputant who assumes that
attitude neither I nor any other civilised man can discuss.
Even in the brutal prize-ring men are obliged to fight
according to the rules.
The time has come to insist that public men can have no
dealings with, those who violate the elementary laws of
courtesy. Quite recently Mr. Foote has grossly exaggerated
his offence by offering similar insults to a Christian lady,
whose integrity is attacked like my own.
Although it was impossible for me to have any discussion
with Mr. Foote, who, I may add, has never suffered the
slightest discourtesy at my hands during all these years of
insult, I was perfectly willing to invite the utmost criticism
of any public act or utterance of mine. It occurred to mo
that there was a well-known public man of Mr. Foote’s way
of thinking, a man of unblemished reputation and a gentle
man—Mr, G. J. Holyoake. Having a slight acquaintance
With Mr. Holyoake, I asked him to read the story of the
“Atheist Shoemaker,” and Mr. Foote’s attack upon it. I
gave him all the names, and offered no suggestion as to "the
method of inquiry. The matter was left absolutely and un
reservedly in his hands. From that day to this I have not
seen him. He has made what inquiries he liked, in his own
way.. The result has been published to l .ie world. Since his
verdict was given, nothing has seen the light which impugn a
the substantial accuracy of any statements for which the two
sisters and I are personally responsible.
But whatever may be said, no civilised man will expect me
to have any communication with Mr. Foote, or with anyone
who represents him, or with anyone else who approves of his
method of controversy. No one regrets more than I do that
Mr. Foote’s own gratuitous conduct has made it impossible
for me to take notice of him.—I am, etc.,
Hugh Price Hughes.
“ If. I am a liar,” Mr. Hughes seems to say, “ it is
very rude to call me one.” He complains of the
incivility of the constable who arrests him. Anything
is preferable to damnation by a Court of Honor.
The whimpering of this man is positively despicable.
�( 30 )
One moment he hides behind Mr. Holyoake, the next
he skulks behind a woman’s petticoats. What have I
to do with the “ Christian lady ” ? I have to deal
with Mr. Hughes. He is the person to be “attacked.”
He alone came before the public without a mask. He
is the author of “ The Atheist Shoemaker.” I there
fore attack him, and I shall continue to do so. Having
proved his story to be a mass of falsehoods, I leave
him to share the responsibility as he pleases with
whatever persons shared with him in the deception.
His “Dignity.”
The only course open to Mr. Hughes is to stand upon
his “ dignity.” Any other course would be fatal. It
was a clever move on his part to obtain Mr. Holyoake’s
“ vindication.” But it was a false move, and he
has paid the penalty. He simply brought upon him
self an avalanche of evidence. He is wiser now, and
knows that if he moves again he is lost.
But movement is possible on my part, and I proceed
to show what this man’s “ dignity ” is worth. I have
to remark that he has been found out before.
In October, 1889, he was taken to task by Captain
Molesworth, the Chairman of the Royal Aquarium
Company, for publicly stating at St. James’s Hall that
“ a young girl who had recently visited the Aquarium
with her father had placed in her hands a card
asking her to accept the escort of a gentleman on
leaving the place.” Being challenged to produce the
girl, her father, and the card, Mr. Hughes was
compelled to admit that the “incident” which had
occurred “recently” had really occurred “two years
ago,” while the “ young girl ” blossomed into a woman.
Captain Molesworth threatened legal proceedings,
whereupon Mr. Hughes replied, “ I .did not intend to
make any attack upon the Royal Aquarium or any
place in particular ”—and by this disclaimer he
avoided a law suit.
, But a far worse case happened in the very same
year, when Mr. Hughes got into trouble with his own
body, by publishing certain articles in the Methodist
Times against the Wesleyan missionaries in India. A
sub-committee was appointed to examine into the
�( 31 )
charges, and the results of the investigation were
published in a volume in 1890 under the title of the
“Missionary Controversy.”
The Rev. George Patterson, who opened the case on
behalf of the missionaries, said that “the mode of
elucidating the truth adopted by the Methodist Times
consisted chiefly in the deliberate suppression of every
thing on the other side.” The sub-committee, while
giving Mr. Hughes credit for “ sincerity in his
professions of confidence and love,” remarked that
he had to “ deal with a public more logical
than himself.” Their report was dead against
hip, and it was accepted by the General Com
mittee, which passed a resolution, for which every
member voted except one, expressing “ profound
regret that charges so grave and so unsustained ”
had been brought against the missionaries by a
Wesleyan minister.
“ In many of the statements
made,” said the Rev. Mr. Allen, “ he has exaggerated
to an enormous extent, and, if he will allow me to say
so, this is characteristic of the man.”
Here, then, we have the official declaration of the
Wesleyan Methodist body, preserved in a special
volume, that Mr. Hughes published in his journal
what he could not sustain under investigation ; and
this is precisely what he did when he published in
that same journal the story of the Atheist Shoemaker.
Here also we have the openly expressed opinion of a
brother minister that enormous exaggeration is “ cha
racteristic of the man.” Yet when he is charged with
having been guilty of “enormous exaggeration” in the
present case, he stands upon his “ dignity,” even in face
of the most overwhelming evidence of his guilt.
Captain Molesworth was able to make the reverend
gentleman climb down, for behind the Chairman of the
Aquarium Company there was the law with all its
terrors. The Wesleyan ; Methodist body was also able
to bring him to trial, because it had the power to
deprive him of his position for contumacy. But no
one can compel him to submit to the adjudication of a
Court of Honor in respect to his story of the Atheist
Shoemaker. All that can be done is to bring him, in
his own despite, before the bar of public opinion.
�FREETHOUGHT
PUBLICATIONS.
FLOWERS OF FREETHOUGHT. By G. W. Foote. Fiftyone selected Essays and Articles. 221pp., cloth. 2s. 6d.
THE GRAND OLD BOOK. A Reply to the Grand Old Man.
By G. W. Foote. An Exhaustive answer to the Right
Hon. W. E, Gladstone s “ Impregnable Rock of Holy
Scripture.” Is. ; bound in doth, Is. 6d.
CHRISTIANITY AND SECULARISM. Four Nights’ Public
Debate between G. W. Foote and the Rev. Dr. J.
McCann. Is. Superior edition, in cloth, Is. 6d.
DARWIN ON GOD. By G. W. Foote. 6d.; cloth, Is.
INFIDEL DEATH-BEDS. By G. W. Foote. 2nd edition,
enlarged, 8d.
Superior edition, cloth. Is. 3d.
LETTERS TO THE CLERGY. By G. W. Foote. 128pp., Is
COMIC SERMONS & OTHER FANTASIAS. By G. W.
Foote. Price, 8d.
BIBLE HEROES. By G. W. Foote. Cloth,'2s. 6d.
BIBLE HANDBOOK fos FREETHINKERS & INQUIRING.
CHRISTIANS. By G. W. Foote and W. P. Ball. Com
plete, paper covers, Is. 4d. Superior paper, cloth, 2s.
THE JEWISH LIFE OF CHRIST. By G. W. Foote and
J. M. Wheeler. With Historical Preface and Voluminous
Notes, 6d. Superior edition, cloth, Is.
CRIMES OF CHRISTIANITY. By G. W. Foote and J. M.
Wheeler. Vol. I., cloth gilt, 216pp.. 2s. 6d.
BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY OF FREETHINKERS of
all Ages and Nations. By J. M. Wheeler. Bound, 7s. 6d.
BIBLE STUDIES. By J. M. Wheeler. Illustrated, 2s. 6d.
MISTAKES OF MOSES. By Col. Ingersoll. Is.; cloth, Is. 6d.
FREE WILL AND NECESSITY. By Anthony Collins.
Reprinted from 1715 ed., with Preface and Annotations
by G. W. Foote, and a Biographical Introduction by
J. M. Wheeler. Is. Superior edition, cloth, 2s.
THE ESSENCE OF RELIGION. By Ludwig Feuerbach. Is.
THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND CATECHISM EXAMINED.
By Jeremy Bentham. A trenchant analysis, in Bentham’s
best manner, showing how the Catechism is calculated
to make children hypocrites or fools, if not worse.
With a Biographical Preface by J. M. Wheeler. Is.
SATIRES & PROFANITIES. By James Thomson (B.V.)
Cloth Is.
B. FORDER, 28 STONECUTTER-STREET, LONDON, E.C.
Printed by G W. Foots, 14 Clerkenwell-green, London. E.C.
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Victorian Blogging
Description
An account of the resource
A collection of digitised nineteenth-century pamphlets from Conway Hall Library & Archives. This includes the Conway Tracts, Moncure Conway's personal pamphlet library; the Morris Tracts, donated to the library by Miss Morris in 1904; the National Secular Society's pamphlet library and others. The Conway Tracts were bound with additional ephemera, such as lecture programmes and handwritten notes.<br /><br />Please note that these digitised pamphlets have been edited to maximise the accuracy of the OCR, ensuring they are text searchable. If you would like to view un-edited, full-colour versions of any of our pamphlets, please email librarian@conwayhall.org.uk.<br /><br /><span><img src="http://www.heritagefund.org.uk/sites/default/files/media/attachments/TNLHLF_Colour_Logo_English_RGB_0_0.jpg" width="238" height="91" alt="TNLHLF_Colour_Logo_English_RGB_0_0.jpg" /></span>
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Conway Hall Library & Archives
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2018
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Conway Hall Ethical Society
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Pamphlet
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
The atheist shoemaker and the Rev. Hugh Price Hughes : or, a study in lying, with a full and complete exposure
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Foote, G. W. (George William) [1850-1915]
Description
An account of the resource
Place of publication: London
Collation: 31 p. ; 20 cm.
Notes: "The atheist shoemaker" is the title of a story by H.P. Hughes, published in the Methodist Times, August 1889. "This pamphlet it written gratuitously by Mr. Foote, and the expense of printing one hundred thousand copies, for free distribution...". [Inside front cover]. Publisher's advertisements on back page. Part of the NSS pamphlet collection.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
R. Forder
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
[1894]
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
N224
Subject
The topic of the resource
Atheism
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
<a href="http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/mark/1.0/"><img src="http://i.creativecommons.org/p/mark/1.0/88x31.png" alt="Public Domain Mark" /></a><span> </span><br /><span>This work (The atheist shoemaker and the Rev. Hugh Price Hughes : or, a study in lying, with a full and complete exposure), identified by </span><a href="https://conwayhallcollections.omeka.net/items/show/www.conwayhall.org.uk"><span>Humanist Library and Archives</span></a><span>, is free of known copyright restrictions.</span>
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
application/pdf
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Language
A language of the resource
English
Atheism
Conversion
Hugh Price Hughes
NSS
-
https://d1y502jg6fpugt.cloudfront.net/25778/archive/files/41ddba7f8bd061e132faa678909c65a2.pdf?Expires=1712793600&Signature=Blz3hGE12foX%7EvgJrnQ00L0nQPRc%7EAt6JUPvdrvKaX5JCKKCZ4mcZIYFFeOO1NjxlrnB2hdKfa8ZBdnHoyfogAIJlrq5IeqBD31MpT3gy2IRo5R-3jvygMmJgggh84B3bKeiWSQPq%7EbR62EhyFDIJ9nV68XVPx0MWEfsWITZBgUJBBHKxybAQaJBKhGPclR8X-t91MAlS-Aw9%7Ee1Skzleos4ejfhzGcvp6q7DIMKNWGFoMrDNyHpTOqXpJMQnzDUjfVNAElt2M-DHJz0QHAyaj2JB0lBLlRqyZC91JgNDXKuS3aE-HUSvGcn6PKwtJNlUbM5R5S6RgXr594qtYW2HA__&Key-Pair-Id=K6UGZS9ZTDSZM
fc7f1688aeec4e0f2375401825e4367f
PDF Text
Text
S'txOASié3l
MORE RATIONAL?
DISOtrSSION
I
BETWEEN
4
Mr. JOSEPH SYMES
GEORGE
■ ♦
LONDON :
FREETHOUGHT PUBLISHING COMPANY,
28, STONECUTTER STREET
E.C.
�H
�NATIONAL SECULAR SOCIETY
... .IS ATHEISM OR THEISM THE MORE
RATIONAL!
LETTER I.
From Mr. J. Symes to Mr. G. St. Clair.
Some weeks ago, Mr. St. Clair delivered a discourse in Bir
mingham on “ The Folly of Atheism.” When informed
thereof, I wrote to that gentleman, respectfully inviting him
to a public oral debate on the question now at the head of
this letter. This he courteously declined, but suggested a
written discussion instead. It now falls to my lot to furnish
the first of. twelve letters,, six by each disputant, to appear
alternately at intervals of not more than a fortnight. Mr.
Bradlaugh deserves our best thanks for'So readily opening
the columns of the National Reformer for this discussion.
Without any “ beating about the bush,” I shall at once
proceed to show why I regard Atheism as being more
rational than Theism. Theism is belief in a God, or deus,
or theos. Atheism is the absence of that belief, with the
general implication, as I apprehend, that the individual
destitute of that belief has done his best to weigh the merits
of conflicting theories, to sift the Theistic evidence, and has
logically concluded that Theism is irrational.
Atheism, requires no direct evidence, nor is it susceptible
of "it. It is arrived at,^n the most logical fashion, by a
course of destructive criticism applied to the God-theorjt.
This theory, when fairly examined, crumbles to dust, and
then evaporates, leaving the investigator without a Godiiand
without belief in one.
As I desire this contest to be definite, earnest, and real,
1 will state my objections to Theism plainly and fairly,
'so jthat my opponent may have the best opportunity of
refuting them. And let it be borne in mind that to state
valid objections to Theism is to put forward equally valid
reasons in favor ofAtheism. Now, as Theistic arguments
usually- take two forms, the intellectual and the moral; as
�4
ATHEISM OR THEISM?
Theism is as much an assertion of or belief in God’s moral
attributes as in his natural attributes or in his bare existence,
I cannot be straying from the subject in discussing the
moral aspects of the question. To show that the moral
attributes of God are fictions will go very far indeed towards
refuting Theism and justifying Atheism. The following
questions will covey most of the ground :—
I. Does there «Assist an infinitely good God ?
II. Does there exist an infinite God whose goodness
exceeds his evilness ?
III. Does there exist an infinitely wise God ?
IV. Does there exist an infinite God whose wisdom exceeds
his folly ?
V. Does there exist a God of absolutely unlimited power?
VI. Does there exist a God whose power exceeds his
weakness ?
VII. Does there exist a God who is in any sense infinite?
VIII. Does there exist any God at all ?
I. The first question, Does there exist an inhnitelugood God?
may be dismissed without any discussion ; for infinite good
ness would render all evil for ever impossible. Infinite
goodness could produce nothing less than infinite good.
Evil, if existent, must limit goodness ; evil does exist; there
fore infinite goodness does not.
II. Does there exist an infinite God whose goodness exceeds
his evilness ? I am sorry to have to use so uncouth a word
as “ evilness,” but I have no other that will so well express
my meaning.
1. It is generally held among Theists that an Infinite God
created all other things. If so, what motive could have
prompted the act ? That motive could not have been an
■exterior one. From the nature of the hypothesisJLit musthave been one confined solely to himself, arising from his
own unrestrained, uninfluenced desires. In a word, he must
ha^made the universe for his own sake, his own ends, his
own pleasure.
Now a being who accomplishes his own pleasure or profit
by or through the pleasure or profit of others, and no ptherwise, must be pronounced just and benevolent. But he who
gains his own ends irrespective of the rights, the profit,
and the pleasure of others, is selfish. He who sends others,
who are helplessly under his sway, on errands for his
�ATHEISM OR THEISM ?
5
personal advantage alone, and knowing they must suffer
excruciating pain and die in the undertaking, is a horrible
^Tr-is said that an infinite God created the universe, and peopled it with sentient beings. Those sen
tient beings, in the nature of the case, could not
be consulted beforehand: their life, organisation, circum
stances of all kinds were decided for Hem and imposed
upon them. And a being more good than evil would have
felt himself in honor and justice bound to provide for the
happiness of those creatures before giving them life while
a being more evil than good would have consulted his own
pleasure chiefly, if not entirely, and have cared little or
nothing for the happiness of his creatures. The last clause
seeems to me to describe, but partially only, the action of the
hypothetical God who is supposed to have created the uni
verse. For pain and misery have been the cruel lot of
his creatures from the remotest epoch to which geology
carries U8 back.
“The whole creation groaneth and
travaileth in pain together until now.” Want, disappoint
ment, bitter warfare, pain, and death are the normal con
dition of the universe as far as it is known. No natural
law has been more fully ascertained than this :—Life is an
endless strife; and each combatant must must kill or be
killed, must eat or be eaten. Another law is, That victor
and vanquished succumb to another foe and die, despite their
struggle for existence. These laws hold good not merely as
regards individuals: races also die out. And if there be
purpose and plan in nature it can only be such purpose and
plan as uses sentient beings for the pleasure of the creator,
who cai®s no more for their welfare than the worst of slave
owners does for his human chattels.
.
2. Nay! more. According to the creation hypothesis,
every pang endured by the creature must have been fore
seen and provided for beforehand. The man who invents
an infernal taachine, say Thomassen of Bremer Haven
notoriety, must be immensely less selfish than the creator
of the world. Thomassen had some want to supply,,^ome
sort of excuse for his awful deed. But an infinite and
eternal being is without excuse; and a being that does
wrong without excuse, knowing what he is doing, must be
actuated by pure malignity ; especially when, as is the case
�ATHEISM OR THEISM?
of all creatures of this hypothetical God, his victims are
absolutely helpless:—they cannot resist him, cannot out
manoeuvre him, and can get no sort of redress for any wrong
they may suffer.
It may perhaps be safely laid down, that he is extremely
good, who does good according to his knowledge and power.
But he “ who know^th to do good and doeth it not, to him
it is sin.” An infinite God knows everything, and his
power is unlimited. Why does he not do good “ as he hath
opportunity ? ”
The only conceivable reason must be
that he is unwilling. He must therefore be extremely evil.
When to this is added the fact that he does immeasurable
evil to helpless beings, we shall at once perceive that the
Theistic object of worship must be totally evil; for even
the seeming good he does is done merely to please himself.
Even if the world contained as much good as evil, theft
would not prove the creator good, for reasons I have given.
But the existence of only one evil would legitimately raise
the suspicion that he was evil, because a moment’s effort on
his part would remove that evil and replace it by good.
But when we find that evil is inseparably mixed with the
universe; when we find that during all its ascertainable
history, and in every direction, at least as much evil as good
has prevailed, we cannot hesitate, except in deference to
old prejudices, to pronounce judgment to the -effect that the
world’s creator is the embodiment of selfishness and ma.bgnity, and destitute of any discoverable redeeming trait in
his character.
It is at present unnecessary to enlarge upon this subject.
But if the goodness of the hypothetical creator cannot
logically be maintained, and if the extreme contrary can be
p logically'and truthfully propounded, as I contend, the next
i question to be answered is,
I
III. Does there exist an infinitely wise God? This, too,
' must be examined and answered by the study of the facts of
Nature ; and it need not delay us longer than did the ques
tion of infinite goodness. If there were infinite wisdom^Mo
such things as fools and folly would exist. These are enor
mously plentiful; whence come they ? Wisdoniicannot
produce folly; a perfectly wise being could not produce a
fool. Some say the great majority of men are fools;
certain it is that large numbers are such. Who made them
�ATHEISM OR THEISM?
7
so ? If there be a creator, he makes the philosopher and the
dolt, the mathematician and the idiot. No wise father
would have an idiot son, if he foresaw its possibility and
knew how to prevent it. Yet the great father, as people
call their deity, produces idiots by the score and fools by the ,
million. Infinite wisdom, therefore, is no better than a
myth, nor more accordant with known facts than the infalli
bility of the Pope.
Want of space compels me here to break off my argument abruptly, though I hope to resume it in my next.
LETTER IT.
From Mr. G. St. Clair to Mr. J. Symes.
As I expect to find in Mr. Symes an honest and fair
opponent, I shall not require a definition of all the terms he
uses, but I may point out that if his definition of Atheism
is correct, we shall want some other word to set forth the
denial of God’s existence. Theism is belief in a God ; and,
according to Mr. Symes, Atheism is simply the absence of
that belief, and valid objections to Theism are equally
valid-reasons in favor of Atheism. I should have thought
this more accurately described Agnosticism than Theism;
but as I am equally opposed to both, perhaps it will not
matter. If the Deity is said by one person to be dead, and
by another to be dumb, I confute them both if I prove that
he speaks. It is only fair I should allow that one sentence
of Mr. Symes’s seems to separate the Atheist from the
Agnostic—the sentence, namely, which says that the Atheist
has logically concluded Theism to be irrational. The
Agnostic does not pretend to do that. At the same time
the question is here begged, or else the language is a little
loose, for, if I am right, no individual can logically conclude
that Theism is irrational, but can only come to such a
conclusion illogically.
I am prepared to prove the existence of an intelligent
Creator of man, and to defend his perfect goodness. I shall
not attempt to defend all the positions which Mr. Symes
sets out to assault. His eight questions, which he says will
cover most of the ground, would no doubt do so, and lead
�8
ATHEISM OR THEISM?
us into oceans of talk as well. I have no desire to meddle
much with the unfathomable and the incomprehensible, and
must decline to be drawn into a discussion of the infinite,
which I do not understand. Six questions out of Mr. Symes’s
eight concern the infinite ! They were, perhaps, prompted
by his idea of what I, as a believer in God, would be likely
to assert; for he says, “It is generally held among Theists
that an Infinite God created all other things.” When he
understands that I maintain a humbler thesis, perhaps he
will withdraw or modify some of these questions. I main
tain that there is an intelligent Creator of Man, against
whose perfect goodness nothing can be proved. If man has
a Creator, that Creator must be called God.; and if there
is a God, the evidence of whose action is to be seen in us
and about us, then Atheism is irrational. It is a larger
question whether God is infinite in all his attributes. It is
another question whether God created all things, matter
and its properties included. I am certainly not going to
maintain that every attribute of God is infinite ; for the
clue and the key to the mystery of evil are to be found in
limitation of power. Like John Stuart Mill, I conceive a
limit to Omnipotence, and that enables me to maintain God’s
perfect goodness. Or rather, I define omnipotence to be the
power of effecting all things which are possible, and I show
that some things are impossible to any worker, because they
involve mathematical or physical contradictions. When,
therefore, Mr. Symes advances to show that “ the moral
attributes of God are fictions,” I have an answer for him
which some Theists have not.
The first question of the eight is in the form, “ Does there
exist an infinitely good God ? ” and in the answer to it there
is a semblance of mathematical demonstration. But I
venture to think that the word “ infinite ” leads to a little
unconscious conjuring. I shall be satisfied to defend God’s
perfect goodness against all attacks. I will not say whether
the goodness is infinite, and what ought, to follow then; but
I calmly assert that the bare fact that “ evil does exist” is
no proof that perfect goodness does not. Mr. Symes con
cludes his demonstration with the Q. E. D. that “ therefore
infinite goodness does not.” I should be glad if he would'
come out of the unfathomable and tell me what he has to
show against perfect goodness. I admit that some evil exists
�ATHEISM OR THEISM ?
9
but limited evil for a limited time is quite consistent with
perfect goodness. It was consistent with goodness in the
case of a father I knew, who submitted his child to the
operation of tracheotomy in order to save its life. Limited
evil for a limited time is forced upon every child who is
kept to his lessons; and it argues no want of goodness
in the parent, but only a certain intractableness in things,
making it impossible to attain desired results except
by means and methods which may sometimes be a little
unpleasant. I feel myself at liberty to use these human
illustrations because I have left out the word “ infinite ” and
am considering the action of a Deity who creates and educates
man. The Iggfiitions of all work are similar, whether the
worker be human or divine.
Space exists, and matter exists. Mr. Symes must allow
that they can exist without having been created, because he
does not believe in a Creator at all. So far I am inclined
to agree with him that space and matter may always have
existed. But whether matter has been created or not is
of little importance in this discussion, if it be allowed
that without matter and space nothing could be made
and no processes could go on—that for instance there
could be no world like this and no human creatures to com
plain of its arrangements. In fact there could be no
arrangements, if there were nothing to arrange and no space
to arrange it in. The Creator is, we may say, bound to have
matter—whether created or uncreated—if he is to accom
plish anything at all. No blame, therefore, can attach to
him on account of the mere existence of matter. All
depends upon what use he will make of it. Now the mere
existence of matter implies certain properties, such as
extension and impenetrability. Further, nothing can be
done with matter without moving it, to bring its parts and
particles into new positions. But the motion of matter in
space is according to the laws of motion, which cannot well
be imagined to be different from what they are. Without
these laws of motion and properties of matter there could
be no universe and no human life, and no printing of this
discussion in the pages of the National, RefdjSffier. At the
same time the Worker, using these mean^and materials,
does his work under conditions which preclude certain results
as physically impossible, as for instance that there should be
�10
ATHEISM OR THEISM?
adjacent mountains without a valley ; and which sometimes
involve concomitant results which may not be wished for,
as when a sculptor chisels out a statue but makes a mess of
chippings ¿ha dust. The end desired is achieved, and more
than compensates for the temporary inconvenience. The
inconvenience is no accident and no surprise, but is foreseen
and deliberately accepted, on account of the good that shall
follow.
Seeing that I regard the matter in this way, many things
which Mr. Symes has said shoot wide of my position. I
am not obliged to consider what motive induced the Deity
to create the universe—whether it was an exterior motive
or one confined solely to himself. I maintain that he
Seated man. I allow that he must have found his own end
in doing it. I do not allow that he has done it regardless
of the good of his creatures: else creatures so logical
ought all to commit suicide at once. Mr. Symes defines
the Creator’s obligations to his creatures in a way which
ought to prevent most men from marrying and becoming
fathers. Because sentient creatures suffer pain and misery,
a good Being, he says—even a Being more good than evil—
would have refrained from creating them without consulting
them. The force or weakness of such an argument depends
very much upon the amount of pain and misery compared
with enjoyment, and very much upon the question whether
pain and misery are to be temporary or permanent. On
both points Mr. Symes holds a view which in my estimation
is not justified by the facts. He dwells on the struggle for
existence—which he describes as a law that each combatant
must either kill or be killed, either eat or be eaten—he
describes the strife as prevailing from the earliest geologic
ages ; and he infers that the Creator cares no more for the
welfare of his creatures than the worst of slave owners does
for his human chattels. But here, in the first place, some
illusion is produced by looking down a long vista of pain
and death. When we look along a grove the trees seem to
touch one another; yet in reality the open spaces are more
than the trees. We may, if we choose, look down that vista
of the ages and see young life and happiness, and mother’s
love and joy at every stage. Nor is it the fact that there are
no deaths but such as are violent. Nor is it the case that
violent deaths occasion much pain and misery. Follow the
�ATHEISM OR THEISM ?
11
life of an individual bird, or dog, or human being, and
inquire whether misery or enjoyment preponderates : that is
the fair way to judge, and not by bringing all the misery of
long ages into a near focus.
And then, as to the permanence of pain, misery, evil, Mr.
Symes declares that “ evil is inseparably mixed with the
universe.” This statement he emphasises, and gives no hint
that he expects evil to work itself out. I should have
thought that, as an Agnostic and an Evolutionist, he would
have followed Herbert Spencer in this as well as in other
things; and Spencer has a chapter to show that evil must be
evanescent. By the law of evolution the human race is
progressive—the purpose of nature (the Creator’s purpose,
as I should say) is being worked out, stage after stage. It
is therefore delusive to judge the present condition of the
world as though it were intended to be final ; it is unfair to
judge the past and present without taking into account the
drift and tendency of things. In a manufactory we don’t
judge in that way of the things which are being made, and
which we chance to see “ in the rough.” If evil is evanes
cent, and the consummation of things is to be glorious, it is
not irrational to believe that present pain is like the tem
porary evil of the sculptor’s chippings, the passing irksome
ness of the school-boy’s discipline, and that “ the sufferings
of this present time are not worthy to be compared with the
glory which shall be revealed to us-ward.”
And here, Mr. Editor, I must break off abruptly, like
Mr. Symes, having come to the end of the space allotted.
Else I could easily double the length of this letter, without
departing from the text Mr. Symes has given me : for he
does at least say something.
LETTER III.
From Mr. J. Symes to Mr. G. St. Clair.
The first paragraph of Mr. St. Clair’s letter requires no
remark; the second may detain us for a few minutes. The
infinity of deity, it appears, is given up. That being so,
Mr. St. Clair should have clearly defined the term god.
The sense he attaches to the word must be exceedingly
�12
ATHEISM OR THEISM ?
different from that which Theists in general attach to it;,
and, as I am totally at a loss to know what his god is, I
can neither aecept nor attack his views until he favors me
with them. I shall feel obliged if in his next he will define,
as clearly as possible, “god,” “ creator,” “created,” “intel
ligent creator.” A further favor will be conferred upon me
if Mr. St. Clair will give his reasons in detail for believing
that man was created by “ an intelligent creator,” and also
his grounds for supposing that creator to possess “ perfect
goodness.” At present he merely declares his belief ; I need
his evidence.
Why does my opponent call limited power Omnipotence ?
Is it not equivalent to limited illimitability ? or finite
infinity ?
Mr. St. Clair is prepared to defend the perfect goodness
of man’s creator. But how can a finite, that is, an imperfect
being, be perfect in any respect? My former objections to
infinite goodness press with equal force against perfect good
ness, for perfect and infinite are here the same. Goodness,
perfect or imperfect, finite or infinite, must from its very
nature prevent or remove evil in the direct ratio of its power
or ability. Mr. St. Clair contends that “ limited evil for a
limited time is quite consistent with perfect goodness.” He
may as rationally contend that “limited darkness for a
limited time is consistent with perfect light.” Darkness,
however limited, is incompatible with perfect light; so evil,
though but for a day, and covering but an area of one square
inch, would prove that perfect goodness did not exist. The
illustrations used—the case of tracheotomy and the unplea
sant processes of education—are both as wide of the mark
as possible. They are not cases of perfect goodness resort
ing to temporary evil, but of imperfect goodness and limited
power choosing the less of two evils where it is impossible to
shun both.
“ The conditions of all work are similar, whether theworker be human or divine.” This may, for aught I know,
be true, for I have no notion of a divine worker. But does
Mr. St. Clair mean to say that his god is compelled to
choose between two or more evils, just as we are? If so,
what necessity urges him ? We are driven to labor by
hunger, cold, storms, and innumerable pains and diseases.
Does god, too, labor for his bread, his clothes, shelter, or
�ATHEISM OR THEISM ?
13
medicine? If not, how are “ the conditions of all labor
similar, whether the worker be human or divine ? ” Will
Mr. St. Clair explain ?
How does my worthy opponent know that evil is limited
as to time ? Can he assure me that any square foot of the
earth’s surface is or ever was totally free from evil ? How
does he know, or why does he assume, that any square foot
of the earth’s surface ever will be entirely free from evil ?
That many evils will diminish in process of time, through
man’s growing wisdom, I cheerfully believe. But, no
thanks to deity for that. Man is improving on god’s
work, and removing evils that ought never to have been in
it. Here the consumer has to labor and suffer and spend
all his energy rectifying the blunders of the manufacturing
deity, or making improvements he never thought of, or else
was too idle, or too weak, or too evil, to introduce.
But does any man conceive that all evil will ever be
removed ? Will the storms be hushed into eternal calm ?
the earthquake heave its final throb and cease for ever ?
the volcano spout no more its terrible agents of destruction?
disease and death prey no longer upon animals and men ?
If these are ever conquered, man must do it, for they are
god’s agents for destroying men—if god there be. Can
Mr. St. Clair name one evil his god ever removed ?
Mr. St. Clair seems to hold the eternity of matter. Is
god also eternal; and if so, how do you ascertain that ?
I am not just now much concerned to inquire whether the
creator found matter ready to his hand, or first made it; but
I contend that he who arranges matter as we find it in
Nature (not in art) is not good. The tree is known by its
fruit. Matter is so arranged as to give pain, produce
misery, and death universal! And if so arranged by an
intelligent creator, he must therefore be more evil than
good. When Mr. St. Clair speaks of the “ end desired ” in
the “ chippings and dust ” of the sculptor, I can pretty well
understand him; but does he know the aim and end of the
creator ? If not, what is the value of his illustration ?
It is of no use to say that creatures “ ought to commit
suicide,” if my contention is correct—ought not to marry,
&c. Has not the creator rendered that impossible for most
men by passion and an invincible love of life ? And is it
kind to stretch a poor wretch longer upon the rack of this
�14
ATHEISM OR THEISM?
rude world by so forbidding him to die, though his every
breath is on® of pain ? Goodness never arranged it thus.
I am not concerned with striking the balance between evil
and good; I merely contend that goodness cannot originate
evil, except unwittingly; that perfect goodness would render
all evil impossible. I do not yet see any just cause to retract
or soften a single statement in my first letter; and shall
therefore proceed now to deal with my questions as far as
space will permit.
But Does there exist an infinite god whose wisdom
exceeds his folly ? Wisdom conducts its affairs with reason,
prudence, economy, and directs its energies to the attain
ment of some definite and worthy end. Does any man
know the final cause of the universe, the latest and highest
end aimed at by the creator ? It seems only reasonable that
the Theist should know this before he ventures to attribute
wisdom to his deity.
I grant that if the “ works ” of Nature exhibited evidences
of wisdom as far as men can observe them, and no cases of
evident folly were discoverable, the Theist would have the
best of reasons for assuming that all the universe was equally
well arranged and conducted. But if the known parts of
Nature exhibit folly in its worst conceivable forms, then
the only rational view to take is that the universe at large is
a blunder, and its creator a blunderer.
It is frequently assumed that a fool is reprehensible for
his folly, and that if men are fools, it must be their own
fault. But that cannot be the case, for no man makes him
self. The creator must take all the responsibility. He who
made men made most of them fools ; therefore he must be
more foolish than wise. And man, be it remembered, is
according to Theists the most important part of the creation
hereabouts. Man, they say, is the crowning piece of his
creator’s workmanship; and all else in the solar system is
subservient to his welfare. Be it so ! But what folly to
make all this and then to people the world with fools !
Such folly cannot be excelled, even by the lowest of
intelligent creatures. And my objections to the wisdom or
“ intelligence ” of deity are equally forceful, whether god
be finite or infinite; for I contend that he is far more foolish
than wise.
The folly of the hypothetical creator, whatever his
�ATHEISM OR THEISM ?
15
power, is seen everywhere—at least, I know of no spot free
from it. Here grow beautiful grass, and herbs, and trees ;
and human industry turns the region into a paradise, dotted
over with towns and villages. The people increase rapidly,
and their flocks, and herds, and farm produce keep pace
with them. Civilisation in all its branches rises and pro
gresses. There dawns a day when the sun shines in
splendor, the breezes gently blow, birds pour out their
melody, and man is contented and happy in some degree;
but there comes a dismal sound, and a mysterious shaking;
and ashes, and stones, and dust shower down in torrents
burying all life in a burning tomb. If an “ intelligent
creatoiiS makes men, why does he thus destroy them ? If
they need destroying, why did he make them so ? Those
creatures of his are of all ages from the youngest embryo to
the oldest man. Why destroy what is scarcely begun ?
Why begin what is to be so quickly destroyed ?
This “ intelligent creator ” produces blossoms in spring,
and then nips them by senseless frosts ; he makes the grain
to grow, and then destroys it by wet or a summer storm, or
parches it by drought; splendid crops of potatoes to flourish,
and then turns them to corruption by the fungus known as
“ the diseasethe cattle to multiply, only to die by
pleuro-pneumonia or foot and mouth disease ; a whole human
population to flourish for years, only to die by famine and
fever. And all this is the constant, every-day conduct of
man’s “ intelligent creator ! ”
I am deeply interested and anxious to see how my re
spected opponent will be able to reconcile divine “ intelli
gence ” or goodness with the phenomena of the earth.
The next question I have set down for discussion is:
VI. Does there exist a God whose power exceeds his weak
ness ? This question, to my surprise, has been answered
already by Mr. St. Clair, by implication at least; for he
informs us that, “Like John Stuart Mill, he conceives a
limit to Omnipotence.” That conception, when rendered
into plain English, can only mean that Mr. St. Clair’s god
is of merely finite power ; and as finite power can bear no
comparison with infinite power, we must conclude that Mr.
St. Clair’s deity has infinitely greater weakness than
strength.
If I were contending merely with Mr. St. Clair, I could
�16
ATHEISM OR THEISM ?
at once pass on to the next question; but I am attacking
Theism in its broadest sense ; and, with all due respect to
my opponent, must decline to narrow the ground to the
dimensions of his peculiar Theism, except by easy and
logical stages.
I hold the doctrine, that force or power can be measured
only by its effects. A force may produce motion in several
phases, or it may be expended in resistance, stress, etc.
But in every case the effect is exactly equivalent to the
cause. An infinite cause could result in nothing short of
infinite effect. But infinite effect does not exist; nor can
any conceivable sum of finite effects amount to one infinite
effect; therefore no infinite cause or infinite power exists.
Now Theists do not pretend to know their god except as
a cause—unless I am mistaken. But if no infinite cause
exists, their god must be finite. But that which is finite
can bear no comparison with the infinite; therefore the power
of a finite being, however great, must be immensely less
than his weakness.
I will close by asking whether it was good, or wise, or
honest for a being of such limited capital, that is, power,
etc., to undertake so great a work as the creation and
direction of the universe ? Though he may be making his
own fortune and ensuring his own pleasure, he is doing it
by the most reckless expenditure of human and animal life,
and by the infliction of unspeakable misery upon helpless
beings. A god of honor and mercy, it seems to me, must
either have stopped the machine in utter disgust, or else
have committed suicide countless ages ago.
LETTER IV.
From Mr. G-. St. Clair to Mr. J. Symes.
Space did not permit me to deal with the whole of Mr.
Symes’ first letter ; and now I must let it go, because his
second letter gives me text enough for a second reply. In
this discussion I should be glad if a respectful tone can be
observed in speaking about the Deity. It cannot serve the
purpose of my opponent, nor of the Editor, that Theists who
begin to read our arguments should throw down the paper
�ATHEISM OR THEISM?
17
in disgust. Mr. Symes expresses himself “ totally at a loss
-to know what my god Is.” I shall be grateffflF if he will
•oblige me by spelling the word with a capital G, because, for
one thing, my God is not the same as Mumbo Jumbo or
any little imaginary divinity worshipped by an African
tribe. Mr. Symes asks for definitions of “ god,” “ creator,”
“ created,” “intelligent creator;” but probably a dictionary
will supply his want at the present stage. In my previous
letter I told him distinctly enough what I understand the
tgrm God to mean: God is the intelligent Creator of man.
This is sufficient for our present purpose. To believe in a
.Creator of man—not a blind force, not an unguided pro
cess wjkich has resulted in his coming into existence, but in
an intcmigent being who made him—this is to be a Theist.
And since the evidence of God’s operation is to be seen in
man’s own frame, this theistic belief is rational, and the
opposite is irrational. This is what we have to argue about,
-and I should be glad if my opponent would keep to the
subject. If it could be shown that the Creator of man is
an evil Being, it might be reasonably maintained that he
ought to be called a Devil instead of a God ; and therefore
I have undertaken to rebut all attacks upon his perfect
goodness. In my last letter I repelled some objections of
this kind, and was enabled to do so successfully, because I
did not foolishly contend that the Deity possesses infinite
power, adequate to the accomplishment of all manner of
impossibilities.
Mr. Symes exclaims, “ The infinity of Deity, it appears,
is given up.” I never maintained it, and therefore I have
not given up anything. It seems to be inconvenient to my
opponent that I do not maintain it. He declines, he says,
“ to be narrowed to my Theism; he attacks Theism in its
broadest sense.” That is to say, he is confident that he
could confute other Theists, but he cannot easily confute
me. I showed him that his eight propositions about the
Infinite, mostly shoot wide of my position ; but he thinks it
well to return to them, and persists in attacking the impos
sible compound which he has set up as the God of those
who believe in God. No doubt he can do some amount of
iconoclastic work here; but what is that to me? If-he
amuses himself and your readers by wasting half the space
at his disposal, perhaps I ought not to complain ; but I am
�18
ATHEISM OR THEISM?
not bound to follow him into this region, and shall only do
so when I can spare the time. I will pursue him just a little
way now. He considers that a Theist ought to know the
final cause of the universe before he ventures to attribute
wisdom to the Deity 1 But surely I may admire the struc
ture of the eye, and perceive it to be well adapted for
seeing, without waiting to examine the heart or learn the
use of the spleen. I may study and admire the human
frame as a whole, and not feel obliged to be dumb concern
ing it because I have not begun the consideration of the
solar system. My opponent wants me to begin at the cir
cumference of the universe, because it has no boundsg and
he wishes to see me bewildered and floundering^ Yet
immediately he himself ventures to judge of the universe as
a whole, and pronounces it a blunder, and its creator a
blunderer, on the strength of some exhibitions of folly (a£
he counts them) in its known parts.
One exhibition of folly, he considers, is the creation of
fools. Repeating a statement of his former letter, he asserts
that most men are fools, and that he who created them so
must himself be more foolish than wise. My reply is that,
whatever the actual proportion of fools, ignorance comes
before knowledge, folly before wisdom, in the natural order
of things. The crude and unfashioned material must date
earlier than the wrought and finished. The educated man
is a production of a more advanced sort than the ignorant
and uncultured man ; he is the same creature in a later stage
of development. But Mr. Symes—whom nothing will satisfy
save impossibilities—demands the later before the earlier.
My opponent thinks that infinite goodness is incompatible
with the existence of the slightest evil at any time. He
imagines that infinite goodness in the creator would prevent
any evil outside of him. To my mind this is not so, unless
the creator, besides being infinitely good, is also omnipotent,
and omnipotent in a sense which enables him to overcome
physical and mathematical contradictions and accomplish
impossibilities. But, to simplify the discussion, I refrain
from contending for infinite goodness, and contend for per
fect goodness. My opponent does not see the difference,
but conceives that his former objections to infinite goodness
press with equal force against perfect goodness. He con
tinues his unconscious legerdemain with the word infinite.
�; ■ w:./ -’
ATHEISM OR THEISM ?
•
w’
19
He asks, “ How can a finite, that is, an imperfect being, be
perfect in any respect ? ” Amazing! We am to suppose
there is no perfect circle conceivable unless it be infinite in
its dimensions, and that no man could be perfectly truthful,
no child perfectly innocent, no flower perfect in its beauty.
The flower must be as large as the universe, it seems, before
its beauty can be perfect. The argument against the per
fect goodness of Jesus Christ would have to run in the form
that his body and soul together were not so big in cubic
measure as all the worlds and spaces which make up the
TCT7rai/, or grtffttall! “ Goodness will prevent or remove evil
to the extent of its ability.” Yes; but since no ability
whatever can be sufficient to surmount impossibilities, limited
^evil nifty exist for a limited time, and be subservient to
greater good (like the inconvenience of scaffolding during
the building of a house). Mr. Symes uses what he supposes
to be a parallel, that limited darkness is not consistent with
perfect light. But this shows some obscurity of thought.
Darkness and light are opposites, and so are good and evil ;
but not goodness and evil. I did not say that limited evil
was consistent with perfect good, as an existing condition
of things everywhere; I said it was consistent with perfect
goodness as an element of character existing in the Deity.
With God, in the higher plane of his operations, as with
man on a lower, it may be wise and good to “ choose the
less of two evils where it is impossible to shun both.”
“ How do I know that evil is limited as to time ? ” How
does Mr. Symes know that it is not ? Let him read Herbert
Spencer’s chapter on the “ Evanescence of Evil.” Let him
ask himself what prospect there is of the eternal duration
of a thing which is continually diminishing in amount. He
admits that evils are diminishing through man’s agency,
man’s growing wisdom. So they ought some day to end.
But he declines to give God the glory. Now the Creator of
man is the author of man’s wisdom. He employs man as
his best instrument to improve the face of the earth and
weed out evils from society. To a Theist this is so, of
course; the creator of man’s body is the author of his spirit
and the guide of his course. But with curious blindness to
the Theistic position, Mr. Symes seeks to infer that man is
wiser than his maker. He reckons disease and all destructive
forces as God’s agents for evil, but does not reckon physi
�20
ATHEISM OR THEISM?
cians, philanthropists and reformers as his agents for good.
He fails to see that on the theistic hypothesis the evils which
man remov^God removes.
Mr. Symes contends that “ he who arranged matter as we
find it, is not good,” because it produces pain and other evils.
He would not say this of any human operator. When I
saw him the other day at a public meeting, he complained
of neuralgia and talked of going to a dentist. I am afraid
the dentist would have to arrange matter so as to give tem
porary pain, and yet the dentist might be good and might do
good. It is not the poser which my oppontml thinks it is,
to ask me whether I equally know the end and aim of fhp
Creator. I’m not going to search for it among the infinities.
Looking at the human jaws, and the apparatus of the teeth,
in connexion with food and the digestive organs, I think I
know the aim and end of the Creator in giving us teeth. It
is that we may chew our victuals. And then their occa-wr
sionally aching is an incidental evil, which may have some
bearing on his omnipotence, but does not bear witness against
his goodness. Mr. Symes’ next paragraph is curiously con
tradictory. He considers life a torture, every breath pain,
death preferable ; but does not commit suicide because lie
has an invincible love of life !
I have agreed with Mr. J. S. Mill that physical “ con
ditions ” put some limit to omnipotence as we might other
wise conceive it. Mr. Symes pounces upon this, but does
not seize it well. He says, “ Here is an admission of finite
power, and since finite bears no comparison to infinite we
must conclude that Mr. St. Clair’s deity has infinitely greater
weakness than strength.” Does this sound conclusive ? I
may correspondingly argue as follows,—My God can do
something, therefore his weakness is not utter inability, not
infinite weakness ; it is finite, and bears no comparison with
the infinite, therefore he has infinitely greater strength than
weakness. Why does not Mr. Symes give up dabbling in
this ocean of the infinite, which is too deep for both of us,
but where, if I choose to follow him, I can make quite as
great a show as he of letting down a plumb-line ? He wants
me to tell him—“ Is god eternal, and how do I ascertain
it?” What I think on the subject, I’ll tell him another
time : at present I assert that the human frame had a
creator—it is a designed machine, and machines must have
�ATHEISM OR THEISM ?
21
intelligent makers—and I challenge him to show that this,
my belief, is irrational.
“ Why do I call limited power omnipotence ? ” If power
to do all possible things is not to be called omnipotence we
must drop the term. I found the term in use and I used it:
but it is not essential to my argument. If Mr. Symes can
imagine the ability to do impossible things, he has powers
of imagination which transcend mine. I do not expect the
Deity to cause two and two to be five, and the whole to be
less than one of its quarters; I do not look for him to
make squares without angles, and a succession of days without
intervening nights. I believe in a Deity who can do all
¿lings not Involving contradictions. Can Mr. Symes show
that this belief of mine is irrational ? The kind of world
which my opponent demands—brand-new and straight off—
would involve impossibilities. His cry is for the moon.
He wants blossoms which never suffer from frost; he asks
for anjunbroken succession of good crops; he desires the
absence of all liability to disease in man and beast. Can
he suggest how a fleshly body, or any animal organism
could be made free from all liability to disease ? His
notion of the universe leaves no room for incidental evils,
necessary concomitants, “ partial evil, universal good ”—in
which I find the explanation of many difficulties.
I have only space to assert afresh that the human
frame is a machine, the human eye is an instrument;
machines and instruments have to be made ; the maker of
man is God; therefore Theism is true and it is rational to
believe it.
LETTER V.
From Mr. J. Symes to Mr. G. St. Clair.
I cannot say if it was my fault or the printer’s that “God”
was spelt with a small g ; but I am not anxious to be read
by those who would throw down the paper in disgust for
such a trifle. I cannot induce Mr. St. Clair to give me a
sight of his deity, and therefore do not know what it is he
worships. It is not Mumbo Jumbo, nor yet an infinite god;
it is “ the intelligent creator of man,” he informs me. But
�22
ATHEISM OR THEISM ?
no such being exists, as far as I can ascertain ; and why
should I give a capital G to a myth ? My opponent is
illogical in demanding honor for his god before he has
proved that he has one worthy of honor, especially when all
known facts are so strongly against his position. I respect
Mr. St. Clair, for I know him ; I don’t know his god ; to
give him capital letters might be construed to signify that
I both knew and honored him.
“The intelligent creator of man” is no more a description
of deity than “the tree that bears oranges” is of the orange
tree. I wish to know what the deity is; he merely speaks
of what he does. What was he before creating man ?
What is he apart from that action altogether ? I cannot
believe Mr. St. Clair knows, nor do I believe he has any
god at all. He can confute and confound me by a real
exhibition of his deity in his next letter.
My opponent rather unceremoniously sends me to “a
dictionary ” for definitions of “ God,” etc. I go. “ GOD,
n. [Sax., god; G., gott; D., god; Sw. and Dan., gud;
Goth., goth or guth.~\ 1. The Supreme Being ; Jehovah ;
the Eternal and Infinite Spirit, the Creator, and the Sove
reign of the Universe,” etc. (Webster’s Improved Diet. ;
Glasgow, W. Mackenzie.) What am I to think of Mr. St.
Clair’s consistency ? In both letters he has, almost indig
nantly and with something akin to sneering, repudiated the
“ infinity ” of god ; and yet I find this attribute duly set
out in the only definition of his deity which he has as yet
condescended so much as to indicate ! I must now pi ess
him to be candid : Is the definition to which he directed me
correct? If so, why does he reject the “infinity” or
decline to “maintain” it? If this definition be incorrect,
why did he refer me to it ?
I will next deal with a few of the fallacies and mistakes
of his second letter. 1. Mr. St. Clair is mistaken in as
suming that he “ successfully repelled ” any objections of
mine to god’s goodness. The strength of my objections
lies in the well-known and horrible facts of nature, which
cannot be explained away. Goodness, finite or infinite,
removes or prevents every evil in its power. Does Mr. St.
Clair venture to assert that there is no evil now in the world
which his deity could remove if he would ? If be cannot
remove so much as one of them—say cancer or neuralgia—
�ATHEISM OR THEISM ?
23
why call such a weakling god ? If he can and will not,
where is his goodness ? I demand no “ impossibilities ” of
deity, unless he is extremely weak. If he is not able to do
immensely more than I require, he should retire from his
post.
2. Mr. St. Clair, in not “ maintaining ” the infinity of !
I his god, “gives it up”—in the only sense I intended. I
j have suffered no sort of “ inconvenience ” from this. Oh
i dear, no! The only inconvenience I feel in this contest '■
lies in the fact that I have nothing but shadows and tinCertainties to contend with, phantoms,
“That flit e’er you can point the place.”
Would Mr. St. Clair kindly furnish me with one or two
stubborn Theistic facts, if he has them ?
3. It is amusing to learn that I waste “ half my space ”
in demolishing the “infinite” god, the very deity my
opponent sent me to the dictionary for! I presume that
must be his own ? 4. “ Ignorance comes before knowledge,
folly before wisdom.” No doubt. And in many millions
of cases the ignorance and the folly are never superseded by
anything better. Does Mr. St. Clair hold that, “whatever
is best ” ? What point has his remark else ? A perfectly
good and wise god would have permitted no folly, nor have
left his creatures ignorant of anything necessary to be
known. I expect Mr. St. Clair to contend in his next that
folly argues the wisdom, and evil the goodness, of his deity,
while inability to remove evils is proof positive of his
omnipotence.
5. My opponent jumbles mathematics, morality, and
botany in the most edifying manner in his allusion to the
circle, the child, and the flower. Geometrical conceptions
are not “ beings;” they are abstractions. Innocence and
beauty may be perfect in a very imperfect and extremely
limited sense ; is that so with god’s goodness ? Mr. St.
Clair is extremely unfortunate in his analogies. All that
he has yet tried are failures. Or else his god is one of
very slender means. He is a surgeon performing “ tracheo
tomy,” a sculptor chipping stones into shape, a parent
“ educating ” his children, a builder employing “ scaffolds,”
etc. Before he has done, I fear he will rouse my sympathy
for this god as the most unfortunate victim of circumstances
�24
ATHEISM OK THEISM?
that ever lived. The orthodox divinity is certainly superior
to this. He never loses his power, and is self-reliant all
throughout his career. But Mr. St. Clair’s deity is so com
pletely under the control of circumstances, mostly adverse
ones, that I expect my opponent to announce next that a
memorial of condolence is to be despatched to him, and a
subscription opened to replenish his exhausted exchequer.
With the old-fashioned Christian god “ all things were
possible ; ” with Mr. St. Clair’s it seems quite the reverse.
No excuse could possibly be urged for any wrong done by
the orthodox deity ; nothing hut excuses have yet been urged
for this new one. I point out his misdeeds and show up his
criminal conduct. But Mr. St. Clair is ever ready with an
apology—“ Well, yes, but he couldn’t help it.” And this
poor thing must have a capital G-! Well, well. He needs
one!
6. Unless Mr. St. Clair knows that his god has removed
one evil, it is irrational to expect him to remove all. If
evil and good are compatible at all, and “ for a limited
time,” why not for ever ? How long must evil last to be
inconsistent with goodness ? “ Darkness and light are
opposites, so are good and evil; but not goodness and evil.”
Is that “ legerdemain ” or theology? It cannot be called
“ confusion of thought,” for thought is absent. We were
informed in Mr. St. Clair’s first that the conditions of all
labor were the same. What now does he mean by in
sinuating that man works on a “ lower plane ” than god ?
How is that assumption to be reconciled with the further
statement that god works by man ? God’s work is man’s
work, and man’s is god’s, if that be so. I shall be delighted
to be assured that all evil will be removed. But what are
its laws ?—laws of origin, progress, and decay ? Will
death and pain go ? Suppose they did go; the crime of
their introduction or creation remains.
7. God employs man to “ improve the face of the earth
and to weed out evils from society.” Assertion without
evidence. If true, what must be thought of a god that
creates evils and nourishes and perpetuates them for indefinite
periods, and ultimately uses man as his catspaw to remove
them ? How horribly they burn their fingers often in the work!
What confusion of thought and of moral perception must
possess a man who can count the author of all evil good,
�ATHEISM OR THEISM?
25
and thank him for removing evils by the agency of human
suffering. What a monument that deity would have if all
the bones of his miserable agents could be collected and
reared into one stupendous pyramid—the bones of the
swarming millions who have perished horribly in removing
divine evils, of the poor blind slaves whipped on by the
crudest taskmaster that ever lived to undo the mischiefs
his folly or malice created. What can be the state of mind .
that supposes the “ physician ” who does his best to heal
sickness to be incited thereto by the author of that sick
ness—that the philanthropist who shelters, feeds, and
clothes the orphan is inspired by the being who murders the
parents ? When you “ gather grapes of thorns or figs of
thistles,” then may the author of evil incite to good deeds.
Or must we suppose the deity to be destitute of moral
qualities, and engaged in supernal legerdemain, throwing
in evils with one hand and removing them by the other, using
men as sentient and suffering marionettes in operating his
play ?
8. A dentist would have no calling if deity had not
“ scamped ” his work. If he inflict more than necessary
pain, he is considered cruel. An infinite god, such as I was
sent to the dictionary for, could have been under no
necessity to inflict any pain. Mr. St. Clair’s god seems able
enough for mischief, but almost powerless for good—a being
that needs endless apologies.
9. If my opponent’s deity renders death infinitely desirable
as a refuge from bis tyranny, and yet blocks the path to
it by inspiring an invincible love of life, wherein lies the
“ contradiction ” of my reference to it ?
10. I must leave my opponent for the present floundering
in the hopeless task of proving that his deity must be infi
nitely powerful because he can do “something.” Not I, '
but he, is the one who “ dabbles in the ocean of the infinite.”
11. Mr. St. Clair seems to hold that omnipotence is equiva
lent to the power to do all possible things. Is that new? I
never heard of its being used to signify the power to do
impossible things. I thought from his former letter that
“ omnipotence ” with him designated limited power ; it now
returns to its old condition, and in this letter signifies what
is indicated above. I wish Mr. St. Claii’ would be a little more
definite. He now “ believes in a deity who can do all things
�26
ATHEISM OR THEISM ?
not involving contradictions.” Well, I have asked for no
contradictions, the very reverse. This belief of Mr. St.
Clair’s is highly irrational. You cannot possibly know how
many things could be done not involving contradictions ;
nor can you possibly know what power might be necessary
to perform them ; nor is it possible you should have any
reason for believing your deity to possess such power. If
that confession of faith is not a “ dabbling in an infinite
ocean,” what is it ? It is immensely amusing to see how
Theists and semi-Theists talk ! Their knowledge and ex
perience is about on a par with ours; yet they profess
belief in that into which, in the very nature of the case,
they can have no insight. But faith not founded on know
ledge must be irrational. Thus I show Mr. St. Clair’s creed
to be baseless and destitute of reason.
12. Perhaps my opponent will kindly show that a world
such as I desire would involve “ impossibilities,” or that a
God such as he believes in could not have made such a one ?
I do want “ blossoms that never suffer from frost; ” who
does not ? I do desire “ an unbroken succession of good
crops ; ” will Mr. St. Clair say that he does not ? Else why
is he pleased at the thought that all evil will ultimately
cease ? To judge from my opponent’s remarks, one might
suppose that it were a fault to desire good and not evil. Is
it so ? I hope it is no sign of depravity to hate evil and to
protest against evil-doers, even when they are deities. Does
Mr. St. Clair enjoy evil ? Would he not remove it all, if he
could ? He hates evil as I do ; but, like a lawyer with an
utterly indefensible client, he struggles to show a case
where there is none, and tries to defend an incongruous
rabble of half-formed and contradictory conceptions, mostly
remnants and tatters of old superstitions, loosely and unsymmetrically strung together on verbal threads, and col
lectively called God. It is pitiable to see a man of his
intellect and goodness engaged in hot conflict defending
error against truth, and palliating and excusing all evil for
the sake of the fancied author of it all.
�ATHEISM OR THEISM ?
27
LETTER VI.
From Mr. G. St. Clair to Mr. J. Symes.
I regret that Mr. Symes should persist in speaking con
temptuously of the Deity. The little matter of the little
g ” in the name of God, if it was the printer’s fault, he
now makes his own. He considers he is not called upon to
give a capital G to a myth. No, but until he has proved God
to be a myth, he must allow the possibility of his existence;
and he ought to speak respectfully. In this third letter he
uses language about the Deity which renders it painful for
me to continue this discussion. It is a smaller matter that
he should forget the courtesy due to an opponent, and
insinuate a want of candour, as he does by “ now pressing
me to be candid.”
The question we were to discuss is set forth thus : “ Is
Atheism or Theism the more rational ? ” As Mr. Symes is
a professed Atheist, one would expect him to advance
reasons for believing that Atheism is rational, that there is
Ho God, and that the word ought to be spelt with a small g.
But it would be a difficult task, and as yet he has not at
tempted it. He would have to explain how things came to
be as they are without any intelligence either originating,
guiding, or controlling. His position is, that the eye was
not made to see with, the teeth were not made for mastica
tion, the human frame was not made at all. Like Topsy,
he “ specks it growed !” He knows that steam-engines do
Hot grow, except under the hand and mind of intelligent
engineers, but he thinks that human bodies do. He is
aware that telescopes and opera glasses have to be fashioned,
but he imagines that that'more wonderful instrument, the
human eye, is a sort of accident. Human intelligence has
grown up out of the dust; and there is no other origin for a
mother’s love or a martyr’s self-devotion. There is intelli
gence in every workshop, and at the head of every successful
business in the world, but none presiding over the universe.
Out of the fountain head have come greater things than
ever were in it. These are a few of the things which Mr.
�28
ATHEISM OR THEISM ?
Symes has to defend and show to be rational. No wonder
that he defers the task !
He has not even fairly set about the alternative task of
showing Theism to be irrational. I have let him know
that I believe in an intelligent creator of man, worthy to be
called God because of the greatness of his power and the
goodness displayed in his operations. I have explained that
by “ creator ” of man I mean former of man out of pre
existing materials, and author of him as man. I have
urged that this belief of mine is rational, because the human
frame is a machine—in fact, much more, for it is a compli
cation of machines and instruments—and all machines and
instruments at all comparable to the bodily parts and organs
have required intelligence to form them. Telescopes are made,
and for a purpose; so must eyes have been: steam-engines
are made, and for a purpose, and so is the machine of the
human body. This is my rational belief. To deny these
things is to deny that similar effects require similar causes
to produce them, and is quite irrational. But instead of
showing my Theism to be irrational my opponent sets forth
a form of Theism which is irrational, and, therefore, easy to
refute, and picks out some inconsistencies in that. His
method may be summarised as follows:—“ Theism is belief
in an infinite God, a God of infinite power can do all things,
a God of infinite goodness would do all good things, but all
conceivable good things have not been done, therefore, a
God does not exist.” But this argument is fallacious : all
that follows is that either the power or the goodness of God
is less than infinite, and 1 have shown that we have no
right to credit the Deity with a power of effecting impossi
bilities. Omnipotence must be limited in that sense and to
that extent, and we must not expect to see contradictions
reconciled. God’s goodness I defend, and undertake to
show the inconclusiveness of anything which may be urged
against it. I do not contend for infinite power in the sense
of power to effect impossibilities. I do not deny almightiness if properly defined; though it is not essential to my
argument to contend for it, since something less than
almightiness may have sufficed for the creation of man.
Mr. Symes does waste ink in trying to commit me to his
absurd definition of Deity. The “infinite God” whom he
considers that he demolishes is only the image which he
�ATHEISM OR THEISM ?
29
himself had set up and wrongly exhibited as mine. I can
not allow it is mine any the more because he has found one
something like it in “Webster’s Dictionary.” Certainly,
when he demanded definitions, I said that a dictionary
might serve his purpose at that stage ; but I did not say it
would serve or satisfy me at all stages. Mr. Symes also
amuses me by his awkward gymnastics in the ocean of the
infinite. I followed him into the deep just to drive him out ;
so now he tries to get to shore before me, and shouts out
that it is I who am dabbling in the bottomless sea. Seeing
that I am leaving the waters, he tries to entice me back
again. He protests that he will now be reasonable. He
will confess himself confuted and confounded if I will afford
him, in my third letter, a real exhibition of my Deity!
Very likely; but I really cannot allow myself to make the
attempt. Regarding myself as only a creature, inferior to
my Creator, I do not presume to comprehend all his great
ness, so as to be able to give an exact description, or paint
an adequate portrait. I have heard of genii being induced
to go into a bottle, and I can imagine a Goliath taking a
Tom Thumb in his hand; but I for my part do not profess
to have th’s superiority over God. To define God would be
to chalk out his limits. As I decline to contend for a Deity
possessing contradictory infinities, my opponent wishes to pin
me to the equally foolish alternative of a God with no infinity
at all, a very limited marionette figure, such as I might
comprehend all round and put forth upon the stage for
Mr. Symes to laugh at. If God is not infinite in all senses,
I am to describe him ! But I do not feel shut up to any
such dilemma. God is the intelligent Being who consciously
and deliberately gave existence to man.
Mr. Symes complains that “ intelligent Creator of man ”
is no description. I have not promised a description, and
my argument does not require it. I judge that man had a
maker, as I judge that Cologne cathedral had an architect.
The architect of that cathedral is not known ; his name has
not come down to us, and no description could be given that
should distinguish him from others ; but the cathedral is
sufficient evidence that he existed. It is more rational to
believe in an architect than to disbelieve. I defend the
rationality of believing in God. I am not bound to give an
exact description of him. The question “ What was he
�30
ATHEISM OR THEISM?
before creating man ? ” I am not obliged to answer. I offer
Mr. Symes the “stubborn Theistic facts” which he asks for.
Human eyes are instruments superior to opera-glasses;
opera-glasses are designed for a purpose, and formed only
under intelligent direction; therefore nothing less than
intelligence will account for the existence of human eyes.
The human frame is a machine, including within itself
several subordinate machines of engines and levers ; repeat "
the above argument. A mother’s affection is intended for !
the good of her offspring, for the preservation of its life, for
securing the succession of generations ; and yet this affection
is not accounted for by saying it is of human origination ;
it owes its origin to the author of life, who planned the
succession of generations. These are Theistic facts, so
stubborn that no Atheist can satisfactorily dispose of them,
if I may judge from such attempts as I have seen As I
gave my opponent two out of these three facts before, he
had no ground for crying out that he has nothing but
shadows to contend with.
I define omnipotence to be the power of doing all things
not involving contradiction and impossibility. Mr. Symes
questions whether this view is new. I am not much con
cerned about that: it is the view I hold and I challenge
him to prove it irrational. He says he never heard of
“ omnipotence ” being used to signify the power to do im
possible things. If, then, my view is the only one he has
ever heard of, why does he ridicule it and allude to it as
semi-theistic? why does he say the orthodox divinity is
superior to mine ? why does he complain that I give him no
sight of the deity I worship ? But in truth my opponent
himself assumes that omnipotent goodness ought to do im
possible things—ought to give us the full-blown flower of
creation before the bud, and accomplish grand results
without processes involving incidental evil. He wishes me
to explain to him how it is that a God, such as I believe in,
cannot make such a world as is asked for. I have only to
say that no God could do it, because all operations must
have a beginning, a process and an end, and no conceivable
power, out of Hibernia, can make the end come before the
beginning. Will my opponent show me how it is to be
done ? Will he state a method by which the earth and
moon may be allowed to keep their present orbits, and light
�ATHEISM OR THEISM ?
o1
01
remain subject to its present laws, and yet eclipses be
rendered impossible ? Can he devise a human body that
can live and move and yet not be at all composed of flesh
subject to wounds ? Does he not see that a great and good
result may carry some minor undesirable concomitants along
with it ? Does he think he could show that any of the
evils he complains of are not of this sort ?
He seems to have great difficulty in grasping the thought
that all operations imply a process, take up time, and
involve incidental results which are not directly bargained
for. They may not be desired, yet may be foreseen and
accepted, because they lie in the path by which greater good
is to be attained. Mr. Symes says that he points out the
misdeeds and shows up the criminal conduct of God, and that
when he does so I reply, “ Yes, but he couldn’t help it.”
This is my opponent’s way of admitting that when he
charges the sufferings of mortals upon the Deity, as a Being
who could prevent them but will not, I have a reply for
him. I show that instead of limiting God’s good intent and
beneficent action, it is equally a solution of the difficulty if
we suppose a limitation of power. Then I show that limita
tions actually exist, in the ever-present conditions under
which operations are performed and ends wrought out. This
view of mine, which I reverently maintain, the language
of my opponent grossly misrepresents as equivalent to
making God “ the most unfortunate victim of circumstances
that ever lived.” It makes him and it leaves him almighty.
The alternative would have been to maintain that the power
of deity is without limits of any sort—that he can make
squares without angles, or diffuse a limited quantity of
material through a greater space without spreading it thinner.
This might have pleased Mr. Symes, who now parades
“the orthodox divinity who never loses his power, the oldfashioned Christian God with whom all things were pos
sible.” He never heard of any view of omnipotence different
from that which I maintain ; but he has heard of this oldfashioned Christian God so different from mine, and thinks
such a conception of God preferable. Naturally so, because
it is the conception which he feels able to demolish, as it is
composed of inconsistent parts.
Mr. Symes, unable to comprehend the temporary use of
scaffolding, except for human builders, inquires how long
�32
ATHEISM OR THEISM ?
evil must last to be inconsistent with goodness ? Probably
as long as the good process which necessitates it as a con
comitant is still proceeding, and has not got beyond the
stage which requires it. I am surprised it should appear1
to Mr. Symes’s intelligence that the evil which is compatible
with goodness for a limited time, may as well be so for ever.
A stormy voyage may be endured because of the desirability
of migrating to a better country; but surely the storms
must be differently regarded if it is known that they are to
be perpetual and there is no port to be reached. Mr. Symes
forms his impression of the storms while he is sea-sick,
and refuses beforehand to find any compensation in reaching
the haven of rest. Suppose the storms go, he maintains
that the crime of their introduction or creation remains.”
He persists in charging all evils upon the Deity as crimes, as
though he knew enough of the ultimate issues of things to
justify him in saying there has been the least departure
from wise and good arrangements. If impossibilities could
be effected we might have the fruit before the bud, and ripe
apples before sour ones. If Mr. Symes is going to be
reasonable he must not ask for such things. He does ask
for them when he demands wisdom before ignorance and
declares that a good and wise God would not have left his
creatures ignorant of anything necessary to be known. And
he does ask for them, in my opinion, when he complains
against God on account of any evil whatever. He cannot
show that whatever is is not best, in the sense of being the
best possible at the present stage of the general progress.
As usual I leave much unsaid for want of space.
LETTER VII.
From Mr. J. Symes to Mr. G. St. Clair.
Mr. St. Clair’s third is no stronger in facts or arguments
than his two former letters. It would, however, be unkind
to grumble, as he cannot present a strong case for Theism,
for the very sufficient reason that no such case exists.
He complains of my “ language about the deity.” Well,
in that he shows himself as unreasonable, though not so
cruel, as Nebuchadnezzar when he sent the three Hebrews
�ATHEISM OR THEISM ?
33
to the fiery furnace for refusing to worship his image. Mr.
St. Clair thinks I should “ advance reasons for believing
Atheism to be rational.” Each of my letters has teemed
with such reasons, not one of which has been yet refuted.
Has my opponent read what I have written ? I have also
shown how irrational it is to believe in a good and omni
potent god. The facts of nature proclaim aloud that no
good god exists; and there does not exist one fact, or one
aggregation of facts, to warrant the belief that an omni
potent god lives. Therefore Mr. St. Clair’s belief is
irrational. The believers in Mumbo Jumbo, the infalli
bility of the Pope, transubstantiation, or witchcraft, are not
more irrational than a Theist. They all believe, no doubt,
sincerely enough, but without any adequate reason.
In my last I expressed the anticipation that my opponent
would in his next argue the omnipotence of his deity from
his “ inability to remove evils.” Mr. St. Clair, in the
penultimate paragraph of his third letter, obligingly fulfils
my prediction by affirming that “ a limitation of power ”
, . . “ makes and leaves god almighty.”
Mr. St. Clair takes umbrage at my request that he would
be “ candid.” The request arose from that reference to the
dictionary and its necessary connexions. I do not yet know
whether the dictionary contains a definition he approves.
It seems to me—I may be in error—but it seems to me that
candor would have set me at rest on that before now.
At length Mr. St. Clair plunges into the Design Argu
ment—the most fallacious and ill founded of all the argu
ments for divine existence.
1. Adaptation argues an adapter, and an intelligent one.
Does it? Water is as well adapted for drowning land
animals as it is for marine animals to live in. Fire is
beautifully adapted to burn men; falling stones, trees, etc.,
storms, floods, explosions, fevers, famines, wild beasts, earth
quakes, and a thousand other evils are delightfully fitted to
kill them. Old age, too, will do it equally well. It cannot
be denied that the processes of decay and destruction show
as much regularity of action and as perfect adaptation of
means to ends as the processes which result in life. Perhaps
Mr. St. Clair regards an earthquake, a cantier, or any other
destructive agency as a “ sort of accident;” he fails to see,
probably, how beautifully, cunningly, and maliciously
�34
ATHEISM OR THEISM ?
they are fitted for their work of destruction and misery 1
Certain skin diseases, tic-doloreux, sciatica, cramps, the
stone—how beautifully they are all adapted to the work of
inflicting pain ! Racks, wheels, stakes, gyves, “ boots,”
thumbscrews, bastinadoes, swords, guns, etc., are all made,
and argue or imply makers ; but earthquakes, plagues, frost
and snow, floods, famines, wild beasts, fevers, small-pox,
cancer, and what not, are immensely superior as agents of
pain and death, and yet Mr. St. Clair seems to see no design
in them, and fails to recognise the existence of a perfectly
malignant god, who made them all for his own pleasure !
Can perversity of intellect proceed farther? My worthy
opponent can readily enough perceive the design and the
malice of an infernal machine, and yet fails to recognise
the design and the malice of diseases and famines! He
recognises the folly or the malice of warriors, murderers,
and tyrants who kill or torture a few; and yet cannot admit
that there must be an omnipotent god, who cunningly con
trives and maliciously sets in motion the grand and perfect
machinery of nature to destroy all living things 1 He admits
the existence of folly and malice amongst mankind, and yet
refuses to admit that far greater folly and malice “ preside
over the universe ! ”
Of course, it cannot rationally be contended that god is
infinitely foolish and malicious, though he is “ perfectly” so.
He cannot do “ impossibilities,” nor things involving “ con
tradiction.” He found matter to his hand, and had to work
under the “ same condition of labor ” that men work under ;
and so, though the universe is not absolutely and infinitely
bad, yet it is as bad as the deity could possibly make it.
And, further, we are not to argue that because some scraps
of good, or seeming good, really do exist, that therefore the
good is eternal; for “ limited good for a limited time ” may
be consistent with perfect evil, and the deity is working by
various agencies to remove all good from his universe; and
then nought but evil will remain for ever!
There is Mr. St. Clair’s argument simply reversed.
2. But I must notice in detail the very few natural pheno
mena my opponent condescends to mention. The eye he
instances as a proof of design and beneficent divine work
manship. He says it is superior to opera-glasses. The best
eyes, no doubt, are better than opera-glasses. But our best
�ATHEISM OR THEISM ?
35
telescopes and microscopes far transcend the eye as optical
instruments. Its qualities are coarse and rudimentary com
pared with theirs. Eyes ! They are beautiful and ugly,
of good color and of disagreeable ; there are blear eyes,
goggle eyes, squint eyes, wall eyes ; color-blindness is a
defect observed in many thousands. Millions upon millions
of eyes never see at all. Were they made to see with ?
Had a beneficent creator made eyes, he would have
ensured their good performance. Had he meant them
for human advantage, he would have turned out
respectable workmanship. I wonder he did not do that
for his own credit. What optician could follow his example ?
All over the civilised world are ophthalmic institutions,
where men are constantly engaged patching up, or actually
improving, the work of Mr. St. Clair’s divine manufacturer,
who made eyes of water, jelly and soft fibres, whereas they
should have been made of hard and tough material, so that
disarrangement and destruction were next to impossible.
And these eyes, good, bad, useless, are palmed off upon us
by the maker, whether we like them or not. He gives no
guarantee for their performance either, as a respectable
jnanufacturei’ would, nor does he ever repair them when
dace out of order. There is no sense of honesty, decency or
shame in this deity. If he bestows eyes as a duty, they
ought all to be good ; if out of charity, it is a mockery to
give a poor wretch the eyes we often see !
If the eye is a divinely-manufactured article, as Mr. St.
Clair says (without attempting to prove it), then the worker
knew less of optics than I do, or else carelessly did his
work. The eye is not achromatic, and it has too many
lenses, the many surfaces of which waste light. It has the
defect of astigmatism, which shows that its maker did not
know much of mathematical optics. This grand instru
ment, the crowning work of an almighty god, has two
odd curves in the front—that is, in the cornea.
Everyone knows that the common run of spectacles
have a longer curve horizontally than perpendicularly,
and so has the eye !
Our best lenses are ground to
mathematical correctness, and the same curve prevails all
over the same side ; but the eye is herein defective. Hence
we cannot see, at the distance of clear vision, a horizontal
and perpendicular line distinctly at once : one of them is in
�36
ATHEISM OR THEISM ?
focus when the other is out. Had there been a wise and
beneficent creator, he would long since have corrected this
defect, for opticians pointed it out generations ¡fince in
their critiques upon the eye. The eye, therefore, if made at
all, must be considered as the work of a mere amateur, and
-of one who worked more for his own amusement than for
human welfare.
3. The teeth! First of all, we are born without any;
later we “cut” them in misery, convulsions, often at the
expense of life.' The teeth thus cut are not permanent,
after all; in a few years they drop out, or are pushed out
by the so-called permanent teeth. And these!—in many
cases they begin to decay in a very few years ; henceforth
the victim of this dishonest tooth-maker is subject to tooth
ache, neuralgia, and dyspepsia. He also has to go to the
expense of new teeth, stuffing, etc., if he can afford them.
And may I ask my opponent what he would think of a
dentist who furnished him with teeth that ached, and
and decayed, and tumbled out ? What would he say if any
dentist treated him half so badly as his deity treats thousands?
If eyes and teeth are really manufactured by deity, Mr. St.
Clair must refute my criticisms, or admit that his deity is a
clumsy or careless worker, and also very dishonest and cr^jel.
These facts must be met and explained before Theism can
be shown to be rational.
4. But Mr. St. Clair seems to me virtually to give up all
possible right to use the Design Argument by admitting, as
he does, the independent existence of matter. If there be a
mystery in nature, then the existence of matter is that
mystery. And, further, there must be, from the nature of the
case, as much, at least, as much, if not more, design and
adaptation in the very elements of matter as in any living
thing. And, further still, I am not aware that anyone has
yet drawn the line between living matter and non-living
matter, nor have I any reason to suppose such a line
possible. All matter is probably alive, and always was
so, and ever will be so, though in far different degrees.
I affirm, too, that the adaptation between the molecules,
or atoms, or whatever the ultimate elements of matter may
be called, must be more perfect than between the parts of a
man. No man is perfect; nor is his best organ beyond the
range of adverse criticism. No man is perfectly adapted to
�ATHEISM Oli THEISM ?
37
his environment—at best his adaptation is but a makeshift,
a “ roughing it,” a period of unstable equilibrium, a tight
rope dance for dear life, with absolute certainty in every
case of a fatal fall by way of finale.
Turning from man, look at the ocean. Its waves swell
and roar and break a million million times ; but its water
changes not. Its atoms of hydrogen and oxygen are in
perfect equilibrium, in perfect mutual adaptation. So was
it when the first water flowed ; so will it be for ever. And
could that adaptation, so perfect, so absolute, so time-defy
ing, be the result of an accident, or natural result of merely
natural forces, as Mr. St. Clair implies ? And will he con
tend that the most perfect adaptations require no adapter,
while asserting that the imperfect, evanescent, and miserable
adaptations seen in man required for their production
an almighty and intelligent god ? To do so may be
prime theology, but it is not philosophy, nor science, nor
reason.
Mr. St. Clair now admits that he cannot define deity. I
suspected as much—he has no deity to define. Then why
does he contend for what he does not understand ? Like
the woman of Samaria, he “ worships he knows not what.”
“A mother’s affection is intended for the good of her off
spring,” my opponent informs me. It is impossible that he
can know that it is “ intended” for anything; that it does
effect the good of her offspring, though not invariably, is at
once conceded. What more does Mr. St. Clair know about
it ? And what is a mother’s hate “ intended ” for ? And
this hate “ owes its origin to the author of life.” Rabbits
frequently eat their young; is that also at the instigation
of deity ? Such arguments as my opponent deals in are
not “ Theistic facts,” as he supposes; they are merely
superstitious fictions unworthy the respect of a man
like Mr. St. Clair. To talk about deity caring for a
mother’s offspring is to me simply shocking. Who is
it' kills children in millions by measles, whooping cough,
convulsions, fever, small-pox, by earthquake, flood and
famine ? If there really does exist a deity, he kills millions of
children every century by famine. Has Mr. St. Clair ever
reflected on that fact ? Why, if a mother’s love has any
“ intention ” at all, it is to defend her child as long as
possible against the murderous attacks of this very deity,
�88
ATHEISM OR THEISM ?
who meets us at every turn and “ seeks to kill us ” at every
stage of life.
Will Mr. St. Clair give me one proved Theistic fact in
his next ?
LETTER VIII.
From Mr. Gr. St. Clair to Mr. J. Symes.
Robinson Crusoe was puzzled as to his whereabouts in the
great ocean, but he was able to explore his little island;
and he might have made canoe voyages and gradually
extended the area of his knowledge, though hopeless of
including all the world. Mankind, in like manner, have
mapped the solar system, and delved down to the Silurian
rocks with their fossils, and they find their knowledge real
and useful, though it brings them no nearer to the beginning
of time or the boundaries of space. Our inability to com
prehend the Infinite is not a reason for undervaluing the
things within our reach. It is foolish to say we explain
nothing, because we cannot fully understand the first origin.
Things are explained, in a degree which gives the mind
some satisfaction, when we trace them back to their causes.
The trade winds, for instance, are accounted for by the
sun’s heat and the earth’s rotation : and this explanation is
not rendered inaccurate by pointing out that the cause of
the earth’s rotation is not known, and that the sun’s heat
itself requires accounting for. I, in my Crusoe fashion,
explore, and am obliged to be content with something less
than infinite knowledge. I trace some things to man’s intel
ligent action as their cause, and am convinced that certain
steam-engines, pumps, microscopes, &c., would not have
existed but for his operation. I find other things which I
can only explain by ascribing them to an intelligence which
is not man’s. The worker is not seen, but the work is seen;
and I know there must have been an architect of the human
frame, as I know there must have been a designer of
Cologne cathedral.
The human eye would be enough evidence if I had no
other. “ Was the eye constructed without skill in optics ? ”
asks that great mathematician, Sir Isaac Newton—“ or the
�ATHEISM OR THEISM?
S9
ear without knowledge of sounds ? ” The argument is a
thousand-fold stronger for regarding the human frame as a
designed structure taking it as a whole ; for the eye stands
to the body only as the east window to the cathedral. The
teeth are a beautiful apparatus, surpassing human inven
tions, when we consider their growth, their enamelled pro
tective covering, their office, and their position at the
entrance of the alimentary canal, in proximity to the
tongue and the sources of saliva. The valves in the blood- vessels are so manifestly placed there with a view of securing
the circulation of the blood that Harvey inferred the Crea
tor’s intention, and so was guided to his discovery. It is a
question which all great investigators ask—“ What is the
creative intention in this arrangement ?■ ” for they find it a
clue to discovery. I must not linger over the human body:
let Atheists read Paley, Brougham, and Bell, and some of
them will give up their Atheism and take to refuting Mr.
Symes’s worn-out objections. Every creature is admirably
adapted to its mode of life and to the element in which
it lives. If we desired to give the body of a fish the best
form for moving through the water we should have to
fashion it as a solid of least resistance. “ A very difficult
chain of mathematical reasoning, by means of the highest
branches of algebra, leads to a knowledge of the curve which,
by revolving on its axis, makes a solid of this shape ....
and the curve resembles closely the face or head part of a
fish.” Let the young reader, perplexed by Mr. Symes’s
objections, read more of this in Lord Brougham’s “ Objects,
Advantages and Pleasures of Science.” The feathers of the
wings of birds are found to be placed at the best possible
angle for assisting progress by their action on the air. In
the Duke of Argyll’s “ Reign of Law ” there is a chapter
concerning the admirable mechanism of the bird’s wing. A
bird is heavier than the air in which it is sustained, and it
has to make headway against a resisting atmosphere. Man’s
poor attempts to make wings usually result in the disaster
of Imlac in Dr. Johnson’s “ Rasselas ” ; man’s attempts to
navigate the air by balloons are so poor that the Customs
Officers have no fear of being eluded. If we wish to see
how material laws can be so bent as to effect a designed
purpose we must study the problem of a bird’s flight.
Leaving birds for insects, how marvellous it is that the
�40
ATHEISM OR THEISM?
cabbage butterfly should always lay its eggs on the cabbage,
the leaves of which are so suited for the nourishment of the
young grubs, and will be so much relished! That butter
fly has no taste for cabbage leaves itself, and it will not live
to see its offspring, yet its instinct—which is not of its own
creation—guides it aright. These are samples of Theistic
facts, in one department. When Mr. Symes has dealt with
them I can furnish more.
In my Crusoe fashion, I discern an intelligence at work
which is not my own, nor that of my brother man, which
immensely transcends mine and his, though, with my Crusoe
limitations, I have not the means of deciding the measure
of its greatness. I discern a worker, whether infinite or
not—a worker operating under conditions, whether the con
ditions be self-imposed or not. He accomplishes many
things which I can appreciate ; He seems to be working
out greater purposes which I do but dimly grasp.
As an evolutionist I discern something of a purpose
running through the ages, independent of the will of kings
and legislators. I perceive a gradual advance to higher
platforms of life, at present culminating in man. Man did
not come until the earth had been prepared for him, and
stores of coal and iron laid up for his use. Apparently he
could not come without lower creatures preceding him ;
because he had to be born from them. As a race, we have
had to go through our schooling, for in no other way could
we become educated; our struggle with difficulty makes
men of us, unless we neutralise it by taking the discipline
sulkily. Had the Creator been perpetually at our elbow to
do our lessons for us, to work for us while we slept, and to
help us over all stiles, we should never have attained intel
lectual manhood and moral strength. Man is progressing
still, and therefore will be a nobler creature by and bye.
His surroundings are subject to an evolution and improve
ment, which advances pari passu with himself. He himself
is the Creator’s latest-fashioned and best-adapted instru
ment for effecting these desirable adaptations, commissioned
to carry on and carry out some of the highest purposes of
God. It is a great thing to be conscious of this ; and I am
bold to say that thousands of good people are conscious of
communion with a Higher Soul, of inspirations received
from him, and of tasks assigned by him, the act omplish*
4
�ATHEISM OR THEISM?
41
meut of which is another phrase for co-operation with him
and doing his will on earth.
This Divine Worker seems to be limited by “the con
ditions of all work.” rAs regards ourselves and our own
work, we candlbt conceive how we could live at all in a
dreamy, shifting, chance world, not subject to fixed con
ditions. We are finite and conditioned, and cannot realise
an utterly different kind of existence. It would follow from
this alone that anything which the Creater may do with us
or for us must be conformable to the conditions of the
world we live in if it is to be comprehensible to us. Although,
therefore, He be great beyond all assignable limits, he must
necessarily look limited to us. Where we see him operating
we see him making use of natural forces, moulding and
directing them. The natural forces in themselves are neither
moral nor immoral—steam, electricity, and strychnine have
no conscience, and are not to be blamed or praised for their
effects. They may be turned to good uses or to bad uses—
strychnine to poison or to relieve, steam to work a locomo
tive or propel a murderous bullet. We infer a worker and
his moral character from the use made of natural forces.
Mr. Symes does not distinguish between forces working
blindly and forces working under intelligent direction, but
insists on ascribing all results to God, or else none. This
is not what I discern, for I perceive that some things have
been contrived by some Intelligence, and of other things I
do not perceive it.
An enlightened evolutionist ought to know that “ Evil ”
is “ Good in the making.” It has been so in the past,
again and again. Perfect goodness is producing more and
more good constantly (evil, as Spencer shows, is evanes
cent) and may probably produce infinite good in the course
of time. But Mr. Symes is not content to have it produced,
he wants his bread before the cake is baked.
Mr. Symes finishes his last by asking “Will I give him one
proved Theistic fact?” Well, something depends upon
what is allowed to be “ proof,” and that again depends upon
whether you have to convince a man of common sense or a
man of uncommon obstinacy. If folk possess eyes it is no
guarantee that light will reach their minds, if they choose
to live in a camera obscura. My opponent closes the shutters
and then complains that things are dark. What can I do
�42
ATHEISM OR THEISM?
with a man who does not believe that eyes are given him
to see with ? On the same principle his faculties are not
given him to enable him either to reason correctly or to
understand arguments. Perhaps I ought not to be surprised
that my proofs are thrown away upon him.
1 have noticed in going through a cut-glass manufactory
that although the workmen are skilful and the processes are
ingenious by which the crude “ metal” is blown, annealed,
ground on wheels of iron for the pattern, and on wheels of
stone and wood for smoothing and polishing—I have noticed
that accidents are liable to occur at every stage, and some
few cruets, wine-glasses, decanters, etc., get broken and
thrown into the waste tub. But if I want to see what is
being produced, and was designed before it was manufac
tured, I go not to the waste-tub, but to the show-room.
Certainly even a fractured salt-cellar in the waste-tub
would show design—a formative design accidently baulked,
not a design to produce fracture and waste—but a wise man
will rather go to the show-room. Mr. Symes, I imagine,
would go to the waste-tub and refuse to see anything out
side of it. He invites us to contemplate blind eyes, rotten
teeth and people suffering from cancer. He assures us that
had a beneficent Creator made our eyes He would have
ensured their good performance. I should reply that He
does so. “ Not in all cases,” says my querulous friend,
“ why I find squinting eyes and blind eyes, and here are
ophthalmic institutions ! ” True, man’s heart of pity leads
him to heal. Man’s intelligence enables him to understand
something of optics. In both respects he is growing up in
the ways of his Heavenly Father. The modest Newton
admired the Divine skill in optics: but Mr. Symes claims
to “ know more of optics himself,” and to be able to teach
the Creator his business. The eye “ought to have been made
not of water, jelly, and soft fibres, but of hard and tough
material.” Surely Alphonso of Castile has come back again.
That monarch said that had he been of the privy council of
the Deity he could have advised the formation of the solar
system on a better plan ! Had he said this concerning the
actual solar system instead of against the false system of
Ptolemy, it would have been irreverent, not to say blasphe
mous. I count it rather inconsistent in Mr. Symes to want
any uyes at all, as he thinks they were not made to see with
�ATHEISM OR THEISM ?
43
and are an endlass bother. Perhaps the hard and tough one£
which he would substitute would be faulty in their re
fraction (for all work is conditioned by the material).
Can my opponent assure me that it would not be so ? Has
he got any of these eyes ready-made, and do they answer
perfectly ? or is this an empty boast of his about improving
upon the Creator’s work ? I doubt not that there is a good
reason for employing soft humors and delicate fibres in the
eye, and then I admire the care and wisdom which have
provided so well for the protection of such a delicate organ,
by the position given to it, in a bony socket defended by lids
and lashes and ramparts. “ But the eye lacks achromatism,
and has the defect of astigmatism, and follows the pattern
of inferior spectacle-glasses in having two curves in the
cornea.” Rather random assertions these : take for instance
the first. Chromatism is color-ism; a double convex lens
or magnifying glass causes objects to appear with rainbow
colored fringes. This was a defect for a long time in
telescopes, and telescopes free from the defect are called
achromatic. Well, are we troubled and inconvenienced by
seeing these colored fringes when we use the naked eye ?
Is any reader conscious of it ? Now what is the fact ? All
telescopes were defective in this particular, and Sir I.
Newton had said that there could be no remedy, until it
occurred to an ingenious optician that the difficulty must
have been overcome by the Maker of the eye. So he
examined the eye till he discovered how it was overcome,
and then by imitation of the Creator’s method invented the
first achromatic telescope. I would call my opponent’s
attention to this, but I suppose it is of no use ; he will
persist in regarding the eyes as clumsy workmanship and in
complaining that they are palmed off upon us whether we
like it or not. The traveller Vambery mentions that in
Bokhara they punish slaves by gouging out their eyes. Mr.
Symes, to be consistent, ought not to protest against the
■cruelty, since in his estimation it involves no loss, and the
Chief cruelty is in having the eyes thrust upon us. But in
answer to his astounding assertion that the eye is not
respectable workmanship and that the best telescopes far
transcend it as optical instruments, it is sufficient to say
that we can see with our eyes, unaided by telescopes, whereas
we cannot see with telescopes unaided by eyes.
�44
ATHEISM OR THEISM ?
My opponent not only damns his eyes, but curses his
Jreth. First because he is born without them! On his
theory this ought to be an advantage, so far as it goes. But,
considering that other beautiful provision of the beneficent
Creator, which supplies a fountain of milk for the infant
lips to draw from, teeth are not only not required for a milk
diet, but would be inconvenient to the mother. Then Mr.
Symes cries out, “ We cut them in misery! ” He is always
afraid of a little pain. “The first set are not permanent.”
No, becau-e the child will grow, the jaws will lengthen, and
there will be room enough for larger teeth, and for thirtytwo instead of twenty. Mr. Symes, as a child, had less
jaw; which reminds me, however, of a pun made by John
Hunter, the famous surgeon. While he was once lecturing,
and pointing out that in the higher animals the jaw is
shorter, while the intelligence, of course, is greater, his
pupils were chattering nonsense to one another. “ Gentle
men,” said Hunter, “let us have more intellect and less
jaw!” I don’t know whether those young men had attained
their wisdom-teeth. Mr. Symes is annoyed that even the
second set of teeth are subject to neuralgia and decay.
This he considers a great Atheistic fact. The evil appa
ratus of the teeth is thrust upon us in the same cruel
manner as our clumsily-made eyes, and we may any day
have an attack of neuralgia. At length, however, the
teeth decay and leave us, and then what do we do ? Why,
it appears, we have to go to the expense of a new set, so
essential are they, and this is made an additional subject of
complaint! By the bye, I suppose I must not pass over the
question put—what should I say if a dentist supplied me
with teeth that ached ? I should say that he was cleverer
than any other dentist I had met with, for the aching was
proof that he had connected the teeth with nerves, and made
them live. I should say I was glad to have living teeth in.
my mouth, instead of dead ivory, and that I was satisfied
the teeth were contrived for me to eat with, while their very
occasional aching was only an unpleasant incident, and per
haps brought on by my own folly. Careful people will not
often catch cold in the face, and good, moral people will not
so devote themselves to Venus and mercury that their teeth
fall out.
Let us come to adaptations. Of course I am not going.
�ATHEISM OR THEISM ?
45
to be pinned to any definition which makes adaptation the
same thing as design. Some adaptations may not be
designed. There’s a distinction to be drawn between mere
fitness to produce a result, and purposive fitness which intends
to secure the result. But Mr. Symes as usual does not
perceive distinctions which make all the difference. He
says that water is adapted for drowning and fire for burning.
Granted: but are they purposely adapted, deliberately
designed and fitted ? This is the very essence of the question.
When the jeweller’s boy drops a watch, gravity and “ the
law of falling bodies” are adapted to smash it; but that is
an accidental adaptation, not to be compared with the
adaptation of part to part in the construction of the watch
—not to be compared with it, but rather contrasted.
Humpty-Dumpty had a great fall, and the egg thus smashed
could not say that gravity was unadapted to produce the
result ; but compare this with the purposive adaptation of
an egg, as I will now epitomise it from Professor Owen’s
lecture on “ Design.” An egg is made convex and dome
like, to bear the weight of the sitting bird. It contains a
whitish spot, which is the germ, in which the development
of the chick begins. The germ is on one side of the yolk,
quite near to the shell, for it is necessary that it should be
brought as close as possible to the hot brooding skin of the
sitting hen. Now it is a fact that though you take as many
eggs as you please, and turn them about as often as you
like, you will always find this opaque white spot at the
middle of the uppermost surface of the yolk. Hunter com
pared this phasnomenon to the movements of the needle to
the pole. Of course there is an apparatus -which secures
this result; but it is an apparatus, a piece of machinery.
“ As the vital fire burns up, organic material is reduced to
carbon ; a membrane, over which the blood spreads in a
net-work of minute vessels, like a gill or lung, then extends
from the embryo to the inner side of the shell, between it
and the white; the shell is made porous to allow the air
access to this temporary respiratory organ ; and the oxygen
combining with the carbon, it exhales as carbonic acid. As
the chick approaches the period of its extrication, it is able
to breathe by its proper lungs, and in the vesica aeris, or
collection of air at the great end of the egg, it finds the
wherewithal to begin its feeble inspirations, and to utter the
�46
ATHEISM OR THEISM ?
Jow chirp which may be heard just before it chips the shell.
And how does it effect this ? By means of a hard knob
specially formed upon the end of the upper beak, and which,
after it has done its work, disappears.” All this appears to
me something very different from the adaptedness of the
hard ground to break the egg if it falls; but Mr. Symes
would have us believe that the adaptation is of the same
sort! His words are, “ It cannot be denied that the pro
cesses of decay and destruction show as perfect adaptation i
of means to ends as processes which result in life.”
He argues that if anything is designed, earthquakes,
plagues, cancer, etc., are designed to cause pain, and must
be regarded as proving a malignant God. But can he show
that the fitness or adaptation in these agencies is purposive ?
I can see design in an infernal machine ; oh yes ! but I am
not convinced that earthquakes are an infernal arrangement,
much less that teeth are a diabolical invention because
they sometimes ache. The adaptedness of the teeth for
mastication bears the appearance of a good purpose; the
adaptedness of an earthquake to rock down houses is
not clearly purposive at all. There are influences of
destruction and of decay, I admit; but the constructive
operations are what I see design in. If I don’t attribute
the former to God, my opponent must not object, since he
does not either.
I have a word to say which must be fatal to this idea
that the forces of decay and destruction are purposive, if
any are, and prove a malignant deity. A malignant deity
finding pleasure in destruction, would soon destroy every
thing. But, in fact, the agencies which build up are
stronger than the agencies which destroy; construction
gains upon decay, good gains upon evil. For evil is evanes
cent as Herbert Spencer shows, in a chapter which Mr.
Symes will not deal with. Even if destruction had to be
ascribed to a destroying deity, construction would have to be
ascribed to a deity engaged in building up. Then, as the
same being would hardly build up with one hand and destroy
with the other, Mr. Symes would be landed in Dualism, or
the old Persian belief in two Gods. The further fact that
construction is gaining upon decay, good gaining upon evil,
would force him to admit that the good deity was the
stronger. The way out of this difficulty is only to be found
�ATHEISM OR THEISM ?
47
fai Theism as I advocate it—one God, operating under con|
ditions. One proof and test of this Theism consists in the
fact that evil and decay do not carry purpose on the face of
them, while organised adaptations do.
If the reader grasps this fact he will see through my
opponent’s curious attempt to turn my argument round and
make it appear equally good for proving the existence of a
malignant deity. He suggests such a being, “ laboring
under conditions ” which prevent infinite evil from being
effected at once, but “ working by various agencies to remove
all good from his universe.” He does not seem to see
that this implies a universe of “ good ” to begin with, and
that this is another form of his irrational demand that the
finished thing should exist before the crude and unwrought,
the perfect v^ork before there has been time for its elabora
tion. He wants his cake before it is baked, before the flour
is kneaded, before the wheat is grown.
LETTER IX.
From Mr. J. Symes to Mr. G. St. Clair.
Mr. St. Clair says he “ knows ” there must have been
an “ architect of the human frame,” as he knows there
must have been “ a designer of Cologne Cathedral.” Well,
then, the human frame must be an architectural production,
or building. Of what Order, of what Style is it ? I never
saw it described in any book on Architecture : how is that ?
So baseless is my opponent’s Theism that he confounds
language in order to support it. If he will prove that
man’s frame is an architectural structure, I will prove
Cologne Cathedral to be a mushroom, of an edible sort, too.
Mr. St. Clair having no case, no real god, no facts to
support his superstition, cherishing a blind belief in an
impossibility, resorts to the unconscious legerdemain of
deceiving himself and his readers by the use of poetical and
mythical language, in which the distinction between natural
objects and human manufactures is ignored, and a potato
is dubbed a building and a building designated a turnip.
This is what the “Design argument” resolves itself into;
and under its witchery, men, not otherwise unfair or
�4 <8
ATHEISM OR THEISM?
^logical, run through fantastic mazes of bewilderment,
vainly persuading themselves that they are reasoning, when
they arc only floundering in “ Serbonian bogs,” following
the Theistic will-o’-the-wisp, manifestly benighted and lost,
and yet assuring you with the utmost gravity that they and
they alone are perfectly self-possessed and well know their
whereabouts, and whither they are tending.
With Mr. St. Clair, teeth are yet a beautiful apparatus
designed and intended for mastication. Has he never
reflected that nutrition is totally independent of mastication
and teeth in countless millions of beings ? The child lives
without teeth, so does many an old man ; sheep and cows
have no front teeth in the upper jaw; the whale, the
dugong, the ornithorhynchus, ant-eaters, and all birds are
destitute of teeth. If presence of teeth argues design, what
does their absence argue ? If ^od gives a man teeth to eat
with, I presume he means him to cease eating when he
destroys them. Instead of that, my opponent and other
irreverent and disobedient Theists, either misunderstanding
or disregarding the divine intimation, rush away to the
dentist and get other teeth wherewith to obstruct the divinf
intentions ! Will he explain his conduct?
Of course, I admit that nature can in some departments
immensely exceed man, but that does not prove any exis
tence ctbopc nature. The valves of the blood-vessels are
manifestly placed there to secure the circulation of the
blood, says my opponent. He might as well affirm that a
river-bed is manifestly placed where it is to secure the flow
of the river that way. Which existed first, rivers or river
beds? Which existed first, valves or blood-circulation?
There is in the animal world abundant circulation without
valves or veins. The cetaceans (whales, dolphins, porpoises,
&c.) have no valves in their veins; and yet, I presume,
their blood circulates as well as ours. Circulation goes on
in a speck of protoplasm where there is no structure at all.
Even in organisms, the heart may be very diverse, and yet
serve the owner as well as we are served. In frogs, toads,
&c., there is but one ventricle; in most fish there is but one
auricle and one ventricle; in the lancelet there is but a
single tube. But their blood circulates as well as ours.
Had Mr. St. Clair’s deity felt any deep concern for
human welfare, he would have placed, had it occurred to
�ATHEISM OR THEISM ?
49
him, valves in the deep arteries, so that the poor wretcH
who ruptures one of them should not bleed to death.
I grew out of Paley, Brougham, and Bell’s theology years
ago. What naturalist or physiologist to-day shows any
respect to their crude Design argument ? Besides, Mr. St.
Clair has no right to refer to them; his god is not theirs—
theirs was almighty and infinitely wise; his a poor puny
thing for whom his single high priest is ever making
apologies.
If every creature were adapted, !< admirably ” or not, “to
the element in which it lives,” it wmuld never die. Geological
strata furnish absolute proofs that no creatures, no race of
creatures, were ever yet “ admirably adapted to their con
ditions.” Whole races have died out. Will my opponent
kindly explain ? Has he ever read of famines, coal-pit
disasters, earthquakes? What sort of a world does he live in?
Has he never passed a shambles or a cemetery ? Do the
creatures of his marvellously concocted god die of excessive
adaptation to their environments, or what ?
The fish is of just the right shape—the solid of hast
resistance fits it for its element. This looks learned and
imposing. But are all inhabitants of the water of one shape?
How is the solid of least resistance realized in the spermaceti
whale, with its big, blunt, square-fronted head ? In the
hammer-head? In the “ Portuguese man-of-war ? ” In
those slow ones that fall a prey to the swift ? Mr. St. Clair
reminds me of that venerable lady who could not sufficiently
admi re the ■wisdom of god in making rivers run down hill
and along the valleys. That, certainly, is a very strong
proof of divine existence; for rivers would run the other
way if there were no god, just as surely as fishes would be
of divers shapes, instead of being all of one pattern as they
now are, if there were not a god to make them all in his own
image.
The feathers of a bird’s wings are placed, I am informed,
at the “ best possible angle for assisting progress,” etc.
And cold is found in the best possible conditions for freezing
the early buds and blossoms and for killing men and children
exposed to it. Heat is well adapted to warming purposes.
Had there been no god, heat would probably freeze things,
and frost would roast, boil, or burn them. There is as much
design in the one case as in the other. Mr. St. Clair may
�50
ATHEISM OR THEISM?
next tell us the design in the wings of a penguin, a moa, or
an apteryx.
The cabbage butterfly deposits its eggs by instinct, says my
opponent. How does he know that sight or smell does not
guide it ? Has he consulted the insect ? What is instinct ?
And what right has Mr. St. Clair’s god to destroy my cabbages
by the disgusting caterpillars which spring from those eggs ?
Gardeners kill those caterpillars by myriads every year; but
the real destroyer of our gardens is Mr. St. Clair’s god.
Whose instinct or instigation leads the ichneumon to deposit
its eggs right in the body of a caterpillar, so that its
murderous brood should eat up their living host ? Whose
instinct guides the tapeworm to a human body ? Whose
instinct guides the locusts to lay waste a country and produce
a famine ?
My opponent says that butterflies and other objects men
tioned in his second paragraph are “ samples of theisti®'
facts.” So much the worse for deity and Theism, if true. I
had supposed, however, that Mr. St. Clair knew the differ
ence between Theology and Natural Science 1 Must I
enlighten him ? The eye and the circulation of the blood
are anatomical and physiological facts, not Theistic; birds
and fishes are subjects in zoology, and insects belong to the
sub-science of entomology. Cannibalism is as much, possibly
more, a Theistic fact as any yet named. Though if my
opponent will claim for his god the credit of creating all
noxious and destructive pests, including fleas, bugs, tape
worms, etc., I suppose an Atheist need not complain.
What my opponent says of “ discerning an intelligence
at work,” a “ worker .... whether infinite or not,” a
“ purpose running through the ages,” etc., is no doubt
borrowed from one of his discourses; and sure I am it
edified all the devout who listened to it. But discussion is
not a devotional exercise exactly, and I must beg him to
translate those liturgical scraps into plain language,
specially that about the “purpose running through the
ages.” The language is good ; I wonder if the purpose is.
I am in a fever-heat of anxiety to hear what it is my
opponent discerns, whether anyone else may get a glimpse
of it—at not too great a cost. The man that can “ discern
a purpose running through the ages ” of human history
must be either very much clearer sighted or immensely
�ATHEISM OB THEISM ?
51
more superstitious than anyone that I know. Indeed, I
must, till evidence be forthcoming, regard the boast as
nothing more than a rhetorical flourish. Is Mr. St. Clair a
clairvoyant, I wonder, or subject to second sight ?
“Man,” we are gravely told, “did not come until the earth
had been prepared for him.” Neither did the tapeworm, till
man had been prepared for him. It is worthy of note, too, that
pickpockets, forgers, swindlers, fortunetellers, inquisitors,
aristocrats, and vermin generally “ did not come till the
«
earth had been prepared for them.” And, who would credit
it ? there never was a chimney sweep till chimneys existed !
In that fact “ I discern ” a profound “ purpose ” of a two
fold nature:—1st. Chimneys were intended and designed to
be swept, and to this end divine Providence made coals
black and sooty, else sweeps would never have had any
work; 2nd. He made the sweeps in order to clear the flues
of their foulness. Mr. St. Clair may close his eyes to these
facts as long as he pleases ; they are Theistic facts—if any
and are a most remarkable proof of design and
intelligence. It was just as impossible for man to antedate
his necessary epoch, or to postpone it, as for sweeps to precede chimneys. Man’s coming was the natural and inevitable Outcome or result of all the phænomena that preceded
him io-flis own line of development. You have no better
proof that water is a natural product than that man is such.
He had nbJntelligent creator, nor was one required. Man
is a natural, not supernatural, phænomenon. His so-called
creator is Really his creation, a fancy, a bugbear, and
nothing more. It is high time for Atheists, I think, to
cease beating about the bush, and tell the Theist bluntly
that his gods are figments neither useful nor ornamental,
th® offspring of ignorance, fear, and slavery—to-day mere
grim and curious survivals of the epochs when superstition
was unchecked in its growth and sway.
Mr. St. Clair at length takes refuge in inspiration and
. infallibility. “ I am bold to say,” says he, “ that thousands
of good people are conscious of communion with a higher
soul, of inspirations received from him, and of tasks assigned
by him.” Here my opponent chooses for his comrades the
phrenzied prophets and priestesses of ancient superstitions ;
the hysterical nuns who converse with Mary at Lourdes and
where not; Johanna Southcott, Joseph Smith Edward
�52
ATHEISM OR THEISM?
Irving, Brigham Young, Mother Girling, et hoc genus
omne, whose name is legion, whose “ inspirations ” and god
given “ tasks ” have been “ thick as autumnal leaves in
Vallombrosa,” and have included every absurdity and every
crime known to history. What has god not “inspired?”
What has he not imposed as a task? “I could a tale
unfold,” but space forbids.
Will my opponent name one syllable of truth or an original
idea that either he or any other person ever derived from
“inspiration” or in “communion” with this higher soul?
Ah, me! This world is very wonderful. Socrat^ had a
deemon, Prospero was served by Ariel, Faust had his Mephistopheles, and Mr. St. Clair has his “ higher soul,” spelt with
initial capitals ! This higher soul of his—I may speak
with some authority—is but himself, in dim, shadowy, and
magnified outline, a very Brocken Spectre, projected on the
soft clouds of his superstition. I once had the diswg^
badly, but recovered long since. Do not despair, good sir;
the rising sun of common-sense and healthy Atheistic
thought will soon fling his powerful beams on the very spot
where your magnified and ghostly shadow now sits, and the
mists which form the throne of your deity will rarify and
vanish along with the occupant!
But to claim inspiration is to claim infallibility. If you
are sure you have communion with some one, to discuss the
question of his existence, to ask if belief in it is rational, are
highly improper—you have settled the matter by fact, and
there is an end of it. There is no arguing with an inspired
man ; nor should he himself attempt reason, it is unneces
sary. An inspired man should merely dogmatise—as Mr.
St. Clair does. He never argues, he merely states. I under
stand him now; he is weak in logic, but invincible in
faith. Men who hold communion with higher souls rarely
argue well. The reason is obvious:—no man that can
reason well and has a good case ever thinks of rushing into
inspiration. Inspiration is the despair of logic; it is the
refuge of those who are bankrupt of reason. Mr. St. Clair
must no more grumble with the Pope and his infallibility ;
he claims it too, and for exactly the same reasons. Had
the Pope been able to prove his other claims, he would have
had no excuse for claiming infallibility and “ communion
with the higher souls.” Just so, if Mr. St. Clair had been
�ATHEISM OR THEISM?
53
able to make out even a passable, lame, blind, and limping
case in this discussion, we should have heard nothing about
inspiration and “ consciousness ” of deity. Any devout
worshipper can extort just as much real inspiration from
old clouts and mouldy bones as my opponent derives from
his god. Of course there is no arguing with this new
Moses—he is up among the crags of Sinai contemplating his
god, speaking to him face to face, reflecting on his feet, or
viewing other “ parts ” of his splendid person. I hope he
will publish his inspirations when he descends.
I should not show any respect to Mr. St. Clair were I to
notice some few sentences in his letter, one close to the end
for example. No man not near his wit’s end could permit
himself deliberately to publish that about gouging out
eyes, &c.
Lastly, Mr. St. Clair has written four out of his six
betters, and yet no shadow of a Theistic fact. Assertions
—-bold enough many of them—we have had in abundance,
but no sound reasoning, no evidence of a divine existence
yet. Is he reserving his arguments and facts for his last
letter, and does he intend to overwhelm me then without
leaving me the possibility of reply? I should like to know
what his god is. Has he not yet made up his mind about
him ?
____
Postscriptum.—I have now, Friday evening, seen the
conclusion of Mr. St. Clair’s long letter. I understood
we were to confine ourselves to two columns and a-half each
letter; but here is one from my opponent of nearly five
columns. If his logic were equal to the length of his
epistles, I should soon be hors de combat, but the logic is in
the inverse ratio of the cubes of the lengths, and so I have
but little to do.
The first sentence of his supplement seems very much like
swearing. I do not “ damn eyes ” or “ curse teeth ; ” I
point out their faults and thus damn their maker, if there be
one. All I have done is to employ fair and honest criticism
respecting the manufactures of this new deity manufactured
by Mr. St. Clair. The really good things of Nature I no
more ignore nor despise than my opponent; I merely show
what sort of a god he has, if he has one. The excuses and
apologies he makes for his most unfortunate deity sufficiently
�54
ATHEISM OR THEISM?
show that Mr. St. Clair feels what I say and cannot refute
my criticisms. This is all I desire of him. He cannot deny
my facts, nor can he successfully defend his poor god upon
one single point, except by representing him as being weak
to contempt. Why contend for such a god ?
Considering how much Mr. St. Clair can write without
saying anything to the point, how long are his letters, how
weak his arguments, how many his words, how few his facts,
and how pointless even those are which he produces, it seems
to me that Hunter’s joke about the “ Jaw ” should have
been reserved for his own behoof. I have nothing at all to
do with the size of the jaw. If the deity made the jaw toe
small for its purpose, my opponent will need to make another
apology for him. I beg to ask : could Mr. St. Clair’s deity
have made the jaw and teeth so that they could grow at an
equal rate, or could he not? Could he have given every
person a good set of teeth that would do their work without
aching, or could he not ? Does he know when producing a
set of teeth that they will begin to decay almost as soon as
completed ? Does he intend them to do so ? Does he intend
them to give pain, or not ? I ask the same about the eyes.
Does this poor deity know when making a pair of blind eyes
that they will never see? Does he intend them to see, or
not? Mr. St. Clair will not answer these questions; his
false position will not allow him.
He would like a dentist who could give him an aching set
of teeth! I have long suspected him of joking, now I am
sure of it. If two of his new teeth pinched his gum, he
would return to the dentist to have them rectified. It is
only when Quixotically defending his poor god that he
pretends to despise pain. It seems to me very heartless to
speak of “ Venus and Mercury ” as he does when he must
know that many people, children for example, who devote
themselves to neither, suffer horrible pain both in connexion
with teeth and eyes—ay, every organ of the body. Is
human suffering a thing to be joked with? Evidently
“ communion with that higher soul ” whom he supposes to
have made this dreadful world, has produced its natural
effects and rendered my opponent callous to the sufferings
around him. Of course, it is only when the spirit of the
lord is upon him and he rises in wrath to do battle for his
deity that he feels no sympathy for human pain. It was
�ATHEISM OR THEISM?
i
1
5S
converse with fancied deities that led to all the atrocit’js
of the middle ages. Once believe in a god that inflicts pain,
that makes people deformed, sickly, that afflicts them with
all the horrible diseases that flesh is heir to, and you make
, light of all pain but your own, out of sympathy for your
god and in acquiescence with his supposed intentions. This,
1 I fear, is my opponent’s condition. During this discussion
' he has persevered in ignoring suffering, and has spoken of
all evils as if they were flea-bites. It is, I am sure, his
irrational Theism that makes him do so.
The egg is descanted upon by my opponent. Well, did it
never occur to him that, here, as in every other case he can
mention, the creator, if such there be, must have made the
necessity for his design and adaptation before meeting that
necessity by contrivances? Young are produced in a great
variety of ways. Was it necessary that eggs should be
laid and then brooded over for weeks by the bird ? If so,
whence came that necessity? And does the deity know
whe# he is so carefully constructing an egg that it will
never be laid ? that fowl and egg will both die and rot
together? Or does he know that Mr. St. Clair will eat
g it for breakfast ? What a silly deity to manufacture such
countless millions of eggs, eggs of fishes, and eggs of fowls,
for the purpose of developing them into animals, when he
knows all the while that only a very few of them can
possibly reach their destination ! If he does not know their
destiny, he must be equally contemptible.
Mr. St. Clair tries to establish a distinction between
a mere fitness to produce a result, and purposive fitness
which intends to secure the result. This is a bold flight.
He won’t be “ pinned to definitions,” but he will assume
ability to distinguish between accidents and purposed events
in Nature. I presume his “ communion with the higher
soul ” must have been exceedingly close to authorise him to
speak thus. Is he the grand vizier of his deity, or who ?
Does he suppose his god would overdo his adaptation?
The destructive forces and processes of nature are just as
much organised and arranged for the set purpose of destroy
ing as anything that can be named. To the point: Does
Mr. St. Clair argue or hold that all pain is accidental?
That death is not intended, not designed ? Will he venture
to give a direct answer to these questions ? Are the teeth
�56
ATHEISM OR THEISM?
of cats, tigers, lions, etc., less evidently adapted to their
work of killing than the egg for its supposed intention ? Is
an earthquake less adapted to the destruction of life than
warmth and eggs are to produce or extend it ? Is a famine
less adapted to destroy than a harvest to sustain ? Is the
Spring more fit to produce blossoms than the frost is to nip
them ?
No; a malignant deity would not at once destroy every
thing, for two reasons : 1st. He might be too weak, as Mr. St.
Clair’s is ; 2nd. He would lose most of his horrible pleasure.
Malignancy would do just what my opponent’s god is doing,
raise up generation after generation, as long as he is able,
for the gratification of torturing and destroying them. No .
doubt, if Theism be at all rational, Dualism is the only '
logical form it can take. I am neither Monotheist nor
Duotheist: the whole belief appears to me so irrational and
absurd that I cannot think that civilised men of to-day
would be swayed by it, were their minds not perverted in
that direction in early life.
Indeed, it vastly surprises me to find a partial sceptic,
like my opponent, resuscitating the Design Argument,
which the “ Bridgewater Treatises ” so long ago elaborated
to death. I wish he would say a word or two on the tape
worm, the trichina, and other pests. It is so delightfully
amusing to me to hear a Theist expatiating on the goodness
of deity as displayed in the evils of life 1 “Evil and decay
do not carry purpose on the face of them, while organised
adaptations do.” Indeed 1 What would become of all new
organisms if the old were not cleared off by decay and
death? Beasts, birds, and fishes of prey, are not then
organised to destroy ? The wings of the hawk, the legs of
the tiger, the shape and tail of the dolphin were not
organised to enable them to destroy their prey ? The smut,
a fungus that destroys wheat, the dry rot, barnacles that
eat ships to destruction, locusts, caterpillars, phylloxera,
the empusa muscoo, a fungus that kills flies, the botrytis
bassiana, a fungus which attacks the silkworms, and reduced
the annual production of cocoons in France between the
years 1853 and 1865 from 65,000,000 to 10,000,000; thepotato disease, which caused such suffering and misery in
Ireland—these fungi are not organised, Mr. St. Clair, by im
plication, affirms! What will not Theism lead a man to say?
�ATHEISM OR THEISM?
57
He quotes Professor Owen—Does he not know that Owen
and other great Naturalists can tell by the examination of
a tooth whether an unknown animal was a carnivore or a
vegetarian, etc. ? Were the teeth, muscles, viscera, etc.,
of a carnivore “purposively” adapted for killing, tearing,
, and digesting other animals, or not ? Yes, or no ? pray.
!■
My opponent must try again—I wish to encourage him.
He has not yet laid the first stone of rational Theism. No
Theistic fact has he given us yet, no argument or criticism
of mine has he upset so far. I don’t blame him. He has
undertaken an impossible work. All material, all force,
all arrangements (except those of art), all causes, all effects,
all processes, are natural; the supernatural is but a dream.
LETTER X.
From Mr. G-. St. Clair to Mr. J. Symes.
Mr. Symes, in his postscript, again tilts at somebody who
believes in the supernatural. When I spoke of conscious
jbommunion with a Higher Soul, and inspirations received
from Him, I knew 1 was saying something the seeming
refutation of- which was easy; sol prefaced it with—“I
am bold to say.” No doubt all sorts of fanatics have
claimed inspiration. But I do not contend for the divine
ness of phrensies, nor argue for the special inspiration of the
Hebrew prophets. I hold reasonably that all new light of
knowledge and all new impulse to duty is inspiration. Tracing
effects back to causes, I come at last to One Divine Fount.
To Him I ascribe all life, all faculty in man, all insight
into truth, and all the development, improvement and refine
ment which are synonymous with progressive civilisation.
So, when I am requested to name one syllable of truth or a
single original idea derived from inspiration, I name all, for
there is not one which has had any othei’ ultimate source.
I may be referred to secondary or proximate sources, but
that would be like referring me to the printer’s types and
the compositor’s muscular exertions as an explanation of
Tennyson’s poem on “ Despair ” in the November number
of the Nineteenth Century. I am told that the Higher Soul
of which I speak is but myself projected in magnified form
�58
ATHEISM OR THEISM?
on a cloud, and there is just that modicum of truth in as
sertions of this sort which serves to lead some persons into
Atheism. Mr. Symes need not address me as though I were
ignorant of all that has been urged in the way of proving
that “ man makes God in his own image.” I believe man
has often done so, and I employ myself sometimes in destroy
ing such images. But just as there is true astronomy,
notwithstanding early and still-lingering superstitions of
astrology, so there is a true theology. I have shown that
there are evidences of purpose in nature—proofs of a Mind
at work—and there is a mind in man which reads and
understands the realised thoughts in nature and the designs
in progress. Hence it is true to say there is a God, and
that man, intellectually, is made after his likeness.
The closing paragraph of the postscript shows again how
Mr. Symes mistakes the issue. He says: “ All material,
all force, all arrangements (except those of art), all causes,
all effects, all processes, are natural; the supernatural is but
a dream.” Is this supposed to be good against me? I might
almost claim it as my own. My opponent denies the dis
tinction between the natural and the supernatural. So do I,
unless you define “ supernatural” to be the action of mind,
whether human or divine. He maintains a distinction be
tween the natural and the artificial. So do I. I perceive
for myself, and I point out to him, that all “ arrangements ”
made by man, and therefore called artificial, are effected by
the use of “ material ” and “ forces ” and “ causes ” ; so
that to judge whether they be artificial or not we have to
look for evidences of mind, purpose, design. Then I point
out that, judged in this way, the human eye is an artificial
production ; yet not a production of man’s art, and therefore
must be the work of some other Artificer. For similar
reasons, I am forced to the same conclusion regarding many
other things, and in a general way regarding the evolution
of the human race and the progress of the world,
“ I see in part
That all, as in some piece of art,
Is toil co-operant to an end.”
I don’t call these works supernatural; but seeing that they
are superhuman I reckon them as divine art. But Mr.
Symes, because it is po-sible to distinguish between divine
art and human, denies all resemblance; as though that
�ATHEISM OR THEISM?
59
followed ! In his first paragraph, flippant and foolish, be
cause he does not find the human frame classed with orders
of architecture, he objects to my saying it has been built
up. He ought to have read a little book called “ The
House I live in”—a work on the human body. But he
would like, if he could, to laugh my legitimate analogies out
of court.
Paley, Brougham, and Bell—my God is not theirs. If
he means that my theology is not quite the same as theirs,
I assent, for I take into account Evolution, which they, in
their day, could not do. The arguments of Paley only
want restating in terms of the Evolution theory. The
machinery, and arrangements, and adaptations which Paley
ascribed to the Creator, some Atheists now ascribe to Evo
lution, as though Evolution were an intelligent creative
entity. Mr. Symes has been slow in launching this
boomerang, probably being little familiar with it, or know
ing it to be ineffective against Theism as I defend Theism ;
but now, for lack of better missiles he hurls it, though
timidly, as one who fears it will come back upon himself.
He disputes my argument that the valves in the blood
vessels are intended to secure the circulation of the blood,
OD the ground that a river makes its own channel. A few
zoological facts are adduced to support the inference, I
imagine, that the blood has constructed the blood-vessels
and given them a gradually increasing complication as we
advance from protoplasm through animals of low organisa
tion, up to man. This is an argument from Evolution.
So there is a gradual advance, is there? with increasing
Complication in the apparatus, and with the noble frame of
man as the result, and yet no design in any of it! Topsy
’spects it comes of itself! natural causes account for it!
Topsy does not comprehend that in divine art, as well as
in human, what is designed by the mind has to be accom
plished by the aid of ‘‘natural” instruments. All that the
eye can see is the instrument and the process; for the
existence of the originating mind has to be mentally
inferred, the guiding and governing spirit is only spiritually
discerned.
Alphonso suggests an improvement in the circulating
apparatus ; he would “ place valves in the deep arteries, so
that the poor wretch who ruptures one of them should not
�60
ATHEISM OK THEISM?
bleed to death.” It seems that valves in the blood-vessels'
might be placed there for a purpose if Alphonso were taken
into counsel! Now there are valves in the arteries, which
allow the blood to flow out from the heart, through the
system, and prevent its regurgitating. If this is the very
thing which Alphonso considers a wise arrangement, why
does he object to it when I call it wise? Or would he make
them to open the reverse way ? Then certainly the heart’s
blood would not pour through an accidental rupture, but
neither would it flow through the system at all, and there
fore we could not live. The arrangement suggested for the
arteries is that which does prevail in the veins; and there
fore there is much less danger from a ruptured vein than
from a ruptured artery. But how could you have circula
tion, if both sets of valves were adapted for sending blood
to the heart, and neither set would allow it to come away ?
Alphonso here shows himself very wise indeed. He is
again asking for contradictory arrangements; he again
fails to see that the Creator is working under conditions.
Mr. Symes, who has not a syllable to say in the way of
proving his Atheism to be rational, can only find material
for his letters by drawing out his opponent—“ Could God
make jaws and teeth in a certain way?” .“What isinstinct?” “Will I make plainer the purpose running
through the ages ? ” etc. Though aware of the trick, I will
say as much as my space allows, about Evolution. Briefly,.
Evolution explains the introduction of new species on to
this planet, in the following way. Taking some alreadyexisting species, the offspring inherit the parental likeness
with variations ; afterwards, in their individual life, they
may undergo modifications, which in turn they transmit to
their offspring. The particular varieties best suited to
external conditions, survive, and leave offspring equally
well suited, or even better suited. Variation upon variation,
in successive generations, causes the difference from the
original to become great, and the creatures are then classed
as a distinct species. In this way one species is born from
another, as truly as an individual is born of its parents.
This inheritance with modifications, is creation by birth.
If external conditions change, the modification takes a
direction which adapts the creature to them. If the crea
ture changes its habits, or migrates and comes under new
�ATHEISM OR THEISM?
61
conditions, the modification takes the form of increased
growth in the organs and parts now especially called into
use, and diminished growth of the parts disused. It is no
poser for Mr. Symes to ask me the design of the wings of
the penguin, the moa and the apteryx: their wingshave
become reduced to remnants too small to fly with, because
they changed their habits, because they found a paradise
and preferred not to fly away from it. The wings of their
progenitors served their purpose well; inheritance repro
duced them as long as they were wanted; and when new
conditions or changed habits demanded the greater growth
of other organs, the forces of development were turned in
that direction. Could any self-acting arrangement be more
beautiful ? This is creation from age to age. This is part
of the method by which the purpose of the ages is being
elected. I am not contending for the supernatural instan
taneous creation of elephants with tusks full grown, but for
creation by natural means ; and here we see it going on.
Does Mr. Symes know anything at all about Evolution ?
Has he even read Darwin and Herbert Spencer? His
notion of creation seems to exclude evolution, and his
notion of evolution to exclude creation : but there are two
things he cannot do.: (1) explain any possible process of
creation without evolution, (2) explain how Evolution got
itself into geai’ without a Creator—I mean into such gear
as we find, when its machinery produces organised creatures
of higher and higher sort, culminating in man ; yes, in man,
with his marvellous frame and flesh, blood and brain, reason
and conscience, heart and hopes.
God created man; that is to say, the human race
has been born in fulfilment of the divine purpose. The
i idividual, tracing his parentage backwards, must pass
beyond “Adam” to some creature who was the common
progenitor of men and apes. Of course, man could no
more antedate his necessary epoch and come before his
time than sweeps could precede chimneys, to' use Mr.
Symes’s sooty illustration. I will grant Mr. Symes that; I
will grant him that man could not be born before his parents.
With equal readiness I assent to the proposition that, just as
with the individual infant, the human race was the necessary
result of the phenomena which preceded it in its own line of
development. That is to say, man is a product of natural
�62
ATHEISM OR THEISM?
causes, “ a natural and not a supernatural phenomenon.”
But if this is supposed to exclude a creative Mind, which
designed and fashioned man, I need only ask whether the
statue of Priestley, in Mr. Symes’s town of Birmingham, is
not at once the production of the sculptor’s design and the
inevitable result of particular movements of chisels upon a /'■
block of marble. There is no human production except by
the agency of natural causes ; there are no marks of inten
tion stamped upon such productions without a mind to give 5
them origin and authorship.
Mr. Symes, because I twitted him for crying so much
about his toothache, wrongfully represents me as being
callous to human sufferings. I think, if he had studied
Evolution, he would hardly speak of “ a God that inflicts
pain .... and afflicts people with all the horrible diseases
that flesh is heir to.” He wishes to know, “ Do I hold that
all pain is accidental ? and will I venture to give a direct
answer ? ” Of course I will. As I understand this discus
sion, Mr. Symes does hold that all pain is accidental.
Topsy ’spects that all pain comes of its own self. I, for my
part, have no hesitation in saying that the capacity to suffer
pain is deliberately designed, is manifestly for the gcod of
the individual, and a necessary factor in the evolution of
the higher animals. It may seem a paradox to say that
pain, when it occurs, is a good thing, and yet that it should
be removed as quickly as possible. Nevertheless I say it,
and can show it to be true. If you rest your hand on a
heated iron plate, it will disorganise the flesh. That is un
desirable, because it deprives you of a handy servant. The
pain which tells you that you are running this risk is no
evil, but a sentinel’s warning, a red-light danger signal, a
telegraphic intimation to use caution. We should be badly
off without the capacity for pain, while we should be want
ing in sense not to try and get rid of it by removing its
cause. Returning to “ the purpose runuing through the ,
ages,” it will be found that the animals with the most highly
developed nervous system and greatest capacity for pain
have become the higher animals in other respects, and are
classed high by the naturalist. Sensibility to pain has saved
theii’ progenitors from many dangers, has given them an
advantage in the “ struggle for existence,” and has promoted
their upward evolution in proportion to its acuteness.
�ATHEISM OR THEISM?
63
Mr. Symes, who, two or three letters back, thought life
not worth living, has a great objection to death. I thought
so, because when I showed that he ought logically to commit
suicide it was not agreeable to him. When he passes a
cemetery, or reflects that whole races of creatures have died
out, he is much concerned, and marvels that I can retain
my Theism. As with pain, so with death, he demands to
know, “ Do I hold that death is not intended or designed ? ”
and how about beasts of prey—“Yes or no, pray ”? This
peremptory attitude, when used on a platform, might cow a
timid man, and at all events helps to produce an impression
that he is shirking a difficulty. To shirk difficulties is not
my custom. But when Mr. Symes adduces the earthquake
as apparently designed to destroy men, I cannot accept the
instance, because I cannot see that earthquakes are pur
posely adapted to rock down cities. Having some idea of
geological facts, I believe that earthquakes were before
cities in the order of time, and men in their ignorance have
built their cities on the earthquake lines. But the tiger’s
claws and fangs I accept as being plainly designed to fit the
animal for catching and tearing prey. I have before asserted-—and my opponent cannot disprove it—that every
organ is for the good of its possessor. If any exceptions
can be brought forward, I will show that they literally
prove the rule. The tiger’s organs are for the tiger’s
advantage ; so far there is design, and even beneficence.
It is equally true, of course, that the tiger’s claws are a dis
advantage to the tiger’s prey—to the individuals which fall
victims. This has been a great difficulty to the minds of
many good people who have not ransacked nature to find
atheistic arguments. I have only space to say that the
weeding-out of inferior and ill-adapted animals, with the
survival of the fittest, who leave offspring “fit” as them
selves, is a necessary part of the machinery for the evolu
tion of the higher animals. Without this arrangement
there never would have been a race of mankind. It ill
becomes us to quarrel with the process which gave us birth.
The death of those weak individuals is for the good of the
species, and the entire arrangement adds to the sum of
animal enjoyment. Death, in the form in which it comes
to the lower animals, is generally unexpected and seldom
painful; death, as it comes to man, is no evil if it be the
�64
ATHEISM OR THEISM?
portal to higher life. But Atheists, of course, are without
hope. The moral difficulties of the “ struggle for life ” are
dealt with in a volume which may be seen in the British
Museum and in the Birmingham Free Library—a volume
called “ Darwinism and Design,” written by George St.
Clair.
LETTER XI.
From Mr. J. Symes to Mr. G. St. Clair.
Mr. St. Clair entered upon this discussion with the
ostensible object of showing that Theism is rational and
more rational than Atheism. But either he has never
seriously engaged in the work or else has wofully failed in
spite of honest and earnest effort. • What a iheos, deus, or
god is has yet to be learned—my opponent has no settled
opinions upon the subject. If he has, why does he not
straightforwardly state the proposition he intends to main
tain, and then allege only such facts and employ only such
reasoning as may tend to establish his theory ?
His Theism has evidently never been thought out ; he has
adopted it as he adopted the fashion of his coat, and has
never investigated the one or the other critically. If he has
investigated his Theism and really does understand its
nature, ramifications, and bearings, he most scrupulously
keeps it all secret, as Herodotus did much of what he was
told about the gods in Egypt—the most secret mysteries he
refused, from the most pious motives, to reveal. This is to
be regretted, especially as my opponent has so much to
reveal, if he could be induced to do it, being imbued with
plenary inspiration. Though, like most modest men, now
that I ask him to let us know what his god has told him, I
find his bashfulness so overpowers him that he cannot
summon up sufficient courage to give the world a single
syllable of what he heard or saw on Horeb or in the third
heaven. It is a pity the deity did not select a more appro
priate prophet ; but the ways of divine providence are
notoriously odd, capricious, uncertain, contradictory, and
insane.
Mr. St. Clair asks if I know anything of evolution. No
�ATHEISM OR THEISM ?
65
doubt that is intended to be a tit for some tat of
mine,
I may say that I understand Darwin and the
resMf the evolutionists sufficiently to know that evolution
is purely Atheistic, that nature is all-sufficient for all her
operations; that no god is wanted, needed, or desirable for
‘ any of her processes. I am obliged to Mr. St. Clair for
calling attention to his own book on the subject, though fir
the purposes of this discussion it was unnecessary ; and, if
Mr. St. Clair does not understand Darwin far better than
he does his poor deity, the book cannot be worth reading.
A man who can write five long letters on Theism without
naming one Theistic fact, or attempting a logical or rational
argument in support of his position—five letters full of
irrelevancies, side-issues, platitudes, uncertainties apologies
for deity, misrepresentation of natural facts, pompous
boasts of divine inspiration, and ability to “ discern the
purpose” of god “running through the ages,” and the dis
tinction between accidents and “purposive” events in
nature—whatever knowledge such a man may have, his
temper and disposition, his total want of ballast and critical
acumen must unfit him entirely for writing a work on
-evolution or any other philosophical subject.
If nature operates her own changes, evolution is a
beautiful theory ; but admit a god who works by means of
evolution, and the whole aspect of the subject is changed;
evolution becomes the most perfect system of red-tapism
that can be conceived. If evolution results in good, all
that good was as much needed millions of years back as
now; but red-tape decided that whole generations must
perish, that evils and abuses could not be removed, except
by an interminable and bewildering and murderous process,
complex beyond expression or thought—whereas an honest
■ and able god would have done the work out of hand and
i shown as much respect for the first of his children as for
later ones. But Mr. St. Clair’s murders generation after
J generation of his family for the sake of working out some
change, the evolution of a new organ, the gradual atrophy
or decay of old ones, the rise of a new species or the
destruction of aboriginal races.
I shall not further follow up Mr. St. Clair’s remarks.
They are not to the point, even approximately. He con
founds language and mingles art and nature, and thus
�66
ATHEISM OR THEISM?
bewilders his unwary reader instead of informing him. Long
since I should have ignored what my opponent says, only
my action would have been misunderstood. To prove
Theism rational one must prove that there is a god. This
has not been done. Then you must connect god and nature.
This has not been done; in fact, Mr. St. Clair is reduced to
the necessity of admitting that his god is weak and even a
part of nature—a big, stupid giant, most probably living in
that region to which the celebrated Jack climbed up by a
bean-stalk.
Here follow some positive evidences that there is no god
existing, except the mere idols and fictions of worshippers,
etc.—
1. No trace of one has been observed, no footstep, copro
lite, or what not. The only life of which mankind has any
knowledge is animal life and vegetable life; and it is in
conceivable that there should be any other.
2. The world was never made, nor any natural product
in it ; and therefore a maker is impossible.
3. The universe, so far as it is known, is not conducted
or governed, nor is any department of it, except those de
partments under the influence of living beings. Nature’s
processes consist in the interaction, attraction, repulsion,
union and disunion of its parts and forces, and of nothing
else.
4. All known substances and materials have definite and
unalterable quantities and attributes or qualities. Their
only changes are approximation, recession, combination, and
disunion; and all the phenomena of nature are the sole re
sults of these, one class of phenomena being no more
accidental or designed than another. Design is nowhere
found beyond the regions of animal action, and animal
action is nothing more nor anything less than the outcome
or the result, however complex, of the total forces and
materials which alternately combine and segregate in all
animals. An animal is what he is by virtue of his ante
cedents, his physical combinations and disunions, and his
environments.
All known facts lead logically to the above conclusions,
and it is naught but superstition or irrational belief that
assumes or predicates the contrary. Nor is any honest result
ever gained by assuming the existence of a god: it explains
�ATHEISM OR THEISM ?
67
nothing, it leads to nothing but confusion. More than that,
it is an attempt to explain nature’s mystery by creating a
still ^eater mystery, which is unphilosophical. Further
still, it is an attempt to expound nature by (1) that which
is not nature, or (2) by a natural phenomenon or set of
phenomena; for your god must be either natural, super1 natural, or artificial. Mr. St. Clair’s is not supernatural,
but natural. Very well; if it be natural, as he says, it is
an unknown phenomenon, or substance, or force ; and there
fore cannot be utilised in any way by reason. A false
philosophy or imposture may appeal to the unknown to
explain difficulties ; the whole round of religion consists of
nothing else than examples of it. But true philosophy
never attempts to explain the known by the unknown.
5. Mr. St. Clair believes in evolution, and yet holds the
dogma of a former creation. That is to play fast and loose
with reason; for why do you ascribe any power to physical
causes, if you refuse to regard them as sufficiently power
ful to originate, as well as to develope the phsenomena of
Nature ? Mr. St. Clair ascribes all the evils of life to
second causes, all its goods to deity. That is good Theology,
but the worst Philosophy. If life is physically sustained,
developed, and modified, it must be physically originated.
The only logical conclusion to be drawn from Theistic pre
misses is that each event, each phenomenon, each change is
the work of a separate god, or fairy, or devil—beings of
whom nothing is known beyond the fact that everyone of
them was created by man for the express purpose of creating
and governing the world or parts of it. But the philosopher
will never think of using them in any way till their real
existence and action have been placed beyond a doubt.
6. If the world was really made, it was not intelligently
made,, for it is chiefly a scene of confusion, strife, folly,
insanity, madness, brutality, and death. No intelligent
creator could endure the sight of it after making it:—be
would put his foot on it and crush it, or else commit suicide
in disgust. In geology the world is but a heap of ruins ; in
astronomy an unfortunate planet, so placed as regards the
sun that one part roasts while another freezes.
7. Men talk of the wisdom and goodness seen in God’s
creation ! He made man, and left him naked and houseless,
ignorant of nearly all he needed to know, a mere brute. He
�68
ATHEISM OR THEISM?
showed neither goodness nor wisdom here. It is only by a
painful process “ running through the ages,” a prqgtes of
blood, murder, starvation, and the death of millions %pon
millions that our civilisation has been achieved; and what
is it even now ? A civilisation of fraud, brutality slightly
veiled, hypocrisy wholesale, superstitions the most costly
and profound, a civilisation that houses the dead better than
the living, that pauperises survivors to bestow costly tombs
upon the dead, that builds splendid temples for gods and
priests to sport in, and leaves men and women to rot physi
cally, mentally and morally, in dens !
8. But this god never interferes for human good. This
governor of men never governs. He might prevent all
crime ; he prevents none. What is the use of a god who
could not or would not prevent the murder of Lincoln, Gar
field, and thousands of others ? If he could, and was by,
he is an accessory or worse ; if he couldn’t, he has in man
a creature he cannot control, and is therefore contemptible.
9. I am aware that some Theists urge that god could not
interfere, as I suggest, without violating man’s free-agency.
Whether Mr. St. Clair holds that opinion I cannot just now
say; but all along I have aimed at a much wider Theism
than that of Mr. St. Clair, and shall therefore make a remark
or two on this subject.
(1.) All government interferes with free-agency. And no
one complains that a government should try to prevent
crime. Indeed, that is one of its main functions. And a
government that does not, to its utmost knowledge and
power, prevent crime, is a bad government. Well, the socalled divine government prevents none ; what is its use?
Not to prevent crime is to encourage its commission. This
the divine government does.
(2) The free-agency plea is silly. Every murderer, every
tyrant destroys the free-agency of his victim. Does god
respect the free-agency of the victim less than that of the
villain ? Does he scrupulously refrain from checking the
latter while he inflicts wrong and death upon the former ?
Human laws are professedly (many of them really) framed
to protect the innocent and weak, and to restrain the strong
and vicious; divine laws must have a contrary intention, if
the free-agency plea is correct.
Finally.
I am well aware that my style of treating thia
�ATHEISM OR THEISM?
69
subject must be very offensive to some. But I make no
apoloev for it. I adopt it deliberately and of set purpose.
I regard Theism as immensely stupid, so much so that
serious argument is wasted upon it, just as it would be
waste labor to try to disprove transubstantiation or to
show that Laputa could not fly as Gulliver describes.
Uncompromising ridicule seems to me the best weapon
wherewith to attack this miserable fetishism of my
opponent. I have used it unsparingly and heartily, and hope
my opponent has enjoyed the discussion as much as I
have.
I close without a spark of ill-will towards Mr. St. Clair,
and beg to express the opinion that his failure is not due
to any intellectual defect in him, but to the utterly im
possible proposition he undertook to defend. It is no
disgrace to fail where success is impossible. Nor do I
claim any credit to myself—Atheism is so easy to defend
that I must have been totally excuseless to have failed in it.
LETTER XII.
Fi‘‘om Mr. G. St. Clair to Mr. J. Symes.
Mr. Symes goes off the platform with a laugh, and tells the
audience he has won a victory ; but he must be conscious
all the time that he has not dislodged his antagonist from
his entrenchments. I have been disappointed in my op
ponent. His first letter confirmed the assurance which he
had given to me privately—that this discusssion should be
“ definite, earnest, real ”—but his last contains the con
fession that he has deliberately adopted an offensive style
and dealt in uncompromising ridicule, because he considers
that serious argument would be wasted upon so stupid a
subject as Theism.
All through this discussion I have only used half the
notes made on a first reading of Mr. Symes’s letters, and
now, in order to find room for a general summing up, I
must withhold the detailed reply which I could give to his
last. It is annoying to have to leave so many fallacies
unanswered ; but I think I have replied to most statements
which could claim to be arguments, as far as my space
allowed.
�70
ATHEISM OR THEISM?
Mr. Symes opened the discussion, and ought to have
advanced some reasons for considering Atheism rational;
but he confessed at once that he had nothing positive to
urge in favor of his negative, but should confine himself to
picking holes in Theistic arguments. His letters have
abounded with peremptory questions, and every answer I
have given has afforded material to tear to pieces or snarl
at. My opponent began by asking eight questions, six of
which involved a discussion of the infinite, the infinite being
easy to juggle with. The definition of God which he pre
ferred was the vulgar definition, which involves a contradic
tion, and would therefore have given him an opportunity of
dialectical victory. He wished me to say that God is a
Being infinite in power and infinite in goodness, and he
wanted the former part of this definition to mean that the
power of Deity is adequate to accomplish things which are
in their very nature impossible. Then he would have argued
that infinite goodness would desire to free the world at once
from all evil, pain and inconvenience; that infinite power
could accomplish this ; but that it is not done, and there
fore no God exists. I refused to define Deity in the way
dictated to me, but it was all the same to my opponent—
his arguments were only good against the vulgar definition,
and so he attacked that. He set forth at large that there
was a good deal of pain and trouble in the world, which, to
his mind, must be inconsistent with the existence of an
infinite God. Of course, it is not really so unless, besides
possessing infinite goodness of nature, the Creator possesses
unlimited power, and that in a mathematical sense. Now, I
have shown that the Creator cannot possess unlimited power
in this sense, and therefore my opponent’s objection to God’s
existence on the ground that “ evils ” exist is not conclusive.
The analogy of human labor employed in building a
cathedral shows us that a fine pile may be completed in the
course of time. It leads us to compare past phases of the
world with the present, that we may discover the movement
and tendency of things, for
“We doubt not, through the ages one increasing purpose runs.”
We go as deep down into the past as Evolution will enable
us to do, and, beginning at the lowliest forms of life, we
find a gradually ascending series. At length we come to
�ATHEISM OR THEISM?
71
man, who, even as a savage, is superior to all that went
be£a^. But the savage, as Gerald Massey says in his
“TSe of Eternity,” is only the rough-cast clay model of the
perfect statue. The savage advances into the condition of
a barbarian, and the barbarian, in time, becomes civilised.
But God has not yet finished the work of creating man into
his own image. It is astonishing that any student of Evolu
tion, possessing two eyes, should go to the quarry and fetch
out fossils for the purpose of showing that creatures have
suffered and died, and should fail to get any glimpse of “ a
purpose running through the ages.” But this is the case
with my opponent, to whose eye Evolution “ is purely
atheistic.” He also fails to see that, on this rational view
of creation, evils may be only temporary ; nay, more, that
they are certainly diminishing, and tend to vanish altogether.
I have invited my opponent three times over to find any
flaw in the reasoning of Herbert Spencer, where he main
tains that evil is evanescent; but it would have suited him
better if he could have quoted Spencer in a contrary sense.
The Creator’s power is exerted under conditions and
limitations arising out of the mathematical relations of
space “and time. It is, therefore, not “ in fining’ in the
vulgar sense. The vulgar definition of God wants mending;
and this is about all that Mr. Symes has been able to show.
As I, for my part, never put forth the vulgar definition, he
ought not to have given us a panorama of the evils of the
world, much less have made it revolve ad nauseam. The
rational Theism which I hold is not overturned by the
temporary occurrence of evil. But, when Mr. Symes found
this out, he took to ridiculing my God as a being who is
less than infinite in the vulgar sense, and professed to find
the orthodox God immensely superior.
Besides exposing the fallacy of the chief objections
brought against the existence of a Divine Being, I have
advanced positive proofs, from the marks of design in his
works. I lay stress on the fact that organs such as the
eye, and organisms such as the body, are instruments and
machines comparable to those designed and made by man,
and which never come into existence except when contrived
by intelligence. We never see the human mind going
through the process of designing. We never see the mind
at all. We have to look for marks of design in the work.
�72
ATHEISM OR THEISM?
It is the same with regard to the Divine Spirit. Objection
is made to Design, on the ground that Evolution explains
all things without a Creator; but I have shown that this is
not the case. Mr. Symes has hunted up all the blind eyes
he can find, and the perverted instincts, which do not effect
their asserted purpose, and is daring enough to say that
eyes are not made to see with. The difficulty is fully
explained by what I have said of the analogy between
divine and human work, performed under conditions, and
with concomitants of evil. I have challenged our clever
Alphonso to show us a pair of those superior eyes which he
says he could make, but he does not do so. He had only
made an empty boast.
Connected with Design is Adaptation. Mr. ¡Etames is
irrational enough to say that if anything is designed all
things are designed, and if Adaptation is seen in anything
it is seen iu all things. He sees it as much in the accidental
smashing of an egg as in the wonderful formation of the
egg to be the ark of safety for an embryo chick. This
astounding nonsense is forced upon him by his Atheism,
and must be charged to the irrational theory rather than to
the man4 But in seeking to bolster it up, Mr. Symes made
use of one argument which might seem to possess force un
less I exposed its weakness, and I had no space to do that
in reply to his fourth letter. He said that if there be design
anywhere it must be in the elements of matter especially,
where I do not seem to see it, as I bring forward organised
structures, living things. He says all matter is probably
alive—“ probably ! ” An instance of modesty in Mr. Symes,
though immediately afterwards he becomes positive again,
and says “ I affirm.” He affirms something about invisible
atoms, namely, that there is adaptation between the atoms,
and “ an equilibrium stable, perfect, time-defying,” far
superior to the unstable adaptation of living creatures to
their surroundings. My reply must be brief. An atom is
that which has no parts. It cannot therefore have any
organs, nor be an organism, nor possess life. Out of atoms,
as out of bricks, larger things are built up, and in some of
them I discern a certain architecture which speaks of Design.
Whether the bricks themselves are a manufactured article
does not affect my conclusion. The “ adaptation between
the atoms ” which Mr. Symes discerns and affirms cannot be
�ATHEISM OR THEISM ?
73 ’
in their interiors, for they are without parts. If he means
an adaptation of atom to atom, as in the chemistry of water,
I ne«d not deny it, though two or three bricks in combina
tion don’t impress me like the cathedral of the human body;
and as to the “ perfect, time-defying equilibrium ” of the
atoms of oxygen and hydrogen which form water, electricity
will unsettle it at once.
Has Mr. Symes proved Atheism to be rational? He
began by declaring that “ Atheism requires no direct evi
dence,” which I must interpret to mean it has none to offer.
What he now pretends to offer in his last comes late, and is
not good. Has he disproved the rationality of Theism ?
No, not as I present Theism to him. He said, very early,
that he “ must decline to narrow the ground ” to Theism as
I preset it, and, accordingly, what he has chiefly attacked
has be$n the vulgar definition of Theism. Now the dictionary
definition may go as far as I am concerned, but God remains.
If there are some difficulties on the theory of Theism,
they are only increased when we fly to Atheism. Atheism
accounts for nothing. Pain and misery, which are so much
complained of, are just as much facts whether there be a
God or no. Atheism does nothing to explain them, to
release us from them, to help us to bear them. An en
lightened Theism shows that sensibility to pain is a gracious
provision, warning us in time to escape greater evils and
contributing to our upward evolution. Evil is accounted
for as “ good in the making” or the necessary accompani
ment of greater good, or the temporary inconvenience lying
in the path to some glorious goal. Whatever is, is the best
possible at the present stage, if only all the relations of
things were known to us. Death enters into the great
scheme, for, by the removal of the aged, room is made for
younger life, and the total amount of enjoyment is increased.
At the same time, this is no hardship to those who pass
away, for the life of the individual soul is continued here
after and carried higher. This belief brightens the whole
of life and gives a very different aspect to pain and trouble and
death, which might fairly cause perplexity if death were the
final end.
The one advantage I derive from Mr. Symes’s letters is
that they seem to show me how men become Atheists.
There are certain questions which cannot be answered, and
�74
ATHEISM OK THEISM?
they are always asking those questions. There are certain
difficulties of belief, and these they cherish in preference to
the stronger reasons for faith and hope. There is sunshine
and shadow in the world, and they prefer to dwell in the
gloom. They search out all the crudities and failures, stinks
and sores, diseases and evils which the world affords, or ever
has afforded, and look at them through a magnifying glass.
Impressed with the magnitude of the loathsome heap, and
oblivious of everything else in creation, they presume to
think they could have advised something better if the
Creator had only consulted them. Had there been a wise
Creator he surely would have done so 1 Henceforth they
shriek out that there is no God; and nevertheless, illogical
as they always are, they whimper at pain instead of bearing
it, and complain of evils as though therewere some God
who was inflicting them. They complain that life is not
worth living, and yet speak of death as though it were
maliciously desigued and the greatest evil of all. They
have got into a world which is “ a fatherless Hell, “ all
massacre, murder and wrong,” and ought logically to commit
suicide, like the couple of Secularists in Mr. Tennyson’s
“ Despair!’ But, alas ! not even death will land them in
any better place. They are
• “ Come from the brute, poor souls—no souls
—and to die with the brute 1 ”
Yet that couple cherished love for one another and pity for
all that breathe, and ought to have inferred thence that
unless a stream can rise higher than its source, there must
be much more pity and love in the Great Fount and Heart
of All Things.
�Three Hundred and. Seventy-second Thousand.
January, 1882.
. "W ORKS
SOLD BY THE
FREETHOUGHT PUBLISHING COMPANY,
28, STONECUTTER STREET, FAhRINGDON STREET, E.C.
Orders should be sent to the Manager, Mr. W. J. Ramsey, accompanied
with Post Office Order, payable at Ludgate Circus, or Cheque
crossed “ London anddsouth Western Bank.”
The International Library of Science and Freethought.
Volume I., “ Mind in Animals,” by Professor Ludwig Buchner.
Translated, with the author’s consent, by Annie Besant,
price 5s. Volume II., “The Student’s Darwin,” by Edward B.
Aveling, D.Sc. (Loud.), F.L.S., Fellow of University College
(Lond.), etc., price 5s. Volume III., “Jesus and the Gospels,”
and “ The Religion of Israel,” by Jules Soury, price Is.
The Freethinker’s Text-Book.—Part I. By 0. Bradlaugh.
Section I.—‘ ‘ The Story of the Origin of Man, as told by the Bible
and by Science.” Section II.— “ What is Religion ? ” “ How has it
Grown ? ” “God and Soul.” Each Section complete in itself, with
copious index. Bound in cloth, price 2s. 6d.
Part II., by Annie Besant. ■—“ On Christianity.” Section I.—
“Christianity: its Evidences Unreliable.” Section II.—“Its Origin
Pagan.” Section III.—“Its Morality Fallible.” Section IV.—
“ Condemned by its History.” Bound in cloth, 3s. 6d.
History of the Great French Revolution.—By Annie Besant
Cloth, 2s. 6d.
Impeachment of the House of Brunswick.—By Charles
Bradlaugh. Eighth edition. Is.
What does Christian Theism Teach P—A verbatim report of
two nights’ Public Debate between the Rev. A. J. Harrison and
C. Bradlaugh. Second edition. 6d.
God, Man, and the Bible.—A verbatim report of a three nights’
Discussion at Liverpool between the Rev. Dr. Baylee and C.
Bradlaugh.
This is the only debate extant on the purely Socratic method. 6d.
Heresy; its Morality and Utility.—A Plea and a Justification.
By Charles Bradlaugh. 9d.
�2
On the Being of a God as the Maker and Moral Governor
of the Universe.—A verbatim report of a two nights’Discussion
between Thomas Cooper and C. Bradlaugh.
6d.
When were our Gospels Written?—A Reply to Dr. Tischendorf
and the Religious Tract Society. By Charles Bradlaugh.
6d.
Has Man a Soul ?—A verbatim report of two nights’ debate at
Burnley, between the Rev. W. M. Westerby and C. Bradlaugh. Is.
Christianity in relation to Freethought, Scepticism and
Faith.—-Three Discourses by the Bishop of Peterborough, with
Special Replies by Charles Bradlaugh.
to fid.
New edition, reduced
Is it Reasonable to Worship God?—A verbatim report of two
nights’ debate at Nottingham between the Rev. R. A. Armstrong
and C. Brad laugh. Is.
National Secular Society’s Tracts.-—1. Address to Christians.
2. Who was Jesus ? 3. Secular Morality. 4. The Bible and
.Woman. 5. Secular Teachings. 6. Secular Work. 7. What is
Secularism ? 8. Who are the Secularists ? 9. Secular Responsi
bility. 11. Creed of an Atheist. 7|d, per 100, post free.
My Path to Atheism.—Collected Essays of Annie Besant.—The
Deity of Jesus—Inspiration—Atonement—Eternal Punishment—
Prayer—Revealed Religion—and the Existence of God, all examined
and rejected ; together with some Essays on the Book of Common
Prayer. Cloth, gilt lettered, 4s.
Marriage: as it was, as it is, and as it should be.
By
Annie Besant. In limp cloth, Is.
Verbatim Report of the Trial, The Queen against Brad
laugh and Besant.—Neatly bound in cloth, price 5s., post free.
With Portraits and Autographs of the two Defendants.
Second Edition, with Appendix, containing the judgments of
Lords Justices Bramwell, Brett, and Cotton.
The Biography of Charles Bradlaugh.—Written by Adolphe
S. Headingley. Crown 8vo., cloth, 332 pages, price 7s.
The Jesus of the Gospels and The Influence of Chris
tianity on the World.
Two nights’ Debate between the
Rev. A. Hatchard and Annie Besant.
Is.
PAMPHLETS BY ANNIE BESANT.
s. d.
The Physiology of Home—No. 1, “Digestion” ; No. 2, “ Organs
of Digestion” ; No. 3, “ Circulation”; No. 4, “Respiration”;
Id. each. Together, in neat wrapper ...
...
... 0 4
Free Trade v. “Fair” Trade—No. 1, “England before the Repeal
of the Corn Laws” ; No. 2, “The History of the Anti-Corn
Law Struggle ” ; No. 3, “ Labor and Land: their burdens,
duties and rights ” ; No. 4, “ What is Really Free Trade ” ;
No. 5, “ The Landlords’ Attempt to Mislead the Land
less ”; Id. each. In neat wrapper with Appendix
... 0 6
q-
�3
s. d.
God’s Views on Marriage...
....
...
...
... 0 2
The True Basis of Morality. A Plea for Utility as the Standard
of Morality ...
...
...
...
...
... 0 2
Auguste Comte. Biography of the great French Thinker, with
Sketches of his Philosophy, his Religion, and his Sociology.
Being a short and convenient resume of Positivism for the
general reader
...
...
...
...
... 0 6
Giordano Bruno, the Freethought Martyr of the Sixteenth Cen
tury. His Life and Works ...
...
...
...0 1
The Political Status of Women. A Plea for Women’s Rights ... 0 2
Civil and Religious Liberty, with some Hints taken from the
French Revolution ...
...
...
...
...
0 3
The Gospel of Atheism
...
...
...
...
... 0 2
Is the Bible Indictable ? ...
...
...
...
... 0 2
England, India, and Afghanistan ...
...
...
... 0 9
The Story of Afghanistan...
...
...
...
... 0 2
The preceding two pamphlets bound together in limp cloth, Is.
The Law of Population : Its consequences, and its Bearing upon
Human Conduct and Morals. Fiftieth thousand...
... 0 6
Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity ...
...
...
...0 1
The Influence of Heredity on Free Will, from the German of
Ludwig Buchner
...
...
...
...
... 0 2
The Ethics of Punishment
...
...
...
...0 1
Landlords. Tenant Farmers, and Laborers ...
...
...0 1
The God Idea in the Revolution ...
...
..
...0 1
The Gospel of Christianity and the Gospel of Freethought
... 0 2
English Marseillaise, with Music ...
...
...
... 0 1
English Republicanism ...
...
...
...
...0 1
Christian Progress
...
...
...
...
...
0 2
The English Land System
...
...
...
...0 1
The Transvaal ...
...
...
...
...
...
Q p
Vivisection
...
...
...
...
...
...
q p
Fruits of Christianity
...
...
...
...
...
o 2
Or bound in cloth,
Social and Political Essays.—By Annie Besant. 3s. 6d.
Theological Essays and Debate.—By Annie Besant. 2s. 6d.
PAMPHLETS BY C. BBADLAUG1I.
s. d.
Hints to Emigrants, containing important information on the
United States, Canada, and New Zealand
...
... p q
Cromwell and Washington : aContrast
...
...
... q y
A Lecture delivered to large audiences throughout the United States.
Five Dead Men whom I Knew when Living. Sketches of Robert
Owen, Joseph Mazzini, John Stuart Mill, Charles Sumner
and Ledru Rollin
...
...
...
’ q 4.
Jesus, Shelley, and Malthus, an Essay on the Population Question 0 2
Life of George, Prince of Wales, with Recent Contrasts and Coin
cidences
...
... ...
...
.
Q g
�Real Representation of the People...
...
...
... o 2
Toryism from 1770 to 1879
...
...
...
... 0 1
Letter to Albert Edward Prince of Wales, on Freemasonry
... 0 1
Why do Men Starve?
...
...
...
...
...0 1
Poverty and its effect upon thePeople
...
...
...0 1
Labor’s Prayer ...
...
...
...
...
... 0 1
The Land, the People, and the Coming Struggle
...
... 0 2
Plea for Atheism
...
...
...
...
... 0 3
Has Man a Soul ? New Edition ...
...
...
... 0 2
Is there a God ? ...
...
...
...
...
... 0 p
Who was Jesus? New Edition ...
...
...
...
0 1
What did Jesus Teach ? ...
...
...
...
...
0 1
The Twelve Apostles
...
_ ...
...
...
... 0 1
The Atonement ...
...
...
...
...
...
0 1
Life of David ...
...
...
...
...
...
0 2
Life of Jacob ...
...
...
...
...
...
0 p
Life of Abraham
...
...
...
...
...
0 1
Life of Moses ...
...
...
...
...
...
0 1
Life of Jonah ...
...
...
...
...
...
0 1
A Few Words about the Devil. New edition
...
...
0 1
Were Adam and Eve our First Parents ?
...
...
...
0 1
Perpetual Pensions. Thirtieth thousand ...
...
...
0 2
The Laws Relating to Blasphemy and Heresy
...
...
0 6
Four Lectures on Anthropology. Id. each. Together in neat
wrapper ...
...
...
...
...
... 0 4
Or to be obtained in volumes.
Political Essays.—By C. Bradlaugh. Bound in cloth, 2s. 6d.
Theological Essays.—By 0. Bradlaugh. Bound in cloth, 3s.
Four Debates between C. Bradlaugh and Rev. Dr. Baylee, in
Liverpool; the Rev. Dr. Harrison, in London ; Thomas Cooper,
in London; the Rev. R. A. Armstrong, in Nottingham; with
Three Discourses by the Bishop of Peterborough and replies by
C. Bradlaugh. Bound in one volume, cloth. Price 3s.
• Large Photograph of Mr. Bradlaugh for Framing, 2s. fid.
Large Portrait of Mrs. Besant, fit for Framing, 2s. 6d.
A splendidly executed Steel Engraving of Mrs. Besant, price 2d.
Chromo-litho of Mr. Bradlaugh.—Cabinet size, Id. In Letts’s
protecting case, post free 2d.
Splendid Chromo-litho of Mr. Bradlaugh.—Large size, 6d.
In Letts’s protecting case, post free 7d.
Cabinet Photographs of Mr. Bradlaugh and Mrs. Besant.—
By the Stereoscopic Company. 2s. each.
Also Cabinets.—By the Van der Weyde Light process, very remark
able. 2s.
Past and Present of the Heresy Laws.—By W. A. Hunter,
M.A., Barrister-at-Law, Professor of Jurisprudence, University
College, London. (The Counsel who so ably defended Mr. Edward
Truelove before the Lord Chief Justice of England, and again
before Mr, Baron Pollock). Price 3d.
�5
Natural Philosophy; or, Elementary Physics.
This subject
is the basis of all scientific work, and should be understood by
those who would study Botany, Zoology, or Biology. Especially
adapted for London University Matriculation. The only work
dealing with all the subjects required for that examination. By
Edward B. Aveling. Price 4s.
Pamphlets by Edward. B. Aveling, D.Sc., F.L.S., Fellow
of University Oollege, London.—“ The Value of this Earthly .Life,”
Is. “ Biological Discoveries and Problems,” Is. “ Science and
Secularism,” 2d. “Science and Religion,” Id. “ The Sermon on
the Mount,” Id. “ Superstition,” Id. “Creed of an Atheist,” Id.
“Wickedness of God,” Id. “ Irreligion of Science,” Id. “ Why I
dare not be a Christian,” Id. “God dies: Nature remains,” Id.
“ Plays of Shakspere,” 4d.
Wealthy and Wise. A lecture introductory to the Study of Poli
tical Economy. By J. Hiam Levy. 6d.
Pamphlets by Geo. Standring.—“Life of C. Bradlaugh,” with
portrait and autograph, 12 pages, Id. “Life of Colonel R. G.
Ingersoll,” with portrait and autograph, and extracts from his
Orations, in wrapper, Id. “Court Flunkevs: their Work and
Wages,” Id.
The Education of Girls.—By Henry R. S. Dalton, B.A., Oxen.
Second Edition. Price 6d.
Ish’s Charge to Women. By H. R. S. Dalton. 4d.
Religion and Priestcraft. By H. R. S. Dalton. 2d.
On the Connection of Christianity with Solar Worship.
By T. E. Partridge.
Is.
(Translated from Dupuis.)
Clericalism in France.—By Prince Napoleon Bonaparte (Jerome).
Translated by Annie Besant. Price fid.
The Cause of Woman.—From the Italian of Louisa To-Sko.
By
Ben W. Elmy. Price 6d.
Studies in Materialism.—By Ben. W. Elmy. Price 4d.
Lectures of Colonel Robert Ingersoll.—“ Oration on the Gods.”
Price fid.—“Oration on Thomas Paine.” Price 4d.—-“Heretics
and Heresies.” Price 4d.—“ Oration on Humboldt.” Price 2d.—
“ Arraignment of the Church.” Price 2d. These can be supplied
in one volume neatly bound in limp cloth. Price Is. 6d. Also, by
same author, “ The Ghosts.” Price 4d.—Religion of the Future.”
Price 2d.—-“Farm Life in America.” Price Id.—“Mistakes of
Moses.” Price 3d.
The Ten Commandments.—By W. P. Ball. Price Id.
Religion in Board Schools.—By W. P. Ball. 2d.
The Devil’s Pulpit, being Astronomico-Theological Dis
courses.—By the Rev. Robert Taylor, B.A., of St. John’s
College, Cambridge. (Reprinted verbatim from Richard Carlile’s
original edition). In two vols., neatly bound in cloth, 8s. Or in
forty-six numbers, 2d. each. Also, by same author, “ The
Diegesis,” 3s. fid., cloth, and “The Syntagma,” Is., both dealing
with the origin and evidences of Christianity.
�6
Four Lectures on the “ Chemistry of Home,” by
Hypatia Bradlaugh.—“ Air, I.” “Air, II.,” “Water, I.,”
“ Water, II.”
Id. each, or the whole, in neat wrapper, 4d.
City Missionaries and Pious Frauds.—By W. R. Crofts. Id.
Natural Reason versus Divine Revelation.—An appeal for
Freethought. By Julian. Edited by Robert Lewins, M.D. 6d.
Pamphlets by J. Symes. — “The Methodist Conference and
+
Eternal Punishment: Do its Defenders Believe the Doctrine/’3d.
“ Hospitals and Dispensaries, are they of Christian Growth ? ” new
and revised edition, Id. “Man’s Place in Nature, or Man an
Animal amongst Animals,” 4d. “ Philosophic Atheism,” 4d.
“ Christianity and Slavery,” 2d. “ Christianity at the Bar of
Science,” 3d, “Debate on Atheism with Mr. St. Clair,” Is.
Robert Cooper’s Holy Scriptures Analysed, with Sketch of
his Life. By C. Bradlaugh. 6d.
Thomas Paine’s Common Sense.—With New Introduction. By
Charles Bradlaugh. 6d.
New Theory of Poverty.—By H. Aula. Id.
Liberty and Morality. By M. D. Conway. 3d.
Shelley’s Works, reprinted from the original MSS.—The Poet of
Atheism and Democracy.—In four handsome volumes, each com
plete in itself. Vol. .1, Early Poems. Volume 2, Later Poems.
Vol. 3, Posthumous Poems. Vol. 4, Prose Writings. 2s. each.
Pamphlets by C. R. Drysdale, M.D.—“ The Population Ques
tion,” Is. “ Tobacco, and the Diseases it Produces,” 2d. “Alcohol,”
6d.
The History of Clerkenwell. By the late W. J. Pinks, with
additions and Notes by the Editor, Edward J. Wood, complete in
one vol., fully gilt, 800 pp., 15s.
Paine’s Theological Works; including the “Age of Reason,”
and all his Miscellaneous Pieces and Poetical Works ; his last Will
and Testament, and a Steel Portrait. Cloth. 3s.
The Age of Reason. By Thomas Paine. Complete, with Pre
face by C. Bradlaugh. A new edition, the best ever issued,
printed in large type on good paper, Is.; cloth gilt, Is, 6d.
Paine’s Rights of Man. A Reply to Burke on the French Revo
lution. Is.
The Immortality of the Soul Philosophically Considered.
Seven Lectures by Robert Cooper.
Voltaire’s
Philosophical
Is.
Dictionary.
The edition in six,
re-printed in two thick volumes. Two portraits and a memoir. 8s.
Analysis of the Influence of Natural Religion on the
temporal Happiness of Mankind. By Philip Beauchamp (a
pseudonvm adopted by G. Grote, the historian of Greece). Pp.
123. Is.
Shelley’s Song to the Men of England. Set to Music for
four voices. By Herr Trousselle. 2d.
A Manual of Political Questions of the Day, with the
arguments on either side. By Sydney Buxton. 130 pp. 6d.
�7
Fine Large Portrait of John Bright, for framing, size 23| by
17|.
Is.
P. 3d.
The City of Dreadful Night, and other Poems.
Thomson (“ B. V.”)
By James
Cloth 5s.
Pamphlets by G. W. Foote.—“ Secularism the True Philo
sophy of Life,” 4d. “ Futility of Prayer,” 2d. . “ Atheism and
Morality,” 2d. “Death’s Test, or Christian Lies about Dying
Infidels,” 2d. Bible Romances, Id. each : “ Noah’s Flood,” “ Cre
ation Story,” “Eve and the Apple,” “The Bible Devil,”
“Jonah and the Whale,” “The Ten Plagues,” “ The Wandering
Jews,” “ The Tower of Babel,” “Balaam’s Ass,” “ God’s Thieves
in Canaan,” “Cain and Abel,” “Lot’s Wife.” Or the 12, in colored
wrapper, Is.
Fine Steel Engravings of William Ewart Gladstone and
John Bright. 3d. each ; the two sent post free for 6d.
The Life of Jesus. By Ernest Renan. Authorised English
Translation. Crown 8vo, pp. xii.—312, cloth, 2s. fid.; stitched in
wrapper. Is. fid.
The Crisis in Farming; its Radical Causes and then only
Remedies. Twenty-two evils arising from Landlord, thirteen from
Tenant. By the Author of “ Hints to Landlords and Tenants.” 6d.
The First Seven Alleged Persecutions, A.D. 64 to A.D. 235.
By Thos. L’Estrange. fid.
The Eucharist. By the same Author. 6d.
These two pamphlets are highly recommended as able contri
butions to Freethought enquiry.
Chrestos : a Religious Epithet; Its Import and Influence.
By J. B. Mitchell, M.D., Mem. Soc. Bib. Arch.
Is.
Volney’s Ruins of Empires, with Plates of the Ancient Zodiac,
etc., carefully reprinted from the best edition, cloth, lettered, 2s.
The Three Trials of William Hone, for Publishing Three
Parodies ; viz., The late John Wilkes’s Catechism, The Political
Litany, and The Sinecurists’ Creed; on three ex-offleio infor
mations, at Guildhall, London, during three successive days—
December 18tli, 19th, and 20th, 1817—-before three special juries,
and Mr. Justice Abbot, on the first day, and Lord Chief Justice
Ellenborough, on the last two days. 2s.
The House of Lords. How it grew—Fifty years ago—Blueblooded Legislators—Broad-acre Legislators—Professional Legis-'
lators—Against Parliamentary Reform—Against Municipal Reform
—Against Religious Liberty—Against Social Reforms—Its Deal
ings with Ireland—-Its Foreign Policy—Concluding Remarks. By
H. R. Fox Bourne. (Reprinted from the “Weekly Dispatch.”)
80 pp. 3d.
Land Law Reform, and its relation to Work, Wages,
and Population. 2d.
The True Principle of Population, Trade Profits, &c.,
and the Land Laws. By T. R, 2d.
�8
The True Source of Christianity; or, a Voice from the
Ganges. By an Indian Officer. Originally published at 5s.
This work is now republished verbatim, in paper covers, Is. ;
cloth gilt, Is. 6d.
The Roll Call: a Political Record of the years 1775 to
1880. Commencing with the great wars of the last century, and
brought down to the close of 1880, with full Index. In paper
covers, 78 pp., 6d.
Under which Lord? By the author of “Joshua Davidson.”
Originally published in 3 vols. at £1 11s. 6d., now issued complete
in 1 vol., cloth gilt, 2s. 6d.
The Rev. Joseph Cook: A Critical Examination. By Professor
Fiske. Id.
The Jewish Sabbath and the Christian Lords. By Pro
fessor Blackie. 2d.
Religion in the Heavens ; or, Mythology Unveiled. In
a Series of Lectures. By Logan Mitchell. Uniform with
International Series. Cloth, gilt, 5s.
LIST B.
Special List of Remainders, in cloth, new and uncut—All
the books in List B are at the lowest price, and no reduction can
be made to the trade, the object being to supply readers of the
National Reformer with literature at specially low rates.
Orders must be accompanied by cost of Postage, which is inserted
after the letter P. Where no postage is mentioned, the books go by
Sutton at cost of purchaser, and 2d. in addition to price must be
sent for booking.
Eminent Radicals in and out of Parliament. By J. Morri
son Davidson, Barrister-at-law. Being sketches of W. E. Glad
stone, John Bright, P. A. Taylor, Sir C. Dilke, J. Cowen, Sir W.
Lawson, H. Fawcett, J. Chamberlain, T. Burt, H. Richards, L. H.
Courtney, A. J. Mundella, John Morley, Robert William Dale,
Joseph Arch. Edward Spencer Beesly, Charles Haddon Spurgeon,
Charles Bradlaugh, Frederic Augustus Maxse, James Beal, Mon
cure Daniel Conway, James Allanson Picton, The Hon. Auberon
Herbert, Edward Augustus Freeman. Demy 8vo., 262 pp. Pub
lished at 10s. 6d. 2s. 6d. P. 7d.
The Outcast. — By Winwood Reade.
Handsomely bound,
pp. 262., Is. 6d. P. 3jd.
Ancient Mysteries described, by William Hone. With En
gravings on Copper and Wood. 2s. 6d. P. 6d.
The Apocryphal New Testament, bein? all the Gospels,
Epistles, &c., attributed to Christ, his Apostles, and their com
panions in the first four centuries of the Christian Era. By
W. Hone. 2s. 6d. P. 6d.
Three Essays on Philosophical Subjects — The Infinite;
Arabic Peripateticism; Sir W. Hamilton and J. S. Mill. Crown
8vo, 290 pp., Is. P. 3|d.
�17
Modern Protestantism: a few words on Essays and Reviews. By
G. J. Holyoake. Published at 6d. Post free l|d.
Thomas Cooper’s Celebrated Eight Letters to the Young Men
of the Working Classes. Post free 3d.
Horatio Prater’s Letters to the American People on Christianity
and the Sabbath. (Published by G. J. Holyoake, Fleet Street.)
P. 2^-d. Paper covers 6d. P. 2d.
By Victor Hugo and Garibaldi. 16 pp.,
stitched, Id. P. |d.
The National Inheritance : an Exhaustive Treatise on the Land
Question. By James Walker. 16 pp., demy 8vo, stitched, Id.
Cloth, new, 8d.
Political Poems.
P. ^-d.
Address to Socialists on the Rational System of Society, and
the measures required for the successful operation of the Universal
Community Society. By Robert Owen. Free 1^-d.
“Notre Dame!” A Freethinker’s address to the Hierarchy of
the Church of Rome. By R. H. Dalton, author of “ Education of
Girls,” etc. (Published at Is.) Post free, IJd.
Vol. 1 of “ Health. ’ A Monthly Magazine, edited by G. Drewry,
M.D. Containing the whole issues for 1878, full of interesting
articles on food, dress, diseases, sanitary matters, &c., &c. (Pub. lished at 2s.) Cloth, new, 6d. P. 4d.
Lord Byron’s “Vision of Judgment.” 24 pp., stitched, in wrapper,
free 2d.
An Essay on the Functions of the Brain. In paper wrapper, Id.
P. |d.
The complete Works of Shakspere, with a Memoir. By
Alexander Chalmers. Handsomely bound, richly gilt covers,
708 pp., Diprose’s diamond edition, Is. 6d. P. 5d. Very suitable
for presentation.
Russian and Turk from a Geographical, Ethnological, and His
torical point of view. By R. G. Latham, M.A., M.D. Royal 8vo
435 pp., 3s. 6d. P. 8d.
Inquiry into the Theories of History, with special refer
ence, to the principles of the Positive Philosophy. By W. Adam.
Dealing with the philosophy of Comte with great care and critical
ability. This work was favorably noticed by J. S. Mill. Demv
8vo, 441 pp., 3s. P. 7d.
Brief Biographies of German Political Leaders, including
Bismarck, Arnim, Camphausen, Lasker, Jacoby, Sonneman, Gueist,
Virchow, etc., etc., in all nineteen principal men in the country.
Crown 8vo, 264 pp., 2s. P. 4d.
Political Pamphlets by Thomas Paine—“ Decline and Fall of
the English System.of Finance;” “Public Good;” “Letters to
the Citizens of America ; ” “ Agrarian Justice opposed to A gra.rian
Law and Agrarian Monopoly, with a plan for creating a National
Fund ; “ Dissertations on the First Principles of Government ”
The five free for 6d.
�18
Pamphlets by R. D. Owen—“A Lecture on Consistency;”
“ Situations—Lawyers, Clergy, Physicians, Men and Women ; ”
" Darby and Susan: a Tale of Old England; ” “ Wealth and
Misery; “ Is eurology : an Account of some Experiments in
Cerebral Physiology; ” “ Sermon on Free Enquiry,” etc. Id. each.
P. |d. Or the whole freQ for 6d.
Letter to the Abbe Raynal, in correction of his Account of the
Revolution in America. By Thomas Paine, with correspondence
between the writer and George Washington. 54 pp., stitched in
wrapper (published at 6d.), free 3d.
Address delivered by Robert Owen on the Opening of the
Institution for the Formation of Character at New Lanark, on
January 1st, 1816, being the first public announcement of ’the
discovery of the Infant School System. Demy 8vo, 32 pp., stitched
in wrapper, free 2d.
An Enquiry into the Nature of Responsibility, as deduced
from Savage Justice, Civil Justice, and Social Justice ; with some
Remarks upon the Doctrine of Irresponsibility as taught by Jesus
Christ and Robert Owen ; also upon the Responsibility of Man to
God. By T. Simmons Macintosh, author of “ The Electrical
Theory of the Universe.” 124 pp., 6d. P. l|d.
The Life and Writings of Joseph Priestley.
Id.
Paper covers,
Personal Narrative of Travels in Eastern Lands, principally
Turkish, in 1833, in a Series of Letters, 67 in all. By Professor F. W.
Newman. The letters are full of most interesting matter concern
ing Eastern Social and Political Life. Crown 8vo, paper covers
120 pages of close print, 6d. P. lj-d.
1
’
Household Words.—Conducted by Charles Dickens.
Strongly
bound. Each volume, 2s.; published at 5s. 6d.
Vol. 9 contains the whole of the essays on Turkey and Greece,
by G. A. SaXa, under the title “ A Roving Englishman,” written
at the close of the Crimean War.
Vol. 14 contains the story of “ The Wreck of the Golden Mary,”
also the famous papers by G. A. Sala, “ A Journey due North,”
and “A Journey to Russia.”
Pamphlets by G. J. Holyoake.—“ Working-class Representa
tion and its Conditions and Consequences ; ” “ Outlaws of Freethought ; ” “ The Limits of Atheism ; or, Why Should Sceptics be
Outlaws ; ” “ The Social Means of Promoting Temperance,” with
remarks on errors in its advocacy; “ A New Defence of the Ballot; ”
“ Life and Last Days of Robert Owen, of New Lanark ; ” “ The
Suppressed Lecture at Cheltenham; ” “ Public Lessons of the
Hangman.” The lot, post free, 8d.
Indian Infanticide : its Origin, Progress and Suppression.
Con
taining a large amount of information respecting the Social Life of
the Hindus. 250 pp., Is. 6d. P. 4d.
�19
The
Scriptural Religions, Histories and Prophecies
Analysed and Examined. By J. W. Willcock, Q.C. A
searching and critical exposure of the Biblical Narratives and
Myths. Vol. I. (all that has been issued), demy 8vo, 526 pp.,
3s. 6d. P. 8d.
Credibility of the Gospel Narratives of the Birth and
Infancy of Christ, with an Introduction on the Acts of the
Apostles. A critical analysis of the contradictions of the Gosiel
Writers. 91 pp. (published at Is. 6d. by Thomas Scott), 6d.
P. Id.
Biographies of John Wilkes and William Cobbett, with
steel engravings. By the Rev. J. S. Watson, M.A. Good inuex,
410 pp., 2s. 6d. P. 6d.
Historical Studies and Recreations. By Shosiiee Chunder
Dutt (J. A. G. Barton), author of “ Bengaliana,” etc. Containing
the World’s History retold, in two parts : the Ancient World and
the Modern World. Also Bengal, an account of the Country from
the earliest times, the Great Wars of India, the Ruins of the Old
World, read as Milestones of Civilisation. 2 vols, 8vo, cloth, new,
uncut. Vol. I. pp. 470; vol. II. pp. 600. (Published at 32s.)
os. 6d.
Phraseological Notes on the Hebrew Text of the Book of Genesis.
By Theodore Preston, M.A.
Illustrating the remarkable
peculiarities and anomalies of matter, style, and phrase in the
Book of Genesis, with references to Rashi, Aben Ezre. Gesenius
etc., etc. Crown 8vo, pp. 290, 2s. P. 4^d.
’
THE GOLDEN LIBRARY SERIES.—Bayard Taylor’s Diver
sions of the Echo Club—The Book of Clerical Anecdotes—Byron’s
Don Juan—Emerson’s Letters and Social Aims—Godwin’s (William)
Lives of the Necromancers—Holmes's Professor at the Breakfast
Table—Hood’s Whims and Oddities, complete, with all the original
illustrations—Irving’s (Washington) Tales of a Traveller—Irving’s
(Washington) Tales of the Alhambra—Jesse’s (Edward) Scenes
and Occupations of Country Life—Leigh Hunt’s Essays, with
portrait and introduction by Edmund Ollier—Mallory’s Sir Thos.
Mort d’Arthur, the Stories of King Arthur and of the Knights of
tlie Round Table; edited by B. Montgomery Ranking—Pascal’s
Provincial Letters ; a new translation, with historical introduction
and notes by T. M’Orie, D.D., LL.D.—Pope’s Complete Poetical
Works Kocflefoucald s Maxims and Moral Reflections, ■with, notes
and introductory essay by Sainte-Beuve—St. Pierre’s Paul and
Virginia, and the Indian Cottage; edited, with Life, by the Rev.
E. Clarke Lamb s Essays of Elia; both series complete in one
volume. Handsomely bound. Reduced to Is. each. If sent bv
Post 3d. each extra.
J
Essays— Scientific, Political, and Speculative. (Second
series.) By Herbert Spencer. (Published at 12s.) Demv 8vo
362 pp., 3s. 6d. P. 6d. A rare opportunity.
’
’
Matter and Motion. By N. A. Nicholson, M.A., Trinity Colleo'e
. Oxford. 48 pp., demy 8vo, 3d. P. Id.
S >
�The Year Book of Facts for 1880.
Containing the principal ;
discoveries in Geology, Dynamics, Geography, etc., with the Speech
of the President at the British Association Congress of that year,
with Index. 210 pp., 7d. P. 3|d.
The Classification of the Sciences ; to which are added Reasons
for Dissenting from the Philosophy of M. Comte. By Herbert
Spencer. 48 pp., demy 8vo, colored wrapper, Is. P. Id.
The Eternal Gospel; or, the Idea of Christian Perfectibility. By
N. W. Mackay, M.A. (Published at 2s. by Thomas Scott.) In
two Parts, 200 pp. in all, 6d. P. 2d.
Practical Remarks on State Vaccination, addressed to the
Smallpox and Vaccination Committee of the Epidemiological
Society. By Edward J. Hughes, M.D., Medical Officer to the
Holywell Union. 32 pp., demy 8vo, Id. P. ^d.
The Crimea and Transcaucasia; being the narrative of a
journey in the Kouban, in Gouria, Georgia, Armenia, Ossety,
Imeritia, Swannety, and Mingrelia, and in the Tauric Range. By
Commander J. P. Telfer, R.N. With two fine Maps and nume
rous Illustrations ; two vols. in one, splendidly bound in cloth, gilt
edges, royal 8vo, 600 pp. (Published at £1 16s.) A handsome
presentation book, 5s.
An Essay on Classification. By Louis Agassiz. 8vo. Pp. vii.
and 381. Cloth. (Published at 12s.) Reduced to 3s. P. 6d.
Light, and its Influence on Life and Health. By Dr.
Forbes Winslow. 301 pp. Is. P. 4d.
Human Longevity; and the amount of life upon the globe.—By P
Flourens, Professor of Comparative Physiology, Paris. Trans
lated by Charles Martel. Boards, Is. P. 2Jd.
The Meteoric Theory of Saturn’s Bings, considered with
reference to the Solar Motion in Space. With illustrations. Paper
wrapper, crown 8vo, Id. P. ^d.
The Human Mind. A System of Mental Philosophy. By J. G.
Murphy, LL.D. Cloth, crown 8vo, 350 pp., 2s. P. ad.
The Modern Practice of Physic, exhibiting the symptoms,
causes, prognostics, morbid appearances and treatment of the
diseases of all climates. By R. Thomas, M.D. Eleventh edition,
revised by A. Frampton, Physician London Hospital. In 2 vols.,
royal 8vo, 564 pp. and 756 pp. This work contains a great
number of recipes and prescriptions for all kinds of diseases, each
given in both Latin and English. With a copious index and table
of contents. 6s.
The Finding of the Book. An essay on the origin of the Dogma
of Infallibility. By John Robertson. This is the important
work which provoked the famous heresy’ prosecution. Published
at 2s. Post free Is.
Facts and Figures for Working Men. An analysis of the
Drink Question in relation to commerce, foreign competition,
our food supply, strikes, the death rate, and prosperity of the
country, etc. By Frederick Leary. Id.
�The Irish Problem and how to solve it.
An historical and
critical review of the legislation and events that have led to Irish
difficulties, including suggestions for practical remedies. Cloth,
demy 8vo, 410 pp. This work is only just issued, and brings the
History of the Irish Question up to the present time, and contains
in addition to Compensation for Disturbance Bill, several Acts
of Parliament, including the Coercion Bill of the present year.
2s. P. 9d.
The Rights and Duties of Property. With a plan for paying
off the National Debt, dealing with the Science of Political
Economy, the Land Question, etc., etc. Clotb, gilt lettered, 260
pp. 6d. P. 3d.
Satan: His existence disproved, and the notions of Battles in
Heaven and of Fallen Angels shown to have originated in Astro
nomical Phsenomena. Id. P. ¿d.
Science Lectures for the People. By Professors Huxley,
Tyndall, Duncan, Williamson, Huggins, Roscoe and others.
In all 55 lectures, in 3 vols., gilt cloth, 4s. 6d.
Intervention and Non-Intervention on the Foreign Policy
of Great Britain, from 1790 to 1865. By A. G. Stapleton.
Demy 8vo, 300 pp. 2s. P. 6d.
Reply to Bishop Watson’s attack on the “ Age of
Reason.” By Thomas Paine. Id. P. |d.
Splendid Steel Portraits of Lord Brougham, John Bright and
Richard Cobden. 24 by 18 Is. each; or the three for 2s. 6d.
The Pentateuch and Book of Joshua in Contrast with the
Moral Sense of our Age. Published at 6s. 6d. in parts. By the
late Thomas Scott. In 1 vol. complete. 2s. P. 5d.
Christianity in the Nineteenth Century. A Religious and
Philosophical Survey of the Immediate Past. By Etienne
Ohastel, Professor of Ecclesiastical History at the University of
Geneva. Translated by J. Beard. Cloth, crown 8vo, 236 pp.,
Is. P. 3£d.
The History of Christianity. By E. N. Bouzique. Translated
by J. Beard. In three vols., nearly 400 pp. in each, crown 8vo,
cloth. 5s.
EDUCATIONAL.
From List B.
Elementary Chemistry.
P. 3|d.
By Rev. H. Martyn Hart, B.A.
A Compendium of English History.
Is.
From the Earliest Times
to a.d. 1872. With copious quotations on leading events and Con
stitutional History, with Appendices. By Herbert R. Clinton.
358 pp. Published at 7s. 6d. 2s. 6d. P. 5d.
First Book of English Grammar. By John Hugh Hawley.
Third edition, . Cloth, 3d. P. Id.
�22
Geography Classified.
A systematic manual of Mathematical,
Physical and Political Geography. With Geographical, Etymo
logical and Historical Notes. By Edwin Adams, F.R.G.S. Pp.
357. (Published at 7s. 6d.) Is. 6d. P. 4d.
Latin Grammar. By L. Direy. Pp. 179. Neatly bound. (Pub
lished at 4s.) 6d. P. 2d.
English. Grammar. By L. Direy and A. Foggo. Pp. 136.
(Published at 3s.) 6d. P. 2^-d.
The Life of Cicero. By Conyers Middleton, D.D. Complete
in one volume, with copious index and steel frontispiece. Demy
8vo, 760 pp. 2s. 6d. P. 9£d. Very cheap.
Facts and Figures, Important Events in History, Geography,
Literature, Biography, Ecclesiastical History, etc., etc. Arranged
in classified chronological order. Post free, 6d.
Elements of Chemistry, Theoretical and Practical, including the
most recent discoveries and applications of the science to medicine
and pharmacy, to agriculture, and to manufacture. Illustrated
by 230 woodcuts, with copious index. Second edition. By Sir
Robert Kane, M.D., M.R.I.A., President of Queen’s College, Cork.
Cloth, royal 8vo, 1069 pp. Price, 3s. 6d.
Parker’s Compendium of Natural and Experimental
Philosophy Mechanics, Hydrostatics, Acoustics, Astro
nomy, etc., etc. Post 8vo, profusely illustrated, 400 pp. Is. 6d.
P. 3|d.
The Elements of Agricultural Chemistry and Geology.
By the late Professor J. F. W. Johnston and C. A. Cameron,
Prof. Chemistry, R.C.S., etc., etc. Post 8vo., 500 pp., tenth
edition. 2s. P. 4|d.
Elements of Astronomy, for Academies and High Schools. By
Elias Loomis, LL.D. Well illustrated, crown 8vo. 2s. 6d. P. 4d.
Crabbe’s Technical Dictionary of all the Terms used in the Arts
and Sciences. Post 8vo, 600 pp., 2s. P. 5d.
The Child’s Ladder of Knowledge. By G. J. Holyoake.
Illustrated (published at 8d.), post free 4d.
Works by the celebrated Sir Benjamin Brodie.
Physiological Researches. Dealing with the Influence of the
Brain on the Action of the Heart and the Generation of Animal
Heat. Observations and experiments on the modes in which death
is produced by vegetable poisons, &c., &c. Cloth, Royal 8vo, 146 pp.
(Published at 5s.) Is. P. 3d.
The Diseases of the Urinary Organs, with Treatment and
Modes of Cure. Cloth, Royal 8vo, 400 pp. (Published at 12s.) 2s
P. 7d.
Pathological and Surgical Observations on the Diseases of
the Joints, Inflammation of the Synovial Membrane, Ulceration of
ditto, Morbid Alteration of Structure, Cancellous Structure of
Bones, &c., &c. Cloth, royal 8vo, 400 pp. (Published at 10s. 6d.)
2s. P. 6d.
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Victorian Blogging
Description
An account of the resource
A collection of digitised nineteenth-century pamphlets from Conway Hall Library & Archives. This includes the Conway Tracts, Moncure Conway's personal pamphlet library; the Morris Tracts, donated to the library by Miss Morris in 1904; the National Secular Society's pamphlet library and others. The Conway Tracts were bound with additional ephemera, such as lecture programmes and handwritten notes.<br /><br />Please note that these digitised pamphlets have been edited to maximise the accuracy of the OCR, ensuring they are text searchable. If you would like to view un-edited, full-colour versions of any of our pamphlets, please email librarian@conwayhall.org.uk.<br /><br /><span><img src="http://www.heritagefund.org.uk/sites/default/files/media/attachments/TNLHLF_Colour_Logo_English_RGB_0_0.jpg" width="238" height="91" alt="TNLHLF_Colour_Logo_English_RGB_0_0.jpg" /></span>
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Conway Hall Library & Archives
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2018
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Conway Hall Ethical Society
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Pamphlet
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Is atheism or theism more rational? A discussion between Mr. Joseph Symes and Mr. George St. Clair
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Symes, Joseph [1841-1906]
Saint Clair, George
Description
An account of the resource
Place of publication: London
Collation: 74 p. ; 18 cm.
Notes: Part of the NSS pamphlet collection. Publisher's list, dated January 1882, on pages at the end numbered [1]-8 and 17-22, i.e. p.9-16 are missing. Printed by Annie Besant and Charles Bradlaugh.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Freethought Publishing Company
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1882
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
RA1777
N631
Subject
The topic of the resource
Atheism
Theism
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
<img src="http://i.creativecommons.org/p/mark/1.0/88x31.png" alt="Public Domain Mark" /><br /><span>This work (Is atheism or theism more rational? A discussion between Mr. Joseph Symes and Mr. George St. Clair), identified by </span><span><a href="https://conwayhallcollections.omeka.net/items/show/www.conwayhall.org.uk">Humanist Library and Archives</a></span><span>, is free of known copyright restrictions.</span>
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
application/pdf
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Language
A language of the resource
English
Atheism
NSS
Theism
-
https://d1y502jg6fpugt.cloudfront.net/25778/archive/files/5ffb0140a09a171aa305eaecb1e6d9a8.pdf?Expires=1712793600&Signature=gV2A5xkJ1g9mvUZakoI1E8kXFuWRsnWOXHPXdZ24kquBEDnJuAI1%7Ekot-LuRgl9CK4Ckzz%7EnNoVtM69vn4FQo6Ils4jW3IskIBuuhtxXWjPobF9cN0E%7EmZ3T5SjLfQv5zmNjYON1ysr3mbc3ZA4eUkl-lIiBTLhsZceUwgjJKn12-G5fmvQQ5MoUQiv%7Eo3ZvWCA21LqWky9w8bSWUyY316vbAemua0aQgvRMQMUXm80PfBhX3Tfja06ibRCzV0KMPOgEf4GUKyayEk2bypiB1Lwm95W79fKCN6OG-ImrFyHs1ltbOoVFDYKX5SiG3wy7b4F9gUWDtjK4N%7EWmABR5Vg__&Key-Pair-Id=K6UGZS9ZTDSZM
97efea1ca6cc58f6432376b214d5a7e6
PDF Text
Text
g
(V
national secular society
Qlatfarivi.
XII.
WHY SHOULD
I ATHEISTS BE
PERSECUTED?
BY
ANNIE
BESANT.
LONDON:
FREETHOUGHT
PUBLISHING
63, FLEET STREET, E.C.
1 8 84.
PRICE
ONE
PENNY.
COMPANY,
�THE ATHEISTIC PLATFORM.
Under this title is being issued a fortnightly publi
cation, each number of which consists of a lecture
delivered by a well-known Freethought advocate. Any
question may be selected, provided that it has formed the
subject of a lecture delivered from the platform by an
Atheist. It is desired to show that the Atheistic platform
is used for the service of humanity, and that Atheists war
against tyranny of every kind, tyranny of king and god,
political, social, and theological.
Each issue consists of sixteen pages, and is published at
one penny. Each writer is responsible only for his or her
own views.
1. —“ What is the use of Prayer ? ” By Annie Besant.
2. —“ Mind considered as a Bodily Function.” By At,tor
Bradlaugh.
3. —“ The Gospel of Evolution.” By Edward Aveling,
D.Sc.
4. —“England’s Balance-Sheet.” By Charles Bradlaugh.
5. —“ The Story of the Soudan.” By Annie Besant.
6. —“ Nature and the Gods.” By Arthur B. Moss.
These Six, in Wrapper, Sixpence.
7.—“ Some Objections to Socialism.” By Charles Bradlaugh.
8. —“Is Darwinism Atheistic ?” By Charles Cockbill
Cattell.
9. —“The Myth of the Resurrection.” By Annie
Besant.
10. —“ Does Royalty Pay ? ” By George Standring.
11. —“ The Curse of Capital.” By Edward Aveling, D.Sc.
Part II. of the “Atheistic Platform,” containing Lec
tures 7—12 can be had in paper wrapper, Price Sixpence.
Also Parts I. and II., bound in one, forming a book of
192 pages, can be had, price One Shilling.
�WHY SHOULD ATHEISTS BE
PEESECUTED ?
Friends,—In. the old days, when Christianity was feeble
and Paganism was strong, when Christians had to plead
to Pagans for toleration as Atheists have to plead to Chris
tians now, Christians from time to time pnt forth an
Apology for their faith. Thus Justin Martyr pleaded
before the Emperor Antoninus, and other Apologies are to
be found in the literature of the early Christian Church.
The word Apology was not used in its modern sense of
excuse, of submissive phrase; it was an Apologia, a
defence of the faith believed in, a vindication of the
principles held. To-day, I Atheist, in a Christian com
munity, stand as did the Christian in the second century in
a Pagan society ; and I put forth an Apologia, a defence, a
vindication of my faith. Faith, in the noblest sense of that
much-abused word, for it is a belief based on reason, in
tellectually satisfying, morally regulative, socially re
formatory.
I will take it for granted, for the purposes of this lec
ture, that the majority of you present here—as of the
wider public outside—-belong to the religion known as
Christian. It is to Christians that this vindication of
Atheism is addressed, and my aim in this lecture is a welldefined one; I am not going to ask from you any agree
ment in my speculative views; I am not going to try to
convince you that Atheism is speculatively accurate ; I am
only going to propose to you, and to answer in the nega
tive, the following question : Granted an Atheist or a small
number of Atheists, in a Christian community, is there any
reason why he or they should be persecuted, for the intel
lectual, moral, or social doctrines held and published ? Is
�180
THE ATHEISTIC PLATFORM.
there anything in Atheism, in its intellectual speculations,
in its moral teaching, in its social theories, which makes it
dangerous to the prosperity, progress and well-being of
the society in which it is professed ?
Such is the question I propose to you. I of course shall
answer it in the negative, and shall try to show you that
whether Atheistic speculations be true or false, the Athe
istic spirit isl of vital importance to society. And at the
very outset let me remind you of the remarkable testi
mony borne to the social aspect of Atheism by the great
philosopher Bacon: ‘‘Atheism leaves a man to sense, to
philosophy, to natural piety, to laws, to reputation, all of
which may be guides to an outward moral virtue, though
religion were not; but superstition dismounts all these and
erecteth an absolute monarchy in the mind of men; there
fore Atheism never did perturb States, for it makes men
wary of themselves, as looking no further ; and we see the
times inclined to Atheism, as the times of Augustus Csesar,
were civil times; but superstition has been the confusion
of many States.” Yet though he thus wrote, Bacon was
not an Atheist, for he said (I here quote from memory):
“A little knowledge inclineth a man to Atheism, but
deeper search brings him back to religion.” These are
not, therefore, the words of the Atheist on his own behalf,
but the testimony of an opponent who has studied the his
tory of the past.
Strange, indeed, it is to those who know that record of
history to remark how Superstition is condoned to-day,
while Atheism is condemned. The wildest vagaries of
Superstition are excused, while the very word Atheism is
held to connote immorality. Take the Salvation Army ; it
may shut up young lads and lasses for an “ all-night ser
vice,” in which they “creep for Jesus” in a hall with
locked doors; when the natural result follows of gross
immorality, excuses are made for the leaders that “their
motives are good.” But let a man be known as an Atheist,
and though his life be spotless, his honor unstained, his
integrity unsoiled, there is no slander too vile to be be
lieved of him, no libel too baseless or too foul to be credited
about his character. Superstition has lighted stakes, built
Inquisitions, turned the wheels of the rack, made red-hot
the pincers to tear men’s flesh, has slaughtered, tormented,
burned and ravaged, till the pages of her history are
�WHY SHOULD ATHEISTS BE PERSECUTED ?
181
blotted with, tears and drip with, blood. Atheism, has slain
none, tortured none; yet men welcome the cubs of the
wolf that will prey on them, and hunt down the watch-dog
that would protect.
1. Is there anything in Atheism in its intellectual aspect
which should make-it mischievous to society ? To answer
this part of the question we must analyse the Atheistic
type of mind and seek its chief and essential character
istic. If you do this you will, I think, find that the
Atheistic mind is essentially of the challenging, the
questioning, the investigating type. It is of that type
which will not accept a thing because it is old, nor believe
it because it is venerable. It demands to understand before
it admits, to be convinced before it believes. Authority,
qua authority, it does not respect; the authority must
prove itself to be based on reason and on knowledge before
cap may be doffed to it or knee bent in homage. Nor is
this questioning silenced by an answer that really leaves
unresolved the problem. The Atheistic spirit remains un
satisfied until it has reached, to use an expressive Ameri
canism, “the bed-rock” of the matter in hand. If an
answer is not to be had, the Atheistic spirit can contentedly
keep its opinion in suspense, but cannot believe.
Now there is no doubt that this type of mind—which is
in the psychical world like the explorer in the physical—is
one which is very unpleasant to the mentally lazy, and
unfortunately the majority, even in a civilised land, is
composed of mentally lazy people. Words are very loosely
used by most folk, and they are apt to be angry when they
are forced, by questioning, to try and think what they really
do mean by the phrases they employ as a matter of course.
We all know how impatient foolish mothers and nurses
grow with a child’s ceaseless questions. A bright, healthy,
intelligent child is always asking questions, and if it is
unlucky enough to live among careless, thoughtless people,
it too often happens that, unable to answer fully, and too
conceited to say “I do not know,” the elder person will
give it a slap, and tell it not to be so tiresome. The Atheist
questioner meets with similar treatment; society, too ig
norant, or too lazy to grapple with his enquiries, gives him
a slap and puts him in the corner.
None the less is this challenging, questioning type of the
most priceless value to society. Without it, progress is
�182
THE ATHEISTIC PLATFORM.
impossible. _ Without it every childish superstition would
be immortal, every mouldy tradition would reign for ever
over men. And the challenge is useful, whether addressed
to truth or to falsehood. It injures no truth. A truth is
vindicated by enquiry ; those who hold a truth only become
more certain of it when questioning forces them to re
examine the grounds on which it rests. But a lie perishes
under investigation as a moth shrivels in the flame.
Progress can be made only by re-affirming truth known,
by discovering truth hitherto unknown, and by destroying
ancient falsehoods. Hence the value to society of the
challenging Atheistic type, whether its speculations be
right or wrong.
Professor Tyndall has proclaimed in noble words his pre
ference for intellectual effort, rather than for intellectual
sleep. In his celebrated Presidential Address at the meet
ing of the British Association at Belfast, he said, dealing
with his own views, and in warning to his hearers : “ As
regards myself, they are not the growth of a day; and as
regards you, I thought you ought to know the environment
which, with or without your consent, is rapidly surrounding
you, and in relation to which some adjustment on your
part may be necessary. A hint of Hamlet’s, however,
teaches us all how the troubles of common life may be
ended; and it is perfectly possible for you and me to
purchase intellectual peace at the price of intellectual
death. The world is not without refugees of this
description; nor is it wanting in persons who seek
their shelter, and try to persuade others to do the
same. The unstable and the weak have yielded, and
will yield to this’ persuasion, and they to whom repose is
sweeter than the truth. But I would exhort you to refuse
the offered shelter and to scorn the base repose—to accept,
if the choice be forced upon you, commotion before stag
nation, the leap of the torrent before the stillness of the
swamp.”
It is this leap of the torrent which the Atheist faces,
feeling that he can better breast the rapids, even if drown
ing be the penalty, than float idly on down the lazy
current of popular opinion. To “ refuse the offered shelter
and to scorn the base repose” is to show the martyr-spirit
that welcomes death rather than dishonor, and the noblest
faith in Truth that man can have is proved when he flings
�WHY SHOULD ATHEISTS BE PERSECUTED ?
183
himself into the billows of fact, let them cast him up on
what shore they may.
Well was it said by a noble and earnest thinker that
Atheism was oft-times “ the truest trust in Truth.” A
legend says that in a pagan land a God was worshipped,
at whose shrine was sacrificed all that was most precious
and most beloved. At last, revolt was made against the
hideous deity, and one man, young and brave, stood forth
to challenge the wrath of the mighty God. Round the
statue of the deity stood thousands of his worshippers; amid
■dead silence walked forth the heroic youth, a javelin in his
hand. Face to face he stood with the God, and poising his
weapon, he cried aloud: “God, if God thou be, answer
with thy thunderbolt the spear I fling! ” And as he spoke,
the strong right arm launched the javelin, and it struck full
and fair, and quivered in the heart of the God. An awful
silence fell on the crouching multitude, as they waited for the
lightning which should flash out in answer to the insult.
But lo! there was none, nor any that regarded, and the
silence brooded unbroken over the pierced statue, and the
blasphemer who had defied the God. There was silence.
Then, a long breath of relief ; then, a cry of rapture ; and
the crowd who had knelt flung itself on the riven statue
and only a heap of dust told where a God had been. Athe
ist was that bold challenger, that questioner of a long-held
faith; and he freed his nation from the yoke of a spectre,
and shivered one of the superstitions of his time. Atheist
is each who challenges an ancient folly, and who, greatly
daring, sets his life as wager against a lie.
This same questioning spirit, applied to the God-idea,
has given Atheism its distinctive name. It finds the God
idea prevalent and it challenges it. It does not deny, but
it “wants to know” before it accepts, it demands proof
before it believes. The orthodox say: “Do you believe
in God?” The Atheist answers: “What is God? You
must tell me what you believe in, ere I can answer your
question.” And then arises the difficulty, for the word
“God” is used “rather to hide ignorance, than to express
knowledge ” (Bradlaugh), and the worshipper anathema
tises the Atheist because he does not adore that which he
himself cannot explain or define.
Sometimes the Atheist analyses the metaphysical defi
nitions of God and finds them meaningless. One instance
�184
THE ATHEISTIC PLATFORM.
will here serve as well as a dozen. Take the phrase that
“ God is Absolute Being.” Bnt, says Dean Mansel, in his
famous Bampton lectures (2nd. Ed., pp. 44, 45, 49), “ by
the Absolute is meant that which exists in, and by itself,
having no necessary relation to any other being............
That which is conceived as absolute and infinite, must be
conceived as containing within itself the sum, not only of
all actual, but of all possible modes of being. Eor if any
actual mode can be denied of it, it is related to that mode,
and limited by it; and if any possible mode can be
denied of it, it is capable of becoming more than it
now is, and such a capability is a limitation...............
The absolute cannot be conceived as conscious, neither
can it be conceived as unconscious; it cannot be con
ceived as complex, neither can it be conceived as simple ;
it cannot be conceived by difference, neither can it be
conceived by the absence of difference; it cannot be
identified with the universe, neither can it be distin
guished from it.” Such is the description of the Abso
lute, given by a great Christian philosopher. If then
by knowledge or by worship I enter into a relation with
God, I at once destroy him as the Absolute. If he be Ab
solute Existence, he is for ever unknowable to man. Why
should the Atheist be persecuted because he refuses either
to affirm or to deny that which by the definition of the'
believer cannot be known or distinguished ?
Pass from metaphysics, and take God as “the First
Cause.” “Every effect must have a cause, and therefore
the universe must have a creator.” Will you kindly tell
me, ere I examine your argument, what you mean by the
word “effect” ? Only one definition can be given : some
thing that results from a cause. “Everything that results
from a cause must have a cause.” Granted. “ Therefore
the universe must have a creator.” Stop, not so fast.
You must show that the universe is an effect, i.e., that it
results from a cause, before you can logically make this
statement, and that is the very point you set out to prove.
You are begging the very question in dispute. Besides
if your argument were valid, it would go too far, for then
behind your creator of the universe, you would need a
creator of the creator, and so on backwards ad infinitum.
The truth is that in speaking of causation we must keep
within the realm of experience; we might as well try to
�WHY SHOULD ATHEISTS BE PERSECUTED ?
185-
plumb the mid-Atlantic with a five-fathom line, as try to
fathom the mystery of existence with our brief experi
mental sounding lead. Christians believe where their
knowledge ends; Atheists suspend their judgments and
wait for light.
“God is the designer of the world, and it shows the
marks of his handiwork.” Did he design the beast of
prey, the carnivorous plant, the tape-worm, the tsetze?
did he design that life should be sustained by slaughter,,
and the awful struggle for existence ? did he design the
pestilence and the famine, the earthquake and the volcanic
eruption ? Is “Nature, red in tooth and claw with ravin,”
the work of all-loving God ?
“God is all-good.” Then whence comes evil? As
long as man has thought, he has wearied himself over the
problem of the existence of evil in the work of an all-good
God. If evil be as eternal as good, then the Persian view
of the co-equal powers of darkness and light as fashioners
of the world is more rational than the Christian. If it be
not eternal, if there were a time when only God existed
and he was good, then evil can only have resulted from
his creative will, and sustained approval. Man Friday’s
question, “Why does not God kill the Devil? ” puts in a
concrete form the problem that no Christian philosopher
has ever solved. The scientific student recognises the
nature and the reason for what we call evil; the Christian
gazes with hopeless bewilderment at the marring of the
work of his all good and almighty God.
Further; from his examination of the many Gods of
the world, the Atheist comes to the conclusion that they
are man-made. The God of every nation is in the same
stage of civilisation as is the nation itself. Such variety
would be incredible if there were an entity behind the
fancy. Compare the God of the savage and of the
European philosopher; the savage worships a concrete
being, brutal, bloody, ferocious as himself; the philoso
pher an abstract idea, a tendency “not ourselves, which
makes for righteousness.” Is there one reality which is
worshipped by the King of Dahomey and by Matthew
Arnold ? In face of such varieties what can the Atheist
think but that “ God” is the reflexion of man, an image
not an object ?
The Atheist waits for proof of God. Till that proof
�186
THE ATHEISTIC PLATFORM.
■comes he remains, as his name implies, without God. His
mind is open to every new truth, after it has passed the
warder Reason at the gate. AR his hope for a true theory
■of the world is fixed on Science, Science which has written
for us the only trustworthy record of the past, and which
is daily writing new pages of the book of knowledge.
What is there in all this to make men persecute the
Atheist ? In this intellectual attitude there is surely no
■crime. Some people say that Atheists lack a sense possessed
by others, in that they do not intuit God, as blind men
lack the vision others enjoy. Suppose it be so, is that any
reason for persecuting them ? Do the people who can see
try to hunt down those who are blind ? I could understand
their pitying us if they possess a joy we do not share, but
I cannot understand their wanting to make us suffer be
cause we are bereft of a faculty enjoyed by them. And
indeed I believe that the noblest and best Christians thus
regard the matter, and regard Atheists with generous
sorrow, not with hatred. But the vast majority have but
little faith in God and little love to man. Our outspoken
unbelief stirs the hidden doubts which lie in their own
minds, and they fear lest we should wake them into activi
ty. They want to believe, because belief is easy and un
belief hard, belief is profitable and unbelief dangerous, and
so they hate and persecute those whose courage is a reproach
to their cowardice. It is not Christian faith nor Christian
truth that incites to modern persecution; it is Christian
hypocrisy and Christian doubt.
Turn from the intellectual to the moral aspect of Atheism
and it is on this that the bitterest attacks are made. Athe
ism being without God, it must seek in man the basis for
its moral code,' and being without immortality it must find
its motives and its sanctions on this side the grave. Athe
istic morality must be founded on man as a social being,
■and must be built up by observation and reflexion. Clearly,
then, it must be Utilitarian; that is, it must set before it
Happiness as the obj ect of life; all that, generally practised,
tends to increase the general happiness is Right; all that,
generally practised, tends to decrease the general happiness
is Wrong.
To this theory the objection is often raised that Virtue
and not Happiness should be the end of life. But what
are virtues save those qualities which tend to produce
�WHY SHOULD ATHEISTS BE PERSECUTED ?
187
happiness, vices those which tend to produce misery and
social disorganisation ? If murder strengthened respect
for human life ; if falsehood increased confidence between
man and man; if love and trust and purity shattered the
society in which they flourished; in a word if virtue made
society miserable while vice raised and ennobled it, do you
think that vice would long be stamped with social disap
proval ? Men are unconsciously Utilitarian, and what is
•called virtue is the means to the end, happiness. By the
Law of Association the means and the end become joined
in thought, and the longing for the end brings about love
of the means.
Let me illustrate what I mean by a case in which pre
judice is less felt than in that of virtue and happiness.
Money is valuable as a means to all it can purchase; when
a man earns and saves money, he earns and saves it not
for itself but for all which he can procure with it. The
little bits of gold and silver have no value in themselves ;
they are valuable only for the comfort, the enjoyment, the
leisure which they symbolise. Yet sometimes the means,
money, takes the place of the end it is generally used to
procure, and the miser, forgetting the end, sets his heart
on the means for itself, and he loves the coins and gathers
them together and heaps them up, and denies himself all
money could buy for the sake of hoarding the gold. In
similar fashion have men learned to love virtue, first for
the sake of the happiness it brought, and then by natural
transition for itself.
But, it is said, the renunciation of personal happiness is
often right; how can Utilitarianism be consistent with the
noblest of human virtues, self-sacrifice. When is the
renunciation of personal happiness right ? WTien the re
nunciation of happiness by one renders needless the renun
ciation of happiness by many; that is, when it tends to the
general good. The man who sacrifices himself for nothing
is a lunatic; he who sacrifices himself to save others from
suffering is a hero. The individual suffers loss, but the
general good is increased.
A curious volte-face is often made by our antagonists.
After declaring that Utilitarianism is low and selfish, they
suddenly assert that the Utilitarian motive is too high to
affect ordinary folk. The “ general good,” they say, is
too vague and abstract a thing to be used for moralising
�188
THE ATHEISTIC PLATFORM.
the populace. I deny it. If a man is exceptionally de
graded, you may find your only appeal must be to himself
or to his immediate surroundings, but the great majority
answer to a wider summons, as do plants to the sunlight.
For your lowest type of man you must use selfish motives,
but even with him you may endeavor to at least touch him
with family, if not with social claims, and so gradually
train him to regard himself as a unit in a community rather
than as an isolated existence. Penalty must educate the
lowest types into recognition of social duty, but the ma
jority of civilised mankind respond to a higher call. And
that this is so we may prove by a mere appeal to statistics.
The Atheists, with no fear of hell nor hope of heaven, with
only the general good as motive and social happiness as
aim, contribute fewer, in proportion to their number, to
the criminal classes, than does any Christian sect, with all
the supposed advantages of Christianity. If Atheism be
morally dangerous to Society, why should Atheism have a
cleaner record than that of any Christian body ?
I ask again : What is there in our Atheistic Utilitarian
code of morals that should justify our persecution ? It
tends to make us seek the happiness of Society in pre
ference to our own, and to put the general before our
individual good. Christians who look to be rewarded for
their goodness may scoff at our disinterestedness, but at
least it does not injure them, and they lose nothing because
we seek not a crown on the other side the grave. To us
“ Virtue is its own reward ; ” we sing with Alfred Tenny
son, ere he sank into a Baron :
“ Glory of warrior, glory of orator, glory of song,
Paid with a voice flying by to be lost on an endless sea—•
Glory of virtue to fight, to struggle, to right the wrong—
Nay, but she aimed not at glory, no lover of glory she;
Give her the glory of going on, and still to be.”
But is there anything in the social views of theAtheist which may, perchance, justify his ostracism ? And
here, at last, we shall come to the crux of our difficulty.
The Atheist, being without God, cannot recognise as
Divine the present order of Society; he claims happinessfor all, and he sees one portion of Society rioting in luxury
while another is steeped in penury; at one end of the
social scale he sees men so wealthy that they cannot even
�WHY SHOULD ATHEISTS BE PERSECUTED ?
189
waste fast enough the riches they own, while at the other
men are so poor that they cannot even feel sure whence
shall come their next week’s food; he notes that the
wealthiest are the idlest, while the poorest are the most
laborious; that those who produce least consume most,
while those who produce most consume least; and he
demands social reconstruction.
No one with a brain and a heart can contrast the dif
ferent conditions into which the children of the rich and
the poor are born, and remain satisfied with Society as it
is. The rich man’s child is born into pure air, into healthy
surroundings; its food is carefully suited to its delicate
organs; its clothes vary with the changes of the weather ;
the most watchful care fosters and cherishes it; as its
faculties expand it is guarded from every injurious influ
ence ; it is coaxed along the right road; all good is made
easy and attractive to it, all evil difficult and repulsive;
the best education is given to the growing lad that money
can buy; body and brain are alike tended and developed ;
in manhood, life’s prizes are open to him, and if he plunges
into crime he does it from an inborn tendency that no
purity of environment has been able to eradicate.
Now contrast the case of the child born into some filthy
overcrowded den in a thieves’ quarter. Its father is a
burglar, its mother a harlot. It is born into squalor, and
foul air, and noisome surroundings; 'its mother’s milk is
gin-polluted; its clothes are filthy rags ; its education con
sists of kicks and curses; foul language is its grammar,
foul thoughts its mental, food; crime is a necessity of its
life; there is no possibility open to it save the reeking
court and the gaol.
The case of the child of the honest but poor worker is
far other than this, but it is not what it should be. The
family is but too often overcrowded and underfed; the
father is over-burdened with wage-winning; the mother
over-sharpened with anxiety; education is rushed through;
work comes too early in life; and while dauntless courage,
unwearying patience and mighty brain power may raise
the poor man’s son into prominence, he can only win by
most exceptional endowment that which comes to the rich
man’s son by chance of birth. Again I say, that looking
at these tremendous inequalities, the Atheist must demand
social reconstruction.
�190
THE ATHEISTIC PLATFORM.
And first, he declares that every adult member of society
should be a worker, that none should live who does not
labor. There is a certain amount of work to be done, and
if some shoulders bear none of the burden, others must
bear more than ought fairly to fall to their lot. If an
idle class exists in a community, an over-worked class
must exist to balance it. The Christian declares that
labor is a curse ; the Atheist that labor is a good; neither
brain nor muscle can be developed without exercise, and
both mental and physical effort are necessary for the due
growth of man. Even the idle classes recognise that
physical exertion is necessary for physical strength, and
there is no reason why the muscle developed by them in
games, should not be developed equally well, and with
equal physical enjoyment, in useful work. I do not want
to see games abolished, but I do want to see them more
equally distributed. All would be the better if the athletic
“ aristocrat ” spent some of his strength in labor, and the
artisan some of his in sport.
Further, the Atheist declares that each should have time
of leisure. Without leisure, no mental improvement is
possible. If a man is wearied out physically, he is not fit
to toil mentally, and only as all take their share of work
can all enjoy their share of leisure. Those who make
society’s wealth have but small share of leisure to-day;
and remember that leisure should include time for mental
work and for complete relaxation. Healthy human life
should be made up of physical effort, mental effort, play,
food-time and sleep. Not one of these can be omitted
from a healthy life.
And see the gain in enjoyment brought about by the train
ing of mental faculty. Lately I went for a brief holiday into
a lonely part of Scotland; there was no “ society” there,
but there were hills and water and clouds; glorious fight
and shade and color ; radiant glow of flowers and plash of
mountain rills. To me, the beauty, the stillness, the ripple
of water, the glory of moor and wood, gave the most ex
quisite enjoyment. But imagine a woman taken from
some filthy London court, and set down in the midst of
that solitude ; ere a day was over she would be wearying
for the revelry of the gin-palace, the excitement of the
fifth-rate music-hall. Why such difference between her
and me ? Because I am educated and she is not. Because
�WHY SHOULD ATHEISTS BE PERSECUTED ?
191
my faculties have been drawn out, trained, and cultured..
Hers have been dwarfed, withered and destroyed.
I claim for all the joy that I have in life, in beauty, in
nature and in art. Why should Society have bestowed so>
much on me, while it leaves my sister beggared ?
But in order that the adult may be cultivated, the child
must be educated. The school-life of the workers is too
short. The children’s pennies are wanted to swell thewages of the family, whereas the father’s wage should be
sufficient for all until the children grow into manhood and
womanhood. And the children should have technical, as
well as book education. In Germany all children learn a
trade, and the present Crown Prince is said to be a cabi
net-maker, some of his palace furniture having been made
by his own hands. If all children were trained in brain
and in fingers, then ability, not birth, would decide the
path in life. There is many a brain now lying fallow in
workshop and behind the plough, which might have been of
priceless service to England had it been set to its fit work;
and there is many a brain, high in the council-chambers
of the nation, scarce fit to direct the fingers in the most
unskilled labor. A just system of national education would
classify thinkers and manual laborers aright, and would
draft the one for higher education, the other for rougher
forms of toil, without regard to the superstition of birth,
or to anything save the capacities given by Nature to each
child.
Moreover this education should be really “national.”
All children, rich and poortogether, should go to the National
Schools. There should be no distinctions, no differences
of rank permitted in the schools, save the distinctions of
ability and of merit. Thus would class-distinctions be
eradicated, and those who had sat side by side on the
same schoolbench could never, in later life, dream they
were of different clay. To such suggestion as this it is
sometimes objected that the vulgar manners of the poor
child would coarsen those of the rich. Friends, the Atheist
seeks to destroy that vulgarity; it is the outcome of
neglected education, of that absence of refinement of
thought and of life, that results from the shutting up of
the poor into one dreary round of ceaseless toil. The
difficulty would only arise during the first generation of
common school-life, and the teachers by careful supervision
�192
THE ATHEISTIC PLATFORM.
might easily prevent any real harm from arising. If any
children were found to use coarse language, they could be
separated off, until they understood that indecency would
not be tolerated. As a rule, absolute coarseness of language
and gesture would be found only in the children of the
'Criminal classes, and they should be taught in different
schools.
The Atheist looks forward to, and works towards, a
Society in which class-distinctions shall have vanished, in
which all shall be equal before the law, all shall be given
equal opportunities, and shall share equal education in
their youth. From that Society both crime and poverty
shall have vanished; the workhouse and the gaol shall
have passed away. Small wonder then that the Atheist
should be persecuted; he is hated by the idle wealthy, by
the aristocratic pauper who lives on other men’s toil; these
set the fashion of social ostracism, and the fashion is
followed by the thousands who ape and echo those above
them in the social scale. None the less is the Atheist hope
already shining above the horizon, and sunned in tlie
warmth of that radiance he waits patiently for the coming
noon.
Printed by Annie Besant and Charles Beajdlaugh, 63, Fleet Street,
London E.C.
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Victorian Blogging
Description
An account of the resource
A collection of digitised nineteenth-century pamphlets from Conway Hall Library & Archives. This includes the Conway Tracts, Moncure Conway's personal pamphlet library; the Morris Tracts, donated to the library by Miss Morris in 1904; the National Secular Society's pamphlet library and others. The Conway Tracts were bound with additional ephemera, such as lecture programmes and handwritten notes.<br /><br />Please note that these digitised pamphlets have been edited to maximise the accuracy of the OCR, ensuring they are text searchable. If you would like to view un-edited, full-colour versions of any of our pamphlets, please email librarian@conwayhall.org.uk.<br /><br /><span><img src="http://www.heritagefund.org.uk/sites/default/files/media/attachments/TNLHLF_Colour_Logo_English_RGB_0_0.jpg" width="238" height="91" alt="TNLHLF_Colour_Logo_English_RGB_0_0.jpg" /></span>
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Conway Hall Library & Archives
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2018
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Conway Hall Ethical Society
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Pamphlet
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Why should atheists be persecuted?
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Besant, Annie Wood [1847-1933]
Description
An account of the resource
Place of publication: London
Collation: [179]-192 p. ; 18 cm.
Series title: Atheistic Platform
Series number: 12
Notes: Printed by Annie Besant and Charles Bradlaugh. Part of the NSS pamphlet collection.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Freethought Publishing Company
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1884
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
N073
Subject
The topic of the resource
Atheism
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
<a href="http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/mark/1.0/"><img src="http://i.creativecommons.org/p/mark/1.0/88x31.png" alt="Public Domain Mark" /></a><span> </span><br /><span>This work (Why should atheists be persecuted?), identified by </span><a href="https://conwayhallcollections.omeka.net/items/show/www.conwayhall.org.uk"><span>Humanist Library and Archives</span></a><span>, is free of known copyright restrictions.</span>
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
application/pdf
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Language
A language of the resource
English
Atheism
NSS
-
https://d1y502jg6fpugt.cloudfront.net/25778/archive/files/c1f6ed4b1aae3fc75921b5d243ae23e9.pdf?Expires=1712793600&Signature=pakta7O5LPFqrqqNktJIf0XlbkbLy%7EP4EgHj8NbqMCcc3GR1WrM6N-u7iB%7EFRNGgDqmj5UIegLZ4oTHsNuWy5Junzay5iJnfGJ4gJKSPhccR0VOwEN9S6CFIM4zXMQK%7EU9nu0Ywg%7EWi3J16D-GX5BNmF8UsfpdW11gBgtECWZrx1B6wDgH65WCYNxEYa0pnS2%7EDV38GOF4Z6VtSuTvDKMtgFYy7uaUFnLpVWJGcTOhmYlfYOtl8TyFKdux%7EmntekcBD10I-K4%7EOnOqtXRKNMrDlKDv%7E%7ETwu8%7E-lj4lbogiAcUrnFmsfPAfscZyPx7tBJuAYnRu6VAaaFODypRI8gDA__&Key-Pair-Id=K6UGZS9ZTDSZM
a3a59a7193a068a5724eb14875a4ee7b
PDF Text
Text
����������������
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Victorian Blogging
Description
An account of the resource
A collection of digitised nineteenth-century pamphlets from Conway Hall Library & Archives. This includes the Conway Tracts, Moncure Conway's personal pamphlet library; the Morris Tracts, donated to the library by Miss Morris in 1904; the National Secular Society's pamphlet library and others. The Conway Tracts were bound with additional ephemera, such as lecture programmes and handwritten notes.<br /><br />Please note that these digitised pamphlets have been edited to maximise the accuracy of the OCR, ensuring they are text searchable. If you would like to view un-edited, full-colour versions of any of our pamphlets, please email librarian@conwayhall.org.uk.<br /><br /><span><img src="http://www.heritagefund.org.uk/sites/default/files/media/attachments/TNLHLF_Colour_Logo_English_RGB_0_0.jpg" width="238" height="91" alt="TNLHLF_Colour_Logo_English_RGB_0_0.jpg" /></span>
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Conway Hall Library & Archives
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2018
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Conway Hall Ethical Society
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Pamphlet
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Did Charles Bradlaugh die an atheist?
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Bonner, Hypatia Bradlaugh [1858-1935]
Description
An account of the resource
Place of publication: London
Collation: 12, [2] p. ; 20 p.
Notes: Works by and about Charles Bradlaugh, and chief works of Thomas Paine, with extracts from reviews, listed on unnumbered pages at the end. Printed by A. Bonner, Took's Court, London.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
A. & H.B. Bonner
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1898
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
G4346
Subject
The topic of the resource
Atheism
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
<a href="http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/mark/1.0/"><img src="http://i.creativecommons.org/p/mark/1.0/88x31.png" alt="Public Domain Mark" /></a><span> </span><br /><span>This work (Did Charles Bradlaugh die an atheist?), identified by </span><a href="https://conwayhallcollections.omeka.net/items/show/www.conwayhall.org.uk"><span>Humanist Library and Archives</span></a><span>, is free of known copyright restrictions.</span>
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
application/pdf
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Language
A language of the resource
English
Atheism
Charles Bradlaugh