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A DEFENCE OF ATHEISM:
BEING
A LECTURE
DELIVERED IN
MERCANTILE HALL, BOSTON,
APRIL 10, 1861,
BY MRS. ERNESTINE L. ROSE.
BOSTON: •
PUBLISHED BY J. P. MENDUM, INVESTIGATOR OFFICE.
1881.
��A DEFENCE OF ATHEISM.
My Friends :—In undertaking the inquiry of
the existence of a God, I am fully conscious of
the difficulties 1 have to encounter. I am well
aware that the very question produces in most
minds a feeling of awe, as if stepping on forbid
den ground, too holy and sacred for mortals to
approach. The very question strikes them with
horror, and it is owing to this prejudice so deeply
implanted by education, and also strengthened by
public sentiment, that so few are willing to give it
a fair and impartial investigation,—knowing but
too well that it casts a stigma and reproach upon
any person bold enough to undertake the task,
unless his previously known opinions are a guar
antee that his conclusions would be in accordance
and harmony with the popular demand. But be
lieving, as I do, that Truth only is beneficial, and
Error, from whatever source, and under whatever
name, is pernicious to man, I consider no place
too holy, no subject too sacred, for man’s earnest
investigation; for by so doing only can we arrive
at Truth, learn to discriminate it from Error, and
be able to accept the one and reject the other.
Nor is this the only impediment in the way of
this inquiry. The question arises, Where shall
we begin ? We have been told, that “ by search
ing none can find out God,” which has so far
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A DEFENCE OF ATHEISM.
proved true ; for, as yet, no one has ever been
able to find him. The most strenuous believer
has to acknowledge that it is only a belief, but he
knows nothing on the subject. Where, then, shall
we search for his existence? Enter the material
world ; ask the Sciences whether they can disclose
the mystery ? Geology speaks of the structure of
the Earth, the formation of the different strata, of
coal, of granite, of the whole mineral kingdom.—
It reveals the remains and traces of animals long
extinct, but gives us no clue whereby we may
prove the existence of a God.
Natural history gives us a knowledge of the
animal kingdom in general; the different organ
isms, structures, and powers of the various species.
Physiology teaches the nature of man, the laws
that govern his being, the functions of the vital
organs, and the conditions upon which alone health
and life depend. Phrenology treats of the laws
of mind, the different portions of the brain, the
temperaments, the organs, how to develop some
and repress others to produce a well balanced and
healthy condition. But in the whole animal econ
omy—though the brain is considered to be a “ mi
crocosm,” in which may be traced a resemblance
or relationship with everything in Nature—not a
spot can be found to indicate the existence of a
God.
Mathematics lays the foundation of all the ex
act sciences. It teaches the art of combining num
bers, of calculating and measuring distances, bow
to solve problems, to weigh mountains, to fathom
the depths of the ocean; but gives no directions
how to ascertain the existence of a God.
Enter Nature's great laboratory—Chemistry.—
She will speak to you of the various elements,
their combinations and uses, of the gasses con
�A DEFENCE OF ATHEISM.
5
stantly evolving and combining in different pro
portions, producing all the varied objects, the in
teresting and important phenomena we behold.
She proves the indestructibility of matter, and its
inherent property—motion; but in all her opera
tions, no demonstrable fact can be obtained to in
dicate the existence of a God.
Astronomy tells us of the wonders of the Solar
System—the eternally revolving planets, the ra
pidity and certainty of their motions, the distance
from* planet to planet, from star to star. It pre
dicts with astonishing and marvellous precision
the phenomena of eclipses, the visibility upon our
Earth of comets, and proves the immutable law
of gravitation, but is entirely silent on the exist
ence of a God.
In fine, descend into the bowels of the Earth,
and you will learn what it contains; into the
depths of the ocean, and you will find the inhab
itants of the great deep; but neither in the Earth
above, nor the waters below, can you obtain any
knowledge of his existence. Ascend into the
heavens, and enter the “ milky way.” go from
planet to planet to the remotest star, and ask the
eternally revolving systems, Where is God ? and
Echo answers, Where ?
The Universe of Matter gives us no record of
his existence. Where next shall we search ? En
ter the Universe of Mind, read the millions of
volumes written on the subject, and in all the
speculations, the assertions, the assumptions, the
theories, and the creeds, you can only find Man
stamped in an indelible impress his own mind on
every page. In describing his God, he delineated
his own character: the picture he drew represents
in living and ineffaceable -colors the epoch of his
existence—the period he lived in.
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A DEFENCE OF /THEISM.
It was a great mistake to say that God made
man in his image. Man, in all ages, made his
God in his own image; and we find that just in
accordance with his civilization, his knowledge,
his experience, his taste, his refinement, his sense
of right, of justice, of freedom, and humanity,—so
has he made his God. But whether coarse or re
fined ; cruel and vindictive, or kind and generous;
an implacable tyrant, or a gentle and loving fa
ther ;—it still was the emanation of his own mind
—the picture of himself.
But, you ask, how came it that man thought or
wrote about God at all? The answer is very sim
ple. Ignorance is the mother of Superstition. In
proportion to man’s ignorance is he superstitious—
does he believe in the mysterious. The very name
has a charm for him. Being unacquainted with
the nature and laws of things around him, with
the true causes of the effects he witnessed, he as
cribed them to false ones—to supernatural agen
cies. The savage, ignorant of the mechanism of
a watch, attributes the ticking to a spirit. The
so-called civilized man, equally ignorant of the
mechanism of the Universe, and the laws which
govern it, ascribes it to the same erroneous cause.
Before electricity was discovered, a thunder-storm
was said to come from the wrath of an offended
Deity. To this fiction of man’s uncultivated mind,
has been attributed all of good and of evil, of wis
dom and of folly. Man has talked about him,
written about-him, disputed about him, fought
about him,—sacrificed himself, and extirpated his
fellow man. Rivers of blood and oceans of tears
have been shed to please him, yet no one has ever
been able to demonstrate his existence.
But the Bible, we are told, reveals this great
mystery. Where Nature is dumb, and Man igno
�A DEFENCE OF ATHEISM.
7
rant, Revelation speaks in the authoritative voice
of prophecy. Then let us see whether that Reve
lation can stand the test of reason and of truth.—
God, we are told, is omnipotent, omniscient, om
nipresent,—all wise, all just, and all good; that
he is perfect. So far, so well; for less than per
fection were unworthy of a God. The first act
recorded of him is, that he created the world out
of nothing; but unfortunately the revelation of
Science—Chemistry—which is based not on writ
ten words, but demonstrable facts, says that Noth
ing has no existence, and therefore out of Nothing,
Nothing could be made. Revelation tells us that
the world was created in six days. Here Geolo
gy steps in and says, that it requires thousands of
ages to form the various strata of the earth. The
Bible tells us that the earth was flat and station
ary, and the sun moves around the earth. Co
pernicus and Galileo flatly deny this 7^ assertion,
and demonstrate by Astronomy that the earth is
spherical, and revolves around the sun. Revela
tion tells us that on the fourth day God created
the sun, moon, and stars. This, Astronomy calls
a moo» story, and says that the first three days,
before the great torchlight was manufactured and
suspended in the great lantern above, must have
been rather dark.
The division of the waters above trom the wa
ters below, and the creation of the minor objects,
I pass by, and come at once to the sixth day.
Having finished, in five days, this stupendous
production, with its mighty mountains, its vast
seas, its fields and woods; supplied the waters
with fishes—from the whale that Jonah swal
lowed to the little Dutch herring; peopled the
woods with inhabitants—from the tiger, the lion,
the bear, tire elephant with his trunk, the drome
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A DEFENCE OF ATHEISM.
dary with his hump, the deer with his antlers
the nightingale with her melodies, down to the
serpent which tempted mother Eve ; covered the
fields with vegetation, decorated the gardens with
flowers, hung the trees with fruits; and survey
ing this glorious world as it lay spread out like a
map before him, the question naturally suggested
itself. What is it all for, unless there were beings
capable of admiring, of appreciating, and of en
joying the delights this beautiful world could af
ford ? And suiting the action to the impulse, he
said,
Let us make man.” “ So God created
man in his own image; in the image of God cre
ated he him, male and female created he them.”
I presume by the Term “image,” we are not to
understand a near resemblance of face or form,
but in the image or likeness of his knowledge, his
power, his wisdom, and perfection. Having thus
made man, he placed him (them) in the garden
of Eden the loveliest and most enchanting spot
at the very head of creation, and bade them (with
the single restriction not to eat of the tree of
knowledge,) to live, to love, and to be happy.
What a delightful picture, could we only rest
here ! But did these beings, fresh from the hand
of omnipotent wisdom, in whose image they were
made, answer the great object of their creation?
Alas ! no. No sooner were they installed in their
Paradisean home, than they violated the first, the
only injunction given them, and fell from their
high estate; and not only they, but by a singular
justice of that very merciful Creator, their inno
cent posterity to all coming generations, fell with
them ! Does that bespeak wisdom and perfec
tion in the Creator, or in the creature ? But what
was the cause of this tremendous fall, which frus
trated the whole design of the creation ? The
�A DEFENCE OF ATHEISM.
9
serpent tempted mother Eve, and she, like a good
wife, tempted her husband. But did God not
know when he created the serpent, that it would
tempt the woman, and that she was made out of
such frail materials, (the rib of Adam,) as not to
be able to resist the temptation? If he did not
know, then his knowledge was at fault; if he
did, but could not prevent that calamity, then his
power was at fault; if he knew and could, but
would not, then his goodness was at fault. Choose
which you please, and it remains alike fatal to the
rest.
Revelation tells us that God made man perfect,
and found him imperfect; then he pronounced all
things good, and found them most desperately
bad. “ And God saw that the wickedness of man
was great in the earth, and that every imagina
tion of the thought of his heart was evil continu
ally. And it repented the Lord that he had made
man on the earth, and it grieved him at his heart.”
ct And the Lord said, I will destroy man whom
I have created, from the face of the earth ; both
man and beasts, and the creeping things, and the
fowls of the air, for it repenteth me that I have
made them.” So he destroyed everything, except
Noah with his family, and a few household pets.
Why he saved them is hard to say, unless it was
to reserve materials as stock in hand to commence
a new world with; but really, judging of the
character of those he saved, by their descendants,
it strikes me it would have been much better, and
given him far less trouble, to have let them slip
also, and with his improved experience made a
new world out of fresh and superior materials.
As it was, this wholesale destruction even, was
a failure. The world was not. one jot better after
the flood than before. His chosen children were
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A DEFENCE OF ATHEISM.
just as bad as ever, and he had to send his proph
ets, again and again, to threaten, to frighten, to
coax, to cajole, and to flatter them into good be
haviour. But all to no effect. They grew worse
and worse: and having made a covenant with
Noah after he had sacrificed of “ every clean
beast and of every clean fowl,”—“ The Lord
smelt the sweet savour; ai\d the Lord said in his
heart, I will not again curse the ground any more
for man’s sake; for the imagination of man’s
heart is evil from his youth ; neither will I again
smite any more everything living, as I have done.”
And so he was forced to resort to the last sad al
ternative of sending “his only begotten son,” his
second self, to save them. But alas! “ his own
received him not,” and so he was obliged to
adopt the Gentiles, and die to save the world.
Did he succeed, even then ? Is the world saved ?
Saved I From what? From ignorance ? It is all
around us. From poverty, vice, crime, sin, mis
ery, and shame ? It abounds everywhere. Look
into your poor-houses, your prisons, your lunatic
asylums; contemplate the whip, the instruments
of torture, and of death ; ask the murderer, or his
victim ; listen to the ravings of the maniac, the
sirieks of distress, the groans of despair; mark
the cruel deeds of the tyrant, the crimes of slave
ry, and the suffering of the oppressed; count the
millions of lives lost by fire, by water, and by the
sword; measure the blood spilled, the tears shed,
the sighs of agony'- drawn from the expiring vic
tims on the altar of fanaticism;—and tell me from
what the world was saved? And why was it not
saved? Why does God still permit these horrors
to afflict the race? Does omniscience not know
it? Could omnipotence not do it? Would infi
nite wisdom, power, and goodness allow his chil
�A DEFENCE OF ATHEISM.
11
dren thus to live, to suffer, and to die? No!
Humanity revolts against such a supposition.
Ah ! not now, not here, says the believer. Here
after will he save them. Save them hereafter!
From what? From the apple eaten by our mo
ther Eve? What a mockery! If a rich parent
were to let his children live in ignorance, poverty,
and wretchedness, all their lives, and hold out to
them the promise of a fortune at some time here
after, he would justly be considered a criminal, or
a madman. The parent is responsible to his off
spring—the Creator to the creature.
The testimony of Revelation has failed. Its
account of the creation of the material world is
disproved by science. Its account of the creation
of man in the image of perfection is disproved by
its own internal evidence. To test the Bible God
by justice and benevolence, he could not be good ;
to test him by reason and knowledge, he could
not be wise; to test him by the light of truth, the
rule of consistency, we must come to the inevita
ble conclusion that, like the Universe of matter
and of mind, this pretended Revelation has also
failed to demonstrate the existence of a God.
Methinks I hear the believer say, you are un
reasonable ; you demand an impossibility; we
are finite, and therefore cannot understand, much
less define and demonstrate the infinite. Just so !
But if I am unreasonable in asking you to demon
strate the existence of the being you wish me to
believe in, are you not infinitely more unreason
able to expect me to believe—blame, persecute,
and punish me for not believing—in what you
have to acknowledge you cannot understand ?
But, says the Christian, the world exists, and
therefore there must have been a God to create it.
That does not follow. The mere fact of its exist
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A DEFENCE OF ATHEISM.
ence does not prove a Creator. Then how came
the Universe into existence? We do not know ;
but the ignorance of man is certainly no proof of
the existence of a God. Yet upon that very igno
rance has it been predicated, and is maintained.
From the little knowledge we have, we are justi
fied in the assertion that the Universe never was
created, from the simple fact that not one atom of
it can ever be annihilated. To suppose a Uni
verse created, is to suppose a time when it did not
exist, and that is a self-evident absurdity. Be
sides, where was the Creator before it was creat
ed ? Nay, where is he now? Outside of that
Universe, which means the all in all, above, be
low, and around? That is another absurdity. Is
he contained within? Then he can be only a
part, for the whole includes all the parts. If only
a part., then he could not be its Creator, for a part
cannot create the whole. But the world could not
have made itself. True; nor could God have
made himself; and if you must have a God to
make the world, you will be under the same ne
cessity to have another to make him, and others
still to make them, and so on until reason and
common sense are at a stand-still.
The same argument applies to a First Cause.
We can no more admit of a first than a last cause.
What is a first cause ? The one immediately pre
ceding the last effect, which was an effect to a
cause in its turn—an effect to causes, themselves
effects. All we know is an eternal chain of cause
and effect, without beginning as without end.
But is there no evidence of intelligence, of de
sign, and consequently of a designer? I see no
evidence of either. What is intelligence? It is
not a thing, a substance, an existence in itself, but
simply a property of matter, manifesting itself
�A DEFENCE OF ATHEISM.
13
through organizations. We have no knowledge
of, nor can we conceive of, intelligence apart from
organized matter: and we find that from the small
est and simplest insect, through all the links and
gradations in Nature’s great chain, up to Man—
just in accordance with the organism, the amount,
and quality of brain, so are the capacities to re
ceive impressions, the power to retain them, and
the abilities to manifest and impart them to others,
namely, to have its peculiar nature cultivated and
developed, so as to bear mental fruits, just as the
cultivated earth bears vegetation—physical fruits.
Not being able to recognize an independent intelli
gence, I can perceive no design or designer except
in the works of man.
But, says Paley, does the watch not prove u
watchmaker—a design, and therefore a designer ?
How much more then does the Universe? Yes;
the watch shows design, and the watchmaker did
not leave us in the dark on the subject, but clearly
and distinctly stamped his design on the face of the
watch. Is it as clearly stamped on the Universe?
Where is the design, in the oak to grow to its ma
jestic height ? or in the thunderbolt that rent it
asunder? In the formation of the wing of the
bird, to enable it to fly, in accordance with the
promptings of its nature ? or in the sportsman to
shoot it down while flying? In the butterfly to
dance in the sunshine? or its being crushed in the
tiny fingers of a child ? Design in man’s capacity
for the acquisition of knowledge, or in his groping
in ignorance? In the necessity to obey the laws
of health, or .in the violation of them, which pro
duces disease ? In the desire to be happy, or in
the causes that prevent it, and make him live in
toil, misery, and suffering ?
The watchmaker not only stamped his design
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A DEFENCE OF ATHEISM.
on the face of the watch, but he teaches how to
wind it up when run down; how to repair the
machinery when out of order; and how to put a
new spring in when the old one is broken, and
leave the watch as good as ever. Does the great
Watchmaker, as he is called, show the same in
telligence and power in keeping, or teaching oth
ers to keep, this contemplated mechanism—Man
-—always in good order? and when the life-spring
is broken replace it with another, and leave him
just the same? If an Infinite Intelligence designed
man to possess knowledge, he could not be igno
rant; to be healthy, he could not be diseased; to
be virtuous, he could not be vicious ; to be wise,
he could not act so foolish as to trouble himself
about the Gods, and neglect his own best interests.
But, says the believer, here is a wonderful adapt
ation of means to ends; the eye to see, the ear to
hear,. &c. Yes, this is very wonderful; but not
one jot more so, than if the eye were made to
hear, and the ear to see. The supporters of De
sign use sometimes very strange arguments. A
friend of mine, a very intelligent man, with quite
a scientific taste, endeavored once to convince me
of a Providential design, from the fact that a fish,
which had always lived in the Mammoth Cave of
Kentucky, was entirely blind. Here, said he, is
strong evidence; in that dark cave, where noth
ing was to be seen, the fish needed no eyes, and
therefore it has none. He forgot the demonstrable
fact that the element of light is indispensable in
the formation of the organ of sight, without which
it could not be formed, and no Providence, or
Gods, could enable the fish to see. That fish
story reminds me of the Methodist preacher who
proved the wisdom and benevolence of Providence
in always placing the rivers near large cities, and
�A DEFENCE OF ATHEISM.
15
death at the end of life ; for Oh 1 my dear hearers,
said he, what would have become of us had he
placed it at the beginning?
Everything is wonderful, and wonderful just in
proportion as we are ignorant; but that proves no
“design” or “designer.” But did things come by
chance ? I am asked. Oh ! no. There is no such
thing as chance. It exists only in the perverted,
mind of the believer, who, while insisting that
God was the cause of everything, leaves Him
without any cause. The Atheist believes as little
in the one as in the other. He knows that no ef
fect could exist without an adequate cause ; that
everything in the Universe is governed by laws.
The Universe is one vast chemical laboratory,
in constant operation, by her internal forces. The
laws or principles of attraction, cohesion, and re
pulsion, produce in never-ending succession the
phenomena of composition, decomposition, and
recomposition. The how, we are too ignorant to
understand, too modest to presume, and too hon
est to profess. Had man been a patient and im
partial inquirer, and not with childish presump
tion attributed everything he could not under
stand, to supernatural causes, given names to hide
his ignorance, but observed the operations of Na
ture, he would undoubtedly have known more,
been wiser, and happier.
As it is, Superstition has ever been the great
impediment to the acquisition of knowledge. Ev
ery progressive step of man clashed against the
two-edged sword of Religion, to whose narrow re
strictions he had but too often to succumb, or
march onward at the expense of interest, reputa
tion, and even life itself.
But, we are told, that Religion is natural; the
belief in a God universal. Were it natural, then
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A DEFENCE OF ATHEISM.
it would indeed be universal; but it is not. We
have ample evidence to the contrary. According
to Dr. Livingstone, there are whole tribes or na
tions, civilized, moral, and virtuous; yes, so hon
est that they expose their goods for sale without
guard or value set upon them, trusting to the
honor of the purchaser to pay its proper price.—
Yet these people have not the remotest idea of a
God, and he found it impossible to impart it to
them. And in all ages of the world, some of the
most civilized, the wisest, and the best, were en
tire unbelievers, only they dared not openly avow
it, except at the risk of their lives. Proscription,
the torture, and the stake, were found most effi
cient means to seal the lips of heretics ; and though
the march of progress has broken the infernal ma
chines, and extinguished the fires of\the Inquisi
tion, the proscription, and more refined but not
less cruel and bitter persecutions of an intolerant
and bigoted public opinion, in Protestant coun
tries, as well as in Catholic, on account of belief,
are quite enough to prevent men from honestly
avowing their true sentiments upon the subject.—
Hence there are few possessed of the moral cour
age of a Humboldt.
If the belief in a God were natural, there would
be no need to teach it. Children would possess it
as well as adults, the layman as the priest, the
heathen as much as the missionary. We don’t
have to teach the general elements of human na
ture,—the five senses, seeing, hearing, smelling,
tasting, and feeling. They are universal; so
would religion be were it natural, but it is not.
On the contrary, it is an interesting and demon
strable fact, that all children are Atheists, and
were religion not inculcated into their minds they
would remain so. Even as it’is, they are great
�A DEFENCE OF ATHEISM.
17
sceptics, until made sensible of the potent weapon
by which religion has ever beyn propagated, name
ly, fear—fear of the lash of public opinion here,
and of a jealous, vindictive God hereafter. No •
there is no religion in human nature, nor human
nature in religion. It is purely artificial, the re
sult of education. while Atheism is natural, and,
were the human mind not perverted and bewil
dered by the mysteries and follies of superstition,
would be universal.
But the people have been made to believe that
were it not for religion, the world would be de
stroyed-;—man would become a monster, chaos
and confusion would reign supreme. These erro
neous notions conceived in ignorance, propagated
by superstition, and kept alive by an interested
and corrupt priesthood who fatten on the credulity
of the public, are very difficult to be eradicated.
But sweep all the belief in the supernatural
from the face of the earth, and the world would
remain just the same. The seasons would follow
each other in their regular succession ; the stars
would shine in the firmament; the sun would
shed his benign and vivifying influence of light
and heat upon us; the clouds would discharge
their burden in gentle and refreshing showers;
the cultivated fields would bring forth vegetation ;
summer would ripen the golden grain, ready for
harvest; the trees would bear fruits; the birds
would sing in accordance with their happy in
stinct, and all Nature would smile as joyously
around us as ever. Nor would man degenerate.
Oh ! no. His nature, too, would remain the same.
He would have to be obedient to the physical,
mental, and moral laws of his being, or suffer
the natural penalty for their violation; observe
the mandates of society, or receive the punish
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A DEFENCE OF ATHEISM.
ment. His affections would be just as warm,
the love of self-preservation as strong, the desire
for happiness and the fear of pain as great. He
would love freedom, justice, and truth, and hate
oppression, fraud, and falsehood, as much as ever.
Sweep all belief in the supernatural from the
globe, and you would chase away the whole fra
ternity of spectres, ghosts, and hobgoblins, which
have so befogged and bewildered the human
mind, that hardly a clear ray of the light of Rea
son can penetrate it. You would cleanse and puri
fy the heart of the noxious, poisonous weeds of
superstition, with its bitter, deadly fruits—hypoc
risy, bigotry, and intolerance, and fill it with
charity and forbearance towards erring humanity.
You would give man courage to sustain him in
trials and misfortune, sweeten his temper, give
him a new zest for the duties, the virtues, and the
pleasures of life.
Morality does not depend on the belief inany
religion. History gives ample evidence that the
more belief the less virtue and goodness. Nor
need we go back to ancient times to see the crimes
and atrocities perpetrated under .its sanction. We
have enough in our own times. Look at the
present crisis—at the South with 4,000,000 of
human beings in slavery, bought and sold like
brute chattels under the sanction of religion and
of God, which the Reverends Van Dykes and the
Raphalls of the North fully endorse, and the
South complains that the reforms in the North are
owing to Infidelity. Morality depends on an accu
rate knowledge of the nature of man, of the laws
that govern his being, the principles of right, of
justice, and humanity, and the conditions requi
site to make him healthy, rational, virtuous, and
happy.
�A DEFENCE OF ATHEISM.
19
The belief in a God has failed to produce this
desirable end. On the contrary, while it could
not make man better, it has made him worse ; for
in preferring blind faith in things unseen and un
known to virtue and morality, in directing his at
tention from the known to the unknown, from the
real to the imaginary, from the certain here to a
fancied hereafter, from the fear of himself, of the
natural result of vice and crime, to some whimsi
cal despot, it perverted his judgment, degraded
him in his own estimation, corrupted his feelings,
destroyed his sense of right, of justice, and of
truth, and made him a moral coward and a hypo
crite. The lash of a hereafter is no guide for us
here. Distant fear cannot control present passion.
It is much easier to confess your sins in the dark,
than to acknowledge them in the light: to make
it up with a God you don’t see, than with a man
whom you do. Besides, religion has always left
a back door open for sinners to creep out of at the
eleventh hour. But teach man to do right, to
love justice, to revere truth, to be virtuous, not be
cause a God would reward or punish him here
after, but because it is right; and as every act
brings its own reward or its own punishment, it
wouid best promote his interest by promoting the
welfare of society. Let him feel the great truth
that our highest happiness consists in making all
around us happy ; and it would be an infinitely
truer and safer guide for man to a life of useful
ness, virtue, and morality, than all the beliefs in
all the Gods ever imagined.
The more refined and transcendental religionists
have often said to me, if you do away with re
ligion, you would destroy the most beautiful ele
ment in human nature—the feeling of devotion
and reverence, ideality, and sublimity. This, too,
�20
A DEFENCE OF ATHEISM.
is an error. These sentiments would be cultivat
ed just the same, only we would transfer the de
votion from the unknown to the known ; from the
Gods, who, if they existed, could not need it, to
man who does. Instead of reverencing an imagi
nary existence, man would learn to revere justice
and truth. Ideality and sublimity would reline
his feelings, and enable him to admire and enjoy
the ever-changing beauties of Nature; the vari
ous and almost unlimited powers and capacities of
the human mind ; the exquisite and indescribable
charms of a well cultivated, highly refined, virtu
ous, noble man.
But not only have the priests tried to make the
very term Atheism odious, as if it would destroy
all of good and beautiful in Nature, but some of
the reformers, not having the moral courage to
avow their own sentiments, wishing to be popular,
fearing lest their reforms would be considered
Infidel, (as all reforms assuredly are,) shield them
selves from the stigma, by joining in the tirade
against Atheism, and associate it with everything
that is vile, with the crime of slavery, the corrup
tions of the Church, and all the vices imaginable.
This is false, and they know it; Atheism protests
against this injustice. No one has a right to give
the term a false, a forced interpretation, to suit his
own purposes, (this applies also to some of the
Infidels who stretch and force the term Atheist out
of its legitimate significance.) As well might we
use the terms Episcopalian, Unitarian, Universalist, to signify vice and corruption, as the term
Atheist, which means simply a disbelief in a God,
because finding no demonstration of his existence,
man’s reason will not allow him to believe, nor his
conviction to play the hypocrite, and profess what
he does not believe. Give it its true significance,
�A DEFENCE OF ATHEISM.
*
21
and he will abide the consequence; but don’t
fasten upon it the vices belonging to yourselves.
Hypocrisy is the prolific mother of a large family !
In conclusion, the AtheistJ says to the honest,
conscientious believer, Though I cannot believe in
your God whom you have failed to demonstrate, I
believe in man ; if I have no faith in your religion,
I have faith, unbounded, unshaken faith in the
principles of right, of justice, and humanity.
Whatever good you are willing to co for the sake
of your God, I am full as willing to do for the
sake of man. But the monstrous crimes the be
liever perpetrated in persecuting and exterminat
ing his fellow man on account of difference of be
lief, the Atheist, knowing that belief is not volun
tary, but depends on evidence, and therefore there
can be no merit inathe belief of any religions, nor
demerit in a disbelief in all of them, could never
be guilty of. Whatever good you would do out
of fear of punishment, or hope of reward here
after, the Atheist would do simply because it is
good • and being so, he would receive the far
surer and more certain reward, springing from
well-doing, which would constitute his pleasure,
and promote his happiness.
�
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A collection of digitised nineteenth-century pamphlets from Conway Hall Library & Archives. This includes the Conway Tracts, Moncure Conway's personal pamphlet library; the Morris Tracts, donated to the library by Miss Morris in 1904; the National Secular Society's pamphlet library and others. The Conway Tracts were bound with additional ephemera, such as lecture programmes and handwritten notes.<br /><br />Please note that these digitised pamphlets have been edited to maximise the accuracy of the OCR, ensuring they are text searchable. If you would like to view un-edited, full-colour versions of any of our pamphlets, please email librarian@conwayhall.org.uk.<br /><br /><span><img src="http://www.heritagefund.org.uk/sites/default/files/media/attachments/TNLHLF_Colour_Logo_English_RGB_0_0.jpg" width="238" height="91" alt="TNLHLF_Colour_Logo_English_RGB_0_0.jpg" /></span>
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A defence of atheism: being a lecture delivered in Mercantile Hall, Boston, April 10, 1861
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Rose, Ernestine L. (Ernestine Louise) [Mrs]
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Place of publication: Boston
Collation: 21, [3] p. ; 18 cm.
Notes: Publisher's advertisements on unnumbered pages at the end. Copy CT92 presented in Memory of Dr. Moncure D. Conway by his children, July Nineteen hundred & eight. Ernestine Louise Rose was a freethinker, a feminist, and an abolitionist.
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1881
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A PLEA EOR ATHEISM,
Bf C. BEADLAUGH.
Gillespie says that “ an Atheist propagandist seems a nos^
descript monster created by nature in a moment of mad
ness.” Despite this opinion, it is as the propagandist of
Atheism that I pen the following lines., in the hope that I
may succeed in removing some few of the many prejudices
which have been created against not only the actual holders
of Atheistic opinions, but also against those wrongfully sus
pected of entertaining such ideas. Men who have been
famous for depth of thought, for excellent wit, or great
genius, have been recklessly assailed as Atheists, by those
who lacked the high qualifications against which the spleen
of the calumniators was directed. Thus, not only has
Voltaire been without ground accused of Atheism, but
Bacon, Locke, and Bishop Berkeley himself, have, amongst
others, been denounced by thoughtless or unscrupulous
pietists as inclining to Atheism, the ground for the accusa
tion being that they manifested an inclination to improve
human thought.
It is too often the fashion with persons of pious reputation
to speak in unmeasured language of Atheism as favouring
immorality, and of Atheists as men whose conduct is neces
sarily vicious, and who have adopted atheistic views as a
desperate defiance against a Deity justly offended by the
badness of their lives. Such persons urge that amongst
the proximate causes of Atheism are vicious training, im
moral and profligate companions, licentious living, and the
like. Dr. John Pye Smith, in his “ Instructions on Chris
man Theology,” goes so far as to declare that “ nearly all
the Atheists upon record have been men of extremely
debauched and vile conduct.” Such language from the
Christian advocate is not surprising, but there are others
arho, professing great desire for the spread of Freethought,
�2
A PLEA FOE ATHEISM,
and with pretensions to rank amongst acute and liberal
thinkers, declare Atheism impracticable, #nd its teachings
cold, barren, and negative. In this brief essay I shall
except to each of the above allegations, and shall en
deavour to demonstrate that Atheism affords greater possi
bility for human happiness than any system yet based on
Theism, or possible to be founded thereon, and that the
lives of true Atheists must be more virtuous, because more
human, than those of the believers in Deity, the humanity
of the devout believer often finding itself neutralised by
a faith with which it is necessarily in constant collision.
The devotee piling the faggots at the auto da fe of an
heretic, and that heretic his son, might, notwithstanding, be
a good father in every respect but this. Heresy, in the
eyes of the believer, is highest criminality, and outweighs
all claims of family or affection.
Atheism, properly understood, is in nowise a cold,
barren negative; it is, on the contrary, a hearty, fruitful
affirmation of all truth, and involves the positive assertion
and action of highest humanity.
Let Atheism be fairly examined, and neither condemned
—its defence unheard—on the ex parte slanders of the pro
fessional preachers of fashionable orthodoxy, whose courage
is bold enough while the pulpit protects the sermon, but
whose, valour becomes tempered with discretion when a free
platform is afforded and discussion claimed; nor misjudged
because it has been the custom to regard Atheism as so
unpopular as to render its advocacy impolitic. The best
policy against all prejudice is to assert firmly the verity.
The Atheist does not say “ There is no God,” but he says,
“ I know not what you mean by God ; I am without idea
of God; the word ‘ God ’ is to me a sound conveying no
clear or distinct affirmation. I do not deny God, because
I cannot deny that of which I have no conception, and' the
conception of which, by its affirmer, is so imperfect that
he is unable to define it to me.” If you speak to the
Atheist of God as creator, he answers that the conception
of creation is impossible. We are utterly unable to construe
it in thought as possible that the complement of existent has
been either increased or diminished, much less can we con
ceive an absolute origination of substance. We cannot con
ceive either, on the o^e hand, nothing becoming something,
�A PLEA FOR ATHEISM.
or on the other, something becoming nothing.
3
The Theis t
who speaks of God creating the universe, must either sup
pose that Deity evolved it out of himself, or that he pro
duced it from nothing. But the Theist cannot regard the
universe as evolution of Deity, because this would identify
Universe and Deity, and be Pantheism rather than Theism.
There would be no distinction of substance—in fact no crea
tion. Nor can the Theist regard the universe as created
out of nothing, because Deity is, according to him, necessa
rily eternal and infinite. His existence being eternal and
infinite, precludes the possibility of the conception of
vacuum to be filled by the universe if. created. No one can
even think of any point of existence in extent or duration
and say, here is the point of separation between the creator
and the created. Indeed, it is not possible for the Theist to
imagine a beginning to the universe. It is not possible to
conceive either an absolute commencement, or an absolute
termination of existence; that is, it is impossible to con
ceive beginning before which you have a period when the
universe has yet to be ; or to conceive an end, after which
the universe, having been, no lunger exists. It is impos
sible in thought to originate or annihilate the universe.
The Atheist affirms that he cognises to-day effects, that
these are at the same time causes and effects—causes to the
effects they precede, effects to the causes they follow.
Cause is simply everything without which the effect would
not result, and with which it must result. Cause is the
means to an end, consummating itself in that end. The
Theist who argues for creation must assert a point of time,
that is, of duration, when the created did not yet exist. At
this point of time either something existed or nothing;
but something must have existed, for out of nothing no
thing can come. Something must have existed, because the
point fixed upon is that of the duration of , something.
This something must have been either finite or infinite;
if finite, it could not have been God, and if the something
were infinite, then creation was impossible, as it is impos
sible to add to infinite existence.
If you leave the question of creation and deal with the
government of the universe, the difficulties of Theism are
by no means lessened. The existence of evil is then a
terrible stumbling-block to the Theist.
Pain, misery,
�4
A
PLEA FOB. ATHETSM.
crime, poverty, confront the advocate of eternal goodness,
and challenge with unanswerable potency his declaration of
Deity as all-good, all-wise, and all-powerful. Evil is either
caused by God, or exists independently; but it cannot be
caused by God, as in that case he would not be all-good;
nor can it exist independently, as in that case he would not
be all-powerful. Evil must either have had a beginning,
or it must be eternal; but, according to the Theist, it can
not be eternal, because God alone is eternal. Nor can it
have had a beginning, for if it had it must either have ori
ginated in God, or outside God; but, according to the
Theist, it cannot have originated in God, for he is all-good,
and out of all-goodness evil cannot originate; nor can evil
have originated outside God, for, according to the Theist,
God is infinite, and it is impossible to go outside of or
beyond infinity.
To the Atheist this question of evil assumes an entirely
different aspect. He declares that evil is a result, but not
a result from God or Devil. He affirms that by conduct
founded on knowledge of the laws of existence it is possible
to ameliorate and avoid present evil, and, as our knowledge
increases, to prevent its future recurrence.
Some declare that the belief in God is necessary as a check
to crime. They allege that the Atheist may commit murder,
lie, or steal without fear of any consequences. To try the
actual value of this argument, it is not unfair to ask—Do
Theists ever steal? If yes, then in each such theft, the
belief in God and his power to punish has been inefficient
as a preventive of the crime. Do Theists ever lie or mur
der ? If yes, the same remark has further force—hell-fire fail
ing against the lesser as against the greater crime. The
fact is that those who use such an argument overlook a great
truth—i.e., that all men seek happiness, though in very
diverse fashions. Ignorant and miseducated men often mis
take the true path to happiness, and commit crime in the
endeavour to obtain it. Atheists hold that by teaching
mankind the real road to human happiness, it is possible to
keep them from the by-ways of criminality and error.
Atheists would teach men to be moral now, not because God
•ffers as an inducement reward by and by, but because in
the virtuous act itself immediate good is ensured to the doer
and the circle surrounding him. Atheism would preserve
�A
PLEA FOR ATHEISM.
O
man from lying, stealing, murdering now, not from fear of
an eternal agony after death, but because these crimes make
this life itself a course of misery.
While Theism, asserting God as the creator and governor
of the universe, hinders and checks man’s efforts by de
claring God’s will to be the sole directing and controlling
.< power, Atheism, by declaring all events to be in accordance
, with natural laws—that is, happening in certain ascertain'■ able sequences — stimulates man to discover the best condi
tions of life, and offers him the most powerful inducements
to morality. While the Theist provides future happi
ness for a scoundrel repentant on his death-bed, Atheism
affirms present and certain happiness for the man who does
his best to live here so well as to have little cause for re
penting hereafter.
Theism declares that God dispenses health and inflicts
disease, and sickness and illness are regarded by the Theist
as visitations from an angered Deity, to be borne with meek
ness and content. Atheism declares that physiological
knowledge may preserve us from disease by preventing our
infringing the law of health, and that sickness results not
as the ordinance of offended Deity, but from ill-ventilated
dwellings and workshops, bad and insufficient food, exces
sive toil, mental suffering, exposure to inclement weather,
and the like—all these finding root in poverty, the chief
source of crime and disease ; that prayers and piety afford
no protection against fever, and that if the human being be
kept without food he will starve as quickly whether he be
Theist or Atheist, theology being no substitute for bread.
When the Theist ventures to affirm that his God is an.
existence other than and separate from the so-called mate
rial universe, and when he invests this separate, hypothe
tical existence with the several attributes of omniscience,
omnipresence, omnipotence, eternity, infinity, immutability,
and perfect goodness, then the Atheist, in reply, says—“ I
deny the existence of such a being.”
It becomes very important, in order that injustice may
not be done to the Theistic argument, that we should have
—in. lieu of a clear definition, which it seems useless to ask
for—the best possible clue to the meaning intended to be
conveyed by the word God. If it were not that the word
is an arbitrary term, invented for the ignorant, and the
�6
A PEEA FOR ATHEISM.
notions suggested by which are vague and entirely contin
gent upon individual fancies, such a clue could be probably
most easily and satisfactorily obtained by tracing back the
word “ God,” and ascertaining the sense in which it was
used by the uneducated worshippers who have gone before
us ; collating this with the more modern Theism, qualified
as it is by the superior knowledge of to-day. Dupuis
says—“ De mot Dieu parait destine a exprimer l’idee de la
force universelie et eternellement active qui imprime le
mouvement a tout dans la Nature, suivant les lois d’une
harmonie constant et admirable, qui se developpe dans les
diverses formes que prend la matiere organisee, qui se mele i
tout, anime tout, et qui semble etre une dans ses modifica
tions infiniment variees, et n’appartenir qu’a elle-meme.”
“ The word God appears intended to express the force uni
versal, and eternally active, which endows all nature with
motion according to the laws of a constant and admirable
harmony; which develops itself in the diverse forms of
organised matter, which mingles with all, gives life to all;
which seems to be one through all its infinitely varied modi
fications, and inheres in itself alone.”
In the “ Bon Sens ” of Cure Meslier, it is asked, “ Qu’estce que Dieu?” and the answer is “ C’est un mot abstrait fait
pour designer la force cachee de la nature; ou c’est un
point mathematique qui n’a ni longueur, ni largeur, ni profundeur.” “ It is an abstract word coined to designate the
hidden fo'rce of nature, or rather it is a mathematical point
having neither length, breadth, nor thickness.”
The orthodox fringe of the Theism of to-day is Hebraistio
in its origin—that is, it finds its root in the superstition
and ignorance of a petty and barbarous people nearly desti
tute of literature, poor in language, and almost entirely
wanting in high conceptions of humanity. It might, as
Judaism is the foundation of Christianity, be fairly expected
that the ancient Jewish Records would aid us in our search
after the meaning to be attached to the word « God.” The
most prominent words in Hebrew rendered God or Lord in
English are nin11 Jeue, and
-A-leivn. The first word
Jeue, called by our orthodox Jehovah, is equivalent to “ that
which exists,” and indeed embodies in itself the only possible
trinity in unity—i.e., past, present, and future. There is
nothing in this Hebrew word to help you to any such defini—
�A
PLEA FOE ATHEISM.
7
tion as is required for the sustenance of modern Theism.
The most you can make of it by any stretch of imagination is
equivalent to the declaration “ I am, I have been,I shall be.’’
The word iTin'1 is hardly ever spoken by the religious Jews
who actually in reading substitute for it, Adonai, an entirely
different word. Dr. Wall notices the close resemblance
in sound between the word Yehowa or Yeue, or Jehovah,
and Jove. In fact Zevc iran)p Jupiter and Jeue—pater
(God the father) present still closer resemblance in sound.
Jove is also Zevg or Qeog or Aevc, whence the word Deus
and our Deity. The Greek mythology, far more ancient
than that of the Hebrews, has probably found for Christi
anity many other and more important features of coincidence
than that of a similarly sounding name. The word 0eoc
traced back affords us no help beyond that it identifies Deity
with the universe. Plato says that the early Greeks thought
that the only Gods (0EOY3) were the sun, moon, earth,
stars, and heaven. The word
Aleiin, assists us
still less in defining the word God, for Parkhurst translates
it as a plural noun signifying “ the curser,” deriving it from
the verb
(Ale) to curse. Finding that philology aids
us but little, we must endeavour to arrive at the meaning
of the word “ God ” by another rule. It is utterly impos
sible to fix the period of the rise of Theism amongst any
particular people, but it is notwithstanding comparatively
easy, if not to trace out the development of Theistic ideas,
at any rate to point to their probable course of growth
amongst all peoples.
Keightley, in his “ Origin of Mythology,” says—“ Sup
posing, for the sake of hypothesis, a race of men in a state
of total or partial ignorance of Deity, their belief in many
gods may have thus commenced. They saw around them
various changes brought about by human agency, and hence ?
they knew the power of intelligence to produce effects, j
When they beheld other and greater effects, they ascribed
them to some unseen being, similar but superior to man.”
They associated particular events with special unknown
beings (gods), to each of whom they ascribed either a pecu
liarity of power, or a sphere of action not common to other
gods. Thus one was god of the sea, another god of war,
another god of love, another ruled the thunder and lightning;
�8
A
PLEA FOB ATHEISM.
and thus through the various elements of the universe and
passions of humankind, so far as they were then known.
This mythology became modified with the advancement of
human knowledge. The ability to think has proved itself
oppugn ant to and destructive of the desire to worship.
Science has razed altar after altar heretofore erected to the
unknown gods, and pulled down deity after deity from the
pedestals on which ignorance and superstition had erected
them. The priest who had formerly spoken the oracle of
God lost his sway, just in proportion as the scientific teacher
succeeded in impressing mankind with a knowledge of the
facts around them. The ignorant who had hitherto listened
unquestioning during centuries of abject submission to their
spiritual preceptors, at last commenced to search and examine
for themselves, and were guided by experience rather than
by church doctrine. To- day it is that advancing intellect
challenges the reserve guard of the old armies of super
stition, and compels a conflict in which humankind must in
the end have great gain by the forced enunciation of the
truth.
From the word “ God” the Theist derives no argument
in his favour; it teaches nothing, defines nothing, demon
strates nothing, explains nothing. The Theist answers that
this is no sufficient objection, that there are many words
which are in common use to which the same objection
applies. Even admitting that this were true, it does not
answer the Atheist’s objection. Alleging a difficulty on the
one side.is not a removal of the obstacle already pointed out
on the other.
The Theist declares his God to be not only immutable,
but also infinitely intelligent, and says:—‘‘Matter is either
essentially intelligent, or essentially non-intelligent; if mat
ter were essentially intelligent, no matter could be without
intelligence; but matter cannot be essentially intelligent,
because some matter is not intelligent, therefore matter is
essentially non-intelligent: but there is intelligence, there
fore there must be a cause for the intelligence, independent
of matter—this must be an intelligent being—i.e., God.”
The Atheist answers, I do not know what is meant,
in the mouth of the Theist, by “ matter.” “ Matter,”
* substance,” “ existence,” are three words having the
�A
PLEA FOR ATHEISM.
9
same signification in the Atheist’s vocabulary. It is not
certain that the Theist expresses any very clear idea
when he uses the words “ matter” and “ intelligence.’
Beason and understanding are sometimes treated as
separate faculties, yet it is not unfair to presume
*> that the Theist would include them both under the word
v intelligence. Perception is the foundation of the intellect.
| The perceptive faculty, or perceptive faculties, differs or differ
I in each animal: yet in speaking of matter the Theist uses
the word “ intelligence” as though the same meaning were
to be understood in every case. The recollection of the per
ceptions is the exercise of a different faculty from the per
ceptive faculty, and occasionally varies disproportionately;
thus an individual may have great perceptive faculties, and
very little memory, or the reverse—yet memory, as well as
perception, is included in intelligence. So also the faculty
for comparing between two or more perceptions ; the faculty
of judging and the faculty of reflecting—all these are subject
to the same remarks, and all these and other faculties are in
cluded in the word intelligence. We answer, then, that
“ God” (whatever that word may mean) cannot be intelligent.
He can never perceive ; the act of perception results in the
obtaining a new idea, but if God be omniscient, his ideas
have been eternally the same. He has either been always, ana
always will be perceiving, or he has never perceived at all.
But God cannot have been always perceiving, because if he
had he would always have been obtaining fresh know
ledge, in which case he must have some time had less know
ledge than now, that is, he would have been less perfect;
that is—he would not have been God : he can never
recollect or forget, he can never compare, reflect, nor
judge. There cannot be perfect intelligence without un
derstanding ; but following Coleridge, “ understanding is
the faculty of judging according to sense.” The faculty
of whom? Of some person, judging according to that
person’s senses ? But has “ God” senses ? Is there any
thing beyond “ God” for “ God” to sensate ? There
' cannot be perfect intelligence without reason. By reason
we mean that faculty or aggregation of faculties which avails
itself of past experience to predetermine, more or less
accurately, experience in the future, and to affirm truths
which sense perceives, experiment verifies, and experience
�10
A PLEA FOE ATHEISM.
confirms. To God there can be neither past nor future,
therefore to him reason is impossible. There cannot be per
fect intelligence without will, but has God will ? If God
wills, the will of the all-powerful must be irresistible; the
will of the infinite must exclude all other wills.
God can never perceive. Perception and sensation are
identical. Every sensation is accompanied by pleasure or
pain. But God, if immutable, can neither be pleased nor
pained. Every fresh sensation involves a change in mental
and perhaps in physical condition. God, if immutable, cannot
change. Sensation is the source of all ideas, but it is only
objects external to the mind which can be sensated. If God
be infinite there can be no objects external to him, and
therefore sensation must be to him impossible. Yet without
perception where is intelligence ?
God cannot have memory or reason—memory is of the
past, reason for the future, but to God immutable there can
be no past, no future. The words past, present, and future
imply change; they assert progression of duration. If God
be immutable, to him change is impossible. Can you
have intelligence destitute of perception, memory, and
reason? God cannot have the faculty of judgment—judg
ment implies in the act of judging a conjoining or dis
joining of two or more thoughts, but this involves change
of mental condition. To God the immutable, change is
impossible.
Can you have intelligence, yet no per
ception, no memory, no reason, no judgment ? God
cannot think. The law of the thinkable is, that the
thing thought must be separated from the thing which
is not thought. To think otherwise would be to think
of nothing—to have an impression with no distinguishing
mark, would be to have no impression. Yet this separation
implies change, and to God, immutable, change is impossible.
Can you have intelligence without thought ? If the Theist
replies to this, that he does not mean by infinite intelligence
as an attribute of Deity, an infinity of the intelligence found
in a finite degree in humankind, then he is bound to explain,
clearly and distinctly, what other a intelligence” he means,
and until this be done the foregoing statements require
answer.
The Atheist does not regard “ substance” as either essen
tially intelligent or the reverse. Intelligence is the result of
�A PLEA POE ATHEISM.
11
certain conditions of existence. Burnished steel is bright—
that is, brightness is the necessity 01 a certain condition of
existence. Alter the condition, and the characteristic of the
condition no longer exists. The only essential of substance
is its existence. Alter the wording of the Theist’s objection.
Matter is either essentially bright, or essentially non-bright.
If matter were essentially bright, brightness should be the
essence of all matter I but matter cannot be essentially
bright, because some matter is not bright, therefore matter
is essentially non-bright; but there is brightness, therefore
there must be a cause for this brightness independent of
matter—that is, there must be an essentially bright being—
e.,
i. God.
Another Theistic proposition is thus stated:—“ Every
effect must have a cause ; the first cause universal must be
eternal: ergo, the first cause universal must be God.” This
is equivalent to saying that “ God” is “ first cause.” But
what is to be understood by cause ? Defined in the absolute,
the word has no real value. “ Cause,” therefore, cannot be
eternal. What can be understood by “ first cause ?” To us
the two words convey no meaning greater than would be
conveyed by the phrase “ round triangle.” Cause and effect
are correlative terms—each cause is the effect of some prece
dent ; each effect the cause of its consequent. It is impossible
to conceive existence terminated by a primal or initial cause.
The “ beginning,” as it is phrased, of the universe, is not
thought out by the Theist, but conceded without thought.*
To adopt the language of Montaigne, “ Men make themselves
believe that they believe.” The so-called belief in Creation
is nothing more than the prostration of the intellect on the
threshold of the unknown. We can only cognise the ever
succeeding phenomena of existence as a line, in continuous
and eternal evolution. This line has to us no beginning;
we traee it back into the misty regions of the past but a little
way, and however far we may be able to journey, there is still
the great beyond. Then what is meant by “ universal cause ?”
Spinoza gives the following definition of cause, as used in its
absolute signification, “By cause of itself I understand that,
the essence of which involves existence, or that, the nature of
which can only be'considered as existent.” That is, Spinoza
treats “ cause” absolute and “ existence” as two words
having the same meaning. If his mode of defining the word
�12
A PLEA FOE ATHEISM.
be contested, then it has no meaning other than its relative
signification of a means to an end. “ Every effect must have
a cause.” Every effect implies the plurality of effects, and
necessarily that each effect must be finite ; but how is it
1 possible from a finite effect to logically deduce an universal—
e.,
i. infinite cause ?
4
There are two modes of argument presented by Theists,
I and by which, separately or combined, they seek to demonstrate the being of a God. These are familiarly known as
the arguments a priori and a posteriori.
The a posteriori argument has been popularised in Eng
land by Paley, who has ably endeavoured to hide the weak
ness of his demonstration under an abundance of irrelevant
illustrations. The reasoning of Paley is very deficient in
the essential points where it most needed strength. It is
utterly impossible to prove by it the eternity or infinity of
Deity. As an argument founded on analogy, the design
argument, at the best, could only entitle its propounder to
infer the existence of a finite cause, or rather of a
multitude of finite causes. It ought not to be forgotten
that the illustrations of the eye, the watch, and the
man, even if admitted as instances of design, or rather
of adaptation, are instances of eyes, watches, and men,
designed or adapted out of pre-existing substance, by a
being of the same kind of substance, and afford, there
fore, no demonstration in favour of a designer, alleged
•to have actually created substance out of nothing, and also
alleged to have created a substance entirely different from
himself.
The a posteriori argument can never demonstrate infinity
' for Deity. Arguing from an effect finite in extent, the most
it could afford would be a cause sufficient for that effect,
j such cause being possibly finite in extent and duration.
?. And as the argument does not demonstrate God’s infinity,
neither ean it, for the same reason, make out his omniscience,
as it is clearly impossible to logically claim infinite wisdom
for a God possibly only finite. God’s omnipotence re
mains unproved for the same reason, and because it is
clearly absurd to argue that God exercises power where he
may not be. Nor can the a posteriori argument show God’s
absolute freedom, for as it does nothing more than seek to
prove a finite God. it is quite consistewi with the argument
�k PLEA FOB ATHEISM.
13
that God’s existence is limited and controlled in a thousand
ways. Nor does this argument show that God always existed;
at the best the proof is only that some cause, enough for the
effect, existed before it, but there is no evidence that this
cause differs from any other causes, which are often as
transient as the effect itself. And as it does not demon
strate that God has always existed, neither does it demon
strate that he will always exist, or even that he now exists.
It is perfectly in accordance with the argument, and with
the analogy of cause and effect, that the effect may remain
after the cause has ceased to exist. Nor does the argument
from design demonstrate one God. It is quite consistent with
this argument that a separate cause existed for each effect,
or mark of design discovered, or that several causes con
tributed to some or one of such effects. So that if the
argument be true, it might result in a multitude of petty
deities, limited in knowledge, extent, duration, and power;
and still worse, each one of this multitude of gods may have
had a cause which would also be finite in extent and dura*
ition, and would require another, and so on, until the design
argument loses the reasoner amongst an innumerable crowd
of deities, none of whom can have the attributes claimed for
God.
The design argument is defective as an argument from
analogy, because it seeks 'to prove a Creator God who
designed, but does not explain whether this God has been
eternally designing, which would be absurd; or, if he at
some time commenced to design, what then induced him so
to commence. It is illogical, for it seeks to prove an im
mutable Deity, by demonstrating a mutation on the part of
Deity.
It is unnecessary to deal specially with each of the many
writers who have used from different stand-points the a
posteriori form of argument in order to prove the existence
of Deity. The objections already stated apply to the whole
class; and, although probably each illustration used by the
theistic advocate is capable of an elucidation entirely at
variance with his argument, the main features of objection
are the same. The argument a posteriori is a method of
proof in which the premises are composed of some position
of existing facts, and the conclusion asserts a position ante
cedent to those facts.* The argument is from given effects
�14
A PLEA FOB ATHEISM.
to their causes. It is one form of this argument which
asserts that man has a moral nature, and from this seeks
to deduce the existence of a moral governor. This form
has the disadvantage that its premises are illusory., In
alleging a moral nature for man, the theist overlooks the
fact that the moral nature of man differs somewhat in each
individual, differs considerably in each nation, and differs
entirely in some peoples. It is dependent on organisation
and education: these are influenced by climate, food, and
mode of life. If the argument from man’s nature could de
monstrate anything, it would prove a murdering God for
the murderer, a lascivious God for the licentious man, a
dishonest God for the thief*, and so through the various
phases of human inclination. The a priori arguments are
methods of proof in which the matter of the premises exists
in the order of conception antecedently to that of the con
clusion. The argument is from cause to effect. Amongst
the prominent theistic advocates relying upon the d priori
argument in England are Dr. Samuel Clarke, the Rev.
Moses Lowman, and William Gillespie. As this last
gentleman condemns his predecessors for having utterly failed
to demonstrate God’s existence, and, as his own treatise
on the “Necessary Existence of God” comes to us certified
by the praise of Lord Brougham and the approval of Sir
William Hamilton, it is to Mr. William Gillespie that the
reader shall be directed.
The propositions are first stated entirely, so that Mr.
Gillespie may not complain of misrepresentation :—
1. Infinity of extension is necessarily existing.
2. Infinity of extension is necessarily indivisible.
Corollary.—Infinity of extension is necessarily immov
able.
3. There is necessarily a being of infinity of extension.
4. The being of infinity of extension is necessarily of
unity and simplicity.
Sub-proposition.—The material universe is finite in ex
tension.
5. There is necessarily but one being of infinity of expan
sion.
Part 2, Proposition 1.—Infinity of duration is neces
sarily existing.
2. Infinity of duration is necessarily indivisible.
�A TLEA FOB ATHEISM.
15
-Corollary.—Infinity of duration is necessarily immovable.
3. There is necessarily a being of infinity of duration.
4. The being of infinity of duration is necessarily of unity
and simplicity.
Sub-proposition.—The material universe is finite in dura
tion.
Corollary.—Every succession of substances is finite in
duration.
5. There is necessarily but one being of infinity of dura
tion.
Part 3, Proposition 1.—There is necessarily a being of
infinity of expansion and infinity of duration.
2. The being of infinity of expansion and infinity of dura
tion is necessarily of unity and simplicity.
Division 2, Part 1.—The simple sole being of infinity of
expansion and of duration is necessarily intelligent and
all-knowing.
Part 2.—-The simple sole being of infinity of expansion
and of duration, who is all-knowing, is necessarily allpowerful.
Part 3.—The simple sole being of infinity of expansior
and of duration, who is all-knowing and all-powerful, i
necessarily entirely free.
Division^.—The simple sole being of infinity of expansion
and of duration, who is all-knowing, all-powerful, and en
tirely free, is necessarily completely happy.
Sub-proposition.— The simple sole being of infinity of
expansion and of duration, who is all-knowing, all-powerful,
entirely free, and completely happy, is necessarily perfectly
good.
The first objection against the foregoing argument is, that
it seeks to prove too much. It affirms one existence (God)
infinite in extent and duration, and another entirely
different and distinct existence (the material universe)
finite in extent and duration. It therefore seeks to sub
stantiate everything and something more. The first pro
position is curiously worded, and the argument to demon
strate it is undoubtedly open to more than one objection.
Mr. Gillespie has not defined infinity, and it is possible
therefore his argument may be misapprehended in this
paper. Infinite signifies nothing more than indefinite.
When a person speaks of infinite extension he can on!)
�16
A
PLEA FOB ATHEISM.
mean to refer to the extension of something to which he
has been unable to set limits. The mind cannot conceive
extension per se, either absolute or finite. It can only
conceive something extended. It might be impossible
mentally to define the extension of some substance. In
such a case its extension would be indefinite j or, as Mr.
Gillespie uses the word, infinite. No one can therefore
possibly ha^b any idea of infinity of extension. Yet it is
upon the existence of such an idea, and on the impossibility
of getting rid of it, that Mr. Gillespie grounds his first pro
position. If the idea does not exist, the argument is des
troyed at the first step.
Mr. Gillespie argues that it is utterly beyond the power
of the human mind to conceive infinity of extension non
existent. He would have been more correct in asserting
that it is utterly beyond the power of the human mind to
conceive infinity of extension at all, either existent or non
existent. Extension can only be conceived as quality of
substance. It is possible to conceive substance extended.
It is impossible in thought to limit the possible extension
of substance. Mr. Gillespie having asserted that we cannot
but believe that infinity of extension exists, proceeds to
declare that it exists necessarily. For, he says, everything
the existence of which we cannot but believe, exists neces
sarily. It is not necessary at present to examine what Mr.
Gillespie means by existing necessarily; it is sufficient to
have shown that we do not believe in the existence of infinity
of extension, although we may and do believe in the existence
of substance, to the extension of which we may be unable to
set limits. But, says Mr. Gillespie, “ everything the ex
istence of which we cannot but believe is necessarily exist
ing.” Then as we cannot but believe in the existence of
> the universe (or, to adopt Mr. Gillespie’s phrase, the ma| terial universe), the material universe exists necessarily. If
I by “ anything necessarily existing,” he means anything the
essence of which involves existence, or the nature of which
can only be considered as existent, then Mr. Gillespie, by
demonstrating the necessary existence of the universe,
refutes his own later argument, that God is its creator.
Mr. Gillespie’s argument, as before remarked, is open to
misconception, because he has left us without any definition
of some of the most important words he uses. To avoid the
�A PLEA EOK ATHEISM.
17
same objection, it is necessary to state that by substance or
existence I mean that which is in itself and is conceived
per se—that is, the conception of which does not involve
the conception of anything else as antecedent to it. By
quality, that by which I cognise any mode of existence. By
mode, each cognised condition of existence. Regarding
extension as quality of mode of substance, and not as sub
stance itself, it appears absurd to argue that the quality
exists otherwise than as quality of mode.
The whole ofthe propositions following the first are so built
upon it, that if it fails they are baseless. The second proposi
tion is, that infinity of extension is necessarily indivisible.
In dealing with this proposition, Mr. Gillespie talhs of the
parts of infinity of extension, and winds up by saying that
ne means parts in the sense of partial consideration only.
Now not only is it denied that you can have any idea of
infinity of extension, but it is also denied that infinity
can be the subject of partial consideration. Mr. Gillespie’s
whole proof of this proposition is intended to affirm that the
parts of infinity of extension are necessarily indivisible from
each other. I have already denied the possibility of con
ceiving infinity in parts ; and, indeed, if it were possible to
conceive infinity in parts, then that infinity could not be
indivisible, for Mr. Gillespie says that, by indivisible, he
means indivisible, either really or mentally. Now each part
of anything conceived is, in the act of conceiving, mentally
separated from, either other parts of, or from the remainder
of, the whole of which it is part. It is clearly impossible
to have a partial consideration of infinity, because the part
considered must be mentally distinguished from the uncon
sidered remainder, and, in that case, you have, in thought,
the part considered finite, and the residue certainly limited,
at least, by the extent of the part under consideration.
If any of the foregoing objections are well-founded, they are
fatal to Mr. Gillespie’s argument.
The argument in favour of the corollary to the second pro
position is, that the parts of infinity of extension are ne
cessarily immovable amongst themselves ; but if there be no
such thing as infinity of extension—that is, if extension be
only a quality and not necessarily infinite; if infinite mean
only indefiniteness or illimitability, andif infinity cannot have
parts, this argument goes for very little. The acceptance of the
�18
A PLEA FOB AtfHElSliG
argument that theparts of infinity of extension are immovable,
is rendered difficult when the reader considers Mr. Gillespie’s
sub-proposition (4), that the parts of the material universe
are movable and divisible from each other. He urges that
a part of the infinity of extension or of its substratum must
penetrate the material universe and every atom of it. But
if infinity can have no parts, no part of it can penetrate the
material universe. If infinity have parts (which is absurd),
and if some part penetrate every atom of the material uni
verse, and if the part so penetrating be immovable, how
can the material universe be considered as movable, and
yet as penetrated in every atom by immovability ? If pene
trated be a proper phrase, then, at the moment when the
part of infinity was penetrating the material universe, the
part of infinity so penetrating must have been in motion.
Mr. Gillespie’s logic is faulty. Use his own language, and
there is either no penetration, or there is no immovability.
In his argument for the fourth proposition, Mr. Gillespie
—having by his previous proposition demonstrated (?) what
he calls a substratum for the before demonstrated (?) in
finity of extension—says, “it is intuitively evident that the
substratum of infinity of extension can be no more divisible
than infinity of extension.” Is this so ? Might not a com
plex and divisible substratum be conceived by us as possible
to underlie a (to us) simple and indivisible indefinite exten
sion, if the conception of the latter were possible to us ?
There cannot be any intuition. It is mere assumption, as,
indeed, is the assumption of extension at all, other than as
the extension of substance. In his argument for proposi
tion 5, Gillespie says that “ any one who asserts that he
can suppose two or more necessarily existing beings, each
of infinity of expansion, is no more to be argued with
than one who denies, Whatever is, is. Why is it more dif
ficult to suppose this than to suppose one being of infinity,
and, in addition to this infinity, a material universe? Is it
impossible to suppose a necessary being of heat, one of light,
and one of electricity, all occupying the same indefinite
expansion ? If it be replied that you cannot conceive two
distinct and different beings occupying the same point at
the same moment, then it must be equally impossible to
conceive the material universe and God existing together.
The sec md division of Mr. Gillespie’s argument is also open
�A PLEA FOE ATHEISM.
19
to grave objection. Having demonstrated to his own satis
faction an infinite substance, and also having assumed in
addition a finite substance, and having called the first, infi
nite “ being•” perhaps from a devout objection to speak of
God as substance, Mr. Gillespie seeks to prove that the infi
nite being is intelligent. He says, “ Intelligence either
began to be, or. it never began to be. That it never began
to be is evident in this, that if it began to be, it must have
had a cause; for whatever begins to be must have a cause.
And the cause of intelligence must be of intelligence; for
what is not of intelligence cannot make intelligence begin
to be. Now intelligence being before intelligence began to
be, is a contradiction. And this absurdity following from
the supposition, that intelligence began to be, it is proved
that intelligence never began to be: to wit, is of infinity of
duration.” Mr. Gillespie does not condescend to tell us
why ** what is not of intelligence cannot make intelligence
begin to bebut it is not unfair to suppose that he means
that of things which have nothing in common one cannot
be the cause of the other. Let us apply Mr. Gillespie’s
argument to the material universe, the existence of which is
to him so certain that he has treated it as a self-evident
proposition.
The material universe—that is, matter, either began to be,
or it never began to be. That it never began to be, is evi
dent in this, that if it began to be, it must have had a cause;
for whatever begins to be must have a cause. And the cause
of matter, must be of matter; for what is not of matter,
cannot make matter begin to be. Now matter being
before matter began to be, is a contradiction. And this
absurdity following from the supposition that matter—i.e.,
the material universe, began to be, it is proved that the mate
rial universe never began to be—to wit, is of indefinite
duration.
The argument as to the eternity of matter is at least as
logical as the argument for the eternity of intelligence.
Mr. Gillespie may reply, that he affirms the material
universe to be finite in duration, and that by the argument
for his proposition, part 2, he proves that the one infinite
being (God) is the creator of matter. His words are, “ As
the material universe is finite in duration, or began to be, it
must have had a cause; for, whatever begins to be must have
�20
A PLEA FOB ATHEISM.
•
And this cause must be [Mr. Gillespie does not
explain why], in one respect or other, the simple sole
being of infinity of expansion and duration, who is all-know
ing [the all-knowing or intelligence rests on the argument
which has just been shown to be equally applicable to matter]
inasmuch as what being, or cause independent of that being,
could there be ? And therefore, that being made matter
begin to be.” Taking Mr. Gillespie’s own argument, that
which made matter begin to be, must be of matter, for what
is not matter, cannot make matter begin to be; then Mr.
Gillespie’s infinite being (God) must be matter. But there
is yet another exception to the proposition, which is, that
the infinite being (God) is all-powerful. Having as above
argued that the being made matter, he proceeds, “ and this
being shown, it must be granted that the being is, necessarily,
all-powerful.” Nothing of the kind need be granted. If it
were true that it was demonstrated that the infinite being
(God) made matter, it would not prove him able to make
anything else; it might show the being cause enough forthat
effect, but does not demonstrate him cause for all effects.
So that if no better argument can be found to prove God allpowerful, his omnipotence remains unproved.
Mr. Gillespie’s last proposition is that the being (God)
whose existence he has so satisfactorily (?) made out, is ne
cessarily completely happy. In dealing with this proposition,
Mr. Gillespie talks of unhappiness as existing in various
kinds and degrees. But, to adopt his own style of argu
ment, Unhappiness either began to be, or it never began to
be. That it never began to be is evident in this, that what
ever began to be must have had a cause ; for whatever be
gins to be must have a cause. And the cause of unhappi
ness must be of unhappiness, for what is not of unhappiness
cannot make unhappiness begin to be. But unhappiness
2 being before unhappiness began to be, is a contradiction;
therefore unhappiness is of infinity of duration. But pro
position 5, part 2, says there is but one being of infinity of
duration. The one being of infinity of duration is therefore
necessarily unhappy. Mr. Gillespie’s arguments recoil on
himself, and are destructive of his own affirmations.
In his argument for the sub-proposition, Mr. Gillespie
says that God’s motive, or one of his motives to create, must
be believed to have been a desire to make bappin^-ss., besides
a cause.
�A PLEA FOB ATHEISM,
„
-j
|
•
■
21
his own consummate happiness, begin to be. That is God,
who is consummate happiness everywhere for ever, desired
something. That is, he wanted more than then existed.
That is, his happiness was not complete. That is, Mr. '
Gillespie refutes himself. But what did infinite and eternal complete happiness desire ? It desired (says Mr. Gil- '
lespie) to make more happiness—that is, to make more than
an infinity of complete happiness. Mr. Gillespie’s proof, on
the whole, is at most that there exists necessarily substance,
the extension and duration of which we cannot limit. Part
of his argument involves the use of the very a posteriori
reasoning justly considered regarded by himself as utterly
worthless for the demonstration of the existence of a being
with such attributes as orthodox Theism tries to assert.
If Sir William Hamilton meant no flattery in writing
that Mr. Gillespie’s work was one of the “ very ablest ” on
the Theistic side, how wretched indeed must, in his opinion,
have been the logic of the less able advocates for Theism.
Every Theist must admit that if a God exists, he could have
so convinced all men of the fact of his existence that doubt,
disagreement, or disbelief would be impossible. If he could
not do this, he would not be omnipotent, or he would not
be omniscient—that is, he would’ not be God. Every
Theist must also agree that if a God exists, he would wish
all men to have such a clear consciousness of his existence
and attributes that doubt, disagreement, or belief on this
subject would be impossible. And this, if for no other
reason, because that out of doubts and disagreements on
religion have too often resulted centuries of persecution,
strife, and misery, which a good God would desire to prevent.
If God would not desire this, then he is not all-good—that
is, he is not God. But as many men have doubts, a large
majority of mankind have disagreements, and some men
have disbeliefs as to God’s existence and attributes ; it follows either that God does not exist, or that he is not all- ■'
wise, or that he is not all-powerful, or that he is not all
good.
Every child is born into the world an Atheist; and if he
grows into a Theist, his Deity differs with the country
in which the believer may happen to be born, or the people
amongst whom he may happen to be educated. The belief
is the result of education or organisation. Religious
�22
A PLEA FOE ATHEISM.
belief is powerful in proportion to the want of scien
tific knowledge on the part of the believer. The more
ignorant, the more credulous. In the mind of the Theist
“ God ” is equivalent to the sphere of the unknown ; by
the use of the word he answers without thought problems
which might otherwise obtain scientific solution. The more
ignorant the Theist, the greater his God. Belief in God
is not a faith founded on reason; but a prostration of
the reasoning faculties on the threshold of the unknown.
Theism is worse than illogical; its teachings are not only
without utility, but of itself it has nothing to teach. Sepa
rated from Christianity with its almost innumerable sects,
from Mahomedanism with its numerous divisions, and sepa
rated also from every other preached system, Theism is a
Will-o’-the-wisp, without reality. Apart from othodoxy,
Theism is a boneless skeleton; the various mythologies give
it alike flesh and bone, otherwise coherence it hath none.
What does Christian Theism teach ? That the first man
made perfect by the all-powerful, all-wise, all-good God,
was nevertheless imperfect, and by his imperfection brought
misery into the world, where the all-good God must have
intended misery should never come. That this God made
men to share this misery, men whose fault was their being
what he made them. That this God begets a son, who is
nevertheless his unbegotten self, and that by belief in the
birth of God’s eternal son, and in the death of the undying
who died to satisfy God’s vengeance, man may escape the
consequences of the first man’s error. Christian Theism
declares that belief alone can save man, and yet recognises
the fact that man’s belief results from teaching, by establish
ing missionary societies to spread the faith. Christian
Theism teaches that God, though no respector of persons,
selected as his favourites one nation in preference to all
others; that man can do no good of himself or without
God’s aid, but yet that each man has a free will; that God
is all-powerful, but that few go to heaven and the majority
to hell; that all are to love God, who has predestined from
eternity that by far the largest number of human beings are
to be burning in hell for ever. Yet the advocates for Theism
venture to upraid those who argue against such a faith.
It is not pretended that this inefficient Plea for Atheism
contains either a refutation of all or even the majority of
�A
PLEA FOB ATHEISM,
23
Theistic arguments, or that it offers an explanation of every
objection against Atheism; but it is hoped that enough is
here stated to induce some one of ability on the Theistic
side to write for the better instruction of such as entertain
the views here advocated—views held sincerely, views pro
pagated actively, and views which are permeating more
widely than is generally supposed.
Either Theism is true or false. If true, discussion must
help to spread its influence; if false, the sooner it ceases
to influence human conduct the better for human kind. It
will be useless for the clergy to urge that such a pamphlet
deserves no reply. It is true the writer is unimportant,
and the language in which his thoughts find expression
lacks the polish of a Macaulay, and the fervour of a Burke;
but they are nevertheless his thoughts, uttered because it is
rot only his right, but his duty to give them utterance. And
this Plea for Atheism is put forth challenging the Theists to
battle for their cause, and in the hope that the strugglers
being sincere, truth may give laurels to the victor and the
vanquished; laurels to the victor in that he has upheld
the truth; laurels still welcome to the vanquished, whose
defeat crowns him with a truth he knew not of before.
London: Austin & Co., Printers and Publishers, 17, Johns«u’s Court|
Fleet Street, E.C.
�
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Title
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A plea for atheism
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Bradlaugh, Charles
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Place of publication: [London]
Collation: 23 p. ; 18 cm.
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[Austin & Co.]
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[1896]
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N101
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Atheism
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Atheism
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Text
NATIONAL SECULAR SOCIETY
A RROWS OF
PREETHOUGHT.
BY
Gr -
W.
ZE O O T ZE 7
Editor of “ The Freethinker.”
LONDON :
H. Ä. KEMP, 28 STONECUTTER STREET,
FÁRRINGDON STREET, E.C.
1882.
�LONDON:
PRINTED AND PUBLISHED BY H. A. KEMP
�&-2-4-3O
CON T E N T S.
Preface ■ Religion and Progress
A Defence of Thomas Paine The Gospel of Freethought
Freethought in Current Literature
Dean Stanley's Latest
God and the Queen
Cardinal Newman on Infidelity
Sunday Tyranny
Who are the Blasphemers?
The Birth of Christ
----The Reign of Christ
The Primate on Modern Infidelity
Baiting a Bishop Professor Flint on Atheism
A Hidden God
General Joshua -----Going to Hell
Christmas Eve in Heaven
Professor Blackie on Atheism
Salvation ism’ A Pious Showman -
PAGE
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IOS
�PREFACE.
I republish in. this little volume a few of my numerous
articles that have appeared in the Secularist, the Liberal, the
National Reformer, and the Freethinker, during the last five
or six years. I have included nothing (I hope) of merely
ephemeral interest. Every article in this collection was at
least written carefully, and with an eye to more than the
exigencies of the moment. In disentombing them from the
cemeteries of periodical literature, where so many of their
companions lie buried, I trust I have not allowed parental
love to outrun discretion.
I have not thought it necessary to indicate, in each
case, the journal in which the reprinted articles were first
published.
Should anyone object to the freedom of my style, or the
asperity of my criticism, I would ask him to remember that
Christianity still persecutes to the full extent of its power,
and that a Creed which answers argument with prosecution
cannot expect tender treatment in return; and I would also
ask him, in the words of Ruskin, “ to consider how much less
harm is done in the world by ungraceful boldness than by
untimely fear.”
London, November 15th, 1882.
�RELIGION AND PROGRESS.
(November, 1882.)
The Archbishop of York is peculiarly qualified to speak on
religion and progress. His form of thanksgiving to the
God of Battles for our “ victory ” in Egypt marks him as
a man of extraordinary intellect and character, such as
common people may admire without hoping to emulate;
while his position, in Archbishop Tait’s necessitated
absence from the scene, makes him the active head of the
English Church. Let us listen to the great man.
Archbishop Thomson recently addressed “ a working-men’s
meeting ” in the Drill Hall, Sheffield. It was densely
crowded by six or seven thousand people, and this fact was
cited by the Archbishop as a proof that the working classes
of England have not yet lost interest in the Christian faith.
But we should very much like to know how it was ascercertained that all, or even the major portion, of the vast
audience were working-men. It is easy enough to give any
meeting a name. We often hear of a Conservative Work
ing-men’s banquet, with tickets at something like a guinea
each, a duke at the top of the table and a row of lords down
each side. And our experience leads us to believe that
nearly all religious meetings of “working-men ” are attended
chiefly by the lower middle classes who go regularly to
church or chapel every Sunday of their lives.
Even, however, if the whole six or seven thousand were
working-men, the fact would prove little; for Sheffield con
tains a population of three hundred thousand, and it was
not difficult for the clergy who thronged the platform to get
up a big “ ticket ” meeting, at which a popular Archbishop
was the principal speaker, and the eloquence was all to be
had for nothing.
The Archbishop’s lecture, or sermon, or whatever it was,
contained nothing new, nor was any old idea presented in a
new light. It was simply a summary of the vulgar decla
mations against the “ carnal mind ” with which we are all
so familiar. Progress, said his Grace, was of two kinds,
intellectual and moral. Of the former sort we had plenty,
�6
RELIGION AND PROGRESS.
but of the latter not so much. He repudiated the notion
that moral progress would naturally keep pace with intel
lectual progress, and he denied that righteousuess could ever
prevail without “ some sanction from above.” This was
the sum and substance of his discourse, and we have no
doubt that our readers have heard the same thing, in various
forms of language, some hundreds of times.
Like the rest of his tribe, Archbishop Thomson went
abroad for all his frightful warnings, and especially to
France. He severely condemned the French “pride in
progress,” which led to the Revolution. His Grace has
certainly a most original conception of history. Ordinary
historians tell us that the Revolution was caused by hunger,
bad government, and the rigidity of old institutions that
could not accommodate themselves to new ideas. But
whatever were the causes, look at the results. Compare the
state of France before the Revolution with its condition
now. The despotic monarchy is gone ; the luxurious and
privileged aristocracy has disappeared ; and the incredibly
wealthy and tyrannous Church is reduced to humbleness
and poverty. But the starving masses have become the
most prosperous on the face of the earth ; the ignorant
multitudes are well educated; the platform and the press
are free ; a career is open to every citizen ; science, art, and
literature have made immense strides ; and although Paris,
like every great capital, may still, as Mr. Arnold says, lack
morality, there is no such flagrant vileness within her walls
as the corruptions of the ancien régime; no such impudent
affronting of the decencies of life as made the parc aux cerfs
for ever infamous, and his Christian Majesty, Louis the
Fifteenth, a worthy compeer of Tiberius ; no such shameless
wickedness as made the orgies of the Duke of Orleans and
the Abbé Dubois match the worst saturnalia of Nero.
His Grace felt obliged to advert also to the Paris Com
mune, about which his information seems to be equal to his
knowledge of the Revolution. He has the ignorance or
audacity to declare that the Commune “ destroyed a city and
ravaged the land ;” when, as a matter of fact, the struggle
was absolutely confined to Paris, and the few buildings
injured were in the line of fire. This worthy prelate thinks
destruction of buildings a crime on the part of Communalists,
but a virtue on the part of a Christian power; and while
�RELIGION. AND PROGRESS.
7
¿enouncing the partial wreck of Paris, he blesses the whole
sale ruin of Alexandria.
His Grace ventures also to call the leading men of the
Commune “ drunken dissolute villains.” The beaten party
is always wicked, and perhaps Dr. Thomson will remember
that Jesus Christ himself was accused of consorting with
publicans and sinners. Drunken dissolute villains do not
risk their lives for an idea. The men of the Commune may
have been mistaken, but their motives were lofty ; and
Millière, falling dead on the Church steps before the
Versailles bullets, with the cry of Vive VHumanité on his
lips, was as noble a hero as any crucified Galilean who
questioned why his God had forsaken him.
That intellectual and moral progress naturally go to
gether, the Archbishop calls “ an absurd and insane
doctrine,” and he couples with these epithets the honored
names of Buckle and Spencer. Now it will be well to have
a clear understanding on this point. Are intellectual causes
dominant or subordinate ? Even so intensely religious a
man as Lamennais unhesitatingly answers that they are
dominant. He affirms, in his Du Passé et de V Avenir du
Peuple., that “intellectual development has produced all other
developments,” and he adds :—
“It is represented that evil, as it appears in history, springs
entirely from the passions. This is quite false. The passions
disturb the existing order, whatever it may be, but they do not
constitute it. They have not that power. It is the necessary
result of the received ideas and beliefs. Thus the passions
show themselves the same in all epochs, and yet, in different
epochs, the established order changes, and sometimes funda
mentally.”
The truth is that the great moral conceptions are securely
•established, and the only possible improvement in them must
come from the increased fineness and subtlety of oui- mental
powers.
Civilisation and progress are, according to Archbishop
Thomson, nothing but “ cobwebs and terms.” He besought
the working men of Sheffield not to go for information to a
big book written in some garret in London. His Grace,
who lives in a palace at other people’s expense, has a very
natural dislike of any man of genius who may live in a
garret at his own. What has the place in which a book is
�RELIGION AND PROGRESS.
written to do with its value ? “ Don Quixote ” and the
“ Pilgrim’s Progress ” were written in gaol; and for all
Archbishop Thomson knows to the contrary every gospel
and epistle of the New Testament may have been written in
an attic or a cellar.
The Archbishop seems to hate the very idea of Progress.
What has it done, he asks, to abolish drunkenness and
gambling ? To which we reply by asking what Christianity
has done. Those vices are unmistakably here, and on the face
of it“any objection they may furnish against Progress must
equally apply to Christianity. Nay more; for Christianity
has had an unlimited opportunity to reform the world, while
Progress has been hindered at every turn by the insolent
usurpation of its rival.
Dr. Thomson admits that he cannot find a text in the
Bible against gambling, and assuredly he cannot find one in
favor of teetotalism. On the contrary he will find plenty of
texts which recommend the “wine that cheereth the heart of
God and man
and he knows that his master, Jesus
Christ, once played the part of an amateur publican at a
marriage feast, and turned a large quantity of water into
wine in order to keep the spree going when it had once
begun.
We repeat that all the Archbishop’s objections to Pro
gress, based on the moral defects of men, apply with tenfold
force against Religion, which has practically had the whole
field to itself. And we assert that he is grievously mistaken
if he imagines that supernatural beliefs can ennoble knaves
or give wisdom to fools. When he talks about “ Christ’s
blood shed to purchase our souls,” and specifies the first
message of his creed as “Come and be forgiven,” he is
appealing to our basest motives, and turning the temple into
a huckster’s shop. Let him and all his tribe listen to these
words of Ruskin’s :—
“Your honesty is not to be based either on religion or policy.
Both your religion and policy must be based on it. Your
honesty must be based, as the sun is, in vacant heaven; poised,
as the lights in the firmament, which have rule over the day
and over the night. If you ask why you are to be honest—you
are, in the question itself, dishonored. “ Because you are a man,”
is the only answer; and therefore I said in a former letter that
to make your children capable of honesty is the beginning of
education. Make them men first and religious men afterwards,
�RELIGION AND PROGRESS.
9
and all will be sound; but a knave’s religion is always the
rottenest thing about him.—Time and Tide, p. 37.”
These are the words of a real spiritual teacher. Arch
bishop Thomson will never get within a million miles of
their meaning; nor will anybody be deceived by the
unctuous “ Oh that ” with which he concludes his discourse,
like a mental rolling of the whites of his eyes.
As we approach the end of his address, we begin to under
stand his Grace’s hatred of Progress. He complains that
“ intellectual progress never makes a man conceive eternal
hopes, never makes a man conceive that he has an eternal
friend in heaven, even the Son of God.” Quite true. In
tellectual progress tends to bound our desires within the
scope of their realisation, and to dissipate the fictions of
theology. It is therefore inimical to all professional soul
savers, who chatter about another world with no under
standing of this; and especially to the lofty teachers of
religion who luxuriate in palaces, and fling jibes and sneers
at the toiling soldiers of progress who face hunger, thirst
and death. These rich disciples of the poor Nazarene are
horrified when the scorn is retorted on them and their creed ;
and Archbishop Thomson expresses his “ disgust ” at our
ridiculing his Bible and endeavoring to bring his “ con
victions ” into “ contempt.” It is, he says, “ an offence
against the first principles of mutual sympathy and con
sideration.” Yet this angry complainant describes other
people’s convictions as “ absurd and insane.” All the
sympathy and consideration is to be on one side ! The less
said about either the better. There can be no treaty or truce
in a war of principles, and the soldiers of Progress will
neither take quarter nor give it. Christianity must defend
itself. It may try to kill us with the poisoned arrows of
persecution ; but what defence can it make against the rifle
shot of common-sense, or how stand against the shattering
artillery of science ? Every such battle is decided in its
commencement, for every religion begins to succumb the
very moment it is attacked.
�A DEFENCE OF THOMAS PAINE.
(February^ 1879.)
Fling mud enough and some of it will stick. This noble
maxim has been the favorite of traducers in all ages and
climes. They know that the object of their malignity can
not always be on the alert to cleanse himself from the filth
they fling, especially if cast behind his back; they know that
lies, and especially slanderous lies, are hard to overtake, and
when caught harder to strangle ; and therefore they feel
confident as to the ultimate fate of their victim if they can
only persevere long enough in their vile policy of defamation.
For human nature being more prone to believe evil than
good of others, it generally happens that the original traducers
are at length joined by a host of kindred spirits almost as
eager and venomous as themselves, “ the long-neck’d geese
of the world, who are ever hissing dispraise because their
natures are little;” while a multitude of others, not so much
malignant as foolish and given to scandal, lend their cowardly
assistance, and help to vilify characters far beyond the reach
of their emulation. And should such characters be those of
men -who champion unpopular causes, there is no lie too
black for belief concerning them, no accusation of secret
theft or hateful meanness or loathsome -lust, that will not
readily gain credence. Mr. Tennyson speaks of—
that fierce light which beats upon a throne,
And blackens every blot:
but ■what is that to the far fiercer and keener light which
beats upon the lives of the great heroes of progress ? With
all due deference to the Poet Laureate, we conceive that
kings and their kind have usually extended to them a charity
which covers a multitude of their sins. The late king of
Italy, for instance, was said to have had “the language of a
guardroom, the manners of a trooper, and the morals of a
lie-goat,” yet at his death how tenderly his faults were dealt
with by the loyal press, and how strongly were all his merits
brought into relief. Our own royal Sardanapalus, George
the Fourth, although Leigh Hunt had the courage to describe
him aright and went to the gaol for so doing, was styled by
(
�A DEFENCE OF THOMAS PAINE.
11
Society “ the first gentleman in Europe.” Yet Mazzini,
Vittor Emmanuel’s great contemporary, whose aims were
high and noble as his life was pure, got little else than abuse
from this same loyal press ; and the Society which adored
George the Fourth charged Shelley himself with unspeak
able vices equalled only by the native turpitude of his soul.
Perhaps no man has suffered more from calumny than
Thomas Paine. During his lifetime, indeed, his traducers
scarcely ever dared to vent their malice in public, doubtless
through fear of receiving a castigation from his vigorous and
trenchant pen. But after his death they rioted in safety,
and gave free play to the ingenuity of their malevolence.
Gradually their libels became current; thousands of people
who knew almost nothing of his life and less of his writings
were persuaded that Thomas Paine, “ the Infidel,” was a
monster of iniquity, in comparison with whom Judas appeared
a saint, and the Devil himself nearly white ; and this estimate
finally became a tradition, which the editors of illustrated
religious papers and the writers of fraudulent “ Death-Bed
Scenes ” did their best to perpetuate. In such hands the
labor of posthumous vilification might have remained with
out greatly troubling those who feel an interest in Thomas
Paine’s honor through gratitude for his work. The lowest
scavengers of literature, who purvey religious offal to the
dregs of orthodoxy, were better employed thus than in a
reverse way, since their praise is so very much more dis
honorable and appalling than their blame. But when other
literary workmen of loftier repute descend to the level of
these, and help them in their villainous task, it becomes
advisable that some one who honors the memory of the man
thus aspersed should interpose, and attempt that vindication
which he can no longer make for himself.
In reviewing Mr. Edward Smith’s “Life of Cobbett,” our
principal literary paper, the Athenceum, in its number for
January 11th, went out of its way to defame Paine’s
character. This is what it said:—
“A more despicable man than Tom Paine cannot easily be
found among the ready writers of the eighteenth century. He sold
himself to the highest bidder, and he could be bought at a ve ry
low price. He wrote well; sometimes he wrote as pointedly as
Junius or Cobbett. Neither excelled him in coining telling and
mischievous phrases ; neither surpassed him in popularity-hunting.
�12
A DEFENCE OF THOMAS PAINE.
He had the art, which was almost equal to genius, of giving
happy titles to his productions. When he denounced the
British Government in the name of ‘ Common Sense ’ he found
willing readers in the rebellious American colonists, and a rich
reward from their grateful representatives. When he ’wrote on
behalf of the ‘Rights of Man,’ and in furtherance of the ‘Age of
Reason,’ he convinced thousands by his title-pages who were
incapable of perceiving the inconclusiveness of his arguments.
His speculations have long since gone the way of all shams; and
his charlatanism as a writer was not redeemed by his character as
a man. Nothing could be worse than his private life ; he was
addicted to the most degrading of vices. He was no hypocrite,
however, and he cannot be charged with showing that regard for
appearances which constitutes the homage paid by vice to virtue.
Such a man was well qualified for earning notoriety by insulting
Washington. Only a thorough-paced rascal could have had the
assurance to charge Washington with being unprincipled and
unpatriotic. Certainly Mr. Smith has either much to learn, or
else he has forgotten much, otherwise he could not venture to
suggest the erection of a monument ‘ recording the wisdom and
political virtues of Thomas Paine.’ ”
Now we have in this tirade all the old charges, with a new
one which the critic has either furnished himself or derived
from an obscure source—namely, that Paine “ sold himself
to the highest bidder.” Let us examine the last charge first.
The critic curiously contradicts himself. Paine, he admits,
could “ sometimes write as pointedly as Junius or Cobbett,”
whose works sold enormously, and he had the art of
devising happy titles for his productions ; yet, although he
sold himself to the highest bidder, he could be bought at a
very low price ! The fact is, Paine was never bought at all.
His was not a hireling pen. Whatever he wrote he put his
name to, and he never parted with the copyright of any of
his works, lest the Government or some friend of despotism
should procure their suppression. He also published his
writings at a ridiculously low price, so low indeed that he
lost by them instead of gaining. Of his “ Common Sense,”
that fine pamphlet which stirred the American colonists to
battle against their oppressors, not less than a hundred
thousand copies were sold; yet he found himself finally
indebted to his printer £29 12s. Id. Fifteen years later the
English Government tried through the publisher to get the
copyright of the “ Rights of Man
but though a large
sum was offered, Paine refused on principle to let it pass
�A DEFENCE OF THOMAS PAINE.
13
out of his own hands. The first part of this work was pub
lished at a price which precluded any chance of profit ; the
publication of the second part caused him to be tried and
condemned for treason, the penalty of the law being escaped
onlv bv flight. All publication of his works, whether
political or religious, was afterwards illegal. Thousands of
copies were circulated surreptitiously, or openly by men like
Richard Carlile, who spent nine years in prison for his sale
of prohibited books. But clearly Paine could derive no
profit from this traffic in his works, for he never set foot in
England again. Thomas Paine wrote in order to spread his
political and religious views, and for no other purpose. He
was not a professional author, flor a professional critic, and
never needed payment for his literary work. And assuredly
he got none. Let the Athenceum critic inform the world to
whom Paine sold himself, or who ever paid him a penny for
his writings. Until he does so we shall believe that the
author of •• Common Sense,” the u Rights of Man,” a nd the
*
• Age of Reason,” was honest in saying: " In a great affair,
where the good of mankind is at stake, I love to work for
nothing ; and so fullv am I under the influence of this
principle, that I should lose the spirit, the pride, and the
pleasure of it. were I conscious that I looked for reward.”
Popularity-hunting, to use the critic's graceless phrase,
was Paine’s next fault; but as, according to the same
authority, he was guilty in this respect only in the same sense
as Junius was, the burden of his iniquity cannot be very
great.
Addiction to the most degrading of vices, is a charge
difficult to confute until we know specifically what vice is
meant. Paine has been accused of drunkenness; but by
whom ? Not by his intimate acquaintances, who would have
detected his guilt, but by his enemies ivho were never in his
society, and therefore could know nothing of his habits.
Cheetham, who first disseminated this accusation, was a
notorious libeller, and was more than once compelled to
make a public apology for his lies ; but he was a shameless
creature, and actually in his “ Life ” of Paine resuscitated
and amplified falsehoods for which he had tendered abject
apologies while his victim was alive. Even, however, if
Paine had yielded to the seductions of strong drink, he should
be judged by the custom of his own age, and not that of ours.
�14
A DEFENCE OF THOMAS PAINE.
Mr. Leslie Stephen does not rail against Boswell for liis
drinking powers ; Burns is not outlawed for his devotion to
John Barlycorn ; Byron and Sheridan are not beyond pardon
because they often went drunk to bed ; and some of the
greatest statesmen of last century and this, including Pitt
and Fox, are not considered the basest of men because they
exercised that right which Major O’Gorman claims for all
Irishmen—“ to drink as much as they can carry.” But no
such plea is necessary, for Paine was not addicted to drink, but
remarkably abstemious. Mr. Fellows, with whom he lived for
more than six months, said that he never saw him the worse
for drink. Dr. Manley said, “ while I attended him he never
was inebriated.” Colonel Burr said, “ he was decidedly
temperate.” And even Mr. Jarvis, whom Cheetham cited as
his authority for charging Paine with drunkenness, authorised
Mr. Vale, of New York, editor of the Beacon, to say that
Cheatham lied. Amongst the public men who knew Paine
personally were Burke, Horne Tooke, Priestley, Lord
Edward Fitzgerald, Dr. Moore, Jefferson, Washington,
Volney and Condorcet: but none of these ever hinted at his
love of drink. The charge of drunkeness is a posthumous
libel, circulated by a man who had publicly quarrelled with
Paine, who had been obliged to apologise for former
aspersions, and who after Paine’s death was prosecuted and
condemned for libelling a lady whom he had accused of undue
familiarity with the principal object of his malice.
Finding the charge of drunkenness unequivocally rebutted.
Paine's traducers advance that of licentiousness. But this is
equally unsuccessful. The authority relied on is still
Cheetham, who in turn borrowed from a no less disreput
able source. A man named Carver had quarrelled with
Paine over money matters; in fact, he had been obliged
with a loan which he forgot to pay, and like all base natures
he showed his gratitude to his benefactor, when no more
favors could be expected, by hating and maligning him. A
scurrilous letter written by this fellow fell into the hands of
Cheetham, who elaborated it in his “Life.” It broadly hinted
that Madame Bonneville, the by no means youthful wife of a
Paris bookseller who had sheltered Paine when he was
threatened with danger in that city, was his paramour; for
no other reason than that he had in turn sheltered her when
she repaired with her children to America, after her home
�A DEFENCE OF THOMAS PAINE.
15'
had been broken up by Buonaparte’s persecution of heihusband. This lady prosecuted Cheetham for libel, and a
jury of American citizens gave her a verdict and damages.
Here the matter might rest, but we are inclined to urge
another consideration. No one of his many enemies ever
accused Paine of licentiousness in his virile manhood; and can
we beli ve that he began a career of licentiousness in his old
age, when, besides the infirmities natural to his time of life, he
suffered dreadfid tortures from an internal abcess brought
on by his confinement in the reeking dungeons of the Luxem
bourg, which made life a terror and death a boon ? Only
lunatics or worse would credit such a preposterous story.
The Athenceum critic alleges that Paine insulted Washing
ton, and was therefore a “ thorough-paced rascal.” But he
did nothing of the kind. He very properly remonstrated
with Washington for coolly allowing him to rot in a French
dungeon for no crime except that he was a foreigner, when
a word from the President of the United States, of which he
was a citizen, would have effected his release. Washington
was aware of Paine’s miserable plight, yet he forgot the
obligations of friendship ; and notwithstanding frequent
letters from Munro, the American ambassador at Paris,
he supinely suffered the man he had once delighted to honor
to languish in wretchedness, filth, and disease. George
Washington did much for American Independence, but
Thomas Paine did perhaps more, for his writings animated
the oppressed Colonists with an enthusiasm for liberty
without which the respectable generalship of Washington
might have been exerted in vain. The first President of theUnited States was, as Carlyle grimly says, “no immeasur
able man,” and we conceive that Paine had earned the
right to criticise even him and his policy.
Every person is of course free to hold what opinion hepleases of Paine’s writings. The Atlienceum critic thinks
they have “ gone the way of all shams.” He is wrong in
fact, for they circulate very extensively still. And he may
also be wrong in his literary judgment. William Hazlitt,
wdiose opinion on any subject connected with literature is at
least as valuable as an Athenceum critic’s, ranked Paine very
high as a political writer, and affirmed of his “ Rights of
Man” that it was “ a powerful and explicit reply to Burke.”
But Hazlitt had read Paine, which we suspect many glib
�16
A DEFENCE OF THOMAS PAINE.
critics of to-day have not; for we well remember how
puzzled some of them were to explain whence Shelley took
the motto “We pity the Plumage, but Forget the Dying
Bird” prefixed to his Address to the People on the death of
the Princess Charlotte. It was taken, as they should
have known, from one of the finest passages of the “ Rights
of Man.” Critics, it is well known, sometimes write as
Artemus Ward proposed to lecture on science, “ with an
imagination untrammeled by the least knowledge of the
subject.”
Let us close this vindication of Paine by citing the esti
mate of him formed by Walt Whitman, an authority not to
be sneered at now even by Athenaeum critics. In 1877 the
Liberal League of Philadelphia celebrated the 140th birthday
of Thomas Paine, and a large audience was gathered by the
announcement that Whitman would speak. The great
poet, according to the Index report, after telling how he had
become intimate with some of Paine’s friends thirty-five
years before, went on to say :—
“ I dare not say how much of what our Union is owning and
enjoying to-day, its independence, its ardent belief in, and sub
stantial practice of, Radical human rights, and the severance of
its Government from all ecclesiastical and superstitious dominion
—I dare not say how much of all this is owing to Thomas Paine ;
but I am inclined to think a good portion of it decidedly is. Of
the foul and foolish fictions yet told about the circumstances of
his decease, the absolute fact is that, as he lived a good life after
its kind, he died calmly, philosophically, as became him. He
served the embryo Union with the most precious service, a ser
vice that every man, woman, and child in the thirty-eight States
is to some extent receiving the benefit of to-day, and I for one
here cheerfully and reverently throw one pebble on the cairn of
his memory.”
We are content to let the reader decide between Whitman
and the Athenaeum critic in their respective estimates of him
who wrote, and as we think acted up to it—“ All the world
is my country, and to do good my religion.”
�FREETHOUGHT IN CURRENT LITERATURE.
31
Almost all the young school of poets are Freethinkers.
Browning, our greatest, and Tennyson, our most popular,
belong to a generation that is past. Mr. Swinburne is at
the head of the new school, and he is a notorious heretic.
He never sings more loftily, or with stronger passion, or
with finer thought, than when he arraigns and denounces
priestcraft and its superstitions before the bar of humanity
and truth.
The reception of Mr. Thomson’s poems and essays affords
another sign of the progress of Freethought. This gentle
man for many years contributed to secular journals under
the initials of “B. V.” He is a pronounced Atheist, and
makes no concealment of it in his poems. Yet, while a few
critics have expressed horror at his heresy, the majority
have treated it as extremely natural in an educated thought
ful man, and confined themselves to the task of estimating
the genius he has put into his work.
I must now draw to a close. Freethought, I hold, is an
omnipresent active force in the English literature of to-day.
It appears alike in the greatest works of scholarship, in the
writings of men of science, in the songs of poets, in the
productions of novelists, in the most respectable magazines,
and in the multitudinous daily press. It is urgent and aggres
sive, and tolerates no restraint. It indicates the progress
we have made towards that time when the mind of man
shall play freely on every subject, when no question shall be
thought too sacred to be investigated, when reason shall be
the sovereign arbiter of all disputes, when priestly authority
shall havq perished, when every man’s thought shall decide
his own belief, and his conscience determine the way in
which he shall walk.
�DEAN
STANLEY’S
LATEST.
(August, 1880.)
At one of Charles Lamb’s delightful Wednesday evenings
Coleridge had, as usual, consumed more than his fair share
of time in talking of some “ regenerated” orthodoxy. Leigh
Hunt, who was one of the listeners, manifested his surprise
at the prodigality and intensity of the poet’s religious ex
pressions, and especially at his always speaking of Jesus as
'• our Savior.” Whereupon Lamb, slightly exhilarated by
a glass of gooseberry cordial, stammered out, “ Ne—ne—
never mind what Coleridge says ; he’s full of fun.” This
jocular and irreverent criticism is perhaps, after all, the
most pertinent that can be passed on the utterances of this
school of “ regenerated orthodoxy.” Coleridge, who had un
bounded genius, and was intellectually capable of transform
ing British philosophy, went on year after year maundering
about his “ sumject” and “ omject,” mysteriously alluding
to his great projected work on the Logos, and assuring
everybody that he knew a way of bringing all ascertained
truth within the dogmas of the Church of England. His
pupil, Maurice, wasted a noble intellect (as Mill says, few of
his contemporaries had so much intellect to waste) in the
endeavor to demonstrate that the Thirty-Nine Articles really
anticipated all the extremest conclusions of modern thought;
afflicting himself perpetually, as has been well said, with
those “ forty stripes save one.” And now we have Dean
Stanley, certainly a much smaller man than Maurice, and
infinitely smaller than Coleridge, continuing the traditions
of the school, of which let us hope he will be the last
teacher. What his theology precisely is no mortal can
determine. He subscribes the doctrines of the Church of
England, but then he interprets them in an esoteric sense;
that is, of course, in a Stanleyan sense ; for when the letter
of doctrine is left for its occult meaning every man “ runs”
a private interpretation of his own. The Nineteenth
Century for August contains a characteristic specimen of
his exegesis. It is entitled “ The Creed of the Early
Christians,” but is really a sermon on the Trinity, which
doubtless has been preached at Westminster. We shall
�dean Stanley’s latest.
qq
examine its peculiarities and try to reach, its meaning ; a
task by no means easy, and one which we could pardon
anyone for putting aside with Lamb’s remark, “ It’s only
his fun.”
Dean Stanley has a new theory of the Trinity, partly de
duced from other mystics, and partly constructed on the
plan of the negro who explained that his wooden doll was
made “ all by myself, out of my own head.” God the
Father, in this as in other theories, comes first: not that
he is older or greater than the other persons, for they are all
three coequal and coeternal; but because you must have a
first for the sake of enumeration, or else the most blessed
Trinity would be like the Irishman’s little pig who ran about
so that there was no counting him. There is also another
reason. God the Father corresponds to Natural Religion,
which of course has priority in the religious development of
mankind ; coming before Revealed Religion, to which God
the Son corresponds, and still more before Spiritual Religion
to which corresponds the Holy Ghost.
“ We look round the physical world; we see indications of
order, design, and good will towards the living creatures which
animate it. Often, it is true, we cannot trace any such design ; but,
whenever we can, the impression upon us is the sense of a Single,
Wise, Beneficent Mind, the same now that it was ages before the
appearance of man—the same in other parts of the Universe as
it is in our own. And in our own hearts and consciences we
feel an instinct corresponding to this—a voice, a faculty, that
seems to refer us to a higher power than ourselves, and to point
to some Invisible Sovereign Will, like to that which we see im
pressed on the natural world. And further, the more we think
of the Supreme, the more we try to imagine what his feelings
are towards us, the more our idea of him becomes fixed as in
the one simple, all-embracing word that he is Our Father."
The words we have italicised say that design cannot
always be traced in nature. We should like to know where
it can ever be. Evolution shows that the design argument
puts the cart before the horse. Natural Selection, as Dr.
Schmidt appositely remarks, accounts for adaptation as a
result, without requiring the supposition of design as a
cause. And if you cannot deduce God from the animate
world, you are not likely to deduce him from the inanimate.
Dean Stanley himself quotes some remarkable words from
Dr. Newman’s Apologia—“ The being of a god is as certain
c
�34
DEAN" STANLEY S LATEST.
to me as the certainty of my own existence. Yet when I
look ont of myself into the world of men, I see a sight
which fills me with unspeakable distress. The world of men
seems simply to give the lie to that great truth of which my
whole being is so full. If I looked into a mirror and did
not see my face, I should experience the same sort of diffi
culty that actually comes upon me when I look into this
living busy world and see no reflection of its Creator.” How,
asks the Dean, is this difficulty to be met p Oh, he replies,
we must turn to God the Son in the person of Jesus Christ,
and his utterances will supplement and correct the uncertain
sounds of nature; and then there is the Holy Ghost to
finally supply all omissions, and clear up all difficulties.
Now to our mind this is simply intellectual thimble-rigging.
Or rather does it not suggest the three-card trick ? One
card is useless, two cards are unsafe, but with three cards to
shuffle you are almost sure to win. Dr. Newman gets his
God through intuition; he maintains that the existence of
God is a primary fact of consciousness, and entirely declines
the impossible task of proving it from the phenomena of
nature. Dean Stanley should do the same. It is not
honest to employ an argument and then shirk all the diffi
culties it raises by resorting to the theological three-card
trick, which confounds instead of satisfying the spectator,
while emptying his mental pockets of the good cash of com
mon sense.
The Dean’s treatment of God the Son is amusing. He
writes of Jesus Christ as though he were a principle instead
of a person. “The Mahometan,” he says, “ rightly objects
to the introduction of the paternal and filial relations into
the idea of God, when they are interpreted in the gross and
literal sense. But in the moral spiritual sense it is true that
the kindness, tenderness and wisdom we find in Jesus Christ
is the reflection of the same kindness, tenderness and wisdom
which we recognise in the governance of the universe.”
This may be called mysticism, but we think it moonshine.
Gross and literal sense, forsooth ! Why, was not Jesus Christ
a man, a most literal fact, “ gross as a mountain, open,
palpable ?” Dean Stanley approves the Mahometan’s objec
tion, and yet he knows full well that it contravenes a funda
mental dogma of the Christian Church, and is accounted a
most damnable heresy. Why this paltering with us in a
�35
DEAN STANLEY S LATEST.
double sense ? To our mind downright blatant orthodoxy,
which is at least honest if not subtle, is preferable to this
hybrid theology which attempts to reconcile contradictions
in order to show respect to truth while sticking to the fleshpots of error, and evades all difficulties by a patent and
patently dishonest method of “interpretation.”
Quoting Goethe’s “ Wilhelm Meister, ” Dean Stanley tells
us that one great benefit traceable to God the Son is the re
cognition of “humility and poverty, mockery and despising,
wretchedness and suffering, as divine.” Well, if these things
are divine, the sooner we all become devilish the better.
Nobody thinks them divine when they happen to himself;
on the contrary, he cries out lustily against them. But it is
a different matter when they happen to others. Then the
good Christian considers them divine. How easily, says a
French wit, we bear other people’s troubles ! Undistracted
by personal care, pious souls contemplate with serene resigna
tion the suffering of their neighbors, and acknowledge in
them the chastening hand of a Divine Father.
God the Holy Ghost represents Spiritual religion: the
Father represents God in Nature, the Son represents God
in History, and “ the Holy Ghost represents to us God in
our own hearts and spirits and consciences.” Here be
truths ! An illustration is given. Theodore Parker, wheD
a boy, took up a stone to throw at a tortoise in a pond, but
felt himself restrained by something within him; and that
something, as his mother told him, was the voice of God, or
in other words the Holy Ghost. Now if the Holy Ghost
is required to account for every kind impulse of boys and
men, there is required also an Unholy Ghost to account for
all our unkind impulses. That is, a place in theology must
be found for the Devil. The equilateral triangle of theology
must be turned into a square, with Old Nick for the fourth
side. But Dean Stanley does not like the Devil; he deems
him not quite respectable enough for polite society. Let
him, then, give up the Holy Ghost too, for the one is the
correlative of the other.
“ It may be,” says the Dean, after interpreting the Trinity,
“that the Biblical words in some respects fall short of this
high signification.” What, God’s own language inferior to
that of the Dean of Westminster ? Surely this is strange
arrogance, unless after all “ it’s only his fun.” Perhaps
c 2
�36
bean
Stanley’s latest.
that is how we should take it. Referring to some sacred
pictures in the old churches of the East on Mount Athos,
intended to represent the doctrine of the Trinity, the Dean
says that standing on one side the spectator sees only Christ
on the Cross, standing on the other he sees only the Holy
Dove, while standing in front he sees only the Eternal
Father. Very admirable, no doubt. But there is a more
admirable picture described by Mr. Herbert Spencer in his
“ Study of Sociology,” which graphically represents the
doctrine of the Trinity in the guise of three persons trying
to stand in one pair of boots !
Goethe is cited as a Christian, a believer in the Trinity.
Doubtless the Dean forgets his bitter epigram to the effect
that he found four things too hard to put up with, and as
hateful as poison and serpents; namely, tobacco, garlic,
bugs, and the Cross. Heine also is pressed into service,
and an excellent prose translation of one of his poems is
given, wherein he celebrates the Holy Ghost, the Spirit of
God. But Dean Stanley has read his Heine to little purpose
if he imagines that this radiant and splendid soldier of pro
gress meant by the Spirit of God the third person of the
Christian Trinity. Heine was no Christian, and the very
opposite of a theologian. We might translate passages of
scathing irony on the ascetic creed of the Cross from the
De L’Allemagne, but space does not admit. A few of
Heine’s last words must do instead. To Adolph Stahr he
said : “ For the man in good health Christianity is an un
serviceable religion, with its resignation and one-sided pre
cepts. For the sick man, however, I assure you it is a very
good religion.” To Alfred Meissner: “ When health is
used up, money used up, and sound human sense used up,
Christianity begins.” Once, while lying on his mattress
grave, he said with a sigh : “ If I could even get out on
crutches, do you know whither I would go ? Straight to
church.” And when his hearer looked incredulous, he
added : “ Most decidedly to church. Where else should one
go with crutches ?” Such exquisite and mordant irony is
strange indeed in a defender of the holy and blessed
Trinity.
Dean Stanley’s peroration runs thus :—“ Wherever we
are taught to know and understand the real nature of the
world in which our lot is cast, there is a testimony, however
�dean
Stanley’s
latest.
37
humble, to the name of the Father ; wherever we are taught
to know and admire the highest and best of human excel
lence, there is a testimony to the name of the Son:
wherever there is implanted in us a presence of freedom,
purity and love, there is a testimony to the name of the
Holy Ghost.” Very fine, no doubt; also very soporific.
One is inclined to mutter a sleepy Amen. If this passage
means anything at all it implies that all who know truth,
admire excellence, and have any share in freedom and
virtue, are testators to the names of Father, Son and
Holy Ghost; so that many Atheists are Trinitarians with
out knowing it. “ In Christianity,” says the Dean, “ no
thing is of real concern except that which makes us wiser
and better.” That is precisely what the sceptic says, yet
for that coroners reject his service on juries, and rowdy
Christians try to keep him out of Parliament when he has
•a legal right to enter. But the Dean adds : “ Everything
which does make us wiser and better is the very thing which
Christianity intends.” That is, Christianity means just
what you like to find in it. How can a man of Dean
Stanley’s eminence and ability write such dishonest trash ?
Must we charitably, though with a touch of sarcasm, repeat
Lamb’s words of Coleridge—“ Never mind; it’s only his
fun ?”
�GOD AND THE QUEEN.
(March, 1882.)
The Queen is now safely lodged at Mentone. Althoughthe political outlook is not very bright, there is pretty sure
to be a good solid majority to vote a dowry for Prince
Leopold’s bride ; and so long as royalty is safe it does not
ranch matter what becomes of the people. That dreadful
Bradlaugh is gagged; he cannot open his mouth in the
House of Commons against perpetual pensions or royal
grants. The interests of monarchy are in no immediate
peril, and so the Queen is off to Mentone.
Now she is gone, and the loyal hubbub has subsided, it
is just the time to consider her late “ providential escape ”
from the bullet which was never fired at her.
What is the meaning of providential ? God does all or
nothing. There is a special providence in the fall of a
sparrow, as well as in the fall of empires. In that case
everything is providential. But this is not the ordinary view.
When a railway accident occurs those who do not come to
grief ascribe their preservation to Providence. Who then
is responsible for the fate of those who perish ? Centuries
ago Christians would have answered, “ the Devil.” Now
they give no answer at all, but treat the question as frivo
lous or profane.
. Thomas Cooper, in his Autobiography, says that the per
fecting touch was given to his conversion by an interposition
of God. During a collision, the carriage in which he sat
was lifted clean on to another line of rails, and thus escaped
the fate of the other carriages, which were broken to
pieces. Pious Thomas recognised at once the finger of God,
and he there and then fell on his knees and offered up a
thanksgiving. He was too vain to carry his argument out
to its logical end. Why did the Lord protect him, and not
his fellow-travellers ? Was he of more importance than
any of the others ? And why, if it was right to thank God
for saving Thomas Cooper, would it be wrong to curse him
for smashing all the rest ?
This superstition of Providence is dying out. Common
�GOD AND THE QUEEN.
39
people are gradually being left to the laws of Nature. If a
workhouse were to catch on fire, no one would speak of
those who escaped the flames as providentially saved. God
does not look after the welfare of paupers; nor is it likely
that he would pluck a charwoman’s brat out of the fire if
it tumbled in during her absence. Such interpositions are
■ absurd. But with kings, queens, princes, princesses, and big
nobs in general, the case is different. God looks after the
quality. He stretches forth his hand to save them from
danger, from the pestilence that walketh by day and the
terror that walketh by night. And his worshippers take
just the same view of the “ swells.” When the Queen came
to London, a few weeks ago, one of her mounted attend
ants was thrown and badly hurt; and the next day one of
the loyal Tory papers reported that her Majesty had com
pletely recovered from the accident to her outrider !
But if the Lord overlooks the great ones of the earth, why
is he not impartial ? He did not turn aside Guiteau’s
bullet, nor did he answer the prayers of a whole nation on
its knees. President Garfield was allowed to die after a
long agony. Poor Mrs. Garfield believed up to the very
last minute that God would interpose and save her husband.
But he never did. Why was he so indifferent in this case ?
Was it because Garfield was a President instead of a King,
the elected leader of free men instead of the hereditary
ruler of political slaves ? Informer Newdegate would say
so. In his opinion God Almighty hates Republicans. Yet
the Bible clearly shows that the Lord is opposed to monarchy.
He gave his chosen people a king as a punishment, after •
plainly telling them what an evil they had sought; and
there is perhaps a covert irony in the story of Saul, the son
*' of Kish, who went to seek his father’s asses and found in
stead a nation of subjects—two-legged asses, who begged
him to mount them and ride.
Take another case. ' Why did God permit the Nihilists
to assassinate the late Czar of Russia ? All their previous
plots had failed. Why was the last plot allowed to succeed ?
There is only one answer. God had nothing to do with
any of them, and the last succeeded because it was better
devised and more carefully executed. If God protected
the Czar against their former attempts, they were too
many for him in the end; that is, they defeated Omni
�40
GOD AND THE QUEEN.
potence—an absurdity too flagrant for any sane naan to
believe.
Why should God care for princes more than for peasants,
for queens more than for washerwomen ? There is no
difference in their compositions ; they are all made of the
same flesh and blood. The very book these loyal gushers
call the Word of God declares that he is no respecter of
persons. What are the distinctions of rank and wealth ?
Mere nothings. Look down from an altitude of a thousand
feet, and an emperor and his subjects shall appear equally
small; and what are even a thousand feet in the infinite
universe? Nay, strip them of all their fictions of dress;
reduce them to the same condition of featherless bipeds;
and you shall find the forms of strength or beauty, and the
power of brain, impartially distributed by Nature, who is
the truest democrat, who raises her Shakespeares from the
lowest strata of society, and laughs to scorn the pride of
palaces and thrones.
Providence is an absurdity, a superstitious relic of the
ignorant past. Sensible men disbelieve it, and scientists
laugh it to scorn. Our very moral sense revolts against it.
Why should God help a few of his children and neglect all
the others ? Explosions happen in mines, and scores of honest
industrious men, doing the rough work of the world and
winning bread for wife and child, are blown to atoms or
hurled into shapeless death. God does not help them, and
tears moisten the dry bread of half-starved widows and
orphans. Sailors on the mighty deep go down with uplifted
hands, or slowly gaze their life away on the merciless
heavens. The mother bends over her dying child, the first
flower of her wedded love, the sweetest hope of her life.
She is rigid with despair, and in her hot tearless eyes there
dwells a dumb misery that would touch a heart of stone.
But God does not help, the death-curtain falls, and dark
ness reigns where all was light.
Who has the audacity to say that the God who will not
aid a mother in the death-chamber shelters the Queen upon
her throne ? It is an insult to reason and a ghastly mockery
of justice. The impartiality of Nature is better than the
mercy of such a God.
�CARDINAL NEWMAN ON INFIDELITY.
(ApriZ, 1882.)
Cardinal Newman is perhaps the only Catholic in England
worth listening to. He has immured his intellect in the
catacombs of the Romish Church, but he has not been able
to quench it, and even there it radiates a splendor through
the gloom. His saintly character is as indubitable as the
subtlety of his mind, and no vicissitude has impaired the
charm of his style, which is pure and perfect as an exquisite
and flawless diamond; serene and chaste in its usual mood,
but scintillating gloriously in the light of his imagina
tion.
On Sunday last Cardinal Newman preached a sermon at
the Oratory in Birmingham on “ Modern Infidelity.” Un
fortunately we have not a full report, from which we might
be able to extract some notable passages, but only a news
paper summary. Even this, however, shows some points of
interest.
Cardinal Newman told his hearers that “ a great storm of
infidelity and irreligion was at hand,” and that “ some
dreadful spiritual catastrophe was coming upon them.” We
quite agree with the great preacher ; but every storm is not
an evil, and every catastrophe is not a disaster. The revo
lutionary storm in France cleared the air of much pestilence.
It dissipated as by enchantment the h rrible cloud of
tyranny, persecution and want, which had for centuries
hovered over the land. And certainly, to go back a stage
farther in history, the Reformation was not a misfortune,
although it looked like a “spiritual catastrophe” to a great
many amiable people. The truth is, Revolutions must occur
in this world, both in thought and in action. They may
happen slowly, so that we may accommodate ourselves to
them; or rapidly, and so disturb and injure whole genera’
tions. But come they must, and no power can hinder them ;
not even that once mighty Church which has always striven
to bind Humanity to the past with adamantine chains of
dogma. In Cardinal Newman’s own words, from perhaps
his greatest and most characteristic book,—“ here below
�42
CARDINAL NEWMAN ON INFIDELITY.
to live is to change, and to be perfect is to have changed
often.”
We cannot say that Cardinal Newman indicates how
humanity will suffer from the “ coming storm of infidelity
and irreligion.” He does, indeed, refer to the awful state
of a people forsaken by God, but in our humble opinion
this is somewhat ludicrous. We can hardly understand
how God can forsake his own creatures. Why all this
pother if he really exists ? In that case our scepticism eannot affect him, any more than a man’s blindness obscures the
sun. And surely, if Omnipotence desired us all to believe
the truth, the means are ready to hand. The God who
said, Let there be light, and there was light, could as easily
say, Let all men be Christians, and they would be Chris
tians. If God had spoken the universe would be convinced ;
and the fact that it is not convinced proves, either that he
does not exist, or that he purposely keeps silent, and desires
that we should mind our own business-.
The only tangible evil Cardinal Newman ventures to
indicate is the “ indignity which at this moment has come
over the Holy Father at R ime.” He declares, as to the
Pope, that “there hardly seems a place in the whole of
Europe where he could put his foot.” The Catholics are
carrying this pretence of a captive Pope a trifle too far.
His Holiness must have a tremendous foot if he cannot put
it fairly down on the floor of the Vatican. He and his
Cardinals really wail over their loss of temporal power. It
would be wiser and nobler to reconcile themselves to the
inevitable, and to end the nefarious diplomacy by which they
are continually striving to recover what is for ever lost.
The whole world is aware of the scandalous misrule and
the flagrant immorality which, under the government of the
Papacy, made the Eternal City a byword and a reproach.
Under the secular government, Rome has made wonderful
progress. It has better streets, cleaner inhabitants, less
fever and filth, and a much smaller army of priests, beggars,
and prostitutes. Catholics may rest assured that the bad
old times will never return. They may, of course, promise
a reformation of manners if the Holy Father’s dominion is
restored, but the world will not believe them. Reforming
the Papacy, as Carlyle grimly said, is like tinkering a rusty
old kettle. If you stop up the holes of it with temporary
�CARDINAL NEWMAN ON INFIDELITY.
43
putty, it may hang together for awhile ; but “ begin to
hammer at it, solder it, to what you call mend and rectify
it,—it will fall to shreds, as sure as rust is rust; go all into
nameless dissolution,—and the fat in the fire will be a thing
worth looking at, poor Pope !”
As a sincere Christian (a very rare thing, by the way, in
these days), Cardinal Newman is bound to lament the spread
of infidelity. He is a keen observer, and his word may be
taken for the fact. A stormy time is undoubtedly coming.
Old creeds and institutions will have to give an account of
themselves, and nothing that cannot stand the test will live.
But truth will not suffer. Criticise the multiplication table
as much as you please, and twice two will still be four. In
the storm and stress of controversy what is true and solid
will survive; only the hollow shams of authority and
superstition will collapse. Humanity has nothing to fear,
however the Churches may groan.
�SUNDAY
TYRANNY.
(May, 1882.)
Last Sunday the myriads of Paris turned out to the Chan
tilly races. The sun shone brilliantly, and all went merry
as a marriage hell. Yet there was no drunkenness or dis
order ; on the contrary, the multitude behaved with such
decorum, that one English correspondent said it would not
have appeared strange if a bishop had stepped forward in
full canonicals to give them his benediction.
Why cannot Englishmen enjoy their Sunday’s leisure
like the French ? Because we are still under the bondage
of Puritanism ; because our religious dress is nothing but
Hebrew Old Clothes ; because we follow Moses instead of
Jesus ; because we believe that man was made for the
Sabbath, instead of the Sabbath for man • because, in short,
there are in England a lot of sour Christians who play the
dog in the manger, and will neither enjoy themselves on
Sunday nor let anyone else. They often prate about liberty,
but they understand it as the Yankee did, who defined it as
the right to do as he pleased and the right to make every
*
body else do so too.
Let us all be unhappy on Sunday, is the burden of "thensong. Now, we have no objection to their teing miserable,
it they desire it, on that or any other day. This is supposed
to be a free country ; you decide to be wretched and you
select your own time for the treat. But you have no right
to interfere with your neighbors. This, however, is what
the Christians, with their customary “ cheek,” will insist on
doing. They like going to the church and the public-house
on Sunday, and those establishments are permitted to open ;
they have no wish to go elsewhere, and so they keep all
other establishments closed. This is mere impudence.
Let them go where they choose, and allow the same freedom
to other people. Those who advocate a free Sunday ask for
no favor ; they demand justice. They do not propose to
compel any Christian to enter a museum, a library, or an
art gallery ; they simply claim the right to go in themselves.
�SUNDAY TYBANNY.
45-
The denial of that right is a violation of liberty, which every
free man is bound to resent.
This country is said to be civilised. To a certain extent
it is, but all our civilisation has been won against Chris
tianity and its hrutal laws. Our toiling masses, in factory,
mine, shop, and counting-house, have one day of leisure in
the week. Rightly considered it is of infinite value. It is
a splendid breathing-time. We cast off the storm and stress
of life, fling aside the fierce passion of gain, and let the
spirit of humanity throb in our pulses and stream from our
eyes. Our fellow man is no longer a rival, but a brother.
His gain is not our loss. We enrich each other by the
noble give-and-take of fellowship, and feel what it really
is to live. Yet our Christian legislature tries its utmost to
spoil the boon. It cannot prevent us from visiting each
other, or walking as far as our legs will carry us ; but
almost everything else is tabooed. Go to church, it says.
Millions answer, We are sick of going ; we have heard the
same old story until it is unspeakably stale, and many of
the sermons have been so frequently repeated that we
suspect they were bought by the dozen. Then it says, Go
to the public-house. But a huge multitude answer, We
don’t want to go there either, except for a minute to quench
our thirst; we have no wish for spirituous any more than
spiritual intoxication ; we desire some other alternative than
gospel or gin. Then our Christian legislature answers, You
are discontented fools. It crushes down their better aspi
rations, and condemns them to a wearisome inactivity.
Go through London, the metropolis of the world, as we
call it, on a Sunday. How utterly dreary it is ! The
shutters are all up before the gay shop-windows. You
pace mile after mile of streets, with sombre houses on either
hand as though tenanted by the dead. You stand in front
of the British Museum, and it looks as if it had been closed
since the date of the mummies inside. You yearn to walk
through its galleries, to gaze on the relics of antiquity, to
inspect the memorials of the dead, to feel the subtle links
that bind together the past and the present and make one
great family of countless generations of men. But you must
wander away disappointed and dejected. You repair to the
Kational Gallery. You long to behold the masterpieces of
art, to have your imagination quickened and thrilled by the
�46
SUNDAY TYRANNY.
glories of form and color, to look once more on Romo
favorite picture which touches your nature to its fineRt
issues. But again you are foiled. You desire to visit a
library, full of books you cannot buy, and there commune
with the great minds who have left their thoughts to
posterity. But you are frustrated again. You are cheated
out of your natural right, and treated less like a man than
a dog.
This Christian legislature has much to answer for.
Drunkenness is our great national vice. And how is it to
be overcome ? Preaching will not do it. Give Englishmen
a chance, furnish them with counter attractions, and they
will abjure intoxication like their continental neighbors.
Elevate their tastes, and they will feel superior to the vulgar
temptation of drink. Every other method has been tried
and has failed; this is the only method that promises success.
Fortunately the Sunday question is growing. Christian
tyranny is evidently doomed. Mr. Howard’s motion for
the opening of public museums and art galleries, although
defeated, received the support of eighty-five members of Par
liament. That minority will increase again next year, and
in time it will become a majority. Mr. Broadhurst, for
some peculiar reason, voted against it, but we imagine he
will some day repent of his action. The working-classes
are fools if they listen to the idle talk about Sunday labor,
with which the Tories and bigots try to bamboozle them.
The opening of public institutions on Sunday would not
necessitate a hundredth part of the labor already employed
in keeping open places of worship, and driving rich people
to and fro. All the nonsense about the thin end of the
wedge is simply dust thrown into their eyes. The very
people who vote against Sunday freedom under a pretence
of opposing Sunday labor, keep their own servants at work
and visit the “ Zoo” in the afternoon, where they doubtless
chuckle over the credulity of the lower orders. Christian
tyranny unites with Tory oppression to debase and enslave
the people. It is time that both were imperiously stopped.
The upper classes wish to keep us ignorant, and parsons
naturally want everybody else’s shutters up when they open
shop. We ought to see through the swindle. Let us check
their impudence, laugh at their hypocrisy, and rescue our
Sunday from their hands.
�WHO ARE THE BLASPHEMERS?
(June, 1882.)
Atheists are often charged with blasphemy, but it is a
crime they cannot commit. God is to them merely a word,
expressing all sorts of ideas, and not a person. It is,
properly speaking, a general term, which includes all that
there is in common among the various deities of the world.
The idea of the supernatural embodies itself in a thousand
ways. Truth is always simple and the same, but error is
infinitely diverse. Jupiter, Jehovah and Mumbo-Jumbo
are alike creations of human fancy, the products of ignor
ance and wonder. Which is the God is not yet settled.
When the sects have decided this point, the question may
take a fresh turn ; but until then god must be considered
as a generic term, like tree or horse or man; with just this
difference, however, that while the words tree, horse and
man express the general qualities of visible objects, the
word god expresses only the imagined qualities of some
thing that nobody has ever seen.
When the Atheist examines, denounces, or satirises the
gods, he is not dealing with persons but with ideas. He
is incapable of insulting God, for he does not admit the
existence of any such being.
Ideas of god may be good or bad, beautiful or ugly; and
according as he finds them the Atheist treats them. If we
lived in Turkey we should deal with the god of the Koran,
but as we live in England we deal with the god of the
Bible. We speak of that god as a being, just for conveni
ence sake, and not from conviction. At bottom, we admit
nothing but the mass of contradictory notions between
Genesis and Revelation. We attack not a person but a
belief, not a being but an idea, not a fact but a fancy.
Lord Brougham long ago pointed out, in his “ Life of
Voltaire,” that the great French heretic was not guilty of
blasphemy, as his enemies alleged ; since he bad no belief
in the actual existence of the god he dissected, analysed and
laughed at. Mr. Ruskin very eloquently defends Byron
from the same charge. In “ Cain,” and elsewhere, the
�48
WHO ARE THE BLASPHEMERS ?
great poet does not impeach God ; he merely impeaches the
orthodox creed. We may sum up the whole matter briefly.
No man satirises the god he believes in, and no man
believes in the god he satirises.
We shall not, therefore, be deterred by the cry of “ blas
phemy,” which is exactly what the Jewish priests shouted
against Jesus Christ. If there is a God, he cannot be half
so stupid and malignant as the Bible declares. In de
stroying the counterfeit we do not harm the reality. And
as it is better, in the words of Plutarch, to have no notion
of the gods than to have notions which dishonor them we
are satisfied that the Lord (if he exist) will never burn us
in hell for denying a few lies told in his name.
S' The real blasphemers are those who believe in God and
*
blacken his character ; who credit him with less knowledge
than a child, and less intelligence than an idiot; who make
him quibble, deceive, and lie ; who represent him as in
decent, cruel, and revengeful; who give him the heart of a
savage and the brain of a fool. These are the blasphemers.
When the priest steps between husband and wife, with
the name of God on his lips, he blasphemes. When, in the
name of God, he resists education and science, he blas
phemes. When, in the name of God, he opposes freedom
of thought and liberty of conscience, he blasphemes.
When, in the name of God, he robs, tortures, and kills
those who differ from him, he blasphemes. When, in the
name of God, he opposes the equal rights of all, he blas
phemes. When, in the name of God, he preaches content
to the poor and oppressed, flatters the rich and powerful,
and makes religious tyranny the handmaiden of political
privilege, he blasphemes. And when he takes the Bible in
his hand, and says it was written by the inspiration of
God, he blasphemes almost beyond forgiveness.
Who are the blasphemers ? Not we who preach freedom
and progress for all men ; but those who try to bind the
world with chains of dogma, and to burden it, in God’s
name, with all the foul superstitions of its ignorant past.
�THE BIRTH OF CHRIST.
(December, 1880.)
“ The time draws near, the birth of Christ,” as Tennyson
sings in “ In Memoriam,” and the pious followers of the
Nazarene will celebrate it with wonted orgies of pleasure.
The Incarnation will be pondered to the accompaniment
of roast beef, and the Atonement will play lambently
around the solid richness of plum-pudding. And thus
will be illustrated the biological truth that the stomach
is the basis of everything, including religion.
But while Christians comport themselves thus in pre
sence of the subtlest mysteries of faith, the Sceptic
cannot be without his peculiar reflections.
He, of
course, knows that the festal observance of this season is
far more ancient than Christianity ; but he naturally wonders
how people, who imagine it to be a unique feature of their
sublimely spiritual creed, remain contented with its extremely
sensual character. They profess to believe that the fate of
the whole human race was decided by the advent of the
Man of Sorrows ; yet theyi£ommemorate that event by an
unhealthy consumption of tqa meat which perisheth, and a
wild indulgence in the frivolousqfleasures of that carnal mind
which is at enmity with God. Astonished at such conduct,
the Sceptic muses on the inconsistency of mankind. He may
also once more consider the circumstances of the birth of
Christ and its relation to the history of the modern world.
Jesus, called the Christ, is popularly supposed to have been
of the seed of David, from whi‘Bh it was promised that the
Messiah should come. It is, however, perfectly clear that
he was in no-wise related to the man after G-od’s own heart
His putative father, Joseph, admittedly had no share in
bringing him into the world ; for he disdained the assistance
of a father, although he was unable to dispense with that of
a mother. But Joseph, and not Mary, according to the
genealogies of Matthew and Luke, was the distant blood
relation of David; and therefore Jesus was not of the seed
of the royal house, but a bastard slip grafted on the ancient
family-tree by the Holy Ghost. It is a great pity that
D
�50
THE BIRTH OF CHRIST.
newspaper correspondents did not exist in those days. Had
Joseph been skilfully “interviewed,” it is highly probable
that the world would have been initiated into his domestic
secrets, and enlightened as to the paternity of Mary’s
eldest son. The Holy Ghost is rather too shadowy a
peisonage to be the father of a lusty boy, and no young lady
would be credited in this age if she ascribed to him the
authorship of a child born out of wedlock. Mbst assuredly
no . magistrate would make an order against him for its
. maintenance. Even a father of the Spiritualist persuasion,
who believed in what is grandly called “ the materialisation
of spirit forms,” would probably be more than dubious if his
daughter were to present him with a grandson whose father
lived on the other side of death and resided in a mansion not
made with hands. It is, we repeat, to be for ever regretted
that poor Joseph has not left his version of the affair. The
Immaculate Conception might perhaps have been cleared
up, and theology relieved of a half-obscene mystery, which
has unfortunately perverted not a few minds.
The birth of Jesus was announced to “wise men from the
East ” by the appearance of a singular star. Is not this a
relic of astrology ? Well does Byron sing—
“ Ye stars ! which are the poetry of heaven,
If in your bright beams we would read the fate
Of men and empires, ’tis to be forgiven,
That in our aspirations to be great
Our destinies o’erleap their mortal state,
And claim a kindred with you ; for ye are
A beauty and a mystery, and create
In us such love and reverence from afar
That fortune, fame, power, life, have named themselves a
star.”
But this star was the most wonderful on record. It “ went
before ” the wise men, and “ stood over where the young
child was.” Such an absurdity could be related and credited
only by people who conceived of the sky as a solid vault, not
far distant, wherein all the heavenly bodies were stuck.
The present writer once asked an exceedingly ignorant and
simple man where he thought he would alight if he dropped
from the comet then in the sky. “ Oh,” said he, naming the
open space nearest his own residence, “ somewhere about
Finsbury Circus.” That man’s astronomical notions were
�THE BIRTH OE CHRIST.
51
very imperfect, but they were quite as good as those of the
person who seriously wrote, and of the persons who seriously
believe, this fairy tale of the star which heralded the birth of
Christ.
Luke’s version of the episode differs widely from Matthew’s.
He makes no reference to “ wise men from the East,” but
simply says that certain “ shepherds” of the same country,
who kept watch over their flock by night, were visited by
“ the angel of the Lord,” and told that they would find the
Savior, Christ the Lord, just born at Bethlehem, the City
of David, “ wrapped in swaddling clothes and lying in a
manger.” Luke does not, as is generally supposed, represent
Mary as confined in a stable because Joseph 'was too poor to
pay for decent accommodation, but because “ there was no
room for them in the inn.” It is perfectly consistent with
all the Gospel references to Joseph’s status to assume that
he carried on a flourishing business, and Jesus himself in
later years might doubtless have earned a good living in the
concern if he had not deliberately preferred to lead the life
of a mendicant preacher. This, however, is by the way.
Cur point is that Luke says nothing about the “ star ” or
the “wise men from the East,” who had an important inter
view with Herod himself; while Matthew says nothing
about the “ manger ” or the shepherds and their angelic
visitors. Surely these discrepancies on points so important,
and as to which there could be little mistake, are enough to
throw discredit on the whole story.
It is further noticeable that Luke is absolutely silent about
Herod’s massacre of the innocents. What can we think of
his reticence on such a subject ? Had the massacre occurred,
it would have been widely known, and the memory of so
horrible a deed would have been vivid for generations.
Matthew, or whoever wrote the Gospel which bears his name,
is open to suspicion. His mind was distorted by an intense
belief in prophecy, a subject which, as old Bishop South
said, either finds a man cracked or leaves him so. After
narrating the story of Herod’s massacre, he adds : “ Then
was fulfilled that which was spoken by Jeremy, the prophet,
saying,” etc. Now, he makes similar reference to prophecy
no less than five times in the first two chapters, and in each
case we find that the “prohetical” utterance referred to
has not the faintest connexion with the incident related.
d 2
�52
THE BIRTH OF CHRIST.
Besides, a man who writes history with one eye on his own
period, and the other on a period centuries anterior is not
likely to be veracious, however earnestly he may intend to.
There is an early tradition, which is as strong as any state
ment about the history of the Primitive Church, that
Matthew’s Gospel was originally written in Hebrew ; and it
has been supposed that the writer gratuitously threw in
these references to Jeremy and others, in order to please the
Jews, who were extremely fond of prophecy. But this supposition is equally fatal to his credibility as an historian.
In any case, the Evangelists differ so widely on matters of
such interest and importance that we are constrained to dis
credit their story. It is evidently, as scholarship reveals, a
fairy tale, which slowly gathered round the memory of
Jesus after his death. Some of its elements were creations
of his disciples’ fancy, but others were borrowed from the
mythology of more ancient creeds.
Yet this fairy tale is accepted by hundreds of millions of
men as veritable history. It is incorporated into the founda
tion of Christianity, and every year at this season its in
cidents are joyously commemorated. How slowly the world
of intelligence moves ! But let us not despair. Science and
scholarship have already done much to sap belief in this
supernatural religion, and we may trust them to do still
more. They will ultimately destroy its authority by refuting
its pretensions, and compel it to take its place among the
general multitude of historic faiths.
If Jesus was the Christ, the Messiah, the Deliverer, why
is the world still so full of sin and misery ? The Redeemer
has come, say the Christians. Yes, we reply, but when
will come the redemption ? Apostrophising Jesus in his
lines “ Before a Crucifix,” Mr. Swinburne reminds him that
“ the nineteenth wave of the ages rolls now usward since thy
birth began,” and then inquires :—
“ Hast thou fed full men’s starved-out souls,
Or are there less oppressions done
In this wide world under the sun ?”
Only a negative answer can be given. Christ has in no
wise redeemed the world. He was no god of power, but a
weak fallible man like ourselves ; and his cry of despair on
the cross might now be repeated with tenfold force. The
�THE BIRTH OF CHRIST.
53
older myth, of Prometheus is truer and more inspiring than
the myth of Christ. If there be gods, they have never
yielded man aught of their grace. All his possessions have
been cunningly, patiently, and valorously extorted from the
powers that be, even as Prometheus filched the fire from
heaven. In that realm of mythology, whereto all religions
will eventually be consigned, Jesus will dwindle beneath
Prometheus. One is feminine, and typifies resigned sub
mission to a supernatural will ; the other is masculine, and
typifies that insurgent audacity of heart and head, which has
wrested a kingdom of science from the vast empire of
nescience, and strewed the world with the wrecks of theo
logical power.
�THE REIGN OF CHRIST.
(January
1880.J
Christmas and Easter are fruitful in panegyrics on Jesus
and the religion which fraudulently bears his name. On
these occasions, not only the religious but even the secular
newspapers give the rein to their rhetoric and imagination,
and indulge in much fervid eloquence on the birth or the
crucifixion of the Nazarene. Time-honored platitudes are
brought out from their resting-places and dexterously moved
to a well-known tune; and fallacies which have been
refuted ad nauseam are paraded afresh as though their
logical purity were still beyond suspicion. Papers that differ
on all other occasions and on all other subjects concur then,
and “ when they do agree their unanimity is wonderful.'’
While the more sober and orthodox discourse in tones
befitting their dignity and repute, the more profane riotously
join in the chorus ; and not to be behind the rest, the noto
riously misbelieving Greatest Circulator orders from the
profanest member of its staff “ a rousing article on the
Crucifixion,” or on the birth of Jesus, as the case may be.
All this, however, is of small account, except as an indica
tion of the slavery of our “ independent” journals to Bumble
and his prejudices, before whom they are obliged to masque
rade when he ordains a celebration of his social or religious
rites. But here and there a more serious voice is heard
through the din, with an accent of earnest veracity, and not
that of an actor playing a part. Such a voice may be worth
listening to, and certainly no other can be. Let us heai’ the
Rev. J. Baldwin Brown on “ The Reign of Christ.” He is.
I believe, honorably distinguished among Dissenters; his
sermons often bear marks of originality; and the goodness
of his heart, whatever may be thought of the strength of his.
head, is sufficiently attested by his emphatic revolt against
the doctrine of Eternal Torture in Hell.
Before criticising Mr. Brown’s sermon in detail I cannot
help remarking that it is far too rhetorical and far too
empty of argument. Sentimentality is the bane of religion
in our day; subservience to popularity degrades the pulpit
�THE REIGN OF CHRIST.
55
as it degrades the press. If we desire to find the language
of reason in theology, we must seek it in the writings of
such men as Newman, who contemplate the ignorant and
passionate multitude with mingled pity and disdain. The
“ advanced ” school of theologians, from Dean Stanley to
the humblest reconciler of reason and faith, are sentimen
talists almost to a man ; the reason being, I take it, that
although their emotional tendencies are very admirable, they
lack the intellectual consistency and rigor which impel
others to stand on definite first principles, as a sure basis of
operation and an impregnable citadel against attack. Mr.
Brown belongs to this “ advanced ” school, and has a
liberal share of its failings. He is full of eloquent passages
that lead to nothing, and he excites expectations which are
seldom if ever satisfied. He faces stupendous obstacles
raised by reason against his creed, and just as we look to
see him valiantly surmount them, we find that he veils them
from base to summit with a dense cloud of words, out of
which his voice is heard asking us to believe him on the
other side. Yet of all men professional students of the
Bible should be freest from such a fault, seeing what a
magnificent, masterpiece it is of terse and vigorous simplicity.
Mr. Brown and his “advanced” friends would do well to
ponder that quaint and pregnant aphorism of old Bishop
Andrewes—“ Waste words addle questions'’ When I first
read it I was thrown into convulsions of laughter, and even
now it tickles my risibility ; but despite its irresistible quaint
ness I cannot but regard it as one of the wisest and pithiest
sentences in our literature. Dr. Newman has splendidly
amplified it in a passage of his “University Sermons,”
which I gratuitously present to Mr. Brown and every reader
who can make use of it:—“ Half the controversies in the
world are verbal ones ; and could they be brought to a plain
issue, they would be brought to a prompt termination.
Parties engaged in them would then perceive, either that in
substance they agreed together, or that their difference was
one of first principles. This is the great object to be aimed
at in the present age, though confessedly a very arduous
one. We need not dispute, we need not prove,—we need
but define. At all events, let us, if we can, do this first of
all; and then see who are left for us to dispute with, and
what is left for us to prove.”
�56
THE REIGN OF CHRIST.
Mr. Brown’s sermon on “ The Reign of Christ ” is
preached from a verse of St. Paul’s first Epistle to Timothy,
wherein Jesus is styled “The blessed and only Potentate.”
From this “ inspired ” statement he derives infinite consola
tion. This, he admits, is far from being the best of all
possible worlds, for it is full of strife and cruelty, the wail
of anguish and the clamor of frenzy ; but as Christ is “ the
blessed and only Potentate,” moral order will finally be
evolved from the chaos and good be triumphant over evil.
Now the question arises: Who made the chaos and who is
responsible for the evil ? Not Christ, of course : Mr. Brown
will not allow that. Is it the Devil then ? Oh no! To
say that would be blasphemy against God. He admits,
however, that the notion has largely prevailed, and has even
been formulated into religious creeds, “ that a malignant
spirit, a spirit who loves cursing as God loves blessing, has
a large and independent share in the government of the
world.” But, he adds, “ in Christendom men dare not say
that they believe it, with the throne of the crucified and
risen Christ revealed in the Apocalypse to their gaze.”
Ordinary people will rub their eyes in sheer amazement at
this cool assertion. Is it not plain that Christians in all
ages have believed in the power and subtlety of the Devil
as God’s sleepless antagonist ? Have they not held, and do
they not still hold, that he caused the Fall of Adam and
Eve, and thus introduced original sin, which was certain to
infect the whole human race ever afterwards until the end
of time ? Was not John Milton a Christian, and did he not
in his “Paradise Lost” develope all the phases of that
portentous competition between the celestial and infernal
powers for the virtual possession of this world and lordship
over the destinies of our race ? If we accept Mr. Brown’s
statements we shall have to reverse history and belie the
evidence of our senses.
But who is responsible for the moral chaos and the exist
ence of evil ? That is the question. If to say Christ is
absurd, and to say the Devil blasphemy, what alternative is
left ? The usual answer is : Man’s freewill. Christ as “ the
blessed and only Potentate ” leaves us liberty of action, and
our own evil passions cause all the misery of our lives. But
who gave us our evil passions ? To this question no answer
s vouchsafed, and so we are left exactly at the point from
�THE REIGN OF CHRIST.
57
which we started. Yet Mr. Brown has a very decided opinion
as to the part these “ evil passions ” play in the history c f
mankind. He refers to them as “ the Devil’s brood of lust
and lies, and wrongs and hates, and murderous passion and
insolent power, which through all the ages of earth’s sad
history have made it liker hell than heaven.” No Atheist
could use stronger language. Mr. Brown even believes that
our “ insurgent lusts and passions ” are predetermining causes
of heresy, so that in respect both to faith and to works they
achieve our damnation. How then did we come by them ?
The Evolutionist frankly answers the question without fear
of blasphemy on the one hand or of moral despair on the
other. Mr. Brown is bound to give his answer after raising
the question so vividly. But he will not. He urges that it
“ presents points of tremendous difficulty,” although “ we
shall unravel the mystery, we shall solve the problems in
God’s good time.” Thus the solution of the problem is to
be postponed until we are dead, when it will no longer
interest us. However convenient this may be for the
teachers of mystery, it is most unsatisfactory to rationalists.
Mr. Brown must also be reminded that the “ tremendous
difficulties ” he alludes to are all of his own creation. There is
no difficulty about any fact except in relation to some theory.
It is Mr. Brown’s theory of the universe which creates the
difficulties. It does not account for all the facts of existence
—nay, it is logically contravened by the most conspicuous
and persistent of them. Instead of modifying or transform
ing his theory into accordance with the facts, he rushes off
with it into the cloud-land of faith. There let him remain
as he has a perfect right to. Our objection is neither to
reason nor to faith, but to a mischievous playing fast and
loose with both.
Mr. Brown opines that Christ will reign until all his
enemies are under his feet. And who are these enemies ?
Not the souls of men, says Mr. Brown, for Christ “ loves
them with an infinite tenderness.” This infinite tenderness
is clearly not allied to infinite power or the world’s anguish
would long since have been appeased and extinguished, or
never have been permitted to exist at all. The real enemies
of Christ are not the souls of men, but “ the hates and
passions which torment them.” Oh those hates and passions!
They are the dialectical balls with which Mr. Brown goes
�58
THE REIGN OF CHRIST.
through his performance in that circle of petitio principii so
hated by all logicians, the middle sphere of intellects too
light for the solid earth of fact and too gross for the aerial
heaven of imagination.
It will be a fitting conclusion to present to Mr. Brown a
very serious matter which he has overlooked. Christ,
“ the blessed and only Potentate,” came on earth and origi
nated the universal religion nearly two thousand years ago.
Up to the present time three-fourths of the world’s inhabitants
are outside its pale, and more than half of them have never
heard it preached. Amongst the quarter which nominally
professes Christianity disbelief is spreading more rapidly
than the missionaries succeed in converting the heathen; so
that the reign of Christ is being restricted instead of in
creased. To ask us, despite this, to believe that he is God,
and possessed of infinite power, is to ask us to believe a
marvel compared with which the wildest fables are credible,
and the most extravagant miracles but as dust in the
balance.
�THE PRIMATE ON MODERN INFIDELITY.
(^September, 1880.)
A bishop once twitted a curate with preaching indifferent
orthodoxy. “ Well,” answered the latter, “ I don’t see how
you can expect me to be as orthodox as yourself. I believe
at the rate of a hundred a year, and you at the rate of ten
thousand.” In the spirit of this anecdote we should expect
an archbishop to be as orthodox as the frailty of human
nature will allow. A man who faithfully believes at the
rate of fifteen thousand a year should be able to swallow
most things and stick at very little. And there can be no
doubt that the canny Scotchman who has climbed or wrig
gled up to the Archbishopric of Canterbury is prepared to
go any lengths his salary may require. We suspect that he
regards the doctrines of the Church very much as did that
irreverent youth mentioned by Sidney Smith, who, on being
asked to sign the Thirty-nine Articles, replied “ Oh yes,
forty if you like.” The clean linen of his theology is im
maculately pure. Never has he fallen under a suspicion of
entertaining dangerous or questionable opinions, and he has
in a remarkable degree that faculty praised by Saint Paul
of being all things to all men, or at least as many men as
make a lumping majority. What else could be expected
from a Scotchman who has mounted to the spiritual Primacy
of England ?
His Grace has recently been visiting the clergy and
churchwardens of his diocese and delivering what are called
Charges to them. The third of these was on the momentous
subject of Modern Infidelity, which seems to have greatly
exercised his mind. This horrid influence is found to be very
prevalent, much to the disconcertion of his Grace, who felt
constrained to begin his Charge with expressions of des
pondency, and only recovered his spirits towards the end,
where he confidently relies on the gracious promise of Christ
never to forsake his darling church. Some of the admissions
he makes are worth recording—
“I can,” he says, “have no doubt that the aspect of Christian
society in the present day is somewhat troubled, that the Church
�■60
THE PRIMATE ON MODERN INFIDELITY.
of Christ and the faith of Christ are passing through a great
trial in all regions of the civilised world, and not least among our
selves. There are dark clouds on the horizon already breaking,
which may speedily burst into a violent storm .... It is
well to note in history how these two evils—superstition and
infidelity—act and react in strengthening each other. Still, I
cannot doubt that the most [? more] formidable of the two for us
at present is infidelity...................... It is indeed a frightful
thought that numbers of our intelligent mechanics seem to be
alienated from all religious ordinances, that our Secularist halls
are well filled, that there is an active propagandism at work for
shaking belief in all creeds.”
These facts are of course patent, but it is something to
get an Archbishop to acknowledge them, His Grace also
finds “from above, in the regions of literature and art,
efforts to degrade mankind by denying our high original
the high original being, we presume, a certain simple pair
called Adem and Eve, who damned themselves and nearly
the whole of their posterity by eating an apple six thousand
years ago. The degradation of a denial of this theory is
hardly perceptible to untheological eyes. Most candid minds
would prefer to believe in Darwin rather than in Moses even
if the latter had, which he has not, a single leg to stand on.
For the theory of our Simian origin at least involves pro
gression in the past and perhaps salvation in the future of
our race, while the “ high original ” theory involves our re
trogression and perdition. His grace wonders how these
persons can “ confine their hopes and aspirations to a life
which is so irresistibly hastening to its speedy conclusion.”
But surely he is aware that they do so for the very simple
reason that they know nothing of any other life to hope
about or aspire to. One bird in the hand is worth twenty
in the bush when the bush itself remains obstinately invisible,
and if properly cooked is worth all the dishes in the world
filled only with expectations. His grace likewise refers to
the unequal distribution of worldly goods, to the poverty and
misery which exist “ notwithstanding all attempts to regene
rate society by specious schemes of socialistic reorganisation.”
It is, of course, very natural that an archbishop in the en
joyment of a vast income should stigmatise these “specious
schemes ” for distributing more equitably the good things of
this world; but the words “ blessed be ye poor ” go ill to
the tune of fifteen thousand a year, and there is a grim irony
�THE PRIMATE ON MODERN INFIDELITY.
61
in the fact that palaces are tenanted by men who profess to
represent and preach the gospel of him who had not where to
lay his head. Modern Christainity has been called a civilised
heathenism; with no less justice it might be called an
organised hypocrisy.
After a dolorous complaint as to the magazines “lying
everywhere for the use of our sons and daughters,” in which
the doctrines both of natural and of revealed religion are
assailed, the Archbishop proceeds to deal with the first great
form of infidelity, namely Agnosticism. With a feeble
attempt at wit he remarks that the name itself implies a
confession of ignorance, which he marvels to find unaccom
panied by “ the logical result of a philosophical humility.”
A fair account of the Agnostic position is then given, after
which it is severely observed that “ the better feelings of man
contradict these sophisms.” In proof of this, his Grace
cites the fact that in Paris, the “stronghold of Atheistical
philosophy,” the number of burials that take place without
religious rites is “a scarcely appreciable percentage.” We
suspect the accuracy of this statement, but having no
statistics on the subject by us, we are not prepared to
dispute it. We will assume its truth ; but the important
question then arises—What kind of persons are those who
dispense with the rites of religion ? Notoriously they are
men of the highest intellect and character, whose quality far
outweighs the quantity of the other side. They are the
leaders of action and thought, and what they think and do
to-day will be thought and done by the masses to-morrow.
When a man like Gambetta, occupying such a high position
and wielding such immense influence, invariably declines to
enter a church, whether he attends the marriage or the
funeral of his friends, we are entitled to say that his ex
ample on our side is infinitely more important than the
practice of millions who are creatures of habit and for the
most part blind followers of tradition. The Archbishop’s
argument tells against his own position, and the fact he cites,
when closely examined, proves more for our side than he
thought it proved for his own.
Atheism is disrelished by his Grace even more than
Agnosticism. His favorite epithet for it is “ dogmatic.”
“ Surely,” he cries, “ the boasted enlightenment of this
century will never tolerate the gross ignorance and arrogant
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THE PRIMATE ON MODERN INFIDELITY.
self-conceit which presumes to dogmatise as to things con
fessedly beyond its ken.” Quite so; but that is what the
theologians are perpetually doing. To use Matthew Arnold’s
happy expression, they talk familiarly about God as though
he were a man living in the next street. The Atheist and
the Agnostic confess their inability to fathom the universe
and profess doubts as to the ability of others. Yet they are
called dogmatic, arrogant, and self-conceited. On the other
hand, the theologians claim the power of seeing ih/rough
nature up to nature’s God. Yet they, forsooth, must be ac
counted modest, humble, and retiring.
wad some pow’r the giftie gie us
To see oursels as ithers see usI”
“O
These abominable Atheists are by no means scarce, for,
says his Grace, “ practical Atheists we have everywhere, if
Atheism be the denial of God.” Just so ; that is precisely
what we “ infidels ” have been saying for years. Chris
tianity is utterly alien to the life of modern society, and in
flagrant contradiction to the spirit of our secular progress.
It stands outside all the institutions of our material civilisa
tion. Its churches still echo the old strains of music and
the old dogmatic tones from the pulpit, but the worshippers
themselves feel the anomaly of its doctrines and rites when
they return to their secular avocations. The Sunday does
nothing but break the continuity of their lives, steeping
them in sentiments and ideas which have no relation to their
experience during the rest of the week. The profession of
Christendom is one thing, its practice is another. God is
simply acknowledged with the lips on Sunday, and on every
other day profoundly disregarded in all the pursuits of life
whether of business or of pleasure. Even in our national
legislature, although the practice of prayer is still retained,
any man would be sneered at as a fool who made the least
appeal to the sanctions of theology. An allusion to the
Sermon on the Mount would provoke a smile, and a citation
of one of the Thirty-nine Articles be instantly ruled as
irrelevant. Nothing from the top to the bottom of our
political and social life is done with any reference to those
theological doctrines which the nation professes to believe,
and to the maintenance of which it devotes annually so
many millions of its wealth.
�THE PRIMATE ON MODERN INFIDELITY.
63
In order to pose any member of the two great divisions of
“ infidelity,” the Archbishop advises his clergy to ask the
following rather comical questions :—
“Do you believe nothing which is not capable of being tested
by the ordinary rules which govern experience in things natural ?
How then do you know that you yourself exist ? How do you
know that the perceptions of your senses are not mere delusions,
and that there is anything outside you answering to what your
mind conceives? Have you a mind? and if you have not,
what is it that enables you to think and reason, and fear, and
hope ? Are these conditions of your being the mere results of
your material organism, like the headache which springs from
indigestion, or the high spirits engendered by too much wine ?
Are you something better than a vegetable highly cultivated, or
than your brothers of the lower animals ? and, if so, what is it
that differentiates your superiority ? Why do things outside you
obey your will ? Who gave you a will ? and, if so, what is it ?
I think you must allow that intellect is a thing almost divine, if
there be anything divine ; and I think also you must allow that
it is not a thing to be propagated as we propagate well-made and
high-bred cattle. Whence came Alexander the Great ? Whence
Charlemagne? And whence the First Napoleon? Was it
through a mere process of spontaneous generation that they
sprang up to alter by their genius and overwhelming will the
destinies of the world? Whence came Homer, Shakespeare,
Bacon ? Whence came all the great historians ? Whence came
Flato and all the bright lights of divine philosophy, of divinity,
■of poetry ? Their influence, after all, you must allow to be quite
as wide and enduring as any produced by the masters of those
positive material sciences which you worship. Do you think that
all these great minds—for they are minds, and their work was
not the product of a merely highly organised material frame—
were the outcome of some system of material generation, which
your so-called science can subject to rule, and teach men how to
produce by growth, as they grow vegetables?”
The Archbishop is not a very skilful physician. His pre
scription shows that he has not diagnosed the disease.
These strange questions might strike the infidel “ all of a
heap/’ as the expressive vernacular has it, but although
they might dumbfounder him, they would assuredly not con
vince. If the Archbishop of Canterbury were not so exalted
a personage we should venture to remark that to ask a man
how he knows that he exists betrays a marvellous depth of
ignorance or folly. Ultimate facts of consciousness are not
subjects of proof or disproof ; they are their own warranty
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TUE PRIMATE ON MODERN INFIDELITY.
and cannot be transcended. There is, besides, something ex
traordinary in an archbishop of the church to which
Berkeley belonged supposing that extreme idealism follows
only the rejection of deity. Whether the senses are after all
delusory does not matter to the Atheist a straw ; they are
real enough to him, they make his world in which he lives
and moves, and it is of no practical consequence whether
they mirror an outer world or not. What differentiates you
from the lower animals ? asks his Grace. The answer is
simple—a higher development of nervous structure. Who
gave you a will ? is just as sensible a question as Who gave
you a nose ? We have every reason to believe that both
can be accounted for on natural grounds without introducing
a supernatural donor. The question whether Alexander,
Napoleon, Homer, Bacon and Shakespeare came through a
process of spontaneous generation is excruciatingly ludicrous.
That process could only produce the very lowest form of
organism, and not a wonderfully complex being like man
who is the product of an incalculable evolution. But the
Archbishop did not perhaps intend this ; it may be that in
his haste to silence the “ infidel ” he stumbled over his own
meaning. Lastly, there is a remarkable naïveté in the aside
of the final question—•“ for they are minds.” He should
have added “ you know,” and then the episode would have
been delightfully complete. The assumption of the whole
point at issue in an innocent parenthesis is perhaps to be ex
pected from a pulpiteer, but it is not likely that the “ infidel”
will be caught by such a simple stratagem. All these
questions are so irrelevant and absurb that we doubt whether
his Grace would have the courage to put one of them to any
sceptic across a table, or indeed from any place in the world
except the pulpit, which is beyond all risk of attack, and
whence a man may ask any number of questions without
the least fear of hearing one of them answered.
The invitation given by his grace, to “ descend to the
harder ground of strictest logical argumentation,” is very
appropriate.
Whether the movement be ascending or
descending, there is undoubtedly a vast distance be
tween logical argumentation and anything he has yet
advanced. But even on the “ harder ” ground the Arch
bishop treads no more firmly. He demands to know how
the original protoplasm became endowed with life, and if
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THE PRIMATE ON MODERN INFIDELITY.
that question cannot be answered he calls upon us to admit
his theory of divine agency, as though that made the subject
more intelligible. Supernatural hypotheses are but refuges
of ignorance. Earl Beaconsfield, in his impish way, once
remarked that where knowledge ended religion began, and
the Archbishop of Canterbury seems to share that opinion.
His Grace also avers that “ no one has ever yet been able
to refute the argument necessitating a great First Cause.”
It is very easy to assert this, but rather difficult to main
tain it. One assertion is as good as another, and we shall
therefore content ourselves with saying that in our opinion
the argument for a great First Cause was (to mention only
one name) completely demolished by John Stuart Mill, who
showed it to be based on a total misconception of the nature
of cause and effect, which apply only to phaenomenal changes
and not to the apparently unchangeable matter and force of
which the universe is composed.
But the overwhelming last argument is that “ man has
something in him which speaks of God, of something above
this fleeting world, and rules of right and wrong have their
foundation elsewhere than in man’s opinion .... that
there is an immutable, eternal distinction between right and
wrong—that there is a God who is on the side of right.”
Again we must complain of unbounded assertion. Every
point of this rhetorical flourish is disputed by “ infidels ”
who are not likely to yield to anything short of proof. If
God is on the side of right he is singularly incapable of
maintaining it; for, in this world at least, according to some
penetrating minds, the devil has hitherto had it pretty much
his own way, and good men have had to struggle very hard
to make things even as equitable as we find them. But
after all, says his Grace, the supreme defence of the Church
against the assaults of infidelity is Christ himself. Weak
in argument, the clergy must throw themselves behind his
shield and trust in him. Before his brightness “ the mists
which rise from a gross materialistic Atheism evaporate,
and are scattered like the clouds of night before the dawn.”
It is useless to oppose reason to such preaching cs this. We
shall therefore simply retort the Archbishop’s epithets.
Gross and materialistic are just the terms to describe a
religion which traffics in blood and declares that without the
shedding of it there is no remission of sin; whose ascetic
E
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TUB PRIMATE ON MODERN INFIDELITY.
doctrines malign our purest affections and defile the sweetest
fountains of our spiritual health ; whose heaven is nothing
but an exaggerated jeweller’s shop, and its hell a den of
torture in which God punishes his children for the conse
quences of his own ignorance, incapacity or crime.
�BAITING
A
BISHOP.
(^February, 1880.)
Bishops should speak as men having authority, and not as
the Scribes and Pharisees. Even the smallest of them should
be a great man. An archbishop, with fifteen thousand a
year, ought to possess a transcendent intellect, almost be
yond comprehension ; while the worst paid of all the reverend
fathers of the Church, with less than a fifth of that salary,
ought to possess no common powers of mind. The Bishop
of Carlisle is not rich as bishops go, but he enjoys a yearly
income of ¿£4,500, besides the patronage of forty-nine
livings. Now this quite equals the salary of the Prime
Minister of the greatest empire in the world, and the Bishop
of Carlisle should therefore be a truly great man. We regret
however, to say that he is very much the reverse, if we may
judge from a newspaper report which has reached us of his
lecture on “Man’s Place in Nature,” recently delivered
before the Keswick Scientific and Literary Society. News
paper reports, we know, are often misleading in consequence
of their summary character; nevertheless two columns of
small type must give some idea of a discourse, however ab
struse or profound; here and there, if such occured, a fine
thought or a shrewd observation would shine through the
densest veil. Yet, unless our vision be exceptionally obtuse,
nothing of the kind is apparent in this report of the Bishop’s
lecture. Being, as his lordship confessed, the development
of “ a sermon delivered to the men at the Royal Agricul
tural Society’s Show last summer,” the lecture was perhaps,
like the sermon, adapted to the bucolic mind, and thus does
meagre justice to the genius of its author. His lordship,
however, chose to read it before a society with some pre
tentions to culture, and therefore such a plea cannot avail.
As the case stands, we are constrained to accuse the bishop
of having delivered a lecture on a question of supreme im
portance, which would do little credit to the president of a
Young Men’s Christian Asssciation ; and when we reflect
that a parson occupied the chair at the meeting, and that
the vote of thanks to the episcopal lecturer was moved by
e 2
�68
BAITING A BISHOP.
a canon, who coupled with it some highly complimentary
remarks, we are obliged to think the Church more short of
brains than even we had previously believed, and that Mene,
Mene, Tekel, Upharsin has already been written on its
temple walls by the finger of doom.
Very early in his lecture the Bishop observed that “the
Scriptures are built on the hypothesis of the supreme and
unique position of man.” Well, there is nothing novel in
this statement. What we wrnnt is some proof of the hypo
thesis. His lordship’s way of supplying this need is, to say
the least, peculiar. After saying that “he would rather
trust the poet as an exponent of man than he would a student
of natural history,” he proceeds to quote from Shakespeare,
Pope and Plato, and ends that part of his argument with a
rhetorical flourish, as though he had thus really settled the
whole case of Darwin versus Moses. Our reverence of great
poets is probably as deep and sincere as the Bishop’s, but we'
never thought of treating them as scientific authorities, or
as witnesses to events that happened hundreds of thousands
of years before their birth. Poets deal with subjective facts
of consciousness, or with objective facts as related to these.
The dry light of the intellect, radiated from the cloudless
sun of truth, is not their proper element, but belongs ex
clusively to the man of science. They move in a softer
element suffused with emotion, whose varied clouds are by
the sun of imagination touched to all forms of beauty and
splendor. The scientific man’s description of a lion, for
instance, would be very different from a poet’s ; because the
one would describe the lion as it is in itself, and the other
as it affects us, a living whole, through our organs of sight
and sound. Both are true, because each is faithful to its
purpose and expresses a fact; yet neither can stand for the
other, because they express different facts and are faithful
to different purposes. Shakespeare poetically speaks of
“the ruddy drops that visit this sad heart,” but the scientific
truth of the circulation of the blood had to await its Harvey.
In like manner, it was not Milton but Newton who ex
pounded the Cosmos ; the great poet, like Dante before
him, wove pre-existent cosmical ideas into the texture of his
sublime epic, while the great scientist wove all the truth of
them into the texture of his sublime theory. Let each
receive his meed of reverent praise, but do not let us appeal
�BAITING A BISHOP.
69
to Newton on poetry or to Milton on physics. And when a
Bishop of Carlisle, or other diocese, complains that “ the
views advanced by scientific men tend painfully to degrade
the views of poets and philosophers,” let us reply that in
almost every case the great truths of science have been
found to transcend infinitely the marvels of theology, and
that the magnificence of song persists through all fluctua
tions of knowledge, because its real cause lies less in the
subject than in the native grandeur of the poet’s mind.
Man’s place in nature is, indeed, a great question, and it
can be settled only by a wide appeal to past and present
facts. And those facts, besides being objective realities,
must be treated in a purely scientific, and not in a poetic
or didactic spirit. Let the poet sing the beauty of a con
summate flower; and, if such things are required, let the
moralist preach its lessons. But neither should arrogate
the prerogative of the botanist, whose special function it is
to inform us of its genesis and development, and its true
relations to other forms of vegetable life. So with man.
The poet may celebrate his passions and aspirations, his joys
and sorrows, his laughter and tears, and ever body forth
anew the shapes of things unseen ; the moralist may employ
every fact of his life to illustrate its laws or to enforce its
duties ; but they must leave it to the biologist to explain his
position in the animal economy, and the stages by which it
has been reached. With regard to that, Darwin is authori
tative, while Moses is not even entitled to a hearing.
Although the Bishop is very ready to quote from the
poets, he is not always ready to use them fairly. For
instance, he cites the splendid and famous passage in
“ Hamlet“ What a piece of work is man I How noble
in reason ! How infinite in faculties ! in form and moving,
how express and admirable! in action, how like an angel!
in apprehension, how like a god! the beauty of the world !
the paragon of animals !” There his lordship stops, and then
exclaims, “ Shakespeare knew nothing of the evolution of
man from inferior forms.” But why did he not continue
the quotation ? Hamlet goes on to say, “ And yet, what to
me is this quintessence of dust?” How now, your lordship ?
We have you on the hip! “Quintessence of dust” comes
perilously near to evolution. Does not your lordship re
member, too, Hamlet’s pursuing the dust of Caesar to the
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BAITING A BISHOP.
ignominious bunghole ? And have you never reflected how
the prescient mind of Shakespeare created an entirely new
and wonderful figure in literature, the half-human, halfbestial Caliban, with his god Setebos—a truly marvellous
resuscitation of primitive man, that in our day has inspired
Mr. Browning’s “ Caliban on Setebos,” which contains the
entire essence of all that Tylor and other investigators in
the same field have since written on the subject of Animism ?
It seems that the Lord Bishop of Carlisle reads even the
poets to small purpose.
Haughtily waving the biologists aside, his lordship proceeds
to remark that “ man’s superiority is not the same that a dog
would claim over a lobster, or an eagle over a wormthe
difference between man and other animals being “ not one of
degree, but of kind.” Such a statement, without the least
evidence being adduced to support it, places the Bishop
almost outside the pale of civil discussion. When will these
lordly ecclesiastics learn that the time for dogmatic assertion
is past, and that the intellectual temper of the present age
can be satisfied only by proof? We defy the Bishop of
Carlisle to indicate a single phase of man’s nature which
has no parallel in the lower animals. Man’s physical
structure is notoriously akin to theirs, and even his brain
does not imply a distinction of kind, for every convolution of
the brain of man is reproduced in the brain of the higher
apes. His lordship draws a distinction between instinct and
reason, which is purely fanciful and evinces great ignorance
of the subject. That, however, is a question we have at
present no room to discuss ; nor, indeed, is there any neces
sity to do so, since his lordship presently admits that the
lower animals share our “ reason ” to some extent, just as to
a much larger extent we share their “ instinct,” and thus
evacuates the logical fortress he took such pains to construct.
Quitting that ground, which proves too slippery for his
feet, the Bishop goes on to notice the moral and aesthetic
difference between man and the lower animals. No animal,
says his lordship, shows “ anything approaching to a love of
art.” Now we are quite aware that no animal except man
ever painted a picture or chiselled a statue, for these things
involve a very high development of the artistic faculty. But
the appreciation of form and color, which is the foundation
of all fine art, is certainly manifested by the lower animals,
�BAITING A BISHOP.
71
and by some ofathem to an extreme degree. If his lordship
doubts this, let him study the ways of animals for himself;
or, if' he cannot do that, let him read the chapters in Mr.
Darwin’s “ Descent of Man ” on sexual selection among
birds. If he retains any doubt after that, we must conclude
that his head is too hard or too soft to be influenced, in either
of which cases he is much to be pitied.
His lordship thinks that the moral sense is entirely absent
in the lower animals. This, however, is absurdly untrue;
so much so, indeed, that we shall not trouble to refute it.
Good and noble, he avers, are epithets inapplicable to animals,
even to the horse or dog. What vain creatures men are to
talk thus! Does his lordship remember Byron’s epitaph on
his Newfoundland dog, and the very uncomplimentary dis
tinction drawn therein between dogs and men ? Look at
that big pet with the lordly yet tender eye! How he
submits to the boisterous caresses of children, because he
knows their weakness and shares their spirit of play ! Let
their elders do the same, and he will at once show resent
ment. See him peril his life ungrudgingly for those he loves,
or even for comparative strangers ! And shall we deny him
the epithet of noble or good ? Whatever theologians may
say, the sound heart of common men and women will answer
No!
Lastly, we are told that “ the religious sentunent is cha
racteristically and supremely human.” But here again we
must complain of his lordship’s mental confusion. The re
ligious sentiment is not a simple but a highly complex
emotion. Resolve it into its elemental feelings, and it will
be found that all these are possessed in some degree by lower
animals. The feeling of a dog who bays the moon is pro
bably very similar to that of the savage who cowers and
moans beneath an eclipse; and if the savage has supersti
tious ideas as well as awesome feelings, it is only because
he possesses a higher development of thought and imagina
tion.
Canon Battersby, who moved the vote of thanks to the
Bishop, ridiculed the biologists, and likened them to Topsy
who accounted for her existence by saying “ Specs I growed.”
Just so. That is precisely how we all did come into
■existence. Growth and not making is the law for man as
well as for every othei’ form of life. Moses stands for
�72
BAITING A BISHOP.
manufacture and Darwin stands for growth. And if the
great biologist finds himself in the company of Topsy, he will
not mind. Perhaps, indeed, as he is said to enjoy a joke and
to be able to crack one, might he jocularly observe to
“ tremendous personages ” lihe the Bishop of Carlisle, that
this is not the first instance of truths being hidden from the
“ wise ” and revealed unto babes.
�PROFESSOR FLINT ON ATHEISM.
(January^ 1877.)
Professor Flint delivered last week the first of the present
year’s course of Baird lectures to a numerous audience in
Blythswood Church, Glasgow, taking for his subject ‘u The
Theories opposed to Theism.” Anti-Theism, he said, is more
general now than Atheism, and includes all systems opposed
to Theism. Atheism he defined as “ the system which teaches
that there is no God, and that it is impossible for man to
know that there is a God.” At least this is how Professor
Flint is reported in the newspapers, although we hope he was
not guilty of so idiotic a jumble.
Where are the Atheists who say there is no God ? What
are their names ? Having mingled much with thorough
going sceptics, and read many volumes of heretical literature,
we can confidently defy Professor Flint to produce the names
of half a dozen dogmatic Atheists, and we will give him the
whole world’s literature to select from. Does he think that
the brains of an Atheist are addled ? If not, why does he
make the Atheist first affirm that there is no God, and then
affirm the impossibility of man’s ever knowing whether thereis a God or not? How could a man who holds his judgment
in suspense, or who thinks the universal mystery insoluble to
us, dogmatise upon the question of God’s existence? If
Professor Flint will carefully and candidly study sceptical
literature, he will find that the dogmatic Atheist is as rare as
the phoenix, and that those who consider the extant evidences
of Theism inadequate, do not go on to affirm an universal
negative, but content themselves with expressing their
ignorance of Nature’s why. Foi’ the most part they endorse
Thomas Cooper’s words, “ I do not say there is no God, but
this I say, I know not.” Of course this modesty of affirma
tion may seem impiously immodest to one who has been
trained and steeped in Theism so long that the infinite
universe has become quite explicable to him; but to the
sceptic it seems more wise and modest to confess one’s igno
rance, than to make false pretensions of knowledge.
Professor Flint “ characterised the objections which
�74
PROFESSOR FLINT ON ATHEISM.
Atheism urges against the existence of God as extremely
feeble.” Against the existence of what God ? There be
Gods many and Lords many; which of the long theological
list is to be selected as the God ? A God, like everything
else from the heights to the depths, can be known only by
his attributes; and what the Atheist does is not to argue
against the existence of any God, which would be sheer
lunacy, but to take the attributes affirmed by Theism as
composing its Deity and inquire whether they are compatible
with each other and with the facts of life. Finding that
they are not, the Atheist simply sets Theism aside as not
proven, and goes on his way without further afflicting him
self with such abstruse questions.
The Atheist must be a very dreary creature, thinks Pro
fessor Flint. But why ? Does he know any Atheists, and has
hefound them one half as dreary as Scotch Calvinists ? It
may seem hard to the immoderately selfish that some Infinite
Spirit is not looking after their little interests, but it is
•assuredly a thousandfold harder to think that this Infinite
Spirit has a yawning hell ready to engulph the vast majority
•of the world’s miserable sinners. If the Atheist has no
heaven, he has also no hell, which is a most merciful relief.
Far better were universal annihilation than that even the
meanest life should writhe for ever in hell, gnawed by the
worm which never dieth, and burnt in the fire which is never
quenched.
Even Nature, thinks Professor Flint, cannot be contem
plated by the Atheist as the Theist contemplates it; for
while the latter views it as God’s vesture wherewith he hides
from us his intolerable glory, the latter views it as the mere
embodiment of force, senseless, aimless, pitiless, an enormous
mechanism grinding on of itself from age to age, but to
wards no God and for no good. Here we must observe
that the lecturer trespasses beyond the truth. The Atheist
•does not affirm that Nature drives on to no God and no
good; he simply says he knows not whither she is driving.
And how many Theists are there who think of God in the
presence of Nature, who see God’s smile in the sunshine, or
hear his wrath in the storm ? Very few, we opine, in this
practical sceptical age. To the Atheist as to the Theist, in
deed to all blessed with vision, Nature is an ever new
wonder of majesty and beauty. Sun, moon, and stars,
�PROFESSOR FLINT ON ATHEISM.
75
earth, air, and sky, endure while the generations of men pass
and perish; but every new generation is warmed, lighted,
nurtured and gladdened by them with most sovereign and
perfect impartiality. The loveliness and infinite majesty of
Nature speak to all men, of all ages, climes and creeds. Not
in her inanimate beauty do we find fatal objections to the
doctrine of a wise and bountiful power which overrules her,
but rather in the multiplied horrors, woes, and pangs of
sentient life. When all actual and recorded misery is effaced,
when no intolerable grief corrodes and no immedicable
despair poisons life, when the tears of anguish are assuaged,
when crime and vice are unknown and unremembered, and
evil lusts are consumed in the fire of holiness ; then, and
then only, could we admit that a wise and righteous omni
potence rules the universal destinies. Until then we cannot
recognise the fatherhood of God, but must find shelter and
comfort in the more efficacious doctrine of the brotherhood
of Man.
Professor Flint concluded his lecture, according to the
newspaper report, thus :—“ History bears witness that the
declension of religion has ever been the decline of nations,
because it has ever brought the decay of their moral life;
■and people have achieved noble things only when strongly
animated by religious faith.” All this is very poor stuff
indeed to come from a learned professor. What nation has
declined because of a relapse from religious belief ? Surely
not Assyria, Egypt, Greece, or Carthage ? In the case of
Rome, the decline of the empire was coincident with the
rise of Christianity and the decline of Paganism ; but the
Roman Empire fell abroad mainly from political, and not
from religious causes, as every student of history well knows.
Christianity, that is the religion of the Bible, has been
dying for nearly three centuries ; and during that period,
instead of witnessing a general degradation of mankind we
have witnessed a marvellous elevation. The civilisation of
to-day, compared with that which existed before Secular
Science began her great battle with a tyrannous and obscu
rantist Church, is as a summer morn to a star-lit winter
night.
Again, it is not true that men have achieved noble things
only when strongly animated by religious faith ; unless by
“ religious faith ” be meant some vital idea or fervent enthu-
�76
FliOFESSOll FLINT ON ATHEISM.
siasm. The three hundred Spartans who met certain death
at Thermopylae died for a religious idea, but not for a
theological idea, which is a very different thing. They
perished to preserve the integrity of the state to which they
belonged. The greatest Athenians were certainly not re
ligious in Professor Flint’s sense of the word, and the grand
old Roman patriots had scarcely a scintillation of such a
religious faith as he speaks of. Their religion was simply
patriotism, but it was quite as operant and effective as
Christian piety has ever been. Was it religious faith or
patriotism which banded Frenchmen together in defiance of
all Europe, and made them march to death as a bridegroom
hastens to his bride ? And in our own history have not our
greatest achievers of noble things been very indifferent to
theological dogmas? Nay, in all ages, have not the noblest
laborers for human welfare been impelled by an urgent
enthusiasm of humanity rather than by any supernatural
faith ? Professor Flint may rest assured that even though
all “ the old faiths ruin and rend,” the human heart will
still burn, and virtue and beauty still gladden the earth,
although divorced from the creeds which held them in the
thraldom of an enforced marriage.
�A
HI D D E N
GOD.
(Oo/o&er, 1879.)
The Christian World is distinguished among religious jour
nals by a certain breadth and vigor. On all social and
political subjects it is remarkably advanced and outspoken,
and its treatment of theological questions is far more liberal
and intelligent than sceptics would expect. Of late years it
has opened its columns to correspondence on many topics,
some of a watery character, like the reality of Noah’s flood,
and others of a burning kind, like the doctrine of eternal
punishment, on all of which great freedom of expression has
been allowed. The editor himself, who is, we suspect, far
more sceptical than most of his readers, has had his say on
the question of Hell, and it is to be inferred from his some
what guarded utterance that he has little belief in any such
place. This, however, we state with considerable hesitation,
for the majority of Christians still regard the doctrine of
everlasting torture as indubitable and sacred, and we have
no desire to lower him in the estimation of the Christian
world in which he labors, or to cast a doubt on the ortho
doxy of his creed. But the editor will not take it amiss
if we insist that his paper is liberal in its Christianity, and
unusually tolerant of unbelief.
Yet, while entitled to praise on his ground, the Christian
World deserves something else than praise on another. It
has recently published a series of articles for the purpose of
stimulating faith and allaying doubt. If undertaken by a
competent writer, able and willing to face the mighty differ
ence between Christianity and the scientific spirit of our age,
such a series of articles might be well worth reading. We
might then admire if we could not agree, and derive benefit
from friendly contact with an antagonist mind. But the
writer selected for the task appears to possess neither of
these qualifications. Instead of thinking he gushes ; instead
of reason he supplies us with unlimited sentiment. We
expect to tread solid ground, or at least to find it not
perilously soft; and lo ! the soil is moist, and now and then
we find ourselves up to the knees in unctuous mud. How
�78
A HIDDEN GOD.
difficult it is nowadays to discover a really argumentative
Christian! The eminent favorites of orthodoxy write
sentimental romances and call them “ Lives of Christ,” and
preach sermons with no conceivable relation to the human
intellect; while the apologists of faith imitate the tactics of
the cuttle-fish, and when pursued cast out their opaque fluid
of sentimentality to conceal their position. They mostly
dabble in the shallows of scepticism, never daring to venture
in the deeps ; and what they take pride in as flashes of
spiritual light resembles neither the royal gleaming of the sun
nor the milder radiance of the moon, but rather the phos
phorescence of corruption.
In the last article of the series referred to, entitled
“ Thou art a God that Hidest Thyself,” there is an abund
ance of fictitious emotion and spurious rhetoric. From
beginning to end there is a painful strain that never relaxes,
reminding us of singers who pitch their voices too high and
have to render all the upper notes in falsetto. An attempt
is made to employ poetical imagery, but it ludicrously fails.
The heaven of the Book of Revelation, with its gold and
silver and precious stones, is nothing but a magnified
jeweller’s shop, and a study of it has influenced the style of
later writers. At present Christian gushers have descended
still lower, dealing not even in gold and j'ewels, but in Brum
magem and paste. The word gem is greatly in vogue.
Talmage uses it about twenty times in every lecture, Parker
delights in it, and it often figures on the pages of serious
books. In the article before us it is made to do frequent
service. A promise of redemption is represented as shining
(¡rem-like on the brow of Revelation, Elims gem the dark
bosom of the universal desert, and the morning gleams on
the tew-gemmed earth. Perhaps a good recipe for this kind
of composition would be an hour’s gloat on the flaming
window of a jeweller’s shop in the West End.
But let us deal with the purport and purpose of the
article. It aims at showing that God hides himself, and
why he does so. The fact which it is attempted to explain
none will deny. Moses ascended Mount Sinai to see God and
converse with him, Abraham and God walked and talked
together, and according to St. Paul the Almighty is not far
from any one of us. But the modern mind is not prone to
believe these things. The empire of reason has been en-
�A HIDDEN GOD.
79
larged at the expense of faith, whose provinces have one after
another been annexed until only a small territory is left her,
and that she finds it dificult to keep. Coincidently, God
has become less and less a reality and more and more
a dream.
The reign of law is perceived everywhere,
and all classes of phsenomena may be explained without
recourse to supernatural power. When Napoleon objected
to Laplace that divine design was omitted from his
mechanical theory of the universe, the French philosopher
characteristically replied: “I had no need of that hypo
thesis.” And the same disposition prevails in other depart
ments of science. Darwin, for instance, undertakes to
explain the origin and development of man, physical, intel
lectual and moral, without assuming any cause other than
those which obtain wherever life exists. God is being slowly
but surely driven from the domain of intermediate causes,
and transformed into an ultimate cause, a mere figment of
the imagination. He is being banished from nature into that
poetical region inhabited by the gods of Polytheism, to keep
company there with Jupiter and Apollo and Neptune and
Juno and Venus, and all the rest of that glorious Pantheon.
He no longer rules the actual life and struggle of the world,
but lives at peace with his old rivals in—
“ The lucid interspace of world and world,
Where never creeps a cloud or moves a wind,
Nor ever falls the least white star of snow,
Nor ever lowest roll of thunder moans;
Nor sound of human sorrow mounts, to mar
Their sacred everlasting calm.”*
The essence of all this is admitted by the writer in the
Christian World; he admits the facts, but denies the infer
ence. They show us one of God’s ways of hiding himself.
Order prevails, but it is the expression of God’s will, and not
a mere result of the working of material forces. He operates
by method, not by caprice, and hence the unchanging
stability of things. While doing nothing in particular, he
does everything in general. And this idea must be extended
to human history. God endows man with powers, and
allows him freedom to employ them as he will. But,
strangely enough, God has a way of “ruling our freedom,”
Tennyson: “ Lucretius.'
�.80
A HIDDEN GOD.
and always there is “a restraining and restoring hand.”
How man’s will can be free and yet overruled passes our
merely carnal understanding, although it may be intelligible
■ enough to minds steeped in the mysteries of theology.
According to this writer, God’s government of mankind is
a “ constitutional kingdom.” Quite so. It was once
arbitrary and despotic; now it is fai' milder and less ex
acting, having dwindled into the “constitutional” stage,
wherein the King reigns but does not govern. Will the law
of human growth and divine decay stop here ? We think
not. As the despotism has changed to a constitutional
monarchy, so that will change to a republic, and the
empty throne be preserved among other curious relics of
the past.
God also hides himself in history. Although unapparent
on the surface of events, his spirit is potent within them.
“ What,” the writer asks, “ is history—with all its dark
passages of horror, its stormy revolutions, its ceaseless
conflict, its tears, its groans, its blood—but the chronicle
of an ever-widening realm of light, of order, of intelligence,
wisdom, truth, and charity ?” But if we admit the progress,
we need not explain it as the work of God. Bunsen wrote
a book on “ God in History,” which a profane wag said
should have been called “ Bunsen in Historyyet his
attempt to justify the ways of God to men was not very
successful. It is simply a mockery to ask us to believe
that the slow progress of humanity must be attributed to
omniscient omnipotence. A God who can evolve virtue
and happiness only out of infinite evil and misery, and
elevate us only through the agency of perpetual blood and
tears, is scarcely a being to be loved and worshipped, unless
we assume that his power and wisdom are exceedingly
limited. Are we to suppose that God has woven himself
a garment of violence, evil, and deceit, in order that we
might not see too clearly his righteousness, goodness, and
truth ?
It must further be observed that Christian Theists cannot
be permitted to ascribe all the good in the world to God,
and all the evil to man, or else leave it absolutely un
explained. In the name of humanity we protest against
this indignity to our race. Let God be responsible for good
and evil both, or for neither; and if man is to considei’
�81
A HIDDEN GOD.
himself chargeable with all the world’s wrong, he should at
least be allowed credit for all the compensating good.
The theory of evolution is being patronised by Theists
rather too fulsomely. Not long ago they treated it with
obloquy and contempt, but now they endeavor to use it as
an argument for their faith, and in doing so they distort
language as only theological controversialists can. Changing
“ survival of the fittest ” into “survival of the bestfi they
transform a physical fact into a moral law ; and thus, as they
think, take a new north-west passage to the old harbor
zof “whatever is is right.” But while evolution may be
•construed as progress, which some would contest, it cannot,
be construed as the invariable survival of the best; nor, if
it were, could the process by which this result is achieved
be justified. For evolution works through a universal
struggle for existence, in which the life and well-being of
Some can be secured only through the suffering and final
extinction of others ; and even in its higher stages, cunning
and unscrupulous strength frequently overcomes humane
wisdom fettered by weakness. “Nature, red in tooth and
•claw, with ravin shrieks against the creed ” of the Theist.
If God is working through evolution, we must admit that
he has marvellously hidden himself, and agree with the
poet that he does “ move in a mysterious way his wonders
to perform.”
The writer in the Christian_ World borrows an image
from the puling scepticism of “In Memoriam,” which
describes man as
“ An infant crying in the night,
And with no language but a cry.”
This image of the infant is put to strange use. The writer
says that God is necessarily hidden from us because we can
grasp “ his inscrutable nature and methods ” only as “ an
infant can grasp the thought and purpose of a man.”
Similes are dangerous things. When it is demanded that they
shall run upon all fours, they often turn against their mas
ters. This one does so. The infant grows into a man in
due course, and then he can not only grasp the thought and
purpose of his father, but also, it may be, comprehend still
greater things. Will the infant mind of man, when it
reaches maturity, be thus related to God’s ? If not, the
F
�82
A HIDDEN GOD.
analogy is fallacious. Man is quite mature enough already,
and has been so for thousands of years, to understand
something of God’s thought and purpose if he had only
chosen to reveal them. This, however, if there be a God,
he has not condescended to do. An appeal to the various
pretended revelations of the world serves to convince us
that all are the words of fallible men. Their very dis
cord discredits them. As D’Holbach said, if God had
spoken, the universe would surely be convinced, and the
same conviction would fill every breast.
The reason given for God’s hiding himself is very curious.
“ If,” says the writer, “ the way of God were not in large
measure hidden, it would mean that we could survey all
things from the height and the depth of God.” Truly an
awful contemplation! May it not be that God is hidden
from us because there is none to be revealed, that “ all the
oracles are dumb or cheat because they have no secret to
express ” ?
But, says the writer in the Ghristian World, there is one
revelation of God that can never be gainsaid; “ while the
Cross stands as earth’s most sacred symbol, there can be no
utter hiding of his love.” This, however, we venture to
dispute. That Cross which was laid upon the back of Jesus
poor mankind has been compelled to carry ever since, with
no Simon to ease it of the load. Jesus was crucified on
Calvary, and in his name man has suffered centuries of
crucifixion. The immolation of Jesus can be no revelation
of God’s love. If the Nazarene was God, his crucifixion
involves a complicated arrangement for murder; the Jews
who demanded his death were divinely instigated, and Judas
Iscariot was pre-ordained to betray his master; in which
case his treachery was a necessary element of the drama,
entitling him not to vituperation but to gratitude, even
perhaps to the monument which Benjamin Disraeli sug
gested as his proper reward. Looking also at the history of
Christianity, and seeing how the Cross has sheltered op
pressors of mind and body, sanctioned immeasurable shed
ding of blood, and frightened peoples from freedom, while
even now it symbolises all that is reactionary and accursed
in Europe, we are constrained to say that the love it reveals
is as noxious as the vilest hate.
�GENERAL
JOSHUA.
(April, 1882.)
Mountebank Talmage has just preached a funeral sermon
on General Joshua. It is rather behind date, as the old
warrior has been dead above three thousand years. But
better late than never. Talmage tells us many things about
Joshua which are not in the Bible, and some sceptics will
say that his panegyric is a sheer invention. They may,
however, be mistaken. The oracle of the Brooklyn Jabbernacle is known to be inspired. God holds converse with
him, and he is thus enabled to supply us with fresh facts
about Jehovah’s fighting-cock from the lost books of Jasher
and the Wars of the Lord.
Joshua, says Talmage, was a magnificent fighter. We
say, he was a magnificent butcher. Jehovah did the fight
ing. He was the virtual commander of the Jewish hosts;
he won all their victories ; and Joshua only did the slaughter.
He excelled in that line of business. He delighted in the
dying groans of women and children, and loved to dabble
his feet and hands in the warm blood of the slain. No
“ Chamber of Horrors ” contains the effigy of any wretch
half so bloodthirsty and cruel.
According to Talmage, Joshua “always fought on the
right side.” Wars of conquest are never right. Thieving
other people’s lands is an abominable crime. The Jews had
absolutely no claim to the territory they took possession of,
and which they manured with the blood of its rightful
owners. We know they said that G-od told them to requisition
that fine little landed estate of Canaan. Half the thieves
in history have said the same thing. We don’t believe them.
God never told any man to rob his neighbor, and whoever
says so lies. The thief’s statement does not suffice. Let
him produce better evidence. A rascal who steals and
murders cannot be believed on his oath, and ’tis more likely
that he is a liar than that God is a scoundrel.
Talmage celebrates “five great victories ” of Joshua. He
omits two mighty achievements. General Joshua circum
cised a million and a half Jews in a single day. His greatest
F 2
�84
GENERAL JOSHUA.
battle never equalled that wonderful feat. The amputations
were done at the rate of over a thousand a minute. Samson’s
jaw-bone was nothing to Joshua’s knife. This surprising
old Jew was as great in oratory as in surgery. On one
occasion he addressed an audience of three millions, and
everyone heard him. His voice must have reached two or
three miles. No wonder the walls of Jericho fell down
when Joshua joined in the shout. We dare say the Jews
wore ear-preservers to guard their tympanums against the
dreadful artillery of his speech.
Joshua’s first victory, says Talmage, was conquering the
spring freshet of Jordan. As a matter of fact, Jehovah
transacted that little affair. See, says Talmage, “ one mile
ahead go two priests carrying a glittering box four feet long
and two feet wide. It is the Ark of the Covenant.” He
forgets to add that the Jew God was supposed to be inside
it. Jack in the box is nothing to God in a box. What
would have happened if the Ark had been buried with
Jehovah safely fastened in? Would his godship have
mouldered to dust? In that case he would never have
seduced a carpenter’s wife, and there would have been no
God the Son as the fruit of his adultery.
Talmage credits General Joshua with the capture of
Jericho. The Bible says that Jehovah overcame it. Seven
priests went blowing rams’ horns round the city for seven
days. On the seventh day they went round it seven times.
It must have been tiresome work, for Jericho was a large
city several miles in circumference. But priests are always
good “Walkers.” After the last blowing of horns all the
Jews shouted “ Down Jericho, down Jericho!” This is
Talmage’s inspired account. The Bible states nothing of
the kind. Just as the Islamites cry “ Allah, Il Allah,” it is
probable that the Jews cried “ Jahveh, Jahveh.” But Talmage
and the Bible both agree that when their shout rent the air
the walls of Jericho fell flat—as flat as the fools who be
lieve it.
Then, says Talmage, “ the huzza of the victorious
Israelites and the groan of the conquered Canaanites com
mingle !” Ah, that groan ! Its sound still curses the Bible
God. Men, women and children, were murdered. The
very cattle, sheep and asses, were killed with the sword.
Only one woman’s house was spared, and she was a harlot.
�GENERAL JOSHUA.
85
It is as if the German army took Paris, and killed every
inhabitant except Cora Pearl. This is inspired war, and
Talmage glories in it. He would consider it an honor to be
bottle-washer to such a pious hero as General Joshua.
When Ai was taken, all its people were slaughtered, with
out any regard to age or sex. Talmage grins with delight,
and cries “ Bravo, Joshua!” The King of Ai was reserved
for sport. They hung him on a tree and enjoyed the fun.
Talmage approves this too. Everything Joshua did was
right. Talmage is ready to stake his own poor little soul on
that.
Joshua’s victory over the five kings calls forth a burst of
supernatural eloquence. Talmage pictures the “ catapults
of the sky pouring a volley of hailstones ” on the flying
Amorites, and words almost fail him to describe the
glorious miracle of the lengthening of the day in order that
Jehovah’s prize-fighters might go on killing. One passage
is almost sublime. It is only one step off. “ What,” asks
Talmage, “ is the matter with Joshua? Has he fallen in an
apoplectic fit ? No. He is in prayer.” Our profanity would
not have gone to that length. But we take Talmage’s word
for it that prayer and apoplexy are very much alike.
The five kings were decapitated. “ Ah,” says Talmage,
i‘ I want five more kings beheaded to-day, King Alcohol,
King Fraud, King Lust, King Superstition, and King Infi
delity.” Soft, you priestly calumniator ! What right have
you to associate Infidelity with fraud and lust ? That
Freethought, which you call “ infidelity,” is more faithful
to truth and justice than your creed has ever been. And
it will not be disposed of so easily as you think. You will
never behead us, but we shall strangle you. We are crush
ing the life out of your wretched faith, and your spasmodic
sermons are only the groans of its despair.
Talmage’s boldest step on the line which separates the
ludicrous from the sublime occurs in his peroration. He
makes General Joshua conquer Death by lying down and
giving up the ghost, and then asks for a headstone and a foot
stone for the holy corpse. “ I imagine,” he says, “ that for
the head it shall be the sun that stood still upon Gibeon,
and for the foot the moon that stood still in the valley of
Ajalon.” This is about the finest piece of Yankee buncombe
extant. If the sun and moon keep watch over General
�86
GENERAL JOSHUA.
Joshua’s grave, what are we to do ? When we get to the
New Jerusalem we shall want neither of these luminaries,
for the glory of the Lord will shine upon us. But until
then we cannot dispense with them, and we decidedly object
to their being retained as perpetual mourners over Joshua’s
grave. If, however, one of them must do service, we
humbly beg that it may be the moon. Let the sun illumine
us by day, so that we may see to transact our affairs. And
if ever we should long to behold “ pale Dian’s beams ”
again, we might take Talmage as our guide to the unknown
grave of General Joshua, and while they played softly over
the miraculous two yards of turf we should see his fitting
epitaph—Moonshine.
�GOING
TO
HELL.
{June, 1882.)
Editing a Freethought paper is a dreadful business. It
brings one into contact with many half-baked people who
have little patent recipes for hastening the millennium ; with
ambitious versifiers who think it a disgrace to journalism
that their productions are not instantly inserted; with
discontented ladies and gentlemen who fancy that a heterodox
paper is the proper vehicle for every species of complaint;
and with a multitude of other bores too numerous to mention
and too various to classify. But the worst of all are the
anonymous bores, who send them insults, advice, or warnings,
through the post for the benefit of the Queen’s revenue.
We generally pitch their puerile missives into the waste-paper
basket; but occasionally we find one diverting enough to be
introduced to our readers. A few days ago we received the
following lugubrious epistle, ostensibly from a parson in
Worcestershire, as the envelope bore the postmark of
Tything.
The fool hath said in his heart there is no God”—I have seen
one of your blasphemous papers; and I say solemnly, as a clergy
man of the Church of England, that I believe you are doing the
work of the Devil, and are on the road to hell, and will spend
eternity with the Devil, unless God, in his mercy, lead you, by the
Holy Spirit, to repentance. Nothing is impossible, with him. A
Dean in the Church of England says, ‘ Be wise, and laugh not
through a speck of time, and then wail through an immeasurable
eternity.’ Except you change your views you will most certainly
hear Christ say, at the Judgment Day, ‘Depart ye cursed into
everlasting fire prepared for the Devil and his angels.’
(Matt, xxv.)”
This is a tolerably warm, though not very elegant effusion,
and it is really a pity that so grave a counsellor should con
ceal his name ; for if it should lead to our conversion, we
should not know whom to thank for having turned us out of
the primrose path to the everlasting bonfire. Our mentor
assures us that with God nothing is impossible. We are
sorry to learn this; for we must conclude that he does not
�88
GOING TO HELL.
take sufficient trouble with parsons to endow them with the
courage of their convictions, or to make them observe the
common decencies of epistolary intercourse.
This anonymous parson, who acts like an Irish “ Moon
*
lighter,” and masks his identity while venting his spleen,,
presumes to anticipate the Day of Judgment, and tells
exactly what Jesus Christ will say to us on that occasion.
We are obliged to him for the information, but we wonderhow he obtained it. The twenty-fifth of Matthew, to which
he refers us, contains not a word about unbelievers. It
simply states that certain persons, who have treated the Son
of Man very shabbily in his distress, shall be sent to keep
company with Old Nick and his imps. Now, we have never
shown the Son of Man any incivility, much less any in
humanity, and we therefore repudiate this odious insinuation.
Whenever Jesus Christ sends us a message that he is sick,
we will pay him a visit; if he is hungry, we will find him a
dinner; if he is thirsty, we will stand whatever he likes to
drink; if he is naked, we will hunt him up a clean shirt and
an old suit; and if he is in prison, we will, according as he
is innocent or guilty, try to procure his release, or leave him
to serve out his term. We should be much surprised if
any parson in the three kingdoms would do any more.
Some of them, we believe, would see him condemned (new
version) before they would lift a finger or spend sixpence to
help him.
We are charged with doing the work of the Devil. This
is indeed news. We never knew the Devil required any
assistance. He was always very active and enterprising, and
quite able to manage his own business. And although his
rival, Jehovah, is so do tingly senile as to yield up everything
to his mistress and her son, no one has ever whispered the
least hint of the Devil’s decline into the same abject position.
But if his Satanic Majesty needed our aid we should not be
loth to give it, for after carefully reading the Bible many
times from beginning to end, we have come to the conclusion
that he is about the only gentleman in it.
We are “ on the road to hell.” Well, if we must go
somewhere, that is just the place we should choose. The
temperature is high, and it would no doubt at first be incom
modious. But, as old Sir Thomas Browne says, afflictions
induce callosities, and in time we should get used to anything.
�GOING- TO HELL.
89
When once we grew accustomed to the heat, how thankful
we should be at having escaped the dreary insipidity of
heaven, with its perpetual psalms, its dolorous trumpets, its
gruesome elders, and its eldarly beasts ! How thankful at
having missed an eternity with Abraham, Isaac, Jacob,
David, and all the many blackguards and scoundrels of the
Bible I How thankful at having joined for ever the society
of Rabelais, Bruno, Spinoza, Voltaire, Thomas Paine, John
Stuart Mill, and all the great poets, sages and wits, who
possess so much of that carnal wisdom which is at enmity
with the pious folly of babes and sucklings I
On the whole, we think it best to keep on our present
course. Let the bigots .rave and the parsons wail. They
are deeply interested in the doctrine of heaven and hell beyond
the grave. We believe in heaven and hell on this side of it;
a hell of ignorance, crime, and misery ; a heaven of wisdom,
virtue, and happiness. Our duty is to promote the one and
combat the other. If there be a just God, the fulfilment of
that duty will suffice ; if God be unjust, all honest men will
be in the same boat, and have the courage to despise and
defy him.
�CHRISTMAS EVE IN HEAVEN.
(December, 1881.)
Christmas Eve had come and almost gone. It was drawing
nigh midnight, and I sat solitary in my room, immersed in
memory, dreaming of old days and their buried secrets. The
fire, before which I mused, was burning clear without flame,
and its intense glow, which alone lighted my apartment, cast a
red tint on the furniture and walls. Outside the streets
were muffled deep with snow, in which no footstep was
audible. All was quiet as death, silent as the grave, save
for the faint murmur of my own breathing. Time and
space seemed annihilated beyond those four narrow walls,
and I was as a coffined living centre of an else lifeless
infinity.
My reverie was rudely broken by the staggering step of a
fellow-lodger, whose devotion to Bacchus was the one
symptom of reverence in his nature. He reeled up stair after
stair, and as he passed my door he lurched against it so
violently that I feared he would come through. But he
slowly recovered himself after some profane mutterings,
reeled up the next flight of stairs, and finally deposited his
well-soaked clay on the bed in his own room immediately
over mine.
After this interruption my thoughts changed most fanci
fully. Why I know not, but I began to brood on the strange
statement of Saint Paul concerning the man who was lifted
up into the seventh heaven, and there beheld things not
lawful to reveal. While pondering this story I was presently
aware of an astonishing change. The walls of my room
slowly expanded, growing ever thinner and thinner, until
they became the filmiest transparent veil which at last dis
solved utterly away. Then (whether in the spirit or the
flesh I know not) I was hurried along through space, past
galaxy aftei’ ■ galaxy of suns and stars, separate systems yet
all mysteriously related.
Swifter than light we travelled, I and my unseen guide,
through the infinite ocean of ether, until our flight was
arrested by a denser medium, which I recognised as an
�CHBISTJIAS EVE IN HEAVEN.
91
atmosphere like that of our earth. I had scarcely recovered
from this new surprise when (marvel of marvels!) I found
myself before a huge gate of wondrous art and dazzling
splendor. At a word from my still unseen guide it swung
open, and I was urged within. Beneath my feet was a solid
pavement of gold. Gorgeous mansions, interspersed with
palaces, rose around me, and above them all towered the
airy pinnacles of a matchless temple, whose points quivered
in the rich light like tongues of golden fire. The walls
glittered with countless rubies, diamonds, pearls, amethysts,
emeralds, and other precious stones; and lovely presences,
arrayed in shining garments, moved noiselessly from place
to place. “ Where am I ?” I ejaculated, half faint with
wonder. And my hitherto unseen guide, who now revealed
himself, softly answered, “ In Heaven.”
Thereupon my whole frame was agitated with inward
laughter. I in Heaven, whose fiery doom had been pro
phesied so often by the saints on earth ! I, the sceptic, the
blasphemer, the scoffer at all things sacred, who had laughed
at the legends and dogmas of Christianism as though they
were incredible and effete as the myths of Olympus ! And I
thought to myself, “ Better I had gone straight to Hell, for
here in the New Jerusalem they will no doubt punish me
worse than there.” But my angelic guide, who read my
thought, smiled benignly and said, “Fear not, no harm
shall happen to you. I have exacted a promise of safety
for you, and here no promise can be broken.” “ But why,”
I asked, “ have you brought me hither, and how did you obtain
my guarantee of safety?” And my guide answered, “It is
our privilege each year to demand one favor which may not
be refused; I requested that I might bring you here ; but I
did not mention your name, and if you do nothing outrageous
you will not be noticed, for no one here meddles with
another’s business, and our rulers are too much occupied
with foreign affairs to trouble about our domestic concerns.”
Yet,” I rejoined, “I shall surely be detected, for I wear
no heavenly robe.” Then my guide produced one from a
little packet, and having donned it, I felt safe from the fate
of him who was expelled because he had not on a wedding
garment at the marriage feast.
As we moved along, I inquired of my guide why he took
such interest in me; and he replied, looking sadly, w I was
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CHRISTMAS EVE IN HEAVEN.
a sceptic on earth centuries ago, but I stood alone, and at
last on my death-bed, weakened by sickness, I again
embraced the creed of my youth and died in the Christian
faith. Hence my presence in Heaven. But gladly would
I renounce Paradise even for Hell, for those figures so lovely
without are not all lovely within, and I would rather consort
with the choicer spirits who abide with Satan and hold
high revel of heart and head in his court. Yet wishes are
fruitless ; as the tree falls it lies, and my lot is cast for
ever.” . Whereupon I laid my hand in his, being speechless
with grief!
We soon approached the magnificent temple, and entering
it we mixed with the mighty crowd of angels who were
witnessing the rites of worship performed by the' elders and
beasts before the great white throne. All happened exactly
as Saint John describes. The angels rent the air with their
acclamations, after the inner circle had concluded, and then
the throne was deserted by its occupants.
My dear guide then led me through some narrow passages
until we emerged into a spacious hall, at one end of which
hung a curtain. Advancing towards this with silent tread,
we were able to look through a slight aperture, where the
curtain fell away from the pillar, into the room beyond. It
was small and cosy, and a fire burned in the grate, before
which sat poor dear God the Father in a big arm-chair.
Divested of his godly paraphernalia, he looked old and thin,
though an evil fire still gleamed from his cavernous eyes.
On a table beside him stood some phials, one of which had
seemingly just been used. God the Son stood near, looking
much younger and fresher, but time was beginning to tell
on him also. The Ghost flitted about in the form of a dove,
now perching on the Father’s shoulder and now on the head
of the Son.
Presently the massive bony frame of the Father was con
vulsed with a fit of coughing; Jesus promptly applied a
restorative from the phial, and after a terrible struggle the
cough was subdued. During this scene the Dove fluttered
violently from wall to wall. When the patient was
thoroughly restored the following conversation ensued :—
Jesus.—Are you well now, my Father?
Jehovah.—Yes, yes, well enough. Alack, how my
�CHRISTMAS EVE IN HEAVEN.
93
strength wanes! Where is the pith that filled these
arms when I fought for my chosen people ? Where
the fiery vigor that filled my veins when I courted your
mother ?
(Here the Dove fluttered and looked queer.)
Jesus.—Ah, sire, do not speak thus. You will regain
your old strengthJehovah.—Nay, nay, and you know it. You do not
even wish me to recover, for in my weakness you exercise
sovereign power and rule as you please.
Jissus.—0 sire, sire !
Jehovah.—Come now, none of these demure looks. We
know each other too well. Practise before the saints if you
like, but don’t waste your acting on me.
Jesus.—My dear Father, pray curb your temper. That
is the very thing the people on earth so much complain of.
Jehovah.—My dearly beloved Son, in whom I am not
at all well pleased, desist from this hypocrisy. Your temper
is as bad as mine. You’ve shed blood enough in your time,
and need not rail at me.
Jesus.—Ah, sire, only the blood of heretics.
Jehovah.—Heretics, forsooth! They were very worthy
people for the most part, and their only crime was that they
neglected you. But why should we wrangle ? We stand or
fall together, and I am falling. Satan draws most souls
from earth to his place, including all the best workers and
thinkers, who are needed to sustain our drooping power;
and we receive nothing but the refuse ; weak, slavish, flabby
souls, hardly worth saving or damning; gushing preachers,
pious editors, crazy enthusiasts, and half-baked old ladies of
both sexes. Why didn’t you preach a different Gospel while
you were about it ? You had the chance once and let it
slip : we shall never have another.
Jesus.—My dear Father, I am reforming my Gospel to
make it suit the altered taste of the times.
Jehovah.—Stuff and nonsense! It can’t be done ;
thinking people see through it; the divine is immutable.
The only remedy is to start afresh. Could I beget a new
son all might be rectified; but I cannot, I am too old. Our
dominion is melting away like that of all our predecessors.
You cannot outlast me, for I am the fountain of your life;
and all the multitude of “ immortal ” angels who throng our
�/
94
CHRISTMAS EVE IN HEAVEN.
court, live only while I uphold them, and with me they will
vanish into eternal limbo.
Here followed another fit of coughing worse than before.
Jesus resorted again to the phial, but the cordial seemed
powerless against this sharp attack. Just then the Dove
fluttered against the curtain, and my guide hurried me
swiftly away.
In a corridor of the temple we met Michael and Raphael.
The latter scrutinised me so closely that my blood ran cold;
but just when my dread was deepest his countenance cleared,
and he turned towards his companion. Walking behind the
great archangels we were able to hear their conversation.
Raphael had just returned from a visit to the earth, and he
was reporting to Michael a most alarming defection from
the Christian faith. People, he said, were leaving in shoals,
and unless fresh miracles were worked he trembled for the
prospects of the dynasty. But what most alarmed him was
the spread of profanity. While in England he had seen
copies of a blasphemous paper which horrified the elect by
ridiculing the Bible in what a bishop had justly called “ a
heartless and cruel way.” “ But, my dear Michael,” con
tinued Raphael, “ that is not all, nor even the worst. This
scurrilous paper, which would be quickly suppressed if we
retained our old influence, actually caricatures our supreme
Lord and his heavenly host in woodcuts, and thousands of
people enjoy this wicked profanity. I dare say our turn
will soon come, and we shall be held up to ridicule like
the rest.” “ Impossible ! ” cried Michael: “ Surely there
is some mistake. What is the name of this abominable
print?”
With a grave look, Raphael replied: “No,
Michael, there is no mistake. The name of this imp of
blasphemy is—I hesitate to. say it—the Free------” *
But at this moment my guide again hurried me along.
We reached the splendid gate once more, which slowly
opened and let us through. Again we flew through the
billowy ether, sweeping past system after system with in
toxicating speed, until at last, dazed and almost unconscious,
I regained this earthly shore. Then I sank into a stupor.
When I awoke the fire had burnt down to the last cinder,
all was dark and cold, and I shivered as I tried to stretch
* Was it the Freethinker?
�CHRISTMAS EVE IN HEAVEN.
95
my half-cramped limbs. Was it all a dream? Who can
say ? Whether in the spirit or the flesh I know not, said
Saint Paul, and I am compelled to echo his words. Sceptics
may shrug their shoulders, smile, or laugh ; but “ there are
more things in heaven and earth than are dreamt of in
their philosophy.”
�PROFESSOR BLACKIE ON ATHEISM.
(January, 1879.)
Professor Blackie is a man with whom we cannot be
angry, however greatly his utterances are calculated to
arouse that feeling. He is so impulsive, frank, and essen
tially good-natured, that even his most provoking words call
forth rather a smile of compassion than a frown of resent
ment. Those who know his character and position will
yield him the widest allowance. His fiery nature prompts
him to energetic speech on all occasions. But when his
temper has been fretted, as it frequently is, by the boisterous
whims of his Greek students in that most boisterous of
universities, it is not surprising if his expressions become
splenetic even to rashness. The ingenuous Professor is quite
impartial in his denunciations. He strikes out right and left
against various objects of his dislike. Everything he dis
sents from receives one and the same kind of treatment, so
that no opinion he assails has any special reason to com
plain ; and every blow he deals is accompained with such a
jolly smile, sometimes verging into a hearty laugh, that no
opponent can well refuse to shake hands with him when all
is over.
This temper, however, is somewhat inconsistent with the
scientific purpose indicated in the title of Professor Blackie’s
book. A zoologist who had such a particular and unconquer
able aversion to one species of animals that the bare mention
of its name made his gorge rise, would naturally give us a
very inadequate and unsatisfactory account of it. So, in this
■case, instead of getting a true natural history of Atheism,
which would be of immense service to every thinker, we get
only an emphatic statement of the authors’ hatred of it under
different aspects. Atheism is styled “ a hollow absurdity,”
“ that culmination of all speculative absurdities,” “ a disease
of the speculative faculty,” “a monstrous disease of the
reasoning faculty,” and so on.
The chapter on “ Its Specific Varieties and General
Root ” is significantly headed with that hackneyed declara
tion of the Psalmist, “ The fool hath said in his heart, There
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PROFESSOR BLACKIE ON ATHEISM.
is no God,” as though impertinence were better from a Jew
than from a Christian, or more respectable for being three
thousand years old. Perhaps Professor Blackie has never
heard of the sceptical critic who exonerated the Psalmist on
the ground that he was speaking jocosely, and really meant
that the man who said in his heart only “ There is no God,”
without saying so openly, was the fool. But this interpre
tation is as profane as the other is impertinent; and in fact
does a great injustice to the Atheist, who has never been
accustomed to say “ There is no God,” an assertion which
involves the arrogance of infinite knowledge, since nothing
less than that is requisite to prove an universal negative :
but simply “ I know not of such an existence,” which is a
modest statement intellectually and morally, and quite unlike
the presumption of certain theologians who, as Mr. Arnold
says, speak familiarly of God as though he were a man
living in the next street.
For his own sake Professor Blackie should a little curb
his proneness to the use of uncomplimentary epithets. He
does himself injustice when he condescends to describe David
Hume’s theory of causation as “ wretched cavil.” Carlyle
is more just to this great representative of an antagonistic
school of thought. He exempts him from the sweeping
condemnation of his contemporaries in Scottish prose
literature, and admits that he was “ too rich a man to
borrow ” from France or elsewhere. And surely Hume was
no less honest than rich in thought. Jest and captiousness
were entirely foreign to his mind. Wincing under his
inexorable logic, the ontologist may try to console himself
with the thought that the great sceptic was playing with
arguments like a mere dialectician of wondrous skill; but in
reality Hume was quite in earnest, and always meant what
he said. We may also observe that it is Professor Blackie
and not Darwin who suffers from the asking of such questions
as these :—“ What monkey ever wrote an epic poem, or com
posed a tragedy or a comedy, or even a sonnet ? What
monkey professed his belief in any thirty-nine articles, or
well-compacted Calvinistic confession, or gave in his ad
hesion to any Church, established or disestablished ?” If
Mr. Darwin heard these questions he might answer with a
good humored smile, “ My dear sir, you quite mistake my
theories, and your questions travesty them. I would further
G
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PROFESSOR BLACKIE ON ATHEISM.
observe that while the composition of poems would un
questionably be creditable to monkeys, I, who have some
regard for them as relatives, however distant, am heartily
glad they have never done any of the other things you
mention, which I deem a negative proof that their reason,
though limited, is fortunately sane.”
Professor Blackie’s opening chapter on “Presumptions”
fully justifies its title. The general consent of mankind in
favor of Theism is assumed to have established its validity,
and to have put Atheists altogether out of court; and a long
list of illustrious Theists, from Solomon to Hegel, is con
trasted with a meagre catalogue of Atheists, comprising only
the names of David Hume, Jeremy Bentham, and John
Stuart Mill.
*
Confucius and Buddha are classed apart, as
lying “ outside of our Western European Culture altogether,”
but with a promise that “ in so far as they seem to have
taught a morality without religion, or a religion without
God, we shall say a word or two about them by-and-by.”
So far as Buddha is concerned this promise is kept; but in
relation to Confucius it is broken. Probably the Chinese
sage was found too tough and embarrassing a subject, and
so it was thought expedient to ignore him for the more tract
able prophet of India, whose doctrine of Transmigration
might with a little sophistry be made to resemble the
Christian doctrine of Immortality, and his Nirvana the
Kingdom of Heaven.
What does the general consent of mankind prove in
regard to beliefs like Theism ? Simply nothing. Professor
Blackie himself sees that on some subjects it is worthless,
particularly when special knowledge or special faculty is re
quired. But there are questions, he contends, which public
opinion rightly decides, even though opposed to the con
clusions of subtle thinkers. “ Perhaps,” he says, “ we shall
hit the mark here if we say broadly that, as nature is always
right, the general and normal sentiment of the majority must
always be right, in so far as it is rooted in the universal and
* Professor Blackie is singularly silent as to James Mill, the
father of the celebrated Utilitarian philosopher, far more robust in
intellect and character than his son. He is the dominant figure of
Mill’s “ Autobiography,” and has about him a more august air
than his son ever wore.
�PROFESSOR BLACKIE ON ATHEISM.
99
■abiding instincts of humanity; and public opinion, as the
opinion of the majority, will be right also in all matters
which belong to the general conduct of life among all classes,
and with respect to which the mind of the majority has been
allowed a perfectly free, natural, and healthy exercise.”
Now, in the first place, we must reiterate our opinion that
the general consent of mankind on a subject like Theism
proves absolutely nothing. It is perfectly valid on questions
of ordinary taste and feeling, but loses all logical efficacy
in relation to questions which cannot be determined by - a
direct appeal to experience. And undeniably Theism is one
of those questions, unless we admit with the transcendentalist
what is contrary to evident fact, that men have an intuitive
perception of God. In the next place, the minor premise of
this argument is assumed. There is no general consent of
mankind in favor of Theism, but only a very extensive con
sent. Mr. Gladstone, not long since, in the Nineteenth
Century, went so far as to claim the general consent of man
kind in favor of Christianity, by simply excluding all heathen
nations from a right to be heard. Professor Blackie does
not go to this length, but his logical process is no different.
Lastly, our author’s concluding proviso vitiates his whole
case; for if there be one question on which “ the mind of
the majority ” has not been allowed a “ perfectly free, •
natural, and healthy exercise,” it is that of the existence of
God. We are all prepossessed in its favor by early training,
custom, and authority. Our minds have never been per
mitted to play freely upon it. A century ago Atheists stood
in danger of death ; only recently have penal and invidious
statutes against them been cancelled or mitigated; and even
now bigotry against honest disbelief in Theism is so strong
that a man often incurs greater odium in publicly avowing
it than in constantly violating all the decalogue save the
commandment against murder. Murderers and thieves,
though punished here, are either forgotten or compassionated
after death; but not even the grave effectually shields the
Atheist from the malignity of pious zeal. Fortunately, how
ever, a wise and humane tolerance is growing in the world,
and extending towards the most flagrant heresies. Perhaps
we shall ultimately admit with sage old Felltham, that “ we
fill the world with cruel brawls in the obstinate defence of
that whereof we might with more honor confess ourselves to
a 2
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PBOFESSOR BLACKIE ON ATHEISM.
be ignorant,” and that “ it is no shame for man not to know
that which is not in his possibility.”
The causes of Atheism are, according to Professor
Blackie, very numerous. He finds seven or eight distinct,
ones. The lowest class of Atheists are “ Atheists of im
becility,” persons of stunted intellect, incapable of compre
hending the idea of God. These, however, he will not
waste his time with, nor will we. He then passes to the
second class of reprobates, whose Atheism springs not from
defect of intellect, but from moral disorder, and who delight
to conceive the universe as resembling their own chaos.
These we shall dismiss, with a passing remark that if moral
disorder naturally induces Atheism, some very eminent,
Christians have been marvellous hypocrites. Lack of rever
ence is the next cause of Atheism, and is indeed its “ natural
soil.” But as Professor Blackie thinks this may be “ con
genital, like a lack of taste for music, or an incapacity of
understanding a mathematical problem,” we are obliged to
consider this third class of Atheists as hopeless as the first.
Having admitted that their malady may be congenital, our
author inflicts upon these unfortunates a great deal of super
fluous abuse, apparently forgetting that they are less to
blame than their omnipotent maker. The fourth cause of
Atheism is pride or self-will. But this seems very erratic
in its operations, since the only two instances cited—namely,
Napoleon the Great and Napoleon the Little, were certainly
Theists. Next comes democracy, between which and irre
verence there is a natural connexion, and from which, “ as
from a hotbed, Atheism in its rankest stage naturally shoots
up.” Professor Blackie, as may be surmised, tilts madly
against this horrible foe. But it will not thus be subdued.
Democracy is here and daily extending itself, overwhelming
slowly but surely all impediments to its supremacy. If
Theism is incompatible with it, then the days of Theism are
numbered. Professor Blackie’s peculiar Natural History of
Atheism is more likely to please the opposite ranks than his
own, who may naturally cry out, with a sense of being sold,
“ call you that backing of your friends ?”
Pride of intellect is the next cause of Atheism. Don Juan
sells himself to perdition for a liberal share of pleasure, but
Faust hankers only after forbidden knowledge. This is of
various kinds ; but “ of all kinds, that which has long had
�PROFESSOR BLACKIE ON ATHEISM.
101
the most evil reputation of begetting Atheism is Physical
Science ” Again does the fervid Professor set lance in rest,
and dash against this new foe to Theism, much as Don
Quixote charged the famous windmill. But science, like the
windmill, is too big and strong to suffer from such assaults.
The “ father of this sort of nonsense,” in modern times was
David Hume, who, we are elegantly informed, was “ a
very clever fellow, a very agreeable, gentlemanly fellow too.”
His “ nonsense about causation ” is to be traced to a want
of reverence in his character. Indeed, it seems that all
persons who adhere to a philosophy alien to Professor
Blackie’s have something radically wrong with them. Let
this Edinburgh Professor rail as he may, David Hume’s
theory of causation will suffer no harm, and his contrast of
human architecture, which is mechanism, with natural
architecture, which is growth, will still form an insuperable
•obstacle to that “ natural theology ” which, as Garth
Wilkinson says with grim humor, seeks to elicit, or rather
construct,” “ a scientific abstraction answering to the
'concrete figure of the Vulcan of the Greeks—that is to say
a universal Smith ” !
Eventually Professor Blackie gets so sick of philosophers,
that he turns from them to poets, who may more safely be
trusted “ in matters of healthy human sentiment.” But here
fresh difficulties arise. Although “ a poet is naturally a
religious animal,” we find that the greatest of Roman poets
Lucretius, was an Atheist, while even “ some of our most
brilliant notorieties in the modern world of song are not the
most notable for piety.” But our versatile Professor easily
accounts for this by assuming that there “ may be an
idolatry of the imaginative, as well as of the knowing
faculty.” Never did natural historian so jauntily provide
for every fact contravening his theories. Professor Blackie
will never understand Atheism, or write profitably upon it,
while he pursues this course. Let him restrain his discursive
propensities, and deal scientifically with this one fact, which
explodes his whole theory of Atheism. The supreme glory
•of our modern poetry is Shelley, and if ever a man combined
splendor of imagination with keen intelligence and saintly
character it was he. Raphael incarnate he seems, yet he
stands outside all the creeds, and to his prophetic vision, in
the sunlight of the world’s great age begun anew, the—
�1 02
PROFESSOR BLACKIE ON ATHEISM.
Faiths and empires gleam
Like wrecks of a dissolving dream.
In his treatment of Buddhism Professor Blackie is candid
and impartial, until he comes to consider its Atheistic cha
racter. Then his reason seems almost entirely to forsake
him. After saying that “ what Buddha preached was a
gospel of pure human ethics, divorced not only from Brahma
and the Brahminic Trinity, but even from the existence of
God;” and describing Buddha himself as “ a rare, exceptional,
and altogether transcendental incarnation of moral per
fection ;” he first tries to show that Nirvana is the same as
the Christian eternal life, and transmigration of souls a
faithful counterpart of the Christian doctrine of future
reward and punishment. Feeling, perhaps, how miserably
he has failed in this attempt, he turns with exasperation on
Buddhism, and affirms that it “ can in no wise be looked
upon as anything but an abnormal manifestation of the
religious life of man.” We believe that Professor Blackie
himself must have already perceived the futility and
absurdity of this.
The last chapter of Professor Blackie’s book is entitled
“ The Atheism of Reaction.” In it he strikes characteristi
cally at the five points of Calvinism, at Original Guilt,
Eternal Punishment, Creation out of Nothing, and Special
Providence ; which he charges with largely contributing to
the spread of Atheism. While welcoming these assaults on
superstition, we are constrained to observe that the Christian
dogmas which Professor Blackie impugns and denounces are
not specific causes of Atheism. Again he is on the wrong
scent. The revolt against Theism at the present time is
indeed mainly moral, but the preparation for it has been an
intellectual one. Modern Science has demonstrated, for all
practical purposes, the inexorable reign of law. The God
of miracles, answering prayer and intimately related to his
children of men, is an idea exploded and henceforth im
possible. The only idea of God at all possible, is that of a
supreme universal intelligence, governing nature by fixed
laws, and apparently quite heedless whether their operation
brings us joy or pain. This idea is intellectually permissible,
but it is beyond all proof, and can be entertained only as a
speculation. Now, the development of knowledge which
makes this the only permissible idea of God, also changes
�PROFESSOR BLACKIE ON ATHEISM.
103
Immortality from a religious certitude to an unverifiable
supposition. The rectification of the evils of this life cannot,
therefore, be reasonably expected in another; so that man
stands alone, fighting a terrible battle, with no aid save from
his own strength and skill. To believe that Omnipotence is
the passive spectator of this fearful strife, is for many minds
altogethei' too hard. They prefer to believe that the woes
and pangs of sentient life were not designed ; that madness,
anguish, and despair, result from the interplay of unconscious
forces. They thus set Theism aside, and unable to recognise
the fatherhood of God, they cling more closely to the
brotherhood of Man.
�SALVATIONISM.
(April, 1882.)
There is ho new thing under the sun, said the wise king
Many a surprising novelty is only an old thing in a new
dress. And this is especially true in respect to religion.
Ever since the feast of Pentecost, when the Apostles all
jabbered like madmen, Christianity has been marked by
periodical fits of insanity. It would occupy too much space
to enumerate these outbursts, which have occurred in every
part of Christendom, but we may mention a few that have
happened in our own country. During the Commonwealth,
some of the numerous sects went to the most ludicrous
extremes; preaching rousing sermons, praying through the
nose, assuming Biblical names, and prophesying the im
mediate reign of the saints. There was a reaction against
the excesses of Puritanism after the death of Cromwell;
and until the time of Whitfield and Wesley religion con
tinued to be a sobei- and respectable influence, chiefly useful
to the sovereign and the magistrate. But these two powerful
preachers rekindled the fire of religious enthusiasm in the
hearts of the common people, and Methodism was founded
among those whom the Church had scarcely touched. Not
many years ago the Hallelujah Band spread itself far and
wide, and then went out like a straw fire. And now we
have Salvationism, doing just the same kind of work, and
employing just the same kind of means. Will this new
movement die away like so many others ? It is difficult to
say. Salvationism may be only a flash in the pan ; but, on
the other hand, it may provide the only sort of Christianity
possible in an age of science and freethought. The educated
classes and the intelligent artisans will more and more desert
the Christian creed, and there will probably be left nothing
but the dregs and the scum, for whom Salvationism is
exactly suited. Christianity began among the poor, igno
rant, and depraved; and it may possibly end its existence
among the very same classes.
In all these movements we see a striking illustration of
what the biologists call the law of Atavism. There is a
�SALVATIONIST.
105
■constant tendency to return to the primitive type. We can
form some idea of what early Christianity was by reading
the Acts of the Apostles. The true believers went about
preaching in season and out of season; they cried and
prayed with a loud voice; they caused tumult in the streets,
and gave plenty of trouble to the civil authorities. All this
is true of Salvationism to-day; and we have no doubt that
the early Church, under the guidance of Peter, was just a
counterpart of the Salvation Army under “ General ”
Booth—to the Jews, or men of the world, a stumblingblock, and to the Greeks, or educated thinkers, a folly.
Early Christians were “ full of the Holy Ghost,” that is
of wild enthusiasm. Scoffers said they were drunk, and
they acted like madmen. Leap across seventeen centuries,
and we shall find Methodists acting in the same way. Wesley
states in his Journal (1739) of his hearers at Wapping, that
“ some were torn with a kind of convulsive motion in every
part of their bodies, and that so violently that often four or
five persons could not hold one of them.” And Lecky tells
us, in his “History of the Eighteenth Century,” that
“religious madness, which from the nature of its hallucina
tions, is usually the most miserable of all the forms of
insanity, was in this, as in many later revivals, of no unfre
quent occurrence.” Now Salvationism produces the very
same effects. It drives many people mad; and it is a
common thing for men and women at its meetings to shout,
dance, jump, and finally fall on the floor in a pious ecstacy.
While they are in this condition, the Holy Ghost is entering
them and the Devil is being driven out. Poor creatures!
They take us back in thought to the days of demoniacal pos
session, and the strange old world that saw the devil-plagued
swine of Gadara drowned in the sea.
The free and easy mingling of the sexes at these pious
assemblies, is another noticeable feature. Love-feasts were
a flagrant scandal in the early Church, and women who
returned from them virtuous must have been miracles of
chastity. Methodism was not quite so bad, but it tolerated
some very strange pranks. The Rev. Richard Polwhele, in
his “Anecdotes of Methodism” (a very rare book), says
that “ At St. Agnes, the Society stay up the whole night,
when girls of twelve and fourteen years of age, run about
the streets, calling out that they are possessed.” He goes on
�106
SALVATIONISM.
to relate that at Pro bus “ the preacher at a late hour of the
night, after all but the higher classes left the room, would
order the candles to be put out, and the saints fall down and
kneel on their naked knees ; when he would go round and
thrust his hand under every knee to feel if it were bare.”
Salvationism does not at present go to this length, but it has
still time enough to imitate all the freaks of its predecessor.
There was an All-Night meeting in Whitechapel a few
months ago, which threatened to develope into a thorough
going love-feast. The light was rather dim, voices grew
low, cheeks came perilously near, and hands met caressingly.
Of course it was nothing but the love of God that moved
them, yet it looked like something else ; and the uninitiated
spectator of “ the mystery of godliness ” found it easy to
understand how American camp-meetings tend to increase
the population, and why a Magistrate in the South-west of
England observed that one result of revivals in his district
was a number of fatherless weans.
In one respect Salvationism excels all previous revivals.
It is unparalleled in its vulgarity. The imbecile coarseness
of its language makes one ashamed of human nature. Had
it existed in Swift’s time, he'might have added a fresh clause
to his terrible indictment of mankind. Its metaphors are
borrowed from the slaughter-house, its songs are frequently
coarser than those of the lowest music-hall, and the general
style of its preaching is worthy of a congregation of drunken
pugilists. The very names assumed by its officers are enough
to turn one’s stomach. Christianity has fallen low indeed
when its champions boast such titles as the “ Hallelujah
Fishmonger,” the “ Blood-washed Miner,” the “ Devil
Dodger,” the “ Devil Walloper,” and “ Gipsy Sal.”
The constitution of the Salvation Army is a pure despot
ism. General Booth commands it absolutely. There is a
Council of War, consisting of his own family. All the
funds flow into his exchequer, and he spends them as he
likes. No questions are allowed, no accounts are rendered,
and everything is undei’ his unqualified control. The
“ General ” may be a perfectly honest man, but we are quite
sure that none but pious lunatics would trust him with such
irresponsible power.
We understand that the officials are all paid, and some of
them extremely well. They lead a very pleasant life, full of
�SALVATI0NI8M.
107
agreeable excitement; they wear uniform, and are dubbed
captain, major, or some other title. Add to all this, that
they suppose themselves (when honest) to be particular
favorites of God; and it will be easy to understand how so
many of them prefer a career of singing and praying to
earning an honest living by hard work, The Hallelujah
lads and lasses could not, for the most part, get decent
wages in any other occupation. All they require for this
work is a good stomach and good lungs; and if they can
only boast of having been the greatest drunkard in the
district, the worst thief, or the most brutal character, they
are on the high road to fortune, and may count on living in
clover for the rest of their sojourn in this vale of tears.
�A
PIOUS
SHOWMAN.
{October, 1882.)
We all remember how that clever showman, Barnum,
managed to fan the Jumbo fever. When the enterprising
Yankee writes his true autobiography we shall doubtless
find some extraordinary revelations. Yet Barnum, after
all, makes no pretence of morality or religion. He merely
goes in for making a handsome fortune out of the curiosity
and credulity of the public. If he were questioned as to
his principles, he would probably reply like Artemus Ward
■—“ Princerpuls ? I’ve nare a one. I’m in the show
bizniz.”
General Booth is quite as much a showman as Barnum,
but he is a pious showman. He is a perfect master of the
vulgar art of attracting fools. Every day brings a fresh
change in his “ Walk up, Walk up.” Tambourine girls,
hallelujah lasses, converted clowns and fiddlers, sham
Italian organ grinders, bands in which every man plays
his own tune, officers in uniform, Davidic dances, and
music-hall tunes, are all served up with a plentiful supply
of blood and fire. The “ General ” evidently means to
•stick at nothing that will draw; and we quite believe that
if a pair of Ezekiel’s cherubim were available, he would
worry God Almighty into sending them down for exhibition
at the City Road show.
Booth’s latest dodge is to say the least peculiar. Most
fathers would shrink from trafficking in a son’s marriage,
but Booth is above such nice scruples. The worst deeds
are sanctified by love of God, and religion condones every
indecency.
Mr. Bramwell Booth, whom the General has singled out as
his apostolic successor, and heir to all the Army’s property,
:got married last week; and the pious showman actually
exhibited the bridegroom and bride to the public at a
shilling a head. About three hundred pounds were taken at
the doors, and a big collection was made inside. Booth’s
anxiety for the cash was very strongly illustrated. Com
missioner Railton, who has had a very eccentric career,
�A PIOUS SHOWMAN.
10&
was enjoying his long deferred opportunity of making
a speech, when many of the crowd began to press towards
the door. “ Stop,” cried Booth, “ don’t go yet, there’s
going to be a collection.” But the audience melted faster
than ever. Whereupon Booth jumped up again, stopped
poor Railton unceremoniously, and shouted “ Hold on, we’ll
make the collection now.” This little manoeuvre was quite
in keeping with the showman’s instruction to his subal
terns, to have plenty of good strong collecting boxes and
pass them round often.
Booth’s facetious remarks during his son’s marriage
according to the Army forms were well adapted to tickle
the ears of his groundlings. The whole thing was a roar
ing farce, and well sustained the reputation of the show.
There was also the usual spice of blasphemy. Before
Bramwell Booth marched on to the platform a board was
held up bearing the inscription “ Behold the bridegroom
cometh.” These mountebanks have no reverence even for
what they call sacred. They make everything dance to
their tune. They prostitute “ God’s Word,” caricature
Jesus Christ, and burlesque all the watchwords and symbols
of their creed.
One of Booth’s remarks after the splicing was finished is
full of suggestion. He said that his enemies might cavil,
but he had found out a road to fortune in this world and
the next. Well, the Lord only knows how he will fare in
the next world, but in this world the pious showman has
certainly gained a big success. He can neither write nor
preach, and as for singing, a half a dozen notes from his
brazen throat would empty the place as easily as a cry of
“ Fire.” But he is a dexterous manager ; he knows how to
work the oracle ; he understands catering for the mob ; in
short, he is a very clever showman, who deals in religion
just as other showmen deal in wild animals, giants, dwarfs,
two-headed sheep, fat women, and Siamese twins.
Fortune has brought to our hands a copy of a private
circular issued by “ Commissioner ” Railton, soliciting
wedding presents for Mr. Bramwell Booth. With the
exception of Reuben May’s begging letters, it is the finest
cadging document we ever saw. Booth was evidently
ashamed to sign it himself, so it bears the name of Railton.
But the pious showman cannot disown the responsibility
�110
A PIOUS SHOWMAN.
for it. He will not allow the officers of the Army to marry
without his sanction ; he forbids them to accept any private
present; he keeps a sharp eye on every detail of the
organisation. Surely, then, he will not have the face to
say that he knew nothing of Railton’s circular. He has
face enough for almost anything, but hardly for this.
There is one damning fact which he cannot shirk. Railton
asks that all contributions shall be made “ pavable to
William Booth, as usual.”
Railton spreads the butter pretty freely on Booth and
his family. He says that their devotion to the Army has
“ loaded them with care, and often made them suffer weak
ness and pain.” As to Mr. Bramwell Booth, in particular,
we are informed that he has worked so hard behind the
scenes, as Chief of the Staff, that many of his hairs are
grey at twenty-seven. Poor Bramwell ! The Army should
present him with a dozen bottles of hair restorer. Perhaps
his young wife will renew his raven head by imitating the
lady in the fable, and pulling out all the grey hairs.
In order to compensate this noble family in some degree
for their marvellous devotion to the great cause, Railton
proposes that wedding presents in the shape of cash should
be made to Mr. Bramwell Booth on the day of his marriage.
Whatever money is received will go, not to the young
gentleman personally, but to reducing the Army debt of
¿£11,000. But as the Army property is all in Booth’s
hands, and Mr. Bramwell is his hair and successor, it is
obvious that any reduction of the debt will be so much clear
gain to the firm.
The General evidently saw that the case was a delicate
one; so Railton sends out a private circular, which he
excuses on the ground that “ any public appeal would not
be at all agreeable to Mr. Bramwell’s own feelings.” Of
course not. But we dare say the wedding presents will
be agreeable enough. As this is a strong point with the
firm, Railton repeats it later on. “ I do not wish ” he
says, “ to make any public announcement of this.” ’ The
reason of this secrecy is doubtless the same as that which
prompts the General to exclude reporters and interlopers
from his all-night meetings. Only the initiated are allowed
in, and they of course may be safely trusted.
With the circular Railton sent out envelopes in which
�A PIOUS SHOWMAN.
Ill
the pious dupes were to forward their contributions ; and
printed slips, headed “ Wedding Presents to Mr. Bramwell
Booth,” on which they were asked to specify the amount
of their gift and the sin from which the Salvation Army
had rescued them. This printed slip contains a list of sins,
which would do credit to a Jesuit confessor. Booth has
we think missed his vocation. He might have achieved
real distinction in the army of Ignatius Loyola.
The circular is a wonderful mixture of piety and business.
Nearly every sentence contains a little of both. The cash
will not only gladden the hearts of the Booths, but
“ make the devil tremble,” and “ give earth and hell
another shock.” This last bit of extravagance is rather
puzzling. That hell should receive another shock is very
proper, but why is there to be an earthquake at the same
time ?
We have said enough to show the true character of this
cadging trick. It throws a strong light on the business
methods of this pious showman. Booth is playing a very
astute game. By reducing the Army to military discipline,
a’ld constituting himself its General, he retains an absolute
confoand over its resources, and is able to crush out all
opposition and silence all criticism. He wields a more
man Papal despotism. All the higher posts are held by
members of his own family. His eldest son is appointed
as his successor. The property thus remains in the family,
and the Booth, dynasty is established on a solid foundation.
Such an impudent imposture would scarcely be credible if
it were not patent that there is still amongst us a vast mul
titude of two-legged sheep, who are ready to follow any
plausible shepherd, and to yield up their fleeces to his
shears.
�LONDON:
PRINTED AND PUBLISHED BY H. A. KEMP.
28 STONECUTTER STREET, E.C.
�
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Arrows of freethought
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Foote, G. W. (George William) [1850-1915]
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Place of publication: London
Collation: 111 p. ; 18 cm.
Notes: Part of the NSS pamphlet collection. Inscription in ink on title page: "To J.M. Wheeler, from his old friend, The Author, Nov. 18th 1882". Articles previously published in the Secularist, the Liberal, the National Reformer, and the Freethinker.
Contents: Religion And Progress; A Defence Of Thomas Paine; The Gospel Of Freethought; Freethought In Current Literature; Dean Stanley's Latest; God And The Queen; Cardinal Newman On Infidelity; Sunday Tyranny; Who Are The Blasphemers?; The Birth Of Christ; The Reign Of Christ; The Primate On Modern Infidelity; Baiting A Bishop; Professor Flint On Atheism; A Hidden God; General Joshua; Going To Hell; Christmas Eve In Heaven; Professor Blackie On Atheism; Salvationism; A Pious Showman.
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H. A. Kemp
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1882
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N222
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Free thought
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Atheism
blasphemers
Free Thought
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“ATHEIS M.”
I.
A SERMON,
PREACHED AT ST. GEORGE’S HALL, LANGHAM PLACE,
JANUARY 12th, 1873, by the
REV. CHARLES VOYSEY.
From the Eastern Post, January Y&th, 1873.
On Sunday'(Jan. 12th) at St. George’s Hall, the Rev. C. Voysey
took his text from Ephesians ii., 12., “ Having no hope and without
God in the world.”
I was speaking last Sunday of our special mission to the
Orthodox Christians, and how it lies in our power to liberate them
from their present position of doubt and dissatisfaction, by winning
them over to our more rational, simple, and consoling belief in God.
But we have another high duty to perform, another mission to
fulfil. There are around us on every hand, almost in every home,
men who are practically Athiests, who ■without actually denying,
in open speech, that there is a God, yet are totally indifferent to
the subject, and care nothing at all whether there be a God or not.
Some of these have joined the school of thinkers who look upon
one question at least as definitively settled; who, at all events, have
satisfied themselves that if there be a God it is impossible for man
to know anything about him ; and who, therefore think it is a
waste of time, energy, and thought to pursue any enquiry into
things Divine. I believe that by far the largest number of
Atheists are men of this school, and the obvious causes of. their
Atheism may be found in the wide-spread diversity of religious
opinion, which shows that even those who believe m a God cannot
agree among themselves as to his nature, or attributes, or dealings
with mankind'; and also in the entire failure of Christianity to
present us with a religious belief in harmony with the Reason, the
Conscience, and the Affections of man,
�The breaking up of their old belief has landed them in a waste
howling wilderness. They have nothing in exchange for what they
have lost, They are “ Without hope and without God in the world. ”
Now it is a fact which I never contemplate without the deepest
delight, that there are some amongst us, some even of our most
devoted friends and supporters, who were for a time Atheists, and
whose hearts were clouded over by utter infidelity, but who
recovered for themselves the blessed solace of a firm faith in a good
God, and whose religious instincts have found new life and fresh
occupation.
Years and years ago many of us must have foreseen what one
of the immediate consequences of the downfall of Orthodoxy
would surely be, viz. : “ The temporary but total eclipse of faith
in the hearts of thousands.” Francis W. Newman, foreseeing this,
prefaced all his work of destruction by sending forth his book
entitled, “The Soul; Her Sorrows and Aspirations,” which was, in
reality, an “ Essay on the Positive Foundations of Practical
Religion.” And his instinctive desire to furnish a. foundation for
true faith in place of the old one, which he was about to remove,
has been shared by other great reformers in this age. In the
works of Theodore Parker and of Francis Power Cobbe, and even
in the purely critical works of Bishop Colenso, the same desire to
establish a pure and true faith is everywhere manifested. The
spirit which has animated the movement with which we are
specially connected is essentially the same, and no libel could be
more unjust than to say we only want to pull down errors and
have nothing to put in their place.
I conceive it to be, then, a very important part of our work to
endeavour to stop the further progress of that Atheism -which
threatens to become so popular, and to win back the poor
wandering souls who have no Divine shepherd to feed, to guide, and
to defend them.
But before we can undertake such an important task we must
carefully consider how it is best to set about it. There are always
two or more ways of doing everything, and we may do more harm
than good if we adopt the wrong method.
Experience of certain wrong methods will furnish us with
one or two excellent cautions -which I will now briefly touch
upon.
�o
1. It was the custom for religious people to approach the un
believing and the hetrodox with an air of superiority; to treat
them as if they were wicked, or, at least, greatly to blame for their
unbelief or their heresy. Now, if we would do any good, if we
wish to be true to our own principles, we must forswear such a
grave mistake as that. The Atheist is, for the most part, on a level
with ourselves, morally and intellectually, not unfrequently our
superior in what is noblest in man. He, at least, has made the
greatest sacrifice which a human heart could make for the sake of
Truth. In his loyalty to what he believed to be true he gave up
all the bright possibilities of a believer’s joy, and abandoned all
hope of a life to come.
We cannot, without folly, as well as impertinence, lecture such a
man as a missionary lectures his idolatrous savage. We cannot,
without indecency, approach such a man with our patronage and
address him with a lofty commiseration.
'lire best attitude we can wear is that which most truly accords
with our inmost humility as seekers after truth. What are we
ourselves but learners 1 We may be very sure that the highest
truth we clasp to day with fond and grateful emotion will one
day have to give place to a truth far higher still, and we may be
sure that if we are ever so much nearei’ to the truth than the
Atheist is, we must have some admixture of error. So if we betake
ourselves to the Atheist it must be to hear and to learn quite as
much as to speak and to teach.
Even granting that the truth is on our side, we may be very
sure that he has some truth to tell, some correction of error to
impart which is of priceless value. Let us argue with him (and
argument means fair play on both sides), and not dictate to him.
Let us remember that our dogmatising is just as unwelcome and
useless to him as his dogmatism is to us. We must not be afraid
to argue even -with the Atheist; for an opinion or belief that will
not bear hard reasoning is in a rapid decline and will soon have to
be buried. If our Faith be true, it will out-match all falsehood.
If our belief in God be worth anything it will be armour-proof
against the most subtle denials. So dearly, so intensely, do we love
truth, that we would give up God Himself if God were a lie, and
we would hug our own despair rather than be the dupes of a fake
hope. Let the Atheist see, then, that we arc quite as much in
�4
earnest as lie is; quite as desirous of learning from him, as that he
should learn from us. Such respect given can only win respect in
turn. It is painfully true that many Atheists are the most vain
and conceited of men—quite as pharisaical as the old chief priests
and scribes down in Judea—quite as scornful in their pity of us
“ blind believers ” as we have ever been towards them. But what
has made them so ? And who is to blame for it ? Why, the
scornful attitude of religious society during the last hundred years.
Voltaire, Tom Paine, and the long list of their successors,
though falsely called Atheists, were considered by Christians as
the offscouring of the world, and a disgrace to mankind, not for
blemishes in their lives, but for heresy in their opinions ; and the
real Atheist, in the present day, is, by religious people, looked
down upon as contemptible, or dreaded as dangerous. It is,
therefore, the fault of believers if Atheists have grown vain and
conceited. False blame always tends to exaggerate the sense of
our own importance, while merited praise tends to remind us of
our shortcomings. If possible, we must change this state of
irrational hostility, and drive out the pharisaism of Atheism, by
first expelling the pharisaism of Belief. Mutual respect is the
key to mutual understanding, and, without that, discussion and
argument are vain.
(2) Another caution I would mention is that against supposing
that modern Atheism is necessarily connected with domestic im
morality or social anarchy. I would not, myself, dare to prognos
ticate the results were the belief in God entirely to fade out of
the hearts of our nation. There might be, for a time, a most fear
ful insurrection of men and women against the moral laws by which
Society is bound together ; but it is impossible to say with accuracy
what would be the result, because men and women are so illogical.
Believing, as I do, in God, and assured, as I am, by the past history
of our race thatwe are ever going forwards, I should expect that God
would provide in the future, as he has ever done in the past, for
the moral government of his children. At all events, so far, the
modern A theist is no ruffianly breaker of laws, or violator of the
sanctity of human rights. Some of them, indeed, are among the
world’s most righteous men, most fond and affectionate husbands
and fathers, most true and generous friends of mankind. Most of
them are lovers of order as well as of freedom, and “ use their
�5
liberty ” as if they believed themselves to be the servants of God.”
It will not do, then, to make the mistake of assuming that the
Atheist is at all our moral inferior. It is false in fact; and to go
upon that assumption is not only to insult a body of highly honour
able men, but to ruin our own work at the outset.
(3.) In the third place, we cannot be too candid in our discus
sions. It is a very common fault in theologians to shut their eyes
to unpleasant facts, and to refuse to draw obvious conclusions.
If we desire to influence reasoning men we must show our own
knowledge of the laws of the game, and use skilfully and fairly
the weapons of logic. Nothing helps sooner to confirm any one
in his own opinion than to hear it feebly assailed, or unfairly
opposed. The weapons of modern Atheism are very powerful and
finely tempered. We cannot, with a wave of the hand, or a shrug
of the shoulders, get rid of the army of unpleasant facts and
stubborn difficulties in the condition of humanity and of nature
around us, which will be arrayed against our belief. AVe must
ignore nothing, we must not gloss over a single flaw in our
reasoning, or make any leaps such as delight theological con
troversialists. The battle of argument must be fought inch by
inch, and there must be no strategem, no surprises.
(I.) As our real aim must be the discovery of the truth,
it will never do to give undue weight to the personal value
of our own convictions. That value is enormous, and of its
weight, as an argument, I shall presently speak ; but it must not
be used in its wrong place. The pleasantness of a conviction, by
itself, is no more proof of the truth of that conviction than the
pleasantness of an action is a proof that that action is right.
<•' Pleasant but false ” is quite as good a proverb as “ pleasant but
wrong.” To believe a doctrine only because it consoles, is to
confess that it has no other logical basis, and therefore is not to
be accepted by reasonable men. We must be prepared to be
utterly loyal to reason and truth, remembering that if there be no
God it is our manifest duty to ascertain and prove the fact, and
if there be a God—a God of truth and equity—it will not please
Him to deceive ourselves, or to prop up our belief by false argu
ments. If there be a God, the very Atheist commends himself to
the Divine approval whenever he is true tq himself.
For what other purpose was our Reason given us than to be
�6
supreme in all intellectual inquiries. It was surely intended to
raise us into a condition superior to all fear, and far above all
bribes. It was given to be the master of our spiritual emotions as
well as the governor of our animal passions, and we cannot,
honour God by renouncing our own Reason, or suffering ourselves
to be carried away from the stern truth, however terrible, by the
allurements of a false hppe, or by the terrors of a dismal certainty.
But, then, if truth be our chief aim, and not our own mental
enjoyment, we must gain by it in the end ; it will make our souls
more heroic ; it will prepare us the better for that clearer know
ledge of God Himself, which may await us as our reward, But if,
on the other hand, we let the Atheist see that we only believe in
God because we want to be comfortable, we put a stumbling block
in his way, and shew ourselves to be unworthy and selfish in
our aims, and no true seekers after truth. The moral effect
upon him, of such a discovery, would be quite fatal to his
conversion.
(•5) The last caution I would name is that against mistaking the exact limits of our inquiry. It must ever be borne
in mind that the Atheists and ourselves stand on the same ground
in denying that the existence of God can be demonstrated in the
same way as we demonstrate a mechanical fact or a scientific
proposition.
Time and breath would be spent in vain if the disputants were
to miss the main point of the question. We do not want to do the
impossible task of demonstrating or defining the existence of God.
We w^nt only to make it clear that the balance of probability is on
the side of Belief—that it is far more likely that 'there is a perfectly
good and capable God, in whose hands every real oi’ apparent evil
is sure to issue in final good to every conscious creature who is the
subject of that evil, than that there is no God at all; Stillmore
probable than that there is a God to whom the sufferings and
failures of his creatures is a matter of unconcern.
If we will only bear in mind that the Atheist can never prove
that there is no God ; and that we can never prove to him that
there is one, we shall more easily confine our discussion to the
balance of probalities, and that, in all conscience, is wide enough to
occupy the deepest and most laborious thought.
It is the province of Reason to examine these probabilities
�awl con; it is not the province of Reason to believe anything.
That we have, most of us, a faculty of believing in God which is
not mere credulity but a reliance of a dependant creature on the
goodwill of its Creator, is one of the facts of the universe which
it will be impossible for the Atheist to ignore ; but that faculty is
not called upon to reason about its object any more than the eye
is called upon to reason about what it sees.
We may first reason upon probabilities and thus call into exer
cise onr sense of Faith ; or we may first believe and then justify
our faith by the exercise of our Reason.
In conclusion, I will say a few. words on the immense value of
our personal convictions as to the existence of God and the hope
which they inspire. Having in the most unqualified manner
asserted that truth must stand first in our regard, that all ease and
comfort and even hope itself must be given up if they clash with
the claims of truth, I trust I shall not seem inconsistent if I say
that the joy and consolation of believing God is one of the strongest
arguments in favour of His real existence. For this joy and
consolation, this perfect peace in the present and hope for the
future, are exactly what we needed to make us to bear up under
the pains and evils of our mortal life, and to watch with submissive
hope the fearful sufferings in the world around us. The strongest
argument the Atheist has against our belief lies in the sin and
misery which abound. I do not see how men and women can
behold all this, believing it to be the work of blind Nature, and yet
preserve their reasons. To take such a view of life, as that described
in the last pages of the Martyrdom of M an, by Mr. Winwood
Reade, and to have no God in whose good purposes to confide, no
hope for a future in which present evil shall work itself out in
everlasting good, would be to darken the whole atmosphere of life
and thought, to paralyse moral energy, and never to smile again.
What conclusion could we draw from all we see and suffer, if there
is to be no beneficent issue to it all, but that we are the sport of a
malignant fiend who has not only amused himself thus at our
expense but mocked at us with false hopes and fond delusions,
creating us, indeed, unspeakably nobler than he is himself, and
worthy to put our feet upon his neck.
If there be no redress, if all these woes, and stragglings, and
sorrows, and irreparable losses are purposeless, the universe itself
�8
is cursed ; it has stultified aud degraded itself by evolving such a
creature as man, who can sit in judgment on the morality of its
course. All its starry gems, its gorgeous drapery, its siren songs,
its fascinating forms, its entrancing magic, its lustrous light and
heat all those, its enticements and allurements, testify, not to the
benevolence, but to the infinite perfidy of the whole design. They
are no better than the deadly gaze of the venomous snake, or the
treacherous blandishments of the harlot. All nature is a foul
cheat, if the aspirations of moral man are false. But I turn from
this dark picture, which is, after all, but a hideous passing dream,
to the fact that under all trials, under every degree of suffering,
physical and moral, men and women have been sustained by a
belief in a God who is filled with all the tenderest and purest
feelings of humanity without sharing any of its faults or ignor
ance. Their minds resting on God, they have not only borne
unspeakable tortures, but they have looked full and steadily in the
face of the world’s worst moral corruption, and their hearts have
told them, “ Bear it all; it will all yet turn to good. Be patient;
God’s ways are mysterious and, to our eyes, often entangled, but
good shall come at last to all. We know not how, or when, or
where. But He who made us what we are, to long only for good
—not for mere happiness but goodness—must Himself do good,
and only good. And in Him wc rejoice. Yea ! and will rejoice
with joy unspeakable and full of glory.” Without God we are
without hope, and the whole world is “a blunder infinite’ and
inexcusable
but with God we can abound in hope, and the
mysterious dealings of God with us and with nature are made, not
only bearable, but even appear as steps unto Heaven for every
suffering creature. Verily, God is as real a necessity to the life of
reasoning moral men as the glorious sun to the planets around
him.
Let us not, then, forget the enormous value of this personal
experience as an argument to meet the strongest arguments on the
other side. The world is only seen to be hopelessly wretched and
base where the Light of God’s righteousness has been shut out
from the soul of man. But everywhere and in everything there
is ground for hope when the fearful shadow has been withdrawn,
and the beams of His Eternal Love burst forth upon us once more
and turn our night into day.
�A SERMON,
PREACHED AT ST. GEORGE’S HALL, LANGHAM PLACE,
JANUARY 19th, 1873, by the
REV. CHARLES VOYSEY.
From the Eastern Post, January 25th, 1873.
------ -c -----*
On Sunday (Jan. 19 th) at St. George’s Hall, the Roa-. C. Voysey
took his text from Psalm viii., G., “Thou rnadest him to have
dominion over the works of thy hands; thou lust put all things in
subjection under his feet.”
In undertaking a task of such magnitude and difficulty as that
of supplying reasonable grounds for belief in a Perfect God, I am
deeply conscious of the inadequacy of my own powers and know
ledge ; and it is only natural for me to approach the work with
fear and trembling lest through my feebleness or errors I should
give a new occasion for the Atheist to triumph. But while I thus
flinch, and am full of diffidence, I am unspeakably consoled and
strengthened by the fact that whatever is really true will prevail
at last, and cannot suffer permanently from the strongest opposition,
or from the feeblest support; it is also an encouragement to remember
that mine is only one poor voice out of many; that no one is pledged
or compromised by what I may say; that I speak for myself alone;
and that, should I fail in my effort, the only logical'conclusion to
be drawn from it by the Atheist is, that one man has tried with
out success to convince the unbelieving world of the reasonableness
of his faith, not that his faith is unreasonable. My failure will
not prove that Atheism is true, though it might in the eyes of
sowe persons be thought to damage Theisrri,
�2
iTow, our first step must be to describe, if possible, what we
mean by the term God. The Christian, the Theist, the Pantheist,
all use the same term, but each in a different sense. I pass over
the first, with which all of us are familiar, to notice the difference
between the Theistic and Pantheistic senses of the term God.
The Pantheist denies self-consciousness to God, while the Theist
affirms it. The Pantheist affirms, not merely the co-extension of
God with the universe, but their absolute identity • the Theist,
denying this identity, affirms that God is distinct from the universe,
however inseparably they may be united. The Theistic idea of God is
of a Being without form, without material substance, one whole and
indivisible; a Being who is self-conscious, and who possesses
intelligence, power, and love, only in a degree far more exalted
than we can comprehend or describe ; and who, therefore, exercises
will and works from design. The Theist confesses that he has no
other means of gaining a conception of God than that which is
affordedhim by the contemplation of the works of God, and
especially of His noblest work—man. Prom a contemplation of
the highest part of man’s nature, viz., his intellect, conscience, and
affection, he rises by a single step into a conception of a Being who
possesses all these faculties in their fullest perfection, without any
of the limitations of matter, time, and space.
It is in vain that an opponent hurls at us his taunts about
anthropomorphism. It cannot be avoided. We have reached the
loftiest peak on which human feet have stood, when we have found
what man can do and be. Man is our only key to the problems
of nature, our only ladder from earth to Heaven. And in no
other way is his present greatness attested, or his glorious future
promised, so distinctly as in his own power to make, as it were, a
God in his own image and after his own likeness, and yet One,
stripped absolutely of every flaw and defect, and even of the
remotest tendency to human weakness. Men have never invented
a God morally inferior to themselves, the idols have only outlasted
*4r.
�3
their time, and have become anachronisms.
As men grew loftier
in mind and morals, the once revered images became first grotesque
and then hideous. I therefore defend the anthropomorphism of
the Theist as a merit, and do not apologise for it as a defeat, of his
system. Used with fidelity to the principles of progress m which
he believes, his anthropomorphic conception of God is a constant
guarantee of higher and higher knowledge, till he shall arrive at
the innermost sanctuary of the Divine presence. . At all events, if
there be a God, it is clear enough that He has given us no other
means of conceiving of Him at all. Man knows his own superiority
to the beasts of the field, the fowls of the air, the fishes m the
sea; to the trees and flowers, the rocks and hills, the towering
mountains and the foaming sea. He knows his own superiority
of nature, even in his extremest physical helplessness, to the wild
and fierce forces which play about him. The winds and the waves,
the roaring cataract, and even the burning lava, he turns to his
own service and becomes their lord; the very lightning becomes
the swift messenger of his thoughts, and the blazing sun itself,
though enthroned afar in unapproachable glory, is made to unfold
the secrets of its awful flame. A human mind which has mastered
its subtle beams, draws them through a fragment of crystal, and
reads the chemistry of the stupendous conflagration. Wonderful
as are the resources, even in organic matter, yet . with
our little fragment of knowledge, and our sense of spiritual
activity we have come to call the great masses of worlds around us
“ inert matter,” and to regard the physical forces every where in
operation as inferior to the emotions and aspirations of the human
soul. From all this, but one conclusion can be drawn, viz., that
there is something even in ourselves radically superior to that
visible universe, from which we, ourselves, were evolved. Man is
thus forced to feel the gulf between the seen and the unseen—
between the grandest exhibitions of power in the world of nature
and the spiritual forces at work within his own soul. It is m vain
that you tell him how he has been evolved m the natural course of
things from the simplest form of animal life, you will only increase
�4
Ills wonder at tlie powers thus originated without shaking for ohe
moment his confidence in their possession, or his faith in their
grandeur. He does not care, except as he may care for every grain
of true knowledge, how he came to be what ho is, what chemical
or molecular changes in inorganic matter produced his compound
and complex organism j but he docs care supremely to know hiraself
as a man, and to wield the royal sceptre over that portion of the
visible universe in which he woke up—a king.
In vain, too, will it be to show him the dissected brain of one of
the world’s great teachers and say, “ We cannot find anything but
wbat you see. All that made the man what he was lies now in
those bony hemispheres; in a few days it will rot and be dissolved
for ever.” He will turn round upon you and say, “This is only
what I expected you would find in the noblest head that lifted itself
proudly above the intellects of men; what I have felt all my life,
is that I am not identical with my body or any of my organs • that
I am something superior to what I see and feel, and that this body
is nothing more to me than the house in which I have dwelt, and
shall dwell till I die. Even, if I never live again, it cannot alter
the conviction of my life; that I have had a something, either the
product of my brain, or the impalpable and nndiscoverable germ
from which my brain was produced, which is myself, as dis
tinguished from the body in which I now speak and hear.
All that can be handled with your forceps, and seen through your
microscope is, of course, doomed to utter and irrevocable dissolution
—the particles will never again be united in their former con
dition. But if they sprung but yesterday from a mollusc, and are
doomed to utter dispersion to-morrow, one fact remains, I am that
I am. I have come into possession of these batteries of cerebral
matter, and I shall have to lay them down ; but they and I are
not one and never were. However essential to our speech and
action upon earth—to our communion with each other as fellow
beings, I have always felt that I was something greater than thev,
that by my will I could keep them in health, give them rest when
weary, and alas make them ache with pain by over-exertion, or by
senseless folly.”
�•J
Should this seem to be a digression, let me remind yoti
of what I am driving at, I want to state with emphasis
the fact, not merely of man’s superiority to the visible Universe,
but also of his own consciousness of his superiority.
With
the materialist he can go all lengths in the admission of the
entirely physical origin of his bodily frame, and of all its organs,
and consequently he can go all lengths with the materialist in
saying that there is nothing discoverable by the eye as a basis of
immortality. But he is no less certain that he is superior to the
body in which he dwells, than certain that he is superior to the
sun, without whose beams his body could not have come into
being at all.
' Now, if this superiority, which is instinctive in thousands and
millions of our race, and in the highest portion thereof, be
admitted, we haVe ground for justifying our search for God by
studying man. Of course, it would not do to study man alone
without studying also the othei’ and inferior works of God, foi that
*
would make our conclusions too visionary and speculative; but it
would be more erroneous still to study only the physical phenomena,
and leave the soul of man out of the range of our enquiry. If
we studied only the physical phenomena we could hardly come to
any other than the conclusion of the modern Pantheist, whereas,
if we study both the phenomena and the human soul, we naturally
arrive at Theism. There is not much, if any, token of conscien
tiousness in the outei world. Individuals are simply ignored by
*
the forces of nature, pain and pleasure are scattered about in what
seems to be wild caprice, i.e., in utter disregard of the merits or
demerits of the individuals on whom they fall. But the whole
thing apparently works pretty well so as to produce a constant
supply of flowers and butterflies who are not expected to stay too
long in their little patch of sunshine, and who must always be
expecting to be done to death at any moment by a sudden change
in temperature, oi' downfall of rain and hail. Still, no matter, a
thousand dead things are soon replaced. The laboratory is always
open, resources are abundant, the workmen never rest, and so far
as a perpetual transformation-scene is the order of the day,
nature certainly does her work with infinite skill and industry.
But you don’t want a moral God to do all this, it does itself
�6
apparently; once set going—no one cares to enquire how—it can’t
help going, till some fine day it will, perhaps, go to pieces and
begin all over again, taking the first employment that offers
itself.
I, for one, do not wonder at the Pantheism or, as
it may truly be called, the Atheism which comes of regarding
only the outside of things, i.e., of studying only physical
phenomena with a determined blindness to the moral and
spiritual nature of man. If nature outside of us were all we had
to lean upon for instruction concerning God, I confess we should
be driven eithei’ to attribute to Him frightful want of conscien
tiousness, or—what is more logical—to do without the hypothesis
of a God at all.
On the other hand, if we take both together, and explain the
one by the other, searching for all that nature has to tell, and
remembering that if God works there, he also works in human
hearts and souls, we shall be able at length, if not to explain
every seeming moral anomaly, at all events, to give Him as much
credit for good intentions, as we do to our fellow-men when we
cannot exactly see what their aims really are, and when we cannot
help finding fault with their methods.
The old maxim “Never let children or’fools see half-done deeds,”
should have its weight in the correction of any impatient
a
*gainst
murmuring
the course of Providence. To Him we are
but as children; by the side of His wisdom, our greatest knowledge
is but folly; and therefore, if we arepermitted to stand by His side,
and follow His dealings as the world’s great artificer, a becoming
silence should mark our reverence, and a patient watchfulness
should be our tribute to His wisdom and skill. “ God is in
Heaven, and thou upon earth, therefore let my words be
few,” contains a profound caution, which we shall do well to
remember.
Having attained a clear perception of the superiority of man—
as the highest product of nature yet known to us—our first
question must be “ Is there, or is there not, some Being higher
still 1” Now, most men, and even Atheists, readily admit the
possibility of the existence of creatures higher than man. They
do not know what other worlds contain, of course, but they think
it quite possible, if not probable, that there are highei’ intclli-
�gences, some where but still evolved like ourselves from the
Universe. They will not take the next step, and say with me
that it is possible that there is one Being, not evolved, but the
source of evolution, above all other Beings, who has perfect
knowledge of the Universe; but it seems to me but a very short
step indeed, from the admission that possibly higher intelligences
than our own exist somewhere. But if they have a right to
assume there are higher intelligences, we surely have the right to
assume that there is one Highest and Supreme.
Here, however, we must use the method of balancing proba
bilities. Supposing that there were no supreme and perfect intelli
gence, then as fax' as we know, man would be the Supreme Being
of the universe—the one intelligent creature who stands on the
highest, pinnacle of knowledge. He knows more about the world
than any other being. Bnt what does he know as yet ? He is only
just beginning to find out how little he knows by comparison with
the sum total of things actually present and visible. He knows
very little about the past, next to nothing about the regions of the
world which are invisible, and nothing at all about the distant
future. A creature only of yesterday, not so long ago an ignorant
savage, a little earlier still only an ape, how should he know more
than he knows at present? But he has, nevertheless, learnt that
there are system and law prevailing in every part of the universe,
that invariable sequences attend given actions and mutations of
force. Man has at least learnt to banish from scientific language
the names of “accident” and “chance,” and he has tacitly admitted
the presence of active intelligence in the evolution of all things.
Nature has taught him all he knows. All his sciences, of which
he is justly proud, are records of facts and phenomena actually
observed, discoveries on his part of what had been done, or is now
being done, without his aid, not inventions of his own or results of
his interference. Nature is so manifestly controlled by intelligence,
that the mind of man has its most exquisite delight in reading the
secrets of nature, and watching her wondrous developments.
Man further admits that we ourselves are products of this care
fully designed whole. That we are the latest, noblest, and fairest
fruit of Nature’s skill; and yet some men will hesitate to confess
that the intelligence which arranged this grand evolution is grander
�far than one of its products. If there be no higher mind than the
mind of man, how could man have ever been evolved ? ‘
nihilo
nihil Jit' stands good yet, and we can never be persuaded that the
intellect of man is the offspring of that which had no intelligence.
A perfect knowledge of all the sciences, and of thousands of things
yet unknown to us, was required to produce even this little globe
on which we live. Had there been false Chemistry, or deficient
Mathematics, or ignorance of the laws of Astronomy, or of Optics,
what hopeless chaos would have ensued ! One false step would
have ruined the whole. Can we then, who attach so much
importance to our own tiny share in this knowledge, pretend that
no knowledge at all was needful to produce the stupendous whole?
It must be infinitely more probable that a Supreme mind is in
existence who knows the whole, while we only know a small part,
than that man is the supreme intelligence himself.
Moreover, if there were no such supreme intelligence, the universe
supposing it to be self-evolved (and of course unconscious, since it is
not intelligent) has only just come into self-consciousness through
one of its parts, viz., man. It had been, so to speak, asleep all these
eycles of ages till man was born, and his intellect dawned upon
the world, and for the first time the Universe realised its own
existence through the intelligent consciousness of one of its pro
ducts I I do not think absurdity could go further than that. If
there be no God then man is the supreme intelligence, and the
product of what vye must admit to be the most profound wisdom
must then be wiser than the wisdom from which he sprang. And
if there be no self-conscious intelligence but man, then the
Universe is only just now, through man, becoming aware of its
own existence.
I throw out these fragmentary hints for abler men to take up.
They are only a specimen of what may be said for and against the
probability that there is a self-conscious supreme intelligence at the
root of, and behind, all visible and invisible things. But, if we
take man as our key to the solution of the problem, we shall find
much more in him than his mind, which justifies his belief in God;
and of this I will speak another day. I conclude by saying that
I shall be thankful to any one who will write to me, to correct my
errors and to point out any flaw in my arguments,
�“A T II E I S M.”
III.
A SERMON,
PREACHED AT ST. GEORGE’S HALL, LANGHAM PLACE,
JANUARY 26th, 1873, by the
REV. CHARLES VOYSEY.
From the Eastern Post, February Is#, 1873.
......
On Sunday (Jan. 26th) at St. George’s Hall, the Rev. C. Voysey
took his text from Psalm xl., 10., “Thy law is within my
heart.”
He said :—Last Sunday we were considering the argument for
the existence of a Supreme intelligence, which may be drawn from
the intellectual part of man’s nature. Our next step is to examine
the moral part, and to endeavour to show that the Conscience of
man furnishes strong ground for our belief in a Perfectly Good
God.
Let us first inquire what is the proper function of the Con
science. In the first place it seems to be a faculty distinct from
the ordinary reflective powers of the mind, which we sum up
under the term Reason. I do not now enquire how Conscience is,
in the first instance, generated, or whether or not it be some
phrenological organ, more or less conspicuous as a bump on the
human head. It is neither my province, nor within my grasp, to
settle such questions as to its origin or physical construction, I
have only to deal with it as it seems to most men to act- a part in
our complex nature, and to influence our conduct. In affirming,
then, the distinctness of Conscience from the Reasoning faculties,
I only speak of it as it appears -to my thought. It does not, and
cannot, teach me what is right or what is wrong. Only my
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Reason can tell me that, but as soon as I perceive what is right
my Conscience commands me to do it; as soon as I perceive what
is wrong, my Conscience forthwith commands me not to do it.
Many have been the strifes in the world owing to the confusion
between Conscience and Reason. Our knowledge being defective,
our reasoning must be sometimes fallible, our conclusions as to
right and wrong, must be sometimes false, and yet the Conscience
only sanctions what seems to be right, and forbids only what seems
to be wrong. It follows, as a matter of course, that people will
sometimes do wrong conscientiously, i.e., not as wrong, but believing
it to be right.
“ The time will come when he that killeth you
will think that he doeth God service,” is a good illustration of this
perversion of mind. Many persons will thereupon jump at the
conclusion that Conscience is not to be trusted, and that it must
be over-ruled by superior authority external to itself—whereas the
fault lies not with the Conscience but with the Reason which is
imperfectly enlightened. The Conscience has nothing whatever to
do with drawing the conclusions of the Reason; its only function
is to endorse with all the weight of its sanction whatever the
Reason has pronounced to be right. Conscience, even in its
apparently worst perversions, is not perverted at all, is still loyal
to the best that is put before it. It cannot help us to makeup Our
minds in the least degree ; it waits quietly till this process is com
pleted by the Beason, and then steps in with its powerful mandate,
to demand that the best alternative should be adopted and pursued.
It has always seemed to me a great mistake to blame the Con
science for those moral errors which have been perpetrated in its
name. Conscience is evex loyal to duty as duty, never sanctions
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any "wrong as wrong, is a perpetual witness in the soul of man for
all righteousness, and it differs in different men only in strength
and intensity, in its power to control the life ; it does not differ in
being morally inferior and superior.
If my Conscience sanctions what another man’s Conscience
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would condemn, tliat only shows that there is a moral difference of
opinion in our respective minds, not that his Conscience is more
loyal to what is right than my Conscience, nor mine than his.
Looseness of language is largely responsible for many popular
errors. We often speak of one man as conscientious, and another
as unconscientious, when the real difference we wish to describe is
the difference of their moral opinions. We ought never to use
these terms “ conscientious and unconscientious,” except to dis
tinguish between the man who obeys his Conscience and the other
who disobeys it. W e take too much for granted that our estimate
of what is right and wrong is shared by every one else alike; and
then come to the false conclusion that those who do not do what we
believe to be right are acting against their' Consciences.
Whole races of men we have heard stigmatised as wanting in
conscientiousness because they are remarkably untruthful; othei’S
because they are habitual thieves ; others because they love to
shed innocent blood and their land groans with murder ; others
because they are frivolous, fickle and vain ; others because
polygamy is their law ; others because they practice polyandry.
In all these cases you find conscience quite as much at work as in
ourselves, commanding what is believed to be right, for bide, ing
what is believed to be wrong. They lie, and steal, and murder,
&c., through their want of clear and vigorous perception that lying,
stealing, and murder are wrong. Their education has been defi
cient, and the inherited tendency to these habits has not been
resisted; they are ever ready with reasons to justify their conduct,
or to make very light of it. Otherwise, it would have been
impossible for whole populations to connive at these outrages, and
to shield the guilty heads from the penalties of the law. But
these same people taught from their youth up to regard some act
of religious observance as the highest of all duties, and the neglect
of it the most wicked of crimes, are very very conscientious in the
discharge of that duty, and manifest the functions of Conscience
in that particular, in a striking degree.
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If ever the question is raised ‘‘ Why does the Conscience bid
you do this,” the sole answer always is, “ Because it is right.”
Never in any case is it “ Because it is wrong, ”
The Conscience is, I grant, not equally strong in all men. In
some natures it has more, in others less, power to influence the
conduct. But this is only like all other faculties in man. The
Reason, the imagination, the affections, the hopes, and the fears
vaiy considerably in strength and degree in different men, and so
also the Conscience varies; in some it is the lord of the whole
life, in others it is hustled into a corner and seldom suffered to raise
its voice. But it is sufficiently universal to be argued from as
the common property of human nature, and in reasoning about the
source and fountain of all things, the Conscience is as much entitled
to be considered as the intellect.
Moreover, if we would argue fairly, wo must take the average
quality of the Conscience rather than the mor® rare instances of
those who hardly exhibit any Conscience at all. In a treatise
on the Reason of man, it would be manifestly unfair to
take only the undeveloped state of it, as it appears in a
child, 01 the diseased condition of it as it appears in an idiot; so
in speaking of the Conscience of man we ought to take it in
its more complete and perfectly healthy development, in the
noblestmoral examples, rather than its earlier and undeveloped
state.
We are searching for indications of a Divine Being among the
works of the universe, we have found, so far, that man is the
noblest of them, by Reason of his Intellect alone, but we find that
he has something else, which, in his own estimation, he reckons
nobler still than Intellect—viz., Conscience, or the faculty which
urges him to do what is right and avoid what is wrong, and this
faculty is, In its normal exercise, one of the greatest blessings
which man could possess.
In thd first place, it marks afresh our superiority to the physical
world. While everything around us is by the laws and constitution
of its nature designed for selfishness, to win its way, if it can, in
the struggle for existence ; while even the body of man, with all
its functions, has precisely the same nature, and might lawfully
(were it not for the Reason and Conscience) study its own comfort
�and well-being alone, and without the smallest scruple, enrich
and adorn itself at the ruin of others ; while the unbridled indul
gence of our physical instincts would lead us to the most profound
animalism and beastiality, the Conscience is the chief faculty of
our being, which rescues us from this degradation, and actually
alters the whole natural course and tendency of our lives. That
we should, to some extent, lead animal lives is not merely inevitable,
but necessary and good, and, therefore, we find the Conscience, duly
enlightened by Reason, sanctioning a certain degree of animalism
for the very purpose of carrying out a benevolent design; but the
checks and limits, which the Conscience puts upon our indulgence,
are of a nature to cause us, at times, positive pain and annoyance.
We cannot obey the Conscience in everything without trampling
on our physical nature, and sometimes not without permanent
injury to our health and brain. Self-denial and mortification of
the flesh, (and I use this term in the very widest sense, and not
merely in the sense of asceticism) are absolutely necessary to the
perfect supremacy of the Conscience when enlightened by Reason,
If my Reason tells me that such and such a thing is wrong, i.e.,
will inflict, injury on others, that does not necessarily prevent my
wishing to do it. I cannot help wishing to do it, if the gratification
be very great, and do it I should to a certainty, but for that
wonderful monitor within, who says “ How can I do this great
wickedness and sin against God.”
The collision is so complete between the higher voice and the
impelling instinct, that one can only feel that the two are radically
different in nature, and must have had a different source. This
struggle between a strong desire and a higher law within the same
breast if it gives any witness, bears testimony to the exalted
nature of man, and almost drives him in thought to the threshold
of that Heavenly Home, where he was born and cradled. To have
the power of doing intentionally what one shrinks from doing, and
to deny oneself the pleasure which is so fascinating, and which one
longs to do, is to prove the immense superiority of our inner selves
over the visible universe.
Here I must pause to notice an objection which may be urged,
that whenever we obey the Conscience we only do so to gain a
greater pleasure than we relinquish. It is said that we are still
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selfish after all, and dread remorse more than the present pain of
self-denial. Now I cannot, of course, speak for others, but for my
self I deny this with my whole soul. I am perfectly certain that
it is neither fear of greater pain, nor hope for greater joy, that
makes me endeavour to obey my conscience. Many a time in my
life I have had nothing at all but pain for doing what I thought to
be right, and I did it too, grudgingly, half regretting my own self
denial, at the time wishing that I had not been so Conscientious.
It is unfair to mankind to put such a construction upon their sub
mission to that imperious call of conscience. To us, perhaps, the
hope of being perfectly conformed to God’s will, in some far-off
future, may be an attraction entering into more than half our
moral struggles but nothing can be more false than to say it is
always so, or to deny the possibility of a man doing what his
Conscience demands from the most disinterested motives. For does
not Conscience itself sit in judgment with Reason upon motives as
well as conduct ? Does it not condemn, as unworthy, all motives
of action, the. core and kernel of which is selfishness ? No doubt in
our imperfect state our motives are not always pure and perfectly
disinterested, but the soul of man has at all events risen up to
that height in which it deliberately distinguishes pure from impure
motives ; and while she gives her solemn approval to the nobler,
she condemns and denounces the baser. There is all the difference
between seeking to be true to one’s higher nature and seeking
greater happiness. It is true we cannot avoid the happiness, but
we disqualify ourselves for its attainment the moment we fix upon
it a longing eye. What often determines our choice is the strength
of our conviction that a thing is right, not the possibility of our
being the happier for it afterwards. The efforts made by some to
depreciate the force and value of Conscience are unworthy of men
who profess to be students of facts and phenomena; for if there
had been no cases of genuine disinterested doing of duty for duty’s
sake, we should never have been able to discover the difference
*
between that and seeking our own happiness. Man has detected
the superiority of the one motive over the other, only after having
witnessed or experienced the higher motive in himself. Had it
never been done, man would never have imagined that it could be
done.
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And this brings me to notice that the Conscience, enlightened by
Reason, always urges us to do good to our fellow-men, rather than
to make them happy. An unenlightened benevolence, such as the
animal instinct of an indulgent parent, which leads to the spoiling
x of a child, is a mere impulse to give happiness, and is on that
grouud actually condemned by the enlightened Conscience, because
that happiness not only does not tend to the child’s real and lasting
good, but tends to his present and future degradation. In its
higher state the Conscience bids us aim exclusively at the culti
vation of all virtue in ourselves and in others. It teaches us
always to subordinate happiness to holiness, and often deliberately
to forego and withhold happiness, that goodness may ensue. Truth
and righteousness would be preferred, not only before wealth and
comfort here below, but even before an eternity of mere enjoyment
without personal holiness. Thus, on every side, it seems that the
superiority of our inner nature becomes an antagonism to the out
ward and visible. “ The flesh warreth against the spirit, and the
spirit against the flesh, and these are contrary the one to the other.”
The contrast and hostility between them we all feel, but which of
the two do we reckon the higher, the nobler, the truer part of
man 1 Surely the Conscience—the Conscience which makes us
mortify our flesh with its affections and lusts, which often and
often mars our happiness and embitters our pleasure, upbraids us
with reproaches, and stings us with remorse—that voice which
hushes our cry for happiness, which will not endure a single selfish
plea, but demands unquestioning obedience, and bids us fall down
in the very dust before the majesty of duty. We all in our secret
hearts revere this power, whether or not we obey it as we should.
At least we pay it the homage of our inmost souls and feel how
great and grand it is to be its slave.
We have here, then, something in man which we cannot find in
the physical universe, where happiness is the aim of every living
thing. Every single being in every class of animal life, including
the body of man, is constituted to seek its own happiness first, but
in man we find a principle entirely at war with this universal
instinct, a power that forces us to break the natural law of mortal
life, and to seek for that which is supremely higher than mere
animal safety and enjoyment. For the sake of goodness, men have
�learnt, not merely to suffer pain and loss themselves, but to
undergo the still worse pain of inflicting suffering upon others.
We would deliberately hurt their bodies and mortify their
desires, if by so doing we could raise them into the exalted con
dition of goodness.
Now to me, I confess, this fact is a greater revelation of a Divine
Being than even the intellect of man. For ignoring altogether
the fact that men have almost universally regarded the Conscience
as the vicegerent of God—the mere possession of a power which
claims the mastery over our whole natures, which disturbs our
animal repose, and which demands the deliberate surrender ot
happiness for the sake of truth, righteousness, and every form of
duty, brings us face to face with a power—call it human oi
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Divine—which, whatever it be, is absolutely transcendent over
nature, and suggests to our minds the existence of another world
altogether, in and around us, in which the laws and forces of the
visible universe have no place. Were we to grant that our intellect
is only an animal organism, we should still be at our wits’ end to
account for the Conscience on purely physical grounds; and we
would never get over the anomaly and absurdity of the Universe
evolving and evolving itself cycle after cycle till it produced an
element at variance with its own laws, a power and a force which
deliberately set them at defiance, and a conscious being who calmly
rejected, for the sake of virtue, the most enticing happiness placed
in its path. If we could get over the intellectual difficulty of
Atheism, we could never get over the difficulty which is presented
by the Conscience. I do not den> that there is antagonism in the
physical universe ; it abounds everywhere ; it is in accordance with
its own principle of “ Everyone for himself;” but that antagonism
is wholly different from that which exists between two distinct
portions of one and the same being; greater still is the difference
when we observe that the higher law often condemns as morally
wrong what nature herself tempts us to do.
I cannot pursue the enquiry further at present, it is enough that
the human Conscience is not merely superior, but antagonistic, to
the selfish principle in nature, to prove that if we would search for
indications of the Deity, we must make man the field of our
enquiry.
�“ATHEIS M.”
IV.
A SERMON,
PRE ACHED AT ST. GEORGE’S HALL, LANGHAM PLACE,
FEBRUARY 2.nd, 1873, by the
REV. CHARLES VOYSEY.
From the Eastern Post, February 8th, 1873.
On Sunday (Feb. 2nd) at St. George’s Hall, the Rev. C. Voysey
took his text from 1 John iv., 16, “God is love; and he that
dwelletli in love dwelletli in God, and God in him.”
He said—We now come to the third branch of our enquiry into
the nature of man, in search for indications of a Supreme and
Perfect Divine Being.
We have perceived, in the intellect of man, manifest tokens of
a supreme intellect from which it sprang. AVe have discovered in
the Conscience a power, not only superior, but antagonistic, to the
forces in Natureand we must now direct our attention to Human
Love.
What is Love ? This sacred name has alas ! been shamefully
misapplied. It has been made t^stand for its very opposite
selfishness. It has been used to denote the most imperious of our
animal instincts, the gratification of merely physical desire j even
the mere desire to attain such enjoyment, has been profanely called
Love. Far be it from me to deem anything which God has placed
in the nature of man as unholy or unclean. The animal instinct
referred to is exquisite and sacred, the source of untold happiness,
and the fountain of domestic virtue, but then it is not Love.
When people talk of “ making Love ” and “ falling in Love,” they
are using expressions of profound inaccuracy, for which the
poverty of our language is the only excuse. The affection which
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subsists between lovers, husbands and wives, parents and children,
brothers and sisters, is
nothing more than a merely
animal attachment to each other, which they share in common with
the birds of the air and the beasts of the field. It is - all called
“ Love,” and we cannot in a day—no, not in a generation—change
its name. But the time seems to have come for us to make long
and loud our protest against the use of ambiguous terms. Words
do re-act more or less upon those who use them, and if we persist
in applying one and the same term to two or more absolutely
distinct things, we shall come in time to lose sight of the distinc
tion between them, and in that case the higher sense will be
forgotten, and the lower one alone remain.
Now, to discern what Love is, we must contrast it with what it
is not.
We find everywhere reigning in nature the law of self-love, of
self-preservation, self-indulgence, and self-advancement. We own
its necessity. No living thing is safe without it. It is given to
us that we may live as long and as happily as we can, and that we
may promote our own earthly advantage. In the struggle for
existence this law bids us without scruple trample on the rights
of others if they have any, and then might becomes right. In
reference to self-indulgence, it bids us get all the pleasure we
possibly can; it takes no account of the pleasure of others, except in
so far as it may minister to our own. And as for self-advancement
its maxim is to be first in the race if we can. Its cry is, “ Every
man for himself.”
Now it is easy to see without illustration that were this the
only law which governed humanity our time would be divided
between avarice, lust, and war. We should have nothing else to
do but to give free play to our appetites and to smite and murder
every one who stood in the way of our gratification. Supposing
that a certain amount of civilisation had been reached by mutual
concessions for the attainment of happiness, then you would have
�still a state of soiety, if society it might be called, in which selfish
ness would prevail, only somewhat refined and gilded over by
conventionalities. You would still have men seeking to make
themselves rich at the ruin of others, to indulge their animal
passions at the cost of their neighbours’ felicity, and to do each
other to death only in a slower and less brutal manner than by
bloodshed. They would still unscrupulously push themselves to the
front if possible, not caring whom they crushed or trampled under
foot in the struggle.
Bret Harte, an author to whom I shall again presently refer,
among other' writers has given pictures of life in the Far West of
America, wherein all that we could imagine of such a state of
society has been enacted within this century. Lawless, ruffianly,
selfishness has been the rule, because most of the men gathered in
those regions were mere animal men, carrying their whole animalism
with them into a district where they had no law but themselves.
This was the coarse and brutal picture of the reign of selfishness.
But we need not go so far as to San Francisco to see the same
selfishness under a more refined aspect. There are men and women
in all our great cities, aye, and in the country too, (let us hope
there are but few of them), who behave as if they were animals
and nothing more—human animals with the cunning and resources
of human skill, education, and prudence—who live for themselves
alone, and who seldom feel what it is to love. They follow their
strong instincts for pleasure and ease, their unscrupulous desire to
enrich themselves on the race-course or at the gambling tables,
their studious regard for their own health and the supply of every
luxury; and they do not hesitate in the pursuit of their own
indulgence to force their rivals or dependents down into unspeak
able misery, or leave others to die in disease and poverty, rather
than forego one of their accustomed pleasures. •
We may fairly hope that such are extreme and most rare
instances ; but dress it up as finely as you can, you will only get
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one result out of entire obedience to the natural law of selfishness,
you must have avarice, lust, murder, and all manner of crime.
Now true Love is that principle which we find almost universal
in human nature, which impels us to resist in a measure this law
of selfishness, to overcome its dictates whenever they tend to
entrench on the rights and welfare of others. Love will go long
lengths in sanctioning the law of selfishness j but there is a point
where it will stand up and resist it. It will sanction self-preservation
until another’s life is in peril. It will sanction self-indulgence
until that indulgence becomes robbery of the happiness or
well-being of another. It will sanction ambition, and even
gathering of gold, so long as the means employed do not hinder a
companion in the race.
Love will hide itself beneath an apparently selfish disguise, and
all at once it will leap out upon you in all its glory, melting your
eyes and your heart. It is that in man which redeems him from
being a beast—for man without Love is worse than any beast which
Lord God hath made; and when he Loves he becomes more than
animal, more than man, I had almost said, and stands forth in the
very image of God.
With the world so full as it is of real Love, if we will only look
for it, illustrations would be endless. But every wish felt, every
word spoken, every deed done for the sake oj others is a witne s
of true Love.
Some may say this is only the function of conscience over again.
But, in reply, I say that the brilliancy of Love outshines that of
conscience as the sun outshines the moon. Love is conscience in an
ecstasy—it is a perfect enthusiasm of goodness, because it does not
stop to reason out with itself, and to balance the pros and cons of
right and wrong, but with eager bound rushes to its goal and acts
without reflection, the slave of inspiration. Conscience says, 11 Do
this because it is right.” Love says, “ I will do this for you.”
Conscience mercifully keeps us mindful of oui’ responsibility when,
�Love is absent or cool. But Love has no responsibility, and acts
upon its own Divine impulse, needing no reminder, no prompting,
no command. We fall back upon Conscience, only when deficient
in Love.
By Love, we pass out of ourselves into our object, as it were;
we seem to have merged almost our own consciousness, sympathies,
and desires, in the soul of another ; till we live a new life in hers,
and become her saviour and her shield. When Paul said, “ Love
worketh no ill to his neighbour, therefore Love is the fulfilling of
the law,” he stated feebly and negatively the exact truth, fie
should have said, “ Love worketh all possible good to his neigh
bour, therefore Love is the fulfilling of the law.” It will not do
to leave our neighbour alone, and do him no harm ; love bids us
be active and attentive, and do him all the good we can. Then
Love is the fulfilling of all human obligations. If we were wholly
and continually under the influence of Love, and not sometimes
under the sway of selfishness, our whole lives would be blameless,
sin would be no more, and human life—ah ! it would be too sweet
ever to lay it down.
But Love teaches us that goodness is identical with the supremest
happiness of man. It is not identical with physical happiness, it
is often at war with that, and its terms with our animal nature are
unshrinking submission, and if need be, the self-sacrifice of life
itself. Yet strange—-most strange—when we suffer most for one
we love, we reap our highest joys, every wound is a healing of the
spirit, and as we lie on Love’s altar, bleeding, gasping, dying, v e
reach the sublimest region of human joy.
Think what the old poets have sung, what the Bibles of all lands
have enshrined, what tradition prizes as its noblest treasure. They
all sing in praise of Love—Love which began by heroic self-con
quest and ended in death. But one and all bear the same testi
mony, the joy of dying for Love was worth all that life itself
CQuld ever purohase.
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In those tales of the Far West, by Bret Harte, to which I have
alluded, there is unfolded a perfect gospel of this human triumph.
Amidst scenes of appalling horror, of the most brutal savagery,
and the most abandoned lawlessness, he brings to view this one
exquisite flower of humanity, and shows how Bove was at the
bottom of these fierce hearts; how it stayed the murderer’s hand ‘
how it softened the impious tongue; and brought men whose lives
had been fouled by the worst of crimes to die the noblest martyr
death. No Christ could do more than those and hundreds and
thousands of our fellow-men have done for each other, and are doing
daily—and all for Love.
That fearful catastrophe to the Northfleet, off Dungeness, which
has awakened so much sympathy throughout the land, brought
out afresh the glorious powers of self-sacrifice which belong to man.
To some, the touching incidents of the Captain’s farewell of his
wife might seem a conflict between Love and Duty. But Love and
Duty are one, they can never clash. It is always a duty to
do what Love desires. And Love itself is best proved by
doing oui Duty. Just think of those few minutes of parting
agony.
Amid the roar and screaming of rough men and women, all
struggling for their lives, some so fierce and frantic in their terror
that they must be kept back from swamping the boats by the cap
tain’s revolver, his young wife, a bride ef seven weeks, pleads to
be allowed to stay and die at her husband’s side. Her Love, how
ever, made her lose herself in him, and to make him happy she
would do his bidding, and live in bitter grief all her days. Her
Love and duty were one. She would have stayed and died for
Love; she left him for a life of woe—no less for Love. It was all
she could do for him, to live because he asked it; and he, in his
keen sense of duty, knew that to desert his ship even for his
wife’s sake would have been no act of Love to her. To bring with
him into safety a soiled reputation and an honour stained would
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have been far more cruel than to have bid her farewell for ever.
So for Love of her, as well as for duty’s sake, he stands firm as a
rock ; and fighting God’s battle for the weak, against the strong
until the surging waves engulph him, he dies a hero and a martyr,
and around his cross let us say in solemn reverence, “ Truly this
was the Son of God.”
Are there no more like him ? Yea ! thousands on thousands.
The earth is full of such heroes, though we know them not,
and their lives and deaths have been done in secret—no
plaudits to give them courage; no eulogies spoken over their
graves. Ask the generals who lead armies, the captains who
carry their vessels all over the world, search the records of
the Royal Humane Society, look into the hospitals, the theatres,
and the homes of the poor. Enquire at the police stations; yes,
and search the gaols and the galleys. Everywhere you find such
Love as makes men and women Divine; raises them above them
selves, i.e., above all that selfish nature would make them. If
you will only look for it, I believe every one you meet can show
it, or has some heavenly story to tell of how it was shown to
them. Let us not say, then, that God has deserted his world,
while he has given us love. “ He left not himself without wit
ness in that he did us good,” says the Apostle. But he
goes on to say, “ in giving us rain and fruitful seasons,
filling our hearts with food and gladness.”
I will not
question the general benevolence of the arrangements of nature;
but they are not worth looking at by the side of the marvellous
gift of Love which God has given to men to make them fruitful in
all virtue, triumphant over all appetites and passions, and full of joy
unspeakable, and full of glory. This great gift, I say, is so
antagonistic to the laws and forces of nature that it cannot have
had its origin in the visible universe whose laws it sets at defiance.
It cannot be “ of the earth, earthy,” it must be “ the Lord from
Heaven,” it must be an afflatus which is Divine, We
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cannot deny the influence winch, it wields. To see and hear
of any noble act of Love warms and melts the most frozen
nature, and breaks the heart of stone. All mankind, in various
ways, bears testimony to the supremacy of Love. Just as we admire
a conscientious fool more than a clever rogue, so do we admire him
who is impelled by Love more than one who is only guided by a
cold sense of duty. Among the faculties of man, then, Love holds
the very highest place. It is the instinct of doing the best possible
good. "While conscience is our authority for doing it, Love leaps
into the act without needing any sanction at all. To do anything
for Love is to justify the deed without any further plea.
I have only then to urge once more, that as man is the noblest
work in the universe, and as Love is the noblest part of man, so
we must infer that God cannot be a Being inferior to the most
Loving of men. He may be, and to our adoring eyes of faith He
really is, far and high exalted ovei his noblest creature ; but less
*
than that He cannot be. Whenever, therefore, we would conceive
of Him, we must make the noblest part of the noblest man’s
character our starting point, or else we shall do violence to the first
principles of Reason, and contradict the universal testimony of the
human Consciousness.
I believe it can be shown that, with the light of human Love
shed upon the scene, all that is most dark, and sad, and dismal in
the world can be reconciled with the existence of a Perfectly Holy
and Loving God; and more than that, the miseries of the world
become proofs and tokens of what God is, and unfold to us His
nature in a more complete and intelligible manner than had we
been living in a fairyland, or had we been all our lives happy
citizens of some Golden Jerusalem. If you shut out sorrow you
shut out the highest, purest, forms of Love. And if you shut out
Love you shut out God. So we come back, out of our clouds
of sorrow, to praise His glorious Name for every wounded heart,
for- every scalding tear, for every last farewell I
�■k
“A T H E I S M.”
V.—ON
£
“THE MARTYRDOM OF MAN.”
A SERMON,
PREACHED AT ST. GEORGE’S HALL, LANGHAM PLACE,
FEBRUARY 16th, 1873, by the
R EV. CHARLES VOYSEY.
From tits Eastern Post, February 22nd, 1873.
On Sunday (Feb. 16th) at St. George’s Hall, the Rev. C. Voysey
took his text from Hebrew xii, 11, “ Now no chastening for the
present seemeth to be joyous but grievous j nevertheless afterward
it yieldeth the peaceable fruit of righteousness unto them which
are exercised thereby.”
He said :—In my last sermon I endeavoured to describe what
true Love is ; how it differs from merely animal attachment, how
complete is its triumph over the natural desires, and how it raises
us into the highest happiness in the supreme act of self-sacrifice.
It is my purpose now to point out the process by which Love is
venerated or brought out into manifestation j to show that Love
cannot be developed at all except under the conditions of suffering
or sin, and therefore that that which we deem the most beautiful
flower of humanity Is the result of those very conditions on which
the Atheist bases his strongest arguments against the existence of
a Good God. The Atheist, as represented by Mr Winwood
Reade in his Martyrdom of Man, argues thus :—
“ The conduct of a father towards his child appears to be cruel
but it is not cruel in reality. He beats the child but he does it
I
�2
for the child’s own good; he is not omnipotent; he is therefore
obliged to choose between two evils. But the Creator is omnipotent;
He therefore chooses cruelty as a means of education or develop
ment ; He therefore has a preference for cruelty, or He would not
choose it; He is therefore fond of cruelty, or He would not prefer
it; He is therefore cruel, which is absurd.”
“ Again, either sin entered the world against the will of the
Creator, in which case He is not omnipotent, or it entered with His
permission, in which case it is His agent, in which case He selects
sin, in which case He is fond of sin, in which case He is sinful,
which is an absurdity again.”—(pp, 518-519.)
It would be easy to dispose of this argument by at once disputing
the hypothesis that God is omnipotent. The so-called “ omnipo
tence” of God has assumed the most extravagant shapes in the
human imagination. We could name a score or two of things
inherently impossible, which God Himself has no power to do
He cannot make the phenomena of noon and midnight to coincide.
He cannot so alter the nature of a thing as to make it at the same
moment both a cube and a sphere. He cannot confound the parts
of a thing with each other, or put any part for the whole. God
could not make my hand to be my eye j nor my eye to be my handNever could a single limb be a whole human body. Never can
God undo the past or break the sequence of time. God Himself
could not make any material thing to be in two places at once.
God’s power is limited—by what, we do not know—possibly bv
His own will; i.e.—if he wills a thing to be such and such, He
cannot at the same time make it to be absolutely different. We
have no difficulty whatever in giving up the notion of God’s
omnipotence, when the idea of that omnipotence is stretched
beyond the limits of common sense. But this is not quite the
point in the passage quoted from Mr. Reade’s book which I desire
to take up. He manifestly assumes and elsewhere affirms, that if
there be a God, He cannot be either cruel or sinful. Mr. Reade
�3
calls it “ an incontrovertible n axim in morality that a God has no
right to create men except for their good.” We would go further
still, and say, “ God has no right to create any self-conscious
creatures at all, except for their good.” The author then turns to
man and nature, and finds visible tokens of suffering and sin;
from which he draws the conclusion that there is no God. It is
perfectly logical, because his suppressed premiss is, “ that suffer
ing and sin are evils per se, and what is more, they are unnecessary
evils”
If this were true, then with the facts before us, we could draw
no other conclusion than that an evil God caused the unnecessary
evils; but when we confront this conclusion with the axiom that
an evil God is a contradiction in terms; or more plainly, that “ if
there be a God, lie must be good,” it follows at once that if
suffering and sin are unnecessary evils, there is no God at all.
What, then, we have to dispute is the assumption that suffering
and sin are evils, per se, and unnecessary evils.
If we can show that suffering and sin are not evils, per se, but
only relatively evils compared with other conditions ; and further,
that they are not unnecessary, but absolutely indispensable to our
highest good, then, instead of going to prove that there is no God,
suffering and sin will go far to prove that there is a God; and
moreover, a good and holy God, who would not create any creature
except for its good. Now, as I must not attempt too many things
at once, I must leave on one side for the present the sufferings of
the lower orders of animals, and confine myself only to the subject
of the sufferings and sin which are endured by man.
Of the various functions which suffering and sin serve in the
economy of the moral world, I have elsewhere written at some
length ; I now only desire to dwell upon one function, the chiefest
of all, viz.,—they are the agents by which the purest Love is called
forth. If they do originate or call into activity this noblest, most
beautiful part of man’s nature, they cannot be evils per se; and if
�as far as we know, such Love could never have birth apart from
suffering and sin, then they are necessary.
You will remember that true Love is the very opposite of
selfishness—it makes us do sometimes the most painful things ; it
is most exalted and supreme in a perfect self-sacrifice.
Now, what do we find, e.g., in the relations between husband
and wife. Granted that there has been much animal attachment
between them, and that true Love has not been yet elicited. Let
one or the other be in sickness or pain, or in any trouble of mind,
body, or estate, and then, if there be a germ of Love in the other,
it will come forth in thoughts, words, and deeds, of exquisite
sympathy and self-devotion. We need not lift the sacred veil
which covers wedded life, but surely all husbands and wives must
know that their real Love first made itself heard and seen in some
season of suffering and pain; they know what holy sacrifices it has
demanded and received. Suffering is the cradle of Love.
See, too, how the mother’s love, even as a mere animal affection,
surpasses the Love which first made her a bride; and how it quickens
her into activity of devotion; giving, and toiling, and watching;
watching, and toiling, and giving, day and night, to her own cost
of health, rest, and ease; and why ? because her infant is feeble,
dependent, suffering. Its cries lacerate the mother’s heart, and fill
her eyes with tears ; but the same sting kindles a Love which is
Divine, making her ready to give her life for her babe.
You see the same thing in the family. How selfish, how
quarrelsome, children often are; till the hour comes when there
is an accident, a terrible bruise, or a broken bone; and up the
little wranglers run and are like ministeiing angels to the sufferer.
Toys that were once fought for are now heaped on the sick-bed
without being asked for, and the dreariness of the siek-chamber is
willingly endured by sturdy ruddy boys who would ten times
rather have been out at play. But Love has made them stay by
the sick-bed, drawn thither by her handmaid—Suffering. It is
�5
almost invariable that the weakest, sickliest, membei of a family
receives the most love, and is served with the greatest self
sacrifices. And it often happens that a son who has brought the
family into trouble, or a daughter who has put it to shame, is the
object of the parent’s tenderest, most anxious, self-denying Love.
The old story of the Prodigal Son is not only exquisitely true to
nature,but a most powerful illustration of the theory that suffering
and sin are the very cradle of the Highest Love.
By very instinct we look on sin as a terrible kind of suffering
—a fearful moral disease—and it hag a tendency to call out Love,
in spite of its first tendency to call out hatred. We are angry
and indignant if any injury be done to ourselves it is true, but the
highest and rarest forms of Love—viz., mercy and forgiveness,
are very often developed by the wrong doing of others. What
sight more pretty among children than the making up of some
quarrel, the sweet overtures of tiny arms around tiny necks, and
the smothering kisses all wet with tears, which tell of the birth
of the highest Love in their little souls !
In domestic life it often happens that sin, as well as sorrow, calls
forth this noblest virtue. Neglected duties, careless accidents,
even want of fidelity and honesty on the part of servants, have
been overlooked, or forgiven and forgotten out of true pity and
charitv, which “ hopeth all things.” In like manner lovingservants have borne long and patiently with the provocations of
of their masters, forgiving their harsh and inconsiderate treat
ment and their surly tempers, and covering with a sacred privacy
their worst failings. Old and young, all around in turn, have to
bear and forbear, i.e., to bear gently the injuries cf others and to
forbear from revenge, to return good for evil, and thus to rise into
man’s most exalted condition because of the sin which is being con
tinually committed. Love cannot rise higher than this—to render
good for ill, to overcome all evil with good. And where, we ask,
would such Love be but for the evil which calls it into exercise ?
But go abroad and look on men and women beyond the home
which is but a microcosm, and you will see the same beautiful
sights if you knew how to look for them. Sin and sorrow every
�where—but sin and sorrow followed by the holiness and joy of
Heaven-born love. What man or woman who had ever felt the
bliss of it would wish it had never been ?
To have received an injury, and yet to have pardon freely, and
to have turned our foe into a friend, is unspeakably better than to
have received no injury at all. To have kindled Love—true Love
in the breast of another, is worth doing at the cost of much
suffering. And although no one would be so mad as to incur
disease on purpose to arouse sympathy, or so idiotic as to commit
an injury for the sake of being forgiven; yet, for all that, the
suffering and the sin do raise the hearts of those who come in
contact with them, and teach them what they could not otherwise
learn. As Miss Cobbe says in her Intuitive Morals. “ Instead of
an evil nature, oui' lower nature is a necessary postulate of all
our virtue.” Every word you use to denote the highest human
qualities implies the conditions of pain and sin. You speak of
patience ? How could you be patient if there were no trials to
bear, no cruel suspense to undergo, no provocation to irritate your
temper, or to prompt your revenge? You speak of mercy and
forgiveness ? How could you be merciful to those who have done
you no wrong, or forgive those who have never sinned ? You
speak of generosity of heart and hand ? What generosity of
heart could you feel for those who never failed in duty, who never
transgressed the exact limits of their own rights ? What
generosity of hand could you show to those who never needed
your bounty, and what happiness was already full ? You speak
of sympathy, but sooner could the light be severed from the sun
than sympathy be detached from suffering. How could you know
what this perfectly holy feeling is, had there been no suffering to
feel for, no pains to lament, no sin to degrade and distress ? And
you speak of Love—the word which gathers up patience, mercy,
forgiveness, generosity, sympathy, and surpasses them all ? How
could you have known the bliss of it unless human feeling had
been, as it were, bruised and trampled on, to spread its fragrance,
and to shed its life-giving wine? Humanity has indeed been
martyred. Its flesh has been given for the life of the world. Its
sacrifice was needed before men could grow out of the human into
the Divine. Sin and sorrow must rend it, pain and shame must
�7
tread it down, before Love can grow out of it. Your animal
affections, mis-called Love, are only the products of physical ease,
of undisturbed selfishness ; but you had to mortify the flesh with
its affections and lusts before true Love could take its throne in
your soul. You must see and feel what sin and suffering are ;
you must feel them in your own proper person that you may
know what they mean in others, and then you shall enter by that
gate through which all must pass who would fain be Divine. As
fast as one set of sins and sufferings are overcome, new ones arise
in their place. Generation succeeding generation finds the
martyrdom of man taking new shape ; but this is only that man
may not die eternally, but share the life which is endless and
divine. Each age must bear and be hung upon its own cross, that
everyone may learn how to love and be loved.
Evils, you call them ? Well 1 so they are, if, by evil, you mean
that which makes one uncomfortable, The rod, the medicine, and
the surgeon’s knife, are, in this sense, evils. But not so do I
define evil. I call that an evil which works only for harm and
incurable misery ; and of such kind of evil I do not know one
single specimen in the whole universe. Relatively, many things
are evil, nay, almost all things but Love, because they are
imperfections, and constantly under the correction of something
better; but so long as they are working for final good, all things
are good, and to dispense with any one of them while it thus works
would be our bitter loss.
But granting that sin and suffering are evils—not absolute but
relative, we must admit that they are necessary to the development
of that which is highest and most lovely in man’s nature. Because,
as I have tried to show, Love in its highest and purest forms has
no existence apart from the conditions of sin and sorrow which
call it into exercise.
I do not say that this, therefore, proves the existence of God,
but it removes one of the most common and powerful arguments
against it. It destroys the objection of the Atheist which is based
on the sin and misery of the world.
There remains one more objection to meet, and that is contained
in Mr. Reade’s question, “ If God is Love, why is there any bad at
all ?’ Because, I answer, there would have been no more love in
�8
God than love in man, but for the bad. Had there been no
conditions like ours in the universe, the Creator’s heart could have
known nothing of that feeling which we call Love.
Rightly or wrongly, we ascribe to the Divine Being a divine
conquest of Love over what are to us the difficulties and obstacles
in nature. We believe He is taming and subduing all things to
His purposes, and making all things work together for good
to every creature which He has made. Our own highest attitude
in our difficulties of sin and sorrow is that of patient, untiring
Love; and this it is, only in its supremest exaltation that we
ascribe to Him when we say “ God is Love ”
To do the final good at once, instead of to prolong the precess
through painful stages, even if it were possible, would be to achieve
something quite foreign to our best conceptions of good. But it is
a begging of the whole question to imply that it could- be done
*
To make men good at once, without the intermediate processes of
pain and sin, would be to make another kind of creature altogether,
of whom and of whose happiness we have neither experience nor
conception. As well might you try to imagine a man who had
*
never been a child, as a man made perfect without the discipline of
sin and sorrow.
I rejoice in it all, as I have often said, with unspeakable and
glowing delight. My frail flesh would fain escape some of its
dreadful pangs, would fain lay the heavy burden of its cross upon
the shoulders of others. I shudder when I see and think of the
martyrdom of pain, and the worse crucifixion of shame, which
have been the portion of some, and might have been my own •
but I would not have one grain of the world’s burden lightened
by evasion, or one pang dulled by the deadly anodyne,''' so as to
■miss the Heaven-sent blessing which comes to us in disguise,
or to interfere even in thought with the perfect arrangements of
the most Loving Will. I would still say of it all,
“ It is the Lord, let him do what seemeth him good.”
* In the present controversy about Euthanasia, I wish it to be understood that
the term “deadly anodyne” has na reference to the humane and perfectly
justifiable methods of preventing or alleviating physical suffering. I have been
for years an earnest advocate of Euthanasia, and I deem it right to use all means
in our power to diminish or prevent pain. Pain and sin are things to be conquered
and got rid of by all means short of injury to others, or to our higher nature;
but not to be considered unr.ecessarj/ when they are inevitable.
�
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A collection of digitised nineteenth-century pamphlets from Conway Hall Library & Archives. This includes the Conway Tracts, Moncure Conway's personal pamphlet library; the Morris Tracts, donated to the library by Miss Morris in 1904; the National Secular Society's pamphlet library and others. The Conway Tracts were bound with additional ephemera, such as lecture programmes and handwritten notes.<br /><br />Please note that these digitised pamphlets have been edited to maximise the accuracy of the OCR, ensuring they are text searchable. If you would like to view un-edited, full-colour versions of any of our pamphlets, please email librarian@conwayhall.org.uk.<br /><br /><span><img src="http://www.heritagefund.org.uk/sites/default/files/media/attachments/TNLHLF_Colour_Logo_English_RGB_0_0.jpg" width="238" height="91" alt="TNLHLF_Colour_Logo_English_RGB_0_0.jpg" /></span>
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Atheism
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Voysey, Charles [1828-1912]
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Place of publication: [London]
Collation: 5 parts ; 19 cm.
Notes: 5 pamphlets on Atheism delivered at St. George's Hall, Langham Place and printed by the Evening Post. 1: January 12th, 1873 from the Evening Post, January 18th, 1873. II. January 19th, 1873 from the Evening Post, January 25th, 1873. III. January 26th, 1873 from the Eastern Post, February 1st, 1873. IV: February 2nd, 1873 from the Evening Post, February 8th, 1873. V: subtitled 'On the Martyrdom of Man' February 16th, 1873 from the Eastern Post, February 22nd. 1873. Part of Morris Tracts 6.
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Atheism
Morris Tracts
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Text
252,1
ATHEISM
A SPECTRE.
WITH READING FROM MAX MULLER'S SIXTH
HIBBERT LECTURE.
SOUTH PLACE CHAPEL, JUNE 23, 1878.
BY
MONCURE D. CONWAY, M.A.
PRICE TWOPENCE,
�LONDON 5
PRINTED BY WATERLOW AND SONS LIMITED
LONDON WALL.
�READING.
(From Max Müller's Sixth Hibbert Lecture?)
In the bright sky they (the ancient Aryans) perceived an Illumi
nator ; in the all-encircling firmament an Embracer ; in the roar
of thunder and in the violence of the storm they felt the pre
sence of a Shouter and ®f furious Strikers, and out of rain they
created an Indra, or giver of rain. With this last step, however,
came also the first re-action, the first doubt So long as the
thoughts of the ancient Aryan worshippers had something mani
fest or tangible to rest on, they might, no doubt, in their religious
aspirations, far exceed the limits of actual observation ; still no
one could ever question the existence of what they chose to call
their Devas or their gods. The mountains and rivers were always
there to speak for themselves, and if the praises bestowed upon
them seemed to be excessive, they might be toned down, without
calling in question the existence of these gods. The same applied
to the sky, the sun, and'the dawn. They also were always there,
and though they might be called mere visions and appearances, yet
the human mind is so made that it admits of no appearance
without admitting at the same time something that appears, some
reality or substance. But when we come to the third class of
gods, not only intangible, but invisible, the case is different.
Indra, as the giver of rain, Rudra, as the thunderer, were com
pletely creations of the human mind. All that was given was
' the rain, and the thunder ; but there was nothing in nature that
�4
could be called an appearance of the god himself, who thundered
or who sent the rain. Man saw their work, but that was all: no
one could point to the sky or the sun or the dawn or anything
else visible, to attest the existence of Indra and Rudra. We saw
before that Indra, for the very reason that there was nothing in
nature to which he cluDg, nothing visible that could arrest his
growth, developed more than all the other gods into a personal,
dramatic, and mythological being. More battles are recorded,
more stories are told of Indra than of any other Vedic god, and
this helps us to understand how it was that he seemed even to the
ancient poets to have ousted Dyaus, the Indian Zeus, from his
supremacy. But a Nemesis was to come. The very god who
seemed for a time to have thrown all the others into the shade,
whom many would call, if not the supreme, at least the most
popular deity of the Veda, was the first god whose very exist
ence was called in question. . . Thus we read, “Offer praise
to Indra if you desire booty, true praise, if he truly exists.
Some one says : There is no Indra ! Who has seen him ? Whom
shall we praise ? ” In this hymn the poet turns round, and, intro
ducing Indra himself, makes him say : “ Here I am O worship
per ! Behold me here ! In might I overcome all creatures.” But
we read again in another hymn : ‘ ‘ The terrible one of whom
they ask where he is, and of whom they say that he is not: he
takes away the riches of his enemies like the stakes at a game ;
Believe in him, ye men, for he is indeed Indra.” When we thus
see the old god Dyaus antiquated by Indra, Indra himself denied,
and Prajapati falling to pieces, and when another poet declares
in so many words that all the gods are but names, we might imagine
that the stream of religious thought, which sprang from a trust in
mountains and rivers, then proceeded to an adoration of the sky
and the sun, then grew into a worship of invisible gods, such as
the sender of thunderstorms and the giver of rain had well nigh
�5
finished its course. We might expect in India the same catas
trophe which in Iceland the poets of the Edda always predicted,
the Twilight of the gods, preceding the destruction of the world.
We seem to have reached the stage when Henotheism, after try
ing in vain to grow into polytheism on the one side, or mono
theism on the other, would by necessity end in Atheism, or a
denial of all the gods or Devas.
So it did. Yet Atheism is not the last word of Indian reli
gion, though it seemed to be so for a time in the triumph of
Buddhism. The word itself—Atheism—is out of place as applied
to the religion of India. The ancient Hindus had neither the
0eos of the Homeric singers, nor the
of the Eclectic philo
sophers. Their Atheism, such as it was, would more correctly
be called Adevism, or a denial of the old Devas. Such a denial,
however, of what was once believed, but could be believed no
longer, so far from being the destruction, is in reality the vital
principle of all religion. The ancient Aryans felt from the
beginning—aye, it may be more in the beginning than afterwards
—the presence of a Beyond, of an Infinite, of a Divine, or what
ever else we may call it now ; and they tried to grasp and com
prehend it, as we all do, by giving it name after name. They
thought they had found it in the Mountains or Rivers, in the Dawn,
in the Sun, in the Sky, in the Heaven, and the Heaven-Father.
But after every name there came the No! What they looked for
was like the Mountains, like the Rivers, like the Dawn, like the
Sky, like theFather : but it was not the Mountains, «¿/the Rivers»
not the Dawn, not the Sky, it was not the Father. It was some
thing of all that, but it was also more, it was beyond all that.
Even such general names as Asura or Deva could no longer
satisfy them. There may be Devas and Asuras, they said, but
we want more, we want a higher word, a purer thought. They
denied the bright Devas, not because they believed or desired
�6
less, but because they believed and desired more than the bright
Devas. There was a conception working in their mind: and the
cries of despair were but the harbingers of a new birth. So it
has been, so it always will be. There is an Atheism which is
unto death, there is another Atheism which is the very life
blood of all true faith. It is the power of giving up what in
our best, our most honest moments, we know to be no longer
true; it is the readiness to replace the less perfect, however
dear it may have been to us, by the more perfect, however
much it may be detested, as yet, by others. It is the true self
surrender, the true self-sacrifice, the truest trust in truth, the
truest faith. Without that Atheism no new religion, no reform,
no reformation, no resuscitation, would ever have been possible;
without that Atheism no new life is possible for any one of us.
In the eyes of the Brahmans, Buddha was an Atheist; in the
eyes of the Athenian Judges, Socrates was an Atheist; in the
eyes of the Pharisees, St. Paul was an Atheist; in the eyes of
Swiss Judges, Servetus was an Atheist; and why? Because
every one of them was yearning for a higher and purer conception
of God than what he had learnt as a child.
Let no one touch religion, be he clergyman or layman, who is
afraid of being called an Infidel or an Atheist—aye, who is afraid
of asking himself, Do I believe in a God, or do I not ? Let me
quote the words of a great divine, lately deceased, whose honesty
and piety have never been questioned: “God,” he says,'“is a
great word. He who feels and understands that will judge more
mildly and more justly of those who confess that they dare not
say that they believe in God.” Now, I know perfectly well that
what I have said just now will be misunderstood, will possibly
be misinterpreted. I know I shall be accused of having defended
and glorified Atheism, and of having represented it as the last
and highest point which man can reach in an evolution of
�7
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t2
9
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,
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religious thought. Let it be so. If there are but a few here present
who understand what I mean by honest Atheism, and who know
how it differs from vulgar Atheism, I shall feel satisfied, for I
know that to understand this distinction will often help us in the
hour of our sorest need. It will teach us that, while the old
leaves, the leaves of a bright and happy spring, are falling, and
all seems wintry, frozen and dead within and around us, there is
and there must be a new spring in store for every warm and
honest heart. It will teach us that honest doubt is the deepest
spring of honest faith; and that he only who has lost can find.
�I
�ATHEISM.
The boldness of Max Muller’s defence of a faith
ful Atheism which I have read you, does not consist
in its thought so much as in the word he adopts.
The thought is that which sad experience has revealed
to many a reverential thinker in the past as well as
the present. William Penn, the Quaker, said that he
who speaks worthily of God is very like to be called
an Atheist. We owe high honour to the man who
has courage to proclaim in Westminster Abbey the
truth which hitherto has been uttered by the despised
and rejected. But it remains doubtful whether even
the independence and fidelity of the Hibbert lecturer,
and his learning, will be able to recover a word so
fraught with misunderstandings as the word “Atheism.”
If mankind used such words etymologically, “Atheism ”
might be restored ; but they do not; and it is to be
feared that as the name of Jesus could not save
“Jesuitism,” and the name of Christ cannot save
“Christian,” so in another direction the fact that
“ Atheist ” means one who denies the gods of common
�IO
belief, and is without any theory of God, cannot out
weigh the popular meaning of the word. To the
masses Atheist means a godless man, and a godless
man means a bad man. Because of that acquired
accent of immorality Theologians seem fond of using
the word. It is, therefore, a bit of debased currency,
and, as I think, will one day drop out of use. Yet
many excellent people, like Max Müller, see that
while theologically the word carries a vulgar mean
ing, morally it represents the right of man to grow. In
this sense it represents the freedom of man to deny
any and every god which others set up. If that right
had not been exercised we should still be worshipping
Siva or Odin, or the Virgin Mary. The same authority which w’ould to day silence the Atheist before
Jehovah, would have silenced Paul before Diana of
Ephesus. “ Atheism ” is a flag that means unlimited
right of denial, and that involves the right of progress
and the pursuit of truth.
Many liberal thinkers accept the epithet, not as
dogma—not as antitheism—but because they mean to
stand by their freedom, and will not cower before
popular clamour. Trelawney asked the poet Shelley
why, with his high pantheism, he called himself
“ Atheist.” Shelley replied that he did not choose it.
That name was the gauntlet they threw down, and he
picked it up. In that heroic spirit, some still call
�themselvesil Atheists,” even at risk of being misunder
stood. And it must be acknowledged that the epithet
will carry with it a certain accent of moral honesty and
courage, so long as intellectual liberty is met with
menace. When that lingering struggle is over and
past, and the victory of free thought is completely
won, as won it must be, it will no longer be any sur
render of their colours if such brave men and women
consult with their allies to find whether there may not
be a broader, a more universal, banner to represent
our common liberty than that marked “Atheism.” But,
before that time can arrive, earnest and thinking
people must give up their horror of “ Atheism.” That
name now means to most people what devil meant
to our ancestors, and it is equally mythical, unreal,
fantastic. Even many so-called liberal people have
not sufficiently thrown off their theological training to
be released from terror of this latest phantom.
Stat nominis umbra. It is the shadow of a name.
That I propose to prove to you. The laws of nature
have been sufficiently explored to turn the devil into
a grotesque superstition; the laws of mental and
moral nature are sufficiently known to lay this spectre
of “ Atheism ” which has followed him. The so-called
“Atheist” is no more outside psychological laws than
he is bodily outside physical laws. Moral and mental
facts hold him as much as gravitation holds him.
�12
Those facts he may name one way and you another,
but where the reality is the same shall we be tricked
by names ?
There are cases in which the reality is not the
same. A man may believe in a three-headed deity,
in a tri-personal deity, in Jove, Jupiter, Adonai, or
some other celestial thunderer; such belief is not of
thought but authority, it does not pretend to rest upon
fact and evidence, but on tradition or revelation. We
must at present leave all that out of the question.
What we are now concerned with is the difference
between those who, exercising the same reason, in the
same method, upon the same facts, in them and outside
them, state their conclusions differently. One calls
himself 11 Theist,” the other calls himself “ Atheist.”
These words are opposite. But are the realities under
them opposite ?
To find out that we must ask what is in the con
sciousness of each when he so names his conclusion—
assuming that conclusion to be divested of all tradition
in the one case, and of all mere pluck in the other in
each case a genuine product of reason resting on
evidence.
What then is in the mind of the intentionally
rational Theist when he says: “ I believe there is a
God ” ? There is in his consciousness a concept of
law and order in the universe; there is a recognition
�i3
of facts in himself, reason, love, the sense of right, the
ideal, the beautiful; he reasons that because these
things are in him they must be in nature, for he is in
nature, and of nature ; and combining these inward
realities with the law and order of the universe, and
with the tendency of the world to his ideals, the
Theist generalises them all in the word “ God.”
But here many a Theist would break in and say:
“Your statement is incomplete. I believe much
more than that. I believe that God is a personal
Being; I believe that He created the universe; I
believe that He hears and answers prayer.” To which
I reply: “ No doubt you believe these other things ;
but the question is not what you believe, but what you
think, what is purely the product of your reason acting
on evidence. A Catholic believes in his Madonna as
strongly as any Theist in the personality of God. But
what evidence does either give us for such belief?
None at all. What facts show that the world ever was
created? Nobody pretends any. What evidence that
God hears and answers prayer? Absolutely none.”
But then this believing Theist answers : “ It is true
I cannot actually prove the truth of my belief in these
particulars. It may be sentiment, but must sentiment
count for nothing ? What would life be if everything
depended on cold logic ? I feel that I have a Heavenly
Father with whom I can hold communion.”
�14
Very well; but now comes along our man who has
not that feeling at all. He says he feels sure that the
world was never created; that if there were a God
who answered prayer the world would know less
misery; and that he can imagine no personality of
God that would not make him a huge man.
“ Then you are an Atheist! ” cries our believing
Theist.
“ If to disbelieve your private god be Atheism, I
am.”
11 Then I will have nothing to do with you,” the
Theist may say.
“ I am much obliged to you,” the Atheist may
reply. “ In old times they used to have a good deal
to do with us ; it is something to be let alone.”
But now let us cross-examine this Atheist, in his
turn. li Do you believe in the laws of nature ? ” “I
do.” 11 Do you believe in reason? ” “ I do.” “ Do
you possess the sense of right, acknowledge the
sacredness of love, reverence your ideal of truth,
goodness, and beauty ? ” “ These make my moral
and intellectual nature; I can not help believing in
them.” “ Do you believe in the progress of mankind ? ”
“ My life is devoted to it.”
Now, another question—“ Taking all these things
together, what do they sum up in your mind ? ” “A
universe, or nature.”
�15
“Would you mind calling it God?” “Yes; I
object.” “ And why ? ” “ Because most persons when
they say ‘ God ’ mean something very different, and
they would understand me as believing what I do not
believe, and what cannot be proved true. In India
they would understand me as believing in Vishnu on
his Serpent; in Turkey they would think I meant
Allah of the Koran; here some would think I meant
Jehovah, others that I believed in the Trinity, and yet
others that I believed in an omnipotent sovereign
Man reigning over the world.”
“ Then what our Theist calls your ‘ Atheism ’ means
only that you disbelieve all those particular personifi
cations which men have imagined reigning over the
universe, while you do accept all the facts they can
show for their theories ? ”
“ That is what it amounts to. I travel harmoniously
with the Theist so long as he speaks of reason, love,
truth, law, conscience, for these things I know. I
still journey with him when he talks of the vast realm
of the unknown, and of truths and realities that may
be there beyond my grasp ; but when he sets up his
own theory about what is in that unknown, and de
mands that I shall believe that all the same as if it were
proved fact, I am compelled to say I am not convinced.
Then he calls me an Atheist and leaves me—probably
hates me.”
�i6
Now, it is perfectly certain that there is no actuality
in the mind of one of these men that is not in that of
the other. As their eyes see by the same sunshine,
and their lungs breathe the same air, their reason and
rectitude are the same. Yet are they widely sundered—
separated as by an abyss—so that we have the
anomaly of an army of former comrades winning their
common liberty only to use it in fighting each other.
Assuredly there is a serious fault here, perhaps more
faults than one. One is the slowness with which
liberal thinkers raise their hearts to the standard of
their intelligence. In asserting the liberty of reason
it would appear that many of them did not mean to
be taken at their word. That was much the way
with some of the Fathers of the Reformation. Luther
affirmed the right of private judgment, but was aghast
when he found people carrying it a line farther than
himself, and said human nature was like a drunken
man on a horse who, when set up straight on one side,
toppled over on the other. John Calvin too asserted
the right of private judgment. His idea seems to
have been that men -were perfectly free to think as
they pleased, and he was perfectly free to burn them
if their opinions did not please him.
After what happened to Servetus thinkers became
prudent; they followed Erasmus who compared himself
to Peter following his Lord afar oft. But at last the
cock crew. Thinkers took up their cross.
�i7
After many martyrdoms of the best men our laws
have largely, though not fully, proclaimed the freedom
of reason and conscience. But Orthodoxy has never
conceded it. Dogma has been reluctantly compelled
to transfer the faggot and stake by which free
opinion was punished from this world to the next;
and in this world still treats disbelievers as people who
ought to be burned, and will be burned.
But those who call themselves liberal—liberal Chris
tians and Theists—are persons who have avowed the
conditions of freedom in good faith, and if they now
recoil from the inevitable results of those conditions
it is but natural that freethinkers should say they have
not the courage of their principles.
I do not think that explains the whole case ; but it
is natural that it should be so said, and that the anta
gonism of freethinkers should be thereby intensified.
The reserve or hostility of Unitarians and Theists
towards Atheists, so called, is not altogether result of
timidity. They themselves have a severe conflict with
the orthodox, one largely involving their social rela
tions, and they do not wish to be compromised by being
supposed to hold views they do not hold. They
know that men are apt to be judged by the company
they keep, and so they keep aloof from those whose
opinions seem to them extreme and untrue.
Yet are they wrong in this. They are throwing
�i8
their weight in favour of the discredited method of
intolerance, and against the high principle they have
espoused—intellectual liberty. They cannot serve
two masters. They cannot claim freedom for them
selves against the orthodox, then turn and deny it as
against the Atheists. And it is a denial of freedom
when we concede it verbally but treat it when exercised
with aversion or contempt. The moderate liberal
should beware lest in his care not to compromise
himself he does compromise that great and wide prin
ciple of freedom on which he and the Atheist alike
depend. Let him know too that his god is debased
when set against mental independence ; and so long
as any Theism excommunicates any honest thinker it
not only renders Atheism necessary, but lowers itself
beneath that Atheism. For surely that god is only an
idol not yet mouldered, who is supposed to care more
for recognition of his personal existence than for
charity and the independence of the human mind.
Fundamentally, all alienations in the ranks of liberal
people result from the survival in half of them of the
ancient error, that some moral character inheres in
mere opinion. There is a sense in which a man is
responsible for his opinions; he is responsible for the
pains he takes to find the truth, and responsible for
honest utterance of the thing he holds true. But it is
a great and grievous error to suppose that a man can
�19
be morally bound to accept any belief whether he has
reason to believe it or not. For example, to tell a
man he ought to believe in God is like telling a
woman she ought to love her husband. If she has a
husband, and if that husband is worthy of love, and
wins her love, the exhortation to love him is superflu
ous; if otherwise, all the exhortation in the world
cannot enable here to love one who is unloveable. Or,
we may say, to tell a man it is his duty to believe in
God is like lecturing oxygen on its duty to combine
with hydrogen at the moment when galvanism has
decomposed the two.
The liberty of reason being introduced among the
old creeds its effects must be accepted. It can no
more be scolded than any other force in nature. The
thinker must follow his thought, the reasoner must
believe what he finds reason to believe, as the lover
must love what he or she is impelled to love. If the
thinking Theist would convince the thinking Atheist
of a personalised Deity, he must introduce a force
adapted to combine his proposition with the mind to
be convinced. It must be a rational force if it is to
affect the reason. Contempt is not a rational force
—rather it is a confession that there is no rational
force. It is falling back on the old dogmatic and
coercive principle which, if it prevailed, would suppress
all liberty and restore the faggot and the Inquisition.
�20
The unity which I believe possible among the sons
of freedom lies in the spirit of freedom and the spirit
of truth. The position of the simple Theist is not even
yet so popular as to require no sacrifices to maintain
it shall he not respect the still greater sacrifices made
by the man who is denounced as Atheist ? He may
not like the word Atheist; I do not; for I believe
that wherever there is such self-sacrifice, such fidelity
rising above selfishness, there is a spirit essentially
divine. But shall men be blinded by a name—a
word ? Can they not see beyond all phrases that the
spirit in which a man, even an Atheist, earnestly seeks
truth, and bravely stands by what he believes truth—
the spirit which for right, for freedom and justice, casts
away all interests and all ease, toiling, living, suffering
for his ideal right—O can they not see that such bear
in their bleeding hands the very stigmata of Truth’s
own martyrs ? Can we not all see how far above our
doctrines and definitions rises this fidelity of our time,
though it be called infidelity now as it was called im
morality in Socrates and Beelzebub in (Jhrist—while it
was then, is now, the spirit which in all history has been
leading mankind from thraldom to liberty, from dark
ness to light ? If our Theism does not see that spirit, if
our Theism cannot clasp to its heart all hearts animated
by that spirit, be sure it is a mere relic of the past—
some fragment not yet crumbled of ancient supersti
�tion; be sure that the only true God is the God of the
living—and they are the living whose lives are con
secrated to truth and right, however they may be
named, or be they nameless.
Theistic friend, your special theory will pass away.
The highest mind of the past was not able to frame
a god which you can worship unmodified, and you
cannot frame—none living can conceive—an image
which will not be fossil in a few centuries. Nay,
your Theos may be even fortunate if it can be quietly
dismissed before higher light without being degraded
by its efforts to resist that light, sounding war-cries
against earnest thinkers, and gradually taking on the
base insignia of the many Idols, once Ideals, that
kept not their first estate.
I was lately examining a devil carved on Notre
Dame—a hideous creature crushing human beings
beneath his feet. I thought, how hast thou fallen, O
Lucifer, son of the morning ! Thou too wert once a
light-bringer and a god ! But even so must fall all
personifications which try to crush and menace the
reason and nature of man. Just upon the head of
this horrid Notre Dame devil—exactly between his
horns—a little bird has built its nest, and laid its eggs,
with the sky’s soft blue upon them : and as I write it
is probably gathering its young under its wing, and
feeding them, and on the head of that personified
�22
wrath of a god, fearless and free goes on the work of
nature, the divine mystery of life and love.
The Theos of the Theist may wear a halo to-day,
but it depends on his worshippers what that halo shall
be when the personification passes away before another,
or before the eternal Love which vaults above all per
sonifications. That halo may become an immortal ideal
if it mean love to all • but such haloes have generally
turned to horns, and the god of the Theist to-day need
only denounce reason and hate freethinkers to become
quite as grotesque a figure as that Notre Dame
and take the place of that Atheism which now makes
a devil for so many. But above all such tyrannous
forms on their heads, between their finally powerless
horns—the ancient mystery and beauty of Life will
go on. Love will still gather its young under its
wings. Mothers will feed their babes with tenderer
thoughts and purer ideals. Reason will work on;
men and women will think and aspire, will save and be
saved from actual hells regardless of fictitious ones;
the unnamed, uncomprehended, eternal spirit of nature
and the heart will suffer no decay—but ascend for
evermore.
�
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Victorian Blogging
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A collection of digitised nineteenth-century pamphlets from Conway Hall Library & Archives. This includes the Conway Tracts, Moncure Conway's personal pamphlet library; the Morris Tracts, donated to the library by Miss Morris in 1904; the National Secular Society's pamphlet library and others. The Conway Tracts were bound with additional ephemera, such as lecture programmes and handwritten notes.<br /><br />Please note that these digitised pamphlets have been edited to maximise the accuracy of the OCR, ensuring they are text searchable. If you would like to view un-edited, full-colour versions of any of our pamphlets, please email librarian@conwayhall.org.uk.<br /><br /><span><img src="http://www.heritagefund.org.uk/sites/default/files/media/attachments/TNLHLF_Colour_Logo_English_RGB_0_0.jpg" width="238" height="91" alt="TNLHLF_Colour_Logo_English_RGB_0_0.jpg" /></span>
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Conway Hall Library & Archives
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2018
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Conway Hall Ethical Society
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Atheism : a spectre : with a reading from Max Muller's sixth Hibbert Lecture, South Place Chapel, June 23, 1878
Creator
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Conway, Moncure Daniel [1832-1907.]
Description
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Place of publication: [London]
Collation: 22 p. ; 15 cm.
Notes: Printed by Waterlow and Sons, London Wall. Part of Morris Misc. Tracts 1. With a reading from F. Max Muller's sixth Hibbert Lecture 'On henotheism, polytheism, monotheism and atheism' given at Westminster Abbey in June 1878.
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[South Place Chapel]
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[1878]
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G3339
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Atheism
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<img src="http://i.creativecommons.org/p/mark/1.0/88x31.png" alt="Public Domain Mark" /><br /><span>This work (Atheism : a spectre : with a reading from Max Muller's sixth Hibbert Lecture, South Place Chapel, June 23, 1878), identified by </span><span><a href="https://conwayhallcollections.omeka.net/items/show/www.conwayhall.org.uk">Humanist Library and Archives</a></span><span>, is free of known copyright restrictions.</span>
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Text
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English
Atheism
Belief and Doubt
Free Thought
Morris Tracts
Reason
Theism
-
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Text
N -2-1'3
NATIONAL SECULAR SOCI «TY
Atheism
AND
A Reply
SUICIDE.
to
ALFRED TENNYSON, Poet Laureate.
BY
G-. W. FOOTE.
------- ♦-------
Mr. Tennyson has written some fine poetry in his old age,
and he has also written a good deal of trash. Most of the
latter has appeared in the hospitable columns of the Nine
teenth Century. Mr. James Knowles, the editor of that
magazine, is an excellent man of business and knows what
takes with the British public. He is fully aware that Mr.
Tennyson is the popular poet of the day, and with com
mendable sagacity, he not only accepts the poet-laureate’s
verses whenever he can get them, but always prints them in
the largest type. Mr. Tennyson opened the first number
of his magazine with a weak sonnet, in which men like Pro
fessor Clifford were alluded to as seekers of hope “ in sunless
gulfs of doubt.” That little germ has developed into the
longer poem on “Despair” that appears in the current
number of the Nineteenth Century.
The critics have lauded this poem. Nothing else could be
expected of them. Mr. Tennyson is the popular poet, the
household poet, the Christian poet, and scarcely a critic dares
give him aught but unstinted praise. The ordinary gentle
men of the press write to order; they describe Mr. Tenny
son’s poetry as they describe Mr. Irving’s acting; they are
fettered by great, and especially by fashionable reputations ;
and when the publi? has settled who are its favorites they
never resist its verdict but simply flow with the stream. In
the course of time there grows up a sanctified cant of
criticism. If you are rash enough to doubt the favorite’s
greatness, you are looked upon as a common-place person
incapable of appreciating genius. If you object to the
popular poet’s intellectual ideas, you are rebuked for not
seeing that he is divinely inspired. Yet it is surely indis
putable that ideas are large or small, true or false, whether
they are expressed in verse or in prose. When poets con
descend to argue they must be held amenable to the laws of
reason. The right divine of kings to govern wrong is an
exploded idea, and the right divine of poets to reason wrong
should share the same fate.
�2
Mr. Tennyson’s poem is not too intelligible, and with a
proper appreciation of this he has told the gist of the story
in a kind of “ argument.”
“ A man and his wife having lost faith in a God, and hope of a
life to come, and being utterly miserable in this, resolved to end
themselves by drowning. The woman is drowned, but the man
is rescued by a minister of the sect he had abandoned.”
Now Mr. Tennyson has not worked fairly on these lines.
The question “ Does Atheism, as such, incline men to self
destruction ?” is not touched. The Atheist husband of
“ Despair” loses more than belief in God and hope of a life
to come. His wife suffers from a malady only curable, if at
all, by the surgeon’s knife. His eldest son has forged his
name and ruined him, while it is hinted that another son has
sunk to a still worse depth of vice. And he describes him
self as “ a life without sun, without health, without hope,
without any delight.” All this is very inartistic. An
Atheist under such a burden of trouble might commit suicide
just as a Christian might. Dr. Newman well says that by
a judicious selection of facts you may prove anything, and
Mr. Tennyson has judiciously selected his facts. He could
not kill his hero with Atheism, and so he brings in bad
health, a diseased wife, cruel and criminal children, and a
ruined home. Any one of these might prompt to suicide,
without the introduction of Atheism at all.
Mr. Tennyson’s lack of art in this poem goes still farther.
He makes the husband and wife drown themselves theatri
cally. They walk out into the breakers near a lighthouse.
This is mere melodrama. Why did they not take poison
and die in each other’s arms ? The only answer is that Mr.
Tennyson wanted to use that lighthouse, and as he could not
bring the lighthouse to them he took them to the lighthouse.
He wished to make the husband think to himself as he
looked at its rolling eyes—
“Does it matter how many they saved? We are all of us
wreck’d at last.”
This is an old trick of Mr. Tennyson’s. He is always
making his wonderful and vivid perceptions of external
nature compensate for his lack of spiritual insight and
power.
The melodrama of “ Despair ” is continued to the end.
The wife is successfully drowned as she was not required
any further in the poem, but the husband is rescued by (of
all men in the world!) the minister of the chapel he had
�3
forsaken. He loaths and despises this preacher, yet he tells
him all his domestic secrets and reveals to him all his
motives. Nay more, he wastes a great of denunciation on
his rescuer, and vehemently protests his intention to do for
himself despite his watcher’s “lynx-eyes.” Why all this
pother? Earnest suicides are usually reserved and very
rarely make a noise. Why not hold his tongue and quietly
seize the first opportunity ? But Mr. Tennyson’s heroes are
generally infirm of purpose. He can make his characters
talk, but he cannot make them act.
Another defect of Mr. Tennyson’s heroes is their abnormal
self-consciousness. The hero of “ Maud ” rants about him
self until we begin to hope that the Crimea will really
settle him. The hero of “ Locksley Hall” is a selfish cad
who poses through every line of faultless eloquence, until at
last we suspect that “ cousin Amy ” has not met the worst
fate which could befall her. And the hero of “ Despair ”
is little better. After powerfully describing the walk with
his wife to the breaker’s edge of foam, he says that they
kissed and bade each other eternal farewell. There he
should have stopped. But he must go on with—
“ Never a cry so desolate, not since the world began!
Never a kiss so sad, no, not since the coming of man ! ”
This little speculation could not be verified or disproved. It
is one which selfish people usually entertain. They nearly
always think their own sorrows the greatest the world ever
saw. Fortunately, although it may be news to Mr. Tenny
son, all Atheists are not of that kind. Some of them, at
least, are capable of the heroic joys of life, and of con
suming their personal sorrows in the fire of enthusiasm for
lofty and unselfish aims.
Mr. Tennyson should remember the sad end of Brutus in
“Julius Caesar.” Perhaps he does, for some of his language
seems borrowed from it. Brutus has lost what he most
values. His country’s liberties, for which he has fought
and sacrificed all, are lost, and his noble wife has killed her
self in a frenzy of grief. He kills himself too rather than
witness the dishonor of Rome and minister to the usurper’s
pride. But he does not pule and whine. He also bids his
dearest left adieu—
“ For ever, and for ever, farewell, Cassius !
If we do meet again, why, we shall smile;
If not, why then, this parting was well made.”
And Cassius replies in the same magnanimous vein. There
�4
is a large and noble spirit which can face even suicide with
dignity and without repining.
So infected with selfishness is Mr. Tennyson’s Atheist
that he doubts the utility of virtue—
“ Does it matter so much whether crown’d for a virtue, or
hang’d for a crime ? ”
Yes, it does matter; or why does he cry out against his
son’s wickedness ? If the young man’s crime “ killed his
mother almost,” other people’s crime injures mankind, and
that is its condemnation. The real Atheist has his moral
creed founded on fact instead of fancy, and therefore, when
things go wrong with him, he does not rail against virtue.
He knows it to be good in the long run to the human family
whatever may be his own fate.
The hero of “Despair” had evidently been a Calvinist.
He reminds the minister of his having “ bawled the dark
side of his faith, and a God of eternal rage.” And he
exclaims—
“What! I should call on that Infinite Love that has served us
so well ?
Infinite wickedness rather that made everlasting Hell,
Made us, foreknew us, foredoom’d us, and does what he will
with his own;
Better our dead brute mother who never has heard us groan !
Hell? if the souls of men were immortal, as men have been
told,
The lecher would cleave to his lusts, and the miser would yearn
for his gold,
And so there were Hell for ever! but were there a God as you
say,
His Love would have power over Hell till it utterly vanish’d
away.”
Now Calvinism is certainly not the creed any man could
regret to find untrue. And to our mind a man who could
live for years in the belief that the evils of this life are
ordained by God, and will be followed by an ordained hell
in the next life, is not likely to destroy himself when he finds
that the universe has no jailer and that all the evils of this
life end with it.
The man and his wife turn from the “ dark fatalist
creed ” to the growing dawn
“ When the light of a Sun that was coming would scatter the
ghosts of the Past,
And the cramping creeds that had madden’d the peoples would
vanish at last.”
�5
But when the dawn comes, they find that they have “ past
from a cheerless night to the glare of a drearier day.”
They are without a real God, for what deity remains is only
a cloud of smoke instead of a pillar of fire. Darwinism
they find to be very cold comfort, and they wail over them
selves as “poor orphans of nothing,” which is a comical
phrase, and one which we defy Mr. Tennyson or anybody
else to explain. If the Poet Laureate thinks that Darwinian
Atheists go about bemoaning themselves as poor orphans, he
is very much mistaken. He had better study them a little
before writing about them again. They are quite content
to remain without a celestial father. Earthly parents are
enough for them, earthly brothers and sisters, earthly wives,
and earthly friends. And most of them deem the grasp of
a father’s hand, and the loving smile on a mother’s face,
worth more than all the heavenly parentage they are satisfied
to lack.
Mr. Tennyson’s husband and wife, being utterly forlorn,
resolve to drown themselves, and the husband gives their
justication:—
“ Why should we bear with an hour of torture, a moment of
pain
If every man die for ever, if all his griefs are in vain,
And the homeless planet at length will be wheel’d thro’ the
silence of space,
Motherless evermore of an ever-vanishing race,
When the worm shall have writhed its last, and its last brother
worm will have fled
From the dead fossil skull that is left in the rocks of an earth
that is dead ? ”
Now all this will no doubt happen. Many millions of years
hence this world will be used-up like the moon; and there
fore, according to Mr. Tennyson’s argument, we should
commit suicide rather than put up with the toothache. It
will be all the same in the end. True ; but it is a long
while to the end. And people who act on Mr. Tennyson’s
principle must either forget this, or they must resemble the
man who refused to eat his dinner unless he had the
guarantee of a good dinner for ever and ever, with a dessert
by way of Amen.
Elsewhere they express pity for others as well as for them
selves—
“ Pity for all that aches in the grasp of an idiot power,
And pity for our own selves on an earth that bore not a flower;
Pity for all that suffers on land or in air, or the deep,
And pity for our own selves till we long’d for eternal sleep.”
�6
Mr. Tennyson may well make his Atheist husband say “ for
we leaned to the darker side.” This is an earth without a
flower! In every sense it is untrue. There are flowers of
beauty in the natural world, and flowers of greater beauty
in the human garden, despite the weeds. This suicidal pair
are fond of what Mr. Tennyson has himself called “the
falsehood of extremes.”
Sincere pessimists do not advocate suicide. Schopenhauer
himself condemns it as a superlative act of egoism. If here
and there a pessimist destroys himself, how can that make
things better for the masses who are governed by instinct
and not by metaphysics ? Mr. Tennyson does not see that
the most confirmed pessimist may, like George Eliot, believe
in Meliorism ; that is, not in perfection, but in improvement.
Nature, we may be sure, will never produce a race of beings
with a general taste for suicide; and it is therefore the duty
of those who deplore the ineradicable evils of life, to stay
with their brethren and to do their share towards improving
the common lot. If they cannot really make life happier,
they may at least make it less miserable, which is very much
the same thing.
Has Mr. Tennyson been reading that grand and powerful
poem of Mr. James Thomson’s, and is “ Despair ” the result?
If so, it is a poor outcome of such a majestic influence.
Mr. Tennyson has misread that great poem. Its author has
his joyous as well as his sombre moods, and he has himself
indicated that it does not cover the whole truth. Pessimists,
too, are not so stupid as to think that the extinction of a
few philosophers will affect the general life, or that a
universal principle of metaphysics can determine an isolated
case. They know also that philosophy will never resist
Nature or turn her set course. They see that she is enor
mously fecund, and is able to spawn forth life enough to
outlast all opposition, with enough instinct of self-preserva
tion to defy all the hostility of sages. And it is a note
worthy fact that the chief pessimists of our century have
not courted death themselves except in verse. Schopen
hauer lived to seventy-two ; Hartmann is one of the happiest
men in Germany; Leopardi died of disease ; and the author
of “The City of Dreadful Night’’has not yet committed
suicide and probably never will. It is one thing to believe
that, considered universally, life is a mistake, and quite
another thing to cut one’s own throat. The utmost that
even Schopenhauer suggested in the way of carrying out his
principles, was that when the human race had become far
�7
more intellectual and moral, and far less volitional and
egoistic, it would cease to propagate itself and so reaeh.
Nirvana. Whoever expects that to happen has a very farreaching faith. If the sky falls we shall of course catch
larks, but when will it fall ?
Atheists, however, are not necessarily pessimists, and in
fact few of them are so. Most of them believe that a large
portion of the world’s evil is removable, being merely the
result of ignorance and superstition. Mr. Tennyson might
have seen from Shelley’s writings that an Athest may
cherish the noblest hopes of progress. Perhaps he would
reply that Shelley was not an Atheist, but few will agree
with him who have read the original editions of that glorious
poet and the very emphatic statements of his friend Trelawny.
Does Atheism prompt men to suicide ? That is the
question. Mr. Tennyson appears to think that if it does
not it should. We cannot, however, argue against a mere
dictum. The question is one of fact, and the best way to
answer it is to appeal to statistics. Atheists do not seem
prone to suicide. So far as we know no prominent Atheist
has taken his own life during the whole of this century.
But let us go farther. There has recently been published
an erudite work * on “ Suicide, Ancient and Modern,” by
A. Legoyt, of Paris. He has given official tables of the
reasons assigned for suicides in most of the countries of
Europe; and although religious mania is among these
causes, Atheism is not. This dreadful incitement to self
destruction has not yet found its way into the officia
statistics even of Germany or of France, where Atheist
abound I
Suicides have largely increased during the last twenty
years. In England, for instance, while from 1865 to 1876
the population increased 14-6 per cent., suicides increased
27T per cent. In France, Prussia, Austria, Russia, Swit
zerland and Belgium the increase is still more alarming.
But during the same period lunacy has wonderfully in
creased ; and the truth is that both are caused by the everincreasing velocity and complexity of modern life, which
makes greater demands on our cerebral power than we are
able to answer. By-and-bye this will rectify itself through
* Ze /Swicicfe, Ancien et Moderne. Etude Historique, Philosophique
Morale et Statistique. Par A. Lïgott. Paris : A. Drouin.
�8
natural selection, but for the present our brains are not
strong enough for their sudden access of work. Hence the
increase of nervous derangement, lunacy, and suicide.
But it may be urged that religion keeps down the number
of suicides which would be still more plentiful without it.
That, however, is a mere matter of opinion, which can
hardly be verified or disproved. Religion does not restrain
those who do commit suicide, and that fact outweighs all
the fine talk about its virtue in other cases.
Some Christian apologists have made much capital out of
George Jacob Holyoake’s meditation on suicide in Gloucester
jail, when he was imprisoned for “ blasphemy,” or in other
words, for having opinions of his own on the subject of
religion. Mr. Holyoake’s mental torture was great. His wife
was in want, and his favorite daughter died while he was in
prison. Fearing that his reason might forsake him, and
being resolved that the Christian bigotry which had made
him suffer should never reduce him to an object of its derision,
he prepared the means of ending his life if the worst should
happen. “ See,” say these charitable Christians, “ what a
feeble support Atheism is in the hour of need! Nothing
but belief in Christ can enable us to bear the troubles of life.”
But our answer is that Mr. Holyoake did not commit suicide
after all; while, on the other hand, if we may judge by our
own notes during the past six months, one parson cuts his
throat, or hangs, or drowns, or poisons himself, on an
average every month.
Recurring finally to Mr. Tennyson, we say that his poem
is a failure. He does not understand Atheism, and he fails
to appreciate either its meaning or its hope. We trust that
he will afflict us with no more poetical abortions like this,
but give us only the proper fruit of his genius, and leave
the task of holding up Atheists as a frightful example to
the small fry of the pulpit and the religious press.
November 14iA, 1881.
PRICE ONE PENNY.
London : Fbeethought Publishing Company, 28, Stonecutter Street,
Farringdon Street, E.C.
�
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Victorian Blogging
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An account of the resource
A collection of digitised nineteenth-century pamphlets from Conway Hall Library & Archives. This includes the Conway Tracts, Moncure Conway's personal pamphlet library; the Morris Tracts, donated to the library by Miss Morris in 1904; the National Secular Society's pamphlet library and others. The Conway Tracts were bound with additional ephemera, such as lecture programmes and handwritten notes.<br /><br />Please note that these digitised pamphlets have been edited to maximise the accuracy of the OCR, ensuring they are text searchable. If you would like to view un-edited, full-colour versions of any of our pamphlets, please email librarian@conwayhall.org.uk.<br /><br /><span><img src="http://www.heritagefund.org.uk/sites/default/files/media/attachments/TNLHLF_Colour_Logo_English_RGB_0_0.jpg" width="238" height="91" alt="TNLHLF_Colour_Logo_English_RGB_0_0.jpg" /></span>
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Conway Hall Library & Archives
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2018
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Conway Hall Ethical Society
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Title
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Atheism and suicide : a reply to Alfred Tennyson, Poet Laureate
Description
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Place of publication: London
Collation: 8 p. ; 18 cm.
Notes: Includes bibliographical references. Part of the NSS pamphlet collection.
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Foote, George W., 1843-1886
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1881
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Freethought Publishing Company
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Atheism
Suicide
Ethics
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<img src="http://i.creativecommons.org/p/mark/1.0/88x31.png" alt="Public Domain Mark" /><br /><span>This work (Atheism and suicide : a reply to Alfred Tennyson, Poet Laureate), identified by </span><span><a href="https://conwayhallcollections.omeka.net/items/show/www.conwayhall.org.uk">Humanist Library and Archives</a></span><span>, is free of known copyright restrictions.</span>
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N223
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Alfred Tennyson
Atheism
NSS
Suicide
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Title
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Victorian Blogging
Description
An account of the resource
A collection of digitised nineteenth-century pamphlets from Conway Hall Library & Archives. This includes the Conway Tracts, Moncure Conway's personal pamphlet library; the Morris Tracts, donated to the library by Miss Morris in 1904; the National Secular Society's pamphlet library and others. The Conway Tracts were bound with additional ephemera, such as lecture programmes and handwritten notes.<br /><br />Please note that these digitised pamphlets have been edited to maximise the accuracy of the OCR, ensuring they are text searchable. If you would like to view un-edited, full-colour versions of any of our pamphlets, please email librarian@conwayhall.org.uk.<br /><br /><span><img src="http://www.heritagefund.org.uk/sites/default/files/media/attachments/TNLHLF_Colour_Logo_English_RGB_0_0.jpg" width="238" height="91" alt="TNLHLF_Colour_Logo_English_RGB_0_0.jpg" /></span>
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Conway Hall Library & Archives
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2018
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Conway Hall Ethical Society
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Did Charles Bradlaugh die an atheist?
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Bonner, Hypatia Bradlaugh [1858-1935]
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Place of publication: London
Collation: 12, [2] p. ; 20 p.
Notes: Works by and about Charles Bradlaugh, and chief works of Thomas Paine, with extracts from reviews, listed on unnumbered pages at the end. Printed by A. Bonner, Took's Court, London.
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A. & H.B. Bonner
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1898
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G4346
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Atheism
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Atheism
Charles Bradlaugh
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NATIONAL SECULAR CWW A Y
DISCUSSION BETWEEN MR. THOMAS COOPER AND
MR. CHARLES BRADLAUGH.
FIRST NIGHT.
On Monday, the 1st ofFebruary, a discussion was begun at the Hail
of Science between Mr. Thomas Cooper, some time Freethinker,
and recent convert, also the well-known author of the “ Pur
gatory of Suicides,” and Mr. Charles Bradlaugh, who has, for
some years past, acquired a very wide spread reputation as lec
turer under the name of “ Iconoclast,” and has devoted the time
which is not occupied by his professional avocations in the elimi
nation of secular and religious anomalies.
The chair was occupied by James Harvey, Esq. The fo-low
ing was the order of the discussion as stated in the published
programme :—
1. Mr. Cooper to state the Argument for the Being of God, as
the Maker of the Universe, on the First Night—and the Argu
ment for the Being of God, as the Moral Governor of the Uni
verse, on the Second Night; and each statement not to extend
beyond half-an-hour.
2. Mr. Bradlaugh to state the Argument on the Negative side,
each night; and each statement not to extend beyond half-anhour.
3. Not more than a quarter of an hour to be allowed for reply
and counter-reply, to the end.
4. No written speeches to be delivered, and no long extracts
from printed books or papers to be read on either side.
5. The chair to be taken at seven o’clock, and the Discussion
to conclude, as nearly as possible, at ten, each evening.
The Chairman said : I have consented to take the chair to-night,
both by request of Mr. Cooper and some friends, and with the
consent of Mr. Charles Bradlaugh; and I think I shall have your
consent also during the discussion which takes place this evening.
You well know that the duty and power of a chairman is very
limited, being entirely confined to the preservation of order; and
unless he has the support of those over whom he presides, his
authority is of little avail. I trust, therefore, that you will listen to
the arguments that will be addressed to you to-night. There must,
of course, be great difference of opinion on every abstract question,
�2
otherwise there would be no reason for discussion ; so that every
lady and gentleman who comes here may be presumed to have
formed an opinion beforehand ; but trusting^ your forbearance, I
have no doubt that we shall be able to get through the business of
the evening without any unseemly interruption. I feel it is a very
important matter that we have under discussion, respecting not
only us who have met to take a part, but humanity in general.
It is “ Whether there be a God ?” And I hope that whatever
arguments may be adduced, you will patiently hear the
speaker to the end (hear, hear), that a speech shall not be inter
rupted in the middle of a sentence; that you will listen thought
fully and decide candidly. If we act on this principle, if we en
tertain this spirit, we shall be conscious that we have not
lost our evening. I am sure that you will hear both parties fully
out, and support any decision at which I may arrive under the
circumstances (hear, hear.) Mr. Cooper will occupy half-anhour in introducing the subject—“For the Being of God, as
Maker of the Universe, and for the Being of God as the Gover*
nor of the Universe.” Mr. Bradlaugh will then state the Argu
ment on the Negative side, and will also occupy half-an-hour.
After that each speaker will occupy a quarter of an hour, or as
much less time as he pleases. In that case, it is the more neces
sary that a speaker should not be stopped in the midst of a sen
tence which the argument may require to be completed; nor
should be be called to time at the exact moment the quarter of
an hour has elapsed. I mention this that no gentleman may
think I am dealing with one more favourably than the other. I
now call on Mr. Cooper, who will take the affirmative of each
statement, to sta*e the case on his side, but not to exceed a period
of time beyond half-an-hour. (Hear and cheers.)
Mr. Cooper then rose, and was received with cheers. He said :
Eight years have elapsed since I stood in this Hall. It was on
the 13th of February, 1856, when I told my audience that I
could not lecture on Sweden, the subject which had been an
nounced. I told them that my mind was undergoing a change.
This hall was closed against me. I need not say why. Mr. Bendall
was ill, and the Hall in John Street was shut, so I was left without
the means of earning bread. After awhile I was allowed to
go down into the cellar of the Board of Health and copy letters
—seventy words for a penny. It was drudgery, and poor Frank
Grant, who is since dead, and a well known person also since
deceased, said to me—“ Why, it is enough to madden a man like
you 1” But a man who could undergo two years’ imprisonment
in the cause of truth, was not to be deterred by drudgery. Mr.
Bendall applied to me. It was before he was struck down with
paralysis. I did not apply to him, but he came to me, and told me
I must come to this Hall. Now, during the years I lectured
�3
here, there were few men whom I respected more than Mr. Ben
dall, so I recommenced here on the 21st of September, 1856, and
concluded on the 13th of May, 1858. I began with the “ Design
Argument,” and continued to lecture in this hall for a year and
nine months. An hour was allowed for discussion. For five
years and eight months. I have maintained my convictions : one
year and eight months I was in Scotland, and four years in Eng
land. I have lectured in chapels, on platforms, in churches and
in pulpits. Owing to the kindness of Mr. Bendall. who has given
the use of this hall for two nights—this night and Wednesday night
—I am again enabled to addiess you. I am accompanied by some
Christian friends and ministers of the gospel. I assure you I
address you in the spirit of kindness, although I think some of
you have not said the best things of me, or allowed the best
things to be said of me (hear and dissent.) I come, then, out of
kindness to you to propose this argument for the being of God.
It is an argument carrying me to the very door of the proposi
tion that accompanies it, and one which I have revolved in my
mind during the five years and eight months that I have been
absent from you. It has been repeated to you so often, it has
been talked about so constantly, that there can be no mistake
about it. I am. I know that I exist; I am conscious of it. I, a
reasoning, conscious, intelligent, personal existence. But I have
not had this personal, conscious, intelligent existence very long.
I have not long existed, but something must have existed before
me. Something must have always existed ; for if there had been
never anything in existence, there must have been nothing still,
and because nothing cannot make something—something alone
makes, originates, causes something to exist. Thus far, then, I
think we are all agreed. I have said I am a personal, conscious,
intelligent existence. Now either this personal, conscious, intel
ligent existence has always existed, or it began to be. If it began
to be, it has had a cause—indeed, if it has not always existed,
but began to exist, it must have had a cause, and must have been
either intelligent or non-intelligent. But non-intelligence can
not create intelligence. You might as well tell me that the
moon is made of green cheese, or the sun of Dorset butter, that
an oak leaf is the Atlantic ocean, or that Windsor Castle is London
Bridge, as to tell me that non-intelligence can cause to exist a
thoroughly conscious, perfect intelligence. Therefore, this per
sonal, conscious intelligence is itself the result or the effect of
an intelligence pre-existing, which is the cause from which I derive
my existence, the same to which men make reference when
they speak of God. But I discern that there is everywhere
not only something that has always existed everywhere,
I discern also that there is no such a thing as “ nowhere
there never was “nowhere,” there cannot be “nowhere.”
�4
Do you feel inclined to dispute this proposition ? Try, then,
to imagine ‘nowhere.” Where will you go?—beyond the
great solar system ? You may go on for millions and
millions of miles, still there is somewhere. If you try to imagine
nowhere, you gradually begin to apprehend that there is “ every
where,” and that intelligence always has existed everywhere.
You say, then, that something has always existed everywhere.
Can you conceive of that something having existed for nothing ?
Then there is no such thing as nothing; there never was nothing ;
there never could have bern nothing. Something must always
have been, and been everywhere. If we decide thus, we have a
right to say that something is not only everywhere, but on every
point of everywhere; and if this chain of reasoning be broken,
there is no line of demarcation to separate one part from the other.
So we come to the idea of motion. I am gifted with certain
senses, and I come to discern motion by a comparison of the
relation of different objects to each other. I observe motion to
be an attribute of master. By a conscious intuition, we are able
to perceive, and, by the aid of reason, to discern that this personal
existence, this preceding cause, is everywhere present, that it is
an eternal, conscious, nnderived, uncreated, uncaused Being whom
men worship and call God. (Cheers.) So by this personal, con
scious intelligence, men have communication with, and can per
ceive the outward features of this natural universe. But this
material universe is not the something that has always existed,
because it is in parts, because it is divisible, and the parts are
moveable one among the other, and not only moveable in the
sense of motion, but separable in the sense of change. Thus
the fleshly clothing of this body is constantly changing. Our
bodies are not now the bodies we had in infancy, nor those
which we had ten years ago the same as we have now. But by
the exercise of the will, which is a part of intelligence, and thia
wifl'Ucting on matter—matter is separable and moveable. So that
man is not one underived, uncreated, eternal existence. Yet
by his intelligent will, with the assistance of his organised
body, which of itself cannot move matter, he can mould it into
various shapes and perform wonderful results—fitting, shaping,
adapting; aud although we judge by these results that a man is
exercising the power of intelligence, we cannot see him exercising
it. You never saw a man contrive. You never saw a man
design. Yon cannot see that. It is only by analogy that you
can judge of it. There are three forces by which he acts—know
ledge, consciousness, and testimony, and by the aid of these
be is constantly designing and contriving. If you come
to observe the fashion of an object, although you see no maker,
yet when you inspect it and observe the various parts of which
it is composed, their suitability and fitness for the purpose they
�fulfil, then you presume that intelligence has been at work there,
and you recognise its operation, although you could not see it
contrive or design. If I come to a piece of a fashion apparently
the most complicated, yet more remarkable when you understand
it, seeing how simple are the principles of its construction, then
is my admiration called forth. And when I look on the curiously
wrought body, and mark all its various parts ; when I examine
this eye with its wonderful lenses and pulleys, when I look over
this hand with all its wonderful contrivances of adaptation and fit
ness, as to render man lord of the endless plain and the wide
mountain--even of the universe; and still when I look on the
wonderful contrivances in the forms of the animals in creation, and
wonder at their entire adaptation to the wants of each—eyes and
lungs fitted to changes of the atmosphere, and yet so little change
in the atmosphere itself, and when I look at “ this brave over
hanging firmament fretted with golden fires,” and see their
systems extend for millions and millions of miles pursuing their
several ends, and going their refulgent round—I am filled with
thoughts which make me humble, and I come to the conclusion
that this universe has its conscious, personal, and intelligent
designer; that he exists, that he is the author of my intelligence,
that he is the author of the intelligence of the millions that sur
round me. He exists. I did not always exist, that, therefore, he
is all-intelligent, and must be the author of the universe.
Finally, that since my will has such power over matter that he
must be uncontrollable, and, therefore, all-powerful, since he has
been able to produce this universe, he is over my existence, over
your existence, and over every existence; that he is the great un
created, underived cause whom men reverence, and whom I call
God.
Mr. Cooper resumed his seat amidst very warm plaudits.
Mr. Bradlaugh rose and said : Sir, I have listened with con
siderable attention, and with some disappointment, to the brief
address which has been delivered to us in proof of the position
which Mr. Cooper has taken upon himself to affirm this evening,
which position, if I understand it rightly, is that there is an all
wise, all-existent, all powerful, underived, uncaused, personal,
conscious, and intelligent being whom he (Mr. Cooper) calls God.
If saying it amounts to proof, then undoubtedly Mr. Cooper has
demonstrated his position ; but if anything approaching to logical
demonstration be required here this evening, then I shall respect
fully submit that it has been utterly and entirely wanting in the
speech to which we have just listened. (Cheers and dissent.) Mr.
Cooper tells us that something has always existed everywhere—
some one thing, some one existence, some one being. All his
speech turns upon that. All his words mean nothing, except in
so far as they go to support that point. Just notice the conse-
�quenceg involved in the admissions contained in his affirmation
that there is only one existence. If God always was one exist
ence, one eternal, omnipresent existence, beside whom nothing
else existed, what becomes of the statement made by Mr. Cooper
to-night, that the material universe is not that infinite existence,
but exists biside it ? There are thus two existences—the one
everywhere, and the other existing somewhere, although nowhere
remains for it. The one infinite is everywhere, beyond it there
cannot be any existence, and the finite universe has to exist out
side everywhere where existence is not. I will take it to be true
as put by Mr. Cooper, that this same one existence, which has
existed everywhere from eternity, is without motion, because, as
he says, motion implies going or moving from point to point:
existence being everywhere has nowhere to go; because it is
always everywhere, and it cannot move from point to point any
where. Just see, then, the lamentable position in which he
places Deity. If Deity be everywhere, and Deity, as he puts it
to you, made the universe, if made at all, it must have been
somewhere, it cannot have been on one of the points occupied by
Deity, for Mr. Cooper would hardly argue that two existences
can occupy the same point at the same time, from which it would
result that it cannot be in everywhere, and it cannot be anywhere
else, because there is nowhere else for it. There can have been no
making, because there was nothing to be made, everything being
already in existence, and there being not the slightest vacuum
for anything more. But the difficulty is more apparent when
you come to weigh his words. Surely if the word making means
anything, it involves the notion of some act; and if so, how can
you have an action without motion ? I should, indeed, like my
friend to explain this. He has evidently some very different
notions from those which I have. I want to know how we can
have the action of making without motion. I want to know how
Deity, which as Deity has been always motionless, has ever
moved to make the universe. We will examine the position still
further. My friend says that these are arguments derivable from
the fact of consciousness, and in illustration of this, he says—“ I
exist. I am a personal, conscious, intelligent being. I have not
been always, and, therefore, there must have been some time i
when I began to be. I am intelligent^ but have not been always,
and, therefore, I must have been caused by an intelligent being,
because non-intelligence cannot originate or create intelligence.”
Whether he meant non-intelligence and intelligence as positive
existences, it is exceedingly difficult to understand, and it would
be worth while, if we are to follow out the argument, that Mr.
Cooper should explain that to you, or else you will perhaps make
some mistake about it. What does he mean, I ask, by non-intel
ligence ? So far as I understand intelligence, it is a quality of a
�4
mode of existence varying in various modes of existence, and we
only know mode of existence as finite. We cannot conceive the
quality to be infinite, which we only know as appertaining to a
mode—that is, to the finite. I want Mr. Cooper to tell me how I
can reason from such a premiss, which only regards intelligence as
a quality of mode—of the finite, up to what he puts to you as a
quality of the absolute. I confess that on a subject like this some
difference may be expected, and my opponent may rely on the
authority of great names ; but I say that I have not relinquished
my right to examine these great problems, and work out the
result if it be possible for my reason to attain them. He says,
then, that non-intelligence cannot form intelligence. I don’t
wish to make mere verbal objections, or I might put it to him
that I do not understand what he means by intelligence being
formed at all. I must trouble him to make this point as clear to
my mind as it is to himself—before such an argument will con
vince me much more is required. I have no doubt that such an
argument must have come to my friend’s mind in some clearer
form before it carried conviction to him. He says, “ This personal,
intelligent, conscious being had a cause.” Yes ! I suppose every
effect must have had a cause. He tells us that analogy is a good
guide in working out a reasonable result. He uses it himself,
but he does not mean to say that by analogy, he argues back
from effect to cause, and that, from himself, he would go back to
an uncaused cause. “What exists merely as a cause exists for
the sake of something else, and, in the accomplishment of that
end, it consummates its own existence.” “ A cause is simply
everything without which the effect would not result, and all
such concurring, the effect cannot but result.” According to
these passages from Sir William Hamilton, “that which exists
as cause exists for the sake of something else.” Effect is thus
the sequel to cause, and causes are but the means to ends. The
only way of dealing with this question of cause and effect is to
put it frankly that every cause of which we can take cognisance,
is, at the same time, effect and cause, and that there is no cause
on which we can lay a finger, that is not the effect of cause pre*
cedent, to it—yon have an unbroken chain. I defy my friend to
maintain the proposition that, without discontinuity, there can
be origination. If he doesnot, his argument falls to the ground. But
I really labour under considerable difficulty arising from the fact
that my friend has used a large number of words and terms without
explaining to you or to me what he meant by them ? I really
must trouble him by pleading my ignorance as to the meaning
which he attaches to the word uncaused caudb, for I frankly allow
that my reason doesinot enable me to comprehend the word un
caused as applied to existence. I conceive existence only modal
of existence itself—the absolute I cannot conceive. I am not
'
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1
a
1
I
1
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enabled by my reason to go beyond modes of existence. I am
not able by the aid of my intelligence to go beyon'd phenomena,
and so reach the noumenon. Until he has enabled me to attach to
these words, which he has used so gliby, a meaning of a definite
kind, I must confess my inability to appreciate his reasoning.
He would say that there is non-intelligence as well as intelli
gence. If he does not mean that, his words have no meaning. He
has said that non-intelligence could not produce intelligence.
That God by his will caused it. But how if intelligence be
everywhere—infinite, one, eternal—if you cannot limit its dura
tion in point of time or its extent in point of space, if it is so in
definite that to follow it as far as the faintest trace of it can be
observed, it is. infinitely intelligent, how can you talk about
non-intelligence at all ? If intelligence is everywhere, then nonintelligence is not possible. My friend worked up his argument
to a strange sort of climax, that the personal, conscious, eternal,
infinite, omnipotent, intell'gent being was what most men wor
shipped and called God. I take exception to that, and say that
the word God does not, in the mind of any one, express that, and
that in the minds of the majority of men it exprtsses something
very different from that. Indeed, so far as I have been able to
ascertain, the great mass of human kind have precisely opposite
notions when they are using the word God. All their ideas
concerning God comprehend the idea of human and fallible
action, and are held in connection with creeds involving contra
dictions innumerable. The word God is the result of old tradi
tions coming from one generation to another, from father to son,
from generation to generation. In no case is it the out-growth
of the unaided intelligence of the man who makes use of it. To
put it further. I say there are no two men who use the word
God in the same sense, and that it is a mere term which expresses
no fixed idea. It does not admit the preciseness of a definition,
nor can it be explained with an accuracy to admit the test of in
quiry. The idea expressed by the word bears in most cases some
relation to what has gone before, and is useful when appealing
to the popular mind to cover deficiencies in the illogical argu
ments addressed to it to account for the universe. Our friend
passed from the argument from consciousness to what is generally
known as the argument from design. He said that, having seen
the result of man’s contrivance, if he met with a piece of work
fashioned after a peculiar mariner with a view to a particular end,
he should expect from analogy some contriver for it. But sup
pose he had never seen any result of contrivance at all—how
much would his argument help him ? In that case he must en
tirely fail, and in this how little does design help him here ? To
affirm origination from design of already existing substance, and
by analogy it is only of this he can give us any illustration, in
�9
volves a manifest contradiction. The argument distinguishes not
the absolute from the material, the conditioned. It is the finite
which he tells you is God, and yet cannot be God. There is
an utter want of analogy. It is impossible to reason from design
of that which is already existing, and thus to prove the creation
of that which before did not exist. There is not a particle of
analogy between these two propositions. But further, if it were
needful to argue on it, if our friend had put before you the
design argument, it is still utterly wanting as an argument for
an infinite Deity, being "one entirely from analogy. Analogy
cannot demonstrate the infinite wisdom, or the infinite, the
eternal existence of God. It cannot demonstrate infinity of sub
stance, for to reason from finite effects as illustrations, analogy
only takes you back by steps each time a little way, and to a
finite cause. To assert an origin is simply to break a chain of
causes and effects without having any warrant for it, except to
cover your own weakness. The argument falls with this; you
cannot demonstrate the infinity of Deity ; for, admitted a finite
effect, how can you from it deduce an infinite cause ? Thus the
omnipresence of Deity remains unproved. If the substance of
Deity cannot be demonstrated infinite, neither can his attributes;
so that, so far as the proof goes, his wisdom and power may be
limited ; that is, there is no evidence that he is either omniscient
or omnipotent. When our friend talks about having, proved an
all-powerful, all-wise self-existence, he simply misrepresents
what he has tried to do, and he should not use a phrase which
does not, and cannot bear the slightest reference to the argu
ment. So far, then, we take exception to the speech which he
has given us to-night. By whatever means my friend has at
tained his present conclusions, he must surely have gained the
convictions upon some better ground than those which he has
expressed here to-night, unless, indeed, we are to suppose him. to
have changed without any reasoning at all. (Cheers.) I wish,
before concluding, to point out to you that in the position I
have taken up I do not stand here to prove that there is no God.
If I should undertake to prove such a proposition, I should de
serve the ill words of the oft-quoted psalmist applied to those
who say there is no God. I do not say there is no God, but I
am an Atheist without God. To me the word God conveys no
idea, and it is because the word God, to me, never expressed a
clear and definite conception—it is because I know not what it
means—it is because I never had sufficient evidence to compel
my acceptance of it, if I had I could not deny it—such evidence,
indeed, I could not resist—it is for these reasons that I am
Atheist, and ask people to believe me not hypocrite but honest,
when I wtell them that the word “ God ” does not, to my
mind, express an eternal, infinite, omnipotent, intelligent, per
�10
Sonal, conscious being, but is a word without meaning and of
none effect, other than that it derives from the passions and
prejudices of those who use it. And when I look round the
world, and find in one country a church with one faith, in another
country, another creed, and in another a system contradicting
each—no two men agreeing as to the meaning of the word—but
cursing, clashing, quarrelling, and excommunicating on account
of its meaning, relying on force of arms rather than on force of
reason—I am obliged to suppose that deficiency of argument has
left them no other weapon with which to meet the power of
reason. In this brief debate, it would be folly to pretend while
we may combat the opposite opinion we shall succeed in con
vincing each other; but let me ask that to which ever side we
may incline, we may use our intelligence as free from pre
judice as possible, so that we may better understand what
force of each other’s reasonings. Let us agree, it we can, in the
clear and undoubted meaning expressed in the terms we use.
There was a time when men bowed before the word God with
out thought and without inquiry. Centuries have gone by, and
the great men of each age have cast light on what was hitherto
dark. Philosophy has aided our intelligence, and stripped from
the name of God much of the force which it had previously held.
It is in the hope that this progress of human thought may be
more rapid and of higher use, and that, from out of debate, fresh
truths may be gained, that it may teach men to rely upon them
selves, and so make their lives better the longer they live.. It is
with this hope that I have taken the position of to-night.
Mb. Bradiaugh resumed his seat amidst general applause, and
some manifestations of dissent, which lasted for several seconds.
Mr. Cooper : I am very sorry to see all that—I am very sorry
to hear it. I do not want any man to clap his hands for me. I
came here to reason. I did not come here simply to meet Mr.
Bradlaugh. I wished to see appointed representative men. It
is to them and to you that I want to speak. I have nothing to
do with Mr. Bradlaugh’s personal opinions. He says he is not
here to take the negative—to prove the non-existence of God. If
he reads the bill which I hold in my hand, it will tell him that
Mr. C. Bradlaugh will take the negative. But he says he is not
here to take the negative—that he is not here to produce an
argument that there is no God. He knows nothing about God.
(Hear and cheers.) Now, what is the meaning of that cheer ?
(Cries of go on with your argument.) Now, I am afraid it is of no
use : you are not disposed to argue—to reason, but the argument
remains, notwithstanding—(cries of question.) This is the ques
tion. I want you to be less excited. We are here to form some
opinion as to the truth, and not to be crowing over ^ch other.
Mr. Bradlaugh said that I said there was only one existence
�11
always—T never said eo. Then, according to him, “he talked
about millions of existences without motion.” But I said with
out motion such as matter has. I suppose the meaning of what
he said was, There may be many kinds of motion beside the
motion of matter.” Then Mr. Bradlaugh said that I talked of
more than one existence being on one point. There may be a
thousand existences on one point for anything that I know. I
do not know why there cannot be only one existence on one point,
I did not say there could be only one existence on one point.
Expressions of the kind I never used. Then, he said, action
implies motion; but what I Baid was, that God had no motion
such as matter. He was kind enough to tell us what existence
and non-existence were—what intelligence and non-intel
ligence meant—but I thought we all knew these things pretty
well before. Then, he says, existence is a quality of a mode. Man,
he says, is fiuite; he cannot perceive that existence can be infinite.
That is a kind of Spinozaism. I wish he would tell me what he
means by “mode.” He says that I said non-intelligence could
form intelligence. I never used such a word—(cries of oh ! oh!)
I never said anything so nonsensical—(loud cries of oh ! oh !) I
said that non-intelligence could not create—that it could not
originate. I never used the word form. Then again, “ Analogy
was a good guide ”—but he said no more about that, and then ha
quoted Sir W. Hamilton to the effect, that cause was that with
out which effect would not result. “ There is no cause,” he says,
“ on which you can lay a finger, aud not say that it is both cause
and effect,” and he defies me to break the chain of causation
cause and effect I suppose he means. He next quotes from Samuel
Taylor Coleridge, a passage which says—there is an infinite chain
of finite things. Why, it is an utter contradiction. Every man
has intelligence enough to perceive that. What we mean by
uncognised is that there is something unknown, uncognised if
you please. There can be no question about that. He com
plains of the time being taken up with such words, and he goes
on to say—“ My reason does not enable me to comprehend the
uncognised.” Certainly it don’t. More than that, I am very
sorry he cannot comprehend it. But there are many things which
we cannot comprehend. The light for instance. We cannot com
prehend what it is to be everywhere present, but we apprehend
it. There are millions of things which we cannot comprehend,
but we can apprehend them. Then, he says, we talk about nonmtelligence and intelligence, because he contends God does not
exercise any amount of ability. Among men, he says, God means
something that is traditional, and which has no reason to support
it. That has nothing to do with the question. Suppose, he says,
I had never seen the result of design—how could I, by the help
of reason, arrive at it ? It cannot, he says, be. No cause, he sayq
�12
can exist without causing a result. The result of design is part
of our intelligence and experience. There is a modification of
existence only—it is not proved that everywhere existed. But
Mr. Bradlaugh knows that existence is being, and he knows, he
says, that, unless you can substantiate the assertion that it has
always existed, it does not show that he was all-wise. We reason
from this personal, conscious intelligence of man, to the fact that
God had created millions of conscious, intelligent beings—that he
was the author of all existence—that he was intelligent—we do
not reason from man’s finite nature. We see in the manifestations
of his will the type of a higher will, of a nature that is supremacy.
The argument is untouched. Something has always existed, as
personal, conscious, intelligent beings exist—either intelligence or
non-intelligence must have produced them : but non-intelligence
cannot create, cannot originate. You might as well tell me that
there is no such thing as existence, as to try by sneers, and ask
ing me what I mean by intelligence, to say that God does not
exist. I say that I exist—that the world exists—that God made
it. We have come here to establish this. We come here to
reason for the existence of God. It is of no use to say that there
was never nothing to make it out of. Our argument is mistaken.'
Mr. Bradlaugh has not taken up the argument. The bill is
before me in which he is stated to take the negative, but he
has not taken the negative; he simply says he knows not whether
there is a God or not. (Cheers.)
Mr. Bradlaugh : We want the argument for the existence of
God! He (Mr. Cooper) is quite right. We do want it. We
have not had it yet. He says I am bound to prove a negative,
and relies on the wording of the bill. This is hardly fair. The bill
is Mr. Cooper’s own fram ng, unaltered by me. I only tried to
have one word different, and that was refused.
Mr Cooper : You should not want to hide your name.
[Some disorder occurred at this point of the debate, when]—
The Chairman interposed and said : I beg that no reference
may be made to anything which might lead to any wrong feeling.
Mr Bradlaugh : My friend, if he wishes the argument ad- ■
hered to, should have himself made no reference to matters which
were altogether beside it. Let him remember what is the
subject chosen for discussion, and adhere to that alone. He says
that, according to the bill, I am to take the negative side. It
has been my lot in life to be present at the trial of many issues, but I
never heard that the defendant had more to do than rebut the
case sought to be made against him. I will take, as example, an
instance, such as when a man had stolen any article, or committed
some act for which he might incur penalties. It was the duty of
the counsel employed in such a case simply to negative the
evidence which was brought to support the case. The onus pro-
�13
bandi to-night lies with my friend, and the only task that lies
upon me here is to show that he has not succeeded in performing
the duty which he came here to perform. He has declined to
explain certain terms used by him, on the ground that everybody
knew them. Surely he might have enlightened my ignorance;
and, at any rate, he had no right to assume that everybody un
derstood them after my declaration to the contrary. He has used
words on the construction of which the whole argument depends,
and he has failed to explain to us the meaning he intended to ex
press. He might have enlightened my ignorance as to the mean
ing of words he used ; but, instead of that, he has called on me
by way of retort to explain some words used by myself. Now,
by “mode,” I mean a phase of conditioned existence. This glass is
cne mode Of existence, and the water, which I have poured out of
it, is another mode of existence. “ Quality” is an attribute or
characteristic. It is some characteristic, or number of charac
teristics, which enables or enable me to distinguish one mode
from another. If he wishes any better explanation that it is
possible to give, I shall be happy to supply him with it. When
he was asked for explanations, he said it was sufficient that he
had said it. Now if non-intelligence cannot create intelligence,
how do you come to the conclusion that intelligence can create
non-intelligence ? Why is one less possible than the other, or
why is one less reasonable than the other ? If intelligence be
everywhere, then non-intelligence—where is that ? In this kind
of argument, by asserting without warranty that intelligence is
everywhere, and non-intelligence somewhere, you contradict your
self. Then, my friend says, “create” is a word everybody under
stands. He confesses that he did not understand me in quoting
from Hamilton, or when I urged that creation and destruction
were alike impossible. Now we are utterly unable to construe it
in thought as possible, that the complement of existence has
either been increased or diminished—we cannot conceive no
thing becoming something, or something becoming nothing.
The words creation and destruction are, to me, without mean
ing. When our friend uses these words, he should not pre
sume that the majority of the audience comprehend the
meaning he wished to put upon them, or still less that they
apprehended it- He says he does not come to speak to me but to
you; but, for such as have elected me to appear on their
behalf, I ask for those definitions. But Mr. Cooper says he
never did assert that there was only one existence always. Well,
then, does he mean that his argument admitted the possibility of
two existences occupying the same space ? And if one be every
where, where can the other be 1 Oh ! says my friend, there may
be a thousand existences of different natures on one point, though,
if one be all-powerful, it is hard to imagine it exercising power
�14
over other existences having nothing of common nature, and
with which it can have no relativity. Will he tell me how this
can be ? He puts the matter thus to you, and he is bound to
give you some explanation of it. He says, with regard to
motion, that he did not say that one existence had no motion. I
must trouble him, when he rises again, to tell me what he means
by motion, for I really do not know. I thought I had some
notion of it when he began his speech, but now I think he has no
meaning for it. I am bound to concede to him that the words
represent in his mind some ideas he intends to express; but
when I question him on the words he uses, they represent simply
confusion of thought. When I ask him the meaning of uncaused
cause, he says he cannot comprehend it, but can apprehend it like
light and life ; and he asserted that you can no more comprehend
light and life that you can uncaused cause. If he wished to
choose illustrations destructive of his own argument, he could
not have adduced one better adapted to that purpose. He says
that I cavil with words, but the argument is made up of words.
If you knock all these words to pieces, where does the argument
lie 1 If there be your uncaused cause at all, according to you it
is substance, which substance I define as being that existence
which we can conceive per se, and the conception of which does
not involve the conception of any thing else as antecedent to it.
Life may be defined as organic functional activity. You cannot
give any definition of uncaused cause—you might as well say a
square triangle, or a triangular circumference, or sweet number
three. Now, I am placed in this difficulty, that Mr. Cooper,
not prepared to prove his position, calls on me to take up the
attack. We want, he says, the demonstration of God’s non-existence. There is always a great difficulty in trying to do too
much ; but I will endeavour to do what is possible—i.e., to demon
strate to you that there is no such being as the God my friend
argues for—namely, a God everywhere, whose existence being in
finite, precludes the possibility of conceiving any other ex’stence,
but in proof of whom is involved the conception of another
existence created in addition to everything, and which exists
somewhere beyond everywhere—a God who, being infinitely
intelligent, precludes the possibility of conceiving existence with
out intelligence, and yet beside whose infinite intelligence, nonintelligent substance exists. Nothing is easier than to prove the
negative of this, if that is what my friend means. I will endea
vour, for a moment, to do so. I may be ineffective. Our friend
says that God is all-powerful and all-wise. Now either intelli
gence manifests power and wisdom, or it does not. My lriend
says that it does, because he seeks to demonstrate power and
wisdom from the intelligence he discovers in existence. Surely
if it be assumed that intelligence is evidence of power and
�15
wisdom, the lack of or absence of intelligence must be evidence
ot deficiency of power and wisdom. My friend says there is nonintelligence, and I say that non-intelligence demonstrates want
of power and want of wisdom in creating substance without in
telligence. Intelligence is either good or bad. Our friend savs
it is good because it helps him to make out God’s attribute of ail
goodness. If it is good, then the absence of intelligence must be
the reverse; and if non-intelligence is bad, it must be that the
Creator either had not the will or desire to make existence infi
nitely intelligent. My friend says that there is non-intelligent
existence, and he says that God had all-power and all-knowledge.
God must, therefore, have been without the desire, in which case
he would not be all-good. Our friend says I have misquoted
Coleridge. Coleridge says, without discontinuity, there can be
no origination, and my argument is that you are lost in the con
templation ot the chain of causes and effects, and that you can have
no conception of creation or of origination, and, therefore, must
be without the conception of God. (Cheers.)
Me. Cooper : Mr. Bradlaugh has told us that it has been his
lot in life to be at the trial of many issues. Now we are not
lawyers, and cannot say how far this experience may serve the
argument. My friend said there was one word which he had tried
to get in the bill. He should never put on a great hat, and put
on a great name if he did not earn it. I never called myself by
a great name in my life. If I have had a name, I was content
to receive it from others. I never called myself either Icono
clast or I fiddlestick—(Cries of order, oh I oh 1 and cheers.)
Well, if you do not like this, you should not have encouraged it.
He says I should have enlightened his ignorance. I have often
stooped to enlighten him. When he was only a boy here of
eighteen years old, I had marked out his course. He asks how
we come to the conclusion that non-intelligence does not create.
I did not think that Charles Bradlaugh would have asked a ques
tion of that kind, I thought he had more sense. I did not sup
pose that any one in this assembly—any man of common-sense,
had need to ask such question. I said I should teach him. I am
doing my best to teach him. “ Everybody cannot judge well the
reason why he contrives.” But I should have thought that all
reasonable men would have seen that clearly enough. They
have personal intelligence. But, then, he says non-intelli rence
annihilates intelligence which is everywhere. That is not so.
He says also that creation is a word without any meaning for
him. It means, however, an act of God—of the great existence.
But he wants definitions; and, again, he says since there has been
that intelligence existing everywhere, there must have been two
existences occupying the same space. I never indicated such an
argument in the slightest way. I simply spoke of all other
�16
existences being moved, separate from, and derived. I have not
spoken those words that have been imputed to me. I never
said such words. He wants to know what is the motion of
matter. He cannot conceive what matter is and what is motion.
But why has he been talking about motion if he does not understand
it ? He has given us his ideas of motion. He fails to perceive
what is matter, and what is meant by the motion of matter.
But there is matter enough in this room—there is matter enough
before us. If he does not understand what is meant, I go further
and ask what it is ? I am. to understand by a definition which
he has given of life, that it is organic functional activity. He
has explained to me that this was life. He said the remark that
it was uncognised cause, could not be apprehended. Will he
define what he means by organic functional activity? He is
not bound to believe me, but if he does not give some more pre
cise explanation, it simply comes to nothing. He has not come
to any conclusion. He says there cannot be an uncognised cause ;
that it is as unmeaning as a triangular square, or a triangular
circumference, or sweet number three. He has mentioned Sir
William Hamilton and others. I should have relied upon
such men as Butler, Sir Isaac Newton, L .eke, Samuel
Clarke.
When these great men spoke, I should have
thought it might be admitted that it would do. ’ Oh I no.
This was certainly a modest way of talking. Well, it was the
wrong way. It is the wrong sort of modesty. He says I have
endeavoured to prove the possibility of any other existence. I
have not. I have proved that something also is in existence—that
it must be intelligent, and must exist in part everywhere. Stop.
Take the argument—take hold of it—take it to pieces. It con
vinces my own mind. It has passed through my mind fully and
clearly. I said that God was all-powerful and wise. I do not
want to misrepresent, but I want to tell you what Mr. Bradlaugh
did say, and my reply to it. He says that either there is
everywhere intelligence, or that there is somewhere where there
is no intelligence. He says that non-intelligence cannot create
intelligence. He says that in some part of everywhere, there is
non-intelligence. Because I had said that non-intelligence exists,
he denies that God exists everywhere intelligent. But he
must be intelligent, because he created all the intelligence
that exists—because He created every derived intelli
gence. Now, with regard to the moral argument of God’s
goodness, we have nothing to do with that to-night. If we come
to that, it must be on Wednesday. Then his goodness as a moral
governor of the universe comes into question. Now, I did not
say that Mr. Bradlaugh had misquoted Coleridge, What I said
was, that Coleridge never taught me that an infinite chain of
finite intelligences could have existed. I say that Samuel Taylor
�17
Coleridge never maintained any such thing in his life. Coleridge
was a great believer in God. (Hear and laughter.) No sneer or
laughter, I assure you, disturbs me. I exist ; and I have not al
ways existed. Something has always existed. I am conscious
of an intelligent existence. If it began to be, it was caused to be
by some other existence, and must have been so caused. If any
person can persuade himself that non-intelligence can cause
existence, intelligent, personal, conscious existence, let him show
me that he believes, and that he maintains such a doctrine. I
need go no further at present—-there are just these steps in the
j argument. Here is the argument, and if our friend does not give
us the argument for the non-existence of God—that is, the nega
tive of the question—I have shown that I exist, and that, having
begun to exist, something must have existed before me. I am
intelligent, personal, conscious, and so the something which al
ways has existed was personal, conscious, intelligent. It has
always been or began to be. If it began to be, it has cause, and
the cause must be either intelligent or non-intelligent. I say
that non-intelligence cannot be an intelligent creator, an origina
tor, has no reason, will, judgment, can’t contrive, cannot be a cause.
Therefore, I know that my existence, that personal, conscious, in
telligent existence proceeds from that uncaused, underived, un
created intelligence, whom all men reverence and I call God. I
want that disproved. (Applause.)
Mr. Bradlaugh: Were the Danes and the Germanic forces
on either bank of the river Eider to turn their backs to each
other and fire, they would stand in about the same relation as
Mr. Cooper and myself. He will not give definitions, and he
attaches different meanings to the words he uses to those which
I attach to them. How are we, therefore, to arrive at any con
clusion that will be instructive or useful ? He says that he has
often been able to teach me, and if this is so, he should not
have relinquished the office of teacher to-night; but I confess that
if he has taught me, it has been at the greatest possible distance
between himself and myself. The opportunities have certainly
been often sought by myself for instruction at Mr. Cooper’s
hands, but I have only been favoured once or twice. My friend
urges that he does not put himself forward under a name he has
not won, and though these topics have but little to do with
to-night’s debate, I can say that I have fairly won the right to
use my nom de guerre Iconoclast. I have won fame for it with
d fficulty, and maintained my right to use it despite many a pang.
My opponent, though but one consequence can arise from his
stipulation, has compelled me to print my name—that consequence
is an increased difficulty in my business life. But for this I
do not care. Though, unfortunately, placed in this disadvantage,
I print my name and answer for myself, although I am really
�18
surprised that a man with the love of God and strength of truth,
with ability, with learning all upon his side, cannot allow me
my poor folly, if folly it be, and bear with me and my nom de
plume. He says, “ I will not give definitions.” I say, in reply,
you cannot—that you do not know the force and relevance of the
words you use, and you simply don’t tell us because you do not
know. I tell you in the clearest manner that, from your last
speech, you have no notion of the accurate meanings of the
words you used—you talk about “ other and separate, and
derived,” and seem not to know that the words are contradictory.
Derived existence must be relative, cannot be separate iu sub
stance. At least a teacher in using philosophic language to a
scholar ought to have put it more clearly. Let us see. He says
there is one existence, infinite, intelligent. He says everybody
knows that it is more possible for intelligence to create nonintelligence, than for non-intelligence to create intelligence. I say
sthis has no meaning. I defined intelligence as a quality of a
|mode of existence, and cannot understand quality creating subIstance. He has not told us what was meant by uncaused cause;
|and if he will not take intelligence to be a quality of a mode of
| existence, he has not told us what it is. He says there is intel| ligent existence now, therefore its cause is intelligent. You
j might as well tell us for our information that this glass is hard,
| and, therefore, its cause must be a hard existence, and then you
I might as fairly say that because that glass is hard, its cause is
i eternal hardness. There is no relevance whatever between argu| ments founded on phenomena and the noumenon which it is
sought to demonstrate. It is no use my friend denying the
> truth of any one definition, unless he is prepared to give us a
I better, so that you can compare the one with the other if you please.
? Our friend says that intelligence can create non-intelligence, but
| this involves a contradiction of the most striking character. For
I if intelligence is infinite, non-intelligence is impossible, and for
1 infinite intelligence to create non-intelligence is for it to annihi* late itself. My friend appeals to everybody’s knowledge, but the
I whole force of his appeal lies in his confusion of existence and its
J qualities. Intelligence is a quality of a mode—mode is neither ing finite nor eternal, and the attribute cannot be greater than the
I mode it pertains to. You can have no knowledge of existence
§ other than by mode, and can have no knowledge whatever of
I different existences of which one is all-powerful, all-wise, and
| everywhere present; and the other is, or others are, somewhere
| where this one is not. My friend calls on me to prove that difg ferent kinds of existence do not exist at the same time upon the
1 same point. I think it is for the man who talks about these
| existences, and not for me, to show what he means. By Creation
s Mr. Cooper says he means an act of God; if this is what “ create -
�19
*
*
*
>
means, and if he explains it to you in such terms, then is every act
of God a creation ? Our friend surely won’t say that, and if he
means some one particular act of God, he must enable me to
identify it. I am not dealing with the moral argument as to God
as Governor, but if the argument on design as manifesting intel
ligence is relevant, so far it strikes at the want of power,
want of wisdom of God. Is it not an illustration of the poverty
of my friend’s logic, and the weak efforts that are made to sustain a weak case, when an argument is attempted to be conveyed
in such terms as I fiddlestick (cheers), although a pretty tune
might be played on it ? He says he does not know what I
mean by organic functional activity, and asks me to explain.
Well, suppose I could not tell, that would not explain what is an
uncaused cause, I will, however, try to show that I have not
given an improper definition of life. By organic functional activity,
I mean the totality of activity resulting from or found with the
functions of each organism. My friend comprehends that which I
term organism in the vegetable and animal kingdom. If he tells
me that he does not know what I mean by organism, I can
only refer him by way of illustration to the organism of a tree or
of a man ; and by organism I mean the totality of parts of such
tree or man. It is possible that a better versed man than my
self might make this more clear; but it is not for my friend to
shelter himself under my want of knowledge, and to say he will
not give definitions while he requires them from me. Well,
he says, “ I exist; something has existed. It has not existed
always. It has been originated.” I take exception to the word.
I do not understand the word origin in reference to existence.
He says he will not define it. I do not know whether he means
by origination coming into existence where it was before. If so,
I tell him that the conception of this is impossible, that the ap
prehension of it is impossible, that he has used a form of words
which convey nothing of meaning either to you or to me. But
when we tell him that we do not understand an uncaused
cause, he says he don’t understand a scholar without modesty.
Well, then, Locke understood it, he says, and a great many other
great names understood it. Will he tell us how they understood it 1
Surely I have a right to ask him how they apprehended it. He
uses the phrase, and I have surely a right to assume the onus of
proof to be with him. When he does not or will not give us a
lefinition, I believe it is because he cannot. If he has a great
-esson to teach, I cannot suppose that he would be guilty of the
folly of withholding from you all the information that he had, or
could obtain ; but I am bound to suppose it is from his utter
inability to give you any, that he is wholly unprepared, either
with facts or arguments. If intelligence be a quality of mode,
then in so putting it you have entirely overridden the question of
�intelligence as existence, or as infinite attribute of existence. It
is for my friend to make clear his position to you. I know
that to many of you it may seem mere word play, but it is word
play which strikes at the root of the question. What does he
mean, when he says there may be a thousand existences beside
God 1 Does he mean that there may be a thousand existences
scattered and separate ? What does separate mean? It means clear
from, and distinct, and having no link in common with. If there
are a thousand such existences separate, then God is not infinite ;
and if not, our friend’s argument comes to nothing. I find it
difficult to see how my friend can understand that he has proved
his case. I find it more difficult still to conceive how holding at
one period other opinions, he could have been carried away from
those other opinions by such arguments as these. Surely we have
a. right to ask him to make this matter as clear to us as it is to
himself. The argument which convinced him, should convince
us, each individual here. God is personal ? What does this word
personal mean in relation to the infinite 1 God conscious ? Con
scious of what ? Has he an immutable consciousness? Was he
always conscious of the existence of the universe ?—that is, did
he know it to exist before it was created, or has his consciousness
been modified by the creation?
Was God conscious of the
material universe when it yet was not ? If yes, how could he
e know a thing to be which was not yet in being ? If God’s consciousness was once without the fact of the universe, and if God’s
f ‘ consciousness is capable of change, what becomes of the immu| tability of God ? Tell me how it was supplemented since ; tell me
| how something has been added since? You dexterously play
| with terms which you cannot explain, and hope to affirm by asser
tion what you cannot demonstrate by argument. (Cheers.)
Me. Cooper: I have a note about teaching Mr. Bradlaugh. Well,
I am teaching him now, I cannot help it. He d;d not care ! Well,
a quee” word that for young lads. I do not wonder that he is
unfortunate. Most people are unfortunate who do not care. He is
unfortunate, now where is the worst misfortune, I cannot say.
One does not like to talk about these things. Well, he wants to
know why he should be compelled to believe in God, and why
his little folly should not be granted to him ? Well, he wil find
that out some day (cheers and hisses), he must expect it (renewed
expressions of dissent); now do not get into a bad temper ; he
complains that he cannot demonstrate, that I do not know the
use of the terms I use. Then he says derived from, and separate
cause. Really, I thought I saw a great many persons sepa
rate from one another before me, and we separate from them. I
cannot understand this curious kind of definition. I cannot.
Then again, intelligence is a quality of personal, conscious
existence. Well, I spoke of it so. You may call it an attribute,
�or use the word how you please. Why did I say that God could
create ? Because his will must be all powerful. I was talking of
our intelligence, of our will. We have intelligence. I talked about
the power of man’s will as a part of bis personal, conscious, and
intelligent existence. It is therefore a power in G d, and must
be uncontrollable. That power, therefore, must be all powerful.
I have not confused the quality of existence. I never did. But
I want Mr. Bradlaugh to answer the arguments adduced. The
question, he says, is an attribute or mode, and not of existence.
What is the meaning of that ? I said it was not an argument for
to-night. For the moral argument,*lhe right time will be Wednes
day night. I said we must not bring it on to-night. I said it ia
impossible for a thing to come into exis ence when it was not
before. Has he not come into existence, and have not millions of
people come into existence where they were not before ? Now, I
do not know whatryou mean by this :—“ Is it reasonable to sup
pose something separate over which no power can be exercised ?
That glass is separate from me, aad yet I can exercise power over
it.” (Cries of prove it, cheers and dissent). I wish you would rea
son and would not clap your hands. If you do, I can only say
it is sheer nonsense. What does personal, eternal, infinite consci usness mean ? Has God’s consciousness ever changed ? All
things are present to his mind, and always must have been
present to him from his very nature. But I must ask my friend
what life is. He has not made me to comprehend what life is,
although he defines it as organic functional activity. There is no
man can comprehend life. What is man’s life ? What is angel life ?
—it is in vain to tell me about organic functional activity—what is
vegetable life ? And now, since you twit me with absence of
duration where it was never before, am I to understand that in
telligence is a quality of mode, and not a quali y of substance, or
that separate means something over which no power can
be exercised ? Where is the sense of it ? How am I to understand
it? I believe now I have mentioned every thing of importance.
Mr. Bradlaugh : My friend’s last question is, where was the
sense of it ? If it applies to his own speech, I will tell him nowhere—
it really displayed none from beginning to-end. Our friend must
have ability to know the difference between unconditioned exist
ence and modal existence; or if he has not the ability he
is not justified in championing the cause for which he is argu
ing. What he argues for, is not conditioned existence, but for
God, the absolute. If he does know for what he is arguing, or
knows and will not explain—or if he has not the ability to define
my terms, he should not have come here to teach you. In other
words, he should not, if wise, pretend to an ignorance which seta
before us incoherent statements like those he has made in lieu of
the proof he was bound to furnish. I will show you presently
�22
how little he was able to take the part as affirming the being of God
as maker of the universe; and how much he attempts to conceal
in taking that part. He says that God is immutable, and all
(things are now present to him, and ever have been present to
; him. He says this must have been according to God’s very
i nature, but he did not trouble us with a word of reason for this
I startling statement. His affirmation is, that God was as equally
I conscious of the universe before the creation, as after. But to
| say there was a time when the material universe did not exist, f
? and yet that at that time God was conscious of its existence—is »
absurd, and an utter contradiction. How could God be conscious !
that the universe was when it was not ? The phrase is so ludicrously
self-contradictory, that my friend could not have thought at all
when he u*tered it. If God were at any time without conscious
ness of the material universe, and afterwards became conscious
of the new fact of the origination or creation of the universe,
then there was a change in God’s consciousness, which could
not be immutable, as my friend contends. It would be supple
mented by the new fact. I cannot understand what he means
when he talks of the immutability of God’s consciousness being
a necessity of his nature. Surely such a word as nature implies
the very reverse of immutability. And if not, I should be glad
to know in what meaning my friend used a word which in com
mon acceptation implies constant mutation. In dealing with
the question of separate existence, Mr. Cooper says, that you and
I are separate from each other. We are separate modes of the
same existence, but are not separate existences. Does he mean
that the universe is separate from God in the same way that we
are from each other ? If not, this is a subterfuge. He does not
seem to know himself where the sense of his argument lies.
Then he says, “ I am separate from this glass, but I can exerc se power over it.” Here is the illustration of mode—of mode,
in whica there is common substance, common existence, but it
is not an illustration having any analogy. It is only because
he will not think that there is a difference between relative and
absolute terms, or see that we are each using words in opposite
senses. This discussion is degenerating into talk on one side, and
repetition on the other. He says again he is an existence, I say '
he is a mode of existence. I have already defined existence as ’
identical with that substance, which is that which exists per se, ■
and the conception of which does not involve the conception of
an.y other existence as antecedent to it. Mr. Cooper has not dis
puted this definition. He claims for God such existence, and yet
says he himself is an existence. If he means that he is a separate
existence from God—if he says that he is separate and exists
per se, then I do not, I repeat, understand his meaning. I want
an explanation from him. He cannot exist per se, for he says
�23
that he did not always exist, He cannot urge that he came
into existence from himself, or he would argue that he existed,
and did not exist at the same time. His existence can only be
conceived relatively as a mode of existence, such existence
being in truth before its mode, and existing after this mode shall
have ceased. He is not existence, but only a condition of exist
ence, having particular attributes by which he is distinguished
from other conditions of the same existence. He says that it is
nonsense when two men stand on the same platform to discuss an
important matter, and use the same words in a different sense’.
It is undoubtedly nonsense, when one of the disputants passes
over all the definitions of the words without disputing them, or
supplying others. Does he mean to say that he admits the defini
tions I have given ? If he does, the way he speaks of them clearly
shows that his arguments are based on, and prove only modes of
existence, and do not prove existence absolute, so that he has
admitted the whole point for which I am contending (cheers).
He says separate existences can exercise power over each other.
I ask him to show me how, because I have told him it is im
possible to think of two existences distinct and independent of each
other—that it is equally impossible to conceive that two sub- ,
stances having nothing in common, can be the cause of or affect Eone another. He says then that man’s will has furnished him t
with the basis for arguing for God’s power. He reasons up to the |
will of God from the will of man. But if man’s will be, as 1?
declare it to be, the result of causes compelling that will, and
if God’s will is to be fairly taken as analogical to man’s will, then|
God’s will also results from causes compelling his will. But in
this case, the compelling cause must be more powerful than God,
and thus the supremacy of God’s power is destroyed (cheers). &
I know that in this it is possible I may be arguing beside |
the question, because our friend does not take reasonable pains |
to make any explanation as to the value which he attaches to =
the meaning of his words. Le* us see how his demonstration
breaks down:—God’s will and consciousness are identified by
my friend. God’s consciousness, according to him, has never
changed, and never can change. God belore creation must have
been conscious that he intended to create, but if his conscious-,
ness has never changed, he must have been always intending to ;
create, and the creation could never have commenced. Or, Gocl .
must have been always conscious that he had created, iD which
case there never could have been a period when he had yet to
create. He must either at some time have been conscious that
the material universe did not exist, or he must have been con
scious that it always existed. In the last case, there could be no
creation ; and in the first, if God’s consciousness were unchangedJ j
the universe would not yet exist to him. I am not responsible?;
�24
for the peculiar absurdity of this sentence. God either always
willed to make, or he never willed to make. But he could not
have always willed to make, because otherwise there would have
been some time in existence preceding the act of making, which
there could not have been, because God is immutsne, and could
not have changed—there could never have been making without
change—without change there never was intention preceding act,
nor act preceding intention, and there could never have been
manifested that power which he argues for as demonstrating
Deity. I appeal to the audience to think for themselves, and I ask
them whether our friend has adduced any reasonable evidence for
God as the maker and creator of the universe ? I ask whether
he has not put before you an unintelligible jumble of words
without any relation to the question ? I ask you whether he can
fairly be regarded as presenti’ g the united intellect of that
muster-roll of names which he has given as arguing from design
in favour of Deity. How can he claim to be a teacher, who
cannot explain words he uses, or does not know the meaning of
the words his opponent uses ? I simply claim to be a student.
I admit I have not that confidence in myself that enables Mr.
Cooper to regard himself as impregnably entrenched and en
camped, so secure that nobody can touch him. When one sends
a stone through the window of his argument, he says it is not
broken, and when the doors are battered down he declares that
they still stand. I admit so far he is better off than I am. If
he can convince you, and if that conviction be worth anything,
I can only ask when he taunts me about the trial of issue, whether
this is not the most momentous issue that man can have to try ? I
ask not as a lawyer, but as a man. He must meet the question
fairly and honestly, and without a taunt, or before I have done
he will have full payment for all the taunts he gives. (Loud
cheers.)
Mr Cooper: When Mr. Bradlaugh says that the doot-s have
been battered down, and a stone sent through the window—I
say I never said a word about doors or windows. When he says
I will not teach—I say he will not learn. (Cheers and confusion.)
When he says I wish he would not fling such big words at me
—I say his words are so big they split my ears, as they make
such a terrible noise. (Cheers and hisses.) I hardly know what
be was saying when he was talking—(loud cries of question)
Now we are all to the question. (Laughter and oh ! oh !) Who
is that silly man that says question ? You should have
brought your brains in here, and not come without them. (Hisses
and confusion.) Mr. Bradlaugh says I ought to know there is a
difference in condition. That is what I argue for. He says I
have not the ability to discern it, and, therefore, should not have
come here. He says I know it all or 1 conceal it. I have never
�been in the habit of concealing things in my life. “All,” he
repeats, “ is present to the mind of God, that is his conscious
ness.” I said it was present to his mind because he is always.
If my friend tries to show that it is not, let him show it. Pre
sent to his consciousness! He asks—How can it be present to his
consciousness when it has not existed—how can anything be
present to my conscience that has passed away from existence?
There is memory, and he knows that must exist to all eternity—
that is how it is present to his consciousness, so that his immut
ability and his consciousness are essential, he being perfectly wise.
Show me how that can be, says Mr. Bradlaugh. We are separate
modes of the same existence; that glass is a mode of existence.
What is separate 1—the mode ? A jumble of words—indeed, I call
this gibberish. What is this eibberish that tells us that intel
ligence is a mode, or rather a quality of existence ? Show what
is mode ? How are we the same existence as that glass ? Please
to enlighten me. He talks of those listening to mere talk from
me. I really do not know what he is talking about sometimes.
Then he says it is nonsense for two men on the same platform to
use two words in a different sense. Why there is no debate if
we can agree. I don’t want to use words in the sense that myself
and a glass are the same substance. If there are two existences,
one acting on the other, you say it is an affirmation and was not
proved. .Well, but it did not follow, he says, that God was al
ways creating because his conscience was immutable. “ It don’t
show that he should do anything ; acts of will are not tied to the
proof of his consciousness; that can be consciousness something
else, not will, that may be done.” Why that is playing with '
words. Then, again, he says because conscience is immutable
— make affirmation that bis will is immutable. Now I want
my argument answered. (Cheers and hisses.) He asks what we
mean. Why, if he cannot bring forward a better argument than
he has afforded us to-night, he cannot argue it. I exist; but
something must have always existed. I am a personal, conscious,
intelligent existence. You know what it is, or you could not
ask such a question. You did so for a puzzle, perhaps. It is
an act of intelligence to ask the question. Oh ! but I am asked
to define what intelligence is, and when I define it, then to define
the definition. Organic functional activity, he repeats. I have
no explanation of it. Did you define that definition ? (Cries of
yes, yes, and no, no.) Well, you know there is a personal, con
scious intelligence—either there was always existence, or it began
to exist. Then whatever has come into existence must have a
cause. Non-intelligence can’t create intelligence. Conceive it, if
you can. That which can’t be needs no proof. Justas if one could
perceive than a thing can’t be, and yet it necessarily exists. So
non-intelligence cannot create intelligence. “Our friend has not
�26
A
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/
'
shown that it can.” He says he does not know the meaning of
the word create. “He has not shown what he means,” Mr.
Bradlaugh says, “ by personal, conscious, intelligent existence.”
That it has always been, that it is derived from some personal,
conscious, intelligent always existent being. Well, I mean that,
if you like. (Cheers.)
Mr. Bradlaugh : My friend, in conclusion, said I had not
shown that non-intelligence could create intelligence. Consider
ing that I have repeatedly declared that I do not know the mean
ing of the word create, I think my friend must be rather san
guine to suppose that I would undertake to enlighten him upon
this point. It does not lie upon me to prove that non-intelligence
can create intelligence, but on my friend, who affirmed a con
tradiction in terms, to prove it. This statement of my disincli
nation does not help his inability. If I am lame, it don’t prove
that he can walk without crutches. But Mr. Cooper says that
in representing to you God’s consciousness as immutable, I do
injustice to his views; that, although all things are perpetually
present to God's consciousness—God need not, and does, nut, he
says, always will to create. But surely such a declaration is
entirely without evidence, and nowise improves Mr. Cooper’s
position. If there was any period when God did not will to
^create, then he must have changed when he varied his will to the
act of creating. But I want to know how a thing can be present
'when it is non-existent ? If all things were always present to
God, all things must have always existed. To God there never
could be a time when they did not exist. There never was to
him a time when it was necessary to create—he could not have
created that which to him had ever existed. He said, he did not
understand what I meant, when I talked of intelligence being
quality of mode. He said it is a quality of existence, a quality
of substance, and therefore God, who created substance, must be
intelligent, his intelligence was a quality of all existence. Not
all, for he says there are some existences, or some parts of sub
stance that are not intelligent. Then intelligence is a quality of
existence, and it is not! Because existence, according to Mr. Cooper,
may be, and is with it and without it. Now, I say that intelli
gence being a quality of mode of existence, that in various modes
we find varying qualities. All intelligence is not of the same
degree, but varies as the modes differ. They differ as by their
Various characteristics. It is by difference of quality that you
distinguish the one mode from the other. If intelligence b’e infi
nite, there can be only one kind of it, and of one degree; it can
never be lesser or greater. But intelligence varies according
tv mole. You find different degrees or ii te’ligence ma ues" . * different organisations. (Heat, hear). It must therefore be, if
Mr. Cooper’s logic be worth anything, that one kind of intelli
�27
gence creates like ; then, seeing that no two men are alike
organised or intelligent, there must be as many different Gods to
create as there are different intelligences. I am driven to this
line of argument by the absurdity of my friend’s speeches. I can
not believe but that he must know better ; if he does not, little
indeed can he have read the elaborate essays of modern
thinkers—little can he have examined the terms used by great men
from whom he professes to quote. Little indeed can he have
read either the volumes of Hamilton or Berkeley, or of the men
whose ideas be professes to put before us. Surely the philoso
phy of the unconditioned has formed, at some time or other, a
reading lesson for my friend. He declares that he has the ability of
teaching one so ignorant as he believes myself to be ; but
when he uses words so irrelevant and so void of meaning, I am
obliged to assume that he uses them ignorantly, or he would be
more heedful of giving their meaning. He says that the glass
and himself are different existences : he cannot understand their
being different modes of the same substance. His understand
ing must be sadly deficient, if he cannot distinguish between
the characteristics of this mode and that one and that each
mode has more or less different qualities with the same substance.
Here, theD, in each quality my friend will have something by
which he can in thought separate modes, but he cannot in
thought give a separate existence to the substance of each mode,
because he well knows that the same substance as this glass, in
another mode, might have gone to form an intelligent being at
some period of existence. If he says he does not know what he
means by his own words, then, by obtuseness of intellect
he is incapacitated as a public teacher, or it is evident he
dare not use the plain meanings of technical language, because
he is afraid of its logical consequences. Then he says that God,
who is everywhere present, yet besides whom there is somewhere
where he is not—that he has a consciousness of existence
passed away. I deny that there ever was existence which
has since passed away. I take a firm stand on this, and I sub
mit that the two phrases, “ creation,” and “ existence or substance
passed away,” are utterly without meaning. Our friend, surely
if he meant anything, cannot have meant existence that had
ceased to be—that something could never become nothing, yet he
alks of existence passed away—he speaks of existence as no longer
existing. If he means that God’s range of observation is limited,
and that it did not come within his range of observation, then I
can understand it; but if he means this, then he abandons the
attribute of omniscience for Deity. It is difficult really to
guess what interpretation he wishes to be put upon his words.
If there is anything which does not exist always to God, it can
never have existed, as my friend denies the possibility of anything
�23
beaming n th’ng, Therefore, to speak of anything which has
passed out of existence, is to use words without sense or relevance.
(Laughter and cheers.) Our friend says that he did not know
that the window was knocked out and the portal carried away. I
am afraid he is the only one in this room in so blissful a state of
ignorance. He complains of my loud voice. I am always desirous
to limit my voice to the place in which I speak, and not to give
offence. But I am apt to remember my subject rather than my
voice. I am apt to remember alone the cause in which I am
speaking rather than the manner of speech. I know that there
is much in my address capable of improvement; and if my friend
wishes to reprove me, let it be by the contrast between us. His
better chosen phraseology, courteous and patient demeanour, quiet
and kindly bearing, will, coupled with his calmness while I
am replying, be more effective than any verbal rebuke. (Loud
cheers.)
It was now a quarter to ten, Mr. Cooper begged to be informed
by the chairman as to a point of order. He said that, in his discus
sion with Joe Barker, the order was that the person who opened
the discussion for the night closed it.
The Chairman, in reply, said :—I think that the best way is
to adopt a rule. I understand from the paper, the order of
speaking is to be alternate speeches of a quarter of an hour each. I
think it best that the person opening should not speak last. There
will be two more speeches. Mr. Cooper will speak for a quarter
of an hour, and Mr. Bradlaugh will speak for the following
quarter of an hour, when the discussion will terminate to-night.
Mr. Cooper : I told you I came here in a friendly spirit, but as
this is the last time I shall have to address you, I must say I
have been grieved to observe a contrary spirit in you. I wish
that you could behave not like an audience of bagmen, and could
sit without clapping hands or making ejaculations, and crying up
some person, whether he' has sense or not. (Cheers, hisses, and
confusion.) Why need you come her'e? You say you want
truth, then why can’t we discuss truth with all proper patience
and kindness, and not be clapping each other, with jeers, because;
I suppose our friend understands sarcasm, which you Londoners ‘
like so very much ? I am old and used to you. I used to see
all that thing before. (Cheers, shouts, and hisses.) Well, I will sit
down if you do not want to hear me. (Cries of sit down, go on
with your argument.) I discovered that sauce for goose was not
sauce for gander here. (Cheers, hisses, and laughter.) Do not
be so very hard on a poor man. “He cannot understand a word
of Greek,” I thought every body knew that. “But it was
wrong to bring into existence that which had no existence before.”
Mr. Bradlaugh c nnot understand, and as he does not, he wants .
a definition.^ I did not say that God was always willing. I did
�29
not say there never was a period when he did not will a certain
thing. He may will something at one period, and some'hiag at
another period. But, then, we are told it did not follow that he
either should or did exist always. I repeat, that things may
have been present to his conscious intelligence before he created
them. It happens not to be mine, but Plato’s universe, that is,
Plato’s language—“ all things are present to his conscious intel
ligence before he created them.” Our friend goes on, “ I am an
old fashioned reader of old fashioned men.’’ He tells me “ if it
be a quality of existence, it is a quality of all existence.” There
are different qualities of the same existence, there is only one
intelligence ; but, says Mr. Bradlaugh, if God be infinite, there
must be different Gods. If there be different men and different
intelligences, if he can create them anywhere, does it follow that
they do not understand ? Does he not understand this logic ? He
must know better than I speak that it must be so. (Hear.)
Some poor man said “ hear.” Well, I came to you as friends, I
came maintaining your sincerity. I never called you infidel, because
that term is generally used to signify blackguard. I never spoke
ill of you, I never questioned your sincerity, I do not question Mr.
Bradlaugh’s sincerity. We come with the belief that God exists.
We believe it to be a most important belief, and most important
it is if it be true. I see no reason for calling this glass and my
self different modes of the same existence. There may be some
men here who think otherwise, but that is not proving they are
modes of the same existence. Well, existence that has passed
away may yet exist somewhere, although it is not present to my
vision. It is in my conscious intelligence, everything I have been
acquainted with. That is my meaning. I think it is clear enough,
but before I sit down, I will re-state my argument. I am told
that I argued inconsistently and unmeaningly. I will try again,
while I am in possession of the time, as it is the last opportunity
I shall have to-night. I exist. I say it for yourself now. I exist.
I have not always existed. Something must have always existed.
If there never had been a period when nothing existed, there must
have been nothing still. I am conscious of a personal, intelligent
existence, which must have always existed, otherwise it began to
be. It must have had a cause, and that cause must have been
intelligent or not; non-intelligence cannot create intelligence.
Show me how it was. “ Show me how you can infer the possi
bility of intelligence,” &c., is what I have been asking every time
I rose to speak to-night. But he has not done it. I cannot see
how he can perceive that non-intelligence could bring intelligence
into existence. Since there was that always in existence, I must
have belief in another act of consciousness that I have exercised,
for I am certain from the observation of my own intelligence,
that something has always existed everywhere, in every, part of
�So
everywhere. Therefore, there are no lines of demarcation—it has
no motion such as you affirm of matter. I do not say that it has
no motion at all. It don’t need to move to one point of every
where, that is already in every part of everywhere, and there is
everywhere. And now I have clearly arrived in my own mind,
at the knowledge of an uncaused existence. It has become
clear to my perceptions that as this existence was everywhere,
it was omni-present, all-powerful, uncreated, underived, per
sonal, conscious, reasonable existence. Then, I turn even towards
J this material universe. It cannot be the something that always was.
I know that I exist now. I know that at two years old I existed.
I recognise change, and I know that I have changed ; that this
universe changes, and therefore it can’t be that which has always
existed. I said I could move, mould, shape, fit, and design
matter. I can recognise the results of design, although I cannot
see the act of the mind. I reason by analogy, from my personal,
conscious existence, that men are contriving and designing; if I
find their composition to consist of parts and peculiar fashions
adapted and fitted for the purpose it fulfils, and if the principle
on which it worked were simple, I should admire it, and by the aid
of reason, conclude that it had a personal, conscious, and intelli
gent existence for its designer and contriver. Then, I look at
this curiously formed body, the bodies of animals; and I remem
ber the power of this hand, and when I look through a telescope
at those shining bodies in the heaven, and see their immensity,
and recognise them by the light of reason to be themselves the
suns of other systems, I then say he is al'-intelligent, since all
intelligence must have come from him—he only existed from all
eternity—he is the author of all things. Whatever exists must
have been by his will, and by his power, therefore he is uncon
trollable by aDy other will, and therefore he is maker of this
universe. I have said that he is not the mode, but that he exists
simply by his will, and in him we live, move, and have our
being—therefore, in him is my being and your being, and the
being of every animal, and that they can be kept in existence only
by One Almighty, all-wise, and everywhere present, self-existing,
self-created, underived, uncognised, personal, conscious, intelligent
being, whom I worship, and men call God. I have re-stated my
argument. If any one seeks to overturn it, let him go through it
step by step. No person has done so here. No person can do it.
It is an argument that shall not pass away, but must come every
day before your eyes, and possibly to your minds. (Cheers.)
Mb. Bradlaugh : Our friend says something exists, that the
universe exists. I reply, that if something now exists, you cannot
conceive when it did not exist. The supposition that there ever
was a period when the universe began to be, is introduced and
assumed without the slightest warrant for such an assumption.
�31
You cannot limit its existence, you canmt limit its duration. He
says something is everywhere, but that the universe is finite in
extent, as it is, according to his view, finite in duration. He can
not in thought put a limit as to how long the universe has existed,
or how far it extends. The duration and extent of existence are
alike illimitable. Then, he says that substance is not naturally
intelligent, and that the intelligence we find must result from
infinite intelligence. I have endeavoured during this argument j
to explain to him that intelligence was a word that could only be j
properly used in the sense of a quality of a mode, in the same way i
that you would use the word hardness, broadness; and that as
you could not say it was all broad, or all hard, no more could
you say it was all intelligence, or without intelligence. I must
confess that I have never listened to any argument more pre
tentiously and less ably put, than that of my friend to-n’ght.
There was only one part of it that would, if complete, have
deserved any reply, and that he took imperfectly from Gilles
pie, where you may see what his argument ought to have been,
for it is there put as clearly and comprehensively as possible.
He says, he comes here to talk to us in a friendly way. He
would assume that we had imported into this debate that which
lacks friendliness. If it be so, I regret it. But, when he is
asked the meaning of one term, he says he was not bound to tell
us that, and when a definition is given by me, and the argument
is approached on that basis, he says hemeant no such thing. He has
said he will not reproach you as infidels, for that infidels are iden
tified with blackguards. Infidel does not mean blackguard. It means
without faith, outside the faith, against the faith. Mr. Cooper is
infidel to every faith but his own. I am but in one degree more
an infidel, and surely we are none the more blackguards because
we are opposed to the faith which he preaches. I am not ashamed
of the word infidel. Nobler men than ever I can hope to be,
truer men than I in my highest aspirations can pretend to be,
have been content to be classed among those who had that name
applied to them, and they have won it proudly in the age in which
they lived. There have been heroes in every age—infidels, if you
please —but I declare them heroes in the mental battle fields who
have been able to hold their own in life, assailed though they were
by calumny when the grave had received them. Our friend says
that he cannot tell why I speak of a glass and myself as different
modes of the same substance, but in my first speech I took pains
to define what I meant by substance. If he had a better defini
tion, he should, in justice to his subject, have presented it to us ;
it was not for him to say he would not give it, and then to say
“ I don’t understand my opponent.” But he says that “ some
thing could never have been produced from nothing. Intelligence
exists, and must therefore have been created by an all-wise intelli-
�32
| gent Deity.” “ TV ere is either no existence without intelligence,
|or there is existence without intelligence.” My friend declares all
|existence is not alike intelligent, but that some is unintelligent,
|and in this I urge that he contradicts himself. If Mr. Cooper
gis right in declaring that there is any substance non-intelligent,
[(then it can only be (on the hypothesis that God is infinite intelli| gence) by supposing God in such case, and so far, to have anni^■hilated his intelligence. But, if there is anv substance non- (
intelligent, then intelligence is not infinite, and the God my friend I
' contends for does not exist. If God brought into existence that
f which was not himself, but something different from himself, he !
■ must have brought something not out of himself, but something
; out of nothing! He contradicts his own argument, and indulges
in the strangest assertions The universe is moveable, God is not.
He does not give us the slightest reason for this statement. He
declares that God is the master of the universe, but does not even
show you that he understands the relevancy of the argument
addressed to him. When he used the phrase, he must have
meant either that what God created was the same as himself, or
different from himself. It could not have been the same as him
self, otherwise there would have been no discontinuity, no break—
there would have been, nothing to distinguish the creator from
the created—no break of continuity to enable us -to conceive
creation possible. Nor could that which God created have been
different from himself, unless my opponent is prepared to con
tend that things which have nothing in common with each other can
be the cause of, or affect one another.. This shows that Mr.
Cooper has not well considered the terms he employs. If our
friend bases any argument for God’s existence upon his intelli
gence, let him explain what he means. It is not enough for him
to take cognisance of the universe, and so cognise certain effects.
All those finite effects do not aid him one step towards the infi
nite. His design argument was a structure without a founda
tion. You have seen how little our friend can understand the
meaning of his own words. He has talked about his trials, and
yet he asked how I could talk about my misfortunes. I have
not yet talked of them. I have not said how men, when I was
yet at an early age, for these opinions drove me out from home,
, and from all that I loved and was dear to me, and threw me within
! eight of the truth, where I have had since the happiness of striv
ing for that truth—lifting up the banner of our cause, showing
that true men may be made truer, and the world be better worth
living in than it was before the struggle. (Cneers.)
|
�SECOND NIGHT.
ON GOD AS MORAL GOVERNOR OF THE UNIVERSE.
At seven o’clock precisely Mr. Harvey, the Chairman, accornp^
nied by Mr. Cooper, Mr. Bradlaugh, and several representative
friends, came upon the platform, and were received with loud
cheers. The Hail was not quite so crowded as on the first night,
but was well filled in every part.
The Chairman : I have to announce that the discussion will
now commence. With your permission I willread the subject from
the printed progran&rie. The argument on the first night was
as to the Being of God, to-night -it is for the Being of God as
Moral Governor of the Universe. As before, each speaker will
occupy half-an-hour and no more for his first speech, or as much
shorter, a period as he may think proper, and afterwards a
quarter of ap hour each. I must again ask the audience to give
me their confidence. I hope they will abstain from unnecessary
cheering or calls of time. If either speaker should get out of
order, I will remind him of it. I have no doubt, if you will
listen to the speakers tilt they have concluded, you will have an
evening of instruction, and be able to appreciate their arguments.
Mr. Cooper : If there is one word of more importance to me
than any*other that could be mentioned—one word of more im
portance to me—to human beings, than any other, that word is
duty—duty, a word, I say, that is all-important to me. We are
not talking of the duty of pigs, of dogs, of rabbits, weasels, snails,
butterflies, bullocks, or elephants—duty belongs to man. Crea
tures have no duty. We never talk of the duty of a snail, of a
horse, of a cat, of a bullock. Duty belougs to man. (Cries of
yes, yes, and question.) Well, the parties of your side who pro
fess a philosophic duty, seem to think that there is no such thing as
duty connected with religion. ‘Who told them so? We believe
that there is a duty of religion, though we ought to obey our
own convictions. Well, but you say we are as moral as you are
on the other side—we follow duty. My question is to, a person
who talks about moral duty as a result of philosophy. Is he a
perfect mau? Is any of you a perfect man? If you are, send
your name to the Times, and be sure you have it put in the
second column, where they put all the curious advertisements—
�34
indeed, you might take a house in Belgrave Square, and people
would come to see you if you were a perfect man. But no;
really I am not a perfect man, nor you. There are none of you
perfect men. Then, I say you, each of us, breaks his sense of
duty again and again. You get out of temper with your wives
and children—you ill use them very likely—you say something
that grieves them very much. Oh, it’s all right—you were out
of temper ! You wonder at yourself for striking her; well, but
whenever any one has struck, or ill used, or trampled on you, you
come to a conviction of another kind. In two or three days,
perhaps, after you have been guilty of this misconduct, you are
sorry. You say, “ what a scandal to have used my wife so.” I
should not have done so. But you have done this often. You
say, I must not do these things again. You accuse yourself, you
threaten to flog yourself. What is all this ? But perhaps you
are a shopkeeper; no matter what the article is that you sell.
A.person comes into your shop: perhaps he is fastidious. You
think he has come in to get something as cheap as he can. There
is nothing doing. You show your articles. You say to your
self, what am I to do with this man ? He has spent a quarter of
an hour in your shop, you seem to have had some time waiting
upon him. Something begins to say to you, “ rent and taxes
must be paid.” He seems to want the article. Yes, it’s a very
well manufactured article. Yes, is the reply, what will you take
for it ? You hesitate; you say to yourself, “I must, I will have
as much as I can get for it.” He pays you your price, and you
are struck with wonder. So off he goes. You have charged
him pretty well. It comes up in your mind that day. You
say to yourself, I have to support a family—it is very difficult to
support a family, also to pay rent and taxes. So you reason
against rates and taxes—wife and children—it beggars you—and
so on. Again, you fall into habits of drink. Some sensible
fellow said to you one day—Turn teetotaler. Depend upon it
he was a sensible fellow who said that—gave you that advice.
You thought it was rather hard at first; you tried it, however,
and you found how effectual it was. When you got up in the
morning you said, “ How light I feel—how comfortable I am.
I am not a slave to drink, I do not wallow in the sty,
a sleep does not oppress me now as it did before. One
day last summer, wnen it was very hot, there was an excur
sion to Gravesend. You wanted relaxation. Young people
are rather fond of that, so you went on the excursion, and
you stopped now and then to see the country. At last you saw
somebody take a glass of porter. You were thirsty. He asked
you to have one, as you were one of the party. Well, you are
over-persuaded. You take one You felt it was wrong, a bad
step. But why, how could this be ? I need take no more. But
�85
you do drink another glass, and your thirst is not slaked. Then
somebody said to you, take a drop of something short, that will
queneh your thirst. And so you do, and your senses come short.
You get into bed. You have burning; a great drum thunder
ing through your head. But conscience comes up, and then you
say—“ I am a brute again. I have gone into drunkenness
again.” How was it that you felt condemnation ? How was it
you felt condemnation as a husband, a father, or a man—all that
condemnation ? Iam sure you could not help it. I do not,ear®
whether you call yourself Atheist, Deist, Sceptic, Freethinker, or
whatever you call yourself, you could not help it. It is a part
of your nature, of a moral nature that you have different from
the inferior animals, that you should have remorse for doing
wrong. You threaten to flog yourself, to lacerate yourself for it.
A man may continue to offend against this something. Stop,
what do you mean by a moral nature ? We talk about defining
words. It is quite necessary to define this word. I remem*
her Robert Cooper being present here so long ago as March,
1856, about the time that I was avowing a change in my
opinions, and another time in John Street. He did notreply to me in a speech, but he did so in a pamphlet. In that
pamphlet, he showed that he did not understand what I have
said. “ Man has an immoral nature, and, therefore, he has a
moral government where he has an immoral nature.” If that
was the amount of his acquaintance with the form of moral
philosophy, it showed he knew nothing about the matter in the
philosophic sense. Man has not an immoral nature, but a moral
nature. It is called “ moral Bense ” by Shaftesbury, “ moral
reason ” by Reid, consciousness by Butler, and is a power within
man which warns him of what is right and what is wrong. It
don’t matter where he is—where he lives—what land he possesses
—what language he speaks, or what colour he is—he is sure to
ask of it, and the reply is infallible, What is right and what is
wrong ? Oh ! but that is not consciousness, says the other side.
We say there is no such power.* It is a thing of education, you
say. It depends on how a man has been instructed. “ Your
conscience is not my conscience, one man’s conscience is not
another’s.’’ The conscience of a Jew is not that of a Christian ;
the conscience of a civilised man is not the same as that of a
savage. “ It is a thing of education.” To be sure ! Well, but
somebody says I cannot understand what conscience is. What
is this moral nature ? Let us try to understand. It is a faculty
in man that discerns that there is right and wrong, and testi
mony is infallible—a faculty, no doubt, that needs to be educated.
You cannot educate it in animals—it is not there. There must
be a right for a man to do right, a wrong to do wrong, each of
which his spiritual nature recognises and distinguishes. I shall,
�36
of course, contend!, that we have in this Christian country the
highest moral teaching in Christianity itself; and if this were
denied, a high moral sense, which some of my friends would attri
bute to the discernment of reason. Moral sense, I say, is the
clearest and strongest discernment of moral nature—it discerns to
practise what is right; that virtue, truth, honour, and so on de
serve praise, and in their very nature confer their own reward;
that the practise of vice, error, which we call wickedness, sin,
and trangre^sions deserve punishment. Man has this moral sense.
He has not an immoral nature, which says that virtue deserves
punishment and error reward. Robert Cooper, therefore, did
not know what he was talking about. There is this faculty in
man—it is part of his intellectual nature. Conscience responds to
it more or less ; and as he is a free agent, so he can resist and sin
against it, which he does easily, so that he sears it as with a red hot
iron, and he may sin on till he is steeped to the lips in vice;
still there it is. For instance, a man meets another who
looks very hard at him in the street. He bolts down the next
entry. He says, “ that man knows me.’’ He wishes it was dark
so that nobody would know him, and when it is dark, and he is
in bed, he pulls down the sheet over his face. Criminals have
made these confessions. Oh ! says somebody, you don’t call that
conscience; didn’t Palmer, that Rugby fellow, die as hard as
iron ; he could not have what you call conscience ? Now, I wish
you would listen to a person of extreme credibility, who had it from that criminal himself—viz., Mr. Goodacre, the clergyman
who attended Palmer every night in the gaol. When Palmer
went back to the gaol after the trial, he was as hard as iron. But
the last night came—he was in the condemned cell. The chap
lain spoke to him, but it was, so to speak, like pouring water upon
a duck’s back. There was no conversion. The clergyman goes to his
lodgings, and prays to bring the unhappy criminal to a sense of his
situation. He felt also that he could not go to bed; doubt pressed
upon his mind as to whether he had said all that he ought to
have said, for before eight o’clock the next morning all would be
over. “ I may not,” said this gentleman to himself—“I may not
have said all that I ought to say—I must say all that I can.” He
went back and knocked at the prison door—by law the chaplain
can get admission into the gaol at any hour. This is the rela
tion given by the gentleman, which exactly illustrates the case in
point. He entered the cell where the wretched man was. “I
am come to speak to you,” said the chaplain. “ I must come and
speak to you. You are a great sinner. I am come to say that
there is pardon for you,” and he alluded to the thief who was *
pardoned on the cross. “ Will you try,” he exclaimed, “ and con
fess your sin, and you may yet find pardon.” It had such an effect
on Palmer that he asked—“ How pardon ? If I should confess about
�37
my wife, I should have to confess about my brother too.” Why,
returned the chaplain, and did you murder your brother also ?
And Palmer clung to the bed stock with both hands, and groaned
as if he would rend his soul. That groan was the voice of con
science. He had sinned against his conscience. But you say
this was not remorse for crime, for this was nor. in his character.
Just imagine to yourself an old lion who entered into a corner of
the wilderness, and groaning because he had killed so many
antelopes, or a cat into the chimney corner, because she had
killed so many mice! How does this happen but because we
have this moral nature ? What does it tell us that vice and
wickedness are wrong, that untruthfulness, tyranny, despotism,
sensuality, all deserve blame and punishment—that virtue, honour,
goodness, self-denial, benevolence, deserve praise and reward—in
a word, it is a dictate of the mind of man ? How comes this to be,
but that there is a moral governor to whom we are accountable ?
We cannot get rid of the responsibility. Deny it as we please, it
is there ; it follows the moral governor exists. We look on his
moral government. We see organic law punishing man for sin.
We sin; punishment fearfully suddenly overtakes the wicked.
Men speak and talk about it. We see vice triumphant, men
wading through blood and gaining a throne ; kings grasping
liberty by the neck, and as each moment rolls on dishonesty,
violence, and weakness successful. Well, say you, is it part of
the moral government that we see the rich getting wealth and
the poor growing poorer, and virtue and poverty suffering to
gether? You look on the great man. There is happiness, you
exclaim, and you say, “ this is not right according to the principles
of your moral government.” You can only come to this conclu
sion at last, and that is my conclusion, that he could only resist
the sense of moral conviction, he could only disobey this sense of
responsibility, because God’s moral government has only begun,
and is not completed. There must be a state where wrong will
be righted—where no four millions of black slaves shall be
lorded over by white men—no bad men sit on thrones, no good
men be imprisoned. There must be a state of equality. What
we see in progress here must be worked out finally. We see in all
these things around about us proof that man i° a being of pro
gress, and which shows that he cannot be limited to this state of
existence. This cannot be the be-all and the end-all. I con
clude that this is only the beginning, and that we are going on;
that this life is not the conclusion of our existence—that a moral
governor exists, that his moral government has begun progressing
« towards perfection. We cannot deny that it is here. You say
there is no moral government. Then why are you punished :
has not sin its penalty ? Why this discontent, this uneasiness, if
there be no hereafter, no accountability ? When you see a throne
�88
like Louis Napoleon’s, who will say there is no hereafter ? If
there were not, why not act like great Caesar himselt ? Cato
could have aided him, and Caesar drove him to suicide. Why is
all this if there be no moral government ? What does it prove ?
This, that a moral governor exists. (Cheers.)
Mr. Bradlatjgh : I am delighted to be able to pay the speaker
who has just sat down, the only compliment that has seemed his
due during the time he has spoken since the commencement of
this discussion. It is that he has occupied, with a degree of skill
which I am utterly unable to imitate, a large portion of your
time, but without the slightest relevance to the question which we
are met to discuss. It says a great deal for the presence of mind
of any speaker, seriously to address an audience not in the spirit
of comedy, but in all solemnity, for so long a period without
touching the subject. It says a great deal for his tact when he
can get through twenty-eight minutes of the time in talking
altogether beside the question, and put into the last two minutes
a sort of preface to the topic for debate in lieu of a serious argu
ment. Last evening we had but little approach to discussion, and
were I content to leave the question where my friend has left it
this evening, we should have no discussion at all. There has not
been a particle of evidence adduced by him for the existence of a
moral governor of the universe (hear, hear, and cheers). In all
that he has said there is not a scintilla of evidence, but in lieu we
have some hopes, but however patent his hopes, and however
certain his prophecy, the facts he has stated are evidence only to
himself and not to me. I fancied that my friend was to state the
argument for, and affirm the being of God, as moral governor of
the universe. If he has done anything at all, the most that he
has effected was to allege, without evidence, that there was such
a person or being as he called moral governor of the universe ;
some such thing as that which he called a moral nature, and that
is some evidence for the existence of some being who gave that
moral nature to the individual possessing it. That is the fullest
possible extent to which he has carried his argument. He was
obliged to qualify it, such as it was, with numerous admissions.
He admitted that this faculty which he callad moral sense or
conscience, was a faculty requiring education ; but then he says—
“ It is a faculty which discerns that there is right and that there
is wrong.” I submit, on the other hand, that a man has no
separate faculty, but that his conscience is the result of the
education of the whole of his faculties—that man has no sepa
rate conscience other than is the result of the condition in which
all his faculties may be at any one time of his life, none certainly
that would enable him to judge right and wrong independently
of his education. I submit that a child newly born is without
any such faculty, that it is entirely destitute of any faculty that
�39
would enable it to judge right and wrong, and that that which
my friend calls moral nature, I repeat, is but the result of the
education of all the faculties in man—further, that what he calls
man’s moral nature, if any one chooses to examine the matter
closely, will be found to vary with tribes, countries, and climates,
vary even with the same individuals at various periods of their
lives, and from such a varying, shifting standard you are to pro
duce the evidence of an immutable Deity as moral governor of
the world. If it be po-sible to effect such a demonstration, my
friend will have to display a talent for logic which he has not
manifested during this debate. Let us see whether his facts were
correct. I submit, even if they were, they were worth nothing,
as being irrelevant; that if everything he said were true, from
Alpha to Omega, then it is not worth anything. But I submit
that what he alleged as facts, are not so. “ Did you ever hear,”
asks my friend, “ of a lion that was stricken with remorse over
the numerous animals he has slaughtered ?” Did you ever hear of
a Thug who, having committed murders by the score, felt joy rather
than remorse for his conduct ? What conscience taught him that
he was more sacred to his deities for the skill displayed in his mur
ders ? Our friend, who certainly manifested a more philosophic
conception of words than he w as able to manifest on the last
night of discussion, might have given us a novel definition of
conscience had he read some essays on the practices of Thuggee,
which he might have found in some of our old review—I have
several of these passing through my mind at the present moment
—he would have also found some extremely serviceable evidence
taken before a parliamentary commission, upon the terrible prac
tice of strangling prevailing among the Thugs of India. He
would have found how faithful wives and good mothers to their
children could regard the taking away human life as a positive
virtue, and a matter deserving praise and reward, and that the
more murders they committed, the holier the devotees of Bowanee
regarded themselves. So far from being like Palmer, groaning
as though he would rend his heart, these Thugs regarded murder
as matter of absolute virtue, making them better men and women
than, according to their belief, they could be otherwise. If this
stood alone it would be enough to at least neutralise all that our
friend put before you, but we shall be able to deal with this
question of the moral governance of the universe hereafter more
effectually than this. The whole of our friend’s argument was
founded on what he calls man’s moral nature. I submit that if
his facts had been true, they would not be much evidence on the
subject. But he has cleverly tried to turn the tables on myself.
He said, if there were not this remorse, this uneasiness, this
misery, what inducement would you atheists have to be virtuous 1
But suppose I showed this was not the subject for debate—sup
�40
pose I should urge, as I might have done, that it was only to
introduce an excuse for the occupation of time, that this point was
urged, and suppose I did not choose to take up the question, how
much would that advance my friend’s case ? He was to prove the
existence of a moral governor for the universe. And as he has not
chosen to battle on his own ground, he requires that I should
breach his fortress, aud storm it for him. I will therefore accept
the issues that he has laid before you. But before doing so,
permit me to point you to one or two matters that seem to strike
against the moral governance of God. Is there a moral governor
rewarding virtue. How then is vice in luxury while virtue is
starving ? How can you account for this, that when two thousand
women kneel in one church, that he permitted them to be burnt
and suffocated there ? If you cannot deal with these two thousand,
I will put before you millions instead of thousands. Instead of
these women dying in sudden anguish, rushing round the church,
and crying out to God for mercy, who showed them none, I will
point to millions in the world dying slowly from poverty, that
strikes them down in lingering misery, and whom God pities no".
This gr -at fact meets you in the face, that if there be a governor,
he allows human beings to come into the world faster than food
for them, and that starvation and misery strike myriads down
to die of disease amidst squalid misery. You may tell me that
poverty constituted a crime; it is a disgrace to the world that
it is so. God the moral governor of the universe ! When in the
square of Warsaw women and children prayed to God for help,
for life, for moral strength, when they besought him to hear
their prayer for liberty, and to alleviate their sufferings, you will
hardly tell me that God was moral governor of the universe
when he permitted the Cossack’s lance point to drink the blood
from their breasts as answer to their praying. You will not say
that God is governor, and yet that this happened without punish
ment on the guilty. But you say that because these wrongs are
not redressed here, they will be hereafter. Who made you prophet
for kingdom come? Who gave you the right to require us to
look mildly and contentedly upon all evils here, on the ground
that they will be put right in another world ? You tell me that
when a man is starved to death in this world, he will be led in the
next, when he can eat no longer ; or that if he is unjustly put
here in the prison cell, that it is what God pleases, and that God
will set all this right at some future time. Set it right 1 How
can you hope that ? He it is, if governor, who causes the child
to be born in poverty and misery, and without power to extricate
itself, and helpless to contend against the woe surrounding it.
He kept its parents starving, that they might give the unfortunate
babe a wretched physique. It was he who made the only instructor
of the child, the police or the magistrate. He brought the child
»
�41
from the cradle to the gallows, with a hempen cord round its neck
—he who initiated it into the world helpless to avoid the crime—
he who ended its career there, helpless to escape the retribution.
You make God do all this ill, then you tell me I am a blasphemer
(loud cheers and hisses, which were protracted for some time).
It is you, and not I, who is blaspheming—you, whenyouaffirm that
God rules and that innumerable wrongs result; it is you and not
I who affirm that God rewards vice with imperial purple, virtue
with threadbare fustian; it is you, and not I, who affirm that
God deals thus unfairly with his people.. And when the earth
quake—as that at Lisbon—comes, when it rends not merely the
mansion of the rich but the hovel of the poor, and when after
rending these, it leaves thousands dying from plague and starva
tion in the streets of a great city whose inhabitants it thus
steeped in ruin and misery, by that which you say is the act of
God—don’t tell me of one or more acts apparently beneheent as
illustrating his goodness and sense, until you deal with th&se acts
so clearly malevolent. Do not tell me that God punishes the
wrong-doer here, or if you do, I will ask you why you drag
another world of punishment out of the future ? Don’t tell me
of some wicked men stricken dowu in the streets to die by God’s
decree, for if you do, then do I sav, that God is unjust in smiting
a few and sparing the majority. Your argument lor God’s moral
power is at an end unless you can explain why the imperial mur
derer is spared and the ragged wretch is stricken. (Cheers, hisses,
and confusion). If you want to hiss, wait till I have said some
thing better to deserve it.
The Chairman: I beg that you will keep Order.
Mr. Bradlaugh : You shall have enough to hiss for when I
shall have said what I wish to say against your threadbare
theology, and it is indeed that wh ch I impeach. (Cheers, and cries
of question and time).
The Chairman : It'gentlemen will be quiet and not cheer so or
cry question, all will be able to hear. I will call time when it is
proper to call time (Cheers)
Mr. Bradlaugh: You ask me why I do not steal; why I do
not lie; why I do not, like a neighbouring scoundrel, aspire to a
kingdom, bieaking oaths and shedding Mood togain my point.
I will endeavour to tell you why, but to do this, I must take
up your position that vice must be punished and virtue rewarded
in some future .state. I will say that from the Atheist’s point
of view that is not so. All mere punishment for crime past is
in itself a crime, a wrong, and is omy to be defended in so far
as it goes to the prevention of crime future, but not in so far
as it can be regarded as vengeance lor crime past. The Atheist
view is not that crime should be punished by some overlooking
judge, but that it carries with it its own punishment in limiting
�42
man’s present happiness and increasing his present misery. The
Atheist does not argue that virtue will gain him Heaven hereatter, but declares that it spreads happiness around the virtuous
doer here, and makes happiness for him because it makes hap
piness amongst his fellows—honesty, truth, manhood, virtue,
work their own reward in rendering happy the doer of them,
and in spreading pleasure in the circle in which he moves. You
admit that God suffers rascals to climb into thrones, and permit
his clergy, who at least should know his will, to pray to him to
keep them there. You who know that God has permitted a
great country to be heavily taxed for the support of a clique of
rascals who perpetrated the coup d'etat, and inaugurated the
reign of the imperial scoundrel who now rules in God’s
name, aad as God’s anointed. You say he is going to punish in
the next world the man who thus climbed into a throne in
this, when we know, if your argument be true, he could not have
ciimbed there without G >d’s help. God knew beforehand the
designs of the man "ho broke his solemn oath to the young
Republic; but this man could not have perjured himseli without
God’s permission, if he be 'he omnipotent governor you say,
any more than he could have climbed to a thione without his
aid. God then, according to you, must have helped this cri
minal here in order to punish him some other time. Is that so ?
If these are your views of God as moral governor of the
universe, I give way at once. They are unanswerably absurd.
But does this dispose of the question ? I do not think it does. I
should like our friend, when he pleases to deal with the
question in vyhat he calls its philosophic sense, to be a little
more profuse of his explanations than he was inclined to be
during the discussion of last evening. As to the moral teaching
of Christ, he will find no one more ready than I am to con
sider that question. But we have nothing to do with Christ
here to-night, any more than we have to do with Mahomet,
Moses, or Zoroaster. If he wants to tell me that Christ has
given us a moral system without reproach, I will reply that
under no system of morality which can pretend to be without
blemish, is so much vice permitted. Christianity is a system
which teaches submission to injury; courting wrong, and volun
teering yourself for oppression. I will tell him, that at present
I pa^s it by, because it is not the subject of our argument; it
is no part of the argument, and is at least a mistake, unless
he introduces it for the purpose of evading the real question, as
also the question arising on his allegation of man’s free agency.
If he would discuss to-night Christian morality, he might have
put it forward fairly as a subject for disenssion, when I should
be ready to meet him. He tells me that he is a free agent. He
had much better have supported his argument on both evenings
�43
by some facts, instead of relying on naked allegations. I will
endeavour to show him the most convincing testimony of free
agency that could be required. He says that man is a free agent,
for he can sin against his conscience. I say that he cannot sin-rman cannot resist the circumstances that result in volition. As to
this he has had no freedom of selection. What are these cir
cumstances ? First his org nisation, then the education affect
ing that organisation to the moment of volition. I say that
no man is perfectly free to choose his education, or the organi
sation educated up to the moment of volition. To talk, there
fore, of man sinning against his conscience—itself the result of
education—is to tell you the grossest absurdity that could be
put before you. Well, Samuel Taylor Coleridge says that any
act to be a sin must be originated in the will entirely apart
from and independent of all circumstance extrinsic to the will.
I say there is not this volition preceding any act resulting from
the will, but that all volition is the result of various circum
stances conducing to the wil’.
Then our friend somewhat
abruptly refers to the thief on the cross who got into paradise.
I will admit, if he wants to try the question according to Bible
Christianity, the greatest rascals on earth are the most likely
to be rewarded in heaven ; and if that establishes anything in
favour of moral governance of the world by God, then the New
Testament, corroborated by the Old, shows that those who have
been liars, thieves, and murderers, have got into heaven by God’s
grace, while some of those who have been especially truthftal and
honest became the others’ victims on earth, and were kept out
of heaven. If any of you doubt that, however, I will abandon it, as
the only evidence is that of the Bible, which for me is indefensible,
though for him it is unanswerable. God is an immutable being,
our friend says, and yet declares that his moral government is
begun but not completed. He urges that because vice is
triumphant here, that this must be set right hereafter, that God
the immutable will change his mode of governance, that slavery
he e is to be compensated by eternal freedom hereafter. If this
is to be taken as evidence of future and more complete moral
governance, it must also be taken that the moral government is
at present incomplete, and therefore is no evidence of ability in
the governor to govern more perfectly. He either lacks desire or
ability. One supposition denies his goodness, the other his power.
Then you say, “ that the wicked who escape here shall be sent to
hell fire hereafter.” I am obliged, you add, to admit that the
moral government is incomplete, but these rascals will be punished
by and by, though before this takes place, though before this
retribution comes, they will be dead. Good men will be rewarded
in the next world who have starved in this. Have not men who
made the world resound with the fame of their intellect and utility
�44
of their philosophy, died in garrets neglected and uncared for!
Have they not been villified and calumniated for centuries—men
whose brows were bound with laurel, the fruit of their own selfreliant genius in this world, and oh, by-and-by, God will reward
them. The men who have struggled for liberty have been stricken
down, and have died despairing, while you have been obliged to
admit vice triumphant, despite the moral governor. What, I ask,
is the object of the war that is raging only a few hundred miles
from where we stand ? Does it rage for the rights of man, for
his liberties, for any great principle, or for the purpose of setting
up one piece of state tinsel against another ? Who is it that keeps
this strife up—who starves to pay for this—the people, those whom
you tell me are God’s people, whom God cares for, whom God
helps ? Never till they help themselves—never till they are able to
strike for themselves—never till they upraise themselves. For
those who tell me of a moral government by God, I will turn to
them the whole map of the world, each page of its history, and I
challenge you to show me any people whom God ever helped
until they helped themselves. (Cheers.) Amongst the tribes of
uncivilised people, or even amidst more favoured nations, where
there was the more ignorance the people were more on their knees
praying and less on their feet thinking. It was there where men
were more trodden down, were more serfs, more slaves; there
was always a priesthood to help the king, but never the people.
Where then is the moral government of the universe ? Not by
God. Where even the governance of society ? Not by God but man,
by human intellect; not by Church edict, but by human thought;
not by a moral government outside the world, which teaches right
and wrong according to a standard that can never be altered; but
rather by the advancing knowledge of each hour which, with
better in f ormation, discovers evil to -morrow where it is yet unseen
to-day, and finds truth to-day where yesterday belief bad found
no trace of it. Mankind must be saved by the development of
its common humanity, and we strive in this to advance with
certain steps to the great truths scattered in the depths of the
mighty unknown around us. We seek to gather not pearls,
sapphires, rubies, and diamouds, but truths, that we may build
them into a priceless moral diadem, and therewith crown the
whole human race. (Loud Cheers.)
Mb. Cooper : (Cries of “ go on, Tommy.’’) I will be very much
obliged if you will never clap your hands any more when I rise. I
feel really tired of complaining thus, and I might as well not occupy
your time in this matter, for I am tired of this childish sort of
work, and if anything could disgust me more it would be this silly
laughter. Thomas Cooper is not a man to be laughed at. I have
been a long time on this platform £.I. was never a disgrace to it
(nor any other) when I was on it. Tnever deserted a good prin-
�45
ci pie that once impressed me; I do not know why you are to treat
me in this manner. I think a man of fifty-nine years of age ought
to have some reverence. You have (turning to Mr. Bradlaugh)
just complained before sitting down that every speech delivered
by me as yet was beside the mark—as if a man could live fiftynine years and then argue as if he talked nonsense whenever he
opened his mouth. I have not heard an argument—not a frag
ment of an argument, in answer to what I have stated. Mr.
Bradlaugh says the most I have done is to affirm that man was
not a moral nature. There are many faculties, he says, but the
child has no faculty. That is no argument. In answer, I say the
child has faculties, but does not display them, that everybody
knows, and no one can deny it. Then “God cannot be immutable
because he creates mutable creatures.
He must be mutable
because the creatures must be mutable.” Where is the contradic
tion ? Then he proceeds, “ If what I said were facts, they were,
not facts.” How has that been shown? Because something wa^z
done amongst Thugs. I have not heard about the Thugs. I know
nothing about these young women who were glad they had com
mitted more murders than others. They exulted in it. Now if
any man says there is no moral sense in Thugs, I should like to
have some conversation with him before I believed him. I appeal
to you and not to Thugs. He said, I cleverly tried to throw my
friend off, to turn the tables on him, and some person imme
diately said “ hear.” Do you mean to call me a liar ? I never had
Mr. Bradlaugh in my thoughts. I will re-affirm that he said
that I would introduce anything to occupy the time. He com
menced by stating that I had manifested something like a philo
sophic apprehension of the meaning of words which had no mean
ing, and that I was trying to keep your attention from the ques
tion. Well, there are only the Thugs’before us at present. There
is only an appeal to persons’ nature—we are talking of acts ; we
are going to what our friend says appears to be complete disproof
of the moral government of the universe. He has not dealt with
that fact, that great fact, which you must feel to be fact yourself.
I mean conscience. Can any one of you tell me that he does not
feel when he is sinnin'g against his conscience ? Why then do you
read with such zest the confessions of criminals, the workings of
the human mind, the convictions of a marl that he is a scoundrel,
a bloodthirsty villain? “ Oh, sinning against conscience is the
greatest absurdity that can be mentioned.” Is it ? Strange procla
mation this in the middle of the 19th century. If this is philoso
phy, I do not know what the world will say to it. Abolish all
the laws of government! What is the use of them ? Well, a
man cannot sin against conscience. Do you see what it is you
defend (hear, hear). Will you have the kindness not to cheer a
sentence of that sort without thinking ? Then we heard about
�46
2,000 women whom God shut in and delivered up to the most
terrible of deaths. Then again, I was esteemed a person who had
pretended to look into the future. Will our freind say that God
showed them no mercy ? That is a very large undertaking for my
friend. Then there is the poverty of millions born into the world
and no food to support them. I say plenty of food, but men are
bad one to another. Man is an enemy to man. What sort of
government would you have ? Had you rather that man had
been a moral agent and have no choice ? But you know that you
have a choice, you feel that you can choose, you are sensible of it.
“ God cannot make us free.” Indeed. And you say, “ subject at
the same time.” You allude to the punishment which is inflicted
upon men by God in conformity with the organic formation of
their bodies. “ Millions in poverty.” Yes, indeed, many of them
suffering deeply. Some, however, are poor by their own fault.
Some men are idle and will not work, others spend their wages,
others beat their wives, and others are dishonest. Among the
rich there are dishonest also, so there are dishonest among the poor,
and so suffering comes by a man’s own fault, folly, or vice, as the
case may be. But, says Mr. Bradlaugh, there were 2,000 women
burnt out of existence. The attention drawn to that topic was
something extraordinary to be addressed to men’s judgments.
He says, did moral government exist then, but then 12,600 persons
have died since we came into this room, 84,000 odd, or 32 millions
eyery year. Men die in suffering and great pain. Those 2.000
left children, brothers, relatives, so have the 2,000 that die hourly.
But who complains of the order of life ? Can you tell me of any
particularly good son that would like his father to live for ever ?
How can we believe in a world constituted as this is of men and
animals—who will say that life should be perpetual 1 Now think
of these 2,000 poor women, they were free beings, those priests also,
whom they say acted so cruelly, delivered them over to the Virgin,
and all that sort of thing, but God is not to force man to be good
if he be a free agent. I am asked who made me a prophet of the
moral nature as well as of God’s declaration ? I feel this con
demnation, and I know by it what is wrong. I feel some great
constitutional disease. In the progressive nature of men there must
be moral disease. They would not be governed without it. God
does not train up children to be slaves. I am not to talk about
blasphemy, for there was a hiss when it was mentioned, and you
cheered Mr. Bradlaugh in his sallies against Deity, so that I
should not wonder to hear a hiss when you hear it affirmed that
God trains up a child for happiness. I say God has a moral
government, and that he makes free beings. Men act on each
other’s circumstances. The mere talk about they could not choose
where they were born, that they could not choose their food, that
they were under the control of circumstances, is mere talk and
�nothing more. Circumstances do not altogether control me. I
have trampled on circumstances a hundred times. Men do right
and wrong, we are actuated by it. We sin against our conscience,
where should be the absurdity of God’s government being begun
and net completed? If God exists,he exists from all eternity, and
he has made millions of beings who exist also. Is it to be denied
that one object of his government is that he purposes these beings
for a higher state? This higher state stands before them an
eternity of happiness if they will conduct themselves properly in
this state of trial. I may here take notice that I have been
faithful to my part of the engagement. Mr. Bradlaugh has some
times spoken so loudly I never thought I had a right to say that
has nothing to do with the question. But I see my time is gone
by, and I must reserve what I have to say.
Mr Bradlaugh : I frankly and unreservedly retract the com
pliment I paid my friend for his ability in evading the subject.
It would be improper in me to persist in tendering him a compli
ment which he repudiates. I also frankly confess I now do not
know for what purpose the first speech was delivered at all, and
this the more because the second speech has not improved the
position. Our friend has been kind enough to express his opi
nion, that it is hardly fair towards a speaker to urge that his
speech has nothing to do with the question. Surely my friend
wants me to offer my opinion on his speech. I have done so; and
if any ot the audience agree with my view, so much the worse
for the speech, because it would show that it produced on the
mind of more than one person an impression, that our friend had
not proved anything which he had proposed to affirm. As to
the moral faculty in a child, Mr. Cooper says the child has no
faculty for some years. I ask whether children up to a certain
ace are without aid from the moral government, and whether
they are not in more need of it than men with matured faculties ?
I ask him whether his argument does not altogether break down
when needed most ? He says that I based an argument on the
fact of man being mutable, whilst God is urged to be immutable.
This is not so. Our friend had urged that men were imperfect—
and I put it to you that we con d hardly expect an imperfect
result from a perfect creation and a perfect creator—a being with
ability to make perfect if he pleased. If I have not made this
clear to you before, I hope I have done so now. Mr. Cooper
declares that he has not heard much about the Thugs hugging,
and that I must bring this hugging business closer to you. My
friend boasts that this argument is very wide and without effect.
I cannot very well oblige my friend by dwelling at any great
length on this phase of human error and crime; for I cannot
do him the injustice to suppose that, in hw endeavours to judge
fairly of moral nature, he should purposely have left out the
�48
history of a large portion of mankind when generalising on the
whole, so that he might make out an argument for the moral
government of the world, 14 The Thugs,” he says, “ are a
long way off.” So was Jesus Christ a long way off. If any ad
verse argument is implied in being a long way off. I retort’ that
they are not so far away as Moses, so distant as David, so far
away as Jonah or Jeremiah. I am not quite so far off as these,
and I must tell him if he will dispute the fact of Thugee strang
ling, he must do so boldly. I will undertake to affirm it. If he
does not know whether the facts he talks about are facts,
he ought not to challenge them by inuendo. The audience will
be able to judge for themselves, whether my friend did not leave
them with an equivocal sort of denial which may mean either
admission of their verity or allegation that they are not correct.
Say you do not know anything about these facts, or that you do
not believe; if you say you do not believe them, I will undertake
to prove them. It may fairly be that, however well a man may
be read, be cannot be presumed to know everything, and your
ignorance is no weapon in my hand. Does he take pains to tell
you what he means by the word sin, or what he means by the
word conscience ? He has not done so, yet persists in speaking
of morality, as though it always and everywhere had one meanir g. Here it is immoral to have two wives. In Turkey it is
not immoral to have two wives. The consciences of the men
who commit polygamy in Turkey, do not burthen them with re
morse, because they have committed what we here should term
a crime. I object to the word sin, because theologians have at
tached a cant meaning to it which I deny. My friend has not
told you his definition. He uses it as though it conveyed a
meaning in which you are all agreed. An act which a man could
not help committing, is not a sin. The wretch who steals a loaf
of bread because starvation, ignorance, poverty, misery, squalor,
and degradation have surrounded him, is not even in your eyes
so guilty as a person of better education and better circumstances.
I will put it to you further, that there are many cases in every
day life, when the same act condemned in one instance, so far
from being regarded as culpable, finds precisely the contrary ver
dict in another. If this be so, our friend’s d:scernment of the
moral government of God is exceedingly short-sighted. How, •
then, does he speak of a common standard for judging right and •
wrong ? I will take you to a great many decent men and women
who would rather prefer stealing to being atheists, and who
would regard it as a greater crime to entertain such opinions as
I hold than to be guilty of theft. To me it is no sin against my
conscience. It reproves me not; on the contrary, the mode in
which my faculties have been educated makes me believe it an
honour to hold and avow these views. He is not dealing with
�49
you fairly when he puts it that men have a common standard of
right and wrong. He said, why deal with the two thousand sq
sadly burned, and not with millions dying around us ? That was
what I did. It was only in one or two short sentences I referred
to the Chili catastrophe, in a few words that I dealt with the two
thousand, and then especially commented on the millions killed by
poverty and disease. My friend replies—the case of the two
thousand poor women startles us from the relief in which it
stands out from the great picture of millions that are stricken down,
that are crushed by poverty—which poverty, he says, only exists
by men’s misdoings, but which I say exists, if there is a moral
governor of the universe, because he keeps it there. For whose
misdoing is a poor child born of weak parents, for whose mis
doing are the parents starving in an unhealthy home with in- 1
sufficient clothing, wretched surroundings, squalid, and with
teaching worse than none ? On whom are we to charge
all this? On the father, on the mother? This cannot be,
because both father and mother are but a part of the squalor,
wretchedness, and misery that existed before them. Then does
God the moral governor of the universe allow all this, never
stopping the pain—never checking the evil ? Our friend has
made a most extraordinary admission. He says these things
result from man’s misdoing. We will take it that a man does
wrong'sometimes—he does it, then, in spite of God or by his
permission, or by his instigation ; but he cannot do it in spite of
God, for Mr. Cooper says that God is omnipotent, therefore it is
impossible to do anything against his power—against his will.
The wrong doer must either be instigated to the wrong doing by
God, or permitted by God to do it; but God being infinite in his
will to permit, would be to compel. It is the same to instigate
as to leave the path for a man to do wrong, who without this
could not help but do right. All wrong and misery exist by
God’s wish or against it. But it cannot exist against God’s wish
if he be all-powerful; nor does Mr. Cooper think ev.il exists
against God’s wish, for he makes God remedy hereafter that
which he might prevent here. God, all-powerful, has the ability
to prevent misery; God, omniscient, knows how to exercise this
ability; and God, all-good, would desire to exercise it. The
population problem, which would take too long to fairly examine
in this debate, is pregnant with weighty arguments on this head.
Poverty exists; and God’s existence, or his power, or his wisdom *
or his goodness stands impeached by it. It would take many
evenings to debate this point fairly, but he does not go beyond
bare assertion, or advance one word of argument about it. He
could not conceive how a good son could wish his father to live
forever. If I understand the meaning of this aright—it would
be that all who wished their fathers to live for ever must be bad
�50
gons. (Hear and laughter.) He says, this life is a probation for
some other state. Which other ? What has he to say except
that the present state is so terribly wicked, so full of treachery
and bloodshed and evil, that he is not heard to express a hop®
to make it better, but is obliged to go to some other world as an
.«
escape from this ? (Laughter and cheers.)
i
Mr. Cooper : So in spite of all I have said about the impropriety
jf of it, the want of wisdom of the thing, the decency of doing it,
I i Mr. Bradlaugh commences again in the same manner. He must
II retract his compliment. He is utterly at a loss to account for the
I,1! first speech; he passes on to say that he must chastise me. I
should say, that that was consummate impudence. Seeing that he
approved of the hisses, he must have great confidence in his powers
of effrontery in conduct like this. (Cries of no, no, he told you to
be less excited)—and he turned round and told this person who
cheered me that he was wrong. (Cries of no, no). I did not say
the child had no moral faculty. I said he did not display that
faculty. He said that an imperfect man was hardly to be ex
pected from an imperfect maker. If he could conceive God at all,
he must be a perfect God, and he could not wish any other God,
but if he saw anything bad, he would say that he was not com
petent to be the framer of the universe. I say there is only one
framer of the universe, God invisible, everywhere present,
all-wise, existent always, an almighty, all-holy being. He knows
that that all-wise and holy being cannot make a being as
perfect as himself. You might as well expect him to make a
triangular circumference. “All-being,” he says, “would be perfect.”
Why waste time on words of this sort ? Our friend then said,
he would make it clear what he meant, when he said, there
was no sinning against conscience. Then he told me about
men having two wives in Turkey; that men had no sense of mora
lity, and that there were men in England who had two wives and
did not think it immoral. We think they do wrong. He says an
act which man cannot help committing is no sin. If I were
disposed to indulge in humour, I should exclaim, a Daniel come to
judgment. A man cannot commit a sin in doing what he cannot
help ; if it is no law to him, he cannot transgress the law. It is
no sin to commit an act. (Cries of question). I did not say that
»il men and women in England had the same standard of judging
of right and wrong. I said no to that, and I said the moral faculty
had to be educated. Every faculty has to be educated. I was
not talking about the millions who suffer death through poverty.
* was talking of the millions that die naturally in an hour. There
such a thing as memory. I did not attribute evil to God because
He never limited or checked it. He talked of weak parents and
the injustice of punishment of sin. Do we not see reasons in the - organic punishment for moral crimes that man can bring disease
�on his children and on himself? Yon say why does God dothat?
Does not vice visit itself? What do you do with that fact ? You
say you cannot take a fact out of the world. Well, it is there.
God says that sin is sinful, that it is abominable in his sight, it is
unholy ; he gives it strong punishment here and everywhere. If
man will not regard himself, he may as regards his children.
Give me an idea whether or not there can be any moral government
where there is no freedom, no will, no possibility of transgression.
Show me that. I cannot understand it. I understand moral
government to mean a government of moral agents by a moral
governor. Moral government means that there are laws to observe,
he must have special rules, that is, the governed must know he
has a government, that is to say, there must be law. What is the
sanction of law ?—punishment. Abolish punishment, and you
abolish law virtually. Just conceive that the Queen abolished
all punishment for crime. Let recognised justice go on. Well,
there is a trial to-night, there is the judge in his scarlet robes, the
barristers in their wigs and gowns, the jury in the jury box. It
is a murderer that is to be tried. He is convicted—what follows ?
The judge puts on his black cap, and sentences the murderer to
death. The keeper then lets him go into the street. A robber is
sentenced to ten years, or twenty perhaps ; he rushes out of the
box and joins his companions in the streets. Then at nisi prius,
it is a horse case, lying seems inseparable from a horse case.
Throughout the whole case there is lying, sticking to your false
hood throughout. You are convicted of perjury, and there is no
punishment. How long will this go on ? There is law then, and
there is a penalty which is the sanction of law. Then there is a
governor, good government if there is a law, and if you abolish
law you abolish government. For God to permit suffering and
wrong is not for him to will or to wish it. I may permit several
things, I do not will them. The father does, the mother does,
the wife does—in all relations of life we often permit that which
we do not will in the active sense. If we come to the philosophic
nature of things, yes; and in the broad sense of language we
permit many things that we do not will. So it is from the moment
that life commences, and for ever. Mr. Bradlaugh knew very
well what I meant. (Cheers.) Why do you clap your hands at my
saying this ? Is it a dignified way to come here ? I expected to
have something like reasonable discussion, and I have to complain
that the argument was never touched. (Hear, dissent, and cries of
“not by you.’’) If any one of you will tell me where the argu
ment was touched, I will be much obliged to him. (Cheers and
hisses.) What is the use of encouraging all this vulgar stuff?
(Hisses.) It is not like reasonable men that want to come to the
truth. There was something that Mr. Bradlaugh said before, that
I meant to touch upon, but had not time. He said, that from the
�52
Atheist’s stand-point, vice should not be punished or virtue
rewarded. Punishment was only to be inflicted so far as it is
preventive. It is to be remedial. May it not be so when he
visits the sin of the parents upon the children 1 Is there not 3
warning ? But then we are told that vice works its own punish
ment and virtue its own reward. Why then complain of Louis
Napoleon ? Should he not be punished according to that theory ?
I cannot see that vice works its own punishment there. I love
Mazzini with all my heart. He is the greatest man I have ever
known in my life. Is virtue rewarded in his mournful life ?
Tyrants on thrones and clergy to help them 1 What does Louis
Napoleon care about clergy?—he makes instruments of them. He
does not believe them any more than did the first Napoleon.
There was also some observation in a former speech about the
ignorant being oftener on their knees than on their feet. The
Kaffirs and the lowest races in the world. But that is not in
the round of my reasoning even if it were true.
Mr. Bradlaugh : Our friend puts it that he did not say the
child had no moral faculty, but he said the child did not display
it. I am sorry I misunderstood him. I will wait for the present
till the report comes out, but I fancy that my comment upon the
old man as upon the child did not misapply. How do you know
that the child has got this faculty before it is manifested ? By
what fact do you discover what is not displayed ? You certainly
have not displayed that faculty of putting things clear, or you
would have tried—
Mr. Cooper : That is your impudence.
Mr. Braelaugh:—Tried to give us some reasons for
supposing that a child has what you call the faculty for judging
what you call right and wrong, and yet having this faculty disp!ays it not. You said that God cannot make another being as
perfect as himself, because you say he is infinite—and he cannot
make another infinite. If that is a fair argument, it destroys
the doctrine of creation altogether. If God cannot create another
infinite, neither can he add to his own infinity. To add a finite
universe to infinity is equally as absurd as to add an infinite.
If God’s ability to create a being as perfect as himself is limited,
then he is not omnipotent. If he is omnipotent, there can be no
such limitation. You say that sin is a transgression of law;
law has two meanings, one scientific as expressing invariable
sequence, and the other moral, as command. You cannot trans
gress the one and the other ; you can the right or duty to dis
obey ; command depends upon who gives the command—with
what sanction it is given—whether it be good or bad to obey or
not to obey. There are many statute laws at the present time
which it is perfect virtue to break, and no sin to disobey.
Mr. Cooper : That won’t do.
�53
i
{
•j
f
i
?
?
Mb. Bradlaugh : Then my friend says vice visits itself on
children, and asks, How does the Atheist deal with that ? He
finding, whether there be a God or not, a moral governor or not,
that children begotten of diseased parents are born in a diseased
state ; strives to educate the parents to observe physical laws—
to know the sequences on which health depends, and to carry
out this law so as to ensure health as the result of the physical
law. As an Atheist, he knows that where there is a child born
into the world and the conditions of health have been known
and observed by its parents, the child is more healthy, whether
there be a God or not. You say that moral government implies
that there are special rules established by the inoral governor.
If a man break these rules unconsciously, is there a penalty?
My friend contends, as I understand him, that those who sin not
knowing the law, escape the penalty. The rules of God—do all
know them ? Yes or no. If all do not know them, what
becomes of this special government ? Some are ignorant. Again,
is God able to make all know them ? If yes, and he only teaches
partially, he is unjust, for He requires from one a higher duty
than from another. You say there is a difference between per
mitting error and willing it. The illustration of the father or
mother permitting without willing has no analogy. No argument
founded on man can conduct you to a demonstration for the
character of Deity. If your assertion of God’s will as infinite
betrue, there is no permission without his will, and the will of
any other cannot be in opposition, because he is omnipotent. If
all things be from God, is it not a fair query how augjht can exist
except by God’s will? He says ihe good are to live for ever :did
he say where or how ? Is it to be in the moon for ever, or in the sun
for ever, or where ? My friend simply appealed to your prejudices,
the prejudices created by your religious education, when he spoke
this. He knew that he meant nothing by it— he did not know any
thing about living for ever anywhere. When he says that his
moral nature leads him to hope that when he fiuds that this life
is imperfect—that God is able to make another, which he hopes
will be better, but he don’t know how it is to be, where it is to
be, or indeed whether it is to be at all, he has not given us a partide of information about it. Now, however, he finds it convenient, having said that he was going to take the broad view of
the question, to take you abroad altogether—and he desires to
take you into the next world, which he would have you examine
in preference to the subject, but we have not that before us, but
tojudge of his Deity as moral governor. He could not have been
more unfortunate than wheu he went to the Kaffirs in his speech,
who have no knowledge of this moral government which he sets
up. There are the Kiffirs, the Dyaks of Rajah Brook, and
many other nations of the world, who have no conception of a
�54
future state of existence, who have no conception of God as sepa
rate, apart, and distinct from the universe, and who, therefore,
they do not pray to. He has used such a defence to-night as
will rather defeat his argument for the existence of God. It is
either good or bad that men should know ot God’s existenceIf it was good, then God should give all men that knowledge ; if >
he did not, he himself was not all good—that is, was not God. I
admit that my friend is right when he says I did not hit his argu- J
ment. I tried as hard as I was able, but it is hard to hit nothing.
- (Cheers.) Why blame Louis Napoleon, and praise Mazzini ? I
complain of him whom I hold to be a scoundrel, because I hope
to make the rest of the world avoid his vices—and because I
dare to wake up a nation to a desire for liberty, whom God lets
sleep in political slavery. Mazzini, whom I love and honour as
much as you can—whose truth I have learned to revere as much,
as you have learned to revere it—when you ask me what reward
this man has, I say that his reward is in his own honour, in his
honest truthfulness, in the love for humanity he expresses, which
makes thousands love him. He has no fears such as possess that
man, that vagabond of the Tuileries, with his baud against
every man ; but this exile, almost prisoner, this recluse, this man
shut out from the world, his life of truth gives me the highest
hope, for he gains and gives sympathy forth to the world and to
the noblest in the world. You tell me of your God. Why does he
allow one to be hunted by police, and keep the other in a posi
tion to drive Europe before him with the edge of his sword ?
Why doesjiGod permit the armies of this crowned scoundrel of
France to protect those Roman bandits, who keep daily open the
bloody wounds of wretched Italy ? I did not bring Napoleon
or Mazzini into the debate, but if you want an argument against
God’s moral government, take that sink of vice and crime, Rome,
the birthplace of your Christian faith, and source of all your
Christian frauds ; Rome, the cancer in the womb of Italian liberty.
You shall have my sympathy with liberty and truth wherever
needed, but we rather forget in this the subject for debate. We
come here to discuss one theme which our friend has entirely
neglected. We ought to have some evidence of God’s moral
- government of the world. So far as our friend is concerned,
every theme has been selected but this, and except reading from
his memorandum book the pencil notes which he has made,
my argument he has met by simplv saying that “he cannot
understand." He cannot understand the meanings of the words
he uses himself, any more than the argument which he heard
used against him. And he tells you of my weakness and
my impudence, but each man has the right to say his b st in his
own way. Age carries with it no respect here, other than it
Warrants by matured thought. Mr. Cooper’s past service carries
�55
with it no respect here, unless he continues it by present duty.'
The speech which must not provoke laughter is sober and earnest
utterance, and the service which finds respect is sterling honest i
work. Let our friend rely not on the past, not on old certificates
of respect, but on the services he performs now, in bringing truth
before you, speaking to your hearts and educating your brains,
developing your intellects, and enlarging your humanity. When
he does this he will have done something entitling him to reproach
you if you fail in respect, and he will save himself the need of
reproaching you at all, for he will win, as I do now, your warmest
sympathy. (Loud Cheers.)
Mr. Coopee : I go on to follow the plan which I suppose to
be the right one. He claims to do the same thing. I think this
the right plan to take up every sentence uttered, and to show
that they are not to the point, that they are instead, great non
sense, and don’t bear on the argument, and are simply false con
clusions. I suppose that to be my plain duty. I come here to
argue for the being of God as moral governor of the universe;
Mr, Bradlaugh comes here to argue that there is no moral govern
ment. I spoke of children having a faculty. He asks how I know
that children have a faculty? Isav by watching its develop
ment. He says sin is not transgression of the law, for law con
sists of command and sequence. What has that to do with the
position ? I know that law is command, and there is sequence,
which is punishment, if you do not obey. But how does that
■overthrow the truth of sin being a transgression of the law ? If
children are born without a faculty, how come they to ever dis
cern whether there is a God or not ? Indeed, that is?the question
between us—whether there is a God or not. Do not all men
know God’s laws ? If he says we see this inequality of punish
ment, he would ask what is God ab mt 1 I say that all human
beings know more or less of God’s law. He says that of some,
more than others, God requires duty without reason. I say no:
where precept has not been given to man, God does not expect
him to fulfil. There is no teaching of any sort that I am aware
of against this. I never learned among any class of persons any
other belief in God, but that he dealt with all al ke. Io that
sense, there was no such inconsistency of philosophy. But Mr.
Bradlaugh said I was not to talk of myse.f. When I was talking
cf permission, I did not mean instigation. I did not mean any
•such thing as “to will it.” I was not also to talk of analogy
between men’s nature and God’s, between toe intelligence of man
and that of God. I say again that permission does not mean
instigation. He says it does. I say it don’t. He 3aid something
about “ living forever.” Why does he affect not to know what
every one else knew, why affect to be so stupid ? “ How
ndid I know that there was an hereafter ?” Because life is not so
�56
perfect as my moral nature. I call will choice, and my moral
nature is so strong on these points that I am obliged to attend to
them. All men are aware of this hereafter, and their conscience
in regard to it troubles all. But then he says, “ Where is this
future life to be ? Is it to be here or elsewhere ?” I am not
anxious about that; I know that the judge of all the earth will do
right. I am sure that the God who made me will do right ; I
am, therefore, not anxious. I am sure that it will be right. I
cannot speak to what will be appointed to me. I may particu
larly call your attention to the strange remark made by Mr.
Bradlaugh, when he instanced what he called a fact, that the
Kaffirs had no hope of a future state, and . that all ignorant peo
ple are oftener on their knees than on their feet. He says he has
proved such a deficiency as will overthrow my argument for
God’s existence. I showed that man is forgetful, and he says
that overthrows my argument. I said that the argument had
not been met, and he said he had nothing to meet. Here are
those representative men on this platform. Is the argument to
he dismissed in this manner ? Is that to go forth from this plat
form as an argument ? And then what he says about the glass
being of the same existence as that of man. (Cries of no no.)
I cannot help being surprised at all this gibberish. (Cries of
question, hisses, and cheers.) Why, you are not fit to listen to the
question. (Hisses, and some confusiou.) I am appealing to
representa'ive men What is the use of argument, if this is argu
ment ? He treats the question as he likes. He tells us that he
had a mission, and he said that all precognition was an utter
absurdity. But the argument of the moral sense was the greatest
argument that could be brought for the existence of a moral
government. It has convinced others, and it has convinced me.
That was the way in which such men as Clark and G Hespie, to
whom Mr. Bradlaugh referred, arrived at the knowledge of moral
governance. He said “that I said what I said before was there,
only that it was not there.’’ But if these great men held those
doctrines which I defend, if thousands of other great men have
held them ; if these arguments have passed through rhe strongest
minds of Englishmen, men who have done such mighty things in
mathematics, men of such disciplined intellect, that there is a God *
as maker and moral governor of the universe, I am compelled ,
to remind him that the argument was neither touched nor
answered, and that all this “flibertigibbet ” is not argument. Is
this to be the close ? Can you offer no further argument? Are
you who assemble here to accept that as argument ? Will you try
to argue thequestion out or—(Cries of hear and his-es ) Thankyou
for nothing. He complains of the order of moral government, and he
talks of L >uis Napoleon as having been success'ul while Mazzni ishunted by police, and he says the reason he does so is to rouse the
�57
nation. It is a queer nation that—when one reflects on its meanness,
its littleness, its lickspittleness, one feels contempt instead of admi
ration for a Frenchman at this time of day. (Cheers and hisses, which,
lasted for some seconds). Show me any six men whom you talk
about—you may tell me that I am talking of the body of Frenchmen in the streets of Paris, but I say that they are unworthy as a
nation to enjoy liberty. But in reply to my question, how is
Mazzini rewarded ? You say by his own sense of honour and truth.
Why do you then say that he is neglected ? What is there to
complain of that things were not right ? Why, according to this,
it is right after all. But no, says my friend, it is not right. My
friend blows hot and cold at the same time. Either the con
science of such men is guilty, and that things are not right in this
world, or they are. Which will he have ? He has chosen to
take the latter conclusion with respect to these two cases. Why
do such things exist, but because there is a moral government and
we are moral agents ? Then he talks of Rome, or rather he says,
“We can talk about Rome.” That is not my religion, that is not
where I am. I always hated her for her bigotry and her tyrannies,
and if I were a Roman Catholic and wished to put down Freethought, I should perhaps have to arrest you first. But that is
not my religion. I do not come from Rome. He then complains
of my reading notes. But please come to this fact, that you have
a conscience. I say you know it, and that you cannot conceal the
fact from yourselves, that when you do wrong there is an inward
chiding; you cannot shake it off. How came you to have it there?
and for the future if there is no moral government, all will soon,
be over. “Men reasoned,” and we are told further, that all
sensible men laughed at the notion of immortality I professed.
But he was sure that he would enjoy this world and everything
that he could have in it as well, whether there was no future, and
he referred to broad history But whatever he may say, I say you
sin against conscience, and you are rebuked by your moral sense.
Oh, but he says “ There is no such thing.” I say there is, that if
you do harm to your wife and children, or to your neighbour; if
you commit d shonesty, you know that you blame yourself—the
faculty, the moral faculty blames you. How could yon have it if
there were no accountability—no moral government? How comes
it there ? It has not been esteemed so very ridiculous by some of
the greatest men that ever lived. It was said that when argu*
ments would not convince Pascal, the moral feeling did. It is ou
record of Emmanuel Kant, the great German philosopher, that
when the design argument, and the argument a priori failed to
convince him, the moral sentiment convinced him. It was the
testimony of Liebig that he was convinced by the moral argument
When nothing else could convince him. “ I feel this moral power
Within me, he said; “ I cannot destroy it, I cannot see it, it
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impels me, it controls me, it blames me. Why is it so, if this be
the be-all and end-all, and there is no moral government ?”
(Hear, and cheers.)
Mr. Bradlaugh : It is not true that it convinced Locke,
Newton, or Samuel Clarke. They take lines of argument opposed
to each other. The illustration is not a fair one, any more than
the quotation from Plato was a correct one. I am surprised at
Mr. Cooper’s lamentable blunder as to laws, as denoting in
variable sequence, telling me that law means command, and that
the sequence follows the breach as punishment. Now, with fiftynine years of experience, to make such a sad blunder when his
distinction of law as command and law as sequence were put before
you in my speech, is at least most extraordinary. I cannot believe
that he has been serious. He surely cannot be so ignorant of the
commonest terms with which thinkers deal; or, if he is so igno
rant, I am justified in standing up in this debate and saying that
he has no right to discuss these subjects at all. If he does not
understand the argument, if he does not understand the ipeaning
of words, then I say that he is unfit to argue; and if he does un
derstand them, his speech is worse than worthless, because wil
fully evasive.
Mr. Cooper : I do not know what you are referring to.
Mr. Bradlaugh : I will do him the justice to say that he did
not, in his last speech, refer to the subject we have met to discuss.
I think I will also do him the justice to say that it was the strangest
and most incoherent speech I ever heard, and I am free to add
that in his attempts to demonstrate Deity he has broken down
lamentably. (Hear, and cheers.)
Mr. Cooper rose, and was understood to say that this was
downright impudence.
Mr. Bradlaugh : I did not interrupt when he was talking
about gib' erish. I have a right to comment on his speech in my
own way—in the way that seems to me best. I asked him how
he knew that the moral faculty existed in children. He says by
watching its development. He took no pains to tell you what
he meant. I will try to do so. The basis for this so-called
faculty is organisation, differing in each individual—that organi
sation is educated, and this education also varies with each.
Therefore this so-called faculty is ultimately resultant from
development of organisation. That basis must be limited and
varied.
It varies perceptibly in different races of mankind.
There is a different development to each individual, and this
education of organisation helps to make up what we call con
science, this conscience varying in its exercise in different
spheres, and by different individuals. Faculty I say it is not,
it is only a condition, the result of all these circumstances, but
-is never independent of them. This alleged moral laculty never
�59
existed without these, either in children, men, or women, at any
age. Then our friend said that all human beings knew more or
less of God’s laws—some knew more, he says, some knew less.
Well, if that is so, if some had abundance, and some were deficient,
then God has been unkind either to them to whom he has given
but little knowledge, or to those to whom he has given much.
The knowledge of God’s laws must be either good or bad. If it
is good for all to have a complete knowledge, then there is in
justice in giving to some more, to some less: if it is bad to have
the knowledge, then there is injustice in giving it to any. In
either case you have an argument against the moral government.
Then our friend goes on to say, “ The future does not trouble
me.” He knows what kind of service will be allotted to him by
God or by any one competent to make the allotment. I can tell
him one kind of service which will certainly not be allotted to
him, and that is, the task of proving that there is a God—or the
moral character of his government. (Cheers.) That duty will
never more be allotted to him. (Cheers.) Our friend was good
enough to tell us that it was the strongest effort of his mind this
demonstration of moral sense, and that he had made it so clear
that there was hardly any use in his arguing the question with
me about it. I will wait till the report shall be in print—that
will speak for itself. I did not refer to last night till he took the
opportunity of introducing it. I would not have brought it
forward because there remained no point needing comment. I
can well conceive a man lamenting during the day over a defeat,
and trying again to-night to talk it into a semblance of victory.
You referred to Mazzini, and asked why I complained. You say—
“ Oh, but it is right or it is wrong.” Why use this term right er
wrong ? If you use them, the one as conducing to happiness,
the other as producing a state of pain, I can unde’-stand what you
mean. It is a state of happiness for a man to work for good—to
work for truth—the development of truth amongst his fellows ;
he finds happiness in so doing. But it is a source of pain to him
to know there is so much evil yet to be undone You can believe
the man more happy who does right than he who commits a
wrong, and this whether there be a God or not. But God, my
friend says, is all-good—that which results from him is there
fore all-good—it must be all-good, as no tvd can come from an in
finite God. Adieism is in the world, and it mu-t come from some
source, as out of nothing nothing can come. God is the source
of all, it must therefore come from God, therefore Atheism is
from God ; but God is good, therefore Atheism i< good. And n w
for the French. They are a queer nation, says our friend He
has been told so perhaps, but those who bave been am mg them
think otherwise. Queer they are, but the men who are most
queer amongst them are the men who are most under the domi-
�60
Stance of theology, and least under the influence of Freethought.
I have found that men who are least under the influence of the
priest are the men who have been best d'spnsed to bring about a
better state of things for their country. These are not the men
you speak of in such unwarrantable language. There are men who
bend before the rising sun, who bow before the crown, but these
are not the men developed by thought and truth. There are men
■who have been mbdeveloped by the misgovernment of kings and
priests ordained by God, who left them without moral thought,
and destitute of manhood. Those men whom you call lick
spittles—men in Paris, men at Lyons, men at Bourdeaux, in the
North and in the South—are men speaking for their country, men
working for liberty, hoping to attain it for their own country and
for others. Men are now striving for liberty again in France.
(Cheers.) Then you come to Borne. Is that so far from your
religion that you can afford to attack it ? Rotten branch, you do
well to shun the stem from which you spring (Loud cheering.)
Matricidal son, you do nobly to plant the dagger of calumny in
the breast of the mother church which bore you How well
pleased her son should be to cover her with odium; but where
would be your church without its early gospel forgeries—where
your Christian establishments, your bishoprics, your evidences,
your prisons, your revenues, all things that go to make up your
faith, if they bad not been treasured up, garnished, furbished in
Rome ? You say you are not Roman Catholic, and that Roman
Catholics will burn men—so will Protestants. Protestants have
burned Roman Catholics. There is a place not so far as
Caff'rar'a, there is Newgate, where Protestant Christian noble
men piled up stones on men of the Romish faith until the blood
gushed from their forehead and finger-ends because they would not
plead before judges who had pre-determined to condemn them.
You tell me you do not—I answer, you do not, because you dare
not do such things now. It is within the brief span of your own
lifetime, when you were but little older than I am now, that
dissenting clergymen sentenced Richard Carlile and Robert
Taylor to Oakham, Giltspur Street, and Newgate, and harassed
Carlile’s family with starvation for holding such opinions I now
hold. (Loud cheers.) You could not do all this to-day, because
the stream of human thought is rushing onward, and would
drown your fires if you dared kindle them. You are only losing
|; time in advocating the past, because new thought is more powerful thau old faith—it has trampled out your faggots. Make not
J a boast over Roman Catholics, both fruit of one tree—rotten fruit
I admit; both are laden with poison, both have given to the
world a heritage—slavery, tyrants, and chains. It is left for the
republic of human intellect to erect a better state of things.
(Loud and protracted cheering.)
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�61
Mb. Cooper : I am returning to the affirmation with which he
sets out. He says that Locke, Newton, and Clark oppose each
other upon this question. I say they don’t. He said what I
quoted from Plato is not in Plato. I say it is. What use in
trying to persuade people that I do not understand my own
argument ? I said I did not understand what Bradlaugh said
about command and sequence. He knew he said that I did not
, understand my own argument. He asked me how did I know
i that men in this world in various nations and situations had
i; more or less knowledge of God’s law ? I said I knew it by their
acts, and then he said it was unkind that God did not reveal to them
the law. He could not; and only when this great moral world
should be destroyed, would there be justice done. If men
transgressed the law, says Mr. Bradlaugh, they should not be
punished for it in this state, he will have no doubt about it in the
next state. So my friend will argue that the virtuous are more
happy even in this world, and yet nothing is right. Can you
understand this reasoning ? He asked me not to blow hot and
cold. It is the most stupid talk I ever heard in the world. He
first tells me that it is right, and then that it is wrong. I cannot
understand all this- The men in France and the priests are so
and so. Yes. Why? Because they bowed to the dominance of
the priests, and not because of theology in general I have it on
the testimony of a gentleman who went to live in a house in
Bordeaux to commence an undertaking as an agriculturist. He
commenced by giving some books to the peasantry on bis estate.
They bowed as they received them, and appeared thankful. In
three days, however, they came back to him, and politely re
quested that they might see the governor of the farm. The Pere
[Mr. Cooper pronounced this word with accent on the last syllable,
a circumstance which caused some laughter and surprise, which
it is necessary to explain, that a portion of the following speech of
Mr. Bradlaugh’s may be understood.] The Pert was a priest in
the village, who, he said, told him that they did not read such
books because of their religion, and they very seldom made acquain
tance with anything beside theology. The great mass of them
bow to the domination of the priest; and so these lickspittles
exist in France, and are, according to my friend, made under God’s
moral government. Has he shown that any other government
will account for the various arguments that have been adduced?
As this is the last time I shall address you, I will simply appeal
to your consciences again. You have a conscience, every man
has a conscience, to which he is responsible in the first instance.
You need not smile—it will not be a smiling matter if, on your
death-bed, your conscience tells you that I am right and that you
are wrong. We will all have to meet it. Every one of us. I
have talked before of death-beds, and there was no indisposition
�62
to listen to me then. If morality is not taught in this room now,
it ought to be. It used to be. You have a conscience which has
dictates, and which, if you do not obey it, flogs you. If you vio
late conscience, on your death-bed it will not be a happy one.
You say there is no future. You may contrive to allay the
gnawings of conscience in some degree—you will not kill them.
They will be there up to the last. You had better listen to con
science before it is too late. The more you ponder on this fact,
the more you will begin to see that there is a moral nature, and
the more clearly you will apprehend that there must be a moral
governor. I wish I had pondered more on this fact in my early
life. It began with that point of government—it began in John
Street in a discussion upon one of Mr. Owen’s propositions, that
man is the creature of circumstances. He was laughed at when
he said there was no praise or blame. In the controversy, I
began to blame myself and praise others. Why, I began to ask,
do you praise such men as Louis Blanc, Mazzini, and Kossuth
when their name is mentioned, and execrate Louis Napoleon?
Praise and blame I We cannot help it. It is no use telling me
there is no such thing as sinning against conscience—there is
something which you cannot get rid of, which cannot be sot out of
the mind, which cannot be got out of the heart. You go about
with this conscience, with the certainty that it is there perpetually
—a tribunal within you. If you reflect on it, the more you will feel
convinced that moral government exists. I reflected, and I said,
what I have ever since maintained, that there exists a moral
government for man, whose head is the Governor and Creator of
the Universe. (Hear, hear.)
Mr. Bradlaugh: It would be impossible to demonstrate to
night that my remarks, in reference to Locke, Newton, and Samuel
Clark, were well founded. A quarter of an hour will not suffice
for that purpose. But I will take occasion to say something in
respect of what has been said to come from Plato. It is very
curious that, in the “ Timaeus ” which I hold in my hand, there is a
passage precisely the opposite to that which my friend quoted,
and I have not been able to find any thing like the sentence he
quoted from Plato. What I do find is in opposition to what he
has attributed to Plato. I take pains to be moderately correct
before I challenge an assertion made in this way. (Mr. Cooper
here interrupted ) He tells me the passage is there, and when I
discover a passage having an opposite meaning, he "a;ks me where '
it is. You first quoted the passage which you say is in J^'ato, and f •
it is for you to point it out.
Mr. Cooper : I don’t know what you are talking about.
Mr. Bradlaugh : You soon will know what I am talking
about if you are indecent enough to continually interrupt. If i
you do not begrudge me this last speech, at least keep quiet. If
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�63
fifty-nine years have not taught you the advantage of imitating
younger men by listening patiently to opposite opinions, such a
lesson may be taught you here to-night.
Mr. Cooper: Hold your impudence. (Loud cries of “Keep
your temper.”)
r
Mr. Bradlaugh: With regard to the agricultural population,
that of England would be as little likely to preserve and read the
works of Paine or of Cobbett, as were the agriculturists of the
South of France to read works that were not recognised by the
Roman Catholic Church. I submit that no greater illustration
in favour of my friend could be drawn from the conduct of the
agriculturists in France, than I could draw, on the contrary, from
the agricultural population in this country, and even in the
counties of Essex, Suffolk, and Norfolk, where the people are
ignorant in the extreme, many of them in these enlightened days
being unable to read or write. They have plenty of clergymen—*
take Harwich and for miles round, it is a place where you will find,
an agricultural population as ignorant, as pious, and as poor as any
in England. Our friend again appealed to conscience, without
having devoted one thought to the way in which he accounted
for conscience. Never having permitted himself to explain one
of the points challenged by me, he talks about conscience as if it
had never been referred to in my speeches. Feeling that his posi
tion was weak, and knowing that he had made nothing of it, he
comes to the old and oft-tried death-bed argument to frighten
those whom he cannot convince. (Cheers.) I ask you, will you
think yourselves the better men that you are frightened into this
conscience dogma, which you could not reasonably believe, and
which you are asked to accept from fear, though you rejected it when
you said there was not evidence enough to convince you ? When
he thus deals with death-beds, is it, does he think, to have some
effect on the conclusion of the debate ? If he search for death
bed arguments, he may find enough for his own refutation. He
has appealed to the cross, and I accept his challenge, and ask him
what were the dying words of Christ himself? “ My God! my
God ! why hast thou forsaken me ?” If he who claimed to be
God and man was so deserted in his dying moments, what hope
? Better recommend salvation by your own manly
thought your own efforts for the development of human hap
piness. My friend says that morality used to be taught in this
room when he was here, and implies that the reverse is now the
case. What call you morality ? Is that a moral act which tends
to the greatest happiness of the greatest number according to the
knowledge of the actor ? No other definition can you give. I
challenge all of you who stand before me whether in every lecture,
teaching, or preaching by me—if you will have it so, whether the
burthen of my lecture has not been the inculcation of morality ?
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The Freethinkers have not fallen away from the cause of truth
and morality. When you presume to deal with myself and my
audience her -, as if we were schoolboys still and you teacher,
you should be prepared with solid instruction as justification for
your presumption, and when you wish men not to laugh at you,
you should have some reason better than your age—something
more argumentative than impudence. You should, at least,
km w better what you are talking about. (Loud cries of question,
question, hear, hear, and cheers.) When the construction of
terms is referred to, and you tell me more than twice that you do
•«. not understand the difference between sequence and command, I am
obliged to tell you that you do not understand the commonest rudimeuts of language, and are unfitted to conduct a grave discussion ;
and when 5 ou say you “ never did say so and so,” that you have a
short nn mory. I can only add that you are either unable to
argue at ail, or you are disingenuously concealing what you know
would be fatal to your position. (Cheers.) There has not been,
I repeat, an attempt by you at logic or argument. How is it that
the friends whom I saw around Mr. Cooper last night have this
evening fled from his flag ? I saw la^t evening, and I was pleased to
see sitting on that side, men of intellect, men of talent—equal to
the task of weighing the force of an argument, addressed to them,
and. knowing the exact value of words. How is it that they
were brought here to wait on victory, but have not returned here
to witness the fray, now the hope for victory has become defeat ?
Is it because there was not on the part of the Chr.stian
advocate even the shadow of a pretence of having advanced any
thing in favour of his side the question ? It is because they came
here seeking in me one who was, as you have declared, too igno
rant to meet you, but notwithstanding I am now here to fulfil
my part, and show that even my ignorance transcends your
knowledge.
"
Mr. Cooper : Is that argument ?
Mr Bradlaugh : I know it is not argument, but it is as good
argument as “gibberish;” it is as good argument and quite as
forcible as the “ impudence,” or that you did not come here to
meet Charles Bradlaugh; that you are not to be answered because
you are fifty-nine years of age. It would have been better for both
of us to have discussed carefully, and to have reasoned together
step by step till we reached the height of this great argument which,
deserves great discussion; but when an attempt is made to override
discussion, I am obliged to turn round, and to show thecause of such
hardiness which lies either in his utter inability or his desire to
avoid the question altogether. (Cheers). I leave the matter in your
hands. I admit that I am not the ablest or the fittest represen
tative the Freethought party might have put forward. But
although I am not the best I have honestly upheld the principles
�/
-of those who trusted their cause to me, and if I have failed, I
have failed in consequence of the weakness of th* advocate; but
you, with the cause of God on your side, and boasting of your
great intellect, you thinking you had only a poor piece of igno
rance to combat—I say you have only made a shadow of a de
fence. On your side has been all the pretence. I remember
when at the Wigan Hail, at the U. P. Kirk, Glasgow, at Man
chester, and here you refused to meet me. (Loud cries of question,
question, cheers, and hisses ) Why, there is not a shred of the
question left. (Great cheering.) I say again it was in the public
Hall at Wigan, it was in the U. P. Kirk, Glasgow, in this Hall of
Science, in the chapel at Manchester, that you told me I was too
ignorant to be met, that I could not understand the meaning of
a&s®
AStow, I words. We have to-night an illustration of your learning when,
sdj .hi ■_ I in the language most commonly spoken throughout Europe and
edF I the world, we hear the word p'ere (father) pronounced pary
rfjae^ I (laughter), proving the extent of your erudition. It would
have been improper for me to deal with this stupid blunder if he
had not been used to boast of the acquisition of fourteen lan
guages, and summoned the world as scholars to hear his champion
■wnttw’ | lectures. Are you then the Christian who placards the walls of
r*®?drio I cities professing to meet all Freethinkers in England with a view
3V!TOOtjf’ | to convert their doubts ? Are you^ar excellence the person who
&MT«Sif': I has read every book carefully to find evidence and argument for
sow -sift I the existence of God, who claim to be teacher and preacher of
■shgfirf-9- I Christian doctrine, bridging over centuries of history with irre
f4d;«»S# | fragable evidences ? It is to be hoped that when it is necessary
i ,m»* o* I to find a champion for the tottering orthodoxy and an argument
MOV-S^Ilf I in favour of a blind belief, some abler representative will be found
i .atflWB
by the Christian body to whom to trust the marshalling of its
forces for another defeat.
----- o----a .tM .
Mr. Bradlaugh sat down amidst loud cheering, which was re
newed again and again. This concluded the discussion, and a
yyMhi'dT
formal vote of thanks having been passed to the chairman, the
meeting separated.
^aimp
�’T-
APPENDIX*
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A PLEA FOR ATHEISM,
CrTTLESPiE says that £*an Atheist propagandist seems a non*
descript monster created by nature in a moment of madness.” Despite this opinion, it is as the propagandist of
Atheism that I pen the following lines, in the hope that I
may succeed in removing some few of the many prejudices
which have been created against not only the actual holders
of Atheistic opinions, but also against those wrongfully suspected of entertaining such ideas. Men who have been
famous for depth of thought, for excellent wit, or great
genius, have been recklessly assailed as Atheists, by those
who lacked the high qualifications against which the spleen
of the calumniators was directed. Thus, not only has
Voltaire been without ground accused of Atheism, but
Bacon, Locke, and Bishop Berkeley himself, have, amongst
others, been denounced by thoughtless or unscrupulous
pietists as inclining to Atheism, the ground for the accusation being that they manifested an inclination to improve
human thought.
It is too often the fashion with persons of pious reputation
to speak in unmeasured language of Atheism as favouring
immorality, and of Atheists as men whose conduct is necessarily vicious, and who have adopted atheistic views as a
desperate defiance against a Deity justly offended by the
‘ badness of their lives. Such persons urge that amongst
< the proximate causes of Atheism are vicious training, im- ■
; moral and profligate companions, licentious living, and the <
like. Dr. John Pye Smith, in his “ Instructions on Christian Theology,” goes so far as to declare that“ nearly all
the Atheists upon record have been men of extremely
debauched and vile conduct.” Such language from the
Christian advocate is not surprising, but there are others
who, professing great desire , the spread of Ereethought,
�A PLEA FOR ATHEISM.
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and with pretensions to rank amongst acute and liberal
thinkers, declare Atheism impracticable, and its teachings
cold, barren, and negative. In this brief essay I shall
except to each of the above allegations, and shall en
deavour to demonstrate that Atheism affords greater possi
bility for human happiness than any system yet based on
Theism, or possible to be founded thereon, and that the
lives of true Atheists must be more virtuous, because more
human, than those of the believers in Deity, the humanity
of the devout believer often finding itself neutralised by
a faith with which it is necessarily in constant collision.
The devol ee piling the faggots at the auto da fe of an
heretic, and that heretic his son, might, notwithstanding, be
a good father in every respect but this. Heresy, in the
eyes of the believer, is highest criminahty, and outweighs
all claims of family or affection.
Atheism, properly understood, is in nowise a cold,
barren negative; it is, on the contrary, a hearty, fruitful
affirmation of all truth, and involves the positive assertion
and action of highest humanity.
Let Atheism be fairly examined, and neither condemned
—its defence unheard—on the ex parte slanders of the professional preachers of fashionable orthodoxy, whose courage
is bold enough while the pulpit protects the sermon, but
whose valour becomes tempered with discretion when a free
platform is afforded and discussion claimed ; nor misjudged
because it has been the custom to regard Atheism as so
unpopular as to render its advocacy impolitic. The best
policy against all prejudice is to assert firmly the verity.
The Atheist does not say “ There is no God,” but he says,
“ I know not what you mean by God; I am without idea
of God ; the word ‘ God ’ is to me a sound conveying no
clear or distinct affirmation. I do not deny God, because
I cannot deny that of which I have no conception, and the
conception of which, by its affirmer, is so imperfect that
he is unable to define it to me.” If you speak to the
Atheist of God as creator, he answers that the conception
of creation is impossible. We are utterly unable to construe
it in thought as possible that the complement of existence has
been either increased or diminished, much less can we con
ceive an absolute origination of substance. We cannot con
ceive either, on the one hand, nothing becoming something,
■■
.
-
’
�A PLEA FOR ATHEISM.
or oil the other, something becoming nothing. The Theist
who speaks of God creating the universe, must either sup
pose that Deity evolved it out of himself, or that he pro
duced it from nothing. But the Theist cannot regard the
■ universe as evolution of Deity, because this would identify
Universe and Deiiy, and be Pantheism rather than Theism.
There would be no distinction of substance—in fact no crea1 tion. Nor can the Theist regard the universe as created
out of nothing, because Deity is, according to him, necessa
rily eternal and infinite. His existence being eternal and
infinite, precludes the possibility of the conception of
vacuum to be filled by the universe if created. No one can
even think of any point of existence in extent or duration
and say, here is the point of separation between the creator
and the created. Indeed, it is not possible for the Theist to
imagine a beginning to the universe. It is not possible to
conceive either an absolute commencement, or an absolute
termination of existence; that is, it is impossible to con
ceive beginning before which you have a period when the
universe has yet to be; or to conceive an end, after which
the universe, having been, no longer exists. It is impos
sible in thought to originate or annihilate the universe.
The Atheist affirms that he cognises to-day effects, that
these are at the same time causes and effects—causes to the
effects they precede, effects to the causes they follow.
Cause is simply everything without which the effect would
not result, and with which it must result. Cause is the
means to an end, consummating itself in that end. The
Theist who argues for creation must assert a point of time,
that is, of duration, when the created did not yet exist. At
this point of time either something existed or nothing;,
but something must have existed, for out of nothing no
thing can come. Something must have existed, because the
point fixed upon is that of the duration of something.
This something must have been either finite or infinite
if finite, it could not have been God, and if the something
were infinite, then creation was impossible, as it is impos
sible to add to infinite existence.
j
If you leave the question of creation and deal with the
‘ government of the universe, the difficulties of Theism are ?
by no means lessened. The existence of evil is then a
terrible stumbling-block to the Theist.
Pain, misery,
�A PLEA FOR ATHEISM.
crime, poverty, confront the advocate of eternal goodness,,
and challenge with unanswerable potency his declaration of
Deity as all-good, all-wise, and all-powerful. Evil is either
caused by God, or exists independently; but it cannot be
caused by God, as in that case he would not be all-good;
nor can it exist independently, as in that case he would nofe
be all-powerful. Evil must either have had a beginning,
or it must be eternal; but, according to the Theist, it can
not be eternal, because God alone is eternal. Nor can it
have had a beginning, for if it had it must either have ori
ginated in God, or outside God; but, according to the
Theist, it cannot have originated in God, for he is all-good,
and out of all-goodness evil cannot originate; nor can evil
have originated outside God, for, according to the Theist,
God is infinite, and it is impossible to go outside of or
beyond infinity.
To the Atheist this question of evil assumes an entirely
different aspect. He declares that evil is a result, but not
a result from God or Devil. He affirms that by conduct
founded on knowledge of the laws of existence it is possible
to ameliorate and avoid present evil, and, as our knowledge
increases, to prevent its future recurrence.
Some declare that the belief in God is necessary as a check
to crime. They allege that the Atheist may commit murder,
lie, or steal without fear of any consequences. To try the
actual value of this argument, it is not unfair to ask—Do
Theists ever steal? If yes, then in each such theft, the
belief in God and his power to punish has been inefficient
as a preventive of the crime. Do Theists ever lie or mur
der ? If yes, the same remark has further force—hell-fire fail
ing against the lesser as against the greater crime. The
fact is that those who use such an argument overlook a great
truth—i.e., that all men seek happiness, though in very
diverse fashions. Ignorant and miseducated men often mistake the true path to happiness, and commit crime in the
endeavour to obtain it. Atheists hold that by teaching
mankind the real road to human happiness, it is possible to
keep them from the by-ways of criminality and error.
Atheists would teach men to be moral now, not because God
offers as an inducement reward by and by, but because in
the virtuous act itself immediate good is ensured to the doer
and the circle surrounding him. Atheism would preserve
�A. PLEA FOR ATHEISM.
man from lying, stealing, murdering now, not from fear of
an eternal agony after death, but because these crimes make
this life itself a course of misery.
While Theism, asserting God as the creator and governor
- of the universe, hinders and checks man’s efforts by de. daring God’s will to be the sole directing and controlling
j power, Atheism, by declaring all events to be in accordance
with natural laws—that is, happening in certain ascertain
able sequences — stimulates man to discover the best condi
tions of life, and offers him the most powerful inducements
to morality. While the Theist provides future happi
ness for a scoundrel repentant on his death-bed, Atheism
affirms present and certain happiness for the man who does
his best to live here so well as to have little cause for re
penting hereafter.
Theism declares that God dispenses health and inflicts
disease, and sickness and illness are regarded by the Theist
as visitations from an angered Deity, to be borne with meek
ness and content. Atheism declares that physiological
knowledge may preserve us from disease by preventing our
infringing the law of health, and that sickness results not
as the ordinance of offended Deity, but from ill-ventilated
dwellings and workshops, bad and insufficient food, exces
sive toil, mental suffering, exposure to inclement weather,
and the like—all these finding root in poverty, the chief
source of crime and disease ; that prayers and piety afford
no protection against fever, and that if the human being be
kept without food he will starve as quickly whether he be
Theist or Atheist, theology being no substitute for bread.
J* *
Iconoclast.
�
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Discussion between Mr Thomas Cooper and Mr Charles Bradlaugh
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Cooper, Thomas
Bradlaugh, Charles [1833-1891]
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Place of publication: [London]
Collation: 65, [5] p. ; 18 cm.
Notes: Includes appendix: A plea for atheism / "Iconoclast" i.e. Charles Bradlaugh. (5 unnumbered pages at end). Annotations in pencil and crayon. Part of the NSS pamphlet collection.
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Atheism
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Atheism
God-Proof
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Text
ECULAR SOCIETY
I SO, PICCADILLY, HANLEY
DOES THERE EXIST A
moral governor of the universe?
AN ARGUMENT AGAINST THE ALLEGED
UNIVERSAL BENEVOLENCE IN NATURE.
BY AUSTIN HOLYOAKE.
induced to suspend the operations of Er t 7 prai8e and pra-ver8> aad
of every earnest suppliant. These are the™3
ra.eet1*16 wants aad wishes
many Theists-men whose theology is modified T* b?hevers- There are
--who reject the Special Providence Zorv » EE advanced views
philosophic conception of Deitv ” The ^’rand ?° d wbat tbeV term a
merciful God made all things for man’s Mn” ‘«T E an alI*wise and all
fixed and unalterable; that he Himself is comn liTr ’
Ws Ws are
the medium of unbending and undevfo inJ? P
t0 aCt sole,V through
idea, there are millions who hold th«
.Forone who holds this
Nevertheless both maintain that TTnivL
°f a Speoial Providence.
But the fallacy underlying the position o/th Bhe“?vo,ea?e reigns over all.
volence, is the assumption that a God mL & E™ ln ua‘vereal bene-th« », r» ,h. beM»t J
•‘■»e» /or • »1.. purpp«
being of infinite power and ffoodnp^a k
term God in the sense of a
pableof controllingall thin^ Tnv7h "T 311 thi^s- aad whois caundeviatmg laws ” of the universe
the “uabending and
part of it, and therefore not God at all I EE'“ na(ure’ and therefore
mg I attach to the terms I uTe as I do nt J l° be explicit ia the ™aawhat is equally as bad, mislead myself rT
to mislead others, or,
without hesitation that I de not believe thE a\0nceJ01a issua, and say
Thed0“^
It
Cbatiesatb7ri0US
38 mUch de£"
The destruction of Pompeii and E 1 ™ betweea contending armies
rendered the name of volcanoes woriof“forrEh0^"6”068 which haV0
Jet some writers, who claim to hold the u! • • ^ronghoijt the world.
®anoes 38 being made hy a good Cod f 8CIent.ltlc Jdea, speak of vol
though what morality there is V th
■/
W18e
purpose”—
^ad out. I think they serve a physical nT? P3ZZle 3 Sciencidc man to
off the incandescent matter and gas^whielA P
?“ occa81onal|y letting
mitting it would not be a wise otfectfon^ CCU“lulat0 ia the earth. Ad
elines that they occasionally blow up but it foT againSt the ase ofsteatn
ebote „i
�A Moral Governor of the Universe.
2
explosion; or when the safety-valve refuses to act, and the boiler, becoming
overcharged, bursts, and spreads destruction all around. But if it were
not for volcanoes, argue some persons, there would be earthquakes. But
earthquakes are continuous notwithstanding, and whole cities are swallowed
up, and thousands of human beings are hurled to destruction. What moral
purpose is served thereby ? With what possible conception of a God who
is worthy of veneration and worship will this harmonise? He makes the
gases and the burning lava in the interior of the earth, and he makes the
volcanoes to act as safety-valves; but they do not always act, and frightful
convulsions are the consequence. Then this arrangement is not perfect,
and man is still the sufferer.
.
. ,
* * nThe countless forms of physical suffering in the world are totally irre
concilable with the idea of an all-wise and all-good Designer. No amount
of logic can bridge over the difficulty. Though frequently out of evil
cometh good, and by suffering we are elevated; yet why not have the good
and the elevation without the evil and the suffering, if wisdom and bene
volence rule the world ? Take a homely illustration.
An aged or infirm
person goes to the seaside and takes up his residence at an hotel, and it is
more conducive to his health that he should live on the top floor, notwith
standing the fatigue of walking up and down ong flights of stairs. But
what says the human designer, who lays no claim to perfect wisdom and
celestial benevolence ?-why, that the aged or infirm shall have the
benefit of the top floor unmixed with evil, and he at once erects a li t
which will enable the invalid to attain to any elevation without the slightest
fatigue. The whole economy of nature seems to be a struggle between
ignorance and force. Nature has secrets to impart and treasures to yield,
but weak man only attains them after toil, anxiety, and danger. Suffe g
is the order of the whole of the animated world. Animals, from the
simplest organisms, prey upon one another; and man, by the power of his
superior endowments, preys upon them all; but he is gifted with reason and
mental faculties of a high order, and these cause him the most exquisite
torture, at times far transcending physical pain. Coal is a great agent o
civilisation, and adds considerably to the comforts of life; man therefore
descends into the bowels of the earth to procure this treasure. But the
demon Firedamp, who has been lying in wait for him during untold ages,
suddenlv rushes from his lair, and sweeps him to destruction without a
moment’s warning. We embark in foreign enterprises, and to carry on
the commerce of nations, “men go down to the> sea m ships, when the
Storm Fiend rises, and the pitiless ocean engulpbs them, and they are seen
no more These and other objections to the idea of universal benevolence
,
toon anntrht to be met by the declaration that whatever is, is
riaht ” Can self-stultification go farther than this? Whatever is, ts;
but to say that the good and the bad are right, is to confound all language.
To assertytSt evil ¿right, and to overcome evil is right also, is simply
in
RevtaCharles Voysey, of the Church of England, and the Rev.
John P^gl Hopps, of the Unitarian Church, both hold the scientific
John rage uopp ,
respective circles, are men of
theory of God Both
n
ti(£ Mr. Hopps has written
mark, and what they say is worthy o
crkicisra of hi3 views. For his
ta tbebuXsof
ado,»«, concept.«« «i bMP
�A Moral Governor of the Universe.
3
rtrhThei?M ?6 bUrni"g °f Shif>3 at 8ea always results from carelessness
h. -k J“ Ab8f m,onstrous supposition), do not tbe innocent suffer with
the guilty ? And where is the goodness of that? Take the large ocean
steamers. Vr hat have the passengers to do with the management of these
vessels—the women and children especially? Yet the ship is burnt and
S Tri Where.ls the g°°dness to them ? There is nothing inconsis
tent, that I can see m asking a God of mercy to “interfere to prevent
the fire burning the poor fellows in the blazing ship.” If onecrWiZ
imagine an all-powerful God making laws which he could not control it
IXThe,ieve thata God of u™ersal ?oodne8s
b .mgs of
0™ creating to become victims of these laws. I embark in
imca, JI
fl
knowledge that fire applied to combustible matter
ZmmitthJ
knOW k is inevitable; I therefore do not
commit the folly of burning the ship and still expect to go scatbless. But
some one else may fire the ship without my knowledge, and when I am
powerless to help myself: I thus lose my life, not through any fault of my
own, but through the wilfulness or carelessness of others. If I saw the
crime about to be committed, and had the power to prevent it, I should do
s without hesitation.
But an all-good and all-powerful God looks
leJe1of°h and.Permit8theevil- You thus degrade the Deity below the
tZi?f u”“ y How can Ipraise and worship a Being thus constiThii-ii ’• ? Uwuaying that “Part™l evil is universal good!”
That is illogical.
When we suffer we cannot be brought to believe that
it is good we should suffer. Then why should we presume to say it is
Rn°tdJh6n OdrS SUffSr Under Pai“ anddisease, misfortune and calamity?
But ships are lost at sea from other causes than fire and neglect. Storms
puCtaStogeSer0
“ t0
pr°P°rty at 8ea than a11 Other causa*
FittlesW ? aS who,can Provlde against all storms? Men build
o niecS P The
y 7 3t; th6y build big 8hiPs’ and they are dashed
wifh!? a
laws of nature are undeviating, but how can weak man
SohrancedanJeflr varl0,us ®Perat!ons? It « an eternal warfare between
would hUd f°rhCeAand «dlions perish miserably in the encounters; and you
Men itb:?m\beheVethat ifc was a11 designed for man s especial good.
Kd cento J“6’
more knowledge of the laws of nature now than they
results of th J. -S0’ 1 r-they u ™ better oPPortunities of recording the
to their Off • investigations; but they cannot transmit their knowledge
hJhJintiZ?gTnay’1S1lnOtaphyskdogica! fact' tbat the children of
An ire born toil parentshave generally but mediocre mental powers?
be Jne thro u ly lgDOrant’ and the same druggie for knowledge has to
be gone through by every generation; tbe same mistakes are made and
the same caja ties f0now ignorance.
A knowledgf) of
the most favo® hf 8afeguard’ but how Htt,e can be learned, even under
the most favourable conditions, in the brief span of human existence,
believe thaJhAi 6 aDdr ma“’8 Position on this earth, I see no reason to
excessive c2 heX
than the meanest flnimaL He dies from
he mav h«nnPJht r
excess,ve heat. On whatever spot of this globe
aguis or f vfX •
. F0rnKOr thr°WD’ he Perishes Prematurely by the
creatL in X H
t0
If ever there
a Crea'°r and *
brute” Man f
i^ine plan man had no pre-eminence above the
for himse&Jr°m Jh ineS8-and egOtism’ has created an immortality
over hkin ° in d he ha^ Imagmed an ever-merciful God watching
of all thineT'ariJ6818
^aSb. meD Pretend t0 comprehend the purpose
tery of ihe ¿Zh
m°r6 .<?autl0U8’ while confessing the profound mys
tery of the unfathomable, sail persuade themselves that boundless benevo
�4
A Moral Governor of the Universe.
lence reigns over all. But man’s weak conjectures receive the rudest
shocks; for Nature sweeps on her majestic course sublimely indifferent to
the frantic cries of humanity. The heaving billows wreck the frail
barque; the volcano overwhelms the smiling village; the earthquake
rends the earth and engulphs the fairest cities; the lightning blasts the
oak ; the hurricane and the tornado spread destruction o’er the plain; the
pestilence exbales its poisonous breath through the affrighted town; and
the busy haunts of men become more hateful than the howling wilderness.
The Rev. Mr. Voysey did me the honour of forwarding tome Parts viii.
and ix. of his Sling and the Stone, containing four sermons preached by
him at Healaugh on a passage from Isaiah lv. 8, 9: For my thoughts
are not your thoughts, neither are your ways iny ways, saith the Lord.
For as the heavens are higher than the earth, so are my ways higher
than your ways, and my thoughts than your thoughts.” I have read
these four sermons attentively, and while agreeing with much that is in
them, and heartily approving of the admirable spirit which pervades the
whole, I take exception to the assumptions and conclusions arrived
at by the preacher, as I must maintain that he has absolutely no data to
go upon.
The believers in a God of mercy and benevolence occupy a position
both amusing and painful. Firmly convinced in their own minds that a
God exists whom they are bound to worship, they set about to invest him
with attributes which, according to their judgment, will justify theit
adoration. But their difficulties are only increased thereby, and many a
contradiction they have to gloss over, and many an anomaly they have to
gulp down. In the words of the text, the Lord’s “ thoughts are not
their thoughts, neither are their ways his ways.” And this must ever
remain so, and to attempt to comprehend them or describe them, is a piece
of self-delusion of the most ludicrous kind. Yet men are constantly
doing this. They are not content to confess that the God whom they
seek is the Nature that they know. But how little even of the nature
which surrounds them, and of which they form a part, do men comprehend.
I wish the Rev. Mr, Voysey had given his conception of what God is —
whether an organised being, subject like all of us to the laws of nature;
or an indefinable something above and beyond all influence. He appears
to hold both notions, paradoxical as it may appear, for in some places he
speaks of God’s thoughts, and we cannot conceive of thought apart from
mental organisation.
Whence Mr. Voysey derives his conception of Deity I cannot tell. At
one time you think he takes it from the Bible, but that supposition soon
becomes dissipated when you find him expressing, in the most unequivocal
terms, his disbelief of portions of the supposed “ Word of God.” He
appears to place implicit belief in the words of the above text, and he
believes that God sent Jesus with a message of “world-wide love;” but
when that messenger is represented as saying, “Verily I say unto you.
This generation shall not pass till all these things be fulfilled,” he says
he does not believe Christ ever said anything so irrational, or ever in
tended to sav it! But then Mr. Voysey obtains both declarations from
the self-same source, and the evidence for the one is quite as conclusive as
the evidence for the other. Here is bewilderment indeed. The rational
man is at liberty to reject anything that does not approve itself to his
judgment which he finds in the Bible, but the orthodox man is not.
Mr. Voysey is no believer in the infallibility of the Bible as we have it.
But his prosecutors will have a difficult task to perform, to reconcile the
�A Moral Governor of the Universe.
5
solemn prophecy of a supposed infallible being with its non-fulfilment. Mr.
Voysey doesnot believein this prophecy, though hesays some of the Apostles
did; neither does he believe in some of the absurd representations in
Genesis as to the firmament, and the windows in heaven through which the
rain came. As a sensible man he is bound to reject those things which
science has proved to be fallacies ; but in clingring to the notion of im
mortality, and the idea of a God of universal benevolence, he plunges into
a sea of difficulties, from which Rationalism alone can rescue him.
Mr. Voysey’s second sermon is devoted to a consideration of the exis
tence of pain and suffering in the world, and an endeavour is made to re
concile that painful fact with infinite wisdom and universal benevolence. I
consider the effort a total failure, as all such efforts must be. You cannot
make the bad good by merely changing the name. Mr. Voysey, all through
his sermon, does violence to his better nature. He is like a fond son en
deavouring to palliate and gloss over the errors and shortcomings of an
erring father. He loves the idea of God, and clings to it with a fervency
that obscures his judgment. This is apparent notwithstanding thecandour
with which he states the difficulties of his case. He says the earthly life
of man displays thoughts and ways of God very different to what we should
have adopted for ourselves, and very different to what at first we should
have expected from a qood God. But he passes this over by remarking,
that God’s thoughts and ways are best after all, and that His purpose with
men is much higher than we dreamt of. This is begging the whole ques
tion. The first duty of the Deist should be to prove the existence of a
Being possessed of the attributes be assigns to him. The manifestations of
nature, and the lives of all men, contradict the assumption of universal
benevolence. To maintain otherwise, is to violate all reason and logic.
We cannot conceive of any one being cruel and kind at the same time, in
the sense claimed for a God. Doctors daily and hourly cause pain to their
patients in their efforts to save their lives or to restore them to health. The
parallel of divine wisdom will not hold. No surgeon amputates a limb, if
he can save the sufferer without doing so. When he operates, it is because
he has no alternative. Deity is represented as making the evil or pain in
the world as well as the good, and he surely had a choice.
Language has no meaning, if it is not to designate that which causes
pain and misery and suffering, as evil ; and that which secures human
happiness, as good. Mr. Voysey says, God’s ways are higher than our
ways, “ because pain is necessary to change, decay, and death ; and change,
decay, and death are,in their proper order, necessary to succession.” This
is the order of nature, and the Atheist accepts it as such; but he does
not say that “pain, decay, and death,” are better than life, health, and
happiness. If he had the power, he would banish pain utterly from the
world. Mr. Voysey says, “ I know that it can easily be answered by saying,
‘why does not God produce succession without death, decay, change,
and pain?’ This I cannot answer; but I do think we might justas
well ask, ‘ Why does not God make earth a cube, instead of a sphere?’ ’’
Our preacher is quite right when he says he cannot answer this unanswer
able query, and he would be consistent if he stopped there, but he attempts
to do that which he confesses he cannot do. when he goes on to argue that
the reason why God does not prevent pain and misery' in the world, is be
cause his ways are wise, and calculated to promote man’s highest happi
ness. I do not see that the question, “ Why does not God make the earth a
cube instead of a sphere ?” is any solution of the difficulty. Mr. Voysey’s
argument is, that a good God has made men miserable, but he intended to
�r>
A Moral Governor of the Universe,,
make them happy We find the earth a sphere, and it does not concern ns
o inquire why it is so ; bur if any one were to ’argue that it was intended
made round!qUaFe
’
™ 8h°Uld haVe the right t0 ask wb? ™s
Mr. Voysey enters into the question of immortality; but his ideas of a
th me Mr V aU iCbaS.°f ?°d’ are peculiar t0 the P™
conceives
th .
n’ °yS?y sP®aks of a “ future life of progress for man.” The or
thodox, who are the vehement proclaimed of a life after death, talk of its
being a state for the “just made^/^i.” But Mr. Vovsevsays hat
death"1
V161"6 would be no Progress, and "that therefore
and all th»?
this future life of progress, is “ a transcendent^,
of 1
, P»PmruS U3/Or 11 and leads t0 n maX be looked upon af part
the nevt p m
?fcourse tbis P,an of pain and death is carried on in
the next world! And if it be so, will not man be suffering, and sighing
7lng through all eternity? A cheering prospect, certainly, for the
I nman race, who are asked to believe that all things are arranged for
thi?earthedg00d/fi,^0” What 1 can jQdge Of tbelife of most people on
for ever and ever"
”"
t0
Sighed f°r’ t0 be PerP0t“ated
If death is a blessing to man, why is the instinct of life implanted so
strongly in him? “Divine wisdom” has made him regard death as the
greatest calamity that can befall him and his. Every hospital and every
doctor is a standing protest against this “ transcendent
And if pain
is wisely ordained to lead to death, why is pain so disproportionate among
suffering humanity? Why should not the smallest amount of pain tf
all afoAe suffice for this happy result? This p'an, like every plan that
ca"be imegmed by man for God, must fall far short of ideal perfection.
Mr. Voysey devotes some consideration to the question of the influence of
pain as a corrective of man’s evil passions. But he also sees that there are
numberless instances in which pain has done no possible good-in which
it has simply been wanton, aimless, profitless woe, as if it had been in
flicted by a blind and savage Being, who tortured for torture’s sake In
the case of shipwreck, we not unfrequently see examples of both kinds ot
result from the mflicti n of pain. The same catastrophe, the same appalling
terror, ennobles some and debases others-makes some brave, others
craven-some generous, others selfish. To all this Mr. Voysey remarks
These apparent anomalies are to be explained, not by laying the
blame of the evil on the presence of pain, but by taking into account the
complex nature and various stages of man. What does him good at one
stage, is fatal at another—what exasperates him at one stage, subdues and
raises him at another. We, none of us, think of objecting to the sun
Which is the very source of all life on earth, because under some circum
stances, exposure to its rays is certain death The varied effects of pain
must be accounted for by taking also into consideration the different cir
cumstances and conditions of the men who are exposed to it.”
How comes it that Mr. Voysey, who is an earnest thinker, overlooks the
fact that the same Almighty Benevolence for which he is pleading, made
the one organisation which receives pain as a chastening and elevating
chastisement, and the other which becomes brutalised under its influence—
and yet,it wasintended to improve each in the same degree? Does Mr
Voysey g argument remove one difficulty from his path? Neither is hfe
illustration about “ objecting to the sun ” a happy one. We do object to
the sun in all countries when we find his rays hurtful to our health and
happiness; m the same way that we object to too much rain and to too
�J Moral Governor of the Universe.
7
much drought, and all inclement seasons. The elements the world over are
at times the enemies of man, and regard him not. Who object more to the
elements than orthodox Christians, who are perpetually putting up prayers
to heaven for fine weather, for rain, for protection from storms, for good
crops in bad season ? Man’s life, both on land and sea, is a ceaseless strife
with the forces of nature. The lightning conductor is a protest against the
electric currents in the air, which, singularly enough, frequently strike
churches and destroy worshippers, but seldom or never visit gin palaces or
dens of infamy and vice!
This sermon concludes with the declaration that man’s thoughts are like
God's thoughts, when man, in his devotion and love to his children, in
flicts pain and sorrow upon them for their good. “ And we know, too,”
itsays, “that children always love those best who do not let them have
their own way, and who inflict pain upon them for their good.”. This is
not true, and if there is such a thing as blasphemy in the world, it is this
lowering of God to the level of imperfect man. Those who inflict pain
upon their children are not the best parents, but those who train even
stubborn and wilful natures by loving watchfulness and tender care.
Harshness never begets love, and never will. The adult who cherishes an
affection for his severe parents, does so, not for their severity, but for some
other quality. Let every man and woman ask his or her own heart if this
is not so.
Mr. Voysey’s God is the maker of all the misery, pain, disease, suffering,
and death in the world, and these sermons were preached in order to show
that all is designed for a wise purpose and for man’s highest happiness, and
therefore man ought to love and adore the hand that smites him. But does
man do so? Doe3 Mr. Voysey himself ? Which does he admire most, the
lovely Alpine valley, or the fearful avalanche which suddenly overwhelms
the smiling village?—the gentle breeze and the rippling sea, or the howling
wind and the heaving ocean that wrecks the stout ship and engulphs her
living freight?—the bloom of health on the cheek of his chi d, or the pallor
that shows the presence of the fell disease which is stealing its young life
away ? Human nature must be entirely changed, before it can be made to
love that which causes it pain, whether inflicted by man, or by a supposed
supernatural Being.
Mr. Voysey devotes two sermons to the question of “Sin,” in which he
appears to me to use extraordinary arguments. Take this as a specimen:
“There is no such thing as darkness. It is not a thing at all. Light
is something. Where light is not we call the darkness - just as where
nothing is, we say there is emptiness. God does not create emptiness. It
is absurd to say that that which is nothing can be made. So God did
not create darkness, for darkness is only a word, and nothing more—a
word by which we express the absence of light.”
Now if this is logical, what was the use of the previous sermon on “Pain?”
If there is no such thing as darkness, as darkness is but the absence of
light, surely there can be no such thing as pain, for pain is but the ab
sence of pleasure. There is nothing in the world that may not be reasoned
out of it, if words are thus to be juggled with. Berkeley’s idea of
“no matter ” is lucidity itself after this. Darkness is as palpable to the
senses of all sane persons as daylight, and therefore for all rational pur
poses one exists as much as the other. From Berkeley’s theory that only
ideas exist, and not matter, it would follow that man does not exist,
for he surely is matter as much as anything we see about us. He
womd have only the idea of his own head; but it is as bad as knocking
�8
bVndte^
A Moral Governor of the Universe.
a P°st - louring to compre-
gieVonT 1 All\t\V7’tiOn 1 take °n thIS qUe8tion a fal,ac!o“s 0^ Mo
tions to that theory whiSai^for 6o^uniC°n<Te V*
°bjec"
thherataheoryinSSI T
mi“d the ^^StuVeTe^gtin“
the ills that flZh' h • ge Hep-ps says that agony aQd calamity, and all
goodness.” The Rev^'cLTerv's^'endow? hit Ddty wkh
to whmta"d PerfeClbeilevo,ence- To s“^ain his position, he has recoup
to what may, without offence, be termed an elaborate attempt at self
world/’7 eadeavourinS t0 show that “ t^re is no absolute evil in the
nn^n6 f?S’ ,read‘nS these sermons, that they are utterly valueless as
no one who wishes to regulate his life by the light of facts as thev relllv
exist, can ever admit the truth of the propositions laid down As before
»bmred, .t >„ell-deoep,l„„ r„m beginning t0 end, .rising7,“„ th. d«X
of the preacher to reconcile the irreconcilable. Denying facts in order to
Sen alTnd
faCtS wil1 rema*
sphe of the
genial, and people will believe them, whoever may declare to the contrary
T J "y.tbatt the earth moves does not stop its revolution round the sun7’
Materialists are accused of obstinacy, or something worse for not
thfiCevP?Sn % l”dea; BUC th6y 6nd k diffic“lc t0 malfe a selection. ?
they go no farther than this small island, they meet with so many
differing and contradictory conceptions of the unknown source of natural
phenomena, that they are compelled to pause, and, in presence of the pro
found ignorance which prevails on the subject, they suspend the assent to
any representations that are upon record. Even believers accuse one
another of holding ‘‘inadequate” conceptions. Some believe in Special
Providence; others reject that idea, asserting that God himselfis bound by
the laws of the universe, and cannot alter them. The real difficulty that
strikes an Atheist is, not for man to form an adequate idea of God • but
for man to form a God adequate to the desires of men. All known id^as of
T-e’ty are so confused, so contradictory, or so repulsive, that the thought
ful Atheist rejects them; and being totally unable to comprehend the"in
comprehensible, he is virtually “witnout God in the world.”
EBICE ONE PENNY.
�NATIONAL SECULAR SOCIETY
Jtt ®enimpattt.
AUSTIN HOLYOAKE,
Jfeb Jpril
1M 1874.
(Reprinted by permission from the National Reformer.)
When my brother Austin Holyoake was born I was a boy ten
years old, wondering very much at arriving at that age. I had
been for some time acquainted with a soldier who had served m
India. A traveller is always fascinating to a youth, and 1 per
suaded my father to take him into his employ, that I might see
more of him. His name was Austin Graves. I thought Austin
a pretty name. It was associated with stories Graves told me,
and I persuaded my mother to give his Christian name to my
new brother. The family choice lay in a different direction.
My father was named after King George, and I was named after
him and one of my sisters was named after Queen Caroline.
One of my Australian brothers, as we call them, bore the name
Horatio, after Nelson. Royalty and patriotism, as well as piety
had adherents among us. Another brother was named Rowland
after the first politician I came to read of and admire—Rowland
Detrosier. At that time news came of his premature death, and
the first public subscription I ever joined in was in that for
Detrosier’s family. I believe I pleaded for both names to be
given to that brother, and I got my eldest sister to help me, who
in her kindness was always ready to side with me, but my mother,
whose will prevailed as to names, would not listen to one so out
landish as Detrosier. She was a dear, insular, English soul.
My father left names to her, and her decision was final. My
brother now dead, came to be named Austin after the manner
I have stated. It is curious how death brings old things to mind.
During the forty-seven years of Austin’s life, I never remember
telling him this, nor am I aware whether he knew it.
My business connection with my brother a happy portion of
my life with him—extended from 1845, less or more, until 1862.
For me to give any adequate idea of what manner of man he
was, and with what devotion he promoted public ends, I must
�2
say a word about that period, for the only praise that men do not
forget is that of facts; certainly acts are the most lasting- eulogies
of the true.
6
After the Bristol and Gloucester imprisonment of two of the
■editors of the Oracle of Reason, we had to carry our printing
operations to London ; and I invited Austin, then a very young
man, to come to London ; and subsequently made him a partner
with me on the express condition that we never incurred any
debt without the knowledge and consent of each other. In
those days all our bill-heads bore the name of “ Holyoake
Brothers,” and. it was my desire and intention that we should
ultimately publish together under that pleasant name. But I
took care not to involve my brother in the unknown responsi
bilities of the Fleet Street House, which I subsequently opened,
where all I possessed, or received, or earned, alike were con
sumed. My brother well knew this, for the ^250 given me
after the Cowper Street debate, and all subsequent sums, were
all paid away, through his hands, in maintaining the Freethought
organisation there. It seems fair to mention these facts, because
they prove the. gallant and untiring co-operation he rendered in
those unrequiting days. The errors of the affair in Fleet Street
were my own. I attempted too much ; I promised too much ;
I trusted too much. Things, however, which we did serviceably
together, were often as much his suggestion as mine, and the
willingness and resource with which he executed whatever
belonged to his departments, and the labour he volunteered for
public objects, won for him the personal regard of all who sought
or accepted the service of that House. When on one happy
morning towards the end of our occupancy, ^ 250 were given
me by an unexpected friend, for my. personal use, I remember
with what honest pride he concurred in its being paid away to
such creditors as remained; regardless that it would not leave me
anything to divide with him, as would have been his right, had
anything remained in my hands. Looking through the window as
«we spoke, and seeing the largest creditor we had on the opposite
side of the street, I gave him £60. and told him to go out and
give it to him, which was done in the street, and thus ended
that obligation. Often, in after years, my thoughts have recurred
to his honest speech of that morning ; and when I looked, a few
days ago, on his cold and silent face, as he lay in.his coffin, the
memory of that speech came back afresh, as I ’ thought how
many, who believed more than he, had less of his honesty of
spirit, which must be the best recommendation to man or God.
The same course I took with pecuniary I took as respects
political responsibility. When we issued Felix Pyat’s letters on
�“ Parliament and the People,” information was given to the
Goverment that it was my act, and applications for summonses
were against me. The Exchequer writ for publishing unstamped
newspapers wfe? issued also against me. It bears my name alone.
Rudio took with him to America my cloak, which my brother Austin
kept under t-he counter, at hand for six weeks, for me to put on
in case of my apprehension, as I had experience of the discom
fort of spending a night insufficiently clad, in the Cheltenham
Station House. But though I took care that no one was left
liable for my acts, my brother was quite as ready as myself to
share any risk of this kind, had it been necessary, and deserves
as much credit as though it had fallen to him. Though I deemed
it base to do anything for which another might have to answer,
my brother never cared for a moment if by any accident of law
or rancour he was involved. His courage was undoubted. I
always regarded him as capable of anything that ought to be
done. His position at the head of the printing department,
and representative of me in the publishing, was entirely indepen
dent. Whenever I spoke in public about our connection, I
always said so, and any honour showed to him was a new plea
sure given to me. Long after we were separated, I sent him for
publication my high estimate of him, and whenever I wrote of
him in public it has been to his honour. I say this to show that
it is not his death alone, but his life, that inspires the words of
respect and regret I write now. A great merit of his was, that
he would do whatever he could to cause Freethought to com
mand influence. He cared for its future credit more than its
immediate success. He would work day or night to do, within
needful time or with greater taste, something or other we thought
useful to issue. I should never have attempted what I did at
Fleet Street had I not been sure of his co-operation ; and all I
take most pride in of what was done there, could never have
been accomplished without his aid. It never occured to him to
evade work, nor to ask himself how little he might do of that
which outside publicists asked him to help them in ; his first
thought was how much more could he do, and how much better,
if possible, than it was being done. Military or social enter
prises were alike to him, if promise of help appeared in them for
those who struggled for independence; whether patriots, or
women, or slaves. My brother entered into everything within
his range, and gave time to everybody. His value and his mis
fortune was, that he thought more of what he could do than of
himself, and so wore himself out by generous exertions before
his time; and whatever may be given now in the way proposed
since his death, for the benefit of his family, has been over and
�over again earned by him, in a way that may fairly be recognised
rather as an act of justice than of charity.
’
°
Parts of his “ Sick Room Thoughts,” the last thing he wrote,
are proof that he had increasing and original power, and, had he
reserved to himself more leisure, he had the capacity of doing
greater service than he had already rendered. The last time I
saw him I told him that opinions we had maintained together
were now meeting with admission in quarters were neither he
nor I expected to live to see their truth recognised ; and I re
peated to him that the Bishop of Manchester had recently-said
that “he did not himself believe that mistakes which did not
arise from perversity of the will, but from incapacity of under
standing, or it might possibly be from the truth never having
been put before the mind very wisely or philosophically —he did
not believe that mistakes of a speculative kind—mistakes in doc
trine or in dogma, even if they were upon what were sometimes
considered vital points, would shut a man out of the Kingdom
of God.......... It was his distinct belief that heaven would be for
feited by no man on account of his theological opinions, unless
those opinions had had a mischievous influence upon his con
duct, and he had allowed the speculations of his brain to blind
and distort the directions of his conscience.” My brother had
a conscience as pure as any priest’s, and needed no external
assurance to satisfy him that following conscience was security
for self-respect and peace of mind ; but I knew he would be glad
to hear that prelates took courage, and followed their consciences
too, and that the differences between honest men were diminish
ing day by day. My brother fulfilled the observation of Spinoza,
that “ a free man thinks of nothing so little as death, and his
wisdom is to think of life, and not of death.” To my mind my
brother did not think .enough of life. The base care of yourself,
which leads to refusing stout help to others who need it, is cer
tainly to be despised; but some regard to the conditions of a
man’s own life is reasonable, and even commendable, if he is
good for anything. After Death had looked in upon my brother,
and given him fair notice of calling again if pretext arose, I
could hear of him being two hours in close, hot lecture-rooms
at night, and afterwards setting out miles over country in an
open vehicle ; and later he would be in the chair at an enerva
ting, crowded meeting when he ought to have been in bed. But
this was his way. His thoughts were to the end with this world.
The last book I sent to him was “ Prince Florestan,” which I
had mentioned to him, and it was the last read to him. His
“ Sick Room Thoughts ” showed that he thought more of
theology than I do. In mv opinion the time has come when we
�s
should give our main strength to superseding error, since it is
never destroyed until it is replaced by new truth. But we all
know that ignorant Christians think that the truth of opinions> is
best seen by what a man thinks of them in the face of deat,.
As Miss Cobbe has said, in a generous notice of my brother s
death in the Examiner, many Christians imagine that the sound
ness of their case will be most favourably seen when disease has
weakened a man’s power of examining it. My brother did as
conspicuous a dying service as man ever rendered, in correcting
the impression that Christian error could not be seen to be error
in death as plainly as in life. Clear, calm, patient, knowing we
that death was waiting near at hand, he shot a bolt, as it were,
from the other side the grave, at superstition’s strongest popular
pretension. He was free of all ostentation ; but when a thing
had to be done, he had the dash in him which did it. He iulfilled Professor Blackie’s prescription of conduct:—
“Wear your heart not on your sleeve,
But on just occasion
Let men know what you believe
With breezy ventilation.”
And he did this with his last breath, when few men think of
doing anything.
He will be long and honourably remembered as one oi the
forces on the side of Freethought progress among the people.
I sometimes think that Death, presiding at the great portal
through which dead nations have passed, is -wearied at times at
the monotony of admitting the commonplace crowds, whom
io-norance and vice, ambition and baseness, silliness and sin, so
copiouslv deliver there—and himself delights to allure noble
travellers to his dominions by holding out to them the high
temptations of truth, or freedom, or heart, or genius, or duty, or
service ; and thus he makes his kingdom richer as he makes us
poorer here.
.
Geo. Jacob Holyoake.
SICK ROOM THOUGHTS.
dictated
shortly
before
HIS DEATH BY AUSTIN
holyoake.
April 8th, 1874.
All those persons who have taken the trouble to read what I
have written in the National Reformer for some years past, and
also published in pamphlets, will know what my opinions
on death and immorality recently were. Those views were
formed when I was in perfect health, and after years of reflection
and enquiry. I am now about to state how my views remain
after protracted suffering.
�Christians constantly tell Freethinkers that their principle of
“ negation,” as they term them, may do very well for health ;
but when the hour of sickness and approaching death arrives,
they utterly break down, and the hope of a “blessed iriftaortality”
can alone give consolation. . In my own case I have been very
anxious to test the truth of this assertion, and have therefore
deferred till the latest moment I think it prudent to dictate these
few lines.
I was born of religious parents, my mother being especially
pious, belongingto that most terrible of all sects of the Christian
body—the Calvinistic Methodists. From my earliest childhood
I remember being taught to dread the wrath of an avenging
God, and to avoid the torments of a brimstone hell. I said
prayers twice a day, I went to a Sunday-school where I learnt
nothing but religious dogmas, and I had to read certain chapters
of the Bible during the week. My Sundays were mostly days of
gloom ; and I may sincerely say that up to the age of fourteen I
was never free from the haunting fear of the Devil.
About this period new light began to break in upon me.
Robert Owen and his disciples first appeared in Birmingham,
and attracted much attention. My eldest brother and sisters
went to hear the new preacher, and what they had heard
they came home and discussed. I listened with all the eager
ness of an enthusiastic boy, and from that hour my mental eman
cipation set in.
My belief in the infallibility of the Bible first gave way. Soon
after commenced my disbelief in the possession of any special
knowledge on the part of the preachers of the Gospel, of the
God and immortality of which they talk so glibly. But it was
years before I thought my way to Atheism. It cannot therefore
be said that I never experienced religious emotions.
For twenty years past my mind has been entirely free from
misgivings or apprehensions as to any future state of rewards
and punishments. I do not believe in the Christian deity, nor
in any form of so-called super-natural existence. I cannot
believe in that which I cannot comprehend. I shall be accused
of presumption in expressing disbelief in an idea which has
commanded the faith of some of the best intellects for centuries
past. This I cannot help. I must think for myself; and if each
of those great men had been asked to define his God, it may
safely be predicted that no two would have agreed. I may also
be reminded that “ the fool hath said in his heart there is no
God.” This would imply thought, and it is doubtful whether a
fool ever thought upon the subject at all; but his idea of a Deity,
if it could be got at, would no doubt be as coherent as most
�other men’s. Many fools have written and spoken as though
they had penetrated the secrets of the inscrutable, and many
wise men have lost their reason in endeavouring to solve the
insoluble jMhnd the world remains just as ignorant on the subject
as it did at the earliest dawn of civilization.
I do not believe in a heaven, or life of eternal bliss after death.
There is nothing in this world to induce me to give credence to
the possibility of such a state of human existence. Wherever
there are living organisms there are suffering and torture amongst
them; therefore analogy would go to prove that if we lived
again we should suffer again. To desire eternal bliss is no proof
that we shall ever attain it; and it long seemed to me absurd to
believe in that which we wish for, however ardently. I regard all
forms of Christianity as founded in selfishness. It is the
expectation held out of bliss through all eternity, in return for
the profession of faith in Christ and Him crucified, induces the
erection of-temples of worship in all Christian lands. Remove
this extravagant promise, and you hear very little of the Christian
religion.
An eternal hell seems to me too monstrous for the belief of
any humane man or sensitive woman; and yet millions believe
in it. Like heaven, it is enormously disproportionate to the
requirements of the case ; as man can never confer benefits
deserving an eternal reward, so it is impossible for him to com
mit sins deserving eternal punishment. The idea must have
had its origin in the diseased imagination of some fanatic; but
it has been cherished and improved upon by priests in subsequent
ages, till it is now incorporated in the creed of all Christian
churches. Father Pinamonti’s “Hell Open to Christians,” and
the Rev. Mr. Furness’s “ Sight of Hell, ” show to what a fearful
extent this diabolical idea can be used in warping and stultifying
the minds of the young.
As I have stated before, my mind being free from any doubts
on these bewildering matters of speculation, I have experienced
for twenty years the most perfect mental repose ; and now I find
that the near approach of death, the “grim King of Terrors,”
gives me not the slightest alarm. I have suffered, and am suffer
ing, most intensely both by night and day ; but this has not
produced the least symptom of change of opinion. No amount
of bodily torture can alter a mental conviction. Those who,
under pain, say they see the error of their previous belief, had
never thought out the problem for themselves.
I cannot conclude without expressing the gratification I have
received from my connection with the National Reformer. My
work on it has indeed been a labour of love, and my association
�8
therein, with my esteemed friends Mr. Bradlaugh and Mr.
Charles Watts, for the past eight years, has been of the most
harmonious nature. My regret now is, that I cannot do my full
share in the work the “ Trinity” have hitherto performed ; but
I must bend to inevitable fate, and content myself by knowing
that an abler and better man may be found to take my place.
However, of this I am sure, that my colleagues will never meet
with a more faithful and ardent friend.
To the true courage and patience of my dear and devoted wife
I owe my present tranquillity. In my little son and daughter I
have all a father’s hope and confidence, and it softens the pain
of parting when I contemplate leaving them with one who has
all the-----
Mr. Austin Holyoake commenced the dictation of this last paragraph a few
hours before he died ; but being soon exhausted, had to break off, and was not
able to resume it.—Ed. N.R.
ADDRESS BY CHARLES BRADLAUGH,
DELIVERED AT THE GRAVESIDE OF AUSTIN HOLYOAKE, APRIL 17TH,
1874.
“ Here we pay farewell tribute ,to the last remains of my
staunch friend and your most loyal brother, and true servant to
the cause of human progress.
Death came to him so slowly, yet so certainly and with such
constant menance, that it needed great courage to wait the end
so long and so bravely as he awaited. Around his grave we
are gathered, each reverently placing on his coffin our testimony
to his fidelity ; trusting that thereout our children’s memory
will weave an enduring wreath of immortelles to mark at least
his life even when his tomb shall be forgotten.
He has left us two legacies :—One the benefit of which inures
to all who desire thought, free, and true, this was the tendancy
of the labour of his life.
The other legacy involving some duty was an unwilling one,
he would not have left it us willingly as a burden, His last recor
ded words—broken short like some death-marking granite splin
ter—reminds us of this second legacy, his wife, his boy, his girl.
To-morrow can alone tell whether his little ones shall have
reason to be sorry that their father died believing that the party,
whose minister he had been, would try to smooth the life-path
his death has made forthem so rugged. Of the dead and to the
dead I can say nothing, a quarter of a century’s recollections
and fourteen years unbroken friendship are now in that grave.
He did well, he did his best,
No more weary—now at rest.”
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Victorian Blogging
Description
An account of the resource
A collection of digitised nineteenth-century pamphlets from Conway Hall Library & Archives. This includes the Conway Tracts, Moncure Conway's personal pamphlet library; the Morris Tracts, donated to the library by Miss Morris in 1904; the National Secular Society's pamphlet library and others. The Conway Tracts were bound with additional ephemera, such as lecture programmes and handwritten notes.<br /><br />Please note that these digitised pamphlets have been edited to maximise the accuracy of the OCR, ensuring they are text searchable. If you would like to view un-edited, full-colour versions of any of our pamphlets, please email librarian@conwayhall.org.uk.<br /><br /><span><img src="http://www.heritagefund.org.uk/sites/default/files/media/attachments/TNLHLF_Colour_Logo_English_RGB_0_0.jpg" width="238" height="91" alt="TNLHLF_Colour_Logo_English_RGB_0_0.jpg" /></span>
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Conway Hall Library & Archives
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2018
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Conway Hall Ethical Society
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Pamphlet
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Does there exist a moral governor of the universe? an argument against the alleged universal benevolence in nature
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Holyoake, Austin, 1826-1874
Description
An account of the resource
Place of publication: [s.l.]
Collation: 8 p. ; 19 cm.
Notes: Stamp on title page: The Free Thought Depot Stationery Repository,80, Picccadilly, Hanley. Includes memoriam Austin Holyoake, died April the 10th, 1874 (reprinted from the National Reformer) (8 p.) Austin [1826-1874]. Part of the NSS pamphlet collection.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
[s.n.]
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
[n.d.]
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
N308
Subject
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Atheism
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
<a href="http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/mark/1.0/"><img src="http://i.creativecommons.org/p/mark/1.0/88x31.png" alt="Public Domain Mark" /></a><span> </span><br /><span>This work (Does there exist a moral governor of the universe? an argument against the alleged universal benevolence in nature), identified by </span><a href="https://conwayhallcollections.omeka.net/items/show/www.conwayhall.org.uk"><span>Humanist Library and Archives</span></a><span>, is free of known copyright restrictions.</span>
Format
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application/pdf
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Language
A language of the resource
English
Atheism
Free Thought
God
NSS
-
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9877653859fc94ca5edecb2cd871bac2
PDF Text
Text
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Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Victorian Blogging
Description
An account of the resource
A collection of digitised nineteenth-century pamphlets from Conway Hall Library & Archives. This includes the Conway Tracts, Moncure Conway's personal pamphlet library; the Morris Tracts, donated to the library by Miss Morris in 1904; the National Secular Society's pamphlet library and others. The Conway Tracts were bound with additional ephemera, such as lecture programmes and handwritten notes.<br /><br />Please note that these digitised pamphlets have been edited to maximise the accuracy of the OCR, ensuring they are text searchable. If you would like to view un-edited, full-colour versions of any of our pamphlets, please email librarian@conwayhall.org.uk.<br /><br /><span><img src="http://www.heritagefund.org.uk/sites/default/files/media/attachments/TNLHLF_Colour_Logo_English_RGB_0_0.jpg" width="238" height="91" alt="TNLHLF_Colour_Logo_English_RGB_0_0.jpg" /></span>
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Conway Hall Library & Archives
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2018
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
Conway Hall Ethical Society
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Original Format
The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data
Pamphlet
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
False divinities or, Moses, Christ & Mahomet
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
A Foreign Theolologist
Description
An account of the resource
Place of publication: London
Collation: 83, [1] ; p. 22 cm.
Series number: no.7
Notes: Annotations in ink. Donated by Mr Garley. Published anonymously by 'A Foreign Theologist'.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
F. Truelove
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1870
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
G5082
Subject
The topic of the resource
Atheism
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
<a href="http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/mark/1.0/"><img src="http://i.creativecommons.org/p/mark/1.0/88x31.png" alt="Public Domain Mark" /></a><span> </span><br /><span>This work (False divinities or, Moses, Christ & Mahomet), identified by </span><a href="https://conwayhallcollections.omeka.net/items/show/www.conwayhall.org.uk"><span>Humanist Library and Archives</span></a><span>, is free of known copyright restrictions.</span>
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
application/pdf
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Language
A language of the resource
English
Atheism
Deism
Jesus Christ
Moses
Muhammad