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Text
CONTRADICTIONS
OF
LORD PALMERSTON
IN REFERENCE TO
POLAND AND CIRCASSIA,
■Snr,;II< £(7
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“ Russia can be reached only in her instruments.”
The Crisis, Paris, 184,0.
LONDON:
HARDWICKE, 192, PICCADILLY.
August, 1863.
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�FALSEHOOD AS A METHOD OF GOVERNMENT.
17, 1863.
An event took place towards the end of the recent Session of
Parliament unprecedented in the history of this country. The
First Minister of the Crown was deliberately charged by Mr.
Cobden with three falsehoods.
The three falsehoods had all been told in the House, and one
was a wilful perversion, after his death, of a speech delivered by
a rival. The purpose in the three cases was to involve the House
in expenditure.
On the 30th of July, 1845, Lord Palmerston had announced
that the invention of steam-ships had destroyed the maritime
supremacy of England; Sir Robert Peel had scouted the notion
as a ridiculous absurdity. On the 23rd of July, 1860, Lord
Palmerston attributed to Sir Robert Peel this very state
ment—namely, that steam had bridged the Channel, and that as
regards security from aggression, England had ceased to be an
island.
On.the 10th July, 1862, Mr. Cobden, on the authority of
quotations from Hansard, called on Lord Palmerston to admit
that his assertion was a mistake, stating that, in order to be Par
liamentary, he used the word “ inexactness^ Lord Palmerston
refused to enter on the subject. Mr. Cobden’s constituents and
several. other bodies have since addressed him on the subject,
conveying their approbation of his conduct.
The effect of Mr. Cobden’s accusation is, therefore, to raise
the objeet of it above all Parliamentary control.
This alarming state of things would be at once reversed if the
laws were enforced. The former practice of the expulsion from
the House of Commons of those who stated what was not true,.
REPORT OF ST. PANCRAS COMMITTEE, APRIL
�would not- only stop the scandal but prevent the malversation
which these falsehoods are employed to disguise.
The first Memoir hereto appended is on Falsehood as dealt with
by the forms of the House of Commons. The second is on the
Falsehoods of .Lord Palmerston, giving some idea of the
extent to which Falsehood is carried on in the management of
the Country.
Signed by order of the Committee, and on their behalf.
C. D. Collet, Chairman.
C. F. Jones, Secretary.
I.
How to deal with Falsehood by the
Forms of the House of Commons.
For some generations back it has been held as an axiom that
Members of the Legislature were incapable of falsehood. Since
the year 1847, however, accusations of this offence have not
only circulated without the walls of Parliament, but have on
several occasions made their way into the House of Commons.
These accusations have always been directed against the same
person—Lord Palmerston. Hitherto they have always been
incidental to Motions respecting some foreign State. Such
Motions have generally been got rid of by means of a u countout” or the dropping of an order of the day, so that the issue
has been evaded.
The recent charges laid against Lord Palmerston, by Mr.
Cobden, having been made under cover of the word <( inex
actness,” have neither presented to the House a dilemma to be
evaded nor to individual members an opportunity to be seized.
The remedy is therefore to reverse the act of Mr. Cobden, and
to bring forward a Motion in the House, dealing with the act by
its proper name, and inflicting the ancient Parliamentary punish
ment for that offence. An inspection of the Journals of the House
shows that this punishment consists in expulsion.
In the cases selected, the motive to falsehood appears unim
portant; namely, to obtain the privilege of Parliament for some
person not entitled to it. The sole point at issue was whether the
Member had spoken the truth or not. The first of these two
cases is that of Colonel Wanklyn, who was summarily expelled.
The second, that of Sir John Prettiman, who was suspended,
and afterwards restored on submission, is still more instructive,
because it shows the pains taken to examine into and to prevent
prevarication, always more difficult to deal with than direct false
hood.
�7
CASE OF COLONEL WANKLYN.
A.D. 1677} 30 Charles II. Friday, February 1.—A Motion being made
against the frequent and irregular granting of Paper Protections by Mem
bers of this House; and
A Petition of Angela Margaretta Cottington being read, complaining
of Mr. Wanklyn, a Member of this House, for granting a Protection to
Charles Cottington, Esq., her husband, as his menial servant, whereby
she was hindered in her prosecution at law against him;
And the House being also informed that the said Mr. Wanklyn had
granted another Protection to one Jones, whereby to hinder the execution
of a writ of restitution awarded by the Court of King’s Bench;
And Mr. Wanklyn being present, and standing up in his place, and an
swering for himself, and to several questions which were propounded to him
by Mr. Speaker ;
And being withdrawn by Order, and the matter debated;
Resolved, &c., nem. contradicente, That Colonel Wanklyn in granting
Protection to Mr. Cottington and Mr. Jones, not being his menial servants,
has violated the justice and honour of this House.
. The Question being put, That Mr. Wanklyn, for granting such Protec
tions, shall be expelled this .House;
The House divide;
The Yeas go forth ;
TeUor,
TeBers
the
} for the Noes’ 109-
And so it was resolved in the Affirmative.
The Question being put, That Mr. Wanklyn shall receive his sentence at
the Bar standing;
It was resolved in the Affirmative.
Mr. Wanklyn being brought to the Bar by the Seijeant-at-Arms attend
ing the House, Mr. Speaker, in the name of the House, pronounced the
said sentence.
Ordered, That Mr. Speaker do issue out his warrant to the Clerk of the
Crown to make out a new writ for the election of a Member to serve in this
present Parliament for the Borough of Westbury in the County of Wilts,
in the room of Thomas Wanklyn, Esq., who was this day expelled the
*
House.
CASE OF SIR JOHN PRETTIMAN.
A.D. 1669, 21 Charles II. Wednesday, December 1.—Upon complaint
made of a Breach of Privilege committed by one * * in arresting of
Robert Humes, a menial servant of Sir John Prettiman, a Member of this
House;
Ordered, That it be referred to Mr. Speaker to examine the matter com
plained of, and give such order therein as he shall find just.
Saturday, December 4.—Mr. Speaker reports the case of Robert Humes,
servant to Sir John Prettiman, arrested and in the prison of the King’s
Bench: that he was heretofore a merchant, but left off his trade about five
years since, and that in August last he was entertained a servant to Sir
John Prettiman at twelve pounds per annum wages : and was employed in
recovering his rents; and was arrested in four several actions of the case,
of a hundred pounds a piece.
* Journals of the House of Commons, vol. ix. pp. 430-31.
�8
The Question being put, That privilege be allowed to Robert Humes,
menial servant to Sir John Prettiman ;
’
The House divided;
The Yeas went out;
poMheYeas.29.
I
.
19.
And so it was resolved in the Affirmative.
Ordered, That the Marshal of the King’s Bench do discharge Robert
Humes, menial servant to Sir John Prettiman (being arrested in breach of
privilege) out of prison.
Monday, March 21, 1670 (New Style.')—Two Petitions being tendered
against Sir John Prettiman, one from Dame Theodosia Prettiman, and
the other from Elizabeth Humes ;
Ordered that the Petitions be read to-morrow morning; and that Sir John
Prettiman have notice to attend then.
Wednesday, March 30.—A Petition of Elizabeth Humes, wife of Robert
Humes, was read;
Resolved, &c., That the Petition be committed to [here follow twenty
names], or any five of them ; and they are to meet to-morrow morning, at
seven of the clock, in the Speaker’s Chambers, and to examine the matter of
the Petition, and report it, with their opinions therein, to the House; and to
send for persons, papers, and records.
Thursday, April 7.—Sir Gilbert Talbot reports from the Committee to
which the Petition of Elizabeth Humes was committed, the whole state of
the matter and evidence therein : And that the Committee did leave it to the
House, to do what they should think fit therein.
And the Question, upon the whole matter, being, whether the said Humes
ought to be allowed privilege as the menial servant of Sir John Pretti
man ;
Resolved, &c., That the matter be recommitted to the former Committee,
to examine whether Sir John Prettiman did know of the condition of the
said Humes, and what accusations were against Humes, when he entertained
him for his servant; and whether he knew he was a prisoner for any criminal
matter, or under bail for the good behaviour, when he did entertain him;
and whether he were so when the Motion was made for his privilege ; and
whether he were arrested, or in prison, for a real debt, or whether the actions
against him were not feigned: And Sir John Prettiman is to attend the
Committee, and make it appear that he^was arrested and detained prisoner
for debt, after he was retained his servant: And the Committee is revived,
and to sit this afternoon : And the Keeper of the prison of the King’s Bench
is to attend the Committee, to give an account of the arresting and detaining
of the said Humes in prison: And all that shall come to the Committee are
to have voices : And [here follow eight names] are added to the Committee :
And the care of the matter is recommended to Mr. Crouch.
Friday, April 8.—Mr. Crouch reports from the Committee to whom the
Petition of Mrs. Humes was committed, That they had, in pursuance of the
order of recommitment, examined the whole matter of fact thereby directed,
relating to Sir John Prettiman’s protection, and moving the House for
giving privilege to Robert Humes, as his menial servant.
Upon stating whereof to the House, it appeared that the House had been
ill-dealt with by Sir John Prettiman in his concealing the truth of the case,
and that Humes was released out of prison, from actions depending against
him, by the miscarriage of Sir John Prettiman, as his menial servant, when
in truth he was not.
�Sir John Prettiman being withdrawn into the Speaker’s Chambers;
Resolved, &c., nemine contradicente, That Sir John Prettiman be suspended
his sitting in this House, and from all privileges Its a Member thereof, until
he shall produce Robert Humes.
Resolved, &c., That he be called to the Bar of this House, and receive from
Mr. Speaker this sentence upon his knees.
The House being informed that the said Sir John Prettiman was not to
be found in the Speaker’s Chambers, ordered that the Serjeant-at-Arms at
tending this House do bring the said Sir John Prettiman to the Bar of
this House to-morrow morning, to receive his sentence as aforesaid.
Resolved, &c., That the back door of the Speaker’s Chambers be nailed
up, and not opened during any sessions of Parliament.
Saturday, April 9.—Ordered, that it be referred to Colonel Bird, Sir
Thomas Meeres, Colonel Reames, Mr. Coleman, Colonel Talbot, to see a
true entry made in the Journal, of the matters concerning Sir John Pret
timan.
Resolved, &c., That no Member of this House do grant any protection to
any but such only as are their menial servants. And that all protections
already granted to any other persons besides menial servants be forthwith
withdrawn and called in.
Resolved, &c., That all protections and written certificates of the Members
of this House be declared void in Taw, and be forthwith withdrawn and called
in, and that none be granted for the future; and that the privilege of Mem
bers for their menial servants be observed according to Law; and that, if
any menial servant shall be arrested and detained contrary to privilege, he
shall, upon complaint thereof made, be discharged by order from the
Speaker.
Same day, afternoon.—Resolved, &c., That a day be given to Sir John
Prettiman to appear and receive the judgment of the House against him.
Resolved, &c. That the day be the second Tuesday at the next meeting
after the Recess.
Monday, April 11, 1670.—(The King having made a speech to the Two
Houses) Mr. Speaker reports the effects of His Majesty’s Speech: And
that it was His Majesty’s pleasure the House should adjourn till the 21th
of October next.
And accordingly the House adjourned till the 24th of October next.
Monday, October 31, 1670.—A Petition of Sir John Prettiman being
tendered to the House;
Ordered, That the Petition of Sir John Prettiman be read on Thursday
morning, nine of the clock.
Triday, November 11.—The Petition of Sir John Prettiman, Knight, was
read. The Petition of Elizabeth Humes was also read.
Resolved, &c., That the Serjeant-at-Arms attending this House do, accord
ing to former order, bring Sir John Prettiman to the Bar of this House on
Monday next, to receive the judgment of the House against him.
Monday, November 14.—In pursuance of the former order of this House, Sir
John Prettiman was, by the Serjeant-at-Arms, brought to the Bar of the
House; who there, upon his knees, received from Mr. Speaker the judgment
and sentence of the House, for his being suspended sitting in this House,
and of all privileges, as a Member thereof, until he shall produce Robert
Humes.
Resolved, &c., that Sir John Prettiman be heard at the Bar of this House
on Monday next upon his Petition, and the Petition of Mrs. Humes, both
formerly read; and that the Seijeant do give them notice hereof.
Wednesday, November 23.—The House then, according to former Order,
did proceed to the hearing of the matter between Sir John Prettiman and
�10
Mrs. Humes. And the Petitions on both sides being again read; and the
counsel for Sir John Prettiman, and the parties and witnesses on both sides,
being heard; it being made appear, on the behalf of Sir John Prettiman,
that he had, since the last recess, used his utmost endeavour to apprehend
and bring in Humes, the husband of Mrs. Humes ; and nothing of the sug
gestions of Mrs. Humes, her Petition being made out ; upon Debate of this
matter;
Resolved, &c., That Sir John Prettiman be restored; and have his pri
vilege, to attend the duty of his place, as a Member of this House.
*
J
From the passage in italics it appears that detection was fol
lowed not only by the punishment of the offender, but by a pro
vision to ensure the non-recurrence of similar acts. The restora
tion of the practice of punishing offences would now, as then, be
accompanied by provisions to prevent them, or, rather, the pro
visions already made by the laws would cease to be ineffective the
moment it was known that punishment would be the result of
their infraction.
il
The Falsehoods of Lord Palmerston.
From the diplomatic history of the last thirty-six years we
propose to select such cases of falsehood as are most glaring, and
such as may be dealt with without entering into the objects for
which they were told.
The cases brought forward by Mr. Cobden have, of course, to
be narrated first, and a careful consideration will show that two of
these were, beyond all others, appropriate ones for the House to
deal with. The list then extends in the inverse order of time.
'
REGARDING THE MILITARY FORCES OF FRANCE.
(mb. cobden’s first charge.)
On Monday, July 7, Mr. Cobden laid before the House a
comparative statement of the forces of England and France, both
naval and military, showing that never had the naval superiority
of England been so great, or the military superiority of France so
small, as at the present time. He complained of the habitual
i( inexactness ” of Lord Palmerston as the cause of the panic,
and consequently of the increase in the expenditure. He made
special reference to his having added 200,000 men to the real
numbers of the French army:—
“ But the noble Lord lias not confined his statements to the navy. He has
also given, us some facts and figures respecting the land forces of Erance ; but
in his statement there was an inexactness of a very grave kind, for he exceeded
the amount of the Trench force by two hundred thousand men, which called
* Journals of the House of Commons, vol. ix. pp. 114—169.
J
�11
down a correction from the Moniteur. I must complain of the habitual in
exactness of the noble Lord as to these matters, and if the China debate
should come on to-morrow I should have to recite another grave inaccuracy.
On the 24tli (23rd) of May the noble Lord, in speaking of the land forces of
France, said: ‘ On the 1st of January, 1862, the French army consisted’—
these are the corrected figures which the noble Lord afterwards gave—‘ of
446,348 men under arms. There was a reserve of 170,000 men, liable to be
called out at a fortnight or three weeks’ notice, malting altogether 616,348 ’
not 816,000 as the noble Lord really said.
“ Lord Palmerston.—No. I never said anything of the kind.
“Mr. Cobden.—I beg the noble Lord’s pardon, this was not a mistake of
■a figure. There was addition and subtraction, and the statement was the same
all through. The noble Lord proceeded‘ In addition to this force actually
under arms, or liable to be called out for service, I stated that there were 268,417
National Guards, making a total available force of 884,765.’ ”—Times, July 8.
Lord Palmerston replied.-.—
“ The hon. Member accuses me of great exaggeration. Now, I utterly deny
that I have been guilty of any exaggeration. Now, with regard to the French
army, I stated on a recent occasion that the French army on the 1st January,
consisted of 446,000 men under arms, and 170,000 men of the reserve, making
a total of 616,000 men. I was reported to have made that total 816,000. It
is very seldom that those gentlemen who report our debates in this House
commit an error, and an error in one figure is not unnatural.”—Times, July 8.
This was on the 7th July. Lord Palmerston speaks of a
recent occasion, but there had been two occasions. The first was
on the 19th May, the second was on the 23rd, and purported to be
a correction not of the former speech but of the erroneous report
of it. On the 19th May Lord Palmerston said:—
“ On the 1st of January last, France had 646,000 men, I think, at all events
upwards of 640,000 men under arms. She had, in addition, 170,000 men of
reserve, liable to be called back to the ranks at a fortnight’s notice. Besides
that she has upwards of 200,000 National Guards. Therefore, her regular
forces under arms, or liable to be called to the ranks at a fortnight’s notice,
are about 816,000 to our 100,000. The French Government had since
determined that towards the end of the year 31,000 of the 646,000 should be
transferred from the active army to the reserve, making no difference in the
amount available, but diminishing the expense without diminishing the eventual
efficiency. I should say, besides the 646,000, there were 70,000 of the con
scription of the present year, which might be called out at any moment if
necessary.”—Times, May 20.
On May 23rd, Lord Palmerston said:—
“ The lion. Gentleman (Sir R. Clieton) read a report of something which I
had said here on a former occasion, in which, notwithstanding its general ac
curacy, there was a mistake of a figure. On the 1st of January, the French
army consisted of 446,348 men under arms. There was, besides, a reserve of
170,000 men, liable to be called out at a fortnight or three weeks’ notice,
making altogether 616,348 men under arms or liable to be called out for service;
there were 268,417 National Guards, making a total available force of 884,705.
And I stated that besides these there were 70,000 men of the conscription for
the present year, liable to be called out if their services should be required. I
also stated that of the 446,000 it was intended at the time to transfer between
30,000 and 40,000 from the number under arms io the reserve, making no dif-
�12
ference in the really available force, though the change is attended with a certain
amount of economy.”—Times, May 24.
It is thus evident that the reporters had made no mistake. Lord
Palmerston says only one figure was wrong, meaning it to
be believed that an 8 was substituted by the reporters for a 6. After
making a variety of minor corrections of a statement in which he
professed that only one figure was wrong, he says, “Making a total
available force OF 884,765.” What he had said before was,
“ Therefore her regular forces under arms or liable to be called to
the ranks at a fortnight?s notice, are about 816,000, against our
100,000.” The reporters, therefore, according to him, substituted,
not a 6 for an 8, but the words in italics for those in small
capitals.
The occasion of this correction has to be taken into considera
tion. It was made on the night of Friday, the 23rd May.
The' next morning the following denial appeared at Paris, in
the Monileur:—
“ In the sitting of the House of Commons of the 19th instant, Lord Pal
estimated the strength of the Trench. army on the 1st of January,
1862, at 816,000 men, of whom 646,000 were under arms, and 170,000 under
reserve. This estimate contains an error sufficiently serious to require a recti
fication. On the 1st of January, 1862, the effective strength of the army was
not 646,000, but 447,000 men—a difference of 199,000 men. The reserve
counted, at the same date, not 170,000 men, but 165,000—a difference of
5000. The total error is, therefore, 204,000 men, or one quarter of the estimate
made in the House of Commons. Since the 1st of January the number of men
of the active army who have been allowed to go into the reserve is not 31,000,
but exceeds 38,000. This brings the reserve to 203,000 men, and reduces the
effective strength of the active army to 409,000 men.- Total, 612,000.”
merston
If Lord Palmerston had been misreported, it was his duty to
have corrected the error the next day. It was also open to him
to inform the French Government what he had really said. But
the Moniteur corrects not the reporters, but Lord Palmerston.
Before taking so serious a step, the French Government must have
demanded an explanation, and have failed to obtain it. The
Moniteur addresses itself to England, for in France it is no crime
to have a quarter of a million extra soldiers in arms. Lord Pal
merston corrects the reporters just in time to nullify the effect
in England of the protest in the Moniteur. That protest is then
a cry of distress. Lord Palmerston tyrannises over the French
Emperor in this matter, just as M. Thouvenel domineers over
Lord Russell in the affairs of Mexico. This is the one Cabinet,
of which “ some members live on the banks of the Seine, and
others on the banks of the Thames.”*
The case, however, is not complete without Lord Palmerston’s
description of the notice in the Monileur. On the 7 th July he said:—
* Lord Palmerston in 1856.
�13
“ But my statement was 616,000, and not 816,000. The French. Moniteur
corrected my statement, and what was that correction ? It charged me with
having made a little error both in the force under arms and in reserve, and the
aggregate was stated by the Moniteur to be 612,000 instead of 616,000. That
was the correction of the Moniteur, which completely and substantially affirmed
the statement that I had made.”—Times, July 8.
Lord Palmerston pretends that the Moniteur accuses him of
an error of only 4000 men; but the Moniteur expressly says:
“ The total error is 204,000 men.” Mr. Cobden terms this
“ inexactness.” The issue between them was the simplest in the
world. Lord Palmerston said it was a mistake of a single
figure. Mr. Cobden said it was not a mistake of a single figure.
Lord Palmerston’s words prove Mr. Cobden’s case. On this
Mr. Cobden drops the matter.
REGARDING THE RATIFICATION OF THE TREATY
OF TIEN-TSIN.
(mr. cobden’s second charge.)
The next day occurred the China debate, and, according to his
promise, Mr. Cobden brought up another case of “ inexactness.”
He proved that Lord Palmerston had first declared that the
Emperor of China had ratified the Treaty of Tien-Tsin, and had
afterwards declared that the war of 1859 was made to obtain the
ratification of that Treaty. Here are the two statements:—
Lord Palmerston, March 16, 1860.
“ A Treaty has been concluded with China. That Treaty has been approved
by the Emperor. We want the ratifications to be exchanged; we want the
Treaty to become a formal and acknowledged compact between the two
countries.”—Mansard, vol. 157, p. 807.
Lord Palmerston, February 14,1861.
“ It is well known that the operations in China arose from the refusal of the
Chinese Government to ratify the Treaty of Tien-Tsin, which has been con
cluded between the two countries. It became necessary to obtain the ratifica
tion of that Treaty.—Mansard, vol. 161, p. 401.
Lord Palmerston said in March, I860, “ That Treaty has
been approved by the Emperor.” That is, it had been ratified by
him at Pekin, as it had been by Queen Victoria in London. On
reference to the Blue-books it will be found that in China this
had been publicly done. An edict had appeared respecting the
Treaty, and it had actually been put in operation before the arrival
of Mr. Bruce. His visit was to exchange the ratifications, which
the Treaty had specially provided must be done at Pekin, although
that exchange could have taken place just as well at London, or
at any Chinese port. When Lord Palmerston contradicts Mr.
Cobden on this point, on the 8th July, he makes his former as
sertion still plainer. For he says, “It (the last expedition) was
�14
Q
not undertaken solely because Mr. Brtjce was not allowed to go
to Pekin (another falsehood); but because the Emperor refused to
ratify certain articles of that Treaty, which he said must be changed
before they could be carried out ”
On the 10th July, when Mr. Cobden answered what Lord
Palmerston had said on the 8th, he (Mr.. Cobden) repeated,
“ I stated that the Treaty had been ratified, and that all that had
to be done was to exchange the ratifications. ’
The truth, as appears in the documents published by the Eng
lish Government itself, is that not only had the Emperor of China
publicly assented to the Treaty, not only were the English actually
trading at some of the new ports opened to them by it before Mr.
Bruce’s arrival and the attack on the Peiho forts, but that no
objection was ever offered to the formal act of exchanging the
ratifications of the two Sovereigns, whether at Pekin or elsewhere.
Lord Palmerston is so sensible of the falsehood he is stating that
he carefully mixes up “ ratification” and il exchange of ratifica
tions,” and by doing so asserts that what Mr. Cobden read confirmed his statement. This was on the 10th, as we shall pre
sently see.
No war having been declared, the Treaty of Tien-Tsin was un
lawfully obtained, and is not binding upon China. Whether it
was obtained by one or by two lawless expeditions is of no im
portance here. What is of importance is, that, in this as in other
matters, Lord Palmerston’s statements are diametrically op
posed to each other.
REGARDING STEAM HAVING DESTROYED ENG
LAND’S NAVAL SUPREMACY.
(mr. cobden’s third charge.)
On the 10th of July, Mr. Cobden brought a third accusation
of inexactness” against Lord Palmerston. He had quoted
Sir Robert Peel as concurring with him instead of being op
posed to him on the subject of steam, the cause of the destruction
of England’s naval supremacy. Mr. Cobden said:—
“ At an early period of my experience in this House a circumstance hap
pened to which I must refer, because it affords another example—a flagrant
example of the inexactness and carelessness of the noble Lord in the state
ments which he makes to us. It occurred in 1845. On that occasion the
noble Lord had already mounted this hobby of his, that steam was the great
danger of this- country. He was fond of saying that the application of steam
to navigation had spanned the Channel with a steam bridge. That simile
occurs a dozen times in his speeches from 1842 downwards. Let nobody
undervalue the force of these repetitions of a phrase, because by dint of them
we come at last to believe them ourselves, and we make others believe them
also. In 1845 the noble Lord, in a harangue intended to induce Sir R. Peel
�15
to increase our armaments in some direction, launched this favourite idea of
his. Sir R. Peel controverted it. That led to the noble Lord rising again to
explain himself. I will read these passages. Outlie 30th of July, 1845, Lord
Palmerston said:—
“ ‘ In reference to steam navigation, what he (Lord Palmerston) said was,
that the progress which had been, made had converted the ordinary means of
transport into a steam bridge.’
“ Sir R. Peel, immediately following in reply, said
“1 The noble Lord (Lord Palmerston) appeared to retain the impression
that our means of defence were rather abated by the discovery of steam navi
gation. He (Sir Robert Peel) was not at all prepared to admit that. He
thought that the demonstration which we could make of our steam navy was
one which would surprise the world ; and as the noble Lord (Lord Palmerston)
had spoken of steam bridges, he would remind him that there were two parties
who could play at making them.’
Now comes this flagrant specimen of the noble Lord’s inexactness. I pur
posely use that long and rather French word because I wish to be Parlia
mentary in what I say. (Laughter.) The noble Lord, in speaking of this
very Fortifications Bill when he brought it in on the 23rd of July, 1860, said,
still reiterating the same argument:—“ e And, in fact, as I remember Sir R. Peel stating, steam had bridged the
Channel, and for the purposes of aggression had almost made this country cease
to be an island.”
“ Now, I happened to hear all that myself, but I am afraid to say so, because I
may be contradicted. (“ Hear,” and laughter.) But now T will make a sug
gestion to the noble Lord. Will he send one of his junior Lords of the Trea
sury to the library to get Hansard? I give him the volumes:—Hansard,
vol. 82, p. 1233, and vol. 160, p. 18. The noble Lord will probably speak
again, as we are in committee, and it would be a grateful thing if he would get
Hansard to satisfy himself of that gross inaccuracy. Moreover, it would only
be just to the memory of a great Statesman, and it is also due to. this House
that he should admit his error and recant it. There would be a novelty about
such a proceeding that would be quite charming. (Laughter.) Let him admit
that he is wrong. _ I will forgive him the China business if he will only get
Hansard, and admit that he was wrong, that it was a fiction—quite a mistake of
memory. (“ Hear, hear,” and laughter.) But the serious question is what kind
of opinion shall we form of the noble Lord’s judgment.”—Times-, July 11, 1862.
Observe, Mr. Cobden says the serious question is Lord Pal
judgment, not his integrity, which he had just proved
not to exist. Lord Palmerston evades; the charge:—
merston’s
“ It is very curious that my hon. Friend accuses me of inexactitude, and
refers me to Hansard to prove my error. I do not feel much disposed to
follow his example, because he and I differed the other evening on a matter of
historical fact. He contended that the Emperor of China had ratified the
Treaty of Tien-Tsin. I said he had not. After two or three days’ delay, my
hon. Friend brought down a Blue-book to confirm his assertion, and proceeded
to read a passage which completely substantiates my statement. [Mr. Cobden
intimated dissent.] Let my hon. Friend read it again if he pleases. I did not
the other night read the whole of the case; but the fact was just as he read it,
and as I stated it. The Emperor of China wrote one of his mandarins to say
that he approved of the Treaty; but when he was called upon to ratify it, and
exchange ratifications, which process alone could give it international value, he
refused, and that which my hon. Friend read confirmed the statement I made.”
(Cheers.)—Times, July 11, 1862.
�16
Mr. Cobden had quoted not a Blue-book but Hansard. One
of his quotations has already been extracted under the head
“Lord Palmerston, March 16, 1860.” The other was from
Lord John Bussell, February 13, 1860:—
“ The Treaty of Tien-Tsin had been signed, and had received the special
approval of the Emperor of China. Nothing but the ratification remained to
be given, and it would have been impossible for us—because Her Majesty’s
forces had suffered a loss, because 400 or 500 men had been killed or wounded
—to give up a Treaty solemnly agreed to, or to retreat from conditions to
which the Emperor of China had given his assent.”—Hansard, vol. 156,
p. 945.
Since this Memoir was published in its original form, Lord
Palmerston has gone round again. In the Debate of July 9,
on Fortifications, he used these words:—
“The hon. Member for Rochdale has referred to something which passed
between myself and the late Sir Robert Peel. When I said that steam had
bridged the channel, Sir Robert replied, in a way suitable to a debate in this
House, “ Ay, it may have bridged the Channel, but that is a game at which
two can play.”—Times, July 10, 1863.
The Prime Minister is charged by Mr. Cobden with three
falsehoods. Two are proved; the proof being accompanied by
fresh falsehoods: the third is admitted. This was a case to be
submitted to the judgment of the House. Mr. Cobden had no
option but a duty which he was bound to perform.
In 1670 the House of Commons suspended Sir John Pretti
man, for having only “ dealt badly with the House by conceal
ing the truth” about a man for whom he had obtained privilege,
by falsely representing him to be his menial servant. The offence
was the falsehood. It is no mitigation of Lord Palmerston’s
offence that it is in weighty, not in trifling matters, that
he has “ dealt badly with the House by concealing the truth.”
But this, which is no mitigation of the offence, is an aggravation
of the danger. In 1670 the House resented an act of deception.
In 1862 it courts such acts, in order to pretend that it is de
ceived. No such deception exists any longer.
GENERAL PRACTICE OF FALSEHOOD
(charges
brought by the queen and substantiated by
EARL RUSSELL.)
The falsehoods with regard to the French army were told
with the view to excite alarm in England, so as to increase the
military expenditure as against the aggressive power of France.
At the same time the Cabinets of England and France are de
clared to be so united as to form but one.
*
* A little while ago, Louis Napoleon was asked by an ecclesiastic, “Why
�17
Lord Palmerston has, during his whole career, been engaged
in increasing the military force of France, and in directing that
force to illegal objects.
,
In 1835 the English navy having been increased, at the instance
of William IV., as a precaution against Russia, Lord Palmerston
suggested to France to increase hers. When France complied with
this advice, he immediately made it a pretence for increased arma
ments on the part of England as against France. He has since
made France a partner in all his schemes of intervention.
So long ago as 1837 the Times made the charge which we
have here pressed home, namely, that Lord Palmerston makes
use of falsehood, not to escape from an attack, but as a method
of Government. The Times wrote, December 29, 1837: —
“ England has been in the habit of receiving as truth the assertions of a
Minister. We are now brought into the lamentable predicament of having
to guard against deception, and to be armed against design in every phrase
which escapes from the lips of the man who at present directs the Foreign
Policy of Great Britain. . . What must be said of the Minister of England
who now, after the display of the force which we have described (the Russian
fleet in the Baltic), instead of taking steps to counteract her, (Russia) instead
of remonstrating, protesting, and preventing, stands forward to justify the
measure, and then to repudiate the responsibility, and, not content with
this, perverts facts, and falsifies truth ?”
Lord Palmerston has now associated France with England
in the distant regions of China, and, pursuing the same course as
in 1837, has brought her forces into the neighbourhood of dis
turbed India, all the while arming in England against her. In 1848,
on the election of Louis Napoleon to the Presidency of the French
Republic, he wrote to Vienna that it was to be inferred from
such a choice that France would enter on a course of aggression.
To Lord Ponsonby, November 11, 1848:—
“Important changes may take place in France; the election, which is
• coming on next month, may bring other men into power in that country;
with other men another policy may come in. Traditional maxims of policy
connected with a busier action in regard to foreign countries may be taken
up as the guide of the Government of France. Popular feeling in that
country, which at present inclines to peace, might easily be turned in an
opposite direction, and the glory, as it would be considered in France, of
freeing the whole of Italy up to the Alps from the domination of Austria
*
might reconcile the French nation to many sacrifices and to great exer
tions.”!
do you not give out openly that you will defend the Pope against Gari
baldi ?” He replied, “ If I were to do so, Palmerston would have me upset
in a week.” The Committee insert this statement on the written testimony
of a gentleman of high standing and character.
* “Italy shall be free from the Alps to the Adriatic.”—Words of Louis
Napoleon in 1859.
T Correspondence respecting the Affairs of Italy, 1849, part iii. pp. 566,
C
�Such purposes of aggression were, however, not compatible
with the then constituted order of things. Lord Palmerston,
however, joined in the measures taken to render Louis Napoleon
absolute, and thus overthrow all restraint upon that career whose
aggressive tendencies he had prophesied.
Throughout Europe it had been Lord Palmerston’s boast to
have established (( Constitutional Government.” To this he had
sacrificed the prerogatives of .every Crown, the usages of every
people, the ancient village government of Greece, the fueros of
the Basques, the old estates of Spain and Portugal. On the en
actment of the coup dftat of the 2nd of December, 1851, he-has
tened to sanction a massacre of unarmed and inoffensive citizens,
the arrest of the members of the Assembly, and the restoration, by
violence and perjury, of a form of government that had destroyed
the liberty of the French people, and indemnified them for the
loss by setting Europe in flames. When asked to give reasons, he
replied, that the unity of purpose and of authority in the Presi
dent was his object. He said in Parliament, February 3,1852:—
“ Such was the antagonism arising from time to time between the French
Assembly and the President that their long co-existence became impossible,
and it was my opinion that if one or the other were to prevail it would be
better for France, and, through the interests of France, better for the in
terests of Europe, that the President should prevail than the Assembly, and
my reason was, that the Assembly had nothing to offer for the substitution
of the President, unless an alternative obviously ending in civil war or
anarchy, whereas the President, on the other hand, had to offer unity of
purpose and unity of authority, and if he were inclined to do so, might give
to France internal tranquillity, with good and permanent government.”
The “ unity of purpose” of Louis Napoleon had already been
•shown in his invasion and occupation of a portion of Italy
(Rome). It could not be the interest of England to confer
i( unity of authority” upon such an individual by means of a
*
usurpation.
The words of Lord Palmerston are unintelligible as those of a
British Minister; they are merely the repetition of a passage on
the same subject contained in a. Russian despatch a quarter of a
century before. Count Pozzo di Borgo wrote from Paris, 22nd
December, 1826:—
“The ancient fortresses are repaired with a dilatoriness that keeps them
still in a state of imperfection, and, consequently, of weakness, particularly
as regards the completion of those raised on the opposite frontier; the great
roads are falling into decay; the army itself and the marine are in a state
that calls for additions and ameliorations ; without which it would be im
possible to make them act with the unity and the power indispensable to
* “Brunnow is said to have mentioned triumphantly the events of the
second and third of December in Paris on the frst of that month, in his
passage through Berlin. He was sure of the success of the plot before it took
place.”—Private Letter, 1852.
�19
their action and their movements............. A serious war and the sacrifices
it would impose, would give rise, I fear, to all the effects of panic among
the capitalists, indifference among a great portion of the nation, and revo
lutionary sentiments, among many others............... In proportion as the situa
tion is. delicate, it will require increased care and interest to guard it from
the evils which menace it. Russia has re-established the French monarchy
by her arms, she has continued to protect it by her generosity, she will
preserve it, I dare hope, from the embarrassments and even misfortunes
which seem to menace it, by her influence and her policy.”
This letter was written soon after the invasion of Spain, into
which, in spite of Mr. Canning, Russia was able to inveigle
- France. Within four years afterwards, France had entered on
the conquest of Algiers. It is impo^ible, except on the supposi
tion that the military power of France is at the disposal of Russia,
to account for the anxiety which a Russian Ambassador feels that
France should be strong. It is impossible, except on the supposi
tion that the British Minister has adhered to this scheme, to
account for his efforts to increase that aggressive power of France
which he predicted beforehand, and which he persists in holding
up. to the English people as an object at once for alarm and
imitation.
Accordingly, it is on this very point that detection has over
taken Lord Palmerston. On his giving his sanction—in defiance
of the Queen and of his colleagues—to the coup d’etat of the
2nd December, he was removed from office by the Queen. On
the opening of Parliament, Lord John Russell announced that this
was not the first time he had been detected. He produced a
memorandum addressed to himself by the Queen on a-former
occasion, in which was consigned a description of the frauds and
usurpations Lord Palmerston had been in the habit of practising,
and a requirement that such practice should cease. Lord Pal
merston did not reject the imputation; on the contrary, he accepted
the terms on which his continuance in office then and for the
future was to depend. He wrote to Lord John Russell:—
“ I have taken a copy of this memorandum of the Queen, and will not fail
to attend to the directions it contains.”
Lord John Russell did not produce to Parliament the whole of
the Queen’s letter, and at a later date, when requested, he refused
to give the remaining portion. We are left in ignorance as to
the. specific occasions in which Lord Palmerston “ failed in sin
cerity.” We may, therefore, infer that specific instances were
given only as an illustration of a general practice; this is borne
out both by the reply of Lord Palmerston and by the terms of the
Queen’s letter. The latter are as follows]
“The Queen requires, first, that Lord Palmerston will distinctly
state what he proposes to do in a given case, in order that the Queen
may know as distinctly to what she is giving her royal sanction,
c2
�20
Secondly, having once given Her sanction to a measure, that it he
not arbitrarily altered or modified by the Minister. Such an act she
must consider as failing in sincerity towards the Crown, and justly
to be visited by the exercise of her constitutional right of dismissing
that Minister, She expects to be kept informed of what passes
between him and the foreign Ministers before important decisions
are taken, based upon intercourse; to receive the foreign despatches
in good time; and to have the drafts for her approval sent to her in
sufficient time to makelherself acquainted with their contents before
they must be sent off. The Queen thinks it best that Lord John
Russell should show this letter to Lord Palmerston.”
On the 3rd of February, 1852, Lord John Russell testified
to the truth of the charges contained in the Queen’s letter, and
made the application of them, using the following words:—
“The noble Lord passed by the Crown, and put himself in the
PLACE OF THE CROWN.”
REGARDING THE ABANDONMENT OF OUR MARI
TIME RIGHTS.
(self-contradiction.)
Mr. Cobden denounces as ridiculous Lord Palmerston’s
pretence that steam has injured, or can injure the naval supremacy
of England, but Mr. Cobden has prepared and is still preparing
the way for Lord Palmerston to destroy the real source of that
supremacy—the Right of Search. The subject has been so fre
quently treated that it is necessary only to recite Lord Palmer
ston’s three speeches on this head:—
Lord Palmerston, November 7,1856.
“ I cannot help hoping that these relaxations of former doctrines, which
were established in the beginning of the war, practised during its continuance,
and which have since been ratified by formal engagements, may perhaps be
still further extended, and that, in the course of time, those principles of war
which are applied to hostilities by land may be extended without exception to
hostilities by sea, so that private property shall no longer be the object of
aggression on either side.”—Times, November 8, 1856.
Lord Palmerston, February 3,1860.
“ A naval Power like England ought not to surrender any means of weaken
ing her enemies at sea. If we did not seize their seamen on board their
merchant vessels, we should have to fight them on board their ships of war.
I deny that private property is spared in war on land any more than in war at
sea. On the contrary, armies in an enemy’s country take whatever they want
or desire, without the slightest regard to the right of property, as we shall find
to our cost if a hostile army should ever succeed in landing in this country.”—
Morning Star, Feb. 6, 1860.
Lord Palmerston, March 17, 1862.
“ The passage quoted as having been part of what I said at Liverpool, related
to two matters. First of all to the exemption of private property at sea from
capture; and, secondly, to the assimilation of the principles of war at sea to
�21
the practice of war on land. I am perfectly ready to admit that I have entirely
altered my opinion on the first point. Further reflection and deeper thinking
has satisfied me that what at first sight is plausible—and I admit that it is
plausible on the surface—is a most dangerous doctrine, and I hope that the
honourable Member (Mr. Bright) will be kind enough to give weight to my
thoughts, and also come round to those second thoughts which are proverbially
the best.” “ My hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham has very ably and
very fully shown that it was a wise and politic measure on the part of the Go
vernment to adopt the principle that a neutral flag should cover enemy’s
goods. There is a principle upon which, as it appears to me, this doctrine
must stand. We have lately maintained, at the risk of war, that a merchant
ship at sea is a part of our territory, that that territory cannot be violated
with impunity, that, therefore, individuals cannot be taken out of a mer
chantman belonging to a neutral country. The same principle may be said
to apply to goods as well as men.”—Times, March 18, 1862.
The transmutation, by a “ principle,” of a ship, whose function
is to move from place to place, and, therefore, to convey help to
the enemy, into a territory whose peculiarity is that it remains
fixed, and, therefore, cannot convey goods to the enemy, is a
climax of absurdity. It covers contraband of war, despatches,
everything. It transmutes the neutral into an enemy so much
the more dangerous as he is himself exempted from all danger.
It is, of course, a flagrant contradiction to the declaration of the
3rd of February, 1860, that “A naval Power like England ought
not to surrender any means of weakening her enemies at sea.”
REGARDING THE SUEZ CANAL.
(SELF-CONTRADICTION’.)
Up to 1857, there was no documentary evidence to show what
had been Lord Palmerston’s conduct in this matter. Mr.
Urquhart, in the il Progress of Russia,” published in 1853, had
declared that Russia, through Lord Palmerston, had actively
intrigued against it for twenty-five years. In 1857 this statement
was confirmed by Lord Palmerston’s admission. In 1858, it
received the further confirmation of his denial:—
Lord Palmerston, July 7, 1857.
“ For the last fifteen years her Majesty’s Government have used all the in
fluence they possess at Constantinople and in Egypt to prevent that scheme
from being carried into execution.”—Hansard, vol. 116, p. 1014.
Lord Palmerston, Ju:ne 1, 1858.
“ We are told now that for fifteen years we have been exercising a moral
constraint upon the Sultan of Turkey to prevent him giving his sanction to
this scheme. Now, I can assure those who hold that opinion that they are
entirely mistaken.”—Hansard, vol. 150, p. 1381.
�22
REGARDING- THE DANISH SUCCESSION.
(CHARGE BY LORD ROBERT MONTAGU.)
The succession to the Crown of Denmark is of course a matter
in which England has no more right to interfere than in the
election of the Governor of New York, or the form of Govern
ment in France. This subject has, however, occupied the English
Government for at least twelve years. The correspondence had
filled, according to Lord Palmerston, in 1851, two thousand
pages of letterpress, and has given rise to repeated contradictions
on his part. The first statement was brought out by a question
from Mr. Disraeli :—
Lord Palmerston, February 4, 1850.
“ There are grave questions to be determined. There is one relating to the
succession to the Danish Crown; another, what should be the Constitution of
the Duchy of Schleswig in relation to the other part of what we call the
Danish Monarchy. . . . We must not expect that matters of that kind can be
arranged so quickly as we could wish; and more especially considering that
Her Majesty’s Government is only acting as mediator, and that we have no
power to exercise authority in regard to these questions.”—Hansard, vol. 108,
p. 283.
The second was a reply to Mr. Urquhart, who “ begged to ask
further, whether in this correspondence there had been any nego
tiation as to the succession to the Crown of Denmark, or in respect
to the succession in the Duchies”:—
Lord Palmerston, March 20, 1851.
“ A good deal had passed in regard to these points, that was to say, in regard
to the succession to the Crown of Denmark • and, as connected with that, in
regard to the arrangements for the order of succession in Schleswig.and Hol
stein. But Her Majesty’s Government had studiously and systematically held
themselves aloof from taking any share in these negotiations. Her Majesty’s
Government have confined themselves strictly to the mediation which they under
took, which was a' mediation for the purpose of bringing about a restoration
of peace between Denmark and the German Confederation.”—Hansard, vol.
115, p. 221.
In 1850, the Mediation included in its scope the settling of the
Danish Succession; in 1851, it had always been confined to the
restoration of peace between Denmark and Germany. Two years
afterwards, Mr. Blackett asked a question which brought forth
a third statement. This statement contradicted both the previous
ones. According to the first statement, it was only as Mediator
that England had anything to do with the Danish Succession;
according to the third, it was her “ business” to alter that Suc
cession.
Lord Palmerston, August 12, 1853.
ee As things stood, the succession to Denmark Proper went in the female
line, the succession of Holstein went in the male line, the succession of
Schleswig was disputed between two parties (!) ; and, therefore, on the death
�23
of the King and his Uncle, who was the next heir, Denmark would have gone
to the female heir, Holstein to the male, and Schleswig been divided between
them. (!) It was the business of the British Government to prevent such a state
of things, and it was thought an important object to keep together those three
States which in common parlance were called the Danish Provinces. He was
anxious to get renunciations also from that male branch which had claims on
Holstein, and to combine the whole in some party who might equally claim
all portions. That was accomplished by the Treaty.”—Hansard, vol. 129,
p. 1680.
On the 5th June, 1851, was signed the Protocol of Warsaw,
which established the “ principle of the integrity of the Danish
Monarchy.” On the 8th May, 1852, this was consigned to a
European Treaty. This was prima facie evidence that Lord
Palmerston’s statement of March, 1851, was false. The d«atj
*
mentary proof was not, however, made public till, on the 18th
June, 1861, Lord Robert Montagu produced in the House the
Draft of the original document:—
Protocol of London, August 2, 1860.
" Art. I.—The unanimous desire of the said Powers is that the state of the
possessions actually united under the Crown of Denmark shall be maintained
in its integrity.”—Hansard, vol. 163, p. 1266.
‘‘Thus,” to use the words of Lord R. Montagu, “the Pro
tocol and the Treaty were conceived in subjection and were exe
cuted in duplicity.”
This was a charge of falsehood, but it was made as a prima
facie case. Lord Robert Montagu challenged Lord Pal
merston to rebut the evidence brought against him. Lord Pal
merston could not disprove, but he did not then dare to avow
his falsehood. He answered by a “ Count Out.”
REGARDING THE FALSIFICATION OF THE
AFFGHAN DESPATCHES.
(CHARGE BY MR. DUNLOP.)
The Danish Treaty places the eventual succession of Denmark
in the Emperor of Russia, by cutting out nineteen of the inter
vening heirs. The Affghan Forgeries, first denied by Lord Pal
merston, are now justified by him on the ground that they
were necessary to save the honour of Russia, and to induce her to
act in accordance with the interests of England:—
Lord Palmerston, March 1,1818.
“ If any man will give himself the trouble of referring to those Debates, as
recorded in Hansard, respecting the despatches of Sir Alexander Burnes, he
will see that it is not true to assert that the papers produced to the House did
not contain a faithful report of the opinions which that Gentleman gave to the
Governor-General and the Board of Control. I do not mean to say that Sir A.
Burnes did not himself subsequently alter those opinions, but the passages
omitted contained opinions on subjects irrelevant to the question at issue.”—
Hansard, vol. 97, p. 102.
�24
Lord Palmerston, March 19,1861.
“ The policy and conduct of the Government were regulated, not by the
opinions of their subordinate agent at Caubul, but by the general knowledge
which they possessed of the state of affairs in the East, of the aggressive
views then entertained by Russia, and of the means by which that State was
preparing to carry hostilities to the very frontiers of our Indian possessions.
If that be so, the question is not the degree in which Parliament has been
misled, or in which Lieutenant Burnes has been injured, by the omission of
portions of his despatches in which his personal opinions, evidently arising
from confusion of ideas, misconception and overcredulity were stated, at
variance with the views justly entertained by the Government under which
he was acting. . . .”
“The opinions of Lieutenant Burnes, which are omitted from the de
spatches form no elements in the policy which was adopted.”—Hansard, vol.
162, p. 63.
Lord Palmerston on this occasion did not hesitate to charge
with falsehood a faithful ally of the British Government, Dost
Mahommed, on the ground not that he had evidence to prove it,
but that to tell falsehoods was a very natural thing.
“ I am sure' nothing can be more easily conceived than that the draught
which was submitted to Lieutenant Burnes was one thing, and the letter
which was sent off was of a totally different character.”—p. 60.
In 1848, Lord Palmerston met the charge by asserting that
the Papers did contain a faithful report of the opinions of Sir A.
Burnes. In 18G1, defending himself against the same charge,
he says his opinions were omitted because they were not acted
upon. When the denial was made, the unmutilated Papers had
not been published. At that time he could say that Lord Fitz
gerald, the President of the Board of Control, “ having access
to these documents, felt himself bound to state that he could not
find any trace on the part of the then Government of concealing
or misrepresenting the facts.” He could boldly challenge ex
posure, and say, “ Sir, if any such thing had been done, what
was to prevent the two adverse Governments who succeeded us
in power from proclaiming the fact, and producing the real docu
ments?”
When the real documents are produced, and the omitted words
are marked by brackets so as to render all further concealment
impossible, he covers the confession by making it in the form of
a justification. The omissions and alterations respecting Russia are
acknowledged in the same manner. This point is worthy of par
ticular attention, because it is the habitual practice and special
art of Lord Palmerston.
*
* Mr. Dunlop thus addressed his constituents at Greenock on the 21st of
October, .1861
“ The idea of my motion being considered an attack on the present Govern
ment never entered my imagination; and the notion that Lord Palmerston
would have resigned, had it been carried, must rest entirely on the assumption
�25
“ I say it was perfectly right, in the letter which has been referred to, to
substitute the words, ‘ the Russian Government’ for the words ‘ the Emperor,’
and to omit the words which would have identified the Emperor in person
with the communication made to Dost Mahommed. . . . Nothing could
have been more unwise than to pin them (the Russian Government) down to
that which you wished them to disavow, and to make it impossible, consistently
with their honour, to undo that which your remonstrances were especially in
tended to induce them to retract.”—pp. 60-1.
It would have been unworthy of Lord Palmerston to have
admitted a forgery without justifying it by a falsehood. The
Russian Government had already disavowed its agents. The
disavowal had been forwarded to Calcutta, and it was after this
that Vicovitch was sent to Caubul with the autograph letter
of the Emperor of Russia. Sir Alexander Burnes wrote,
December 20, 1837:—
“ I shall take an early opportunity of reporting on the proceedings of this
Russian agent, if he be so in reality; for, if not an impostor, it is a most un
called for proceeding, after the disavowal of the Russian Government conveyed
through Count Nesselrode, alluded to in Mr. McNeill’s letter on the 1st of
June last.”
This passage is one of those suppressed in the papers of 1839.
*
REGARDING CIRCASSIA.
'
(MISQUOTATION OF TREATIES—SELF CONTRADICTION.)
This portion of the world, so long thought of only as the region
of fabulous romance, then brought into the light of day to be for
gotten for a quarter of a century, is now seen to contain the key
to the destinies of the world. Yet in 1837 and 1838, when
England was sending an army across the Indus to oppose Russian
influence, nobody would take the trouble to see that the real bul
wark of India was to be preserved by supporting Circassia, not
by destroying Caubul. On the contrary, when the Vixen was
sacrificed by consent of Parliament, the general feeling was that
a great danger—war with Russia—had been escaped at a small
sacrifice—the honour of England. This sacrifice, however, could
be accomplished only on the condition that somebody should veil
it by a falsehood, namely, that the Bay of Soudjouk Kale was in
the possession of Russia at the time the Vixen was seized there.
This falsehood has not yet been retracted by Lord Palmerston,
and cannot therefore be set down here, as it would require the
statement of the whole case. It has, however, been supported by
that he was undeniably guilty, and that he would not^have dared to stand an
inquiry. I can truly say that I not only did not believe that he was participant
in the falsification—though I admit that such belief would not have deterred
me—but that till I heard his speech in answer to me, I had never entertained
even a suspicion that he had been so.”
* See Affghan Papers, 1849, p. 81.
�26
subsequent falsehoods, capable of being dealt with on the plan
said down for this Memoir, namely, simply as falsehoods, and
without reference to the designs with which they are uttered.
The Treaty of Adrianople, September 14, 1829, affected to
confer on Russia the east coast of the Black Sea. Had Russia
been able to conquer this territory, there would have been little
difficulty about the matter. But Russia, not having conquered
this coast, that is, Circassia, it remains very important that Turkey
never had the right or made the attempt to possess it. Russia’s
false claim, of thirty-three years standing, has to be backed up
by false representations, so as to seclude the Circassians from the
commerce of the world till Russia shall have really conquered the
country. In two or three places on the coast the Turks had
erected small forts, by permission of the Circassians. Had these
been specified by name in the Treaty of Adrianople, there would
have been some colour of a title on the part of Russia to these
places, especially if she actually possessed them. But no such
places are mentioned in the Treaty of Adrianople.
On Monday, August 24, 1857, in the House of Commons, in
reply to Lord Raynham, Lord Palmerston said:—“Thecoast
of Circassia—that was to say, the eastern coast of the Black Sea
—was ceded to Russia by Turkey at the Treaty of Adrianople—
that treaty ceding certain points by name along the coast round to
the Sea oj Azoff. The Russians were engaged in hositilities with,
the Circassians on the northern part of the eastern coast, and it
appeared that some of the cruisers which, by the Treaty of Paris,
Russia was entitled to maintain in the Black Sea, had been sent
to operate against the Circassians at Ghelendjik and Redout Kale.
He did not apprehend that in so doing, the Russians had at all
exceeded their powers under the Treaty of Paris.”
The words of the Treaty of Adrianople, Art. IV., are:—
“ The whole of the coast of the Black Sea, from the mouth of the Kuban
as far as the port of St. Nicholas, inclusively, shall remain in perpetuity
under the dominion of the Empire of Russia.”
The Treaty, therefore, instead of ceding certain points by name
along the coast round to the Sea of Azoff, specifies only the two
*
extremities.
This falsehood of Lord Palmerston did not, however, first
appear under the sanction of his name. In the debate of the
21st of June, 1838, on the sacrifice of the Vixen in the previous
year, Lord John Russell said:—
“ What is the case as. to the state of the port at which Mr. Belt’s vessel
is reported to have arrived ? This port, apparently, did not belong to Russia
* A copy of the Treaty of Adrianople will be found in the Collection of
Treaties between Russia and Turkey published by the Government in 1854.
�until the year 1783. Up to that period the fact was acknowledged that it
belonged to Turkey in the map put forth by the Russian authorities, and
this evening alluded to by the right hon. Gentleman. In that map, it is
true, that a great part of Circassia was laid down as belonging to inde
pendent tribes. But three of the places at that time so laid down as be
longing to Turkey were, by the subsequent Treaty of Adrianople, transferred,
by name, to Russia. These places were Soudjouk Kale, Poti, Anapa. They
were named specially in the Treaty, and thence has arisen a claim on the part
of Russia that the whole of that territory which had belonged to Turkey
belongs, since, to her, and has been confirmed to, and comes under her do
minion.”—Mirror of Parliament, p. 4999.
Neither Anapa, nor Poti, nor Soudjouk Kale, is mentioned in
the Treaty of Adrianople. Lord John Russell must have
been whispered to by Lord Palmerston. He appears, however,
to have read the Treaty after the Debate, since the words in
italics quoted from the “ Mirror of Parliament” are not in Han
sard.
In defending himself against the charge of deceiving the
owners of the Vixen, Lord Palmerston had recourse to a pro
cess of fraud and falsehood unexampled in parliamentary history.
Mr. Urquhart, on returning home from Constantinople, where
he had been Secretary of Embassy, consigned in a letter to Lord
Palmerston (dated September 20, 1837) a history of his con
duct in regard to the Vixen, which was at once a statement and
a charge. Sir Stratford Canning (June 16, 1838) requested
Lord Palmerston to lay this letter on the table of the House.
Lord Palmerston refused:—
“With regard to that letter from Mr. Urquhart, it was written after
that Gentleman had ceased to hold an official appointment, and is therefore
to be regarded as a private communication. The letter contains, too, a
number of misstatements and misrepresentations, and is, in fact, an attack
upon my conduct. I have not replied to that letter ; and, considering that it
is not official, I doubt whether it ought to be laid before the House.”—Ibid.,
p. 4831.
Sir S. Canning then requested that that portion of the letter
might be produced which referred to the FZrm. Lord Pal
merston replied:—
“ I believe that that part of the letter is connected with a false statement in
the Petition, namely, that the voyage of the Vixen was undertaken in consequence
of encouragement given to the undertaking by the Under Secretary of State. I
really doubt whether such a document ought to be laid before Parlia
ment.”
To this Sir S. Canning rejoined :—
“ I am informed that there are other portions of the letter having refer
ence to the Vixen. The circumstance of the document not being official,
induces the noble Lord to think that it ought not to be laid upon the table ;
but I beg to ask the noble Lord whether he himself has any objection to
the production of such parts of the communication as have reference to the
Vixen, Mr. Urquhart having given his consent to its production.”
�28
Lord Palmerston then said:—
“The fact is, that Mr. Urquhart wrote me a loDg letter subsequent to
his recal, which letter would, I believe, fill one of the volumes on the table,
and which letter contains a number of misstatements and misrepresentations
connected with transactions in which we had both been concerned. I have
not had time to reply to that letter, or to enter into a controversy with Mr.
Urquhart, and therefore the letter has remained wholly unanswered, but if I
were to lay the document on the table of the House I should be obliged to
accompany it with an answer from myself, in reference to the misstatements
it contains. I do not know that there is any portion of the letter which has an
important bearing on the affair of the Vixen ; but I shall look at it again, and
inform the right honourable Gentleman whether such be the case or not, but
if any part of it is to be produced, it will be necessary for me to write a reply,
and to lay that reply also on the table of the House.”
The letter was connected with a false statement in the petition,
and therefore could not be published. The letter, nevertheless,
had not an important bearing on the affair of the Vixen, though
the false statement which it supported was the whole case referred
to Parliament. Finally, though unimportant, the letter could not
be published unless an answer could be written by Lord Palmerston, and laid on the table of the House.
This conversation is quoted from the Mirror of Parliament. It
is also reported in the Times of June 18, 1838. Not a trace of
it is to be found in Hansard.
Lord Palmerston did, after this, write a reply, but he never
laid it on the table of the House. It was left for Mr. Urquhart
to publish in the Times. But, on the day of the debate (June
21), Lord Palmerston did not hesitate to say that this reply,
written after the lapse of six months, was written the day after
he received Mr. Urquhart’s letter.
“ But we now come to another part of these transactions, being that in
which the right honourable Gentleman means to impute to me, personally,
some considerable blame—I mean as to the matters which form the subject
of a letter written by Mr. Urquhart, and published in the Times this morn
ing. I beg, in the first place, to say that, during the little leisure which in
disposition sometimes gives me, I wrote a letter to Mr. Urquhart, in
answer1 to one I had received from him the day before ; a fact which I men
tion to show the course that was taken in answering his communication.”
Mr. Urquhart’s letter to Lord Palmerston was dated Sep
tember 30, 1837
*
Lord Palmerston’s reply is dated June 20, 1838.|
On June 16, 1838, Lord Palmerston said:—
“That letter has remained wholly unanswered.”
On June 21, 1838, Lord Palmerston said of the same
letter:—•
* It will be found in the Times of June 21, 1838.
j\ See the Times of July 26, 1838, which also contains Mr. Urquhart’s
rejoinder.
�29
. “ I wrote a letter to Mr. Urquhart in answer to one I had received from
him the day before.”
Everybody, surely, can understand a direct falsehood like this.
It must be evident that if Lord Palmerston could not com
pass his defence without having recourse to falsehood, he must
have been guilty of something far worse than anything the Motion
imputed to him.
Such an extraordinary manoeuvre must have had a special ob
ject; but the mode in which it was intended to operate can be
explained only by some one personally cognisant at the time of
the whole transaction. Lord Palmerston completed his task
by repeating, and at the same time contradicting, what he had
said about the private nature of Mr. Urquhart’s communica
tion :—
“It would ill become me to criticise the course that Gentleman has
thought proper to take, but my objection is not what it has been sup
posed to be by the noble Lord the Member for North Lancashire (Lord
Stanley)—that his letter was a betrayal of official confidence ; my objection
is exactly the reverse, namely, that it contains a great number of private
and confidential communications between Mr. Urquhart and other people
which I did not think fit or proper to be published.”—Ibid., p. 4990.
What is a betrayal of official confidence ? Is it not the
revelation by a public servant of private and confidential com
munications made to him as such? Does Lord Palmerston
mean to say that breach of official confidence means pub
lishing that which the public ought to know? If he does not
mean this, it is difficult to know what he does mean. But in
this last contradiction, if the meaning is obscure the purpose
is obvious. The North American Indians, in their warlike
marches, leave to the last man the office of concealing the trail
which may betray them. This feat seems to a European impos
sible, but Lord Palmerston has learned to perform it with an
ease and a perfection which far surpass those of the inhabitants of
the forest. He guards against the danger of being detected and
contradicted in his falsehoods by detecting and contradicting
himself.
REGARDING THE RELATIONS OF ENGLAND WITH
RUSSIA.
(self-contradiction.)
Lord Palmerston lately proposed an assimilation between
war and peace. From 1837 to 1840 he effected an assimilation
between enmity and friendship. He combined with Russia on
all European matters, while he made war upon Dost Mahomed
merely for receiving at his Court a Russian Envoy.
�30
Lord Palmerston, December 14, 1837.
“ I say, therefore—not at all dissembling—that I think Russia does keep a
larger force than is required for the defence of her own possessions, and than is
consistent with the general well-being of other nations at peace with her . .
that having no reason to believe that the intention of Russia is otherwise than
friendly towards this country—having reason, on the contrary, to believe
(whatever her policy or ultimate intentions may prompt) that she has no wish
or design to embark in a war with England, I feel &c.”*
Lord Palmerston, March 11, 1839.
“Ido not like to touch this part of the subject,lest the possible supposition
should be entertained that, in what I say, I am giving any countenance to an
opinion that may be anywhere entertained, that we are now in a state in which
a rupture with Russia is likely to arise. There is nothing in the relations be
tween this country and Russia to justify such an opinion ; on the contrary, I
believe that, on both sides, there is a strong and anxious desire to preserve the
peaceful relations, and to maintain that friendship which at present exist.
Lord Palmerston, March 19, 1861.
“ Russia was then in a state of active hostility to England in regard to our
Asiatic affairs............ The policy which the Governor-General had adopted
required that Dost Mahomed should be treated as an enemy, because he was
allied with those who were at ffiat time the enemies of England.”—Hansard,
vol. 162, pp. 62—3.
REGARDING THE RUSSIAN FLEET IN THE BALTIC.
(self-contradiction.)
Lord Palmerston’s contradiction of himself on this point is
one of the most remarkable of his many contradictions. In 1837
there was, according to his statement at the time, a correspond
ence between England and Russia, respecting the Russian Fleet
in the Baltic. In 1848 he denied that any such correspondence
had taken place. In'making this denial he affected to reply
to a demand for papers on the part of Mr. Anstey. No such
demand was made by Mr. Anstey in his speech, nor were the
papers in question among those recited in his Motion:—
Lord Palmerston, December 14, 1837.
“ I am asked whether any measures have been adopted by the Government
- to prevent Russia from proceeding with the naval armament at Cronstadt.
Now, with regard to the building and equipping of a fleet, no Government is
entitled to prescribe to another Power what fleets it shall build; but unques
tionably when a Foreign Power is fitting out a considerable force, either by
sea or land which indicates intentions calculated to give reasonable ground of
uneasiness to another Power, or its allies, then the Government of such country
has a right to demand for what purpose such force is intended; and certainly
the presence and equipment of the Russian fleet, as it was collected in the
Baltic two or three years ago, did lead to explanations between the Govern* Opinions and Policy of the Right Honourable Viscount Palmerston,
G.C.B., M.P., &c., as Minister, Diplomatist, and Statesman, during more than
Forty Years of Public Life; with a Memoir by George Henry Francis, Esq.
Editor of “ Maxims and Opinions of the Duke of Wellington,” &c. London:
Colburn and Co. 1852. P. 361.
t Ibid. pp. 406-7.
�31
ments of England and of Russia, but those explanations were satisfactory to
the Government of this country • and although, since that time, a large number
of vessels have been fitted out for the purpose of review, there has not been
any such display of naval force in the Baltic as might be reasonably looked upon
as indicating a hostile intention on the part of Russia towards any other
Power.”*
Loud Palmerston, March 1, 1848,
“ The bon. Member (Mr. Anstey) asks for all the correspondence which may
have passed from the year 1835 downwards on the subject of the Russian fleet
in commission in the Baltic. I do not recollect that any particular communi
cations took place on this subject between the British Government, on the one
hand, and those of Russia or Erance on the other.”—Hansard, vol. 97, p. 120.
REGARDING THE COMPARATIVE STRENGTH OF
ENGLAND AND RUSSIA.
(self-contradiction.)
When a Minister avows that he has committed a forgery to
save the honour of an enemy, it is natural to suppose that enemy
to be strong. Lord Palmerston, however, when urged to arm
against Russia, declared that she was weaker than England:—
Lord Palmerston, December 14,1837..
" Does he suppose that Russia—ay, even that same Russia which he seems
so desirous to convert into a general alarm-giver—is in a more warlike position
as regards financial matters than Great Britain? I beg to tell him he is.quite
as much mistaken in thinking that Russia at this moment could.find means to
commence an offensive war, as he is in asserting that England is in such a state
as to render her unable to provide for a defensive one. . . I assert that Russia
would find it more difficult to undertake a war, which had not for its object
self-defence, than England.”f
England, then, was strong enough to cope with Russia if both
stood alone; the only danger was lest England should be en
cumbered by the assistance of allies—for instance, France and
Poland:—
Lord Palmerston, July 9, 1833.
“I repeat that a general war must have taken place if England had interfered
by arms; because, on one side there were Russia, Austria, and Prussia enter
taining one opinion, and, on the other, England and Erance were united in a
different interpretation. Austria and Prussia were both in possession of Polish
provinces, and both were interested, or believed themselves interested (which
is much the same thing), in establishing the interpretation put by Russia on
the Treaty. And what was the state of the disposable army of these Powers?
Russia had an army in Poland against which the Poles were scarcely able to
make head; Austria had an army on the Austrian frontier of Poland; while
Prussia had concentrated her forces on the Russian frontier;. and if the British
Government had wished to make the fate of the Poles certain, and to involve
them in a contest with forces so superior as to render resistance on their part
for a week impossible, they had nothing to do but to declare that they would,
by force of arms, compel Russia to maintain the Constitution of Poland.”^
Lord Palmerston succeeded in persuading the British Par
liament that Austria was the enemy of Poland. That the reverse
* Opinions of Lord Palmerston, pp. 356-7.
f Ibid. pp. 362-3.
J Ibid. pp. 244-5.
�32
was the truth, has lately been established by the public testimony
of a Polish Gentleman whose character and whose knowledge of
the subject are alike unimpeachable:—
Count Zamoyski, July 11, 1861.
“ I remember, when the insurrection broke out in Warsaw, the people looked
up to the Austrian Consul as their friend. There was no English Consul and
no French Consul. No impediment was raised in the way of any man in
Galicia passing the frontier and joining the army. We had several regiments
formed of Galicians. Austria, at that very time, far from being offended at the
Galicians, actually supported the insurrection. The Emperor of Austria
issued a proclamation to the Province in which be announced that six months’
taxes would be.remitted as a token of gratitude for their conduct during the
struggle. Their conduct .consisted in collecting money and men, and sending
them to the Polish insurrection. The Plenipotentiary of the Austrian Govern
ment at the Congress of Vienna was Prince Metternich. Now, the Prince,
during the Polish insurrection of 1831, concealed himself from the Russian
Embassy, but he saw the Polish Envoy every evening, receiving him by the back
door of his house. He conferred with him, and expressed the greatest sym
pathy with Poland, but regretted he could do nothing so long as England and
France took no action. He actually ended every conference about Poland by
saying to the Polish Envoy :—
My dear friend, you lose your time here; you should go to the Govern
ments of Paris and London. We cannot move without having the assurance
and security that they are determined to do the tiling in earnest—to check
Russia at once and for ever.’
. “The Emperor Francis II., of Austria, sent a message through his Mi
nister to the Polish Envoy, and it was to this effect:—
“ ‘ The Emperor feels that he is drawing near his end. He is about to ap
pear before the great Judge. The possession of Galicia weighs upon his con
science as a crime, and he would be happy to restore it to Poland, provided
that it would not be amiexed to Russia.’
“A few years afterwards, the Plenipotentiary of England at Vienna was Lord
Holland, who was then Mr. Henry Fox. He took occasion to observe to
Prince Metternich that he was surprised Austria did not see the benefit
which she would derive from the restoration of Poland, Not knowing what
had happened before, he said Austria had remained quiet, not apprehending the
immense interest she had in the restoration of Poland. This was in 1835.
Metternich’s answer was:—
“ ‘Do you think we do not know and understand that ? Give me the as
surance that Poland will be restored in twenty-four hours, and I will subscribe
to it at once. But do you think it is an easy matter to accomplish ? It wants
the assistance, of you English and French. Give me the assurance that you are
willing to do it, and I am ready. I will ask no compensation for Galicia. The
compensation, of course, would be the re-establishment of the barrier between
ourselves and Russia.’
“ The Polish Envoy at Vienna in 1831 was my own brother, so I have this
from a good source.”
REGARDING POLAND.
(equivocation.)
It was not enough to persuade the British Parliament that
Austria was hostile to Poland, it was necessary to profess a be
lief that Poland would continue to exist as a State. This was
merely a matter of the careful placing of words. In 1832 it was
�33
impossible to exterminate a large kingdom morally or politically.
Nobody dared to say, “Your words are inappropriate, and therefore
unmeaning.” Four years afterwards it was easy to say that what
lie meant was, that it was impossible to exterminate a nation
morally or physically, and as these words, by virtue of having a
meaning, were the reverse of what he had formerly said, they were
taken to mean the same:—
Lord Palmerston, June 28, 1832.
“ As to the idea which seems to be entertained by several gentlemen of its
being intended to exterminate a large kingdom, either morally or politically, if
it be seriously entertained anywhere, it is so perfectly impracticable that I
think there need he no apprehension of its being attempted.”*
Lord Palmerston, April 20, 1836.
" What I, on the occasion referred to, said, was this—that it was impossible
for Russia to exterminate, nominally^ or physically, a nation. I did not say king
dom. A kingdom is a political body, and may be destroyed ; but a nation is
an aggregate body of men; and what I stated was that if Russia did entertain
the project, which many thinking people believe she did, of exterminating the
Polish nation, she entertained what it was hopeless to accomplish, because it
was impossible to exterminate a nation, especially a nation of so many millions
of men as the Polish Kingdom, in its divided state, contained.”!
The conduct of Lord Palmerston in respect to Poland cannot
be better summed up than in the words of Mr. Hennessy,
July 2, 1861:
“ I have said that England has been to blame throughout the whole of this
business. When Lord Clarendon touched the Polish question he did it damage.
Lord Aberdeen and other British statesmen of our day injured it. But the
Minister who has from the beginning to this hour done the most against Poland
is the present Premier. It may surprise some hon. Members to be told that,
when other great Powers were anxious to assist Poland, the noble Lord on
behalf of England, stepped in and prevented them. Had I myself heard such a
statement some time ago, I should probably have been surprised also. But
this session I have seen many things which must lessen the confidence of
the country in the noble Lord. I have observed him rise in his place and
lose his temper when accused by one of his own supporters of falsifying Sir
A. Burnes’s despatches. I have watched influential Members of the Liberal
party recording their votes against the noble Lord when that grave charge was
denied but not disproved. I have heard another supporter of the Govern
ment, when he brought forward the case of the Baron de Bode, taunted by the
noble Lord with bringing forward a case involviug fraud, and I have then
seen, on that issue, the Minister defeated by a majority of this House, and
the charge of fraud flung back upon the noble Lord. And, not the least dis
graceful, I have seen the House counted out by the Government when charges
equally serious were made against the noble Viscount by the noble Lord near me
(Lord Robert Montagu.)”
In reply to this charge, namely, that of having used the power
of England against Poland, and having been guilty of acts which
rendered his denial unworthy of belief, Lord Palmerston was
not able to utter a syllable.
* Opinions of Lord Palmerston, p. 202.
+ Azc.
J Opinions of Lord Palmerston, p. 315.
�34
REGARDING THE OBLIGATIONS OF THE TREATY
OF VIENNA.
(mental reservation.)
_The only difficulty in the way of Lord Palmerston’s betrayal
of Poland has lain in the Treaty of Vienna, by which we were
bound to maintain Poland in the enjoyment of certain rights.
Out of this difficulty Lord Palmerston easily extricates him
self. On August 8, 1831, Mr. Hunt presented a petition pray
ing the House of Commons to address the King to dismiss Lord
Palmerston from his councils for not having assisted Poland.
Mr. Hume said we were bound by treaty to see justice done to
Poland:—
“Lord Palmerston could not, consistently ■with his duty, give the hon.
Member those explanations which he desired; but this, at least, he would
undertake to say, that ichatever obligations existing Treaties imposed, would at
all times receive the attention of Government.”
On August 16, 1831, on a Motion for papers by Colonel
Evans, after an attack by Mr. Hume:—
“ Lord Palmerston hoped that nothing he had said, and nothing he had
omitted to say, would lead any man to suppose that the British Government
had forgotten any obligations imposed upon it by Treaties, or that it was not
prepared to fulfil those Treaties.”
This was before Warsaw had fallen, and while the cessation of
intercourse between England and Russia might have saved
Poland. He denied that England was bound to maintain the
Treaty of Vienna by force. But then he coupled this doctrine
with the hypothesis that England had to stand alone against the
other Powers. On June 28, 1832, in reply to Mr. Cutlar
Fergusson, he said:—
“ England lay under no peculiar obligation, individually and independently
of the other contracting parties, to adopt measures of direct interference by
force.”
At this time it was supposed in England that Austria and
Prussia were ready to make war in concert with Russia, and that
all the other Powers would have been neutral. Now, it is known
that Austria, France, Turkey, Sweden, and Persia were on the
side of Poland, and had to be restrained by Lord Palmerston.
He, however, is quite equal to the emergency. Pie shifts his
doctrine to the very simple one that a State making a joint
Treaty is not bound to enforce it if one of the parties choose to
violate it.
On February 27, 1863, Lord Palmerston, in reply to Mr.
Hennessy, said:—
“ The hon. Member assumes that by the Treaty of Vienna we are under
an obligation to interfere with the affairs of Poland. We have a right to
interfere, but we are under no obligation to do so.”
�35
When, therefore, Lord Palmerston told Mr. Hume that the
British Government had not forgotten any obligations imposed
upon it by Treaties, he made a mental reservation that there were
no such obligations. Falsehood here emulates the simplicity of
truth, and by that simplicity triumphs.
REGARDING THE RUSSO-DUTCH LOAN.
(FORGERY IN COLLUSION WITH THE RUSSIAN AMBASSADORS.)
Connected with the Polish Revolution is the payment of the
Russo-Dutch Loan, and with that again the separation of Belgium
from Holland. The continued payment to Russia of this loan
after it had lapsed by this separation, according to the Treaty
of 1815, was obtained by a most elaborate falsehood concerted
between Lord Palmerston and the Russian Ambassadors.
This falsehood, told in 1832, is contrary to all the evidence, and
especially to Lord Palmerston’s own prior statement. The
substance of it was that Russia had been willing to ensure a
compulsory observance of the Treaty of 1815, and had offered to
march 60,000 men into Belgium for that purpose.
The statement first appears in a note from the Russian Ambas
sadors to Lord Palmerston, dated January 25, 1831. They
declare, at the same time, that in all their conversations with Lord
Palmerston they have reserved their right to the continuance
of the payments as the condition on which they adhered to the
Protocol of the 20th of December 1830. This Protocol they
describe as one which “ does not yet take away the sovereignty
of the King of the Netherlands.” - Yet the Protocol declares
that u the very object of the UnioQ of Belgium with Holland
finds itself destroyed, and that thenceforth it becomes indis
pensable to recur to other arrangements to accomplish the in
tentions to the execution of which the Union should have served
as a means.”
Loan Palmerston, February 18,1831.
“ They (the Conference) were not to concern themselves with the question
whether Belgium, having won her freedom with her arms, should or should not
be subject again to Holland, and no such interference took place.”*
The Protocol of the 20th December, 1830, like every other, was
signed by Russia; she was therefore bound to adhere to it. The
offer of the 60,000 men must, then, have been made not only before
the 25th of January, 1831, but before the 20th of December,
1830—the date of the Protocol.
The offer must also have been known to foreign Powers, since
the Emperor abstained from following up this determination,
4<out of respect to the representations of his Alfies, and princiOpinions of Lord Palmerston, p. 156.
�36
pally out of deference to the opinions and wishes of the Cabinet
of London.”
It was not till the 4th November, 1830, that the King of Hol
land invoked the interference of the Five Powers; it was not
till the 10th that he consented to an armistice. The offer must,
therefore, have been made between the 10th November and the
20th December, 1830. The offer was not for many months com
municated to the public, nor to the Parliament, nor to the Minis
ters themselves. The letter of the 25th January appears to have
lain (unanswered) in Lord Palmerston’s desk till the time came
round for the December payment.
The payments were made twice in the year, the one per cent,
of the principal being paid in July, the interest in December.
The Treaty stipulated for the lapse of a year before the payments
should cease. The July payment was therefore made without
hesitation. But the December one was beyond the stipulated
term. The Comptroller of the Exchequer demurred to the pay
ment. So grave was the objection which he raised, that the case
was submitted to the Law Officers of the Crown. Then it was
that Lord Palmerston first produced the letter of the Russian
Ambassadors reciting this offer, and it was upon this letter that
he obtained an opinion favourable to the Russian claim, and con
sequently the payment of the usual December instalment.
The legality of this payment was warmly contested in both Houses,
and on several occasions. But in spite of this apparent pressure,
the offer of the 60,000 men, which, according to the prevalent
notions of the day, would have justified the payment to Parlia
ment, was still kept in reserve. Sir Thomas Denman, it is true,
referred to a Russian document which had influenced his own
legal opinion, and the non-production of which he deplored. But
the document was not produced. The motives which induced its
suppression appear to have continued for fifteen years, after which
period it was laid before Parliament and printed.
The story of a proposed forcible intervention came out he
France, on the opening of the Chambers in 1832, in the shape of
a boast by M. Casimir Perier that he had threatened with war
any Power that should presume to send forces into Belgium. He
attributed the “ salvation of Belgium” to the promptitude of that
declaration. The Duke of Wellington was indignant at this
statement, and denounced it in the House of Lords as a falsehood.
On the 16th March, 1832, he
“ Most distinctly denied the assumption of M. Perier, namely, that other
nations had evinced an intention of interfering by force. The British Govern
ment had no such intention, nor had any of the other Powers ; and he would
add that the French Government knew that such was the case.”—Hansard,
vol. 11, p. 307.
�37
Lord Grey confirmed the statement of the Duke of Wel
lington.
Some months afterwards, on the 12th of July, Lord Patbrought forward the Russian statement in Parliament
for the first time:—
merston
“In the beginning of October, 1830, the King of the Netherlands applied
to his Allies, telling them his authority had been overthrown in Belgium, and
he asked for military assistance to enable him to re-establish it. Such an appli
cation was made to Great Britain, to Austria, to Russia, and to Prussia. What
was the answer—not of the present, but of the late Administration ? Why,
they declined to afford the military assistance required of them. What, how
ever, was the answer of the Emperor of Russia ? He signified to his Allies
that he had 60,000 men on his frontiers, ready to march for the pur
pose of re-establishing the authority of the King of the Netherlands, if the
other contracting parties to the Treaty were of opinion that such a proceeding
would be consistent with the general interest.”—Hansard, vol. 14, p. 326.
The message of the King of Holland was dated the 4th No
vember. By the 29th Russia required every man, whose services
she could command, to defend herself in Poland, transferring them
from the remotest stations, and leaving naked her most exposed
frontiers. Nobody got up to question the reality of the offer, or
to state the impossibility of its execution. The Duke-of Wel
lington, who had contradicted the statement before it was put
into a definite shape, remained silent.
From that moment the assertion of Lord Palmerston has
been accepted as truth.
This assertion, so long delayed, has no other evidence than that
it is made by the Russian Ambassadors in the letter above men
tioned. That letter, marked “ confidential,” appears never to
have been answered; an answer to it appears, however, to have
been imperative, since it invokes the 11 spirit and the letter of the
Treaty.” The new Treaty commences by declaring that com
plete agreement between the spirit and the letter does not exceed
On the grounds above stated there can be no doubt that the
assertion of Lord Palmerston was false.
Upon this falsehood was obtained the payment of the instal
ment, and through it the payments have continued up to the
present time. It therefore represented a value for Russia, limiting
it to a pecuniary one, of l,837,500Z.
It will also appear from the circumstances and context that the
Russian note of the 25th January, 1831, never had existence.
The need of something to show having arisen at a posterior
date, such a document was forged. It was collusively assumed
between the parties to have been presented by the one and ac
cepted by the other at the time of its date.
�38
.REGARDING RUSSIA AND TURKEY.
(self-contradiction.)
Nearly all the falsehoods already collected have reference to
Russia, and were told for her interest. Secresy and intrigue
have not sufficed to keep down Turkey in the interest of Russia.
Direct falsehoods have been supplied. Among the most obvious
of them is one about the Treaty of Adrianople. By this Treaty
Russia obtained possession of the mouth of the Danube. Lord
Palmerston actually denied that she had obtained by that
Treaty any territory in Europe. He gave an argument in sup
port of his assertion, namely, that she was under a Treaty obliga
tion to make no such acquisition. The obligation, of course, had
no geographical limits. This additional falsehood is important,
because it shows at a glance that Lord Palmerston was not un
acquainted with the truth, but wilfully perverted it.
Lord Palmerston, August 7, 1832.
“ If ever there was just ground for going to war, Russia had it for going to
war with Turkey. She did not, however, on that occasion, acquire any increase
of territory, at least in Europe. I know that there was a continued occupation
of certain points, and some additional acquisitions on the Euxine, in Asia; but
she had an agreement with the other European Powers, to the effect that suc
cess in that war should not lead to any aggrandisement in Europe, I think the
official situation I hold in this House renders it my duty to state facts like
these.”*
Lord Palmerston, April 20, 1836.
“ Undoubtedly, when Russia acquired a portion of the Danube by the Treaty
of Adrianople, that part of the river fell within the scope of the Treaty of
Vienna, as being a part of Russia.” f
REGARDING THE TREATY OF JULY 15, 1840.
(ERASURE OF HANSARD.)
The turning point in the career of Lord Palmerston, and in
the history of the world, is the Treaty of 1840, for the Pacification
of the Levant, by the four Powers to the exclusion of France.
By this Treaty Russia was authorised to occupy Constantinople.
The meaning of the transaction as regards Russia and Turkey
was concealed by the device of the quarrel between the Sultan
and the Pasha of Egypt. England affected to side with the
former, France supported the latter. But though Englishmen
were easily mystified as regards Russia and Turkey, they were not
disposed to sacrifice the good understanding with France. It be
came necessary to make it be believed in Parliament that no insult
had been offered to France. Mr. Hume demanded the production
of the Treaty. Lord Palmerston refused to produce it because
it had not been ratified, and was therefore not yet valid, but he
declared that the Treaty which he refused to the English Parlia
* Opinions of Lord Palmerston, p. 216.
f Ibid., p. 314.
�39
ment he had already, as a mark of confidence, forwarded to the
French Government. This statement was doubly false. No copy
of the Treaty was sent to the French Government for two months
after its signature. By a Protocol signed on the same day as the
Treaty, it was to come into operation without waiting for ratifica
tion.
Loud Palmerston, Avgust 6,1840.
“ My honourable Friend (Mr. Htjme) asked for a copy of the Convention that
had been entered into with the great Powers: that a Convention had been
entered into was certain, but it was not fulfilled until it was ratified and ex
changed by each of the Powers that were parties to it; and until this was
done it was impossible that the document could be made public, or that it
could be laid before Parliament.”—Hansard, vol. 55, p. 1371.
Extract erom Protocol oe July 15,1840.
“ The said Plenipotentiaries, in virtue of their full powers, have agreed
between them Xhat the preliminary measures mentioned in Article II. of the
said Convention shall be put in execution immediately, without waiting for the
exchange of ratifications; the respective Plenipotentiaries state formally by
the present Act the assent of their Courts to the immediate execution of these
measures.”*
These measures were the employment of the British fleet
against Mehemet Ali, and—if she had assisted him—against
France.
Lord Palmerston, August 6, ] 840.
“ In the case of the Convention between France and England, with respect
to Belgium, that Convention was not communicated to the Belgian Govern
ment till after it was ratified; whilst, in the present case, the Treaty was for
warded to France two days after it was signedTimes, August 7, 1840.
Lord Palmerston to M. Guizot, September 16, 1840.
“ The Undersigned had the honour, on the 17th July, to inform his Excellency
M. Guizot, that a Convention upon the affairs of Turkey had been signed on the
15th of that month, &c. . . . The ratifications of that Convention having now
been exchanged, the Undersigned has the honour of transmitting to M.
Guizot, for the information of the French Government, a copy of that Conven
tion and of its annexes.”!
The falsehood of the 6 th August was told for the House of
Commons. We quote it from the Times’ report of the next day.
But, though the House of Commons accepted the statement without inquiry, there were others who could not be deceived by it.
M. Guizot has just published the History of his Embassy to
the Court of St. James in 1840. In it this passage occurs:—
“ On the 16th of September, when all the ratifications had arrived and been
exchanged in London, Lord Palmerston at length made known to us officially
and textually the Treaty of the 15th of July.”
The Appendix to the Correspondence contains the reply of
M. Thiers to a Memorandum of Lord Palmerston of the
31st August, in which he (M. Thiers) says:—
* Convention for the Pacification of the Levant, presented by command.
1841.
f Correspondence relative to the Affairs of the Levant, Part II., p. 190.
�40
“ All at once, on the 17th of July, Lord Palmerston calls to the Foreign
Office the Ambassador of France, and informs him that a Treaty had been
signed the day before yesterday; he tells him this without even communicating
to him the text of the Treaty.”
In another place, speaking of this Treaty, he says :—
“ Which was not communicated to it until two months later.”—Pp. 453,455.
M. Guizot says of this Despatch of M. Thiers:—
“ I read it to Lord Palmerston, who had returned the same day from the
country, and gave him a copy of it.”—P. 318.
When, therefore, Lord Palmerston corrected his speech for
Hansard, he erased the falsehood which had had such an effect
in the House, and substituted the following indistinct and un
meaning form of words:—
“ The four Powers then determined, in accordance with the regulation already
made with France, that they would join in carrying the arrangement into effect,
and notice of the same was given to the French Minister two dags after it was
completed. In the case of the Convention made between France and England
alone, in reference to Belgium, notice of the same was not communicated to
the other Powers till some time after.”—Hansard, vol 55, p. 1378.
If this falsehood had been detected on the night of its utterance,
the career of Lord Palmerston might have been closed.
Lord Palmerston, ever since he has been Foreign Secretary,
harS pretended a great regard for the independence and integrity
of the Ottoman Empire. He said, 11th July, 1833:—
“ The integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire are necessary to
the maintenance of the tranquillity, the liberty, and the balance of Power in the
rest of Europe.”*
No change has taken place in Lord Palmerston’s conduct to
Turkey since he ventured to express a very different opinion.
On the 5th of February, 1830, being in opposition, he for once
spoke out his intentions:—
“I object to the policy of making the integrity of the Turkish dominions in
Europe an object essentially necessary to the interests of Christian and civilised
Europe.”!
These falsehoods are presented here disconnected from the con
sideration of the subjects to which they relate. It is sufficient
that the designs attempted require the use of falsehood for any
honest man to condemn them; they might be arrested in their
course by a nation which, though unable to comprehend treason,
should at least resolve to punish falsehood. But this process will
cease to be effective when, at length, the time shall have arrived
in which falsehood shall no longer be necessary for the success of
treason.
* Opinions of Lord Palmerston, p. 246.
C. WHITING, BEAUFORT HOUSE, STRAND.
f Ibid., p. 131.
�
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Contradictions of Lord Palmerston in reference to Poland and Circassia et caetera
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Notes: From the library of Dr Moncure Conway. The Report originally appeared under the title 'Falsehood as a Method of Government'. Printed by C. Whiting, London. Includes bibliographical references.
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THE ITALIAN MOVEMENT AND
ITALIAN PARTIES.
TWO LECTURES
DELIVEEED AT THE
PHILOSOPHICAL INSTITUTION, EDINBURGH.
" *
SPEECHES
g
DELTVEBED IN
THE HOUSE OF COMMONS AND AT THE WAKEFIELD
MECHANICS’ INSTITUTE.
BY
JAMES STANSFELD, Esq., M.P.
PUBLISHED AT THE REQUEST OF THE GARIBALDI ITALIAN UNITY COMMITTEE.
LONDON:
JAMES RIDGWAY, 169, PICCADILLY,
EFFINGHAM WILSON, 11, ROYAL EXCHANGE.
EDINBURGH: ADAM & CHARLES BLACK.
��fenMbi (JMxmt Bnxtg gummite-
The following Lectures and Speeches are published at the request of
the Executive of the Garibaldi Italian Unity Committee, viz.:—
P. A. Taylor, M.P., Chairman.
W. H. Ashurst, Treasurer.
J. Sale Barker,
W. J. Linton.
W. T. Malleson, B.A.,
William Shaen, M.A.,
R. E. Wainewright, B.A.
J. M. Moir, M.A., Secretary.
March, 1862,
10, Southampton Street, Strand, London.
s
��TWO LECTURES,
&C.
■
LECTURE I.
It is not unusual, I believe, for a Lecturer to commence his
address by some prefatory remarks, intended to demonstrate
the interest and importance of his subject to his hearers. But
my subject needs no such introduction, and if I fail to make it
interesting, the fault will be my own.
Nevertheless, it may be well at the outset of what I have to
say, to endeavour not to prove the interest of my subject, but
to ascertain what are the essential elements and the attributes
of the Italian Question which make it one of so great interest,
of such special import to ourselves.
Tn the first place then Italy has the greatest past of any nation.
She has been mistress of the Pagan and of the Christian
world. She has suffered centuries of decay, of disintegration,
of what seemed death—and it was death—but death precedes
resurrection, and Italy is being born again and to a purer life.
How can we then choose but look upon her regeneration with
the interest which belongs to so great a past, and with that
mingled sense of veneration and of joy, with which we greet
the spectacle, with all its wondrous meaning, of a nation’s life
providentially renewed.
Let us descend from the height of this generality to think of
the living human tender interest inspired by a nearer view of
d;he more immediate past. Count, if you could count them,
B
�2
>
Italy’s martyr heroes in exile, in the dungeon, on the scaffold,
or dying on the field ; from Silvio Pellico to Petroni, from the
brothers Bandiera to Pisacane and Rosolino Pilo, from Joseph
Andreoli and Menotti to Ugo Bassi, Ciceroacchio and the
Canon Tazzoli. From those times so near us as some twenty
years ago, when Joseph Mazzini wrote “ The shadow of des
*
potism is cast on the whole land, on virtue as on vice, on life
and death; one would imagine that the very steps of the
scaffold were clothed with velvet, so little sound do those youth
ful heads make which roll down from them”—down to these
later days when the task of silent martyrdom is over and the
struggle is in the face of day.
And yet alas, even now how many are the noble men
who suffer death that Italy may be, and we know them not, or
their names die from us in the great whirl of time, save for the
few with whom the accidental privilege of personal relation
ship—sad and anxious privilege as it has often proved—has
made them rank us brothers. I have been of these few; for
this reason I am here to-night, for I may say that this Italian
Movement as far as their part in it has been concerned, has been
since 1848, a large part of my daily life. No forlorn hope has
since then been led—precursor of the successes which now fill
us with delight,—that has not numbered personal friends of
mine among its bravest leaders. The dungeons of the Pope
are still crowded with men whose crimes will rank as virtues
when her capital is restored to the Italian nation, amongst
whom I could name men of the highest character and of the
purest devotion, for whom, those whom I love have been pining
night and day for years. Let me recal two names, especially
dear to me of those who are no more. I knew Colonel
Pisacane the forerunner of Garibaldi, who fell in 1857 in an
unsuccessful attempt to raise the Neapolitan provinces against
their deceased king. He was a man of great military capacity,
of enlightened intellect, of high soul and of an absolute devo
tion ; and it was my privilege to call him friend. Rosolino
Pilo too, I knew, and cherish his memory with a peculiar'
affection. You may remember his name, though I know not,
* “ State and Prospects of Italy,” Monthly Chronicle, May, 1839.
�3
for he died too soon to reap the reward of an extended fame—
Rosolino Pilo, the gentle and the brave, without whom the late
insurrection in Sicily might have been crushed out at once, he
kept it alive in the mountains round Palermo until Garibaldi
could come to save it, with his genius and his prestige—and was
then wounded to the death. I might almost say that it was from
my own threshold that he went forth to buy with his life’s blood
the redemption of the country which had been his cradle, and
which was to become his grave.
But let us turn again to considerations of a more general
nature. The Italian movement is above all else one of
national reconstruction or rather of national regeneration.
A few years ago my first business would have been to
prove this, to show that this and not merely some portion
of liberty and reform was the goal towards which all Italy
was striving, and which she was destined to attain. Now
I may start with the assumption of that which all of us
believe, and, this brings me to the next attribute of special
interest in this Italian movement, which I desire to note.
By virtue of its national character, of which it has forced
the consciousness upon us, it has opened our eyes to the
fact that what we call the question of nationalities, is the
great European question of the day. The example of Italy is
contagious and acts directly on the peoples; wherever there is
a sense of national individuality unrecognized or oppressed, the
peoples are astir. I speak not merely of such well recognized
nationalities as those of the Polish and the Magyar races, but
of all those various tribes which people the South East of
Europe, and which are kept together for the time in unnatural
bonds, by the iron rule of Austria or the decaying empire of the
Turks. The organization of these minor nationalities is a
necessary work, perhaps of the immediate future. Italy tells us
so, she heralds and she hastens the advent of the problem to
be solved. The fact of Italy’s reconstruction has another prac
tical interest for us. She has been for centuries the battle-field
of rival ambitions in Europe, and the spoil of the victor. She
will now cease to be a cause of war; she should become a
guardian of the peace. One great element in the creed of
b 2
�modern European statesmanship, is what is called the “ Balance
of Power,”—a phrase dating from Richelieu, who feared or pro
fessed to fear the preponderance of the House of Hapsburg,
which was often used against France, during the wars about the
Spanish succession, and which is referred to in the treaty of
Utrecht between England and Spain (February 1713) as “the
best and firmest support of a mutual friendship and of a durable
understanding.”
Now this phrase the il Balance of Power ” is beginning to be
considered by some as the expression of a rather antiquated
doctrine. But the truth is that it is only the old methods,
dynastic alliances, or treaties to counteract them, that are be
coming out of date. A true “ Balance of Power” is still essen
tial to European peace, and to that confidence which should
save us the cost and the danger of constantly preparing for
war; but it needs to be constructed on some fixed and per
manent basis, and to have added to it, as an equally important
safeguard, the removal of occasions and temptations which lead
to war. Now the principle of the organization of European
states according to nationalities, would, as far as the’west and
centre of Europe are concerned, give us this fixed basis and this
additional safeguard,—an united Italy, and an united Germany,
would be France for all aggressive purposes disarmed.
An additional source of practical and immediate interest to
us in the Italian national movement, is to be found in the
influence it has had upon our own foreign policy, an influence
beneficial in two ways. In the first instance it has, I might
almost say, given us for the first time, a foreign policy based
upon an intelligible principle. The principle is that of “Non
intervention;” not the barren fact, without sympathy, or sense
of duty, or of right, but the principle, to be observed, to be
upheld, and as far as reason and prudence may allow, to be
enforced in the counsels of Europe. I may say that it is the
doctrine of Nationalities which has served to moralize the
doctrine of “ Non-intervention” and to elevate it to the height
of a principle capable of ruling the foreign policy of our
country.
A short time ago, some time in September I think, a well
�known statesman, and a brilliant writer and orator, Sir Edward
Bulwer Lytton, addressed the Hertfordshire Agricultural
Society, on the great political changes which had in the course
of the preceding year passed over both the old world and the
new. His speech was not a party speech, or I should not refer
to it here. He spoke for all Britain, and for statesmen of all
parties. He said that foreigners all misunderstood the foreign
policy of this country; and he undertook in a few words to
explain it. He said that England was a free nation, and that
therefore her Statesmen and her Ministers must consult popular
opinion, but popular opinion sided with the free; he said that
it was our interest that good government should be established
everywhere, because under good government the interchange of
commerce could be promoted, and the spread of freedom
abroad widened the market for English manufactures ; that we
had an interest therefore not in tyrannies and in revolutions,
but in the rise and prosperity of free peoples who would accept
our own temperate form of constitutional government; and if
we must further explain our policy, he added, it was that in the
rise of a free people we might expect an ally in our sympathies
for freedom, and a customer in that prosperity which is the
companion of free political opinions. “ There was the whole
key to the great principle of British foreign policy.”
Now I not only object to this as a definition of what our foreign
policy ought to be, but as a definition of what it is. I don’t think
tthat interest qualified by popular sympathies, is the key of the great
principle of British foreign policy. Iam sure that this is not what
is at the bottom of the mind and of the heart of Britain in the
matter. The leading doctrine of our foreign policy zof to
day is, as I have said “ non-intervention ” and thanks to Italy,
non-intervention in the sense in which I have explained it. Now
this doctrine was born of the desire of peace. We all desire
peace, for we know the cost of war; and England specially
desires peace, because if she were to find, in principle or in
sympathy, a righteous cause of war, she feels no sufficient
assurance that the war would be so conducted or would so
^eventuate as to serve the cause she might have it at heart to
aid. Non-intervention began then as a kind of rule for our
�selves. It was our interest for the sake of peace and it kept us
out of mischief’s way. But considered simply as a rule for
ourselves you will see that it tended logically and inevitably to
the negation of all foreign policy; and it has by some been
carried almost this length. But this was not what England
meant or what she ever would or ever will, I trust, accept. She
sought a foreign policy which should be intelligible, abiding and
at her own control; for this she had need of a principle, and
she found it in the doctrine of non-intervention elevated and
moralized, as I have said. And at the bottom of such doctrine
so accepted and imposed is I say not the notion of interest—that
would never lead us to a principle—but the notion of duty and
of right. We say that each people has the right to shape out
its own national life, and that no foreign power has the right to
interfere to prevent it. We sympathize with a people struggling
to liberate itself from domestic tyranny, but we believe that it
must effect its own emancipation. Where our consciences
point out to us a people dismembered, or partly, or wholly
under the rule of a foreign power, we recognise its right to
work out or to re-establish its national independent existence,
and we say that no other nation has the right to aid such foreign
power in forcibly retaining its wrongful rule. And we believe
it not only to be our interest but our duty, to do what we can
wisely do, to promote an acceptance of this principle and to
procure an observance of this rule of public right and wrong.
Our statesmen used to talk about non-intervention between the
different states of Italy, as if those states could have any rights
which were not subordinate to that of the whole Italian people.
“Non-intervention” led them some short time ago to the
absurdity of saying, that if Venice sought to free herself from
the yoke of Austria, she must do so without the aid of that
portion of Italy already free. We have widened the basis and
raised the level of our idea ; we now deny the right of Germany
to aid Austria, when Italy shall feel the time is ripe to claim
her own.
The Italian question has helped to moralize our foreign
policy in another way. It has roused us, the nation, to dictate
and to control that policy, and it inaugurates the new era, in
�7
which public opinion and public sympathy assert their supe
rior right to the secret or traditional diplomacy of statesmen or
of Courts.
Lastly, the Italian question is deeply, solemnly interesting to
us as a Protestant community. I use the word in no narrow or
antagonistic sense; I mean to us as a community believing in
freedom of conscience as between man and man. We have
not to wait for the destruction of the temporal power of the
Papacy; the temporal power that now supports the Pope is not
that of Papacy; it is that of France. The sham that still re
mains will ere long be swept away. But what we may with
confidence look forward to as a future result of the conflict
between Italy and the Papacy, as a first fruit of that new and
conscious freedom and responsibility which this national up
rising is already calling forth, is a Reformation of the Catholic
Church—not our Reformation, for history does not repeat her
self, and nothing spontaneous can be a copy of what has gone
before, but, nevertheless, a movement of religious reformation
pregnant with the most vital consequences to the Christian
world, and certainly beneficial in its influence on the spirit of
freedom and of faith; and this we shall owe to Italy—born
again into the world, not without purpose in the evolution of the
providential scheme.
We believe in Italy at last. We think that we understand her
movement, and that we can no longer be deceived. Indeed
since we have mastered the notion of national regeneration as
the aim of Italy, we rightly feel that we hold the clue to that
movement, the key to any phenomena it may present, the test,
largely speaking, of the accuracy of what people may wish to
persuade us of in point of facts. And, in truth, since this cha
racter of the movement has become patent to demonstration,
not only to us, but to Europe, none but a few Ultramontane
journals have ventured to dispute the right or the tendency of
the Italian people.
I need hardly say that success has had much to do with this;
there is indeed nothing which succeeds like it, as the French
say. It helped England to the completion of her faith in Italy
—it gave to her her faith in Cavour, in spite’of his French
�alliance and the sacrifice of Savoy and Nice. But the inB
fluence of this faith and of this success cannot alone lead
us to an accurate comparative appreciation of what I may
call the inner life of this movement, of the action and counter
action of the various parties in Italy, each, in their own
way, contributing to the solution of the national problem. Any
man, not somewhere behind the scenes, dependent on the
daily press alone for his impressions, must, if he endeavours
to form precise notions at all, become sadly perplexed by the
conflicting views presented to him. Newspaper corresponden
cies and leading articles, too often like multiplied addresses of
counsel learned in the law, skilled in the arts and trained to
the habit of advocacy, perplex the mind of the Jury of the
nation, if it has nothing else on which to build its verdict, until, like
common juries, it is apt to take refuge in mere impressions,
and almost to resent any appeal to its more careful discrimi
nation. Such task of careful discrimination indeed we cannot
undertake from day to day; we cannot always keep on guard
against the possibility of false impressions; and it is for this
reason that I think, and that I assume you think it to be of use
and of interest occasionally to compare notes, somewhat deli
berately, to endeavour again to build up the elementary outlines
of our knowledge, to refresh ourselves with a text-book of our
own making, and to renew our tests of truth.
In the outline which I shall now give of the Italian move
ment, I shall naturally, though without any very formal plan,
perform this office for myself as for those who hear me. I
shall do this from a certain point of view, for how can there be
opinions of any value without a certain point of view ? That
point of view, I believe, you know. My familiarity is not with
the Ministerial but with what is called the National party in
Italy ; my interest in the question dates from them ; you have a
right to say that my prepossessions will be in their favour; but
I do not think that they have met with such plentiful advocacy
of late as to induce you, on that account, to regret hearing me.
I shall state their case as I see it, but in doing so I shall ask
you to believe me when I say that I have never, in my own
mind, confounded retaliation with defence. I do not trace in
�9
myself the slighest predisposition to react against injustice by
the like. I have ever felt that true friendship never doubting of
itself or fearing doubt, pays its best homage in endeavouring to
be just. It is an homage undoubtedly due to the National
party of Italy, for, all things considered, it is a generous party,
and furnishes instances of the highest self-abnegation, of the
truest-minded self-devotion to the country and the cause.
What, however, I shall say of and for that party, I shall ask
you to depend upon, as knowledge, not opinion merely; for 1
have known that party, and some of its leaders, in the greatest
intimacy, for years.
Italy was one under the Romans, and yet it was not Italy but
Rome that ruled the world. In those days of universal
dominion, the principle of nationality had not yet begun to play
its part in the organization of the world. Then came the decay
of that mighty empire of the Romans, for its work was done,
and a new work was to begin. The northern hordes, migrating
en masse from northern Europe and from Asia, overran the whole
of Europe, sometimes sweeping away whole populations, some
times assimilating with them, remaking and redistributing the
material of European communities; modern nationalities, not
even yet all wrought out into an abiding harmony, being their
result. Two or three centuries of this work of assimilation
sufficed for Italy, and you already find her leading minds, Dante,
Machiavelli, with others of less note, dreaming of a Nation
to come. The first form of renewed life and progress in Italy
was, as elsewhere, municipal. In those barbarous and feudal
times industry collected itself in walled cities and organized for
defence. In Italy because, on the one hand, of the fecund
genius of the people, and on the other of the absence of any
great ruling central power, this new life of Europe had the
most brilliant results. Italy took the lead at once in com
merce and in arts; her merchant princes rivalled monarchs in
splendour and ambition, and excelled them in culture ; cities
became states, aimed at supremacy over their fellows, and in
dulged in the luxury of war. It has been, until a very recent
date, an almost universal habit to cite these wars and jealousies
�10
q
of the Italian Republics of the Middle Ages, as evidences that
Italy was not and could not be, even now, ripe to become a
nation. We borrowed this notion from M. Sismondi, the great
author of the “ History of the Italian Republics.” The destruc
tion of the republic of Florence, and the peace between
Charles V. and Pope Clement VII. in 1530, seemed to him the
death of Italy ; but we now know that neither Emperor nor
Pope, neither Guelph nor Ghibelline, neither foreign or priestly
rule, have any hold whatever on the mind or on the heart of the
Italian people. It was a question of faith or want of faith in
progress and the future. Was Italy, or was she not, at some
future time, again to take her place among the nations ? With
out such faith, the mind naturally, dwelt among the divisions of
the past—and none more likely to do so than the man who had
made of that past his special study—and found in it confirma
tion of its scepticism. But once given that general faith in the
future and a just retrospect of the past tells a very different
tale. The life of the Italian republics was not a national but a
municipal life, on however splendid a scale ; those wars and
jealousies were not between incipient nations but dominant
municipalities, Milan, Florence, Como, Pisa, Sienna, Venice,
Bologna, and so forth. And since those times these very
cities have for centuries been joined under successive though
varying territorial governments ; forgetting their rivalries under
centuries of common slavery, or giving a proof of their readi
ness to unite in a common national life, as when, for instance,
Napoleon included them all in the kingdom of North Italy in
1802. A nation wants good boundaries, an indubitable capital,
and a greater power of attraction of the whole upon its several
parts than any neighbouring national unit can exercise upon
them. This (or even less than this) gives you the virtual
nation, which once realized in fact, must hold itself together
and increase in its cohesive force. Italy has the Alps and the
sea for her boundaries, and Rome for her capital; and I confess
that from the first moment that I turned my thoughts to the
Italian question, it seemed to me clear that the problem was to
found the nation, but that once constituted, it would have the
elements of a nationality as compact and homogeneous as that of
�11
France herself. Napoleon himself said at St. Helena that
Unity of manners, of language, of literature, must at a future
more or less remote, end in bringing her inhabitants under
one government.” In 1814 Napoleon walking along the sea
shore of the island of Elba, with a young Italian, and looking
across to the peninsula, suddenly asked, “ What do the Italians
think of me ? ” “ They would love your majesty more had you
given them unity,” was the reply; “ they are right,” said the
Emperor; “ I did not think that they would go so far towards
that goal. They have exceeded my expectations.”
Immediately before Napoleon, Piedmont and Savoy belonged
to the House of Savoy, but Genoa was republican, and so was
Venice; then all the rest was Austrian, or under Austrian in
fluence ; the Pope at Rome, the kingdom of rhe Two Sicilies
reigned over by the Spanish Bourbons, Lombardy Austrian,
and the dukedoms of Modena, Parma and Piacenza, and Tus
cany ruled by princes of the House of Austria. You will mark
here sources of rivalry between Governments, but no element
beneath the surface likely to be antagonistic to the reconstitu
tion of the nation. The only indigenous governments were that
of the kingdom of Savoy, then a despotism, and the republics
of Genoa and of Venice; all other frontier lines marked out
simply the possessions or the indirect dependencies of Austria.
Then came the period of Napoleon—a step towards unity;
after various changes the kingdom of Italy down to Ancona
in the Papal States, except Parma in the hands of a sister of
the Emperor, Naples and Sicily ruled first by Joseph and then
by Murat, all, in fact, Napoleonic, with the nominal exception
of Rome.
The downfall of Napoleon and the treaties of Vienna of 1815,
brought Austria back in more than her former power. Venice
was given with Lombardy to Austria, with the right of garrison
ing Ferrara and Comacchio ; Tuscany, with the addition of
the island of Elba, to Ferdinand of Austria; Parma to Marie
Louise, who was Austrian ; Modena to the Austrian House of
Este ; Genoa was added to the territories of the House of
Savoy ; the Roman states of course went to the Pope; the two
Sicilies to the Bourbons again. The Allied Powers seemed to
�12
think only of dispossessing France ; they recognized no right
in the Italian people, I will not say to national unity, but to
Governments which should at least not be foreign to the soil.
And yet they had endeavoured to turn Italy against Napoleon
by promises of independence, and at the time of his fall they
had the ample evidence of addresses from the army and the
national guard, from commercial bodies of men, and from deputies
of the kingdom of Italy, sent to Paris immediately on the abdi
cation of Napoleon, to show them that what above all things
Italy dreaded and protested against was the being given back
to Austrian rule. In the report of those deputies to the Presi
dent of the Regency at Milan, I find that after fruitless commu
nications with the representatives of Russia and of Prussia,
they addressed themselves to our representatives, Lord Castlereagh and Lord Aberdeen. Count Frederick Confalonieri,
their spokesman, saying, “Although our country has never tasted
the advantage of a political and national existence, she has
been taught these twenty years to desire such an existence.
The sheer hope, and the bare name of nation have impelled
her to sacrifices of all kinds * * * we are not the men of
twenty years ago, and it is impossible for us to become so, save
by renouncing habits and sentiments grown part of our system
and dear to a nation endowed with intelligence, energy, and
passions, that has acquired a large experience of political mat
ters, and that has learnt also to war * * The best interests of
*
.
our nation (the Count is here in truth speaking of Northern
Italy, which Napoleon erected into a kingdom and which fur
nished him with some of his best troops), requires and demands
a king; and let this king be even an Austrian, our wishes will
be accomplished; all that we desire is to obtain an existence
independent of other states, and a Constitution or National
Representation.” But it was not to be; Italy was conquered
from Napoleon, and was parcelled out as so much booty in the
general spoil. From these iniquities sprang the partial revolu
tions of 1820, 1821, and 1831; the national rising of 1848, and
the late war, together with the number of minor or abortive
attempts, and the constant conspiracies which have followed
each other almost year by year since the Treaties of 1815.
�13
The insurrection of July 1820, took place in Naples, the
army bore part in it; in six days, without resistance or blood
shed, so universal was the movement, the king yielded, and
granted a Constitution. In March, of the following year, an
Austrian army entered the kingdom and despotism was restored.
The insurrection of March, 1821, was Piedmontese, it was
also the work of the army, and succeeded without bloodshed in
three days; on the fourth day the king, Victor Emmanuel, bound
by oaths to Austria not to grant a Constitution, abdicated, and
a Constitutional system was proclaimed. In April it was sup
pressed, and despotism and the king restored by Austrian arms.
Both of these movements were the work of the Carbonari,
amongst whom were enrolled Prince Francis, of Naples, and
Charles Albert, then Prince of Carignano, and heir to the
throne of Savoy. The former was a traitor from the first—the
latter having approved of the movement on the 8th of March,
prepared the next day to prevent it at Turin, but it broke out
on the 10th at Alexandria, and he was himself proclaimed
Regent on the abdication of the king.
The insurrection of Central Italy in 1831, had its source in a
conspiracy dating from the previous year, in Modena, which
had proposed to place the Duke of Modena at the head of the
Italian movement. But this part of the scheme was afterwards
abandoned. The conspirators, with young Menotti at their
head, were betrayed; on the 2nd of February the Duke sur
rounded his house—the conspirators resisted, cannon were
brought to play against them ; at the sound the people rose in
all the neighbouring towns, and in three weeks Parma, Modena,
and the northern half of the Papal States, embracing some two
million and a-half of inhabitants, were in arms. The instinct
of the people was already Italian, they sought to invade Tus
cany and Naples, and to bring about an insurrection at Genoa,
and to march on Rome ; but the Provisional Governments of
Parma, Modena, and Bologna, opposed and prevented all such
movements.
They were not men of revolutionary capacity, they did not
even take any efficient means to prepare for defence, they
sought to moderate the movement and to give it an inoffensive
�14
aspect to the powers of Europe, they believed that if they, not
the originators of the Movement, but being now placed at its
head, proved themselves peaceful and unaggressive. Austria
would not invade, and they knew that otherwise they had no
thing to fear. They had some plausible reasons for their belief.
France had just declared strongly for enforcing non-intervention
with a high hand. On Dec. 1, 1830, M. Lafitte president of the
Council, anticipating disturbances in Italy, had said in the
chambers, “ France will not allow the principle of non-interven
tion to be violated ; but she will labour to prevent peace being
compromised if possible, and if war becomes inevitable, it must
be proved that we had no choice between it and the abandon
ment of our principles.” A note was shown at Bologna, whose
authenticity has however been denied, signed by the French
Ambassador at Naples, pledging France beforehand “to support
Bologna on condition that the government should not assume
an anarchical form, and that it should recognize the principles
which had been declared in the face of Europe—true or not,
the provisional governments, on the faith of it, tempered or
rather emasculated the movement, and relied on France. It is
said that Louis Philippe, to avoid the fulfilment of his pro
mises, and to give time to Austria, kept back from his Minister
Lafitte for five days, the despatch of the French Ambassador
at Vienna, announcing the Austrian invasion. The Austrian
intervention took place first in Parma and Modena, Austria
declaring that she did so to protect her reversionary rights—for
these duchies you will remember were given by the treaties of
1815, to Austrian princes—and that if Bologna remained peace
ful she would be respected. This was in the beginning of
March—on the 20th, the Austrians were at the gates of Bologna
—on the 26th, the capitulation including an amnesty was signed,
to be# afterwards violated by Rome; then followed a mass of
proscriptions and imprisonments. Young Menotti died on the
gallows on March 23rd. He had been wounded on the 2nd
February at Modena, taken prisoner by the Duke, and dragged
away with him in his flight. Italy was again at peace,.
I must ask you to note here that with the failure of the move
ment of 1831 died out, in Italy, the institution, if I may say so,
�15
of Carbonarism. Our notions of Carbonarism have been, in
this country, of the vaguest. We have been accustomed to
hear of it as of a terrible system of secret societies, democratic
in their origin, anarchical in their views, shunned by all decent
men and yet hardly now extinct, and with the dagger as their
sole weapon and device. These notions of ours have not only
been vague, but also about as inaccurate as notions could be.
Carbonarism existed in Italy already in the time of Napoleon.
It was a system of secret societies without a positive political
programme of faith, and in this it was an offspring of the times ;
it was an expression of a state of mind whose function is to
render impossible an existing state of things and to destroy it;
analogous, I might say, to those periods of religious anarchy
and scepticism which precede the dawning of a new faith.
Italy had not yet begun to formalize the faith of her regenera
tion, though I have already given evidences of the existence at
that date of the germs of such faith. Carbonarism was an un
reasoning instinctive creation. Italy conspired a tout prix leav
ing to chance, opportunity, or the discretion of unknown leaders,
to decide the time and the aim : at any rate such action could not
be for the worse, must in fact, be for some measure of liberty
and independence. Then as to the method of conspiracy, this
also partook of the^nature of the times and the character of
the association. It was necessary to ensure secresy and fidelity,
and they were sought for in the modes which had been handed
down and familiarized to men’s minds by the secret societies of
the middle ages, by processes of initiation, by oaths and gro
tesquely fearful ceremonies, intended to impress the imagina
tion of the adept, and to ensure his blind obedience and his
faith. Terrible penalties hung over the heads of those who
should henceforth falter or betray ; and vengeance followed
treason, actual or supposed;—though the love of the -terrible
and the unknown has undoubtedly exaggerated the number of
such instances of vengeance or punishment. On the other hand
Carbonarism was not anarchical in its objects, because the
spirit of Italy was not anarchical, but was already, though half
iinconsciously, seeking a new and better, a more stable and
orderly as well as a freer life. The movements of 1820 and
�16
1821, which I have described, were entirely the work of Car-j
bonarism, that of 1831 also partially, although it was already on
the decline, and in those movements we have seen want of
national faith, want of energy and direction, and hence failure,
but of the spirit of anarchy, nothing. Lastly, Carbonarism
has been laid as a convenient reproach at the door of Italian
Democracy. Reproach or not, this is the greatest mistake of
all. Its great efforts were the movements of 1820 and 1821,
revolutionary but not democratic movements, the heirs apparent
of Naples and of Piedmont were its sworn adepts, the army its
instrument. The last effort, only partially its own, was the
revolution of the centre in 1831. Then it passed away, and
then, and not till then, appeared upon the scene the small be
ginning of that national democratic agitation, which has since
played so important and in some respects, I think, so little
understood a part in the reconstruction of the unity of the
Italian nation.
On the ruins of Carbonarism was founded the society “ La
Giovine Italia” (young Italy) the work of Joseph Mazzini.
Its initiators, with their chief, were all young men, full of the
enthusiasm of a national faith, deeply impressed with the
illusions and the failures of 1820 and 1831, and professing a
republican creed. There was nothing to hope from Italian
princes—they had ceased to conspire and betray: nothing to
hope from cautious diplomatic courses intended as in 1831, to
conciliate Europe, and to ward off the intervention of Austria;
everything to fear from the weak leadership of men, who from
motives of such sort would be certain to denationalize and to
emasculate any movement, the control of which should be en
trusted to their hands. No possible salvation save in proclaim
ing at once their great end, the liberty, independence, and
unity of the whole nation, and in setting themselves to the task
of arousing the whole nation to its conception and accomplish
ment. I will give you the creed and the policy of the new
association in the words of its author.
*
“They had examined
* Vide “ Letters on the State and Prospects of Italy,” by Joseph Mazzini,
Nos. I. to IV., Monthly Chronicle, 1839, from which much of this historical
sketch of the movements in which Carbonarism played out its part, is derived’
�17
| with care the movements of 1831, and had deduced from this
examination, that there was in Italy no deficiency of revolu
tionary elements but of a guiding spirit * * * they aspired to
be not simply revolutionary but regenerative * ** * to rouse
the different Italian States to revolt was not their object, their
sole endeavour was to create the nation * * * they felt that at
bottom the question was no other than the grand problem of
National Education, and arms and insurrection were for them
only the means, without which, from the state of Italy, it was
impossible to accomplish this * * * the Association resolved to
disguise nothing and to sacrifice nothing. It presented itself
as it was, as the tendencies and exigencies of Italy, it believed,
required it to be, an association republican and indivisible. * * *
It exposed the errors of 1831 ; it separated itself from the past.
It repeated everywhere that the salvation of Italy was in the
people, that the grand lever of the people was action; that it
El was necessary to act without ceasing, without discouragement,
without being intimidated by reverses at first, and always in the
name of Italy and for the whole pf Italy. “ It is possible,” it
said, “ that you will succumb, but even then you will instead of
falling basely and without effect, have educated the country; a
« great principle will survive you, and the generation which fol
lows you will read upon your tombs the programme of the Italy
to come.”
I I have read to you these words of Mazzini, at some length,
because, though written years ago, they continue to be the true
key of every movement of his party in Italy from that day to
the present. It is a programme so utterly at variance with our
ordinary, what we call practical notions, that I believe it to be
difficult for many of us even to realize and to comprehend it;
and yet it is of immense interest as the expression of the actual
I rule of conduct of the Party of Action in Italy for thirty years.
I It has educated the nation to the belief in Unity, and to the
needful determination of incessant action to attain it. Not
only Italy but Europe knows that there is no peace possible
till Italy be one. It is true that the practical accomplish
ment of this task has passed, not, however, as I shall hereafter
show, so largely as is generally believed, into other hands. But
c
�18
what higher tribute, I would ask, could be paid to the sound
ness of a principle or a faith, wThat more conclusive testimony
of the hold which it has obtained upon a nation, than that the
supposed decline of the party who originated it should date
from the adoption, more or less, of their principle and their
object by other parties in the state ? What is called the Pied
montese or Moderate Party dates its successes from the moment
when it also gave itself by its own methods to this nation’s
work ; and to pursue, in some manner, without ceasing, this
task, is even now the very term of its power and existence.
You will note that the republican creed of the founders of
Young Italy was not, if I may so say, of the essence of their
faith. It rather served to define their party; it represented the
actual tendency of the young and rising intellect of the day
in their country and the popular instincts of those most likely
among the people to aid them in their work. It was -well to
proclaim it, because there was then nothing to hope from
monarchy, and because its open avowal would give numbers,
enthusiasm, and unity to their ranks. But the object of their
faith, and the great aim of all their labours being the resusci
tated nation, they could not purpose to impose on it a creed,
which it might or might not accept, and it would always be
their duty to subordinate their special political views to the
accomplishment of the great object to which they had devoted
their lives. And I shall show you, I hope, before I have done,
that they have not failed in the observance of so clear a duty.
The Giovine Italia was, as I have said, reared on the ruins
of Carbonarism. The method of its organization, and of its
labours partook of the nature of the ideas on which it was
founded. I shall give you here again the very words of its
founder:—
“ Having principles and reckoning upon them rather than
on the power of mystery and of symbols, it rejected all the
complete machinery of the Carbonarian hierarchy and all the
pomp which was only calculated to hide the absence of real
purpose. It had a central committee abroad, and interior pro
vincial committees directing the ‘ practical conspiracy having
to initiate a work of education the Association only decreed
�19
' secresy as far as necessity required it, that is to say for its
interior operations; with respect to its existence, its object, its
.^hopes, its principles, it challenged publicity. The journal, La
Griovine Italia, was established at Marseilles, another journal in
Switzerland; catechisms of the new faith were printed and
clandestinely distributed with great labour, courage, and inged nuity throughout the peninsula. Their circulation was immense
and their effect also; organization commenced at every point,
and the first work of propagandism was an immense success.”
I quoted from the programme of Young Italy a few moments
ago, the doctrine of incessant action, of perpetually renewed
■ revolt. The party of Young Italy, or the Party of Action as
they came consequently to be called, have abided by that
doctrine; they have had some brilliant successes. I will in
stance the republic at Rome and the recent conquest of Sicily
and Naples to the new kingdom; but their career in action has,
as a logical and inevitable consequence of their fidelity to this
doctrine, been otherwise a succession of forlorn hopes ending
in temporary failure. Some of these have, within my know
ledge, only just escaped success; Austria could tell you how
nearly the attempt at Milan in February, 1853, succeeded in
■renewing the five days of 1848; but they did fail, and as failures
■they were judged, and not unreasonably judged by the world at
► large. But if we, outside of Italy, and only desiring rightly to
understand the regenerative movement of the country in all its
phases and in all its parts, would look this question more
closely in the face, we should have to remember that it is per| mitted to forlorn hopes, that it is of their very nature to be un
dertaken in the face of a preponderance of adverse chances,
because of the proportion ably great results of a successful issue;
and we, should recognise that these long series of attempts have,
after all, achieved their work of arousing the determined con
sciousness of the nation, and that the party which in accordance
with our naturally a priori unfavourable view, ought over and
over again, as, over and over again it has been said to have
been annihilated, has, nevertheless, gone on increasing in in.fluence and in boldness, and is only now less prominent and less
distinct because its preliminary educational task may be said to
c 2
�20
be complete, and it has but to share in the work to which all
parties in the nation havejiow set their hands.
The result of the labours of the Giovine Italia and the pro
gress of the Italian idea will be best understood by a short
reference to the movements of 1848 and 1849; they constitute,
too, the first chapter of the history of the relations of the
national party or party of action with the monarchy of Savoy,
now beginning to play its part also in the nation’s work. You
will remember that all Italy was already in a ferment in 1847,
before the revolution of 1848 in France which dethroned the
Orleans dynasty and gave the signal for the European move
ment of that year. Pius IX. had ascended the Papal chair in
1846, had granted an amnesty and promised administrative
reforms. The instinct of the Italian people seized upon the
occasion to further the national design. I will give you the
opinion of Prince Metternich of the nature and meaning of the
movement in the Roman states—it was afterwards amply veri
fied by facts. Writing to Count Dietrichstein, in a despatch
dated August 2, 1847, he says, “ Under the banner of Admini
strative Reform the factions are endeavouring to accomplish an
undertaking which could not be confined within the states of
the Church, nor within the limits of any one of the states which
in their ensemble constitute the Italian peninsula. The factions
seek to merge these states into one political body, or at least
into a confederation of states, subject to the direction of a cen
tral supreme power.”
The times were, indeed, evidently ripe for a great movement;
it was no longer a question of forlorn hopes; events might at
any moment precipitate the nation into the arena, and this
state of things brought a new party upon the field—the Mode
rate or Piedmontese party.
We left Charles Albert in 1821 affiliated to the Carbonari;
he had been a party to their conspiracy ; but with the weakness
peculiar to his character, he had sought at the last moment to
avert the insurrection. It succeeded, nevertheless, till Austria
intervened. Since his accession in 1831 Charles Albert had
reigned a despot; he, or those who represented him, for I donot wish to make him responsible for every mean or cruel
�21
act perpetrated in his name, had visited with a refined and
ferocious cruelty the insurrectionary attempts of patriots who
Still trod the path he had once professed to enter,—T allude
especially to the arrests of 1833. But the increasing ferment
of the Italian mind had taught him to look back upon the ambi
tion of his younger days, and to feel that the time was at hand
pwhen he might have, mutatis mutandis, to re-enact his part. The
idea of the Moderate party was to renewr the kingdom of Italy of
Napoleonic days, that is a kingdom of the north, to gain Charles
Albert to the cause by offering Lombardy and Venetia to be
snatched from Austria, as the price of his assistance, and thus
at the same time to stem the revolutionary tfde which might
unmake monarchy in building up the nation. I must ask you
to bear in mind this, the leading idea of the Moderate party of
a northern kingdom, for it is the key to the whole of their subse
quent policy. It was their aim in 1848—it ruined that move
ment, it ruined that campaign. It was the aim again of the
compact of Plombieres, and of the Franco-Italian campaign of
1859. That the nation went beyond it is due, not to the policy
of the Moderate party, but to the true instincts and the single
purpose of the Italian people. I shall proceed to illustrate the
truth of what I say. On the 18th March, 1848, Milan was in
insurrection against the Austrians, on the evening of the 22nd
Radetski fled, Charles Albert declared war against Austria on
the 23rd. Piedmont was already sharing in the excitement of
all Europe responsive to the revolution in France. On March
4th, the king having reigned seventeen years a despot, granted
a Constitution ; known as the statute, now the law, very inade
quate to its requirements, for a whole Italian people, for all
Italy save Rome and Venice- The king refused the first re
quest of Milan for his aid ; on the 21st he offered assistance on
condition that they should previously give themselves to him; on
the 23rd the Milanese had triumphed and he declared war;
on the same day Mr. Abercromby, our ambassador at Turin, re
ceived from the Foreign Minister a despatch stating the causes
and motives of the declaration of war. It justified that step on
the ground that the whole country was in insurrection, that
“ after the events in France the danger of the proclamation of a
�22
republic in Lombardy was imminent * * * that the situation of
Piedmont was such that at any moment, at the announcement
that the republic had been proclaimed in Lombardy, a similar
movement might burst forth in the states of his majesty, and
that the king thought himself obliged to take measures to pre
vent such a catastrophe for Piedmont and the rest of Italy.”*
When Charles Albert crossed the frontier the Lombard insur
rection was already victorious in every point. To the Austrians
remained only the Quadrilateral and 50,000 men, and all Italy
was hastening to the war; the Grand Duke of Tuscany, the
Pope, and the king of Naples, were compelled to furnish con
tingents for the crusade. Now, see the position; every other
ruler in Italy save Charles Albert was necessarily an unwilling
contributor to the common cause ; they had nothing to gain, for
if the north were freed it could not come to them, and with the
true instinct of self-preservation they feared the national move
ment which must ultimately sweep them away. The people,
with that weak faith in the professions of their princes, which
was one of the leading characteristics of the European revolu
tionary movement of 1848, believed them, in those moments of
common enthusiasm, to be sincere, but they did nothing wil
lingly against Austria, and, one by one, withdrew what troops
they could when dissension had crept in and the policy of the
monarchy of Savoy had chilled the enthusiasm and the hopes
of the nation.
Charles Albert, on the other hand, and his counsellors, had a
hope and a fear ; the hope was the kingdom of North Italy, the
fear was the republic. It w as this foolish fear which ruined the
campaign. Because of this fear the volunteers were dis
couraged, and the services of such men as Garibaldi and
Cialdini refused. Garibaldi summoned by Mazzini had already
sailed from Monte Video, before the news reached of any
Italian or European movement having taken place. When he
arrived Charles Albert was in the field, and his offers were
refused.
The provisional government of Lombardy, under the in
* Lord Ponsonby to Lord Palmerston.
Corr. Pt. II. p. 338.
Vienna, April 10, 1848.
Italian
�fluence of the King, refused to summon for a war of insurrec
tion in aid of the regular forces of Sardinia, the Italian exiles
who had gained their military experience in the insurrectionary
movements of Spain and Greece, and many of whom are now
to be found distinguished in the service of the present kingdom.
They said that no one knew where they could be found, Mazzini insisting, obtained authority to summon them. Among
them came Enrico Cialdini; he was refused, and said I “ will
not have journeyed here from Spain for nothing, before I
return I shall seek an Italian wound as a common soldier at
Venice”—he went there and was wounded in the ranks. Be
cause of this fear the king keeping near Milan and with his own
frontiers and capital protected by his rear, set himself to the
siege of the four fortresses, neglected the passes of the Alps,
which volunteers alone would have sufficed to seize and guard,
and kept altogether aloof from Venetia where the republican
flag was unfurled under Manin, even instructing his navy to
enter into no hostilities with Austrian men of war. He wanted
the courage to feel that if he trusted the nation and did the
nation’s work, his reward was assured. It was folly to fear
that a people which at the moment of a successful revolution
had abstained from pronouncing upon its future form of govern
ment leaving that to the nation after the successful termination
of the struggle, to decide, would have hesitated in accepting a
King who should have led them to victory.
The army of Radetsky though reduced to 50,000 was safe
within the Quadrilateral, and capable in any case of a prolonged
defence. If its communications were allowed to be kept up
with its base of operations, and reinforcements to be received,
it could only be a question of the time necessary for it to re
ceive sufficient reinforcements, for Radetsky again to take the
field with an army superior to any which the limited resources
of Piedmont could oppose. It was therefore vital to seize
Upper Venetia and the passes of the Alps, to cut off his sup
plies, and to isolate him within the line of his defences. In
that case, in the midst of a hostile population it could again
have been only a question of time, how soon he would have
been compelled to lay down his arms. These are of the very
�24
elements of strategy which any civilian may comprehend.
Charles Albert’s fearful policy made time the ally of his enemy
—and it was a fatal policy. In the beginning of August,
Charles Albert was already in retreat upon Milan, which under
a committee of defence of the nomination of Mazzini, accepted
by the provisional government, and of which General Fanti
was a member, in that moment of supreme danger, was making
most energetic preparations for defence. When Fanti and
Restelli went on the 3rd to Lodi to see the king and ascertain
his intentions, they were informed by General Bava, that the
king would march to the defence of Milan. The king entered
on the 4th, renewing the promise of defence—on the 5th, he
declared that the capitulation was already signed. The popu
lation incensed to fury, threatened his life—he declared that,
moved by their unanimous determination, he would remain and
fight to the death,—in the night he fled in secret and the cam
paign was at an end.
Of the events of 1849, I can hardly now stay to say a word.
We all know how republican Venice under Manin, continued
for a year to resist all the power of Austria by sea and land.
We can never forget the defence of Rome, whither or to Venice,
the republican volunteers repulsed from serving the country in
Lombardy repaired—the heroic defence of Rome under the
Triumvirate of which Mazzini was the chief—the brightest and
saddest page in the history of the Italian Movement. A defence
which, hopeless as it proved to be, was the greatest moral
victory, the most pregnant with consequences for the future,
which Italy has yet achieved. Rome fell after three months
siege, to the overpowering force and the matchless perfidy of
the French. I say that its hopeless defence was the greatest
of all moral victories for Italy. It was so, because it gave to
the unaided people a proof and a consciousness of its own
dignity and of its own faculties; it was so, because it upheld
for three months against the forces of France, Austria, Naples,
and Spain, the national flag in Rome, the future capital of the
nation, and because it shewed what Italian volunteers could do
against all present hope for the future of their country. Twice
were the French troops attacked at the point of the bayonet
�25
and repulsed far beyond the walls. The first occasion was on
the 30th of April, 1849; within a few days a Neapolitan army
of 15,000 men, led by the king in person, encamped at Albano,
some 15 miles from Rome, and on the 10th of May the French
troops again attacked and were again repulsed. On the 19th
of May an armistice was concluded, and negotiations com
menced with Lesseps the French envoy, pending which the
little army at Rome marched against the Neapolitan king at
Velletri, and put him ignominiously to flight; laying the founda
tion for Garibaldi of that wondrous prestige which enabled him
a year ago to free Sicily and Naples, with a handful of volunteers
opposed to an army of 100,000 men, to enter the capital alone,
and to drive the son of Bomba to seek refuge in an almost im
pregnable fortress. On the 31st of May the French envoy
signed a convention between the Roman assembly and himself,
on the ratification of which, by General Oudinot and the French
Government, the gates were to be opened to the army of France,
with a new armistice to be, in case of non-ratification of the
convention, prolonged for fifteen days. The General refused
his assent and produced private instructions of his own, but
promised not to recommence the attack before
the
*
4th of June.
To his eternal infamy, and that of the government which he
served, he forfeited his word, attacked by surprize in the night
of the 2nd and the defence was at an end. And throughout
the whole of this unequal struggle, not only Rome but all the
Roman states remained faithful to the Assembly and Govern
ment of their own choice, and to the flag of the nation which
they had commissioned them to raise and to defend. That
unanimity was the downfall of the temporal papacy, the
thunders of the Vatican were henceforth to rank as stage tricks
to an accustomed audience,—the papal chair must rest on
French bayonets or tumble to the ground. And the protest of
that sublime defence was more, it determined the nature of her
future efforts to all Italy, it rendered impossible at any moment
the adoption by Italy of any other goal but unity, it bound
Italy, without the possibility of being led, or driven, or com
pelled astray, to its accomplishment. Rome for her capital, the
sea and the Alps her frontier lines, were the inevitable future
�26
of the Italian people. And I beg you mark, as if to enhance
the value of this protest and this proof, the triumvirate of men
who ruled Rome during the defence, was chosen for this spe
cial task, on the receipt of the intelligence that Charles Albert’s
renewed campaign had terminated within a few days of its com
mencement, with the disastrous and fatal defeat of Novara.
And thus it was that Italy made her experience of Monarchy
and Republicanism, as agencies towards the achievement of
the national unity.
Such were the efforts, and such the
failures of 1848 and 1849.
My next theme will be the lessons which Italy thereby learned,
and the future action, and the future relation of parties, and of
the instinctive nation, to the present time.
�LECTURE II.
There were certain things made evident to demonstration
by the events of ’48 and ’49. I will clear the ground by stating
these results at once.
First, it was made clear that all Italy was, and would continue
to be, bent on driving out Austria and on accomplishing her
entire independence from foreign rule; and that Austria could
never hope to hold Venice and Lombardy save by the sword,—
in fine, that she was but encamped upon Italian soil, and that
it was a mere question of time and opportunity when the at
tempt to expel her would be again renewed.
Secondly, it was proved that the tendency, the instinct of the
nation was towards unity. To make this assurance doubly sure
there was the fact that with the exception of Piedmont, every
Italian government was necessarily pro-Austrian and antipopular, having nothing to hope and everything to fear from the
national tendency, bound therefore by the logic of its position
to suppress liberty even within its own territories at any risk;
and then there was also to be taken into account the fact of the
existence of a large, active, and restless popular party, with its
ramifications in all parts of the peninsula—the national or re
publican party, pledged and devoted ora e s&wpre to the accom
plishment of the unity as well as the independence of the
country.
Further, however weak and wavering might have been the
policy of Charles Albert, Piedmont stood alone as an Italian
state which had fought for Italy against Austria, and which could
be relied upon as hostile to Austria, which could afford to be
�28
faithful to the constitution which the events of ’48 had induced
it to accord to its own subjects, and which might have hopes for
the future in allying itself again with the nation’s cause.
Charles Albert had abdicated after the defeat of Novara, and
died broken-hearted in exile. His son, Victor Emmanuel,
reigned in his stead, a soldier of undoubted courage, loving
danger and the field, not indeed a man of high intellect or cha
racter, but without special kingly faults, and eager to avenge the
reverses which had brought his father to the grave. Then
there was the fact of the great emigration, especially from
Lombardy and Venice, of the youth who had fought as volun
teers, and who, establishing themselves in Piedmont, made that
state the home of the most eminently Italian element in the
country, and which constituted, or might be made to constitute,
a new link between Piedmont and the Italy which was to be.
All these were capabilities for Piedmont, and moving causes in
the direction of a national career.
There was another cause likely to induce constitutional Pied
mont with more or less of decision towards some sort of active
national policy. If Piedmont should refuse in any manner to
lend herself to the national cause, the nation would inevitably
throw herself into the arms of the republican party pledged to
action. Piedmont had to choose between abandoning Italy to
the republican party and ranking herself with the other doomed
princedoms of the centre and the south, or endeavouring, by a
possible active policy of her’ own, to draw the people to herself
and to centre their hopes upon her alliance.
Piedmont was bound, therefore, to some sort of Italian
national policy; and considering how much Italy has already
accomplished of her unity, so much so, indeed, that no policy
save that of an absolute completion of the task is any longer to
be dreamed of or suggested, and considering, too, how pre
dominately the credit and the practical fruits of that success
have, in the opinion of the world and in the possession of
power, enured to the benefit of the Moderate party, it would
seem natural to imagine that they, too, must have had the unity
of their country long in view, and that they can have differed
only from the National party as to the policy best adapted to
�29
the attainment of a common object; and yet I believe the ac
ceptance of the idea of Italian Unity, as an object of practical
statesmanship, by the leaders of the Moderate party, must be
admitted to be of a very recent date.
I will go back to Gioberti, who was the founder of that party:
in the Sardinian Chambers on the 10th of February, 1849, on
the eve of the short campaign which ended in the defeat of
Novara, Gioberti said—“ I consider the unity of Italy a chimera.
We must be content with its union.” And if you look to the
writings, the speeches, the acts, of all the leading men of the
Moderate party until a very recent period, you will find them
all, without exception, not only not propounding or advocating
unity, or directed to its accomplishment, but explicitly directed
to a different solution. You will find the proof of what I say
in Balbo’s “Hopes of Italy;” in Durando’s “ Essay on Italian
Nationality,” advocating three Italies, north, centre, and south;
in Bianchi Giovini’s work entitled “ Mazzini and his Utopias
and in Gualterio’s “Revolutions of Italy.” Minghetti, Ricasoli,
Farini, each and all have been the advocates of a confederation
of Princes rather than of a united Italy.
Let me come to Cavour. An attempt has recently been
made to claim for him the credit of having since the days
of his earliest manhood conceived the idea of making him
self the minister of a future united Italy. In an article in the
July “ Quarterly,” by a well known pen, a letter of Cavour,
written about 1829 or 1830, is cited in implied justification of
this claim. He had been been placed under arrest a short time
in the Fort de Bard, on account of political opinions expressed
with too much freedom. In a letter to a lady who had written
condoling with him on his disgrace, he says:—“I thank you,
Madame la Marquise, for the interest which you take in my
disgrace; but, believe me, for all that, I shall work out my
career. I have much ambition—an enormous ambition; and
when I become minister I hope to justify it, since already in my
dreams, I see myself Minister of the Kingdom of Italy.” Now
this is, I need not say, a most remarkable letter, and of the
greatest interest, as showing the confidence in his own future,
at so early an age, of one of the greatest statesman of our
�30
times. But no one acquainted with the modern history of Italy,
and familiar with its recognised phraseology, could read in this
letter the prophecy of that unity which is now coming to pass.
The “Kingdom of Italy” is a well known phrase, borrowed
from the time of Napoleon, and has always meant, until facts
have enlarged its significance, that kingdom of Northern Italy
whose precedent existed under Napoleon, which was the object
of Piedmontese policy in ’48 and ’49, and one of the explicit
terms of the contract of Plombieres in ’59. It is rather a
curious inconsistency in the article in question that it itself
furnishes ample evidence that the unity of Italy was no part of
the practical programme of the Moderate party. “ Cavour,” we
are told, “founded in 1847, with his friends Cesare Balbo,
Santa Rosa, Buoncompagni, Castelli, and other men of mode
rate constitutional views, the Risorgimento, of which he became
the editor, and the principles of the new periodical were an
nounced to be i independence of Italy, union between the
princes and peoples, progress in the path of reform, and a
league between the Italian States.’ ” Again, after saying that it
was Ricasoli and the leaders of the Constitutional party who
recalled (in ’49) the Grand Ducal family to Tuscany, and that
Gioberti himself proposed that the Pope should be invited back
to Rome, the writer goes on to say :—“ It was an immense ad
vantage to the restored Princes to have been thus brought back
by the most intelligent and moderate of their subjects. It
rested chiefly with them to render the reconciliation permanent.
The occasion was lost through distrust and fear of those they
governed (not an unusual accompaniment of restorations), and
by a reckless disregard of their rights and feelings. A mode
rate, conciliatory, and just policy might at that moment have
united princes and peoples. All that the wisest and most influ
ential men in Italy asked was a federal union of the different
states in the Peninsula upon a liberal and constitutional basis,
from which even the House of Austria was not to be excluded.
But concession was obstinately refused. The Italian States
again brought under the direct influence of Austria, were
governed in a jealous and severe spirit, and some of them with
a cruelty which aroused the indignation of Europe. In their
�31
bitter disappointment the hopes of the Italians were turned to
Piedmont, and that kingdom necessarily became the rallying
point for Italian freedom; so that the position which she has
since held was made for and not by her.”
I must trouble you with one more quotation. At the con
ference of Paris in 1855, after the Crimean war, Piedmont was
represented by Cavour, who brought before the assembled
statesmen the condition of Italy; but unable to enter fully
into the Italian Question at the conferences, he addressed two
state papers on it to Lord Clarendon. “ In them he proved,”
continues the writer, “by indisputable facts, how impossible
it was for Piedmont to develope her material resources, or her
free institutions, whilst hemmed in on all sides by Austrian
bayonets, exposed to endless intrigues, and compelled for her
own safety to make a constant drain upon her finances. It is
evident by his language in the Congress, and by those docu
ments, that Cavour still looked to a solution of the Italian
difficulty in the withdrawal of the French and Austrian troops
from the territories of the Pope, and in a reform of the Italian
Governments themselves. His plan—at any rate for the tem
porary settlement of the question—was a confederation of
Italian States with constitutional institutions, and a guarantee
of complete independence from the direct interference and
influence of Austria; and the secularization of the legations
with a lay vicar under the suzerainty of the Pope. At that
time he would have been even willing to acquiesce in the
occupation of Lombardy by Austria, had she bound herself to
keep within the limits of the treaty of 1815. Had Austria
shown more wisdom and moderation, there can be little doubt
that the excuse for French intervention would have been
removed, and that the great struggle which has since taken
place in Italy might have been deferred for many years.” *
Now, you cannot, I think, have failed to note the glaring
inconsistency of these praises of what is called the moderation
* Letters of Cavour recently published in the Rivisita Contemporanae,
and referred to in the Turin correspondence of the Times of February 11th,
1862, are quite inconsistent with the view of Cavour’s policy and ideas
in 1855.
�32
of Cavour, with the assumption to him and to his party of the
whole credit of Italian unity, and the theory, now too prevalent,
that no other party has contributed anything but follies and ex
cesses, impediments, not aids to the accomplishment of the
great task. I believe such ideas to be as profoundly unge
nerous and unjust as they are evidently self-contradictory, and
I believe that they will be adjudged by history to be, so far as
they are in any degree in good faith, superficial, partial,
and utterly incapable of serving as any explanation of the
method of the evolution of the great problem of Italian
nationality.
I can tell you something about the origin of these ideas—
they take their rise in the very nature of the policy of the
Moderate party.
The polioy of that party, dating from 1848, was based on a
necessity, a hope, and a fear. It was necessary for Piedmont
to play some part for the nation, or the nation would march
over Piedmont to its goal. It was possible to play that part and
to reap the reward of so doing. But it must either be played
boldly as a national revolutionary policy, or it must be played
in some sense, from the first, in opposition and in antagonism
to the policy of the national party. It would indeed have been
a grand and an inspiring spectacle could we have seen the
counsellors of the monarchy of Savoy, on the very morrow of
its great discomfiture, taking heart from the very depth of their
defeat, and giving themselves unequivocally to the service of
the entire nation. They would assuredly have met with their
reward, in the unquestioned and undivided leadership of a
national movement far higher than anything we have yet seen
in its moral meaning, and pregnant with infinitely grander
consequences to the civil and religious progress of the world ;
but I am not idealist enough to tax men or parties with not
accomplishing a miracle of self-transformation or of faith.
Another method was their inevitable choice ; without abso
lutely defining their ultimate aim, they had to bid against the
national party for the sympathies of the Italian populations,
and above all they had to secure the initiative for them
selves.
�33
This policy once entered upon begat unavoidably antagonism
and distrust, and made it more difficult than ever—though
mistakenly, as events have shown—for them to believe that
they could rely on the nation to accept monarchy when the
nation was once roused to arms. Choosing not to rest abso
lutely on the nation they—or I should rather say Cavour (for
from the moment he laid his hand to the work it became his
own) turned to Europe—to its constituted powers and its diplo
macy, and sought there to strengthen Piedmont for eventu
alities which must sooner or later arise. He concluded treaties
of commerce, he cultivated diplomatic relationships, and by his
successful home and foreign policy, and the general vigour of
his administration, he created a new feeling of confidence in
Piedmont as a well-governed, compact, constitutional govern
ment, the one bright spot in the otherwise sombre picture of the
foreign and domestic misrule of the peninsula.
But, in carrying out this vital portion of his policy, he came
to play a double part. And I ask you to note this, for it is the
key of that which I have now to explain. In Italy it was neces
sary to suggest hopes, however carefully undefined, which
should keep in check the influence of the National party;
abroad he had to protest not only against that party but against
those very popular aspirations which at home it was necessary
that he should be supposed to serve. Hence two languages;
one for the secret agencies, discrediting the National party, yet
whispering the same hopes—and one for state documents and
diplomatic communications, ignoring any thought of Italy save
as her condition imperilled or embarrassed the monarchy of
Savoy, and here again repudiating the National party, and
building up upon the fact of their existence and their restless
and troublesome activity, the most cogent arguments in his own
favour which could be addressed to the representatives of exist
ing monarchies in Europe.
Thus we may understand how it became literally a part of the
system of business, if I may so say, of the Moderate party to
discredit, in every way, the objects, the means, the doings, and
even the personal character of the leaders of the party of action.
If you think of the subsidizing of the press in which foreign
D
�34
governments delight, of the influence of the salons and the
ante-chamber on some purveyors of news, and of the instinctive
fear and hatred, of the prejudice devoid of conscience and the
enmity without law, with which anything linked with the names
of democracy or republic is regarded in the high places of
despotically monarchical Europe, you will not wonder when I
say that a measure of injustice has been dealt out to a deserving
party in Italy of which I have never known the parallel, and
which history will condemn as a calumny and a disgrace.
But I have no desire to retort injustice. It were an easy task
to oppose the diplomatic professions of Count Cavour to the
claims of an exclusive patriotism set up on his behalf and on
that of his party, and to leave the matter there. But I and you
are interested in arriving at a just appreciation of the policy and
of the man, and this is what 1 now proceed to attempt. First
then, I believe that Cavour had from his earliest days the idea of
independence firmly rooted in his mind, and that he never
wavered in the intent of driving Austria beyond the Alps. Any
expressions, any proposals of his to the contrary, at any time,
were mere diplomacy—into the morals of which I do not now
enter. If in 1855, he did, as the Quarterly Revieiver says, profess
“ a willingness to acquiesce even in the occupation of Lom
bardy by Austria, had she bound herself to keep within the
limits of the treaty of 1815,” I am not therefore disposed to
infer that he ever contemplated, much less accepted the possi
bility of the struggle which has ensued, being “ deferred for
many years.” Cavour knew too well that there was no real
danger to the speedy accomplishment of Italian independence
in any such professions. I will take another case, and shall
quote from the official correspondence published by the French
government. On the 10th September, 1860, after the invasion
by Garibaldi of the Neapolitan States, Cavour wrote to Baron
• Talleyrand, “ If we are not at the Cattolica before Garibaldi we
are lost; the revolution will invade central Italy. We are
forced to act.” Again, in a circular of M. Thouvenel, of
October, 1860, I find these words:—“Signor Farini (sent by
Cavour) has explained to the Emperor (at Chambery) the very
embarrassing and dangerous position in which the triumph of
�35
the revolution, to a certain extent personified in Garibaldi,
threatens to place the government of his Sardinian Majesty.
Garibaldi was on the point of freely traversing the Roman
States, raising the populations as he went; and had he once
passed that frontier, it would have been utterly impossible to
prevent an attack on Venice. The Government of Turin had one
mode left open to it in order to prevent that eventuality, and
that was to enter the Marches and Umbria as soon as the arrival
of Garibaldi had produced disturbances, and re-establish order
without infringing on the authority of the Pope, and if need
were to give battle to the revolution in the Neapolitan territory,
and request a congress to immediately decide the destinies of
Italy.” Now, certainly these professions of motive cannot be
said to be very creditable to Cavour, and they look as unlike as
possible to the arguments of a patriot having the accomplish
ment of his country’s unity above everything else at heart. And
yet I do not, therefore, argue that Cavour did not willingly take
advantage of that mighty step of Garibaldi, which gave half
Italy to the new kingdom, and which enabled him, despite his
own past professions, to lift his policy at once to the height of
an openly declared national policy. On the other hand, I be
lieve that neither he nor any other statesman actually in power,
in his own country or elsewhere, believed in Italy being as pre
pared for unity as she has proved herself to be. And although
his faith in Italy must have grown with the growth of his own
policy, and although he may from time to time have had visions
of its possible ulterior development, yet I also believe that up
to the close of the campaign of 1859 (and indeed after its close
and until, on his retirement from office, he saw the people of
Italy in the Duchies and in the Romagna, with a singleness
of purpose and strength of will which, under the influence of a
national faith, made them as one man, better his own policy at
the moment of its apparent defeat) his practical idea was a
kingdom of the north.
Now, I think there is abundant evidence in support of these
views. Cavour’s sense of personal mortification and of failure,
as well as his indighation at the peace of Villafranca, are well
known—he had no conception that Italy was in a mental condin 2
�36
tion to take up the diplomatic game at the very moment of that
seeming checkmate, and by the passive resistance of an abso
lutely unanimous population, to defeat the purpose of their too
powerful ally. A curiously-worded telegram has lately been
brought to light, I think, by Guerazzi, in which Cavour notified
to Ricasoli the conclusion of the peace. If its curt picturesque
ness be not quite suitable for ears polite, you will forgive
me, for the interest which attaches to it as part of the res gestae
of the time. This, then, is the telegram:—“ Cavour to Ricasoli,
—Peace with Austria. I resign. Dukes back. All to the
devil.” Fortunately, Cavour was wrong in the direction in
which all was going, as he soon discovered, returning then with
greater energy, and, can we doubt it, with greater confidence
than ever to his task.
But we have better evidence than this. We know the terms of
the compact of Plombieres. You will think, perhaps, that I speak
with too great confidence in saying that we know the terms. I
will tell you the grounds, then, of that strength of assertion.
You will remember when, on January 1, 1859, the Emperor
Napoleon spoke those words of startling import to Baron
Hiibner, which first gave the alarm of war in Europe. Already
before that day particulars of the compact and the general plan
of the campaign had reached this country from two different
but most reliable sources; they were essentially the same par
ticulars as those which were first published, as a revelation in
the columns of the Times sometime not earlier than the follow
ing month of March; and everything that has since happened
or come to light has only tended to confirm their accuracy. A
cause of war was to be sought with Austria, she was to be
tempted to take the offensive, the campaign was to be a short
one—if necessary peace on the Mincio. If Venice and Lom
bardy were gained to Piedmont, Nice and Savoy were to be
yielded to France. Napoleon, the cousin, married to the king’s
daughter, was to find a kingdom in Tuscany.
And now mark, all these particulars reached here, as I have
given them, not as conjectures or beliefs, but as the reports,
coming from two different sources, of what had been actually
agreed upon between the Emperor and Cavour. I need hardly
�37
tell you that Napoleon, Jerome’s son, with his separate corps
d'ctrmee operating across the Duchies, found that there was no
hope for him ; I need hardly remind you that peace was made
upon the Mincio, and that Venice not being gained, Nice and
Savoy did not become, by virtue of the bond, the due of France,
but were claimed because the Duchies and Romagna persisted
in giving themselves to the king.
I ask then, first, is this not sufficient evidence that a king
dom of Northern Italy was the limit of the practical conception
of the great statesman of the Moderate party; and in the
second place, I would also ask whether the complete success of
the programme of Plombieres in its original entirety, would
not, in establishing a northern Italy, and interposing a French
Prince between it and the centre and the south, have rendered
more distant and more difficult the attainment of a united
national existence ? And if the partially defeated programme
has been made to be more fruitful than could have been the
whole, once again I would ask you whether there is even com
mon honesty or common sense in persistently heaping the
whole merit of Italian unity upon one party and one man, and
in refusing to the true instinct of the nation and to the self
abnegating fidelity to their great aim of the National or so called
Republican party, the credit of having contributed to a result
greater than was the aim of the Moderate party itself, and higher
than the limits of its faith ?
Let me borrow an illustration from the science of Dynamics.
The Italian problem may be likened to that which in Dynamics
is explained by what is known as the parallelogram of forces.
Cavour’s policy alone would carry the question to A, the end of
the shorter side,—A being a kingdom of Northern Italy for the
House of Savoy; the national instinct and the National party
would carry it the longer side to B—the nation indivisible per
haps republican. By the resolution of forces, the diagonal is
taken toC, national unity, monarchical, and Piedmontese. Now
it is not unreasonable to think the diagonal the safer course, or
if you will the only possible course to unity, but it is not allow
able to ignore the existence of a force without whose contributed
impulse that point could not have been attained.
�38
But we are not dealing with unreasoning forces; such has
not been the force of the Republican party. This party an
nounced itself as republican at a time (in 1838) when there was
nothing to hope from monarchy, when the necessity, in an edu
cational sense was felt, of a definite Unitarian programme. I
do not mean to say that this was the only cause of the republi
canism of the party; but it was the justification of inscribing
the republican motto on their national flag. But the Republican
party have never for a moment been guilty of the inconsistency
of even desiring to force their creed upon an unwilling people.
Their aim was to constitute the national sovereignty, and the
sovereign nation must decide upon the form of its own future.
And thus it is that the royal House of Piedmont, always the
only possible Ralian monarchy, has had but to give itself to the
nation to have the certainty of being accepted by the nation ;
for who could dream that the nation ever would refuse the
crown to the soldier king who should unite his fate with theirs,
and with them achieve the independence of his country ? Is
not the instance of Garibaldi enough ? Does not the monarchy
know, has not the monarchy always known, that at the moment
of action it might ever rely upon him to lead the youth of Italy,
call them republican or not, to die for it and Italy upon the
battle field ?
But I will not leave the matter here with Garibaldi, the man
of instinct and action rather than the man of thought. I will
speak of the organized party not upon the field of battle. What
has their course of action been ? I assert then, and I speak
here what is matter of my own knowledge, that there never has
been a time since the movement of 1848 inclusive, in fact, since
Piedmont, an exception to all other Italian governments, be
came constitutional and ceased to be the bounden tool of
Austria, that this party has not been ready practically to
accept monarchy, provided always that monarchy committed
its fortunes to those of the unity of the country. And further, I
say that from the moment when it became possible—after the
peace of Villafranca—by a mere act of adhesion so to commit
monarchy, such act was accomplished with an active aid from
them, which should have been held convincing proof of the
�39
^singleness of their devotion to the one great aim of a recon
stituted nation.
k I will give you irrefutable proof of what I say. There is a
man whom I have named as the founder of this party, and who,
though continuing in exile, or traversing Europe or even re
visiting his own country at the risk of his life, has still re
mained its acknowledged head. I speak of Joseph Mazzini,
long my revered friend, whom I, in intimate daily life, know
perhaps better than any other living man, English or Italian,
knows him, of him whom calumny the most unscrupulous and
systematic, so long continued and so incessant as to have
deceived many _of the most liberal minded and justly meaning
of my own countrymen, has made it suffice to name, to suggest
ideas of anarchy and civil war, of ruin to all wise counsels, and
to Italy’s best or only hopes. I will show you his part towards
monarchy, in the pursuit of that which is now, but only now, a
common aim.
During the Lombard campaign of 1848, before the Decree of
Fusion, proposals were made to Mazzini in the name of
Castagneto, the king’s secretary. It was proposed that he
should constitute himself patron of the monarchical fusion,
that he should endeavour to draw over the republicans ; that he
should have in return as much democratic influence as he
could wish in the construction of the Articles of the Constitu
tion which would be given, and an interview was suggested
with the king. Mazzini replied that to assure the independence
and unity of the country he would sacrifice not his republican
faith, but all action for it, and that already the republicans were
silent upon it for the sake of independence and the war. But,
he said, that they regarded the “Italy of the North” as a fatal
conception, too ambitious for their princes and diplomacy,
and not sufficient for the people of Italy. Thanks to this,
popular enthusiasm was beginning to be extinct, the govern
ments were already showing their hostility, and the chances of
war were turning against them. To turn them in their favour
Charles Albert must dare all, raise the banner of Unity, and call
the nation to arms. When asked what guarantees the king
�40
must give of his devotion to unity, he hastily drew up the
terms of a proclamation containing these words :—
“ Ifeel” the king should say, “ that the time is ripe for the unity
of our country; I hear the shudder which thrills and oppresses
your souls. Up, arise ! I lead the way ! Behold, I give you
as the gage of my good faith the spectacle, hitherto unknown to
the world, of the priest king of the new epoch ; an armed
apostle of the idea-people; architect of the temple of the nation !
In the name of God and Italy, I tear the ancient treaties which
kept you dismembered and which are dripping with your blood 1
I call upon you to overthrow the barriers which still separate
you, and to group yourselves into legions of free brethren
around me, your leader, ready to conquei' or to die with you!”
How magnificent a trumpet call to a revolutionary war! I
cite it not, however, you will understand, as showing what
monarchy might then reasonably have done. I fear that at
that time it was already too late for such a policy; but I adduce
it as evidence of the truth of what I said that Mazzini and his
party had always been ready to act with monarchy for unity.
My second proposition was that as soon as monarchy was, or
rather as soon as she could be, by the people’s act, committed
to unity—the National party helped to accomplish that act, and
for the sake of unity gave themselves to monarchy.
I will call into court the testimony of deeds, not words alone.
On the eve of the campaign of ’59, leaving and even desiring
the bulk of their youth to give themselves to the war under
Garibaldi, Mazzini, with certain of the party, stood professedly
aloof, exposing and protesting against the scheme of Plombieres,
the details of which he knew and published, and preparing the
mind of the country to defeat when the time came, so much of
the compact as opposed itself to the unity of the nation. The
time did come, with the peace of Villafranca. Was a single
voice raised to say
royalty has betrayed us, away with
royalty?” Was that moment, when Cavour despaired, seized
upon to undermine his party, and sow dissension in the camp ?
I will tell you. Immediately after the peace of Villafranca on
the 20th of July, in the Pensiero ed Azione, Mazzini wrote,
�41
“ jLwerty and National Unity. Let this be the sole cry that
bursts from those who will not allow Italy to be a dishonoured
slave. * * * What was the aim of those who separated
themselves from us, and gave themselves to the French alliance ?
Their aim was like ours, one free Italy independent from all
foreigners * * * Now circumstances point out the same
ground for us all; now there is no hope left save in the people.
Let all disputes cease. In the name of the honour of Italy let
us unite. Accursed be he among us who cannot cancel the
memory of all mutual reproaches and accusations in the great
principle that by uniting we may and ought to save our country.”
And he and his party have remained absolutely true to this
programme; they co-operated in those acts of adhesion, deeds
not words alone, by which the Duchies and the Romagna per
sisted in giving themselves to the king, who had to play the
part of an ungracious unwillingness to accept this adhesion—
they planned, and urged, and discussed with members of the
government—I speak of Mazzini himself—Garibaldian expedi
tions upon Naples. These expeditions were ultimately for
bidden and prevented for the time ; but they were bent on that
union of the south which, while it gave Italy to the monarchy of
Piedmont, would conclusively Italianize the policy of that
monarchy, enlarge its dimensions, and be another step tending
to emancipation from the thraldom of a too subservient alliance
with France. It was Mazzini himself who planned the Sicilian
[.insurrection in the following year. Rosolino Pilo, of whom I
spoke before, kept up that movement until Garibaldi could
arrive. It was the same party who prepared the way for Gari
baldi’s entrance into the Neapolitan capital alone—the same
party who furnished and organized and despatched the greater
part of those volunteers who gained Naples and Sicily to the
new kingdom.
And all this they did for monarchy, or rather, through
monarchy, for Italy. Truly it has been a wonderful and an un
accustomed spectacle to see a party called revolutionary and
republican, heaping provinces upon a kingdom, and giving to a
policy which was not their own, a success and a justification
which it could not have earned alone. It has been a miracle of
�42
devotion to a great aim. Each fresh triumph for their great
principle and aim has been cutting ground from under their own
feet for their rivals to stand upon. And on the day of complete
emancipation they, the first teachers, the great martyrs, the in
cessant agitators, the forlorn hope of Italian unity, before
fortune’s smiles were won, will disappear and merge into the
common nation.
There is a curiously interesting estimate, though not from a
favourable point of view, of the two rival policies which I have
been discussing, and of the remarkable men with whom they
are identified. It is in M. Guizot’s recent work on Society and
the Church. He says :—“ The Italian movement * * * has only
burst forth and is only being accomplished under the impulsion
and with the alliance of the republican and democratic party,
which has been pursuing in Italy an end much more advanced,
a revolution much more profound, than the mere expulsion of
the foreigner and the reform of established governments * * *
It is the republican party which has been in Italy the first
patron and the ardent propagandist of Italian unity; it is by the
incessant action of M. Mazzini and his adherents that this idea
has been spread and has been accepted. * * * Cavour—had he
from the first a preconceived determination in favour of Italian
unity ? Has he constantly desired and constantly pursued, as
his aim, Italian royalty, one and constitutional, as M. Mazzini
has desired and pursued the Italian republic, one and demo
cratic ? I know not; but it matters little, for if Cavour did not
premeditate all that he has done, if he has been drawn on to more
conquests than those he sought, he has at least resolutely ac
cepted the impulsion, and if he has only reached the end im
pelled by his rival, he has at least conquered his rival by
robbing him of his arms.”
There is much in this passage of keen and true perception,
but M. Guizot fails to see that the arms were not stolen, but
were heaped upon the victor that he might have no choice,
accepting them, but to conquer in the common cause.
There is then now but one great aim, one common cause in
Italy—henceforth no party, no man, can be permitted to intrude
a less or a divergent purpose—and that purpose is the nation
�43
reconstituted in its entirety, from the Alps to the sea. The
question of policy, of method of accomplishment, alone re
mains. The Moderate party, in power, naturally desire to keep
the control of the movement in their own hands, and to go
to Venice and to Rome only when and how they may think
good policy allows. And in this desire they are justified, and
more than justified, for if they are not capable of exercising
such supreme direction and control, they are no fit government
for renascent Italy. But, in endeavouring to exercise it, they
are, as I think, under two influences, which have tended to en
feeble and to lead them astray. The first is their’ old fear of
the so-called Republican party—now a foolish fear but still fed
by the always exaggerated antagonism of parties in a revolu
tionary era, and by the jealousies and petty personal ambitions
which belong to a successful political coterie. Secondly, they are
hampered in their policy and confirmed in their antagonism to
the National party, by their alliance with France. The National
party naturally chafes, as Garibaldi is known to chafe, under
the policy dictated by that alliance. Rome is still held by the
French, and Italy is kept from the easy conquest of her natural
and necessary capital, by her own ally. How can you expect
the Italian people in a revolutionary time—how especially can
you expect that southern population which does not owe its
liberty either to France, or to Piedmont, but to Garibaldi and
his volunteers, and which only gave itself to Piedmont in order
to give itself to a united Italy,—to be content that the destinies
of its country should hang expectant on a policy dictated from
Paris through Turin ?
But enough of these differences and these difficulties, through
which Italy has yet to work her way,' and in spite of which she
will, it is my profound conviction, conquer her salvation. These
are not the features of the great whole, on which I care to
dwell, or on which I shall ever speak unless it be to defend men
who have wrought, and suffered, and accomplished, and merited far
more than the world will yet acknowledge, for their country.
There are men—but few I am proud to say in our own
country, who, not loving Italy as I do, would, if the temper
of the times allowed, gratify their despotic instincts by easy
�criticisms on the morality of the policy of Cavour, and who
would like to see, and to make us see, nothing in this great
Italian movement but the ambition of a dynasty and the
rivalries and jealousies of parties and of public men. But
for me, when I look, endeavouring to raise myself—as it is
the grand merit of some leaders of the National Italian
party to have raised themselves—above all such considerations,
when I look at the grand and glorious outline of this mighty
movement, when, resolutely closing my eyes to all that is
petty and personal and transitory in the immediate present,
I seek to penetrate to the very soul of this great argument,—
I see not the ambitions of dynasties, not the rivalries and
jealousies of parties or of public men—these are but the
exhibition of human passions and human interests working in
subservience to a great and a providential aim ; but I do see, and
Britain sees, with joy and with reverence she sees, the grandest,
the most hopeful, the most inspiring spectacle which this earth
can furnish forth—the regeneration of a people.
�45
MR. STANSFELD’S SPEECH
On
Italian Question, delivered in the House of
Commons in the Debate of July 19th, 1861.
the
Sir,—If this discussion were one which had been, or which
could be confined to the question which has been directly raised by
the hon. member for Bridgewater (Mr. A. W. Kinglake), I should
not propose to myself to take any part in it. Not that I doubt the
importance of the question ; on the contrary, I think it would be
difficult to exaggerate its importance ; for, if the fears which the
hon. member entertains—if the possibilities which he suggests
*
«were unfortunately ever to be realized in fact, it might well be
no less than the shipwreck of that great policy of non-interven
tion which we have done so much to uphold in Europe, in the
jcause of peace. Nor is it, Sir, that I can pretend to say that I
|fcave been entirely reassured by the statements of the noble Lord,
for I fear that 1 must still attach some credit to those sources of
information which revealed in this country—and here I can more
than confirm the statement of the noble Lord (Lord John
Russell)—the compact of Plombieres, and the very plan of the
Lombard campaign, even before those memorable words were
ispoken to Baron Hiibner, which first roused Europe from her
fdream of peace. But, Sir, the truth is that the question cannot
so confine itself—the truth is that it could not even arise for
discussion, were it not for the existence in Italy of a fact and
of a policy which it is of the deepest interest and moment for
us, not only as well-wishers of Italy, but as Englishmen and as
members of the European community, to take into account. Sir,
the policy is that which has hitherto obtained too exclusively in
�46
Italy, of too absolute and too subservient a dependence on
one foreign alliance; the fact is the long standing and anomalous
fact of the occupation of Rome by the troops of the French
empire. Sir, I will address myself to the question of this policy,
which so deeply concerns us. What ought to be, what ought
we to desire to be, the policy of Italy at the present time ? Sir,
Italy has recently lost a great statesman. I have not been one
of his indiscriminate admirers, but this is not an occasion on
which I ought to enter upon any lengthened criticism of his
policy. Suffice it for me to say that, after his great labours and
his great successes, he is gone, and that with him perhaps we
may be permitted to hope are also gone personal engagements
or at least personal entanglements which it would be well for
the honour and welfare of Italy, for the welfare and peace of
Europe, that they should be buried in his grave. What should
be the policy of his successors ? Italy must have Venice and
she must have Rome, nor can she pause or dally long upon the
road which leads to Venice and to Rome, at the risk of fatal
internal dissensions and of national suicide. In pursuit, then,
of these objects which she cannot relinquish, and which hei’
ministers explicitly avow, what is the policy which it is for us a
matter at once of the highest interest and of the strictest duty—
for I hold that in this matter the interests of Italy, of England,
and of Europe are identical—to induce, and, if we may, en
able her to pursue ? Sir, there are but two policies open to the
counsellors of the new kingdom:—The first is the policy of
Plombieres. Sir, I have to confess that that policy—thanks to
the indomitable spirit of unity of the Italian people—has so far
been productive of beneficial results which at the time of its
inception I did not anticipate as possible. But this I think I
may safely say, that not a single member of this House will be
found to rise in his place to night and to recommend us to ap
prove a repetition of that policy. Well, then, what is the only
alternative policy before the kingdom of Italy ? Is it not, I ask,
simply a truly national Italian policy, resting in absolute depen
dence on no single alliance, but, supported by the sympathies
and the moral aid of all free peoples, multiplying and organiz
ing its own forces, so that in due time Italy may suffice to her
�47
self for the completion of her emancipation ? Sir, there are
great dangers to Europe in a Franco-Italian war of indepen
dence—dangers of cessions of territory, suggested in the speech
of the hon. member for Bridgewater, which might sweep away
that last poor remnant of confidence, on which, as on a slender
thread, hangs suspended the peace of Europe—dangers of
dei many being brought into the field, and of our witnessing an
active alliance between Italy and France, not only on the plains
of Lombardy, but on the banks of the Rhine. But, Sir, there
aie also gieat dangers to Italy, and therefore to Europe, in an
exclusive Franco-Italian alliance, things remaining as they
are. We all know that Rome, in the occupation of the soldiers
of the Empire, is the focus of all reactionary intrigues and
attempts. But this is not all. There is some truth in the
statements of disaffection in the south, which have come from
the other side of the House to-night—disaffection on the part,
not of the adherents of the exiled dynasty, but amongst the
ranks of the patriots themselves, and which all the absolute
fidelity to the cause of Italian unity, and all the unexampled
self-abnegation of their leaders has not sufiiced to dispel or to
prevent. Sir, I do not desire to criticise in a hostile spirit the
faults of judgment or of intention on the part of the ministers
of Turin which have caused this disaffection. I wish simply to
indicate the sole remedy, which consists—I say it without fear
of contradiction—in the pursuit of a truly national and indepen
dent policy, in trusting and not fearing the people, in rallying
them to the aid of the Government, and not, in obedience to the
exigencies of an exclusive and subservient alliance, refusing to
utilize and to organize the immense willing force of a nation
which desires to be free. Sir, there are three practical bases on
which such policy should rest. The first is friendly and open
negotiations, in the face of Europe, with the French Emperor
for the withdrawal of his troops from Rome. Secondly, in order
to dispel the feeling in the south, that whereas of their own will
and by volunteer force alone, they freed themselves and gave
themselves to Italy, they find themselves treated as provinces of
Sardinia ; for such purpose, a clearly expressed understanding
that, her capital once regained to the Italian nation, a national
�48
assembly seated at Rome shall revise in a national sense the
laws of the country, in order that the “ statute” of Piedmont,
borrowed for a time, may not permanently remain without re
vision and modification the law of the reconstituted nation. And
lastly, the multiplication and the organization of the armed
forces, regular and irregular, of the country. At present, spite
of protestations and declared intentions, Italy, with already
twenty-two millions of inhabitants, with nothing to live for, or
to dream of, or to make sacrifices for, but the completion of her
own independence, can place no more armed men in line than
the little neighbouring republic of Switzerland, with less than
one-eighth of her population ; and of the 150,000 men she can
so place in a line, 60,000 are required to restore order in the
south ; while of the volunteer element there is no organization
whatever at all worthy of the name. And thus it comes to pass
that Italy is kept in absolute dependence—in wrongful, foolish
dependence—whatever confidence her ministers may have in
his intentions—on the will and the power of her great ally.
Sir, before I sit down, I desire to say something of a party
in Italy of which I have some special knowledge—the party
originally known as the party of Young Italy, then as the
Republican, then as the National party, and now as the party of
Action. Sir, I have never known, I have never heard or read of
any party in any country or in any time which has been so per
sistently misrepresented and maligned. In the ranks of that
party was born the idea of Italian unity ; by them that idea wras
nurtured into a faith. It was their faith, I may say that it was
my faith, when not a single English statesman could be found
to believe in the possibility of its realization. But, Sir, that
party not only created the idea and nursed it into a faith, but
they supplied also the motive power without which its realiza
tion so far would have been impossible. Trace back step by
step the policy of Count Cavour, and at each of such steps,
whether in argument before the assembled diplomacy of Europe,
or in act upon the field of Italy, eliminate the element of the
existence, of the determination, of the restless enthusiasm of
this party—and you will find the step in argument would have
been impossible as it would have been abortive in point of fact.
�49
The latest is the most brilliant and themost convincing illus
tration of the truth of what I say. The House should know, if
the House does not already know, that by far the greater part
of the volunteers who under Garibaldi won Naples and Sicily—
half Italy—to the new kingdom, sprang from the ranks of this
party—men called republicans, led by one of themselves to die
upon the battlefield that monarchy might rule the future desti
nies of a united Italy Sir, this party—I know it well—has
a policy and programme of its own, to which I invite the
attention of the Government and of the House. It is a policy
consistent with the declarations of the present first minister of
the king. He has but to do, what he has not yet done, to carry
out his words in acts, and he will rally this party round him;
he will have with him all the active forces, all the vital elements
of the country, and the moral unity of Italy will be at once and
for ever assured. And, Sir, this programme and policy is neither
more nor less than that truly national and independent pro
gramme and policy, good for Italy and good for Europe, which
I have endeavoured to lay before the House.
E
�MR STANSFELD’S SPEECH
Delivered
at the
Annual Soiree of the Wakefield
Mechanics’ Institute,
on the
31st October, 1861.
■ Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen,—The most natural
topic for discussion upon an evening like the present, is- evi
dently the practical progress of the institution whose anniver
sary we are met together to commemorate; and the persons
most likely to be able to address you with interest and advan
tage to yourselves upon such a topic, are those who have been
practically concerned, during the past year, in the work of
that Institution. But it has come rather to be the habit of
Mechanics’ Institutes, upon these anniversary occasions, to
summon to common council with themselves those also without
their own body who are locally connected with themselves,
or who may be known as taking an interest in all sub
jects bearing upon the question, and ask them to address them
on such occasions as these. Now when that is so, it follows, as
a matter of course, that those who have not been practically
acquainted with the working of the institution are obliged to
fall back upon generalities. They talk to you of the necessity
of education, of the duty of self-education, of the duty of assist
ing in the education of your fellow-men, and they, perhaps, lay
before you the statistics of education in this and other countries.
But information and arguments of this description, although
very true and very well worth hearing, have become by repeti
tion somewhat trite, and hence we have seen of late years, as
�51
your chairman has already said, in meetings of this description,
as well as in agricultural meetings, that speakers are apt to
wander to any kind of subject, however remote it may appear
to be from the objects or institution in connection with which
I they were assembled, but which they think may prove interest
ing to those whom they may have to address. Now your chairI man has referred to a question in which he has been kind
enough to say that I have taken considerable interest, and with
which I have perhaps some special means of familial’ acquaint
ance. And with reference to that remark of your chairman I
have to note, and I think you must have noted, that of all those
questions of general interest which have of late years been
brought to the attention of public meetings of this descrip
tion, no questions have been found more universally interesting
than what we call foreign questions. I think it is not difficult to
understand why this should be so. You have heard from your
chairman a very eloquent and very accurate description of the
foreign question now so deeply interesting to us as a manufac
turing people—the American question, and I would ask you
what have you there ? You have there what I might call an
agglomeration of States—a kind of partnership of populations
not having the natural unity of purpose and of character which
belongs to an old and well-established nationality like our own
I —having, on the other hand, causes of dissension within its
bosom amply sufficient to rend the strongest nation, and at the
bottom of them all that great question of negro slavery,—a
question which I trust, will meet with some solution consistent
with the liberty of men, be they white or be they black, before
the war now commencing between the North and the South
shall be completed. Then, there is another vast nationality in
the East of Europe to which reference is not so often made—
not so often as it appears to me it would be well to make it—I
allude to the mighty empire of the Russias. There is no grander
spectacle, no more magnificent subject for our consideration in
these recent times than that which has been taking place in
Russia. You have there an internal revolution—you have the
emancipation of a serf-nation—you have Russia, thrown back
upon herself after her conflict and defeat in the Crimea, seeking
�52
to raise herself towards the same level of civilization as that on
which we stand in the west of Europe, and to hold her part with
us in the common progress of the civilized world. Then, turn to
Italy; what have you there ? You have a nation which has been
greater than any other nation—you have a nation which has
suffered more than any other nation—which, perhaps, has been
more degraded than any other nation—but which is now rising
to a unity and to a national life which promise to be second to
the nationality and to the life of no other nation in the world.
I need not ask you whether subjects of this description are not
of the deepest interest to all reasoning and thinking men. What
indeed can be more interesting to us in these days of extended
sympathies and of wider views, than what I may call the bio
graphy of nations ? But these questions are not only of interest
to us—I am entitled to say that if, upon these occasions, we
venture beyond the sphere of what we might strictly call educa
tional questions, there are no questions of general interest more
akin to the purposes of your Institution, more fitting as subjects
for your consideration and your study. For what are all these
questions of national movements, properly considered, but
educational phenomena upon the grandest scale—what are they
all but phases and steps in the life and progress of nations—
what are they all but partial evolutions in time and in space of
that great problem of all problems—the problem of the educa
tion of humanity, which in its complex unity contains the whole
progress of individual and collective man. Now, if I take a
view,—perhaps you may say so general, but I say so true of
this class of questions,—I ask whether it does not justify me
in saying that they are subjects for consideration and for study,
not only upon these anniversary meetings, but in the night
meetings of the members of your institutions. What subjects
can be more elevating, or more interesting, or more instructive
than those great national questions ? I would not deal with
them as I would deal with questions of party politics. I would
have you address yourselves to such questions as students, and
endeavour to seize upon their great outlines and to penetrate to
their very core. If you do so, one of the very first conclusions
you will come to, and a conclusion fitted to inspire you with
�53
,
confidence and courage in all the labours and sacrifices of life,
F will be this—that the great law of humanity is the law of pro
gress. I will take even the case of America—with respect to
which, as your chairman has said, there are many in this
country ready enough to say that it is the bursting of the bubble
r of Republicanism. If you will look at that question in the
student-like truth-seeking aspect which it demands, I ask you
whether you will not say there must be deeper causes there
than any question as to the form of government at stake ; and
whether—the North be entering upon a war with the South
blindly and foolishly or not—it is not evident that they are
at least instinctively endeavouring to cut the Gordian knot
of that past relationship between the South and the North,
which rendered the progress of liberty and which made
national dignity impossible in the United States. Now, let me
turn again for a moment to Ttaly. How interesting to look back
upon the Italian movement, and to trace its character from
former times down to this very day. How interesting to ask
ourselves what it is that Italy and the Italian movement have of
late years done for us as a nation 1 Why, all those who are
actively concerned in political life, and who deal at all with
the foreign policy of this country must know that the Italian
question has given us I might almost say a foreign policy. It
has taught us a new code of the rights and duties of nations—
it has done more than that, it has compelled us, somewhat slow
as we are to take any ideas from abroad, to become conscious
of the fact and to take cognizance of the fact, that what is called
j the question of nationalities is one of the greatest, if not the
most important question which is likely to occupy public
councils during the remainder of our lives. Then what is Italy
doing and hoping to do for herself ? Is it a question, however
great that question may be, simply of liberty or internal reforms,
which is being -worked out; is it simply that the Italians prefer
the Constitutional government of Cavour to the government of
the Pope ; or is it simply a question of independence—inde
pendence from all foreign influence, whether that influence be
&e influence of despotic and hostile Austria, or the influence of
a perhaps too powerful French ally ? Tf you look closely into
�54
the Italian question, and if you study its history, you can only
come to one conclusion, which is this—that the Italian question
is not simply a question of liberty—is not only a question of
independence, but that it is really a question of existence. “ To
be, or not to be ; that is the question.” I could trace to you,
did time afford, the history of Italy from former ages, and show
you the march of the nation towards the conception and the
realisation of its unity;—I could take you back to the days
of ancient Rome, and then on to the time of the Papacy,
when the Papacy had yet a mission to fulfil in Europe, and
show you Italy mistress of the Pagan and the Christian world ;
I could bring you down then to the days of the municipal re
publics of the middle ages—that bright period brilliant in arts,
in war, and in commerce; I could tell you that in those days
and from those days downwards, Italian minds, from Dante
and Machiavelli, to the present time, have dreamt of the
unity of their country; I could bring you next to the days of
the Great Napoleon and show you how, under his mighty
despotism even Italy had a foretaste of nationality, and began to
feel her strength upon the field;—I could tell you then of the
treaties of Vienna—those treaties to which it is a disgrace to us
that we were a party—I could tell you of their blasphemous
dividing of God’s heritage and of His people amongst the
scions of their different houses—I could tell you of the futile
protests of the representatives of the North Italian kingdom—
I could describe to you the revolution of 1821 in the North and
the South, and of 1831 in the centre—the institution of “the
Carbonari,” and that other institution much more potent, much
more pure in its objects and efforts—“ La Giovine Italia;”—I
could tell you of the forlorn hopes which were led, and of the
campaigns and movements of 1848 and 1849. I could show
you that even twelve years ago Italy was ripe for unity, and that
the people of every Italian state rose and proclaimed the inde
pendence and unity of their country—I could explain to you
how the jealousy of the different states of which Italy is com
posed frustrated the accomplishment of that idea,—then I
could show you the growth of that idea, and the fixity of pur
pose with which the Italian people have adhered to it down to
�the campaign of 1859, I could explain to you the compact of
Plombieres and the peace of Villafranca, and how the steadfast
ness of the Italian people snatched from a peace which disap
pointed their fondest hopes, the unity of their nationality—■
and having done this, you could come to no other conclusion
than that the object of Italy, that which they think of by day and
dream of by night is the existence of a free, a great, a united
and an independent people. If you were to go into such a
bourse of history you could not fail to feel as deeply as I feel
that unity is the great object of the Italian people, and that
from that unity would result advantage to Europe—the advantage
of that balance of power of which your chairman has spoken,
which ought to find its reality in the natural distribution of
nationalities—and that in the resuscitation of a people, which
has been great and which would yet be greater, there must be
involved a future hopeful and useful to humanity at large. For
if you look beyond the field of the immediate present—if your
eyes could pierce the intermediate haze of mere party questions,
the war of statesmen and the rival ambitions of contending
dynasties, or if amaster-hand in historic and philosophic art could
trace it to you, believe me, that no fairer or more immortal form
could be revealed unto your gaze than that of “ Italia risorta,”
crowned with the Capitol, girded by the Appenines, with
the blue waters of the Mediterranean smiling at her feet, and
holding in her hand the Book of Life, inscribed with a new and
higher moral code of a nation’s duties and a nation’s rights !
��
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The Italian movement and Italian parties: two lectures delivered at the Philosophical Institution, Edinburgh. Speeches delivered in the House of Commons and at the Wakefield Mechanics' Institute
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Stansfeld, James
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Notes: From the library of Dr Moncure Conway. Published at the request of the Garibaldi Italian Unity Committee.
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James Ridgway, Effingham Wilson, Adam & Charles Black
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[1862]
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Politics
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Conway Tracts
Italy
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Text
THE
NEW
GOSPEL
OF
PEACE
ABSORBING TO
ST.
BENJAMIN.
Manchester:
ABEL HEYWOOD, PRINTER, 56 & 58, OLDHAM STREET
London:
BACON & CO., 48, PATERNOSTER ROW.
��THE NEW GOSPEL OF PEACE
ACCORDING TO ST. BENJAMIN.
CHAPTER I.
1 The Mystery. 2 War in the Land of Unculpsalm. o Phernandiwud. 10 Seeketh a partner. 17 Searcheth the Scripture.
19 Findeth something 1$ his advantage. 24 And walketh
slantindicularly. 25 Is brought before the Judge. Wl Showeth
his innocence.
1. The mystery of the new gospel of peace.
2. In the days of Abraham, when there was war in the
land of Unculpsalm, and all the people fought with weapons
of iron, and with shipm®$$B®n.
3. (For there came a man eufcof the country beyond the
North Sea, a son of Tubal Cain, and joined himself unto
trie people of Unculpsalm, aridt made unto them ships of
iron, with towers upon the decks thereof, and beaks upon
the prows thereof, very mighty and marvellous),
4. There went out one who preached a new gospel of
peace. And it was in fhisiwise.
5. It came to pass in those days that in the country of
Mannatton, in the city which is called Gotham, that is over
against Jarzee, as thou goest down by the great river, the
River Hutzoon, to Communipah, there was a man whose
name was Phernandiwud.
6. And he was a just man, and a righteous; and he
walked uprightly before the world.
�6
THE NEW GOSPEL OF PEACE.
28. And he clid so. And Phernandiwud went out from,
before him justified in his wisdom and his innocence.
CHAPTER II.
1 The Pahdees. 2 They govern Gotham. 5 Phernandiwud
maketh friends of the Pahdees. 8 Who make him Chief Ruler
of the City. 10 And together they devour the substance of the
Men of Gotham. 14 The Watchmen of Gotham removed
from the rule of Phemandiwud. 17 Who gathereth together
the Hittites and the Ilammerites. 18 And conceiveth with the
Mystery of the New Gospel of Peace.
1. Now, it came to pass that in the city of Gotham were
many Pahdees, like unto, locusts for multitude. And they
were not of the land of Unculpsalm, But came from an island
beyond the great sea^a land of famine and oppression.
And they knew nothing. They read not, neither did they
write, and like the multitudes of Nineveh, many of them
did not know their right hand from their left.
2. Therefore the men of Unculpsalm, who dwelt in
Gotham, troubled themselves fettle to govern the city, and
paid the Pahdees richly to govern it for them.
3. For the men of Gotham were great merchants and
artificers, trading to the ends of the earth; diligent and
cunning in their busing’ , wise and orderly in their houses
holds; and they got great gain, and the fame of their wisdom
and their diligence was Spread abroad. Wherefore they
said, why shall we leave our crafts and our merchandise,
and our ships, and our feasts, and the gathering together of
our wives and our daughters, and our men-singers and our
women-singers, to give our time to ruling the city ? Behold,
here are the Pahdees who know nothing, who read not,
neither do they write, and who know not their right hand
�THE NEW GOSPEL OF PEACE.
7
from their left, and who have never governed even them
selves, and will he glad to govern the city in our stead.
4. Wherefore the men of Unculpsalm who dwelt in
Gotham, went the one to his craft, the other to his ships,
and the other to his merchandise; and the Pahdees gov
erned Gotham.
5. Now Phernandiwud saw that the men whom the
Pahdees appointed to be officers in Gotham fed at the pub
lic crib, and waxed fat, and, increased in substance. More
over, so great and mighty was the city of Gotham that they
who ruled it were powerful in the. land of Unculpsalm;
stretching out their hands from the North even unto'the
South, and from the East even unto the West; but most of
all were they powerful with the men of the South.
6. And Phernandiwud said within himself, Shall I not
feed at the public crib, and wax fat, and increase in sub
stance, and become a man of, power in the land of Uncul
psalm ?
7. So he made friends unto himsgjf among the Pahdees,
and of certain men of Unculpsalm who had joined them
selves unto the Pahdees, and .who called themselves Dim
michrats.
8. And he became a great man among them. And they
made him chief ruler of the.gity, And it was of the Pah
dees that he was firsts called Phernandiwud.
9. Now, when Phernandiwud was ©hief ruler of Gotham,
the Pahdees, and the men, of Unculpsalm which were also
Dimmichrats, did what was right in their own eyes ; and
they worked confusion in the city, and\ devoured the sub
stance of the men of Gotham. And the watchmen of the
city were as clay in the hands of Phernandiwud.
10. For he said, I will have a one man power; and the
one man shall be me, even me Phernandiwud; and the
Pahdees, and the Dimmichrats, and the watchmen of
Gotham, shall do my will; and after they have done my
will they may do what is right in their own eyes, and work
confusion, and devour the people’s substance.
�THE NEW GOSPEL OF PEACE.
11. And the men of Gotham were amazed and confounded;
and they said one to another,
12. Behold, we are held as naught by Phernandiwud and
them that are under him, and he will destroy us and our
eity.
13. But they could not cast him out, because of the
Pahdees, and the men of Unculpsalm who also were Dimmichrats.
14. Wherefore they said, we will pray the governor and
rulers of the province to take the watchmen of the city from
under his hand, and putin other watchmen who shall guard
the city, and the country round about the same; and he
shall no longer work confusion^and devour our substance,
and destroy our city.
15. Wherefore the watchmen were taken from under his
rule, and there were appointed other watchmen, whose
captains were not Pahdees and followers of Phernandiwud.
16. But Phernandiwud, because he loved the people, and
himself first, as number one of the people, withstood the
watchmen which the governor and the rulers of the province
had appointed. And he gathered together his watchmen
and much people of the Pahdees, and of the men of Uncul
psalm which also were Dimmichrats.
17. Hittites, so called, because they hit from the shoulder,
and Hammerites, because they brake the heads of all them
that set themselves up against them.
18. And the watchmen of Phernandiwud, and the Pahdees,
and the Hittites and the Hammerites, fought with the
watchmen appointed by the governor and chief rulers of the
province, doing in this the will of Phernandiwud. And
they fought many times, and they brake each the heads of
the other: yet was neither vanquished.
19. And when the judges of the province saw this, they
declared unto the governor, that by the great law of the
province, he could march an army upon Pherandiwud, and
his watchmen, and his Pahdees, and his Hittites, and his
Hammerites, and put them to the sword.
�THE NEW GOSPEL OF PEACE.
20. And when Phernandiwud read this declaration of the
Judges, he saw that there was an end of his rule over the
watchmen, of his one man power in Gotham, and he said
unto the watchmen, and to the Pahdees, and the Hittites,
and the Hammerites, Get you to: your houses, I have no ■
thing more to give unto you.
21. But he charged the cost thereof unto the city.
22. And this was th®, first tirne that Phernandiwud con
ceived in his mind th© mystery of the new gospel of peace,
CHAPTER. III.
1 The War in the land of Unculpsalm. 3 The Great Covenant.
5 The greatness of the land of Unculpsalm. I Provoked the
hatred of Kings and tffjpressws. 8 27ie Niggahs. 11 And
the Covenant concerning them. 14 The Niggahs. 16 There
arise men in Belial. 19 The Tshivulree. 22 And what the
Tshivulree did to the men of Belial. 24 The Dimmichrats
join themselves to the Tshivulree. 26 Thfr Everlasting Niggah. 27 Phillip of Atoms', aPrw$of Beelzebub. 29 Isaiah
• thrusteth him out of the Tabernacle. 31 But the Men of
Belial prevail. 35 And the spirit Bak Bohn possesseth their
Disciples. 39 The Phiretahs and Prestenbruux.
1. Now the war in the. land* of Unculpsalm was in this
-•wise.
2. The people were of one blood, but the land was in
many provinces. And the people ofi'the provinces joined
themselves together and cast off the yokeof a stubborn
king who oppressed them beyond the great sea. And
they said let us hake no king, but let us choose for our
selves a man to rule over us; and let us no longer be many
provinces, but one nation; only in those things which con
cern not the nation let the people in each province do what
fig right in their own eyes.
�10
THE NEW GOSPEL OF PEACE.
3. And let it be written upon parchment and be for a
covenant between us and our children, and our children’s
children forever—like unto a law of the Medes and Per
sians which altereth not.
4. And they did so. And the Great Covenant became
the beginning and the end of all things unto the men of
Unculpsalm.
5. And the men of Unculpsalm waxed great and mighty
and rich : and the earth was filled with the fame of their
power and their riches; and their ships covered the sea.
And all nations feared them. But they were men of peace,
and went not to war of their own accord ; neither did
they trouble or oppress the men of other nations; but
sought each man to sit under his own vine and his own
fig tree. And there were no poor men and few that did
evil born in that land, : except thou go southward of the
border of Masunandicsun.
6. And this was noised abroad; and it came to pass
that the poor and the down-trodden, and the oppressed of
other lands left the lands in which they were born, and
went and dwelt in the land of Unculpsalm, and prospered
therein, and no man molested them. And they loved that
land.
7. Wherefore, the kings and the oppressors of other lands,
and they that devoured the substance of the people, hated
the men of Unculpsalm. Yet, although they were men of
peace, they made not war upon them; for they were
many and mighty. Moreover ■ they were rich and bought
merchandise of othef nations, and sent them corn and gold.
8. Now there were inthe land of Unculpsalm Ethiopi
ans, which the men of Unculpsalm called Niggahs. And
their skins were black, and for hair they had wool, and
their shins bent out forward and their heels thrust out
backward; and their ill savor went up.
9. Wherefore the forefathers of the men of Unculpsalm,
had made slaves of the Niggahs, and bought them ancL
sold them like cattle.
�THE NEW GOSPEL OF PEACE.
11
10. But so it was that when the people Of the land of
Unculpsalm made themselves into one nation, the men of
the North said, We will no longer buy and sell the Nig
gahs, but will set them free; neither shall more be brought
from Ethiopia for slaves unto this land.
11. And the men of the Sduth answered and said, We
will buy and sell our Niggahs; and moreover we will beat
them with stripes, and they shsftl be our heWers of wood
and drawers of water forever | < and when our Niggahs
flee into your provinces, ye shall give them to us, every
man his Niggah; and after a time there shaft. no more be
brought from Ethiopias < as ye say. And this shall be a
part of the great covenant.«
12. And it was a covehant between the men of the
North and the men of thb South.
13. And it came to p&sg that thereafter the men of the
South and the Dimmichrats of the North, and the Pahdees
gave themselves night and day to the preservation of this
covenant about theNiggahs. ' ■ <
o.b i,>.
14. And the Niggahs increased and multiplied till they
darkened all the land of the South. And the men of
Unculpsalm who dwelt in the -South took their women for
concubines and went in unto them, and begat of them sons
and daughters. And they bought and sold: their sons and
daughters, even the fruit of their loins; and beat them
with stripes, and made them hewers of wood and drawers
of water.
: .r.< ,<d
15. For they said, are not, thesd Niggahs otir Niggahs?
Yea, even more than, the other Niggah&<: For the other
Niggahs we bought, or our fathers^ with money; but these,
are they not flesh of our flesh, M -blood Uf Our blood, and
bone of our bone; and shall we not do What we will with
our own?
316. But there arose men in the northern provinces of
the land of Unculpsalm and in the countries beyond the
great sea, iniquitous men, saying, Man’s blood cannot be
�12
THE NEW GOSPEL OK PEACE.
bought with money; foolish men saying, Though the Niggah’s skin be black and his hair woolly, and his shins like
unto cucumbers, and his heels thrusting out backward,
and though he have an ill savor not to be endured by those
who get not children of Niggah women, is yet a man;
men of Belial which said, All things whatsoever ye would
that men should do to you, do ye even so to them; for
this is the law and the prophets.
17. And the slaves were for a reproach throughout all
the world unto the men of the South, and even to the
whole land of Unculpsalm. But by reason of the great
covenant and the laws of the provinces, the men of the
North had naught to do fe this matter.
18. But the men of the South which had Niggahs (for
there were multitudes which had no Niggahs, and they
were poor and oppressed) heeded it not; for they were a
stiffnecked generation. And they said we will not let
our Niggahs go free; for they are our chattels, even as
our horses and our sheep, our swine and our oxen; and
we will beat them, and slay them, and sell them, and be
get children of them, and no man shall gainsay us. We
stand by the Great Covenant.
19. Moreover we are Tshivulree.
20. Now to be of the Tshivulree was the chief boast
among the men of the South, because it had been a great
name upon the earth. For of olden time he who was of
the Tshivulree was bound by an oath to defend the weak
and succor the oppressed, yea, even though he gave his
life for them. But among the men of the South he only
was of the Tshivulree who ate his bread in the sweat of
another’s face, who robbed the laborer of his hire, who
oppressed the weak, and set his foot upon the neck of the
lowly, and who sold from the mother the fruit of her
womb and the nursling of her bosom. Wherefore the
name of Tshivulree stank in the nostrils of all the nations 21. l or they were in the darkness of a false dispensa-.
�THE NEW GOSPEL OF PEACE.
13
tion, and had not yet learned the mystery of the new gospel
of peace.
22. And when the Tshivulree found within their borders
those men of the North, iniquitous men which said that
man’s blood cannot be bought, and men of Belial which
said, Do ye unto all men as ye would have all men do unto
you, they seized upon them and beat them with many
stripes, and hanged them upon trees, and roasted them with
fire, and poured hot pitch upon them, and rode them upon
sharp beams, very grievous to bestride, and persecuted
them even as it was fitting such pestilent fellows should be
persecuted.
23. And they said unto the men of the North, cease ye
now to send among us »these men of Belial preaching
iniquity, cease also to listen unto them yourselves, and re
spect the Great Covenant, or we will destroy this nation.
24. Then the men of Unculpsalm which called them
selves Dimmichrats, and the Pahdees, seeing that the
Tshivulree of the South had only one thought, and that
was for the Niggah, said, We will*, join ourselves unto the
Tshivulree, and we will have, but one thought with them,
even tbe Niggah; and we shall rule the land of Uncul
psalm, and we shall divide the spoilfr i
25. And they joined themselves Unto the Tshivulree;
and the Tshivulree of the South, and the men of the North,
which called themselves Dimmichrats, and the Pahdees
ruled the land of Unculpsalm' for many years; and they
divided the spoil. And theja had but ofic^ thought-; even
for the Niggah.
26. Wherefore he was called the everlasting Niggah.
27. Now, about these days came Philip, from the new
Athens, a priest of Beelze bub, and he taught in the Taber
nacle at Gotham.
28. And Philip had many words, but only one thought;
and that, like the thought of the men of the South, was
for the Niggah. But he respected not the Great Coveu-
�14
THE NEW GOSPEL OF PEACE.
ant. And he said unto the people ye ought to set the
Niggah free.
29. And it came to pass that when he was teaching in
the Tabernacle one Isaiah entered (not the prophet, but he
who was captain of a band of the Hammerites) and pro
tested unto him that he should no more teach such pesti
lent doctrine. And having his band of Hammerites with
him, he knocked Philip down, and thrust him from the
pulpit wherein he was speaking, and drave him out of the
Tabernacle.
30. Now this was the first ministration of the new gospel
of peace. But as yet it was not preached; for it had no
apostle.
31. But in process of time the ministers of Belial turned
the hearts of many men, even of them which called them
selves Dimmichrats fife iniquity;; and they all began to say
that the strength of the great nation of Unculpsalm should
not be used to oppress the Niggah; declaring in the
wickedness of their imaginations and; the hardness of their
hearts, that whatsoever the people of Uuculpsalm would
that bthers should do to them, even so they should do to
others, even unto Niggahs. '■
32. But they had respecteunto the Great Covenant, and
sought not to set the Niggahs free; and they returned unto
the men of the South the Niggahs that fled from their
provinces, according to the Great Covenant.
33. Moreover the men of the North made soft answers
unto the men of the South, and strove to turn away their
wrath, and to live with them as brethren. For though they
feared them not, neither hated them, they did fear that they
would destroy the nation.
34. And the Tshivulree of the South saw that the men
of the North feared their threats ; and they waxed bolder,
and said we will not only keep our Niggahs in our own
provinces, but we will take them into all the country of
Unculpsalm, which is not yet divided into provinces. And,
they went roaring up and down the land.
�THE NEW GOSPEL OF PEACE.
15
35. But in process of time it came to pass that the spirit
of their forefathers appeared among the men of the North,
even the great spirit Bak Bohn; and he stiffened up the
people mightily.
36. So that they said unto the men of the South, Hear
us, our brethren! We would live with you in peace, and
love you, and respect the Great Covenant. And the
Niggahs in your provinces: ye shall keep, and slay, and
sell, they and. the children: which-, ye beget of them, into
slavery,( for" bond men and bond women for ever. Yours
be the sin before the Lord,, not ours; for it is your doing,
and we are not answerable for it* And your Niggahs
that flee from your provinces they shall be returned unto
you, according to the Great Covenant. Only take care
lest peradventure ye make captives the Niggahs of our
provinces which we have made Free men. Ye shall in no
wise take a Niggah of them.
37. Thus shall it be i wij/h your Niggahs and in your
provinces, and ydurs shall be the< blame forever. But out
of your provinces, into the common land of Unculpsalm,
ye shall not carry your Niggahs except they be made
thereby free. For that land is common, and your laws
and the statutes of your provinces, by which alone ye make
bondmen, run not in that land. And for all that is done in
that land we must bear the blame: with you. For that
land is common; and we share whatever is done therein;
and the power of this nation and the might of its banner
shall no longer be used to oppress the lowly and to fasten
the chain upon the captive. Keep ye then your bondmen
within your own provinces.' 1 1 '■■■. ■
38. Then the Tshivulree of the South waxed wroth, and
foamed in their anger, and the air of the land was filled
with their cursings and their revilings. And certain of
them which were men of blood, and which were possessed
of devils, and had difficulties, and slew each other with
knives and shooting irons, did nothing all their time but
rave through the land about the Niggah.
�16
THE NEW GOSPEL OF PEACE.
39. Now these men were the fore-runners of him that
preached the new gospel of peace, and prepared the way
before him. Wherefore they were called Phiretahs.
40. And it came to pass that one of the Phiretahs, whose
name was Prestenbruux, was wroth with Charles, who
was surnamed the Summoner, who was one of the chief
law-givers of the land of Unculpsalm, and also one of the
men of Belial, who taught iniquity, saying, whatsoever ye
would that men should do to you do ye even so to them,
even unto Niggahs.
For Charles the Summoner had declared that it was not
lawful for the men of the South to take their Niggahs out
of their own provinces^ And thus it was that Prestenbruux
was offended in him.
41. Wherefore Prestenbruux took unto himself other
Phiretahs, and he sought Charles the Summoner, and
found him alone at a table, writing in the great hall of
Unculpsalm. And he came upon him unawares, and he
smote him and beat him to the ground, so that he was
nigh unto death.
42. And this was the second ministration of the new
gospel of peace. But even now it was not preached, for
it had yet no apostle.
43. And after these things, James, whose surname being
interpreted meaneth Facing-both-ways, ruled in the land
of Unculpsalm.
CHAPTER IV.
1 The choice of Abraham the Honest. 10 The Phiretas rebel
against him. 14 Compromise. 17 The Phiretahs will have
no more Compromise. 18 Ken Edee and Robert of Joarji.
23 Phernandiwud compromiseth unto Robert. 24 The
men of the North wax wroth.
�THE NEW GOSPEL OF PEACE.
17
1; Now the time drew nigh when James should cease
40 rule in the land of Unculpsalm.
2. And the men of the North, save the Dimmichrats,
among whom were the Pahdees, strove to have Abraham,
who was surnamed the honest, made ruler in the place of
James Facing-both-ways.
3. But the Phiretahs of the South said,- Let us choose,
and let the voices be numbered, and if oui? man be chosen,
it is well, but if Abraham, we will’ destroy the nation.
4. But the men of the North believed them not, because
of the Great Covenant, and because they trusted them to
be of good faith in this matter. For among the men of
the North, even those who lived by casting lots for gold,
stood by the lot when it was cast; And the men of the
North believed not that men -of their own blood, whose
sons were married unto their daughters, and whose daugh
ters unto their sons, would faithlessly do this thing which
they threatened.
p 5. But the men of th® North knew not how the Niggah
-had driven out all, other thoughts from the hearts of the
men of the South, even so that they would violate the
Great Covenant, and set at nought the election according
thereunto if it went against them.
6. And there were throughout the provinces of the land
of Unculpsalm at the North great multitudes, Dimmichrats,
of whom were the Pahdees, who' were friends of the
Phiretahs of the Sonth, and wished them well, and labored
with them; for they said, It is by thd alliance of the men
of the South, and by reason of the everlasting Niggah,
that we rule the land.
7. But they deceived themselves; for it was the Phire
tahs which ruled the land, using the Dimmichrats, and by
the one thought of the everlasting Niggah.
8. Yet it came to pass that when the voices of the people
were numbered, according to the Great Covenant, Abraham
was chosen.
�18
THE NEW GOSPEL OF PEACE.
9. Then the Phiretahs of the South began to do as they
had threatened ; and they gathered together in their pro
vinces, and said, Our provinces shall no longer be a part of
the land of Unculpsalm, for we will not have this man
Abraham to rule over us.
10. Yet were there men of the South, a great multitude,
among whom was Stephen, of Joarji, who said, not so.
Why will ye do this great evil and destroy the nation ? It
is right for us to respect the Great Covenant. If the man
who had our voices had been chosen,, the men of the North
would have received, him, and obeyed him as the chief ruler
in the land of Unigulpsalm; and it is meet and right
that we should do likewise, even according to the Great
Covenant. Moreover, we have suffered no wrong at the
hands of the new rulers; and the old were men of our own
choosing. Will ye make this land like unto Mecsicho ?
11. But the Phiretahs would not hearken unto these men,
and went on their way, and beat some of them, and hanged
others, and threatened noisily, and> gathering unto them all
the people of the baser sort, and inflaming them with hate
and strong drink, they set up a rule of terror through
out their provinces. Bor the Phiretahs were men of blood.
So the Phiretahs prevailed over the men who would have
respected the Great Covenant.
12. And the men of the North, both they who had given
their voices for Abraham and they who had given their voices
with the men of the (South against him, were amazed and
stood astounded. And they said among themselves, This
is vain boasting, and vaunting, such as we have seen afore
time, done for the sake of more compromise.
13. (Now in the land of Unculpsalm, when a man humbled
himself before another which threatened him, he was said
to compromise.)
14. And the Dimmichrats, save those who had hearkened
unto the ministers of Belial, said, Let us compromise our
selves again unto our Southern brethren, and it shall bewell with us.
�THE NEW GOSPEL OF PEACE.
19
15. For they said among themselves, If the men of the
South go, they and their provinces, there will be no more
everlasting Niggah; and we shall cease to rule the land.
And if they go not, behold then they will remember that
we have compromised unto them, and they will again be
gracious unto their servants, and will admit us unto a share
in the government, and we shall rule the land as aforetime.
16. But the Phiretahs were wise in their generation, and
they saw that the Dimmichrats were of no more use unto
them, and that because the Hen Of Belial had prevailed
against the Dimmichrats, their power was gone in their
provinces; and so as they could no more use the Diminichrats, they would not listen to them, and spurned their
compromising, and spat upon it, and went on to destroy the
nation, and prepared to make war against Abraham if he
should begin to rule over them.
17. Now in those days there Was a man in Gotham named
Ken Edee, who was chief captain of the watchmen of the
city and the region round About; and in Joarji was a man
named Robert, who dwelt among the tombs, and who was
possessed of an evil spirit whose name was Blustah. And
Robert was a Phiretah.
18. And Ken Edee, chief d&pfain of the watch in Gotham,
found arms going from Gotham to the Phiretahs in Joarji,
and he seized them. For he said, Lest they be used to
destroy the nation, and against1 the Great Covenant, which
is the supreme law in the land of‘Unculpsalm, to which first
belongeth my obedience.
19. Then Robert, who dwelt among the tombs, being
seized upon by his demon Blustah, sent a threatening mes
sage unto Phernandiwud.
20. (For at this time Phernandiwud was chief ruler in
the city of Gotham.)
21. Saying, Wherefore keep ye the arms of the Phir
etahs ? Give them unto us that we may make war against
you, or it shall be worse for you.
�20
THE NEW GOSPEL OF PEACE.
22. Then Phernandiwud, because he hated the chief of
the watchmen of Gotham, and because he hoped for the
good success of the Phiretahs, compromised himself unto
Robert, and crawled on his belly before him in the dust,
and said, Is thy servant a man that he should do this thing?
Thy servant kept no arms, neither would he do so. Let
them who have the evil spirit Bak Bohn do thus unto my
lords the Phiretahs. Behold, thy servant is no man, but a
Phlunkee.
23. (Now the Phlunkees were men who had never had
the spirit Bak Bohn, or who had had it, cast out of them,
because when they would, have prostrated, themselves and
humbled themselves in the dust and compromised to their
profit, the spirit rent them sore. So they had each of them
his Bak Bohn cast out of him.)
24. And the Phiretahs went on their way without hindrance. For James, by facing both ways, faced neither; and
both of the men of the South and the men of the North he
was not regarded. And the nation spued him out of its
mouth.
25. And Abraham ruled the land. But the Phiretahs
withstood him, and made wai' upon him, and drove his
captains out of the strongholds which were in their provinces,
and humbled the banners of Unculpsalm.
26. Then all the men of the North, even the Dimmi
chrats, of whom were the Pahdees, were exceedingly wroth;
and they rose up against the Phiretahs of the South, and
marched against them to drive them out of the strong places
which they had seized, and to plant thereon again the banner
of Unculpsalm.
27. For they all had exceeding reverence for the Great
Covenant, and they were filled with pride of their nation,
its might, and its wealth, and its vastness, and chiefly that
its people were more free than any other people, and that
its tillers of the soil and its wayfaring men could read and
understand, and that there each man sat under his own
�THE NEW GOSPEL OF PEACE.
21
vine and under his own fig tree with none to molest him
or make him afraid. And they worshipped the banner of
Unculpsalm, and its folds were unto them as the wings of
a protecting angel.
28. Moreover, the Dimmichrats said, We have striven
for our brethren of the South against the men of Belial,
who teach that it is wrong to oppress the Niggah by the
power of Unculpsalm, and now they can no longer use us
they cast us off. Behold, we will fight against them, lest,
also, they make good their threats, and sever their provinces
from our provinces, and there be no more everlasting Nig
gah, and our occupation be departed forever.
29. And thus it came to pass that there was war in the
land of Unculpsalm.
CHAPTER V. .
1 The Men of Gotham assemble. 2 Having each a Bak Bohn.
3 And Phernandiwud getteth a B$jt Bohn. 5 And speaketh
to the People. 8 Benjamin the Scribe goeth not to the
Assembly, but remaineth at home, mourning. 13 His policy
and his prosperity. 18 The War continueth for two years.
19 And why. 26 The Rulers of Jonbool help the Phiretahs.
1. Now, when the news came that the Phiinetahs of the
South with five thousand men, even a great multitude, had
driven one of the captains of Unculpsalm with a band of
ninety out of his stronghold, and whe# a proclamation of
Abraham was spread abroad, calling on the men of Un
culpsalm for the defence of their nation, and the retaking
of its strongholds, and the setting up of its banner which
mad been cast down, the men of Gotham gathered them
selves together in an open place before the world. And
Phemandiwud came also among them.
2. And each man that day out of whom had been cast
�22
THE NEW GOSPEL OF PEACE.
the spirit Bak Bohn, took to himself another worse than
the first. And it seemed that day that in all Gotham there
was not one Phlunkee.
3. And Phernandiwud saw this. So he also straightway
took to himself a Bak Bohn.
4. For he said, Lest they also declare that I shall no
longer be chief ruler of the city.
5. And many men of Gotham spake unto the people.
Phernandiwud also lifted up his voice and said, Hear 0
men of Unculpsalm! give ear, 0 men of Gotham ! The
rulers of this land of Unculpsalm, chosen according to the
Great Covenant, have been defied. The Great Covenant
itself hath been set at naught. The banner of Unculpsalm
hath been cast down. The men of the South begin to
make good their threats that they would destroy this
nation.
6. But I say unto you, in the words of the great ruler Jah
Xunn, whom to our sorrow we have gathered to his fathers,
This nation must and shall be preserved, peaceably if we
can, forcibly if we must. And let us have a strong rule
and a splendid despotism, that we may do this thing as
becometh a great nation. For I have said always afore
time, as ye can bear me witness, Let us strengthen the
hands of the chief rulers, being myself chief ruler of this
city. Hear therefore my pledge unto you this day, I throw
myself wholly into this strife, with all my power and with
all my might.
7. Now there were men who noted that Phernandiwud
pledged himself with all his power and with all his might,
but not with all his soul. And they said, It is because he
hath sold his soul to the mighty spirit Sathanas, that he
should help him. And others said, Not so; for he had no
soul to sell. But these were scoffers and men of Belial.
8. But Benjamin, the brother of Phernandiwud, even
Benjamin the scribe, came not unto the congregation of
the people, but remained at home in his house, exceeding
�THE NEW GOSPEL OF PEACE.
23
wroth and very sorrowful.
For he said, Behold this
people is given over to the spirit Bak Bohn, and into the
hands of the men of Belial, who teach that the power of
Unculpsalm, and the might of the banner of Unculpsalm,
may not be used to oppress the Niggah. And this people
will no more compromise itself before the men of the
South; and there will be no more Phlunkees, and the
everlasting Niggah shall cease from off the land. And he
wept him sore; and cried out aloud, The sceptre hath departed
from the Dimmichrats, and the glory from the tents of
Tamunee!
9. And he wrote against the people of the North; and
sought to exorcise the mighty spii'it Bak Bohn, and to cast
it out of them. But he could not.
10. Now Benjamin the scribe was also a just man, and
a righteous, and walked .nprigh^y before the law.
11. For the law said, Thou shalt not live by casting lots
for gold. For he who liveth by casting lots for gold deceiveth the foolish man to his hurt, and defraudeth the widow
and the fatherless. It is an abomination. And he that
liveth by casting lots for gold shall be guilty and shall be
cast into prison.
12. Wherefore Benjamin being a just man and a right
eous, said, I will not live by casting lots for gold. Far be
it from me to do this thing which is unlawful, and which
will get me into prison. But I will sell policies ; and this
shall be the craft by which I will livby . ■
13. For what saith the prophet Daniel (not Sickles) ?
** And through his policy also shall he cause craft to prosper
in his hand; and he shall magnify himself in his heart.”
14. For Benjamin also searched the Scripture, saying:
Peradventure I may find something therein to my advantage.
15. Wherefore Benjamin the scribe, through his policies
caused craft to prosper in his hand, and magnified himself
in his heart.
16. And he said within himself, I will be a lawgiver in
�TH® NEW GOSPEL OF PEACE.
the land of Unculpsalm, even for the men of Gotham.
Wherefore, he also made Unto himself friends among the
Pahdees; and he became a lawgiver in the land.
17. ' But the men of Gotham cast out Phernandiwud from
his office of chief ruler of the city; because they remem
bered that he had compromised upon his belly to Robert
who dwelt among the tombs, and had eaten dirt before him.
Also that he had said, Let us take our city out of the
nation. So they ,piit no trust in him18. Now so it was that after the space of nearly two
years the war which was in the land of Unculpsalm came
not to an end.
19. For the men of the North and the men Of the South
were of one blood; and both were valiant. And the men
of the North were more in number than the men of the
South. But the men of the South multiplied themselves
because of their Niggahs. For their Niggahs went not
to war, but stayed at home to 'till the soil. Moreover, they
were fighting upon their own ground; and much of their
land was mire and marshes, desert land and wilderness,
through which the armies of Unculpsalm wandered vainly,
and where they stuck fast. And the men of the South
cast up mounds upon their roads and before their cities,
and made strong their high places with towers. And their
land was filled with strong places, and with men of war
and engines of war, such as the men of the North looked
not to see in that land.
20. For the men of the South were astonished when the
men of the North marched against them; because the men
of the North had so often compromised themselves unto
them, that they thought they were all Phlunkees, and that
the spirit Bak Bohn had been utterly cast out of them.
And without that spirit men cannot fight.
21. Wherefore, the men of the South which had Nig
gahs, even the Tshivulree and the Phiretahs, seeing that
their case was desperate, forced all the men of their coun-
�THE NEW GOSPEL OF PEACE.
23
try into their armies, and took the men which had respect
unto the government of Unculpsalm, according to the
.Great Covenant, and loved the banner of Unculpsalm, and
would not fight against it, and they cast them into pits and
into dungeons, and scourged them, and hanged them upon
trees, after their manner. And being men of blood, and
seeing that their case was desperate/ they made it a terror
to live in their country except unto them that professed to
desire the destruction of the nation-.So all men professed
to desire it, or held their peace.
< r' r :
22. But in the land of the men of the North no man was
molested. And men of the South dwelt there, and were
spies and helpers unto their hEethrem And men of the
North, men of Peace, which also were. Phlunkees, helped
their masters the Tshivulree and the Phiretahs.
23. And the men of the South had among them great
captains; men of might and, wisdom in battle. And they
chose to be ruler over them Jeph, surnamed the Bepudiator.
24. (Now among the men of Unculpsalm when a man
would neither pay the debt that-he owed, nor acknowledge
it and ask it to be forgiven him, hewas? called-a repudiator.)
25. And Jeph had been captain over a thousand in the
armies of Unculpsalm when they went into Mecsicho, and
had also been one of the Great Council: and he was a
bold man, and a crafty, one who,knew neither fear nor
scruple.
26. Moreover, the mem of the South wero helped might
ily from beyond the sea, even by the men of, the kingdom
of Jonbool, from which their land was wrested by the
forefathers of the men of Unculpsalm.
27. Yet the men of Unculpsalm would have' loved the
men of that nation, even as a son loveth his mother which
bore him. But the nobles and the rich men of Jonbool
scorned the men of Unculpsalm, and would none of their
affection, and made light of their honor,
ohm vino -. ‘L h !
�96
THE NEW GOSPEL OF PEACE.
28. For the men of Unculpsalm had forgiven the meh
of Jonbool their oppression and their scorn, and had
shown their Prince great honor; but the men who gov
erned that nation had not forgiven the men of Unculpsalm
their victory. And the prosperity and the glory of that
land was an offence to them. And certain of their scribes,
which also were Phlunkees, wrote scornfully against the
land of Unculpsalm, and bore false witness against it from
generation to generation, and got thereby gold and honor
in the land of Jonbool.
29. Wherefore, when the Tshivulree and the Phiretahs
lifted up the standard of revolt, the rulers of the land of
Jonbool said one to another,
30. Lo, the time for which we have waited without hope
draweth nigh; and the land of Unculpsalm may be
divided, and the nation destroyed, and the pride of the
people cast down. And the might of their power shall be
broken, and the glory of that land shall no longer be an
offence unto us; and we shall be avenged without peril
and without cost.
31. Likewise, also said the nobles and the great men of
other lands, where the few devoured the substance of the
many.
32. So the rulers of the land of Jonbool made proclama
tion to all the earth, that in that war they would regard
the men of the South which had revolted even as they
regarded the rulers of the land chosen according to the
Great Covenant. For they said, Thus shall we encourage
them, and give aid to them; and it shall cost us nothing:
and after this they will be more ashamed to submit them
selves unto the law which they have broken, and to the
rulers which they have defied.
33. And the nobles and the merchants of that land,
which aforetime had cursed and reviled the Tshivulree and
the Phiretahs, and had imputed the deeds which were
theirs only unto all the men of Unculpsalm, said Amen,
�THE NEW GOSPEL OF PEACE.
27
34. And the merchants of Jonbool sold the Phiretas
merchandise, and the armorers made them arms, and the
ship-men builded them ships, swift and mighty, wherewith
to destroy the ships of the men of the North. For they
said, Thus shall we be avenged, and turn, also every man,
an honest penny. State-craft and business shall prosper
together, and profit shall go hand in hand with pleasure.
35. And thus was the rebellion strengthened in the land
of Unculpsalm; so that although the armies of Unculpsalm
drove the men of the South out of much country where
they had set up their banner®, and captured their chief
cities, and held all that they had taken; yet after two years
were not their armies scattered qr destroyed, or their ships
which the men of Johnbobl had builded for them, driven
from the sea.
, r<
CHAPTER Vt.
1 Abraham and his Counsellors not wise in their generation.
6 Which is well pleasing tocertain Pimmfchrats. 10 Who
seek to work confusion. 12 And to compromise themselves
unto the Phiretahs. 13 And do compromise themselves unto
the Ambassador of Joribool. 16 Who is crafty and tumeth
neither to the right ri&r to thowrohg. 17 The wrath of the
men of the North. 21 The
of Peace Men. 25 The
House of Hiram the P^blica/n. 26 A Woman of the
Phiretahs. 28 Samuel Seeketh her and ministereth unto
her. 30 Abraham ministOreth ' occasion unto the Peace
men. They have a Martyr.
; 1. Now Abraham was honest; but he was not wise in
his generation.
2. Likewise also of the chief counsellors that he ap
pointed, that one that was counsellor for the war wrought
only mischief and confusion; even so that Abraham, who
�28
THE NEW GOSPEL OF PEACE.
was long-suffering and slow to anger, would sometimes
put down his foot in wrath.
3. Now Abraham’s foot was heavy, but his head was
light, and his knees were feeble. So his foot came down
in the wrong place or at the wrong time, or else it con
tinued not down until the end was accomplished.
4. Wherefore he prevailed not. And he was called
Abraham the well meaning. And men pitied him.
5. And Abraham and his counsellors should have ruled
with a firm hand and a mighty arm, and have bound the
land together with bands of steel; and have smitten down
the strong and set at naught the proud, and been gracious
unto the feeble. But they wavered, and shrank from the
voice of threatening, both in their own land and in the
land of Jonbool.
6. And this was well pleasing unto certain men of the
Dimmichrats. For they said in their hearts, If this nation
can be saved by the rule of the Dimmichrats of our faction,
let it be saved; but if not, let it perish, and let us rule in
our own provinces.
7. But they said not this openly; for they feared the
people.
8. For in all this time the hearts of the men of the
North failed not, neither did they alter in their wicked
purpose to preserve their nation from destruction.
9. And of the Dimmichrats it was only they who were
faithful to their masters the Tschivulree and the Phiretahs,
and who were meek and lowly, and who sought to com
promise unto them, and crawl on their bellies before
them, which was well fitting for them to do, and to say
unto them, What would our masters have ? and what shall
their servants do, that they may be gracious unto their
servants, and allow them a little share in the ruling of this
land?—it was these only among the Dimmichrats who
were well pleased because Abraham and his counsellors
prevailed not.
�THE NEW GOSPEL OF PEACE.
29
10. And these men held not up the hands of Abraham
their ruler, but sought occasion to prevent his purposes
and to bring his counsels to confusion, and his doings to
naught.
11. And when Abraham’s foot came down in the wrong
place, or continued not down until the end was accom
plished, and men’s hearts were sick with disappointment,
they sought to turn them in favor of Jeph the Repudiator
and his counsellors.
12. And they said, Let us not have war with our mas
ters the Tshivulree and the Phiretahs; but let us com
promise unto them, and crawl on our bellies before them,
even as we did aforetime; for it is meet and right and a
pleasant thing to be humble.
13. And they sent messengers unto the Tshivulree, and
the Phiretahs, saying these th«ihgsf> and their scribes wrote
them in books by night and sent them out unto the people
by day. But the Tshivulree and the Phiretahs spurned
them; for now that they could no more use them, they
looked at them with loathing.
14. Likewise also some of them went privily to the am
bassador of the land of Jonbool, even that land which
sought the destruction of the nation of Unculpsalm.
15. And they said unto him, Let u!s take counsel together
that we may bring about this great end, the ceasing of the
war without the putting down of the rebellion.
16. But he was crafty and answered them nothing.
And he wrote letters unto the rulers of hiS land, saying, I
will watch faithfully, and I will turn aside neither to the
right nor to the wrong, going which way it may be need
ful, if it leadeth to our profit. So shall I show myself wor
thy to be a ruler in the land of Jonbool.
17. Now when this letter was noised abroad in the land
of Unculpsalm, the men of the north were incensed, and
the fire of their anger was hot against the Dimmichrats
that called themselves Peace men. For upon this matter
�30
THE NEW GOSPEL OF PEACE.
tiie men of Belial, and the Dimmichrats which were not
Peace men* and the Pahdees were of one mind.
18. And they said, Who is it that hath dared thus to
humble this nation? Let him come out before us. And
no man answered.
19. For they whieh had done it saw that they could not
stand before the people and live. Yet still they said in
their hearts, If this nation can be saved by the rule of the
Dimmichrats of our faction, let it be saved ; but if not, let
it perish, and let us rule in our own provinces. For now
they had but one thought; not how the rebellious Tshivulree and Phiretahs might be subdued and compelled again
to their obedience, but how they might again rule the land
and divide the spoil, and have again their everlasting
Niggah.
20. Whereof they cried aloud for war, but labored in
secret to bring the war to naught, and turn the minds
of the people to peace, that they might compromise unto
the Phiretahs as they did aforetime. And they watched
for their occasion.
21. Now the chiefs of this sect in Gotham were these:
22. Phernandiwud, who had been chief ruler of the city,
and Benjamin his brother; James the scribe, which knew
nothing, and Erastus his brother; Samuel, who was rich in
butter; Hiram the publican, who was also a sinner, and
Elijah, who smelled the battle afar in the tents of
Tamnee; Cyrus (not he that was taught to ride, to shoot
the bow, and to speak the truth, yet did this Cyrus shoot
with a longer bow than the other); Primus the scribe,
whose beard was like Aaron’s, and who dwelt among the
merchants; Samuel, who made the lightnings of heaven
his messengers; Ker Tiss, who wrote concerning the
Great Covenant; and one who dwelt in the elbows of the
Min cio, and destroyed the heerts of women; Isaiah, who
was a captain of the Hammerites; Samuel whose surname
was Brinnzmaid, and whose fathers ate hasty-pudding; and
�THE NEW GOSPEL OF PEACE.
31
Augustus the money-changer, who aforetime was called
Schomberg.
23. Now the others were Gentiles, but Augustus was
of the circumcision.
24. And all these men served diligently their master,
who was Jeph the Repudiator. And many of them were
Scribes, but all of them Were Pharisees; for they held to
the letter of the law, but knew not its spirit. And they
taught, like them of old, concerning th© Sabbath, that the
nation was made for th® Great Covenant, and not the
Great Covenant for the nation.
25. And the inn of Hiram, which before the war began
1 in-the land of Unculpsalm had been filled with Tshivulree
and Phiretahs, and with Plunkees compromising them
selves unto their masters- the Phiretahs, and crawling upon
their bellies before them, became now the chief place of
resort for them that still served the Tshivulree and labored
to prosper1 the rebellion. There they gathered themselves
together and plotted in secret how they might ensnare the
rulers of Unculpsalm, and rejoiced openly when the banner
of the Phiretahs prevailed against the] banner of Uncul
psalm. So did the inn of Hiram become the synagogue
-of rebellion.
26. And there came a woman'of the Phiretahs into Go
tham. And she was married); yet was her husband not
with her. And she was comely and fair to look upon.
27. And it was told unto the rulers of Unculpsalm, Be
hold, this woman of the Phiretahs cometh to spy out the
nakedness of the land.. Wherefore the rulers sent a mes
sage unto Ken Edee, chief of the Watchmen of Gotham,
that he should take her and put her in ward. And he did
so.
28. Now when Samuel, whose surname was Brinnzmaid,
heard that Ken Edee had taken a woman of the Ph iretabs
and put her in ward, he went to her; and when he saw
that her husband was not with her, and that she was comely
�32
THE NEW GOSPEL OK PEACE.
and fair to look upon, and that she had come to spy out
the nakedness of the land, he succored her and ministeredunto her. And he caused Ken Edee to take her out of
ward; and when he had kept her in Gotham for awhile,,
that she might be comforted and see the nakedness of the
land, he sent her back into the land of Tshivulree.
29. So all these men, and many others which followed
them, did nothing else night and day but strive to get the
land again into the hands of their faction that they might
serve their master Jeph the Repudiator, and compromise,
unto him, and preserve their everlasting Niggah.
30. Now while they were waiting their occasion, Abra
ham himself ministered it unto them. For one of the
captains in the army of Unculpsalm, took Clement, a law
giver, because he had said that Abraham was a usurper,
and a tyrant, in that he resisted Jeph the Repudiator, and
had sought to diminish the armies of Unculpsalm, and cast
him into prison; and to a scribe which did likewise, the
captain sent armed men that stood over him with drawn
swords, saying, Ye shall no longer thus stir up the people
to sedition.
31. And immediately the chief men of the Dimmicrats
throughout the land raised a great uproar, for they said,
Now cometh our opportunity.
32. For there was a law in the land of Unculpsalm that
every man might speak and write freely all the promptings
of his heart, so that he slandered not his neighbor, and
that no man should be cast into prison save by a judge,
when he had been condemned by twelve good men of his
province. And the people of the land of Unculpsalm
prized this law above all their other laws; and it was a
part of the Great Covenant and of the Great Charter of
the liberties of that people.
33. But it was written in the Great Covenant that in
times of sedition, privy conspiracy, and rebellion this law
should cease and be of no effect; for the safety of the
nation.
�THE NEW GOSPEL OF PEACE.
3a
34. Now the leaders of the Dimmichrats, who were wise
in their generation, and who sought first to get power,
into their own hands, and afterwards the salvation of the
nation, said among themselves, Lo, Abraham has given us
a martyr; and it is better than if he had given the armies
of Unculpsalm a victory. Now, therefore, let us bewail
the woes of Clement and the violence to the Great Cove
nant and the ancient Charter: and we will declare that it
is to preserve this nation from destruction, and we shall
regain the hearts of this people.
35. And they did so. And the people forgat the peril
of the land, and how it was in more danger from traitors
that were within than from foes that were without; and
they forgat also the provision of the Great Covenant
against such perils; and there was a great commotion’.
36. And Abraham said, L'et not Clement be kept in
prison ; but let him be sent among the Phiretahs; for they
are his friends, and he is'our enemy; and let the scribe
continue his writing. And it was done. So Clement be
came a martyr; and the scribe hardened his heart and
was tenfold more the servant of the Phiretahs than before.
■ For he said, Abraham feareth the Dimmichrats, and even
the men of Belial fear them also, and the spirit Bak Bohn
is again cast out of them.
CHAPTER VII.
1 Phernandiwud summoneth liis disciples to hear the New Gospel
of Peace at the Hall of Peter the Barrelmaker. 8 Who came
not to the assembly. 9 And why. 13 Who came. 17 Pher
nandiwud proclaimeth the New Gospel of Peace. 20 The Hit
tites and Hammerites are well pleased. 22 But have groanings
about the freedom of the Niggah. 25 Phernandiwud showeth
that there is no right but Peace and Everlasting Niggah. 26
And Free Speech. 32 Meekness of Phernandiwud. 33 And
�34
THE NEW GOSPEL OF PEACE.
of the Hittites and the Hammerites. 38 Isaiah telleth of a
ministration of Peace. 45 The Neu Gospel of Peace spreadeth beyond the border of Masunandicsun.
1. Now Phernandiwud saw that his time was come.
2. And he said unto his familiars and to them which did
his bidding, (for he had a great following in Gotham),
Behold, the spirit of peace hath descended upon me; and
I go forth to declare the mystery of a new gospel of peace,
a gospel of great gain, unto me first, and afterward unto
the Dimmichrats. And I shall reward them who are
faithful unto me.
3. Go now therefore and summon the Dimmichrats who
serve Jeph the Repudiator and the Phiretahs in Gotham.
4. James the scribe and Erastus his brother, who know
nothing, and my brother Benjamin, who knoweth some
things; Samuel, who is rich in butter, Hiram the publican;
Elijah, who smelleth the battle afar off; Cyrus who shooteth with a longer bow than the first Cyrus; Primus, who
dwelleth among the merchants; Ker Tiss, of the Great
Covenant; Isaiah, captain of the Hammerites; Samuel,
who sendeth the lightning on his errand, and the other
Samuel, whose surname is Brinnzmaid; and Augustus,
the money-changer.
5. And say unto them, Gather yourselves together, ye
and your following, every man of you in the hall of Peter
who is called the barrel-maker, and in the open spaee
round about, that ye may hear from my lips the new
gospel of peace.
6. (Now this Peter made the substance whereby one
thing sticketh unto another thing. Wherefore he was for
union; and he called the hall which he had builded, the
Union; (for he said, Thus shall I stick this nation to
gether,) but the people called it after his own name. And
he was rich and he offended no man. Now in the land of
Unculpsalm, whosoever was rich and offended no man, be-
�THE NEW GOSPEL OF PEACE.
35.
came one of the chief men of his place, and of his country.
Moreover, Peter gave of his substance unto the people.
And this was he who, at a feast given unto the Prince of
the land of Jonbool, clapped the Prince upon the
shoulder and said unto him, My lord the Prince shall
dance next with my daughter. For he was a gracious
man and a courteous, and he knew that his daughter was
comely.)
7. And Phernandiwud looked for the assembling of the
men which he had summoned, they and their following, at
the hall of Peter the Ba®el-make®, and the space round
about.
8. But these men came n®t: James the scribe, and
Erastus his brother; Samuel, whose sirname is Brinnzmaid
and the other Samuel; Benjamin the brother of Phernan
diwud, and Elijah of Tamunee; Hiram the publican, and
Cyrus, Primus, and Augustus the money-changer, and
their following.
9. For they said within^ themselves, This gospel of
peace will be an offence untpL the people, who are perverse
in their hearts, and who love the banner of Unculpsalm,
and have respect unto the rulers chosen according to the
Great Covenant, even although the men be not to their
liking, and who are foolishly bent on destroying the armies
and the power of them who would destroy the nation.
10. Wherefore we will not be ;seen listening to the gos
pel of peace. For it shall be better for us to cry out for
war, and meanwhile to hinder the war in secret, and to
seek every occasion to bring the rulers of our country to
scorn and derision in the time of her trial, and to aid J eph
the Repudiator, and his spies, and his emissaries, and to
work confusion in the land.
11. For so shall the people be weary of their rulers, and
bewildered with our confusion; and they shall trust us,
and turn unto us in their desolation, and say, Verily, theseare men, and make us rulers of the land.
�36
THE NEW GOSPEL OF PEACE.
IS. Then will we compromise ourselves again unto our
masters the Tshivulree and the Phiretahs, as it is meet, and
right, and pleasant for us to do; and we shall find yet
deeper dust wherein to crawl before them; and we shall
loosen the bonds of these provinces, and make each gov
ernor of a province thereof a little satrap, but great in
his own eyes and in the eyes of the Phlunkees, which will
surround him, that he may defy the chief ruler of the land;
and we shall divide the spoil.
13. But these men came to the hall of Peter the barrel-maker
to hear Phernandiwud declare the new gospel of peace.
14. Din Ninny, who was chief ruler of the assembly,
and who directed all the doings thereof; Isaiah, who was
captain of the Hammerites; and many others of the sect of
Smalphri among the Dimmichrats.
15. And with them there came a great multitude of the
Hittites and the Hammerites, and of the Dedrabitz from
Koubae beyond Boueree, and the dwellers in Phyvpintz,
which is nigh unto the tombs where they buried Juz Tiss.
(Now Juz Tiss was not of kin unto that Ker Tiss who
wrote of the Great Covenant), and in Makkurilvil, and in
the country as thou goest by the shore of the river on the
East, unto Shyppyardz.
.16. And all these men gathered themselves together,
fiercely bent upon peace. And they filled the hall of Peter
the Barrel-maker, and the open space round about.
17. And when Phernandiwud stood up and beckoned
unto them they shouted for about the space of half an hour.
For they remembered what he had done for them afore
time : and they looked for a ministration of the gospel of
peace, such as there had been between the watchmen of
Phernandiwud and those which had been appointed by
the governor and rulers of the province. And they said
within themselves, Now shall we again break the heads
of the watchmen of Ken Edee • and there shall be peace
again in the land.
�THE NEW GOSPEL OF PEACE.
37
18. And Phemandiwud said unto them, Hearken, O
men of Gotham! I come before you this day preaching a
new gospel of peace. Peace on earth and good-will to
men. Peace on earth, that I and my faithful followers
may get what is due unto us, and good-will unto men who
are of our persuasion, among the Dimmichrats.
19. For there be Dimmichrats, yea, verily, even Pahdees,
who are not of our persuasion and who enter not into our
congregation. Let them be accursed.
20. And all the people said, Hi! hi! For such is the
manner of the Hittites and the Hammerites of Gotham
when they are well pleased.
21. And again Phernandiwud opened his mouth and
said, 0, my brethren, the day of calamity cometh upon the
land of Unculpsalm, and there is no man able to help.
Therefore have I come hither that I may save this nation.
No man raiseth the banner of peace. Therefore will I
raise it, that war and hate, which are the children of Satan,
may be at an end, except for the Dimmichrats which are
not of our persuasion, arid the men of Belial which preach
freedom unto the Niggah.; Them let us hate with a
perfect hatred, and upon them let’us make war without
ceasing.
’ •
;■
■
22. (And when the Hittites and Hammerites heard of
liberty to the Niggah, they all groaned with an exceeding
loud groan, as it were if each man had been seized with
pangs of griping in his bowels1. For to hear of freedom to
the Niggah is gall and wormwood to the Hittites and the
Hammerites.)
23. Then said Fernandiwud, Through the pride of
their hearts, and the vanity and wickedness of their imagi
nations, the rulers of this land have sinned and done
wickedly in that they have not allowed the Tshivulree and
kthe Phiretahs to destroy this nation without making war
upon it.
24. For the land of Unculpsalm hath no right to a go-
�38
THE NEW GOSPEL OF PEACE.
vemment, neither have the people of Unculpsalm any right
to be a nation. Neither is the Great Covenant a covenant
to be kept, except by the men of each province, so long as
it is pleasing in their eyes.
25. But these only are right, Peace and the everlasting
Niggah. Such peace as we had aforetime, ere the ac
cursed spirit Bak Bohn took possession of this people.
Peace which will enable our brethren of the South to eat,
their bread in the sweat of another’s face; to rob the,
laborer of his hire; to oppress the weak, and set their foot
upon the neck of the lowly; to beat their Niggahs with
many stripeb, to hunt them with dogs, and to slay them
to take their women for concubines, and to beget of them
sons and daughters; and to sell from the mother the fruit
of her womb and the nursling of her bosom; to make mer
chandise of the fruit of their own loins, and to sell their
own flesh and blood into bondage forever.
27. Peace, my brethren, which will also restore our right
of free speech according to the Great Covenant; of which
we have been robbed by the rulers of this land, that they
may wage their wicked war upon the Phiretahs.
28. For, O men of Gotham, ye see this day how your
rulers oppress you, and will allow no man to speak evil of
them, that they may wage this war without let or hinderance; and that all men’s mouths are shut by fear of the
gallows or the dungeon, who will not prophesy smooth
things of their damnable doings, and cover up their wick
edness and glorify their abominations.
29. Therefore I declare unto you that we must have the
peace, the peace which ensueth from free speech. So that
when men of Belial seek to turn the hearts of the men of
the South to setting their bondsmen free, and taking away
from us our everlasting Niggah, the Phiretahs may seize
upon them, and beat them with many stripes, and hang
them upon trees, and roast them with fire, and pour hot
pitch upon them, and ride them upon sharp beams very
�THE NEW GOSPEL OE PEACE,
39
■grievous to bestride. Peace and free speech, such as there
was on the day when Prestenbruux smote down Charles
the Summoner, and beat him until he was nigh unto
■death.
30. Let this Peace hover over the land, scattering balm
from her outstretching wings. Balm for the wounded
souls of the Tshivulree and the Phiretahs; balm for the
wounds which the Dimmichratic brethren have inflicted on
each other; balm for my bruised spirit and defrauded ex
pectations.
31. Let this peace come to us, my brethren, and the lion
of the South and the lamb of the North shall lie down
together, and there shall no more be contention between
them; for the lamb shall be inside of the lion.
32. Let us then be lambs, 0 men of Gotham! Yea,
let us be meek as lambs. Por'ft is written that the meek
shall inherit the earth.
33. Then the Hittites and the Hamm erites again cried
out Hi! hi! after their fashion; and in a twinkling many
of them took an oath that ■ they were the meek, and that
they should inherit the earth.
34. Then Phernandiwud said, All now is well with us,
my brethren, and with the land of Unculpsalm. Peace
and free-speech shall prevail among us now and forever.
35. Then the Hittites and the Hammerifes shouted with
a great shout, and they cldfeched’’their fist® and said, God
do so to us and more also, if we break not every man his
head which saith there shall n^henceforth be peace and
free-speech throughout th^lstnd!. ■
36. And no man answered. So they said, Lo there is
peace.
B7. And Phernandiwud said these things many times.
38. Now when Phernandiwud had made an end of
speaking unto the people, there arose Isaiah, he who was
captain of a band of the Hammerites, and which was one
of the chief disciples of Phernandiwud. And he said,
�40
THE NEW GOSPEL OF PEACE.
39. Shall there not be peace, my brethren ? Remember
ye not the time when Philip, the priest of Beelzebub came
here preaching deliverence to the captive and the setting
at liberty even of the Niggah? and how he entered into the
Tabernacle and gathered unto him iniquitous men, men of
Belial who hearkened unto him, and believed in him ?
40. And remember ye not how I, with you Hammerites,
who break the heads of all them who set themselves
against you, and you, 0 Hittites, who hit from the shoulder,
went into the Tabernacle and broke up their congregation
and scattered their assembly ?
41. And I knocked. down Philip, and dragged him out
of the pulpit wherein he was speaking, and drave him out
of the Tabernacle ?
42. Yea, verily, I knocked him down; for I am a man
of peace; and dragged him out of his pulpit and drave him
forth of the Tabernacle; for I love free speech.
43. Then the Hittites and the Hammerites and the Dim
michrats which had joined themselves unto the faction of
Jeph the Repudiator, burst out into a great shouting. And
for the space of about an hour they did nothing but cry
Peace and Free Speech, and death unto him that sayeth to
the contrary.
44. And when they were weary of shouting, they went
each man unto his own home.
45. And the new gospel of peace spread abroad, and
prevailed mightily.
46. And it went throughout all the land of Unculpsalmeven beyond the border of Masunandicsun.
47. So that in about ten days the chief captain of the
Tshivulree, whose name was Robbutleeh (he who had
forced Litulmak, who was surnamed the Unready, to
change his base, and sent Joseph, whose surname showeth
that it was not he which fled from the wife of Potiphar,
back from whence he came), took an army of the Phiretahs
and marched into two of the provinces of the land of
�THE NEW GOSPEL OF PEACE.
41
Unculspalm, proclaiming the new gospel of peace at the
point of the sword.
48. And he laid parts of those provinces waste with fire,
and he destroyed the bridges that were over the rivers,
and carried off their horses, and their corn and their cattle;
and put all them that resisted the new gospel of peace to
the sword.
49. So the people began to understand- the mystery of
the new gospel; and they glorified it; and they said, yet a
little while, and the Niggah shall be restored to his bon
dage, and the Tshivulree, and the Phiretahs shall be our
masters, and peace shall rule the land with a rod of iron,
and we shall compromise ourselves for ever. And there
was great rejoicing.
50. Now I, even I, Benjamin the scribe, the brother of
Phernandiwud, have written these things, not of my own
will, or of the promptings of my own heart, for the truth
is not in me. But forasmuch as the spirit of prophecy
hath descended upon me, like Balaam, the son of Beor, I
have uttered the innermost thoughts of my heart in mine
own despite, and I have written the mystery of the new
gospel of peace.
51. And to few shall it be given to comprehend this
mystery.
52. And the acts of Phernandiwud, whose walk was
slantindicular, and of his disciples, after the proclamation
of the new gospel of peace, and of James the scribe, and
of Erastus his brother, and of Samuel who is rich in
butter, and Samuel who sendeth the lightning whither he
will, and Hiram the publican, and that other Samuel, who
ministered unto the Phiretah woman : and of Elijah, who
smelleth the battle afar off in the tents of Tamunee; and
of Cyrus, and Primus, and Kerr Tiss, and Isaiah of the
Hammerites, which were Gentiles; and of Augustus, the
money-changer, which was of the circumcision, and of the
other Pharisees and Phlunkees, shall not I, Benjamin the
�42
THE NEW GOSPEL OF PEACE.
scribe, write them in a book ? and they shall be spread
abroad in all lands for the enlightening of all nations.
■’t
Abel Heywood, Printer, Oldham Street, Manchester.^
���
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Victorian Blogging
Description
An account of the resource
A collection of digitised nineteenth-century pamphlets from Conway Hall Library & Archives. This includes the Conway Tracts, Moncure Conway's personal pamphlet library; the Morris Tracts, donated to the library by Miss Morris in 1904; the National Secular Society's pamphlet library and others. The Conway Tracts were bound with additional ephemera, such as lecture programmes and handwritten notes.<br /><br />Please note that these digitised pamphlets have been edited to maximise the accuracy of the OCR, ensuring they are text searchable. If you would like to view un-edited, full-colour versions of any of our pamphlets, please email librarian@conwayhall.org.uk.<br /><br /><span><img src="http://www.heritagefund.org.uk/sites/default/files/media/attachments/TNLHLF_Colour_Logo_English_RGB_0_0.jpg" width="238" height="91" alt="TNLHLF_Colour_Logo_English_RGB_0_0.jpg" /></span>
Creator
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Conway Hall Library & Archives
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2018
Publisher
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Conway Hall Ethical Society
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Original Format
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Pamphlet
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
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The new gospel of peace according to St. Benjamin
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
White, Richard Grant [1821-1885.]
Description
An account of the resource
Place of publication: Manchester; London
Collation: 42 p. : ill. (accompanying fold-out black and white illustration) ; 19 cm.
Notes: A satire on American politics. From the library of Dr Moncure Conway. The author is not named on the title page. Date of publication from KVK. Accompanying fold-out black and white illustration titled 'What the Peace Party wishes the North to do'.
Publisher
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Abel Heywoord; Bacon & Co.
Date
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[1877]
Identifier
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G5228
Rights
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<a href="http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/mark/1.0/"><img src="http://i.creativecommons.org/p/mark/1.0/88x31.png" alt="Public Domain Mark" /></a><span> </span><br /><span>This work (The new gospel of peace according to St. Benjamin), identified by </span><a href="https://conwayhallcollections.omeka.net/items/show/www.conwayhall.org.uk"><span>Humanist Library and Archives</span></a><span>, is free of known copyright restrictions.</span>
Format
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application/pdf
Type
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Text
Language
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English
Subject
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USA
Politics
Conway Tracts
Satire
United States-Politics and Government