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A
PHILOSOPHICAL CONVERSATION.
TRANSLATED •
FROM THE FRENCH OF DIDEROT.
■ !
*
• By E. N. -
PUBLISHED BY THOMAS SCOTT,'
NO. II THE TERRACE, FARQUHAR ROAD, UPPER NORWOOD,
LONDON, S.E.
----1875.
v
Price Sixpence. '
z.
■
'
‘
�LONDON :
PRINTED BY C. W. REYNELL, LITTLE PULTENEY STREET,
HAYMARKET, W.
�PREFACE.
This dialogue, entitled ‘ Entretien d’un Philosophe avec la Marcchale de * * * ’ was originally
published in Italian and French, professing to be
translated from a posthumous work of the poet
Crudeli. It is written in the most natural style,
and few dialogues in the French language give
such a perfect illusion of two persons conversing.
But, under a style worthy of the best writers of
comedy, the most powerful arguments are to be
seen, and a volume might be written in develop
ment of the points touched upon in these few
pages. Except in a few instances where expla
nation or reference seemed desirable, I have
refrained from adding notes ; the thinking reader
will be able to apprehend the arguments, even
those which, latent in the dialogue, would
develop most brilliantly under dramatic inter
pretation.
Diderot’s writings are too little known in
England; he is hardly ever mentioned; but his
thoughts may be traced in more than one modern
work. Apart from the errors common to all
social philosophy before Malthus wrote, and a
�4
Preface.
style perhaps too much seasoned with Gallic salt
for English taste in the present day, Diderot
stands in the first rank of philosophers and lite
rary men. To none does Humanity owe more.
As a writer, he excelled in lifelike dialogue ; an
admirable specimen of it, 1 Le Neveu de Rameau ’
was recently translated in the Fortnightly
Review; his ‘ Paradoxe sur le Comedien,’ a most
artistic production, will, I hope, soon find a
translator capable of doing justice to it. In the
piece now translated, the nature of the subject
compels rather strict adherence to the letter of
the author, and prevents his spirit from being
conveyed as well as it might be in a purely lite
rary compositiom
�DIDEROT’S
PHILOSOPHICAL
CONVERSATION.
AVING some business with the marechai de
* * * I called on him one morning ; he was
,
out, but I waited for him and was shown in to the
marechale. She is a charming woman, an angel of
beauty and piety; sweet temper is depicted on her
countenance, the tone of her voice and the simplicity
of her conversation agree perfectly with the expres
sion of her features. She was still at her toilet table;
I was asked to sit down, and we began to talk. At
some remark of mine which edified and surprised her
(for she believed that a man who denies the Holy
Trinity is a rogue who will end at the gallows), she
said:—
La Marechale. Are you not Monsieur Crudeli ?
Crudeli.—Yes, Madam.
L. M.—Then you are the man who believes in
nothing ?
Cr.—The same.
L. M.—Nevertheless you profess the same moral
principles as a believer.
Cr.—Why should I not, if I am an honest man ?
L. M.—And do you put these principles in prac
tice ?
Cr.—As well as I can.
L. M.—What! you never steal; you are neither a
murderer nor a robber ?
H
�6
Diderot's Philosophical Conversation.
Cr.—Very rarely.
L. M.—Then what do you gain by your unbelief ?
• Cr.—Nothing ; is one to believe because of some
thing to be gained thereby ?
L. M.—That I can hardly say ; but the motive of
personal interest is not amiss in the business either
of this world or of the next. I am rather sorry for
the credit of poor humanity; it is not saying much
for us. But, really ! do you never steal ?
Cr.—Never, on my word.
L. M.—If you are neither a murderer nor a thief,
you must own that your conduct is unreasonable and
inconsistent.
Cr.—How so ?
L. M.—Because it seems to me that if I had
nothing to hope or to fear when I am out of this
world, there are many little indulgences which I
should not deprive myself of now that I am in it. I
own to investing my good works in expectation of
repayment with enormous interest.
Cr.—You think you do.
L. M.—I do not merely think so; it is a fact.
Cr.—And might I ask you what things you would
permit yourself if you were an unbeliever ?
L. M.—If you please, no ; I keep that subject for
the confessional.
Cr.—My investment of good works is a poor specu
lation ; I shall never see my capital again.
L. M.—That is an unthrifty investment.
Cr.—Would you rather I should be a usurer ?
L. M.—Well, yes; you may practise usury to any
extent in your dealings with God, you cannot ruin
him. I know that it is a rather shabby proceeding,
but what does that matter ? The point is to get into
heaven by hook or by crook ; we must make the best
of everything and neglect nothing which can bring
us in a return. Alas ! whatever we do, our invest
ment will always be pitifully small in comparison with
�Diderot's Philosophical Conversation.
7
the handsome return we expect for it. And so you
expect no return ?
Cr.—Nothing.
L. M.—How sad! You must own that you are
either very wicked or very foolish ?
Cr.—Indeed I cannot say which.
L. M.—What motive for being good can an unbeliever
have if he is in his right mind ? Please tell me that.
Cr.—I can tell you.
L. M.—I shall be glad to know.
Cr.—Do you not think it possible that one may be
so fortunately born as to find a natural pleasure in
doing good ?
L. M.—I think it is possible.
Cr.—That one may have received an excellent
education which strengthens the natural inclination
towards good deeds ?
L. M.—Certainly.
Cr.—And that in after-life experience may have
convinced us that, taking everything into considera
tion, it is better for one’s happiness in this world to
be an honest man than a rogue ?
L. M.—Yes indeed; but can one be honest sup
posing that bad principles combine with the passions
to lead us towards evil ?
Cr.—One may not act in consequence ; and what
do we more commonly see than actions at variance
with principles ?
L. M.—Alas ! it is unfortunately so ; believers con
stantly act as if they did not believe.
Cr.—And without believing one may act nearly as
well as if one believed.
L. M.—I am glad to hear you say so; but what
inconvenience would there be in having a reason the
more, religion, for doing good, and a reason the less,
unbelief, for doing evil ?
Cr.—None, if religion were a motive for doing
good and unbelief a motive for doing evil.
�8
Diderot's Philosophical Conversation.
L. M.—Can there be any doubt on that point ?
Does not the spirit of religion incessantly thwart the
promptings of this vile corrupted human nature, and
does not the spirit of unbelief abandon it to its evil
ways by relieving it from all fear ?
Cb.—Madame la marechale, this will lead us into
a long discussion.
L. M.—And what if it does ? The Marshal will
not be back for some time, and we are better em
ployed talking sense than taking away our neigh
bours’ good names.
Cr.—You see that I shall have to take up the
subject rather far back.
. L. M.—As far back as you like, provided I under
stand you.
Cr.—If you do not understand me it will certainly
be my fault.
L. M.—I thank you for the compliment; but you
must know that I have never read anything but my
prayer-book, and that my occupations have been
exclusively confined to putting the gospel in practice
and looking after my children.
Cr.—Two duties that you have well fulfilled.
L. M.—Yes, as regards the children. But begin.
Cr.—Madame la marechale, is there in this world
any good without some drawback ?
L. M.—Kone.
Cr.—What, then, do you call good and evil ?
L. M.—Evil must be that in which the drawbacks
are greater than the advantages, while good must,
on the contrary, be that which has advantages
greater than the drawbacks.
Cr.—Will you please to bear in mind your defini
tion of good and evil ?
L. M.—I will remember it. Do you call that a
definition ?
Cr.—Yes.
L. M.—This is philosophy, then ?
�Diderot’s Philosophical Conversation.
9
Cr.—Excellent philosophy.
L. M.—The last thing I should have thought
myself capable of.
Cr.—So you are persuaded that religion has more
advantages than drawbacks, and that for this reason
you call it good ?
L. M.—Yes.
Cr.—For my own part I do not doubt that your
steward robs you somewhat less on Good Friday than
on Easter Monday; and that now and then religion
prevents a number of little evils and produces a num
ber of' little benefits.
L. M.—Little by little, the sum mounts up.
Cr.—But do you believe that such wretched little
advantages can sufficiently compensate the terrible
ravages which religion has caused in past times, and
which it will still cause in times to come ? Consider
the violent antipathy which it has created between
nations, and which it still keeps up.
There is
not a Mussulman who would not imagine he was
doing an act agreeable to God and the holy
prophet in exterminating all the Christians, who, on
their side, are hardly more tolerant. Consider the
dissensions which it has created and perpetuated in
the midst of nearly every nation, dissensions which
have rarely been stifled without bloodshed. Our own
history offers us examples which are only too recent
and too disastrous. Consider that it has created, and
still keeps up the most violent and undying hatred
between the members of society, between the indi
viduals of a family. Christ said he had come to
divide the man from his wife, the mother from her
children, the brother from his sister, the friend from
the friend, and his prediction has only been too com
pletely fulfilled.
L. M.—That may be the abuse of the thing without
being the thing itself.
Cr.—It is the thing itself, if the abuses are insepar
able from it.
B
�io
Diderot's Philosophical Conversation.
L. M.—And how can yon show me that the abuses
of religion are inseparable from religion ?
Cb.—Very easily. Tell me this : supposing a manhater had desired to render the human race as unhappy
as possible, what could he have invented for the pur
pose better than belief in an incomprehensible being
about whom men could never be able to agree, and
whom they should regard as more important than
their own lives ? * And is it possible to form a con
ception of a deity without attaching to it the deepest
incomprehensibility and the highest importance ?
L. M.—No.
Cr.—Then draw your conclusion.
L. M.—I conclude that it is an idea not without
serious consequence in the mind of fools.
Cr.—And add that fools always have been and
always will be the majority of mankind, that the
most dangerous fools are those rendered so by
religion, and that these are the men whom the dis
turbers of society know how to work when they have
need of them.
L. M.—But we must have something to frighten
men from such bad actions as escape the severity of
the law; and, if you destroy religion, what can you
substitute for it ?
Or.—Even if I had nothing to substitute for it,
there would be always a terrible prejudice the less,
without counting that in no age and in no country
have religious opinions formed the basis of national
manners. The gods adored by the old Greeks and
Romans, the finest people on earth,f were a most
dissolute set of rascals; a Jupiter who deserved the
faggot and the stake, a Venus worthy of the House
of Correction, a Mercury whose proper place was
in jail.
L. M.—And so you think that it is quite a matter
* See Appendix, Note I.
t See Note II.
�Diderot's Philosophical Conversation,
11
of indifference whether we be Christians or Pagans ;
that as Pagans we should be equally good and that as
'Christians we are no better ?
Cb.—Indeed I am convinced of it; excepting that
as Pagans we should be rather merrier.
L. M.—It is impossible.
Cr.—But, Madame la marechale, are there any
Christians ? I have never seen any.
L. M.—That is a nice thing to say to me.
Cr.—I am not saying it to you: I was thinking of
a lady who is a neighbour of mine, good and pious
as you are, and who believed herself in all sincerity
to be a Christian, just as you do.
L. M.—And you showed her that she was mis
taken ?
Cr.—At once.
L. M.—How did you manage that ?
Cr.—I opened a New Testament, a well-read one,
for it was considerably worn. I read her the Sermon
on the Mount, and at each article of it I asked
her:—“ Do you act up to this ? ” I went on
further. She is a beautiful woman, and although
very pious she is not unconscious of her attraction;
she has a most delicate fair complexion, and although
she does not attach much value to this perishable
charm, she is not displeased if it excites admira
tion ; her bust is perfect, and, although very modest,
she is not averse to its beauty being observed.
L. M.—Provided, of course, that she and her
husband should alone be aware of this.
Cr.—I believe that her husband knows it much
better than any one else; but for a woman who
prides herself on high Christian principles that is
not enough. I said to her :—“ Is it not written
in the gospel that he who has coveted his neigh
bour’s wife has committed adultery already in his
heart?”
L. M.— I suppose she answered yes ?
�12
Diderot’s Philosophical Conversation.
Cr. I said to her:—“And does not adultery
committed in the heart damn as surely as a more
complete adultery ? ”
R- M.—I suppose she answered yes ?
Cb. I said, “ And if the man is damned for
adultery committed in heart, what will be the fate of
the woman who invites all those who come near her
to commit that crime?
This last question rather
embarrassed her.
C. M.—I understand ; she did not cover up that
perfect bust as completely as she might.
Cr.—Not quite. She answered that it was a
custom, as if nothing was more customary than to call
oneself Christian and yet not to be so; that it was
wrong to dress in a ridiculous manner, as if there
could be any comparison between a petty ridiculous
act and the eternal damnation of one’s self and one’s
neighbours ; that she did not interfere with her dress
maker, as if it were not better to change one’s dress
maker than to be false to one’s religion ; that it was
her husband’s fancy, as if a husband could be mad
enough to demand that his wife should push obedi
ence to a wrong-headed husband so far as to disobey
the will of God and to contemn the threats of her
Redeemer I
L. M.—I was well aware of all those childish
reasons; I might even have answered as your neigh
bour did; but both she and I would have been taken
at a disadvantage. However, what conduct did she
adopt, after your remonstrance ?
Cr.—-The day after this conversation was a holy
day ; I was going upstairs to my room, when my
neighbour was coming downstairs on her way to
mass.
L. M.—Dressed as usual ?
Cr.—Dressed as usual. I smiled, she smiled ; and
we passed one another without speaking. This was
a good woman ! a Christian ! a pious woman ! After
�Diderot's Philosophical Conversation.
13
this example and a hundred thousand others of the
same sort, what real influence on conduct can I grant
religion, to have ? Hardly any: and so much the
better.
L. M.—How so much the better ?
Cr.—Yes, I mean it. Supposing that twenty
thousand of the inhabitants of Paris took it into
their heads to conform strictly to the precepts of the
Sermon on the Mount. . . .
L. M.—There would be some ladies’ shoulders
better covered than at present.
Cr.—And so many lunatics that the police would
be at their wits’ end to find room for them all in the
madhouses. In all inspired books there are two kinds
of morality; one general and common to every
nation, to every religion, and which is followed pretty
nearly ; another peculiar to each nation and to each
religion, in which men believe, which they preach in
their churches, which they teach in their homes, and
which they do not follow at all.
*
L. M.—What is the reason of this contradiction ?
Cr.—In the impossibility of subjecting a people to
a rule which only agrees with a few melancholy men
who have diawn it from a model found in their own
character. Religions are like monastic rules; all
become relaxed in time. They are follies which can
not hold ground against the constant efforts of nature
to bring us back to her laws. Let the statesman take
care that the welfare of individuals should be so
bound up with the common weal that a citizen can
hardly harm society without hurting himself; let
virtue be rewarded as certainly as wickedness is
punished; let merit, in whatever position it exist,
and without distinction of sect, be eligible for state
employment, and only count as wicked the small
number of men whom an incorrigible perversity of
* * See Note III.
�14
Diderot's Philosophical Conversation.
nature has dragged into vice. Temptation is too
near and hell is too far off; it is not worth the while
of a legislator to take in hand a system of crooked
opinions which can only keep children under its yoke,
which encourages crime by the facility of its expia
tion ; which sends the culprit to ask pardon from
*
God for the injuries inflicted on man, and which
degrades the order of natural and moral duties by
making it subordinate to an order of chimerical
duties.
L. M.—I do not understand you.
Cr.—I will explain ; but I think I hear the Mar
shal’s carriage coming, just in time to prevent me
from saying something which you might think
impudent.
L. M.—If what you are about to say is impudent, I
shall not hear it; I have a good habit of only hearing
what I choose.
Cr.—Madame la marecliale, ask the curate of your
parish which is the more atrocious crime : to defile
one of the eucharistic vessels or to blacken the good
name of an honest woman ? He will shudder with
horror at the first, he will cry sacrilege ; and the
civil law which takes hardly any notice of calumny
while it punishes sacrilege by the stake,f will finish the
confusion of moral ideas and the corruption of the
public ’mind.
L. M.—I know more than one woman who would
scruple to eat meat on a Friday, and yet would . . .
I was also going to say my piece of impudence.
Continue.
Cr.-—But, Madam, I must really go and see the
Marshal.
L. M.—Another minute, and then we will go
together and see him. I don’t know how to answer
you, and yet you do not persuade me.
* See Note IV.
t See Note V.
�Diderot's Philosophical Conversation,
15
Cr.—I had no intention of persuading you. It is
the same with religion as with marriage. Although
marriage has caused misery to so many others, it has
given happiness to you and the Marshal. Religion
which has made, which still makes, and will yet
make so many men wicked, has rendered you better
than before ; you do well in keeping to it. It pleases
you to imagine, above your head, a great and power
ful being, who 'watches your journey through life ;
this idea strengthens your steps. Continue, Madam,
to enjoy the thought of this august keeper of your
mind, at once a spectator and a sublime model of
your actions.
L. M.—I see that you are not possessed by the
mania of proselytism.
Cr.—By no means.
L. M.—And I esteem you the more for it.
Cr.—I permit every one to think in his way, pro
vided he does not interfere with mine ; and, besides,
those who are destined to deliver themselves from
these prejudices have no need of being catechized.
L. M.—Do you think that man can do "without
superstition F
Cr.—No ; not as long as he remains ignorant and
timorous.
L- M.—Well then, superstition for superstition, as
well ours as another.
Cr.—I do not think so.
L. M.—Tell me truly, have you no repugnance for
the idea of being nothing after death F
Cr.—I would prefer to retain my existence'; not
withstanding that I see no reason why a Being who
has already been able to render me unhappy without
any reason, might not amuse himself again in the
same way.
*
L- M.—If, notwithstanding that drawback, the
* See Note VL
�16
Diderot's Philosophical Conversation.
hope of a life to come appears sweet and consoling,
even to you, why teai’ it from us F
Cr.—I have no such hope, for my desire does not
imply an expectation which I know to be vain; but
I take it away from no one.
*
If any person can
believe that he will see when he has no eyes, that he
will hear when he has no ears, that he will think when
he has no brain, that he will love when he has no heart,
that he will feel when he has no sensation, that he
will exist when he will be nowhere, that he will be
a something without measure or place,—I have no
objection.
L. M.—But this world, who made it ?
Cr.—Perhaps you can inform me.
L. M.—God.
Cr.—And what is God ?
L. M.—A spirit.
Cr.—If a spirit can make matter, why should not
matter make a spirit ?
L. M.—And why should itp
Cr.—Because I see it do so every day. Do you
believe that animals have souls ?
L- M.—Certainly I believe so.
Cr. And could you tell me what becomes, for
instance, of the soul of the Peruvian serpent which
is hung up in a chimney to dry, and remains in the
smoke for one or two years ?
L. M.—Let it go where it pleases ; what does that
matter to me ?
Cr.—You are probably not aware that this serpent,
smoked and dried, revives, and comes to life again.f
L. M.—I don’t believe it.
Cr.—Nevertheless, a clever man, Bouguer, asserts
that it is so.
>
’
, ,
* The terseness of the original deservesnotice. “Je n’ai pas cet
,e,sP°\r> Parceclue le desir ne m’en a point donne la vanite; mais je ne
lote a personne.” Another reading gives “derobe” instead of “ donne
the translation would then be, “for my desire has not deceived me as
to its vanity.”
t See Note VII.
�Diderot's Philosophical Conversation.
17
L. M.—Your clever man has told a story.
Cr.—Suppose what he says were true ?
L. M.—Well, I should have to believe that animals
are machines.
Cr.—’Remembering that man is only a rather more
perfect animal than the rest. . . . But I think
the Marshal is . . .
L. M.—One more question; the last. Are you at
ease in your unbelief F
Cr.—-Impossible to be more so.
L. M.—Yet, if it turned out that you were mis
taken ?
Cr.—Well, and if I were mistaken ?
L. M.—All that you believe to be false would come
true, and you would be cast amongst the damned.
Monsieur Crudeli, it is a terrible thing to be con
demned to.hell, to burn there for all eternity I
*
Cr.—La Fontaine believed that we should be as
comfortable there as fish in the water.
L. M.—You may laugh now ; but remember that
La Fontaine became very serious at his last moments ;
and this is the point where I make my stand against
you.
Cr.—I answer for nothing when my head will be
no longer right; but if I die from one of those
diseases which leave the expiring man his whole
reason, I shall not be more disturbed at the moment
you mention than I am at present.
L. M.—I am confounded at your boldness.
Cr.—I think there is much more boldness in the
man who dies believing in a severe judge who weighs
our most secret thoughts and in whose scales the
most upright man would be lost through vanity, did
he not tremble through fear of being found wanting;
if this dying man had then the choice either of anni
hilation or of judgment, his boldness would impress
* See Note VIII.
3
* v
�18
Diderot’s Philosophical Conversation.
me more should he hesitate to choose the former
alternative; unless he were more insane than the
companion of St. Bruno, or more intoxicated with
his own merits than Bohola.
L. M.—I have read the story of St. Bruno’s com
panion, but I have never heard of Bohola.
Cr.—He was a Jesuit of the college of Pinsk in
Lithuania, who left at his death a coffer full of money,
with a memorandum which he had written and
signed.
L. M.—And what was the memorandum about ?
Cr.—It ran thus : “ I request the dear brother to
whom I have confided this coffer, to open it when I
shall have performed miracles.' The money which it
contains will pay the expenses of my canonization.
I have left some authentic memoirs for the confirma
tion of my virtues and the guidance of those who
undertake to write my life.”
L. M.—What a ridiculous story !
Cr.—It may be so to me, Madam, but in your case
a joke on such a subject may offend God.
L. M.—Indeed, you are right.
Cr.—It is so easy to sin grievously against your
law.
L. M.'—I admit that it is.
Cr.—The justice which will decide your fate is
very rigorous.
L. M.—True.
Cr.—And if you believe the oracles of your religion
on the number of the elect, it will be very small.
L. M.— Oh ! but I am not a Jansenist; I only look
at the consoling side of the question; the blood of
Jesus Christ covers, in my eyes, a multitude of sins ;
and it would seem to me very singular if the Devil
had the best share of mankind, although he did not
give up a son to death.
Cr.-—Do you damn Socrates, Phocion, Aristides,
Cato, Trajan, Marcus Aurelius ?
�Diderofs Philosophical Conversation.
19
L. M.—Certainly not; no one but a wild beast
could think of such a thing. St. Paul says that
every man shall be judged by the law which he has
known, and St. Paul is right.
Cjb.—'And by what law is the unbeliever to be
judged ?
L. M.—Your case is rather different. You are one
of the accursed inhabitants of Chorazin and Bethsaida, who shut their eyes to the light which shone
on them and stopped their ears so as not to hear the
voice of truth speaking to them.
Cr.—The people of Chorazin and Bethsaida were
men such as never existed elsewhere, if they were
free to believe or not to believe.
L. M.—They saw mighty works which would have
made sackcloth and ashes more valuable than gold,
had they been done in Tyre and Sidon,
Cr.—Well, you see, the inhabitants of Tyre and
Sidon were clever people, while those of Chorazin
and Bethsaida were fools. I told you a story just
now, I should like to tell you another. Once upon a
time, a young Mexican . . . But, the Marshal . . .
L. M.—I will send and find out if he is disengaged.
*
Well what about the young Mexican ?
Cr.—Peeling weary of his work, was walking one
day along the sea-shore. He saw a plank, one end
of which was floating while the other was aground.
He sat down on the plank, and then, gazing over the
vast expanse of sea, said to himself:11 My grandmother
must be doting when she tells that story about those
people, who at some long time ago landed here from
somewhere or other beyond the seas. What nonsense I
is it not plain that the sea and the sky join in the
distance ? Can I believe, against the evidence of my
senses, an old story the date of which is unknown,
which every one tells in his own fashion, and which
is nothing but a tissue of absurd traditions about
which people tear their own hearts and one another’s
�20
Diderot's Pkilosophical Conversation.
eyes ?” While he was thus meditating, the rippling
waters were rocking him as he lay on the plank and
he soon fell asleep. The wind rose and the tide
carried the plank out to sea with our young reasoner
still lying asleep on it.
L. M.—Alas1 that is a true image of mankind :
we are each of us floating on a plank, the wind rises
and the tide carries us out to sea.
Cr.—When he awoke he was already far from the
land. Much as he was surprised to find himself out
at sea, he was still more surprised when the land dis
appeared and the sea joined with the sky over the
place where he had not long ago been walking. Then
he began to suspect that he might very possibly have
been mistaken in his incredulity, and that if the wind
continued from the same point, he might perhaps be
carried to the coast inhabited by the people of whom
his grandmother had so often spoken to him.
L. M.—You say nothing about the anxiety he
must have felt.
Cr. He had none. He said to himself:—“ What
does it matter provided I get to land. I have
reasoned rather clumsily, I must own; but I was
sincere, and that is all that can be expected of me.
If cleverness is not a virtue, stupidity cannot be a
crime.” In the meantime the wind continued to
blow, the plank and its freight floated on, the
unknown shore soon began to appear, and before
very long he arrived there and landed.
L. M.—We shall meet on that shore one day,
Monsieur Crudeli.
Cr.—I hope so, Mhdcwne la marechdle; wherever
it be I shall always be delighted at an opportunity of
paying my respects to you. Scarcely had he left the
plank and set foot on shore, when he perceived a
venerable old man standing at his side. He asked
where he was and to whom he had the honour of
speaking. “I am the sovereign of this country,”
�Diderot's Philosophical Conversation.
21
replied the old man. “ You denied my existence ? ”
—“True, I did.”—“And that of my empire ? ”—“ True, I did.”—“ I pardon you, because I am He
who sees to the bottom of hearts, and I have read in
yours that you were in good faith; but all your
thoughts and deeds have not been so innocent.”
Whereupon the old man took him gently by the ear,
recalled to him all the faults of his life, and at each
one the young Mexican bowed down, beat his breast,
and asked forgiveness. How, Madame la marechale,
put yourself for a moment in the place of the old
man and tell me what you would have done ? Would
you have seized this young fool and taken a pleasure
in dragging him round the beach by the hair for all
eternity P
L. M.—Indeed, no.
Cr.—If one of those pretty children of yours had
escaped from the house, and after doing all sorts of
foolish things, came back repentant ?
L. M.—I should rush to meet him, I should take
him in my arms and embrace him with tears. But
his father, the Marshal, would not take things so gently.
Cr.—The Marshal is not exactly a tiger.
L. M.—Not by any means.
Cr.—He would require a little persuasion, but he
would certainly end by forgiving.
L. M.—Certainly.
Cr.—Especially if he came to think that, before
causing the birth of this child, he knew its whole life,
and that the punishment of its faults would be use
less, either for himself, for the culprit, or for the
other children.
L. M.—But the old man and the Marshal are two
very different persons.
Cr.—Do you mean that the Marshal is kinder
than the old man ?
L. M.— God forbid ! I only mean that if my jus
tice is not the same as the Marshal’s, his may not be
the same as the old man’s.
�22
Diderot's Philosophical Conversation.
Ce.—Ah ! Madam, you do not foresee the conse
quences of that answer. Either the general defini
tion of justice is equally applicable to you, to the
Marshal, to me, to the young Mexican and to the old
man, or else I don’t know what justice is and am
totally in the dark as to the means by which the old
man is pleased or displeased.
At this point of our conversation, we were told
that the Marshal was waiting for us. As I shook
hands with the marechale, she said :—It is enough to
make one giddy, isn’t it ?
Ce.—Why should it, if the head is firm ?
L. M.—After all, the shortest way is to behave as
if the old man existed.
Ce.—Even if one doesn’t believe it.
L. M.—And if you do believe it, not to count on
his goodness.
Oe.—If that is not the politest conduct, at least it
is the safest.
L. M.—By the way, suppose you were taken before
the magistrates to give an account of your religious
principles, would you confess them ?
Ce.—I should do my best to save the authorities
from committing an atrocious act.
*
L. M.—Ah! you are a coward ! And if you were
at the point of death, would you submit to receive
the sacraments of the church ?
Ce.—I would not fail to do so.
L. M.—Eor shame! you wicked hypocrite !
* See Note IN.
�APPENDIX.
Note I., page 10.
Compare the opinions of James Mill, as recorded in his
son’s Autobiography, Chapter II. “His aversion to religion,
in the sense usually attached to the term, was of the same
kind with that of Lucretius ; he regarded it with the feelings
due, not to a mere mental delusion, but to a great moral
evil. He looked upon it as the greatest enemy of morality ;
first, by setting up fictitious excellences—belief in creeds,
■devotional feelings and ceremonies, not connected with the
good of human kind,—and causing these to be accepted as
substitutes for genuine virtues : but above all, by radically
vitiating the standard of morals. . . . He was as well
aware as any one that Christians do not in general undergo
the demoralising consequences which seem inherent in such a
creed, in the manner, or to the extent which might have been
expected from it. The same slovenliness of thought, and
subjection of the reason to fears, wishes, and affections, which
enable them to accept a theory involving a _ contradiction in
terms, prevents them from perceiving the logical consequences
of the theory.”
Note II., page 10.
Exception may possibly be taken to the Greeks and Romans
being called “ les plus honnetes gens de la terre.'’ I apprehend
that°Diderot’s meaning will be understood from the following
remarks of John Stuart Mill. “We greatly doubt if most of
"the positive virtues were not better conceived and more highly
prized by the public opinion of Greece than by that of Great
Britain . . . and it may be questioned, if even private
duties are, on the whole, better understood, while duties to
the public, unless in cases of special trust, have almost
dropped out of the catalogue ; that idea, so powerful in the
free states of Greece, has faded into a mere rhetorical
ornament.”—(Review of Grote's ‘History of Greece.’)
Speaking on the use of the Greek and Roman literatures,
Mill also says, “They exhibit, in the military and agri
cultural commonwealths of antiquity, precisely that order of
virtues in which commercial society is apt to be deficient; and
�24
Appendix.
they altogether show human nature on a grander scale ; with
less benevolence but more patriotism ; less sentiment but more
self-control; if a lower average of virtue, more striking
individual examples of it; fewer small goodnesses, but more
greatness and appreciation of greatness ; more which tends to
exalt the imagination and inspire high conceptions of the
capabilities of human nature.”—(Review of De Tocqueville on
‘ Democracy in America. ’)
It is possible that European society may have become more
honest since the middle of the eighteenth century, but at that
time Diderot might with reason regret the ancient standard
of virtue.
Note III., page 13.
This passage is developed by John Stuart Mill, in his Essay
‘On Liberty’:—“Towhat an extent doctrines intrinsically
fitted to make the deepest impression upon the mind may
remain in it as dead beliefs, without being ever realised in the
imagination, the feelings or the understanding, is exemplified
by the manner in which the majority of believers hold the
doctrines of Christianity. By Christianity, I here mean what
is accounted such by all churches and sects—the maxims and
precepts contained in the New Testament. These are con
sidered sacred, and accepted as laws, by all professing Chris
tians. Yet it is scarcely too much to say that not one Christian
in a thousand guides or tests his individual conduct by
reference to those laws. The standard to which he does refer
it is the custom of his nation, his class, or his religious pro
fession. He has thus, on the one hand, a collection of ethical
maxims, which he believes to have been vouchsafed to him
by infallible wisdom as rules for his government; and on the
other a set of every day judgments and practices, which go a
certain length with some of those maxims, not so great a
length with others, stand in direct opposition to some, and
are, on the whole, a compromise between the Christian creed
and the interests and suggestions of worldly life. To the
first of these standards he gives his homage ; to the other his
real allegiance. All Christians believe that the blessed are
the poor and humble, and those who are ill-used by the
world ; that it is easier for a camel to pass through the eye of
a needle than for a rich man to enter the kingdom of heaven ;
that they should judge not, lest they be judged: that they
should swear not at all; that they should love their neigh
bour as themselves ; that if one take their cloak, they should
give him their coat also ; that they should take no thought
�15
Appendix:
for the morrow ; that if they would be perfect they should
sell all that they have and give it to the poor. They are not
insincere when they say that they believe these things. They
do believe them, as people believe what they have always
heard lauded, and never discussed. But in the sense of that
living belief which regulates conduct, they believe these doc
trines just up to the point to which it is usual to act upon
them. The doctrines, in their integrity, are serviceable to
pelt adversaries with ; and it is understood that they are to
be put forward (when possible), as the reasons for whatever
people do that they think laudable. But any one who
reminded them that the maxims require an infinity of things
which they never even think of doing, would gain nothing
but to be classed among those very unpopular characters who
affect to be better than other people. The doctrines have no
hold on ordinary believers—are not a power in their minds.
They have an habitual respect for the sound of them, but no
feeling which spreads from the words to the things signified,
and forces the mind to take them in, and make them conform
to the formula. Whenever conduct is concerned they look
round for Mr A. and B., to direct them how far to go in
obeying Christ. ”
Note IV., page 14.
See in Voltaire’s ‘Philosophical Dictionary’ the article
“Kavaillac.” It is in the form of a dialogue between a
doctor in theology and a page of the Duke of Sully. The
dialogue begins thus : ‘ ‘ Thank God, my dear boy, JRavaillac
died in holiness. He made his confession to me ; he repented
of his sin, and made a firm resolve not to fall into it again.
He wished to receive the holy communion, but that is not
allowed here as at Borne; his repentance stood in place of it,
and it is certain that he is now in paradise. . . . He was
most contrite, and contrition, combined with the sacrament of
confession, effects salvation, which leads straight to paradise,
where he is now praying to God for you.”
Note V., page 14.
This dialogue was written within a few years of the con
demnation of La Barre and D’Etallonde for sacrilege. They
were accused of having insulted a crucifix set up in a public
thoroughfare; the alleged offence was committed at night, and
the evidence was far from satisfactory. D’Etallonde fled, and
was provided for by Frederick the Great at Voltaire’s request;
La Barre was condemned by the Parliament of Abbeville ; he
was racked, his tongue was torn out, and he was then be
headed.
C
�26
Appendix.
Note VI., page 15.
The desirability of a future life is well treated in the West
minster Review for April, 1873 (Mr Gladstone’s “Defence of
the Faith.”) I will only quote the following sentence for
comparison with Diderot: “No doubt the prospect of future
non-existence may not be an altogether pleasant element to
mingle with our ideas for a few short years to come ; but by
no ingenuity can non-existence itself be represented as
unpleasant.” Compare also Mill’s ‘Three Essays,’ page 118.
Note VII., page 16.
The serpent was adored in Peru, as it is in other parts of
the world, as an emblem of eternity and of resurrection, as
well as of destruction and of regeneration. This incident in
the dialogue is evidently an allusion to the idea of resurrec
tion; Diderot, without entering into the hopeless labyrinth of
a discussion on the soul, contents himself with leading his
interlocutor into a dilemma and leaving her there.
Metaphysicians have successively given animals souls, de
graded them to machines (as compared with soul-possessing
man), and finally, perceiving the awkwardness of either posi
tion, decided on allowing them a compromise called instinct.
Note VIII., page 17.
The expediency of “hedging,” so frequently urged on
waverers in faith, is apparently an argument not confined to
modern Evangelical Christians.
Note IX., page 22.
It must not be thought that Diderot was himself so cautious
as he represents his philosopher. Although he had. with the
tolerance which was his characteristic, confided the article
Soul in his Encyclopaedia to a theologian of well-known ortho
doxy, he was attacked for the materialistic tendencies of this
very article, and the work was proscribed. His prospects
were looking gloomy ; Voltaire begged him to leave his un
grateful country, and to accept the noble hospitality offered
by Catherine of Russia; he was in vain reminded of the fate
of the Chevalier La Barre. But Diderot scorned to seek safety
in flight, and, with the scaffold before his eyes, answered Vol
taire in the following terms : “I know that when a wild beast
has tasted human blood it can no longer do without it; I know
that this beast, having devoured the Jesuits, is about to spring
on the philosophers ; I know that it has cast eyes on me, and
that I shall perhaps be the first devoured. . . I know that
one of them has had the atrocity to say that nothing will be
done as long as only books are burnt. ... I know that
before the end of the year I may remember your advice, and
�Appendix.
27
cry Solon! Solon! . . . What is existence to me if I can
only preserve it by renouncing all that is dear to me ? And
then, I rise every morning with the hope that the wicked have
repented during the night, that there are no more fanatics. . .
If I meet the fate of Socrates, remember that it is not enough
to die like him in order to merit comparison with him. . .
Illustrious and tender-hearted friend of humanity, I salute
and embrace you. No man with a spark of generosity but
would pardon fanaticism for cutting a few years off his life if
those years could be added to yours. If we do not join in
your efforts to crush the beast, it is because we are within
*
reach of its claws, and if, knowing its ferocity, we yet hesitate
to retreat, it is from considerations of which the supremacy
influences every upright and sensitive nature.”
P08TCRIPTUM.
Since writing these notes I have observed some remarkable
coincidences between the opening of the argument in Diderot’s
‘ Conversation ’ (page 8) with that in Philip Beauchamp’s
‘ Analysis of the Influence of Natural Religion on the Tem
poral Happiness of Mankind.’ The latter, published in 18221
*
under an assumed name, is generally understood to be the
work of George Grote, and it is acknowledged by John Stuart
Mill to have had great influence on his intellectual develop
ment. At pages 1 and 2 are the following passages :—
‘ ‘ The warmest partisan of natural religion cannot deny that
by the influence of it (occasionally at least) bad effects have
been produced; nor can any one, on the other hand, venture to
deny that it has, on other occasions, brought about good effects.
The question, therefore, is throughout only as to the compara
tive magnitude, number, and proportion of each.”
“The injurious effects have avowedly been thrown aside
under the pretence that they are abuses of religion; that the
abuse of a thing cannot be urged against its use, since the
most beneficent preparations may be erroneously or criminally
applied. ”
‘ ‘ By the use of a thing is meant the good which it produces;
by the abuse, the evil which it occasions. To pronounce upon
the merits of the thing under discusssion, previously erasing
from the reckoning all the evil which it occasions, is most
preposterous and unwarrantable. ”
Chapter VI. is a development of Diderot’s argument at
page 14—“Temptation is too near,” &c.
. * The bete was fanaticism, that referred to in Voltaire’s watchword J
“ Ecrasez I'infame."
t It has recently been reprinted by Truelove, 256 High Holborn.
��“ADDITION
TO THE PHILOSOPHICAL
THOUGHTS”
OF
DIDEROT.
A very rare little work has fallen into my hands,
entitled ‘ Various Objections to the Writings of dif
ferent Theologians.’ Curtailed, and written with a
little more vivacity, it would form a very good sequel
to the ‘ Philosophical Thoughts.’ I give here a few
of the best ideas of the anonymous author in ques
tion :—
1.
Doubts, in matters of religion, far from being acts
of impiety, should be looked upon as good works,
when they are those of a man who humbly acknow
ledges his ignorance and when they arise from the
fear of displeasing God by the abuse of reason.
2.
To admit some conformity between the reason of
man and eternal reason, which is God, and to pretend
that God exacts the sacrifice of human reason, is to
lay down that He at once will and will not.
3.
When God, from whom we have our reason, re
quires the sacrifice of it, He becomes a juggler who
artfully takes away what he has given.
4.
If I give up my reason, I have no longer any guide.
�30
a Addition to The Philosophical
I must blindly adopt a secondary principle and suppose
what is in question.
5.
If reason is a gift of heaven, and if we can say
the same thing of faith, heaven has made us two pre
sents which are incompatible and contradictory.
6.
To remove this difficulty, we must say that faith is
a chimerical principle, and that it does not exist in
nature.
7.
Pascal Nicole, and others have said, “ That a God
should punish with eternal torments the fault of a
guilty father in his innocent children, is a proposition
above and not contrary to reason.” But what then
is a proposition contrary to reason if that which evi
dently asserts a blasphemy is not so ?
8.
Wandering about an immense forest during the
night, I have but a feeble light to guide me. A
stranger approaches and says to me, “ Blow out thy
candle, my friend, in order better to find thy way.”
This stranger is a theologian.
9.
If my reason comes from on high, it is the voice of
heaven which speaks to me through it; I am bound
to listen to it.
10.
Merit and demerit cannot apply to the use of
reason, because all the goodwill in the world cannot
avail a blind man to discern colours. I am forced to
perceive evidence where it is, and the want of evi
dence where it is not, unless I be an imbecile,—now
imbecility is a misfortune and not a vice.
11.
The author of nature, who will not reward me for
�thoughts ” of Diderot.
31
having been a man of sense, said M. Diderot, will
not damn me for having been a fool.
12.
And He will not damn thee even for having been
a wicked man, for hast thou not already been suffi
ciently unhappy in having been wicked ?
13.
Every virtuous action is accompanied by inward
satisfaction, every criminal action by remorse ; now
the mind owns without shame and without remorse
its repugnance to such and such propositions; there
is then neither virtue nor guilt either in believing or
in rejecting them.
14.
If we still need grace in order to do well, what
was the use of the death of Jesus Christ ?
15.
If there are a hundred thousand damned for one
saved, the devil has still the advantage without having
abandoned his son to death.
16.
The God of the Christians is a father who sets
great store by his apples and very little by his chil
dren.
17.
Take away from a Christian the fear of Hell and
you will take from him his faith.
18.
A true religion interesting all men in all times and
in all places must have been eternal, universal, and
evident; none has these characteristics ; all then are
thrice demonstrated false.
19.
The facts of which some men only can be witnesses
are insufficient to demonstrate a religion which ought
to be equally believed by the whole world.
�32
“Addition to The Philosophical
20.
The facts by which religions are supported are
ancient and marvellous; that is, the most doubtful
possible to prove the most incredible thing.
21.
To prove the Gospel by a miracle is to prove an
absurdity by a thing against nature.
22.
But what will God do to those who have never
heard speak of His Son ? Will He punish the deaf
for not having heard ?
23.
What will He do to those who, having heard tell
of His religion, have not been able to comprehend
it ? Will he punish pigmies for not having been
able to walk with the steps of a giant ?
24.
Why are the miracles of Jesus Christ true, and
those of Esculapius, of Apollonius and of Mahomet
false ?
25.
But all the Jews who were at Jerusalem were pro
bably converted at the sight of the miracles of Jesus
Christ ? Not at all. Ear from believing in him^
they crucified him. We must agree that these Jews
are unlike all other men; everywhere we have seen
people carried away by a single false miracle and
Jesus Christ was unable to make anything of the
Jewish people with an infinity of true miracles.
26.
It is this miracle of incredulity on the part of the
Jews which should be placed in the strongest light,
and not that of his resurrection.
27.
It is as true as that two and two make four that
Caesar existed ; it is as sure that Jesus Christ existed as
�Thoughts” of Diderot.
33
Csesar. It is then, as sure that Jesus Christ rose again
as that he or Csesar existed. What logic! The
existence of Jesus and of Cassar is not a miracle.
28.
We read in the life of M. de Turenne, that a house
having caught fire, the presence of the Blessed Holy
Sacrament suddenly arrested the flames. Well, but
we read also in history that a monk having poisoned
a consecrated host, an Emperor of Germany had no
sooner swallowed it than he expired.
’29.
There was something more there than the appear
ances of the bread and wine, or we must say that the
poison had incorporated itself with the body and the
blood of Jesus Christ.
30.
This body becomes mouldy, this wine becomes
sour, this God is devoured by mites upon his altar.
Blind people, imbecile Egyptians open your eyes !
31.
The religion of Jesus Christ announced by ignorant
persons made the first Christians. The same religion
preached by the learned and by doctors now only
makes sceptics.
32.
It is objected that submission to a legislative
authority dispenses one from reasoning; but where on
the surface of the earth is the religion without such
an authority?
33.
It js the education of his childhood which pre
vents a Mahometan from being baptized; it is the
education of his childhood which prevents a Chris
tian from being circumcised; it is the reason of the
grown man which equally despises baptism and
circumcision.
�34
“Addition to Phe Philosophical
34.
It is said in Saint Luke, that God the Father is
greater than God the Son. Pater major me est. Yet,
in spite of a passage so express, the Church pro
nounces anathema on any scrupulous believer who
adheres literally to the words of his father’s testament.
35.
If authority has been able to dispose at its pleasure
of the sense of this passage, and as there is not one
in all the Scriptures more precise, neither is there
one that we can flatter oursfelves we understand, and
of which the Church may not make what it pleases
in future.
36.
“ Tu es Petrus, et super hanc petram cedificaho ecclesiam mean.” Is that the language of a God, or a
medley worthy of the Seigneur des accords ?
37.
ilIn dolore paries.” “Thou shalt bring forth in
pain ” said God to the prevaricating woman; and
what have the females of animals done to offend
Him which also bring forth in pain ?
38.
If we are to understand literally Pater major me
est, Jesus Christ is not God. If we are to under
stand literally hoc est corpus meum, he gave himself
to his apostles with his own hands, which is as absurd
as to say that Saint Denis kissed his head after it had
been cut off!
39.
It is said that he retired to the Mount of Olives,
and that he.prayed, and to whom did he pray ? He
prayed to himself!
40.
This God who causes God to die in order to
appease God is an excellent saying of Baron de la
�Thoughts’" of Diderot.
11
35
Houtan. Less evidence results from a hundred folio
volumes written for or against Christianity than from
the absurdity of these two lines.
41.
To say that man is a compound of strength and
weakness, of light and blindness, of littleness and of
greatness, is not to state his case, it is to define it.
42.
Man is as God or nature has made him, and God
or nature makes nothing evil.
43.
What we call original sin, Ninon de Lenclos
called Ze pecihe original.
'
*
44.
It is unexampled impudence to cite the conformity
of the Evangelists, since in some of them there are
very important facts of which not a word is said in
the others.
45.
Plato considered the Divinity under three aspects,
goodness, wisdom, and power. One’s eyes must be
closed not to see in this the Trinity of the Christians.
It was nearly three thousand years since the philo
sopher of Athens called Logos what we call the
Word.
46.
The divine persons are either three accidents or
three substances. There is no medium. If they are
three accidents, we are Atheists or Deists; if they
are three substances, we are Pagans.
47.
God the Father judges man worthy of His eternal
vengeance ; God the Son judges them worthy of His
* There is a pun here ; originel is the French for ‘‘ original,” while
original means “ queer.”
�36
“Addition to The Philosophical
infinite mercy; the Holy Ghost remains nenter.
How can this senseless Catholic verbiage be recon
ciled with the unity of the divine will ?
48.
Theologians have long been asked to reconcile the
dogma of eternal torture with the infinite mercy of
God, and they are just where they were.
49.
And why punish a culprit when there is no longer
any good to be derived from his chastisement ?
50.
He who punishes for his own sake alone is very
cruel and very wicked.
51.
There is no good father who would wish to resemble
our heavenly Father.
52.
What proportion is there between the offender and
the offended ? what proportion between the offence
and the punishment ? What a heap of absurdities
and atrocities!
53.
And at what is this God so angry ? Would not
one say that Zcould do something for or against His
glory, for or against His peace, for or against His
happiness ?
54.
It is asserted that God causes the wicked man,
who is powerless against Him, to burn in a fire
which will endure everlastingly, yet scarcely would a
father be permitted to give temporary death to a
son who should compromise his life, his honour, and
his fortune !
55.
0 Christians! you have, then, two different ideas
�Thoughts ” of Diderot.
37
of goodness and of wickedness, of truth and of false
hood. You are, then, the most absurd of dogmatists
or the most outrageous of Pyrrhonists.
56.
All the evil of which one is capable is not all the
evil possible ; no it is only he who could commit all
the evil possible who could also deserve eternal
punishment. To make of God an infinitely vindic
tive being, you transform a worm of the earth into
an infinitely powerful being.
57.
That which these atrocious Christians have trans
lated by eternal, signifies in Hebrew only durable.
It is from the ignorance of a Hebrewism and from
the ferocious disposition of an interpreter that the
dogma of the eternity of torment proceeds.
58.
Pascal has said, “ If your religion is false, you risk
nothing in believing it true; if it is true, you risk
everything in believing it false.” An Imaun can say
just as much as Pascal.
59.
That Jesus Christ, who is God, should have been
tempted by the Devil, is a tale worthy the Thousandand-one Nights.
60.
I should be very glad if a Christian, particularly a
Jansenist, would make me feel the cui bono of the
incarnation. Again, would it not need to swell to
infinity the number of the damned if one desires to
turn this dogma to any advantage.
61.
But why do Leda’s swan and the little flames of
Castor and Pollux make us laugh ? and why do we
not laugh at the dove and the tongues of fire of the
Gospel ?
�38
“Addition to The Philosophical
62.
In the first centuries there were sixty Gospels
almost equally believed. "Fifty-six of them have been
rejected as containing puerilities and folly. Does
there remain nothing of all that in those which have
been preserved F
63.
God gives a first law to men; he then abolishes
this law. Is not such conduct a little like that of a
legislator who has been mistaken and discovers it in
time ? Is it like a perfect Being to change his
mind ?
64.
There are as many kinds of faith as there are
religions in the world.
65.
All the Sectarians in the world are but heretical
deists.
66.
If man is unhappy without having been born guilty,
may it not be that he is destined to enjoy eternal
happiness without being able, by his nature, ever to
make himself worthy of it ?
67.
What I think of the Christian dogma, and saying
but one word of its morality, is this: that for a
Catholic father of a family, convinced that the
maxims of the Gospel must be carried out to the
letter, under pain of what is called Hell, seeing the
extreme difficulty of attaining to that degree of per
fection of which human weakness is incapable, I see
no other expedient than to take his child by the foot
and to dash him to the earth, or to stifle him at birth.
By this act he saves him from the danger of damna
tion, and insures him eternal felicity; and I maintain
that such an act, far from being criminal, should be
esteemed infinitely praiseworthy, since it is founded
�Thoughts ” of Diderot.
j9
on the motive of paternal love, 'which demands that
every good father should do for his children all the
good possible.
68.
I ask whether the precept of religion and the law
of. society, which forbid the murder of the innocent,
are not in reality very absurd and very cruel, when,
by killing them, we insure to them infinite happiness,
whereas, in suffering them to live, we devote them
almost certainly to eternal misery ?
69.
How! Monsieur de la Condamine. Can it be allow
able to inoculate one’s son to save him from the small
pox, and not allowable to kill him in order to save
him from Hell ? You are jesting.
PRINTED BY C. W. REYNELL, LITTLE PULTENEY-STREET, HAYMARKET.
�
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A philosophical conversation
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Diderot, Denis [1713-1784]
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Collation: 39 p. ; 18 cm.
Notes: Includes bibliographical references. Translated from French by "E.N." From the library of Dr Moncure Conway. Printed by C.W. Reynell. Includes Appendix (5 p. of notes on the text) and additions.
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jqATIONAL SECULAR SOCIETY
BRUNO
AND
SPINOZA
ARTHUR
B.
MOS S.
[price one penny.]
LONDON:
WATTS & Co., 84, FLEET STREET, E.C.
�ALSO BY THE SAME AUTHOR.
BUDDHA, SOCRATES, AND JESUS.........................................
THE MIRROR OF FREETHOUGHT ..
..
..
..
THE BIBLE GOD AND HIS FAVOURITES............................
FICTITIOUS GODS
...................................................................
CHRISTIANITY UNWORTHY OF GOD
............................
THE SECULAR FAITH...................................................................
IS RELIGION NECESSARY OR USEFUL?
..
..
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HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS
...........................
THE OLD FAITH AND THE NEW
..
..
..
..
o i
to
or
o i
o i
o i
02
01
01
London : Watts & Co., 84, Fleet Street; or (to order) of all
Booksellers.
jSS* For Mr. Moss’s List of Subjects of Freethought, Political, and
Social Lectures apply—89, Catlin Street, Potherhithe Neu Road, S.F.
�BRUNO AND SPINOZA.
Freethought has had no more ardent lovers, philo
sophy no more diligent students, persecution no more
fearless victims, than Bruno and Spinoza. Living in an
age when religious heresy was considered the most
horrible of crimes, these philosophers proved themselves
of such sterling metal that they were prepared to face
any persecution and undergo any punishment in their
zealous pursuit of truth. The first a hot-blooded Italian,
with a passionate love for the study of science and philor
sophy, which difficulties intensified rather than dimi
nished ; the other, a quiet, inoffensive Dutch Jew, with
the highest order of mind—these men confronted, singlehanded, the insidious monster, Superstition, and, by their
teaching and living, dealt such a tremendous blow at the
creature’s head that it has lain writhing in agony ever
since. The Church answered Bruno by imprisonment
and the stake; but the martyred Italian’s name is now
for ever destined to live in the memory of all true lovers
of intellectual freedom. Spinoza was anathematised and
cast out of the Jewish community, to work no longer for
a sect, but for mankind.
Giordano Bruno was born at Nola, near Naples, mid
way between Vesuvius and the Mediterranean, in the
year 1548. Of his parents we know nothing; all we
know is that Giordano, or Filippo—for that was his
baptismal name—was put to an excellent training college,
and at an early age gave promise of turning out a brilliant
scholar. “ He was a true Neapolitan child,” says Lewes,
“ as ardent as its volcanic soul, burning atmosphere, and
dark thick wine; as capricious as its varied climate.”
Filled with the ardour of an apostle, he had that restless
vigorous nature peculiarly fitting a teacher of doctrines
that were to revolutionise the world of thought. He was
�4
. .
BRUNO AND SPINOZA.
born in stirring times. Copernicus had only been dead
a few years; the printing press was in use; discoveries in
science of a very important character had agitated the
minds of thoughtful persons throughout the civilised
world. Possessed of a rich fancy, a polished eloquence,
a varied humour, and chivalrous bearing, Bruno at once
made a good impression upon all with whom he came
in contact. Young and handsome, with all the phrenzied
style of the poet, he was the beau ideal of a preacher;
and it is as a young priest that we first get a glimpse of
him in the Convent of San Domefiico Maggiorie, where
he lectured on his system of religious philosophy. So
strikingly original were his views that an accusation of
heresy was soon drawn up against him, but set aside on
account of his youth. A second accusation of a similar
character was made eight years subsequently, and was
also withdrawn. Doubtless the Dominicans thought that
in time the heretical tendencies of Bruno’s mind would
tone down, and he would become a shining light among
their order. But not so. Bruno’s restless spirit of in
quiry could not be subdued; ever and anon it broke
forth in different directions. First, the young priest’s
mind was filled with doubts concerning the mysterious
doctrine of Transubstantiation; the doctrines of the
Trinity and the Atonement were next called in question,
and, worse than all, he was bold enough to attack the
great pillar of all faith, the chief authority of the age—
Aristotle. Discarding altogether the Aristotelian theory
of the relation of the sun to the earth, Bruno openly
declared his belief in the Copernican theory of astro
nomy, the plurality of worlds, and his complete rejection
of the Scripture teaching respecting the origin of man
kind. The natural consequence of this avowed heresy
was that he was feared, and, as he could not be answered
by arguments, was replied to by that most forcible weapon
of the priesthood, persecution. Unable to withstand
his opponents, he fled; and we next find him in a con
vent at Rome. Here he stayed but a brief while, for,
finding that his persecutors were at his heels, he left the
Holy City, and continued his journey to Noli, at which
place he found employment as a schoolmaster for a few
months.
At the age of thirty he began his adventurous course
�BRUNO AND SPINOZA.
5
through Europe, staying at Geneva, Lyons, Toulouse,
Paris, London, and the Oxford University itself, where
he taught successfully for some time. At Toulouse
Bruno remained about two years, during which time he
filled the ’office of Public Lecturer. Often he held
disputations on his favourite subjects, and while there
found time to compose several works.
In 1583, after having held the position of Lecturer
Extraordinary at the Sorbonne, in Paris, appointed
thereto by Henry III., for more than two years, Bruno
came to England with a letter of introduction to the
French Ambassador in London. Here he was received
at the Court of Elizabeth, and met with a cordial welcome
from all save his own countrymen. While in London
he had the great happiness of Sir Philip Sydney’s
friendship—a friendship that lasted to the day of hia
death. Bruno spoke in flattering terms of English"
freedom, and of the beauty and grace of English women
generally, and expressed great admiration for the charac
ter of Elizabeth. Not long after his arrival in England
he was invited to a splendid fete given by the Chancellor
of Oxford in honour of the Count Palatine Albert de
Lasco. At this fete it was customary to have public dis
cussions, at which all comers were challenged. Oxford,
on this occasion, put forth her dialectical giants to defend
Aristotle and Ptolemy. Bruno stepped into the arena,
and, in the debate, shone to great advantage, igno
miniously defeating his adversaries, whom he said could
only reply by abuse. After this Bruno asked permission
to lecture at the University, which request was granted.
He discoursed on cosmology and on the immortality of
the soul, his lectures producing a great sensation. His
admiration for the learned Professors of Oxford was
apparently not great, for we find him describing them
as “ a constellation of pedants, whose ignorance, pre
sumption, and rustic rudeness would have exhausted
the patience of Job.”
In England Bruno spent the quietest part of his life,
and it was in this country that the greater part of his
Italian works was composed. In time, however, his
audacious opinions, and the eloquence with which he
advanced them, roused such opposition that he found it
necessary to quit the country. He returned to Paris
�6
BRUNO AND SPINOZA.
for awhile, and afterwards to Germany, where, in 1586,
he matriculated as Theologies. Doctor Romanensis, in the
University of Marburg, in Hesse. Shortly after this we
find him at Wiirtemberg, lecturing to large and admiring
audiences. So pleased was Bruno with the intellectual
liberty manifested at this place that he afterwards called
it the “ Athens of Germany.” There seems every reason
to believe that Bruno might have won high honours here,
and have gained a position that would have enabled him
to live in ease and comfort; but his restive spirit would
not admit of it. He was allured on from place to place
to preach, in the true spirit of a reformer, his unpopular
views.
At last we find him ensnared, by one Mocenigo, into
visiting Venice. Wishing to gain what knowledge he
could from Bruno, and being desirous, no doubt, of
patronising a man of great genius, Mocenigo induced
the Italian philosopher to be his guest. Bruno, with
inexplicable haste, accepted. Disappointment on both
sides soon followed; for, instead of fawning to his patron,
Bruno treated him with conspicuous coolness, and sought
the company of others, which so exasperated' Mocenigo
that he denounced him to.the Inquisition as a reprobate
and a heretic.
On this charge Bruno was tried,
transferred to Rome, and cast into prison, where, for
seven weary years, he languished without books to read
and without the companionship of one human being.
At intervals he was subjected to torture, with a view of
extorting from him a retractation of his heresy; but in
vain. Finding that he would not retract, he was brought,
on February 9th, to the Palace of San Severino, and
received the sentence of excommunication, after which
he was handed over by the Cardinals to the secular
authorities with the recommendation of a “punishment
as merciful as possible and without effusion of blood,”
which was the usual formula for burning alive. When
Bruno heard the sentence he turned haughtily upon his
persecutors and said : “ I suspect you pronounce this
sentence with more fear than I receive it.” A week’s
delay was accorded him, in the expectation that he would
recant; but the expiration of this time found him as firm
as ever.
On February 17 th, 1600, Bruno was led to an open
�BRUNO AND SPINOZA.
7
space in Rome, and there, in the presence of fifty
Cardinals and a crowd of pilgrims from many nations,
was burnt to death. The faggots were lighted, the
flames lept about him and consumed his flesh, and, in
a little while, a few ashes were all that remained of the
brave thinker. Bruno perished—the idle wind scattered
his ashes ; but the martyred Freethinker’s name and
work live to-day, and will be remembered with admira
tion and gratitude in every land where the sons of
Freedom dwell.
As a system of philosophy, Lewes thinks that “ Bruno’s
has only a historical, and not an intrinsic, value.” Bruno
was a Pantheist, and, in his writings, anticipates some of
the theories that were afterwards formulated with greater
skill by Spinoza. . The Italian philosopher was an ardent
lover of nature, considering that her wonders formed
the proper study for mankind—in fact, nature Bruno
regarded as the “ garment of God, the incarnation of
the divine activity.
Unlike the poet, Pope, he did not
“ look through nature up to Nature’s God.” Nature, to
him, was everywhere present, and the divine essence
permeated nature through and through. The important
scientific truth of the indestructibility of matter and
force Bruno appears to have thoroughly appreciated.
Writing on this subject, he says : “ What first was seed
becomes grass, then an ear, then bread, chyle, blood,
semen, embryo, man, a corpse, then again earth, stone,
or some other mass, and so forth. Here we perceive
something.which changes in all these things, and ever
remains the same. Thus there really seems nothing
constant, eternal, and worthy of the name of a principle,
but matter alone. Matter, considered absolutely, com
prises all forms and dimensions. But the variety of
forms which it assumes is not received from without,
but is produced and engendered from within.. When
we say that something dies, it is merely a transition to
a new life, a dissolution of one combination and the
commencement of another.” Or, to quote Professor
Tyndall’s Belfast address, referring to Bruno, the learned
Professor said that the Italian philosopher’s opinion was
that “ matter is not the mere naked, empty capacity
which philosophers have pictured her to be, but the
universal mother, who brings forth all things as the fruit
�BRUNO AND SPINOZA.
of her own womb.” And yet, despite the fact that he
looked upon Nature as containing within herself the
power of producing all phenomena, he nevertheless
believed that “ God was the infinite intelligence, the
cause of causes, the principle of all life and mind, the
great activity, whose action we name the universe.”
Thus Bruno’s creed was Pantheistic. It is quite true,
as modern theologians say, that Bruno was not an
Atheist, though he was burned as one y but assuredly he
died the death of a martyr to vindicate the great principle
of Freethought. His writings soon may be forgotten,
his philosophy regarded only with curiosity ; but the
memory of his honest, brave life and noble death will
live till the last syllable of recorded time.
SPINOZA.
Spinoza was not only a great thinker who deserved to
rank high among the most eminent of the world’s philo
sophers, but he was something more than this : he was
a great man, in the true sense of the word. His life
was a poem in itself. Honest, independent, modest, and
virtuous, he walked quietly through the earth, almost
friendless and alone—censured only by those who knew
not the purity of his life, and who were mentally incap
able of understanding the depth and truth of his philo
sophy. But, though he was condemned and calumniated
by the ignorant of his own day, Spinoza has since
been transformed by some into a Saint; and those who
once were disposed to look upon him with feelings akin
to horror and detestation now speak of him with respect
and admiration.
The fact is, Spinoza’s life will bear the severest criti
cism. Tested by the strictest principles of morality, it
was a life of such purity, goodness, generosity, and un
selfishness that even “ our friend the enemy ” is con
strained to admit that it was altogether blameless.
Baruch Despinoza, or Bendictus de Spinoza, was born
on November 24th, 1632, at Amsterdam, and was the
eldest and only son of a wealthy merchant, a descendant
from Portuguese Jews, who had sought refuge in Holland
from the terrible cruelties of the Inquisition. There
were two other children in the family besides young
Benedict—Miriam and Rebecca.
�BRUNO AND SPINOZA.
9
Of the early life of Spinoza we know very little. Our
attention is first drawn to him while he is studying at a
Jewish Academy, at which establishment he is endeavour
ing to qualify himself for a theological career. He is a
very promising pupil, and the Rabbi, Saul Levi Morteira,
predicts for him a prosperous career. At the age of
fifteen so well read was Spinoza that, in the extent and
accuracy of his Biblical knowledge, he was a match for
any Rabbi. He put puzzling, questions to his teacher,
to which answers of a satisfactory character were seldom
forthcoming.
At length his Sceptical spirit became so manifest that
his teacher was bewildered and alarmed. At first
Morteira tried to check Spinoza’s disposition of inquiry ;
but, of course, the attempt proved fruitless. His Scep
ticism showed more alarming symptoms. He actually
gave expression to a doubt concerning the truth of
Scripture, and suggested that Biblical statements were
hopelessly at variance with common sense. This was
too much for some of the Jewish students, to whom
Spinoza confided some of his opinions.' Rumours
regarding his heresy having reached the ears of the
heads of the Jewish Synagogue, Spinoza was called
upon to make submission and acknowledge his sin.
This he resolutely refused to do. Finding that he could
no longer conscientiously remain a member of the
Synagogue, he withdrew. This was not enough. An
interval was allowed, in which. Spinoza was to reconsider
his opinions, and, in the event of his not submitting, a
threat of excommunication was made. All ttys, how
ever-, so far from bridging the difficulty, had the effect of
widening the gulf between them. No doubt Spinoza’s
parents implored their son to give up his opinions, and
believe what they believed. No doubt his sisters urged
him, with many a tear, not to be so headstrong. But
not even their persuasive eloquence—which, doubtless,
was allowed to have its full weight—could alter his
resolution. His was a strong conviction, which no
appeal to the emotions could alter. The arguments of
Spinoza’s teacher having failed, threats followed; then
a bribe was tried, and a pension of one thousand florins
annually proposed to him; but all without avail. His
determination was unalterable. The Rabbis , were en
�10
BRUNO AND SPINOZA.
raged at this refusal, and, it is believed, instigated some
scoundrel to attempt the assassination of Spinoza. The
attempt, however, was not successful. The ruffian
waylaid the young heretic, and smote him from the
rear; but the dagger penetrated the coat collar, and
inflicted but a slight wound in the neck. Spinoza kept
the coat for some years as an evidence of the sort of
deeds religious fanaticism will lead men to perpetrate.
A greater exhibition of fanaticism soon followed ; for
on July 6th, 1656, a large crowd was gathered in the
Jewish Synagogue at Amsterdam to witness the excom
munication of the heretical Spinoza. We can imagine
the pious horror expressed on the faces of the enraged
assembly. Amid the wailing note of a great horn and
the solemn lamentations of a fanatical crowd, the chanter
rose and delivered the following anathema :— .
With the judgment of the angels and the sentence of the
saints we anathematise, execrate, curse, and cast out Baruch
de Spinoza, the whole of the sacred community assembling
in presence of the sacred books, with the six hundred and
thirteen precepts written therein, pronouncing against him
the anathema wherewith Joshua anathematised Jerico, the
malediction wherewith Elisha cursed the children, and all
the maledictions written in the book of the law. Let him
be accursed by day and accursed by night ; let him be
accursed in his lying down and accursed in his rising up,
accursed in going out and accursed in coming in. May the
Lord never pardon or acknowledge him ; may the wrath
and displeasure of the Lord burn henceforth against this
man, load him with all the curses written in the book of
the law, raze out his name from under the sky ; may the
Lord sevfer him for ever from all the tribes of Israel, weigh
him with all the maledictions of the firmament contained
in the book of the law ; and may all ye who are obedient
to your God be saved this day. Hereby, then, are all
admonished that none hold converse with him by word of
mouth ; none hold communication with him by writing ;
that no one do him any service, no one abide under the
same roof with him, and no one approach within four cubits’
length of him ; and no one read any document dictated by
him or written by his hand.
This reads very like the terrible curse in “The Jackdaw
of Rheims”:—
“ But, what gave rise to no little surprise,
No one seemed one penny the worse.”
�BRUNO AND SPINOZA.
II
Spinoza seems to have treated the anathema and ex
communication with the contempt they deserved. The
world was wide, and, for a young man with his talents
and classical knowledge, there were many opportunities
of getting a good living. He soon found an engage
ment in the educational establishment of Dr. Francis
Van den Ende, a man of exceptional attainments and
of very liberal views. Van den Ende had a charming
daughter, and Spinoza appears to have formed a deep
attachment for her; but, when the young lady had grown
to womanhood, Spinoza found that there was a wealthy
rival in the field. The allurements of wealth and position
presented so many charms as to quite fascinate Miss
Van den Ende, and she accepted her wealthy suitor in
preference to Spinoza. Young Spinoza bore his fate
with becoming fortitude : hereafter he devoted himself
to another mistress—to Philosophy, whom he served
with all the ardour of his nature.
“Experience having taught me,” he says, “ that all
the ordinary affairs of life are vain and futile, and that
those things which I dreaded were only in themselves
good or bad according as they moved my soul, I finally
resolved on inquiring if there was anything truly good
in itself, and capable of being communicated to man, a
good Which, everything else being rejected, could fill
the soul entirely—whether, in short, that good existed
which, if possessed, could give supreme and eternal
happiness.” And he came to the conclusion that the
“ supreme good ” was only to be attained by “ the union
of the mind with all nature ”—in other words) by the
study of philosophy.
The rest of Spinoza’s life may be told in a few lines.
By acquiring the art of grinding and polishing lenses
for optical purposes, he was enabled to earn a fair liveli
hood—at all events, sufficient for his small wants. His
daily bread he earned by the labour of his hands. In
the evenings he devoted himself to study and to writing.
In 1658 he left Amsterdam, after his services had
again been solicited by the chief of the Synagogue, and
we next find him residing at the house of a Christian
friend, at Rhynsburg. Here he formed many happy
friendships, among them being that of Dr. Meyer,
Simon de Vries, and, above all, Henry Oldenburg.
�JJ2
BRUNO AND SPINOZA.
In 1664 we find Spinoza at Voorburg, and two years
subsequently he occupied the same rooms at Hague as
Dr. Colerus, his biographer, afterwards lived in. Among
Spinoza’s best friends here was Jean de Witt, an
enthusiastic Republican. The friendship of these two
grew into a brotherly affection, and lasted till death parted
them.
From De Witt Spinoza accepted a small pension; *but
many handsome gifts from other sources he modestly
declined, saying that he had enough to satisfy his wants.
For some years he suffered uncomplainingly from a'
chronic form of consumption. One day.in the winter he
was seized with a sudden difficulty in breathing; unhappily
the attack lasted several hours, and terminated fatally,
Spinoza passing peacefully away on. Sunday, February
21st, 1679, at the age of forty.
Like Bruno, Spinoza was a Pantheist. He believed
in God; but his God was not a person, but an essences
He believed in the one existence, “ the one substance
beneath all appearances, the cause of all things ’’-^in
fact, there was very little difference between Spinoza’s
Pantheism and modern Atheism, which makes the
universe the one existence. Spinoza’s chief works—those
by which he has won general recognition, and, among
the cultured, great favour—are his “ Tractatus Theologico Politicus,” which demonstrates the comparatively
late origin and unreliability of the Pentateuch ; and his
profound work on “ Ethics.”
That Spinoza was a great logician is acknowledged on
all hands. Every problem with which he dealt was
subjected to a most searching analysis. And, though
modern Freethinkers may not be able to accept his con
clusions, for him they cannot but have the profoundest
admiration, not alone on account of his greatness as a
philosopher, but on account of the nobility of his life,
its simplicity, its purity, its courage, its earnest devotion
to truth, and, above all, its unpretentious heroism.
WATTS & GO., PRINTERS, 17, JOHNSON’S COURT, FLEET STREET, LONDON.
�
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Victorian Blogging
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A collection of digitised nineteenth-century pamphlets from Conway Hall Library & Archives. This includes the Conway Tracts, Moncure Conway's personal pamphlet library; the Morris Tracts, donated to the library by Miss Morris in 1904; the National Secular Society's pamphlet library and others. The Conway Tracts were bound with additional ephemera, such as lecture programmes and handwritten notes.<br /><br />Please note that these digitised pamphlets have been edited to maximise the accuracy of the OCR, ensuring they are text searchable. If you would like to view un-edited, full-colour versions of any of our pamphlets, please email librarian@conwayhall.org.uk.<br /><br /><span><img src="http://www.heritagefund.org.uk/sites/default/files/media/attachments/TNLHLF_Colour_Logo_English_RGB_0_0.jpg" width="238" height="91" alt="TNLHLF_Colour_Logo_English_RGB_0_0.jpg" /></span>
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Conway Hall Ethical Society
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Bruno and Spinoza
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Moss, Arthur B.
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Place of publication: London
Collation: 12 p. ; 19 cm.
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Watts & Co.
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[1885]
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Philosophy
Italy
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Benedictus De Spinoza
Giordano Bruno
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Text
Association for the
Harmonious Development of Faculties.
CONFUCIUS
Ibis 'life anb bis HJoctrine
BY
MARIUS DESHUMBERT
TRANSLATED FROM THE FRENCH
BY
CAPTAIN E. M. PERCEVAL, R.A.
WILLIAMS AND NORGATE
14, HENRIETTA STREET, COVENT GARDEN, LONDON
20, SOUTH FREDERICK STREET, EDINBURGH
and 7, BROAD STREET, OXFORD
1897
PRICE
SIXPENCE
�Association for the
Harmonious Development of Faculties.
COMMON-SENSE ETHICS.
BY
“ THE COMMITTEE ”
Copies of the above Pamphlet will be forwarded by
PROF. DESHUMBERT, Hon. Secretary,
Camberley, Surrey
(on application).
CONFUCIUS:
HIS LIFE AND DOCTRINE.
PRICE SIXPENCE.
To be had from the Publishers,
Messrs. WILLIAMS AND NORGATE,
14, Henrietta Street, Covent Garden,
London,
Or from the Hon. Secretary,
�B 23?21^2-
NATIONAL SECULAR SOCIETY
CONFUCIUS.
HIS LIFE.
ONFUCIUS was born in the year 550
or 551 B.c. at Shan-ping, in the province
now known as Shan-tung, the ancient
province of Lu, bathed on the east by
the Yellow Sea, and on the north by the Gulf of
Pechili.
Confucius counted among his ancestors the em
peror Hoang-ti, whose reign is placed by historians
of the Celestial Empire 2637 years before the
Christian era.
The name of his clan was Kung, and missionaries,
in calling him Confucius, have merely latinized his
real name, “ Kung-Fu-tze,” which means “ the
philosopher Kung.”
Confucius was only three
years old when he lost his father, who was Governor
�2
of Tse-u. According to tradition, at the age of six
he showed signs which gave promise of extraordinary
wisdom. He despised games familiar to childhood,
and preferred to offer sacrifices to the gods with his
little comrades, on whom he already exercised a
marked influence.
He would not eat without offering part of his food
to heaven, according to the custom of the ancients.
This custom he practised during the whole of his
life, even though the repast might only consist of rice.
He was married at the age of nineteen, as was
then usual.
At about this time, the fame of his intelligence
and virtues having reached the Prime Minister of
the kingdom of Lu, his native land, the latter en
trusted him first with the superintendence of the
granaries, and later with that of cattle and parks, or
public markets. He accepted these offices on account
of his poverty, but without any thought of becoming
rich.
At the age of twenty-two he commenced to teach.
He wished to revive ancient usages, which, in his
opinion, contained all the moral, social, and political
virtues. He made it his mission to re-establish the
rites, customs, beliefs and institutions which time
had made sacred.
�3
To gain his end, it was not sufficient to teach
only by example; he required disciples, who should
receive from him careful instruction, should go forth
to spread it throughout the empire, and should
succeed him after his death.
The intelligent young men, who wished to learn
to rule justly, soon crowded to him in numbers. He
accepted the honorariums which his disciples offered
him, being, however, always content with what was
given to him, no matter how insignificant the amount
might be. On the other hand, he sent away imme
diately those who did not show sufficient ardour for
study, or such as were not sufficiently intelligent to
understand him.
“ When,” said he, “ I have shown a pupil one
corner of the subject, and he is unable to discover
the other three, I do not repeat my lesson.”
At the age of twenty-four he lost his mother. To
obey the ancient law, he withdrew from the public
life of superintendent in order to mourn the custom
ary period of twenty-seven months, then considered
the equivalent of “ three years.”
We now come to a gap, for we hardly know any
thing of the life of Confucius for several years after
this date. Let us consider here the political state
of China at this time.
�4
China was then but a sixth part of the present
empire.
The population was only ten to fifteen
millions. The nobility was divided into six orders,
which corresponded in many respects to those of
feudal Europe.
The governors of provinces succeeded from father
to son. They are often called by historians “kings,”
and their provinces “kingdoms,” and in fact they
were almost independent. In theory the governors
received from each new emperor a new investiture.
They were bound, in theory, to present themselves
at court, at certain times, to show their submission.
They also paid to the sovereign fixed tributes, and
had to supply him with soldiers when they were
required for the security of the empire.
When, in a feudal state, the sovereign is not
sufficiently energetic or sufficiently powerful to make
his rights respected, the nobles are not slow to show
their independence and to make efforts to extend
the frontiers of their states at the expense of others.
F
At the time of which we speak, the dynasty of
Chow, which lasted from 1122 to 256 B.C., had passed
its zenith. The independence of the sub-kingdoms
was complete. From this it results that the history
of China during the seventh, sixth, and fifth cen
turies B.c. is an unbroken account of great battles,
�5
of hard-fought actions, of heroism, of tried friend
ships, and of atrocious crimes.
This reminds us of the state of England and of
France in the Middle Ages, but China 600 years B.c.
was far more civilized than was Europe during
the time of the Plantagenets, that is to say during
the twelfth, thirteenth and fourteenth centuries
(a.d. 1154-1399). Numerous schools existed then in
China. Each nobleman had collected around him
historians, musicians and other men of learning.
The savants expounded ancient history and com
mented on ancient poems and laws.
Instruction then was carried on brilliantly, but
justice and probity, in a word morality in all its
forms, was trampled under foot. Mencius, the
grandson and continuer of the teaching of Confucius,
tells us that decadence was complete. Justice had
disappeared. One only heard discourse that was
debasing and only saw acts of violence. Ministers
murdered the princes who had called them to power,
and children took the life of those who had given
them birth. Confucius, terrified with what he saw,
resolved to reform the world; a grand ideal to which
he consecrated his whole life.
At the age of thirty-three Confucius visited the
capital of the empire, where he admired the treasures
�6
of the imperial library. He also studied music,
which was held in great honour at Court. He had
also several interviews with Lao-tze, the father of
Taoism. On his return the same year to Lu, the
prince of that State was forced by his ministers to
flee to the neighbouring province of Tse. Confucius
accompanied him, not wishing to appear to support,
by his presence, the rebels who had driven out their
legitimate sovereign. But the king of Tse did not
treat Confucius with the honour his wisdom, virtue
and renown merited. The latter soon returned to
his native land, where during fifteen years he con
tinued his studies. During this period the number
of his disciples increased considerably. It is said
that there were as many as three thousand, and of
these seventy or eighty were distinguished for their
great intelligence. Several became statesmen of
mark. The disciples were young men of all classes,
but the majority were mandarins, public officials, or
governors of towns. All these men of letters showed
the greatest admiration and sincere respect for
Confucius, a fact which goes to prove the moral and
intellectual value of his philosophy.
At the age of fifty-two Confucius was appointed
first magistrate of Chung-too. Immediately, so the
historians assure us, a marvellous change appeared
�7
in the behaviour of the inhabitants. He was ap
pointed Minister of Justice, and crimes disappeared.
He showed his energy and his wisdom in awarding
punishment without distinction of rank, and in start
ing negotiations with the neighbouring State of Tse.
He strengthened the authority of his prince, the
king of Ln, while he weakened that of the nobles.
In order to do this he dismantled the fortified towns
where the chiefs of the principal clans could resist
the king’s authority, as did the barons of feudal
Europe.
Finally he became the idol of the people, whose
welfare was his chief interest. In them he saw the
source of the wealth and prosperity of the State.
He improved their W'ell-being by all means in his
power, especially by putting down the aristocracy,
who were everywhere hostile to those institutions
which he wished to found. He accomplished many
excellent reforms during the two years he was in
power.
The king of Tse, however, saw that if Confucius
were permitted to continue his reforms, the influence
of the king of Lu would soon make itself felt
throughout the whole empire. He determined,
therefore, to deprive this king of his minister. He
�8
showed a profound knowledge of the human heart
by sending to the king of Lu eighty dancing girls of
great beauty, and one hundred and twenty-five mag
nificent horses. These gifts were joyfully accepted
by the prince, who now not only neglected Confucius
completely, but was greatly annoyed at his remon
strances. The philosopher felt that it was not
compatible with his dignity to remain at this Court,
where his counsel was no longer accepted. He
withdrew with slow steps and with regret, hoping
that his sovereign would repent and would send a
messenger to pray him to return. Alas ! no messen
ger appeared, so Confucius sadly continued his way.
The philosopher was then fifty-six.
During thirteen years he went from province to
province, and was everywhere received with great
honour, but no prince would take counsel of him.
He saw that although men have always good
maxims on their lips still they are slow to practise
virtue.
“ Alas,” he cried, “ virtue is not cherished, and
study is not pursued with care. Though one hears
the principles of justice and equity professed, they
are not followed. The wicked and wrong-doers do
not wish to mend their ways. It is this which is
�9
the cause of my sadness.” He knew also what it
was to suffer from ingratitude, but he said, “ What
matters to me the ingratitude of men. It will not
prevent me doing them all the good that may be in
my power. If my teaching remains fruitless, I shall
at least have the consolation of having faithfully
fulfilled my task.”
Thirteen years later he returned for good to his
native land. The king was dead and his son
occupied the throne. The philosopher refused to
accept of him honours and power. He had only a
few years to live, and these he wished to consecrate
to his literary work and to the teaching of his
doctrine in the midst of his numerous disciples.
The year after his return, Confucius was then
seventy, his only son died. This left only one
offspring to perpetuate the race of the philosopher.
But what he felt still more was the loss of his two
favourite disciples, Yen-Hue, who died a year
before this, and Tze-lu, who died some months later.
The end of the philosopher was now approaching
rapidly, hastened no doubt by sorrows.
Early one morning, not being able to sleep, he got
up, and with his hands behind his back he dragged
his stick along as he walked towards the door,
�10
saying, “ The great mountain must crumble away,
the strong pillar must break, the sage must wither
and disappeai’ like a blade of grass.” He then went
back to his bed, and eight days later he died at the
age of seventy-two or seventy-three, in the year
478 b.c.
The funeral rites were performed with great
ceremony by his disciples. A great number of
them built huts close to his tomb and stayed there
twenty-seven months, wearing such mourning as
they would for a father.
His third favourite disciple, Tze-Kung, remained
five years close to the tomb mourning the sage.
The news of the death of the philosopher spread
throughout the empire with marvellous rapidity.
He who, during his lifetime, had been neglected,
became immediately after his death the object of
unbounded admiration; and this admiration has
lasted nearly 2400 years.
The tomb of Confucius is situated on a vast
rectangle outside the town of Kiuh-fow. On
passing through a magnificent gateway, one finds
before one a long avenue of cypress trees which
leads to the enormous tumulus which has been
raised over the tomb. A little in front to the right
�Il
and. left are two smaller hillocks which mark the
tombs of the son and grandson of the philosopher.
Finally to the right of the last one sees a small
house which is said to stand on the ground once
occupied by the hut of Tze-Kung, in which he
passed his five years of mourning. On all sides are
to be seen tablets on which the emperors have had
engraved enthusiastic eulogies of the defunct.
The neighbouring town is still the home of the
Kung family, and it is asserted that from forty to
fifty thousand descendants of the sage inhabit it at
the present time. The chief of the family is the
head of the seventy-fifth generation. He possesses
vast domains, given by the emperor, as well as a
title which corresponds to that of duke.
The dynasty of Chow disappeared 225 years after
the death of the philosopher, and was replaced by
that of Ts’in. The first emperor of the new dynasty
wished to lay the foundations of that despotic
government which still exists. The numerous men
of learning who acknowledged Confucius as their
teacher opposed this innovation. The emperor
was therefore anxious to destroy the posthumous
influence of the sage, and burned all the ancient
books to which Confucius had referred and from
which he had drawn his rules and examples.
�12
Finally he buried alive hundreds of men of
learning who regarded Confucius as their master.
But no persecution could destroy or even diminish
the influence exercised by the philosopher after his
death. All the sovereigns who reigned after the
Ts’in dynasty lost no opportunity of honouring his
memory. At the present time there are tablets
bearing his name in every school and in all
examination halls, and before them the pupils and
candidates bow as they enter.
No prayers are said to Confucius, but great
honour is rendered to him.
�HIS DOCTRINE.
Let us pass now to the study of the philosopher’s
teaching.
His moral and political doctrines are intimately
connected, but, to make our task more simple, we
shall examine them separately.
Confucius collected and placed in order all the
religious, philosophic, moral and political documents
which existed at his time. Of these he and his
disciples formed a set of doctrines under the follow
ing titles :
Yi-King (the sacred book of changes).
Shu-King (the book of historical documents).
Shi-King (the book of verses).
Li-Ki (the book of rites).
Tze-Shu (the four classic books).
Space will not permit of a complete study of all
of these. It will be sufficient for our purpose to
�14
examine briefly the first three of “ the four classic
books.”
The quotations are taken from the excellent
French translation by Pauthier.
*
The sixth phrase of the first classic book gives
the key of the whole philosophy of Confucius. The
sage wrote these words : “ From the man of highest
rank down to the most humble and obscure of men,
each has the same duty to perform : to correct and
better himself. The perfecting of oneself is the
fundamental base of all progress and of all moral
development.”
Confucius returns continually to this great duty
of perfecting oneself. He says, that “he (the sage)
develops to the highest degree the lofty and pure
faculties of his intelligence and makes it a rule to
follow always the principles of right judgment.”
Later on we find, “ Make yourselves complete
masters of that which you have learnt, and always
continue to learn. You then may become a teacher
of men.”
“ The superior man should apply his whole energy
to educate himself, to acquire knowledge.” Lastly :
* Confucius et Mencius : Les quatre livres, &c. Traduit du
chinois par M. G. Pauthier. (Charpentier, Paris.)
�15
“ He who endeavours constantly to perfect himself
is the sage, who knows how to distinguish good
from bad, who chooses the good and holds firmly to
it, never letting it go.”
“He should strive hard to learn all that is good.
He should question others with discernment, seeking
to enlighten himself in all that is good. He should
guard carefully all that is good lest he should lose
it, and should meditate on it in his heart. He
should always try to discern what is good, taking
care to distinguish it from what is bad. He should
then steadfastly and constantly practise that which
is good.” But the perfecting of oneself is not
sufficient, one must also think of the perfecting of
others.
“ The perfect man does not limit himself to his
own perfection, then to rest. He strives to perfect
others also. The perfecting of oneself is undoubtedly
a virtue, but to improve others is a high science.”
Confucius does not forget that the perfect state
must include purity, and so we find this maxim,
“ Be watchful of yourself, even in your own home.
Take care, even in the most secret place, to do
nothing which could make you blush.” Elsewhere
he says : “ The meaning of the three hundred odes
�16
of the book of verses is contained in one of its
phrases :—Do not let your thoughts be wicked.”
His altruism shows itself continually.
The philosopher having said one day, “ My
doctrine is simple and easy to comprehend,” one of
his disciples, Tsen-Tze, replied “ that is certain.”
The philosopher having gone out, the other disciples
asked what the master meant. Tsen-Tze replied,
“ The doctrine of our master consists solely in
having uprightness of heart and in loving one’s
neighbour as oneself.”
Elsewhere Confucius says : “ I would procure for
the aged, quiet rest, for friends and those among
whom one is thrown, constant fidelity, for children
and the weak, motherly care.”
“ The superior man in his dealings with men is
deferential as becomes him. He is polite and kindly
mannered, regarding as brothers all men who live
within the boundaries of the four seas.” By which
he meant the whole universe. “ Reflect carefully
and do not ever tire of doing good nor of being just
in all your actions.”
One day a disciple asked a question in these
�17
words : “ Can one express in a single word all that
one should practise steadfastly throughout one’s
life ? ” The philosopher said: “ There is one word,
‘ Shu,’ the meaning of which is ‘ Do not do unto
others what you would not like them to do unto
you.’ ”
We may perhaps translate this by the single word
reciprocity or altruism.
Confucius returns continually to the importance
of this doctrine of reciprocity, which we wrongly
call “ charity,” for it is not so much charity as
justice.
He persistently 'repeats this doctrine, in order
that all who hear him may become impregnated
with it.
The philosopher often spoke of the “ virtue of
humanity.” One of his disciples having asked what
he meant by this, he replied: “ He who is able to
accomplish five things on earth, is endowed with the
virtue of humanity: respect for himself and for
others, generosity, fidelity or sincerity, diligence in
doing good, and love of all men.” Later on, he adds :
“ Have sufficient self-control, even to judge of others
in comparison with yourself, and to act towards
them as you would wish them to act to you. This
�18
is what one may call “the doctrine of humanity,
and there is nothing beyond this.”
After the perfecting of oneself and of others,
after the love of humanity, that which should be
cultivated is justice.
Here are two maxims on this subject.
“The superior man, in all the circumstances of
life, is exempt from prejudice and stubbornness.
Justice alone is his guide. He employs all his power
to do that which is just and proper and for the good
of mankind.”
His justice extended even to animals. He used
to fish with hooks, but not with nets, he shot birds
with bow and arrow, but would not use a snare.
Practical moral counsels abound in his works, but
it is only necessary to quote some of them.
“ That which you condemn in those who are above
you, do not practise towards those below you. That
which you condemn in your inferiors do not practise
towards your superiors.”
“ If there are people who do not study, or, if they
do study, do not profit by it, let them not be
�19
discouraged, and let them, not desist. If there are
people who do not distinguish good from bad, or, if
they do distinguish it, have not a clear and distinct
perception of it, let them not be discouraged ! If
there are people who do not practise what is right,
or who, if they practise it, cannot devote all their
powers to it, let them not be discouraged ! That
which others may do at the first attempt, they may
do at the tenth. That which others may do at the
hundredth, they may do at the thousandth. He
who will truly follow this rule of perseverance,
however ignorant he may be, he will certainly
become enlightened; however weak he may be, he
will certainly become strong.”
“ When you see a wise man, think whether you
have the same virtues as he. When you see a
wicked man, look to yourself and examine attentively
your own conduct.”
“ If we are three who travel together, I shall
certainly find two teachers (in my companions). I
shall choose the good man to imitate, and use the
wicked man to correct myself.”
“ In your dealings with men, be true and faithful
to your engagements ! Let your words be sincere
and true ! Let your acts be always honourable and
�20
worthy ! Even if you were in the land of barbarians
of the south, or of the north, your conduct should
be faultless.”
“ Be true to yourself and indulgent to others and
so prevent feelings of resentment.”
He did not forget to give children his counsel.
“ Children should have filial piety in their father’s
house and brotherly love outside it. They should
be careful in their actions, sincere and truthful in
their speech to all men, whom they should love
with all their heart, attaching themselves particu
larly to the virtuous. If after having accomplished
their duties they still have energy left, they should
try to improve their minds by study and by acquiring
knowledge and wisdom.”
The advice which Confucius gives to sovereigns
is admirable. “ A prince should select his ministers
according to the promptings of his conscience,
having always the public good in view.
“ He must conform to the great law of duty, and
this great law of duty must be sought for in the
‘virtue of humanity,’ which is the source of love
for all men. This is why even a prince cannot
�21
dispense with the duty of correcting and perfecting
himself.”
“ All who govern empires or kingdoms have nine
invariable rules to know and to follow: to control
or perfect themselves, to revere the wise, to love
their parents, to honour the leading officials or
ministers of the State, to be in perfect harmony
with all other officials and magistrates, to treat and
protect the people as their children, to collect about
them the wise and skilful, to receive kindly those
who come from distant lands, and to treat as friends
all rulers under them.”
Confucius realized the power of doing good which
riches give. He says, however, “ Riches and honour
are the desires of men. Tf one cannot obtain them
by honest and fair means, they must be renounced.
Poverty and humble positions are what men hate
and despise. If one cannot escape these by honest
and fair means, one must submit to them.”
The expressions “the superior man” and “the
common man” occur repeatedly in the four classic
books. The definitions of them which Confucius
gives are clear,
“ The superior man is he who has equal goodwill
�22
towards all, and who is without egotism and
prejudice.
“ The common man is he who has only feelings of
egotism and is without a disposition kindly to all
men.
“ The superior man has equanimity and tranquility
of soul. The common man experiences continually
trouble and anxiety.
“ The superior man raises himself continually in
intelligence and in power of judgment, the man
without merit descends continually into further
ignorance and vice.
“ The superior man is influenced by a sense of
justice ; the common man by the love of gain.
“The superior man places equity and justice
above all else.”
As to the opinion which Confucius had of
himself, this is what he said on the subject. “If
I think of a man who unites saintliness to the
virtue of humanity, how can I dare to compare
myself with him 1 I only know that I strive to
practise these virtues without being disheartened
�23
and to teach, them to others without being dis
couraged or despondent.”
And elsewhere: “ The straight ways or principal
virtues of the superior man are three in number, and
these I have not yet been able to attain completely ;
the virtue of humanity which drives away sadness,
science which clears all doubts from the mind, and
manly courage which drives away fear.”
His disciples affirm that Confucius was completely
exempt from four things. He was without selfconceit, without prejudice, without obstinacy, and
without egotism.
Confucius, in spite of his profound love of
humanity, did not show towards the wicked that
excessive kindness which was taught by Lao-Tze,
his contemporary. The latter recommended the
doing of kindness to the good and to the wicked
without distinction. The good man, he said, should
be always the good man, no matter what the cir
cumstances may be.
Apropos of this, someone, remembering the
doctrine of Lao-Tze, said to Confucius, “What
should one think of a man who returns kindness for
injuries ? ” The philosopher replied, “ If one acts
�24
thus, how can one repay kindness itself ? One must
repay hatred and injuries by equity; and kindness
by kindness.” This reply appeals certainly to our
sense of justice.
Confucius, as a thoroughly practical man, only
occupied himself with what human intelligence is
capable of understanding, and always refused to
discuss metaphysics.
Still, he approved of rendering homage to Heaven,
but, perhaps, only because this was an ancient
custom.
One of his disciples asked one day how one should
serve the spirits and genii.
The philosopher replied, “ When one is not yet in
a fit state to serve men, how should one be able
to serve the spirits and genii ? ”
“ Let me ask you,” continued the disciple, “what
is death ?”
Confucius replied, “When one does not yet know
what life is, how should one know what death is ?”
Let us now make a rapid examination of the
political doctrines of Confucius, of which there is a
�25
form of resume in the Hiao-King (the sacred book
of filial piety), as translated by Leon de Rosny.
In the Hiao-King the predominant idea is the
omnipotence of the father. It requires the emperor
to give to his people an example of submission to
his mother, before whom he kneels publicly on
certain dates fixed by sacred rites.
However low and obscure may be the condition
of the father of a family, the son, even if promoted
to the highest office in the empire, is required to
show to him the respect due to a superior. A
simple peasant should be able without fear of the
slightest reprimand to box the ears of his son, even
if the latter should occupy the highest legal position,
if he should neglect to prostrate himself on meeting
him.
A great mandarin so punished should also suffer
the penalty of being degraded.
At the present time it happens every day that the
son of a peasant fills important offices, for State
employment is to be obtained by examinations in
which everyone may compete.
A son who has deserved well of his country may
obtain honorary titles for his ancestors.
�26
The fulfilment of the duties of filial piety is so
indispensable that in a family where all the sons
have been condemned to death, the youngest is
allowed to live in order that someone may be left to
tend the parents of the criminals.
Confucius said, “ Filial piety is the foundation of
virtue, from which springs all knowledge.” And
elsewhere, “ Do not fail to think of your ancestors,
and strive to copy their virtues.”
The legislation of China has always had as its
foundation the Confucian doctrine of filial pity.
One may add that the whole Chinese social life
since the time of the great moralist has had but this
one pervading sentiment.
To recapitulate, then, according to the political
doctrine of Confucius, the State is one great family,
of which the emperor is the head. The sovereign
claims the same rights from, and performs the same
duties towards the people as a father in regard to
his children.
This conception has given to China a political
stability, the equal of which one would search for in
vain elsewhere. That China has sometimes forgot
ten the words of its great teacher has been the cause
of the greatest part of its troubles.
�27
It happens in China, as elsewhere, that people do
not always conform strictly in practice to the
philosophic teaching or religion they accept. There,
as indeed everywhere, beautiful maxims are more
often on the lips than in the heart. It must be
remembered also that Buddhism and Taoism, both
much degenerated and full of superstitious practices,
unfortunately exercise great influence.
This is
especially the case with the ignorant, and they are
numerous. The pure philosophy of Confucius does
not satisfy them because they are incapable of
understanding all its beauty.
The extent to which the Chinese venerate their
ancestors is generally considered absurd by other
nations. But this sentiment is to be found more or
less developed in all nations, and it is well that this
should be so.
The comforts we enjoy, as well as our most pure and
keen intellectual pleasures, we owe, almost entirely,
to those who have preceded us. It is not we who
have thought of building houses, of making clothes,
of extracting from the hidden depths of the earth
coals and minerals. All, even to the fruits which
we eat, to the flowers which we admire, has been
invented, discovered, or perfected by our ancestors
more or less distant. Without the persistent work
�28
of generations who have preceded, us, we should
still live in a savage state, for our entire covering
we should have but hideous tattooing. If famine
should make itself felt we should offer to fiendish
gods disgusting human sacrifices, if, indeed, we did
not devour open-mouthed the still palpitating flesh
of vanquished enemies.
As regards things purely intellectual, for example,
the eternal principles of truth, of beauty, of good
ness, it is still to the philosophers of antiquity that
we owe the knowledge of them. It is then but
right that we should experience for these bygone
generations respect and gratitude.
Lastly, let us observe the complete difference
which exists between the doctrines of Confucius and
those of Buddha.
The degenerate Buddhism invites us to repose in
an eternal state of unconsciousness.
Confucius tells us to think above all of the
present life, and to minimize its sorrows and misery
by family respect and affection.
The following quotation is from Pauthier:—
“ If one may judge of the quality of a man and of
�29
the power of his doctrines by the influence they
have exercised on humanity, then one may, with the
Chinese, call Confucius the greatest teacher of men
which time has ever produced. In fact, never has
human reason been more worthily represented.
One is truly astonished to find in the writings of
Confucius the expression of such a high and virtuous
intelligence, and at the same time that of a civiliza
tion so advanced.”
We have seen that the political system of
Confucius is very simple. It rests entirely on filial
piety, and the State is but a great family whose
head is the sovereign.
We know also that his moral doctrine consisted
solely in perfecting oneself, in perfecting others, in
uprightness, in treating one’s enemies with justice,
and in loving all men as oneself.
This doctrine he did not expound as new, but as
the traditional opinion of the sages of antiquity,
which he had made it his mission to transmit to
posterity.
This mission he accomplished with
resolution, dignity, and perseverance, but not without
experiencing profound discouragement and sadness
beyond endurance.
“ This mission of teacher of the human race the
�Chinese philosopher accomplished, we say, to its full
extent, and in a manner very different from that of
any other philosopher of classic antiquity. His
philosophy did not consist in speculations more or
less vain, but was a philosophy above all things
practical, which extended to all conditions of life, to
all phases of social existence.
“ There is no doubt that one of the most noble and
gentle impressions of the soul is to be got from the
contemplation of this teaching, so distant in time
and yet so pure, of which humanity, whatever may
be its boasted civilization, may justly be proud.
“One cannot read the works of the two first
Chinese philosophers (Confucius and Mencius) with
out feeling oneself better, or at least strengthened
in the principles of truth and the practice of good,
without having a higher idea of the dignity of our
nature.”
�Association For The Harmonious
Development of Faculties.
The Committee will be pleased to receive
Subscriptions and Donations to help the Association
to carry out the objects for which it was founded,
i.e. to spread (by means of Pamphlets, Reviews,
Lectures, &c.), the principles of Ethics explained in
“ Common-Sense Ethics.”
The Annual Report and Balance Sheet will
be sent to all Subscribers, who are requested to
state whether their full names or initials are to
appear in it.
Cheques and Postal Orders to be made
payable to Prof. M. Deshumbert (Hon. Treasurer
and Secretary), Camberley, Surrey.
Copies of “ Common-Sense Ethics ” will be
forwarded by the Hon. Secretary, on application.
����
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Confucius : his life and doctrine
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Deshumbert, Marius
Perceval, E.M. (tr)
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DIALOGUES
CONCERNING NATURAL RELIGION.
No. II.
BY
DAVID HUME, Esq.
4 nezo Edition, with a Preface and Notes, which bring the Subject
do wn to the present time.
PUBLISHED BY THOMAS SCOTT,
NO. 11, THE TERRACE, FARQUHAR ROAD,
UPPER NORWOOD, LONDON, S.E,
Price One Shilling.
��DIALOGUES
CONCERNING NATURAL RELIGION.
PART VII.
DUT here, continued Philo, in examining the ancient
system of the soul of the world, there strikes me, all
on a sudden, a new idea, which, if just, must go near
to subvert all your reasoning, and destroy even your
first inferences, on which you repose such confidence.
If the universe bears a greater likeness to animal bodies
and to vegetables, than to the works of human art, it
is more probable, that its cause resembles the cause
of the former than that of the latter, and its origin
ought rather to be ascribed to generation or vegetation
than to reason or design. Your conclusion, even
according to your own principles, is therefore lame and
defective.
Pray open up this argument a little farther, said
Demea. For I do not rightly apprehend it, in that
concise manner in which you have expressed it.
Our friend Cleanthes, replied Philo, as you have
heard, asserts, that since no question of fact can be
proved otherwise than by experience, the existence of
a Deity admits not of proof from any other medium.
The world, says he, resembles the works of human
contrivance : Therefore its cause must also resemble
that of the other. Here I we may remark, that the
operation of one very small part of nature, to wit man,
upon another very small part, to wit that inanimate
E
�64 Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion.
matter lying within his reach, is the rule hy which
Cleanthes judges of the origin of the whole, and he
measures objects, so widely disproportioned, by the
same individual standard. But to waive all objections
drawn from this topic; I affirm, that there are other
parts of the universe (besides the machines of human
invention) which bear still a greater resemblance to
the fabric of the world, and which therefore afford a
better conjecture concerning the universal origin of this
system. These parts are animals and vegetables. The
world plainly resembles more an animal or a vegetable,
than it does a watch or a knitting-loom. Its cause,
therefore, it is more probable, resembles the cause of the
former. The cause of the former is generation or vege
tation. The cause, therefore, of the world, we may
infer to be something similar or analogous to generation
or vegetation.
But how is it conceivable, said Demea, that the
world can arise from anything similar to vegetation or
generation ?
Very easily, replied Philo. In like manner as a tree
sheds its seed into the neighbouring fields, and produces
other trees ; so the great vegetable, the world, or this
planetary system, produces within itself certain seeds,
which, being scattered into the surrounding chaos,
vegetate into new worlds. A comet, for instance, is
the seed of a world ; and after it has been fully ripened,
by passing from sun to sun, and star to star, it is at last
tossed into the unformed elements which everywhere
surround this universe, and immediately sprouts up
into a new system.
Or if, for the sake of variety (for I see no other
advantage), we should suppose this world to be an
animal; a comet is the egg of this animal : and in
like manner as an ostrich lays its egg in the sand,
which, without any further care, hatches the egg, and
produces a new animal; so.................I understand
you, says Demea: But what wild, arbitrary suppositions
�Part VII.
65
are these ? What data have you for such extraordinary
conclusions ? And is the slight, imaginary resemblance
of the world to a vegetable or an animal sufficient to
establish the same inference with regard to both ?
Objects, which are in general so widely different;
ought they to be a standard for each other?
Right cries Philo : This is the topic on which I have
all along insisted. I have still asserted, that we have
no data to establish any system of cosmogony. Our
experience, so imperfect in itself, and so limited both
in extent and duration, can afford us no probable
conjecture concerning the whole of things. But if we
must needs fix on some hypothesis; by what rule,
pray, ought we to determine our choice ? Is there any
other rule than the greater similarity of the objects
compared ? And does not a plant or an animal, which
springs from vegetation or generation, bear a stronger
resemblance to the world, than does any artificial
machine, which arises from reason and design ?
But what is this vegetation and generation of which
you talk, said Demea ? Can you explain their opera
tions, and anatomize that fine internal structure on
which they depend 1
As much, at least, replied Philo, as Cleanthes can
explain the operations of reason, or anatomize that in
ternal structure on which it depends. But without
any such elaborate disquisitions, when I see an animal,
I infer that it sprang from generation ; and that with
as great certainty as you conclude a house to have been
reared by design. These words, generation, reason,
mark only certain powers and energies in nature,
whose effects are known, but whose essence is incom
prehensible ; and one of these principles, more than
the other, has no privilege for being made a standard
to the whole of nature.
In reality, Demea, it may reasonably be expected,
that the larger the views are which we take of things,
the better will they conduct us in our conclusions
�66 Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion.
concerning such, extraordinary and such magnificent
subjects. In this little corner of the world alone, there
are four principles, Reason, Instinct, Generation,
Vegetation, which are similar to each other, and are
the causes of similar effects. What a number of other
principles may we naturally suppose in the immense
extent and variety of the universe, could we travel
from planet to planet and from system to system, in
order to examine each part of this mighty fabric ?
Any one of these four principles above mentioned (and
a hundred others, which lie open to our conjecture)
may afford us a theory, by which to judge of the
origin of the world ; and it is a palpable and egregious
partiality, to confine our view entirely to that principle
by which our own minds operate. Were this principle
more intelligible on that account, such a partiality
might be somewhat excusable: but reason, in its
internal fabric and structure, is really as little known
to us as instinct or vegetation ; and perhaps even that
vague, undeterminate word, Nature, to which the
vulgar refer everything, is not at the bottom more
inexplicable. The effects of these principles are
all known to us from experience: but the principles
themselves, and their manner of operation, are totally
unknown : nor is it less intelligible, or less conformable
to experience, to say, that the world arose by vegetation
from a seed shed by another world, than to say that it
arose from a divine reason or contrivance, according to
the sense in which Cleanthes understands it.
But methinks, said Demea, if the world had a
vegetative quality, and could sow the seeds of new
worlds into the infinite chaos, this power would be
still an additional argument for design in its author.
For whence could arise so wonderful a faculty but
from design ? Or how can order spring from any
thing which perceives not that order which it bestows ?
You need only look around you, replied Philo, to
satisfy yourself with regard to this question. A tree
�Part VII.
6y
bestows order and organization on that tree which
springs from it, without knowing the order : an animal,
in the same manner, on its offspring; a bird, on its
nest: and instances of this kind are even more
frequent in the world than those of order, which arise
from reason and contrivance. To say that all this
order in animals and vegetables proceeds ultimately
from design, is begging the question : nor can that
great point be ascertained otherwise than by proving,
a priori, both that order is, from its nature, inseparably
attached to thought; and that it can never, of itself,
or from original unknown principles, belong to matter.
But further, Demea ; this objection, which you urge,
can never be made use of by Cleanthes, without
renouncing a defence which he has already made
against one of my objections. When I inquired con
cerning the cause of that supreme reason and
intelligence, into which he resolves everything; he
told me, that the impossibility of satisfying such
inquiries could never be admitted as an objection in
any species of philosophy. “ We must stop somewhere,”
says he; “ nor is it ever within the reach of human
capacity to explain ultimate causes, or show the last
connections of any objects. It is sufficient, if the steps,
so far as we go, are supported by experience and
observation.” Now, that vegetation and generation,
as well as reason, are experienced to be principles of
order in nature, is undeniable. If I rest my system of
cosmogony on the former, preferably to the latter, it is
at my choice. The matter seems entirely arbitrary.
And when Cleanthes asks me what is the cause of my
great vegetative or generative faculty, I am equally
entitled to ask him the cause of his great reasoning
principle. These questions we have agreed to forbear on
both sides; and it is chiefly his interest on the present
occasion to stick to this agreement. Judging by our
limited and imperfect experience, generation has some
privileges above reason : for we see every day the latter
arise from the former, never the former from the latter.
�68 Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion.
Compare, I beseech you, the consequences on both
sides. The world, say I, resembles an animal; there
fore it is an animal, therefore it arose from generation.
The steps, I confess, are wide ; yet there is some small
appearance of analogy in each step. The world, says
Cleanthes, resembles a machine • therefore it is a
machine, therefore it arose from design. The steps
here are equally wide, and the analogy less striking.
And if he pretends to carry on my hypothesis a step
farther, and to infer design or reason from the great
principle of generation, on which I insist; I may, with
better authority, use the same freedom to push farther
lus hypothesis, and infer a divine generation or
theogony from his principle of reason. I have at least
some faint shadow of experience, which is the utmost
that can ever be attained in the present subject.
.Beason, in innumerable instances, is observed to arise
from the principle of generation, and never to arise
from any other principle.
Hesiod, and all the ancient Mythologists, were so
struck with this analogy, that they universally explained
the origin of nature from an animal birth, and copula
tion. Plato too, so far as he is intelligible, seems to
have adopted some such notion in his Timaeus.
The Bramins assert, that the world arose from an
infinite spider, who spun this whole complicated mass
from his bowels, and annihilates afterwards the whole or
any part of it, by absorbing it again, and resolving it into
his own essence. Here is a species of cosmogony,
which appears to us ridiculous; because a spider is a
little contemptible animal, whose operations we are
never likely to take for a model of the whole universe.
But still here is a new species of analogy, even in our
globe. And were there a planet wholly inhabited by
spiders, (which is very possible), this inference would
there appear as natural and irrefragable as that which
in our planet ascribes the origin of all things to design
and intelligence, as explained by Cleanthes. Why an
�Part VIII.
69
orderly system may not be spun from the belly as well
as from the brain, it will be difficult for him to give a
satisfactory reason.
I must confess, Philo, replied Cleanthes, that of all
men living, the task which you have undertaken, of
raising doubts and objections, suits you best, and
seems, in a manner, natural and unavoidable to you.
So great is your fertility of invention, that I am not
ashamed to acknowledge myself unable, on a sudden,
to solve regularly such out-of-the-way difficulties as you
incessantly start upon me : though I clearly see, in
general, their fallacy and error. And I question not,
but you are yourself, at present, in the same case, and
have not the solution so ready as the objection : while
you must be sensible, that common sense and reason
are entirely against you ; and that such whimsies as you
have delivered, may puzzle, but never can convince us.
PART VIII.
What you ascribe to the fertility of my invention
replied Philo, is entirely owing to the nature of the
subject. In subjects, adapted to the narrow compass
of human reason, there is commonly but one deter
mination, which carries probability or conviction with it;
■and to a man of sound judgment, all other suppositions,
but that one, appear entirely absurd and chimerical.
But in such questions as the present, a hundred
contradictory views may preserve a kind of imperfect
analogy ; and invention has here full scope to exert
itself. Without any great effort of thought, I believe
that I could, in an instant, propose other systems
of cosmogony, which would have some faint appearance
of truth; though it is a thousand, a million to one,
if either yours or any one of mine be the true system.
For instance; what if I should revive the old
Epicurean hypothesis ? This is commonly, and I believe
�7° Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion.
justly, esteemed the most absurd system that has yet
been proposed ; yet, I know not, whether, with a few
alterations, it might_ not be brought to bear a faint
appearance of probability. Instead of supposing matter
infinite, as Epicurus did ; let us suppose it finite. A
finite number of particles'is only susceptible of finite
transpositions j and it must happen, in an eternal
duration, that every possible order or position must be
tried an infinite number of times. This world, there
fore, with all its events, even the most minute, has
before been produced and destroyed, and will again be
produced and destroyed, without any bounds and
limitations. No one, who has a conception of the
powers of infinite, in comparison of finite, will ever
scruple this determination.
But this supposes, said Demea, that matter can
acquire motion, without any voluntary agent or first
mover.
And where is the difficulty, replied Philo, of that
supposition ? Every event, before experience, is equally
difficult and incomprehensible; and every event, after
experience, is equally easy and intelligible. Motion,
in many instances, from gravity, from elasticity, from
electricity, begins in matter, without any known
voluntary agent: and to suppose always, in these cases,
an unknown voluntary agent, is mere hypothesis ; and
hypothesis attended with no advantages. The beginning
of motion in matter itself is as conceivable a priori as
its communication from mind and intelligence.
Besides ; why may not motion have been propagated
by impulse through all eternity; and the same stock
of it, or nearly the same, be still upheld in the
universe ? As much as is lost by the composition of
motion, as much is gained by its resolution. And
whatever the causes are, the fact is certain, that matter
is, and always has been, in continual agitation, as far
as human experience or tradition reaches. There is not
probably, at present, in the whole universe, one particle
of matter at absolute rest.
�Part VIII.
71
And this very consideration too, continued Philo,
which we have stumbled on in the course of the argu
ment, suggests a new hypothesis of cosmogony, that is
not absolutely absurd and improbable. Is there a system,
an order, an economy of things, by which matter can
preserve that perpetual agitation which seems essential
to it, and yet maintain a constancy in the forms which
it produces ? There certainly is such an economy : for
this is actually the case with the present world. The
continual motion of matter, therefore, in less than in
finite transpositions, must produce this economy or
order; and by its very nature, that order, when once
established, supports itself for many ages, if not to
eternity. But wherever matter is so poised, arranged,
and adjusted, as to continue in perpetual motion, and
yet preserve a constancy in the forms, its situation must,
of necessity, have all the same appearance of art and
contrivance which we observe at present. All the
parts of each form must have a relation to each other,
and to the whole: and the whole itself must have a
relation to the other parts of the universe; to the
element, in which the form subsists ; to the materials,
with which it repairs its waste and decay; and to
every other form, which is hostile or friendly. A
defect in any of these particulars destroys the form;
and the matter, of which it is composed, is again let
loose, and is thrown into irregular motions and fermen
tations, till it unite itself to some other regular form.
If no such form be prepared to receive it, and if there
be a great quantity of this corrupted matter in the
universe, the universe itself is entirely disordered;
whether it be the feeble embryo of a world in its first
beginnings that is thus destroyed, or the rotten carcase
of one languishing in old age and infirmity. In
either case, a chaos ensues; till finite, though in
numerable revolutions produce at last some forms,
whose parts and organs are so adjusted as to support
the forms amidst a continued succession of matter.
�Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion.
Suppose, (for we shall endeavour to vary the ex
pression) that matter were thrown into any position,
by a blind, unguided force ; it is evident, that this
first position must in all probability be the most
confused and most disorderly imaginable, without any
resemblance to those works of human contrivance, which,
along with a symmetry of parts discover an adjustment
of means to ends, and a tendency to self-preservation.
If the actuating force cease after this operation, matter
must remain for ever in disorder, and continue an
immense chaos, without any proportion or activity.
But suppose, that the actuating force, whatever it be,
still continues in matter, this first position will
immediately give place to a second, which will likewise
in all probability be as disorderly as the first, and so on
through many successions of changes and revolutions.
No particular order or position ever continues a
moment unaltered.
The original force, still remain
ing in activity, gives a perpetual restlessness to matter.
Every possible situation is produced, and instantly
destroyed. If a glimpse or dawn of order appears for
a moment, it is instantly hurried away, and confounded
by that never-ceasing force which actuates every part of
matter.
Thus the universe goes on for many ages in a con
tinued succession of chaos and disorder. But is it not
possible that it may settle at last, so as not to lose its
motion and active force (for that we have supposed
inherent in it), yet so as to preserve a uniformity of
appearance, amidst the continual motion and fluctuation
of its parts ? This we find to be the case with the
universe at present. Every individual is perpetually
changing, and every part of every individual; and yet
the whole remains, in appearance, the same. May we
not hope for such a position, or rather be assured of it,
from the eternal revolutions of unguided matter; and
may not this account for all the appearing wisdom
and contrivance which is in the universe ? Let us
�Part VIII.
73
contemplate the subject a little, and we shall find that
this adjustment, if attained by matter, of a seeming
stability in the forms, with a real and perpetual
revolution or motion of parts, affords a plausible, if not
a true solution of the difficulty.
It is in vain, therefore, to insist upon the uses of the
parts in animals or vegetables, and their curious
adjustment to each other. I would fain know how an
animal could subsist, unless its parts were so adjusted ?
Do we not find, that it immediately perishes whenever
this adjustment ceases, and that its matter, corrupting,
tries some new form ? It happens, indeed, that the
parts of the world are so well adjusted, that some
regular form immediately lays claim to this corrupted
matter: and if it were not so, could the world subsist ?
Must it not dissolve as well as the animal, and pass
through new positions and situations; till in a great,
but finite succession, it fall at last into the present
or some such order.
. It is well, replied Cleanthes, you told us, that this
hypothesis was suggested on a sudden, in the course of
the argument. Had you had leisure to examine it, you
would soon have perceived the insuperable objections
to which it is exposed. No form, you say, can subsist
unless it possess those powers and organs requisite for
its subsistence : some new order or economy must be
tried, and so on, without intermission ; till at last some'
order, which can support and maintain itself, is fallen
upon. But according to this hypothesis, whence arise
the many conveniences and advantages which men and
all animals possess ? Two eyes, two ears, are not
absolutely necessary for the subsistence of the species.
Human race might have been propagated and preserved,
without horses, dogs, cows, sheep, and those innumer
able fruits and products which serve to our satisfaction
and enjoyment. If no camels had been created for the
use of man in the sandy deserts of Africa and Arabia
would the world have been dissolved ? If no loadstone
�74 Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion.
had been framed to give that wonderful and useful
direction to the needle, would human society and the
human kind have been immediately extinguished ?
Though the maxims of Nature be in general very
frugal, yet instances of this kind are far from being
rare; and any one of them is a sufficient proof of
design, and of a benevolent design, which gave rise to
the order and arrangement of the universe.
At least, you may safely infer, said Philo, that the
foregoing hypothesis is so far incomplete and imperfect;
which I shall not scruple to allow. But can we ever
reasonably expect greater success in any attempts of
this nature 1 Or can we ever hope to erect a system of
cosmogony, that will be liable to no exceptions, and
will contain no circumstance repugnant to our limited
and imperfect experience of the analogy of Nature 1
Your theory itself cannot surely pretend to any such
advantage; even though you have run into Anthropo
morphism, the better to preserve a conformity to
common experience. Let us once more put it to trial.
In all instances which we have ever seen, ideas are
copied from real objects, and are ectypal, not
archetypal, to express myself in learned terms : You
reverse this order, and give thought the precedence.
In all instances which we have ever seen, thought has
no influence upon matter, except where that matter is
so conjoined with it as to have an equal reciprocal
influence upon it. No animal can move immediately
anything but the members of its own body ; and
indeed, the equality of action and reaction seem to be
a universal law of Nature. But your theory implies a
contradiction to this experience. These instances, with
many more, which it were easy to collect, (particularly
the supposition of a mind or system of thought that is
eternal, or, in other words, an animal ingenerable and
immortal); these instances, I say, may teach all of us
sobriety in condemning each other ; and let us see, that
as no system of this kind ought ever to be received
�Part IX.
75
from a slight analogy, so neither ought any to he
rejected on account of a small incongruity. For that
is an inconvenience from which we can justly pronounce
no one to he exempted.
All religious systems, it is confessed, are subject to
great and insuperable difficulties.
Each disputant
triumphs in histurn; while he carries on an offensive war,
and exposes the absurdities, barbarities, and pernicious
tenets of his antagonist. But all of them, on the whole,
prepare a complete triumph for the Sceptic ; who tells
them that no system ought ever to be embraced with
regard to such subjects : for this plain reason, that no
absurdity ought ever to be assented to with regard to
any subject. A total suspense of judgment is here
our only reasonable resource. And if every attack, as
is commonly observed, and no defence, among Theolo
gians, is successful; how complete must be his victory,
who remains always, with all mankind, on the
offensive, and has himself no fixed station or abiding
city,* which he is ever, on any occasion, obliged to
defend ?
PART IX.
But if so many difficulties attend the argument a pos
teriori, said Demea; had we not better adhere to that
simple and sublime argument a priori, which, by offer
ing to us infallible demonstration, cuts off at once all
doubt and difficulty ? By this argument, too, we may
prove the Infinity of the divine attributes ; which, I
am afraid, can never be ascertained with certainty from
any other topic. For how can an effect, which either
is finite, or, for aught we know, may be so; how can
such an effect, I say, prove an infinite cause ? The
unity too of the Divine Nature, it is very difficult, if
not absolutely impossible, to deduce merely from con
templating the works of nature; nor will the uni* Hebrews xiii. 14.
�7 6 Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion.
formity alone of the plan, even were it allowed, give
us any assurance of that attribute. Whereas the argu
ment a priori ....
You seem to reason, Demea, interposed Cleanthes, as
if those advantages and conveniences in the abstract
argument were full proofs of its solidity. But it is
first proper, in my opinion, to determine what argument
of this nature you choose to insist on; and we shall
afterwards, from itself, better than from its useful con
sequences, endeavour to determine what value we ought
to put upon it.
The argument, replied Demea, which I would insist
on, is the common one. Whatever exists, must have
a cause or reason of its existence; it being absolutely
impossible for anything to produce itself, or be the
cause of its own existence. In mounting up, therefore,
from effects to causes, we must either go on in tracing
an infinite succession, without any ultimate cause at all;
or must at last have recourse to some ultimate cause,
that is necessarily existent: now that the first supposi
tion is absurd, may be thus proved. In the infinite
chain or succession of cause and effect, each single effect
is determined to exist by the power and efficacy of that
cause which immediately preceded; but the whole
eternal chain or succession, taken together, is not
determined or caused by anything; and yet it is
evident that it requires a cause or reason, as much
as any particular object which begins to exist in time.
The question is still reasonable, why this particular
succession of causes existed from eternity, and not
any other succession, or no succession at all. If
there be no necessarily-existent being, any supposi
tion which can be formed is equally possible; nor is
there any more absurdity in Nothing’s having existed
from eternity, than there is in that succession of causes
which constitutes the universe. What was it, then,
which determined Something to exist rather than
Nothing, and bestowed being on a particular possibility,
�Part IX.
77
exclusive of the rest ? External causes, there are
supposed to he none. Chance is a word without a
meaning. Was it Nothing ? But that can never pro
duce anything. We must, therefore, have recourse to
a necessarily-existent Being, who carries the Reason of
his existence in himself; and who cannot be supposed
not to exist, without an express contradiction. There
is consequently such a Being ; that is, there is a Deity.
I shall not leave it to Philo, said Cleanthes, (though
I know that the starting objections is his chief delight)
to point out the weakness of this metaphysical reason
ing. It seems to me so obviously ill-grounded, and at
the same time of so little consequence to the cause of
true piety and religion, that I shall myself venture to
show the fallacy of it.
I shall begin with observing, that there is an evident
absurdity in pretending to demonstrate a matter of fact,
or to prove it by any arguments a priori. Nothing is
demonstrable, unless the contrary implies a contra
diction. Nothing, that is distinctly conceivable, im
plies a contradiction. Whatever we conceive as
existent, we can also conceive as non-existent. There
is no being, therefore, whose non-existence implies a
contradiction. Consequently there is no being, whose
existence is demonstrable. I propose this argument as
entirely decisive, and am willing to rest the whole
controversy upon it.
It is pretended that the Deity is a necessarilyexistent being; and this necessity of his existence is
attempted to be explained by asserting, that if we knew
his whole essence or nature, we should perceive it to
be as impossible for him not to exist as for twice two
not to be four. But it is evident, that this can never
happen, while our faculties remain the same as at
present. It will still be possible for us, at any time,
to conceive the non-existence of what we formerly con
ceived to exist; nor can the mind ever lie under a
necessity of supposing any object to remain always
�7 8 Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion.
in. being j in the same manner as we lie under a
necessity of always conceiving twice two to be four.
The words, therefore, necessary existence, have no
meaning; or, which is the same thing, none that is
■consistent.
But farther : why may not the material universe be
the necessarily-existent Being, according to this pre
tended explication of necessity? We dare not affirm
that we know all the qualities of matterj and for aught
we can determine, it may contain some qualities, which,
were they known, would make its non-existence appear
as great a contradiction as that twice two is five. I
find only one argument employed to prove that the
material world is not the necessarily-existent Being;
.and this argument is derived from the contingency
both of the matter and the form of the world. “ Any
particle of matter,” it is said *, “ may be conceived to
be annihilated; and any form may be conceived to be
altered. Such an annihilation or alteration, therefore,
is not impossible.” But it seems a great partiality not
to perceive, that the same argument extends equally to
the Deity, so far as we have any conception of him;
and that the mind can at least imagine him to be non
existent, or his attributes to be altered. It must be
some unknown, inconceivable qualities, which can
make his non-existence appear impossible, or his attri
butes unalterable : and no reason can be assigned, why
these qualities may not belong to matter. As they are
altogether unknown and inconceivable, they can never
be proved incompatible with it.
Add to this, that in tracing an eternal succession of
objects, it seems absurd to inquire for a general cause
or first author. How can anything that exists from
eternity, have a cause; since that relation implies a
priority in time, and a beginning of existence ?
In such a chain, too, or succession of objects, each
part is caused by that which preceded it, and causes
* Dr Clarke.
�Part IX.
79
that which succeeds it. Where then is the difficulty ?
But the whole, you say, wants a cause. I answer, that
the uniting of these parts into a whole, like the
uniting of several distinct counties into one king
dom, or several distinct members into one body, is
performed merely by an arbitrary act of the mind, and
has no influence on the nature of things. Did I show
you the particular causes of each individual in a collec
tion of twenty particles of matter, I should think it
very unreasonable, should you afterwards ask me, what
was the cause of the whole twenty. That is suffi
ciently explained in explaining the cause of the parts.
Though the reasonings which you have urged,
Cleanthes, may well excuse me, said Philo, from start
ing any farther difficulties; yet I cannot forbear
insisting still upon another topic. It is observed by
arithmeticians, that the products of 9 compose always
either 9, or some lesser product of 9 ; if you add to
gether all the characters, of which any of the former
products is composed. Thus, of 18, 27, 36, which are
products of 9, you make 9 by adding 1 to 8, 2 to 7, 3
to 6. Thus, of 369 is a product also of 9 ; and if you
add 3, 6, and 9, you make 18, a lesser product of 9 *.
To a superficial observer, so wonderful a regularity may
be admired as the effect either of chance or design:
but a skilful algebraist immediately concludes it to be
the work of necessity; and demonstrates, that it must
for ever result from the nature of these numbers. Is it
not probable, I ask, that the whole economy of the
universe is conducted by a like necessity, though no
human algebra can furnish a key which solves the diffi
culty ? And instead of admiring the order of natural
beings, may it not happen, that, could we penetrate into
the intimate nature of bodies, we should clearly see
why it was absolutely impossible they could ever admit
of any other disposition ? So dangerous is it to intro
duce this idea of necessity into the present question 1
* Republique des Lettres, Aout, 1685.
F
�80
Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion.
and so naturally does it afford an inference directly
opposite to the religious hypothesis !
But dropping all these abstractions, continued Philo ;
and confining ourselves to more familiar topics ; I shall
venture to add an observation, that the argument a
priori has seldom been found very convincing, except
to people of a metaphysical head, who have accustomed
themselves to abstract reasoning, and who, finding from
mathematics, that the understanding frequently leads
to truth, through obscurity, and contrary to first appear
ances, have transferred the same habit of thinking to
subjects where it ought not to have place. Other
people, even of good sense and the best inclined to
religion, feel always some deficiency in such argu
ments, though they are not perhaps able to explain dis
tinctly where it lies. A certain proof, that men ever
did, and ever will, derive their religion from other
sources than from this species of reasoning.
P A R T X.
It is my opinion, I own, replied Demea, that each man
feels, in a manner, the truth of religion within his own
breast; and from a consciousness of his imbecility and
misery, rather than from any reasoning, is led to
seek protection from that being, on whom he and
all nature is dependent. So anxious or so tedious are
even the best scenes of life, that futurity is still the
object of all our hopes and fears. We incessantly look
forward, and endeavour, by prayers, adoration and
sacrifice, to appease those unknown powers, whom we
find, by experience, so able to afflict and oppress us.
Wretched creatures that we are ! what resource for us
amidst the innumerable ills of life, did not religion sug
gest some methods of atonement, and appease those
terrors with which we are incessantly agitated and
tormented ?
�Part X.
81
I am indeed persuaded, said Philo, that the best, and
indeed the only, method of bringing every one to a due
sense of religion, is by just representations of the
misery and wickedness of men. And for that purpose
a talent of eloquence and strong imagery is more
requisite than that of reasoning and argument. For is
it necessary to prove, what every one feels within bimself? It is only necessary to make us feel it, if
possible, more intimately and sensibly.
The people, indeed, replied Demea, are sufficiently
convinced of this great and melancholy truth. The
miseries of life; the unhappiness of man; the general
corruptions of our nature; the unsatisfactory enjoyment
of pleasures, riches, honours; these phrases have
become almost proverbial in all languages. And who
can doubt of what all men declare from their own
immediate feeling and experience ?
In this point, said Philo, the learned are perfectly
agreed with the vulgar; and in all letters, sacred and
profane, the topic of human misery has been insisted
on with the most pathetic eloquence that sorrow and
melancholy could inspire. The poets, who speak from
sentiment, without a system, and whose testimony has
therefore the more authority, abound in images of this
nature. From Homer down to Dr Young, the whole
inspired tribe have ever been sensible, that no other re
presentation of things would suit the feeling and
observation of each individual.
As to authorities, replied Demea, you need not seek
them. Look round this library of Cleanthes. I shall
venture to affirm, that, except authors of particular
sciences, such as chemistry or botany, who have no
occasion to treat of human life, there is scarce one of
those innumerable writers, from whom the sense of
human misery has not, in some passage or other, extorted
a complaint and confession of it. At least, the chance
is entirely on that side; and no one author has ever, so
far as I can recollect, been so extravagant as to deny it.
�82 Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion.
There you must excuse me, said Philo : Leibnitz has
denied it; and is perhaps the first * who ventured upon
so bold and paradoxical an opinion; at least, the first
who made it essential to his philosophical system.
And by being the first, replied Demea, might he not
have been sensible of his error ? For is this a subject
in which philosophers can propose to make discoveries,
especially in so late an age ? And can any man hope
by a simple denial (for the subject scarcely admits of
reasoning) to bear down the united testimony of man
kind, founded on sense and consciousness 2
And why should man, added he, pretend to an
exemption from the lot of all other animals ? The whole
earth, believe me, Philo, is cursed and polluted. + A
perpetual war is kindled amongst all living creatures.
Necessity, hunger, want, stimulate the strong and
courageous: Fear, anxiety, terror, agitate the weak and
infirm. The first entrance into life gives anguish to the
new-born infant and to its wretched parent: weakness,
impotence, distress, attend each stage of that life: and
it is at last finished in agony and horror.
Observe too, says Philo, the curious artifices of Nature
in order to embitter the life of every living being. The
stronger prey upon the weaker, .and keep them in per
petual terror and anxiety. The weaker too, in their
turn, often prey upon the stronger, and vex and molest
them without relaxation. Consider that innumerable
race of insects, which either are bred on the body of
each animal, or flying about infix their stings in him,
These insects have others still less than themselves,
which torment them. And thus on each hand, before
and behind, above and below, every animal is surround
ed with enemies, which incessantly seek his misery and
destruction.
Man alone, said Demea, seems to be, in part, an
That sentiment had been maintained by Dr King*, and some few
others, before Leibnitz; though by none of so great fame as that
German philosopher.
t Romans viii. 22.
�Part X.
exception to this rule. For by combination in society,
he can easily master lions, tigers, and bears, whose
greater strength and agility naturally enable them to
prey upon him.
On the contrary, it is here chiefly, cried Philo, that
the uniform and equal maxims of Nature are most ap
parent. Man, it is true, can, by combination, surmount
all his real enemies, and become master of the whole
animal creation : but does he not immediately raise up
to himself imaginary enemies, the daemons of his fancy,
who haunt him with superstitious terrors, and blast
every enjoyment of life ? His pleasure, as he imagines,
becomes, in their eyes, a crime: his food and repose give
them umbrage and offence : his very sleep and dreams
furnish new materials to anxious fear: and even death,
his refuge from every other ill, presents only the dread
of endless and innumerable woes. Nor does the wolf
molest more the timid flock, than superstition does the
anxious breast of wretched mortals.
Besides, consider, Demea: This very society, by which
we surmount those wild beasts, our natural enemies;
what new enemies does it not raise to us ? What woe and
misery does it not occasion 1 Man is the greatest enemy
of man. Oppression, injustice, contempt, contumely,
violence, sedition, war, calumny, treachery, fraud; by
these they mutually torment each other: and they would
soon dissolve that society which they had formed, were
it not for the dread of still greater ills, which must
attend their separation.
But though these external insults, said Demea, from
animals, from men, from all the elements, which assault
us, form a frightful catalogue of woes, they are nothing
in comparison of those which arise within ourselves,
from the distempered condition of our mind and body.
How many lie under the lingering torment of diseases ?
Hear the pathetic enumeration of the great poet—
Intestine stone and ulcer, colic-pangs,
Daemoniac frenzy, moping melancholy,
�84 Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion.
And moon-struck madness, pining atrophy,
Marasmus, and wide-wasting pestilence.
Dire was the tossing, deep the groans : Despair
Tended the sick, busiest from couch to couch.
And over them triumphant Death his dart
Shook ; but delay’d to strike, tho’ oft invok’d
With vows, as their chief good and final hope.*
The disorders of the mind, continued Demea, though
more secret, are not perhaps less dismal and vexatious.
Remorse, shame, anguish, rage, disappointment, anxiety,
fear, dejection, despair; who has ever passed through
life without cruel inroads from these tormentors ?
How many have scarcely ever felt any better sensa
tions ? Labour and poverty, so abhorred by every one,
are the certain lot of the far greater number : and
those few privileged persons, who enjoy ease and
opulence, never reach contentment or true felicity.
All the goods of life united would not make a very
happy man : but all the ills united would make a
wretch indeed ; and any one of them almost (and who
can be free from every one ?) nay often the absence of
one good (and who can possess all ?) is sufficient to
render life ineligible.
Were a stranger to drop, on a sudden, into this world,
I would show him, as a specimen of its ills, an hospital
full of diseases, a prison crowded with malefactors
and debtors, a field of battle strewed with carcases, a
fleet foundering in the ocean, a nation languishing under
tyranny, famine, or pestilence. To turn the gay side
of life to him and give him a notion of its pleasures ;
whither should I conduct him ? to a ball, to an opera,
to court 1 He might justly think, that I was only
showing him a diversity of distress and sorrow.
There is no evading such striking instances, said
Philo, but by apologies, which still farther aggravate
the charge. Why have all men, I ask, in all ages,
complained incessantly of the miseries of life ? . . .
They have no just reason, says one : these complaints
* Paradise Lost, xi. 484— 493.
�Part X.
85
proceed only from their discontented, repining, anxious
disposition. . . . And can there possibly, I reply, be a
more certain foundation of misery, than such a
wretched temper ?
But if they were really as unhappy as they pretend,
•says my antagonist, why do they remain in life 1 . . .
Not satisfied with life, afraid of death.
This is the secret chain, say I, that holds us. We are
terrified, not bribed to the continuance of our ex
istence.
It is only a false delicacy, he may insist, which a
few refined spirits indulge, and which has spread these
■complaints among the whole race ? of mankind. . . .
And what is this delicacy, I ask, which you blame ?
Is it anything but a greater sensibility to all the
pleasures and pains of life ? and if the man of a
delicate, refined temper, by being so much more alive
than the rest of the world, is only so much more
unhappy; what judgment must we form in general of
human life ?
Let men remain at rest, says our adversary; and
they will be easy. They are willing artificers of their
own misery. . . . No ! reply I: an anxious languor
follows their repose; disappointment, vexation, trouble
their activity and ambition.
I can observe something like what you mention in
some others, replied Cleanthes : but I confess, I feel
little or nothing of it in myself; and hope that it is
not so common as you represent it.
If you feel not human misery yourself, cried Demea,
I congratulate you on so happy a singularity. Others,
seemingly the most prosperous, have not been ashamed
to vent their complaints in the most melancholy
strains. Let us attend to the great, the fortunate
-emperor, Charles V. when, tired with human grandeur,
he resigned all his extensive dominions into the hands
of his son. In the last harangue, which he made on
�86 Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion.
that memorable occasion, he publicly avowed, “ that
the greatest prosperities which he had ever enjoyed, had
been mixed with so many adversities, that he might
truly say he had never enjoyed any satisfaction or
contentmentBut did the retired life, in which he
sought for shelter, afford him any greater happiness 1
If we may credit his son’s account, his repentance
commenced the very day of his resignation.
Cicero’s fortune, from small beginnings, rose to the
greatest lustre and renown; yet what pathetic com
plaints of the ills of life do his familiar letters, as well
as philosophical discourses, contain ? And suitably to
his own experience, he introduces Cato, the great, the
fortunate Cato, protesting in his old age, that had he
a new life in his offer, he would reject the present.
Ask yourself, ask any of your acquaintance, whether
they would live over again the last ten or twenty years
of their life. No ! but the next twenty, they say, will
be better :
And from the dregs of life, think to receive
What the first sprightly running could not give. *
Thus at last they find (such is the greatness of human
misery; it reconciles even contradictions) that they
complain, at once of the shortness of life, and of its
vanity and sorrow.
And is it possible, Cleanthes, said Philo, that after
all these reflections, and infinitely more, which might
be suggested, you can still persevere in your Anthro
pomorphism, and assert the moral attributes of the
Deity, his justice, benevolence, mercy, and rectitude,
to be of the same nature with these virtues in human
creatures ? His power we allow infinite : whatever
he wills is executed: but neither man nor any other
animal is happy: therefore he does not will their
happiness. His wisdom is infinite: he is never
mistaken in choosing the means to any end : but the
course of Nature tends not to human or animal felicity :
* From Dryden’s “ Aurengzebe. ”
�Part X.
87
therefore it is not established for that purpose.
Through the whole compass of human knowledge,
there are no inferences more certain and infallible than
these. In what respect, then, do his benevolence and
mercy resemble the benevolence and mercy of men ?
Epicurus’ old questions are yet unanswered.
Is he willing to prevent evil, but not able 1 then ishe impotent. Is he able, but not willing ? then is he
malevolent. Is he both able and willing 1 whence
then is evil 1
You ascribe, Cleanthes, (and I believe justly) a
purpose and intention to Nature. But what, I beseech
you, is the object of that curious artifice and machinery,
which she has displayed in all animals ? The preserva
tion alone of individuals, and propagation of the species.
It seems enough for her purpose, if such a rank be
barely upheld in the universe, without any care or con
cern for the happiness of the members that compose it.
No resource for this purpose : no machinery, in order
merely to give pleasure or ease : no fund of pure joy
and contentment: no indulgence, without some want
or necessity accompanying it.
At least, the few .
phenomena of this nature are overbalanced by opposite
phenomena of still greater importance.
Our sense of music, harmony, and indeed beauty of
all kinds, gives satisfaction, without being absolutely
necessary to the preservation and propagation of the
species. But what racking pains, on the other hand,
arise from gouts, gravels, megrims, toothaches, rheu
matisms ; where the injury to the animal-machinery
is either small or incurable ? Mirth, laughter, play,
frolic, seem gratuitous satisfactions, which have no
farther tendency : spleen, melancholy, discontent,
superstition, are pains of the same nature. How then
does the divine benevolence display itself, in the sense
of you Anthropomorphites ? None but we Mystics, asyou were pleased to call us, can account for this strange
mixture of phenomena, by deriving it from attributes,
infinitely perfect, but incomprehensible.
�88 Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion.
And have you at last, said Cleanthes smiling,
betrayed your intentions, Philo ? Your long agreement
with Demea did indeed a little surprise me; but I find
you were all the while erecting a concealed battery
against me. And I must confess, that you have now fallen
upon a subject worthy of your noble spirit of opposition
and controversy. If you can make out the present
point, and prove mankind to be unhappy or corrupted,
there is an end at once of all religion. Por to what
purpose establish the natural attributes of the Deity,
while the moral are still doubtful and uncertain ?
You take umbrage very easily, replied Demea, at
opinions the most innocent, and the most generally re
ceived even amongst the religious and devout themselves:
and nothing can be more surprising than to find a topic
like this, concerning the wickedness and misery of
man, charged with no less than Atheism and profane
ness. Have not all pious divines and preachers, who
have indulged their rhetoric on so fertile a subject;
have they not easily, I say, given a solution of any
difficulties which may attend it! This world is but a
. point in comparison of the universe; this life but a
moment in comparison of eternity. The present evil
phenomena, therefore, are rectified in other regions,
and in some future period of existence. And the eyes
of men, being then opened to larger views of things,
see the whole connection of general laws; and trace,
with adoration, the benevolence and rectitude of the
Deity, through all the maze and intricacies of his
providence.
No 1 replied Cleanthes, No ! These arbitrary sup
positions can never be admitted, contrary to matter of
fact, visible and uncontroverted. Whence can any
cause be known but from its known effects ? Whence
can any hypothesis be proved but from the apparent
phenomena ? To establish one hypothesis upon
another, is building entirely in the air ; and the utmost
we ever attain, by these conjectures and fictions, is to
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ascertain the bare possibility of our opinion; but never
can we, upon such terms, establish its reality.
The only method of supporting divine benevolence
(and it is what I willingly embrace) is to deny ab
solutely the misery and wickedness of man. Your
representations are exaggerated; your melancholy views
mostly fictitious ; your inferences contrary to fact and
experience. Health is more common than sickness;
pleasure than pain ; happiness than misery. And for
one vexation which we meet with, we attain, upon
computation, a hundred enjoyments.
Admitting your position, replied Philo, which yet is
extremely doubtful; you must, at the same time, allow,
that, if pain be less frequent than pleasure, it is in
finitely more violent and durable. One hour of it is
often able to outweigh a day, a week, a month of our
common insipid enjoyments. And how many days,
weeks, and months, are passed by several in the most
acute torments ? Pleasure, scarcely in one instance, is
ever able to reach ecstasy and rapture : and in no one in
stance can it continue for any time at its highest pitch
and altitude. The spirits evaporate ; the nerves relax;
the fabric is disordered • and the enjoyment quickly de
generates into fatigue and uneasiness. But pain often,
how often ! rises to torture and agony ? and the longer
it continues, it becomes still more genuine agony and
torture. Patience is exhausted; courage languishes ;
melancholy seizes us ; and nothing terminates our
misery but the removal of its cause, or another event,
which is the sole cure of all evil, but which, from our
natural folly, we regard with still greater horror and
consternation.
But not to insist upon these topics, continued Philo,
though most obvious, certain, and important; I must
use the freedom to admonish you, Cleanthes, that you
have put the controversy upon a most dangerous issue,
and are unawares introducing a total Scepticism into the
most essential articles of natural and revealed theology.
�90 Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion.
What! no method of fixing a just foundation for
religion, unless we allow the happiness of human life,
and maintain a continued existence even in this world,
with all our present pains, infirmities, vexations, and
follies, to he eligible and desirable! But this is con
trary to every one’s feeling and experience : It is con
trary to an authority so established as nothing can
subvert. No decisive proofs can ever be produced
against this authority; nor is it possible for you to
compute, estimate, and compare, all the pains and all
the pleasures in the lives of all men and of all animals
and thus by your resting the whole system of religion
on a point, which, from its very nature, must for ever
be uncertain, you tacitly confess, that that system is
equally uncertain.
But allowing you, what never will be believed; at
least, what you never possibly can prove; that animal,
or at least human happiness, in this life, exceeds its
misery; you have yet done nothing : For this is not,
by any means, what we expect from infinite power,
infinite wisdom, and infinite goodness. Why is there
any misery at all in the world 1 Not by chance surely.
From some cause then. Is it from the intention
of the Deity ? But he is perfectly benevolent. Is it
contrary to his intention? But he is almighty.
Nothing can shake the solidity of this reasoning, so
short, so clear, so decisive : except we assert, that these
subjects exceed all human capacity, and that our
common measures of truth and falsehood are not
applicable to them; a topic, which I have all along
insisted on, but which you have from the beginning
rejected with scorn and indignation.
But I will be contented to retire still from this
intrenchment, for I deny that you can ever force me in
it: I will allow, that pain or misery in man is com
patible with infinite power and goodness in the Deity,
even in your sense of these attributes : What are you
advanced by all these concessions? A mere possible
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■compatibility is not sufficient. You must prove these
pure, unmixed, and uncontrollable attributes from the
present mixed and confused phenomena and from these
alone. A hopeful undertaking ! Were the phenomena
ever so pure and unmixed, yet being finite, they would
be insufficient for that purpose. How much more,
where they are also so jarring and discordant?
Here, Cleanthes, I find myself at ease in my argu
ment. Here I triumph. Formerly, when we argued
concerning the natural attributes of intelligence and
design, I needed all my sceptical and metaphysical
subtlety to elude your grasp. In many views of the
universe, and of its parts, particularly the latter, the
beauty and fitness of final causes strike us with such
irresistible force, that all objections appear (what I
believe they really are) mere cavils and sophisms; nor
can we then imagine how it was ever possible for us to
repose any weight on them. But there is no view of
human life, or of the condition of mankind, from which,
without the greatest violence, we can infer the moral
attributes, or learn that infinite benevolence, conjoined
with infinite power and infinite wisdom, which we must
discover by the eyes of faith alone. It is your turn
now to tug the labouring oar, and to support your
philosophical subtleties against the dictates of plain
reason and experience.
PAET XI.
I
scruple not to allow, said Cleanthes, that I have
been apt to suspect the frequent repetition of the word
infinite, which we meet with in all theological writers,
to savour more of panegyric than of philosophy; and
that any purposes of reasoning, and even of religion,
would be better served, were we to rest contented with
more accurate and more moderate expressions. The
�92 Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion.
terms admirable, excellent, superlatively great, wise,
and holy; these sufficiently fill the imaginations of
men; and anything beyond, besides that it leads into
absurdities, has no influence on the affections or senti
ments. Thus, in the present subject, if we abandon all
human analogy, as seems your intention, Demea, I am
afraid we abandon all religion, and retain no conception
of the great object of our adoration. If we preserve
human analogy, we must for ever find it impossible to
reconcile any mixture of evil in the universe with
infinite attributes ; much less can we ever prove the
latter from the former. But supposing the Author of
Nature to be finitely perfect, though far exceeding
mankind ; a satisfactory account may then be given of
natural and moral evil, and every untoward phenome
non be explained and adjusted. A less evil may then
be chosen, in order to avoid a greater: Inconveniencies be submitted to, in order to reach a desirable
end. And, in a word, benevolence, regulated by
wisdom, and limited by necessity, may produce just
such a world as the present. You, Philo, who are so
prompt at starting views, and reflections, and analogies;
I would gladly hear, at length, without interruption,
your opinion of this new theory • and if it deserve our
attention, we may afterwards, at more leisure, reduce it
into form.
My sentiments, replied Philo, are not worth being
made a mystery of; and therefore, without any cere
mony, I shall deliver what occurs to me with regard to
the present subject. It must, I think, be allowed,
that if a very limited intelligence, whom we shall suppose
utterly unacquainted with the universe, were assured,
that it were the production of a very good, wise, and
powerful Being, however finite, he would, from .his
conjectures, form beforehand a different notion of it
from what we find it to be by experience; nor would
he ever imagine, merely from these attributes of the
cause, of which he is informed, that the effect could be
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93
so full of vice, and misery, and disorder, as it appears
in this life. Supposing now, that this person were
brought into the world, still assured that it was the
workmanship of such a sublime and benevolent Being ;
he might, perhaps, be surprised at the disappointment;
But would never retract his former belief, if founded on
any very solid argument; since such a limited intelli
gence must be sensible of his own blindness and
ignorance, and must allow, that there may be many
solutions of those phenomena, which will for ever
escape his comprehension. But supposing, which is
the real case with regard to man, that' 'this creature is
not antecedently convinced of a supreme intelligence,
benevolent and powerful, but is left to gather such a
belief from the appearances of things; this entirely
alters the case, nor will he ever find any reason for such a
conclusion. He may be fully convinced of the narrow
limits of his understanding ■ but this will not help him
in forming an inference concerning the goodness of
superior powers, since he must form that inference
from what he knows, not from what he is ignorant of.
The more you exaggerate his weakness and ignorance,
the more diffident you render him, and give him the
greater suspicion that such subjects are beyond the reach
of his faculties. You are obliged, therefore, to reason
with him merely from the known phenomena, and to
drop every arbitrary supposition or conjecture.
Bid I show you a house or palace, where there was
not one apartment convenient or agreeable ; where the
windows, doors, fires, passages, stairs, and the whole
economy of the building, were the source of noise, con
fusion, fatigue, darkness, and the extremes of heat and
cold; you would certainly blame the contrivance, with
out any farther examination. The architect would in
vain display his subtlety, and prove to you, that if this
door or that window were altered, greater ills would
ensue. What he says may be strictly true: The
alteration of one particular, while the other parts of the
�94 Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion.
building remain, may only augment the inconveniences.
But still you would assert in general, that, if the archi
tect had had skill and good intentions, he might have
formed such a plan of the whole, and might have
adjusted the parts in such a manner, as would have
remedied all or most of these inconveniences. His
ignorance, or even your own ignorance, of such a plan,
will never convince you of the impossibility of it.
If you find many inconveniencies and deformities in
the building, you will always, without entering into
any detail, condemn the architect.
In short, I repeat the question. Is the world, con
sidered in general, and as it appears to us in this life,
different from what a man, or such a limited being,
would, beforehand, expect from a very powerful, wise,
and benevolent Deity ? It must be strange prejudice to
assert the contrary. And from thence I conclude, that,
however consistent the world may be, allowing certain
suppositions and conjectures, with the idea of such a
Deity, it can never afford us an inference concerning his
existence. The consistence is not absolutely denied,
only the inference.
Conjectures, especially where
infinity is excluded from the divine attributes, may
perhaps, be sufficient to prove a consistence; but can
never be foundations for any inference.
There seem to be four circumstances, on which
depend all, or the greatest part of the ills, that molest
sensible creatures j and it is not impossible but all these
circumstances may be necessary and unavoidable. We
know so little beyond common life, or even of common
life, that, with regard to the economy of a universe,
there is no conjecture, however wild, which may not be
just; nor any one, however plausible, which may not be
erroneous. All that belongs to human understanding,
in this deep ignorance and obscurity, is to be sceptical,
or at least cautious; and not to admit of any hypothesis
whatever; much less, of any which is supported by no
appearance of probability. Now, this I assert to be the
�Part XI.
95
case with regard, to all the causes of evil, and the cir
cumstances on which it depends.
None of them
appear to human reason, in the least degree, necessary
or unavoidable; nor can we suppose them such, without
the utmost license of imagination.
The first circumstance which introduces evil, is that
contrivance or economy of the animal creation, by
which pains, as well as pleasures, are employed to
excite all creatures to action, and make them vigilant
in the great work of self-preservation. Now pleasure
alone, in its various degrees, seems to human understanding sufficient for this purpose. All animals might
be constantly in a state of enjoyment; but when urged
by any of the necessities of nature, such as thirst,
hunger, weariness; instead of pain, they might feel
a diminution of pleasure, by which they might be
prompted to seek that object which is necessary to
their subsistence. Men who pursue pleasure as
eagerly as they avoid pain ; at least, might have been
so constituted. It seems, therefore, plainly possible
to carry on the business of life without any pain.
Why then is any animal ever rendered susceptible of
such a sensation 1 If animals can be free from it an
hour, they might enjoy a perpetual exemption from
it • and it required as particular a contrivance of their
organs to produce that feeling, as to endow them with
sight, hearing, or any of the senses. Shall we con
jecture that such a contrivance was necessary, without
any appearance of reason ? and shall we build on that
conjecture, as on the most certain truth ?
But a capacity of pain would not alone produce,
pain, were it not for the second circumstance, viz., the
conducting of the world by general laws; and this
seems nowise necessary to a very perfect Being. It is
true ; if everything were conducted by particular voli
tions, the course of nature would be perpetually
broken, and no man could employ his reason in the
conduct of life. But might not other particular voliG
�g6 Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion.
tions remedy this inconvenience ? In short, might
not the Deity exterminate all ill, wherever it were to
be found ; and produce all good, without any prepara
tion or long progress of causes and effects ?
Besides, we must consider, that, according to the
present economy of the world, the course of nature,
though supposed exactly regular, yet to us appears
not so, and many events are uncertain, and many dis
appoint our expectations. Health and sickness, calm
and tempest, with an infinite number of other accidents,
whose causes are unknown and variable, have a great
influence both on the fortunes of particular persons,
and on the prosperity of public societies ; and indeed
all human life, in a manner, depends on such accidents.
A being, therefore, who knows the secret springs of
the universe, might easily, by particular volitions,
turn all these accidents to the good of mankind, and
render the whole world happy, without discovering
himself in any operation. A fleet, whose purposes
were salutary to society, might always meet with a
fair wind; good princes enjoy sound health and long
life; persons born to power and authority, be framed
with good tempers and virtuous dispositions. A few
such events as these, regularly and wisely conducted,
would change the face of the world, and yet would no
more seem to disturb the course of nature, or confound
human conduct, than the present economy of things,
where the causes are secret, and variable, and com
pounded. Some small touches given to Caligula’s
brain in his infancy, might Lave converted him into
a Trajan; one wave, a little higher than the rest, by
burying Caesar and his fortune in the bottom of the
ocean, might have restored liberty to a considerable
part of mankind. There may, for aught we know, be
good reasons, why Providence interposes not in this
manner; but they are unknown to us; and though
the mere supposition, that such reasons exist, may be
sufficient to save the conclusion concerning the divine
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attributes, yet surely it can never be sufficient to
establish that conclusion.
If everything in the universe be conducted by
general laws, and if animals be rendered susceptible of
pain, it scarcely seems possible but some ill must arise
in the various shocks of matter, and the various con
currence and opposition of general laws. But this ill
would be very rare, were it not for the third circum
stance, which I proposed to mention, viz., the great
frugality with which all powers and faculties are dis
tributed to every particular being. So well adjusted
are the organs and capacities of all animals, and so
well fitted to their preservation, that, as far as history
or tradition reaches, there appears not to be any single
species which has yet been extinguished in the
universe.* Every animal has the requisite endow
ments ; but these endowments are bestowed with so
scrupulous an economy, that any considerable diminu
tion must entirely destroy the creature. Wherever
one power is increased, there is a proportional abate
ment in the others, Animals, which excel in swift* Here Hume was quite in error, and consequently made an
admission against himself by thinking that no race of animals has
ever become extinct. The truth is that the very reverse is the.
case. A whole animal and vegetable creation have become
extinct, as the fossil remains of gigantic animals and gigantic
trees abundantly testify. Even tropical climates in parts of the
earth have been, as it were, extinguished, and their places
occupied in some cases by arctic, and in others by temperate
climates. It was probably a change of climate which came on
in places whence the now extinct animals could not get away,
that caused their destruction. At Maidstone, in England, there
have been found the fossil remains of a ’ saurian reptile, called
iguanodon. From these remains naturalists have calculated that
the animal was seventy feet (or more) in length. Therefore these
facts strengthen Hume’s position. They shew at least that this
part of creation is imperfect. They shew that the present order
of things on earth may be as mortal and perishable as that which
preceded it. The fossil remains of the human race may prove a
puzzle to a superior order of animals four hundred thousand years
hence.
But in the days of Hume, geology was not among the sciences
then known. Fossils were an insoluble riddle. It was not until
a long time after Hume’s death, and after the pioneers of
�98 Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion.
ness, are commonly defective in force. Those which
possess both, are either imperfect in some of their
senses, or are oppressed with the most craving wants.
The human species, whose chief excellency is reason
and sagacity, is of all others the most necessitous, and
the most deficient in bodily advantages; without
clothes, without arms, without food, without lodging,
without any convenience of life, except what they owe
to their own skill and industry. In short, nature
seems to have formed an exact calculation of the
necessities of her creatures; and, like a rigid master,
has afforded them little more powers or endowments
than what are strictly sufficient to supply those
necessities. An indulgent parent would have bestowed
a large stock, in order to guard against accidents, and
secure the happiness and welfare of the creature in the
most unfortunate concurrence of circumstances. Every
course of life would not have been so surrounded with
precipices, that the least departure from the true path,
by mistake or necessity, must involve us in misery and
ruin. Some reserve, some fund, would have been
provided to ensure happiness; nor would the powers
and the necessities have been adjusted with so rigid
an economy. The author of nature is inconceivably
• powerful; his force is supposed great, if not altogether
inexhaustible: nor is there any reason, as far as we
can judge, to make him observe this strict frugality in
Geology had groped and lost their way through numbers of
Noachian, and other equally absurd theories by which they tried
to account for the origin and existence of fossil organisms, that
the true theories of geological science were discovered.
There is scarcely any thing in the history of human enlighten
ment, that is more strange and interesting than the steady advance
and triumph of scientific geology over the fables of the Hebrew
and other nonsensical cosmogonies. Only at rare intervals, and
in remote corners of civilization, can there be found even a
Christian priest who has the stupidity, ignorance, and audacity
to question the completeness of this triumph. Religion has fre
quently led men astray, when seeking moral and scientific Truth ;
but religion has never taught men anything worth knowing,
except the knowledge of its own immorality and worthlessness.
�Part XI.
99
his dealings with his creatures. It would have been
better, were his power extremely limited, to have
created fewer animals, and to have endowed these with
more faculties for their happiness and preservation.
A builder is never esteemed prudent, who undertakes
a plan beyond what his stock will enable him to
finish.
In order to cure most of the ills of human life, I
require not that man should have the wings of the
eagle, the swiftness of the stag, the force of the ox,
the arms of the lion, the scales of the crocodile or
rhinoceros ; much less do I demand the sagacity of an
angel or cherubim. I am contented to take an increase
in one single power or faculty of his soul. Let him be
endowed with a greater propensity to industry and
labour ; a more vigorous spring and activity of mind;
a more constant bent to business and application.
Let the whole species possess naturally an equal
diligence with that which many individuals are able
to attain by habit and reflection; and the most bene
ficial consequences, without any alloy of ill, is the
immediate and necessary result of this endowment.
Almost all the moral, as well as natural evils of human
life arise from idleness ; and were our species, by the
original constitution of their frame, exempt from this
vice or infirmity, the perfect cultivation of land, the
improvement of arts and manufactures, the exact
execution of every office and duty, immediately follow ;
and men at once may fully reach that state of society,
which is so imperfectly attained by the best regulated
government. But as industry is a power, and the
most valuable of any, nature seems determined, suitably
to her usual maxims, to bestow it on men with a very
sparing hand; and rather to punish him severely for
his deficiency in it, than to reward him for his attain
ments. She has so contrived his frame, that nothing
but the most violent necessity can oblige him to
labour; and she employs all his other wants to over-
�ioo Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion.
come, at least in part, the want of diligence, and to
endow him with some share of a faculty of which she
has thought fit naturally to bereave him. Here our
demands may be allowed very humble, and therefore
the more reasonable. If we required the endowments
of superior penetration and judgment, of a more
delicate taste of beauty, of a nicer sensibility to bene
volence and friendship; we might be told, that we
impiously pretend to break the order of nature; that
we want to exalt ourselves into a higher rank of
being; that the presents which we require, not being
suitable to our state and condition, would only be
pernicious to us. But it is hard ; I dare to repeat it,
it is hard, that being placed in a world so full of wants
and necessities, where almost every being and element
is either our foe, or refuses its assistance . . . we
should also have our own temper to struggle with, and
should be deprived of that faculty which can alone
fence against these multiplied evils.
The fourth circumstance, whence arises the misery
and ill of the universe, is the inaccurate workmanship
of all the springs and principles of the great machine of
nature. It must be acknowledged, that there are few
parts of the universe, which seem not to serve some
purpose, and whose removal would not produce a visible
defect and disorder in the whole. The parts hang all
together ; nor can one be touched without affecting the
rest, in a greater or less degree. But at the same time,
it must be observed, that none of these parts or prin
ciples, however useful, are so accurately adjusted, as to
keep precisely within those bounds in which their
utility consists ; but they are, all of them, apt, on every
occasion, to run into the one extreme or the other.
One would imagine, that this grand production had not
received the last hand of the maker; so little finished is
every part, and so coarse are the strokes with which it is
executed. Thus, the winds are requisite to convey the
vapours along the surface of the globe, and to assist
�Part XI.
IOI
Bien in navigation : bnt how oft, rising up to tempests
and hurricanes, do they become pernicious ? Rains are
necessary to nourish all the plants and animals of the
earth: but how often are they defective, how often ex
cessive ? Heat is requisite to all life and vegetation; but
is not always found in the due proportion. On the mix
ture and secretion of the humours and juices of the body
depend the health and prosperity of the animal: but the
parts perform not regularly their proper function. What
more useful than all the passions of the mind, ambition,
vanity, love, anger ? But how oft do they break their
bounds, and cause the greatest convulsions in society 1
There is nothing so advantageous in the universe, but
what frequently becomes pernicious, by its excess or
defect; nor has Nature guarded, with the requisite
accuracy, against all disorder or confusion. The irregu
larity is never, perhaps, so great as to destroy any
species; * but is often sufficient to involve the in
dividuals in ruin and misery.
On the concurrence, then, of these four circumstances,
does all or the greatest part of natural evil depend.
Were all living creatures incapable of pain, or were the
world administered by particular volitions, evil never
could have found access into the universe : and were ani
mals endowed with a large stock of powers and faculties,
beyond what strict necessity requires; or were the
several springs and principles of the universe so accur
ately framed as to preserve always the just temperament
and medium; there must have been very little ill in
comparison of what we feel at present. What then
shall we pronounce on this occasion ? Shall we say,
that these circumstances are not necessary, and that
they might easily have been altered in the contrivance
of the universe ? This decision seems too presump
tuous for creatures so blind and ignorant. Let us be
more modest in our conclusions. Let us allow, that if
the goodness of the deity (I mean a goodness like the
* See the Note at page 97.
�102 Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion.
human) could be established on any tolerable reasons a
priori, these phenomena, however untoward, would not
be sufficient to subvert that principle; but might easily,
in some unknown manner, be reconcilable to it. But
let us still assert, that as this goodness is not antece
dently established, but must be inferred from the phe
nomena, there can be no grounds for such an inference,
while there are so many ills in the universe, and while
these ills might so easily have been remedied, as far as
human understanding can be allowed to judge on such
a subject. I am sceptic enough to allow, that the bad
appearances, notwithstanding all my reasonings, may
be compatible with such attributes as you suppose :
But surely they can never prove these attributes. Such
a conclusion cannot result from scepticism; but must
arise from the phenomena, and from our confidence in
the reasonings which we deduce from these phenomena.
Look round this universe. What an immense pro
fusion of beings, animated and organized, sensible and
active 1 You admire this prodigious variety and
fecundity. But inspect a little more narrowly these
living existences, the only beings worth regarding.
How hostile and destructive to each other! How
insufficient all of them for their own happiness I How
contemptible or odious to the spectator 1 The whole
presents nothing but the idea of a blind Nature,
impregnated by a great vivifying principle, and pouring
forth from her lap, without discernment or parental
care, her maimed and abortive children.*
Here the Manichaean system occurs as a proper
hypothesis to solve the difficulty : and no doubt, in
some respects, it is very specious, and has more probabil
ity than the common hypothesis, by giving a plausible
account of the strange mixture of good and ill which
* “As is the race of leaves, even such is the race of men.
Leaves, some indeed the wind sheds on the ground, but the bud
ding wood produces others when the season of spring comes on ;
thus does the race of men, one produce, another cease [produc
ing].”—Iliad vi. 146-9.
�Part XL
Io3
appears in life. But if we consider, on the other hand,
the perfect uniformity and agreement of the parts of
the universe, we shall not discover in it any marks of
the combat of a malevolent with a benevolent being.
There is indeed an opposition of pains and pleasures
in the feelings of sensible creatures : but are not all
the operations of Nature carried on by an opposition of
principles, of hot and cold, moist and dry, light and
heavy? The true conclusion is, that the original
Source of all things is entirely indifferent to all these
principles ; and has no more regard to good above ill,
than to heat above cold, or to drought above moisture,
or to light above heavy*
There may four hypotheses be framed concerning the
first causes of the universe : that they are endowed
with perfect goodness ; that they have perfect malice ;
that they are opposite, and have both goodness and
malice; that they have neither goodness nor malice.
Mixed phenomena can never prove the two former un
mixed principles. And the uniformity and steadiness of
general laws seem to oppose the third. The fourth,
therefore, seems by far the most probable.
What I have said concerning natural evil will apply
to moral, with little or no variation; and we have no
more reason to infer, that the rectitude of the Supreme
Being resembles human rectitude, than that his
benevolence resembles the human. Nay, it will be
thought, that we have still greater cause to exclude
from him moral sentiments, such as we feel them;
since moral evil, in the opinion of many, is much more
predominant above moral good than natural evil
above natural good.
* A remarkable passage in Tacitus (Annals xvi. 33,) contains a
similar idea. He says, “ The same day furnished a bright ex
ample of virtue in the person of Cassus Asclepiodotus, a man con
spicuous among the Bithynians for the extent of his wealth, who
continued to treat Soranus in his decline with the same respect he
had constantly shewn him in the meridian of his fortune. The
consequence was, that he was stripped of all his property and
driven into exile: thus exemplifying the indifference of the Gods
towards patterns of virtue and of vice ! ”
�104 Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion.
But even though, this should not he allowed; and
though the virtue, which is in mankind, should be
acknowledged much superior to the vice; yet so long
as there is any vice at all in the universe, it will very
much puzzle you Anthropomorphites, how to account for
it. You must assign a cause for it, without having
recourse to the first cause. But as every effect must have
a cause, and that cause another; you must either carry
on the progression in infinitum, or rest on that
original principle, who is the ultimate cause of all
things.............
Hold ! Hold! cried Demea: Whither does your
imagination hurry you ? I joined in alliance with you,
in order to prove the incomprehensible nature of the
Divine Being, and refute the principles of Cleanthes,
who would measure everything by a human rule and
standard. But I now find you running into all the
topics of the greatest libertines and infidels; and
betraying that holy cause, which you seemingly
espoused. Are you secretly, then, a more dangerous
enemy than Cleanthes himself ?
And are you so late in perceiving it 1 replied
Cleanthes. Believe me, Demea; your friend Philo,
from the beginning, has been amusing himself at both
our expense; and it must be confessed, that the
injudicious reasoning of our vulgar theology has
given him but too just a handle of ridicule. The
total infirmity of human reason, the absolute incom
prehensibility of the Divine Nature, the great and
universal misery and still greater wickedness of
men; these are strange topics, surely, to be so
fondly cherished by orthodox divines and doctors. In
ages of stupidity and ignorance, indeed, these
principles may safely be espoused; and, perhaps, no
views of things are more proper to promote
superstition, than such as encourage the blind amaze
ment, the diffidence, and melancholy of mankind.
But at present ....
�Part Xll.
105
Blame not so much, interposed Philo, the ignorance
of these reverend gentlemen. They know how to
change their style with the times. Formerly it was a
most popular theological topic to maintain, that human
life was vanity and misery, and to exaggerate all the
ills and pains which are incident to men. But of late
years, divines, we find, begin to retract this position ;
and maintain, though still with some hesitation, that
there are more goods than evils, more pleasures than,
pains, even in this life. When religion stood entirely
upon temper and education, it was thought proper to
encourage melancholy; as indeed, mankind never have
recourse to superior powers so readily as in that dis
position. But as men have now learned to form
principles, and to draw consequences, it is necessary to
change the batteries, and to make use of such argu
ments as will endure at least some scrutiny and
examination. This variation is the same (and from the
same causes) with that which 1 formerly remarked
with regard to Scepticism.
Thus Philo continued to the last his spirit of
opposition, and his censure of established opinions.
But I could observe, that Demea did not at all relish
the latter part of the discourse; and he took occasion
soon after, on some pretence or other, to leave the
company.
PART XII.
After Demea’s departure, Cleanthes and Philo con
tinued the conversation in the following manner. Our
friend, I am afraid, said Cleanthes, will have little
inclination to revive this topic of discourse, while you
are in company; and to tell truth, Philo, I should rather
wish to reason with either of you apart on a subject so
sublime and interesting. Your spirit of controversy,
�io6 Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion.
joined to your abhorrence of vulgar superstition, carries
you strange lengths, when engaged in an argument;
and there is nothing so sacred and venerable, even in
your own eyes, which you spare on that occasion.
I must confess, replied Philo, that I am less cautious
on the subject of Natural Religion than on any other;
both because I know that I can never, on that head,
corrupt the principles of any man of common sense;
and because no one, I am confident, in whose eyes I
appear a man of common sense, will ever mistake my
intentions. You in particular, Cleanthes, with whom
I live in unreserved intimacy; you are sensible, that not
withstanding the freedom of my conversation, and my
love of singular arguments, no one has a deeper sense
of religion impressed on his mind, or pays more profound
adoration to the Divine Being, as he discovers himself
to reason, in the inexplicable contrivance and artifice
of Nature. A purpose, an intention, a design, strikes
everywhere the most careless, the most stupid thinker;
and no man can be so hardened in absurd systems, as
at all times to reject it. That Nature does nothing in
vain, is a maxim established in all the schools, merely
from the contemplation of the works of Nature, without
any religious purpose; and, from a firm conviction of
its truth, an anatomist, who had observed a new organ
or canal, would never be satisfied till he had also dis
covered its use and intention. One great foundation of
the Copernican system is the maxim, That Nature acts
by the simplest methods, and chooses the most proper
means to any end; and astronomers often, without
thinking of it, lay this strong foundation of piety and
religion. The same thing is observable in other parts
of philosophy; And thus all the sciences almost lead
us insensibly to acknowledge a first intelligent Author;
and their authority is often so much the greater, as they
do not directly profess that intention.
It is with pleasure I hear Galen reason concerning
the structure of the human body. The anatomy of a
�Part XII.
1O7
man, says he, * discovers above 600 different muscles ;
and whoever duly considers these, will find, that in
each of them Nature must have adjusted at least ten
different circumstances, in order to attain the end which
she proposed; proper figure, j ust magnitude, right
disposition of the several ends, upper and lower position
of the whole, the due insertion of the several nerves,
veins, and arteries: So that, in the muscles alone, above
6000 several views and intentions must have been
formed and executed. The bones he calculates to be
284 : The distinct purposes, aimed at in the structure
of each, above forty. What a prodigious display of
artifice, even in these simple and homogeneous parts ?
But if we consider the skin, ligaments, vessels, glandules,
humours, the several limbs and members of the body;
how must our astonishment rise upon us, in proportion
to the number and intricacy of the parts so artificially
adjusted 1 The farther we advance in these researches,
we discover new scenes of art and wisdom: But descry
still, at a distance, farther scenes beyond our reach ; in
the fine internal structure of the parts, in the economy
of the brain, in the fabric of the seminal vessels. All
these artifices are repeated in every different species of
animal, with wonderful variety, and with exact propriety
suited to the different intentions of Nature in fra,mi ng
each species. And if the infidelity of Galen, even when
these natural sciences were still imperfect, could not
withstand such striking appearances • to what pitch of
pertinacious obstinacy must a philosopher in this age
have attained, who can now doubt of a Supreme
Intelligence ? f
* De formations foetus.
t Without denying the truth of what Hume says here, to the effect,
that the human frame shews clear and unmistakable proofs of
design ; yet it is doubtful whether his eminently philosophical mind
would have allowed him to state the fact in such very decided
terms as these, if he had been acquainted with even a glimpse of
the evolution theory. But Oken was not born until three years
after Hume’s death. And Darwin’s “Descent of Man” was not
published until more than a century after Hume had ceased to
�io8 Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion.
Could I meet with one of this species, I would ask
him: Supposing there were a God, who did not dis
cover himself immediately to our senses; were it
possible for him to give stronger proofs of his exist
ence, than what appear on the whole face of nature ?
What indeed could such a divine being do but copy
the present economy of things ; render many of his
artifices so plain, that no stupidity could mistake
them; afford glimpses of still greater artifices, which
demonstrate his prodigious superiority above our
narrow apprehensions; and conceal altogether a great
many from such imperfect creatures? Now, according
to all rules of just reasoning, every fact must pass for
undisputed, when it is supported by all the arguments
write. Oken and his followers discovered that the skull and limbs
of vertebrate animals are merely modified forms. And Darwin
discovered that the human animal is merely a development from an
inferior one. Oken has left on record how the light first dawned
on his mind ; and a knowledge of the circumstance is of importance
to the thinker.
In August 1806, while Oken was among the Hartz mountains, he
unexpectedly saw the well-preserved skull of a hind. From the
appearance which the skull accidentally presented to him, he
exclaimed “ a vertebral column ! ” This was a piece of reasoning
a priori. Nevertheless, by thinking over this suggestion he
ultimately discovered that, in all vertebrate animals, the bones of the
skull are only modified vertebrae.
Perhaps he who thinks on Probability will perceive that although
arguments grounded on a priori reasoning are utterly barren of
proof and consequently of result, yet, so far as we know, all the
important discoveries, hitherto made, have been generated from
suggestions arising from a priori considerations. “ Nature does
nothing in vain.” As yet, it is on such suggestions that the
evolution theory is grounded. From considerations such as this
the true thinker will be on his guard, and will not give way to that
prevalent weakness of the human mind, when, upon a comparison
of two important things relating to the same subject, one is found
to be of less importance than the other,To consider the less important
as_ of scarcely any value whatever. “ The Cyclic Poems ” are a
fair sample of an important matter which was despised unphilosophically. During twenty-one centuries they were regarded as
nearly beneath contempt. Yet from Mr F. A. Paley’s “ Introduction ”
to his first volume of the Iliad, we know, in his skilful hands,
how almost invaluable the remains of the “ Cyclic Poems ” proved
towards ascertaining the correct date of our “ Homer.”
�Part XII.
109
which, its nature admits of; even though these
arguments be not, in themselves, very numerous or
forcible. How much more, in the present case, where
no human imagination can compute their number,
and no understanding estimate their cogency ?
I shall farther add, said Cleanthes, to what you
have so well urged, that one great advantage of the
principle of theism, is, that it is the only system of
cosmogony which can be rendered intelligible and
complete, and yet can throughout preserve a strong
analogy to what we every day see and experience in
the world. The comparison of the universe to a
machine of human contrivance, is so obvious and
natural, and is justified by so many instances of order
and design in nature, that it must immediately strike
all unprejudiced apprehensions, and procure universal
approbation. Whoever attempts to weaken this theory,
cannot pretend to succeed by establishing in its place
any other that is precise and determinate. It is
sufficient for him, if he start doubts and difficulties,
and by remote and abstract views of things, reach
that suspense of judgment, which is here the utmost
boundary of his wishes. But besides that this state
of mind is in itself unsatisfactory, it can never be
steadily maintained against such striking appearances
as continually engage us into the religious hypothesis.
From the force of prejudice, human nature is capable
of adhering, with obstinacy and perseverance, to a false
absurd system. But I think it absolutely impossible,
by valid argument, to maintain or defend any system
at all, inculcated by natural propensity and by early
education, in opposition to a theory supported by
strong and obvious reason.
So little, replied Philo, do I esteem this suspense
of judgment in the present case to be possible, that
I am apt to suspect there enters somewhat of a dispute
of words into this controversy, more than is usually
imagined. That the works of nature bear a great
analogy to the productions of art, is evident; and
�11 o Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion.
according to all the rules of good reasoning, we ought
to infer, if we argue at all concerning them, that their
causes have a proportional analogy. But as there are
also considerable differences, we have reason to suppose
a proportional difference in the causes, and in par
ticular ought to attribute a much higher degree of
power and energy to the supreme cause, than any we
have ever observed in mankind. Here then the
existence of a Deity is plainly ascertained by reason;
and if we make it a question, whether on account of
these analogies, we can properly call him a mind or
intelligence, notwithstanding the vast difference which
may reasonably be supposed between him and human
minds ; what is this but a mere verbal controversy ?
No man can deny the analogies between the effects.
To restrain ourselves from inquiring concerning the
causes, is scarcely possible. From this inquiry, the
legitimate conclusion is, that the causes have also an
analogy, and if we are not contented with calling the
first and supreme cause a God or Deity, but desire to
vary the expression ; what can we call him but Mind
or Thought, to which he is justly supposed to bear a
considerable resemblance ?
All men of sound reason are disgusted with verbal
disputes, which abound so much in philosophical and
theological inquiries ; and it is found, that the only
remedy for this abuse must arise from clear definitions,
from the precision of those ideas which enter into any
argument, and from the strict and uniform use of
those terms which are employed. But there is a
species of controversy, which, from the very nature
of language and of human ideas, is involved in
perpetual ambiguity, and can never, by any precaution
or any definitions, be able to reach a reasonable
certainty or precision. These are the controversies
concerning the degrees of any quality or circumstance.
Men may argue to all eternity, whether Hannibal be
a great, or a very great, or a superlatively great man;
�Part XII.
111
what degree of beauty Cleopatra possessed; what
epithet of praise Livy or Thucidydes is entitled to,
without bringing the controversy to any determination.
The disputants may here agree in their sense, and
differ in the terms, or vice versa ; yet never be able
to define their terms, so as to enter into each other’s
meaning: Because the degrees of these qualities are
not, like quantity or number, susceptible of any exact
mensuration, which may be the standard in the con
troversy. That the dispute concerning theism is of
this nature, and consequently is merely verbal, or
perhaps, if possible, still more incurably ambiguous,
will appear upon the slightest inquiry. I ask the
theist if he does not allow, that there is a great
and immeasurable, because incomprehensible, difference
between the human and the divine mind. The more
pious he is, the more readily will he assent to the
affirmative, and the more will he be disposed to
magnify the difference. He will even assert that the
difference is of a nature which cannot be too much
magnified. I next turn to the atheist, who, I assert,
is only nominally so, and can never possibly be in
earnest; and I ask him, whether, from the coherence
and apparent sympathy in all the parts of this world,
there be not a certain degree of analogy among all the
operations of nature, in every situation and in every
age, whether the rotting of a turnip, the generation of
an animal, and the structure of human thought, be
not energies that probably bear some remote analogy
to each other. It is impossible he can deny it. He
will readily acknowledge it. Having obtained this
concession, I push him still farther in his retreat; and
I ask him, if it be not probable, that the principle
which first arranged, and still maintains, order in this
universe, bears not also some remote inconceivable
analogy to the other operations of nature, and among
the rest to the economy of human mind and thought.
However reluctant, he must give his assent. Where
H
�112 Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion.
then, cry I to both these antagonists, is the subject
of your dispute ? The Theist allows that the original
intelligence is very different from human reason. The
atheist allows, that the original principle of order bears
some remote analogy to it. Will you quarrel, gentle
men, about the degrees ; and enter into a controversy
which admits not of any precise meaning, nor conse
quently of any determination ? If you should be so
obstinate, I should not be surprised to find you
insensibly change sides; while the theist, on the one
hand exaggerates the dissimilarity between the supreme
Being, and frail, imperfect, variable, fleeting, and
mortal creatures; and the atheist, on the other, magni
fies the analogy among all the operations of nature,
in every period, every situation, and every position.
Consider then, where the real point of controversy lies,
and if you cannot lay aside your disputes, endeavour,
at least, to cure yourselves of your animosity.
And here I must also acknowledge, Cleanthes, that,
as the works of Nature have a much greater analogy to
the effects of our art and contrivance, than to those of
our benevolence and j ustice ; we have reason to infer,
that the natural attributes of the Deity have a greater
resemblance to’those of men, than his moral have to
human virtues. But what is the consequence ?
Nothing but this, that the moral qualities of man are
more defective in their kind than his natural abilities.
For as the Supreme Being is allowed to be absolutely
and entirely perfect; whatever differs most from him,
departs the farthest from the supreme standard of recti
tude and perfection.*
* It seems evident, that the dispute between the Sceptics and
Dogmatists is entirely verbal; or at least regards only the degrees
of doubt and assurance, which we ought to indulge with regard to all
reasoning : and such disputes are commonly, at the bottom, verbal,
and admit not of any precise determination. No philosophical
Dogmatist denies, that there are difficulties both with regard to
the senses and to all science ; and that these difficulties are in a
regular, logical method, absolutely insolvable. No Sceptic denies
�Part XII.
1T3
These, Cleanthes, are my unfeigned sentiments on
this subject; and these sentiments, you know, I have
ever cherished and maintained. But in proportion to
my veneration for true religion, is my abhorrence of
vulgar superstitions ; and I indulge a peculiar pleasure,
I confess, in pushing such principles, sometimes into
absurdity, sometimes into impiety.
And you are
sensible, that all bigots, notwithstanding their great
aversion to the latter above the former, are commonly
equally guilty of both.
My inclination, replied Cleanthes, lies, I own, a con
trary way. Religion, however corrupted, is still better
than no religion at all. The doctrine of a future state
is so strong and necessary a security to morals, that we
never ought to abandon or neglect it. For if finite and
temporary rewards and punishments have so great an
effect, as we daily find: how much greater must be
expected from such as are infinite and eternal ?
How happens it then, said Philo, if vulgar super
stition be so salutary to society, that all history
abounds so much with accounts of its pernicious
consequences on public affairs ? Factions, civil wars, •
persecutions, subversions of government, oppression,
slavery ; these are the dismal consequences which always
attend its prevalency over the minds of men. If the
religious spirit be ever mentioned in any historical
narration, we are sure to meet afterwards with a detail
of the miseries which attend it. And no period of time
can be happier or more prosperous, than those in which
it is never regarded or heard of.
The reason of this observation, replied Cleanthes, is
obvious. The proper office of religion is to regulate
that we lie under an absolute necessity, notwithstanding these
difficulties, of thinking, and believing, and reasoning, with regard
to all kinds of subjects, and even of frequently assenting with
confidence and security. The only difference, then, between these
facts, if they merit that name, is, that the Sceptic, from habit,
caprice, or inclination, insists most on the difficulties; the Dog
matist, for like reasons, on the necessity.
�114 Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion.
*
the heart of men, humanize their conduct, infuse the
spirit of temperance, order, and obedience : and as its
operation is silent, and only enforces the motives of
morality and justice, it is in danger of being overlooked,
and confounded with these other motives. When it
distinguishes itself, and acts as a separate principle
oyer men, it has departed from its proper sphere, and
has become only a cover to faction and ambition.
And so will all religion, said Philo, except the
philosophical and rational kind. Your reasonings are
more easily eluded than my facts. The inference is
not just, because finite and temporary rewards and
punishments have so great influence, that therefore
such as are infinite and eternal must have so much
greater.
Consider, I beseech you, the attachment
which we have to present things, and the little concern
which we discover for objects so remote and uncertain.
When divines are declaiming against the common be
haviour and conduct of the world, they always represent
this principle as the strongest imaginable, (which
indeed it is); and {describe almost all human kind as
lying under the influence of it, and sunk into the deepest
lethargy and unconcern about their religious interests.
Yet these same divines, when they refute their specu
lative antagonists, suppose the motives of religion to
be so powerful, that, without them, it were impossible
for civil society to subsist; nor are they ashamed of so
palpable a contradiction. It is certain, from experience,
that the smallest grain of natural honesty and benevo
lence has more effect on men’s conduct, than the most
pompous views suggested by theological theories and
systems. A man’s natural inclination works incessantly
upon him ; it is for ever present to the mind; and
■ mingles itself with every view and consideration :
whereas religious motives, where they act at all, operate
only by starts and bounds ; and it is scarcely possible
4'or them to become altogether habitual to the mind.
The force of the greatest gravity, say the philosophers,
�Part XII.
JI5
is infinitely small, in comparison of that of the least
impulse : yet it is certain, that the smallest gravity will,
in the end, prevail above a great impulse ; because no
strokes or blows can be repeated with such constancy
as attraction and gravitation.
Another advantage of inclination : it engages on its
side all the wit and ingenuity of the mind : and when
get in opposition to religious principles, seeks every
method and art of eluding them : in which it is almost
always successful. Who can explain the heart of man,
or account for those strange salvos and excuses, with
which people satisfy themselves, when they follow their
inclinations in opposition to their religious duty ? This
is well understood in the world; and none but fools
ever repose less trust in a man, because they hear, that,
from study and philosophy, he has entertained some
speculative doubts with regard to theological subjects.
And when we have to do with a man, who makes a
great profession of religion and devotion ; has this any
other effect upon several, who pass for prudent, than
to put them on their guard, lest they be cheated and
deceived by him ?
We must farther consider, that philosophers, who-.
♦
cultivate reason and reflection, stand less in need of
such motives to keep them under the restraint of
morals : and that the vulgar, who alone may need
them, are utterly incapable of so pure a religion as
- *
represents the Deity to be pleased with nothing but
virtue in human behaviour. The recommendations to
the Divinity are generally supposed to be either
frivolous observances, or rapturous ecstasies, or a
bigoted credulity.
We need not run back into
antiquity, or wander into remote regions, to find
instances of this degeneracy. Amongst ourselves, soniehave been guilty of that atrociousness, unknown to the '*
Egyptian and Grecian superstitions, of declaiming, in
express terms, against morality ; and representing it as,
a sure forfeiture of the divine favour, if the least trust
•or reliance be laid upon it.
�116 Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion.
But even though superstition or enthusiasm should
not put itself in direct opposition to morality; the
very diverting of the attention, the raising up a new
and frivolous species of merit, the preposterous distri
bution which it makes of praise and blame, must have
the most pernicious consequences, and weaken ex
tremely men’s attachment to the natural motives of
justice and humanity.
Such a principle of action likewise, not being any of
the familiar motives of human conduct, acts only by
intervals on the temper; and must be roused by
continual efforts, in order to render the pious zealot
satisfied with his own conduct, and make him fulfil
his devotional task. Many religious exercises are entered
into with seeming fervour, where the heart, at the time,
feels cold and languid. A habit of dissimulation is by
degrees contracted: and fraud and falsehood become
the predominant principle. Hence the reason of that
vulgar observation, that the highest zeal in religion
and the deepest hypocrisy, so far from being incon
sistent, are often or commonly united in the same
individual character.
The bad effects of such habits, even in common life, '
are easily imagined : but where the interests of religion
are concerned, no morality can be forcible enough to
bind the enthusiastic zealot. The sacredness of the
cause sanctifies every measure which can be made use
of to promote it.
The steady attention alone to so important an
interest as that of eternal salvation, is apt to extinguish
the benevolent affections, and beget a narrow, con
tracted selfishness. And when such a temper is
encouraged, it easily eludes all the general precepts of
charity and benevolence.
Thus the motives of vulgar superstition have no
great influence on general conduct; nor is their opera
tion very favourable to morality, in the instances where
they predominate.
�Part Xll.
117
Is there any maxim in politics more certain and
infallible, than that both the number and authority of
priests should be confined within very narrow limits;
and that the civil magistrate ought, for ever, to keep
his fasces and axes from such dangerous hands ? But
if the spirit of popular religion were so salutary to
society, a contrary maxim ought to prevail. The
greater number of priests, and their greater authority
and riches, will always augment the religious spirit.
And though the priests have the guidance of this spirit,
why may we not expect a superior sanctity of life, and
greater benevolence and moderation, from persons who
are set apart for religion, who are continually inculcat
ing it upon others, and who must themselves imbibe a
greater share of it ? Whence comes it then, that, in
fact, the utmost a wise magistrate can propose with
regard to popular religions, is, as far as possible, to
make a saving game of it, and to prevent their
pernicious consequences with regard to society ? Every
expedient which he tries for so humble a purpose is
surrounded with inconveniences. If he admits only
one religion among his subjects, he must sacrifice, to
an uncertain prospect of tranquillity, every considera
tion of public liberty, science, reason, industry, and
even his own independency. If he gives indulgence to
several sects, which is the wiser maxim, he must pre
serve a very philosophical indifference to all of them,
and carefully restrain the pretensions of the prevailing
sect; otherwise he can expect nothing but endless
disputes, quarrels, factions, persecutions, and civil
commotions.
True religion, I allow, has no such pernicious con
sequences : but we must treat of religion, as it has
commonly been found in the world ; nor -have I any
thing to do with that speculative tenet of Theism,
which, as it is a species of philosophy, must partake of
the beneficial influence of that principle, and at the
same time must lie under a like inconvenience, of being
always confined to a very few persons.
�118 Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion.
Oaths are requisite in all courts of judicature ; but
it is a question whether their authority arises from any
popular religion. It is the solemnity and importance
of the occasion, the regard to reputation, and the
reflecting on the general interest of society, which are
the chief restraints upon mankind. Custom-house
oaths and political oaths are but little regarded even by
some who pretend to principles of honesty and
religion ; and a Quaker’s asseveration is with us justly
put upon the same footing with the oath of any other
person. I know, that Polybius * ascribes the infamy
of Greek faith to the prevalency of the Epicurean
philosophy : but I know also, that Punic faith had as
bad a reputation in ancient times, as Irish evidence has
in modern ; though we cannot account for these vulgar
observations by the same reason. Not to mention,
that Greek faith was infamous before the rise of the
Epicurean philosophy; and Euripides f, in a passage
which I shall point out to you, has glanced a remark
able stroke of satire against his nation, with regard to
this circumstance.
Take care, Philo, replied Cleanthes, take care : push
not matters too far : allow not your zeal against false
religion to undermine your veneration for the true.
Forfeit not this principle, the chief, the only great
comfort in life; and our principal support amidst all
the attacks of adverse fortune. The most agreeable
reflection, which it is possible for human imagination
to suggest, is that of genuine Theism, which represents
us as the workmanship of a Being perfectly good, wise,
and powerful; who created us for happiness ; and who,
having implanted in us immeasurable desires of good,
will prolong our existence to all eternity, and will trans
fer us into an infinite variety of scenes, in order to satisfy
those desires, and render our felicity complete and
* Lib. vi. cap. 54.
+ Iphigenia in Tauride, 1206.
Triarov 'EXXas ol8ei> ovSev.
“ The Greeks are ignorant of good faith. ”
�Part XII.
119
durable. Next to such a Being himself (if the
comparison be allowed), the happiest lot which we can
imagine, is that of being under his guardianship and
protection.
These appearances, said Philo, are most engaging
and alluring; and with regard to the true philosopher,
they are more than appearances. But it happens here,
as in the former case, that, with regard to the greater
part of mankind, the appearances are deceitful, and that
the terrors of religion commonly prevail above its
comforts.
It is allowed, that men never have recourse to de
votion so readily as when dejected with grief or
depressed with sickness. Is not [this a proof, that the
religious spirit is not so nearly allied to joy as to
sorrow 1
But men, when afflicted, find consolation in religion,
replied Cleanthes. Sometimes, said Philo : but it is
natural to imagine, that they will form a notion of
those unknown beings, suitably to the present gloom
and melancholy of their temper, when they betake
themselves to the contemplation of them. Accordingly,
we find the tremendous images to predominate in all
religions ; and we ourselves, after having employed the
most exalted expression in our descriptions of the Deity,
fall into the flattest contradiction, in affirming, that the
damned are infinitely superior in number to the elect.
I shall venture to affirm, that there never was a
popular religion, which represented the state of
departed souls in such a light, as would render it
eligible for human kind, that there should be such a
state. These fine models of religion are the mere
product of philosophy. Eor as death lies between the
eye and the prospect of futurity, that event is so shock
ing to Nature, that it must throw a gloom on all the
regions which lie beyond it; and suggest to the
generality of mankind the idea of Cerberus and Furies ;
devils, and torrents of fire and brimstone.
�120 Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion.
It is true, both, fear and hope enter into religion ;
because both these passions, at different times, agitate
the human mind, and each of them forms a species of
divinity suitable to itself. But when a man is in a
cheerful disposition, he is fit for business, or company,
or entertainment of any kind; and he naturally
applies himself to these, and thinks not of religion.
When melancholy and dejected, he has nothing to do
but brood upon the terrors of the invisible world, and
to plunge himself still deeper in affliction. It may,
indeed, happen, that after he has, in this manner,
engraved the religious opinions deep into his thought
and imagination, there may arrive a change of health
or circumstances, which may restore his good-humour,
and raising cheerful prospects of futurity, make him
run into the other extreme of joy and triumph. But
still it must be acknowledged, that, as terror is the
primary principle of religion, it is the passion which
always predominates in it, and admits but of short
intervals of pleasure.
Not to mention, that these fits of excessive, enthusi
astic joy, by exhausting the spirits, always prepare the
way for equal fits of superstitious terror and dejection ;
nor is there any state of mind so happy as the calm
and equable. But this state it is impossible to support,
where a man thinks, that he lies, in such profound
darkness and uncertainty, between an eternity of
happiness and an eternity of misery. No wonder, that
such an opinion disjoints the ordinary frame of the
mind, and throws it into the utmost confusion. Ard
though that opinion is seldom so steady in its operation
as to influence all the actions; yet is it apt to make a
considerable breach in the temper, and to produce that
gloom and melancholy so remarkable in all devout people.
It is contrary to common sense to entertain appre
hensions or terrors upon account of any opinion what
soever, or to imagine that we run any risk hereafter, by
the freest use of our reason. Such a sentiment implies
�Part XII.
I2I
both, an absurdity and an inconsistency. It is an
absurdity to believe that the Deity has human passions,
and one of the lowest of human passions, a restless
appetite for applause. It is an inconsistency to believe,
that, since the Deity has this human passion, he has
not others also • and in particular, a disregard to the
opinions of creatures so much inferior.
“ To know God,” says Seneca, “ is to worship him.”
All other worship is indeed absurd, superstitious, and
even impious. It degrades him to the low condition of
mankind, who are delighted with intreaty, solicitation,
presents, and flattery. Yet is this impiety the smallest
of which superstition is guilty. Commonly, it de
presses the Deity far below the condition of mankind;
and represents him as a capricious demon, who exercises
his power without reason and without humanity!
And were that Divine Being disposed to be offended
at the vices and follies of silly mortals, who are his own
workmanship ; ill would it surely fare with the votaries
of most popular superstitions. Nor would any of
human race merit his favour, but a very few, the
philosophical Theists, who entertain, or rather indeed
endeavour to entertain, suitable notions of his divine
perfections : as the only persons, entitled to his com
passion and indulgence, would be the philosophical
Sceptics, a set almost equally rare, who, from a
natural diffidence of their own capacity, suspend, or
endeavour to suspend, all judgment with regard to
such sublime and such extraordinary subjects.
If the whole of Natural Theology, as some' people
seem to maintain, resolves itself into one simple,
though somewhat ambiguous, at least undefined pro
position, That the cause or causes of order in the
universe probably bears some remote analogy to human
intelligence : if this proposition be not capable of ex
tension, variation, or more particular explication : if it
affords no inference that affects human life, or can be
the source of any action or forbearance: and if the
analogy, imperfect as it is, can be carried no farther
�122 Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion,,
than to the human intelligence; and cannot be trans
ferred, with any appearance of probability, to the other
qualities of the mind: if this really be the case, what
can the most inquisitive, contemplative, and religious
man do more than give a plain, philosophical assent to
the proposition, as often as it occurs ; and believe that
the arguments on which it is established, exceed the
objections which lie against it ? Some astonishment
indeed will naturally arise from the greatness of the
object; some melancholy from its obscurity; some
contempt of human reason, that it cannot give any
solution more satisfactory with regard to so extraordin
ary and magnificent a question. But, believe me,
Cleanthes, the most natural sentiment, which a welldisposed mind will feel on this occasion, is a longing
desire and expectation that heaven would be pleased to
dissipate, or at least alleviate this profound ignorance
by affording some more particular revelation to man
kind, and making discoveries of the nature, attributes,
and operations of the divine Object of our faith. A
person seized with a just sense of the imperfections of
natural reason, will fly to revealed truth with the
greatest avidity: while the haughty dogmatist, per
suaded that he can erect a complete system of theology
by the mere light of philosophy, disdains any further
aid, and rejects this adventitious instructor. To be a
philosophical sceptic, in a man of letters, is the first and
most essential step towards being a sound, believing
Christian ; a proposition which I will willingly re
commend to the attention of Pamphilus; and I hope
Cleanthes will forgive me for interposing so far in the
education and instruction’of his pupil.
Cleanthes and Philo pursued not this conversation
much further; and as nothing ever made greater
impression on me than all the reasonings of that day;
so, I confess, that upon a serious review of the whole I
cannot but think that Philo’s principles are more
probable than Demea’s ; but that those of Cleanthes
approach still nearer to the truth.
�POSTSCRIPT.
A short account of the “ Dialogues ” will probably be
acceptable to the reader.
It has been stated, in the Preface to this edition of
them, that they were laid in manuscript before Sir
Gilbert Elliott in the year 1751. Hume was most
anxious to publish them, but his friends always dis
suaded him from doing so, knowing how dangerous to
his personal and social peace the experiment might
prove. So, by his will, he appointed his friend Dr.
« -Adam Smith his literary executor, with full power
over all his papers except the “ Dialogues,” which,
however, Dr. Smith was directed to publish. As an
inducement to Dr. Smith to comply with this direction,
Hume added the following clause :—“ Though I can
trust to that intimate and sincere friendship which has
ever subsisted between us for his faithful execution
of this part of my will, yet as a small recompense of
his pains in correcting and publishing this work, I
leave him £200 to be paid immediately after the
publication of it.”
Although there is not the least reason to call in
question the sincerity of the friendship above referred
to, yet Hume foresaw that Dr. Smith would not com
ply with the direction, couched in such affectionate
language, and followed by a substantial legacy; for
by a codicil bearing date the 7 th’ August 1776, only
a few days before Hume’s death, he made the following
provision :—“ I do ordain that if my Dialogues, from
whatever cause, be not published within two years
and a half after my death, as also an account of my
�124 Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion.
life, the property shall return to my nephew, David,
whose duty in publishing them, as the last request of
his uncle, must be approved of by all the world/’
Almost immediately after Hume’s death, his friend,
Dr. Smith, edited the autobiography, “ My own Life,”
alluded to in the codicil; and in a letter addressed to
William Strahan, Esq., dated 9 Nov. 1776, Dr. Smith
gave an account “ of the behaviour of our late excellent
friend, Mr Hume, during his last illness.” That
letter concludes thus :—“ Upon the whole, I have
always considered him, (Hume) both in his lifetime,
and since his death, as approaching as nearly to the
idea of a perfectly wise and virtuous man, as perhaps
the nature of human frailty will permit.” But Dr.
Smith was afraid to publish the “ Dialogues,” and,
although both they and the legacy of <£200 were
offered to him independently of any condition that
might be implied in the terms of the bequest, he
refused both. So it was left to be seen what “ my
nephew, David,” would do.
This David Hume was an advocate at the Scotch
bar, and subsequently a baron in the Court of
Exchequer. He was a true Christian, a very bad
writer, a staunch supporter of terrorism, and a bigoted
upholder of all the arbitrary oppressions exercised by
the English government during the period from 1793
to 1830. He was very unwilling to publish the
“ Dialogues.” However, in the year 1779, he printed
them, but without the name of any publisher, printer,
or even place of printing attached to the volume. The
editor has in his possession a copy of this first and
merely printed edition of the “ Dialogues.” Its title
page stands thus:—“Dialogues concerning Natural Reli
gion, by David Hume, Esq.; Printed in 1779.”—On
the fly leaf there is written, “From the Author’s
Nephew,” indicating that the merely printed copies
were not exposed -for sale, and were circulated only
privately. But as delivery of any written or printed
�Postscript.
125
matter to only one person is “publication ” in the eye
of the law, perhaps the baron persuaded himself that
he had complied with “ the last request of his uncle ”—
in the eye of the law.
So intense was Baron Hume’s dread of the social
persecution which hitherto has always been suffered
by those persons who have sided with the plaintiff in
the good old cause of “ Truth v. Christianity. ” A
cause not yet decided against the plaintiff, notwith
standing the atrocities which the defendant inflicts,
almost every year on those who side with the plaintiff.
The late Dr. John P. Nichol of Glasgow University,
says, “It is at once unjust and unwise to consider
errors and crimes of this sort (persecutions) as ex
clusive attributes of the Romish Church; on the
contrary, their root lies deep in the heart of man.
The domain of physical inquiry is now wholly safe
from the disorders of intolerance; but there are large
departments of knowledge within which Reason is
not yet free; where authority abides on its throne,
and popular prejudice stores its thunderbolts’’
TURNBULL AND SPEAKS, PRINTERS, EDINBURGH.
�
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Dialogues concerning natural religion No. II
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ESSAI
DE
PHILOSOPHIE RELIGIEUSE
PAR EMILE SAISSET.
PREMIERE PARTIE.—ETUDES HISTORIQUES
SIXlfiME fiTUDE. — LE SCEPTICISME DE KANT.
Ai-je enfin trouve dans Leibnitz la verite complete et absolue sur
Lieu, et ne me reste-t-il qu’a la conserver comme mon plus cher
tresor et a la preserver des atteintes du scepticisme ? Je l’ai cru longtemps, et chaque fois que je relis les Essais de theodicee, je me reprends a le croire. Quelle admirable creation! Comme la pensee y
est grande, et comme elle est simple! Que de genie et que de bon
sens! Tous les besoins de Fame y sont satisfaits : le coeur est touche,
la raison convaincue, et en meme temps l’imagination curieuse et
bardie voit s’ouvrir devant elle des horizons sans limite.
Je voudrais m’arreterla, mais c’est impossible. Plus je considere
1’enchainement des pensees de Leibnitz sur les choses divines, plus
je vois que toutes ses vues se rattachent a un vaste systeme dont il est
bien difficile de les separer. Et certes, ce systeme est d’une grandeur
et d’une ricliesse merveilleuses. Il embrasse tous les objets que la
curiosite humaine peut se proposer; il poursuit jusqu’aux dernieres
limites de la raison l’explication de l’enigme des existences. C’est, je
crois, le systeme le plus Vaste qu’aucune intelligence d’homme ait
jamais concu; mais si vaste qu’il soit, est-il autre chose qu’un
systeme ?
Dieu" concu comme la monade supreme dont toutes les monades
�ESSAI DE PHILOSOPIIIE RELIGIEUSE.
27
finies sont des fulgurations continuelles, est-ce la une pensee entierement exempte d’erreur et de peril? Je crains d’y trouver quelque
analogie avec la nature naturante de Spinoza. Si Dieu en effet est
defini la force absolue, puis-je concevoir cette force autrement qu’en
acte? n’est-il pas de 1’essence d’une force de se developper? Mais
alors que devient la notion de l’etre tout parfait, de ce principe
immuable, accompli, qui se suffit pleinement a soi-meme et a’a
besoin de rien autre que soi?
Et puis ces monades qui emanent confinuellement du Createur,
chacune renfermant en elle le germe de tous ses developpements,
est-ce une conception qui satisfasse aux donnees de Texperience? N’y
a-t-il pas dans cette evolution reglee par lla loi de continuity une
espece de fatalisme universel? Et meme, a y regarder de pres, ces
forces, qui ne sortent pas d’elles-memes, qui sont hermetiquement
fermees a toute influence exterieure, ri’ay ant, point, comme dit Leib
nitz, de fenetres sur le dehors, sont-ce des forces yeritables? Ne
ressemblent-elles pas plutot a des abstractions mathematiques, telles,
par exemple, que les points successifs d’une courbe rigoureusement
continue dont l’equation serait ecrite de toute eternite?
Je demande aussi a Leibnitz comment ces monades, qui sont par
definition des unites simples, peuvent expliquer l’etendue et le mouvement? Il me dira que 1’etendue etie mouvement ne sont rien d’absolu, mais de simples phenomenes, des apparences fugitives, pareilles
a l’arc-en-ciel. Dites le mot, Leibnitz. Ce sont pour vous de pures
illusions. Or deja, a vous en croire, l’influence que je m’imagine
exercer sur mes membresest une ilfSbilX gallon dt la reaction perpetuelles des etres de la nature les uns sur les autres, encore une
illusion. J’habite doncun monde d’illusions! Et qui sait done si le
Dieu que je me represente comme T© centr| vivanf et actif de ce
monde, n’est pas, lui aussi, une illusion comme tout le reste?
Voila done le terme ou me conduisent, par des chemins difierents,
Descartes et Leibnitz, Malebranche ef Newton. L’un'me,presente ses
tourbillons, l’autre ses monades; l’un estpour le plein, 1’autre pour
le vide; l’un se declare mecaniste, l’aiitre dynamiste, Ils n’ont tous
peut-etre qu’un trait commun, e’est d’habiter le pays des chimeres.
Descartes me parle d’un Dieu dont la :toute-puissance est tellement
absolue qu’elle fait a son gre non-seulement Ips etres, mais les verites. Point du tout, dit Malebranche, la volonte de Dieu est reglee
par sa sagesse. Voici Newton qui se represente son Dieu comme re-
?
�28
ESSAI DE PHILOSOPHIE RELIGIEUSE.
pandu dans la duree et dans l’espace, et bornant sa fecondite derisoire
a disperser a travers les champs infinis de l’immensite quelques
atomes dont l’economie fragile menace a chaque instant de se dissoudre. Leibnitz proteste et soutient que Dieu est en dehors et audessus de l’espace, et que, sans tomber dans le temps, il remplit les
espaces et les siecles des fulgurations de sa puissance infinip.
Quel amas de pensees contradictoires ! Si Descartes et Newton, si
Malebranche et Leibnitz ne se sont pas entendus, la faute en est-elle ]
a ces grands genies? Le seul coupable, c’est l’esprit humain. Car1
enfin pourquoi, en metaphysique, les systemes succedent-ils aux
systemes, sans que jamais rien puisse durer et s’etablir? A quoi bon
ces mouvements qui agitent la pensee sans la faire avancer d’un pas ?
Ne serait-ce point que le probleme de la nature des choses surpasse
l’homme, que les systemes exprjment tout simplement les formes de
notre enfendement, c’est-a-dire les divers points de vue sous lesquels
nous nous representons les choses, que nous n’avons de prise certaine
que sur les objets de l’experience, et qu’il faut se resigner a explorer
la surface des choses, dans une impuissance eternelle de percer le
my stere de leur origine et de leur fin.
Voila les impressions et le&dputes qui se glissent dans mon
esprit aii-spectacle des contradictions du genie. Sont-ce la des pensees
qui me soient propres? Non; elles sont venues a de grands esprits,
a Voltaire, a Reid, a Locke, a Hume, a Kant; elles ont ete l’opinion commune de tout un siecle. Je me ferais scrupule de ne pas
consulter a leur tour ces grands douteurs, et je veux leur donner
'
pour interprete celui qui passe pour avoir le plus resolument embrasse et le plus, fortement congu et combine ce qui etait dans
l’esprit de tous les autres. Cet homme est Kant. On dit que les
formes de son systeme sont lourdes et pedantesques. Peu m’importe,
pourvu que je puisse en comprendre le fond.
Kant nous raconte, avec cette sincerite et cette candeur qui relevent
en lui la force et l’originalite du genie par la beaute du caractere,
que son initiateur en philosophic fut David Hume. Quand la lecture
du philosophe ecossais l’eut, dit-il, reveille de son sommeil dogma- i
tique, le premier fait qui frappa. son attention, ce fut la variete, la
contradiction et le rapide declin de tous les systemes metaphysiques* |
D’ou vient, se demanda le disciple desabuse de Leibnitz et de Wolf,
d’ou vient que la philosophic, depuis deux mille ans, erre ainsi a
l’aventure, a la merci de ces reveries steriles et changeantes qu’on
�ESSAI DE PHILOSOPHIE RELIGIEUSE.
29
appelle des systemes, alors que d’autres sciences deploient une activite si reguliere en ses mouvements, si feconde en ses produits? Les
mathematiques ont eminemment ce caractere : elles changent et se
renouvellent, ilestvrai, mais pour s’accroitre et s’enrichir sans cesse.
Descartes a surpasse Euclide, et tous deux ont ete surpasses par
Newton; mais le calcul infinitesimal n’a pas detruit F analyse cartesienne, pas plus que celle-ci n’avait renverse la vieille geometric. En
metaphysique, au contraire, les systemes renversent les systemes. Un
philosophe ne peut croire qu’il a raison sans condamner tous les
autres a 1’erreur, et 1’oeuvre incessamment reprise dans son entier est
toujours a reprendre encore.
Pour penetrer la cause de ce contraste extraordinaire, Kant soumet
a une analyse profonde la constitution intime, des sciences., Il re
marque, et c’est pour lui un trait de lumiere, que les mathematiques
n’ont pas pour objet de connaitre les choses en elles-memes, mais
seulement de developper certaines notions inherentes a l’esprit humain, les notions d’unite, de nombre, d’espace, et autres semblables.
Par exemple, la geometrie s’inqui'ete peu de l’essence des corps de la
nature; elle s’attache a la notion d’etendue, notion independante des
sens, et avec cette don"ee toutJSleoout M^raite, llle developpe la
serie de ses constructions et de peg
L’objet du geometre,
ce n’est pas une essciiqe, un etre en soi, c’est une idee. De meme,
\ l’algebriste ne s’interesse en rien a ces objets changeants dont l’egaI lite n’est qu’apparente, dont l’uriite csrtouten?mative; ctest la quantite
* ideale, le nombre abstrait, c’est-a-dire encore une idee, une notion,
qui fait la matiere de ses equations. Telle est, suivant Kant, 1’explication de la solidite singuliere et de jl^B^i^u^iiBntestee des
sciences mathematiques.
Elles n’ont pas seules ce privilegeWle^sciences' phwques yantent
avec raison leur caractere positif et leur regulierl developpement;
mais depuis quand ont-elles prisle rang eleve qu’ejles occupent dans
l’estime des hommes? depuis qu’elles'se sent separ&^de la meta
physique et qu’elles ont abando'nnu la*chimere d’una,explication
absolue des choses pour se reduire* a l’experience et au calcul : a
■’experience, quirecueille les faits, au calcui, qui leur’applique les
lois de la pensee. La physique n’a rien a demeler avec l’essence im
penetrable des choses. Les corps sont-ils ou non divisibles a l’infini?
Le monde a-t-il eu ou non un commencement? Qu’importe a Ga
lilee et a Kepler? Ils laissent les docteurs de l’ecole argumenter pour
�30
ESSAI DE PIIILOS.OPHIE RELLGIEUSE.
et contre ces fantomes opposes; il leur suffit d’explorer la nature etde
mesurer les cieux.
Interrogez l’histoire des sciences philosophiques elles-memes. Depuis Aristote, tout a change en philosophic, une seule chose exceptee,
la logique. Ainsi la metaphysique varie avec les systemes, la logique
leur survit. Pourquoicela? c’est que la logique ne s’occupe en aucune
facon des objets de la pensee, mais seulement de la pensee en ellememe. Le premier qui s’est pose ce probleme : A quelles conditions
la pensee peut-elle, ense developpant, rester toujours d’accord avec ses
propres lois? celui-la a cree la logique. Que sont devenues les entelechies d’Aristote, et ses formes substantielles, et son premier ciel?
Tout cela n’est plus,, mais Y Organon est reste; il est reste avec YHistoire des Animaux^ parce que. deux choses seules restent dans les
sciences : les faits de la nature visible et les lois de la pensee.
Telle m’apparait Fidee mere de la Critique de la Raison pure
die est aussi simple que bardie. Des deux elements dont le rapport et.
1’harmonie composent la science, savoir, l’esprit humain, d’une part,,
le sujet et; deFautre, les choses,, les etres, Vobjet, Kant se propose:
de supprimer le seeond et de reduire la science au premier. Ecarter
a jamais ^objectifi comme' absolument inaccessible et indetermi
nable, wit resoudre dans le subjectify, voila son but, et de la les
grandes lignes de son entreprise.
Kant me fait suivre four a tour deux voies diverses et convergentes.
Il m’enferme d’abord dans le sujet,c’est-a-dire dans l’analyse de l’es
prit humain, et ramenant toutes les lois. qui gouvernent la pensee a
mi certain nombre de concepts elementaires rigoureusement definis
et classes* il s’efforce de me prouver que ces concepts n’ont qu’une
valeur subjective et relative,, incapables qu’ils sont de me rien apprendre sur 1’essence des choses, et uiiles seulement a coordonner les
phenomenes de Fexperience, ou, en.d’autres termes, a imprimer aux
connaissances humaines le caractere de Fiinite. Cette oeuvre achevee,.
Kant me propose de. soumettre a une grande epreuve dialectique les
resultats de son analyse: il parcourt avec moi successivement les trois
grands’objets des speculations metaphysiques, l’ame, l’univers et
Dieu, et entreprend de me faire voir qu’il n’y a pas une seule asser
tion dogmatique sur Fessence de Fame, sur l’origine et les elements
de l’univers, enfin sur Fexistence de Dieu, qui ne puisse etre convairicue de s’appuyer sur un paralogisme, de couvrir une antinomie
oude realiser arbitrairement une abstraction.
�ESSAI DE PHILOSOPHIE RELIGIEUSE.
3£
Je vais suivre tour a tour la Critique de la Raison pure sur le ter
rain de l’analyse et sur celui de la dialectique. Kant decompose tout
le mecanisme de la connaissance humaine en trois fonctions intellect
tuelles, savoir : la Sensibilite, l’Entendement et la Raison. Apercevoir les choses particulieres, ou en d’autres termes former des intui
tions, voila l’acte propre de la Sensibilite; saisir les rapports des
choses et former des jugements, voila Facte propre de l’Entendement;
former enfin des raisonnements,, c’est-a-dire lier entre eux les juge
ments et rattacher les consequences a leurs principes,./voila Facte
propre de la liaison. Or, dans l’exercide de chacune de. ces. trois fonc
tions intellectuelles, F analyse dccouvre deux elements, Fun qui est a
priori, l’autre qui est a postw®ri.-Le premier constitue la matiere;
de la connaissance, le second sa.forme,., Celui-la est domic * pour
ainsi dire, du dehors; celui-ci sort.du propre fonds. de F esprit, de*
son activite, de sa spontaneity natives..Par.. exemple v nul acte de
la sensibilite ou nulle intuition'n’est:possible.qu’a.Kaide des notions
d’espace et de temps. Kant soutient que ces notions sont a priori, et
il les appelle formes pures de la sensibilite. De meme, nul acte de
l’entendement ou nul jugement n’esfc possible quia* Fiaide, de eertaines
notions d’unite, de realite,vde possibility, etc., lesquelles sont egalement a priori, et que Kant appelle les concepts purs de l’entendement. Enfin, nul acte de la raison ou nul raisonnement n’est possible
qu’a l’aide de certaines notions de Fabsolu ou de: Finconditionnel..
Kant leur donne le nom d’idees pures de la raison. Il s’agit maintenant de recueillir ces formes, ces concepts, ces idees,,1014 supremes;,
ressorts constitutifs de la. raison Kuniaine,. pour. en. approfondir la.
nature et en mesurer la portee.
L’analyse de la sensibilite est dans le systeme de Kant une affaire
capitale. La sensibiliteH.effetestlasource des.intuitions,, lesquelles
deviennent la matiere des jugements et par suite des raisonnements,,
‘ ce qui nous conduit jusqu’a l’idee de Fabsolu, forme supreme de
toutes nos connaissances.
Dans toute perception d’tin phenomena exMrieiir., /^ffljtWsiihgue.
deux choses : d’une part,Je. phenomeneexemple tel;
mouvement corporel; de l’autre, la condition de ce phenomene,.
savoir l’espace, sans lequel aucun mouvemem ne saurait etre percu.
Les phenomenes exterieurs varient.a l’infini; Jacondition.de ces phenomenes, l’espace, esttoujours la .meme. Liespace est done, suivant
Kant, la forme pure des sens exterieurs. De meme, le tempsl est la
�32
ESSAI DE PHIL0S0PH1E RELIGIEUSE.
forme pure du sens intime, nulle sensation et en general nulle modi
fication de nous-memes ne pouvant etre percue que sous la condition
du temps. L’espace et le temps, voila done les deux formes pures de
la sensibilite. Etant concus comme anterieurs aux phenomenes j|
comme uns et infinis, l’espace et le temps ne sont pas des objets de
l’experience, qui ne donne que des phenomenes toujours divers et
toujours limites. Qu’est-ce done que l’espace et le temps? Voulezvous en faire des choses absolues, objectives? mais alors, soit que
vous les eleviez au rang d’etres en soi, soit que vous en fassiez des
attributs de Dieu, soit enfin que vous les reduisiez a des proprietes ou
a des rapports des etres de la nature, vous tombez egalement dans
l’absurde. Dans le premier cas, en effet, vous aboutissez a deux etres
absolus qui sont des non-etres; dans le second, vous confondez le
temps avec 1’eternitej l’espace avec l’immensite; dans le troisieme,
comme vous ne donnez a l’espace et au temps qu’une valeur contingente, vous etes dans l’iinpossibilite d’expliquer le caractere absolu de
deux sciences fondees sur les notions d’espace et de temps, savoir, la
geometrie et la mecanique rationnelle. Il suit de la que l’espace et le
temps n’ont aucune sorte de realite objective et ne peuvent etre autre
chose que des formes de la connaissance: formes necessaires, univer
selies, donnees a priori, mais n’ayant aucune portee au dela du sujet,
n’exprimant que la nature de la pensee, ne servant qua rendre
l’experience possible.
Telle est en substance 1’esthetique transcendantale de Kant, et il
faut convenir qu’elle est subtile, profonde, originale; mais est-elle
exacte? il me semble que non, et si les principes manquent d’exac
titude, comment les conclusions ne manqueraient-elles pas de rigueur?
Toute cette ingenieuse theorie de Kant sur l’espace et le temps renferme une erreur qui se retrouve dans toute la suite de son oeuvre
analytique et en corrompt tous les resultats; au lieu d’observer la
realite, il tourmente des abstractions; au lieu de chercher dans la
conscience l’origine des notions fondamentales, il les prend toutes
formees, a l’etat ou une longue suite d’abstractions les a portees, et
il s’imagine que ces notions abstraites sont anterieures a l’experience,
sans laquelle pourtant elles seraient parfaitement vides et inintelli—
gibles.
•
Kant considere l’espace et le temps sous leur forme la plus gene
rale et la plus abstraite, anterieurement a toute notion d’etendue sen
sible et de duree particuliere et determinee. Or, il est parfaitement
�ESSAI DE PHILOSOPHIE RELIGIEUSE.
33
inexact que mon esprit debute par de telles conceptions. Avant l’abstrait, le concret; avant la notion d’espace, la notion d’etendue; avant
la notion de temps, les notions de succession et d’identite personnelle.
Je vois un corps ou je le touche, je le percois comme etendu; en le
maniant, je passe d’une impression a une autre, je me sens identique
dans la succession de ces deux etats, je me sens durer; il n’y a point
encore dans mon esprit Fidee abstraite d’espace, Fidee abstraite du
temps. Ce n’est qu’apres avoir percu bien des etendues et bien des
durees que je formerai, par l’abstraction, l’idee generale d’espace et
l’idee generale de temps, pour arriver enfin a concevoir, par la, rai
son, au dela de tous les corps et de toutes les durees, un etre infini,
absolu, pur des limitations de l’etendue, etranger aux vicissitudes du
temps, en un mot, immense et eternel.
Ainsi done, d’abord, par un acte d’in tuition, les notions concretes
de telle etendue sensible, de telle duree delerminee; puis, par un
acte d’abstraction, les nations generates -d’espace et de temps; puis,
par un acte de raison, leS conceptions absolues d’eterriiteet d’immensite; voila la vraie histoire de mon esprit a la place de l’histdire fantastique tracee par Kant.
Ayant une fois sepafe, isole l’espace et le temps de toute intuition
concrete d’etendue et de duree, il n’est pas mervci’lleux qn’il trouve
ces notions vides, creuses, insignifiantes; pour leur rendre leur rea
lite et leur sens, il suffit de les rapporter a leun'^reritableorigine, de
les replacer au sein de la conscience. Un kantien me demandera-t-il
maintenant ce que -je pense de la nature objective'de l’espace et du
temps? Je lui repondrai qu’il faut distinguefientre fl*etendue, l’espace
et l’irnmensite, comme ilfaut distinguer entre-la duree, le temps et
d’eternite. L’etendue est une propriety reelle des corps*, et 'la duree
une propriety reelle de> tousBes etres qui| changent ;* l’immensite et
l’eternite sont deux atfribuWMe Ffitre divin, lesquels expriment la
permanence et l’omnipresence de son etre, profondement distinctes
et independantes de toute succession et de toute forme finie; l’espace
et le temps enfin sont de pures abstractions.
Oui, j ’en conviens, faire de Fespace et du temps des etres en soi,
cela est deraisonnable; concevoir Dietl Confine durant et etendupmeme
a l’infini, cela n’est pas moins insoutenable^je l’accorde encore; mais
je ne suis pas pour cela condamne a refuser a la science de l’etendue
et a la science du mouvemdni leur caractere absolu. En effet, tout en
reconnaissant que les propositions de la geometric sortt absolument
Tome III. — 9* Livraison.
3
�34
ESSAI DE PHILOSOPHIE RELIGIEUSE.
necessaires, je puis expliquer autrement que Kant leur necessity. La
geometrie repose sur l’idee de l’espace, idee abstraite a mon avis;
mais cette idee abstraite etant donnee, toutes les consequences qui
s’en deduisent sont necessaires, par la necessity inherente au principe
meme du raisonnement, au principe d’identite. Le triangle, le cercle
ne sont pas des choses reelles, ce sont de pures constructions de 1’esprit tracant pour ainsi dire au sein de Tidee abstraite de l’etendue'
diverses limitations precises; mais le cercle etant une fois pose comme
cercle, il est necessaire que ses rayons soient egaux, Voila la necessity
inherente aux propositions geometriques; die n’a nul besoin d’une
pretendue intuition a priori de l’espace un et infini; elle n’a besoin
que de la necessity de ce principe : A est A, un cercle est un cercle,
en general, une chose ne peut pas etre differente d’elle-meme, prin
cipe evidemment necessaire et absolu, qui communique sa necessity a
toutes ses consequences,
L’analyse de l’entendement a, dans le systeme de Kant, les memes
defauts que celle de la sensibilite : elle est artificielle et fausse, prenant des abstractions pour des realites, etrangere a l’observation vraie
de la conscience. De quoi s’agit-il en definitive? de rendre compte
d’un •certain nombre de notions premieres qui sont, en effet, presentes dans tous nos jugements, comme les notions de cause, de sub
stance, d’unite, lesquelles deviennent la base de ces grands principes
sur Lesquels repose le systeme tntier de nos connaissances. Que fait
Kant? au lieu d’observer la conscience humaine et d’avoir l’oeil fixe
sur ce principe reel et vivant qui dit moi, qui se saisit immediatement lui-meme, qui se sent vivre, agir, durer, qui s’apercoit, non
comme une condition abstraite de la pensee, mais comme un sujet
reel et vivant, comme une veritable cause, une veritable substance,
une veritable unite, au lieu, dis-je, de contempler ce monde des rea
lties interieures, Kant se perd dans un labyrinthe inextricable de
conceptions abstraites et de distinctions arbitrages, Il dresse une
table de tous les jugements possibles ; il en reconnait douze especes,
reparties trois a trois dans quatre cadres distincts, suivant leur qua
lity, leur relation et leur modalite. Ces douze especes de jugements,
generaux, particuliers et singuliers, affirmatifs, negatifs et linaitatifs,
categoriques, hypothetiques et disjonctifs, problematiques, assertoriques et apodictiques, representent a ses yeux douze fonctions logiques
de I’entendement, douze procedes distincts pour ramener une variete
donnee a 1’unite. Il conclut de la qu’il doit y avoir dans 1’entende-
�ESSAI DE PHILOSOPHIE RELIGIEUSE.
35
ment douze concepts purs, qui seuls peuvent rendre possibles ces
diverses formes du jugement. G’est ainsi que sont introduites les
.fameuses categories : unite, pluralite et totalite; realite, negation et
Limitation; inherence, dependance et reciprocite ; possibility, existence et necessity.
Suivant Kant, tous ces concepts sont a priori, antgrieurs a toute
experience, absolument necessaires a la formation du.moindre juge
ment. Ge n’est pas tout, une nouvelle condition est nece^aire : audessus de ces douze formas pures de l’entqndement’, Kant place une
forme generale qu’il appelle ljunite synthetique de l’aperception, ou
' encore Funi te trans^ndantale de la ^conscience. Etji’allez pas croire
qu’il soit ici question, de la .conscience que chacun de nous a -de ses
actes, de cette conscience qui se traduit par .des affirmations comme
celles-ci: Je sens, je pense, je suis. Non, la.conscience de Kant est
une conscience abstraite, un cogito logique, une forme generale de
la pensee; en un mot, ce n’est pas un fait, une realite est une pure
abstraction, arhitrairement erigee en condition necessaire ei a priori
de tout jugement possible.
Voila une analyse qui paraitdejabien compliquee, mais Kant
n’est pas encore au bo.uE Il se flatte :|.uavdnf rendu compte des con
cepts purs d’unite, d’inherence, de dependance, etc1. ; nicds 11 n’a pas
encore atteint les notions de cause, de substance, d’activi^, ni les
principes correspondants. G’est pourquoi4.il ajopite lei sa theorie du
schematisme. Outre ses’douze concepts purs, il lui faut douze
schemes, c’est-a-dire douze representations a priori du temps,
schemes de quantite , scnemesi de qualite, schemes de relation ,
schemes de modalitd’ il lui faut ces representations pour vivifier
ses concepts abstraits, pour ges rendre applicables aux donnees de
Fexperience, pour leur donnejune valeur et un sens.
J’ai epuise enfin la serie compliquee, ’subtile, laborieuse, des con
ditions sous lesquelles Kant .croit parvenir a rendre compte des prin
cipes de l’esprit humain, et par exemple des principes de causalite et
de substance. Or, s’il faut dire tout ce que je pense, ,il n’y a rien de
plus faux, rien de plus vain que cettepretendue deduction qui lui a
coute tant d’eflorts. Kant altere 'essenticllement les notions de cause
et de substance. La notion1 de cause se transforme pour lui en celle
de succession con stante; la notion de substance en celle de perma
nence. Ge sont la deux erreurs psychdlogiques de la deriiiere gravite.
Quand je produis une actionvolontaire, un efiori des muscles, par
�36
ESSAI DE PHILOSOPHIE RELIGIEUSE.
exemple, il n’y a pas entre ces deux termes, ma volonte et l’effortJ
une simple relation de succession, comme entre le jour et la nuitl
ou, si Kant aime mieux, entre le vent qui souffle et le roseau qui
plie. Il y a une relation bien plus intime, bien plus profonde : ma
volonte produit l’effort, ma volonte est une cause dont l’effort est un
effet, cause fixe, une, identique, qui se manifeste par une variete
indefinie de phenomenes. Plus j’approfondis la notion de cette acti—j
vite, de ce moi qui fait le fond de ma conscience, plus je reconnaSi
qu’il s’apercoit, non-seulement comme cause, mais comme sub
stance, je veux dire comme un etre tour a tour ou simultanement
actif et passif, mais toujours identique sous la succession de ses
modifications diverses. Ce n’est point la une substance abstraite,
comme celle de Kant, un je ne sais quoi concu comme permanent,
en opposition avec un ecoulement de phenomenes dont ce terme per
manent serait la condition abstraite et a priori; c’est une substance
reelle, une substance determihee, une substance qui se sait et se sent
exister et agir. Voila une analyse bien simple, bien facile a verifier;
cependant elle suffit pour faire crouler tout l’echafaudage d’abstrac
tions, symetrique, subtil, ingenieux, j’eii tombe d’accord, mais tout
artificiel, eleve par la main de Kant.' A la place de ces concepts a
priori, parfaitement vides et creux, il faut done substituer des intui
tions immediates de la conscience, pleines de realite et de vie; a la
place de ces principes arbitraires, sans usage et sans portee, de veritables principes tenant par leurs racines a 1’experience, et dans leurs
amples developpements embrassant l’univers et portant jusqu’aDieu.
Tels sont les vices essenliels qui me frappent dans l’oeuvre analytique de Kant, et cela suffit pour me mettre en garde contre les con
sequences qu’il va tirer de ces faux principes dans la partie dialectique de son entreprise.
Kaiit m’a explique tout a l’heure quel est, suivant lui, le role de la
raison dans l’economie de nos connaissances. La raison prise en gene
ral est la faculte de raisonner, e’est-a-dire de ramener le particulier
au general^ Or, cette operation suppose un dernier principe general
qui soit la condition de tous les autres et qui lui-meme soit inconditionnel. La conception de cet inconditionnel, tel est l’office de la rai
son pure. Mais la raison pure ne se borne pas a concevoir l’inconditionnel; elle entend se servir de cette idee pour speculer a priori sur
la nature des etres. De la, si j’en veux croire Kant, des illusions
�ESSAI DE PHILOSOPHIE RELIGIEUSE.
37
necessaires. Pour les detruire a jamais, il entreprend d’en decouvrir
I les sources psychologiques et de faire en quelque sorte la science des
T erreurs naturelles de l’esprit humain.
Le principe general de la raison pure est celui-ci : Le conditionnel
etant donne, avec lui est donnee la serie entiere des conditions et par
( consequent l’inconditionnel lui-rneme. Ceprincipe revolt,trois grandes
applications, l’une au sujet de la pensee, F autre aux^objet^sensibles,
la troisieme aux choses en general. De la trois idees : Fidee psycho] ogique, l’idee cosmologique et l’idee theologique. La raison cherche
dans la conscience un sujet qui ne soit pas l’attribut d’un autre sujet,
un sujet absolu, l’ame ou la substance pensante. En presence des
objets sensibles, elle remonteu&e phenomene en phenomene et concoit
quelque chose de premier et de definitif comme servant de base et de
■principe aux phenomenes du ^^m>s J Egbragsarf renfip, U totality
absolue des existences possfBlK elle pose, comme condition de cette
totality, une unite absolue qui est Dieu. Ces trois idees, ces trois
principes, Fame, le Cosm(^eLDieu,^&peuyen^te,-W3dgonature
meme, ni demontres, ni
peuvent gKp^^Bmfces,
puisqu’ils sont ce qu’il y a
d^Mnstration; ils ne peuvent etre realises, puisqu’ils representent ce qui
est au dela de toute experience possible. Leur valeur est done purement subjective*, ils n’etendent pas la connaissance humaine, ils la
circonscrivent et l’achevent, voila tout.
La metaphysique a d’autres pretentions
pretend faire la
science de Fame, celle du Cosmos et celle meme de Dieu. De la
conce|)tion abstraitedenotre e^e.pehsant, Jaquirie
®en
de multiple, elle conclut a l’unite absolue de cet etre, ce qui est un ’
paralogisme. De F impossibility de s’arreter dans la serie regressive '
des phenomenes, elle..cqnfelut Jl uneSadition'
cette condition se presente de deuxMccm^^^^dict^^il enresulte
une antinomie; enfin, de la totalite
desaiobi'et^.eEL'
general, elle conclut a l’etre des etres comme condition de la possibi
lity des choses et fondement deMie^^nceMniv^^lle.!S|n que cet
etre nous soit absolument inconnu. De .la, un. ideal nuenous transformons arbitrairement en chose reelle et oil nous voyons meme le
fondement de toute realitq. AinsjL l’lmel% runjfeJa|fDieu, tous
les objets de notre pensee,, tout l’edifice de nos croyances, tombe
Apiece a piece et s’ecroule sous la main de Kant, et la conclusion de
cette dialectique negative, c’est que la nietaphysique entiere, avec les
�38
•
ESSAI DE PHILOSOPHIE RELIGIEUSE.
trois sciences qui la constituent, psychologie rationnelle, cosmologid
rationnelle, theologie rationnelle, est ruinee a jamais.
J’entends dire autour de moi que ces objections de Kant sont absolument invincibles. Mais sans dissimuler ce qu’elles ont a quelques
ogards de fort et de serieux, il me semble von? ici, comme dans son
oeuvre analytique, beaucoup plus d’artifiee que de solidite. Kant
reduit la psychologie .aux quatre theses suivantes : lame est une
substance, lime est simple, Fame est une, Fame est spirituelle. Or,
suivaut bailees quatre propositions reposent uniquement sur quatre;
arguments vicicux ou se retrouve toujours le meme paralogisme. On
pose, dit-il', dans les- premisses un moi purement subjectif, qui n’est1
autre chose1 qu’une condition logique de la perception des pheno—
menes, et dans le passage des premisses a la conclusion, on trans
form^ ce moi subjectif et logique ehJun moi objectif doue d’une
realiteabsolue /
Je repondrai a Kant que sa dialectique peut etre vietorieuse eontre
Ja psychologie concue a la maniere de Wolf, je veux dire exclusivement fbndee sur Fabus des procedes logiques, mais qu’elle ne saurait
atteindre la veritable science de Fame, celle qui prend son point d’appui, non dans des syllogismes, mais dah^’ttne analyse approfondie de
la nature humaine. En effet, quelle est la veritable base de la psycho
logie ?un fait permanent et tiniverseL le fait de conscience. Je sens
vivre au dedans de moi un principe toujours present, qui ne se confond pas avec la seriede mes modifications, que je retrouve identique
a lui-mfeme sous les vicissitudes de mon existence mobile, qui, sort
en subissant Faction des choses exterieures, soit en reagissant art'
dehors, soit en sei concentrant sur soi dans une action tout interieure,
a chaque instant se connatt, a chaque instant Faffirme avee une darts
et une certitude infaillibles. Est-ce la le moi dont parle Kant, ce sujet
logique, cette forme abstraite* pure condition de la possibility de Fexperienee? non, evidemment non; Le moi de la conscience est une
force en action, une Energie qui se deploiej quelque chose d’essentielI'ementreeT, contret, vivant. Maintenaht, pour etre reel et concret, ce
moi n’a-t-il qu’une valeur empirique? n’esHT pas un veritable etre,
une veritable substance?On refusera d’fen eonvenir, si: avee Kant! on
fait de la substance un principe mysterieux, un je ne sais quoi, un
X algebrique, si avee lui bn se plait a creuser un abime infranehis*sable entre la consdence et la Faison, ent re le monde des phenomenes
ei le monde des etres. Mais- cette separation n’a aucun sens pour l’obr -
%
�ESSAI DE PHILOSOPHIE RELIGIEUSE.
30
^TS^eur attentif. Dans l’acte de conscience en effet, le sujet se saisit
lui-meme et s’affirme comme objet. Entre le moi qui agit et le moi
qui se sent agir, l’analyse peut distinguer, mais la nature, le mouvement reel de la vie ne distinguent pas, Fobjectif et le’subjectif ne font
qu’un.
Et maintenant, pow; dfeblir Fwitei,, la simplicity lagubstotialite^
la spirituality de Fame, faudra-t-il faire appel au raisonnement, construire des syllogismes?Il est cl air qu'e cefe est parfaitement inutile;
j’ajoute que cela m’a toujours paru tres-dangereux. En effet, raisonner pour trouver Famy^estadmettire que' Fame ne s’apercoit pas
elle-meme, c’est eteblir une' distinction factice entrb' dJdtix moi,f le; moi
de la conscience et fe mor dh la raison, c’est eiever enfre eiix une bstt’riere arbitraire que le raisonnement ne pourra pas franchir. A ce
point de vue, Kant a raison. Il n’y a plus de psychologie, des qu’il
n’y a plus une intuition de conscience qui atteigne 1’elre, Funite, la
substance dans leur profondeur. C’en est fait de toute metaphysique,
et I’esprit humain esl condamne aignererFunivers ef Dieu, arester
enferme dans la region des phenomenes. Voila ce que Kant a supe—
rieurement vu; voila pour moi la valeur et l’interet de sa dialectique.’
Mais ce qu’il n’a pas vu, c’est que la science de Fame a pour base,
non pas un moi logitjue^ mats un moi reel, non pas un moi purernent
phenomenal, mais un moi cause, un moi substance, un moi un, iden
tique, vivant, objectif et subjectif tout ensemble. Retablir ce principe,
c’est refuter Kant, et c’est du meme coup rendre a la psychologie
rationnelle et a la mdtaphysiquq leur fondement.
J’oserai maintenant jeter un coup d’oeil sur ces fameuses antino
mies qui passent chez beau coup d’e sprits pourlede sespoiretern el‘ et
l’insurmontable ecueil de la philosophic speculative. Elles resultent,
dans le systeme de Kant, de l’application du principe fondamental de
la raison, savoir que le conditionnel etant donne, aved fui
ment donnee la serie entiere des conditions et partant l’inconditionnel lui-meme. Appliquez ce principe a l’idee du mbndb, considere
comme un ensemble de phenomenes exterieurs, vous verrez se former
quatre theses, contre lesquelles s’eleveront aussitot quatre antitheses,
d’ou resultera une quadruple antinomie. Comment cela? c’est que,
selon Kant, chaque fois que vous affirmez qu’un phenomene est
subordonne a une serie de conditions, vous pouvez egalement concevoir cette serie comme finie ou comme infinie. Dans les deux cas,
l’absolu semble donne, et Fabsolu JcVst fa chi’rtiefb’ que l’esprit
�40
ESSAI DE PHILOSOPHIE RELIGIEUSE.
humain, en vertu des lois de sa nature, cherche sans cesse sans
pouvoir jamais la saisir.
Considerez-vous le monde suivant les categories de la quantite et
de la qualite? vous le concevez avec un droit egal comme limite en
extension et en duree, c’est-a-dire comme fini, ou comme illimite
dans Fespace et dans le temps, c’est-a-dire comme infini; vous vous
le representez tout aussi bien comme compose de parties simples que
comme infiniment divisible. .£e sont la les antinomies que Kant
appelle mathematiques. Concevez-vous le monde sous de nouveaux
points de vue, ceux de la relation et de la modalite ? vous etes porte a
rattacher tous les effets,a une cause premiere et libre, ou bien, tout
aussi arbitrairement, a les concevoir comme une chaine infinie de
phenomenes lies par une aveugle fatalite. De meme, vous etes egalement enclin a donner pour base a la serie des choses contingentes
une existence necessaire et a concevoir cette serie comme indefinie.
Ce sont la les antinomies dites dynamiques et qui completent ce
systeme de .contradictions regulieres imposees par Kant a l’esprit
humain.
Je noterai ici une premiere reflexion, flont je suis frappe, c’est que
Kant ne considere comme absolument insolubles que les antinomies
mathematiques .; il admet pour les autres une solution, et il travaille
meme a la decouvrir. Certes $ voila une concession qui est de la derniere importance. Car il est assez clair que les antinomies dynami
ques sont les plus gravesde tputes, puisque l’existence de la liberte y
est engageej et deja meme, par anticipation , ,Fexistcnce de Dieu,
c’est-a-dire la morale et la religion. Kant accorde done que sur ces
grands objets la raison n’est pas reduilev,au desesperant aveu d’une
contradiction inevitable. La morale et la religion sont a couvert. D
ne reste done plus de serieusement compromis que l’interet de curio
site qui s’attache pour l’homme a ces questions purement metaphysi- ■
ques, qui restent pour la masse du genre humain parfaitement indif- ;
ferentes et sur lesquelles l’ignorance est facile a supporter, meme au
petit nombre d’esprits curieux qui les agitent, par exemple, la ques
tion de savoir si la matiere est ou non divisible a l’infini. Voila done
ou aboutit ce grand et solennel acte d’accusation si laborieusement
dresse, ou le scepticisme a epuise toute sa force et tous ses artifices.
Concentree sur ce terrain, j’avoue que la discussion perd de sa gran
deur, mais elle perd aussi de ses perils. Si la morale et la religion
sont hors de cause, qu’importe apres tout que, sur quelques points
�ESSAI DE PHILOSOPHIE RELIGIEUSE.
41
de subtile metaphysique, mon esprit soit oblige de confesser son
impuissance?
•
Mais meme dans cet ordre de problemes abstraits, il me semble
que Kant n’aboutit pas a la conclusion oil il aspire. Je m’armerai contre lui de ses propres aveux. Il resout les antinomies dynamiques par
une distinction fort juste entre le point de.vue de l’experience et le
point de vue de la raison. De ce que pour les sens: il n’y .a que des
phenomenes contingents,! on ne pent pas:conclure, ditsil,' qu’au dela
des phenomenes, darisi une region?ou les sens, ne peuvent atteindre,
il n’y ait pas un etre necessaire,iune cause, spontanee ebpremiere qui
soit le principe de tous les phenomenes de l’univers. Fort bien; mais
je dirai a Kant, ennui empruntant son moyien de s-solation &t en le
poussant plus loin que lui, .que si les sens et ^imagination nous invitent a nous representer un monde fini,, cela ne prouve pas que la
raison n’ait pas le droit.de co.riqp¥®ir,f.au.moip^ commeipossible, un
univers sans bornes, dont l’etendue et la duree illimitees reflechissent en quelque sorte l’eternite et l’immensite incommunicables
de Dieu. De meme, si les sens et l’imagination s’arretent avec com
plaisance a la vieilleet grossiere hypothese des atomes, rien n’empeche
la raison de detruire ces fausses‘apparences, de nousdaire comprendre
l’impossibilite d’un atome etendu , c’est-a-dired’un indivisible divi
sible ; rien ne l’empeche surtout de .saisiig.au dela d^l’etehdue et du
mouvement, les causes invisibles dont Faction permanente anime la
face du monde, et de concevoir ces, causes commo des principes doues
d’unite, inferieurs sans doute, mais plus ou moins analogues a cettc
cause simple et indivisible que.iiiousjsentons vivre; et .palpjter au
dedans de nous. Ainsis’evanouit le fantastique assendjlage.de con
tradictions imagine par le sceptieismp, et il.ne reste^deftanbdiefforts
d’un genie fait pour unautre.usage^ qu’une leGpn. de modestie donnee
a l’esprit humain.
Sices vues sont justes, je puis aborder avec un peu plus de confiance les objections de Kant contre la possibility d’une theologie
rationnelle.
A ses yeux l’idee„de Dieu,ou de l’etre de^gOp^ estdajpluswhaute de
la raison et la plus necessaire, puisquey e’est par elie que la raison
Tonsomme son oeuvre synthetique en^ dormant aul’ensemble de la,
connaissance liumaine sa derniere ignite; mais tout ce qui>resulte
de la, dit-il, c’est que DieU est, non pas la realite supreme, mais seu
lement le supreme ideal, rien de plus’. Or, il arrive que la curiosite
�42
*
•
X (< g.scX
J
ESSAI DE PHILOSOPHIE RELIGIEHSEi
humaine ne se peut satisfaire d’un simple ideal; emportee par le
desir de penetrer jusqu’au fond des choses, elle transforme cet ideal
tout subjectif et tout relatif en une realite absolue, et se flatte de pouvoir saisir, embrasser et decrire le principe de 1’existence.
Cette illusion se produit, d^apres Kant, selon une marche reguliere. D’abord la raison, en contemplant co vaste et harmonieux univers, le>rattache a un principe invisible puis, elle conceit ce principe
comme necessaire pour y trouver la raison, d’etre de l’ensemble des
choses contingentes ; enfm, de 1’etre necessaire elle s’eleve a l’Ctre des
etreSy c’est-a-dire a I’etre qui contient toutes- les realites et toutes les
ptjssibilites , cet etre pouvant seul renfermer la. raison universelle et
absolue de toute existence-.
La theologie rationnelle exprime a sa maniere cette evolution spontanee de la raison speculative, en demontrant. [’’existence de Dieu par
trois arguments 5 ^’argument, physico-theologique', qui s’appuie sur
l’ordre de l’univers, 1’argument cosmologique, fonde sur la contingencedu monde, 1’argument ontologique,. qui deduit du concept de
Fetre parfait son existence reelle.
Je dois convenir d’une chose, c’est que Kant me semble avoir parfaitement reussi a mettre enlumiere les defauts de ces arguments, de
meme qu’SL triomphaitaisement tout a.l’heure des; preuves syllogistiques de la spirituality de Fame. Mais qu’en faut-il conclure? que les
bases de la theodicee sont detruites > nullement; mais que Kant n’a
connu ^es veritables bases de la theodicee. lEadt a l’heure, il alterait et niait F intuition immediate du moi pair lui-meme; maintenant
il altere et nie une autre intuition, moins claire peut-etre, mais egalement irrefragable, l’intuition de l’etre parfait et absolu. let encore,
il n’y a pas, d’un cote, un concept abstrait, logique, le concept d’une
existence absolue envisag^e commo purement possible; de l’autre,
l’esprit humain se consumant en raisonnements steriles, entassant les
syllogismes pour irouver, par dela ce concept parfaitement vide de
toute reality un Dieu reel et vivant qui sans cesse lui echappe et
semble se derober a ses efforts. G’est la une fausse image de la con
science humaine, d’oil ne pent sortir qu’une fausse et sterile theolo
gie. De meme que je ne saisis pas d’abord un moi abstrait, un moi i
possible, pour arriver ensuite, a travers des raisonnements arbitraires, q
a un moi reel, coneret, effectif, substantiel; de meme, quand je rat- \
tache mon existence fragile a cette source infinie d’etre, de pensee et !
de vie quu j’appelle Dieu, ce n est point la. un raisonnement fonde. j
�ESSAI DE PHILOSOPHIE RELIGIEUSE.
i
r:
I
43
snr des conceptions abstraites, e’est une veritable intuition, ou l’Etre |
desetres est saisi et affirme, non comme possible, mais comme reel;
et present.
> ri Vienne maintenant Kant; reduire1 la theologie rationnelle a trois
syllogismesje lui dirai qu’il pent avoir raison con lire une theologie
raisonneuse et nourrie deputes abstractions^ telle par exemple que la
theologie toute scolastique de Wolf; mais qu’il n’atteini pas une
theologie amie des faits et solidement appuyee sur les intuitions
reelles et fecondes de; la conscience.
Voici en effet le procede dont se sort Kant pour battre em br'eche
la theologie rationnelle. Apres avoir aftaque 1’argument physico-theologique, fonde sur les causes finales,/tequel devient enlre ses mains
une preuve purement empirique, etrangere a toute notion de perfec
tion absolue,. incapable par consequentld’atteindre jusqu’au principe
de l’existence, il ramene subtilementl’argument cosmologique tire de
la contingenee du monde a l’argument ontologique sur'lequol il lui
plait de concentrer tout le dehai. Or, quel est eet argument supreme T
e’est la preuve inspireeva saint Anselmepar le genieisubtil de la sco
lastique, et mal a propos ressuscitee. par le grand geometrefiqui a.
fonde la philosophic moderne.. Elle cqnsiste a poser le concept d’une
perfection possible pour en? fairs iojdir par fife dSisonnement »|Vxistence reelle et actuelle d’un etre parfait. Toute la subtilite ingenieuse
de saint Ans.elw> tout© I’industrie geometriques de. Descartes sont
impuissantesr il est Vraa f a operer cette deduction.. Je l’accorde a
Kant, et voila le resuriat^mTde cette. partie de son entreprise, dialectique; mais a-t-il atteint son but? a-t-il prouve I’impuissance de
l’esprit humain a saisir le principe premier de la pensee et de 1’etre ?
il est clair que non.
Telle est 1’impression que me laisse l’etude de la Critique de la
Raison pure speculative, et il semblerait en resulter que les pro—
blemes religieux n’ont idea
avee Kaaatj si '6e n’esta titred’adversaire. Mais le grand ouvrage que. je viens de mediterne eon—
tient qu’une m@itM.de I’entreprise philosophique' db> Kant Hl II y aft
deux hommes en lui, le metaphy sicien et le moraliste. Le metaphysicien aboutit, comme je viens de le voir, au seepticisme absolu; mais
le moraliste est profondement dogmatique^ et il ramene le metaphy—
sicien a la certitude et a Dieu. Si la raison speculative etait la raison
tout entiere, l’homme de Kant ne ^prtirait jamais-de sa propre. pen
see; il y languirait comme dans une: etroite prison,, contemplant
�44
ESSAI DE PHILOSOPHIE RELIGIEUSE.
sterilement ces ideaux, ces concepts, vaines images d’un monde intel
ligible a jamais insaisissable a ses yeux. Mais, a cote de la raison
speculative, il y a en nous la raison pratique. Les formes pures de
l’intuition, les concepts de l’entendement, les ideaux de la raison
n’epuisent pas l’analyse de la conscience humaine; elle renferme
encore d’autres elements a priori, par exemple, ces deux grands con
cepts du devoir .et de la liberte sur lesquels repose toute notre vie
morale. L’homme de la raison speculative, c’est un etre purement
intellectuel, n’ayant rien autre chose a tfaire qu’a penser; mais
l’homme veritable n’est pas un pur esprit, c’est un etre actif, sen
sible; il a des besoms, des desirs, des obligations,ail aspire au bonheur, a la.perfection, a rimmor.talite. He bien! le voila qui va
retrouver au sein de la vie morale la certitude qui lui echappait dans
ses recherches speculativesl L’ame spirituelle et Immortelle, Dieu,
la Providence, s’etaient jusqu’a present derobes a tous ses efforts;
appuye sur l’idee du devoir, ii saisit d’une main sure toutes ces verites desormais a l’abri de toute atteinte. L’idee du devoir est le Cogito
ergo sum de Kant ; c’est le minimum quid inconcussum, invincible
au doutequi sort a cenouveau Descartes a*consolider tout ce qu’il
avait ebranle. Telle est 1’idee generate de la Critique de la Raison
pratique, let c?est la pretention formelie de Kant, que ce second
ouvrage, loin d’etre, une aite?ajoutee apres coup) I un edifice mal
construitpar un architecte imprevoyant, ^ient au contraire concourir
aved lai Critique de la Raison speculative a former un monument
regulier, complet et harmonieux *.
Comment la morale de Kant peut-elle servir de base a une theodicee? comment Dieu est-il, avec la liberte et la vie future, un des
trois postulate dela Raison pratique? voila maintenant la question.
Kant part du concept fondamental de la raison.pratique , c’est-adire^du. concept du devoir, et il.stattache a etablir que ce concept a
uneveCtu objective que me possede aucun des concepts de la raison
speculative ;lcela fait,jril< soutient que le concept du devoir commu
nique immediatement sa vertu objective a un second concept, celui
de liberte, tellement lie avec le premierqu’ils forment a eux deux un
tout inseparable. 'Cela etabli, Kant .se flatte d’avoir deja fait un pas
hors du cercle de la conscience ; .rear Jia liberte, . a l’en croire, ne se
1. Je ne disrifen d’une troisifeme’tritiqufe/laCritique duJugement, qui vient
encore accroitre et compliipifer le syst&me de Kant.
�E1SSAI DE PHILOSOPHIE RELIGIEUSE.
45
sent point, elle se conclut. Les concepts de devoir et de liberte, avec
la force d’objectivite qui leur est propre, ont done fait ce que
n’avaient pu faire les speculations les plus puissantes de la metaphy
sique: ils m’ont assure de l’existence reelle d’un etre en soi, d’un
noumene.,.car ils m’ont fait saisir l’etre libre et moral, oblige de faire
Son devoir et aspirant au meilleur usage, de sa liberte, c’est-a-dire
au souverain bien. 0r^ maintenanl|4e concept du souverain bien, ou
se resume la morale, est lie a deux nouveaux concepts, oil se resume
la religion : de sontdes concepts., deilDieia>e.L de la vie future. Qu’arrive-t-il de la? e’est quelle' concept mo^al communique aux concepts
religieux la vertu objective qui estleii lui^ et de la sorte, Dieu et;la vie
future, qui n’etaient pour-liaison speculative t»e des ideaux' et des
possibles, deviennent indirectement pour nous des realites certaines.
Il faut reprendre, anneau par anneau, la chaine de cette deduction,
afin d’en toucher au doigtple fort et lefaiole. K.ant commence*par le
concept de devoir, et y appliquant.^analyse aveejune rigueur et une
profondeur justement admirees, il en etablit l’existence et les caracteres. Il y a des devoirs, et tout devoir est absolu par son essence. Tu
ne mentiras pas^ tu ne deroberas pas, ce sont des maximes evidentes
par elles-memes. Or, l’obligation qu’ell es expriment est-elle particuliere a tel temps, a tel lieu, a tel individu, a telle circonstance? nullement; ces maximes sont universelies et necessaires; y supposer une
seule exception, e’est les detruire. Partant de la, Kant pose comme
criterium de la moralite cette fameuse regie : Agis toujours de telle
sorte que la maxime de ta volonte puisse etre consideree comme
un principe de legislation universelle, et il refute victorieusement
tous les philosophesjqui pret‘dndenfr£expliquer»lc d&voir, soitipar
1’education, comme Montaigne, soit par la constitution civile, comme
Mandeville, soit par le bonheur, comme Epicure, soit par le senti
ment, comme Hutcheson, soit par la perfection, comme Wolf apres
les stoiciens, soit enfin par la volonte divine, comme Grusius et d’autres theologiens et philosophes.
Le devoir est done un principe absolu, cela est demontre; mais
y a-t-il quelque raison pour accorder a ce concept une valeur objec: tive, quand on le refuse a une fonle d’autres concepts; egalement
absolus, tels que ceux de la raison speculative? C’est ici que Kant
epuise, mais bien vainement, toutes les ressources de son esprit
inventif et subtil.
Il pretend distinguer le concept du devoir d’avec les- notions d’es-
�46
ESSAI DE PHILOSOPHIE RELJGIEUSE.
pace, de temps, de cause, de substance, et autres semblables, soit en
ce que l’espace et le temps se rapportent aux objets de l’experience,
tandis que le concept du devoir en est entierement independant,
soit en ce que la cause et la substance, si Ton fait abstraction de leur |
usage dans les, choses de I’experience, n’ont plus qu’un rapport loin-|
tain et hypothetique avec les objets intelligibles auxquels on vent |'
■etendre arbitrairement .leur application, tandis. que le concept du
devoir, reglant immediatement et absolument ce qui doit etre fait,
ce qui oblige tout etre raisonnable, acquiert par cela inline une force
d’objectivite incontestable, puisque 1’etre raisonnable ne peut nier
la valeur objective du concept du devoir,*saus nier le devoir hdineme.
Investi par Kant de ce privilege objectif,_le concept du devoir le
communique a plusieurs autres, et d’abord, d’une facon immediate,
a celui de la liberte . J e. touche <a un des paradoxes les plus extraordinaires de Kant.
lout en reconnaissant hautement la liberty il pretend que nous
n’en .avens pas conscience. La liberie n’est pas un fait a ses yeux;
c’est sun concept a priori. Prise en elle-meme, ce n’est qu’un ideal,
et eel ideal ne devient une realite quepar la force d’objectivite attribuee au concept du devoir.UDe sorte que nous ne connaissons pas
immediatement que nous sornmes* fibres, nous le concluons. En
verite, je ne puis m’expliquer cette artificielle et etrange deduction
qu’en me disant que Kant etail condamne d’avance aux vains raffinements de 1’analyse et a toutes sortes d’eijreurs par son scepticisme
-absolu en metaphysique; II. a voulu en effet, dans la Critique de la
Raison speculative, etablir une pretendue antinomie entre les lois
de la nature et les lois de 1’ordre moral. A l’entendre, dans la region
des choses de I’experience (laquelle embrasse les faits du sens intime), I
lout est sounds a une .fatalite absolue; un phenomene, quel qu’il
soit,, extern® ou interne, est determine par les phenomenes anterieu^|, de sorte qu’il n’y a la aucune place pour la liberte. Au
contraire, dans la region des choses du devoir, les phenomenes, qui
sent des actions raisonnables, ont pour caractere propre de se rap
porter a use cause libre. Voila la these d’une part, et l’antithese de
1’autre, d’ou -resulte une antinomie. -C’esl pour la resoudre et pour :
sauver la morale, menacee d’etre emportee dans la ruine de l’ontologie, que Kant a imagine sa theorie de la liberte. Il veut que la liberte
soit en dehors de 1’experieuce, en dehors meme du sens intime, afin
�ESSAI DE PHILOSOPHIE RELIGIEUSE.
47
de la soustraire a la loi qui regit suivant lui le monde des faits; il la
transporte done dans les regions des choses ideales, et se flatte ainsi
de resoudre l’antinomie qu’il lui avait plu de supposer. Mais s’il
suffisait, dans la Critique de la Raison pure, ■d’idealfeer la liberte
pour la conserver, dans ^ Critique de la Raison pratique, cela no
suffit plus. Il faut a Kaul, non pas une liberte ideate, line liberte
abstraite et purement possible, mais une liberte reelle, pour avoir
une morale reelle etdes devoirs effectifs^'Que fait-ilT il transforme
l’ideal en reel, d’une maniere aussi ingenieuse et aussi vaine qu’il
transformait tout a Theure le reel ctfjdeal. Nous; n’avons;^! est 4rai,
si on veut s’en tier a lui, qu’un concept delnotre liberte, a la place
d’un sentiment immediat et precis; mais, grace au concept du devoir
et a la merveilleuse faculte objectivante dont il l’a gratifie, cette
liberte possible et tout ideale se metamorphose en^triie liberte eHec—
tive. En effet que signifierait, dit-il, le concept de devoir pour un
etre qui serait depourvu de liberte ? Tu dois, done tu peux. Si nous
avons des obligations, comme cela est evident de soi, nous sommes
libres de les accomplir. Autrement nous ne connaitrions que le desir
et la necessite. Le desir incline, la necessity contraint, le devoir seul
oblige, parce qu^seuTiLsuppos^Ialibea’te.^
C’est a 1’aide de tous ces detours compliques et laborieux que Kant
aboutit au premier postulat de Idraison pratique ^existence reelle
de la liberte. S’imaginant avoir arrache la morale au scepticisme,
par la morale il tente de lui arracher aussi la religion.
Si la morale est vraid* la ‘morale telle que vientflde la constituer
Kant, avec la loi dii devdih pour principe et la liberte pbntlMlfoquence, quelle est la fin de Fhomnte^ Kant# demande si We'fin
est la vertu seute, la vertu se suffisant pleineriitmt a elle-meme, ainsi
que Font enseigne les stoiciens. Il examine alors le principe fondamental de cette grande ecole *ieHle comparant avbe te principe contraire des epicuriens, il fait voir avec une force eirijbe iagejj ddulirV
hies que ni la vertu, ni te bonheur ne constituent separement la fin
de l’bomme, le souverain biefi". Sans meconnaitre la superiority du
principe stoicien, Kant prouve qu’il est insuffisant et qu’il a besoin
d’etre tempere pfe^fe priilcipe epicurien, qui a sorltour reduit a
lui-meme, serait ^ansWtorite comffie sans dignite-ferales. ZJRduverain bien n’est done ni?Ta vertu seule, ni le seul bbfifeur,%iais
l’harmonie du bonheur dtde la vertu. Br, maintenant, ce souverain
bien, vers lequel la raison nous ordonne de lendre sansMHk, est-il
�r
ESSAI DE PHILOSOPHIE RELIGIEUSeSP
realisable dans les conditions du monde sensible? Kant demontre
superieurement le contraire.
Sans aucun doute, la vertu est accessible a l’homme dans une
certaine mesure, puisqu’elle depend de sa volonte; mais la vertu
parfaite c’est la saintete, et la saintete est un ideal que la volonte ne
peut atteindre ,. quoiqu’elle puisse et doive y tendre sans cesse. AinJI
done, des deux elements du, sopverain >bien, le premier ne saurait
etre realise dans l$s limites d’une existence bornee. D’ou il suit qu’il
faut de deux choses,Funes: ou bien admettre que cet ideal est une
. chimere trpjaipeuse, ce qui renyerse tout l’ordre moral, ou bien
' reconnaitre apres la vie presente une carriere indefinie de perfectionnements pour la moralite humaine.
Cette derniere conclusion se confirme encore, si l’on considere le
second element, du^ souverain bien, le bonheur. Non-seulement le
bonheur n’est pas et ne peut pas etre de ce monde, ce qui acheve de
prouver la vie future, mais le rapport du bonheur et de la vertu est
completement independant de notre volonte, et ce rapport ne peut
etre etabli selon les lois absolues de la justice que par une volonte
superieure a-j,’p^^ers,f.et qui tienne en quelque sorte l’humanite et
la nature dans sa main. C’cst ainsi- que le souverain bien, que la
raison pratique nous,.fait.concevoir.comme l’objet necessaire de notre
volonte, supposant lui-meme, dit Kant, un Souverain bienprimitif
d’ou il puisse deriver, il est moralement necessaire d’admettre Fexis
tence de Dieu.,
Wila.donc notre grand sceptique en possession d’une existence
absolue, et certes ce resultat ^st deja ysingulierement surprenant.
Mais ce qui est plus extraordinaire encore, c’est qu’apres avoir affirme
Dieu, il entreprenne de determiner sa nature. Quoi! Fauteur de la
Critique de la nation pyre
construire jane dheologie rationnelle
a la maniere de Wolf! Quoi^vous avez consume toute votre puis
sance d’analyste?sltoute votre vigueur de dialecticien a prouver que
la metaphvsique est impossible, et vous venez apres coup nous proposer la solution du probleme metaphysique le plus eleve! Votre
circonspectipn systematique etait tellemue.vous ne vouliez rien affirmer de l’objet meme qui est le plus pres de nous, de ce principe qui
en nous pense et agit sans,.cesse ,a.l|plumiere de la conscience, et
maintenant vous vous flattez de penetrer legrand my stere de l’existence, d’atteindre Fabsolu et de le decrire! Que va devenir l’idee
fondamentale ue votre reform e philosophique, cette idee qui devait
�ESSAI DE PHILOSOPHIE RELIGIEUSE.
49
modifier si profondement le cours de l’esprit humain, et changer la
face de toutes choses dans l’ordre philosophique, comme avait fait,
tdans l’ordre physique, la decouverte de Copernic ?
. Certes je ne puis douter que Kant, un des esprits les plus systematiques du monde, ne se soit propose, toutes ces objections et bien
d’autres encore. Mais une fois resolu a sauver^le principe des verites
religieuses, une fois entre dans la voie de la Critique de la Raison
pratique, je comprends aussi qu’il lui etait bien difficile de ne pas
aller au dela de la simple affirmation de Dieu. A quel titre, en effet,
avons-nous le droit, sui\ant Kant, d’affirmer que Dieu existe ? c’est
parce que le souverain bien, qui ^iLneces^^menl
realise, ne
peut l’etre qu’en supposant Dieu. Mais s’il en est ainsi, nous avons
une methode pour determiner la nature de Dieu. Bien que saisi par
nous indirectement, Dieu n’est na& poufegel^jM l^^^^CRiyniatique. Nous ne voyons pas digcGtement ce qu’il est, mais nous savons
ce qu’il doit etre, car noiis savons qu’il doit avoir tous les gttributs
sans lesquels il lui serait impossible d’etre ce qu’il est, c’est-a-dire le
principe qui realise le souverain bien. Or, pour realiserle souverain
bien, il faut d’abord le connaitre. Done, DieS est intemgwffl. Il ne
suffit pas de le connaitre, il faut l’aimer et le vouloir. Done Dieu
est bon et puissant. H
Ainsi parle la logique; mais je JfaisTe parler Kant lui-meme:
« Dieu doit etre omniscient, diL-jl, afin de penetrer nos plus secretes
intentions dans toushles’cas possibles et dans tous les temps; omni
potent, afin de departir a ma conduite les suites qu’elle rnerite, et de
meme, omnipresent, eternel, etc.1 » Et c’est ainsi, ajoute Kant, que
la loi morale determine, a l’aide de l’idee du souverain bien, la
notion de l’Etre supreme, ce que ne pouvaient faire ni la physique,
ni la metaphysique, nuen gen^Oltoute
speculative.
Arrive au terme de la Critique de la Raison pratique, Kant fait
d’incroyables efforts pour se demontrer a lui-meme qu’elle est d’ac
cord avec la Critique de la Raison* spjl&dMiA
Pu. douter
de Dieu dans celle-ci et l’affirmer dans celle-la sans aucune contra
diction. La raison pratique, remarque=-t-il, n’etend point la connais
sance speculative; elle nous fait seulement connaitre comme reel co
que la raison speculative concevait comme problematique. La liberte,
tt’immortalite, Dieu, ne son|tpas nou/Epsaisoii speculative des objets
3. Critique de la 'Raison pratique, traduction de M. Jules Barni, p. 358.
Tome III.— 9" Livraison.
4
�50
ESSAI DE PHILOSOPHIE RELIGIEUSE.
nouveaux; la raison pratique se borne a nous assurer de leur realite;
objective, que nous ignorions. Pour la liberte, cela se fait immediatoment: tu dois, done tu es libre; la liberte est la condition a priori de
la loi morale. Et quant aux deux autres grandes verites religieuses,
1’immortalite et Dieu, lteur realite objective est liee a celle de la
liberte , qui elle-meme est inseparable de la loi morale, dont nous
avons l’immediate conscience.
Lorsque la raison pratique affirme 1’immortalite et Dieu, ce n’est
pas un simple besom speculatif, un simple moyen de donner a nos
connaissances un plus haut degre d’unite et de perfection; e’est un
besoin legitime d’admettre une chose sans laquelle ne pourrait avoir
lieu ce que nous devons necessairement nous proposer pour but de
nos actions. Ainsi done, la raison pratique ne contredit pas, elle confirme la raison speculative. Il y aurait contradiction entre elles si la
raison pratique pretendait etendre le ehamp de nos speculations theoriques et donner aux idees un usage transcendantal. Mais non ; si la
raison pratique donne a certains concepts une portee que la raison
speculative ne pent leur attrfbuer, ce n’est pas une portee speculative*
Dieu et 1’immortalite restent pour nous speculativement des choses
impenetrables; nous savons seulement d’une maniere certaine qu’il
y a un Dieu et une vie future. La raison speculative nous avait averti
qu’au dela du phenomena il doit y avoir autre chose. Cette autre
chose reste inconnue a la raison pratique en ce sens qu’elle ne peut
le determiner speculativement, ou du meins qu’elle n’ajoute rien
aux concepts speculatifs que nous en avions; mais ces concepts speculatifs nous presentaient l’idqal et l’absolu simplement possibles; la
raison pratique noiis les donne comme certains.
Que- faut-il penser de ces explications ingenieuses? A dire le vrai,
je les trouve parfaitement vaines, et il me semble que toutes les tentatives de Kant pour donner au concept du devoir la portee objective
' qu’il refuse aux autres concepts de la raison, ont completemeni
Lechoue. II dit que le concept du devoir a une force d’objectivite qui
■ lui est exclusivement propre, en ce qu’il exprime ce qui doit etre fait
’ par toute volonte raisonnable, abstraction faite des conditions de
1’experience, et realise ainsi lui-meme ses objets, puisqu’il depend
toujours de la volbnte de Tester fidele au devoir. — Je reponds que
le concept de la cause et eelui de la substance sont, tout aussi bien
que la loi du devoir, independants des objets sensibles. Supposez, en
effet, l’univers aneanti, ees concepts gardent une valeur propre; car
�ESSAI DE PHILOSOPHIE RELIGIEUSE!
51
il reste vrai que tout effet suppose une cause et tout attribut une
substance. — Ce sont la, dit Kant, des concepts vides. — Soit; mais
quoi de plus vide aussi que la notion du devoir;, s’il n’y avait pas
des etres doues de volonte? Le deyoir, ditej^yous, non-seul.ement
regie le monde moralcomme la Joi de la causajite regie le monde
physique, mais il leconstitue, Suhtije et fgusse distmetiond Otezles
etres moraux, dont ^experience seule, no.us apprend I’exkten^ au x
dedans et au dehors* de^ous^ le devoir n’est plus qu’une abstraction
sans realite. Tous les raffinements et toutes les subtilites imaginees
pour creer ici une difference ne prouvent qu’une chose, c’esf. que le ’
bon sens de Kant et sa bonne conscience ne peuvent tenir dans le ,
systeme d’abstractions et de doutes ou la peur de la metaphysique l’a '
conduit a s’emprisonner.
Supposons maintenanWuele concept, du devoir,. tel que Kant le
Mecrit, possede en effet une valeur objective,fc|e dis,qu’il ne pourra la
communiquer ni aux concepts de la. vie future et.de Dieu,7m meme
an concept de la liberte., C’est sans doute une maxirne tres-belleet
tres-vraie que celle de Kant: tu dois,. done tu peux, et il est incon
testable en soi que le devoir et la liherte sont inseparables; mais j’ose
dfere que cela est yj» pour tout le monde excepfe pour Kant. Ek#
effet, quiconque s’interroge saps pardi pris reconnaitra aisem,ent
qu’aussitdt que la raisoa fait, (ii^tinguer a rh.omme le bieu du mal8,
la conscience lui apprend qu’il est lihre dmchoisir J’un ou l’aufre.
Ce qui est bien en soi^coneu comme obligafoire pour un etre libre,
voila le devoir. Otez-moi la conscience de ma liberte, vous m’otez la
notion du devoir tout ,missi s^omgnt quo si fvous m’blic^’idoe dir
bien et du mal. Or, e’est la doctrine consfanle et systematique dp
Kant, que la liberte ne tornbe pas sous la conscience.. A ses yeux, la
liberte n’est pas un fait, e’est un concept a priori. Cette doctrine est
etrange, j’en conviens, contraire au temoignage eclatant de la
conscience, j’en suis convaincu, mais e’est la doctrine de Kant dans
la Critique de la Raison,spsculaldv^r^ if.pretend y rester fidele dans.
Id, Critique de la Raison pratique.
'
5
Supposons donq &vechii-g^n homme' fmaginaire qui n’aff pas* ;
conscience de saliberte. Cet homme aura, je veux bien l’admettre un
■instant, le concept du devojj?,. Qu’Oil resultera4-il? ‘luiyant Kant? 10’
devoir supposant la liberte, gelubqui feconnait'le devoir doit concluru
qu’il est libre. Entendons-nousrLe devoir, tant que j’ignore si je
suis libre, n’est pour moi qu’un devoir possible et abstrait. Ce devoir
�S2
ESSAI DE PHILOSOPHIE RELIGIEUSE.
suppose un etre libre, soit; mais un etre purement possible, une
liberte tout abstraite et tout hypothetique. Je dis par exemple : c’est
un devoir pour un etre libre de ne pas nuire a son semblable, mais
ce devoir existe-t-il pour moi? oui, si je suis libre; si je ne le suis
pas, non. Admettez, en effet, qu’au lieu d’une personne morale je
lusse un pur esprit sans besoins et sans passions, ou bien un animal
soumis dans ses actes au seul instinct, il est clair que le devoir de ne
pas nuire n’existerait plus pour moi. Il suit de la que dans le systeme
de Kant il n’y a que des devoirs conditionnels; l’homme de son sys
teme connait les lois de la morale comme il connait les lois de la
geometrie, c’est-a-dire comme des lois absolues, mais qui se rap
portent a d’autres etres que lui. Reste a savoir s’il doit se les appliquer a lui-meme. Or, cette question de fait ne pourra etre resolue
que par sa conscience, et sa conscience, selon Kant, etant muette sur
la liberte, il en resulte que la question est pour lui insoluble.
J’accorde maintenant pour un moment tout ce que Kant s’est vainement efforce d’etablir, et la force d’objectivite accordee au concept
du devoir, et cette force communiquee au concept de liberte, et la
morale sauvee du naufrage, je dis que Kant donne vainement la tor
ture a son esprit pour tirer de la une theodicee. Dieu ne nous est
connu, dans son systeme, qu’a titre de condition necessaire de la rea
lisation du souverain bien. Mais, en verite, quoi de plus fragile et de
plus etroit qu’une telle base, et comment un esprit ferme et vigoureux comme celui de Kant aurait-il pu se faire illusion sur ce point?
Voici un philosophe qui s’est donne pour mission d’introduire dans
la science un esprit de reserve et de rigueur jusqu’alors inconnu. Les
affirmations absolues lui paraissent suspectes touchant les objets les
plus familiers, du moment qu’on peut craindre que l’homme ne
confonde les lois et les besoins de sa nature avec la verite des choses.
Et maintenant, pour affirmer l’existence de l’etre le plus mysterieux,
il lui suffit de cette raison que l’homme a besoin de cette affirmation,
et que sans elle il ne pourrait comprendre le gouvernement moral de
1’univers. Mais qui vous dit que ce besoin de Dieu et cette impossibilite d’expliquer sans lui le monde moral ne sont pas une suite de
la constitution de l’esprit humain ou seulement de ses limites! qui
vous assure que Dieu est la seule hypothese legitime, et qu’il n’y a
pas mille aulres explications ue cette enigme qui pese sur notre
faiblesse!
Cela est si evident que la bonne foi de Kant n’a pu s’empecher de
�ESSAI DE PHILOSOPHIE RELIGIEUSE.
53
le reconnaitre en un passage remarquable de la Critique de la raison
1 ou il se demande si le jugement que nous portons sur
T existence de Dieu, comme condition necessaire de la possibility du
souverain bien, a veritablement une valeur objective La raison,
dit-il, a-t-elle bien le droit de decider que l’harmonie ou reside le
souverain bien ne pout absolument deriver de lois universelies sans
le concours d’une cause sage qui y preside? non, elle ne le peut, et
pour dire le vrai, cette impossibilite ou nous sommas de pqncevoir
comme possible la parfaite harmonie (ju bonheuret de la moralite
sans supposer une cause morale du monde, estpurement subjective.
Il est inutile de rien ajouter apres un tel aveu 1* et l’on comprend
maintenant sans peine que, du vivant meme de Kant, lorsque son
disciple Fichte vint reprendre tout le systeme pour lui donner
plus de rigueur et d’unite, un^de .ses premiers soins fut de le
debarrasser de cette chancelante theodicee comme d’un appendice
inutile, et de substituer a 1’idee d’un Dieu legislateur qui lui paraissait arbitraire et anthropomorphique, celle d’un ordre moral resul
tant de la nature des choses, ordre necessaire et impersonnel par qui
serealise eterncllementrharmonie legitime du bonheuret de la vertu.
SEPT I £ ME ETUDE. — LE PANTHEISME DE HEGEL.
Je n’en puis douter: l’idee que Kant s’est faite de la Divinite est
en desaccord avec son systeme. Dois-je conclure delaquelekantisme
est faux? non, car si. je prends ce systeme en lui-meme, apres l’avoir
degage de tout element etranger, il semble formermn tout assez bien
uni, et ce tout est peut-etre la verite.
Voila un dernier doute que je veux: eclaircir. Ou aboutit en defi
nitive le systeme de Kant? J’entends dire qu’il mene a l’idealisme de
Fichte, et que cet idealisme lui-meme a conduit Fichte a un pantheisme subjectif d’ou est sorti le pantheisttie absolu de Schelling et
de Hegel.
Idealisme, pantheisme subjectif, pantheismeOsolu, que veulent
dire ces formules? Qu’est-ce que cette etrange genealogie qui fait
sortir Fichte de Kant, Schelling de Fichte,, Hegel de Schelling? Je
1. Critique de la raison pratique, liv. II, ch. n, § 8.
�54
?ESSAI DE PHILOSOPHIE RELIGIEUSE.
voudrais comprendre tout cela, je voudrais surtout avoir la clef du
systeme de Hegel, puisqu’il contient, a ce qu’on assure, le dernier
mot de la philosophic allemande.
Un premier point qui me parait clair, c’est que le mouvement
d’idees suscite par Kant ne pouvait s’arreter avec lui. J’ai deja
recoimu en effet que la Critique de la Raison pure et la Critique
de la Raison pratique ne forment pas uhe philosophic homogene,
mais, en quelqtie sorte, deux philosophies distinctes et contraires
qu’aucun artifice de logique ou d’analyse ne saurait concilier, sans
compter que Kant a ecrlt une troisieme critique, la Critique duJugement, qui, en s’ajoutant aux deux autres par d’ingenieuses combinaisons, enrichit sans doute, mais aussi complique a l’exces l’ensemble
du systeme. *
Mais je consens a m’enfermer dans Fenceinte de la Critique de la
/Raison pure et a oublier tout le reste. Le systeme simplifie de la
’sorte a-t-il une rigueur parfaite et une parfaite unite? telle est la
question que se posa Fichte, et qui le conduisit a substituer une doc
trine nouvelle a celle de son maitre, tout en ne s’etant propose d’abord
que de la perfeciionnet. Suivant Fichte en effet, le systeme developpe dans la Critique de la Raison pure manque essentiellement de
cette severite logique qui est pour lui le caractere de la science.
La premiere parole de Kant, c’est que rien ne se produit dans la
pensee que.. par suite de l’cxperience et des phenomenes qui frappent
nos sens. Or, ces phenomenes, que l’esprit rencontre et qu’il ne pro
duit pas/supposent un principe etranger. TVoila des le debut une
concession euorme, et qui’ d’avanee mine tout le systeme* de la philo
sophic critique. Qcioi! la science a pour infranchissable enceinte
l’esprit humain, le .sujet, et cependant il existe autre chose, et la
premiere condition de la science est de supposer un objet qu’elle ne
conMait pas, qu’elle ne peut atteindre et qui est l’unique origine de
tout! elle debute done par une hypothese, et par une hypothese contradictoirea sa nature ; elle laisse son principe hors d elle, ou plutot
elle n’a pas de principe, elle n’est pas.
Donner a la science un principe, un vrai principe , e’est-a-dire un
principe absolu, ne reposant que sur soi et servant de base a tout le
reste, tel est le but que
propose Fichte et qu’il essaye d atteindre
dans sa Thdorie.de la Science. Ici, Tidealisme de Kant est embrasse
dans toute sa rigueur; plus d’element objectif suppose arbitrairejnent, meme a titre de simple phenomene. Tout cst severement
�r*. -rV-'--
ESSAI DE PIIILOS©PHIE RELIGIEUSE.
55
deduit du seul terme de la connaissance qu’admette l’idealisme, du
sujet. Le probleme pour Fichte est celui-ci: tirer du moi la philoso
phic tout entiere, et l’audacieux raisonneur pretend donner a cette
deduction une rigueur superieure a celle des mathematiques. L’algebre s’appuie en effet sur la loi de l’identite qui s’exprime ainsi:
A= A. Fichte soutient que'cette loi en suppose une autre, la.seule
qu’un philosophe ait le droit d’admettre sang la prouver, et ,1a .seule
aussi dont il ait besoinMOI =fc=MOI.
Quand vous dites A = A,, vous n’entendez rien a ffirinersur Insis
tence de A. Vous> affirmez seulement que si A est A, A tie peut pas
etre autre chose que A. La proposition A=A n’esi done, dit Fichte,
vraie absolument>que dans sa forme., et non dans sa matiere ou dans
son contenu. Je ne safe si A existe effectivement, mateniellement, ou
s’iln’existe pas; mais peu importe, j’ai la certitude d’ormelle queA
4tant pose, A ne peut differer de A, .et qu’il y a entre ces deux termes
un rapport necessaire. G’est par 1’analyse de ce rapport que Fichte
efftreprend de prouver l’exfetence du moi. En effet, dit-il, dans la
proposition A = A, le premier A n’est pas considere sous le meme
point de vue quele second A. Le premier A, nous l’avons reconnu,
est pose conditionnellement.; le second est pose d’une maniere abso
lue. Qu’est-ce qui ramene ces deux termes a l’unite? qu’est-ce qui
les met en un certain rapport? qu’est-ce qui juge, affirme et constiiue
ce rapport? evidemment, le moi. Otez le moi, vous otez lerapport,
vous otez les deux termes, vous otez la proposition A = A. Ily a done
au-dessus d’elle une write plus haute., plus immediate. Le principe
del’identite n’est absolu que dans sa forme; le principe MOI == MOI
est absolu dans sa tonne et dans sa matiere: il -est seul- waiment
absolu.
Je n’ai pas besoin de suivre Fichte dans le cours de sa deduction,
la plus subtile et la plus artificielle qui se puisse concevoir. Il me
suffit de savoir qu’il a pousse jusqu’au bout l’etrange idee de deduire '
tout un vaste systeme de philosophic de ce seul principe, le moi.
C’est sur cette pointe aigue qu’il pretend faire reposer 1’edifice entier
des croyances humaines. La nature et Dieu ne sont que des developpements du moi. Le moi seul est principe, expliquant tout, posant
tout, creant tout, s’expliquant, se posant, se creant lui-meme. Je <ne
safe ici ce que je dois admirer le plus, soit de l’exces d’extravagance
ou peut s’emporter 1’esprit humain, soit de 1’etonnante feeondite de
ses ressources. Le voila condamne par Kant a igtiorer 1’u.nivers et
i,
I
�56
ESSAI DE PHILOSOPHIE RELIGIEUSE*
Dieu et a s’emprisonner dans le moi; laissez-le faire: ce seul point
conserve lui fera retrouver tout le reste. Il ira meme des dernieres
limites du scepticisme au dogmatisme le plus absolu. Tout a l’heure,
il doutait de tout; maintenantil se vante, non-seulement de connaitre
la nature, mais de la creer; que dis-je? il se vante de creer Dieu. Ce
sont les propres expressions de Fichte, a la fois absurdes et consequentes.
Oui, Fichte tire du moi la nature et Dieu. Le moi en effet suppose
le non-moi; il se limite soi-meme, il n’est soi-meme qu’en s’opposant un autre que soi, il ne se pose qu’en s’opposant son contraire, et
Ini-meme est le lien de cette opposition , la synthese de cette anti
nomie. Si en effet le moi n’est pour soi-meme qu’en se limitant, cette
faculte qu’il a de se limiter suppose qu’en soi il est illimite, infini. 11
y a done au<dessus du moi relatif, du moi divisible, du moi oppose
au non-moi, un moi absolu qui enveloppe w nature et l’homme. Ce
moi absolu, c’est Dieu. Voila done la pensee en possession de ses trois
objets essentiels, voila Fhomme, la nature et Dieu dans leurs rela
tions necessaires, membres d'une meme pensee a trois termes, separes a la fois et reconcilies, voila une philosophie digne de ce nom,
une science rigoureuse, demontree, homogene, partant d’un principe
unique pour en suivre et en epuiser toutes les consequences.
Telle est dans son principe general la metaphysique de Fichte; sa
morale en est une suite, imprevue peut-etre, mais rigoureuse. Elle
est fondee suf le moi.: Le caractere eminent du moi, c’est la liberte.
Conserver sa liberte, son moi, c’est le devoir; respecter le moi, la
liberte des autres, c’est le droit. De la ce noble stoicisme de Fichte et
cette passion pour la liberte qui ont ete en si parfait accord avec la
male vigueur de son caractere et le role genereux qu’il s’est donne
dans les affaires politiques de l’Allemagne. Mais l’importance du
systeme de Fichte n’est pas la. Sa grandeur et son originalite, je les
■ trouve dans cette extraordinaire metaphysique, si justement et si hardiment appelee par lui-meme l’idealisme subjectif absolu. Elle a ce
; caractere singulier qu’en poussant a ses plus extremes consequences
le scepticisme de Kant, elle prepare le dogmatisme de Schelling et
de Hegel. Et non-seulement elle le prepare, mais deja elle le com
mence et meme le contient. Fichte en effet aspire ouvertement a la
science absolue. Il explique toutes choses, l’homme, la nature et
Dieu. 11 mene la philosophie allemande, si je puis dire ainsi, du
subjectif a l’objectif par le subjectif meme. Du scepticisme absolu il
�ESSAI DE PHILOSOPHIE RELIGIEUSE.
57
la jMte dans un dogmatisme eiiorme, et parti d’une doctrine tellement timide qu’elle ose a peine affirmer un 6tre effectif, «il prelude a
r cette philosophie ambitieuse qui embrasse dans ses cadres immenses
l’histoire de l’humanite et celle de la nature, et pretend sans mesure
et sans reserve a l’explication universelle des choses,
Schelling a commence sa carriere philosophique par accepter le
^ysteme de Fichte, comme Fichte avail d’abord adopte celui de Kant.
Son premier ecrit, compose a vingt ans, porte ce titre expressif : Du
I vgzoz comme principe de la philosophie. Mais il ne tarda pas a s’apercevoir de l’impossibilite absolute de maintenir fc philosophie dans cette
etroite enceinte ou elle etouffait. Egaree sur les pas de Fichte, la
pensee humaine avait perdu la nature; il s’agissait de la reconquerir.
La nature existe en face du moi. Ce n’est la qu’un fait, mais c’est
un fait que la science doit expliquer. Or toute tentative de deduire du
moi la nature, du sujet l’objet, est radicalement impuissante, 1’exemple de Fichte Fa prouve, On ne reussirait pas mieux a deduire de
l’objet le sujet, de lamdure le moi", de l’etre la pensee. Ainsi point
d’etre sans pensee,, Joint de pensee sans etre, etgancun moyen de
resoudre la pensee daiig 1’eire ou l’etre dans la pensee. C’est dans
ces termes que se posait devant Schelling, le probleme philos^phique.
Je m’explique assez simplement la solution ou il fut conduit. Sui
vant lui, la pensdget l’etre, le sujet et l’objet, ne peuvent etre ala
fois irreductibles et inseparables que s’il y a un .plincipe commun de
l’un et de l’autre, principe a la fois subjectif et objectif, intelligent et
intelligible, source unique de la pensee et de l’etre. Ce principe, ce
sujet-objet absolu, comme l’appelle Schelmg, S Fiuee^mere de sa
philosophie. Aussi bien c’est a peu pres de la meme maniere que
Spinoza fut conduit a l’unite de la substance. Son'mait^Descartes.
en effet, avait constate, au debut de kuscience, une dualite fdndamentale. En face de l’e® qui pense, il avait reconnu l’etre etendu. Com
ment expliquer leur coexistence, bien plus, leur union? Malebranche,
preludant a l’idealisme de Kant, ayait niegju’on piit connaitre les
corps; Berkeley, devangant Fichte, ayait essaye d’expliquer l’etendue
comme une creation.de la pensee. Spinoza^ sentantrd’avanceja vanite
de ces tentatives, declare hardimeiltque«la coexistence de la pensee
et de l’etendue n’etait possible que par une substance infinie, a la
fois etend^ue et pensante,. a la fois nature et humanite. L’analogie est
sensible, mais je dois prendre garde de l’exagerer. Le mouvement de
la philosophie allemande a un caractere qui lumest propre et une
�58
ESSAI DE PHILOSOPHIE RELTGIEUSE.
-originalite limitee, mais reelle. Schelling n’est point le plagiaire de
Spinoza, bien qu’il l’ait connu et admire des sa jeunesse, bien que la
polemique ardente qui divisa Mendelsohn et Jacobi, et a laquelle prit
part toute l’Allemagne pensante, soit anterieure de quelques annees
■aux premiers ecrits de Schelling |t Fait de ‘bonne heure si vivement
frappe cpill exprimait o’uvertement, dans son premier essai, l’esperance dgfeWM^r un'jour un systeme qui fut le'pendant de Vtdhique
de Spinoza *."C’lesi justement ce qui est arrive. '
, Dans1’univers de Spinoza, il y a deux mondes, a la fois unis et
opposes., le monde de la pensee bu des ames, etie monde de l’etendue
ou des corps. Ces mondes se penetrant 1’un l’autre. Foute ame a un
corps,’ tout corps a line ame. La pensee ’a ses Ibis, la nature a les
sicnnes; mais ces lois se correspondent etroitement. Un des grands
iheoremes de Spinoza est celui-ci: L’.ordre et la connexion des idees
est le mime que •Tbrdre et la connexion des 'choses2. Quel est le
secret de cette identite? .e’est que la pehsee bt Tetendue, les ames et
les corps, ne sont que les deux faces d’une meme existence. La na
ture, d’e^t Dieu daris Fetendue et lemoUvement; I’dme, e’est Dieu
dans la pensee. Dieu etant un, les lots de son d’eveloppernent sont
unes. Ainsi toutes les ’existences se penetrent, tout s’unit, tout
s’identifie.
’’‘“ 'C'"' 1 *’'' '
Schelling part aussi de cette dualiie,_.la pensee on Je sujet, les
ehoses ou l’objet, ou encore la nature et Thumanite. La nature a des
lois•; mais une loi, e’est essentiellement quelque chose d’intellectuel,
e’est une idee.1 La nature est done toute penetree d-intelligence; d’un
autre cbte, 1’humanite a aussi seslois; elle est litre sans doute, mais
elle n’est pas livree au hasard. Des reglef aibsolues gouvernent son
developpeinent. 11 y a done parente entre l’humanite et la nature.
D’ou vient leur distinction? e’est que la nature obeit a ses lois sans
cunscience, tandis que rhuinanite a conscience des siennes. En d’autres termes, il y a de 1’ietredans lapensbe, del’ideal dans le reel, etil
y a aussi de la pensee dans I’dtre, du reel dans I’ideal. La difference,
e’est qu’ici la pensee et la l’etre dominent; mais au fond la pensee et
Fetre sont inseparables. Il 'y a done un principe cornmun qui se
developpe tantdt sans conscience et tantot avee’conscience de soimdme.-G’est le Dieu de Schelling|B
4. Schelling, Du moi con sidere comme principe de la philosophic.
2. Ethique, part, n, prop. 7.
i.
;
\
�ESSAI DE PHILOSOPHIE RELIGIEUSE.
59
Jusque-Ia le philosophe hollandais et le philosophe allemand ne
different pas; voici le point ou ils se separent. Dans 1’univers de Spi
noza, il y a un abime entre la pensee et l’etendue. La pensee et l’ertendue, c’est toujours Dieu sans douteJ, inaiS il ny'a aucune sorte
d’union entre cesdeux parties de sonetre. Leflot des idees coule d’un,
cote, le flot des corps coble de Taiitre. Dieu les cmbrass’e,’ it "fest vrai,|
mais dans cet ocean infini, les ondes contraires ne s’unissent pas. De
la au sein de la nature toe sblmion decbiffinhitd eternelle. Il ’en est
tout autrement dans le systeme de Schelling. L’ensernble des etres
compose une echelle continue ^t ndinogene du. chaque forme de
l’existence conduitJ a une forme superieure' La hdttfteii’y esi pas,
comme chez Spinoza, destituee d^n^ellige^cp,^ Uncobfant infini de
pensee circule dans toutes ses parties; seulement cette pensee n’arrive
pas du premier coup a la plenitude de son etre. G’est d’abord une
pensee tellement' obscure, tellement Sourde, qu’elle s’edhappe absolument a elle-meine. Par degres, elle s*eclaircit et se replie sur soi;
elle se sent d’abord, puis se distingue, enfin elle arrive a se reflechir,
a se posseder, a se connaitre parfaitement. « La nature, dit Schelling,
sommeille dans la pl ante, elle reve dans l’animal, elle se reveille
dans l’homme. » Ge developpement merveilleux est ce que les Allemands appelleht le'pWgr^ ou le ^roce^^deTdtr’b^/’o^s), et s’il
faut les en croire, l’idee du processus est la conquete propre et le
grand titre d’honneur de’Schelling.^ C’est oublierque Leibnitz et,
deux mille ans avant Leibnitz, Aristote, avaient honcu la nature
comnle une serie de formes homogenes s’elevant de degre en degre,
a une perfection toujours croissante; mais peu importe, il est ciair
que Schelling n’a copie personne, ni Leibnitz, ni Spinoza; c’est le
mouvement propre de sa pensee, c’est le courant de la philosophie
kantienne qui l’a conduit ataphiloso^hie deridcntiVe. ’ ■
Le systeme de Schelling en effet, bien qtl’il soil' ’en 'nn^sens toe
reaction extreme effio la doctrine de Fichte,' en un autre’sens la
continue. Fichte'n’^Bwttait-il paoussi riddntlW a'bsoluccles3choses?
ne resolvait-il pas l’opposition du moi et du non-moi dans uh prin
cipe superieur? Seuwienf ce principe supbffeur'detail fftijours Ie
moi, et de la le caractere idealiste et subjectif de tout le systeme. Cette
identite admise par Fichte, Schelling la generalise et la transforme.
Elle n’est plus pour lui renfermee dans cette etroite prison du moi,
elle est le fond de touteschoses. On peut dire que Schelling a pris
des mains de Fichte les cadres d’e's’a pfiilbSophie, trials qu’en le'S ’eiar-
�^0
ESSAI DE PHILOSOPHIE RELIGIETOEM
gissant, il leur a donne une ampleur infinie. Il a fait entrer dans le
systeme de Fichte la nature proscrite, il y a repandu a pleines mains
la realite.
L’evolution de la philosophic allemande ne pouvait s’arreter a
Schelling. Le systeme^de Schelling . §n effet, renfermait bien un I
principe, mais elle ne fournissait aucun ■ moyen de le developper !
scientifiquement. Qu’avait fait Schelling? il avail concu l’ensemble ,
des choses comme la serie progressive des formes variees d’un prin-lI
cipe identique. Or, comment saisir ce principe? comment atteindre '
la loi de son developpement? comment la demontrer? e’est. ce que
Schelling nefaisait pas.
Pourquqi ce principe se developpe-jd-il? pourquoL devient-il tour a
tour pesanteur, lumiere, activile,-conscience ? Est-ce a l’experience
qu’on le demandera? Mais 1’expprience constate les faits, elle ne les
explique pas. Dira-t-on que le sujet-objet se developpe par sa nature?
On demandera quelle est sa mature, et Schelling ne la determine en
aucune fagon. Il faut done admetlre ici la qualite occulte d’un prin
cipe inconnu. Que de mysteres et d’hypotheses! et a quoi tout cela
sert-il? Otezl’experienge, nul moyen n’apparait de construire regulierement ou meme d’ebaucher la science. jC’est souslepoids de cette
difficulty que Schelling avait imagine son intuition intellectuelle,
faculte transcendante qui atteint l’absolu d’une prise immediate sans
passer par les degres laborieux de l’analyse et de la reflexion; mais
jamais Schelling n’a pu eclaircir la nature equivoque de cette intuiJ I
tion pretendue. Est-ce un don naturel de l’esprit humain? est-ce un
privilege? on ne jsait. Quoi de plus obscuqj de plus arbitraire, de
plus incompatible avec les conditions de la science? Evidemment la
philosophic allemande devait faire un pas de plus ou abandonner son
principe, Ce dernierjpas^ Hegel le fit Hegel aicherche, il a cru trouver une methode pour construire la science absolue, pour la demon
trer. Cette methode, e’est la logique.
Rien ne/jparait au premier abord plus extraordinaire, et, pour
trancher le mot, plus absurde que le systeme de Hegel. Non-seulement il pousse plus loin queue l’avait fait Schelling, etjusqu’a sa
derniere limite, le/principe d£v lidentite,absolue de la pensee et de
l’ytref mais * par une suite de cet exces meme, il introduit une loi
qui est le renversement de toutes les idees-recues, savoir : que les
contradictoires sont identiques, l’etre identique au neant, le fini a
l’infini, la vie a la mort, la lumiere aux tenebres. La philosophic
�ESSAI DE PHILOSOPHIE RELIGIEUSE.
61
consiste pour Hegel a trouver en tout 1’unite sous la contradiction,
l’identite sous la difference.
On se sent dispose tout d’abord en face d’une telle entreprise
a la defiance et presque au dedain. Supposez que Kant, en 1820,
fut sorti de son tombeau , nul doute qu’en voyant ce que la philoso
phic etait dcvenue entre les mains de Hegel,4Ine se fut eerie,
comme Malebranche en lisant Spinoza, que e’etait une epouvantable
chimere. Et cependanf^a y regarder de*plus pres, ces deux principes
si etranges et si dangereux, l’identite des contradictoires, -I’identite
de la pensee et ^e I’etre^ sont deja dans le systeme de Kant. N’est-ce
pas Kant, en effet, qui dans sa dialectique a donne 1’eXemple d’oppo
ser les idees 1’une a l’autre et de prouver que les theses contradictoires sont egalement vraies? La logique de Hegel, sous ce point de
vue, n’est-elle pas le developpement des antinomies? mais ce qui est
plus evident encore et* d’une#plus grande consequence, e’est que Kant
a prepare 1’identification absolue de la pensee et de d’etre.
C’est une etude infiniment isurleuse a se proposes que-Thistoire de
ce principe dont 1’Allemagne est si fiere , et ou elle fait consister son
principal titre d’honneur. On le void. naitre aveg Kant, se developper
dans Fichte, se transformer dans Schelling, et arriver enfin dans le
systeme de Hegel a son pfein developpement. Suiya-fi^Kant, ce que
nous appelons les lois de la nature, ce sont en realite les formes de
notre intelligence que nous appliquons aux phenomenes. La grande
erreur des philosophes, e’est de detacher ces lois de leur veritable
principe, qui est 1’esprit humain ou*'le sujet,' pour les transporter
dans les choses, pour les objectiver. Kagabaimait a rendre sensible
1’idee de sa reforme philosophique en la rapprochant de celle que
son compatriote Copernic avait introduite dans l’astronomie. Le vulgaire croit que les astres tournent autour de la terre, ce qui ne peut
K’accorder avec robservation exacte desjfaits. Changez l’hypothese,
faites tourner la terre autour du soleil, toute contradiction disparait,
tout s’explique et s’eclaircit. De meme on est accoutume a subordonner la pensee a l’etre, tandis qu’au vrai, suivant Kant, c est 1 etre qui
est subordonne a la pensee.
Jb
De cette conception a celle de Fichte, il n’y a*qu’un pas-. Si-les
choses ne sont que ce que lfes fait4a pensee, e’est la pensee qui coiistitue, qui cree les choses. Lqmoi1,; en se pensant, .en se posant , se
cree lui-meme. Voila l’identite absolue de la pensee et de 1etre,
egplicitement professee par Fichte et deduite avec hardiesse, mais
�62
ESSAI DE PHdLOSOPHIE RELIGIEUSE,
avec rigueur, de l’idee fondamentale de Kant. Seidement cette iden
tity absolue a le caractere particulier du systeme de Fichte; je veux
dire qu’elle est purement psychologique et subjective; l’etre, pour
Fichte, comme la penseec’est .toujours le moi ou un developpe
ment du moi. Fichte ne pouvait donner a l’identitede la pensee et de
l’etre un autre sens qu’a condition de sortie de son systeme. Schelling
rcprit,en le transformant,radicalement,jlesysteme de Fichte. A ses
yeux, le,moi et, le. non-moi out une egale rpalite * la nature et l’humanite, subsistent en face Tune deT’autre; elles trouvent leur union
dans un principe a la fois ideal at reel, subjectif et objectif, qui les
constitute et les. contient,
Cette identity de la pensee et de FMre, du sujet et de Fobjet, concue
comme reelle et objective, voila le principe commun de la philoso
phie de Schelling et de celle de llegel^et par la elles se rattachent
etroitement, l’une etl’autre, aux doctrines antejieures. Voici mainte
nant la difference des deux systeme§> Schelling n’identifie la pensen
et 1’etre que dans leur principe premier qui est Dieu; mais au-dessous de Dieu, la pensee etl’^tre, sans jamais seseparer, se distinguent, 11 y a^plus d’etre dans la nature, Uy a plus de: pensee dans
1’homme, S’il enest ainsi?.1’etre et la. pensee sent deux choses differentes, et le principe de Tidentite est en ddfaut. A la rigueur en effete
si 1’etrent la pensec sont une seule et meme essence, non-seulement
la pensee doit se trouver partout ou est L’etre, mais elle doit s’v rencontrer dans la meme proportion* Pourquoi pet equilibre,est-il rompu
et comment est-il possible qu’il vienne a. so rompre?: pourquoi Dieu
est-il pins dans, 1’humanite que dans la nature ? Question temeraire
sans doute, mais a laquelle est tenu de repondre celui qui ose soutenir que la science absolue est possible a L’homme. Qr cette question 9
Schelling ne la reseat pas et ne peut pas la resoudre, Le voila convaineu d’inconsequence. Il a proclama le principe de l’identite de la
pensee et de Tetre^il l’a degage du caractere relatif et subjectif qui
le defigurait/dans Fichte et dans Kant, mais il n’a pas ose le developper avec rigueur; aussi sa philosophic ne s’est-elle soulcnue que
par des hypotheses ou par des emprunts deguises qu’il a faits a 1’ex
perience.;
Hegel met sa gloir.e a etre, plus consequent et plus hardi que son
devancier, et il pretend tirer du pifincipj^de L’jdentite ce que Schel
ling ni aucun philosophe n’avaient jamais pu lui faire rendre, une
science du developpement des choses.
�ESSAI DE PHILOSOPHIE RELIGIEI’SE. .
63
La pensee et 1’etre, e’est tout un. A quoi bon deux mots pour
exprimer une essence unique ? Ne disons pas la pensee, l’etre, disons
l’idee. L’idee, voila le Dieu de Hegel; le developpement de Tideer
voila la realite; la connaissance de ce develqppement, voila la scienceLa science de i’idee s’appelle la. logique,. et ainsi la metaphysique et
la logique se confondent.. .
Grace a cette identite vraiment absolue, la science.devient possibleElle se reduit en effet a determiner les rapports necessaires des idees,Dans la theorie d<8chelling, on etait reduit, soit a s’appuyer sur
I’experience pour decrire le mouvement de Petre dans la nature,, ce
qui ne donnait pas une veritable science, soit a donner carriere a
■^’imagination et, a presenter des hypotheses deguisees sous le beau
nom d’intuition intellectuelle. Cela tenait a Le que 1’essence du pre
mier principe restait indeterminee, et a ce que Eon admettait une
distinction arbitrage entre Ips objets de4jla pensee et la pensee elle—
meme. Maintenant que^.nous savons que ce premie^ principe e’est
l’idee, et que la nature et l’hnmanite ne sont autre chose que le
developpement de 1’idee, quand les lois de 1’idee seront connues, la
science sera trouvee.
On demandera a Hegel comment les IdiT de l’idee peuvent letra
determinees. H repond a cette question par sa logique. qui est la
determination scientifique des lois de Tidee- Elies se deduisent tou
tes d’une loi unique et fondamentale, laJ.oi de 1’identite des contra
dictoires. Suivant Hegel, toute pensee, tout^etre,. toute. idee renferma
une contradiction J et non-seulement cette contradiction existe dansles choses, mais'elle les constitue. La vie est essentiellemenf la
synthese, Turnon de deux elements qui tout ensembl"s’excluent et
s’appellent necessairement.,
Au premier abord^ dit. Hegel,,, cette doctrine revolte le Sens commun et parait favorable au scepticisme. Les Pyrrhoniens triomphent
de l’opposition des ideesj,j mais cette opposition n’embarrasse en rien..
le vrai philosophy qui y volt la condition et le mouvement meme de,
la vie. Aussi bien. le sens commun, loin de repousser le principe de»
l’identite des contradictoires, luirend a chaque instant temoignage-.
Ne maintient-il pas, fiermement de siecle en sieele la difference et;
l’identite de Tame et du corps, la coexistence et I’opposition dela,
prescience de Dieu et du. libre arbitre? C’esi manquer an sens?
commun que d’abandonner une de ces verites pour l’autre^ sous le
vain prptexte qu’elles se contredisent. Examine? le sens commun
�64
ESSAI DE PHILOSOPHIE RELIGIEUSE.
sous sa forme la plus haute, la religion. L’ame religieuse n’adoret-elle pas un Dieu a la fois personnel et infini, un Dieu immobile
et vivant, visible et invisible tout ensemble? Le sceptique croit
triompher en opposant ces attrihuts; c’est que le raisonnement a
etouffe en lui la raison. Pendant qu’il se tourmente a alter d’un de
ces contraires a l’autre, un elan du coeur vers Dieu les unit. La plus
raisonnable des religions, la religion chretienne, n’enseigne-t-elle
pas au genre humain depuis dix-huit cents ans que Dieu a fait le
monde de rien, que Dieu s’est fait homme? Et ne sont-ce pas la
autantde contradictions, mais des contradictions pleines de raison,
de vie et de verite?
Les sciences nous offrent aussi mille exemples de l’identite des
contradictoires. En physique, n’admet-on pas sans aucune difficulte
que la lumiere suppose les tenebres? Imaginez une lumiere sans
ombre. Les objets egalement eclaires ne se distinguent plus, et ce
jour uniforme est en tout identique a la nuit. Ainsi la lumiere implique son contraire, l’obscurite. Non-seulement elle la suppose,
mais elle la porte en soi, elle l’engendre; et d’un autre cote, en la
produisant, elle se realise elle-meme. Le produit, c’est la lumiere
effective, la couleur.
Nous pouvons sur ces exemples tres-bizarres "mais tres-simples,
prendre une idee generale du systeme de Hegel. Toute idee renferme
trois elements, ou pour employer le langage consacre, trois mo
ments. Vous pouvez'ia considerer ou en elle-meme, ou dans son
opposition avec l’idee contraire qu’elle renferme, ou enfin dans
l’union qui les concilie.
Le premier momentest celui de l’idee en soi; le second, celui de
l’idee hors de soi ; le troisieme enfin, celui de l’idee en soi et pour
soi. L’idee existe d’abord d’une maniere simple et immediate, puis
elle se divise et s’oppose a elle-meme; enfin, elle ramene ses deuxi
membres a l’unite. Le moment de l’unite est celui de la vie, de la
realite concrete et individuelle. Celui qui ne considere l’idee que dans
les moments anterieurs ne connait que des abstractions, et voila la
commune infirmite du vulgaire et de ces pMIosophes qui suivent la
logique de l’ecole. Le vulgaire s’en tient aJ cette premiere vue des
choses qui nous les fait connaitre dans un etat de melange et de con
fusion1. C’est la perception des sens. L’entendement s’applique a cette
matiere grossiere, la divise, la decompose. Ici eclatent les oppositions,
toutes’choses paraissent coiitraires, la vie et la mort, le mouvement
�ESSAI DE PHILOSOPHIE RELIGIEUSE.
6S
et le repos, Fame et le corps, le fait et le droit, la societe et la nature,
la philosophie et la religion. Les esprits qui s’attachent a ces opposi
tions ne peuvent manquer de tomber dans le scepticisme, absurde
extremite aussi eloignee du sens commun que de la yraie philoso
phie; mais s’arreter au scepticisme, c’est bien mal connaitre la
nature des choses et la puissance de la pensee; 1’entendement est
au-dessus des sens, mais la raison est aii-dessus de Fentendement.
Ce que Fentendement separe, la raison l’unit; les choses qui semblaient incompatible^ apparaissent comme inseparables; a la confu
sion succede l’ordre, ® la guerre la paix, au doute. la foi,.aux
r angoisses de Fame, auxhesitations du raisonnement la serenite
’ d’une affirmation sure dtelle-meme, la plenitude d’une comprehen
sion parfaite. La vie et la mort ne sont que les deux moments de
l’existence, le fait etle droit, les deux aspects d’une meme necessite,
la societe un progres fait sur la nature, la philosophie un developpe
ment de la religionM
J’entrevois maintenant comment Hegeh< pwtreconduit au prin
cipe de sa logique et de toute sa philosophie, Fidentite des contradic
toires. Trouver dans chaque idee une idee contraire et les unir dans
une troisierne idee, opposer a la these Far|tithese et les reunir dans
la synthese, considerer successivement Fidee ensoi, hors de soi. efc
pour soi, telle est sa methode constants, iffidee a. laq,uelle Hegel
aboutit au terme de chaque opposition, n’est pas autre chose que
l’idee premiere, mais vivifiee par cette opposition elle-meme,
d’abstraite devenue concrete, de morte vivante. Cette meme idee
ainsi transformee traverse une. nouvelle opposition, une nouvelle
contradiction, pour en sortir victbrieuse, et ainsi de suite a l’infini,
depuis Fidee la plus simple, qui contient le germc de toutes les
autres, jusqu’a la plus composee, qui en exprime le plus complet
developpement.,.La; chaine de ces oppositions, c’esMi*science. Elle
consiste a faire voi® F universelie identite : partie d’une idee- primi
tive au plus has degre de la pensee, felle la retrouve au faite,. et toutes.
les idees intermediaires ne sont tousjburs qftie la meme idee qui se
, deploie a l’infini.
1
Cette vue generate me permet de m’orienter au sein de ce vaste
edifice d’abstractions accumulees ou se joue avec une fecondite et une
subtilite inouies la pensee de Hegel. Rien ne resteen dehors de ce
Isysteme, et il y a la, je ne son-ge pas a en disconvenir, un effort im
mense pour tout embrasser et tout expliquer. Voici les grandes lignes
Tome III. — 9e Livraison.
v
5
�66
ESSAI DE PHILOSOPHIE RELIGIEUSE.
du monument. L’ceuvre de Hegel comprend trois parlies: la logi
que proprement dite, la philosophie de la nature et la philosophic de
1’esprit. Le principe premier et dernier des choses, ce que Hegel
appelle Vidte, doit d’abord etre envisage en lui-meme, dans les
profondeurs de son essence non encore manifestee, dans ces lois
necessaires et primitives qui la constituent et qui se reflechissent plus
tard en toutes ses oeuvres. La science de l’idee en soi,. e’est la Logique
pure, clef de voute de tout le systeme. Maintenant l’idee, par une
suite necessaire de sa nature, telle que la logique 1’a decrite et expliquee, 1’idee se developpe, ou pour mieux dire, se brise et met a nu
^element de la contradiction qui etait renferme en son sein. Elle etait
Dieu en soi, elle devient nature; eternelle, elle tombe dans le temps,
iinmuab'le dans le changement. De la la Philosophie de la nature
qui nous developpe la serie des mouvements necessaires de l’idee a
travers tous les degres de l’echelle des etres sensibles. Les lois de
la mecanique, de la chimie, de la physiologie, se resolvent dans
une serie d’oppositions; mais le principe supreme qui preside a ce
developpement vent que la contradiction, necessairement posee,
soit necessairement detruite. L’idee, qui s’ignorait et se niait dans
la nature, retourne a soi pour devenir esprit. La science du re
tour de l’idee a elle-meme est la Philosophie de I'esprit. Les reli
gions, les aits, les systemes, les institutions sociales, ne sont
que les phases diverses de cette evolution que regie une eternelle
et inflexible geometric. L’histoire de Thumanite reflechit celle de
Dieu; e’est une logique vivante, e’est Dieu qui se realise, qui,
parti de soi, revient a soi, refermant ainsi le cercle infini et
eternel.
Je reprends ces grandes divisions : la logique, dans le systeme de
Hegel, tient la place qu’occupe la theodicee dans les systemes ordinaires; elle est la science de Dieu considere en soi, avant la creation,
si toutefois les mots Dieu et creation ont ici un sens. Strange theo
dicee en effet, ou, a la place de ces attributs sublimes de la justice
eternelle, de la bonte infinie, de la beaute pure et sans melange, je
trouve une seche enumeration d’idees abstraites, l’etre, le neant, la
qualite, la quantite, la mesure, 1’identite, la difference. Rien de plus
aride que cette algebre qui ajoute, a la monotonie de notions toujours
indeterminees, l’insupportable uniformite du procede qui les oppose et
les combine sous la loi d’une trichqtomie. toujours renaissante. La
Somme de saint Thomas, qui comprend quelques milliers de syllo-
�ESSAI DE PHILOSOPHIE RELIGTEUSE,
67
gismes a la suite les uns des autres, ou pour choisir un plus conve
nable exemple, les deux cents propositions, corollaires et scolies de
XEthique, sont a cote de la logique de Hegel , des oeuvres pkines de
charme et de vie.
Ces abstractions et la loi qui les enchaine constituent pour Hegel
le fond des choses. Le vulgaire y volt de vaines eombinaisons de
l’esprit; ce sont les veritables realites. Quelle abstraction plus vide,
a ce qu’il semble., que celle de l’etre? Tbut pour Hegel en va
sortir. L’auteur de la Logique semble avoir voulu accumuler ici
tous les sujets de defiance et d’etonnement, D’une idee abstraite,
il pretend faire sortir la realite, et comment, je vous prie? par
1’intermediaire d’une idee encore plus vide, celle du meant. L’idee
confondue avec, Fetre, l’etre avec le meant, le eoncret sortant de
1’abstrait, la contradiction placee a l’origine des choses, voilci
l’epreuve ou Hegel ne craint pas de soumettre noire ben sens ei metre
patience.
L’idee de 1’etre est en effet la plus simply de toutes les idees; toutes
les autres la supposent et elle n’en suppose aucune avant elle. Or,
l’idee de l’etre ou l’etre, car Hegel identifie ici comme toujours ees
deux choses, est identique au neant. Qu’est-ce en effet que Fetre
considere en soi? e’estd’etre absolument indetermine, ce qui n’est ni
fini, ni infini, ni esprit, ni matiere, ce qui n’a ni quantile, ni qualite,
ni rapport. Tout cela peut s’affirmer du meant. Penser au neant, e’est
faire-abstraction de toutes les formes de l’existence, e’est la mhme
chose par consequent que penser a l’etre en soi. D’un autre cote,
Hegel ne nie pas que l’Mre et le. meant, ee qui est et ce qui n’est pas,
me soient deux termes contradictoires. Ils sont a lafois contradictoires
et identiques. La contradiction dans 1’identite, voila la-souve.raine loi
de la pensee et des choses.
Ainsi du sein de 1’idee de l’etre, matiere primitive des choses, sort
Fidee du neant; mais Fetre et le neant ne restent pas en face Fun de
Fautre. L’etre exclut ef appelle le meant; ee double mouvement suscite une troisieme idee que Hegel appelle le devenir et qui reconcilie
les deux autres. Le devenir, e’est Fidee du developpement par lequel
un etre devient ce qu’il n’etait pas. Cette idee implique a la fois celle
de l’etre et celle du meant; elle en est la synthese. Nous, voila sortis
de cette abstraction confuse oil tout se mele et se perd;: nous mettons
le pied sur le terrain de la realite; nous avons affaire a Fetre deter
mine, a la qualite.
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ESSAI DE PHILOSOPHIE RELIGIEUSE.
A travers cette deduction interminable, que je renonce a poursuivre
en detail, l’idee dominante du systeme de Hegel se maintient avec
une fermete singuliere. Partout l’idee traverse les trois moments
necessaires; elle est d’abord l’identite confuse des contraires, puis
elle se divise, pour rentrer finalement dans son identite primitive,
eclaircie et vivifiee. Cette loi domine toutes les spheres de la pensee,
non-seulement la physique, l’astronomie et les sciences naturelles,
mais aussi la psychologie, la morale, le droit, l’histoire de la civilisa
tion, celle des religions et des philosophies.
Il y a trois facultes dans l’esprit humain: la sensibilite qui nous
livre les idees dans leur confusion, l’entendement qui les debrouille
et les oppose, la raison qui les unit.
L’homme est d’abord pour lui-meme unite confuse d’une ame et
d’uncorps: cetteunite se brise par la reflexion; Fame s’oppose le
corps, mais elle s’apercoit que le corps, c’est encore elle-meme, et
alors elle le ramene a soi comme un moment necessaire de son
existence.
Dansl’homme, tout est d’ahord mele: l’instinct, la volonte, la
raison. L’homme existe deja sans doute dans l’enfant, mais d’une
maniere abstraite et indeterminee; il est en soi, il n’est pas pour soi.
L’age de la reflexion arrive; une opposition se declare entre l’instinct
et la raison, entre la nature et la volonte. De la le mal, mais de la
aussi le bien. Le bien suppose le mal; car celui qui fait le bien sans
effort, sous la seule impulsion d’une nature excellente, n’est pas veritablement bon. Ici se verifie avec eclat, suivant Hegel, le principe de
Sa logique. On ne peut concevoir le bien sans concevoir en meme
temps le mal. Le bien en un sens implique done le mal, et cependant
il l’exclut. Il l’exclut et il le suppose, voila la contradiction qu’il faut
resoudre. Hegel y croit parvenir en demontrant qu’au fond l’instinct
et la raison sont identiques. L’instinct, c’est la raison qui s’ignore :
apres s’etre opposee a elle-mdme dans la lutte de la volonte et de la
nature, elle reconnait leur identite, et des lors tout rentre dans l’ordre
au sein de Fame pacifiee; l’instinct comprend qu’obeir a la raison,
c’est etre fidele a lui-meme; la raison comprend qu’elle est faite, non
pour etouffer ou comprimer l’instinct, mais pour le conduire, et cette
harmonie intelligente et volontaire de l’instinct et de la raison, c’est
la vertu, source du bonheur. On s’imagine que le bonheur et la vertu
sont deux choses differentes: philosophie etroite, philosophie de Fen
tendement ! La raison identifie ce que le coeur de .l’honnete homme
�ESSAI DE PHILOSOPHIE RELIGIEUSE.
69
ne separe jamais, le bien-faire et le bien-etre, Taction vertueuse et
la felicite.
Partout a la surface, la contradiction, la difference; partout au
fond, l’barmonie et l’identite. Quoi de plus oppose, a ce qu’il semble,
que la philosophie et la religion? quoi de plus divers que les cultes?
quoi de plus contraire que les systemes philosophiques? En realite,
toutes ces institutions religieuses, dont la variete nous confond, dont
l’opposition nous etonne, ne sont que les membres d’un meme corps,
les moments d’une meme idee. Cette idee, qui se developpe dans la
suite harmonieuse des religions, est la meme qui, sous des formes
plus claires, deploie dans le mouvement regulier des systemes philo
sophiques sa nature toujours diverse et toujours identique. Les lois
de la logique, partout presentes, parce qu’elles sont le fond de
tout, determinent et gouvernent souverainement cette double evo
lution.
Il y a trois grandes religions : la religion orientate, la religion
grecque et la religion chretienne, lesquelles correspondent aux trois
moments necessaires de l’idee logique. La religion orientale, cest
l’idee de Dieu a son premier moment, celui qui comprend tous les
autres dans leur unite confuse. L’homme adore Dieu, mais sans le
connaitre et sans se connaitre soi-meme. Univers, homme, Dieu,
tout cela ne forme encore qu’un tout indecis, la nature. La religion
grecque, c’est l’idee de Dieu au moment de la diremption, de la con
tradiction. Dieu se divise, pour ainsi dire, s’ebranche en mille rameaux, s’oppose a l’homme et a lui-meme; T infini se perd et se
dissout dans le fini. La religion chretienne est par essence la religion
de la reconciliation. Fille de l’Orient et de la Grece, elle les reproduit
etles identifie. Dieu, qui s’ignorait dans les obscurs symboles de
l’lnde, qui errait en quelque sorte hors de soi dans la prodigieuse
variete des divinites contraires de la Grece et de Rome, revient a soi
danS le christianisme pour prendre conscience claire et pleine posses
sion de soi. Aussi, le christianisme est-il la seule religion complete,
la seule vraie, la seule evidente par elle-meme: c’est Dieu se sachant
et s’affirmant Dieu.
Ce qu’on appelle les mysteres de la religion chretienne, ce sont les
lois absolues des choses, obscures pour les sens, absurdes et contradictoires pour l’entendement, claires et harmonieuses pour la raison.
Le premier de ces mysteres, n’est-ce point celui de la sainte Trinite?
Or la sainte Trinite, c’est, sous la forme du symbole, le principe
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' ESSAI DE PHILOSOPHIE RELIGIEUSE.
m&ne de la logique. Le Pere, e’est 1’idee en soi; le Fils, e’est Fide'e
hors de soi, dans sa manifestation visible, sous la double forme de la
nature et de l’humanrte; l’Esprit, e’est l’idee en soi et pour soi, parvenue au terme de son mouvement, se reconnaissant identique dans
tous les degres qu’elle a parcourus. Au sein meme du Pere se retrouvent les trois moments de l’idee, mais sous une forme encore tout
ideale: I’Etre ou la Puissance, objet de la pensee; le Verbe ou l’lntelligence, ou entore la Pensee, engendrde par FEtre; l’Amour enfin,
qui procede de tous deux et qui les unit. Cette Trinity tout ideale se
realise par la creation, royaume du Fils; mais, pour rattacher la
creation & son principe, il faut que le fini se sache infini, que
Fhomme se connaisse Dieu : e’est le royaume de l’Esprit.
Il appartient eminemment & la philosophie de realiser sur la terre
le royaume de 1’Esprit. C’est elle en efiet qui, en rattachant les symboles du christianisme aux lois de la pensee, demontre et explique ce
que la religion ne faisait qu’affirmer, Funion intime de l’homme et
de Dieu. La premiere forme de cette union se trouve dans la Communaute chr&ienne de l’eglise au berceau; la seconde, c’a et6 l’Eglise organisee; la derniere sera l’Etat, oh toutes les croyances religieuses sont appelees h s’allier un jour sous la loi de la raison et de
la liberte.
* Je 1’avouerai i mon premier sentiment, au sortir de ces specula
tions Stranges de FAllemagne contemporaine, e’est de m’etonner que
dans la patrie de Leibnitz elles aient pu captiver si longtemps les
intelligences. Si jene me trompe, la philosophie allemande est depuis
un deml-siecle sous l’empire et comme sous le charme d’une illu< sion, c’esl de croire que la science absolue est possible pour l’esprit
humain. La science absolue, je veux dire l’explication universelle et
adequate des choses, voila la chimere que poursuit depuis Fichte la
philosophie allemande, et chacun des systemes qu’elle a tour a tour
enfantes n’est qu’un effort pour saisir 1’insaisissable fantome.
On dit que cette confiance demesuree dans la pure theorie tient au
genie speculatif de la race germanique, et cette explication est vraie,
mais elle ne suffit pas; car enfin cette terre de Fenthousiasme a
porte de grands critiques, Wolf, Heyne, Paulus; cette race chimerique a prqduit Kant. Je croirais plutot que e’est 1’exces meme dti
doute dans la doctrine de Kant qui a produit dans celle de Hegel
l’exces de l’orgueil dogmatique. Il y a dans la philosophie a tenir
�ESSAI DE PHILOSOPHIE RELIGIEUSE.
,
71
compte de deux elements essentiels : d’un cote,, l’esprit humain avec,
sa nature, ses limites, ses faiblesses de toute sorte; de l’autre, l’ensemble des choses, leur essence, leurs rapports. Reduire l’esprit
humain a connaitre sa constitution dans l’oubli de la nature des
choses, c’est nier la science; concevoir la science comme independante de la nature de l’esprit humain, de ses conditions, de ses lois,
de ses limites, c’est la nier encore, car c’est la rendre impossible et
contradictoire.
La philosophie allemande me donne le spectacle de ces deux
exces contraires. Kant commence par reconnaitre que dans la science
les philosophes n’ont pas su faire la part de 1’esprit humain, la part
du sujet: vue profonde autant que solide, d’ou est sortie une incom
parable analyse de la raison; mais, bientot entraine par son prin
cipe, ce sage esprit oublie sa sagesse au point d’interdire a 1’esprit
humain tout acces dans la realite des choses, Hegel s’est jete a 1’extremite opposee. L’auteur de la Critique, de la Raison pwe osait
a peine affirmer l’existence des objets exterieurs; l’auteur de la
Logique en connait a fond, en explique, en deduit, en demontre
1’origine, l’essence et les lois. Le pare de la philosophie allemande
reduisait la theodicee a soupgonner la possibilite de Dieu; pour le
dernier heritier de cette philosophie, la nature divine n’a pas de
mysteres; le nombre et 1’ordre de ses attributs se decouvrent avec la
meme clarte que les proprietes des courbes geometriques. Kant
enfermait la raison dans le cercle de l’experience; Hegel refuse a
1’experience toute autorite scientifique; tout doit etre demontre en
philosophie, c’est-a-dire deduit des idees pures. Les plus hautes
conceptions de l’esprit humain n’avaient pour le maitre qu’une
valeur relative et subjective; rien de relatif et de subjectif,
si l’on en croit le disciple, n’a de place dans les cadres de la
science.
Ainsi, des deux termes necessaires de toute connaissance, l’esprit
humain et les choses, Kant supprime le second, Schelling et Hegel
retranchent le premier. Fichte marque la transition d’un exces a
l’autre. Fichte en effet, tout en exagerant le kantisme, poursuit la
chimere de la science absolue; mais c’est dans le moi qu’il se flatte
de la trouver. Il supprime comme Kant les choses, mais il en con
serve les idees et prepare la transformation future qui, de ces idees,
va faire les choses elles-memes.
Ainsi, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, et on peut ajouter a ces noms
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ESSAI DE PHILOSOPHIE RELIGIEUSE.
eminents ceux de tous les philosophes de la moderne Allemagne,
ont ce point commun au sein des differences qui les separent: e’est
de croire que la science absolue est possible, e’est de la chercher, e’est
de la construire. De la leur methode commune, aussi chimerique,
aussi vaine que l’objet qu’elle poursuit. Son trait distinctif, e’est la
suppression de l’experience ou du moins la subordination com
plete de l’experience aux donnees de la raison pure. L’Allema
gne a le plus parfait mepris pour l’observation. Tenir compte des
faits, e’est a ses yeux tomber dans l’empirisme, dernier degre de
l’abaissement intellectuel. La science est essentiellement l’explication
des choses; or, l’experience n’explique rien; la science en expliquant
demontre, l’experience ne saurait rien demontrer. L’experience est
enfermee dans des limites necessaires; elle sait ce qui arrive en tel
temps, 'en tel lieu; la science veut des resultats universels et dura
bles ; l’experience est l’ouvrage d’un esprit fini, et partant elle est
toujours relative et toujours subjective; la science est absolue et
objective par essence.
Evidemment, si la philosophie poursuit la science absolue, la me
thode philosophique, e’est la methode a priori, fondee sur les idees
pures, suivant l’ordre des choses, expliquant tout, deduisant tout,
meprisant l’experience, ne reconnaissant aucune limite, aucune con
dition. A une telle science il faut une telle methode; ces deux
chimeres sont faites l’une pour l’autre.
Si je ne m’abuse, le secret de toutes les speculations allemandes est
la : le principe de l’identite de la pensee et de l’etre, commun fondement du systeme de Schelling et de celui de Hegel, le principe plus
dangereux encore de l’identite des contradictoires dont la logique
hegelienne est une perpetuelle application, enfin cette idee eminemment pantheiste du processus des choses qui fait de l’esprit humain le
terme supreme oil les developpements successifs de l’existence viennent se concentrer et se reflechir, tout cela m’apparait comme autant
de suites necessaires de la double illusion que je viens de signaler.
Pour que la science absolue soit construite, il ne suffit pas en effet
que l’ordre des idees exprime l’ordre des choses, il faut que les idees
embrassent, penetrent, constituent les choses; il faut que les idees
soient les choses. Supposez que les choses soient separees ou seule
ment distinctes des idees, un doute est possible sur la conformite
parfaite des idees avec les choses; l’essence des etres est soupeonnee,
entrevue, elle n’est pas saisie, atteinte dans son fond. C’en est done
�/ ESSAI DE PHILOSOPHIE RELIGIEUSE.
73
fait He wteeuce absolue, s’il n’y a pas identite entre les idees et les
choses.
jLa science absolue doit partir d’une premiere idee et en deduire
toutes les. autres. Quelle peut-etre cette idee? la plus comprehensive
et la plus vague de toutes, l’idee de l’etre indetermine. Mais comment
passer de 1’etre indetermine a l’etre reel, de l’abstrait au concret, du
neant de l’existence a la vie? Il y a la une contradiction. Eh bien! au
ytett de la dissimuler, acceptons-lahardiment. La contradiction est a
I origine des choses : que cette contradiction primitive devienne la loi
fondamentale de la pensee et de l’etre, qu’elle se retrouve dans toute
la feature, qu’elle soit la force cachee par qui les idees sortent les unes
Ides autres depuis la plus pauvre jusqu’a la plus riche, de sorte qu’en
definitive le neant soit le prineipe, Dieu le terme, et que le lieant
devienne Dieu.
M^Wais comment l’esprit humain pourra-t-il connaitre et decrire cette
vaste et merveilleuse evolution? a une seule condition, c’est que l’esprit humain soit le degre superieur oil tout aboutit, le dernier cercle
qui enveloppe et penetre tous, les autres, a condition que l’esprit
.humain soit tout, que l’homme.soit Dieu. L’homme divinise, voila le
.dernier mot de la philosophie.allemande.
’ Schelling dit que Dieu, c’est le sujet-objet absolu; Hegel que c’est
l’idee, l’esprit infini. Mais.il faut bien s’entendre. Le'sujet-objet,
.considere avant son developpement, n’est qu’une abstraction, une
identite vide. J’en dis autant de 1’espri.t infini, de 1’ideeen soi. Hegel
lui-meme declare que l’idee en soi est identique au neant. Si c’est la
Dieu, il faut s’expliquer avec franchise mais non, le Dieu de la philosophie allemande n’est pas au commencement des choses, il est a
leur terme. Ce Dieu, c’est l’esprit humain, ou plutoi Dieu est a la
foi&a l’origine, au terme et au milieu, ce qui revient a dire qu’il n’y
a pas de Dieu distinct des choses.
. - Ces etranges doctrines, a defaut de merite plus solide, ont-elles du
moins celui de la nouveaute? c’est encore la une des illusions de la
philosophie germanique.
Rien de plus naif que les pretentions de nos voisins d’outre-Rhin
en fait d’originalite. Dans l’ecole hegelienne en particulier, on les a
portees a leur comble. Hegel ne reconnait en ses Lecons sur Vhistoire
cfe la philosophie que deux grandes epoques, l’epoque grecque et
l’epoque germanique. Or, il va sans dire que la philosophie germanique est comprise entre Kant et Hegel. C’est rayer d’pn trait de
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ESSAI DE PHILOSOPHIE RELIGIEUSE.
plume des annales de la pensee humaine la scolastique et la philoso
phie fran^aise, des noms, par exemple, comme ceux d’Abelard et de
Descartes. Que 1’Allemagne traite avec ce mepris superbe des philosophes fran^ais, cela peut a la rigueur se concevoir; mais rabaisser
aussi Leibnitz, n’est-ce pas l’exces de 1’ingratitude? EUe est d’autant
plus choquante que ces altiers contempteurs de la philosophie du
dix-septieme siecle n’ont pas dedaigne de lui emprunter ses vues les
plus originales. Le principe de l’homogeneite universelie des sub
stances, la loi de continuite suivant laquelle tous les etres s’enchainent et s’echelonnent, le dynamisme interieur qui se fait sentir dans
toute la nature sous l’apparent mecanisme de ses phenomenes, l’analogie profonde des lois de l’univers physique et des lois de l’humanite, toutes ces grandes idees qui sont la force et la richesse du
systeme de Schelling, ne viennent-elles pas de Leibnitz? Un autre
cartesien, Spinoza, n’a-t-il pas aussi a revendiquer sa large part tJalt
dans les speculations de 1’Allemagne? Le principe de l’identite de la
pensee et de l’etre n’est-il pas, je viens de m’en assurer, le propre
fonds du spinozisme? Hegel accuse le Juif d’Amsterdam d’avoir
meconnu le principe occidental, le principe modeme de la personnalite, d’avoir fait de Dieu la necessity ou la chose absolue, sans reconnaitre en lui le sujet, la personne; mais est-ce bien a Hegel qu’il , «
appartient d’elever contre le spinozisme une telle accusation, d’ailleurs
I
si legitime? Cette personnalite qu’il invoque, l’a-t-il respectee dans
Lhomme et en Dieu, lui qui n’a vu partout, du sommet de 1’etre
jusqu’a son plus bas degre, que la rigoureuse geometrie de l’idee?
'9
Tout en se distinguant de Spinoza, Hegel reconnait pourtant a la
philosophie germanique un grand precurseur. Lequel, je vous prie?
fl
ce n’est pas Spinoza, ce sera peut-etre Descartes? non; e’est un Allemand du seizieme siecle, le chimerique auteur de XAurore naissante,
le cordonnier philosophe de Goerlitz, Jacob Boehme 1
Je laisse parler Hegel lui-meme : « Nous verrons, dit-il dans un
discours celebre, que chez les autres nations de l’Europe ou les scien
ces sont cultivees avec zele et autorite, il ne s’est plus conserve de la
philosophie que le nom, 1’idee en a peri, et elle n’existe plus que
chez la nation allemande. Nous avens re$u de la nature la mission
d’etre les conservateurs de ce feu sacre, comme aux Eumolpides
d’Athenes avait ete confiee la conservation des mysteres d’Eleusis,
aux habitants de Samothrace celle d’un culte plus pur et plus eleve,
de meme .que, plus anciennement encore, l’esprit universel avait
�■ ESSAI DE PHILOSOPHIE RELIGIEUSE.
-15.
donnd a la nation juive la conscience que ce serait d’elle qu’il sortirait
renouvele *. »
Ce qui m’etonne dans l’exaltation naive de ces paroles, c’est que
1’histoire de la philosophic, qui a ete cultivee avec tant de patience
et de profondeur par les compatriotes de Hegel etpar Hegel lui-meme,
n’ait pas quelque peu altere la serenite de leur orgueil speculatif.
Sans remonter aux temps reeules de la philosophie grecque, je trouve
audeclin de la civilisation greeque et romaine un mouvement philosophique plein d’analogies frappantes avec celui qui agite depuis
soixante ans l’Allemagne, je veux parler de la philosophie Alexan
drine. Elle aussi avait ete precedee par un radical scepticisme, celui
d’CEnesideme, d’Agrippa et de Sextus. Elle aussi s’elan^a a 1’extre
mity contraire pour embrasser le fantdme de la science absolue. Comme
Hegel, Plotin dedaigne l’experience; comme lui, il pretend saisir
l’ordre absolu des choses, et non-seulement le saisir, mais le deduire
et le demontrer; tous deux admettent dans l’etre un mouvement dialectique qui se reflechit dans la science et identifie la raison et 1 etre
Eans l’idee. A Alexandrie comme a Berlin, on voit clair dans les
mysteres de l’essence divine; on la decompose en trois elements a la
fois distincts et inseparables, trinite primitive qui se retrouve au fond
de toute chose et de toute pensee. Cette trinite devient pour les deux
ecoles une baguette magique qui fait tomber tout voile, eclaircit toute
obscurite, efface toute difference. Les systemes philosophiques se rapprochent, les symboles religieux se confondent, tout se penetre et
s’unit. Au sommet de la trinite, par dela toutes les determinations de
la pensee et de l’etre, regne l’Unite absolue, identite du neant et de
S’ existence, abime ou la pensee humaine, apres avoir parcouru le
cercle necessaire de ses revolutions, vient chercher le repos dans
I’aneantissement de la conscience et de la personne.
Ainsi meme principe, la recherche de la science absolue| meme
methode, la speculation toute rationnelle; memes resultats, l’identite
des contradictoires et l’homme s’unifiant avec Dieu.
Je connais done le principe etle terme de la philosophie allemande:
elle commence, par le scepticisme, elle finit par le pantheisme. Et
voila les deux sources ou s’abreuvent les generations nouvelles :
Kant leur verse le scepticisme, Hegel le pantheisme, et ces deux
1. Paroles prononc^es par Hegel, d Heidelberg, en octobre 1816, aFouverture de son cours d’histoire de la philosophie.
�76
ESSAI DE PHILOSOPHIE RELIGIEUSE.
courants d’idees se rencontrent dans la doctrine du Dieu impersonnel.
Ainsi e’est vainement que Descartes et Malebranche, Newton et
Leibnitz ont epuise leur genie a organiser en systeme la croyance
universelle du genre humain. Le Dieu personnel, le Dieu du bon
sens, le Dieu de la philosophie spiritualiste succombe, et a sa place le
scepticisme et le pantheisme conjures introduisent la substance indeterminee des etres. Est-ce la que je dois aboutir? Ce resultat est-il
le dernier mot de mes longues recherches historiques ? e’est ce que
je veux me demander serieusement une fois dans ma vie. J’ai assez
lu, j’ai assez discute, l’age mur arrive, il faut fermer les livres, me
replier au dedans de moi et ne plus consulter que ma raison.
(La suite a la prochaine Livraison.)
�
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Essai de philosophie religieuse. Premiere partie - Etudes historiques. Sixieme etude - Le scepticisme de Kant
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Saisset, Emile
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Place of publication: [Paris]
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Conway Tracts
Immanuel Kant
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ETHICS AND .ESTHETICS
OB,
ART AND ITS INFLUENCE ON OUR
SOCIAL PROGRESS.
‘Stctnre
DELIVERED BEFORE THE
SUNDAY LECTURE SOCIETY,
ST. GEORGE’S HALL, LANGHAM PLACE,
ON
SUNDAY AFTERNOON, 5th MARCH, 1876.
BY
Dfi. G. G. ZERFFI, F.R.S.L., F.R. Hist. S.
One of the Lecturers in IUI. Department of Science and Art.
LONDON:
PUBLISHED BY THE SUNDAY LECTURE SOCIETY.
1876.
Price Threepence.
�SYLLABUS.
1. The component elements of man’s nature.
2. Reason and imagination.
3. Ethics and ^Esthetics.
4. The Cosmical Laws in Nature and Art.
5. Distinction between “ Sublime ” and “ Beau
tiful.”
6. The most important conditions of Art.
7. Art as it shows itself in the three groups of
mankind.
8. Religion has been always one of the prin
cipal agents in exciting our innate dynamic force
to produce works of Art. The relative changes
in Religions reflect corresponding changes in Art.
9. Oriental and Greek Art. Architecture and
Sculpture.
10. Christian Art, and its distinguishing fea
tures from Ancient Art. Carving and Painting.
11. Gothicism, a revival of Indo-Buddhism and
Renaissance, a revival of Grseco-Romanism. Ideal
ism and Realism.
12. Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus, the English, Ger
mans, Italians, and French on Art. Our social
progress as reflected in Art. Hogarth and Flax
man, Sir Joshua Reynolds and Gainsborough.
Neglect of ^Esthetics. Symmetrophobia. China
mania. Rinkomania. Conclusion.
�ETHICS AND AESTHETICS ;
OB,
ART AND ITS INFLUENCE ON OUR SOCIAL PROGRESS.
HERE can be no doubt that there are con
flicting and often contradictory constituent
elements in man. He is God’s fairest creature, but
often capable of the meanest and most cruel actions,
of which no animal is guilty. This is, and will always
be the case, whenever these conflicting elements
are not properly developed and trained. Man, at
times, is more stupid than an animal; the assertion
that he learnt his first steps in art from plants and
animals, beginning with the lowest animals, is not
a mere hypothetical assertion, but a fact. Man, in
his first periods of development, often acts on mere
unconscious impulses.
He recognises outward
objects, sees them only as detached incoherent units,
and cannot yet observe them as the emanations of
one general idea, according to which they are
formed. At a later period, however, he becomes
conscious of his power to recognise detached objects
in their coherence, and traces in them general
features which unite them into grand harmonious
groups. The more he extends this latter power,
the more he becomes master of the surrounding
phenomena of the outer world, and the more his
artistic powers develope. The force to create is
as inborn in man as the force to think. The former
power is based on imagination affecting his emo
tional element, the latter on reason affecting his
intellectual capacity. Our reason must be guided
and cultivated as carefully as the art of walking.
A child left to itself would scarcely ever learn how
T
�4
ETHICS AND AESTHETICS.
to walk upright—it must be taught to do so. Our
imagination requires the same training as our
reason. Necessity is the mother of invention, and
all that is unnecessary is looked upon as superfluous
and useless. But necessity is not the only mother
that leads us on to activity. As soon as we have
satisfied our wants, they cease to excite us to
further action, and we step into a second stage of
our intellectual faculty; we strive to embellish, to
beautify the means by which we have succeeded in
satisfying our wants. A knife with an ornamented
or carved handle does not cut better than one with
a plain handle; neither does a heavy club kill a
brother more quickly because its handle is ingeni
ously decorated with geometrical patterns ; a plain
pint jar does not hold more water because it is
glazed or painted with flowers and groups of dancing
nymphs, and still even savages decorate, ornament,
and embellish their every-day utensils, their huts,
and their very bodies. The faculty, the striving to
improve upon nature, is as much part of our entity
as breathing, eating, drinking, and money-making.
The power of enjoying and becoming conscious of
the cause of our enjoyment ought to be as much
cultivated as our endeavours to know. To cultivate
our reasoning faculty one-sidedly, and to pretend that
the world is a mere machine, is one of the most objec
tionable fundamental errors, one which would turn
humanity into a grand fraternity of “ Bounderbys ”
continually echoing the question into your ears,
What is the good of flowers on a carpet, or of
mouldings on a house, if only the sewage be good,
the ventilation perfect, and the wet kept out ? So
long as a nation is in a transition state from bar
barism into civilization, these “ Bounderbys ” reign
supreme ; but the moment that higher ethics take
the place of low conceptions concerning God and
the world, the inborn force of aesthetics begins to
ferment, to work in man, and to drive him to resign
�5
ETHICS AND AESTHETICS.
his Hebrew-Puritan coarseness, and to begin to orna
ment, to improve the outer aspect of his houses and
towns, his every-day utensils, and to foster with
great energy the culture of the Fine Arts. As little
as birds can rise and sing in the heavens whilst the
storm is raging, but will wait until it is abated, so
it is with artists; their hearts and imagination are
dumb whilst utilitarian indifference oppresses the
social atmosphere, or political passionsrageinanation.
If the Fine Arts could be imported, as tallow is from
Russia, indigo from India, or turnips from Sweden, we
might do a tolerably good trade ; but the Fine Arts
do not grow like mushrooms in musty and moist,
in dark and hidden places, but only in the broad
daylight of general culture. It is not in vain that
we speak in the artistic world so much of our
“ stars.” Stars shine only when there is night;
the darker the night the brighter are the stars,
which often lose their lustre in the light of a tole
rably bright full-moon of criticism. We can see,
however, the bright dawn of a greater love of art
tinting our horizon; but we must learn, above all,
to look upon aesthetics as an important branch of
our education. We are living in the amiable con
ceit that a knowledge of the “ Beautiful” is a mere
matter of opinion. We wrap ourselves in the say
ing “de gustibus non est disputandum.” But we
dispute about the eastern postures, the real presence,
the right of believing in a personal devil, the es
sence of the Divinity, and the efficacy of embroid
ered petticoats for dancing priests, who patronise a
kind of art which has long gone out of fashion, and
will as little come into general use as “ tattooing ”
or pretty silk tailcoats in union with iron armour,
spears, cross-bows, and helmets.
If there be no absolute law in aesthetics, there is
none in ethics. For ethics, in fact, regulate relative
beauty in actions, whilst aesthetics regulate relative
taste in forms. Ethics teach us how to act rightly ;
B
�6
ETHICS AND AESTHETICS.
eesthetics, how to see and appreciate beauty. The
one discerns between good and evil; the other be
tween beautiful and ugly. The one is philosophy
of action ; the other philosophy of form. The one
may be stated to be the logic of virtue; the other
the logic of taste. But between virtue and taste
there is merely a formal difference : the one affect
ing, as I have said, reason ; the other imagination
both constituent faculties of our mind. Ethics
teach us the idealisation of our nature, elevatingus into true human beings ; and aesthetics teach us.
the idealization of nature, transfiguring her worksinto works of art. The difference between the twolies in the fact that the moral teacher influencesever-changing agents and agencies, whilst the
aesthetical teacher influences the highest god-like
nature of man, through which works, that may de
light humanity for thousands of years, can be cre
ated in stone, on paper, or on canvas. Morality
is an utterly abstract and at the same time re
lative notion, like “ beauty:” but both may be
defined as based on the laws of the “ Cosmosand.
the Greeks used the same word for “ beautiful” asfor the “ universe.” The laws of nature form the
basis of all our right actions, and only so far as our
actions are in accordance with these eternal laws
can we say that we are really moral. It is a factthat the more nations deviated from these laws, the
more they built themselves “codes,” based on a
heated imagination ; the more monstrosities they
created in arts, the more sanguinary cruelties they
perpetrated in history. For morals and arts have
one and the same basis—namely, conformity to the
laws of nature. Morals consist in our becoming
masters of our own nature, and make us fit to live
as human beings in a social condition. This is ex
actly what eesthetics teach us with reference to the
forms of nature. We have to learn how to use the
laws of nature in creating anything so as to make
�ETHICS AND AESTHETICS.
7
it a real work of art. The question whether our
reason or our sentiment was to be most affected by
a work of art led to two different schools, which
still leave it unsettled. Sentiment was to be placed
above sensation, or imagination above emotion ; as
though we could have sensations and emotions with
out our sentiments being aroused by our imagina
tion through outward impressions. The question
cannot rest on effects, but first on causes, producing
certain effects. The cause of all our striving after
emotions is found in the intellectual force with
which we are endowed, and which, driven into
false grooves through an imagination wrongly acted
upon, may seek for emotions which are either false,
ugly, pernicious, or monstrous. Nature everywhere
shows forces forming endless forms in space and
time. Here she differs from art, which has to bring
in space and time the creations of an unlimited
imagination into limited shapes and forms. Tnfinity
is the attribute of nature; finiteness the element of
art. Still, whilst nature in her infinity works
only to transform, or apparently to destroy, art
produces in her finiteness works which, stamped
with the power of intellect, outlast the works
of nature, and can be said to be immortal. How
many beautiful men and women passed away
whilst the marble-wrought gods of Phidias still live
amongst us. Where are TEschylos, Sophokles, Euri
pides, Shakespeare, Schiller, and Goethe ? The crea
tures of their imagination still live amongst us.
We hear the unrestrained curses of “ Prometheus
Bound ” resounding in our hearts ; we mourn with
Antigone ■ we are horrified with Medea; Brutus,
Antony, have vanished, but their memories, their
very speeches, have been recorded for ever by the
immortal Shakespeare ; Mary Stuart has been
clothed in an eternal, never-fading beauty by
Schiller; and Faust and the Devil have become
incarnations of a higher type through Goethe’s
master-mind.
�ETHICS AND AESTHETICS.
Gazing at the heavens on a starry night, we see, in
addition to myriads of sparkling worlds floating in
the air, a great quantity of nebulse. Either decayed
systems of worlds, or worlds in formation. Worlds
which have lost their centre of gravity and fallen
to pieces ; or worlds which are seeking, according to
the general law of gravitation, to form a central
body by the attraction of cosmical ether. The one
phenomenon is that of destruction, the other that of
formation. This double cosmical process is continu
ally repeating itself in the development of art. Art
is like a mirror—whatever looks into it is reflected
by it. If a poor untrained imagination stares into
the mirror, no one must be astonished that poor and
distorted images result. Nature furnishes us with
mortar and stones for the building, but the archi
tect’s intellectual force has to arrange the elements
and to bring them into an artistic shape. Nature
furnishes us with flowers, trees, animals, and men ;
but the artist has to reproduce and to group them so
as to impress the objective forms of nature with his
own intellectual subjectivity. To become thoroughly
conscious of the distinction between the “ sublime ”
and “ beautiful ” is the first step towards a correct
understanding of works of art.
During the long period of the geological formation
of the earth, when mountains were towered upon
mountains, rocks upheaved, islands subsided ; when
air, water, fire, and solid matter seemed engaged in
never-ending conflict—nature was sublime. The
dynamic force appeared to be the only working
element in nature, and the counterbalancing static
force seemed to be without influence. Gradually,
vegetable and animal life in their first crude forms
commenced to show themselves. Zoophytes deve
loped into megatheriums and mastadons. Mam
moths and elks sported on plains which now form
the mountain-tops of our continents.
Scarcely
visible coral insects were still engaged in construct-
�ETHICS AND AESTHETICS.
9
ing mountain chains, and a luxuriant vegetation
covered the small continents which were surrounded
by apparently endless seas. Such changes, trans
formations, and convulsions are gigantic, grand,
awe-inspiring—sublime—but not beautiful. When
ever nature is at work disturbing the air with elec
tric currents or shaking huge mountains so that they
bow their lofty summits, or when the dry soil is rent
asunder, and sends forth streams of glowing lava,
we are in the presence of the sublime—but not of
the beautiful. Whenever man’s nature is overawed,
whenever he is made to feel his impotence by the
phenomena of nature, he faces the sublime. When,
however, the cosmical forces had expended their
exuberant powers, when a diversified climate had
produced those plants and animals that surround
us, when man appeared in his threefold develop
ment, as black, yellow, and white man on this re
volving planet, and by degrees reached his highest
development, then only art acquired, through man’s
consciousness of what is beautiful, a real meaning
and existence on earth. Science eternally tries to
vanquish error. Industry subdues matter, and uses
it for utilitarian purposes : but the vocation of art
is to produce beauty for beauty’s sake, and to idealise
nature.
Nature produces like art. It is characteristic that
some people continually talk of the Divinity as a
“ maker,” which at once shows the low conception
they have of the incomprehensible first cause. We
may talk of a “ watchmaker ” or a “ shoemaker,”
but to speak of a “ world-maker ” degrades the
divinity which endows matter with inherent laws,
and then, according to the immutable law of causation, allows it unconsciously to assume its varie
gated forms. The products of art, on the other
hand, are the results of the conscious intellectual
power of the artist. It is the free yet well-regu
lated consciousness of the artist that elevates his
�IO
ETHICS AND ^ESTHETICS.
productions into works of art. Undoubtedly the
great store-house of the artist is nature ; he learns
from her how to create, but he has to discern, to
combine, to adapt, to select his forms, and to know
the laws of combination, adaptation, and, above all,
selection; for the whole success of an artist, in what
ever branch he works, depends on his power of
selection and rejection. This power of selection
varies in the three groups of mankind.
The negro is triangular-headed (prognathos), with
his facial lines drawn downwards; lie is the fossil,
or the antediluvian man, and as such indulges in an
antediluvian taste ; his mechanical skill is that of
a child; he never goes beyond geometrical figures
and glaringly bright colours. The negro is still the
woolly-headed, animal-faced being represented on
the tombs of the Pharaohs, because his bodily struc
ture and facial lines have not altered during thou
sands of years. In studying his artistic products,
his customs and manners, we are struck with their
resemblance to those which our more direct fore
fathers, the Turanians and Aryans, used when still
in a savage state. They used, and still use, the
same kind of flint instruments ; their pottery is the
same; their clubs, paddles, the cross-beams of their
huts, are adorned with the same rope and serpent
like windings and twistings.
Next we have the Turanian (from “ tura,” swift
ness of a horse); he is square and short-headed,
(brachikephalos), the traditionary yellow man. His
face is flat, his nose deeply sunken between his
prominent cheeks, and his reasoning faculty only
developed to a certain degree. He has small, oblique
eyes, the lines of his face being turned upwards,
expressing cunning and jocularity. He is an excel
lent rider, but a slow, though steady walker. He
looks on nature with a nomadic shepherd’s eye, and
not with that of a settled artist. He possesses
remarkable technical ability, has great powers of
�ETHICS AND ^ESTHETICS.
11
imitation, can produce geometrical ornamentations
of the most complicated and ingenious character,
and excels in a realistic reproduction of flowers,
fishes, butterflies, and birds; he has no sense for
perspective, and no talent for modelling by means
of shade and light. He is incapable of drawing a
dog, a horse, or a human being.
Finally, we have the Aryan, the long or oval
headed man (dolichokephalos), the historical white
man, the crowning product of the cosmical forces
of nature so far as our globe is concerned. His
facial lines are composed of the emblems of the two
conflicting forces working throughout nature, the
static, represented by a horizontal, and the dynamic
by a vertical line, both framed in by an oval. To
him alone we owe art in its progressive develop
ment and its highest sense. He surpasses the two
other groups of humanity not only in technical
skill, but especially in his inventive and reasoning
power, critical discernment, and purity of artistic
taste. The white man was unquestionably the
founder of all the different religious systems. He
tried with his inborn faculty of intellect to answer
the three questions : Where from ? what for ? and
where to ? He measured synthetically the three
dimensions of space and time ; he tried to trace the
three ever-stable and still ever-varying phenomena
of creation, preservation, and transformation. Art
was the most important means to give utterance in
forms to these answers ; and thus the art-forms of
the Orientals, as well as of the Greeks, are but con
tinuous commentaries on their religious conceptions.
It is this fact that necessitates a correct knowledge
of the phases, developments, and changes in the
different religions, as the abstract products of our
endeavours to solve the mysterious questions forced
upon us by nature, and their concrete results in
visible forms by means of works of art. The In
dians, in striving to give shape and form to abstract
�12
ETHICS AND ESTHETICS.
notions, lost themselves through an ill-trained, over
whelming imagination, and produced caricatures.
The Persians, in worshipping the Deity in pure
thoughts, engendering pure words and producing
pure deeds, built magnificent palaces, but scarcely
any temples. We have no representations of their
Divinities ; neither of Ormuzd nor of Ahriman, but
we have Fervers and Devas, the former as winged
human beings, the latter as winged animals or com
positions of animals, chimeras, or as symbols of the
King’s power. The theological, religious, and sym
bolical elements are altogether neglected in the
Perso-Assyrian and Babylonian reliefs. We have
the friends, relations, attendants, and servants, of
the King; tributaries submitting to Kings ; officers
holding fly-flaps of feathers; horses crossing rivers ;
kings hunting and slaying lions ; armies before be
sieged towns; warriors returning from battle; in
fantry and horse with spears, bows and arrows;
boats floating on rivers; galleys going to sea;
damsels and children with musical instruments;
and mathematical tablets with calculations of square
roots. We might study all this and verify what I say
at this moment, if our magnificent British Museum
were not a book, provided with the seven seals of
Sabbatarian bigotry, closed to the nation as a means
of higher education on the Sunday. We should see
in these Assyrian works of art the very opposite of
Egyptian art; the one the outgrowth of man’s capa
city as a human being, and the other the result of agloomy, mighty hierarchy looking on man as created
for another world—neglecting houses, but construct
ing monumental temples in honour of the gods. In
every form Egyptian art reflects the stifling influ
ences of a hierarchy. But the East never succeeded,
whether in Asia or Africa, in freeing itself from the
influence of the marvellous. Now the marvellous
can only form a certain constituent part in man’s
artistic products; so far as it reflects the sublime
�ETHICS AND AESTHETICS.
13
impressions of natural phenomena. These impres
sions, working through our senses on our intellect,
must come under the regulating and checking in
fluences of reason, engendering symmetry, eurythmy,
proportion, action, and expression. The Indians
tried to explain the phenomena of nature in an ab
stract sense, and to bring metaphysics into outward
shapes ; the Persians were bent on the glorification
of power, visible on earth in the person of the despot,
and their sculptures are but monotonous rows of
stiff attendants as far as the men are concerned.
The animals are treated with greater freedom, be
cause the artist was not tied down by court rules or
ceremonials, as in the treatment of the King and
his myrmidons. The Egyptians tried to copy the
material phenomena of nature, brought them into geo
metrical forms, and marked them with realistically
drawn symbols. When a deity as some force of nature
was invested with a form, the form being one with
some religious dogma or mystic emblem of the power
of the gods, such form could not be changed; for it
became in art what technical words are in science.
When once a form with its symbols and emblems
was settled, as that of Brahma, Vishnu, S’iva, Osiris,
or Isis, or the serpent fixed as the symbol of
eternity, the hawk as that of light, the inner spi
ritual life of the artist was tied down to outward
forms with special inward meanings, and the con
straining sway of misunderstood nature on one side,
and the stationary precepts of an omnipotent hier
archy on the other, entangled the artist’s imagina
tion and paralysed every effort of his individual
subjectivity. The different artistic forms of the
Eastern nations became by degrees petrified and
immutable national and religious incrustations.
Even when geometrical figures, flowers or leaves,
and animals were used, the combinations were
marred by a want of harmony between the dynamic
and static elements in their composition. There is
�14
ETHICS AND AESTHETICS.
always a “too much,” rarely a “too little.” The
East rent nature asunder, looked upon matter as
evil, and yet matter was to be used to bring the
eternal spirit into form. The element of S’iva,
Ahriman, or Typhon was to give expression to the
essence of Brahma, Ormuzd, or Osiris. What
wonder, then, that the artists succeeded so badly,
and that their gods looked in abstracto as. well as
in concreto so much like infernal monstrosities., So
long as the Greeks were in these Asiatic fetters
they produced similar forms, as also did Christian
art in its infancy, as may be seen in the South
Kensington Museum in the splendid cast of the
Buddhistic gate of the Sanchi Tope, which is close
to a cast by Veit Stoss, a Nuremberg sculptor of the
fifteenth century. But as soon as the self-conscious
spirit of youthful humanity was aroused in the
Greeks through their poets and philosophers, art
improved in the same ratio as the hierarchical
power and the superstitious belief in their gods
diminished. Feelings and emotions were as much
fostered with the Greeks as the consciousness of
these phenomena. Prometheus may be said to
have been the best and most intelligible emblem of
classic heathen humanity, as Faust may be con
sidered the representative of romantic Christian
humanity. Prometheus longed to bring matter
into form; Faust to know what kept matter and
spirit together, and what became of the spirit if
once freed from matter. Prometheus made man of
clay, stole fire from heaven, and vivified the image
with his stolen fire. Faust knew that the heavenly
fire was a force over which he had no control, and
he called upon a spirit of the lower burning regions
to teach him — “how all one whole harmonious
weaves, each in the other works and lives. The
formal outer-form is the longing of the Greek
Faust, and the spiritual inner-life the aspiration of
the Teuton Prometheus. Architecture and sculp-
�ETHICS AND AESTHETICS.
I5
ture were the distinguishing characters of Greek
art; carving and painting were the elements of
Christian art, especially in its first slow develop
ment, struggling to free itself in architecture as
well as in sciences from the oppressive influences of
an Indo-Egyptian hierarchy. To the immortal
honoui- of that hierarchy it must be recorded that
they helped humanity in the development of art
with all their power. I will not enter into a pain
ful inquiry as to how far they endeavoured, like
the Egyptian priests or the Buddhistic Bonzes, to
divert mankind from thinking and reasoning through
the erection of mighty churches. These edifices
were constructed in the old Egyptian sense so far
as the subterranean vaults were concerned. The
superstructures were simply revivals of IndoBuddhistic rock-hewn temples, placed as detached,
free -standing monuments in the midst of crooked
small streets, with crooked little houses in which
very crooked-thinking beings must have lived, shut
ting out the glorious daylight by means of painted
glass or numberless leaden hexagons—probably so
many symbols of the fetters which humanity had
to shake off through a revival of Grseco-Romanism
in art and in our modes of thinking, building, and
painting. How intimately our intellectual and sci
entific progress is interwoven with our progress in
morals and political freedom may nowhere be
studied to greater advantage than in the artistic
life of the Greeks under Perikles, and the artistic
movement of Italy during the sixteenth century,
when the invention of the art of printing, the dis
covery of America, the study of the ancient classics
and the Reformation brought new life, new ideas
amongst the masses ; and we must all be convinced
that art requires a certain moral and intellectual
condition under which alone it will live. If the
intellectual or moral atmosphere be changed, the
artists either work in an Egyptian or Indo-Assyrian
�16
ETHICS AND ^ESTHETICS.
style. If a continual abhorrence of the body as theseat of thousands of devils be preached, we shall be
furnished by our artists with those emaciated, elon
gated, spider-armed and legged saints that adorned
the churches with their meagre half-starved frames
during the eleventh and twelfth centuries. We
shall have pictures representing men and women
roasted, boiled, quartered, pinched with iron tongs,
or broken on the wheel, or starved in dungeons.
The influence of such an art must have been
terrible on the ethical or moral education of man
kind. For what pity could man have for his fel
low-creatures when his eyes rested on the frightful
scenes of the torments which St. Catherine under
went when broken on the wheel; St. Primatius,
who was burnt alive ; St. Peter, who was crucified
with his head downwards; or St. Lambert, who was
beaten with a club, and so on ? Could men be ex
pected to have treated their wretched fellow sinners
with great kindness, when they could point to a
crucified God, and to his best followers tormented to
death ? How much art was the mere reflection of
this diabolical spirit of the darkest ages, and how
much art again contributed to the demoralised hard
ening of the masses, it would be difficult to decide.
It is a further fact that, with the revival of classic
feelings in poetry and sciences, art turned with
horror from these ugly scenes, and painted the
Virgin with the child, bringing men through a more
humane representation of the divinity into nearer
relations with our higher aspirations. But if the
surroundings of the artists be changed again through
the superstitions of an ignorant mob, the despotic
organisation of a government, or the rule of a wild
and bigoted party, the artistic force will also change
or die out altogether. The artist acts only to a cer
tain extent on the public, whilst the public re-acts
with a combined and often entirely crushing “ vis
inertias ” on the artist. I have only here to mention
�ETHICS AND AESTHETICS.
17
the evils which Puritanism, with its Hebrew hatred of
art and refinement, produced in this once“ merry Old
England.” Artists can often only reflect the intel
lectual atmosphere in which they live. How is a
man who sees nothing but emaciated, beggarly, or
sanctimonious faces, thin limbs, hungry looks, dwel
lings bare of all domestic comfort, decayed brick
houses and crumbling walls, to paint convivial
scenes of happiness and joy ? Or let me draw
another picture; how is a man to paint mighty
dramatic scenes on a canvas, when he has to live in
an atmosphere of so-called modern respectability,
seeing always the same bland smiles around him,
the same trimmed whiskers, the same stiff collars,
with the same faultless but not less stiff bows, hear
ing the same stereotyped insignificant phrases about
the weather, the funds, the high prices of coals or
butcher’s meat, receiving an order for a so-called
nice little picture, with plenty of sentiment in a
dead cock-robin, and the important question put
under it, “ Who killed cock-robin ?” in old Gothic
letters ; or another for a yawning Christ, who, tired
of his daily work, does not enjoy his god-head,
brightly looking towards the hour when he is with
his last breath on the Cross to redeem humanity.
Such a poetical conception, painted yawning, is
truly a sign of our times, but not one of the most
encouraging. We are just passing through a crisis.
We were too strongly Platonists in our notion of
art until recently. Plato used to place artists in
the same category with hair-dressers, cooks, and
eheats, who continually try to belie us. This is a
mean view for so divine a philosopher to take,
but nothing is too mean for a divine philoso
pher to assert when it suits his preconceived hypo
theses. Aristotle improved on Plato, and advocated
“ limitation,” “ order,” and “ symmetry.” Aristotle
already treats of “ reality” in art, which has to as
sume the concrete form of beauty, and wishes that
�ETHICS AND AESTHETICS.
our “imitation. ” (jiipr)cris') of nature should be done
under the influence of purification (icaOapais), and he
admits the effect which art must have on the gene
ral improvement of morals as they work ethically,
pathetically, and practically. Plotinus, of the
Alexandrian school, is next to be studied. Self
motion is with him the essence of absolute beauty,
which self-motion is to be expressed in a work of art.
With him a beautiful work of art is not a mere re
production of reality, but he requires to see in it
the reflection of the “ moving (subjective) spirit” of
the artist j as soon as the moving idea is not to be
traced, he condemns the work as “ ugly.” Influ
enced by the spreading “ spiritualism ” of Christia
nity, he assumes “matter” as “evil,” as the nega
tive element of the “ ideal ” of “ good.” The vivi
fying and idealising element giving form to thoughts
is the essential element of beautv. He goes beyond
the principles of antiquity in sculpture and wishes
the art of painting to concentrate all its efforts on
the expression of an inner life through the eye. For
nearly 1500 years art is left without a theoretical
guide. After a life of beauty in the antique, we
have a revived second life. This resurrection took
place through the Renaissance, this true and mighty
offspring of the Reformation. “ Love,” in its most
sublime meaning, became the fundamental basis of
modern art. It was in this glorious island that
aesthetics received, like “ political economy,” a sys
tematic form for the first time. We have continued
to cultivate the study of political economy, with its
regulations of demand and supply; we have even
gone so far as richly to reward fat cocks and pigs,
cows and bulls, big-eared rabbits, goitered pigeons,
and have our horse, baby, and barmaid shows ; but
we have not continued the study of aesthetics, and
have shut out the very word from our modern phi
losophical writings. Hutcheson, however (16941747), revived the study of the beautiful, and Cousin
�ETHICS AND AESTHETICS.
I9
is honest enough to accord to the Englishman the
priority in having placed sentiment above sensa
tion, and written on the laws of the beautiful.
Hutcheson distinguished the faculty which perceives
pure beauty from the two which were generally sup
posed to comprise the entire soul, namely, under
standing and physical sensibility. The idea that
art would decline when metaphysics, as some mate
rialists chose to call aesthetics, flourished, is not borne
out by facts in art-history ; neither is that perni
cious idea correct, “ that the arts of poetry, painting
and sculpture may exclusively flourish under a
despotic government.” Those who have studied art
history may point to the period of Perikles, under
whom art flourished, and attained the very highest
development in sculpture and architecture. Art
began to flourish during the Middle Ages in the freetowns of Germany and Italy, and not under the
despotic sway of the Imperial House of Hapsburg.
French art revived under the Republic and during
the Liberal Government of Louis Philippe; it flour
ished, and continues to flourish, under the sway of
the liberal-minded Hohenzollerns in Prussia; it was
neither under the despotic King John, nor under
Henry VIII., but under the great and immortal
Queen Elizabeth that Shakespeare wrote his master
works, his divine historical paintings in words.
Freedom of thought in poetry and art may exist
often under a despot, whilst even a Commonwealth,
if swayed by purely utilitarian ideas, will stifle and
kill art altogether. Quetelet is incorrect in saying
that “modern art has suffered from a too servile
imitation of the ancients.” Art has suffered
from a neglect of the study of the antique, and
from the false notion that a slavish imitation
of nature could be art. Whilst Germans and French
continued in the path which Hutcheson was the
first to point out, and introduced the study of
aesthetics into all their schools, whilst no great
�20
ETHICS AND AESTHETICS.
French or German philosopher could dare to separate
ethics and aesthetics, our great thinkers consider the
emotional beneath their dignity. They propound
that only what can be weighed, demonstrated, or
calculated deserves an earnest man’s attention. It
was that matter of fact, philosophical Bounderby,
Feed, who said that the “ Fine arts are nothing else
but the language of nature, which we brought into
the world with us, and have unlearned by disuse,
and so find the greatest difficulty in recovering it.
Abolish the use of articulate sounds and writing
among mankind for a century and every man would
be a painter, an actor, and an orator.” It is per
fectly astounding at times to see what some of our
authorities venture to put on paper. Is there a
single fact in the whole history of humanity to bear
out this bold paradoxical assertion of a not entirely
dementicated writer. But the mischief was done.
In vain did Sir Joshua Reynolds try through theory
and practice to raise art from the contempt into
which it had fallen with us; in vain did many
masters like Gainsborough paint; in vain did Flax
man with his chisel endeavour to revive classic
sculpture, in surpassing many antique products and
emulating the very best works of antiquity; in
vain did Haydon sigh for higher aims in art, for
historical paintings, and sacrifice himself at last,
seeking despairingly death rather than a life under
the baneful influence of indifference. Hogarth, this
immortal Walter Scott in colours, Shaftesbury,
Henry Home, and Edmund Burke also contributed
some extraordinary theories on the study of aesthetics.
It was the pride of Hogarth to have discovered the
t( serpent-line,” or rather the waving line, as the
line of beauty; so that a wriggling worm is the
eternal prototype of beauty. The French early
advocated a coarse realism, whilst the Germans are
often too metaphysical and, to the detriment of
technical execution, lay too much stress on the idea
�ETHICS AND AESTHETICS.
21
which the artist intends to carry out. We have in
later years made gigantic strides towards a correct
study and appreciation of taste in general. We
have done much towards an improvement in art.
We possess more means for cultivating art than any
other nation. No second British Museum, no
second South Kensington Museum exists in the
world. We need only employ the same energy
with which we collect old, quaint-looking China,
always with a keen eye to business, to attain great
artistic results. We admire plates dressed as ladies
in brocade and silk with flounces and lace, and
ladies or mandarins walking about like tea-pots or
flower-vases. Our symmetrophobia, which makes
us hate every straight line, and our Chinamania
are excellent signs, not less than our Rinkomania.
and Cookomania. We have at last awakened to
the emotional, if not yet in the right, at least in a
better direction. It is no more the lisping spiritual
adviser that interests us at a game of croquet. We
prefer an old plate with bright flowers to him, and
paper our walls with cups and saucers instead of
whitewashing them; we do not discuss any longer
the last dull sermon ; we slide on little wheels on
asphalte-ice, and prove to the world that with horse
racing, rowing, and rinking we intend to be the
ancient Greeks in modern Ulster coats ! All these
freaks of a misdirected taste will die out; and now
that the emotional is aroused, it will, when directed
into a proper groove, produce marvels. We had
once a Michael Angelo in words, what hinders us
from having a Shakespeare in colours. Nothing
but the indifference and tastelessness of the public.
Let us only treat aesthetics at the central seats ot
our learning, in our colleges, but essentially in our
ladies’ schools, with the same fervour as ethics, and
cur symmetrophobia, Chinamania and Rinkomania
will soon become matters of the past. There ought
not to be a town with a mayor in this wealthy
�22
ETHICS AND AESTHETICS.
kingdom that has not its public library, its museum,
and, above all, its picture-gallery filled with the
products of our talented, striving, home artists.
Wedgwood made his fortune, and raised English
'china to works of art, through English artists;
Minton did the same; and the Doulton manufactory
of terra-cotta, &c. has recently sent for the Inter
national Exhibition at Philadelphia works of art,
exclusively the work of English artists, that will do
honour to our progress in this long neglected branch.
We must try to support talent wherever we find it,
and not only pay fabulous sums to those who
happen to be fashionable, but to all those who strive
to improve their artistic powers, and could do so
still more if they received half the support an old
China tea-pot or a Japanese monstrosity is capable
of commanding, or is afforded to the establishment
of rinks, which display angular gymnastics to the
detriment of our sound limbs. Courses on aesthetics
proving their identity with sound ethics, arousing
and satisfying our emotional nature in a higher
direction, would be of inestimable advantage to our
political economy, our taste, and our fame as an
artistic nation.
In conclusion, I may draw your attention to the
three different points from which we may study
aesthetics. We may do this from a realistic, an his
torical, or a philosophical point of view.
Realism and idealism may be traced in a con
tinual conflict in the domains of aesthetics as in
the domains of ethics. The realistic school of art
has in later years had an immense influence with
us. In the same ratio, I may say, as the realistic
school in science. But whilst the realistic school in
science continually tries to prove some general pro
position, which is to be converted from a mere
hypothesis into a systematically proven theory, art
critics have gone so far as to demand from artists
the very stratification of rocks, or of the different
�ETHICS AND .ESTHETICS.
23
kinds of soil, to such an extent that the farmer
should be able to recognise the ground in which tosow his oats or wheat. Pictures, according to these
gesthetical wiseacres, should be geological maps or
mineralogical surveys; as far as flowers are con
cerned they ought to be perfect specimens fit for a
herbarium ; and as to the human body they should
present correct diagrams of veins and sinews and
strongly-protruding muscles. When these critics
take up the archaeological branch of art they advo
cate with indomitable tenacity the old forms and
check the imagination wherever they can. Art is
only to be a reflex of old Greek or Gothic forms, of
Chinese or Indian curiosities, or a slavish reproduc
tion of the Renaissance. The self-creative origi
nality of the artist is neither guided nor even taken
into consideration by this school.
The art-historians proceed in the right direction.
They endeavour to bring before our eyes the past,
so as to enable us to understand the present and to
influence the future of our art. But the historians
have driven us into two divergent backward direc
tions. They either advocate the antique, or they
are consistent Goths—sham Goths generally; the
one holding that everything beautiful must be a
fret, a meander, or a Korinthian pattern, or they
delight in symbolic trefoils, finials, pinnacles, but
tresses, thin and lofty spires, pointed arches, and
darkish-painted windows; neither seeing what an
anachronism is advocated. The philosophical school
at last often indulges in tall phrases—the more un
intelligible the better. We hear of the depth and
breadth of the picture, of deep sentiment and nice
feeling, of perspective in the clouds, &c. We are
startled with hypothetical paradoxes, with specu
lations of the wildest sort on grouping, expression,
and the flowing lines of the composition. As on
theological and medical matters, everyone thinks
himself justified to have an opinion of his or her
�■24
ETHICS AND AESTHETICS.
own on art matters ; as though ethics and aesthetics,
like medicine, were not the results of thousands of
years—now progressive, then again retrograde, but
always onward striving movements of humanity.
Music, poetry, and art have, as well as our morals,
laws which must be known and studied. Music
speaks in sounds, poetry in words, art in forms,
morals in actions. But without harmony, music
would became dissonance; without rhythm, poetry
■would be but an inflated prose ; art without aesthe
tics, a vulgar and objectionable caricature ; and our
morals without ethics, an arbitrary confusion of
whimsical actions. Ethics and aesthetics will fur
nish us with that bright and real worship of God
and his nature, reflected in our creative powers,
for which so many of us yearn with eager hearts;
they will bring to us that bright future in which
men, freed from all fetters of prejudice and super
stition, will unite reason, as the father of science,
with emotion, as the mother of art.
SUNDAY LECTURE SOCIETY,
To provide for the delivery on Sundays in the Metropolis, and
to encourage the delivery elsewhere, of Lectures on Science,
—physical, intellectual, and moral,—History, Literature,
and Art; especially in their bearing upon the improvement
and social well-being of mankind.
THE SOCIETY’S LECTURES
ARE DELIVERED AT
ST. GEORGE’S HALL, LANGHAM PLACE,
On SUNDAY Afternoons, at FOUR o'clock precisely.
(Annually—from November to May).
Members’ £1 subscription entitles them to an annual ticket
(transferable and admitting to the reserved seats), and to eight
single reserved-seat tickets available for any lecture.
For tickets and the published lectures apply (by letter, enclos
ing postage-stamps, order, or cheque), to the Hon. Treasurer, Wm.
Henry Domville, Esq., 15 Gloucester Crescent, Hyde Park, W.
PRINTED BY c. W. REYNELL, LITTLE PULTENEY STREET, HAYMARKET.
�
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Victorian Blogging
Description
An account of the resource
A collection of digitised nineteenth-century pamphlets from Conway Hall Library & Archives. This includes the Conway Tracts, Moncure Conway's personal pamphlet library; the Morris Tracts, donated to the library by Miss Morris in 1904; the National Secular Society's pamphlet library and others. The Conway Tracts were bound with additional ephemera, such as lecture programmes and handwritten notes.<br /><br />Please note that these digitised pamphlets have been edited to maximise the accuracy of the OCR, ensuring they are text searchable. If you would like to view un-edited, full-colour versions of any of our pamphlets, please email librarian@conwayhall.org.uk.<br /><br /><span><img src="http://www.heritagefund.org.uk/sites/default/files/media/attachments/TNLHLF_Colour_Logo_English_RGB_0_0.jpg" width="238" height="91" alt="TNLHLF_Colour_Logo_English_RGB_0_0.jpg" /></span>
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Conway Hall Library & Archives
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2018
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Conway Hall Ethical Society
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Ethics and aesthetics; or, Art and its influence on our social progress. A lecture delivered before the Sunday Lecture Society, St. George's Hall, Langham Place, on Sunday afternoon, 5th March, 1876
Creator
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Zerffi, G. G. (Gustavus George)
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An account of the resource
Place of publication: London
Collation: 24 p. ; 19 cm.
Notes: Part of the NSS pamphlet collection. Presented in Memory of Dr. Moncure D. Conway by his children, July Nineteen hundred & eight.
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Sunday Lecture Society
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1876
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N703
CT10
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Ethics
Aesthetics
Philosophy
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English
Aesthetics
Art
Conway Tracts
Ethics
NSS
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Title
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Victorian Blogging
Description
An account of the resource
A collection of digitised nineteenth-century pamphlets from Conway Hall Library & Archives. This includes the Conway Tracts, Moncure Conway's personal pamphlet library; the Morris Tracts, donated to the library by Miss Morris in 1904; the National Secular Society's pamphlet library and others. The Conway Tracts were bound with additional ephemera, such as lecture programmes and handwritten notes.<br /><br />Please note that these digitised pamphlets have been edited to maximise the accuracy of the OCR, ensuring they are text searchable. If you would like to view un-edited, full-colour versions of any of our pamphlets, please email librarian@conwayhall.org.uk.<br /><br /><span><img src="http://www.heritagefund.org.uk/sites/default/files/media/attachments/TNLHLF_Colour_Logo_English_RGB_0_0.jpg" width="238" height="91" alt="TNLHLF_Colour_Logo_English_RGB_0_0.jpg" /></span>
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Conway Hall Library & Archives
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2018
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Conway Hall Ethical Society
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Gottfried Wilhelm Leibnitz
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Kroeger, A. E.
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Place of publication: [Boston]
Collation: 36 p. ; 22 cm.
Notes: Includes bibliography (p.1). From the library of Dr Moncure Conway. From North American Review,108, no. 222 (January, 1869).
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[Ticknor and Fields]
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1869
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CT27
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Enlightenment
Philosophy
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Conway Tracts
Enlightenment
Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz
Philosophy
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Haeckels
Coptributicp
To Religiop
A. S. MORIES,
Author of “A Religion that Will Wear”
[issued
for the rationalist press association, limited]
WATTS & CO.,
17, JOHNSON’S COURT, FLEET STREET. LONDON, E.C.
1904
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CONTRIBUTION
RELIGION
S. MORIES
Author of “ A Religion that Will Wear
[ISSUED FOB TSE RATIONALIST PRESS ASSOCIATION.> limited]
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WATTS & co.,
17, JOHNSON’S COURT, FLEET STREET, LONDON, E.C.
1904
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TO THE MEMORY OF
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WILLIAM HASTIE, D.D.,
PROFESSOR OF DIVINITY, UNIVERSITY OF GLASGOW,
SCHOLAR, THINKER, AND POET,
WHOSE GENEROUS AND STIMULATING FRIENDSHIP
I DESIRE THUS TO ACKNOWLEDGE.
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�CONTENTS
PAGE
CHAPTER I.
What
is the
Essence of Religion?
7
CHAPTER II.
Haeckel’s Contribution
of
Science
to
Religion—The Contribution
------
13
CHAPTER III.
Herbert Spencer’s Contribution to Religion—The Con
tribution of
Agnosticism
-
-
*
27
CHAPTER IV.
Hegel’s Contribution to Religion—The Contribution of
Psychology
-
-
-
*.
.
*
48
CHAPTER V.
The Mystics’ Contribution ’uo Religion—The Contribu
tion of
Spiritual Insight
.
.
-
.
59
CHAPTER VI.
Wanted—A New Butler
69
�PREFACE
“ Too far East is West ” is a proverb which has its
counterpart even in philosophy. One object of this little
volume is t® show, however inadequately, that a rigorously
applied Materialism ends of necessity in Idealism—that,
however they may seem to differ in their methods, Science
and Religion are in the end inseparable.
The title adopted does not cover the full scope of the
argument, but it draws the reader’s attention to its most
important illustration.
Professor Loofs, in his Anti-Haeckel (English edition),
makes it plain that he does not deal at all with Haeckel’s
“standpoint,” nor with his “view of the world,” but
merely with “ the audacious statements he has made regard
ing Christianity and its history.’1 My purpose is exactly
the reverse. It is of Haeckel’s “ view of the world ” that I
propose to treat. For that is the one essential matter in his
whole argument. It is there that he has to be met, not in
his incursions into theology, a subject which he frankly
admits “in the strict sense is quite out of my line.” I aim
here at supplying a corrective to the anti-religious interpre
tations that have been put on Haeckel’s main thesis, and
at supplying that corrective in his own words, as well as
5
�6
PREFACE
by means of the analogous and most deliberate declarations
of Herbert Spencer.
While I take the contention here expounded to be
Haeckel’s own contention, I desire to make it clear that
for the opinions here expressed the Rationalist Press
Association is to be held in no way responsible. That
Association has justified its title to the name Rationalist by
its catholicity in allowing this expression of opinion to be
published under its auspices.
A. S. Mories.
�Chapter I.
WHAT IS THE ESSENCE OF RELIGION?
“ Philosophy is life’s one match for Fate.”—Meredith.
Withes u ch an object before us as is indicated in the
following pages, it might seem more fitting to post
pone the attempt to answer this question to the close
than to deal with it at this early stage. But while it
is clear that the answer we propose to suggest cannot
have its full force at the outset, it is almost necessary to
indicate here the line we propose to follow, so that the
leading illustrations of which the various succeeding
chapters consist may be the more intelligible and
their force be the better appreciated.
These illustrations, as will be seen, are taken from
types of thought and methods of investigation widely
separated, some of them being often regarded as
mutually exclusive.
But as the religious instinct is, in one form or
another, inherent in the human mind, and can be
met with at its best in the strongest minds of each
age, we take these extreme illustrations designedly.
We have endeavoured to reduce their hard-won con
victions to what may be called their common denomi
nator—to the conceptions, that is to say, which are
vital and common to them all; and these we claim as
the essence of religion—that of which all its historical
forms are more or less refracted images.
There is nothing new, of course, in the idea of the
simplification and condensing of religious belief. The
process is a familiar one in the history of the Church.
There is Jiardly a doctrine of the ancient creed that
7
�8
WHAT IS THE ESSENCE OF RELIGION ?
has not been eviscerated of that which its pious
holders once regarded as sacred and essential. In the
days of the first Apostles themselves the process was
already in full force. The “ Second Coming,” which
for a time was looked for at any moment, and in the
most realistic form, had, perforce, to merge itself in
the larger, and to them more prosaic, movement of
human history
The story of the Final Judgment, the “ Dies iron
dies ilia,” with all its lurid realism, has overpowered
the imagination of the Church for ages in a way that
no attempt to unfold the eternal issues of human
character will perhaps ever do, so that the minds of
the diplomatists of Church dogma may remain com
paratively easy. And yet the story is a parable from
beginning to end. Anselm’s “ Cztr Deus Homo ?” with
its forensic exactitude and logical presumption, so
long dominating the Church’s thought, has been
superseded by the more searching question, “ Quomodo
Deus Homo?” the answer to which is really the crux
of modern Christianity.
This revolution, however, has. been intramural.
But the course of modern thought has carried us far
beyond the internal controversies of Church or creed.
The Churches have always been the home of miracle.
And nothing so characterises the whole course of
modern thought as the decay and steady disappear
ance of miracle.
Outside the bounds of the Church no well-educated
person dreams of accepting any miraculous narrative.
He is convinced that “whatever happens or ever
happened happens naturally.” This difficulty in
Scripture is steadily growing. It covers not merely
the miraculous narratives themselves, but the “ in
spiration” of the books which contain those narra
tives. Thus the very “ seat of authority” in religion
�WHAT IS THE ESSENCE OF RELIGION?
9
has been undermined, and we are driven to look else
where for the essence and foundation of the faith.
Religion, we are compelled to admit, is one of the
natural outcomes of the human spirit. From the
point of view of ordered thought, then, where is the
essence, not merely of Christianity, but of religion
itself to be found, and in what does it consist ?
Many have been the attempts to define the essence
of religion. That essence, we believe, can only be
found in some conception or conceptions that are
perfectly consistent with reason and in harmony with
observed facts, and are at the same time the most
universal expression of the religious instinct. Such
observed facts, explanatory of and illustrated in the
various historical and traditional religions, and
expressed in their most condensed form, we find to be
these :—
(1) The perception of the intelligibility, and finally
of the unity, of the universe—“ The One.”
(2) The consciousness, more or less vivid, of man’s
own kinship with this “ Unity ” or “ One.”
These two conceptions will be found to form a
touchstone for the classification of the various phases
of religious belief.
Those forms which the religious instinct has
assumed, and which are known as Fetichism, Poly
theism, and finally Monotheism, will be found to
resolve themselves, from the speculative point, of
view, into more or less effective and consistent modes
of realising the first of these. This great series of
religions which culminate in Judaism and Moham
medanism have as their common feature the tendency
towards the worship of an objective and transcendent
God—a God external to the worshipper, and exercising
an authority kin to that of a lawgiver.
For examples of the second we turn to Brahmanism,
�10
WHAT IS THE ESSENCE OF RELIGION?
Buddhism, and all the various forms of ancient and
modern mysticism. Their predominating thought
has been the more or less vivid consciousness of the
soul’s own kinship with the eternal—with God. The
strength of Christianity lies in its combination of
both, and especially in the firmergrasp and the bolder
assertion of the latter of these two truths. The
feelings which gave birth to these two complementary
forms of the religious instinct seem to be, as it were,
engrained in the nature of man.
For we find them in very early stages of his
development. Their appearance in history does not
seem to be a question merely of time. We cannot say
that either is the precursor or the resultant of the
other. And though classifications of national or racial
thought are elastic, not mechanical, the one is no doubt
more characteristic of certain great divisions of the
human race, and the other of others.
But both satisfy profound aspirations and answer
constant demands of the human spirit. Both are
undoubted manifestations of the Divine through the
human heart.
If we are to give each its place in the hierarchy of
ideas, we cannot hesitate to accord the place of
honour to the latter of the two—npt as a matter of
mere individual preference, but as its spiritual and
even philosophical right.
For immanence is more profound and commanding
than transcendence. Kinship and sonship are more
purely spiritual conceptions than mere acknowledged
dependence on a creator.
The human heart yearns for that which it long
since learned to call a Divine Fatherhood. That
Fatherhood is the pictorial and most endearing name
for a kinship which is dynamic and fundamental.
And even though the thought of it should be veiled
�WHAT IS THE ESSENCE OF RELIGION?
11
under the cold philosophical garb of “ Unity,” the
warrant for all that we mean by Fatherhood is still
there- Science, and even philosophy, may know
nothing directly of a Divine Fatherhood ; but science
and philosophy combine to establish a principle of
what they call “cosmic unity,” which not only covers
it, but in some respects may be said to bring it nearer
still to our hearts than any but the most saintly
mystic has ever dared to conceive. For it represents
us as not only kin with the Divine, but one with it.
In doing so, Science certainly raises other and
serious questions. To these we shall refer later.
The one thing we desire to emphasise here is that
these two main types of religious thought are not
only not mutually incompatible, but are beginning to
disclose their fundamental harmony, and to be seen
as complementary aspects of a thought which is
deeper than either and embraces both. The true
Catholic religion is that which finds room for both.
In doing so, it faithfully reflects the very texture of
our innermost nature. For we ourselves are living
epitomes of these two principles or forms of thought.
We are both immanent in, and transcendent to, our
selves. And the religion that is to satisfy the rounded
thought of man inust assimilate and embody both.
The conception of transcendence satisfies the indi
vidualistic, objectivating element of our being. That
of immanence ministers to a still deeper need, and
witnesses to a still deeper truth—that of our conscious
possession of, and kinship with, the Divine. In face
of modern thought, the faith that embodies and
balances both these principles is the faith of the
future. Such a faith is entirely consonant with
science, and, at the same time, expansive enough
for the most devout believer. It consecrates science
and makes faith rational. Further, we hope also to
�12
WHAT IS THE ESSENCE OF RELIGION ?
show that these two conceptions are but the religious
embodiments of two still more fundamental concep
tions which have exercised, and still exercise, an
equal command over philosophic thought. The
cleavage which their application has caused in the
sphere of religion is matched in the world of thought
by a similar phenomenon.
The earliest problem which presented itself to the
minds of thinking men was how to explain the rela
tion between nature and that which was recognised
as above nature, between the visible and the invisible,
between the objective world and the subjective ego.
The philosophies of the world have oscillated age
after age round this problem. Of this oscillation and
steady evolution we shall give a rapid sketch in
Chapter IV.
The two main types of mental outlook there set
forth are the very same types which are illustrated
in the great divisions of religions which we have indi
cated here.
The world’s religious thinking and the world’s
philosophic thinking are thus seen to be but the
appropriate expressions, in their respective spheres,
of the inherent, mental outlook.
If this be so, it becomes evident that religion is an
equally fit subject for analysis with philosophy ; and
the religion that aims at expressing the highest
reason of man is the ideal religion. Christianity, if
it is permanently to hold the field, must fulfil this
condition. In order to effect this, it must be purged
of its non-essentials. Towards this consummation
modern Rationalism and science have given valu
able aid.
The typical and leading examples of this aid we
proceed to consider.
�Chapter II.
HAECKEL’S CONTRIBUTION TO RELIGION—
THE CONTRIBUTION OF SCIENCE
“ Le philosophe doit tater toutes choses, meme les plus poetiques, avec
les antennes de la pensee froide et curieuse.”—Nietzsche.
Strong minds sum up in their own comprehensive
and condensed experience the more scattered and
timid thoughts of common men. It is this that con
stitutes such men not only the result and expression
of the generation they are born into, but the most
dominant intellectual force of their day. In the
scientific world there have been many such men, who
not only stood for the prevailing thought of their time,
but, by a happy exercise of the imagination, discounted
the future, and set other and less venturesome minds
on new and prolific lines of thought. Of this type
Haeckel is probably to-day the most pronounced
instance that could be cited. He has been a scien
tific man all his days. He has lived through a time
when the floodgates of scientific discovery have been
wide open, and he has indulged the daring gift of
generalisation to an extent which places him among
the thinkers as wrell as the observers of his time. On
what ground, however, do we speak of his “ Contribu
tion to Religion ”? And what is the nature of that
contribution, if any?
To enable us to answer this question it is not
necessary to give any resume of Haeckel’s scientific
work. That is written at large in many well-known
13
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. ' ‘ • :^-. •" ’. - '* .
14
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HAECKEL’S CONTRIBUTION TO RELIGION
works, and spread over a long series of years. It is
sufficient for our purpose to take up the parable at the
point, or points, where his latest works begin to
impinge, as is generally believed, on the central con
ception of religion. The only proviso we make at this
stage is that the man who insists on treating the
current dogmatic tenets of the Church as the central
conceptions of religion need proceed no further with
us here. The conflict of the day is not with these,
but with something far more vital. It is the citadel
that is at stake, not the outworks. The “ miraculous ”
outworks of religion are to-day, indeed, ignored. Like
the German colonies, they cost more to defend than
they are worth. They are a constant drain on the
reserves of faith. Gradually scientific discovery and
literary investigation have succeeded in banishing the
miraculous from shelter after shelter. One of the
most persistent refuges was the sphere of what is
called organic nature. Here, at least, it was believed
a divine intervention must be accepted as indispensable.
Life must be a special creation, and the occasion of
its first appearance a red-letter day in the annals of
the divine. Alas ! even here Miracle found no rest
for the sole of her foot. All clear demarcation
between organic and inorganic disappeared, and we
were thrown back on the all-embracing doctrine of
evolution, which in its protean application covers
everything, from the inanimate clod to the most perfect
human frame. But even then there was one unques
tioned reservation to which for long no one had
dreamt that science could ever assert a claim. The
soul of man was surely beyond the reach of physical
science. Even the keenest scientific investigators
were content at this point to accept the apparently
inevitable. Mind, they seemed to agree, was sui
generis. And a new genus such as this presupposed
�HAECKEL’S CONTRIBUTION TO RELIGION
15
a new effort of the generator. Here again, however,
latest science maintains, in the words of Haeckel,
that “ Man has no single mental faculty which is his
exclusive prerogative.” “ Man’s power of conceptual
thought and of abstraction has been gradually evolved
from the non-conceptual stages of thought and ideation
in the nearest related mammals,” and differs from
them “ only in degree and not in kind, quantitatively
not qualitatively.” One of the last barriers for faith
seems here to be broken down, and the very soul of
man made continuous with the instincts of the brute
creation, and all these in their turn merely the out
come of a material combination.
But the last word of Haeckel is more searching still.
The hitherto undisputed assumption of science has
been dualistic. The sharpest investigation and keenest
criticism agreed on the two fundamental factors of
the universe, matter and force, or matter and motion.
Given these, science could construct the universe—
matter as the raw material, and energy or force as
the moving power. It is here that Haeckel comes in.
With him any form of dualism is intolerable. Unity
or Monism is his all-embracing principle. And his
special contribution to the everlasting riddle of the
universe is to transfer the whole ultimate issue down
to one clear point, beneath even the accepted funda
mentals of his scientific brethren. The way, indeed,
has been to some extent prepared for the admission
of a larger and more profound conception. Physicists
themselves have declared that it is becoming more and
more difficult to determine the supposed immutable
boundary between matter and energy. The forms of
matter are found to be so rarefied and impalpable that
we pass insensibly from matter to energy, and from
energy to matter. Haeckel combines the two prin
ciples of the persistence of matter and the conservation
�16
HAECKEL’S CONTRIBUTION TO RELIGION
of energy under a single generalisation, which he
calls “ the law of substance.” The discovery and
establishment of this law is, he maintains, “ the
greatest intellectual triumph of the nineteenth
century, in the sense that all other known laws of
nature are subordinate to it.” “ Substance ” is thus
defined by Haeckel to be that original unitary whole
whose first differentiation is into what he declares are
really but two phases or conditions of itself—viz.,
ponderable matter and ether. The difference between
these two things is described as merely a difference in
the intensity of the condensation of the original
simple “ substance.” This point in his exposition is,
to all appearance, an assumption. It is of essential
importance to the argument, however, to note that this
ponderable matter and ether “ are endowed with sensa
tion and will,” though naturally of the lowest grade ;
they “ experience,” they “ strive,” they “ struggle.”
This definition is so far satisfactory, inasmuch as
all that evolution afterwards shows to have been
taken out of “ matter ” is here declared to be originally
in it. And probably there is no part of his latest
book so interesting, from the philosophical point of
view, as that in which he sets forth with the keenest
appreciation the remarkable anticipation of his funda
mental conception of “substance” in the work of
“ the great philosopher, Baruch Spinoza.” And the
astonishing thing is that Mr. McCabe, his British
champion, totally ignores this vital part of his teaching,
and does not even name Spinoza. Now, Spinoza was
a passionate Monist before the term was heard
of. And the striking thing is that that powerful
thinker had not had the advantage which the advance
of modern science has given to the philosopher of
to-day. What they are driven to by the steady com
pulsion of wider and wider generalisation of physical
�HAECKEL’S CONTRIBUTION TO RELIGION
17
laws Spikoza reached, we may say, through intuition,
the sheer force of the higher reason. His phraseology
for the two great phases of the world-substance is
different from that of Haeckel and his school.
Spinoza called matter and spirit but two comple
mentary aspects or attributes of the one substance,
which is identical with God. Material things and
immaterial ideas are both but modes of the eternal
substance, which is as close a paraphrase as possible
of the philosophical position of Haeckel, while the
phraseology is richer and warmer and more kin with
our religious instincts. Both believe, though they
express it a little differently, in “ the divine nature of
the world.” Spinoza’s own words are strikingly in
accord with the teaching of Haeckel. “ Nescio,” he
writes, “ cur materia divina, natura indigna esset,”
meaning by materia, of course, not the ponderable
matter of the physicist, but that reality which may be
regarded as the basis of the phenomenal world.1 And
this agreement contains much that is of large promise
fowthe future of modern thought.
This is the point in the teaching of Haeckel which
negatives entirely the charge of Materialism and
Atheism so persistently hurled against him. Monism
is neither Materialism nor Atheism. It is really the
denial of both. And if any reader should doubt the
fact as characteristic of Haeckel, let him read that
1 David Hume himself, the most unmystical of men, when labour
ing with the cosmological argument, asks at one point, “ Why may
not the material universe be the necessarily existent Being?”—surely
the brightest flash of mystic feeling of which Hume’s severely
analytical mind was capable. Or consider the strong, reverent
language of the devout Lord Gifford in his own lecture on “ Sub
stance
“Said I not that the word Substance was perhaps the
grandest word in any language ? There can be none grander. It is
the true name of God. Do you not feel with me that it is almost
profane to apply the word Substance to anything short of God ? God
must be the very substance and essence of the human soul ” (quoted
by Dr. Hutcheson Stirling in his Gifford Lectures, p. 207).
C
�18
HAECKEL’S CONTRIBUTION TO RELIGION
writer’s reference to Spinoza and note the un
restrained enthusiasm with which he proclaims his
agreement with the most spiritual of all our modern
philosophers, the “ God-intoxicated” Spinoza. “ In
his stately pantheistic system,” writes Haeckel, “ the
notion of the world (the universe or the cosmos) is
identical with the all-pervading notion of God—is at
one and the same time the purest and most rational
Monism and the clearest and most abstract Mono
theism. This universal ‘ substance,’ this ‘ divine
nature of the world,’ shows us two different aspects of
its being, or two fundamental attributes—matter (in
finitely extended substance) and spirit (the all-em
bracing energy of thought). All the changes which
have since come over the idea of substance are
reduced on a logical analysis to this supreme thought
of Spinoza’s. With Goethe, I take it to be the loftiest,
profoundest, and truest thought of all ages” (p. 76).
And he declares succinctly (p. 8), “We adhere firmly
to the pure, unequivocal Monism of Spinoza.”
The thinker who can speak in terms such as these,
and can do so, as Haeckel does, in the name of the
most advanced modern science, so far from being a
Materialist or an Atheist, makes a contribution to
religion that is of the highest importance to modern
thought, and must prove to be of permanent value in
helping to explain “ the riddle of the universe.”
Haeckel, indeed, in one of the closing paragraphs
of his book, plaiifly admits all this. 1 I must not,
however,” he writes, “ take leave of my readers without
pointing out in a conciliatory way that this strenuous
opposition [of Monism to Dualism] may be toned
down to a certain degree—may, indeed, even be con
verted into a friendly harmony. In a thoroughly
logical mind, applying the highest principles with
equal force in the entire field of the cosmos—in
�HAECKEL’S CONTRIBUTION TO RELIGION
19
both organic and inorganic nature—the antithetical
positions of theism and pantheism, vitalism and
mechanism, approaeh until they touch each other.”
In almost the exact words of Herbert Spencer, he
says (p. 134) : “ We must even grant that this
essence of substance becomes more mysterious and
enigmatic the deeper we penetrate into the knowledge
of its attributes, matter and energy, and the more
thoroughly we study its countless phenomenal forms
and their evolution.” And his “ conclusion ” is a tacit
admission that the “riddle” is, after all, more in
name than in reality. “ Only one comprehensive
riddle now remains,” he says “—the problem of ‘ sub
stance.’ What is the real character of this mighty
world-wonder that the realistic scientist calls Nature
or the Universe, the idealist philosopher calls ‘ sub
stance ’ or the Cosmos, the pious believer calls
Creator or God?” Is anything further required to
show how striking and valuable a defender Haeckel
shows himself to be of the central conception of
religion? Could a purely scientific writer, as such,
possibly supply a more direct and unequivocal contri
bution to religion than such a declaration ?
But there is more involved in Haeckel’s teaching
than even this.
One of the most important bearings of this funda
mental conception is on the nature and meaning of
consciousness. And it is here where, it seems to us,
Haeckel and his school do not rise to the level of their
own doctrine. The question (of which so much is
made) whether consciousness is a physiological or a
transcendental problem is comparatively needless.
Consciousness is both. Science shows that conscious
ness is dependent for its appearance on “ the normal
structure of the corresponding psychic organ, the
brain.” But, whatever be the physiological method
�20
HAECKEL’S CONTRIBUTION TO RELIGION
by which consciousness is enabled to appear, the
content of consciousness is essentially transcendental.
And to say so is not really inconsistent with the
essence of the Haeckel doctrine. On the contrary, it
seems to us to be its fitting and culminating expres
sion. The physiological machinery of consciousness
is but the frame of the telescope by which we see back
and down into the infinite “ substance ” on which it
and all things rest. The human consciousness is
simply the divine “ substance ” of the world coming
to self-consciousness. That of which our conscious
ness is conscious is the divine “ substance ” itself.
This is where the divinity of human nature, so con
sonant with the teaching of Haeckel, is seen to be the
true solvent of all such philosophic difficulty. We are
touching the divine at every point, and whether we
call it world-substance or cosmos, or by any other
title which the advance of science may render more
accurate and intelligible, the reality predicated is the
same. We are not only in touch with the Divine ; we
are divine. As has been well said, “ There are unfathom
able depths in the human soul, because God himself
is at the bottom of it.” The transcendental in this
deep sense cannot be avoided. It is easy for the hard
materialist to say that this is mere hallucination, for
no human mind can actually come into conscious
contact with the Infinite. But no more can Haeckel
lay his scientific finger on that “ substance ” which
he nevertheless regards as the underlying basis of all
things. “ Substance,” so far as scientific objectivity
is concerned, is a figment of the imagination ; but it
is vital to his intellect, and we accept it at once as a
sufficient name for that to which both science and
philosophy point. On exactly similar lines we contend
that the united, continuous, determinate conviction of
the richest human minds as to the content of the
�HAECKEL’S CONTRIBUTION TO RELIGION
21
higher consciousness is not to be lightly brushed
aside. The “ ideas ” of the human mind are, on the
showing of the Haeckel school themselves, literally the
final efflorescence of the whole evolving cosmos.
They are the culminating point, so far as known, of
the one undivided “ substance ” from which sprang
ultimately the whole sum of created ” things. How
are they related to this substance ?—which, after all, is
but Haeckel’s name for what we call God. We main
tain that it is absolutely consistent with the line of the
Haeckel teaching to hold that these “ ideas ” of ours
are what we call divine—that self-consciousness is
consciousness of that which is part and parcel of the
divine “ substance.” And if this be so, we have a firm
scientific basis for faith and for true idealism in all
its outlets, untrammelled by “ dualism” of any kind.
To Haeckel “ substance ” is the final, irreducible
element of the universe, the fans et origo of all. And
the name we may give to this final irreducible is a
matter of very little moment. We call it God, and
believe ourselves to be part of this divine element.
Haeckel does the same under another name. Monism
does not abolish, it only reaffirms, the continuous vital
connection between the “ substance ” and its offshoots,
between the human and the Divine.
This is the only truth that can preserve to us our
“ immortality.” To Haeckel, the immortality of the
soul is “ the highest point of superstition.” To our
thinking it is the direct suggestion of his own prin
ciple. His doctrine of “ substance,” indeed, rather
guarantees than weakens the doctrine of the immor
tality of the soul. He himself, for example, accepts
“ the idea of immortality in its widest sense.” “ The
indestructibility and eternal duration of all that exists
is not merely acceptable, but self-evident to the
monistic philosopher ” (p. 68).
�22
HAECKEL’S CONTRIBUTION TO RELIGION
His difficulty, of course, is with the immortality of
the individual soul. But this, when analysed, simply
means that the feeling of individuality or personality
which we associate with the spiritual life is apparently
lost at death.1 Now, there is no subject on which it
is so rash to dogmatise as this. The scientific man
deals admittedly with appearance only. Of un
challengeable knowledge on the subject he is as
destitute as anyone else. But, in the absence of any
possible demonstration, it is surely a striking fact
that this loss of conscious personality is the very thing
which, as we shall see later, our great mystics declare
to be characteristic of their ecstatic experience. They
lose the consciousness of personality. They, in
fact, scout the idea of its permanence in the con
crete, individualistic sense in which we are accustomed
to use the word “personality.” They seem to feel the
clinging to individual personality to be a forfeiture of
the highest bliss and a profanation of the beatific
vision. The scientific mind, approaching the subject,
of course, from the purely physical side, declares
against such a thing as a continuous personal existence
after death. The factors of personality, it declares,
are dissolved and disappear.
The spiritual mind professes to reach the subject
from the other side, and, curiously, they meet each
other half way, and find that in this thought of the
disappearance of individual consciousness they are on
common ground. May not the Haeckel doctrine on
this point really connote just what the experience of
the mystics of all time declares to be fact ? Even the
changing forms of matter are redeemed from annihila
tion by the doctrine of the conservation of energy.
Similarly, the change which we call loss of conscious
1 All the monistic philosophers of the century are thanatists (Riddle
of the Universe, p. 69).
�HAECKEL’S CONTRIBUTION TO RELIGION
23
personality by no means invalidates the idea of
persistence after death. With that change the mystics
have long since made us familiar as matter of personal
experience here and now. It is absolutely consistent
with reason and science, we contend, to regard the
scientific Monist’s absorption into the eternal “ sub
stance ” as simply his way of describing what the
spiritual Monist calls absorption into the Divine
Spirit. Nirvana, in short, is the spiritual realisation
of Monism. If a human spirit can so abstract itself
from the purely physical condition of its ordinary life,
and so enter into the unseen as to lose all sense of
individuality and become one with the All, may this
not be a perfectly natural anticipation and foretaste
of the condition which the materialist perfers to speak
of as dissolution and disappearance ? Involution, we
must remember, not dissolution, is the true antithesis
of evolution. And even if we were entitled to assume
that this mysterious involution takes place at death,
can any scientific man justly challenge the mystic’s
unvarying personal experience when it is put forward
as an indication of what the involution or re-absorption
really is ?
Such an involution may be called death, and is
at least death in the ordinary sense of the word as we
know it. But it may be death only in the sense in
which the new-born babe dies to its previous state,
that state being henceforth to it as if it had never
been. In the Monist’s creed there can be no death in
the sense which he endeavours to impose upon the
word. Life is universal. The whole question is as to
the particular form or character of that life at any
particular stage of being.
The old apothegm of Paul, “In Him we live and
move and have our being,” was surely admirably
suited to the scholarly audience he addressed at
�24
HAECKEL’S CONTRIBUTION TO RELIGION
Athens. It is marvellously suited to the tendency of
latest thought. It has a philosophical as well as a
spiritual side, and is equally suited to express the
faith of a Monist as of a mystic.
“In water lives the fish, the plant in the earth,
The bird in the air, in the firmament the sun,
The Salamander resides in fire,
And the heart of God is Jacob Bohme’s element.”
If in the mystic’s case the loss of self-consciousness
is found to be part and parcel of the soul’s experience,
why should it be thought incredible in this other case?
If not incredible, then surely in this respect extremes
meet, and wisdom is justified of all her children.
Besides, as Haeckel tells us (p. 94), “ the life of the
animal and the plant bears the same universal char
acter of incompleteness as the life of man. Evolution
seems, on the whole, to be a progressive improvement
in historical advance, from the simple to the complex,
the lower to the higher, the imperfect to the perfect.”
And as the merely physical evolution of man seems to
be completed, it can only be to his psychical evolution
that we must look for the further continuation of that
great process. To such a continuation of evolution
who will dare to set limits ? To trace the past
development of the physical organisation of man, and
even the efflorescence of mind as science does, is but
one half of the task prescribed by the doctrine of
evolution. The mystical phenomena of human
nature are a necessary consequence of human nature.
These phenomena point prophetically to the future. It
is quite an arbitrary proceeding to accept the theory
of evolution, but at the same time to detach from it
its weightiest consequence. The field of man’s future
evolution is the psychical. The materialistic scientists
who make so much of man’s past evolution, but ignore
his future evolution, resemble people who retail an
�HAECKEL’S CONTRIBUTION TO RELIGION
25
anecdote, but forget the point (Carl du Prel, The Philo*
sophy of Mysticism).
One of the most slashing critics, and at the same
time self-restrained thinkers (M. J. Guyau), says:
“ If the unknown activity that lies at the basis of the
natural world has produced in the human race a con
sciousness of goodness and a deliberate desire for it,
there is reason to hope and to believe that the last
word of ethics and metaphysics is not a negative.”
May we not with equally modest assurance say that,
if the “ substance ” that lies at the basis of the natural
world has produced in the human race the conscious
ness of a condition of thought and feeling that rises
far beyond the range of common experience, that is
open to all, and of which the element of conscious
time is no part, and has produced at the same time
in the best minds everywhere a deliberate and
passionate desire for, and delight in, that conscious
ness, there is reason to hope and to believe that the
last word of the most perfect evolutionary science does
not negative the idea of the continuance of that life
hereafter in some intensely real, though necessarily
indefinable, manner?
To such a life we may give what formal name we
choose. The more we realise it here, the more
indifferent we become to all attempts at defining it,
the more catholic in welcoming every form of
expressing it, that may commend itself to the medi
tative soul. For such a union with the Divine
immortality is quite an intelligible word. It is a
word that attempts to describe, under the one category
of endless time, a life and a condition of thought
which in our own actual experience transcend time.
Where demonstration is impossible, we must perforce
be satisfied with the indications which our own highest
^experience gives us of the possibility and naturalness of
�26
HAECKEL’S CONTRIBUTION TO RELIGION
a life for which such words as “ immortal ” and “ eter
nal ” are as permissible and suggestive as any other.
If religion, then, means essentially recognition of
the unity of the universe, and of our kinship with
that unity, even the “ materialist ” Haeckel makes a
contribution to religion that, in the present state and
direction of educated thought, is of high importance.
His recent book, The Riddle of the Universe, may seem
at first sight to give the lie to such an estimate of his
teaching as is here put forward. And the orthodox
world has certainly represented it as hopelessly
inimical to religion. With some of his references to
the origin of Christianity we have no sympathy. But
while there is no denying that Haeckel’s teaching is
quite incompatible with the authorised dogmatic faith
of the Church, the fact remains that his fundamental
position is essentially religious, and, as he says him
self, identical with the teaching of the most spirituallyminded philosopher that ever lived—the God-intoxi
cated Spinoza.
�Chapter III.
HERBERT SPENCER’S CONTRIBUTION TO
RELIGION—THE CONTRIBUTION OF
AGNOSTICISM
Agnosto Theo.
“ I gazed on power till I grew blind.
On power; I could not take my eyes from that.”—Paracelsus.
Mr. Spencer was long the bete noire of a large
proportion of our religiously-minded people. Indeed,
many people, by no means ignorant, believe that the
philosophy of Mr. Spencer boasts of giving the final
quietus to everything that has hitherto been associated
in the popular mind with religion. And there can be
no question that the Synthetic Philosophy has per
manently affected our conception of the basis of
religion.
Science and philosophy in the hands of Mr. Spencer
lead us easily and unaided to the borderland of the
unseen. But when we begin “ toiling in the presence
of things which cannot be dealt with by any other
power” than that higher imagination, intuitive faculty,
call it what we will, which is the glory of our man
hood, Mr. Spencer seems to leave us to our own
resources, and to drop to earth again like a spent ball.
This is the only faculty which Mr. Spencer almost
refuses to cultivate. And yet even he cannot wholly
escape its cautious exercise.
His Synthetic Philosophy is a monument to
individual genius such as the world has seldom seen.
27
�28 HERBERT SPENCER’S CONTRIBUTION TO RELIGION
For, notwithstanding the prolonged labours of a host
of trained scientific collaborators, the synthesis itself
is the work of a single brain, and evinces a grasp of
detail, a dovetailing of endless material, coupled with
a comprehensiveness of generalisation, that stamp its
author as one of the thinkers of the world.
On the real issues, then, that are of never-failing vital
interest to the human soul, what has Mr. Spencer to
tell us ? What is his definite message to the world ?
Probably the shortest form in which we can
epitomise his philosophy is to say that it is the
apotheosis of evolution. What in our more serious
moments we want to know is, What or who is it that
is evolving ? Why should there be—why, indeed, is
there—such a process at all ?
That there is not behind it all or underneath it
“ some far-off divine event,” which sheds a meaning
on it, the human spirit refuses permanently to believe.
That there is at the heart of it all a presence and
a purpose of which it is but the tangible expression
is the instinctive feeling, if not the ineradicable con
viction, of every calm, clear-thinking soul.
Why, then, does not Mr. Spencer, with his massive
intellect, acknowledge and entertain this conviction ?
The truth is, that is exactly what he does, though
naturally he uses a cautious phraseology of his own
to express it. His apotheosis of evolution represents
the universe, organic and inorganic, as self-contained
and automatic.
His successive “ integration and
disintegration, ” “ evolution and involution,” are but
his hard modern form of the truth long ages ago
discovered by the Oriental thinkers, and taught by
them more poetically as the “ outbreathing ” and
“ inbreathing ” of God. It is often supposed by
those who have not examined Mr. Spencer’s meta
physical basis or First Principles that he leaves no
�HERBERT SPENCER’S CONTRIBUTION TO RELIGION 29
room whatever for faith. The very reverse is the
case. If there is one thing which Mr. Spencer has
made more clear than another in this connection, it
is his unshakeable belief in a Power “ whose positive
existence is a necessary datum of consciousness,” and
which, though “not capable of being brought within
limits, nevertheless remains as a consciousness that
is positive and is not rendered negative by the nega
tion of limits.” What Kant surrendered as knowledge
he restored as belief. Spencer, strange though it
may seem, would rather reverse the process. His
never-resting analysis dissipates ordinary concrete
and apparently positive conceptions. Conscience,
“ stern daughter of the voice of God,” is but the
ever-growing moral experience of the race. Its
dictates, a priori to the individual, are a posteriori to
the race. Authoritative “ revelation,” too, is but the
symbolic representation of a purely natural process.
Nothing is at first sight more spiritually disintegrating,
more absolutely corrosive of all customary religious
teaching, than this philosophy of evolution. But even
analysis has its limits. And in the end synthesis is
triumphant. For the man who is so eagle-eyed in
tracking this universal symbolism pulls up at last
before a “certainty” which even he declares, with
intensest conviction, is “more profoundly true than
any religion supposes ”:—
Not only is the omnipresence of something which passes compre
hension that most abstract belief which is corSmon to all religions,
which becomes more distinct in proportion as they develop, and
which remains after their discordant elements have been mutually
cancelled ; but it is that belief which the most unsparing criticism of
each leaves unquestionable, or, rather, makes ever clearer. It has
nothing to fear from the most inexorable logic, but, on the contrary,
is a belief which the most inexorable logic shows to be more pro
foundly true than any religion supposes (First Principles, 5th ed.,
1890, p. 45).
Again :—
Amid the mysteries which become the more mysterious the more
�30 HERBERT SPENCER’S CONTRIBUTION TO RELIGION
they are thought about, there will remain the one absolute certainty
that we are ever in presence of an Infinite and Eternal Energy from
which all things proceed (Nineteenth Century, January, 1884).1
Could more be asked from the metaphysics of a
philosophy based, as Mr. Spencer’s is, on concrete
facts, and not daring to launch the human spirit on
that shoreless sea of unseen reality which, in spite of
all castrated intellectualism, is its natural element and
abiding home ?
Even in this, his unmistakeable attitude, he is
denounced as a renegade from the principles of his
own philosophy. Some of his leading disciples have
proclaimed themselves his defenders against himself—
as, indeed, more Spencerian than Mr. Spencer himself.
Mr. Frederic Harrison long since felt acutely the
importance of Mr. Spencer’s contention, and how
fatal it is to the arrogant pretensions of a superficial
Positivism.2
1 As Mr. Spencer himself says in his Facts and Comments (chapter
on Ultimate Questions), and apropos of a letter of Jowett’s, “ Con
sidering what I have written, I might reasonably have thought that
no one would call me a Materialist.”
2 And if Mr. Spencer’s doctrine of the existence of “ the Unknow
able ” has been so condemned by the straiter sect of his own followers
as supplying (to use M. Brunetiere’s words) “une base ou un fondement scientifique a la religion," how infinitely more pregnant with
religious issues is his determined declaration of the identity of this
unknowable Power with the power which we call ourselves ? If the
one conception is the fondement, the other is surely the chief corner
stone of the building itself, and is being recognised as such by discern
ing minds everywhere. M. Brunetiere has gone into this subject
more deliberately still in his article, “ La Metaphysique Positiviste ”
(in Revue des Deux Mondes, October 1st, 1902). He there quotes the
words “si souvent citees ” of Mr. Spencer to the effect that, “From
the necessity of thinking en relation, it follows that the relative is
itself inconceivable except as related to a real non-relative. If we do
not postulate a non-relative reality—an absolute—the relative itself
becomes absolute, which is a contradiction. And we see, by consider
ing the trend of human thought, how impossible it is to rid oneself of
the consciousness of une chose effective—an actuality—underlying
appearances, and how from this impossibility results our indestruc
tible belief in the existence of this thing.” _ And, as Brunettere puts
it, “ the foundation of science is metaphysical, and we see without
any effort of reflection or of reasoning, but without any contradiction,
metaphysics re-established, if I may so say, in the very heart of
Positivism.”
�HERBERT SPENCER’S CONTRIBUTION TO RELIGION 31
Mr. Macpherson, Mr. Spencer’s recent biographer,
is evidently alive to the same fact, and seems to be
almost equally disappointed with Mr. Harrison.
What, then, are Mr. Spencer’s grounds for this
most profound certainty which he champions so
vigorously ?
Nothing is more striking and suggestive in the
annals of philosophical thinking than to observe its
inevitable convergence on the one testing question:
What is Consciousness, and what does it really tell
us ? This is what is called technically the Theory of
Knowledge. It is the Armageddon field of all intel
lectual analysis. Aristotle’s “ nothi seauton ” was
one of the profoundest directions ever given. For we
may truly say of the human consciousness, as
Tennyson says of the
“Little flower—if I could understand
What you are, root and all, and all in all,
I should know what God and man is.”
Mr. Spencer is characteristically careful in all that
he says on this fundamental point, but his biographer
is characteristically reluctant to give Mr. Spencer’s
phraseology its full and natural weight. “It is idle,”
Mr. Macpherson says, “ to inquire into the ultimate
nature of consciousness.”
This is not the view of Mr. Spencer. And though
he is remarkably careful of the phraseology to which
he commits himself, yet, where controversy has inter
vened, we naturally get his meaning, if possible, more
sharply defined still. This is the case on this very
point. For hear him in his “Explanations” in the
1870 preface to his Principles of Psychology :—
The aggregate of subjective states constituting the mental “I”
have not in themselves the principle of cohesion holding them
together as a whole. But the “I” which continuously survives in
the subject of those changing states is that portion of the Unknowable
Power which is statically conditioned in special nervous structures
�32 HERBERT SPENCER’S CONTRIBUTION TO RELIGION
that are pervaded by a dynamically conditioned portion of the Unknow
able Power called Energy.
The mind is thus not simply “ a power of recog
nising and distinguishing feelings,” which power, so
far as Mr. Macpherson’s version is concerned, may be
merely a function of matter. It is “ the I which con
tinuously survives.” It is “ a portion of the Unknow
able Power,” or Substance, to use Haeckel’s word.
The Problem of Personality, Mr. Macpherson rightly
says, is “the great difficulty which faces Idealism.”
It is here solved so far as Mr. Spencer’s conviction is
concerned. And this passage is an express refutation
of Mr. Macpherson’s contention, where he says:—
Self-consciousness, according to the New Kantian and Hegelian, is
impossible except on the assumption that in the mind there exists a
unifying spiritual principle which, so to speak, sits at the loom of
time and weaves the isolated, unrelated threads of experience into an
organised and coherent whole. Have we not here an illustration of
the tendency of the mind to personify the processes of Nature, and
convert a final product into an initial, all-controlling agent ?
This “ unifying spiritual principle ” is exactly what
Mr. Spencer insists on—“the I which continuously
survives.” And this “ I ” is directly linked on to the
“ Eternal Energy.” Mr. Macpherson says “ the
basis of the system [of Idealism] is the identity of
the human with the divine self-consciousness,” an
identity which is expressly asserted here by Mr.
Spencer—if language has any meaning.
And lest this assertion by Mr. Spencer, that “ the I
is a portion of the Unknowable Power,” should be
challenged as in this bald form a mere passing dictum,
let us follow his reasoning a little more in detail, and
we find the grounds of his “ dictum.”
There are two great philosophical paths by which
we are brought face to face with this riddle of the
universe—those, namely, of psychology and objective
science.
By the former line of investigation Mr. Spencer
�HERBERT SPENCER’S CONTRIBUTION TO RELIGION 33
finds that the one thing the human mind is directly
conscious of is will, force, our own will—that is to
say, as the one form in which we directly experience
force, “ Force as we are conscious of it when by our
own efforts we produce changes.”1
By the method of objective science we reach a
similar conclusion. The conservation of energy and
the whole modern teaching of science compel us to
believe in an Eternal Energy underlying all things.
This Eternal Energy is that “ from which all things
proceed.” This is the cul de sac into which all the
wonderful unification of scientific thought lands us,
and from which there is no escape. And when Mr.
Spencer declares in most carefully-chosen language
that “it is the same power which in ourselves wells
up under the form of consciousness,” we do not
require his formal imprimatur to assure us that in
the most fundamental conception of all religion, in
that truth which has made religion possible, he is
not only “ not against us,” but “ for us.”2
Mr. Spencer says it wells up in us under the form
of consciousness, and he calls this consciousness of
force—and otherwise self-consciousness. Now, what
does this familiar word “ self-consciousness ” really
mean ? What can it mean but that we ourselves
stand, as it were, outside of ourselves, beside and
1 It is interesting to notice how the same effort to define to the
intellect the content of consciousness takes shape, in Schopenhauer’s
case, in the definition of the world as will—the “ will to live,” in
short, as the metaphysical substance of the world and of man. It is
but the same idea as that which Spencer more vaguely describes as
force. Schopenhauer approximates the force more nearly to every-day
human experience. And this apparently slight difference in expres
sion at the start leads him directly into moral considerations of the
most searching kind, and ultimately into his pessimistic philosophy.
2 Haeckel, too (as his translator and champion says), “maintains
that the forcS associated with the atom or the cell is the same funda
mentally as that which reveals itself in our consciousness ” (Haeckel’s
Critics Answered, p. 54).
b
�34 HERBERT SPENCER’S CONTRIBUTION TO RELIGION
apart in some way from “ ourselves,” as we still call
this “ object ” of consciousness, and feel its moving,
throbbing life in our spirits ? Is it not, in short, a
form of the God-consciousness? As T. H. Green
says : “ It is the irreducibility of this self-objectifying
consciousness to anything else that compels us to
regard it as the presence in us of the mind for which
the world exists.”
As a French writer says : “For the old doctrine of
a consciousness absolutely one, the new psychology
substitutes the formula ‘ continuity of consciousness.’”
How can we ourselves be both the subject and the
object of consciousness at one and the same moment,
except on the principle, as Mr. Spencer puts it, that
our “I” is just a “portion of the Unknowable Power”
which thus, as some writers express it, “ comes to
self-consciousness in man ” ?
Mr. Spencer himself deals thus elsewhere with the
direct psychological evidence, and seems again to
suggest, or at least imply, the same idea. He says,
First Principles, p. 88 :—
Besides that definite consciousness of which logic formulates the
laws, there is also an indefinite consciousness which cannot be
formulated. Besides complete thoughts, and besides thoughts which,
though incomplete, admit of completion, there are thoughts which it
is impossible to complete, and yet which are still real in the sense that
that they are normal affections of the intellect.
And it is specially interesting to turn to his own
version of the actual historical origin of the religious
consciousness as it slowly rises into clearness and
definiteness.
‘ Unlike the ordinary consciousness,” he says, “the
religious consciousness is concerned with that which
lies beyond the sphere of sense”; and the rise of this
religious consciousness, he contends, “ begins among
primitive men with the belief in ‘ a double^ belong
ing to each individual, which, capable of wandering
�HERBERT SPENCER’S CONTRIBUTION TO RELIGION 35
away from him during life, becomes his ghost or spirit
after death ; and from this idea of a being eventually
distinguished as supernatural there develop in course
of time the ideas of supernatural beings of all orders
up to the highest.”
This conclusion is his reading of an immense
number of facts gathered from the traditions of
uncivilised peoples. It is, in short, an attempt to
trace the natural history of the God-consciousness in
man. And to challenge Mr. Spencer is, as usual, but
to bring out his meaning more clearly. “ Surely,”
exclaims Mr. Harrison, “ if the primitive belief [in a
material double] was absolutely false, all derived
beliefs must be absolutely false.”
“ This objection looks fatal,” replies Mr. Spencer ;
“ and it would be fatal were its premises valid.
Unexpected as it will be to most readers, the answer
here to be made is that at the outset a germ of truth
was contained in the primitive conception—the truth,
namely, that the Power which manifests itself in con
sciousness is but a differently conditioned form of the
Power which manifests itself beyond consciousness.”
This shows Mr. Spencer’s view to be that the earliest
form of what ultimately is seen to be God-conscious
ness is simply the direct consciousness of our own
spirits. In other words, it is through the narrow
channel of our self-consciousness that we gradually
become conscious of “ that which lies beyond the
sphere of sense,” and which we call God. The latter
consciousness is but the developed form of the earlier.
What is this but an admission that it is practically
impossible to draw a sharp line of demarcation
between the one and the other ? The Inscrutable
Power is the same in both cases. And Mr. Spencer,
so far from denying or dissipating the fundamental
ideas of religion, shows them to be stereotyped in all
�36 HERBERT SPENCER’S CONTRIBUTION TO RELIGION
nature and enthroned in the very citadel of our own
being. Not only is the evolution philosophy thus
robbed of its terrors for many devout souls, but it
shows us philosophy and religion joining hands in a
much more directly religious truth than that which
Mr. Spencer seems formally to enunciate—in short, in
a common declaration of the essential unity of the
Divine and human natures.1 Indeed, Mr. Spencer,
when he sums up his whole philosophy and defines its
relation to the Unseen, strains his vocabulary to find
the most unequivocal terms possible in which to assert
its intensely religious basis. Passages to this effect
might be quoted in abundance. Take this as a
sample:—
The spiritualist, setting out with the same data [as the materialist],
may argue with equal cogency that, if the forces displayed by matter
are cognisable only under the shape of those equivalent amounts of
consciousness which they produce, it is to be inferred that these forces,
when existing out of consciousness, are of the same intrinsic nature as
when existing in consciousness. And that so is justified the spiritu
alistic conception of the external world as consisting of something
essentially identical with what we call mind. (First Principles, p. 558.)
And though in this same passage he seems to accord
equal validity to the materialist argument, he seems
to us rather to overstretch his phi&seology in the
latter connection. For when he says that “ what
exists in consciousness under the form of feeling is
transformable into an equivalent of mechanical motion,
and, in consequence, into equivalents of all the other
forces which matter exhibits,” the word “ transform
able ” seems to connote more than is legitimately
implied or required. It would surely be truer to his
1 As has been well said, “ Every man is in a very true sense essen
tially of divine nature, even as Paul teaches, ‘ Theion genos
but no man is conscious of himself as divine ; otherwise expressed, in
no man does this divine energy directly identify itself in conscious
ness with the source from which it proceeds. ‘ In fact, while we say
and are compelled to say “I,’’while we speak and cannot but speak of
our Self, in reality the essential content or nature of this Self, of this
subjective noumenon, is veiled from us.’ ”
�HERBERT SPENCER’S CONTRIBUTION TO RELIGION 37
own teaching to say that what exists in consciousness
is capable of being manifested in an equivalent of
motion. And when he adds that the phenomena of
consciousness are “therefore material phenomena,”
would it not be more consistent with Mr. Spencer’s
own positions elsewhere to say that these phenomena
of consciousness in the form of feeling, when looked
at from outside, are recognisable through, or suggested
by, material phenomena ?
Mr. Spencer, we submit, is fundamentally an
Idealist. He links the human with the Divine; and
this, as his biographer admits, is the “ basis of
Idealism.” He is not an Idealist, of course, to the
detailed extent to which such a thinker as Lotze and
others of the German school are. Lotze deliberately
professes to “reconstruct an idealistic philosophy on
a materialistic basis.” And he and his school do so
with very great power and on lines that are essentially
Spencerian. They point out that the inseparable
relationship of every material element to every other
by the law of what is called causal connection pre
supposes the inner unity of all material elements.
“ The scientific interest,” Lotze declares, “is satisfied
by the assumption of such elements or atoms as are
actually indivisible in our experience. But the
assumption of a plurality of extended elements, even
if they are conceived as infinitely small, can never be
a final assumption of thought. We must give up
either the unity of the atoms or their extension. We
must conceive atoms as centres of force, each of which
is a starting-point for the working of the original sub
stance.” This inter-relationship of the world accord
ing to law is the objective basis of the philosophy of
religion.
This is the fact which, so far from making the idea
of God superfluous, makes it a necessity of thought.
�38 HERBERT SPENCER’S CONTRIBUTION TO RELIGION I
For even the supposed mechanical conception of
nature, if rigorously followed out, lands us in a
perfect unity, whose only rational name is God. And
Idealism thus, from this point of view, may be said to
rest on and spring from Materialism.
Nothing, however, is more persistently character
istic of Mr. Spencer, once he lays down the all-impor
tant position we have referred to, than his determined
agnosticism as to all ’beyond. The Unknowable
Power is to us—while the most absolute of certainties
—utterly inscrutable.
Our object here, presumptuous as it may seem, is
to show, if we can, that the implications of this posi
tion of Mr. Spencer are deeper and more commanding
than at first sight appears. And we are the more
convinced of this when we find a striking con
vergence going on among Christian thinkers towards
the form which this implication takes in Mr. Spencer’s
teaching. Purely Christian thinkers, of course, start
from quite a different standpoint. And the movement
of their thought is, in form at least, a movement of
surrender—in reality, a movement of retiral and con
centration. But concentration always takes place
round vital points. And the conception which is
steadily being accepted by the strongest Christian
thinkers as the most central, illuminating, and
prolific of all is just that which, we maintain, is more
than implied, is directly expressed in Mr. Spencer’s
philosophy—the essential unity of the Divine and
human natures.
We have it in the well-known passage already cited,
where he tells us that “it is this same Power which
in ourselves wells up under the form of consciousness.”2*
It is the same Power that is subjective as well as
objective. And though he here interposes the word
“form” of consciousness to indicate its subjective
�HERBERT SPENCER’S CONTRIBUTION TO RELIGION 39
form, we find elsewhere, as already cited, that “ the
‘14 is that portion of the Unknowable Power...... ”
So that, making every allowance for the limitations of
language (and in no case is there less need for this
th^n in Mr. Spencer’s), the identity of the Divine and
the human is here deliberately asserted.
The importance of the fact is evident. In one
form or other Mr. Spencer is constantly insisting on
it. He speaks of the tendency towards the identifi
cation of “Being as present to us in consciousness
with Being as otherwise conditioned beyond con
sciousness.’^ His own farewell word to us is to the
same effect:—
And then the consciousness itself, what is it during the time that it
continues ? And what becomes of it when it ends ? We can only
infer that it is a specialised and individualised form of that infinite
and eternal energy which transcends both our knowledge and our
imagination, and that at death its elements lapse into the infinite and
eternal energy whence they were derived. (Facts and Comments,
p. 203.)
This contention of Mr. Spencer is one of the
bravest things yet done by strictly analytical thought.
Unfortunately, Mr. Spencer, after he discovers the
existence of this great Power, refuses to turn his gaze
on its face, or attempt to learn any more about it.
Now, this function of the human spirit, called by
metaphysicians consciousness, cannot be isolated and
castrated in the way Mr. Spencer attempts to do. To
say that the existence of this Power may be present to
us in consciousness, but that His nature as he affects
this same consciousness cannot by any possibility be
present to us there, seems more an unconscious
subterfuge of logic than a contribution to philosophy.
Mr. Spencer’s declaration clearly implies that we
are in some kind of conscious contact with God. But
on what psychological principle can he justly contend
that the only form in which this “ eternal energy
from which all things proceed ” can well up in us is
�40 HERBERT SPENCER’S CONTRIBUTION TO RELIGION
»
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that of a bare consciousness of His existence ? Gera
has no meaning to our minds as mere existence. /To
speak of God’s existence apart from His Being is to
be the slave of words, not the possessor of ideas./ And
the question at this stage is not whether we can form
a complete conception of the being of God in our
minds. That is at all times impossible. The ques
tion is: If God touches us at all, is it rational to
suppose that He does so as “mere ” existence ? Our
neighbour’s existence wells up in us as a fact in con
sciousness. If we can attain to a knowledge of our
neighbour’s being and character, whose existence is
so apart from our own, and draws its life directly
and independently from the same source as our own,
shall we not much more be able to attain tp some
knowledge of that eternal energy with which our own
is so interfused, and in which at every moment it
lives and moves and has its being ? On the contrary,
with the windows of our souls clear, how can we escape
that consciousness, avoid that knowledge ?
Is “the categorical imperative” not an equally
real “ welling-up ” in us of that eternal energy from
which this, as “all things” else, “proceed”? If, as
Mr. Spencer says, force in us is the “correlative” of
the universal Power beyond us, is not the ideal in our
minds the “correlative” of the ideal mind beyond
us ? (First Principles, p. 579). No theory of the slow
evolution of the human conscience from the interaction
with our environment can remove God from the process.
That environment is itself but a form of the eternal
energy. Are we to measure the depth of that well
which so fills our consciousness by the first trickle
that reveals its presence ? Shall we not rather look
for its measure in the highest moments of the highest
types of our race, those in whom the unity of the
Divine and human natures is all but a direct and
�HERBERT SPENCER’S CONTRIBUTION TO RELIGION 41>
conscious experience ? The moral ideal in man is the
correlative and counterpart of the Divine Ideal outside
of man, and is as clearly and directly evidence of
God as force, as we experience it in consciousness,
is evidence of the Divine Power beyond conscious
ness.1
Mill rightly contended that, if this Divine Power is
to be understood as but the infinite degree of what
we know in our human experience as power, we are
entitled to do the same with the Divine Goodness and
Justice. Infinite Goodness, in short, must still be
goodness—which is the self-same conclusion as that
more Platonicsflly maintained by Maurice. Thus is
the essential kinship of God and man vindicated both
by philosopher and theologian.
Is the metaphysician’s cold conclusion to be taken
as the measure of the attainment of man’s spirit
towards the unseen^ and the rapt communion of the
mystic to be treated as mere hallucination ?
1 Since writing the foregoing I find the following suggestion of a
similar idea in the slashing critical work of Marie Jean Guyau,
entitled The Non-Religion of the Future, p. 386: “ According to
Spencer, the unknowable itself is not absolutely unknowable. Among
the mysteries which become more mysterious as they are more deeply
reflected upon there will remain, Spencer thinks, for man one
absolute certitude—that he is in the presence of an infinite and
eternal energy which is the source of all things. No religion can
stop with the bare affirmation of the existence of an eternal energy or
infinity of energies. It must maintain the existence of some relation
between these energies and that of the moral impulse in mankind.”
Is it not remarkable, too, to find among the earliest of the Greek
thinkers, busy with the same irresistible search after God, so close an
alter ego of Mr. Spencer as was Xenophanes ? The vivid description
of that thinker given fifty years since may be read to-day, word for
word, as a true portrait of our own great philosopher : “ Xenophanes
was no atheist, but a very earnest theist. He asserted a Being*. If
he had been asked, ‘ What Being ?’ he would have owned that he
could not reply. He could only say what he was not. He approached
the border of negation, but he approached it manfully and reverently;
therefore he did not pass it. He pointed out a void which he could
not fill. That alone would have been a reason for feeling gratitude
to him. But he also saw the way to a radical truth.” (Maurice’s
Moral and Metaphysical Philosophy, p. 110.)
�42 HERBERT SPENCER’S CONTRIBUTION TO RELIGION
If so, what a deliberate invitation and encourage
ment to all revelation-mongers ! The human mind
refuses to content itself with merely believing that
“ He is.” As long as thinkers take up that attitude,
so long will “ special revelations ” flourish and
abound. But let thinkers declare, as they are entitled
to do, that the mind of man is in real contact with
God, even though it should legitimate every religion
under the sun, and Christianity will then take its true
place as the high-water mark of man’s vision of God.
Ruskin had a metaphysical and analytical intellect
as keen as any man’s. Listen to his criticism of
Spencer in this connection thirty years since :—
It will not, I trust, be thought violation of courtesy to a writer of
Mr. Spencer’s extending influence if I urge on his attention the
danger under which metaphysicians are always placed of supposing
that investigation of the processes of thought will enable them to
distinguish its forms. As well' might the chemist who had exhaus
tively examined the conditions of vitreous fusion imagine himself
therefore qualified to number or class the vases bent by the breath of
Venice.
Mr. Spencer has determined, I believe, to the satisfaction of his
readers, in what manner thoughts and feelings are constructed ; it is
time for him now to observe the results of the construction ; whether
native in his own mind, or discoverable in other intellectual territories.
That is to say, the true problem is not with what
degree of consecutive exactness can we track the
process of conscious thought, but what does conscious
thought at its unmolested highest teach us ? What,
as matter of historical fact, has it taught the best and
strongest minds the world has known ?
Turn to the highest stages of human imagination.
The mystics were rarely metaphysicians. They had
and have a gift before which mere metaphysical
acumen is comparatively incompetent. Mr. Spencer’s
statistics tell of the slow trend of human thought.
The mystics read their own spirits. Mysticism
discounts the intellectual labour of later generations
and pierces straight to the truth itself. It is this
�HERBERT SPENCER’S CONTRIBUTION TO RELIGION 43
thought of the identity, in some sense, of the soul
with God that has fed their souls, and lifted them
into their rapt communion. Are we to be told that
this spiritual ecstasy is but “ a bubble of the blood ”?
The keenest analysis, we have seen, discloses at last
truths which are enough to tax the powers and fire
the imagination of the most exalted mystics. Are we
to be told that just when man is at his highest he most
misses the Divine ? On the contrary, by the actual
pressure of modern thought, impelled alike by science,
psychology, and religion, are we not beginning to see that
this recognition of God in man is not only on all fours
with the most advanced scientific teaching, but solves
psychological problems and satisfies religious aspira
tions with a completeness that nothing else can match ?
Have not our philosophers and metaphysicians,
from Plato to Kant and Spencer, from whatever
point of view they try to answer the riddle of the
universe, and after each exhausting the ingenuities
of his intellect, found themselves driven at last “ in
a mathematical necessity ” to fall back on the only
Satisfying solution; found that if they calmly, as it
wtere, place their open palm on the world’s breast,
they feel the very heart of God beating through it,
and at once arise and worship ?
And although this satisfaction is only to be reached
by the sacrifice of much phraseology that is naturally
dear not only to the popular mind but to the devout
Christian soul, that is a loss which is more than made
good. The fact remains that we are capable of coming
into a true consciousness of God, and, indeed, cannot
escape from it. And as Mr. Spencer says :■—
This inscrutable existence which science in the last resort is
compelled to recognise as unreached by its deepest analysis of matter,
motion, thought, and feeling, stands towards our general conception
of things in substantially the same relation as does the creative power
asserted by theology. And when theology, which has already dropped
�44 HERBERT SPENCER’S CONTRIBUTION TO RELIGION
many of the anthropomorphic traits, eventually drops the last of them,
the foundation-beliefs of the two must become identical.
We do not profess to be authorised expounders of
Mr. Spencer’s definite but cautious pronouncements ;
neither would his friends’ repudiation of such a com
mentary as ours much trouble us. Mr. Spencer,
in such utterances as these, is (and he takes no
pains to hide that he is) what we Christians call
“ feeling after God, if haply he may find him.” It
is generally felt that he does not venture beyond the
vestibule of the temple, but he is on holy ground. His
striking declaration of the identity of our human con
sciousness with the Divine Presence shows him to be
very near to the centre of the deepest religious faith,
and (with reverence be it said) is but a philosophical
way of expressing the profoundest spiritual convic
tion of Jesus himself. “ I am in the Father and the
Father in me.” “ I am in my Father and ye in me,
and I in you,” the divine element overshadowing,
suffusing, and inspiring all nature. As one discerning
writer says: “ This grand and comforting doctrine
of the incarnate presence of God in each man’s con
sciousness is rapidly becoming the dominant concep
tion of God in all the greatest religious teachers.”
And faith, which in spiritual things is open vision,
may enter in and worship where philosophical intel
lectualism declines to commit itself to anything so
presumptuous.
Even Comte’s Grande Etre, Humanity, in so far as
it betokens reality at all, is but his objective method
of reaching the realisation of this God-consciousness.
It is the result of that instinctive yearning after some
permanent object of affection that can only be satisfied
by some form or other of the God-consciousness.
For, as Mr. Spencer says, “it owes whatever there is
in it of beauty to that Infinite Eternal Energy out of
�HERBERT SPENCER’S CONTRIBUTION TO RELIGION 45
which humanity has quite recently emerged, and into
which it must in course of time subside.”
As has been well said, “ In that newest phase of
natural religion called Positivism there is a more
real apprehension of the natural unity of humanity,
both as to its rootage in the past and its progressive
life in the future, than is possessed by many professing
Christians; but its conception of humanity is closed
in by the gates of Hades, on both sides of the gulf
of time. Its Gospel of Humanity is wanting in
the essential element of Divinity, in which alone
can be found the reality, promise, and potency of
eternal progressive life for the individual no less than
for the race, as the Son of God. Christian faith takes
nothing away from Positive conceptions; it compre
hends, fulfils, and eternalises them.”
To Spinoza this same conviction of the presence of
God in the heart of man was irresistible. It swamped
all else, and earned for him the title of the “ Godintoxicated ” man.
Was this conception of the unity of the Divine and
human natures not just the essence, too, of the famous
early controversy over the person of Christ ? In the
light of modern Christian development we come to see
that Athanasius and his victorious allies digged deeper
than they knew, and that (to change the metaphor) in
the casket of their triumphant dogma they succeeded
in preserving intact to later ages the symbol of a
truth which nothing else could have so well preserved.
The instinct of the Church’s strongest thinkers pre
vailed, and they succeeded in stamping on the Church’s
heart for the ensuing fifteen hundred years the
tremendous truth that very God and very man had, in
that unique form at least, come together. The God
man became to believing souls the intelligible symbol
of the Divine Presence in the race of which he and
�46 HERBERT SPENCER’S CONTRIBUTION TO RELIGION
they were alike members; and that achievement was
worth all the struggle it entailed.
Mineralogists tell us that the most precious diamond
is but a condensed globule of intensely heated vapour,
thrown up in one of those wild eruptions to which our
earth is subject; and they point us, in evidence, to the
fact that very often, when transplanted from its native
bed to the colder and more temperate regions, the
diamond bursts into a thousand fragments, and merges
itself with the circumambient air.
So with the triumphant dogma of Athanasius.
Called into being by the deep need of the human soul,
it was cradled in wild controversy and matured on the
field of battle. It has been the object of the Church’s
passionate attachment ever since. Though it has
assumed degraded forms in degraded times, it has
survived intact, to become at last the object of the
coolest and most unrelenting criticism, until now it
begins to burst its limits and expand into a universal
truth, revealing in our human nature an inherent
glory else unseen, and lifting all humanity into
Divine fellowship and communion.
On Mr. Spencer’s own showing, then, and utilising
his own deliberate admissions, we see no ground on
which he can consistently object to the construction
of earnest practical religious faith. For we are then
merely following his own principle, and “interpret
ing this great single induction deductively.” Subject
always to the inevitable Spencerian rider that man is
in no sense “ the measure of the Infinite,” or to
the equally decisive declarations of Paul that He
“ dwelleth in light which no man can approach unto,”
“ whom no man hath seen or can see,” there is nothing
theoretically inconsistent with a strong rational reli
gious faith. The Spencerian faith, that final truth
of the Spencerian philosophy, is really what is called
�HERBERT SPENCER’S CONTRIBUTION TO RELIGION 47
Panentheism. It is a consciousness of God which, to
use his own words, “ gives the religious sentiment the
widest possible sphere of action.” “ Every man may
properly consider himself as one of the myriad
agencies through whom works the Unknown Cause.
And when the Unknown Cause produces in him a
certain belief, he is thereby authorised to profess and
act out that belief.” Such a faith by no means
banishes the thought of God’s transcendence, properly
understood; but it brings God so near to us as to
irradiate our whole life with his presence, and make
us rejoice in his perpetual inspiration. To the man
who holds this faith
“ Earth’s crammed with heaven
And every common bush afire with God.”
Mr. Spencer would probably have scouted all asso
ciation with so distinctly religious a conception as
this. But the unity of the Divine and human natures
is a religious as well as a philosophical idea. And the
quotations here given, and the considerations naturally
suggested by them, show, we submit, that to the pro
mulgation of this doctrine Mr. Spencer must be
acknowledged as directly contributory. His phrase
ology is characteristically metaphysical, and his
caution is consistently Agnostic. But the thing
signified is essentially the same. And, if this conten
tion be sound, Mr. Spencer has earned that which he
neither wrought for nor hoped for—the lasting thanks
of every Christian thinker.
�Chapter IV.
HEGEL’S CONTRIBUTION TO RELIGION—
THE CONTRIBUTION OF PSYCHOLOGY
“ The soul in some way—how, we know not—identical with God.”
—Tennyson.
In previous chapters we endeavoured to show that the
great modern exponents of the purely scientific and
materialistic attitude of mind had reached a conclusion
so profound and suggestive as to constitute the basis
of an idealistic philosophy.
Spencer’s declaration of the identity of the power of
which we are conscious in ourselves (as force, will, or
energy) with the great Power or energy outside of us,
strikes one, when we first encounter it in his writings,
as a boulder from a higher latitude, a meteoric stone
from a world beyond his philosophical range. Yet
there it is—propounded and reiterated—though not,
we venture to think, with his full customary realisa
tion, or at least admission, of its philosophical import.
The object of this chapter is to show that this same
conclusion was reached long ago by minds equally
powerful with that of Spencer, and on lines perfectly
distinct from his, and at first sight apparently quite
opposed in their direction. Purely psychological
thinkers, occupying a position of perfect aloofness
towards all schools of thought, and dealing directly
with the elemental energies of human nature, have in
their more abstract way been equally compelled to
proclaim the same truth, which we cannot but regard,
48
�49'
HEGEL’S CONTRIBUTION TO RELIGION
therefore, as the greatest generalisation of modern
times.
The long, slow outcome of Western thought, from
the days of Plato, and even Thales, to those of Kant
and Hegel, and the whole modern schools of Western
Europe, is just the slow but steadily growing appre
hension of this same truth, veiled, no doubt, in the
garb of metaphysics and psychology, but, when
stripped of its technicalities and cleared from its haze,
seen to be absolutely one with the truth discerned
by Haeckel and Spencer. Nay, more. By the very
necessity of the case, the purely psychological
thinker, when he does reach his conclusion, states
it in a form that is more comprehensive still than
either of the others, and shows them to be but illus
trations in their own sphere of a great dynamic fact
that is part and parcel of the very being of man.
It would be endless to attempt to trace in detail the
long, slow movement of human thought which has
finally culminated in this conclusion. But, in order
to make the conclusion more intelligible, it is almost
necessary to point out the two main lines on which
the movement has proceeded, dealing, as they do,
respectively with the objective and the subjective worlds
—with the thinking being and the object thought.
At one time, and among particular nations, and
especially in the earlier stages of thought, the in
fluence of the objective world naturally predominated,
at another the subjective. In both cases the human
spirit was searching for the same thing—seeking more
or less consciously an access to the Divine Spirit.
It is the generalisation which both have finally
peached that now throws back a light that gives every
step of the movement a meaning, and shows them all
to have been directly or indirectly contributing to the
slowly evolving conclusion.
E
�50
HEGEL’S CONTRIBUTION TO RELIGION
In Egypt, for example, the objective world was
fatally victorious. There was not sufficient intel
lectual reaction in the Egyptian mind. The thinking
spirit was dwarfed and intimidated by the terrors and
immensities of Nature. Egypt, therefore, cannot be
said in strictness to have left us any philosophy.
In India it was exactly otherwise. The Indians pro
duced no history. Their writings, which are psycho
logical and religious, are really their history. Their
spiritual passion, their joy in the soaring, seeing power
of the human spirit, is the special and valuable contri
bution of India to the world’s grasp of the Divine.
In China, on the other hand, the sense of the invisible
and ideal seems almost to have been absent. But this
cannot really be the case. Laotse’s teaching was kin
with Indian and later Western thought. But Confucius
was the typical Chinese mind. And the teachings
of Confucius are not a philosophy at all. They are
but the hard-baked fossils from a soil on which a long
anterior philosophy once flourished. Practical maxims
and ceremonial directions are not philosophy ; neither
are they religion. They are but—in Bacon’s phrase
—its translation into the vulgar tongue. Confucius
inculcated reverential forms. The ancient thinkers of
China had more or less clearly discerned that, in whose
presence reverence was the only fitting attitude of
spirit. Confucius taught rules of conduct between
man and man. The ancient thinkers had grasped
the principle of reason and justice of which all rules
of conduct are but working formulae. This reason was
the divinest thing Confucius knew. This is not a
large or very vitalising contribution to human thought.
But it contained an element of the ideal. It sprang
from the moral vision of that ancient people. A
great nation has lived on it for ages. Even at the
lowest estimate, it is an illustration on a large scale
�HEGEL’S CONTRIBUTION TO RELIGION
51
of the saying that “it is marvellous in what a com
paratively exhausted receiver the Divine spark will
continue to burn.” At the highest estimate, it was
an illustration of astonishing devotion, not to the
vivid conception of a Divine Being, but to what we
may call the metaphysical principle (the idea, as Plato
afterwards called it) of law, order, duty. And in so
far it entitles Chinese thought to a humble place in
the pantheon of Philosophy.
To the Persian mind, again, the spiritual world
seems to have been its native atmosphere. And it
is surely striking to notice that it was through the
exercise of their naturally keen moral sense that they
rose to the conception of the Eternal Spirit. Is it
not in reality a curious anticipation of one of the
modern declarations of European philosophy, in
which Kant acknowledges the Categorical Imperative
as the most commanding evidence to man of the
Eternal Spirit, of which our own is an abiding echo ?
Was its highest spiritual conception, of which the
most fitting symbols they could find were light and
fire, not an anticipation even of the Christian con
ception of Him “ Who is Light, and in Him is no
darkness at all ” ? Yet Zoroaster failed to find a
solution of the moral difficulty of the world. But
who are we, with our Satan and our story of the Fall,
that can afford to smile contempt at the Ahriman of
the Persian theology ?x
i<n a book on The Ideals of the East, just published by a Japanese
author (London : John Murray; 5s. net; 1903), is to be found a very
discerning confirmation of the general view here taken. The author,
Kakasu Okakura, emphasises the unity of Asia," the love for the ultimate
and universal which is the common thought and inheritance of every
Asiatic race,” and finds in “Arab chivalry, Persian poetry, Chinese
ethics, and Indian thought a common life, bearing in different regions
different characteristic blossoms, but nowhere capable of a hard and
fast dividing line.” Speaking of his own special subject, the art of
Japan, he says: “The history of Japanese art becomes the history of
�52
HEGEL’S CONTRIBUTION TO RELIGION
Buddhism, again, was the great Protestantism of the
East. And in its philosophical aspect our Western
Protestantism pales its ineffectual fires before it
altogether. Buddhism not only reasserted with a
vehemence and passion that have astonished the
world, the truth of which its ancient predecessor had
been a great efflorescence—the truth, namely, that
there was a Divine strength in the human spirit, a
power of piercing to the unseen, and of true com
munion with the Eternal Spirit. It carried that faith
to a point not even yet dreamed of by the ordinary
Western mind.
As F. D. Maurice says :—
European sages in the last century and in the present have cried
out: “When will philosophy break loose from the fetters which
priests have imposed upon it ?” Philosophy in Asia performed that
task 2,000 years ago. It threw off the yoke which was become quite
intolerable. It affirmed that man’s soul is capable of unlimited
expansion. It claimed for that soul the homage due to a divinity.
It made no mere idle boast of power. It actually won the allegiance
of multitudes. (Moral and Metaphysical Philosophy, p. 53.)
Or, to use the words of Professor Rhys Davids:—
For the first time in the history of the world, Buddhism proclaimed
a salvation which each man could gain for himself, by himself, in
this world, during this life, without having the least reference to God
or Gods, either great or small.1
This conviction was a tremendous advance on
anything previously attained or attempted. The only
thing that can give it a reasonable explanation to our
minds is the belief that its founder, at least, and his
Asiatic ideals—the beach where each successive wave of Eastern
thought has left its sand and ripple as it beat against the national
consciousness.”
1 Not only so, but, as M. Guyau says, “the Hindu books are the
most extraordinary example of moral symbolism. The entire world
appears to the Buddhist as the realisation of the moral law, sine© in
his view beings take rank in the universe according to their virtues or
vices, mount or descend on the ladder of life according to tbeir moral
elevation or abasement. Buddhism is, in certain respects, an effort to
find in morals a theory of the universe.” (Non-Religionof the Future,
p. 170.)
�HEGEL’S CONTRIBUTION TO RELIGION
53
immediate followers, felt the passionate inspiration of
this very principle, whose slow possession by the
human spirit we are attempting to trace, the affinity
of their own spirits with the Eternal Spirit. In this
light what has often been called mere Atheism was
but Mysticism become conscious of itself, and exer
cising the spiritual strength which intense conscious
ness of the Divine always supplies.
Even when we come to Greece, the great forerunner
and inspirer of the European intellect, what a long
process of vacillating thought do we find ! The philo
sophical and scientific and psychological instincts are
all there. At all hazards the Greek felt that he must
find the reason or cause or single idea (if there was
one) that lay at the root of things. Water, air, earth,
fire, even number, were successively set forth as the
one secret of the visible universe. But these early
Greek physicists were more poets than physicists.
They looked, and dreamed, and allegorised; but the
era of patient observation was not yet. By-and-bye,
however, they began to be conscious of laws or an
order which seemed to govern the inner world of their
own minds. And this conception of the laws of
thought is of interest here, not for its details, but
because it was, so far as it went, a true intuition—a
direct attempt at the analysis of human consciousness.
As such, it was the opening of a new and most
suggestive channel of inspiration as to the very Being
that is at the centre of the universe. “ Know
thyself ” contained the possibility of a true knowledge
of the Divine.
Plato was the first mediator between the two great
factors of the world of thought. He set forth in the
strength of his own spirit, and endeavoured to enter
and breathe the atmosphere of the Divine. Plato the
Seer came down from the Mount like Moses the
�54
HEGEL’S CONTRIBUTION TO RELIGION
Legislator, but not with tables of stone to be a work
ing code for a hard-hearted people. Plato, too, felt
the Spirit of the Eternal coursing through his own
soul, and, with the instinct of the poet and the seer,
he bodied it forth in thoughts that have ever since
been the accepted foundation of all spiritual philo
sophy. As has been well said of him, “ Plato’s
abstractions seem to become for him not merely
substantial things in themselves, but little short of
living persons, and constituting together a sort of
divine family or hierarchy with which the mind of the
individual, so far as it is reasonable and really knows,
is in communion and correspondence.” Plato faced
the problem of duality, and minimised no side of the
difficulties connected with it. He set all his suc
cessors on the right track towards its solution. From
Plato down, it would be a task too minute to attempt
to follow the course of thought in detail. Enough to
point out that from his time, with varying intensity,
each side of this great antinomy came to the front.
It was this double consciousness in its most intense
form that was found in the pure, strong vision of
Jesus, the profoundest and most practical of all the
mystics. The truth which fuses these two sides of the
human consciousness together into a great moral and
spiritual force was not only implicit but even explicit
in his teaching. Jesus was no speculator. But the
intuitive mystical element in the Jewish nature had
come to a climax in him. He saw and felt intensely
this union of the Divine and human natures. It was
this that he lived to teach and died to attest. “ I
and my Father are one.’M “ That ye (His disciples)
may be one, even as we are one.” And if this is the
truth for which the religion of Jesus stands, and of
which it was the first complete assertion, what a light
it throws on the character and person of Jesus!
�HEGEL’S CONTRIBUTION TO RELIGION
55
How is it conceivable or consistent with any just
notions we can form of a Divine economy, that an
emanation of deity of a kind previously unheard of
should have to appear among men, in order to teach
us authoritatively a truth which lay in the direct line
of human thought and investigation 1 Such an idea,
instead of emphasising, tends rather to nullify the
principle of the Divine self-manifestation.
Paul could boldly speak of men as “ the temple of
God,” and to very poor specimens of mankind did he
address these pregnant words. Even uneducated
Peter could describe the object of the Christian life in
such mystical words as these: “ That ye might be
partakers of the Divine nature.”
But the Church for ages almost smothered this
essential truth under a mass of dogmas and symbols
and organisation such as the world has hardly seen
matched elsewhere.
The Reformation (to take a long leap forward) was
essentially, so far as it went, a reassertion of this
inherent dignity and glory of the human spirit.
Descartes' “ I think, therefore I am,” and Schopen
hauer's “ I will, and that is the essential element not
only of my being, but of all spiritual existence,” were
fresh reassertions of the inalienable force of the human
spirit, and did much to hasten the inevitable conclusion.
Spinoza's whole work was an unmatched expression
of this great reassertion, but the pantheistic monism
in which it culminated was, in his day, too absolute a
diet for daily food. Kant's doctrine of the generative
power of the human spirit as the creator and fashioner
of all that can be called true knowledge was the nearest
approach that had been made since the days of Plato
to the solution of the riddle of philosophy. A dis
cerning writer (Schwegler) says of Kant:—
As regards the thing-in-itself that lies behind the appearance of
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HEGEL’S CONTRIBUTION TO RELIGION
sense, Kant, in the first edition of his work, expressed himself as if
it were possible that it and the Ego might be one and the same
thinking substance. This thought, which Kant only threw out as a
conjecture, has been the source of the whole subsequent evolution of
philosophy.
But it is when we come to Hegel, and study his
capacious grasp of the whole problem, that we find
the master-mind able to gather up the separate
threads of previous philosophic thought and bind them
together by a piercing insight and bold generalisation
that is nothing else than a reassertion of this intuitive
conjecture of Kant, which we take to be the greatest
generalisation of modern times.
Now, we do not pretend to break down Hegel for
popular consumption. The 1,200 somewhat verbose
pages1 in which The Secret of Hegel has been
disclosed to English readers are enough to deter any
ordinary man from the attempt. But, after all, the
secret, as it is called, is there. And, despite the
caution as to the impracticability of attempting to
convey a general idea of a modern philosophic system
for the benefit of “ well-informed people,” we venture
to see in this Secret of Hegel, the most commanding
analysis of that very consciousness and self-conscious
ness yet made by any philosopher, and the most
daring transference of the results of that analysis to
the curtain of the Infinite, to the very mind of God.
As the author of The Secret of Hegel says, “ that
process of self-consciousness strikes the keynote of the
whole method and matter of Hegel ” (p. 78).
1 Dr. Stirling’s style, in its alliterative, accumulative, and
accentuated ponderosity, is most irritating. It is not confined to The
Secret of Hegel. Here is a passage taken at random from his
Gifford Lectures, p. 279 : “ It is really very odd, but Hume is never
for a brief instant aware that in that he has answered his own
cardinal, crucial, and climacteric question. The immediate nexus,
the express bond, the very tie which he challenged you and me and the
whole world to produce, he actually at that very moment produces
himself, holds up in his hand even, openly shows, expressly names,
and emphatically insists upon. ’ ’
�HEGEL’S CONTRIBUTION TO RELIGION
57
Kant had sounded the same depths before Hegel.
Kant, indeed, had discerned and laid bare to ordinary
thinking men the leading land-marks, the constitutive
elements of human thought. He called these the
“ Categories of Thought.” These categories (which
we need not here refer to in detail) Hegel grasped,
unified, and expanded, and declared them to be
essential elements of that Pure Reason in man which
is absolutely kin and identical with the Universal
Reason which is God.
Hegel, in fact, showed that what the Mystics knew
to be the only satisfaction of their spiritual nature was
also the only possible answer and satisfaction to the
very laws of thought.
A later expounder of Hegel (Professor Wallace,
Prolegomena to the Logic of Hegel) says, emphasising
the very point we here insist on:—
The Hegelian was the first attempt to display the organisation of
Thought pure and entire, as a whole and in its details. The organism
of thought as the living reality and gist of the external world and the
world within us is called the “ Idea ” (p. 174).
The Idea is the reality and ideality of the world, the totality con
sidered as a process beyond time. God reveals his absolute nature in
the several relatives of the process. He is cognisable in those points
where that process comes to self-perception or self-apprehension. They
are the several forms under which the Absolute is cognisable to man.
In logical language, these forms of the Absolute are the Categories of
Thought.
And he proceeds to comment thus on a well-known
and vital philosophical controversy :—
Spencer and Mansel, Hamilton and Mill, are nearly all at one in
banishing God and religion to a world beyond the present sublunary
sphere, to an inscrutable region beyond the scope of scientific inquiry.
He is the Unknown Power, felt by what some of these writers call
Intuition, and others call Experience. They do not, however, allow to
knowledge any capacity for apprehending in detail the truths which
belong to the Kingdom of God.
The whole teaching of Hegel is the overthrow of the limits thus set
to religious thought. To him, all thought and all actuality, when it is
grasped by knowledge, is from man’s side, an exaltation of the mind
towards God; while, when regarded from the Divine standpoint, it is
the manifestation of His own nature in its infinite variety (p. 27).
In short, we may say that God is cognisable by man
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HEGEL’S CONTRIBUTION TO RELIGION
just because the very spiritual substance of man is a
breath and true part of the Divine Spirit; and the
highest forms in which the human mind can think,
and according to which it is ultimately compelled to
think, are just those features of the Divine mind
which are irrevocably stamped on the human spirit.
This embracing thought of Hegel, then, the unity
of the thinking being and the object thought, of the
subject and the object, of the Divine nature and our
human nature, we take not only on its merits, but
because we find it, as we have shown, to be the
essential identical conclusion reached by quite inde
pendent thinkers.
In respect of their personal attitudes towards
religion, no one would dream of linking together such
men as Haeckel and Spencer with Hegel. Our sole
object here is to show that on quite independent but
analogous lines all three have reached what is essen
tially the same conclusion. All three contribute their
own characteristic corroboration to the teaching of the
religious instinct. They confirm us in the possession
of a solid rational foundation for that which the
human heart demands, and the higher reason has
always supplied.
�Chapter V.
THE MYSTICS’ CONTRIBUTION TO RELIGION
—THE CONTRIBUTION OE SPIRITUAL
INSIGHT
“Avicenna, the Philosopher,
‘ All that he sees I know. ’
Abu Said, the Mystic,
‘ All that he knows I see.’ ”
Mysticism is often regarded as a transient and unim
portant excrescence on the religious history of man.
On the contrary, it is neither transient nor unim
portant. It is found in active force and in developed
form among some of the earliest peoples of whom we
have any record. East and West, we find it in all
climes and among all races.
The peculiar feature of the mystics is that in their
most characteristic moments and states they seem to
ignore and overleap merely intellectual barriers, and
fly straight to the apprehension of the very truth
which we find so laboriously wrought out by more
cautious and sceptical minds. The mystics, wherever
we find them, profess to have reached the joyous con
sciousness of a union with the Divine Spirit beyond
any power of description which they themselves could
command, or which others, however desirous to do
so, could adequately understand. How is this to be
explained ? How should one man feel himself com
pelled by the hard necessity of his ratiocinative
faculties to plod step by step, and with long oscillations,
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THE MYSTICS’ CONTRIBUTION TO RELIGION
towards a point which another man seems able to
reach with almost lightning speed, and to leave little
or no tatiocinative track to show his path ? Is there
any/svidential value in the experience of such men
towards understanding the great conclusion which
they, in common with very different minds, arrive at ?
What, in short, is the rationale of mysticism ?
Those who have studied the writings and the lives
of the mystics have not hesitated to declare them to
be the most profoundly spiritual of the race.
One of the most philosophical minds of our day
(the Master of Balliol) has defined mysticism as
“Religion in its most concentrated and exclusive
form, that in which all other relations are swallowed
up in the relation of the soul to God.” Another
Gifford lecturer (Professor Wm. James, of Harvard)
says to the same effect that “ all personal religious
experience has its root and centre in mystical states
of consciousness.” And mysticism is distinguished
from all other phases of mental action in this—that it
cannot be called the direct result of long intellectual
processes. Intellectual differences have formed the
perpetual element of division among ordinary religious
people, and are much modified after every minor or
major “reformation” that takes place. The essential
ideas, and, generally speaking, even the language, of the
mystic recur age after age with remarkable uniformity.
The explanation lies on the surface—the thought of the
mystic is nearer the centre, if we may so say, than
that of any other student of divine things. And if
mysticism be thus more deeply rooted than ordinary
forms of faith, any fluctuation in the form of expres
sion is so lit up by the vivid inner faith as to be seen
as but the play of the intellect round that which is
beyond its grasp. The true mystic thus finds himself
as much at home in the spiritual apophthegms of
�THE MYSTICS’ CONTRIBUTION TO RELIGION
61
ancient India or Persia as in those of modern Europe.
The mysticism of the ancient Brahmanic faith is
well known; and we refer to it here only to point out
a characteristic feature of mysticism wherever we find
it. One able writer says :—
Mysticism as a genuine, progressive world-illuminating power began
with the Greeks. The Indians, no doubt, asserted the I and the not I
to be one. But they made nothing of this great truth, save to seek,
each man for himself, absorption into the Absolute. The Absolute
was real; the Phenomenal was illusion. The Greeks were more
honest thinkers. 'In short, the Indians were merely mystics. The
Greeks were mystics plus philosophers.
There is undoubtedly truth in this statement. The
mystical consciousness, unless it can be intellectualised—expressed, that is to say, in more or less
definite and illuminating language—will never be of
much spiritual value to other minds—though there is
a most true sense in which the mystic consciousness is
“ineffable”; its spiritual contents cannot be effectively
conveyed from one to another, just as the sun’s rays
may be reflected from one object to another, but the
full strength of his influence must be received directly
by each object for itself. But the form which this
mysticism assumed in the ancient Indian mind was
not the result of a mere unassisted imaginative tour de
force. It had been preceded, we may be sure, by
thought and experience. And though the actual
entry into 4jhe mystic consciousness would no doubt
be what is called an intuitive act, which at one
bound rose above the level of the intellect, brooding
meditation is the soil from which it grows. For the
very perception of the phenomenal as Maya or Illusion
was almost certainly the outcome of long meditation
on the fleeting things of time and sense. And though
they could not succeed in thinking this phenomenal
into God, or conceiving it in terms of God, these
mystical minds felt that there was no abiding city;
that, on the contrary, their own spirits were greater
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THE MYSTICS’ CONTRIBUTION TO RELIGION
than all these visible things; that this spirit of theirs
must, in some deep sense, be an index to the meaning
of the world; and they clasped to their hearts the
belief that God was not only spirit, like themselves,
but the only Spirit, the only Reality in the universe,
and their own spirits but breaths and sparks of that
Eternal Spirit with whom it was their highest spiritual
satisfaction to feel themselves united. We may call
this philosophy or not, as we choose. It was the profoundest philosophy the world had at that time heard
of. And even European philosophers whose names
no thinker can afford to despise have called these
“ the loftiest heights of philosophy.” The correct
definition of mysticism, however, is a minor question.
The real point is that the mystic—that is, the charac
teristically religious spirit—long since instinctively
grasped the truth which we desire to emphasise : the
union of the Divine with the human.
The Platonic doctrine that the human soul is a portion
of the Divine nature is as simple a digest of the mystic
principle as any. And even Plato was long antici
pated by the old Brahmanic philosophy. “ The
kernel of the Vedantic philosophy—the great sentence,
it is called—is ‘ Tat tv am asi ’—‘ That thou art.’
Thou, 0 neophyte, art thyself the Brahman whom thou
seekest to know. Thou thyself art a part of the All.”
And see how naturally this same thought finds
itself reproduced in our latest modern philosophy.
Hegel says, recognising the affinity to his own
deepest thought, of the great Persian mystic lately
introduced to English readers by Dr. Hastie :—
In the excellent Jelaleddin Rumi in particular we find the unity of
the soul with the One set forth, and that unity described as Love.
And this spiritual unity is an exaltation above the finite and common,
a transfiguration of the natural and spiritual in which the externalism
and transitoriness of nature is surmounted. In this poetry, which
soars above all that is external and sensuous,, who would recognise
the prosaic ideas current about so-called Pantheism ?
�THE MYSTICS’ CONTRIBUTION TO RELIGION
63
It is easy to see how such a faith might lead its
possessors into many extravagancies. Modern illus
trations will occur to every reader. Take Bohme, the
German mystic. Bohme in early life felt so acutely
the working and suggestions of his own spirit that he
instinctively regarded the thoughts which thus came
to him as Divine revelations. And he was nearer the
truth in this than colder natures could imagine. His
consciousness of the Divine was not at fault; it was
no hallucination. But his efforts at exposition were
often confused, and even unintelligible. Not only so ;
his mind was so hampered and bound by an almost
slavish adherence to the dogmas of his day that his
writings. often suggest to the mind of the reader
the wild flutterings of an eagle in the cage of a
sparrow.
There are, in fact, two classes of mystics. One, the
more familiar, consists of such as Bohme, Blake, and
even Swedenborg, whose forte, and at the same time
weakness, was that they felt themselves overwhelmed
by the Infinite—their spirits swayed helplessly beyond
the control of the intellect, in a kind of hypnotic sleep
of the spirit. Their mystical experience intoxicated
them—made them all one as if they were insane.
They often failed to grasp the mystic lesson that their
reason is but universal reason. Hence it was not to
the normal workings of their spirit that they attended.
Voices, visions, ecstatic visitations—these only were
to them messages from God.
In the case of other mystic souls the mighty thought
of their oneness with the All steadied rather than
staggered their intellects. Tyndall, in a letter, recalls
Tennyson saying of the mystical condition, with the
passionate confidence of one who has experienced it,
“ By God Almighty! there is no delusion in the
matter! It is no nebulous ecstasy, but a state of
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THE MYSTICS’ CONTRIBUTION TO RELIGION
transcendent wonder, associated with absolute clear
ness of mind ” (Memoirs of TennysonfrNoX. ii., p. 473).
The thought of their oneness "with the All freed
them from “ the heresy of separateness,” and
enabled them to say, “If we are one with the All,
the thought that is in us is not our thought, but
simply Thought. It follows that, if we cautiously yet
boldly record the utterances of our own spirit, we shall
be recording the everlasting oracles themselves.”
Thus Plato, Wordsworth, Emerson, and a host of
others. Plotinus, who has been called “ the only
analytical mystic,” only twice or thrice in his life
claimed to have had direct vision of the perfect and
absolute One. His intellect was too active and critical
to admit of its habitual surrender to the mystic
passion.
Inspiration has been called merely “ an intensified
state of consciousness and he is but a poor specimen
of our common human nature in whom the Divine
does not find some more or less conscious flashpoint.
The commonest experience of this, and fortunately
the most valuable for the conduct of life, is that of
our moral convictions. The man who has learned the
force of the categorical imperative, as Kant called it,
or the imperious dictate of a reasonably enlightened
conscience, has learned the presence of the Divine in
his inner nature, even if the thought of it strikes
him as a kind of presumptuous familiarity. “ Stern
daughter of the voice of God ” is not all a metaphor.
We touch the Divine, or, rather, the Divine touches us,
at many points. Who has not felt it ? Who has not
experienced something of that overshadowing of his
spirit that comes through what we appropriately call
Communion—that conscious approach to the Divine
which slowly, but at last instantaneously, passes into
unconscious submersion of the spirit ?
�THE MYSTICS’ CONTRIBUTION TO RELIGION
65
“Clear thought dies out in love’s absorbed delight.”
“ With thy sweet soul this soul of mine
Hath mixed as water doth with wine.
Who can the wine and water part,
Or me and thee when we combine ?
Thou art become my greater self ;
Small bounds no more can me confine.
Thou hast my being taken on ;
And shall not I now take on thine?”
—Jelaleddin, X.
When that stage of spiritual intensity is reached, the
only language possible is that of symbol. And the
symbols, being but the counters of the intellect, are
but feeble illustrations of that which is the ineffable
and incommunicable. They have their value up to
a certain point. Beyond that, their light is lost in a
brightness that is past their ken.
And yet mysticism is not unrelated to ordered
thought. There is no reason to suppose that it is in
any way incompatible with the largest attainments of
scientific and philosophic thought. On the contrary,
it has nothing to fear from the encroachment of the
scientific spirit. Latest science and latest philosophy
alike point unmistakeably to the truth which is the
core of mysticism. In the words of a careful French
writer,1 “ It is my opinion that mysticism, pure of all
alloy, will expand as much as science, and will expand
with it.” The progress of scientific and philosophic
thought, therefore, only confirms the mystic faith.
Mysticism, in its exercise of what we call intuition,
or deep spiritual passion, has thus all along dis
counted the slow attainment of more prosaic powers.
Spencer’s own conclusion is that mysticism underlies
all knowledge. To-day it is the slow-footed scientific
spirit that is at last coming into line with the swift,
unquestioning faith of the mystic. All shades of the
1 E. Recejae, Essay on the Basis of the Mystic Knowledge, trans
lated by S. C. Upton (Kegan Paul & Co., 1899).
F
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THE MYSTICS’ CONTRIBUTION TO RELIGION
orthodox faith, if they could recognise their true
interest, would thank God, not merely for the strong,
persistent faith of the mystic, which has borne per
petual witness to that for which all religion stands,
but for the latest outcome of modern thought, which,
so far from weakening that faith, is rendering its
essence more impregnable than ever.
See, for example, how even the Agnostic may find
himself fundamentally at one with the mystic. To
Dionysius, the mystic, Negation and Affirmation were
the two appropriate methods for knowledge of the
Infinite. Vaughan says of him—and the words cannot
fail to recall to memory the ever-recurring language of
our modern Agnostics—“ To assert anything concern
ing a God who is above all affirmation is to speak in
a figure—to veil him. The more you deny concerning
him, the more of such veils do you remove. By Nega
tion we approach most nearly to a true apprehension of
what he is.” Thus does the mystic avail himself of
the Agnostic’s most cherished phrases as the fittest
help in the expression of his own deepest faith. God
is regarded as “ the Nameless,” “ the inscrutable
Anonymous.” With all deference to Spencer’s
favourite phrase, “ the Unknowable,” this of the
Nameless and the inscrutable Anonymous is distinctly
superior. It covers the whole difference between the
Agnostic and the mystic. Of the existence of the
eternal reality both are passionately convinced. Both
are prepared to defend it against all shades of mate
rialists. The Agnostic never gets or hopes to get any
nearer to an apprehension of the Infinite Reality. All
his phraseology is the phraseology of despair. When
he has once satisfied himself of its reality, he im
mediately turns his back and retires from its presence
with a wail of hopeless denials. He thus feels himself
for ever debarred from attempting to commune with
�THE MYSTICS’ CONTRIBUTION TO RELIGION
67
the Eternal. The mystic, on the contrary, even with
a similar and reverent refrain of denials, feels himself
drawn ever the nearer to the one object of his faith.
“ I am what is and is not; I am the Soul in All. ”—Jelaleddin, XVI.
Dionysius, with the mystic’s ready gift for similes,
aptly compares his negative method of speaking con
cerning the Supreme, to the operation of the sculptor
who strikes off fragment after fragment of the marble,
and progresses by diminishing. With such an issue as
this before us we must beware of becoming entangled
in the limitations and inadequacies of mere words.
To the true mystic language is but noise. As one of
them said ages ago :—
So long as the bee is outside the petals of the flower it buzzes and
emits sounds ; but when it is inside the flower the sweetness thereof
has silenced and overpowered the bee. Forgetful of sounds and of
itself, it drinks the nectar in quiet. Men of learning, you too are
making a noise in the world; but know the moment you get the
slightest enjoyment of the sweetness of the love of God you will be
like the bee in the flower, inebriated with the nectar of Divine love.
(“Ramakrishna,” Nineteenth Century, August, 1896.)
^hus do the mysticism of thousands of years ago and
the latest generalisation of modern philosophy meet
and join hands in one and the same truth. And as
Professor Wm. James suggests (p. 389):—
What reader of Hegel can doubt that that sense of a perfected Being,
with all its otherness soaked up into itself, which dominates his whole
philosophy, must have come from the prominence in his conscious
ness of mystical moods in most persons kept subliminal ?
Our union with the Divine, then, the truth which
was clasped to their hearts by the mystics with the
first appearance of developed thought, has been con
tributed to directly or indirectly by every nation under
the sun; has at last been slowly, and one might say
almost unwillingly, confessed by the purely scientific
men who were not searching for it; has been acknow
ledged by discerning Christian theologians as the
fundamental principle of their faith; has been finally
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THE MYSTICS’ CONTRIBUTION TO RELIGION
grasped and stated in its most comprehensive form by
the legitimate heirs of all the slow deposits of human
thought, and stands forth challenging the verdict, not
only of philosophers, but of every human being who
chooses to think seriously on the subject, and is
destined, we believe, to provide ultimately a great
eirenicon for all the creeds and cults of the human race.
�Chapter VI.
WANTED—A NEW BUTLER
“ There is in progress a movement vastly more important than
that which is the special concern of the higher criticism, and that is
the total reconstruction of theological theory, in fearless logical
accord with the truth of incarnation.”—“ The Christ of To-day”
It would be interesting to trace the disintegrating
and at the same time illuminating effect which the
general naturalistic view expressed in the preceding
pages has on Church dogma. That must be left for
some future occasion. Meantime, it is distinctly
suggestive to note the confusion and perplexity which
the want of such a view creates in the minds of the
more thoughtful adherents of the Church. The best
minds, of course, feel this most. But it is not often
that we find it so vividly illustrated, and even
admitted, as in a recent work by a representative
theologian.
Dr. Fairbairn, of Mansfield College, has lately
brought his proved ability and insight to bear on a
Philosophy of the Christian Religion. It is one of
many like attempts; and we call attention to this one
here because it is an elaborate effort to apply anew,
in the full light of modern science and criticism, the
famous Analogy of Butler. So faithful is the attempt
at reproduction that the good Bishop’s failures, too,
have been carefully repeated, on a scale proportionate
to the larger material now available for the treatment
of the argument. For, as is well known, Butler
attempted too much. In principle, his argument was
69
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WANTED—A NEW BUTLER
irrefragable. It was a memorable tu quoque to the
Deists of his time. But he accepted to the full the
whole dogmatic framework of the Church, and
deemed it to be his duty to show that even dogmas
that have been quite discarded since were equally in
line with his great analogy. Needless to say, that
was an impossible and futile task.
The Bishop’s natural cast of mind and his reveren
tial study of “ the constitution and course of nature ”
assure us that, in other circumstances and with larger
light, he would have been the first man to hail the
slow, orderly, self-manifestation of God as the one key
to Nature and Religion alike. Unfortunately, the
nearest approach he could make to this larger concep
tion was to “prove,” as he endeavoured to do, that
that special dispensation of Providence, the Christian
Religion, being “ a scheme or system of things carried
on by the mediation of a Divine person, the Messiah,
in order to the recovery of the world,” is analogous
to what is experienced in “ the constitution and course
of Nature.” “ The whole analogy of Nature,” he
says, p. 151, chap. v.,“ removes all imagined presump
tion against the general notion of a Mediator between
God and man. For we find all living creatures are
brought into the world, and their life in infancy is pre
served, by the instrumentality of others; and every
satisfaction of it, in some way or other, is bestowed by
the like means ” !
That is to say, the fact that we are brought into
the world by means of the instrumentality and
mediation of our parents is the good Bishop’s proof,
by analogy, that the theological mediatorship ascribed
to Christ, in the Church’s dogmatic system, is a truth
consonant with all Nature.
The Bishop dug from a rich quarry, and his ground
plan was admirable ! But his architecture is
�WANTED—A NEW BUTLER
71
antiquated, and many of his rooms are long since
deserted.
Dr. Fairbairn adjusts his effort to the new situation,
and fortunately puts the crux of the matter plainly
before his readers. “ The problem of the person of
Christ,” he says, “ is exactly the point in the Christian
religion where the intellect feels overweighted by
mysteries it cannot resolve.” Another question
arises—Is that mystery “ a thing of nature, or is it
a made or manufactured article, a myth which the
logical intellect has woven out of the material offered
by a simple and beautiful story”? The theological
mystery of the person of Christ is undoubtedly “ a
made or manufactured article.” We accept Dr.
Fairbairn’s description of the process of its pro
duction :—
The imaginations [of the early disciples and evangelists], touched
by the enthusiasm of an all-believing love, became creative, and they
saw Jesus as if he had been the Messiah they had hoped he was....
and it needed only the fearless logic of a metaphysical, unscientific
age to identify him with Deity, and resolve his humanity by the
incarnation of the Son of God.
But that process of their imagination, and that logic
of a metaphysical unscientific age, were really uncon
scious vindications of that larger truth, that universal
“ mystery ” in which there is nothing that is “ficti
tious or artificial,” but which is, on the contrary,the
full expression of that unity of the Divine and the
human for which Jesus lived and died.
Under the unconscious shelter of this deeper truth,
the conflicting theological contentions of the Gnostics,
the Arians, and the Athanasians find their explana
tion and their historical justification. Without the
hard-fought decision of the early Councils, this larger
truth would have been lost for ages. Without this
larger truth, waiting its full realisation, the deification
would have remained in the region of pure dogma,
�72
WANTED—A NEW BUTLER
and lost its fertilising power altogether. At the
present moment this is more apparent than ever
before in the history of Christian theology. Scaf
folding after scaffolding is being taken down, and the
“ building not made with hands, eternal in the
heavens,” and in the heart of man, is being laid bare
to our view, and all the struggles of past ages justified
and made intelligible.
Dr. Fairbairn himself admits that it is not the
Gospel records that supply him with the chief mystery
of the person of Christ:—
It is not Jesus of Nazareth who has so powerfully entered into
history. It is the deified Christ, who has been believed, loved, and
obeyed as the Saviour of the world. The act of apotheosis created the
Christian religion (p. 15).
The question as to the person of Christ is a problem directly raised
by the place he holds and the functions he has fulfilled in the life of
man collectively and individually.
And so boldly does Dr. Fairbairn sum up his solution
of the problem that he says :—
The conception of Christ stands related to history, as the idea of
God is related to nature—i.e., each is in its own sphere the factor of
order and the constitutive condition of a rational system (p. 18).
This is the point where a sober philosophy parts
company with Dr. Fairbairn. For, needless to say,
this is a tremendous contention to maintain. Here
is how he attempts to base his analogy:—
What do the theories of energy and evolution mean but the con
tinuance of the creative process ? But if new forms in biology have
emerged, if from however mean an origin, in a mode however low,
mind once began to be, why may not new and higher types appear in
the modes and forms of being known to history as politics, ethics,
religion ? In other words, may not the very power which determined
the appearance of the form, and the whole course of evolution from
it, determine also the appearance of creative persons in history, and all
the events which may follow from their appearance ? Might we not
describe the failure of the fit or needed man to appear at some supreme
moment as a failure which affects the whole creation ? And would
not the work which he did for God be the measure of the degree of
the Divine presence or quantity of the Divine energy immanent
within him ? It seems fair, then, to conclude that, so far from the idea
of a supernatural person being incompatible with the modern idea of
nature, it is logically involved in it!
�WANTED—A NEW BUTLER
73
Will any tyro in logic pretend that this attempted
analogy from new forms in biology can by any strain
of legitimate reasoning suggest a “ Divine Man,” a
“ stupendous miracle,” as he elsewhere calls Christ ?
The attempt made in this passage is quite unworthy
of Dr. Fairbairn, and absolutely inconsistent with the
profession of his preface. He shuffles and alters the
cards in such a way that, beginning with the innocent
phrase, “ new and higher types,” he passes on to
“ creative persons
then deliberately steps from the
plural into the singular number, “ the fit or needed
man,” which is still, however, conceivable as one of’
an orderly series; and at last boldly “ concludes ” for
“ a supernatural person,” as being “ logically
involved ” in the idea he started with. This is first
to parade a philosophical attitude, and then repudiate
it inch by inch.
Supernatural man—that is to say, man conceived
in terms of the invisible and transcendental—Dr.
Fairbairn apparently cannot bring himself to treat
seriously as an element in philosophy. And yet he
speaks of “the incarnate reason we call man”
(p. 291), and in many passages uses language which
shows how willingly, if he dared, he would utilise this
larger conception if only he could reconcile with it the
idea of “ the ” supernatural person, the “ stupendous
miracle.” Even his friendly reviewer, Dr. Orr, feels
compelled to point out this inconsistency. Referring
to Dr. Fairbairn’s contention for the perfect super
natural personality of Christ (p. 92), Dr. Orr says:—
This is finely put, and undeniably has truth in it. But language
must not conceal from us the fact that this mode of interpreting the
supernatural, however noble, leaves us still a long way from the kind
of supernatural implied in the incarnation, as Dr. Fairbairn would
have us understand it, or in miracles like those of the evangelical
history, as Dr. Fairbairn in a later chapter (pp. 331-5) defends them.
What we have reached so far is the supernatural as a spiritual
principle in nature, but not a supernatural which transcends
�74
WANTED—A NEW BUTLER
nature, save in the sense in which every man as personal and
ethical is supernatural. The formula applicable to the former—viz.,
that the supernatural is but the natural viewed under a changed
aspect (pp. 56, 307, etc.)—can certainly not be stretched without
amphiboly to cover the supernatural of the Gospel and the Creeds.
Dr. Fairbairn’s idealistic friends will go with him his whole length in
the one contention. They would probably not go with him a single
step in the other.1
Dr. Fairbairn’s comparison of Christ and Buddha
is remarkably well drawn out. We cannot deal with
it here in detail. Sufficient to say, nothing could be
more strained and inconsistent than the quite opposite
conclusions he draws from two cases admittedly so
similar. Here again, Dr. Orr (though, like all his
confreres, without the full courage of his conviction)
says:—
Here we may begin to feel that we are getting on very slippery
ground indeed. There must be interpretation and apotheosis by
the community, but in the case of Buddha, at any rate, that apotheosis
is purely imaginative—fictional. Is it to be presumed that it is the
same with Christ ? Dr. Fairbairn would repel that inference with
his whole soul, but in some of his parallels he comes perilously near
suggesting it.2
And again, referring to Dr. Fairbairn’s appeal to
history as the ultimate verification of the claims of
Christ:—
Might not the same argument, mutatis mutandis, be urged as estab
lishing the truth of the conception of the idealised Buddha ?
For our own part, we accept Dr. Fairbairn’s bracket
ing of creation and incarnation. We are even pre
pared to press the analogy. For, if truly applied, it
is illuminating in the highest degree. But every
analogy that can be consistently drawn from the idea of
creation points not to a single historical event like the
life of Christ, as Dr. Fairbairn contends, but to a fact
as fundamental and universal as creation itself—the
incarnation of God in humanity.
If creation, as the rationale of the material universe,
1 Contemporary Review, September, 1902.
2 Ibid.
�WANTED—A NEW BUTLER
75
be incarnation, as Dr. Fairbairn says—that is to
say, an embodiment of the Divine so far as it goes
—so, the analogy teaches us, incarnation, as the
rationale of the moral and spiritual world, is the
embodiment of the Divine in a sense and to a
degree of which the material universe is only a
pictorial suggestion.
If the promise and potency of all organic life is
enshrined in the germ which science has disclosed as
its secret, so, if the analogy has any force at all, in
that same germ there lies the promise and potency of
all the moral and spiritual life of man.
What the precise method of the Divine inhabitation
may be neither science nor psychology will probably
ever fathom. But in both respects the germ is
possessed by the Divine energy, and all the wondrous
life of man—body, soul, and spirit—lay latent in its
insignificant folds.
It is painfully evident that Dr. Fairbairn feels the
inadequacy of his own attempt to apply the Bishop’s
method to the problem which faces us to-day. It is
this that explains his aspiration after something more
effective than Butler’s Analogy.
11 The time is coming,” he says,“ and we shall hope
the man is coming with it, which shall give us a new
analogy, speaking a more generous and hopeful lan
guage, breathing a nobler spirit, and aspiring to a larger
day than Butler’s.” And the striking thing is that, feel
ing this inadequacy so acutely, he was unable to grasp
the larger analogy when it was put vividly before him.
Dr. Fairbairn came into personal contact in India with
men to whom the larger conception of incarnation is
part of their spiritual being, and it is deeply inte
resting to see how Dr. Fairbairn’s mind was affected
by this contact. He admits frankly that he was both
‘ ‘ illuminated and perplexed ” by it. “It was not that his
�76
WANTED—A NEW BUTLER
previous knowledge of their religion was found to be in
correct or false, but that it was mistaken in its emphasis.”
This is a confession that does Dr. Fairbairn credit,
and it expresses very correctly the exact position of his
mind. He saw the larger truth, and was “ illumi
nated.” He failed to see—or, rather, as we believe, he
could not afford to admit—the radical importance, to a
true philosophy of the Christian religion, of the great
predominant doctrine of India, “ the community of
Gods and men,” as Dr. Fairbairn calls it, or the in
carnation of God in humanity, to give it its proper
name. This is what “ perplexed ” him. “ The Jew,”
he tells us, “ could not conceive how his God could
become incarnate in any man. The Hindu cannot
conceive how any man could be the sole and exclusive
incarnation of God. He thinks of God as incarnate
in every man and in all forms of life. In so thinking
he makes incarnation in the Christian sense impos
sible ; and, by deifying everything, he undeifies all.”
Evidently, according to Dr. Fairbairn, we may have
too much of the Divine! But “ what God hath
cleansed, that call not thou common ”! So what God
has glorified by his presence, that call not thou
common or undeified, else you fly in the face of that
very Scripture whose letter you so magnify.
This truth requires no twisted or strained analogies
to support it. Its perfect analogy with all Nature is
complete. Dr. Fairbairn constantly flutters around it,
but can never fling himself on it, or tear himself
away from his great presupposition. He can say in
one passage that “ the reason that is in man is one
with the universal reason.” But for the practical
purpose of his philosophy that is a forbidden fruit to
him. He is afraid to pluck it, but cannot keep his
eyes off it. Or, to change the metaphor, he is like the
timid bather who cannot trust himself beyond the
�WANTED—A NEW BUTLER
77
solid footing to which he has been accustomed, having
no faith that the sea, the apparently yielding sea, can
ever support him.
♦
The incarnation of God in all men, the manifestation of the Creator
in the whole race he had created, might be an arguable position, but
not its rigorous and exclusive individuation or restriction to a single
person, out of all the infinite multitude of millions who have lived, are
living, or are to live. In some such manner the understanding, by
means of its keen, dexterous logic, might argue that “the ” incarnation
was a mere fictitious and artificial mystery.
, We feel, after reading such a passage, that the
writer is really envying the “ arguable position ” and
the “ keen dexterous logic ” to which he somewhat
cynically refers. His dogmatic presupposition blinds
him to the fact that this larger doctrine of incarnation
is implicit, and in some places quite explicit, in his
own faith, as that faith was taught by the Founder
himself.
To surrender what he has no better name for than
“ the metaphysical conception of Christ,” and to hail
in its place this great spiritual dynamic fact, would
not only have fed his own spirit, but satisfied his
intellect and proclaimed the essential truth of all
religion.
Dr. Fairbairn, when stating “ the problem,” in his
opening chapter, speaks of the “mass of intricate
complexities and incredibilities ” which surround the
orthodox view of the person of Christ. And after
letting “ the dexterous logician ” speak for himself, he
says:—
The dexterous logician is not the only strong intellect which has
tried to handle the doctrine. The contradictions which he translates
into rational incredibilities must either have escaped the analysis of
men like Augustine or Aquinas, or have been by their thought
transcended and reconciled in some higher synthesis. It is a whole
some thing to remember that the men who elaborated our theologies
were at least as rational as their critics, and that we owe it to
historical truth to look at their beliefs with their eyes (p. 13).
We accept the spirit of Dr. Fairbairn’s reference to
these ancient authorities. There is a higher synthesis.
'
*
�78
WANTED—A NEW BUTLER
It by no means follows that they had seized it. There
is not necessarily any presumption in maintaining
that these “ rational incredibilities,” of which Dr.
Fairbairn speaks, have gradually forced modern
thought towards a synthesis that, pin its simplicity,
universality, and spiritual power, gives them all their
due place, and preserves, for the higher life of man,
all the truth which they contained. Illusion and
tentative dogma have formed a large element in the
moral and spiritual progress of man, Christian and
pagan alike! We can only reconcile the confused
attitude of Dr. Fairbairn in this whole book by
suggesting that, to use a modern phrase, his subs
liminal consciousness is loaded with the true higher
synthesis which we here emphasise, but that his
logical faculties are enlisted in the defence of the
orthodox conceptions. He frequently writes as if
under the influence of the former, but perpetually
falls into the meshes of the latter.
We commend to Dr. Fairbairn and his whole school
the following from the Master of Balliol’s latest
exposition. We know of no philosophical pronounce
ment, in recent times, that means so much for the
future of Christian thought, and that says what it
means in plainer and less pugnacious language:—
From the beginning Christianity involved a new conception of the
relation of God to man. But this conception Was at first an unde
veloped germ—a germ of which the whole history of thought from that
time has been a development. It was the idea of God in man, and
man, by a supreme act of self-surrender, finding the perfect realisation
of himself as the son and servant of Go<t- It was this as embodied in
an individual, to whom others might attach themselves, and by this
attachment participate in the same life....... The issue of the contro
versy (of the early centuries) at the moment was the assertion of the
unity of Divinity and humanity in Christ, but this issue was deprived
of a great part of its meaning, in so far as it was confined to Christ
alone, and in so far as the unity was regarded, not as a unity realised
in the process of the Christian life, but a unity that existed indepen
dently of any process whatever. The imperfection of this result was
explained by the necessity that the principle of unity of the human
and the Divine should be asserted, ere it could be worked out to any
�WANTED—A NEW BUTLER
79
further consequences. Christ was the one crucial instance, which, if
it could be maintained as real, must inevitably determine the whole
* issue. And if one man, living such a life of self-sacrifice for mankind,
was in perfect unity with God, so that his consciousness of himself
could be taken as the Divine self-consciousness, then must not the
same be true of all who followed in the same road
In that case,
the highest goodness was shown to be only the realisation of an ideal
which every human soul, as such, bears with it.
There is the true philosophic ring. There is the
true rationalising of the Christian religion, showing it
to be, when rightly understood, in perfect harmony
with the whole “ constitution and course of Nature.”1
If Dr. Fairbairn could have assimilated an inclusive
principle, such as we have endeavoured to set forth,
instead of the absolutely exclusive doctrine which
forms the assumption of his book, he would not have
been merely “ perplexed ” by what he saw and heard
in India—he would have had his whole philosophy
widened and rationalised, and would have been able
to proclaim a far greater Analogy than Butler’s, in a
♦ universal truth which, once it is really seen, finds a
response in the human spirit everywhere. He would
have proved himself a pioneer in a movement which,
sooner or later, must secure the spiritual sympathies,
as *®ell as the philosophic acceptance, of Western
« Europe. Dr. Fairbairn, in this great undertaking,
has *lost his chance, and completely fails in the
* * philosophical ” task to which he set himself. Will
any candid reader maintain that such argument as Dr.
^Faii^irn’s book contains induces him to believe that
human history, ancient and modern, “ has no meaning
apart from Christa in the sense in which Nature is
unintePljgible without God ” ? That is the demand
which Dr. Fairbairn makes on our reason.
We can only conclude by saying that, while he has
adde$ yet another to the innumerable apologies for
(rlasgow Gifford Lectures.
*
*
�WANTE0—A NEW B%TLEE .
the Christian dogmatic system, he has made more >
patent than ever the impossibility of framing a con
sistent “ philosophy ” of that dogmatic system as it at
present stands. The larger Analogy he prays for is
ready to our hand * and Dr. Fairbairn might have
been the modern Butler.
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PRINTED BY WATTS AND CO., I7, JOHNSON’S COURT, FLEET STREET, LONDON, E.C
�By the same Author.
■ “A RELIGION THAT WILL WEAR."
SECOND EDITION.
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Professor MAX MULLER.
“A book with most of which I fully agree, and from which I have
learned a great deal. ”
STOPFORD BROOKE,
“I think it will do a great deal of good among laymen, more proI bably than any authorised preacher is likely to do. Things are faced
not in the conventional manner, and without the catchwords of the
mere theologian. I am glad to see the book, and wish it God-speed.”
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excellent. It is written with great intelligence, and every subject is
treated with marked moderation. There is not a canting statement
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“ ‘ A Layman ’ shows an intimate knowledge of theology, such as
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in the deepest and truest elements of human life, though theology
may change and critics re-write the Bible.”
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„ It is a valuable contribution to practical Christianity for thinking
men, and should place some wavering feet on solid ground. I am
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�By the same Author.
“A RELIGION THAT WILL WEAR."
SECOND EDITION.
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“ It is a clearly-stated and interesting discourse, which meets the
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and offers an acutely reasoned and well-informed, if perhaps not
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wholly free from all bonds to theological formulas, it presents the
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London: JAMES CLARKE & CO.
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Haeckel's contribution to religion
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Mories, A. S.
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Place of publication: London
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Ernst Haeckel
Philosophy
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Ernst Haeckel
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Religion
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PNo. 2,-R.P.A. EXTRA SERIES.
The "Riddle” Vindicated
......... ......... .
........... —. . ............. *"*5^
Haeckel’s Critics
Answered
JOSEPH McCABE
(FORMERLY THE VERY REV. FATHER ANTONY, O.S.F., PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY AND
ECCLESIASTICAL HISTORY AT ST. ANTONY'S, FOREST GATE)
Author of “Twelve Years in a Monastery, ” “ Peter Abelard," “St. Augustine and
li is Age" etc.
WATTS & CO.,
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[issued
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for the rationalist press association, limited]
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Prolegomena to “The History of Philosophy,” by 0. H. LEWES.
�THE
Rationalist Press Association,
LIMITED.
Registered Office—V], Johnson’s Court, Fleet Street, London, E.C.
Chairman:
Mr. George Jacob Holyoake.
Honorary Associates:
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�B1SH0PSGATE INSTITUIE
REFERENCE LIBRARY
Not to be taken away
HAECKEL’S CRITICS ANSWERED
�By JOSEPH McCABE.
Twelve Years in a Monastery.
A New Edition, Revised and Enlarged.
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issued, with additions, including an examination of Mr. Wells’s position on
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By PROFESSOR HAECKEL.
The Riddle of the Universe.
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The Agnostic Annual for 1904.
Contents : The Cult of the Unknown God, by Joseph McCabe ; The
Master-Builder, by Eden Phillpotts; Historic Christianity, by Charles T.
Gorham; The Position of Freethinkers in the Church, by John M. Robertson;
Towards Freedom, by Lady Florence Dixie ; A Rose, A Life (a poem),
by Henry Allsopp ; The Philosophy of the Human Mind, by Charles Watts 5
Can Man Know God ? by the Author of Mr. Balfour1 s Apologetics ; The
Poets and Rationalism, by Mimnermus; The Labour Movement and
Christian Orthodoxy, by F. J. Gould.
London : WATTS & CO., 17 Johnson’s Court, Fleet Street, E.C.
�NATIONAL SECULAR SOCIETY
HAECKEL’S
CRITICS ANSWERED •
BY
JOSEPH McCABE
(FORMERLY THE VERY REV. F. ANTONY, O.S.F., PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY AND ECCLESIASTICAL HISTORY
at st.
Antony’s,
forest gate)
AUTHOR OF “ TWELVE YEARS IN A MONASTERY," “ PETER ABELARD,”
“ST. AUGUSTINE AND HIS AGE,” ETC.
\Issued for the Rationalist Press Association, Limited.}
WATTS & CO.,
17, JOHNSON’S COURT, FLEET STREET, LONDON, E.C.
1903
�BISHSPSGATE INSTITUTE
REFERENCE LIBRARY
y.. 1 9 MAY 1987
k Ciassiflcat i&n .. H. hi?. §•
�CONTENTS
PAGE
I.
II.
Some General Criticisms, and
The Unity
of the
a
Lessonin Modesty........................................ 7
World, and the Lawof Substance
.
.
.
.18
III.
The Evolution of the Inorganic World....................................................... 29
IV.
The Origin of Life................................................................................................. 39
V.
The Ascent
of
Man................................................................................................ 49
VI.
The Immortality of the Soul...............................................................................61
VII.
God........................................................................................................................ 68
VIII.
IX.
X.
Science
and
Christianity....................................................................................... 80
The Ethic and Religion of Monism.............................................................. 91
Dr. Wallace and
his
Critics............................................................................... 99
XI.
Lord Kelvin Intervenes...................................................................................... 108
XII.
Mr. Mallock’s Olive Branch..............................................................................114
XIII.
Conclusion............................................................................................................... 123
Index........................................................................................................................127
�PREFATORY NOTE
WHILST these pages were in the press an interview with Mr.
F. Ballard, written by Mr. Raymond Blathwayt, has appeared in Great
Thoughts. The interviewer introduces his subject with the following
passage :—
“ None can deny Haeckel’s sincerity; few can deny a certain wistful eager
ness ; all must stand saddened at his pessimism. He himself, if report be true,
is shaken to the very core as to his own position. A friend of his, entering his
study a few weeks ago, found him in a somewhat mournful condition. ‘ What is
the matter ? ’ said he, and the great philosopher replied, ‘ I cannot feel certain of
my own position ,■ suppose all my theories should turn out to be false? So that
even Haeckel, whom most people regard as a blank materialist, is overshadowed
now and again by the spirit world which surrounds us all, and to him also come the
doubts and craven fears to which the strongest of humanity is liable now and again.”
I at once submitted this passage to Professor Haeckel, and he
replied :—
“The anecdote about the wavering of my Monistic position is a pure invention.
My views are firm as a rockj but they may, naturally, be only partly correct.
The reader will find from the following pages that this—whoever
was the “ inventor
is only one of a long series of untruths and mis
representations with which the distant Professor has been cowardly
assailed.
J. M.
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HAECKEL’S CRITICS ANSWERED
■ '
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1881 L,* imL
Chapter 1
SOME GENERAL CRITICISMS, AND A LESSON IN
MODESTY
Some forty-four years ago a young
German medical man was spending
laborious hours in an effort to penetrate
the secret of the living organism. From
his earliest years he had been powerfully
attracted to the study of life. He had
written a small work on botany whilst
he- was yet a boy at the gymnasium. He
had then had the advantage of a train
ing for the medical profession under
such masters as Kolliker and Johannes
Muller. He had published an essay on
crabs in 1857, and in 1859 he was pur
suing a most important inquiry into the
microscopic life that fills the blue waters
of the Italian coast. But his many lines
of research had not as yet led to any
large conclusions. He stood perplexed
between the discarded views of the older
biologists and the dim vision that was
slowly breaking upon the scientific mind
of the time. His own revered master
had insisted on the fixity of the various
species of organisms, but it was an age
when every note of the time-spirit whis
pered “advance” in the ears of the
younger men. The despotism of Genesis
had been broken by the new criticism,
and the Mosaic barrier to research was
being trampled under foot. The young
scientist, then in his twenty-seventh year,
returned to Berlin in 1861, and heard
that during his absence an English
naturalist had published a startlingly
revolutionary view of the whole kingdom
of life.
He obtained a copy of The
Origin of Sfecies, and saw at a glance
that a great truth had been discovered.
In the light of the new theory of evolu
tion, fulfilling the intuitions of Goethe
and the speculations of Lamarck, the
vast realm of animals and plants began
to exhibit the order and rationality he
had so long sought.
The very valuable and brilliant work
he had done in Italy secured for him a
professorship at the University of Jena,
and he at once devoted himself to the
creation of the new biology. In 1863
(his twenty-ninth year) he gave an able
address on the new theory before a
congress at Stettin, where all the most
distinguished scientists of Germany were
assembled. It was his baptism of fire
in a life-long campaign against error and
prejudice.
The vast majority of the
scientists present scoffed at Darwin’s
idea, and said it was not a matter for
serious discussion.
“The harmless
dream of an after-dinner nap,” said one
distinguished zoologist; and another
said they might as well discuss “ tableturning.”
A famous botanist present
said there was not a single fact of
science in its favour; though Darwin’s
book alone contains an overwhelming
mass of evidence. In France the great
Cuvier was crushing the young theory
with the weight of his authority. From
the pulpit of Notre Dame the brilliant
Lacordaire was assuring men that “its
father was pride, its mother lust, and
�8
SOME GENERAL CRITICISMS, AND A LESSON IN MODESTY
its offspring revolutions.” The young
naturalist went back to Jena with a
stem and grim resolve to pursue truth
through fire and water, and, as Huxley
was putting it after a like experience,
to “smite all humbugs” that lent their
authority to error. Five years later he
published his Generelle Morphologie,
which Huxley calls “ one of the greatest
scientific works ever published,” and
which considerably advanced the libera
tion of Germany from the old error.
Two years afterwards he published his
Natural History of Creation, of which
Darwin said that, had he read it earlier,
the Descent of Man would probably
never have been written.
With phe
nomenal industry, with brilliant success,
and with a moral idealism of the highest
order, he continued his research into the
nature of life and the nature of man,
and long before the close of the century
he was in the foremost rank of men of
science.
His progress was impeded by the
usual conservative hostility. For years
the ecclesiastical party strove to drive
him from the university, and enforced
a boycott of him and his family. One
day a prelate approached the Grand
Duke of Weimar, and urged him to put
an end to the scandal of the heretical
professor. “ Do you mean to say,” asked
the Grand-Duke—for the spirit of Goethe
still lingered in the court of Weimar,
“ that the professor really believes these
things he teaches?”
“He certainly
does,” assured the cleric.
“Then the
man is only doing what you are doing
yourself,” was the amiable retort. At
another time the professor himself ap
proached the head of the university,
Dr. Seebeck, an orthodox thinker, and
offered to resign his chair, to end the
trouble, as he would never swerve one
inch from the path of integrity and
faithfulness to what he considered to
be the truth. Dr. Seebeck bade him
remain; and his name has, in return,
taken the name of Jena to the ends of
the earth. His books have been trans
lated into twelve languages. Flis name
will rise first to the lips of any informed
student in the civilised world, from
Yokohama to St. Petersburg, from San
Francisco to Calcutta, if you speak of
zoology or embryology. He holds four
gold medals for research, and more
than seventy diplomas from so many
academies and learned bodies all over
the world, who have desired to have his
name on their roll of members or asso
ciates. When, in 1881, the Asiatic Society
of Bengal resolved to nominate six special
“ centenary honorary members,” he was
the one chosen for Germany. On the
occasion of his sixtieth birthday, ten
years ago, the elite of the scientific
world sent their greeting to the man
“who has devoted his life in unselfish
devotion to science and to truth, who
has opened new paths and inaugurated
fresh knowledge wherever he has turned,
and who has ever given his best for the
moral welfare of humanity.”
That is the real Ernst Haeckel.
That is the man whom our ecclesias
tical M.A.’s and our D.D.’s have lately
been accusing of “scientific humbug”
and “insolent dogmatism” and “child
ish credulity” and “mendacities” and
“rhodomontade,” of being “an essen
tially ignorant guide,” “an atrophied
soul,” and “ a rude, ill-mannered, igno
rant child,” of “ poisoning the minds ”
of the people and leading them “back
into barbarism,” of “prostituting him
self,” of making “misrepresentations so
gross and glaring as to make it extremely
difficult to credit him at once with
mental ability and sincerity,” of “ having
forfeited all right to speak as a serious
scientific man,” and of being “so fla
grantly prejudiced, so false to fact, and
so insolent in tone, as to require much
self-control to keep one from flinging
the book away in disgust.” I am not
quoting itinerant Christian Evidence
lecturers, but the deliberately published
observations of Dr. Horton, Dr. Loofs,
and the Rev. Mr. Ballard.
We need not tender our sympathy to
Professor Haeckel. He has been listen
ing to language of this kind ever since
�SOME GENERAL CRITICISMS, AND A LESSON IN MODESTY
he published his famous General Mor
phology in 1866. He may have by this
time a kindly theory that it comes
naturally to a mind that breathes a
mediaeval atmosphere, and that still holds
the general principles on which the
Holy Inquisition was founded. But it
is worth while investigating how all this
lurid language is reconciled with the
culture and scholarship and tolerance
which are claimed for the modern
clergyman. The writers of these pic
turesque phrases would indignantly re
pudiate the notion that they were angry
merely because Haeckel’s views of the
nature of man and the constitution of
the universe contradict their own, and
tend to diminish the number of their
followers. They do, indeed, reject the
substance of his speculations, but their
quarrel is with the manner in which he
pursues and expounds them. A few
years ago he published a summary of
the opinions he had arrived at on a vast
number of problems of science, philo
sophy, history, and religion. As he saw
his great colleagues pass on one by one
to join “ the choir invisible,” he decided
to draw up this “last will and testa
ment ”; to look back over the sombre
fields of half-a-century of warfare, and
sum up the issues of the conflict. In
Germany his Riddle of the Universe
sold 9,000 copies in two months, and
has led to an appalling outpouring of
controversial ink. In England it was
eagerly and extensively welcomed in the
more expensive edition, and in the cheap
form it is circulating to the extent of
nearly 80,000 copies. I have waded
through the turgid flood of criticisms it
has called forth, and will deal first with
those charges which tend to palliate the
outrageous phrases I have quoted before
I proceed to the criticisms of its sub
stance. These ponderous names are
not flung out, we are told, from a secret
consciousness that sober criticism would
have little force. They are reluctantly
penned out of regard for the ethic
and aesthetic of controversy. Professor
Haeckel, whom Mr. Mallock has saluted
9
in the Fortnightly Review (September,
1901) as “one of the most eminent and
most thoughtful men of science in
Europe,” whom an antagonistic reviewer
in Knowledge describes as “ impelled by
no motive but a love of truth,” and says
that “ to know him is to love him,” and
“ there are few who have worked harder
and, at the same time, more brilliantly,
for their day and generation,” whom the
Westminster Review regards as “a great
biologist and thinker,” and whom even
Dr. Dallinger calls “a man of large
scientific attainments, a biologist of the
highest repute, and possessed of the
keenest acumen” (fThe Creator, p. 18)
—this Professor Haeckel has, it seems,
greatly violated the good taste and the
ordinary morality of literary work in his
Riddle of the Universe. Mr. Ballard
epitomises the charge very neatly in the
British Weekly. The book, he says,
“ teems with exhibitions of bitter pre
judice, arrant dogmatism, unwarranted
assumption, uncalled-for insult, logical
failure, and self-contradictions ”; and
the misguided British public calls for
five editions of it, in spite of all the
abuse that is heaped on it and all the
secret and public manoeuvres that are
directed against its circulation.
A desperate champion might ask the
reader to reflect on the atmosphere of
invective in which Haeckel has lived for
the last fifty years—from Lacordaire’s
tracing of the parentage of evolution to
Dr. Talmage’s sermons on the subject
only four years 'ago—and might recall
that even dainty prelates like Bishop
Wilberforce could utter bitter insults in
that charmed region. He might argue
that a Haeckel was not pledged to turn
the other cheek to the smiter. He might
point out that it is not soothing to have
had to spend half a life in overcoming
what is now acknowledged to be a foolish
resistance, yet see the same theological
forces arrayed at a more advanced
position to-day. But, in truth, we shall
do better to ask, what is the aesthetic
and ethical standard of controversy
cherished by Dr. Haeckel’s critics, and
B
�IO
SOME GENERAL CRITICISMS, AND A LESSON IN MODESTY
how: far does he really fall below their
shining example ?
There is Dr. Horton, for instance,
whose sensitive nature is outraged by
Haeckel’s rude comments on some of the
Christian beliefs. Now, I have been a
priest and I know how largely rhetorical
this kind of indignation is, and how
effective it is sometimes in preventing a
book from being read. As a fact, one
who was present when Dr. Horton
delivered his philippic tells how, when the
preacher read out in tremulous tones
the famous mother-in-law passage (and the
like) from the Riddle, his audience was
really shaking with suppressed laughter.
However, let us examine Dr. Horton’s
discourse,1 and learn the better manners
which he desiderates in Haeckel. He
opens with a reference to “ the depths of
degradation and despair into which the
teaching of Haeckel will plunge man
kind ; ” though, of course, to speak
of Dr. Horton’s views as degrading
would be considered insulting. Then,
though “ there has been no more diligent
and successful investigator of the facts of
nature than Ernst Haeckel during the
century that has passed,” he is a child
at moral and religious reasoning, “ a rude,
ill-mannered, ignorant child ; ” he is “ an
atrophied soul, a being that is blind on
the spiritual side.” The “ spiritual side ”
being a blend of moral and intellectual
faculty (if it is anything more than
imagination), this is grave; but Dr.
Horton says it <£in the interest of souls
and truth.” Presently he finds Haeckel
an ££ utterly unsatisfactory and essentially
ignorant guide,” an “ unthinking mind ”
with -whose “ obvious weakness and igno
rance ” and “ childish credulity ” “ the
rationalist press gulls the ignorance of
the public.” Dr. Horton admits that
modern science “ must gradually affect
the view of man, even the view of God,
which we drew from the matchless
revelation of the first chapters of
Genesis” [this in Hampstead, in the
1 It is published in the Christian World
Pulpit, June loth, 1903.
year of grace 1903 !], and must modify
“ the naive, but essentially correct, con
ceptions of our ancestors ”; but Haeckel
asks too much. I will touch in the
proper place Dr. Horton’s brief argu
mentation on the origin of life and the
origin of the mind,1 and will only admire
here the delicacy with which he points
out the spiritual consequences of monism.
“ Men who have no belief in God and
immortality sink to the level of the
brutes,” and Haeckel is “ anxious to
sweep us back into this barbarism under
the name of progress.”
Haeckel is not
conscious of the degradation that has
passed upon his spirit ” through rejecting
the particular solution of the world-riddle
which Dr. Horton recommends, but in
any one who does so “ the soul is shrunk,
the mind is warped, the very body must
carry its marks of degradation.” It is
true that the preacher’s sense of humour
awakes at one point, and he disavows
any intention of imputing these “ bestial
levels ” to Haeckel himself, but he seems
to forget the reservation, and ends in a
most ludicrous strain of commiseration.
There is nothing half so insulting and
offensive in Haeckel.
Passing by Dr. Loofs (whose little work
is one of the most spiteful and painful
diatribes that has issued from a modern
university), as he does not claim to be an
English gentleman, we may turn to the
Rev. F. Ballard for an exhibition of those
manners which Haeckel has neglected to
cultivate.
Mr. Ballard is said in the
religious press to have proved that
“ Haeckel doesn’t count,” and it will be
expected from the precision and force of
his indictment of Haeckel’s manner
(which I have quoted above) that this
1 Dr. Horton’s knowledge of the controversy
may be tested very well by his statement that
Bois-Reymond, Vogt, Buchner, and Baer, “per
haps four of the greatest men of science in the
nineteenth century in Germany,” came to “ the
recognition of spirit as the author of conscious
ness.” Not one of the four ever recognised any
thing of the kind, as we shall see. Bois-Reymond
and Baer remained agnostic, whilst Buchner and
Vogt were actually the leaders of German
materialism up to the moment of death.
�SOME GENERAL CRITICISMS, AND A LESSON IN MODESTY
scientific clergyman will be quite the
Beau Brummel of religious controversy.
He has written a chapter on The
Riddle of the Universe in his Miracles
of Unbelief, but this has been swallowed
up in his great attack in the columns of
the British Weekly. The later articles
of this series refer to the able editor of
the Clarion,, and Mr. Blatchford has
shown a sufficient command of appro
priate language to dispense with my
services. I confine myself to the first
three articles (July 23rd, 30th, and Aug.
6th). It proves, on examination, that
twelve columns out of the thirteen are
mainly preliminary comments on Haec
kel’s morals. I will deal with the thir
teenth column (which will turn out to be
very largely a question of Mr. Ballard's
morals) in its proper place, and will
here briefly examine the general criti
cisms.
Dogmatism and dishonesty are the
chief points Mr. Ballard charges, with an
infinite variety of phrasing, against the
absent Professor. Now, one would
really’ be disposed to see something in
the first point, since it is so persistently
urged by Haeckel’s critics. Unfortun
ately, when one looks closely into the
grounds of the charge it begins to totter ;
and when one compares Haeckel’s words
with those of his critics, one wonders
what dogmatism really is. There is, for
instance, that admirable writer of the
Christian World, Mr. J. Brierley (“J. B.”),
who stooped in some unguarded hour to
attack Haeckel. The Riddle is “ one of
the most amusing books this generation
has seen” because “its dogmatism is so
naive.” “ Professor Haeckel has found
everything out,” says Mr. Brierley. “ He
has exploded the old mystery, and found
it a bag stuffed with sawdust. There is
nothing to wonder at in suns and sys
tems. They are just matter and force,
and there is an end.” Now, the Chris
tian World is a fine paper, and “ J. B.”
is one of its sanest contributors, yet this
passage is astounding. Whence did a
hostile reviewer in the Sheffield Daily
Telegraph get the opposite impression
n
that Haeckel “is modest and unassum
ing in the claims he makes for his
system”? How came the Westminster
Review to call it “ a careful and conscien
tious endeavour to construct a theory of
the universe in harmony with the teach
ings of modern science”? Read the
second page of the preface to the Riddle.
“ The studies of these world-riddles which
I offer in the present work,” you read,
“ cannot reasonably claim to give a
perfect solution of them; they merely
offer to a wide circle of readers a critical
inquiry into the problem, and seek to
answer the question as to how nearly we
have approached that solution at the
present day. What stage in the attain
ment of truth have we actually arrived
at in this closing year of the nineteenth
century ? What progress have we really
made during its course towards that
immeasurably distant goal ? ”
Those
words—and you will vainly seek their
equal in modesty in any religious riddle
solver in the world—meet the eye at the
very opening of the book, and they are
substantially repeated at its close (p.
134).1 “The answer which I give to
these great questions,” Haeckel con
tinues, “ must naturally be merely sub
jective and only partly correct.” Was
there ever so singular a “ dogmatist ” ?
“ The one point that I can claim is that
my Monistic Philosophy is sincere from
beginning to end.” “ My own command
of the various branches of science is
uneven and defective, so that I can
attempt no more than to sketch the
general plan of such a world-picture,
and point out the pervading unity of its
parts, however imperfect be the execu
tion.” “ In taking leave of my readers,
I venture the hope that, through my
sincere and conscientious work—in spite
of its faults, of which I am not uncon
scious-—I have contributed a little to
wards the solution of the great enigma.”
If that is dogmatism, and the average
theological pronouncement is fragrant
1 I quote throughout from the cheap edition
of the Riddle.
�12
SOME GENERAL CRITICISMS, AND A LESSON IN MODESTY
with modesty, we shall need to recon
sider our moral terminology.1
But Mr. Ballard would tell us there
are other passages in which “ the most
arrogant dogmatism ” breaks out. Well,
Haeckel has told us the book is uneven
and sketchy, that its parts were written
at different times, in different moods;
and, knowing there was no inconsistency
of thought, he may have trusted to the
intelligence of his readers to adjust any
mere inconsistency of expression. But
the truth is, that Mr. Ballard’s choice
examples (given in his third article) of
“ unmitigated dogmatism ” are little short
of ridiculous. “ Thus we have got rid of
the transcendental design of the philo
sophy of the schools ” and “ The unpre
judiced study of natural phenomena
reveals the futility of the theistic idea ”
are two of the shorter quotations. Clearly,
Mr. Ballard must mean that Haeckel
should have interposed “ in my opinion ”
in these sentences. Does Mr. Ballard
do that? Does any sane and literary
writer do it who expects to have intelli
gent readers ? Professor Haeckel is by
no means a Social Democrat, but he
does credit “ the general reader ” with
intelligence enough to relieve him from
saying “ this is my opinion ” at every
third line. He has gone out of his way
to warn the reader from the beginning
that his conclusions are “ merely subjec
tive.” In not one of these cases does he re
present a conclusion as being unanimously
accepted. On the contrary, Mr. Ballard
and his friends are never tired of point
ing out how Haeckel, on his own showing,
1 An amusing feature of this delinquency of
Mr. J. Brierley’s—which I sincerely regret to
have to notice—is that it follows upon a fine
article on ‘ ‘ Candour in the Pulpit ’’—that is to
say, on the lack of candour in the pulpit and of
honesty in apologetic literature. So that, almost
side by side with this unhappy passage, one
reads : “A foremost modern theologian, by no
means of the radical school, has recorded his
significant judgment that one of the main charac
teristics of apologetic literature is its lack of
honesty; and no one who has studied theology can
doubt that it has suffered more than any other
science from equivocal phraseology” {Christian
World, August 20th, 1903 ; p. 10).
is contradicted by his own colleagues in
Germany. The whole matter is too ab
surd to prolong. Haeckel’s “dogma
tisms ” are the ordinary ways of expres
sion in adult literature. They shine with
modesty in comparison with theological
utterances, and they are guarded from
misinterpretation on the part of the unin
formed by a most rare and conscientious
warning in the preface.
Finally let us consider the charge of
misinterpretation, trickery (“jugglery,”
the Rev. Rhondda Williams says), and
general dishonesty of method. To deal
with this fully would be to anticipate my
whole book here; the reader will be
amply informed for judgment in the
sequel. But we may, in the meantime,
profitably run our eye over Mr. Ballard’s
twelve columns of moral censorship. In
the last chapter of Miracles of Unbelief,
Mr. Ballard says “ we find misrepresen
tations so gross and glaring as to make it
extremely difficult to credit the writer at
once with mental ability and sincerity ”
(p. 35°)- 1° immediate justification of
this, Mr. Ballard quotes Haeckel’s state
ment (p. 46 of the Riddle) that even
some Christian theologians deny the
liberty of the will. This Bachelor of
Divinity seems unaware for the moment
that the Calvinists notoriously denied
freedom on the very ground indicated
by Haeckel, and that the greater part of
the Catholic theologians (the Thomists
and Augustinians) are accused by their
colleagues of being, logically, in the same
predicament. A more paltry justifica
tion for so grave a charge it would be
hard to conceive. The only other point
in the chapter worth noting is the com
ment on abiogenesis, and this will be met
at a later stage.1 I turn to the pages of
the British Weekly, and their blush of
righteous indignation.
The only point that concerns us in
1 But the many admirers of Mr. Ballard who
wish to know the worst at once may refer now
to p. 40, and see how their apologist garbles
his quotation from Haeckel, misrepresents his
position, misstates the attitude of science, and
so wins a glorious victory—over the Decalogue.
�SOME GENERAL CRITICISMS, AND A LESSON IN MODESTY
the first article is a curiously spirited
attack on my opinion that the Riddle is
“unanswered because it is unanswer
able,” and it is instructive to consider
this. Take down your copy of the
Riddle—do not contract the slovenly
and expensive habit of trusting. a con
troversial writer; and I will give you
pages throughout, which Mr. Ballard
never does—and notice that I wrote this
in November, 1902. Mr. Rhondda
Williams had not then written his
pamphlet, Dr. Horton had not preached
his sermon, and Dr. Loofs’s book was
unknown in England.
The only
“ reply ” in the field was a hastily added
chapter to Mr. Ballard’s Miracles of
Unbelief, which one may be pardoned
for not having discovered by 1902.
Further, I wrote with pointed reference
to Dr. Beale’s pathetic promise of a
reply in the agony column of the Times,
Oct. 1st, 1900; a promise which he
withdrew by referring later (Dec. 19th)
to a tiresome collection of letters from
the Lancet which he had published in
1898. Moreover, I pointedly wanted
an answer to the most important thesis
of the book, the evolution of mind,
which, I find, even Mr. Ballard had not
met. Mr. Ballard’s selection of spon
taneous generation as the chief point —
whereas Haeckel only offers it as “a
pure hypothesis,” and it is only an
incidental (though necessary) conse
quence of his system—is unworthy of a
serious scientific man. So, brushing
aside criticisms of Haeckel’s views on
Christ and the Immaculate Conception,
which have nothing to do with the
integrity of his system, I deplored “ the
silence or triviality of his opponents.”
But note how Mr. Ballard manipulates
this innocent observation. Premising
that I am “ doubtless honest,” and that
“ the apostles of free-thought, of all
men, might leave others free to think
for themselves,” and so on, he tells me
it was answered by himself (in an
obscure corner of an obscure book) and
—by anticipation! That encourages
him to call my statement an “ untruth.”
13
In the second article my enormity
grows. Readers are told that I assert
the “ monistic mechanism ‘ has been for
ever established ’ as the all-sufficient
origin, means, and end of everything ”;
whereas I most clearly said only that
“ the case for the evolution of mind ”
had been “ for ever established.” Later
we have a reference to “ the reactionary
assurances of an ex-ecclesiastic to the
effect ‘ that all Christian faith is ship
wrecked and all Christian convictions
amongst the breakers.’ ” The unsophis
ticated reader will learn with surprise (in
spite of “ to the effect ”) that this, whether
reactionary or not, is not a quotation from
me. And finally the growth is complete,
and I am made to “sneer at the triviality
or the silence of the opponents of the
mechanical theory of the universe.” Mr.
Ballard, F.R.M.S., clearly makes a very
improper use of his microscope at
times.
So it is with my innocent remark that
in the Riddle we have a “ masterly treat
ment of the question of the evolution of
mind.” “ Masterly ” soon grows into
“ more masterly,” and Mr. Ballard airily
asks : “ I really want to know why, for
some of us who make no profession to
be experts, Dr. Haeckel’s treatment
should be more ‘ masterly ’ than that of,
say, Dr. Wallace ” ; and in the end :
“ May we not then ask Mr. McCabe, or
Mr. Blatchford, why, or by what
authority, they proclaim that Prof.
Haeckel’s treatment is so much more
masterly than that of all others as to
foreclose the question ? ” The perver
sion of my phrase into a comparison
and the implication that I fail in respect
for Dr. Wallace or any other dis
tinguished thinker come very oddly
from the pen of this literary censor
morum.
Yet this is a fair sample of Mr.
Ballard’s procedure—and is in fact a
great part of his procedure, or I should
not have dwelt on it. The only other
important element in Mr. Ballard’s
preliminary twelve columns is his
industrious collection of authorities to
�14
SOME GENERAL CRITICISMS, AND A LESSON IN MODESTY
oppose to Dr. Haeckel. I shall speak
presently of the proper merit of this, but
must touch a few points of it here to
finish the consideration of Mr. Ballard’s
standard of controversy. He constantly
affirms that Haeckel is opposed by the
majority of scientific authorities. We
shall see what this really amounts to,
but let us consider it here in the light of
the more important question whether
they support Christianity. I have care
fully examined the list of writers quoted
against Haeckel by Mr. Ballard, and
this is the result. In the front rank
are the three eminent scientists, Lord
Kelvin, Sir O. Lodge, and Dr. A. R.
Wallace. Their convictions every man
will respect who respects himself, but—
two of them are Spiritists (having there
fore, an alien and empirical source of
faith, and holding views on the future state
which Christian teaching rejects), and
Lord Kelvin gives a very slender support,
as we shall see. Then there are Dr.
Beale (who confesses in his latest book
that he is fighting a vast majority), Dr.
Croll (who denies the liberty of the
will), Dr. Stirling (whose contribution is
the same as Dr. Beale’s), Dr. Winchell
and Sir J. W. Dawson (geologists of a
past generation, who defend the literal
interpretation of i. Genesis : Sir J. W.
Dawson thinks geology only claims
7000 years for the life of man, and
that “ the deluge is one of the most
important events both in human history
and the study of the later geological
periods ”), Professor Flower (with ten
lines of qualifications, but whose only
contribution to the subject seems to be
an address at a Church Congress, in which
he sharply tells the clergy they have
done mischief enough in the past, and had
better leave evolution to men of science ;
two short phrases about an “ eternal
power ” and the “ Divine govern
ment of the world ” seem to constitute
his slender theology), Dr. A. Macalister,
Professor Le Conte and Mr. Fiske
(American evolutionists and Pantheists),
Mr. Row (the Christian Evidence
lecturer), Dr. Cook (the American
Christian evidence lecturer), and Lord
Grimthorpe (the Vicar-general of York,
whose “legal and scientific mind” may
be seen at work in his Letters on Dr.
Todd's Discourses on the Prophecies}. The
rest of Mr. Ballard’s list consists of pro
fessional theologians. “ Dr.” This, and
“ Professor ” That, usually turn out to be
graduates in divinity. I am not for a
moment slighting the scientific acquire
ments of men like Dr. Dallinger, Mr.
Newman Smyth (one of the few
apologists who retain the character of a
gentleman amidst polemical work), Dr.
Iverach, Mr. Ballard, Mr. Profeit, and
Mr. Kennedy; I am not so unintelligent.
But it would be absurd to say that the
publications of these professors of
apologetics and doctors of divinity have
the same value, as replies to Haeckel, as
those of scientific laymen. The result is
that Mr. Ballard’s list is totally and
gravely misleading to the uninformed.
Rubbish like the “ Present Day Tracts ”
and antiquated work like Winchell’s and
Dawson’s and Stirling’s and Wainwright’s
are mixed up with the good work of
Newman Smyth and Dallinger and
Kennedy.
Evolutionists and non
evolutionists, theists and pantheists,
Christians and non-Christians, are hastily
thrown together. He drags in Prof.
W. James to rebuke Haeckel; the
average reader will have little suspicion
that James rejects the title of theist,
speaks scornfully of Mr. Ballard’s God,
and is not sure of the immortality of the
soul. All this is gravely misleading.
Clearly, Mr. Ballard’s ideal of con
troversy is not much superior to that
of Dr. Horton. Yet this budding con
troversialist has the effrontery to tell
Haeckel that “if he has no sense of
shame, then we have a sufficient object
lesson as to the failure of ‘ monistic
religion ’ to develop even an elementary
degree of morality.” This is provoked
by statements which Haeckel quotes
with transparent honesty from writers
named in his book. We have seen
how an equally coarse outburst was
prompted by a statement (as to the free-
�SOME GENERAL CRITICISMS, AND A LESSON IN MODESTY
dom of the will) which is literally correct.
The only other specific criticisms offered
by Mr. Ballard relate to the nature of
matter and the origin of life. In both
cases he gives a mere travesty of
Haeckel’s position. We shall take them
in detail later (though the reader may
find them at once by means of the index,
if he desires). For the present we take
our leave of these graceful guardians of
the taste and ethic of controversy.
“ What sort of an age do we live in ? ”
asked the Prager Tageblatt, when it saw
the clerical and scientific Lilliputians
of Germany shooting their insults at the
distinguished scientist. We are living,
still, in an age when religion is made to
consist essentially in certain speculations
about the nature of the universe, which
were framed, in substance, thousands of
years ago ; an age when any independent
speculator on the nature of things must
expect to arouse a bitter antagonism if
his conclusions differ from those of
religious tradition. Religion is, in a most
important aspect, “ a cosmic doctrine,”
to quote the words of Mr. Mallock.
“Religion and science,”he says, “touch
and oppose each other primarily as rival
methods of explaining the .... universe
taken as a whole, man forming part of
it.” Until a short time ago theologians
held that their particular cosmic specula
tions had the distinction of a super
natural origin, and they damned people
-who called them into question. To-day
the gilt is wearing off the legends of
Genesis, but the hereditary spirit of
intellectual arrogance goes more slowly.
To-day there are many theologians who
call themselves truth-seekers, and there
are a few who write and speak as if
they were truth-seekers, and not truthfulminators. But the sad truth is that
the majority are morally hampered by a
conviction of the sacredness and the
exclusive truth of certain speculations,
about God and the soul, which they
have a corporate charge to defend.
Every man who opposes them is con
structed into a hater of their religion and
a menace to human progress. The
15
diminution of their followers seems
only to increase their violence. “Al
ready,” says Mr. Rhondda Williams, “ it
is the fact that the cultured laity on the
one hand and the bulk of the democracy
on the other are outside the Churches.”1
Yes, people are seeking the truth, out in
the light of day, and they distrust a
tradition that has broken down section
by section as the century advanced.
Haeckel, starting from a most compre
hensive knowledge of living nature, has
reached out to certain conclusions on the
cosmic mystery. It will not avail to
Caricature his conclusions and vilify his
person and motives and method. Neither
he, nor his translator, nor his publishers,
dreamed of thrusting his zoological
authority down people’s throats, except
in so far as his book deals with zoology.
His further conclusions must be met on
their argumentative merits. His whole
system must be judged by rational
evidence.
Dust-throwing and mud
throwing are not the methods of truth
seekers ; they are the devices of timid
or foolish partisans.
But before I enter upon a systematic
examination of Haeckel’s system and the
criticisms it has provoked, I wish to ex
pose one further misrepresentation of a
general character. Almost all the critics
endeavour to make us distrust Flaeckel
by attributing to him a solitary and
isolated position in the scientific ■world.
Even if this were the case, it would only
be an incentive to examine his views
with the greater care. Copernicus stood
alone throughout life. Darwin was op
posed by most of the scientists of his
time. Wolff enunciated a profound
truth which was not accepted until long
after his death. Robert Owen preached
a whole series of social truths that we
all accept to-day. Further, all writers
do not regard Haeckel as isolated. Mr.
Mallock, in his Religion as a Credible
Doctrine, not only takes him to be the
supreme living representative of scientific
philosophy, but says that he and his
1 Does Science Destroy Religion ? p. 29.
�16
SOME GENERAL CRITICISMS, AND A LESSON IN MODESTY
colleagues “ are correct in their methods
and arguments—that the attempts of
contemporary theologians to find flaws
in the case of their opponents, or to
convert the discoveries of science into
proofs of their own theism, are exercises
of an ingenuity wholly and hopelessly
misapplied, and exhibit too often an
unreasoning or a feverish haste which
merely exposes to. ridicule the cause
which they are anxious to defend.”1 Dr.
Lionel Beale speaks throughout his
Vitality of the majority being on
Haeckel’s side in that controversy. Dr.
Iverach speaks in his Theism of “ scien
tists,” in a general way, as refusing to go
with him. But the misconception it is
particularly needful to clear up is as to
the relation of Haeckel’s Monism to
Agnosticism. When Mr. Ballard speaks
crudely of the majority of modern scien
tists being opposed to Haeckel, the
uninformed will conclude that they are,
therefore, more or less with Mr. Ballard.
We have corrected that impression by
giving the list of all the scientific laymen
of England and the United States, of
recent years, that Mr. Ballard has been
able to get under one very broad religious
umbrella. It bears only a small propor
tion to the whole, even when we have
added Professor Henslow and a few
more later on. On the other hand, the
average educated man would say that
Haeckel is a materialist and atheist, and
the great bulk of our men of science
reject both names. Haeckel, it is true,
equally rejects the name materialist, but
we may defer that point to the next
chapter. Our average educated man
has no illusion as to Huxley, Tyndall,
Clifford, Darwin, Bain, Sully, Maudsley,
Spencer, Ray Lankester, Karl Pearson,
and scientists of that type (or those
types) favouring what Mr. Ballard would
call religion. These have professed
Agnosticism; and the silence on the
religious question of the vast majority of
our scientific men must—especially in
1 The Fortnightly Review, September, 1901 ;
p. 400.
view of the feverish alertness of the
Churches to drag them on to platforms
when they are known to be in the least
favourable—I should say, be construed
in the same sense.
Now, Agnosticism is held to be more
or less respectable. Mr. Ballard quotes
Huxley and Darwin and Tyndall with a
light heart and without the least recburse
to his red ink. Haeckel is abused be
cause of his “dogmatism.” But let us
refrain from raising dust, and see what
the difference really comes to. I might
quote Lord Grimthorpe, whose “legal
and scientific mind ” Mr. Ballard has
warmly recommended to us : “ As for
professing to believe neither alternative,
atheism or theism, . . . that is not only
probably but certainly wrong, and, in
deed, is so impossible that any man who
thinks he has come to that conclusion is
mistaken, and is at present an atheist.” 1
But I think a writer of that type ought
to be left in his grave. Listen, however,
to what one of the ablest living thinkers
of England says on the matter : “ The
Neutral or Agnostic Monism now in
vogue amongst scientific men ... is
scientifically popular mainly because it
is still essentially naturalistic, and dis
parages the so-called psychical aspect as
epistemologically subordinate to the
physical. . . This monism escapes the
absurdities of the old materialism more
in seeming than in fact . . it is material
ism without matter. . . In this monism
the mechanical theory is still regarded
as furnishing a concrete and complete
presentment of the objective world. . .
If dualism is unsound, there seems to
be no agnostic resting-place between
materialism and spiritualism.”2 I do
not subscribe to all this, but the high
authority of the writer encourages me
to say that the custom of opposing our
1 At the close of The Origin of the Laws of
Nature.
2 Professor J. Ward, Naturalism and Agnosti
cism, p. 207, vol. ii. So Professor Case, in the
article on Metaphysics in the tenth edition of the
Encyc. Brit, says Huxley, Tyndall, and Spencer,
only escape materialism by being inconsistent.
�'some general criticisms, and a lesson IN MODESTY
Agnostic scientists to Haeckel—especi
ally when fairly ancient quotations are
dug out of their works in support of it—
is totally misleading.
The difference between them is this
(setting aside for the manner the question
of idealism): Haeckel’s system is a
comprehensive theory covering the uni
verse, whilst they remain on ground
which they feel to be very solid. They
affirm the evolution of all things, of
matter, of solar systems, of species from
lower species, of man, of religion and
ethics. But they decline to skate at all
on thin ice. Whether the universe had
a beginning, whether evolution has been
purposively guided, whether or how life
arose out of non-life, whether conscious
ness is of the same texture as physical
force, whether death makes an end of it
—all these things they prefer to leave to
a later generation. Where they do
affirm, they agree with Haeckel; but
they consider his further affirmations
premature, to say the least. They
agree with him that the religious theory
is quite uncalled-for by the facts of
science ; but they think it too early to
frame counter-theories. This is the real
significance of those famous conversions
of German scientists of which every
critic of Haeckel has made so much.
Du Bois-Reymond, Virchow, Baer, and
Wundt spread their affirmations over
the universe in their younger days. At
a later period they restricted themselves,
like Huxley or Darwin, to positions
which seemed impregnable. They re
treated to Agnosticism on the more ad
vanced questions. It. is absurd to find
Haeckel’s critics representing them as
having gone over to theism or Christian
ity.1 Like Huxley and Tyndall (in his
1 Haeckel is read a ferocious lesson in
manners by all his critics for putting a certain
construction on their change. Let it stand. I
am chiefly concerned with the truth or untruth
of his ideas. I see, therefore, a far more griev
ous sin in the almost general misrepresentation
of the nature of these “conversions.” Dr.
Horton, we saw, slipped in Vogt and Buchner,
the most advanced materialists of Germany, as
converts to spiritualism. Mr, Ballard inserts
17
agnostic mood) they only decline to
follow Haeckel in a constructive theory
of the origin of life and the relation of
consciousness to brain, and the strenuous
denial of God and immortality; but they
shrink just as severely from the con
structive theories and the dogmas of
Haeckel’s critics.
In that sense Haeckel stands apart,
though far from alone. Is he justified
in leaping the abysses from which his
colleagues shrink ? Would it be wiser to
keep to the solid ground ? To put no
rounded system before the world ? We
can judge best when we have covered
the whole ground over which his system
extends. Meantime, remember three
things which are lost sight of in the dust
of this controversy. Firstly, Dr. Haeckel
does not claim anything like equal value
for his views on all points. He knows
perfectly well how the evidence differs,
and how at times he must bridge a chasm
with “a pure hypothesis,”as he calls his
theory of abiogenesis; though he does
not even put out a hypothesis without
sober ground.
His system is an
elaborate structure of demonstrated
truths, convincing theories, and rational
hypotheses of all grades of strength. The
critic who confuses the latter with the
former, and thinks he has destroyed
“ the fundamental axiom,” when he has
only shown that some outlying hypothesis
A only a hypothesis, does not evince
much discernment or a scrupulous desire
to let truth prevail. Secondly, dualism,
or theism, may not logically rush in if one
Romanes, of whose conversion Haeckel was
totally unaware when he wrote the book, and
whose change of views differs toto co:lo from that
of Virchow or Wundt. All essentially misstate
the real “ metamorphosis.” It was merely from
dogmatic monism to what Dr. Ward calls
“agnostic monism.” It lends no support to
theism or spiritualism. Prof. Haeckel assures me
that “even to-day these men are styled atheists
by German ecclesiastical writers.” Read Mr.
Kennedy’s attack on Du Bois-Reymond’s hetero
doxy, after his “ Ignorabimus-Rede,” in his
Natural Theology and Modern Thought, pp.
42-65. Darwin used stronger language about
Virchow than is to be found in the Riddle.
�18
THE UNITY OF THE WORLD, AND THE LAW OF SUBSTANCE
of Haeckel’s particular hypotheses breaks
down. Between Haeckel and Martineau
or Fiske lies the broad region of neutral
or agnostic monism. And thirdly, this
is the ordinary procedure of science. It
throws out the light bridges of its hypo
theses far in advance of its solid march.
They may be withdrawn later. More
probably they will gather strength as the
years roll on, and be at length absorbed
in the growth of the impregnable
structure of scientific truth.
Chapter II
THE UNITY OF THE WORLD, AND THE LAW
OF SUBSTANCE
What, then, is this monism which
has aroused so much bitterness and an
tagonism ? Once more, before we can pro
ceed to a sober and patient study of the
position of Dr. Haeckel, we find it
necessary to lay the dust which his
critics have raised. There is the defini
tion given by the Rev. Ambrose Pope,
who seems to have led the opposition
to Haeckel in the Clarion controversy.
Mr. Pope disposes of the system —
which it has taken Dr. Haeckel a
laborious life-time to construct—-with
a marvellous and quite papal facility.
It was made, he thinks, during three “half
day excursions” out of Haeckel’s own
province. From these he returned with
certain “assumptions” which contain,
with almost ludicrous clearness, the con
clusions he wanted to reach. We will
have a word on these “ assumptions ”
(which are really the conclusions of years
of observation and reflection) when the
time comes. But incidentally Mr. Pope
defines monism, or, as he calls it for
some occult reason, “ physiological
monism.”_ “Briefly,” he says, “the
universe is not dual in its ultimate
nature, viz., spirit (or soul) and matter;
but single (monistic), viz., matter (or
substance).” Mr. Pope goes on to say
airily that "this is another of those inno
cent-looking hypotheses” from which
Haeckel derives his atheism, &c. How
any man can fail to see that this is
not an assumption, but the most
laboured conclusion of Haeckel’s sys
tem—not the base but the apex of his
pyramid—passes comprehension. Mean
time, it is formulated in utter defiance
of Haeckel’s words, and one might think
Haeckel would be consulted on the
matter. He says (p. 8) that monism
does “ not deny the existence of spirit,
and dissolve the world into a heap of
dead atoms ” and that “ matter cannot
exist and be operative without spirit, or
spirit without matter.” Dr. Horton and
many others have the same confusion.
The Rev. Rhondda Williams says : “ He
recognises that there is something which
is not material (spatial) which we may
call mind, or soul, or spirit. But if this
spiritual something is treated as the
mere, product of matter, or the mere
function of the material organism, its
reality is denied, i.e., it has no real
spiritual nature.” But Haeckel has no
where said that spirit (or force) is a
product of matter. There are scientists
who resolve matter into force, but no one
ever attempted the reverse, except in
�THE UNITY OF THE WORLD, AND THE LAW OF SUBSTANCE
the sense of reducing force to motion,
which Haeckel certainly does not.
Monism is so clearly defined at the
very commencement of Haeckel’s book
(p. 8) that these gentlemen must have
convinced themselves he gave an im
proper definition in order to escape the
odious label “materialist.” Before we
proceed, let us be perfectly clear why
this odium does attach to the word
“materialism.” It is well worthwhile,
for here is one of the strangest and most
common sophisms
of the
hour.
Materialism is the name for two totally
different things, which are constantly
confused. There is, in the first place,
materialism as a theory of the universe—
the theory that matter is the source
and the substance of all things. That is
(if you associate “ force ” or “ energy ”
or “motion” with your “matter,” as
every materialist does) a perfectly
arguable theory. It has not the remotest
connection with the amount of wine a
man drinks or the integrity of his life.
But we also give the name of materialism
to a certain disposition of the sentiments,
which few of us admire, and which
would kill the root of progress if it
became general. It is the disposition to
despise ideals and higher thought, to
confine one’s desires to selfish and
sensual pleasure and material advance
ment. There is no connection between
this materialism of the heart and that of
the head.
For whole centuries of
Christian history whole nations believed
abundantly in spirits without it having
the least influence on their morals;
and, on the other hand, materialists like
Ludwig Buchner, or Vogt, or Moleschott,
were idealists (in the moral sense) of the
highest order.1 Look around you and
see whether the belief or non-belief (for
the Agnostic is in the same predicament
here) in spirit is a dividing-line in conduct.
There is no ground in fact for the con
fusion, and it has wrought infinite
mischief; while it has rendered, and
1 See sketches of their lives in Last Words on
Materialism,
19
still renders, incalculable service to con
servative religion.
In his Natural History of Creation
Professor Haeckel admitted that his
monism was not far removed, from
scientific materialism. But there is still
so gross a confusion on the subject
that it is very natural for him to refuse
the name.
Indeed, he could not
logically accept it, and no one who is well
informed in recent physics will accept it,
unless he is allowed to interpret it in his
own way; a right which seems to be
denied to men like Dr. Haeckel. Glance
at any scientific work, and you will
find that it speaks as much, if not
more, about force than about matter.
Hence if critics insist on calling
materialism a belief in “dead atoms”
and “ hard atoms,” and “ solid atoms,”
and nothing else, there
are no
materialists to-day, if ever there were?
We shall see more presently about
modern notions of matter and force, but
may take it that Haeckel, in proper
scientific spirit, attaches as much im
portance to force as to matter, and does
not make any absurd attempt to derive
force from matter.1 Further, he identi
fies “ soul ” or “ spirit ” with force. Mr.
Williams says this is a polite way of
denying its existence, and Mr. Pope
would say it is an assumption.
It is
neither one nor 'the other, but a most
serious and characteristic conclusion of
Haeckel’s researches.
I am now
stating his position, not the grounds for
it (which will come in due time). He
concludes that the thinking and willing
force in man—what we call his mind or
spirit—is identical with the force that
reveals itself in light and heat. In
other words, he is forced to think that
spirit and energy are one and the same
thing, and so he uses the names in
discriminately. But he is further con
vinced, on grounds we shall see
presently, that matter and spirit (or
1 Yet even the writer of the article on Meta
physics in the 10th edition of the Encyclopedia
Britannica, who devotes two columns to the
Riddle, joins in this general misrepresentation,
�20
THE UNITY OF THE WORLD, AND THE LAW OF SUBSTANCE
force) are not two distinct entities or
natures, but two forms or two aspects of
one single reality, which he calls the
fundamental substance.
This
one
entity with the two attributes, this
matter-force substance, is the sole
reality that exists—to use a Greek word,
the motion—the one nature that presents
itself to our contemplation in the
infinitely varied panorama of the
universe.
This position is logically, as I said,
the culmination of Haeckel’s system.
For the convenience of this brief de
scription I take it as the starting point
of that network of explanations, theories,
and hypotheses which constitutes the
monistic philosophy. There is a most
important school of philosophers who
will challenge even the existence of this
matter-force substance, as we shall see
presently, but for the vast majority of
men of science, as well as of ordinary
folk, this matter-force element is the one
obvious reality. In this Haeckel’s cri
tics are at one with him. It is when
Haeckel goes on to say it is the sole —
mon-on—reality that the conflict begins.
The view which Haeckel opposes is that
there is another element in existence,
totally distinct from this matter-force
reality : that the mind of man cannot be
an evolution from the matter-force sub
stance, and that this substance itself
could not have evolved into the orderly
universe about us except under the guid
ance of a still higher intelligent principle,.
God. Now, it would be quite legitimate
to say that we are as yet so imperfectly
acquainted with this matter-force reality
that it is premature to say what it can o<cannot do. That is the Agnostic posi
tion, rejecting alike the dualist theory of
Mr. Ballard and the monistic explana
tions of Dr. Haeckel.1 But monism is
more ambitious.
Science has now
1 But I must repeat—so persistent is the mis
representation—that this agnostic position is as
antagonistic to Christianity as monism is. Its
quarrel with what it calls the premature theories
of the monist is a purely scientific or philosophical
matter, and is totally unconnected with religion.
amassed enormous quantities of facts
concerning every part and aspect of the
universe. The monist believes we can
already, with this material, sketch in
broad outline, at least, the upward
growth of the great world-substance
until it is transfigured in the beauty of
the living organism, and becomes selfconscious in the mind of man. Every
body admits to-day, says Mr. Mallock,
that the inorganic world is “an absolute
monism.”
The monist proceeds to
bring the realms of life and conscious
ness into this matter-force unity, and to
show that we are not warranted in claim
ing that its growth needs a designer or a
controller. He will go on until he has
embraced the whole life of humanity,
science, art, religion, and ethics, in his
single formula.
Do not misunderstand me to the
extent of supposing, as so many strangely
do, that the monist is bound to have a
theory ready for every phenomenon
under heaven. We find even the ablest
of Haeckel’s critics claiming that monism
breaks down here, or fails to explain
there, and then with a chant of praise
fluttering the banner of dualism in the
breach. Such a course is absurd. If
the monistic theory fails anywhere, the
next attitude that logic enforces is agnos
ticism, or reserve of judgment.
If
Haeckel’s theory of the origin of life, or
of heredity, or of consciousness, or of
morality, or of Christ, will not stand the
strain of rational examination, this does
not impair the general system of monism.
The heart of the system is (i) the affir
mation that a great matter-force sub
stance (or nature) is unrolling its poten
tialities in the universe about us
(which no one denies), and (2) that we
have no rational evidence that there exists
any other substance (or super-nature).
To say that Haeckel is bound to explain
everything or die, is a grotesque assump
tion.
He has plainly disavowed so
foolish an ambition. It may be that
before the last red rays of our dying sun
fall upon the eyes of the last of our race,
some millions of years hence, the mon-
�THE UNITY OF THE WORLD, AND THE LAW OF SUBSTANCE 21
bundle of sense-impressions which he
istic philosophy will be complete. That
quite gratuitously supposes to be caused
is the “ infinitely remote goal ” he spoke
by a material object, and his stomach.is
of. But, as I said, science has already
accumulated so vast a library of know a fiction. So with the whole of material
life. It is a kinematoscopic display in
ledge that we may venture even now to
draw the outline of an extensive view of the mind—not, as far as we know, taken
from life. Berkeley opined that God
the universe in the monistic sense. That
was the operator of the instrument.
is what Dr. Haeckel does in the Riddle,
Idealists generally have dispensed with
of the Universe. He has spent half a
the operator now. The show unwinds
century in seeking truth. He has fought
itself by some occult law of the mind.
side by side with the finest scientific
thinkers of the last century in overcom In either case “ this too, too solid flesh ”
ing an historic resistance on the part of does melt, and thaw into something
the Churches. No one who is not con thinner than “an everlasting dew,”
Matter is a mental construction, force
vinced that humanity has already, at the
very beginning of its higher life, reached is the same, the world they make up
cannot be otherwise.
There is, of
the final truth, will be diverted by the
course, the agnostic position, that we
sneers and gibes of heated partisans
do not know whether this kinematoscopic
from a patient study of his conclusions.
No one who believes that truth is a panorama is a photograph, or a diagram,
of a real world, or no. But all idealists,
sacred possession, and the first condition
and they are the vast majority in philo
of lasting progress—no one who feels
sophy to-day, sternly insist that the
that dignity and sincerity are the first
matter and force which the scientist
qualities required in its pursuit—will
manipulates are mental counters; that
allow himself to be turned from the true
he is dealing with his idea of matter and
and vital issues by a petty and frivolous
force, whether or no an eternal reality
criticism of irrelevant details.
corresponds to these. Hence it is that
The plan I have adopted is to state
so many cultivated reviewers set aside
first the almost undisputed unity of the
inorganic world, then proceed to con Haeckel’s system with polite disdain.
sider its evolution, and pursue the pro His realism—his habit of talking of
cess of development through the suc matter and force as familiar objective
cessive stages of life, consciousness, and realities—is too naive.
Now this philosophy so obviously cuts
reason. But I have already said that
an important group of philosophers chal out the root of Haeckel’s system that
some of his clerical critics have put on
lenge our right even to the inorganic
superior airs and borrowed phrases from
world as a base of operations. Age
it. If the very existence of matter and
after age philosophy has rung the changes
on the familiar bells—materialism, ideal force is doubtful, clearly monism is in a
parlous state. They forget one thing.
ism, spiritualism, realism. To-day the
system in favour in the schools is ideal If idealism excludes, or throws doubt on,
the objective reality of matter, it in the
ism. According to the idealists the
same proportion destroys the Christian
naive belief of the average man that he
position. What is the meaning of the
lives in a material universe, which lay
Incarnation, or the death of Christ, or
here in space before humanity began to
the whole historic foundation of Chris
furrow its soil, and will lie there still
tianity, if the material world and its
when the last man has dropped into his
eternal tomb, is a delusion. The arch history are subjective ? Dr. Iverach sees
this very well, and warns his impetuous
sophist, Berkeley, comes along, and
colleagues. “In truth,’’ he says, “we
explains that the orange he thinks he
must arrive at a conception which leaves
is vulgarly injecting into a material
cavity he calls a stomach, is only a room for real individuality; that will
�22
THE UNITY OF THE WORLD, AND THE LAW OF SUBSTANCE
recognise the uniqueness of every person,
and yet place every person in relation to
every other person and thing that is, has
been, or will be. It must allow reality
to history, and permit a real progress
and real events in it. It must recognise
human activity as a factor in the world’s
history, and recognise somehow that
good and evil, happiness and misery,
righteousness and sin, are not appear
ance, but stern realities, which philo
sophy and theology must deal with.”1
There are, of course, important divines
amongst the idealists, such as Dr. Caird,
but they are neither consistent nor likely
ever to be literally adopted.
The
Catholic Church is intensely realistic.
Its philosophers, Dr. Ward, Dr. Mivart,
Father Maher, Father Clark, etc., have
never yielded a step to the reigning
fashion of idealism. In a word, the
defenders of religion whom Haeckel
opposes are as “ naive realists ” as he is.
It is only the more short-sighted who
meddle with the edged tools of the
modern metaphysician.
But the philosophers themselves, the
aristocracy of the intellectual world!
Are we to go on with our construction
in total disregard of their protest ? I
believe Haeckel is quite right in doing
so. As Mr. Mallock says, these idealist
dreams are not “ the mere raving
which at first sight they seem to be.”
On the other hand, the common fashion
idealists have of saying that the man
who refuses to take them seriously must
be altogether ignorant of their philo
sophy—a species of arrogance peculiar
to idealists and Roman Catholics—is
absurd. Few cultivated men are ignorant
of their arguments.
But the average
man of science, the average historian,
and the average man of affairs, sweep
away their theory as, in the words of
Mr. Mallock, “a fantastic, though in
genious and learned, dream.2 “ If phi1 Theism in the Light of Present Science and
Philosophy, p. 305.
2 Religion as a Credible Doctrine, p. 202.
Mr. Mallock gives an admirable summary of the
system, as presented by its latest and ablest
expositor, Professor James Ward.
losophers,” he says again, “instead of
confining themselves to the solemn alti
tudes of existence . . . would conde
scend to take their examples from the
common events of life, they would avoid
many of the mistakes which expose
them to the just ridicule of the vulgar.”
The historian is hardly likely to admit
that the stupendous drama he is engaged
in reconstructing is not the real play of
living passion. The astronomer is not
prepared to see in the vast expanse of
the heavens only the unreal mirage
of his ideas.
The physicist contemp
tuously repudiates the idealist’s interpre
tation of his matter and force.
The
question is raised, said Sir A. Rucker, in
his presidential address to the British
Association in 1901, “whether our basic
conceptions are to be regarded as accu
rate descriptions of the constitution of the
universe around us, or merely convenient
fictions,” and he gave an emphatic adhe
sion to the former. His speech ended
with a claim that ether and the atom are
not mere mental fictions, not mere “ work
ing hypotheses,” but “objective realities.”
His successor in the presidency, Pro
fessor Dewar, no less strongly repudiated
“ the ancient mystifications by which a
certain school shatter the objective reality
of matter and energy.” Indeed, signs
are not wanting of a coming change
amongst the metaphysicians themselves.
The immense difficulty of explaining how
we can perceive an external world is
familiar enough to every thinking man.
But philosophy must try again.
The
material world is more convincing than
all their difficulties.
The article on
“ Metaphysics,” by Professor Case, in the
latest edition of our greatest Encyclopaedia
is one long warning that the reign, or the
nightmare, of idealism is over, and that
we shall shortly return through “the
anarchy of modern metaphysics ” (as he
says), to a normal belief in the reality of
a material world, the reality of war and
disease and poverty and ignorance, and
the rationality and validity of social
enthusiasm and scientific investigation.
With Professor Haeckel, then, we pass
�THE UNITY OF THE WORLD, AND THE LA W OF SUBSTANCE
by our perplexed metaphysicians, and
smile at their supercilious comments.
We turn to the spreading panorama of
inorganic nature as the first embodiment
of the monistic substance.1
There
should be no criticism for us to meet
here, but the eagerness to deny and to
discredit and to score a point—as if we
were conducting a mimic Parliament in
some dull provincial town, instead of
being sober searchers for truth—has
been so feverish that we shall find it
breaking out into all kinds of frivolous
criticisms.
When you look up at night into the
heavens you see some three or four
thousand stars scattered through space.
Each is an incandescent sphere, rarely
less than three million miles in circum
ference, and usually separated from its
fellows by billions of miles of space. It
would take some 175,000 years to count
the distance in miles to the nearest of
them. Some of them can be proved to
be at least 1,500,000,000,000,000 miles
away. With the use of a good telescope
the number of these world-masses runs
up to more than a hundred millions.
Yet even then we seem to be only at the
fringe of the question of the magnitude
of our universe. When a telescope
containing a highly sensitive photo
graphic plate is directed to what seem to
be dark and empty parts of space, and
is kept in that position for eight or ten
hours, the plate is found to bear the
faint imprint of a fresh myriad of worlds.
They are so far distant that, though they
are 150 times more luminous than lime
light, and though the waves of light they
send us have been falling on the plate—
1 A certain school would have us admit that,
because our conviction of the reality of the
external world is incapable of demonstrative sup
port, we should grant the same privilege to the
belief in God. There is no analogy whatever.
We cannot get away from our belief in the real
world. The idealists themselves assume it in
their arguments—as when they take the physi
cist’s analysis of sound or light, to throw doubt on
our hearing or sight. There is not a particle of
this irresistibility about the idea of God. We
can trace its roots and reject it without the
slightest inconsistency.
23
a plate that would take a picture in the
merest fraction of a second in day-time
— at the rate of 700,000,000,000,000
per second, many of them fail to make the
least impression after six or eight hours’
exposure. We have no ground for sup
posing our most powerful instruments
bring us to anything like a limit to the
universe.
Is the universe infinite? Dr. Haeckel
speaks of it as infinite and eternal, and
this is just one of those typical cases
where the monist outruns the agnostic.
The criticisms which have been passed
on the phrase “ infinite ” (we shall speak
of eternity later), as applied to the
material universe, are not very dis
cerning. There are critics who imagine
that Haeckel must advance no statement
for which he cannot furnish empirical
proof; whereas he has told us from the
first page that, as a sensible thinker, he
employs his faculty of speculation
(taking care that it starts from facts) as
well as his power of observation. Then
there are critics who insist on thinking—
it is very convenient for their purpose—
that he lays the same stress on every line
of his system, and so cry “ dogmatism ”
wherever the evidence is slender. We
must approach the subject more reason
ably. The question is, does the evidence
of astronomy point in the direction of
limits or of illimitableness ? Philosophy
has nothing to say against the infinity of
the cosmos. “We have no evidence,”
says Dr. Ward, “of definite space and
time limits; quite the contrary. ... we
certainly cannot prove that the universe
as a whole is measurable and therefore
finite. And when we pass to more
purely a priori considerations, the case
against a universe with fixed and finite
limits is equally strong.”1 The idea of
a limit is in fact unthinkable, and the
evidence of astronomy is far from sug
gesting it. “Is the universe infinite?
Who can say ? ” asks Dr. Dallinger.
He refers to the fairly definite scheme of
1 Naturalism and Agnosticism, vol. i. p. 195.
Dr. Ward does not, of course, say the cosmos is
infinite.
�24
THE UNITY OF THE WORLD, AND THE LA W OF SUBSTANCE
our milky way, but says 11 it may be but
a complex particle in a universe of
universes, stretching on for ever and
ever over the bourneless immensity of
the unknown.”1 Briefly, what evidence
we have is totally against the idea of a
limit, and that idea is so unimaginable
that it would never have been suggested
but for theological considerations. Dr.
Haeckel prefers to rely on the scientific
indications. I reserve for a separate
chapter the discussion of Prof. Wallace’s
curious views on the subject.
The next step that science takes is to
establish the unity of this immeasurable
universe. There is no question to-day
about the identity of the matter which
composes these innumerable and widely
distant worlds. The spectroscope is a
more delicate analyst than the apparatus
of the chemist. It has detected poison
and convicted criminals where chemistry
has been mute. And the spectroscope
will tell us the chemical constituents of
Arcturus, 1,500,000,000,000,000 miles
away, as confidently as it ■will analyse
the matter in the laboratory. It needs
for its operation only a ray of light from
the matter in question. We have thus
learned that the material of the stars is
the same as that of our earth. We may
find different elements here and there;
we may find matter in states we cannot
detect or produce on earth. But the
ancient idea that the heavens were made
of a superior substance is totally dis
credited. From end to end of the
known universe matter is one. It is
also established that a more subtle form
of matter, called ether, fills the inter
stellar spaces and penetrates into the
very heart of the most solid substances.
Even the apparently rigid particles of a
1 The Creator, p. 14. Strange to say, Dr.
Dallinger immediately continues: “If that be
so, we can make no useful inference from our
finite universe ” : and shortly after actually infers
that the world was created on the ground that it
is “finite”! “What is finite begins to be,
must have been caused to be” (p. 14). If
Haeckel had proceeded in this slovenly fashion,
what an outcry there would have been.
block of iron are really swimming in
miniature oceans of ether.
But this is not unity, it is a wonderful
variety, some of the critics exclaim; you
give us ether on the one hand and some
seventy-four different kinds of ponderable
matter on the other. The latter part of
the objection is not now seriously urged.
For years the indications in chemistry
pointed towards a real unity of the chemi
cal elements, and to-day no one has any
doubt whatever that they are all multi
ples of some simpler form of atom. The
unity of oxygen, hydrogen, iron, gold, and
so on, is completely accepted. Astrono
mers have observed in some of the stars
matter which seems to be actually in a
transition stage; and physics, which has
made gigantic strides of late, seems to
have detected the same phenomenon in
its laboratories, as Sir O. Lodge points
out in his brilliant Romanes Lecture for
1903. The elements have been built
up by evolution from some simpler and
homogeneous substance. That is the
belief of all physicists and chemists, and
it is based on a mass of facts. Mr.
Ballard thinks it useful, or wise, to raise
the dust even here. He says (third
article—not the one in which he charges
Haeckel with dogmatism) that Haeckel
frankly confesses—as he does—his lack
of expert knowledge of physics, and adds
that these “ ultimate questions of mole
cular physics of necessity determine our
conceptions of the constitution of matter,
and so are fundamental to the whole of
his monistic theory.” This is mere dust
throwing. The unity of matter is a
necessary part of the monistic theory,
but this is given in the commonest and
the finest manuals of physics as an
established and accepted truth; how the
various elements arose from one form of
matter is a subject of merely speculative
interest to Dr. Haeckel, and is not yet
settled. But Mr. Ballard plunges deeper,
and says Haeckel’s confession of weak
ness in physics “ does not prevent his
recommending ‘ the brilliant pyknotic
theory ’ of J. C. Vogt to the acceptance
of every biologist.” Then he begs the
�THE LAW OF SUBSTANCE 25
THE UNITY OF THE WORLD, AND
reader to study the stale criticisms of
Mr. Stallo “before accepting the VogtHaeckel theory as final,” and later says
Haeckel “decides that the conception
which best suits his purpose is the one
to be generally received.”
He then
reads a lesson on the impropriety of
misleading people, and, finally, after a
bewilderingly tortuous run, appeals to
the expert physicists Stewart and Tait
and Lord Kelvin to prove—quite irrele
vantly—that there is a Supreme Being.
The whole passage is too ludicrous to
analyse in detail, but I must point out
two things. Firstly, Mr. Ballard has no
more doubt than I have of the unity, of
matter, which is the only serious point
in question; Haeckel can fit into his
system any theory of the. evolution of
matter that physicists decide to adopt.
Secondly, Mr. Ballard quite misrepre
sents Haeckel’s attitude towards the
“pyknotic theory.” He does not say
“it is the one to be generally received,”
but says (p. 78) he “thinks it will prove
more acceptable to every biologist who
believes in the unity of nature” than
the other theory. The foolishness of
the whole episode is seen when one
reflects that this somewhat old (1891)
theory of Vogt’s is infinitely nearer to
the theories which are being discussed
to-day than the “ kinetic ” theory which
he dislikes.
The unity of all ponderable matter is,
then, an accepted doctrine, but we meet
fresh difficulties when we turn to ask if
there is a unity of ponderable and im
ponderable matter (or ether). . Here, in
deed, we meet a critic of a friendly dis
position whom it is courteous to hear. A
writer in the Reformer says, “ it will be
news to most of us that the ether is. the
original and fundamental matter, since
it is in its properties, so far as known,
pretty nearly the antithesis of all we
understand by material ”; and he
describes ether as “a material substance
which has none of the properties of
matter, and has most of those usually
associated with spirit.” Whether ether
has the properties of spirit or no depends
on what we mean by spirit. Theologians
mean nothing like ether, but spiritists
(who seem to be generally materialists
unconsciously) frequently do.
In any
case both Sir O. Lodge and Sir A.
Rucker meet the objection for us. Sir O.
Lodge, in his Romanes Lecture (1903),
says some physicists admit two kinds of
inertia, and he himself boldly advocates
the unity of electricity and ponderable
matter. “ An electric charge,” he says
(p. 4), “ possesses the most fundamental
and characteristic properties of matter,
viz., mass or inertia.” Sir A. Rucker, in
his presidential speech (1901), sweeps
the objection away as unphilosophical.
“ We cannot,” he says, “ explain things by
the things themselves.
If it be true
that the properties of matter are the
product of an underlying machinery,
that machinery cannot itself have the
properties which it produces, and must,
to that extent at all events, differ from
matter in bulk as it is directly presented
to the senses.”1 The affinity of ether
and ponderable matter is not questioned
in science, whatever the actual degree
of affinity may prove to be. And the
proof is advancing rapidly. I have said
that the astro-physicist finds a . transi
tional matter in the heavenly bodies, and
now the terrestrial physicist announces 2
that in his experiments with the new
element, radium, he witnesses the actual
break-down of the ponderable atom into
a form of matter he associates with
electricity. In fact, every modern theory
1 These principles also dispose of the critic in
Light who finds Haeckel “very uneasy” at
having to fit ether into his scheme, and thinks
his “ annexing ” it is “desperate work at this
hour of the day.” Seeing that the whole trend
of physics has been ever since in the direction
which Haeckel follows, I should say the criticism
is “ desperate work.” Light thinks ether is
“ending the old materialism ” and making for
spiritist monism. As I said, it depends what
you mean by spirit. Religious philosophy has
always meant “ unextended substance.
Ether
is just as quantitative as the most ponderable of
the elements.
2 See Sir O. Lodge’s Romanes Lecture, 1903,
and the discussion at the recent British Associa
tion meeting.
�26
™E miTY 0F ™E WORLD, AND THE LAW OF SUBSTANCE
of the atom implies its origin from ether,
’
what does Haeckel mean by making this
or their common origin.
’
reality, or substance, of which they are
Haeckel is, therefore, fully justified in
the . manifestations, the central mystery
taking from physics and chemistry his
of life at one moment, and doubting its
thesis of the unity of matter. No man
very existence the next ? A patient ex
of science disputes it, and it is a purely
amination of what Haeckel says, and a
scientific question. With regard to the
little less eagerness to score rhetorical
unity of force, there is even less difficulty.
It is now notorious that the forces of the points, would have enabled Mr. Rhondda
Williams and other critics to see what
universe are interchangeable, and are
he meant. He warned them that the
regarded in physics as so many varieties Riddle'^ a sort of “sketch-book,” and
(chiefly differentiated by wave-movements
they might have expected a lack of com
of different lengths) of one fundamental
plete harmony of expression. Haeckel
energy. I am not, of course, including says (p. 134): “We must even grant that
here the disputed “ vital force ” and the
this essence of substance [more cor
human soul, which later chapters will
rectly, the essence of this substance]
discuss. But the unity of the forces with becomes more mysterious and enigmatic
which the physical sciences deal is beyond the deeper we penetrate into the know
dispute. We have thus so far simplified
ledge of its attributes, matter and energy,
the visible universe as to detect beneath and the more thoroughly we study its
its kaleidoscopic variety the operation of
countless phenomenal forms and their
one form of force and one form of matter evolution. We do not know the ‘thing
from end to end of the universe. The
in itself’ that lies behind these know
next and final step as far as the unity of able phenomena. But why trouble about
the material universe is concerned is to
this enigmatic ‘thing in itself’ when
bring together this matter and force
we have no means of investigating it,
themselves.
when we do not even clearly know
Dr. Haeckel has done this by saying whether it exists or no ? ” The Greeks
that matter and force (or spirit) are “ the long ago started the notion that the
two fundamental attributes, or principal properties or attributes of a thing were
properties, of the all-embracing divine
really distinct from its substance. The
essence of the world, the universal sub mediaeval philosophers made them as
stance.” He further admits that “ the distinct as the skin is from a potato, and
innermost character ” of this substance so it became a general custom to speak
is still totally unexplored; and in the end
of the essence or substance of a thing as
seems to question its existence altogether being hidden within or underneath a
(P- I34)- Here, of course, the critics
shell of properties. The senses stopped
are active. In the first place let us
short at the shell, but the intellect some
examine the alleged arbitrariness of this
how penetrated to the kernel. Kant’s
conjunction of matter and force. It is
critical philosophy destroyed this sup
a perfectly sound scientific and philo posed privilege of the intellect, but
sophic procedure. We not only know substituted for the substance-and-prono form of matter without force, but we perties idea the equally false and arbi
cannot imagine it. It could not act on trary notion of phenomena (qualities or
our organs of perception. On the other attributes that reach the senses) and
hand, we know no force apart from matter noumena (or “ things-in-themselves,”
(or ether). Force seems to be always which would be food for the intellect, if
embodied or substantiated in matter.
it could reach them). In both cases
Each is an incomplete reality; or, rather,
there is the veil of phenomena, or pro
they are two sides, or two different mani perties (colour, sound, shape, etc.), and
festations, of one reality.
That is in the veiled and inaccessible substance,
full accord with scientific teaching. But j <or essence, or noumenon. Now, many
�THE UNITY OF THE WORLD, AND THE LAW OF SUBSTANCE
of us deny to-day that there is any solid
ground for the distinction at all, and that
is what Haeckel means. You say, he
argues, that matter and force are only
phenomena, and that there is an under
lying “thing-in-itself.” If there is, he
says, it is as mysterious as ever; but I
see no good reason at all for thinking
that matter and force are a screen or
veil hiding something else. They are
the one eternal substance or reality. It
is a pure fallacy to say tnat in oidinary
experience we are dealing with a shell, of
properties or phenomena, and not with
the realities themselves.
Therefore—
logic sternly enjoining us never to multi
ply entities without necessity—I take it
that matter and force are the world-sub
stance breaking upon our perception in
two different ways.1
To illustrate the point , further, and to
meet a further class of critics, let us hear
what science says about these properties
or phenomena of things. Let us take
the familiar ones, sound and colour,
Are you unaware, we are severely asked,
that science has shown these to be
totally subjective ? Yes, I am quite un
aware ", though I know perfectly well
what science has done. I am writing
over a green table-cloth. Science tells
me that this really means that the
material covering my table, is of such a
molecular texture that it absorbs. a
number of the waves of sun-light which
fall upon it, and only reflects the blue
and yellow waves. These it sends to my
retina at the rate of some hundred
billion per second: they cause a
peculiar movement in my optic nerve,
and finally in my brain, and—I see green.
So, as I write, the clock strikes twelve.
That is to say, the metal molecules of
the bell are thrown into a violent
oscillation; they cause waves in the
surrounding atmosphere; and the in
tricate mechanism of the ear turns these
into a modification of my auscultory
nerve and brain. And all this elaborate
description of objective movements and
objective agencies is supposed, to.have
made colour and sound “subjective.!
In point of fact, it has done away, with
the old shell of properties (though, it is a
question how far people ever did say
their sensations of colour and sound
were objective) and brought us into
direct touch with realities. And as all
the unnumbered objects about us con
stitute, fundamentally, one matter and
one force, we are face to face with the
one fundamental reality. We do not
“ know all about it.”
That is the
grossest perversion of Haeckel’s words.
To borrow the fine metaphor of Sir A.
Rucker, we see it in a light that is still
dim, but we see it. It is for the future
to complete the outline and fill in the
detail, as the light grows.1
Thus we have given in terms of
science the world substance, the matter
force reality, which is the constructive
starting point of Monism. The res^
our work consists in eliminating the
additional substances or forces which
theists, spiritualists, or supernaturalists
would compel us to add to it. It only
remains here to say a word of what
Haeckel calls the fundamental “law of
substance.” And first as to Haeckels
idea of a “law.” A fair-minded re
viewer in the Inquirer (March 9, 1901)
says: “The distinguished author seems
to have failed to see that to imagine a
law as an active power is every whit as
‘ anthropomorphic ’ as to imagine a God
of manlike form as feeling.” A writer in
Knowledge (January 30, 1901)—from
whom the Inquirer probably borrowed—
1 From these principles the reader can answer
for himself the often-heard criticism : You build
up the universe by matter and force, but what
do you really know about matter and force themselves ? The answer is : Go to a good library,
and ask for a few recent manuals of astronomy,
geology, chemistry, physics, and physiology. If
they do not deal with matter and force,, they
deal with fictions. The fallacy of the criticism
1 And that is not only the literal, but the only
is, of course, that science deals with this lmposrational, meaning of “phenomenon.”
Prof.
I torly shell of “ phenomena,” and does not reach
Haeckel readily endorses my explanation of his
I the “ essence ” or the “ underlying reality.”
position.
�28
THE UNITY OF THE WORLD, AND THE LA W OF SUBSTANCE
puts it as strongly : “ To scientific minds
tion of energy—which are, said the
who regard laws of nature as merely con Manchester Guardian critic, “precisely
ceptual formulae summing up certain
the oldest of all man’s discoveries in
sequences of experience, it may seem
the cosmological field.”
No particle
that to replace a deliberate architect and
of matter is ever annihilated or created ;
ruler of the world by 1 the eternal iron
that is the first axiom. Recent experi
laws of nature ’ is to be guilty of an
ments have actually seen the break
anthropomorphism precisely analogous to down of what has been called the
those on which the illustrious author
atom, and have seen particles chipped
pours contempt,” and he says, “ evolution off it; but only another form of matter
travels through the book like a creator is produced. The observations have
in disguise.” It would be rather curious
been so broad that physicists have felt
if one of the ablest living scientists did justified in concluding that indestructi
not know what science means by “ a law.”
bility or permanence is a property of
I .say science, because there is here no
matter. The same has been experi
discrepancy of views. That “ law ” only mentally demonstrated of force.1 Both
means “a summing-up of experience,” a are constant in quantity, though ever
uniform mode of action of this or that changing in form and distribution.
force, is a platitude of natural science.
Since we have seen reason for associat
Said Professor Dewar in his Presidential ing matter and force so closely, it is
Speech: “ When the scientist speaks of necessary to combine the two axioms
‘ a law of nature ’ he simply indicates a likewise. The great fundamental reality
sequence of events, which, so far as his
is constant or permanent amidst all its
experience goes, is invariable, and which qualitative changes. That is the first
therefore enables him to predict.” But and firmest law or feature of the monistic
the “law,” or mode of operation, of an
substance.
agency is so closely connected in our
We have now seen that Professor
minds with the agency itself that we fre Haeckel is in full accord with the latest
quently substitute the one for the other.
scientific teaching in his doctrine of the
It is strange to hear that this deceives
unity of the visible world. We have
any one.1 When a scientist speaks of the
seen(i) that matter and force are
law of gravitation, or the law of evolution,
realities; (2) that there is at bottom one
producing or compelling certain results,’
supreme form of each; (3) that there is
he invariably means the force of gravita no reason for holding them to be
tion or the agencies of evolution.
distinct realities, and so we unite them
We come, finally, to what Mr. Ballard as aspects of one substance or reality;
strangely calls Haeckel’s “ irrational law and (4) that this substance is, as far as
of substance.” The law of substance is extended observation goes, constant and
one of the most undoubted truths of indestructible in its quantity. We may
modern science. It is merely the union
now proceed to consider the evolution of
in one sentence of two of the proudest this matter-force reality into the infinite
results of modern physics, the inde complexity of the visible universe.
structibility of matter and the conserva{( 1 Does any one quarrel with us for saying that
“the law” compels us to pay taxes, and so
forth ?
1.'^s 10 t^le difficulty alleged to rise from
radio-action, Sir O. Lodge says there was
“never any ground” for concern about the
theory.
�THE EVOLUTION OF THE INORGANIC WORLD
29
Chapter III
THE EVOLUTION OF THE INORGANIC WORLD
Dr. Iverach says, or it may have been one
hundred or more, as others think—the
part of space we occupy was filled with
a cloud (not necessarily a “ fire-mist ”) of
infinitely attenuated matter. By the
action of its inherent and natural forces
this nebular matter entered upon a pro
cess of condensation and disruption.
Portions of it—whether or no they were
cast off in the form of rings, which
broke into irregular masses—condensed
into the several planets of our system,
and were set in revolution round the
central mass. This central mass, the
sun, is still condensing and pouring out
the heat which its compression causes.
The smaller masses, such as the earth,
cooled in time and formed a solid crust
at their surface. This outline is
accepted by all educated people to-day.
Quibbles about the details of the pro
cess are best left to expert astronomers
to deal with.
Our solar system is as a single snow
flake in a shower, but we have already
seen that it in every verifiable way
resembles its fellow flakes. It is of the
same stuff as they, and is ruled by the
same laws or forces. We have un
deniable ground to extend our nebular
theory to other worlds than ours, and
take it as the key to the formation of
all the stars that fill the immeasurable
heavens.
Indeed, we find worlds in
every stage of development, as required
by the theory, when we sweep the sky
at night.
We find nebulse stretching
sometimes over billions of miles (as
the nebula in Orion), and patches cut
out of them, as it were, to form stars.
We find clusters of thousands of stars
(as the Pleiades) with the remnants
still clinging to them of the gigantic
nebula they were developed from. We
1 Theism in the Light of Present Science and
find nebulse and stars illustrating almost
Philosophy, p. 35.
Where shall we begin in a descrip
tion of the growth of the universe?
Can we go back' to a stage beyond
which the imagination cannot penetrate
with its ceaseless questioning? It is
impossible for us to hope ever to do
this. Wherever we start in our con
struction, we shall start with positive
building material, and the imagination,
if not reason, will ask endless questions
about its previous history. All that we
can do is to set out from a definite and
recognised point, the nebula from which
our particular solar system has been
formed. From this, once we have
traced the broad lines of the evolution
of our sun and planets, we may, in. the
light of the discoveries and speculations
of modern science, look back into the
appalling abysses of past time and out
over the boundless panorama of the
universe.
With what is known as the nebular
hypothesis we need not linger. Haeckel
has sketched the outline of the theory,
and there is no relevant criticism of it.
“ There is no doubt,” says Dr. Iverach,
“ that some form of the nebular theory
is true.”1 There are clerical writers
who seem to think it profitable in some
obscure way to point out defects in the
theory, or to prove that the evidence for
it is not overwhelming. What they
gain by such efforts is not clear. The
question has long since passed beyond
the sphere of theology. Catholic
astronomers like Miss Agnes Clerke
accept it as eagerly as atheists. No
man of science entertains the smallest
doubt to-day that it correctly describes
in outline the formation of our solar
system. Once upon a time—it may
have been fifty million years ago, as
�3o
THE EVOLUTION OF THE INORGANIC WORLD
every step of the process.
We find
dark stars, extinct suns, which point
to the complete accomplishment of
such a process.
Astronomers are of
late years disposed to think the number
of these extinct suns is enormous.
Moreover, at times a new star flames out
in the sky, announcing the recommence
ment somewhere of the familiar drama
of world-formation.
In a word, the evidence of astronomy
forbids us to look upon the evolution
of the material universe as a continuous
process in a straight line of which we
might picture a definite beginning
and for which we might anticipate a
definite end.
The life-force of the
great substance only dies down in one
corner of space to be relit in another.
The dark stars which indubitably have
run their million-year long course are
only waiting to be reanimated by collision
or some other cosmic accident.
The
nebulae are embryonic worlds before our
own eyes. The blue-white stars are in
the prime of life. The red stars (with
certain peculiarities) are slowly dying,
but may rise again any day from their
tombs. Science, as Dr. Mivart said in
Truth, “ points to no beginning.” Nor
does it help us to approach the subject
from another point of view. We have
not only the evolution of cosmic masses
to explain, but the evolution of the
chemical elements themselves, or of
ponderable matter, from the finer
medium from which all physicists
believe it has been developed. If we
had any scientific evidence which
justified us in going back to a stage
when ether (or whatever the “ prothyl ”
may turn out to be) alone existed; and
could then show how atoms of ponder
able matter arose by condensation of it,
or by the formation of vortices in it;
and could see these atoms being
grouped into the complex atoms of
oxygen, gold, sulphur, &c.; and could
further, trace their aggregation into
meteorites, and the meteorites into
nebulae, and the nebulae into solar
systems—even then we should in
reality be no nearer the beginning.
The “ prothyl ” (or “ first matter,” a
name which does very well to designate
the much-sought elementary substance)
might very well be only the last term of
a previous universe-drama. The cyclic
process may have gone on for ever as
far as science can tell. But in point of
fact the universe does not as yet give
indications of any such continuous
process.
The universe is developed
piecemeal, star by star. The hundred
millions that we see shining to-day are
by no means “the universe.”
We have here a drama of life and
death on an almost inconceivable scale,
but the point I want to bring out is that
even the most daring speculations of
science bring us no nearer to a begin
ning than we are to-day. Dr. Haeckel
has been roundly abused for speaking of
the universe as eternal. I think it is
quite clear that, if we confine ourselves
to scientific considerations, he is using a
very proper kind of language. Here is
a matter-force reality which is constant
and indestructible in its ultimate quan
tity ; and though we can go back millions
of years on solid evidence, and billions
of years on fair speculation, we find no
more suggestion of a limit in time than
we did in regard to space. Certainly,
the greatest number of billions of years
we could imagine would not be nearer
to eternity than a day is. I merely say
that if any one suggests a limit in time
for the cosmic process he will not find
the shadow of a justification in science.
Critics seem at times to employ a curious
logic in dealing with this question.
“Finiteness” and “infinity” are words
with a strong odour of metaphysics about
them. Let us take it that it is a question
simply whether the universe had a be
ginning.
Now, some critics naively
assume that it is our place to prove that
the universe, or matter, or force, or
motion, never had a beginning. That
is a novel kind of logic. Here is the
universe given, and if any one makes the
very pregnant and formidable assertion
that there was a time when it did not
�THE EVOLUTION OF THE INORGANIC WORLD
exist, and that it came into existence
out of nothing, he must have. a very
positive and firm ground for his asser
tion. As far as scientific experience of
matter and force (or motion) goes, they
are not entities that slip in and out of
existence, but are constant. Yet we
have Mr. Rhondda Williams talking of
“ the mystery of the primitive push ” as
having always been the great difficulty
of mechanism. He tries at first to make
a scientific difficulty of it: “ Galileo,
the founder of physical science, laid it
down as the first principle of dynamics,
that every movement of matter could
only be explained by another movement
of matter, and that has been a recognised
principle of science ever since.” 1 Well,
that looks like a very strong confirma
tion of Haeckel’s thesis that matter and
motion must be eternal. But Mr. Wil
liams goes on : “ The difficulty was to
explain how matter began to move, what
caused the first movement, what gave
the primitive push ? ” But science, we
have seen, knows nothing whatever about
any “ primitive push.” It is a purely
gratuitous assumption. Dr. Horton might
refer us to “ the matchless revelation of
Genesis,” and we might suggest that the
Babylonian astronomers of 6,000 years
ago are not very safe guides. Mr. Wil
liams is content to assume the fact of
this “primitive push” without saying
why he thinks there was one. More
than that, he is greatly excited because
Haeckel declines to attempt to explain
it until some good reason has been
shown for thinking there ever was such
a thing. He tell his admiring audience
that Haeckel says “ the origin of move
ment is no difficulty because it never did
originate, he explains by simply denying !
What evidence does he adduce ? Abso
lutely none.” Dr. Haeckel, one would
think, can hardly be expected to spend
time in finding scientific proofs for the
first chapter of Genesis. His position is
negative. Eternity is a negative concept.
We do not prove negations in logic, or
1 Does Science Destroy Religion? (p. 13).
31
in real life. Mr. Williams further says
he has no objection to Haeckel holding
this “as a belief,” but he “does object
to his contention that this type of monism
is based upon empirical investigation.”
This is an unfortunate confusion. The
essence of Haeckel’s position is negative.
But he goes beyond the agnostic chiefly
on the ground of (1) the astronomical
evidence, and (2) the constancy of
matter; and those constitute empirical
evidence.
But to take them as more
than suggestions, and to ask empirical
proof that the world is eternal is rather
funny.
Finally, Mr. Williams says
Haeckel is equally unsatisfactory, about
the origin of consciousness. This just
illustrates Mr. Williams’s essential con
fusion. We know that consciousness
had a beginning, so there is no analogy ;
and in point of fact Haeckel, as we shall
see, devotes whole chapters to the origin
of consciousness.
Now this is a fair illustration of the
dreadful confusion which rules in the
minds of the people who put on very
superior airs about Haeckel’s “ dog
matic ” affirmation that the universe is
infinite and eternal. They almost al
ways assume, often in sweet unconscious
ness, this most important thesis that
there was a time when matter or motion
was not. It is one of the largest asser
tions that was ever made on the poorest
of sophisms. The scientific evidence,
such as it is, favours Haeckel’s negative
attitude.1 Philosophy is equally mute.
1 It is true that Mr. Mallock thinks one might
plausibly infer from what is called the entropy of
the universe that it had a beginning. This is the
only case where Mr. Mallock allows that scientific
evidence even seems to help theism. But we
shall soon see that the theory of entropy is totally
unable to bear the strain of such an inference.
Sir J. W. Dawson, one of the scientists Mr. Bal
lard raises from the dead to answer the Riddle,
says science does not regard the universe as
eternal “because, when we interrogate it as to
the particular things known to constitute the
heavens and the earth, it appears that we can
trace all of them to beginnings at more or less
definite points of past time.” Even at the time
this was written it was false in fact and unsound
in logic.
�32
THE EVOLUTION OF THE INORGANIC WORLD
The Greeks held that matter was eternal.
“It is not more difficult,” says Mr.
Mallock, “to suppose an eternal, self
existing and self-energising substance
than it is to suppose an eternal and
self-energising God.” But Christian
scholars have, in the interest of dogma,
tried to prove that the universe must
have had a beginning. We have seen
how Dr. Dallinger skipped from “ bourne
less immensity ” to “ finiteness,” and
concluded that “ what is finite begins to
be.” The last link of his curious chain
is hardly better than the others. Dr.
Iverach suggests the argument, but
abandons it (Ch. I., Christianity and
Evolution}. Dr. W. N. Clarke says:
“The things that we behold, mutable
though magnificent, bear the marks, not
of original, but of dependent existence.
Somehow existence has been caused.”1
Such an argument could only be
elaborated with the aid of a mediseval
metaphysic which we do not take to-day
as a measure of things. Dr. Clarke,
indeed, retreats to the position that even
if it were eternal we should need a
“ character-giving Spirit ” along with it;
a point we shall discuss later.
To sum up: neither philosophy nor
science points to a beginning of the
scheme of things. In view of the con
stancy of matter and the inconceivability
of a creation out of nothing, very strong
evidence would have been required to
make us accept this beginning. As it is,
the only source of the assertion is the
first line of Genesis and a concern for
theistic evidence. Professor Haeckel
has preferred to be guided by the sug
gestions or indications afforded by
scientific evidence. “ Science points to
no beginning,” as Mivart wrote. “We
have no evidence of definite space and
time limits; quite the contrary. . . .
And when we pass to more purely
a priori considerations, the case against
a universe with fixed and finite limits is
equally strong.” 2 Every effort to assign
1 An Outline of Christian Theology, p. 109.
2 l’rof J. Ward, quoted previously.
a beginning fails. We should never have
heard of it but for “ the matchless reve
lation of Genesis.”
Let us now turn to consider whether
science has anything to say with regard
to the end of the universe. As far as
our solar system is concerned, the
teaching of science is firm. Our sun
can only sustain his terrible vitality by
shrinking a certain number of feet every
century. He is doomed, as far as
astronomy can see, to die, like the dark
stars that already lie in the vast cemetery
of space. The air and water will dis
appear from the surface of our planet,
and for a time the heat of the sun will
beat upon the white tomb of all the
hopes and all the achievements of
humanity. The moon is the skeleton
at our feast. Its yawning sepulchre
points out the fate that awaits us.
Thou too, oh earth—thine empires, lands, and
seas—
Least, with thy stars, of all the galaxies,
Globed from the drift like these, like these
thou too
Shalt go. Thou art going, hour by hour, like
these.1
Perhaps Jupiter and Saturn will even
then teem with life, and their astronomers
study nightly the scarred and silent face
of the planet we enliven to-day.2 But
from planet to planet the hand of death
will travel. Then one by one, astrono
mers believe, the planets will fall into
the shrinking bosom of the sun and eke
out its failing vitality. At last the
blood-red sun will die out, and continue
to speed through space at twelve miles
a second, a dark, solid, silent, and
gigantic sepulchre. Physicists talk of
ten million years. It is an hour in
eternity.
1 Mr. Mallock’s Lucretius.
2 When Prof. Lionel Beale says (Vitality,
p. 4) that “ the more recent discoveries as to the
constitution of our sun and the planets as well
as the fixed stars, render it most improbable that
life exists in these or other orbs,” one can only
gasp with astonishment. There is no truth
whatever in it; and the mere idea of people
living in the stars—at a temperature of several
thousand degrees—makes one uncomfortable.
�THE EVOLUTION OF THE INORGANIC WORLD
For this is only a relative end. The
whole hundred-million-year drama of our
history will be, in our present cosmical
perspective, only the subsidence of a
tiny ripple on the bosom of an illimitable
ocean. Millions of similar dramas had
been played out before ours began; and
when silence shall have fallen succes
sively on the planets of our system, the
great nebulae that lie against the back
ground of space will be but waking into
existence. Moreover, the dark stars, and
the new stars that appear at times in the
heavens, point to an indefinite prolonga
tion of the process. The colliding of two
of these extinct suns—two globes of per
haps 800,000 miles diameter (like the dark
companion of Algol)-—would generate
heat enough to reduce them to a nebu
lous mass, pouring out for millions, if not
billions, of miles ; and the force of gravi
tation would ensure a further condensa
tion and world-formation. Actual collision
is, indeed, net believed to be necessary ;
in cases an approach within a few million
miles is believed to have led to a stellar
conflagration. Moreover, there are stars
so stupendous (take Arcturus, for in
stance), and moving at such inconceivable
speed through the universe, that we can
only look upon them as destructive
anarchists.
The universe, taken as a
whole, has all the appearance and promise
of “ perpetual motion.”
Recent writers have, however, appealed
to the theory of entropy as a scientific
indication of an end of the process.
Briefly, all energy can be (and is daily)
converted into heat, but heat is not all
reconverted into electricity, &c. This
seems to forecast a time when all the
working energy of the universe will be
dissipated, or lost in a generally diffused
heat.
Mr. Mallock has pointed out
(though Lord Grimthorpe and others had
done so years ago) that if this were true
the universe cannot have been eternal.
We should have reached the final stage
long ago. Haeckel has described and re
jected the theory. It only remains for me
to show how the very latest pronounce
ments of science quite confirm his posi
33
tion. Physicists generally are by no means
disposed to allow that, because in our
laboratories a certain quantity of the heat
force cannot be reconverted, we may
jump to a cosmic conclusion on the
matter. Mr. Mallock admits that many
physicists reject it altogether, “ but
since others equally eminent maintain
that there is no escape from it—so far at
least as our present knowledge extends
—it is necessary to consider how it may
bear on the point at issue.”
The
parenthetic clause contains the essential
weakness of the theory. It assumes an
acquaintance with cosmic processes
which science is very far from possessing.
Sir O. Lodge deals with the point
incidentally in his recent Romanes
Lecture. “ So long,” he says, “ as there
is only a force of one sign at work it
would seem that ultimately the regenera
tive process must come to an end. The
repellent force exerted by light upon
small particles, however, must not be
forgotten ; and there are other possibili
ties.”
These possibilities have been
emphasised by the most recent discoveries
in physics, in connection with radio
action, so that Haeckel was more than
justified in declining to accept the hasty
and unwarranted conclusions of the
entropists.
Sir O. Lodge suggests an analogous
theory with regard to matter—a kind of
entropy of matter—but he suggests only
to reject it. He and many distinguished
physicists see in the phenomena of
radium, which have so greatly agitated
the world of physicists of late, an actual
breakdown of the atom. Electrons (units
of electricity) are detached from matter
at an electrode, and it is believed that
these electrons are really “ bits chipped
off” the .Acr'0 It is a “reasonable
hypothesis ” that an atom of ponderable
matter is made up of these electrons.
An atom of hydrogen is something like
the hundred-millionth of a centimetre in
diameter; yet an electron has only about
one-thousandth the mass of an atom of
hydrogen.
It is calculated that 700
electrons would go to make the hydrogen
c
�34
THE EVOLUTION OF THE INORGANIC WORLD
atom, 11,200 to make the atom of oxy
gen, and so on with the other elements.
Not that these electrons are to be pic
tured as locked in each other’s embraces
to form a solid atom. If the atom were
magnified to the size of the Sheldonian
Theatre, its constituent electrons would
be “ like full-stops flying about the
room.” They occupy the atom by their
forceful activity, not by bulk. These
electrons are thought to be the ultimate
units of which the atoms of ponderable
elements are built—though no doubt Sir
Oliver would allow that there remains
the question of the formation of these
electrons themselves from a continuous
medium.
But the most curious fact
is that in the experiments on radium
the atoms seem to disintegrate and give
rise to other forms of matter, which break
up in their turn. This seems to point to
a dissipation of matter into electrons cor
responding to the dissipation of force into
heat. But Sir O. Lodge reminds us at
once of the impropriety of founding such
large cosmic theories on our laboratory
experiments. ‘'‘There may be regenera
tion as well as degeneration,” he urges,
and he points to the analogy of the
collision of stars.1 Theoretical physics
is making rapid pace to-day—too rapid,
some physicists say. But the whole of
its recent discoveries and speculations go
to confirm those physical theorems which
Professor Haeckel took from the physics
of the time when he wrote (1890-5), and
built into the structure of his system—viz., the unity of matter and force, the
indestructibility of matter and conserva
tion of energy, and the evolution of the
ponderable out of imponderable matter
and its natural aggregation, by gravita
tion, into nebulae and solar systems.
Monism can easily acccrr.modace itself to
any rectifications of the details of these
theorems.
1 On the whole question see the Romanes
Lecture for 1903—which recalls the brilliant
expository work of Professor Tyndall—and the
proceedings of the Physical and Mathematical
Section at the meeting of the British Association,
September, 1903.
We are thus made acquainted with the
second great law of the universal matter
force reality—evolution. Avoiding meta
physical and abstract formulas, and keep
ing as closely as possible to the facts of
science, we learn from the study of in
animate nature that the life of this
great reality stretches as far behind and
before us in time as its substance
stretches over the abysses of space. We
find it in a condition of orderly and con
tinuous development. Chronologically,
we cannot reach back to any stage of the
process where we discover a continuous
and homogeneous form of matter and
force diffused through space.
But phy
sical analysis brings us almost within
sight of such a “ prothyl ” (first-matter)
and of the connecting link between
ponderable and imponderable matter.
If we can to-day witness the disintegra
tion of the atom, we are completely
justified in forming theories of its inte
gration ; and the theories find strong
empirical confirmation in the astro-phy
sical observations. We can trace the
upward growth of our “ prothyl ” into
the familiar chemical elements with their
immense variety of properties—and it
may be noted, in face of the recru
descence of old metaphysical theories
as to these new properties, that the new
elements (formed in radio-action, for
instance) sometimes only acquire their
distinctive qualities with very sensible
gradations. The titanic forces of the
universe—already differentiated into
heat, electricity, gravitation, &c.—mould
the new-formed matter into meteorites,
nebulae, stars, and solar systems. Man
looks about him on a vast and restless
ocean of being, on the surface of which
the life of his whole race is no more
than a momentary bubble.
There are two points to be considered
before we follow Dr. Haeckel into the
more contentious field of biological evo
lution in which he possesses an almost
unique authority.
We have to meet
the charge that Haeckel tries to bully
and depress us with the magnitude of
this “ cosmological perspective,” and we
�THE EVOLUTION OF THE INORGANIC WORLD
must see how far his opponents accept
this teaching of modern science. Mr.
Ballard declares that this “ latest pseudo
gospel from Jena is as miserably be
littling and depressing as it is intellec
tually invalid and practically unwork
able.” A^critic in the Daily Chronicle
expresses the same sentiment (as to
depression), and it has been repeated
by many of the reviewers. There is an
excellent English proverb about the
proof of a pudding which might have
saved these writers if they had heeded
it. Haeckel himself is by no means
depressed by his “ cosmological perspec
tive,” if he is saddened at times by the
slow progress of truth. No Rationalist
is ever heard to complain of or to betray
the faintest depression at his position.
Sometimes, indeed, with that marvellous
alacrity of his, the theologian flies to
the other extreme, and says the Ration
alist must infallibly come to the practical
conclusion to eat and drink and be
merry. It is curious that we, who are
credited at times with making too much
use of reason, should be held to make
so little use of it in the ordering of our
lives. Quite certainly one effect of this
perception of our infinite littleness in
the universe at large, with its yawning
cosmic sepulchres on every side, is to
make us eager to enjoy our present life.
Quite certainly we say to ourselves, in
the words of Omar,
“ Ah ! make the most of what we yet may spend
Before we too into the dust descend.
Dust into dust, and under dust to lie,
Sans wine, sans song, sans singer, and sans
end.”
«Ve have not the remotest idea of
being depressed or bullied by the im
mensity of the universe or its sepulchral
aspect. That would be folly, not ra
tionalism. Moreover, it would be equal
folly to plunge into those sensual depths
which are so strangely said to be the
alternative to depression. Life is too
precious a thing to be squandered on
every impulse. Its potentialities must
be reasoned out. The promise and the
35
prospect of developing its higher gifts
must be pondered. Science, art, litera
ture, social and political activity, refined
intercourse, and sweet homes—those are
the most precious gifts life offers to us.
We are rationalistic enough to prefer the
higher to the lower, to prefer gladness to
depression.
The objection is, in fact, a purely
captious one. Haeckel’s belittlement of
man is relative. It aims at discrediting
the traditional and arrogant doctrine of
man’s uniqueness, which has done so
much to obstruct the advance of truth
in the nineteenth century. Even if it
were depressing to learn that we are not
compacted of a special material, and that
the universe is not a toy-theatre for us to
play our parts on before the angels, we
should welcome the truth and speak it.
The code of morals that consults our
likes and dislikes does not find favour
amongst Rationalists. But depressing
the truth certainly is not; and it is only
belittling in a narrow, comparative sense.
One of Haeckel’s critics proceeds to
show that, “ if we look at evolution from
above downwards, man is still the chief
thing in the universe.” With a passing
reminder that we do not know the whole
of evolution—we do not know what the
process may have produced in other
planets—we need only say that here is,
of course, another aspect of the question.
But to suppose that it has been over
looked, and that the belittlement is other
than comparative, is quite gratuitous.
The last point we have to deal with
here is: What is the attitude of the
opponents of Monism on the teaching
we have seen thus far ? As far as the
inorganic universe is concerned, they
accept the teaching of science, and are
usually content to add to it a theistic
supplement. They generally deny, as
we saw, the infinity and eternity of the
universe; and we have discussed the
grounds of their denial. The more
impetuous and less informed of them
have some vague notion of rendering
service to religion by criticising (for the
edification of their followers) every
�36
*
THE EVOLUTION OF THE INORGANIC WORLD
advance of scientific theory. Even Dr.
Dallinger protests that the nebular
hypothesis is not “an undisputed and
established fact of modern science.”
Others, like Mr. Ballard, recommend the
study of sceptical writers like Stallo.
All these petty criticisms might profitably
be left out of religious controversy.
They tend to no conclusion now. There
was a time when theistic evidence meant
the detection of gaps in the scientific
view of the world, and a rush to fill up the
gap with supernatural action. It is be
ginning to dawn on the more enlightened
of our theists that this is weak in logic,
and dangerous in practice. Who could
number the gaps they have occupied
during the last two centuries—and
deserted ? They are beginning to see
at length—what they were begged to
consider from the beginning—that a gap
in scientific construction may only mean
our temporary (or even permanent)
ignorance, and does not necessarily
imply a real breach or defect in the
action of natural agencies. We shall
see more of this later. Meantime Mr.
Mallock says: “ If we compare the
evidences in favour of the monistic
doctrine generally with the objections
urged by religious dualists against it, the
great difference between the two is this :
that whilst the objections of the latter
are isolated, disconnected, casual, the ex
isting evidences of the former cohere and
dovetail into one another like numbered
stones designed for some vast edifice:
and whilst the missing evidences of the
monist are one by one being found, the
objections of the dualists are in daily
process of being discredited.” 1 Hence,
he says, “ educated apologists of all
schools accept evolution to-day,” and he
quotes Professor Ward as saying that, if
there has been any interference in the
cosmic process, it “ took place before the
process began, not during it.” And
Professor Le Conte, whom Mr. Ballard
recommends us to read, and who accepts
evolution from the atom to the human
mind, says: “ Evolution is no longer a
school of thought. The words evolu
tionism and evolutionist ought not any
longer to be used, any more than
gravitcitionism or grcivitationist; for the
law of evolution is as certain as the law
of gravitation.” 1
So theistic writers are beginning to
repudiate the theology of gaps. “ How
slow of spirit we have been to learn
that the Divine Spirit does not work
through gaps,” says Mr. Newman Smyth.2
Already we see a tendency to prove on
theological principles that the world
must have been evolved, from the
primary matter (and there is a disposition
to let this be eternal) up to the human
mind j that evolution is the one divine
process, and that the old idea of succes
sive interferences in the work is too
undignified altogether. This language
will be heard from every village pulpit in
fifty years’ time. We need not be spite
ful about it; but, on the other hand,
these advanced theologians, who know
it, might understand the irony and
humour of a great scientist who has
lived through the struggles of the last
fifty years. At present the spectacle we
witness is not unlike that of the competi
tors in a walking-match. In front are
a few laymen like Professor Le Conte
and Mr. Fiske (who have nearly
dropped their theism for greater lightness
on the way). Mr. Rhondda Williams
and Mr. Newman Smyth are not far
behind. Canon Aubrey Moore and Dr.
W. N. Clarke would be well in the
running if they were still here. Mr.
Ballard, who thinks “ Christian thinkers
have every reason for accepting evolution
as the general method of world-growth ”
(but makes a tremendous pother when
it comes to the evolution of life), and
Dr. Iverach, who is not anxious to
quarrel with evolutionary terms “ except
in so far as they become the symbols of a
mechanical evolution ” (but
raise much
dust as he goes along), are at a third
stage. Mr. Ambrose Pope, who thinks
*• Religion as a Credible Doctrine., p. 78.
1 Evolution and Religious Thought, p. 66.
2 Through Science to Faith, p. 20.
�THE EVOLUTION OF THE INORGANIC WORLD
“ the theory of evolution is a scientific
hypothesis, true only in the sense that it
explains all the facts to hand at present,
true in exactly the same sense in which
the theory of creation, as found
in Genesis, was at the time it was
written,” comes a bad fourth—in line,
however, with the average “ cultured ”
preacher and the leader-writers and
reviewers of the Tablet, Guardian, and
Church Times.
Then we have a
straggling line of Christian Evidence
Lecturers, tract-writers, preachers, and
leader-writers in the Methodist Luminary,
&c.; ending in bunches of suburban
curates and rural vicars, who are still
handicapped with heavy old copies of
the Bible.
All this puts a peculiar difficulty in
the way of the Rationalist. If he
attacks the attitude of the advanced
minority, Christianity at large repudiates
his criticism; if he tilts at the con
ventional beliefs, the little band of the
intellectuals use excited
language.
There is hardly a single question on
which we have anything like a solid
front to meet. This will be clearer as
we proceed. As regards the inorganic
universe, we may say that no Christian
scholar of any serious influence ques
tions its unity, its actual constancy (or
its first law—the law of substance), or
its formation by gradual development
(its second law—the law of evolution)
from a primitive matter. They rest their
dualism, as far as visible nature is con
cerned, on (i) the need for a creator of
matter and force, and (2) the need for a
directive intelligence. With the first
point—or with its groundwork—we have
already dealt, and will deal again in the
chapter on God. The second point
must be very clearly grasped. It is the
last conceivable quasi-scientific argu
ment for the existence of God. It will
confront us throughout the next three
chapters, and it will before long be the
only argument of “physical theology.”
In its general formula it runs:
Although science can assign the efficient
or physical causes of the complex
37
phenomena about us, it cannot say why
they produced just these phenomena and
not different ones ; and the more clearly
science shows that an elaborate pheno
menon—say, thought, or life—is only
the outcome of a long and intricate
evolutionary process, the more pressing
is the need to admit that the evolutionary
agencies were guided and controlled by
intelligence from the first. The argu
ment is not a new one, of course, but the
best-informed theistic apologists are
warning their colleagues to fall back on
it at once, and to abandon the defence
of temporary gaps and petty criticisms
of science. “We are not,” says Dr.
Iverach (though he will forget it later),
“of those who are constantly looking
about for imperfections in a mechanical
or other theory in order to find a chink
through which the theistic argument
may enter. If that were our position,
the argument for theism would soon be
a fugitive and a vagabond on the face of
the earth; each advance of science, each
discovery of law, would simply drive the
theistic argument to find a new refuge.” 1
So Mr. Newman Smyth says : “ The
assurance of faith cannot be maintained
from a fortified critical position outside
the province
of the evolutionary
science.” And
Mr.
R.
Williams
declares : “ I do not worship a God
who only fills gaps, nor hold a religion
whose validity depends on missing
links.” Teleology is the word. The
scientist will show you everywhere
certain forces co-operating to produce
certain complex results. Point out that
these “ blind ” erratic forces must have
been guided in their co-operation,
especially if the result is beautiful [or
orderly or beneficial or admirably adapted
to produce a certain further result.
The advantage of “ the new teleology ”
1 Christianity and Evolution, p. 26. Observe
the excellent description of what the theistic
argument has been for some time and the naive
proposal of this as a mere contingency. We
shall find, too, that the old Adam is still strong in
Dr. Iverach, and he is still keen on gaps in
practice.
Bishopsgate Institute*
�38
THE EVOLUTION OF THE INORGANIC WORLD
—which is the “old teleology” re
enamelled—is obvious. Science may
now strain its mechanical causes as it
pleases to explain the origin of life and
consciousness. The more stupendous
the results it claims for physical agencies,
the clearer will it be that there were
design, guidance, and control. More
over, the argument comes into play from
the very first step that evolutionary
science takes. The best illustrations of
its application will be found in Dr.
Iverach and Mr. Profeit.1 They follow
step by step the teaching of physics and
chemistry, and pause at the end of each
paragraph to admire the wisdom of the
creator with Paleyesque devotion. Be
hold the primitive matter mould itself
into electrons and atoms. Whence did
it get the power? How came a blind
force to put together the electrons in
such an orderly series of atoms with such
wonderful chemical adaptations to each
other? Behold the ponderable matter
grow into nebulae and solar systems.
Who distributed the elements so nicely
amongst the various nebulae ? Who
distributed the elements
the nebula,
and broke off the whirling rings at the
proper moment, and set the planets
going at the requisite speed, that a
system of perfect order resulted, and
was found to be just suited for the
sustenance of life ?
Now let us be perfectly clear. This
argument is to be the great reply to
Haeckel, and it will recur all through.
It thinks it differs from the old Paleyism
in this : it can grant science the power,
either now or in the future, to give a
complete explanation on physical lines of
the up-building of an atom or a world.
1 The Creation of Matter. Mr. Ballard tells
us this may count as a reply to the Riddle. It
has been published since the Riddle, but does
not seem to mention Haeckel’s book.
As it says, science may explain how
these things were done. It adds that
every thoughtful man must ask also
why—why the process took place at all,
and why it took this particular line, with
such a lucky termination for us, rather
than any one of a thousand others.
They say: Let Haeckel explain the
whole world-growth on mechanical
principles, from the formation of the
first atoms of hydrogen to the solidifica
tion of the last planet. That only tells
how natural forces built up the world :
we want to know why. So we can
allow the naturalist or mechanical view
to be complete in itself, yet leaving full
room for us. ■
In order to avoid the repetitions and
the confusion which this design
argument leads to, I propose to take the
hint offered and keep quite separate the
questions how the world was made and
why it was so made. In this and the
following three chapters we shall see
how the world was made ; in the seventh
chapter we shall discuss the teleological
argument in its principle. We shall see
that the theistic evolutionists are by no
means prepared in practice to allow that
science can explain how all things were
made, or to assign adequate efficient
causes
for
the
more
complex
phenomena. The first line of defence
had better hold as long as it can, in
case the second should be not quite
impregnable. As to inorganic nature,
however, there is no serious hesitation.
The inherent or native qualities of the
matter-force reality (I am not shirking,
but deferring, the question why it has
these qualities at all) are generally
admitted to be the adequate efficient
explanation of the formation of atoms
and stars. The first serious challenge
rings out when we come to the frontiers
of living nature.
�THE ORIGIN OF LIFE
39
Chapter IV
THE ORIGIN OF LIFE
No sooner do we pass from the con
sideration of inorganic nature to a
discussion of the origin of life than we
encounter in a severe form the per
plexity I have previously indicated. Do
theists or dualists deny that Haeckel
may legitimately extend the monistic
interpretation to the problem of life ?
At once we have to deal with a straggling
line of contradictory thinkers, instead of
the fairly solid front which we desire
to face.
A large number of the
authorities recommended to us as cor
rectives of Haeckel’s philosophy entirely
agree with him in his theory of the
spontaneous generation of life, and are
content to add, as before, the teleo
logical consideration. A large number
severely criticise his position—and
therefore that of their own advanced
colleagues—even from the point of view
of physical or efficient causation ; and
there is every grade of vacillation
between the two.
It will be interest
ing to see first how far the doctrine
of the first appearance of life by
abiogenesis is accepted by theistic
writers,
It is well known that Dr. Mivart
defended the doctrine with great ability
for the twenty years preceding his death.
To-day Father Zahm and other Catholic
scientists are no less willing to admit it.
That Professor Le Conte and Mr. Fiske
accept it goes without saying. Dr. W.
N. Clarke is disposed to grant it:
“Life, when its time came, may have
come in by direct creation; so may
human life or the life of other species;
or the whole process of unfolding may
have been continuous, impelled by only
one kind of divine movement from first
to last. Whether God has performed
specific acts of creation from time to
time is a question for evidence, which
lies outside the field of theology.”1
Mr. Newman Smyth admits that it is now
irresistible: “ While the fact is now
universally admitted that non-living
matter cannot now be organised into a
living form except through the prior
agency of life, on the other hand the
momentum of all our scientific know
ledge of the continuities of nature leads
modern biology to the assumption that
the organic substance at some time has
been raised and quickened from the
deadness of the inorganic world.” 2 Mr.
Profeit also is willing to admit the
evolution of protoplasm, though only
“as the result of working intelligence.” 3
Dr. Iverach, who is also anxious to
stress the teleological aspect, never
theless admits that life was “ implicit in
the whole ”; though we shall find him
raising superfluous difficulties later.
Thus in his allegation of the fact that
life was evolved out of non-life Professor
Haeckel finds himself in quite respect
able company. The sonorous philo
sopher of one of our dramatic and
sporting papers (the Referee} delivered
himself as follows some months ago
(March ist, 1903): “At the very
threshold of this great theme we
encounter the eternal question as to
how life began at all, and here the
scientist cannot help us.” It would be
1 Outlines of Christian Theology, p. 132.
2 Through Science to Faith, p. 17.
3 The Creation of Matter, p. 96 ; his proviso
is, of course, shared by all these evolutionists.
We are for the present concerned only with
efficient causation. When Mr. Profeit goes on
to tell us that when protoplasm appeared “the
stars clapped their hands for joy,” we can hear
the rustle of his surplice. The evolution must
have taken millennia, if not millions of years.
There was no psychological moment for applause.
�40
THE ORIGIN OF LIFE
interesting, and not a little enlighten
ing, for “Merlin” to investigate this—
under the circumstances—remarkable
phenomenon of a group of ardent
religious apologists subscribing to the
doctrine of abiogenesis. But “ Merlin ”
might quote a number of scientific men
(of ecclesiastical standing) who make
the same affirmation in yet stronger
language, and who denounce Haeckel
with some vigour for representing
abiogenesis as a scientific theorem.
There is Dr. Horton, the admirer of
Vogt and Buchner, who assures us
that “ no leading man of science treats
it [Haeckel’s theory of the origin of life]
seriously.” But the leading opponent
is Mr. Ballard, and we will treat his
criticism at respectful length. It will
lead us, sooner or later, into the heart
of the difficulty.
It will be remembered that in his
attack in the British Weekly, in which
he emulates the spirited Dr. Loofs in
literary manner, he devotes the bulk
of his articles (about twelve columns
out of thirteen) to preliminary obser
vations, and then turns, “ for sheer relief,”
to criticise Haeckel from the scientific
point of view. I will strike off super
fluous errors as I go along, and deal with
the essence of his objection afterwards.
“To begin with,” he says, “its funda
mental thesis is utterly unscientific, viz.,
the assumption of the actuality of spon
taneous generation.” To begin with, I
may repeat, this sentence contains three
grave and essential misrepresentations.
Spontaneous generation is very far from
being the “fundamental thesis ” (or the
“fundamental axiom” and “crucial
proof ” he elsewhere calls it) of the
Riddle, or of Haeckel’s system ; it is not
an “assumption,” but a serious conclu
sion ; and Haeckel does not claim that
spontaneous generation takes place to
day. It is preposterous to suppose that
Haeckel’s fundamental thesis should be
one that many Christian scholars accept,
and the reader will already understand
that, though it is necessarily involved in
Monism, it is no more “ fundamental ”
than ten other propositions. But Mr.
Ballard proceeds to make good his state
ment. He says Haeckel “frankly ac
knowledges that spontaneous generation
is ‘ an indispensable thesis in any natural
theory of evolution. I entirely agree
with the assertion that to reject abio
genesis is to admit a miracle.’ ” “ An,”
one may observe, is different from “the,”
and “ indispensable ” from “ fundamen-'
tai ” ; but that is a comparative trifle. No
page is given, but if you do look up the
passage (page 91) you find that Haeckel
is saying that Professor Naegeli represents
it as “an indispensable thesis,” and that
“the assertion” should be “his asser
tion.” It would not do, I suppose, to
let readers of the British Weekly know
that Haeckel does not stand alone, so
the quotation is manipulated. More
over, the phrase, “to reject abiogenesis
is to admit a miracle,” is quoted by
Haeckel from Naegeli, but the quotation
marks are omitted by Mr. Ballard. The
reader may judge if the fact of Haeckel’s
agreeing with Naegeli justifies this. I
know that Mr. Ballard quotes the passage
fairly in his Miracles of Unbelief My
second point, that it is not an “assump
tion,” will be clear when I come to resume
the evidence for it. The third point is
that if Mr. Ballard uses “actuality” in
the ordinary sense of the word, as the
ordinary reader will suppose, he gravely
misstates Haeckel’s position. That he
does imply that Haeckel claims spon
taneous generation to be “ actually ”
occurring is clear from his appeal to
those scientists (Tyndall, Pasteur, &c.)
who disprove no more than this. As a
fact Haeckel says (p. 91) : “ I restrict the
idea of spontaneous generation—also
called abiogenesis or archigony—to the
first development of living protoplasm
out of inorganic carbonates.” Further,
Haeckel refers the reader to his earlier
work for details, and Mr. Ballard himself
quotes therefrom that Haeckel only offers
the doctrine as “a pure hypothesis”
without experimental support.
Haeckel’s position is, then, properly
stated, that we have no evidence that
�THE ORIGIN OF LIFE
living things now arise by spontaneous
generation; that the monistic view of
the universe, which other scientific
evidence commends, requires the birth
of living things from non-living in the
beginning; that he finds no peculiar
qualities in the vital force which forbid
the extension of the law of evolution to
it; and that he therefore sketches a
purely hypothetical suggestion of the
mode of transition on broad lines. A
really careful and impartial inquirer
would see that the essential part of this
position, from the logical point of view,
is the third part of it—the conviction
that there is no peculiar feature of the
vital force which forbids us to assume
its evolution. Evolution is a known
law of the cosmos—or “ the general
method of world-growth,” as Mr.
Ballard says. We apply it until we are
pulled up by some phenomenon of a
specific nature that seems impossible to
have been evolved. But Mr. Ballard
utterly disregards this chief strength of
Haeckel’s position (supported by the
whole of this chapter of the Riddle),
proceeds to flourish weapons which do
not reach that position at all, and con
cludes that Haeckel is “ utterly without
scientific warrant,” or, as he has previously
said, he “ sets at defiance the latest and
most exact findings of science, and cuts
the Gordian knot by sheer assertion of
that which is essential to his hypothesis,
but is itself undemonstrated, and, we
may venture to add, on good authority,
undemonstrable.” His procedure is
so typical of the usual confused dis
cussion of the subject that we may
follow him to the end.
After saying that Haeckel offers no
proof—which we will discuss presently—
he goes on to overwhelm him with the
“ conclusions of experts.” G Between
the inorganic and the organic, there is,
according to all the facts now known
and the consensus of modern science
concerning them, a stage in which, to
quote Mr. Wallace, ‘ some new cause or
power must necessarily have come into
action.’ ” We are defending a gap after
4i
all, you see; though Mr. Ballard says it
is not essential to do so. Further, it is
not only “utterly without scientific
warrant,” but “ emphatically ” contra
dicted by “the conclusions of such
experts as Tyndall, Pasteur, Drysdale,
Dallinger, Roscoe, Kelvin, Beale, &c. ” ;
and “for modern science, speaking
generally and carefully, spontaneous
generation is as dead as Huxley’s
Bathybius.” One’s mind goes back
involuntarily to those clerical spontane
ous generationists and the horrible
levity with which they have deserted the
gap. The truth is, as those who know
anything of the controversy will have
seen long ago, Mr. Ballard is throwing
dust. He knows perfectly well that the
only point on which scientists are
agreed—and Haeckel is quite with them
—is that abiogenesis does not take place
to-day; that is a thesis which Haeckel
has explicitly disavowed. The experi
ments of Pasteur never purported to
prove anything else, and never could.
His favourite Professor Beale admits his
own solitude : “ Physicists and chemists
look forward with confidence ” to further
experiments, and “think to acquire a
knowledge of the manner in which the
first particle of living matter originated.”1
He cannot quote a single biologist to
say that his science is against Haeckel’s
“ hypothesis ” of abiogenesis in the past.
I will presently quote more than one in
favour of it, in the sense of endorsing
Haeckel’s most important point—that
there is no essential difference between
vital force and non-vital force. He, a
bachelor of science, has blurred the
distinction between actual abiogenesis
and archigony, which is essential, and
which has been pointed out for twenty
years by men of science. And this is
the culmination of his attack on Dr.
Haeckel, and, I suppose, the chief justi
fication for the gross epithets he has
showered on one of the most venerable
figures in the scientific world.
Mr. Mallock says : “ It was formerly
1 Vitality, p. 7.
D
�42
THE ORIGIN OF LIFE
supposed that they [life and manj were Mr. Ballard and others so confusedly
produced by isolated creative acts; but represent as opposed to Haeckel.
we now know that they are the results of Science draws no inference, and logic
an orderly process of evolution. The can draw no inference, with regard to the
theist of to-day admits this as fully as primeval origin of life from this negative
anybody.” Unfortunately, we see that evidence. This has been pointed out
there are theists, who are held to be men time after time, as it was by Sir W.
of scientific culture and liberality, who do Turner in his Presidential Address in
not admit it, and we must discuss the 1900.
subject patiently. This is largely the
Haeckel’s second point (in my analysis
result of people like Mr. Ballard, in their of his position) is that we have ample
eagerness to draw up a long list of reason to regard evolution as a law of
“ sound ” literature, recommending all substance, or a law of nature. We
kinds of antiquated works. For instance, have seen how completely scientific
one of the authors he urges us to read this thesis is.
“ Evolution,” said
on this question, “ Principal Chapman,” Canon A. L. Moore, sixteen years ago,
assures his readers that Buchner and “may fairly claim to be an established
Haeckel assert “life now can be repro doctrine.”1 And we have quoted the
duced out of inorganic conditions,” and Rev. Newman Smyth’s opinion that “ the
attacks the “asserted possibility of arti momentum of all our scientific know
ficially producing organic compounds” ledge of the continuities of nature leads
—which are produced artificially by the modern biology to the assumption that
score to-day ; whilst his general culture the organic substance at some time has
may be measured by his giving the been raised and quickened from the
motto of the Buchner school as : “ Ohne deadness of the inorganic world.” As a
Phosphor ohne Gedank.” This does matter of scientific procedure, then, we
not tend to the advancement of truth. are bound to assume that life arose by
Let us have a clear idea what the real evolution until it has been proved that
position of Haeckel’s theory is in the vital force is something specifically
science.
distinct from physical force, and could
I have stated it in four theses, and not have been derived from it. That is
will deal with these separately. In the both the scientific and the logical way of
first place, scientists of all schools are looking at the question. The scientist
agreed that we do not know a single case does not depart from his ordinary
of abiogenesis taking place to-day. methods without grave reason; nor does
Curiously enough, religious philosophers nature. Nature evolves, wherever evolu
in the Middle Ages believed that any tion is not impossible. The really im
number of highly organised forms of life portant point is, then, this question
(such as bees) were produced daily by whether there is something so peculiar
spontaneous generation. It was science about vital force that we cannot suppose
that first opposed them. However, a it to have been evolved; and we find
few decades ago a group of materialistic accordingly that Haeckel devotes several
scientists made a stand for abiogenesis as pages to the point. I will not repeat,
an actual occurrence, and there was a but only supplement these from other
fierce controversy. It was a purely scientists; though, as we will discuss the
scientific quarrel, Tyndall opposing them question of the nature of life more fully
as firmly as the semi-vitalist Pasteur. It later (in the chapter on Lord Kelvin’s
was abundantly proved that no living intervention), I will not say more than is
thing we are acquainted with to-day is necessary for our purpose here.
developed without living parentage.
This is that “ teaching of science ” (to
1 Science and the Faith, p. 162: one of the
which Haeckel fully subscribes) which works Mr. Ballard recommends to us.
�THE ORIGIN OF LIFE
Let me begin by quoting this admir
able warning to those who affirm that
nature could not have evolved life with
out a divine interference : “ In spite of all
present-day scientific generalisations, and
these based on the widest inductions
possible to us, we have no warrant what
ever for the assumption that the possi
bilities of the universe end where our
human apprehension of nature has
reached its ne plus ultra! Does Mr.
Ballard recognise the words ? They are
taken from his own preface to his
Miracles of Unbelief. A theistic phi
losopher, Professor J. Ward, also says:
“ Of the origin of life, if it ever did
originate, we have absolutely no know
ledge. But, on the one hand, there is
no definite limit to the possible com
plexity of mechanical processes, nor any
definite limit on the other, to the possible
simplicity of life.”1 These are timely
warnings to the theist not to build on
gaps in biology. Yet Dr. Horton tells
his trustful congregation that science has
“ not discovered what is that vast bridge
which spans the regions which, to the
eye, appear so near.” And a reviewer in
the Church of England Pulpit says the
gap between the living and the non-living
is “now wider than ever.” If you seek
the authority for these assertions, you are
generally met with a reference to Pro
fessor Lionel Beale. Now, Prof. Beale
is an able scientist and original worker,
and we will examine his claims about
protoplasm in a later chapter. Mean
time, we may recall that it was he who
so pathetically protested in the agony
column of the Times that Haeckel’s as
severations in this chapter were not in
accord with the teaching of science, and
later referred the anxious world to his
little work on Vitality. Now, when we
peruse Vitality we are given to under
stand almost from first page to last that
1 Naturalism and Agnosticism, ii, 262. Pro
fessor Ward, therefore, assumes life was evolved.
The Words, “if it ever did originate,” must be
understood in the idealist sense ; and the em
phatic denial of knowledge is grounded rather
confusedly on the Pasteur experiments.
43
Professor Beale is nearly contra mundum.
“ It must be admitted,” he says (p. v),
“ that few scientific men are quite satis
fied that vital phenomena may not yet
be otherwise explained ”; and we have
already quoted his admission (p. 7) that
“ physicists and chemists ” look forward
to a mechanical explanation of the origin
of life.
And in point of fact one can quote a
string of the ablest authorities against the
claim that vital force has so specific a
character that it could not have been
evolved. Says the theistic (or pantheistic)
evolutionist, Professor Le Conte, one of
Mr. Ballard’s chief authorities: “ Vital
forces are also transmutable into and
derivable from physical and chemical
forces . . . Vital force may now be re
garded as so much force withdrawn from
the general fund of chemical and physi
cal forces ... If vital force falls into the
same category as other natural forces,
there is no reason why living forms
should not fall into the same category in
this regard as other natural forms.”1
Says Professor J. Ward, another of Mr.
Ballard’s authorities : “ The old theory of
a special vital force, according to which
physiological processes were at the most
analogous to—not identical with—•
physical processes, has for the most part
been abandoned as superfluous. Step
by step within the last fifty years the
identity of the two processes has been
so far established that an eminent
physiologist does not hesitate to say
‘that for the future the word vital, as
distinctive of physiological processes,
might be abandoned altogether.’ ” 2 The
“ eminent physiologist ” is Sir J.
Burdon Sanderson, another able author
ity. In the article on zoology in the
Encyclopcedia Britannica, Professor Ray
Lankester says : “ It is the aim or busi1 Evolution and Religious Thought, p. 36.
2 Naturalism and Agnosticism, ii, p. 9. Ward
and Le Conte, while admitting the mechanical
theory as the explanation of “ efficient ” causa
tion, claim the action of a guiding intelligence.
That is a point we have reserved, and it does
not affect the present question.
�44
THE ORIGIN OF LIFE
ness of those occupied with biology to
assign living things, in all their variety
of form and activity, to the one set of
forces recognised by the physicist and
the chemist,” On the physical side Sir
A. Rucker, in his presidential speech of
1901, spoke of the recent rise of Neo
Vitalism as merely the result of “some
outstanding difficulties ” in biology, and
he protested that “the action of physical
and chemical forces in living bodies can
never be understood, if at every diffi
culty and at every check in our investi
gations we desist from further attempts
in the belief that the laws of physics
and chemistry have been interfered with
by an incomprehensible vital force.” His
successor in the presidential chair also
protested that science was “ not debarred
from speculating on the mode in which
life may have originated,” and he quoted
this splendid expression from Lord
Kelvin’s (then Sir W. Thomson) presi
dential speech in 1871: “Science is
bound, by the everlasting law of honour,
to face fearlessly every problem which
can fairly be presented to it.
If a
probable solution, consistent with the
ordinary course of nature, can be found,
we must not invoke an act of Creative
Power.” And, finally, when Lord Kelvin
recently declared that he understood
biologists were coming again to entertain
the notion of a specific vital force, he
was, as we shall see (or the reader may
see now in Chap. XI.), emphatically
contradicted by the representative biolo
gists of this country.
The authority of Dr. Haeckel himself
on this point is paramount.
He has
made a life-long study of it. But I have
shown that his conclusion is in accord
with the general scientific attitude to-day,
and that he is not giving us the “ science
of yesterday,” as the dilettanti of the
Pall Mall Gazette express it. I will
only add here a few further considera
tions that tend to make clearer the ques
tion of the primitive origin of life, and
will reserve the discussion of Neo-Vitalism until we come to deal with Lord
Kelvin and his critics.
It is a matter of some importance to
remember that we do not know the nature
of the earliest organisms. Living things
had to proceed very far in their develop
ment before it was possible for their
remains to be fossilised and preserved.
Palaeontology can give us no aid what
ever. It is generally assumed that the
monera and such simple forms—mere
tiny globules of protoplasm—were the
earliest in point of time. That they
must have been the earliest of existing
forms is obvious, but, as Professor Ward
suggests, it is conceivable that there were
many simpler forms of life before the
moneron. We had to wait for the
microscope to discover the protists. We
may make other discoveries yet; or there
may have been earlier forms too un
stable to persist. These are “ may be’s,”
but remember Lord Kelvin’s advice that
we must exhaust the possibilities of
nature before we invoke “ an abnormal
act of Creative Power.” Canon Aubrey
Moore said long ago in connection with
the evolution of species : “ In this pro
cess of evolution there are things which
puzzle us, though it would be quite true
to say there is nothing half so puzzling
as there was, if we had only thought
more about it, in the old theory of
special creation.” .That is peculiarly
applicable to the question of the origin
of life. The notion of a “ creative
act ”—the notion that, at the mere ex
pression of a wish on the part of some
infinite being, particles of “ dead ”
matter scrape themselves together with
out any physical impulse, and, though
they are incompetent to see the design
they are to execute or the end of their
individual movements, build themselves
up into the intricate structure of living
protoplasm—is a perfect world of mys
teries, instead of being an “explana
tion.” We can only have recourse to it
when every conceivable effort has been
made to explain the phenomenon by
the physical impulsion of the atoms by
natural forces and by a very slow and
gradual development; and science, we
saw, is by no means inclined to admit
�THE ORIGIN OF LIFE
that its possibilities have been exhausted
yet.
But if we cannot get any nearer to the
origin on the biological side, it may be
possible to do something on the chemical
side; and from this side, in point of
fact, the “gulf,” as preachers call it
(compare Huxley’s article on Biology in
the Encyclopedia, Britannica}, between
the organic and the inorganic is being
bridged. If you take down one of the
apologetic works of the last generation
(even some of those Mr. Ballard recom
mends to-day), you will find that the
writers lay great stress on the inability of
the chemist to produce artificially certain
compound substances which were then
only made by the living organism. To
day a large number of these are produced
by the chemist in his laboratory. This
branch of chemistry is advancing every
year, and last year was able to announce
the artificial synthesis of so complex an
organic substance as albumen. The
“gulf” is narrowing; it is very far from
being “wider than ever.” Dr. Iverach,
one of those hesitating teachers who are
continually criticising scientific results
with some vague notion of serving
religion, says these chemists only “ac
complish at great cost and labour and
with many appliances what life is doing
easily every moment.” Very true ; but,
pray, how long was nature in fitting up
her laboratory and making her appli
ances ? Possibly millions of years in
making the protoplasm of the first
moneron; certainly many millions of
years in evolving those higher organisms
which the scientist is set to emulate.
One does not see what liberal-minded
and scientific men gain by strewing the
path with little obstacles of this kind.
There are other writers who say che
mistry may produce organic substances
without number, but it cannot produce
an organism. Well, on the theisticevolution hypothesis, which the abler
apologists adopt to-day, it took God
hundreds of thousands, if not millions,
of years to make an amoeba, with all the
resources of nature completely known to
45
him. And man, with his dim knowledge
of natural forces, is to make one in a
few weeks, or years! Science is ad
vancing. Let us be patient.
We are now in a position, then, to
estimate the criticisms that have been
directed against this section of Dr.
Haeckel’s system. There are two aspects
of his position. On the one hand there
is the negative side, that we are not
justified in rushing into the present gap
(such as it is) of scientific knowledge
with a “ vital force ” or a “ creative
power,” which are specifically distinct
from the natural forces we have hitherto
studied; and there is, further, the posi
tive attempt to sketch a theory of the
way in which protoplasm was evolved.
The first part is essential to monism ;
the second is not, and may vary with
the progress of science. Both parts
are scientifically justified. How widely
Haeckel’s first position is shared by men
of science, and how it is forced on us by
the axioms of men so different as Lord
Kelvin and Canon A. L. . Moore, we
have already seen. It is the only logical
attitude. When science assures us that
it has acquired a perfect knowledge of
vital force on the one hand and physical
force on the other, and that the two are
so widely separated that it cannot con
ceive the one to have been evolved from
the other; then there will be time enough
to talk of gaps and gulfs and creative
power. In the meantime logic forbids
us to multiply agencies without need.
There is a plausible kind of critic—
usually a preacher—who says: Well,
Haeckel may enjoy his opinion as long
as he likes, and the agnostic may wait
eternally for the last word of science, but
I find this creator-idea very satisfying,
and you may keep your logic for the
school. That is the practical man—the
man who would think you a fool if you
reasoned like that in business. It must
be remembered that we are not playing
a parlour game with conventional rules.
It is a question of truth or untruth,
reality or unreality. It is a huge asser
tion, this of creative action, It at once
�46
THE ORIGIN OF LIFE
brings a new element into our cosmos.
We see that the material universe exists.
We must not recklessly affirm the exist
ence of anything beyond it; or if we do,
we have no guarantee of the truth of our
statements.
Now, until science has
shown that physical force and vital force
are not transmutable, and that no exten
sion of the former, even into the most
elaborate complication, could produce
the latter, you cannot extract from the
appearance of life a particle of evidence
fo,r an interfering cause other than
nature.
But Haeckel does not cease to speak
as a scientific man when he goes on to
offer a positive suggestion as to the
origin of life. Science advances com
monly by projecting hypotheses in
advance of its solid and established
positions, and if ever we are to under
stand the mode of the origin of life it
will be by such a procedure. No living
scientist is better acquainted with the
conditions of the problem than Haeckel,
and it would be preposterous to suppose
that he has not framed a theory con
sistent with the known facts. His theory
is directly grounded on the established
facts of the chemistry of protoplasm.
The only possible justification for the
criticism offered by scientists like Dr.
Horton would be if Haeckel had put it
before us as a sort of photographic
description of the primeval dawn of life.
As Mr. Ballard reminds us, Haeckel
only offers it as “a pure hypothesis,”
consistent with the facts as we know
them, and capable of any modification
new discoveries may entail.
Thus, when we have shaken off this
group of not very enlightened critics,
we see that we have advanced a step
in the evolution of the monistic uni
verse.
We had already followed the
great matter-force reality in its develop
ment as far as the formation of planets
with firm crusts, with heated oceans
and an enveloping atmosphere, and
provided by a shrinking central luminary
with a powerful flood of heat, light,
and electricity. Some time in the pre
Cambrian epoch living things appeared
in the primeval oceans. This was not
a sudden and dramatic entrance on the
stage of time, at which the morning
stars might clap their incandescent
hands ; it was the final issue of a long
course of evolution. It was the matter
force reality slowly groping upwards
through more and more elaborate com
binations of the
formed chemical
elements until a stage was reached
when a substance sufficiently plastic to
exchange elements with the environing
fluid and sufficiently stable to maintain
its integrity was formed. To-day this
substance (living protoplasm) is marked
off by several remarkable properties
from inorganic matter. Professor Beale
talks much of its “ structureless ” cha
racter. In view of the known extreme
complexity of its molecular structure, it
would be a miracle if it did not exhibit
functions widely removed from those of
simpler compounds. But the finding of an
actual divergence to-day is no obstacle
to our entertaining a theory of evolu
tion. No serious scientist questions to
day the evolution of the human body
from that of a lower animal species.
Yet the connecting links have disap
peared. It is a scientific truth that
intermediate forms do tend to disappear.
We see here, then, only another phase
in the unfolding of the cosmic substance,
or nature. Neither scientific evidence
nor logic compels us yet to admit a
fresh reality, a new form of being. We
are still monists. Whether nature has
needed the guidance of intelligence in
this evolution we need not consider
yet. First let us establish the fact that
nature evolves, from the first union of
electrons into an atom to the develop
ment of man, by means of its inherent
forces, and then we will consider
“ whence ” it got these forces and
whether they must have been guided.
Now, given the first tiny globule of
living protoplasm, there is no further gap
for the theologian to defend until we
come to the human mind. For the fifty
million years which extend from the
�THE ORIGIN OF LIFE
Laurentian epoch to the early Pleisto
cene we witness the natural evolution of
the cosmic substance without any plau
sible interference. Naturalists “ have
accepted Darwin’s idea,” Sir W. Turner
tells us in his presidential speech; and
he speaks with respect of Haeckel’s
great share in constructing our ancestral
tree. Huxley said a long time ago that
he “ refused to run the risk of insulting
any sane man by supposing that he
seriously holds such a notion as special
creation.” Canon Aubrey Moore wrote
sixteen years ago that “ every competent
man of science believes in the origin of
species by progressive variations.”1 “All
living nature is of one descent and con
stitutes one relationship,” says Mr.
Newman Smyth. “ Evolution as a law
of derivation of forms from previous
forms ... is not only certain, it is axio
matic,” says Professor Le Conte. “ The
immutability and separate creation of
species . . . are doctrines now no longer
defensible,” says Professor Ward. And
Professor Flower (to whose qualifications
Mr. Ballard devotes ten lines—much
more than Professor Flower ever devoted
to theology) told the Reading Church
Congress twenty years ago (1883) that
the doctrine of the evolution of species
was even then “almost, if not quite,
universal among skilled and thoughtful
naturalists of all countries,” and advised
the clergy not to burn their fingers again
with it.2 We might fill a book with such
quotations.
Happily, there is no longer the need
to do so. Darwin lies in Westminster
Abbey, and episcopal lips utter his name
without a tremor. No one now questions
the fact that the species have been
formed by evolution; but there are still
ecclesiastics who take this occasion to
show that they are of a critical rather
than a credulous temper. They quarrel
with the agencies which science assigns
to the task of the formation of species,
or with the mode in which science con
ceives those agencies to have acted.
1 Science and the Faith, p. 165.
2 Recent Advances in Natural Science.
47
They express an opinion that natural
selection and sexual selection could
not do this or the other; that the
question of the transmission of acquired
characters is very unsettled, and so
forth. Now, it is in itself a healthy sign
of the times that our theologians take an
interest in these scientific questions, and
as scientific men. But the cause of
truth and progress, and the placidity of
scientific workers, would be best con
sulted by keeping these criticisms out
of Christian evidence treatises, with
which, logically, they have 'nothing to
do. Thus Dr. Iverach discusses the
question at great length in his Theism in
the Light ofPresent Science and Philosophy.
He thinks that natural selection may
act on variations, but cannot initiate
them, and cannot show why some
organisms remain unicellular and others
become multicellular.
Biologists do
not, he urges, prove the indefinite ex
pansiveness of species, and do not
explain the special causes which check
expansion. In strict logic this has nothing
to do with “Theism.” If biologists
have not adequately explained the pro
cess of evolution, we must wait until
they have further knowledge.
His
point is, of course, that the triumph of
evolution only means “ to transfer the
cause from a mere external influence
working from without to an immanent
rational principle.”
He is pleading
again for that “ incomprehensible vital
force,” as Sir A. Rucker calls it, which
we have already discussed and will dis
cuss later.
If it is sufficient to admit natural
(physical and chemical) forces in the
first formation of protoplasm, we meet
nothing to turn us aside from these with
any plausibility until we come to con
sciousness, which I will treat in the
next chapter. With that reservation
Haeckel’s mechanical explanation of the
derivation of species is accepted. Pro
fessor Ray Lankester says, in the article
on zoology in the Encyclopedia Britan
nica : “ It was reserved for Charles
Darwin in the year 1859 to place the
�48
THE ORIGIN OF LIFE
whole theory of organic evolution on a
new footing, and by his discovery of a
mechanical cause actually existing and
demonstrable, by which organic evolution
must be brought about, to entirely
change the. attitude in regard to it of
even the most rigid exponents of scientific
method.” The recent letters of Pro
fessor Ray Lankester to the Times,
which I will quote later (Chap. XII.),
show that he has not departed from this
position. Dr. Croll also admits of the
derivation of species: “ At present
[1890] most evolutionists regard the
process as purely mechanical and physi
cal, the results of matter, motion, and
force alone.”1 And Mr. Fiske says:
“The natural selection of physical
variations will go far towards explaining
the characters of all the plants and all
the beasts in the world.” 2
But do not let us lose our way amidst
conflicting authorities. Two objections
are formulated, more or less vaguely,
against this phase of Haeckel’s position ;
or the two objections may be combined
into the general statement that the
mechanical explanation leaves some
aspects of the derivation of species
unaccounted for; and so we must admit,
besides the evolving matter-force reality,
a telic or purposive principle in the
organism and a general controlling in
telligence, or at least the latter (Fiske,
Ward, Le Conte, &c.). The second
opinion does not really conflict with our
present purpose, because it assumes that
this directing intelligence never takes the
place of physical agencies. It always
acts through mechanical causes, so that
science is quite right in expecting to
build up a perfect mechanical scheme of
the development of the world-substance.
With its further contention that this
mechanical scheme points to an initial
designer, we will deal later. It is only
the first opinion—that which postulates
a purposive principle in the organism—
which conflicts with the monistic view
at this stage. And this second opinion
1 The Philosophical Basis of Evolution, p. 2.
2 Through Nature to God, p. 81.
is, frankly, a philosophy or a theology
of gaps. It lodges in the breaches, or
supposed breaches, in our knowledge of
the evolutionary processes, and naively
takes these to be breaches in the cosmic
scheme itself. Remember Mr. Ballard’s
wise injunction that “we have no
warrant whatever for the assumption
that the possibilities of the universe end
where our human apprehension of
nature has reached its ne plus ultra ”—
for the time being, let me venture to
add. Which attitude is the more logical
and scientific, and the best accredited
by experience—this defence of gaps, or
the resolution to admit no aquosities or
vitalities, or other immaterial entities
until science has given a definite and
fully-informed decision ?
Professor Haeckel adopts the latter
attitude, and proceeds to reconstruct the
wonderful paths that nature has followed
in her journey from those ancient
Laurentian waters to the achievements
of man. We have three convergent and
consonant lines of evidence : the docu
ments of palaeontology, or the science of
fossils, the documents of zoology (to
speak of animals only), and the docu
ments of embryology. From them, as
from three synoptic gospels, we retrace
the upward growth of living nature.
The simplest organisms we can definitely
picture to ourselves are simple granules
of protoplasm, or structureless morsels
of an albuminous matter. In time some
of these are formed which live on their
fellow-protists, and the distinction of the
animal from the plant is adumbrated.
Later, some of them develop a nucleus
and form definite cells ; the cells cling
together in colonies and form multi
cellular organisms; these cells are dis
posed in a layer or skin with a central
cavity, and develop fine hair-like pro
cesses by which they can travel through
the water. As the ages advance some
of these beings fold their cell-layer in
wards and form the primitive gut. From
these, probably, the flat worms are
developed, with a primitive nervous
system and reproductive apparatus.
�THE ASCENT OF MAN
Higher worms arise with primitive
vascular and excretory systems, and at
length with a rude kind of breathing
apparatus. At the next stage the rudi
ment of a spinal cord appears, and
continues to develop until the lowest
vertebrates (such as the lampreys) are
seen, with their primitive crania, suctorial
mouths, and advancing ears. Then
comes a great development of fishes
with strong dermal armour and in
creasingly acute organs of sense. _ Am
phibious animals link the fishes with the
reptiles, which soon prowl over the
us
49
earth in huge and terrible forms.
Mammals,
or
warm,
red-blooded
animals, next appear in the Jurassic
strata, and slowly advance through the
forms of marsupials and placentals until
the lowest lemures, in the lower Eocene
strata (computed to be 3,000,000 years
old), bring us within dim and distant
vision of the human form. The man
like apes appear in the Miocene period
(about 850,000 years ago).
Some
600,000 years later the pithecanthropus,
or erect man-ape, is found to herald the
approach of our own race.
Chapter V
THE ASCENT OF MAN
When the third International Zoo
logical Congress met at Leyden in 1895
a Dutch military physician produced two
or three bones that he had discovered in
Java the previous year, which created a
lively sensation amongst the assembled
anthropologists. They were merely the
skull-cap, a femur, and two teeth of some
animal form that had been buried in the
upper Pliocene strata nearly 300,000 years
ago. The modern zoologist can recon
struct a skeleton almost from a single
bone, and the complete outline of the
being to which these scanty remains had
belonged was quickly restored. Science
found itself confronted with the long
sought missing link between man and his
pithecoid ancestors. The powerful form,
standing five feet and a half high when
erect, yet still much bent with the curve
of its prone ancestors : the great cranial
capacity (about 1,000 cubic centimetres),
much greater than that of the largest ape,
yet lower than that of man, and associ
ated with prominent eye-brow ridges and
heavy jaws; in a word, all its features
pointed very emphatically to a stage half
way between man and the earlier species
from which he and the apes had
descended. A loud and long discus
sion followed Dr. Dubois’ address. The
celebrated Dr. Virchow stubbornly op
posed the conclusion of Haeckel and his
colleagues, and was driven from point to
point by his opponents.1 In the end
twelve experts of the Congress gave a
decision on the remains. Three of them
held that they belonged to a member of
a low race of man ; three held that they
1 See the account of Virchow’s pitiful and
transparently prejudiced resistance to evolution
in Buchner’s Last Words on Materialism, p. 97.
At a scientific congress in the preceding year,
one of Virchow’s colleagues observed that his
behaviour was “quite enough to justify us in
paying serious attention no longer to the great
pathologist on this question.” In effect, Vir
chow’s opinions on the matter have died with
him.
�so
the ascent of man
had belonged to a huge man-like ape;
and six were convinced that they be
longed to an intermediate form, which
was rightly called the pithecanthropus
erectus (erect ape-man). The opinion of
the majority has now become the general
opinion in anthropology.
This was a dramatic intervention in
the standing controversy with regard to
the origin of man. Ever since Darwin
had, as Professor Dewar says, “ illumined
the long unsettled horizon of human
thought” with his theory of selection
and descent, anthropologists had foreseen
the extension of the doctrine of evolution
to man. Haeckel and Darwin had soon
effected that extension in theory. Now
the discovery of the pithecanthropus came
as a remarkable crown to the enormous
structure of evidence in its favour. But
a distinction had already been drawn
between the evolution of body and the
evolution of mind. Thinkers like Dr.
Wallace and Dr. Mivart offered no re
sistance, or, indeed, strongly defended,
the doctrine that man had inherited his
bodily form from a lower animal species,
but affected to see a gulf in mental
faculty which forbade us to derive man’s
mind from that of any animal. Since
those days the evidence for the evolution
of the mind has accumulated until it is
at least equivalent to that for the evolu
tion of the body. In the Riddle of the
Universe Professor Haeckel gives a mag
nificent summary of the evidence for
both theses, for the development of man,
mind and body, from an animal ancestor,
through which he is closely related to
the apes. The subject is one that be
longs to the science of which Haeckel is
one of the acknowledged masters. It was
thought that all serious criticism of the
work—all criticism that had the moral and
constructive aim of ensuring the triumph
of truth—would centre upon these first
ten chapters dealing with evolution. The
critics have acted otherwise, and we shall
see that there is little serious resistance
to our extension of the principle of
natural evolution to man, and bringing
him within the unity of the cosmos.
Let us see first, however, what is the
attitude of cultivated thought generally
on the subject. We have seen how the
defenders of gaps have surrendered the
inorganic world to the monist, how a
mere handful remain to defend the
dualistic theory of the origin of life, and
how they have fled before the advance
of the Darwinians. We shall now find
that they are fast deserting this last
breach in the evolutionary scheme. A
quarter of a century ago Tyndall shook
the world with his famous : “ We claim,
and we will wrest from theology, the
whole domain of cosmological theory.”
‘‘ His successors,” said Professor Dewar,
in the same city, last year, “have no
longer any need to repeat those signifi
cant words . . . The claim has been
practically, though often unconsciously,
conceded.”
Canon Aubrey Moore,
whose work Mr. Ballard recommends
us to read, urged his colleagues to
admit the claim nearly twenty years
ago. Wallace’s idea, he said, “has a
strangely unorthodox look.
If, as a
Christian believes, the higher intellect
who used these laws for the creation of
man, was the same God who worked in
and by these same laws in creating the
lower forms of life, Mr. Wallace’s dis
tinction of cause disappears.” Again :
“We have probably as much to learn
about the soul from comparative psychology, a science which as yet scarcely
exists, as we have learned about the
body from comparative biology.”1 He
concludes that the question has nothing
to do with religion. Dr. W. N. Clarke
is no less clear. “The time has come,”
he says, “ when theology should remand
the investigation of the time and manner
of the origin of man to the science or
anthropology with its kindred sciences,
just as it now remands the time and'
manner of the origin of the earth to
astronomy and geology . . . anthropo
logy and its kindred sciences will give
an evolutionary answer.” Again : “ But
though there is no reason against
1 Science and the Faith, pp. 203 and 211.
�THE ASCENT OF MAN
5i
an infirmary in travelling by rail across
admitting it if it is supported by facts,
special creation, whether of the spirit of Switzerland. Observations on the beauty
man or of other new elements of the of the mountains led to a discussion of
advancing order, may come to appear their natural growth, and the nun—little
improbable. The larger the sweep of suspecting his identity—informed him
one great progressive method, the more that she had obtained her sensible and
probable does it become that the method modern views from Haeckel’s Natural
is universal. The idea of unity in God’s History of Creation / We shall see in
the end that the religious opposition to
work and method is an idea that tends,
Haeckel’s teaching—his real teaching—
when once it has been admitted, to
is crumbling year by year. On our pre
extend over the whole field.”1
Dr.
Iverach and Mr. Newman Smyth desert sent question of the evolution of the
the gap, and refer us to science for the human mind, one may gather from this
solution; though, as before, we shall very general agreement of the cultured
find Dr. Iverach raising subsequent and defenders of Christianity that scientific
irrelevant difficulties.
Professor Le and expert opinion can be little short of
Conte and Mr. Fiske, whom we are unanimous. Dr. Wallace, with whose
views we shall deal separately, does in
told to read, are emphatic evolutionists.
Says Le Conte : “ I believe the spirit of deed stand out with a strange obstinacy
man was developed out of the anima or in the world of science—stands out as
conscious principle of animals, and that Virchow so long did in Germany, as
this again was developed out of the Cuvier did in France—but the doctrine
of the evolution of mind is now
lower forms of life-force, and this in its
turn out of the chemical and physical generally accepted by psychologists.
Professor J. Ward says “ the unanimity
forces of nature.” 2 Mr. Fiske sketches
with which this conclusion is now
a theory of natural evolution in his
accepted by biologists of every school
Through Nature to God (p. 94). Dr.
Dallinger allows it is “ not by any means seems to justify Darwin’s confidence a
other than conceivable that science may quarter of a century ago.”1 Another
psychologist, Professor
be able to demonstrate the actual distinguished
Miinsterberg, is equally scornful of those
physical line of man’s origin” (quoted
by Mr. Ballard). Even Mr. Rhondda who still linger in this breach.2 Sir W.
Williams believes “ evolution is com Turner closed his Presidential address
plete from the jelly-fish up to Shake to the British Association in 1900 with a
confident assumption of the general
speare” (p. 26), and says (p. 40):
“When evolution reached man she acceptance of the doctrine3—so far,
seemed not to be content with making indeed, as to evoke from a conservative
writer in the Athenceum a lament that
bodies, and devoted herself to the
development of intelligence and the he “ carried the evolutionary idea to its
logical conclusion with a most uncom
noblest feelings.”
Haeckel is, therefore, once more in promising materialism.” In fact, a cul
tivated and hostile reviewer in the Man
excellent and edifying company. He
chester Guardian dismisses the first and
tells in his latest work (Aus Insulinde)
how he found himself a few years ago
1 Naturalism and
p. 7face to face with the religious director of Ward is speaking ofAgnosticism, ii, doctrineDr.
the complete
of
1 An Outline of Christian Theology, p. 225.
2 Evolution and Religious Thought, p. 313.
And elsewhere he says that until recently “ the
grounds of our belief in immortality were based
largely on a supposed separateness of man from
the brutes—his complete uniqueness in the whole
scheme of nature. This is now no longer
possible” (The Conception of God, p. 75).
development.
2 Psychology and Life, p. 91.
3 I shall quote his words presently to show
that he held not only evolution, but evolution in
the same sense as Haeckel. I shall also quote
similar language from the speech of the President
of the Anthropological section at the Congress of
1901.
�52
THE ASCENT OF MAN
chief part of Haeckel’s book with an
assurance that “ nowadays you cannot
startle even the man in the street by tell
ing him the soul has been continuously
evolved from the souls of unicellular
protists.” For my part, I am not pre
pared to assign Dr. Wallace, or even
Dr. Horton, to a lower level of culture
than that of the man in the street. But
it would be difficult to draw up to-day
even a slender list of capable biologists
or anthropologists who deny the ascent
of man from the rest of the animal
world.
. This very general agreement of scien
tific men, accepted, as it is, by the ablest
theistic writers of the day, has a formid
able support in the facts and the justified
assumptions of science. Once it has
been proved that the whole development
of nature, from the formation of atoms
up to the formation of species, has pro
ceeded in a continuous manner; and
when it is known, as we do know to
day, that this law of natural evolution
applies also to the most elaborate of our
thoughts and institutions, to our art, our
language, and our civilisation; it becomes
clear that there is so strong a presump
tion for the natural evolution of man
that only the most explicit proof of
man’s uniqueness could prevent us from
applying the law to explain his origin.
When we find further that man is akin
to the lower species in a score of ways
which point to derivation, and are quite
unintelligible on any other theory, the
onus of proof lies heavier than ever on
those who resist. We should be scien
tifically and logically justified in assuming
the evolution of man, unless and until
some grave hindrance is pointed out
in. the nature of man’s structure or
spiritual powers. . But, as I said, the
positive evidence is enormous. As far
as structure is concerned we have no
reply to meet.
The proofs which
Haeckel has marshalled so ably in
Chapters II.-V. of the Riddle have
passed unchallenged; nor is there any
serious “answer by anticipation” which
we should be expected to consider. The
analogy of man’s structure and his phy
siological functions with those of other
mammals, the significant course of his
embryological development, and the
atrophied organs and muscles that are
still transmitted from mother to child,
have convinced a stubborn world at
length. . That gap has been deserted.
It is still thought by some that a gulf
remains between the mind of man and
that of the other animals, and that here
at least they still find their treasured in
tervention of an external power in the
orderly development of the universe.
They think that man’s mental powers,
and what he has achieved with those
powers, mark him off too sharply
from the psychology of the lower
animals for us to admit evolution.
Let us see first what distinctions are
alleged in support of this assertion,
and then we may study the force
of. the psychological evidence for evo
lution.
Now, when we turn to the critics of
the Riddle—either explicit critics or
critics “ by anticipation ”—we find we
have to deal with a very meagre group
of. not very clear or well-informed
thinkers. Such phrases as those which
Mr. Blatchford quotes from a sermon
delivered by Dr. Talmage as late as
1898, that the evolution of man is “con
trary to the facts of science,” and that
“natural evolution is not upward but
always downward ’’—only show the kind
of stuff that can be safely delivered
in tabernacles. Dr. Horton, another
preacher, complains that Haeckel “has
not been able to explain the origin of
consciousness,” or “how the rational
life we call spirit has been produced by
the physical ”; which is a complete
ignoring—probably ignorance—of" the
mass of evidence Haeckel has presented,
as we shall see.
Mr. Ballard hides
behind the respectable figure of Dr.
A. R. Wallace, though at other times he
seems indesirous to press the objection.
We are, in fact, left to face a medley of
small points made by the Rev. Rhondda
Williams (who admits the evolution of
�THE ASCENT OF MAN
the mind), Dr. Iverach, and the Rev.
Ambrose Pope.
Mr. Pope, you will remember, holds
that Haeckel collected the basic material
for his system during three “half-day
excursions.”
He himself admits the
sufficiency of evolution until we come
to the human mind, and then says:
“This is psychology, and, like all psy
chologists, Haeckel starts with certain
metaphysical hypotheses.
His hypo
thesis is that mental phenomena are the
effects of physical phenomena.” This,
he says, “ looks like an innocent assump
tion ”—to whom, we are not told—but
it contains the fatal conclusion, and is
“ opposed by nearly every psychologist of
repute in the world.” These men are
“ expert psychologists,” whereas Haeckel
is only making a “ half-day excursion ”
from his own province into “ another
subject entirely.” One really begins to
suspect that it was during “ a half-day
excursion ” that Mr. Pope studied
Haeckel.
A grosser travesty of his
system it would be difficult to conceive.
Serious students will not expect an
analysis of it, but I will briefly point
out its absurdities. This subject is as
much within the province of compara
tive zoology, of which Haeckel is one of
the greatest living masters, as it is in
the field of psychology. It is a border
question. There was, therefore, no ex
cursion.
Indeed, it is not too much
to say that this tracing of the upward
growth of mind has been one of
Haeckel’s most absorbing studies ; and
now his conclusion, based on a long
life of study and research, is to be
flippantly represented as an “assumption”
ignorantly and hastily stolen from a
province “ entirely ” different from his
own—a province, moreover, where we
are assured it did not exist. Further,
of the seven “ psychologists of repute ”
whom Mr. Pope quotes—Windt (Wundt),
Hoffding, Ward, Sully, Stout, Dewy,
and James—six at least admit the evo
lution of mind by purely natural pro
cesses. I have already quoted the ablest
ot them, Professor Ward, as a witness
53
to the unanimity of this conclu
sion.1
With the difficulties alleged by Dr.
Iverach we will not linger. He seems
not to insist on the impossibility of
evolution, but urges that man is actually
separated from the animals by several
marked prerogatives. One of these is
language; but as Dr. Iverach admits this
is “ manifestly a social product ”—that is
to say, evolved—one wonders why it is
adduced at all. Another difference is
in his relation to his environment, which
he can modify and turn to service ; that
also is clearly an acquired or evolved
faculty. Finally, Dr. Iverach urges man’s
distinction in the way of science,
religion, morality, civilisation, and so on.
Experts are agreed, and many theo
logians are with them, that these are all
evolutionary products. They did not
exist 300,000 years ago. Nor does Dr.
Iverach seriously urge them as objections
to the theory of evolution. On the other
hand, Mr. Rhondda Williams, who
“ believes ”—though it is “not proved
that man was evolved, soul and body,
makes a prolonged onslaught on
Haeckel’s position. Before we follow
him into his storm-cloud of rhetoric, let
us make clear what he hopes to gain by
it. He admits the fact of evolution.
He claims, of course, that the evolution
ary process was divinely or pantheistically
guided; a point we discuss later. The
only practical question is : Does he, or
does he not, admit that the agencies at
work in the uplifting of the human
species are the same agencies which we
have hitherto dealt with ? If he does, it
is of no real consequence to us that he
finds Haeckel’s theory of consciousness
or of memory at fault. The main point is
the exclusion of the new kind of force
which was supposed to enter the world
with the human mind. It is important
to remember—he seems to forget it
himself sometimes—that Mr. Williams
does not postulate the entrance of a new
1 In so far as Mr. Pope means that they differ
from Haeckel as to the actual relation of brain
and mind we shall meet the point presently.
�54
THE ASCENT OF MAN
force into the cosmos, but, like Le Conte to “ psychoplasm ” for more “conjuring.”
and Fiske, sees only a further unfolding
Haeckel is represented as “calling in
of the universal spirit. At the bottom
psychoplasm to account for what proto
his quarrel with Haeckel is not about the plasm could not do”—which is false;
evolution of the human soul, or the
psychoplasm being the same thing as
agencies which evolved it, but as to the protoplasm, but in a different relation,
relation of all soul to brain.
just as Dr. Lionel Beale speaks of
He promises us, then, that he is going
“bioplasm”—and then as saying that
to convict the distinguished scientist
“ what springs from it is declared to be
of “jugglery,” and to find him in only a name for what protoplasm does.”
“a perfect muddle,” and so on. The Mr. Williams foists on Haeckel a
first “conjuring trick” is produced by fictitious distinction, and then invites
a little conjuring on the preacher’s his admiring audience to make merry
own part. He cuts in two Haeckel’s over the confusion it involves. Any
reference (p. 94) to “ the transcendental student with a desire to understand,
design of the teleological philosophy of rather than to score rhetorical points,
the schools,” inserts a full-stop after will see at a glance that Haeckel’s termin
“design,” and then asks us to admire ology is perfectly consistent with itself
the stupidity or desperateness of a man and the facts.
Protoplasm is the
who first excludes purpose from the material substratum of all life; but
universe—“in order to shut out God” when it takes on the form of nerve
—and then finds it in the organic world tissue and becomes the base of nerveand calls it “ mechanical teleology.” If,
life (which we all agree to call psychic
moreover, Mr. Williams cannot see that life) it is described as psychoplasm.
the word “design” or “purpose” is Just as Mr. Williams’s procedure would
used only in a figurative sense in the be called clever from the intellectual
second application, he would do well to point of view, but by a different name
re-study the passage. A similar con from the moral standpoint.
fusion is found in his criticism of
As a last instance of this poor
Haeckel’s treatment of consciousness
“jugglery” I will quote one more
and memory. He labours to prove that passage. Haeckel, he says, “speaks of
Haeckel must take the word memory
certain parts of the brain as ‘the real
figuratively in its lower stages—which organs of mental life; they are those
is precisely what Haeckel obviously highest instruments of psychic activity
means. But the justification of apply that produce thought and conscious
ing the word “ memory ” to the function
ness ! ’ Look at the contradiction in
of a cell and to the human faculty lies
that statement. Certain parts of the
in the whole mass of proof Haeckel has brain are said to be at once the instru
accumulated to show that they are the ments and the producers of conscious
same function, and that the one passes
ness 1 Talk about a doctor using
gradually, as the nervous system develops,
instruments if you like, but do not talk
into the other. That is one of the
of the instruments producing the doctor;
most superficial truths of comparative and especially do not speak as if both
statements could be true at the same
psychology.1 Then Mr. Williams turns
time.” This is a bewildering sort of
1 We may compare Mr. Ballard’s eagerness to
point out that, whereas Haeckel grants zis no
souls or wills, he ascribes these even to the cells
and atoms. It is the same curious and wilful
misconstruction. Haeckel maintains that the
force associated with the atom or the cell is the
same fundamentally as that which reveals itself
in our consciousness. That is the logical con
clusion of all his proofs of continuous, natural
development. He is, therefore, logically correct
in speaking of the “soul” of the atom if we
insist on speaking of the “soul” of man. The
sensation and will he attributes to atoms are
obviously figurative, and merely reminders of his
doctrine of the unity of all force or spirit—a
unity which Le Conte and Fiske and even Mr.
Williams (when he is consistent) also admit.
�THE ASCENT OF MAN
criticism.
Organs, instruments, and
producers are clearly used by Haeckel
in much the same sense. None but a
pedant, or a desperate critic, would
abuse us for saying that the stomach
was the instrument and producer of
digestion; certainly no one would
misunderstand us. Thought is not a
substantial entity like a doctor. The
simile is totally misleading.
Happily, Mr. Williams finds we have
arrived at last at the crucial point, and
he says that it is : “ Does the mind use
the brain as an instrument, or does the
brain really produce the mind ? Haeckel’s
position is the latter. But do not sup
pose for a moment that he has any
scientific proof of it.” Anyone who is
acquainted with modern psychology is
aware that neither of the positions Mr.
Williams puts is held by anybody of
consequence nowadays.
Spiritualist
philosophers do not speak of the mind
using the brain; and Haeckel, when
you pay serious attention to all he says,
does not hold that the brain produces
the mind. Matter, he has said from the
beginning, never produces force or spirit.
They are two aspects of one reality, as
Mr. Williams himself holds (p. 8). The
sole question with Haeckel is whether
this force we call the human mind is one
with the force revealed in the animal
mind and also in inorganic nature. That
is naturally the first concern of a monist.
Force, it is a truism in science, varies with
its material substratum. When hydrogen
and oxygen are united the resultant force
has vastly different properties from what
it had before. When water unites with
fresh chemical substances, force takes on
again a wholly new set of properties ;
and the more elaborate the material
compound, the more elaborate the force.
Protoplasm is a most highly elaborate
chemical compound with a most intri
cate molecular structure. It is quite
natural to expect the force-side of it to
be very distinctive and peculiar; so we
agree to connect life with the lower
forces. But when protoplasm becomes
psychoplasm, the complication greatly
55
increases; the force varies in the same
proportion. The psychoplasm or proto
plasm of the higher animal brain ad
vances still further in complexity, and,
moreover, organic structure of the most
intricate kind is added. Hence in the
human brain, on physical principles, we
must expect a manifestation of force
vastly different from all that we find else
where. We find mind.
Haeckel, on
the strength of this very clear and
scientific reasoning, and of all the facts
as to the intimate dependence of mind
on nerve-tissue which he gathers into
several chapters, and all the facts as to
the gradual unfolding of this force we
call mind in exact correspondence to the
growth in complexity of the nervous
system, concludes that he sees no reason
for thinking that the mind-force is
specifically different from any other kind
of force. I will return to this very im
portant point presently. Meantime we
see what there is in Mr. Williams’s state
ment of Haeckel’s position and his
assertion that it is an idle assumption.1
1 I dare not risk fatiguing the reader with a
further analysis of Mr. Williams’s criticisms under
this head. I have treated them at some length,
because this is the chief section of his criticism
of Haeckel, and because, though this is the chief
section of Haeckel’s book, no other critic devotes
more than a paragraph to it. But I will briefly
point out some further instances of Mr. Williams’
peculiar method. He says that, “ as far as science
goes,” we are “quite free” to conceive the rela
tion of mind to brain as that of “ the musician
and his instrument.” That is gravely misleading.
Science permits no such substantial independence
of each other as there is between musician and
organ. The only proper metaphor science would
allow is the relation of music to the instrument;
which is by no means so accommodating to the
dualist. With the petty quibble about “ truth
I will not delay. But on the next page (23) you
will note how Mr. Williams quotes Haeckel’s,
saying that ‘ ‘ man sinks to the level of a placental
mammal ” (which no one questions, in substance),,
and in the next paragraph turns this into the
grotesque doctrine ‘ ‘ that human nature sinks to.
the level of tie lowest placental mammal ” (a,
very lowly beast)! Then he grumbles that
Haeckel is “ inconsistent in his estimates of
man ” ; though he must know that Haeckel only’
belittles man relatively to the old theology.
Then (p. 24), after a pedantic effort to make
Haeckel say the mind of Shakespeare may have:
rivals in the animal world, he credits him with.
Bishops gate Institnta?
�56
THE ASCENT OF MAN
Mr. Williams and his colleagues may
be advised to take to heart the words of
one of the ablest American psycho
logists, Professor Miinsterberg, who is
by no means a materialist. “ The
philosopher,” he says, “ who bases the
hope of immortality on a theory of brain
functions and enjoys the facts which
cannot be physiologically explained,
stands, it seems to me, on the same
ground with the astronomer who seeks
with his telescope for a place in the
universe where no space exists, and
where there would be undisturbed room
for God and eternal bodiless souls.”1
All this criticism is neither more nor less
than an attempt to defend gaps. If Mr.
Williams replies that it is rather an
attempt to point out gaps in Haeckel’s
system, the reply is obvious. The
essence of Haeckel’s system is monistic
or negative. Any positive theories he
may advance as to the relation of brain
to memory or cell to consciousness are
scientific theories, grounded on the best
available evidence, but not final and
unchangeable. If they prove inade
quate, or if fresh facts discountenance
them, they will be modified. But the
essential part of his position remains.
“The whole momentum of our know
ledge of biological continuities,” as
Mr. Newman Smyth says, the whole
momentum of our knowledge of cosmic
processes, indeed, impels us to suppose
the human mind was evolved. Where
are the obstacles to such an assump
tion ?
Where are the specifically
different—not merely very different, but
the opinion that the difference between the mind
of Plato and the animal is “slighter in every
respect than that between the anthropoid ape
and a bird”; whereas Plaeckel had said “be
tween the higher and the lower animal souls,”
which may mean the gorilla and the amoeba.
Then he finds a difference between the animal
and the human embryo in the fact that the
embryo will become a man and ‘1 the highest
animal never will ” ; which is begging the whole
question whether the highest animal has not
actually done so. Such is the farrago of rhetoric
opposed to us as the only and adequate reply to
the most important section of the Riddle.
1 Psychology and Life, p. 91.
different in kind—contents of the
human mind which forbid us to suppose
it ? They are disappearing one by one
as the sciences of comparative psycho
logy and comparative philology and
comparative sociology and comparative
ethics and religion unfold their several
stories. Everything has been evolved.
To talk blandly of the “vast difference ”
between mind and matter is “ an appeal to
the imagination ” and “ an insult to the
understanding,” says Mr. Mallock. He
goes on to censure the dishonest
practice of contrasting the mind of the
highest man with that of the lower
animals. That is not truth-seeking.
The truth-seeker will take the highest
animal intelligence (as discovered by
the observations of Darwin, Romanes,
Lloyd-Morgan, Lubbock, and so many
others) and the lowest human intelli
gence (as seen in the Veddahs or
Hottentots, or as indicated by pre
historic human skulls) and ask himself
whether he finds here a gulf which
evolution could not be supposed to
have bridged in something like 500,000
years. But if animals have the germ,
ask some, why can you not raise one to
a higher level ? Setting aside the actual
results of training, let us ask : Did it,
on the theistic-evolution theory of man’s
origin, take God 300,000 years or more
to raise the highest animal species to the
miserable level man occupied 50,000 or
100,000 years ago ? And do you ask
man to do more than this in a year or
two ?
But, though it is well to remember
that the essence of Haeckel’s position is
the reasoned exclusion of any new force,
we are bound to give serious attention to
the positive evidence he has accumu
lated.
The verbal quibbles of Mr.
Williams have not touched the structure
of evidence given in Chaps. VII.-X.
of the Riddle, and no other critic is in the
field. To resume it briefly, we have a
fourfold gradation of psychic force, or a
fourfold exhibition of the growth of
mind. In the first place, we may arrange
J all known organisms, from the moneron
�THE ASCENT OF MAN
to man, in a scale of mental faculty, or
vital faculty leading up to mental, and we
find a sensibly graduated development
of mind, corresponding rigidly. to the
growth of structure in complexity. In
the second place, we study the growth
of the individual human mind from the
impregnated ovum, and we find the
same gradual formation of nerve and
brain and the. same proportionate
unfolding of consciousness. In the
third place, we learn from palseontology
that living things have been developed
from each other in the order in which
the zoologist arranges his subjects, and
which is confidently anticipated by the
embryologist. In the fourth place, if we
arrange the brains of all known men in
a similar hierarchic scale, we find the
same rigid correspondence of function
and structure, or of mind-action and
brain. Then there are supplementary
and complementary lines of research.
There is the life of the sub-conscious
self, which Professor James says is a
great world we are only just beginning
to explore. Already the explorations
show conscious action to be only a
small area of mental action ; the larger
area is mostly mechanical, and the
conscious area passes gradually into it
and out of it. As Mr. Mallock says:
“ The human mind, like an iceberg
which floats with most of its bulk sub
merged, from its first day to its last, has
more of itself below the level of con
sciousness than ever appears above it.”
There are the facts of double and
abnormal consciousness, the. various
kinds of mental paralysis resulting from
lesion of the brain, the phenomena of
somnambulism and narcotic action and
artificial unconsciousness. There are
the voluminous determinations
of
psycho-physics as to the exact correspon
dence between purely physical and
chemical changes in the brain and
changes in thought or emotion. There
are the zealous investigations of the
modern students of child-life and child
brain, showing the same exact relation
of development. And there are the
57
most recent and largely successful
efforts to localise mental functions in
different parts of the brain.
Now, let us be perfectly clear what
this enormous mass of convergent
evidence really means. When we study
the stomach or the lungs in comparative
zoology, and perceive the close cor
respondence, from the lowest to the
highest forms, of structure and function,
we do not dream of concluding only
that the two have a very close con
nection : we say at once that they are
in the relation of organ and its function :
we say that the digestive force or the
respiratory-force is the same throughout,
and we can at the lowest end of the
scale connect it with ordinary natural
forces. Yet when we have this stupen
dous mass of evidence converging along
a dozen lines to the conclusion that the
mind-force is continuous throughout the
animal kingdom, and is rigidly and
absolutely bound up, as far as every
particle of scientific evidence goes, with
the nerve-structure., and is, at the lower
end, continuous with the ordinary force
of the universe, we are told we must
draw no conclusion whatever. We are
asked to believe that this mass of
scientific evidence is quite consistent
with a belief that some extraneous force,
distinct in kind from the ordinary force
of the cosmos, is “ using ” the nerve
tissue to manifest itself; and that the
highly complex force which must result
from the intricate molecular texture of
the human brain is nowhere discoverable.
On scientific principles “these facts,” as
Mr. Mallock says, “totally destroy the
foundation of the theist’s arguments.”
They teach us that, as he says again,
“each mother who has watched with
pride, as something peculiar and original,
the growth of her child’s mind, from the
days of the cradle to the days of the
first lesson-book, has really been watch
ing, compressed into a few brief years,
i the stupendous process which began in
the darkest abyss of time and connects
our thoughts, like our bodies, with the
primary living substance—whether this
�58
THE ASCENT OF MAN
be wholly identical with what we call
matter or no.”1 If it were not for the
presence amongst us of certain religious
traditions about the nature of man’s
“ soul,” or mind-force, no scientist would
ever hesitate for a moment to draw a
conclusion which would be justified by
every canon of logic and science—the
conclusion that in this vast hierarchy of
facts we see the world-force ascending
upwards until it grows self-conscious in
the human brain. Haeckel’s attitude is
the strictly and purely scientific attitude.
But, it is further urged, this is only a
description of the manner of growth, not
of the causes. “ Thus,” says Professor
Case, “ in presence of the problem which
is the crux of materialism, the origin of
consciousness, he first propounds a
gratuitous hypothesis that everything has
mind, and then gives up the origin of
conscious mind after all.” I have ex
plained in what sense Haeckel attributes
mind to “ everything ”—though a skilled
metaphysician might be expected to see
that. To the second point I reply that
the whole of this evidence is an explana
tion of the origin of mind. The whole
evidence points to the conclusion that
conscious mind is an outgrowth of un
conscious, and that this is the generally
diffused cosmic force. But you cannot
derive the conscious from the uncon
scious, say several critics. The objection
is childish. If we are to explain any
thing, as Sir A. Rucker said, we cannot
explain it in terms of itself: the conscious
must be derived from the unconscious.
And as a fact, Mr. Mallock points out,
you do get consciousness out of the
unconscious every day—in the growth of
the infant; or, as Lloyd Morgan puts it,
in the development of the chicken from
the egg. In any case, the critics plead,
you are only saying how and not why
mind was evolved. Now, in so far as
this is a plea for teleology, we remand it,
1 Religion as a Credible Doctrine, p. 77. The
last phrase is superfluous. No one “wholly
identifies ” the primary living substance with
“ matter.” Matter and force are two aspects of
it, as brain and mind are.
as before. If it is anything more than
this, it is a plea for gaps and breaches in
the mechanical scheme of the universe,
building. fallaciously (as usual) on the
present imperfection of science. Take
the development of the embryo. We
certainly can do little more as yet than
describe its stages. But no one now
doubts it is a mechanical process. The
assumption that some non-mechanical
force was grouping and marshalling the
molecules of protoplasm, according to a
design of which it was itself totally un
conscious, only plunges us in deeper
mysteries than ever. Moreover, the facts
of heredity, the transmission of bodily
marks and features and peculiarities,
point wholly to a mechanical or bodily
action. The development of the mind
on a cosmic scale is still more clearly
mechanical. There is not a single fact
that compels us to go outside of the range
of familiar cosmic forces to seek an
explanation.
I will add one or two illustrations from
recent science to show how its progress
tends more and more to confirm Haec
kel’s position. Sir W. Turner closed his
presidential address to the British Asso
ciation three years ago with these words
(which were duly censured as “ material
ism ”): “ At last man came into exist
ence. His nerve-energy, in addition to
regulating the processes in his economy
which he possesses in common with
animals, was endowed with higher
powers. When translated into psychical
activity, it has enabled him throughout
the ages to progress from the condition
of a rude savage to an advanced stage
of civilisation.” Thus is the very lan
guage of Haeckel used on our supreme
scientific solemnity. The following year
Professor D. J. Cunningham (M.D.,
D.Sc., LL.D., D.C.L., F.R.S.) was the
president of the Anthropological Section
of the Congress, and his presidential
address was devoted to “ the part which
the human brain has played in the evo
lution of man.” The whole speech was
a vindication of the purely mechanical ex
! planation of the rise of man. Instead of
�THE ASCENT OF MAN
seeking the influence of external powers,
Professor Cunningham looks for more
prosaic changes that may have led to the
segregation of man. The reader who is
only accustomed to rhetorical and
spiritualistic treatment of the theme will
learn with a shock that the mere forma
tion of a habit of setting the hands free
for other purposes than locomotion pro
bably had a profound effect on the brain
and intelligence. “ So important is the
part played by the human hand as an
agent of the mind, and so perfectly is
it adjusted with reference to this office,
that there are many who think that the
first great start which man obtained on
the path which has led to his higher
development was given by the setting
of the upper limb free from the duty or
acting as an organ of support and loco
motion.” It hardly needed divine inter
vention or guidance to suggest this
change. The hand-centre in the brain
is located in such a region that its de
velopment must react on the cortex.
Further it is “ the acquisition of speech
which has been a dominant factor in
determining the high development of the
human brain.” The centre for facial
expression is contiguous to that of the
hand, and, as communication began to
grow between the primitive men, much
facial expression would be used, giving a
still further stimulus to the brain. In
fine, not only is language shown by the
philologist to be an evolutionary product,
but the physiologist finds that the dis
tinctive structures in the human brain
(though they may occasionally be fairly
traced in the brain of the anthropoid
ape) which are connected with speech
are the outcome of “a slow evolu
tionary growth.” Thus is science coming
to determine the physiological line of
evolution which gave the first distinction
of brain-power, on which natural selec
tion has fastened so effectively.1
1 Let me quote Professor Cunningham’s con
clusion : “ Assuming that the acquisition of
speech has afforded the chief stimulus to the
general development of the brain, therebygiving it a rank high above any other factor
59
Thus are the mechanical methods of
science bridging the supposed gulf.
There is no longer serious ground for
claiming a unique position for man, and
it is not surprising to find the leading
theologians sounding the retreat once
more. We are, in fact, beginning to
realise that the dualist theory of man
never did afford any “ explanation ” of
anything. The connection of soul and
body was always incomprehensible;1
nor is there the slightest intellectual satis
faction in covering up the whole mystery
of the mind with a label bearing the
word “ spirit.” Psychology has deserted
its old ways and become a science.. The
theologians will do well not to wait until
they are again ignominiously splashed
by the advancing tide of scientific re
search. Their efforts to “ show cause ”
why we should not apply the mechanical
process of evolution (whether divinely
guided or not) to the growth of man
have hopelessly failed.
But before we leave the question it
is necessary to consider for a moment
the question of the liberty of the will.
Here Haeckel’s opponents are content
to appeal to what Emerson calls “the
cowardly doctrine of consequences.”
We shall consider the moral outlook of
a monistic world in a later chapter, but
which has operated in the evolution of man, it
would be wrong to lose sight of the fact that
the first step in this upward movement must have
been taken by the brain itself. Some cerebral
variation—probably trifling and insignificant at
the start, and yet pregnant with the most farreaching possibilities—has in . the stem-form of
man contributed that condition which has
rendered speech possible.
This variation,
strengthened and fostered by natural selection,
has in the end led to the great double result.of
a large brain with wide and extensive associa
tion-areas and articulate speech, the two results
being brought about by the mutual reaction of
the one process on the other.”
1 Compare Professor Herbert’s desperate pre
dicament in his Modern Realism Examined,
which we are urged to read : “We may regard
the material world as real, but if we do we must
deny the existence of all but Creative Intelligence.
... If the material world is as it seems, it
contains no minds” (p. 148). Mr. Mallock
points all this out to Father Maher.very forcibly
in his Religion as a Credible Doctrine.
�6o
THE ASCENT OF MAN
may observe in passing that all this kind
of reasoning is futile and insincere. It
will not make the least practical differ
ence to life whether psychologists do
or do not agree to leave unimpaired the
old formula of “ the liberty of the will.”
A man can control his actions to a great
extent, and will to that extent be re
sponsible for them. On that we have
the witness of consciousness. How this
apparent power of choice arises in a
mechanism like the mind we can hardly
expect to understand until the new
psychology has made some progress.
But the old idea of a “ self-determining
power of the will ” is now “ an unthink
able conception,” as Dr. Croll (who
is on the list of the sound scientists)
emphatically says. Mr. Mallock also
thinks that “every attempt to escape
from the determinism of science by
analysis or by observation is fruitless.”
No sooner do we begin to look closely
into our free-will than we find the sup
posed area of its action shrinking
rapidly : we find ourselves in a perfect
network of determining influences.
Our will is the slave to our desire; we
cannot will what we do not desire, nor
what we desire the least or the less.
Our desire can always be traced to
our circumstances, our education, our
character and temperament. And our
character and
temperament — here
modern science has had a great deal
to say—are determined by heredity and
environment. The attempt to break
through this network with a cry of alarm
about consequences is futile. There
will be no practical consequences of an
evil character; and the consequences
for good of the scientific attack on the
old doctrine, from the days of Robert
Owen down, have been incalculable.
The community is a self-conscious
determinism. Now that it knows how
much heredity and environment have to
do with character and desire, and with
the healthy balancing of desires, it will
take action. The whole of education
and social reform have benefited enor
mously by the overthrow of the old
scholastic notion of the will. Such
“ freedom ” as we now find we have—if
we may still use the word—is not differ
ent in kind from that which a cat or a
dog evinces every day.
We conclude, then, that Haeckel’s
opponents have shown no plausible
reason why evolution should not extend
to the origin of man. The great achieve
ments which distinguish man to-day from
the animal world—art, science, philo
sophy, religion, civilisation, language—•
are known to have been formed, from
very rudimentary beginnings, by a long
process of evolution. At their root, in
the men whose skulls and bones and
rude implements are unearthed to-day,
we find only a somewhat more elaborate
brain, with deeper furrows and more con
volutions, a somewhat higher grade of
intelligence and emotion, than in the
higher animals about us. There is no
gulf, no gap: but there is a period of
some 300,000 years for natural selection
to work in. Comparative anatomy is
beginning to trace the steps—quite
natural, if not at first casual, steps—by
which man ascended in this direction. A
chance variation in the use of the limbs
could, it seems, greatly stimulate the
most important part of the brain. Any
increase of brain-power would prove of
enormous advantage, and would be
“ selected ” and emphasised at once. In
any case the momentum of continuity
and the mass of evidence for actual con
tinuity are enormous. It is no less
scientific than philosophical to see in the
growth of the human mind a further ex
tension of the life-force of the cosmos, a
further embodiment of the great matter
force reality which unfolds itself in the
universe about us and in the wonderful
self-conscious mechanism of the mind.
�THE IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL
Chapter
61
VI
THE IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL
Until a few centuries ago a belief in have the same fate. Man now sees in
the immortality of the soul harmonised the universe at large no shadow of
so well with the prevailing conception support for that promise of unending
of the world at large that men were life he has entertained so long.
content with but slender rational proof “What! shall the dateless worlds in dust be
of it. Even then, it is true, the tragedy
blown
Back to the unremembered and unknown,
of death seemed to the eye so final—And this frail Thou—the flame of yesterday—
the curtain seemed to be rung down so
Burn on forlorn, immortal, and unknown ? ”
inexorably on the conscious soul—that
sceptics were not wanting. The Sad
Death is the law of all things. It is
ducees amongst the Hebrews, the true that the great reality that shapes'
Epicureans amongst the Greeks, and itself in a million forms never dies.
the materiarii of early Christian times, That is its first law. But of every
rejected the belief entirely. Some of single embodiment of its restless energy,
the ablest of the mediaeval schoolmen of every individual being that pours out
(such as Duns Scotus) went so far as to of its womb, the path is measured and
deny that any rational proof could be the fate is written.
devised in support of the belief. But ‘
“ Life lives on.
for most men the belief was credible
It is the lives, the lives, the lives, that die.”
enough, and not unwelcome. Immor
So rhe position of the belief in per
tality was a familiar idea to them. Not
only God and the angels had that sonal immortality has changed. The
prerogative, but the very stars they pretty thoughts that supported it, or
looked on night by night were believed accompanied it, in the mind of a Plato
to be of immortal texture. In a world or an Augustine, crumble beneath the
where the immortal outnumbered the burden some would lay on them to-day.
mortal, man could well convince him The cosmic odds are against it. It is
self that the tradition of his own immor now the assumption of a stupendous
privilege on the part of one inhabitant
tality was true.
But the world has grown into a of the universe, who flatters himself he
universe to-day, and from end to end of is exempted from the general law of
it comes only the whisper of death. death. We look up now to no immortal
The stars, that had been regarded as ■i stars for reassurance as we turn sadly
fragments of immortal fire, are known from the truthful face of the dead. The
to be hastening to a sure extinction. angels have retreated far from the ways
The moon stands close to us always of humanity. God has shrunk into an
as a calm prophet of death. Such as it intangible cosmic principle. If belief
is, the corpse of a world, will our earth in immortality is to be anything more
one day be. Such will our sun finally than a despairing trust, it must appeal to
become; and after him, or with him, the presence in man of some unique
the hundred millions of his fellows in power and promise. But we have seen
the firmament. Countless dead worlds that modern science completely dis
already lie on the paths of heaven ; and credits the “ supposed separateness of
the millions that are yet unborn will man from the brutes,” to use the words
�62
THE IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL
of Le Conte. The thinking force in him
is the same force that reveals itself in
the industry and ingenuity of the ant or
the affection of the dog. Why shall it
survive the corruption of the brain
in this case, yet in their case die
away as surely as the light dies when
the sun sets ? It would seem that it is
not so much a question of examining
Haeckel’s disproofs, as of asking where
we are to look for the ground of this
stupendous claim.
We shall fully consider both points in
the light of the criticisms passed on
Haeckel’s chapter on immortality and
the works on the subject which are
opposed to him. The actual criticisms
will detain us very little, for an obvious
reason. Haeckel has already destroyed
the ground for any claim of a unique
character of the human mind. We have
seen with how little success his oppo
nents have tried to impede or retard his
progress from point to point of the
evolutionary scheme. The very latest
researches of science confirm his theses.
The ablest Christian apologists yield
their arms and desert the long defended
breaches. We have been borne along
by the flood of scientific evidence,
philosophically considered, as far as the
closing thesis of our last chapter. Man
is the latest and highest embodiment of
the universal matter-force reality.
It
would seem that the acceptance of this
thesis is equivalent to an abandonment
of the belief in immortality, but we shall
see that evolutionists like Fiske, and Le
Conte, and Mr. Newman Smyth still
erect feeble barriers. Meantime, let us
dispose of the less advanced critics;
those who reflect the ideas of the average
church-goer and strive to offer some
defence of them.
There is Dr. Horton, for instance,
who pleads much for “ the naive, but
essentially correct, conceptions of our
ancestors.” Dr. Horton seems to think
it most effective to urge that men who
do not share the belief in God and im I
mortality live on “ bestial levels,” and [
are “ shrunk in soul, warped in mind, i
and degraded in body.” The “intel
lectual strain ” of Haeckel’s scientific
work is kindly said to relieve him
personally from these consequences, but
one gathers that we who are not great
scientists fall under Dr. Horton’s merci
less logic. “Accustom yourselves,” he
says, “ to believe that God and freedom
and immortality are hallucinations;
accustom yourselves to the idea that
this stupendous order of being in which
we live is not a rational order at all, but
the mere fortuitous concourse of atoms
[! ], and by an inevitable logic, as our
anarchist friends see, when you have got
rid of the first lie, which is God, you
quickly get rid of the second lie, which
is righteousness, and then you get rid of
all the other lies, which are love, and
truth, and peace, and joy, and civilisa
tion and progress generally, and poetry,
and life.” We will not stay here to
discuss this insincere rhetoric. It is too
great a libel on Dr. Horton himself, if
we take it seriously, and too insulting to
the intelligence of his readers—who,
one may assume, happen to know a few
agnostics. Nor need -we be detained
with the various criticisms in Light.
The chief of these articles states that
Haeckel relies on “physics ” to disprove
the immortality of the soul; more curi
ously still, a second writer in Light (Jan.
19th, 1901) does rely on physics (the
conservation of energy) to rehabilitate
the belief. The second writer, more
over, completely ignoring Haeckel’s de
liberate words, assures his readers that he
“is terrified at the thought of life beyond
the grave,” and adopts the grotesque
title of “ A Frightened Philosopher.”
We shall not get much light from that
side.
Most of the critics we have already
passed, attempting loyally to defend one
or other of the supposed breaches in the
evolutionary doctrine, so that they make
little resistance here. When, in the
course of the next ten years, they have
fallen back on this last position—probably discovering that, on theological
principles, man must have been evolved
�THE IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL
—they will begin to repeat the argu
ments of Fiske and Le Conte, which we
shall presently consider. But there are
several critics who, setting aside the
question of evolution as not essential to
defend, formulate their objection thus.
Science proves up to the hilt that brain
and mind are correlative. As brain
develops, the mind opens—and in strict
est proportion. Lesion or other affection
of the brain proportionately mars the
mental or emotional life.
Psycho
physical observations show that the in
tensity of brain-action quite corresponds
to the intensity of mind-action. Let us
grant all this. But, they say, all this
throws no light whatever on the question
whether the mind may not outlive the
brain.
“ It’s logic! ” exclaims Mr.
Brierley, contemptuously, when he
comes to this part of Haeckel’s scheme.
Mr. Williams and Dr. Horton, and
others, make the same reply. Indeed,
as accomplished rhetoricians, they offer
Haeckel a pretty figurative way of con
ceiving the relation, which may help his
sluggish imagination and correct his
logic. Mind-action is like the music a
master evokes from the piano or violin.
A musical instrument maker would, like
the psycho-physicist, find an exact cor
respondence between the ailments and
defects of the violin and the disorders of
the music, or between the violence of
the molecules of string and wood and
the intensity and tone of the music.
But—Haeckel has forgotten the player !
Brain and thought are instrument and
music. Where, in Haeckel’s philosophy,
is the instrumentalist?
A very singular omission on the part
of one of the keenest observers in the
world! Let us examine the matter.
We have seen in the preceding chapter
the immense mass of scientific evidence
which goes to show that there is an
exact correspondence between brain
action and soul-life. The correspondence
is just the same in man as in the ape or
the dog. As the shadow varies with the
object which projects it, so does thought
vary with the quality and action of the
63
brain. There is no dispute about this.
No induction is based on a wider and
more varied range of observations.
This correspondence is the same as we
find in the case of the heart and its
function, the stomach and digestion, or
the lungs and respiration. Now, in all
these analogous cases we do not seek an
instrumentalist.
The instrument is
automatic. For its formation we look
back along a process of natural evolution
which stretches over 50,000,000 years.
Whether the evolutionary agencies were
divinely guided or no will be considered
presently, but at all events in the heart
and lungs we have automatic instruments,
and we never dream of looking for a
present instrumentalist. It is the same
with the brain of the dog. When the
dog dies, we do not ask what has become
of the instrumentalist now that the
instrument (brain) is broken and the
music (thought) is silent. We never
dream of there being a third element.
But the mind of man is the same mind
more fully developed.
In a sense there is a third factor—
both in the stomach, the canine life, and
the human life—and this is the only
truth there really is in this very mislead
ing figure of rhetoric. I have already
mentioned a critic who endeavours to
deduce the immortality of the soul from
the conservation of energy, and this
gives us the clue. Critics very stupidly,
or very wilfully, represent Haeckel as
saying that thought is a movement of
the molecules of the brain, just as they
say he resolves all things into matter.
They ignore the fact that he lays as
much, if not more, stress on force than
on matter. He holds, of course, that
there is fundamentally only one reality,
but it is most improper to call that by
the name of one of its attributes (exten
sion). Thus we have, in a sense, three
elements : the instrument, the music, and
the soul or energy associated with the
brain. When Haeckel speaks of thought
as “ a function of the brain,” he means
the living brain—the incomparably intri
cate structure of material elements and
�64
THE IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL
the natural forces associated with them,
in which thought arises. We have no
scientific or philosophical ground what
ever for . postulating any further element
to explain the music. Is it scientific to
make an exception of this living brain,
and say it is the only non-automatic organ
in the body ? Does its relation to the
rest of the body give the least support
to the notion ? Is it scientific to say the
living brain is automatic in the whole
animal world, but cannot be so in man
because the music is finer and more diffi
cult ? Does embryology favour the idea ?
Does philosophy step in, and bid us sus
pend the scientific method and admit a
breach in the scientific continuity ?
Probably it is to philosophy they will
appeal. These ideas, Dr. Horton says,
“rest on the region of thought and con
sciousness ” to which Haeckel “ studi
ously closes his eyes.” By all means let
us go to philosophy. Kant will tell us
that these psychological proofs of immor
tality are quite discredited. Schelling
and Hegel and Schopenhauer will give us
the consolation of disappearing in the
world-process. Hume and Mill and Spen
cer will prove more than sceptical. Most
modern philosophers will tell us, as
Miinsterberg does, that “ the philosopher
who bases his hope of immortality on a
theory of brain-functions . . . stands
on the same ground as the astronomer
who seeks with his telescope for a place
in the universe where no space exists,
and where there would be undisturbed
room for God and eternal bodiless souls.”
Certainly one can quote thinkers who
wish mind and brain movements to be
left parallel, with the relation of the two
undetermined. But they advance no
reasons which arrest the application of
scientific method. Here in the mind
life are phenomena that we can examine
from two sides—from without and from
within. This may seem at first to give
a certain uniqueness to the soul-life.
But the only soul-life we can examine
from within is our own individual experi
ence. Every other man’s soul is a
matter of objective examination to us;
and by much of the same evidence which
convinces us of his similar experiences,
we are forced to extend conscious mental
action to the brutes. So the uniqueness
once more disappears. Philosophy will
not help or hinder us. Referring to the
work of Professor Royce, a distinguished
American philosopher and Gifford Lec
turer, Professor Le Conte says: “He
gives up the question of immortality as
insoluble by philosophy. Well—perhaps
it is.” i
Thus (reserving some further philo
sophic arguments for the moment) we
return unembarrassed to our scientific
procedure ; and “ science,” Prof. Miinsterberg says, “ opposes to any doctrine
of individual immortality an unbroken
and impregnable barrier.”2 The rigid
relation determined by psycho-physics,
the rigid relation observed in the evolu
tion of the thinking animal, the rigid
relation that is recorded by pathology
and ethnology, and that lies on the
very surface of life, means something
more than parallelism.
It is easy to
quote Huxley and Tyndall in opposition
to Haeckel’s formula. The one was an
idealist in metaphysics: the other has
said much more in the monistic sense
than he ever said in the agnostic. Pro
ceeding on realistic and scientific lines,
we are driven by the rules of induction
to regard thought as wholly bound up
with brain, and to look for no third
element beyond the matter and force of
which the brain is so intricately con
structed. The mysteries that still linger
about consciousness and memory, just as
about embryonic development, for in
stance, are scientific mysteries. To build
on them would be to repeat the discre
dited old tactics.
If the theories of
them which Haeckel offers are unsatis
factory, wait for better ones. They are
the light bridges of the monistic system,
forecasting the scientific advance. But
that, in whatever way, mind-force is an
evolution of the general cosmic-force,
1 The Conception of God, p. 752 Psychology and Life, p. 85.
�THE IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL
and that it therefore affords no more
promise of immortality in the individual
human mind than it does in the indi
vidual motor-car, is a scientific induction
resting on a mass of evidence and drawn
up in observance of the most rigid
rules.
Let us now consider the arguments
brought forward in favour of the belief
in immortality by 'those who have not
lingered to defend any evolutionary gap,
but who freely admit the evolution of
the human mind. These are the “ replies
by anticipation” which, we are told,
should have withheld Professor Haeckel
from his extreme conclusions. Let us
see how puny and fruitless are the efforts
they make to overleap the “ unbroken
and impregnable barrier ” that Professor
Miinsterberg speaks of. Miinsterberg
himself offers a curious example of the
way modern philosophers, especially
idealist philosophers, lend a nominal
support to religious doctrines, yet are
found to mean something totally different
from what the world at large understands
by those doctrines. As the words I
have quoted show, he is as hostile as
Haeckel to any belief in personal im
mortality. “ Only to a cheap curiosity,”
he says again, “ can it appear desirable
that the inner life, viewed as a series of
psychological facts shall go on and on ”;
and again : “ The claim that the deceased
spirits go on with psychological existence
is a violation of the ethical belief in
immortality.”1 Thus he rejects the only
notion of immortality which is in any
plausible way connected with those
moral consequences that are so much
urged upon us. However, he speaks of
an “ ethical belief in immortality,” and
so is gathered by controversialists into
the imposing category of “scientists
opposed to Haeckel.” The immortality
he promises us is no more consoling
than that offered by Comte or by
Haeckel himself. “Life lives on.” It
is a natural expression of his idealism.
“ For the philosophic mind,” he says,
1 Psychology and Life, p. 280.
65
“ which sees the difference between
reality and psychological transformation,
immortality is certain; for him the denial
of immortality would be even quite
meaningless.
Death is a biological
phenomenon in the world of objects in
time; how then can death reach a reality
which is not an object but an attitude,
and therefore neither in time nor space ? ”
He meets the scientific evidence by
getting rid of the body and death, and
the material world altogether.
Professor W. James, another able
American psychologist whom
Mr.
Ballard and Mr. Williams and several
ecclesiastical papers urge us to read, has
made his profession of faith at the close
of his recent Gifford Lectures, pub
lished under the title of Varieties of
Religious Experience. We shall see that
it does not include a belief in God.
On our present question it is little more
helpful to the Christian. Professor
James is convinced as a spiritist that
there are non-human intelligences in
existence, but he is not yet convinced
that these external intelligences are the
souls of men and women who have
“ passed beyond.” So far he lends no
real support to the doctrine of immor
tality. Professor J. Royce, another
distinguished American thinker whom
the Gifford Trust has invited amongst
us, “givesup the question of immortality
as insoluble by philosophy ”; so
Professor Le Conte assures us.
Mr. Le Conte himself, we saw,
follows this statement with a candid
admission that “perhaps it is.” But
he is not disposed to yield entirely as
yet. Where does so thorough an
evolutionist find ground for ascribing
this unique prerogative to the human
soul ? He professes to find it precisely
in the “evolutionary view of man’s
origin.” If that view of the world
process which we have hitherto sustained
is correct, it follows, he says, that the
human mind-force is “a spark of the
Divine Energy ” and a “ part of God.”
So is the force of a motor car, on his
principles. But, he says, the universal
E
�66
THE IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL
spirit (Haeckel’s universal substance on
its force side) has worked its way
upward through the hierarchy of evolu
tion, so that it (or God) “ may have, in
man, something not only to contem
plate, but also to love and to be loved
by ” ; and in view of that project, which
is not supposed to be a temporary pro
ject, man must be immortal.1 The
frailty of the position is obvious. It
assumes that the “ Divine Energy ”
(which is Haeckel’s substance) was
intelligent and had “designs” from the
beginning.
We shall consider the
grounds of this assumption in the
next chapter. But, granting it for the
sake of the argument, we are asked to
conceive this eternally intelligent prin
ciple going through a laborious process of
evolution in order to reach consciousness
in the human mind and admire itself,
and love and be loved by itself, in that
form; for the mind zs God, on these
pantheistic principles. Moreover, sup
posing that we could gather this remark
able project, it contains no promise
whatever of immortality for the in
dividual ; the “ Divine Energy ” is
incarnated in so many forms, and will
be throughout the eternal world-process,
that the perishing of one form or of one
world will hardly diminish its contempla
tion or its admiration. Further, if man
z's God, how comes he to be ignorant of
the project ?
What becomes (theo
retically) of moral distinctions ? But
this fantastic theory bristles with diffi
culties.
Mr. Fiske’s conclusion is very similar
to Professor Le Conte’s, as will be
expected from the similarity of his
premises. The doctrine of evolution,
he says, does not destroy our hope of
immortality. “ Haeckel’s opinion was
never reached through a scientific study
of evolution, and it is nothing but an
echo from the French speculation of the
eighteenth century ” ; and “ he takes his
opinion on such matters ready-made
from Ludwig Buchner, who is simply an
echo of the eighteenth century atheist
La Mettrie.”1 How Fiske could ever
pen such an egregious statement about
either Haeckel or Buchner is one of the
mysteries of religious controversy. After
our review of Haeckel’s arguments it
may very well be ignored. And when
Fiske has come to the end of this petty
and petulant criticism of Haeckel we
find him presenting a conclusion almost
less satisfactory than that of Le Conte.
The substance of his argument is that
“ there is in man a psychic ele
ment identical in nature with that
which is eternal” (p. 170). On the face
of it, that is just what Haeckel says.
Man’s mind-force is a little eddy or
focus in the eternal cosmic force.
There is no ground whatever for assum
ing that as such it will be eternal, and
will not simply sink back into the
eternal stream, like all other temporary
concentrations. The only difference is
that Fiske takes the eternal principle to
be conscious and intelligent from the
first—a point we discuss in the next
chapter.
There remains only the argumentation
of Mr. Newman Smyth in his able but
pathetic attempt to reconstruct Christian
belief on a scientific base.2 The argu
ment itself is an old one, but it is put
with some freshness.
He points out
that the evolutionary process has just
reached an important stage. Evolving
nature has at length passed beyond mere
animal life and reached the threshold of
the spiritual life. Since, then, we dis
cern an upward purpose in evolution, it
is impossible to suppose that the process
will end now that so promising a stage
has been reached. To this we need
only reply that, whether or no “ purpose ”
is discernible in nature (which we shall
deny), this further evolution will take
place in the race taken collectively. This
is so clear that Mr. Smyth makes a des
perate effort to apply his argument to the
individual. He says the “ last word of
organic development is the individual
1 The Conception of God, p. 77-
1 Through Nature to God, p. 144.
2 'Through Science to Faith, p. 265 and foil.
�THE IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL
and his worth,” and he appeals to
“nature’s increasing estimate of indi
viduality in comparison with the species.”
Now, if we take this in the only sense
in which it could be conceived to help a
belief in personal immortality, it is totally
opposed to the scientific evidence. The
only way in which nature seems more
concerned about the individual is in the
perfection which she gives to the indi
viduals of the later species; but this is
absolutely necessary if the species itself
is to advance. In all other respects
nature, as ever, is indifferent to the indi
vidual—or, for the matter of that, if we
take a long enough perspective, to the
species itself.
The
supplementary
consideration
which Mr. Smyth submits is still feebler.
He contends that, though evolution is
generally continuous, it shows what he
calls “critical periods.” He instances
the changes which take place in a drop
of water as it sinks to freezing-point or
rises to the point of evaporation. He
thinks science does not preclude the
possibility of some analogous “ critical
period ” for the human soul. Nay, he
says, getting bolder, biology favours such
a view.
Look how “very slight and
easily changed” is the connection be
tween mind and organism at certain
times—at conception, in sleep, and when
we near death. Biology, he says, shows
that “ the mind does not need for its
birth and its coming to its inheritance a
whole body, a complete brain, a fullyformed organ of sense, or so much as a
single nerve ; a few microscopic threads
of chromatin matter in the egg are
enough.” Hence, if at both ends of
life the bond that links mind and body
can wear so thin, it is conceivable that
it may be dispensed with altogether.
Now, this is a most perverse piece of
reasoning. At conception, and long after
conception, we have no right to say that
the mind is there at all. It appears and
grows with the brain—that is all the
evidence says.
The facts point to a
conclusion diametrically opposed to that
of Mr. Smyth.
They show complete J
67
and slavish dependence. As to heredity,
it is gratuitous to say it is the mind, and
not the body, that inherits. Even Dr.
W. N. Clarke (who, with many modern
theologians, does not believe that the
“soul” is transmitted from parent to
child) says the facts of heredity point to
the mechanical, not the spiritual, theory.
At death we see the same rigid depend
ence of mind on organism, instead of
finding anything like a token of an in
dependent mind. The mind flickers and
goes out—as far as evidence goes—in
exact proportion to the last spluttering
and extinction of the physical life of the
body. At both ends of life, as through
out its course, the correlation of mind
action and brain-action is rigid and ab
solute. And, finally, what Mr. Smyth
unfortunately calls “ critical periods ” in
nature have not the least analogy to the
notion of the mind-force existing apart
from its material substratum. A differ
ent grouping of the water-molecules
naturally gives rise to different properties ;
so does a different grouping of brain
molecules (in fever, under opium, &c.)
give rise to different mental qualities.
When we find a case of the properties
or forces of a substance parting company
from, or changing independently of, the
material substratum, we shall have found
some ground in nature for the conception
of a disembodied soul; but not until
then.
Such are the feeble defences which
are to-day set up by the apologists
who have scientific attainments in the
Christian body. On the strength of
these ethereal speculations we are asked
to resist the weight of the scientific
evidence as to the relation of body and
soul, and to admit for man a privilege
that is unknown from end to end of the
universe. We are asked to believe that
with the aid of a fantastic and desperate
philosophy such as this we can overleap
science’s “unbroken and impregnable
barrier.” We are asked to call Haeckel
“an atrophied soul” and “a child in
spiritual reasoning ” because he will not
abdicate his scientific method and
�68
GOD
procedure in the face of such specula
tions as these. I have not, it is true,
examined the argument for a future
life from the alleged exigencies of the
moral order; but this is little urged
to-day, and we shall see, when we come
to deal with the monistic ethics, that
it rests on a false conception of moral
’trw.1
I have sought, in particular, and
stated with perfect fidelity, the argu
ments of those modern scholars who
are opposed to him as being equally in
formed in science and equally convinced
of evolution. The reader may judge
whether he or they are the more
philosophic, logical, and scientific in
procedure.
Chapter VII
GOD
We now enter upon a new and almost
the final stage of our direct vindication
of monism. If we have succeeded so
far in warding off the objections which
have been urged against Haeckel’s
position, if we have shown that the very
latest scientific research increasingly
confirms his position, it is clear that we
have covered considerable ground. We
have discerned in the stupendous process
of cosmic evolution the growth or the
unfolding of one great reality that lies
across the immeasurable space of the
universe. An illimitable substance, re
vealing itself to us as matter and force
(or spirit), is dimly perceived at the root
1 Neither have I, it will be noted, referred to
the empirical or spiritistic evidence for the per
sistence of mind, which gains increasing favour
to-day. This is not due to any lack of respect
for the distinguished scientists who have admitted
such evidence, or for the sobriety and judgment
of so many about us to-day who receive it. It is
due to the utter futility of discussing evidence of
this kind. It is of such a nature, resting so
largely on delicate moral considerations, that it
must in my opinion be left entirely to personal
examination in the concrete. But that Haeckel
is right in saying the subject is obscured with
much fraud and triviality is admitted, not only
by life-long students like Mr. Podmore, but by
many earnest spiritists.
of this evolution as a simple and homo
geneous medium (prothyl), associated with
an equally homogeneous force. Then the
continuous prothyl, by a process not yet
determined, forms into what are virtually
or really discrete and separate particles
—electrons: the electrons unite to
build atoms of various sizes and
structures, and the rich variety of the
chemical elements is given, the base of
an incalculable number of combinations
and forms of matter. Meantime the
more concentrated (ponderable) elements
gather into cosmic masses under the
influence of the force associated with
them : the force evolving and differen
tiating at equal pace with the matter (with
which it is one in reality). Nebulse
are formed: solar systems grow like
crystals from them: planets take on
solid crusts, with enveloping oceans
and atmospheres. Presently a more
elaborate
combination of material
elements, protoplasm, with—naturally—■
a more elaborate force-side, makes its
appearance, and organic evolution sets
in. The little cellules cling together
and form tissue-animals, which increase
in complexity and organisation and
centralisation until the human frame is
�GOD
produced, the life-force growing more
elaborate with the structure, until it
issues in the remarkable properties of
the human mind.
The tracing of this picture is the ideal
that science set itself a quarter of a
century ago.
The success has been
swift and astounding. We are still, as
Sir A. Riicker said, living in the twilight;
but no man of science now doubts that
what we do see is the real outline of the
universe and its growth. But other and
different cosmic speculations held the
field, and these were ultimately con
nected with the powerful corporations
and the intense emotions of religion.
As science advanced theology began a
long process of adaptation to the new
thought. The ambition of science was
to cover the whole ground with a scheme
of mechanical and orderly explanation,
because the instinct of science felt that
the universe was an orderly and con
tinuous structure. The ambition of the
theologian was to detect and exult over
gaps and breaches in this mechanical
scheme, and introduce his supernatural
agencies by means of them. We have
seen that many of the ablest theistic
apologists of our day (Ward, Smyth, Le
Conte, Fiske, Clarke, &c.)—almost all,
indeed, of those who have scientific
equipment—grant the ability of science,
now or in the near future, to cover “ the
whole cosmological domain ” with its
network of mechanical causation. We
have seen that there is a general dis
avowal of “ a theology of gaps ” or of the
desire to build on the temporary igno
rance of science.
But a few heroic
souls still linger in the familiar trenches,
and we have fully considered what they
have to say. With Smyth, Le Conte,
and Fiske, we have been forced to con
clude that so far we have seen in the
cosmic process the orderly unfolding of
one sole all-diffused matter-force reality,
which we commonly call Nature.
But we have throughout, for the sake
of clearer procedure, reserved one con
sideration that these advanced evolution
ists have been urging on us at every
69
step—that is to say, the claim that the
evolutionary process must have been in
telligently set going and intelligently
directed. Haeckel is quite right, they
say, in claiming that science can give or
adumbrate a mechanical interpretation
of the whole process. Quibbles about
his particular way of conceiving the first
formation of life, or of consciousness,
and so on, are irrelevant and distressing
to the serious thinkers, as is the diver
sion of the issue by discussing his taste,
or his knowledge of history, or his
optimism or pessimism. The important
point is that he has proved his case so
far in its essentials. But he must now
meet this last position of his opponents.
Was this monistic cosmic process con
ceived and designed from the beginning,
and guided throughout, by an intelligent
being, or no ? 1 This is the question of
the hour, and especially of the coming
hour, in apologetics.
As I write a
journal reaches me containing an inter
view with Mr. Ballard. Asked whether
he thinks “the rehabilitation of religion
would come from the scientists,” he
replies: " I think that the theistic basis
of Christianity will have scientific support
more than ever.
Modern science is
pledged to evolution, and Christianity
can only be justified scientifically on
evolutionary lines.” And Professor Le
Conte says: “ Here is the last line of
defence to the supporters of supernatu
ralism in the realm of Nature ... it is
evident that a yielding here implies not
a mere shifting of line, but a change of
base: not a readjustment of details
only, but a reconstruction of Christian
theology.
This, I believe, is indeed
necessary.”2
And we have already
seen passages from Ward and others to
the same effect.
Here is a dramatic simplification of
the controversy, which every thinker
1 Let us note in passing that this is not neces
sarily a question of monism or dualism. Mr. R.
Williams and others expressly state they are
monists, that God is not distinct from Nature.
More about this presently.
2 Evolution and Religiozis Thought, p. 295.
�7o
GOD
will welcome. Theology will, as before,
spread itself over the whole cosmos, but
it will be with the repetition of a single
formula. There will no longer be cease
less quarrels as to whether science can
explain this or that phenomenon with
its natural or mechanical causes. The
new attitude. is that this mechanical
explanation is precisely the work of
science, and if it cannot give a mechani
cal explanation of a thing—say, con
sciousness—to-day, we will wait patiently
till to-morrow.
But, the new theolo
gians say, we want to know in addition
how these mechanical causes came to
co-operate in producing such remarkable
structures.
With this science has
nothing to do, so we close our thirty
years’ war and sign an eternal truce.
Nay, if we look at the matter rightly,
these theologians of the twentieth cen
tury say it is very desirable that science
should complete its mechanical interpre
tation of the cosmos.
An automatic
universe, evolving by inherent forces
from electrons to minds, would be the
most marvellous mechanism ever con
ceived. The mind would be forced to
look for the engineer. Those ancient
theologians who scoffed at Tyndall for
his Belfast address were too hasty; so
were those who caused Huxley to com
pare their dread of the mechanical
scheme to the terror of savages during
an eclipse of the sun; so are those who
beat their wings in vain against Haeckel’s
structure to-day. The materialist will be
the truest auxiliary of the theist. If he
can only show that the universe is the
unfolding of one form of matter and one
force (or one matter-force reality), he
has put before us one of the most
stupendous machines that ever bore the
mark of intelligence.
We are then, it seems, approaching
the psychological moment in the great
drama of the conflict of science and
religion. That I am indicating a true I
tendency will be perfectly clear from the •
preceding chapters.
We have rarely |
found men of ability or of complete i
scientific equipment defending the old !
trenches that barred the advance of the
mechanical system of science. We have
constantly heard impatient denials of a
love for “ gaps.” But before I proceed
to show how Haeckel has met this teleo
logical position, let me quote a few
recent writers, both to show that the
formula is as simple as I said, and that
concentration on this position is the
order of the day.1 I have quoted Pro
fessor Ward’s opinion that, “ if there has
been any interference in the cosmic pro
cess, it must have been before the process
began.’( Dr. Croll, in his Basis of Evolu
tion, distinguishes between producing
(mechanical) and determining (directive)
forces, and tells the theologian of the
future to confine his attention to the
latter : “ The grand, the difficult, though
as yet unanswered, question is this:
What guides the molecule to its proper
position in relation to the end which it
has to serve ? ” With Mr. Newman
Smyth the supreme question is: “ Is
evolution without guidance or with guid
ance ?” Mr. Fiske says: “There is in
every earnest thinker a craving after a
final cause . . . and this craving can no
more be extinguished than our belief in
objective reality.” 2 Dr. Dallinger says
that, if the mechanical philosophy is
true we have “ a more majestic design
than all the thinkers of the past had
ever dreamed.”
And the sermon
preached on the last Association Sun
day at Southport by the Bishop of Ripon
points unmistakably to the same tendency
—even to a pantheistic identification of
God with the forces at work in Nature.
1 There may be a few fond and admiring
souls who are looking out for a reference to Mr.
Ambrose Pope’s third criticism. Briefly, he
finds that Haeckel has got rid of God by a third
“half-day excursion,” in the course of which he
discovered a system of “ physiological monism,”
which, as before, contains the fatal germ under
an innocent exterior. The joke may be given
for what it is worth, but it gets stale. Mr. Pope
goes on to say that when you ask Haeckel about
the substance he puts instead of God, he says he
is not sure whether it exists. Tableau, and
exeunt omnes, of course. We have met this
point in the second chapter.
2 The Idea of God, p. 137.
�7i
GOD
The new teleology flatters itself it
differs very scientifically from the old;
for “ teleology ” had fallen into disrepute
during the period of “ gap ” theology
which followed the break-up of Paleyism.
It is true that there are differences.
Aubrey Moore points out that we now
do not forget the past (the evolution) of
the organ. Dr. Iverach observes that
the new teleologist. does not think so
much of an “ external artificer ” as of an
immanent directive principle, and that
we do not now attempt to deduce scien
tific knowledge from the “ purpose ” of
a thing. These differences, however, do
not alter the essential structure of the
argument, which remains the same as
when Kant rejected it and Paley drove
it to death. We may state it briefly in
abstract form to this effect: Wherever in
Nature we find several agencies co
operating in the production of a certain
result which is orderly or beautiful, we
see the guidance of mind. The under
lying assumption is that the unconscious
forces of the universe will only produce
chaos unless they are guided. Pre-con
ceived design followed up by directive
control, or else a “ fortuitous clash of
atoms,” is the alternative put before us.
The process of evolution taken as a
whole has been so orderly, and had such
marvellous results, that we must admit
the agencies at work in the process were
intelligently guided. To suppose that
this process should chance to culminate
in the appearance of man is said to be
incredible. So throughout the whole
process we find co-operations, adapta
tions, orderly and beautiful operations,
which speak eloquently of design and
control. From the very first step, the
making of the atom, to the last, the
making of man’s brain, we see the finger
of God.
A few extracts and references will
show that this is a correct summary. As
regards the inorganic universe a little
work recently published by the Rev. W.
Profeit well illustrates the argument.
The author starts with the principle that
“every form of being must act according
to its nature,” and goes on to say that
“ the particles of matter have not in them
conscious intelligence, and consequently
have not of themselves the power of
arranging, and so of producing complex
order.”1 He then reviews the teaching
of modern physics at length, pausing at
every few paces, in the familiar manner,
to admire the ways of the Creator.
“ To deal with every particle of matter
in the universe, so as to make it of a
special type, to order all, so that they
might come under types so few and
compact, demanded an amount . of
thought and work of overwhelming
greatness, and could not be the result of
chance.” Chemistry is “crowded with
adjustments, packed with adaptations.”
The moulding of matter into solar
systems of such marvellous symmetry
and adaptability to life occasions another
outburst. In short, theology can easily
run to volumes by repeating “ Great are
thy works” at every forward step in
evolution. Chance is out of the ques
tion. “ Ah ! what foolery it is to deem
that a mighty world has been produced
by chance.” Happily, there are no fools
of that particular type amongst us. But
“necessity” is equally impotent. “No
sane mind ’’—the young theology keeps
up the literary tradition, you see, which
made even Fiske exclaim against “the
intellectual arrogance which the argu
ments of theologians show lurking
beneath their expressions of humility ” 2
—“no sane mind can for a moment
imagine that from the nature of things it
was an eternal necessity that the seventy,
or thereby, different kinds of atoms
should all exist, or be formed in the
numbers and proportions of numbers, in
which they help to form our great system
obeying the orb of day.” So it is to be
either “ fortuitous concourse ” or mind ;
and as the universe is not a chaotic
mess, -we must admit it was presided
over by intelligence from the first.
Dr. Dallinger offers us the same
1 The Creation of Matter, p. 6.
2 Outlines of Cosmic Philosophy, p. 451.
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GOD
dilemma of chance or control, and urges
that to adopt chance “ is surely to trifle
with the fundamental principles of our
reasoning powers.” Rationalists, we
may say in passing, had a concern for
our “ reasoning powers ” in days when
doctors of divinity looked upon them as
mischievous.
Dr. Croll argues in the
same .way. Some principle, he says,
must determine why a natural force
takes direction A instead of direction B
or C. The determination of planetary
orbits is not so much due to gravitation
as to the way in which gravitation acted.
So in the formation of crystals or
organisms. “ Out of the infinite number
of different paths, what is it that directs
the force to select the right path ? ”
Dr. Croll seems to fancy that in this he
has suggested a new idea to the world.
Dr. Iverach, both in Christianity and
Evolution and in Theism, follows the
same line. For the pre-atomic mass to
be made atomic, and to produce the
orderly and periodic system of elements
with their affinities, the forces at work
must have been guided.
The argument does not differ in sub
stance when we pass to the organic
world, but, naturally, the notes of ex
clamation and edifying observations
increase. Biological science, says Dr.
Iverach, “must admit purpose in the
magnificent adjustments it points out.”
Mr. Newman Smyth gives an admirable
sketch of the evolution of the eye, and
pleads that the forces which have
gradually constructed it did not any the
less need guidance and control because
they took millions of years to do it.
Mr. Ballard takes the evolution of the
eye in the foetus, and says that if a child
were to repeat “ that God caused it so
to do, it is utterly beyond the power of
all modern science to contradict.”1
Embryology is, it is true, as yet very
imperfect.
However, other passages
make it clear that, though Mr. Ballard
may here be building on a “gap,” he
generally offers us the usual dilemma,
1 Miracles of Unbelief, p. 51.
design or “fortuitous concourse of
atoms,” and characteristically tells us
the latter is “fatuous.” In fact Mr.
Ballard tells even the agnostic, who
thinks there is not enough evidence
either for or against teleology, that his
hesitation is mere “childish fatuity.”
The Rev. R. Williams—not to neglect
him—tells his weaver-admirers that “the
solar system is really more wonderful
than a loom,” which is obviously de
signed, and that organisms are more
wonderful still. And Dr. W. N. Clarke
says “it is not probable that the most
significant elements in a world came
into it without having been entertained
during the process as character-giving
ideals.” He says Darwinism has modi
fied, but not destroyed, teleology. We
now know that needs, and contrivances
to supply them, “ grow up within the
universe,” but this power of adaptation
must have been given to organisms by a
purposive intelligence.1
The argument, therefore, on which
the fate of theism is finally to be deter
mined is now tolerably clear. Leave
Haeckel free to perfect his mechanical
monism ; when he has completed it, we
shall point out to the astonished pro
fessor that he has been proving the
existence of God all the time. If this
force which he traces for us in its
marvellous ascent through the atom, the
nebula, the cell, and the organism, was
unconscious from the start, and if it has
achieved all this progress in so orderly
and determined a fashion, it must have
been guided. Well, let us see whether
Haeckel is quite so naive and antiquated
as these good people assure the world.
To begin with, the flavour of antiquity
is quite clearly on the other side.
“ Chance ” and “ fortuitous concourse
of atoms ” are phrases which you will
not find outside theological schools for
the last 2,000 years. The early Greeks
used them. The constant reiteration of
them in our time is a grave piece of
insincerity, or else ignorance. How Mr.
1 Outlines of Christian 1'heology, p. 116.
�GOD
Profeit and Mr. Ballard come to use
these phrases in the year of grace 1903
is best known to themselves. Professor
Haeckel deals clearly with the point
(p. 97), and explains—as has been ex
plained innumerable times—the only
sense in which science admits “ chance ”
events. Mr. Profeit rightly indicates a
third alternative, necessity; and Dr.
Dallinger somewhat vaguely suggests it.
Haeckel and his colleagues hold that
the direction which the evolutionary
agencies take is not “ fortuitous ” : that
they never could take but the one
direction which they have actually taken.
A stone has not a dozen possible paths
to travel by when you drop it from your
hand. You do not seek any reason why
it follows direction A instead of direction
B or C. So it is, says the monist, with
all the forces in the universe. Some
day science will be able to trace a set of
forces working for ages at the con
struction of a solar system, or at the
making of an eye. The theist says the
ultimate object must have been foreseen
and the forces must have been guided,
or they would never have worked
steadily in this definite direction. The
monist says that these forces no more
needed guiding than a tramcar does;
there was only one direction possible for
them. Here is a clear issue, and in the
present state of apologetics, an important
one. It is useless to talk, as Fiske does,
of the “ teleological instinct.” “ The
teleological instinct in man,” he says,
“ cannot be suppressed or ignored. The
human soul shrinks from the thought
that it is without kith or kin in all this
wide universe.” This is not only “an
appeal to the imagination ”: it is utterly
opposed to the facts of life. Mr. Fiske
ascribes his own peculiar temperament
to the universe. The matter must be
reasoned out.
Now, it seems clear that if a man
asserts that the forces of the universe are
naturally erratic, and may go in any one
of a dozen directions unless they are
guided, he must show cause for his
Opinion. The man of science has never
73
discovered an erratic force yet. Force
always acts uniformly, always takes the
same direction. If you say this is only
because the natural forces are guided
and controlled, and is not their proper
and inherent nature, the man of science
naturally asks: How do you know ?
Science sees nothing in nature to suggest
such an idea. “ When we consider the
movements of the starry heavens to-day,”
says Mr. Mallock, “instead of feeling
it to be wonderful that they are ab
solutely regular, we should feel it to be
wonderful if they were ever anything
else . . . We realise that order, instead
of being the marvel of the universe, is
the indispensable condition of its
existence—that it is a physical platitude,
not a divine paradox, ”1 That is certainly
the feeling the universe inspires in men
of science. What is the ground for this
notion of the essentially erratic character
of natural forces ? One seeks it quite in
vain. Dr. Croll says : “ Though our
acquaintance with the forces of nature
were absolutely perfect, the question as
to how particles or molecules arrange
themselves into organic forms would
probably still remain as deep a mystery
as ever, unless we knew something more
than force.” 2 But he does not offer us a
single consideration to convince us of
this “ probability.” When Mr. Profeit
tries to bully us into admitting that “ no
sane mind can for a moment imagine
that from the nature of things it was an
eternal necessity that the seventy, or
thereby, different kinds of atoms should
all exist,” we timidly venture to inquire :
Why not ? Force, as far as our ex
perience goes, acts necessarily, inevitably,
infallibly. There could be no science if
it did not.
The only attempt made to escape this
initial difficulty of the teleologist is to
appeal to a number of totally false
analogies. The favourite is that vener
able and imposing sophism, that if you
cast to the ground an infinite (or a finite)
number of letters, they might after
1 Religion as a Credible Doctrine, p. 162.
a The Basis of Evolution, p. 24.
F
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GOD
infinite gyrations make a word here and
there, but we should think the man an
enthusiast who expected even a short
sentence, and a fool if he expected
them ever to make a poem. It is
absurd to offer us this as an analogy
to-day; or else it is begging the
whole question.
Take the case of
the eye. Quite certainly this is an
evolutionary product. Forces acting on
matter during millions of years have
evolved it. Each step in the process is
perfectly complete and intelligible in
itself. It is wholly arbitrary to suppose
the eye was in view when protoplasm
was first formed: or when the first
sensitive cells appeared on the surface of
the primitive animal body: or when
pigment-cells were developed at the fore
most part of the body : or when a sensi
tive nerve was formed under the skin;
and so on. Each structure was useful
in its turn ; and on that very account
natural selection fastened on it. It is
sheer imagination to suppose that the
ultimate form was foreseen: and it is sheer
scientific untruth to say the ultimate
form must have been foreseen or else the
earlier structures would be unintelligible.
Here is a plexus of natural forces acting
on matter, without, as far as we can see,
the possibility of their acting otherwise;
only one result was possible. And we
are asked to regard this as curious,
because, in the case of the imaginary
throw of type, natural forces will not lose
their uniform character and act miracu
lously. Finally, it is a colossal petitio
principii, because the question is pre
cisely whether Virgil’s Aeneid or Shake
speare’s Hamlet is not an evolutionary
product.
It seems, then, that the initial diffi
culty of the teleologist is insuperable.
He cannot give us a shadow of proof of
his assertion that natural forces are erra
tic. Haeckel is completely within the
right of science in speaking of the uni
verse as, in Goethe’s phrase, “ ruled by
eternal, iron laws ” (or forces). They
have wrought out a certain result—the
world we form part of. Until some good
reason is shown for thinking they could
have acted otherwise, we see no need for
designer, or guide, or engineer. Let us
put it another way. To an extent the
teleologists are playing on the present im
perfection of science, as Dr. Croll
innocently betrayed. Let us take them
at their word, and suppose science will in
time give a complete mechanical expla
nation of everything, for the good reason
that God, as they say, created a machine
that needed no mending or re-starting.
And let us suppose that he designed the
ultimate form of the cosmos. Is this
design communicated to the unconscious
atoms and their forces ? Clearly not; no
one would say that. Are these forces
which build up and impel the atoms
supernaturally inflected or modulated at
each step ? Again, no one would say
this. The only possible conception of
telic action on a cosmic scale is, when
we descend from grandiose phrases to
practical ideas, that from the start the
matter-force reality was of such a
nature that it would infallibly evolve into
the cosmos we form part of to-day. Any
other conception of “ guidance ” and
“control” is totally unthinkable. And
as a fact theists are settling down to
formulate their position in that way.
The interference, as Ward says, took
place before the process began.
But before we take up this last point
it is necessary to glance at another side
of the question. Haeckel has pointed
out that, not only do we see no ground
for believing in the presence of some
primitive design, but we see very con
siderable reasons for rejecting it. The
world is crowded with features which
forbid us lightly to admit a controlling
supreme intelligence. There is no an
swer to this. “ The fact stands inex
orably before us,” says Mr. Fiske, “ that
a Supreme Will, enlightened by perfect
intelligence and possessed of infinite
power, might differently have fashioned
the universe, though in ways inconceiv
able by us, so that the suffering and the
waste of life which characterise nature’s
process of evolution might have been
�GOD
avoided.”1 As to the waste, Dr. Iverach
ventures to say that “infinite precision
at one point is inconsistent with bad
shooting ”; but the infinite precision is,
we have seen, an assumption, whereas
the bad shooting is ubiquitous. At
every sex-act millions of spermatozoa are
wasted. Others say the glorious final
issue puts all right. But as Mr. Mallock
says, “ Whatever may be God’s future,
there will still remain His past.” Most
ideologists retreat into mystery. One
might unkindly remind them of their
great disinclination to let the monist
leave anything unexplained, but it is
better to say that when all the tangible
evidence is on one side and none on the
other, we do not regard it as a fair
dilemma. Listen to the impression of
a cultured defender of religion after a
study of the evolutionary process in
nature : “ We must divest ourselves of
all foregone conclusions, of;all question
begging reverences, and look the facts
of the universe steadily in the face. If
theists will but do this, what they will
see will astonish them. They will see
that if there is anything at the back of
this vast process with a consciousness
and a purpose in any way resembling our
own—a Being who knows what He
wants and is doing his best to get it—
he is, instead of a holy and all-wise God,
a scatter-brained, semi-powerful, semi
impotent monster. They will recognise
as clearly as they ever did the old familiar
facts which seemed to them evidences of
God’s wisdom, love, and goodness; but
they will find that these facts, when taken
in connection with the others, only sup
ply us with a standard in the nature of
this Being himself by which most of his
acts are exhibited to us as those of a
criminal madman. If he had been blind,
he had not had sin; but if we maintain
that he can see, then his sin remains.
Habitually a bungler as he is, and callous
when not actively cruel, we are forced to
regard him, when he seems to exhibit
benevolence, as, not divinely benevolent,
1 Outlines of Cosmic Philosophy, p. 462.
75
but merely weak and capricious, like a
boy who fondles a kitten, and the next
moment sets a dog at it. And not only
does his moral character fall from him
bit by bit, but his dignity disappears
also. The orderly processes of the stars
and the larger phenomena of nature are
suggestive of nothing so much as a
wearisome Court ceremonial surrounding
a king who is unable to understand or
to break away from it; whilst the thunder
and whirlwind, which have from time
immemorial been accepted as special
•revelations of his awful power and ma
jesty, suggest, if they suggest anything of
a personal character at all, merely some
blackguardly larrikin kicking up his heels
in the clouds, not perhaps bent on mis
chief, but indifferent to the fact that he
is causing it. . . . A God who could
have been deliberately guilty of them
[the evolutionary processes] would be a
God too absurd, too monstrous, too mad
to be credible.” 1
No one who has studied biological
evolution can fail to recognise these
facts. They make it impossible for us
to see a divine presence and guidance at
least during the process. The only
plausible theory is that God set the
machine going and left it to itself. If
we hold that he is guiding molecules to
“their proper place ” in the construction
of the tiger’s eye, we must hold that he
has some control of the molecules in the
cruelty-centre of the tiger’s brain. A
universe without carnivora is conceivable
enough. Professor Kennedy and others
would divert us from a consideration of
these facts to contemplate the beauty and
sublimity the universe exhibits. But the
beauty of the starry heavens is only the
effect of distance and position; the
beauty of the Bay of Naples could be
1 Mr. W. H. Mallock, Religion as a Credible
Doctrine, p. 177. Mr. Mallock has throughout
life been one of the ablest opponents of agnosti
cism, and he has been nothing less than scornful
of a profession of atheism. Does he not see
how natural and logical atheism seems when one
sweeps aside all theistic proof on the one hand,
and recognises these dark features of the uni
verse on the other ?
Bishopsgate InstitutSi-
�76
*
GOD
shown by science to be a purely acci
dental outcome of the action of natural
agencies. The beauty of the diatoms
that are brought from the lowest depths
of the ocean, the beauty of the radiolaria
that swarm about the coast, and the beauty
of a thousand minute animal structures,
are obviously not designed and purposed
beauties. They were unknown until the
microscope was invented : the polariscope
reveals yet further beauties : the tele
scope yet more. The idea of these
things being designed for our, or for
God’s, entertainment belongs, as Mr.
Mallock says, “ to a pre-scientific age
. . . an age which had realised the
spectacular unity of the cosmos, but had
very imperfectly realised the nature of
its mechanical unity : and which, more
over, had never grasped the fact that the
forces in virtue of which material things
move, such as energy, attraction, repul
sion, and chemical affinity, are as much
a part of the material things themselves,
and as much amenable to scientific ex
periment, as extension, or shape, or mass,
or softness, or hardness, or visibility.”
Once more we are thrown back on the
efficient, mechanical, producing causes.
The point we have reached, then, is
this: the notion that molecules are
“ guided ” to their “ proper position ” by
any other than a mechanical force—'the
notion of “guidance ” or “control ” dur
ing the cosmic process is unproved, is
unthinkable when examined in detail,
and is opposed by an appalling mass of
facts (waste, cruelty, suffering, &c.). It
starts from an assumption—the assump
tion that natural forces are erratic in
action—for which it does not offer any
justification, and which is directly op
posed to scientific experience. It rests
on a number of fallacious analogies and
poetical expressions, on a fallacious
application of the term “ blind ” to
natural forces, and on the as yet imper
fect condition of our scientific knowledge
of the construction of organisms. All
that remains, then, is to examine the
position of the really consistent evolu
tionary theist, who does not build his
belief on the temporary ignorance of the
scientist. This position, to which all
apologists are tending, is that “ the only
interference was before the cosmic pro
cess began ”: that God created a matter
force reality in the beginning of such a
nature that it should evolve spontane
ously into the universe we know and of
which we are a part. This is the ideal
and final position of the apologist.
Science will drive him back pitilessly
decade by decade until he adopts it.
Many of the best-informed apologists
already adopt it.
Let us see, then, where Haeckel and
what remains of his opponents are now.
Both admit that the universe is a
mechanical system, a great machine that
has worked from the first without control,
in virtue of its inherent character. But
the dualists say such a machine must
have been most skilfully designed and
constructed : it is, in Dallinger’s words,
“a more majestic design than all the
thinkers of the past had ever dreamed ”
—and therefore it will commend itself
more and more to theists.
The
position is—it is very important to
understand clearly—that God only
creates any particular content of the
universe—say Plato’s mind—in the
sense that he imparted to the primitive
nebula, or ultimate prothyl, a natural
force to evolve it.
The germ of
everything, the capacity to evolve every
thing, is in the great matter-force
reality.
Now, we have seen in the
third chapter that “ science points to no
beginning.” It is perfectly consistent
with the scientific evidence to say that
the universe is eternal. We saw that
those who attack Haeckel’s ascription of
infinity and eternity 1 to the basic sub
stance show no cause why he should not
proceed candidly on the astronomical
evidence. No better evidence is forth1 Note the remarkably different treatment of
Haeckel and Mr. Spencer. Mr. Spencer’s First
Cause cannot be distinguished from Haeckel’s.
Yet when he speaks of it With capital letters, as
an Infinite and Eternal Power, we hear nothing
but admiration.
�GOD
coming here. Dr. Croll says : “ If any
man should affirm that the succession of
events had no beginning, but has been
in operation from all eternity, it would
be difficult indeed to prove him to be in
the wrong; but, on the other hand, it
would be far more difficult, nay, utterly
impossible, for him to prove his as
sertion.” 1 But, as we saw, the scientific
evidence and the rules of logic and truth
seeking put the burden of proof dis
tinctly on the man who asserts there was
a beginning. Professor Ward attempts
to infer a beginning from the theory of
entropy; but we saw that this is dis
credited by the latest pronouncements of
physicists. “Our experience,” as Pro
fessor Ward says himself elsewhere,
“certainly does not embrace the totality of
things; is, in fact, ridiculously far from
it”; and so entropy is a “ridiculously”
hasty conclusion.
No, there is no proof whatever that
the machine ever began to exist at all.
As far as we can see, it has eternally
possessed those forces and properties
with which we have agreed to credit it,
and has been eternally evolving them.
And, as a fact, apologists are rapidly
moving on to the identification of God
with Nature, which means an abandon
ment of the idea of creation. A curious
symptom falls under my notice as I
write. An editorial article in the Daily
News, the distinguished organ of the
Nonconformist Churches, commenting
on the Bishop of Ripon’s sermon at
Southport, endeavours to reconcile
science and religion.
The laws of
science, it says, reveal the working of
force, and it goes on to ask: •“ What is
that power ? May it not be the syn
thesis of all the various forces and
vitalities which the universe contains;
and may not that synthesis be God ? ”
That is precisely what Haeckel says ; in
fact, in a late German edition of the
Riddle he calls his system “ the purest
monotheism.” So close are we to
“ reunion ” ! Take, again, the Anticipa1 The Basis of Evolution, p. 167.
77
lions of Mr. H. G. Wells. Looking
about on the cultured thought of our
time, he says that before the end of this
century educated men will have ceased
to believe in “ an omniscient mind ”—
“ the last vestige of that barbaric theology
which regarded God as a vigorous but
uncertain old gentleman with a beard
and an inordinate lust for praise and
propitiation ”—and a supreme “ moral
ist ” and prayer ; and will know God
only as “a general atmosphere of im
perfectly apprehended purpose.” Mr.
Rhondda Williams assures us that “it
is not for dualism I am arguing. I
believe in the unity of the world, and a
kind of monism is probably the truest
solution of the riddle ; but I must find
the unity in spirit, not in matter.” That
means, if it means anything, not only a
complete misconception of Haeckel,
but an identification of God with Nature.
Professor Le Conte says : “ God may be
conceived as self-sundering his energy,
and setting over against Himself a part
as Nature. A part of this part, by a
process of evolution, individuates itself
more and more, and finally completes
its individuation and self-activity in the
soul of man. . . . Thus an effluence
from the Divine Person flows downward
through Nature to rise again by evolution
to recognition of, and communion with,
its own source. . . . And the sole
purpose of this progressive individuation
of the Divine Energy by evolution is
finally to have, in man, something not
only to contemplate, but also to love
and be loved by.” 1 In another place
he says : “ The forces of Nature are
naught else than different forms of one
omnipresent Divine energy or will,” and
“ In a word, according to this view,
there is no real efficient force but spirit,
and no real independent existence but
God.”2 We have seen how Mr. Fiske
1 The Conception of God, p. 77. Le Conte
tells us, moreover, that he is almost using the
language of another “theistic” writer, Mr.
Upton, the Hibbert lecturer.
2 Evolution and Religious Thought, p. 301.
He frankly allows that he is here close to the
opinions of Berkeley, and even Swedenborg.
�78
GOD
claims immortality on the ground that
“ there is in man a psychic element
identical in nature with that which is
eternal ” ; and man’s psychic element is,
he allows, an evolutionary outcome of
natural force. Professor Royce, a recent
Gilford lecturer and distinguished Ameri
can thinker, says, when he comes to
distinguish man from God : “ We there
fore need not conceive the eternal
Ethical Individual, however partial he
may be, as in any sense less in the grade
of complication of his activity or in the
multitude of his acts of will than is the
Absolute. ... It may be conceived as
a Part equal to the whole, and finally
united, as such equal, to the Whole
wherein it dwells.”1 Professor W.
James, another Gifford lecturer, rejects
the title of theist altogether, and says
“we must bid a definite good-bye to
dogmatic theology.” The metaphysical
attributes of God (omnipotence, omnis
cience, omnipresence, eternity, &c.)
are, he thinks, “ destitute of all intelligible
significance,” and “ the metaphysical
monster they offer to our mind is an
absolutely worthless invention of the
scholarly mind.”2
We are advancing rapidly. To this
does a knowledge of science bring the
theologian. It is true that some of
these evolutionary theists, like Mr.
Rhondda Williams, regard it as a great
gain that science has destroyed the idea
of a “ transcendent ” God and forced
theology to recognise his “ immanence ”
in nature. This is very misleading.
The “ immanence ” of God in nature
has been consistently taught in Roman
Catholic theology for the last thousand
years. You will not find a single Roman
Catholic theologian who locates God
outside the universe. It is a common
place with them that God is more closely
present in every part of nature than
ether is, for instance. Nor do the great
1 The World and the Individual, vol. ii,
P-451Varieties of Religious Experience, pp. 445-8.
He adds that the “ moral attributes ” are just as
indefensible.
Anglican divines speak differently.
What, then is the new feature ? It is
that these modern apologists have been
driven to deny that there is any real
distinction between God and nature.
They talk of God “ sundering ” himself
and of nature being “ part ” of his sub
stance— which has a strange resemblance
to various ancient and mouldy Oriental
speculations (Brahmanic, Gnostic, and
Manichean)—but the gist of their posi
tion is that God and nature are one.
God is the “ pervading spirit ” and the
“ unifying force ” of the cosmos, or the
“Eternal and Infinite Energy” behind
phenomena, as Sir Henry Thompson
puts it. This is the kind of theology
which generally lies at the back of the
few theistic utterances which our anxious
bishops can wring out of men of science
to-day. It is the last page of a remark
able history. Man’s first idea of deity
was animistic and pantheistic, according
to one school of hierologists. In the
course of ages the shape of God was
disentangled from visible nature and
dramatically set against it. Now God
slowly sinks again into the life of nature.
Great Pan is alive once more.
How does this position compare with
that of Haeckel? We will not be so
rude as to suggest that if Haeckel used
capital letters, like Mr. Spencer, they
would greet him as a brother. Nor, on
the other hand, can we admit that, as
Mr. Williams claims, they find the unity
of the universe in spirit, while Haeckel
bases it on matter. We saw that
Haeckel does nothing of the kind.
Matter and spirit are to him two aspects
of one reality, and the unity of the
cosmos is the unity of that reality.
Spirit-force or energy emerging finally
as human thought-force is admitted by
Haeckel as freely as by Mr. Williams.
An idealist like Ward would very
naturally say that the unity of the world
consists in spirit, but we assume Mr.
Williams admits the existence of matter
and corporeal fellow-creatures. But
there is one further sense in which the
unity of the world could be said to
�GOD
consist in spirit, and in this lies the
final difference between Haeckel and
his critics on these cosmic speculations.
These theistic, or rather pantheistic,
monists hold that the cosmic energy is
essentially and from the beginning, or
from eternity, conscious and intelligent.
Haeckel holds that consciousness only
arises when a certain stage of nerve
formation appears. What evidence do
they offer for this? We may note in
passing that, when the real difference
between Haeckel and those scientific
writers who are the most zealously
pitted against him is so small, it would
have been better for his critics to say so
outright.
The average reader who
wades through the surging flood of
rhetoric will probably learn with aston
ishment that the chief champions of
reasoned Christianity to-day stand so
close to Haeckel’s position that only
one frail npetaphysical bridge divides
them.
Let us examine this last
division.
It is clear, in the first place, that the
evidence for the position of these evolu
tionary theists is not of a scientific
nature. Science does not find intelli
gence in the cosmos until a fairly
advanced stage of animal organisation is
reached. In fact, science finds conscious
ness so completely and rigidly bound
up with nerve-structure that it can only
listen with astonishment to the theory
of a vast consciousness existing apart
from nerve-structure and before it was
developed. One wonders, therefore,
what Mr. Ballard means when he
assured his anxious interviewer that
“the theistic basis of Christianity will
have scientific support more than ever.”
The reasons alleged for postulating this
intelligence at the “ beginning ” of
things are metaphysical. Mr. Rhondda
Williams formulates them more or less
clearly, as they are invented by
Dr. W. N. Clarke and Dr. Ward and
Le Conte. He says first—and this, I
believe, is an original contribution—that
science finds “ law ” in the cosmos ; but
“ law ” is a mental concept: ergo, science
79
finds mind in the cosmos. We will over
look that little weakness, and come to
the plausible arguments he has borrowed.
He says (after Ward) that the universe
must be the work of intelligence
because it is intelligible. The axiom
he rests on is that “ what is intelligible
must either be intelligent or have in
telligence behind it.” Now, on idealist
principles this is quite time; there being
no material world at all, if anything
exists, mind clearly exists. But, apart
from this denial of' a real ’world, the
axiom has no sense whatever; it is
simply an audacious assertion. Dr
Iverach {Theism) uses much the same
argument, and tries to give it a respect
able realistic air. “ A system,” he says,
“ which at this end needs an intelligence
to understand it must have something
to do with intelligence at the other.”
Many other writers say the same. To
show the inanity of the assertion, one
has only to ask Dr. Iverach whether
even a chaotic and disorderly uni
verse would not need “ an intelli
gence to understand it.” If he
means by “ intelligible ” that it is
orderly and systematic, he is simply
begging the whole question, and asking
us to swallow his position in the form of
an axiom, because he cannot prove it.
He says elsewhere {Christianity and
Evolution) that “ if thought has come out
of the universe, if the universe is a uni
verse that can be thought, then thought
has had something to do with it from
the outset.” That is the favourite form
of argument that “you cannot get out of
a sack what is not in it.” It is a longdiscredited fallacy. We have seen how
out of a simple matter and force have
come an immense variety of things.
These things were only implicitly in the
primitive prothyl. Similarly, the evolu
tion of thought only shows that thought
was implicitly in the first cosmic princi
ples. Moreover, consciousness evolves
out of the unconscious every day—in
embryonic development. Mr. Williams
finally urges that a thing which has not
been made by intelligence should be
�8o
SCIENCE AND CHRISTIANITY
reversible, and says : “ But it is the
essential principle of science that things
are not reversible; that they must be
where they are, as they are; the order
of nature is the greatest scientific dis
covery.” This is a curious confusion.
It is difficult to see why a thing con
structed by mechanical forces should be
immediately reversible, in any sense
which does not apply to an intelligent
construction; and in the long run the
cosmic process will be reversed, and
begun again, if the scientific evidence
counts for anything.
It is on the strength of such verbiage
and sophistry as this that Haeckel’s
critics assume airs of spiritual superior
ity and spatter his “ godless ” system with
contempt. He has followed up the
scientific evidence with a close fidelity.
He has not forgotten for a moment that
the unseen may be gathered from the
seen by valid reasoning (as he himself
has gathered many truths by inference
from the facts observed); he has not ex
cluded the sober and accredited use of
the speculative imagination. Professor
Henslow has recently, in a letter to the
daily Press, suggested that Rationalists
deny the existence of God because
it does not fall under observation or
experiment.
The
writer
Professor
Henslow quoted has himself repudiated
this interpretation of his words; and
certainly Haeckel has repeatedly en
dorsed the procedure of passing beyond
observation, when the inference is firmly
based on the facts and is logical in form.
Whether he is not justified in rejecting
as unsound these pseudo-metaphysical
arguments we have been considering,
the reader may judge for himself.
Whether his procedure is not more
scientific, more logical, and more philo
sophical than that of his opponents—
whose arguments I have, as far as possi
ble, given in their own words—may now
be determined. And if his procedure
so far is correct, and the objections of
his critics futile, we have established the
bases of monism. We have followed
the great matter-force reality through its
cosmic development until it breaks out
in the glory of the human mind and
emotions. And we have seen no reason
for suspecting the existence of any prin
ciple or agency distinct from it, or for as
cribing to Nature itself any feature that
would justify us in transferring to it the
title or prerogatives of the dying God.
Chapter VIII
SCIENCE AND CHRISTIANITY
As we have previously seen, the
cosmic speculations of the Monist find
themselves in antagonism with a set of
cosmic speculations
which
already
occupy, not merely the mind, but the
heart of a large number of people.
Whilst older religions, such as Confucian
ism and, to an extent, Buddhism, have
succeeded in effecting a separation
between ancient cosmological notions
and religion proper, so that the educated
Japanese, for instance, does not confound
theistic controversy with religion, Chris
tianity has retained the belief that man
is immortal, and that the universe has a
supreme controller as essential parts of
its framework.
Naturally, Christian
thinkers who are alert and informed are
�SCIENCE AND CHRISTIANITY
ity ; as if his critics were somehow
beginning to deny this. .Mr. R. J.
unable to understand a pure love of
Campbell, for instance, insists. that
truth or regard for its moral and social
Christianity is “not dogma, but life a
stimulus. However, it is on this
life lived in conscious union with a
chapter of his work that critics have
Divine Person.” But that is somewhat
fastened most eagerly and most ardently.
bewildering. In one phrase dogma is
Now, one cannot but protest in pass
disavowed, and in the next a dogma of an
appallingly metaphysical character is ing against the foolishness of such a
made essential to the definition.
A procedure. All the world knows that
Professor Haeckel is not an expert in
similar inconsistency is found in almost
every other ecclesiastic who speaks of ecclesiastical history. If he felt himself
constrained to warn his readers that he
removing the emphasis from dogma.
had no expert acquaintance with physics,
The two dogmas of God and the future
life are still essential to Christianity, and lest he might innocently induce the
it is precisely these dogmas which uninformed to attach undue weight to
conflict with the monistic conception of his judgment in that department, he
the universe. The few advanced think might in return expect from, them a
ers we have encountered represent, on reasonable sense of the proportion of his
book.
His authority lies chiefly in
the whole, only a small cultured minority.
The great bulk of the faithful cling to zoology. We saw that he built some of
the most important parts of his system
the old ideas in the old form. And it. is
because this mass of conventional belief on the facts of zoology, or biology, and
still exists that preachers find it possible it is to these that the honest critic will
and advisable to bespatter the reputa mainly address himself. We saw how
few of the critics did so. But the book was
tions of fearless and sincere speculators,
who seek to spread their views amongst intended, as he says, to stand in some
measure for the complete system of his
the people.
Such a thinker as Haeckel, who has thought, which he feared he could now
never give to the world. It, therefoie,
found his faith obstructed throughout
life in the supposed interest of Christian contained an expression of his opinion
ity, naturally turns to consider that great on a multitude of topics which it is not
religion when the solid frame of his essential for a Monist, as such, to pass
In this he naturally
monistic system is compacted. He judgment on.
challenges the criticism of his opinions,
finds four dogmas chiefly responsible for
and must meet it. But he had a right
that strong attachment to Christianity,
to expect that his book and his system
which seems to him to prolong the life
of the errors he has criticised and the of thought should be judged essentially
diversion of men’s interest to another by their essential positions; he had a
world. These are, briefly— a belief in the right to expect that no one who would
supernatural character of the Bible; a be likely to read ten pages of such a
book would be so unintelligent as to
belief in the divinity, or . the unique
extend his zoological authority into the
character, of Christ; a belief that there
domain of ecclesiastical history.
is something preterhuman about the
Further, no one who takes the trouble
historical progress and moral power of the
to understand Haeckel’s system of
Christian religion; and a belief in the
infallibility of the Pope. He therefore thought would expect him to devote very
considerable time to an examination of
seeks to discredit those beliefs, in order
to prepare the way for an impartial con the dogmas I have enumerated. If his
previous conclusions are true, these
sideration of the new conception of life
dogmas must be false. That is a logical
which he regards as true and valuable.
At once, of course, he is credited, with and proper attitude. The man who has
some mysterious “ hatred” of Christian ) spent a life in deciphering the message
�82
SCIENCE AND CHRISTIANITY
of the cosmos, and has been compelled
characteristic portion of his work. But
to. interpret it in a monistic sense, and it has been sought to bring the full
reject entirely the dogmas of God and
weight of expert, historical scholarship to
immortality, has reached a conclusion bear on this episodic chapter on Chris
which he may apply to Christianity with
as strict and full a right as the historian tianity, and to make any defect dis
who has devoted his life to the direct covered in it the occasion of a bitter
and violent attack on Haeckel’s general
study of it.. Theistic writers are too apt authority. The. trained thinker sweeps
to forget this. When a man has reached
aside such tactics as an impertinence.
a conviction that God is a myth, he is But the untrained and uninformed
neither logically, nor morally expected to
millions of the Churches are assured
ask . himself seriously whether Christ or that. Haeckel’s authority has been dis
Christianity is divine. And it is per credited. They are taught that his
fectly obvious to any one who reads this
rejection of Christian beliefs is traceable
seventeenth chapter of the Riddle that
to a “childish credulity” (Dr. Horton)
this has been Haeckel’s attitude. He
and is supported by “mendacities”
merely skims the surface of a vast his (Mr. Ballard). However, let us examine
torical subject. He abandons the rigid the allegations on which the grossest
method of the earlier part, with its diatribes against Haeckel have been
accumulations of evidence. He hesitates supported.
to “devote a special chapter to the sub
The Achilles of the critics in this
ject,” and refers to other works. He then department is Dr. Loofs, professor of
decides to “ cast a critical glance ” at it, ecclesiastical history at the University of
protesting that it is only the hostility of Halle, and from his Anti-Haeckel we
the Churches which provokes him to do
gather the most formidable censures.1
so. He is mindful of “ the high ethical This work I have already qualified as
value ”. of pure Christianity and “ its
one of the coarsest and most painful
ennobling influence on the history of publications that have issued from a
civilisation.”
But it still clings to modern university. The story of its
beliefs which Haeckel (and large num writing runs thus. Dr. Loofs tells us
bers of its own theologians) believe to
St. Bernard has the same artistic
have no more than a legendary founda exordium to his attack on Abe'lard—
tion, and which nevertheless give it an that he was dragged into the arena by
incalculable influence on the minds of friends and colleagues in Germany. He
millions. Haeckel, therefore, gathers read the seventeenth chapter of the
from a group of German works or trans Riddle, and at once wrote an “ open
lations (all of which are indicated in the letter ” to Dr. Haeckel on the errors it
German edition) points of criticism in contains. This “ open letter ” first saw
regard to these dogmas, and briefly, with the light in the pages of an Evangelical
a light satire that evinces the absence of weekly, Die Christliche Welt, which circu
prolonged research in this department, lates amongst some 5,000 pious readers
fires them at the popular beliefs.
in Germany, and is hardly likely to
These considerations, which will penetrate into a university. Its tone
readily occur to the impartial student, was bitter and scurrilous. However, it
are prompted by the tactics which have was copied by other periodicals, and
been largely employed in the criticism of Haeckel wrote a brief reply in a
the Riddle. What value there is in the scientific and serious review, the editor
attack on its main position we have of the review, Dr. E. Bischoff, supportalready seen. The epithets that have
1 An English translation is promised, but has
been showered on the distinguished
scientist recoil on their authors where not appeared at the time of writing. It will, no
i
doubt, temper the extreme coarseness and ugli
there is question of the essential and ness of the German original.
�SCIENCE AND CHRISTIANITY
ing Haeckel with his expert knowledge
and with a very plain but dignified
comment on Loofs’s procedure. At this
Dr. Loots seems to have lost all sense
of either humour or dignity, and
included these documents with his
reply in the brochure we are about to
examine. Its pages sparkle with in
candescent phrases, which are, more
over, usually italicised. “ Incredible
ignorance,” “crass stupidity,” “pure
folly,” etc., are amongst the milder
of these phrases. When, towards the
close, he looks back on his virulent
italics (or that larger type that serves
for italics in German), he says de
liberately: “It is not the ‘point of
view,’ not the ‘system,’ of Professor
Haeckel, but his scientific honour, that I
have attacked; and I have done it so
unmistakably that any court will convict
me of libelling my colleague of Jena, if
I cannot support my charges.” In a
word, he tells us (3rd edit., p. 52) that
the Press has ignored his precious
diatribe, and that a libel action.(though
he declines to “ provoke ” it) will bring
his grievance before the public. Such
is the famous rejoinder to Haeckel
which our ecclesiastical journals have
praised so highly.
After all this the reader will expect to
find that Haeckel has been convicted of
one of the most remarkable series of
controversial frauds and literary delin
quencies that a university professor to
say nothing of a man with four gold
medals and seventy honorary diplomas —ever stooped to. The reality would be
amusing if it were not for the vulgarity
and coarseness in which it is enveloped.
Leaving aside the pedantic discussion of
minor points (the date of the Council of
Nicaea, the authorship of the Synodicon,
and so on), and granting that Dr. .Loofs
abundantly proves that Haeckel is not
an expert in ecclesiastical history (if
there be any who did not know it),
we find that the two chief points are the
criticism of Haeckel’s observations on
the formation of the canon and on the
birth of Christ,
83
Haeckel, it will be remembered, states
that the canonical gospels were, selected
from the apocryphal by a miraculous
leap on to the altar at the Council of
Nicaea. At this the indignation of our
professor of church-history flashes forth.
Mr. J. Brierley alludes to this, saying :
“ He gives the story as though it were
the accepted Christian account of the
admission of the four gospels to the
canon. It is difficult to chaiacterise this
statement.” Well, it is foitunate that
some rationalistic Dr. Loofs does not have
to characterise this statement. Haeckel
does exactly the reverse of this. He
gives the “ leap ” story as a correction of
the “ accepted Christian account.” “ We
now know,” he says, in introducing his
version. Further, he gives the state
ment candidly on the authority of the
Synodicon j though he should have said
this was only edited by Pappus. His
own honesty in the matter is perfectly
transparent ; if his acquaintance with
ecclesiastical history is very far from
complete. The story in the Synodicon
is not to be taken seriously. The canon
of the gospels was substantially settled
long before the Council of Nicaea. It
is true that Dr. Loofs is himself accused
of error by Dr. Bischoff for stating that
the Nicene Council did not discuss the
canon, but we will keep to the main
issue. The story taken from the
Synodicon is not worthy of consideration
as an account of the forming of the
canon.
The reader will remember Haeckels
pointed warning in his preface that, not
only are his conclusions on all matters
“subjective and only partly.corrrect,
but his book contains “studies of un
equal value,” and his knowledge, of some
branches of science is “ defective.
In
the face of those repeated expressions it
is ludicrous to suppose that Haeckel
wished to employ his great authority as.a
man of science to enforce opinions in
ecclesiastical history. Here is, on the
face of it, a department of thought where
no one will suspect him to have spent
much of his valuable time, and the di§-
�84
SCIENCE AND CHRISTIANITY
covery of defects in this chapter was value of the Gospels.
He will learn
almost a matter of course. He has
with surprise that Dr. Loofs by no
acknowledged those defects, and has in
means shares the conventional rever
serted in the cheap German edition of his
ence for the New Testament.
The
work a notification that the authority he synoptic Gospels were written, he
followed on this and the following thinks, between the years 65 and 100,
question was unsound. That authority and the Gospel of “ St. John ” before
was an English writer, who had had a
I?5;
That is the general opinion of
theological training, and whose work had
biblical scholars to-day; but it is by no
been translated into German. Haeckel
means the general opinion of the readers
had been, wholly misinformed as to his
of Die Christliche Welt, or of religious
standing in this country, and thus had people in this country. What is more
been betrayed into a reliance on what he important, Dr. Loofs, as we shall pre
understood to be his expert knowledge.
sently see, rejects as worthless, if not
In the case of a writer who claimed dishonest, interpolations some of the
infallibility, or at least a uniform weight,
most treasured and familiar passages of
for the whole of his book, such a defect the New Testament. Let us remember
would be more or less serious. Whether what is really at stake in these con
it was in point of fact one-tenth as
troversies.
serious as some of the procedure of his
To come, then, to the cardinal offence
critics which we have reviewed, whether of Haeckel’s book—we will take a few
it is a matter for violent discussion at all,
detailed criticisms later—we find it in
and not one that might have been the statement that Jesus was the son
pointed out by a colleague without loss of a Greek officer of the name of
of dignity—I leave it to the reader to Pandera. Now let us approach the sub
say. The section in which the passage ject with some sense of proportion. For
occurs shows a fair average acquaintance
Haeckel it is (legitimately) a foregone
with its subject, but it is clear from the
conclusion that Jesus was a human being,
authorities explicitly mentioned in it
born in a normal manner. The conclusions
(Strauss, Feuerbach, Baur, and Renan)
he has already so laboriously reached
that it was written, or prepared, years
compel him to assume this. If there is
ago. Any modern expert would find it no God, Jesus was a man—a “noble
defective. Whether this defect is a prophet and enthusiast, so full of the
fitting.ground for Dr/Loofs’s structure of love of humanity,” Haeckel generously
rhetoric and scholarship may be called
describes him.. This is a standpoint
into question. But whether it is either which Haeckel is by no means alone in
sensible or honourable to seek to dis taking to-day.
The vast majority of
credit Haeckel’s earlier positions in
the cultured writers of every civilised
science, which we have reviewed, by a
country share it with him. It is very
microscopic examination of such a
largely held within the ranks of the
section as this, cannot long remain un Christian clergy themselves. Mr. Rhondda
decided.
Williams preaches it openly. The posi
Before we pass to a consideration of tion of our own Broad Church theolo
the second chief charge, there is one
gians is known.
Even Dr. Loofs—
more point that it is highly expedient
remember well—holds as frankly as
to make clear.
The average inexpert
Haeckel does the natural human parent
reader, about whom our ecclesiastical
age of Jesus, and has formulated his
writers have suddenly grown so con opinion, as the opinion of the average
cerned, will be apt to suppose that this
cultured theologian, in a German theo
deadly attack by the spirited theologian
logical encyclopaedia. He angrily resents
of Halle is prompted by a devotion
the imputation that he believes in the
to the current belief in the unique
virgin-birth, and says no historian of
�SCIENCE AND CHRISTIANITY
dogma can entertain it.
He affirms
that the birth-story in Matthew and
Luke is a late interpolation in the
Gospel, and is quite discredited.
What then is the great difference
between the two ? It is that Loofs
awards the paternity of Christ to Joseph,
and Haeckel assigns it to the Greek
officer of a Roman legion. Our average
Christian neighbour will probably feel
that in substance it is a case of the devil
and the deep sea.
Further, it is easy to see in what
frame of mind a scientist like Haeckel
would approach such a matter. . The
birth of a Saviour-God from a virgin is a
legend that we find in all kinds of
religions anterior to Christianity.
We
know that in all these cases the prophet,
or god—supposing his historical reality
—was awarded this distinction by later
admirers to enhance the repute of his
divinity. When, therefore, Haeckel is
commenting on the dogma of the Im
maculate Conception,1 he turns aside for
a moment to discuss the question of
paternity. Not attaching an overwhelm
ing importance to the question, Who was
Christ’s father? he does not make a pro
found inquiry into it. But in one of his
authorities—the English writer whom I
have mentioned—he finds the curious
statement that the father was a Greek
officer, and it seems to harmonise with
the other statements. He finds that the
Gospels emphatically exclude the notion
that Mary was at that time married to
Joseph, or that Joseph was the father.
He finds, too, that as a matter of history
these miraculously born children were
generally illegitimate. In fact, the intro
duction of a Greek strain would help not
1 Which he misunderstands. The dogma of
the Immaculate Conception does not refer to the
conception of Christ by Maty, but to the concep
tion of Mary by her mother. Dr. Horton is
astonished at Haeckel’s ignorance. For my part
I am astonished at Dr. Horton’s knowledge.
The version Haeckel follows is quite the ordinary
non-Catholic version of the dogma. You will
find it even in Balzac (£<z messe de PathPe}.
Nay, even Mr. Ballard, B.D., thinks it is
correct {Miracles of Unbelief, p. 348).
85
a little to interpret the scriptural figure
of Christ, if it is taken to be historical.
It has long been an argument for the
divinity of Christ that the figure de
picted in the New Testament is so very
un-Hebraic in many of its features. We
who know the composition of the Gospels
understand this Greek element, But the
supposition that Christ had a Greek
father is not a little attractive in the cir
cumstances. When, therefore, Haeckel
learns from his authority, or supposed
authority, that in one of the apocryphal
gospels (the Gospel of Nicodemus)
Jesus was said to be the illegitimate son
of a Greek officer, and that this is con
firmed by the Sepher Toldoth Jeschua, he
at once embraces it as the most plausible
explanation of the “ high and noble
personality” of the Galilean.
These
apocryphal Gospels are, he tells the
reader, no less and no more reliable in
themselves than the canonical Gospels,
but this version of the birth seems to
accord best with the general situation.
Now this is a perfectly honest pro
cedure for a man who makes no pre
tension to expert knowledge or research.
Haeckel has again been misled by his
authority, it is true. The sentence, he
quotes from “ an apocryphal gospel ” is
not found in any of those books in that
form. The Gospel of Nicodemus merely
states that the Jews declared Christ to be
illegitimate. The Sepher ToldothJeschua,
which gives the story, is an early
mediaeval Jewish work of no authority.
The story can, indeed, be traced back
well into the second century (to about
130 a.d.), since Origen gives it as being
told to his opponent Celsus by the Jews,
in his Contra Celsum (I, 32); but this
was unknown at the time to Haeckel
and his authority. Further, it is mis
leading to say “the official theologian”
burks the story. It is perfectly true that
the Sepher Toldoth Jeschua is little com
mented on, but it is a worthless docu
ment; and Strauss, the author of the
Zz/e ofJesus, had contemptuously rejected
the story. These are undoubted errors
on Haeckel’s part. But, after all, the
�86
SCIENCE AND CHRISTIANITY
radical error is that he took a superficial
and unreliable author as his authority.
To have been misinformed as to the
weight and qualifications of a foreign
writer on a subject completely outside
his own territory, and to have neglected
to verify his information, is the full
extent of Haeckel’s delinquency. Dr.
Horton, who gives Vogt and Buchner as
shining lights in the spiritualist firma
ment, pompously tells us this was
“childish credulity.” Mr. Ballard, who
deals in such a remarkable fashion with
Haeckel’s observations on the pyknotic
theory and abiogenesis and determinism,
says he is “ ashamed to put such men
dacities into print,” and that if Haeckel
is not ashamed of himself he has not
developed “ an elementary degree of
morality.” Dr. Loofs calmly pours out
such a stream of invective that he thinks
it well to remind Haeckel of the text and
section of the German law which covers
the case ! He is afraid, he says, that
Haeckel will not be stung into dragging
the matter into court, and so he
continues to the end to dredge up
the. strong sediment of the German
dictionary.
A more ludicrous situation it would be
difficult to conceive. Haeckel frankly
states that in his opinion this is a subject
on which none of the evidence is worth
much. But he finds one legend more
plausible than that given in the canonical
gospels, and he points out that it seems
to be the most plausible. There is not
the slightest deception, as he openly
relies on the intrinsic plausibility of the
story, and openly states the immediate
and the ultimate sources from which he
takes it. No doubt he should have
examined more closely into the subject,
and should have looked into more
weighty and more recent literature. He
would then have found that the pas
sages which deny Joseph’s paternity
“belong to the least credible of New
Testament traditions,” as Dr. Loofs
says.1 But that his opponents should
1 American Journal oj Theology, July, 1899.
attack him with this virulence and
viciousness on that account is one of
the most disgraceful episodes of this
dreary controversy.
. The other defects which Dr. Loofs
discovers with his microscopic eye in
this chapter of the Riddle are mostly
pedantic rectifications of minor state
ments, or corrections with which only an
expert would concern himself, and as to
which opinions sometimes differ. Many
of them are quite paralleled by Dr.
Bischoff’s examination of Loofs’s own
statements. The year of the Council of
Nicfca and the number of bishops
present are incorrect; the number of
apocryphal gospels and of the genuine
Pauline epistles is not according to the
latest vagary of the critics; the statistics
of religion are not up to date; the
Immaculate Conception and Immaculate
Oath are improperly described. These
are the other points of the indictment.
The reader may judge for himself
whether there is anything more than a
lack of expert knowledge in these things;
and whether Haeckel ever claimed, and
did not rather disclaim from the outset,
such expert knowledge.
But we now turn to another aspect of
the matter. Haeckel, I said, set out to
discredit four dogmas which he found
hindering the progress of scientific know
ledge amongst the people at large. The
serious reader, impatient of all this dust
throwing and mud-throwing, will ask
how far the substance of Haeckel’s
attack on these dogmas survives this
scrutiny, and how far it is supported by
sound historical research. The dogma
of the infallibility of the Pope does not
appeal to the sympathies of these
Protestant critics, so that Haeckel’s
attack on the papacy is allowed to stand.
Let us consider his position with regard
to the other points—the uniqueness of
the Bible, of Christ, and of the history
of Christianity. Whether Haeckel is
infallible or not is hardly a subject for
prolonged discussion, provided his
“ scientific honour ” and “ scientific
conscience ” are not involved in the
�SCIENCE AND CHRISTIANITY
manner that Dr. Loots would have the
readers of Die Chnstliche Welt to be
lieve. The serious question is : Can we
sustain his attack on these dogmas,
apart from the incidental errors into
which his unfortunate reliance . on
“ Saladin ” has betrayed him ? This is
a study in Church History, in the full
sense in which that science is under
stood to-day.1 We shall see that the
substance of Haeckel’s position is com
pletely supported by our present know
ledge of the subject.
In the first place, that implicit reli
ance on the statements found in the
Bible, which Haeckel set out to impugn,
is now wholly discredited. We need
not consider the Old Testament, and
Haeckel does not discuss it. _ The
cosmological speculations of Genesis are
now known to have been borrowed from
earlier religions : the historical books
are so full of error that we can only
trust them when we have independent
verification; whole books (Daniel, Es
ther, Tobit, etc.) are given up as wholly
unhistorical. This can be learned from
the works of Christian scholars to-day.
The Old Testament remains a work of
surpassing interest, containing some fine
literature and some of the highest moral
teaching of the ancient world. But it
no longer obstructs the path of the
scientist or the historian. As to the
New Testament, the work of recon
struction is not equally advanced.
Writers like Archdeacon Wilson confuse
the issue by taking “verbal inspiration ”
to be the butt of the rationalist attack.
No doubt one will still find many simple
believers in verbal inspiration, but that
is not the serious difficulty. The
opinion that the rationalist seeks to dis1 As a fact, the real secret of Dr. Loofs’s
bitterness and animosity seems to be that
Haeckel has laid a strong charge against Church
History. Apart from one historian, whom he
mentions by name, there was no reason for
thinking he included advanced writers like
Harnack and Loofs. But that his charge
against conventional Church History was solidly
grounded is well known to every student of
history, and will presently be fairly established.
87
credit—the opinion of the majority of
Christians to-day (solemnly propounded
to the world only a few years ago by
the official head of the Church of Rome)
—is the belief that the Bible contains
no error. Once the infallibility of the
Bible is abandoned, it ceases to be a
barrier to progress. The infallibility of
the Old Testament is not now held by
any Christian scholar; and the infalli
bility of the New Testament is rapidly
being expelled from the cultured Chris
tian mind. We have seen how Dr.
Loofs himself rejects the account of the
virgin-birth (Matt, i., Luke ii.) which
had worn itself into the very heart of
Christianity. “No well-informed, and
at the same time honest and conscien
tious theologian, can deny that he who
asserts these things as indisputable facts
affirms what is open to grave doubts,”
he says, significantly enough, in his
article in the American Journal of
Theology. In his article (“ Christologie
Kirchenlehre ”) in the Real-Encyclopadie filer Protestantische Theologie he
talks freely of “layers of biblical tradi
tion ” and their relative trustworthiness.
This statement, which has been taken
throughout the Christian era to be the
most characteristic and one of the most
important statements of the New Testa
ment, is now relegated to “ one of the
latest and least reliable ” of these
“layers.” The article on the Gospels
in the Encyclopedia Biblica, which re
flects the condition of cultured biblical
thought in England, is written entirely
in the same spirit; the author finds only
nine texts in the Gospels which are
“ entirely credible,” and without which
“ it would be impossible to prove to a
sceptic that any historical value what
ever was to be assigned to the Gospels.”
The inexpert reader is often misled by
statements to the effect that the critics
are returning on their traces, and are
denying the late dates assigned by the
Tubingen school to the Gospels and the
fewness of the genuine epistles of St.
Paul. The second point is not important
for our purpose, but the first statement is
�88
SCIENCE AND CHRISTIANITY
gravely misleading. When an ecclesias
tical journal or a tactical apologist re
produces Harnack’s saying that recent
criticism is vindicating “the essential
truth of tradition” about the Gospels,
one can only regret that one is incom
petent to borrow some of the phrases of
Dr. Loofs. The simple believer is en
couraged to think that the miraculous
life of Jesus is being fully rehabilitated.
The composition of the Gospels is being
put back to the period 65-125 : that is
to say, 65-70 for Mark, 70-75 for
Matthew, 78-93 for Luke, and 80-120
for John. It is not thought proper to
explain that the critics by no means
refer to the Gospels as we have them
to-day, and that these Gospels consist
of earlier and later “layers”—in plain
English, interpolations. It is not con
sidered necessary to explain that the
return to the Gospels only means, in
the words of Loofs, “ a return to the
sayings of Jesus in the synoptic gospels,”
and that the miraculous legends may be
sorted out as unprovable and incredible.
Well may the Christian World com
plain of “the lack of honesty” in
theological literature ! The truth is that
the historical value of the New Testa
ment is shattered, and Christian scholars
are, as in the case of the Old Testament,
retreating upon its ethical value. Thus
the putting back of the composition of
the synoptic Gospels into the first cen
tury does not save that popular reliance
on their legends which Haeckel solely
regarded.
This brings us to our second point,
the consideration of the person of Christ.
In this, as a matter of fact, Haeckel takes
up an exceedingly moderate position, and
falls far short of the advanced position
of many of the ablest recent Rationalist
writers. He assumes not only the his
torical character of Christ, but also that
we know enough about him to speak of
“ his high and noble personality ” and
to describe him as “ a noble prophet
and enthusiast.” He denies the divinity
of Christ, the miraculous powers that
are assigned to him in the Gospels, and j
the. originality of some of the chief
ethical sayings attributed to him. This
is not merely a position that will readily
be endorsed by numbers of Christian
theologians, but it is one that many theo
logians, to say nothing of non-Christian
writers, will regard as granting too much
to the religious tradition. How widely
the divinity of Christ is rejected to-day
few can be ignorant. The vague and
fluid phrases in which even the belief in
it is expressed very commonly now mis
lead only the inexpert. The older
Rationalistic attitude as to Jesus—that
we might omit the supernatural portions
of the Gospel narrative and take the
rest as historical—is giving way to a more
scientific procedure, and the figure of
Christ is dissolving into a hundred
elements. Comparative religion traces
numbers of the Gospel legends, such as
the virgin-birth, if not all the features of
the birth-story, to pre-Christian religions.
The death and burial, many incidents of
the life, and very much of the teaching,
are not more difficult to trace. Whilst
Christian scholars are separating the
Gospel-story into “layers of tradition”
(thus explaining the obvious contradic
tions), the study of the Greek, Egyptian,
Mithraist, and other religions, which
prevailed at the time and in the place
where the Gospels were written, is assign
ing their proper sources to the “ later
layers.” 1 The virgin-birth, which has
been so prominently brought before the
mind of English readers through the
famous denial on the part of a dignitary
of the Church of England, is only an
illustration of the process of dissolution
that is going on. When that process is
complete we shall see how little will be
left of the figure of the Crucified that
has been graven on the heart of Europe
for nearly 1500 years. Most assuredly
Haeckel’s position is a modest one. And
1 Read the able and learned efforts to trace
many of the gospel-elements in Mr. J. M.
Robertson’s Pagan Christs and Christianity and
Mythology. For the analysis of the Gospels read
especially Dr. Schmiedel’s article in the Encyclo-.
padia Biblica.
�SCIENCE AND CHRISTIANITY
to conceal the strength of his position (as
opposed to the conventional position) by
the dust of a heated conflict as to
whether Christ’s father was Joseph the
carpenter or Pantheras the Greek is only
another specimen of “the lack of honesty
in apologetic literature.”
The third point to which Haeckel ad
dresses himself is the belief that there
has been anything unique about the
history or power of the Christian religion.
Here not only is Haeckel’s position very
moderately expressed, but the belief he
attacks is dissolving more rapidly than
the preceding beliefs. The term “unique ”
is—people so often forget—a relative or
comparative term; yet nine-tenths of
the ordinarily educated Christians who
talk of the uniqueness of the Bible have
never read a line of the Babylonian,
Persian, Egyptian, Hindoo, or Chinese
religious literatures; nine-tenths of those
who talk of the unique character of
Christ are totally ignorant of the work
and (traditional) character of Zoroaster,
Buddha, Lao-Tse, Kung-Tse, Apollonius,
or the Bab ; and nine-tenths of those
who think the history of Christianity is
“ unique ” have never studied, even in
the most general way, the growth and
work of Buddhism, or Confucianism, or
Parseeism, or Manicheeism, or Moham
medanism, or Babiism.
They have
trusted their ecclesiastical historians—
not men like Loofs and Harnack, but
the “ popular ” writers and the apologetic
writers of the Churches. Through this
literature most of us have waded at one
time or other; we can appreciate the
justice of the heaviest censure that can
be passed on it. It is one of the most
questionable implements in the employ
ment of the modern Churches. Com
plaint is frequently heard that rationalist
writers are ever seeking to belittle and
besmirch a religion which, with all its
defects, has had, in Haeckel’s words,
“ an ennobling influence on the history
of civilisation ” (p. 117). The reason is
found in the gross mis-statement and
perversion of the moral and religious
life in Europe during the last 1500 years
89
which the ecclesiastical historians have
been guilty of.
I will take in illustration one of . the
most characteristic and interesting periods
of this history of which I chance to have
expert knowledge—the fourth century.
Not many years ago I taught in a semi
nary, and preached from a Catholic
pulpit, the conventional theory of a
spiritual conquest of the Roman world
by Christianity—of “Rome, oppressed
by the weight of its vices, tottering to
embrace the foot of the crucifix.” That
is the historical theory you will hear from
almost every pulpit in this land to-day,
and will find, not merely in Christian
Evidence and S.P.C.K. and R.T.S.
Tracts, but in Sheppard and Milman
and Villemain and Dollinger and other
standard authorities. It is a ridiculously
false picture. Schultze has shown1 that
in some of the most important provinces
of the Empire not more than two and a
half per cent, were Christian at the
beginning of the fourth century. The
old religion had almost lost all serious
influence, and a number of Oriental re
ligions were pervading the Empire with
an ascetic and spiritual gospel. Of these
religions Christianity was one—not the
most ethical or spiritual or most success
ful. When the persecutions ceased, and
the Christians came out into the light of
day, their spiritual poverty was—with few
exceptions—a notable feature. Until 323
they proceeded quietly with their proselytic work, like the Mithraists and the
Manicheans, whom they closely re
sembled, when the conversion of Con
stantine to Christianity suddenly gave
them an immense advantage.
The
emperor’s “ conversion ” is not claimed
to have been important either as an in
tellectual or a spiritual phenomenon, but
it was supremely important in the poli
tical sense. Courtly senators followed
his example. It became, as Symmachus,
one of the last of the great pagans, says,
“ a new form of ambition to desert the
altars ” of the gods. Successive Christian
1 Geschichie des Untergangs des Heidenlhums.
�90
SCIENCE AND CHRISTIANITY
emperors sat on the Western throne, but
preserved a political neutrality, so that
Christianity advanced slowly. The short
reign of Julian showed how far Chris
tianity was from a triumph, and his suc
cessors, though Christian, still declined
to interfere politically in the rivalry of
religions.
By the year 380 the overwhelming
majority of the people and “ nearly the
whole of the nobility ” (St. Augustine
says) were still Pagan ; and the letters
of St. Jerome show that the Christians
were less spiritual than ever. But in 382
the “ triumph of Christianity ” began ;
within twenty years it became the
religion of the Empire. How ? From
the accession of Gratian (aged sixteen)
and Valentinian II. (aged four) there was
a succession of youthful, weak, and
religious emperors in the West. The
court was at Milan; its spiritual director
was St. Ambrose, one of the finest,
strongest, and most ambitious (for the
Church) of the fathers. He used his
influence, threatened the boy-emperor
with excommunication, and soon decree
after decree went out in favour of
Christianity. The pagan revenues were
confiscated: then the pagan temples
were destroyed or sealed up : finally any
who dared to cultivate any other than the
Christian religion were fined, imprisoned,
and threatened with death. At the same
time the Christian Churches adopted, or
had already adopted, all the attractions'
of the temples. They had gorgeous
vestments and ceremonies and pro
cessions, aspersion with water, incense,
banquets and dancing in the Church on
feast-days (generally ending in drunken
revelry), and all that the Roman cared
for in “religion.” The pagan merely
walked over to the Christian temple,
when he found his own barred by soldiers
or razed to the ground, and took
with him his music and flowers and in
cense and wine and statues. There was
no great moral reform, no great spiritual
conversion, except in a few distinguished
cases like that of St. Augustine.1
This gross misrepresentation of his
torical truth by ecclesiastical writers is
the sole reason for the Rationalist’s
playing “ the devil’s advocate.” Almost
the whole period of Christian history has
been treated with similar untruthfulness.
The good has been greatly exaggerated :
the evil suppressed or denied. The
belief in the uniqueness of the growth
of Christianity and of its moral and
civilising influence rests on a mass of
untruth and of calumny of other religions
and sects. Christianity and its sacred
books take their place in the great world
process. We see them growing naturally
out of the older religions and literatures,
and linking us with thoughts of other
ages. When theological literature has
ceased to offend us and to mislead the
people with its “ lack of honesty,” we
will study them with impartial interest,
and seek to establish their influence for
good as well as their share in the de
gradation of Europe from the first
century to the twelfth. Until then the
work of the Rationalist historian is
bound to seem destructive and one
sided.
1 Fuller details may be found in the author’s
St. Augustine and His Age: or in Boissier’s
Fin du Paganisme, Beugnot’s Histoire de la
Destruction dit Paganisme, or Schultze’s Geschichte des Untergangs des Heidenthums.
�THE ETHIC AND RELIGION OF MONISM
9i
Chapter XI
THE ETHIC AND RELIGION OF MONISM
Mr. H. G. Wells, the accredited
prophet of these latter days, predicts in
his well-known Anticipations that by the
end of the present century Christianity
will have been wholly abandoned
by people of culture. There will be,
he thinks, “a steady decay in the
various
Protestant
congregations,”
whilst Catholicism will increase for a
time, but only amongst “ the function
less wealthy, the half-educated, in
dependent women of the middle class,
and the people of the Abyss.” Another
recent writer, Sir Henry Thompson,
says in his essay on The Unknown
God\ “The religion of Nature must
eventually become the faith of the
future; its reception is a question for
each man’s personal convictions. It is
one in which a priestly hierarchy has no
place, nor are there any specified
formularies of worship. For ‘ Religion
[in the words of Huxley] ought to mean
simply reverence and love for the
Ethical ideal, and the desire to realise
that ideal in life. ’ ” Recently, too, Mr.
J. Brierley wrote one of his widely-read
articles in the Christian World on the
theme that there is impending “ a more
radical and more effective attack on
Christianity” than any that have pre
ceded. Mr. Rhondda Williams says that
“ already it is the fact that the cultured
laity on the one hand, and the great
bulk of the democracy on the other, are
outside the Churches.” It is true that
Mr. Ballard wrote in the British Weekly,
in July of this year, that Christianity “ is
at all events larger in quantity and
better in quality than ever before, and has
a brighter promise than in any previous
period of its history.” But within two
months we find him expressing himself
as follows : “ The outlook is a serious
one ; but I am not a pessimist, although
too many of my colleagues regard me as
such. I am only sensitive to the danger
of the day. What they call pessimism
I call open-eyed honesty. We are enter
ing on a very grave and probably pro
longed struggle, as Dr. Flint has recently
stated. The modern atmosphere is in
general tending away from rather than
towards all that is distinctive of Chris
tianity.” 1
Many things happened during the
course of the last summer to elicit or to
confirm these vaticinations. Haeckel’s
Riddle of the Universe was circulating to
the extent of some eighty thousand
copies in this country alone. Ecclesi
astics affected to believe that it was only
ignorant and thoughtless workers and
clerks who were deluded by its show of
learning, but they must have known
that it was being eagerly read by tens of
thousands of thoughtful artisans and
middle-class readers.2 Letters began to
trickle into the religious Press, telling of
increasing secessions and expressing ex
treme alarm. Within twelve months the
Rationalist Press Association, labouring
under the usual disadvantages of an
heretical publisher, put into circulation
nearly half a million of its publications ;
1 See interview by Mr. Raymond Blathwayt
in Great Thoughts.
2 So much pity is expressed in this connection
for the poor artisan that I must make this
observation. I have had intimate knowledge of
the clergy—Roman Catholic clergy, who, as a
rule, have had more definite philosophical instruc
tion than their Protestant colleagues—and have
lately, in the course of lecturing and wandering,
made a fair acquaintance with the working and
lower middle-class readers, who so largely pur
chase sixpenny editions. I do not hesitate to
say that there are tens of thousands of the latter
in England who can read Haeckel more intelli
gently than the majority of the Catholic clergy.
�92
THE ETHIC AND RELIGION OF MONISM
and almost every journal in England was
disturbing the peace of the faithful with
a reminder that there was a riddle of the
universe.
A Socialist journal, the
Clarion, made a drastic and sustained
attack on Christianity, in spite of threats
and jeers, and immediately found itself
in touch with the predominant sentiment
of its readers.
Other working-class
organs found it equally safe to open fire
on the Churches.
Two independent
and rigorous inquiries were conducted
into the religious condition of London,
where the Churches display incalculable
wealth. Both inquiries—that conducted
by Mr. C. Booth and that conducted by
Mr. Mudie-Smith for the Daily News—
proved that the Christian Churches in
London do not attach to themselves
more than a quarter of the population,
and that the great majority of their
adherents are women. A census taken
in Liverpool was equally depressing;
and observations made in several small
provincial towns showed that the con
dition was very general in the country.
At the Trade Union Congress at
Leicester the representatives of several
million workers declared for the ex
clusion of religious instruction from the
schools. A superficial inquiry at New
York discovered the same condition in
America, and the latest Australian
census also showed a decay of the
Churches, especially the Catholic Church
and the Salvation Army. M. Guyau dis
covered that in Paris not one in sixteen
of the population attended church, and
Protestant ministers have reported that
scarcely 8,000,000 of the population of
France remain under the obedience of
the Roman Church. The Belgian elec
tions show that half the population of
that “Catholic” country has definitely
ranged itself against the Church. The
success of the Social-Democrats in
Germany, and the reports from Spain
and Italy, point to the same general
defection of the people from Church
influence.1
1 One of the points in which Dr. Loofs joins
issue with Haeckel is in relation to religious
With the various sources of consola
tion which the clergy point out to each
other we are not concerned. The chief
of these seems to be hope; and a com
plete ignorance of the grounds on which
it rests prevents me from discussing it.
We know that the Churches have enor
mous wealth; one secondary denomination
having recently collected a sum of a mil
lion guineas, and another having erected
a cathedral at a cost of a quarter of a
million.
We know that no odium
attaches to the defence of Christianity, if
a scientist or historian be disposed to
defend it. We know that no intrigue
or menace is directed against the pub
lication or circulation of Christian litera
ture.
We know that the wealthier
journals of this country and the general
cultured sentiment is averse to attacking
even when it does not believe. We know
that the clergy have made enormous
concessions to the secular spirit of the
age, until in places their definite reli
gious ministration can only be timidly
and apologetically slipped in between a
cornet solo and a phonographic entertain
ment. Yet “ the outlook is serious,”
and “the cultured laity and the great
bulk of the democracy are outside the
Churches.”
Mr. Ballard has made
merry over the fact that Haeckel opens
his work in a despondent strain, and
yet his translator prefaces this with “a
paean of triumph.” He forgets that
there is an interval of several years
(not two months, as in his own case)
between the two passages.
The
twentieth century opened with—most
Rationalists considered—a brighter pros
pect for the Churches. Already this
statistics. Haeckel had given (from another
writer) the number of Christians as 410,000,000.
Dr. Loofs quotes two recent authorities who give
the figures as 535,000,000 and 556,000,000,
respectively. This is a fair illustration of the
“ victories ” of our apologists. Everyone knows
that these figures are obtained by lumping
together the populations of what are called
“Christian countries.” So France and England
are each credited with about 40,000,000 Chris
tians instead of 10,000,000. Belgium and Italy
and other countries are similarly treated. The
figures are totally worthless.
�THE ETHIC AND RELIGION OF MONISM
has wholly faded, and it seems impos
sible for the Churches ever to regain a
foot of the lost territory.1
This is not a “ paean of triumph,” but
a statement of fact. In the days when
a profession of unbelief involved social
ostracism and malignant calumny, when
men were thrown into prison with the
dregs of society for selling critical litera
ture or uttering critical sentiments, when
nearly every advance of science was
opposed by ignorant clergymen, when
women were bade to see their husbands
and sons in Hell for refusing to fre
quent the church, and the mind of
England was enslaved to dogmas that
all abhor to-day, the attack on Chris
tianity was necessarily predominantly
negative and destructive. Growth was
impossible until the iron bonds were
broken. To-day Rationalism, still rightly
militant and critical, has a conspicuous
constructive side. It has a sociological
outlook and an idealist gospel. After
all, the life of Europe has rested on
doctrinal foundations so long, and has
grown so accustomed to the stimulus of
religious thought, that some idea must
be substituted for the sources of inspira
tion that are rapidly exhausting. Haeckel
turns, therefore, at the close of his
cosmic speculations and his historical
glance at the Christian Church to con
sider this question of the successor of
Christianity.
Years ago he offered
Monism as “ a connecting link between
science and religion ”; as a system that
could unite harmoniously the finest
ethical truths of the Christian religion
1 Mr. Campbell makes a rhetorical point by
challenging a comparison between the census of
church-goers and a census of “ all the professedly
atheistic assemblies in London, all the Hyde
Park atheistic platforms, and the people who
are listening to atheistic propaganda.” Such a
quibble is unworthy of a serious speaker. 1 lie
limitation to “professedly atheistic” gatherings
makes the comparison ludicrous and unmeaning.
Let me in turn issue a challenge. Let the
figures of the circulation of the sixpenny Chris
tian publications be honestly compared with an
equal number, in an equal time, of the Rational
ist sixpenny works. Rationalism, Mr. Campbell
knows quite well, is almost entirely unorganised.
93
with the unshakable truths of modern
science. Even the believer in Christianity
must at times contemplate with misgiving
the practice of grounding the moral life
on beliefs which are to-day disputed and
attacked in every workshop in the land.
The child who has been trained to
honesty and sobriety on the ground
of supernatural reward or punishment,
or on the mere ground of giving offence
to an injured deity, must be of a singu
larly robust character to withstand
entirely the sneers at Hell and Heaven
and the open disbelief in God that
will presently assail his ears. If it be
desirable to have a humane, temperate,
and honourable community, it behoves
every thoughtful man to cast about for
some other ground for the commenda
tion of these moral qualities than an
enfeebled and disputed dogma. In
creasing stress is, therefore, laid on the
ethical and religious aspect of Monism.
One result of this is that, although the
Churches of our day profess a tolerance
which would have outraged the feelings
of their earlier leaders, their apologists
have by no means ceased to gird at the
alleged disastrous consequences of ma
terialism and agnosticism. Mr. Ballard,
who is supposed to have studied “un
belief” and “unbelievers,” introduces
his study (Miracles of Unbelief} with this
amiable quotation:
“ Hold thou the good : define it well:
For fear divine philosophy
Should push beyond her mark and be
Procuress to the Lords of Hell.”
Mr. Rhondda Williams says “ ideal has
no place in Haeckel’s philosophy ”; and
that on his principles “ over the crimes
of a Csesar Borgia you must write a great
‘Can’t help it.’ . . . The sweater who
grinds the faces of the poor can’t help
it.” Dr. Horton says that “men who
have no belief in God and immortality
sink to the level of the brutes,” and
“ come down to the level of the stocks
and the stones ”; that their “ soul is
shrunk, the mind is warped, and the
very body must carry its marks of degra-
Bishopsgat® InfititutaJ
�94
THE ETHIC AND RELIGION OF MONISM
dation.” Mr. R. J. Campbell says that
if the soul is not immortal, then the
right philosophy is to “eat and drink
and be merry ”; that the real obstacles
to Christianity are the thirst for money,
sensual pleasure and entertainment; and
that atheism is “ the gospel of destruc
tion, disease, and death.”1 This senti
ment is repeated weelily from scores of
pulpits all over the country; it is a
commonplace of ecclesiastical literature
and of a certain type of fiction.
Such tactics are malignant and dis
honourable.
I remember reading an
article in the Daily News some months
ago by Mr. Quiller Couch—a religious
author writing in a journal with a pre
ponderantly religious following.
He
touched on the current calumny of the
man without belief in God and immor
tality, and he urged that his readers
knew as well as he that when they
wanted a man of honour and humanity
to confide in they most probably looked
to an agnostic. Without claiming so
much as this, without enumerating the
Stephens and Morleys and Harrisons
that for years have adorned our letters
and our public life, one asks oneself
whether these cultivated clergymen can
have had an experience of their fellows
so different from that of this candid
novelist and essayist that we can at least
credit them with sincerity. It is impos
sible. The statement is an argument, a
stratagem, a flimsy piece of theorising.
It overrides for the moment every gentle
manly impulse, and closes its eyes to the
pain and the heart-burn that many a
gentle Christian mother will suffer as
she broods over it and thinks of her
wandering son. It is a mighty palliative
—I will not say justification—of the
violent language which often returns to
these gentlemen. Did you ever meet a
Christian who felt a moment’s anxiety
about his own character in the event of
his ceasing to believe in Christian teach1 Sermon in -the Christian Commonwealth,
July 30, 1903. This was Mr. Campbell’s first
sermon in the City Temple, and must be regarded
as an exceptionally deliberate utterance.
ing ? I never did. They could not face
their fellows with an avowal that they
were humane (when not defending the
faith) and honourable only or chiefly
because of reward hereafter, or because
God willed it. They are proud of their
own manliness. Their anxiety is ever
for the welfare of others, for “the
people.”
What, then, is the ethic of Monism
which these rhetoricians so completely
ignore ? One does not need a profound
or prolonged research to find it. It
rises out of the very ground on which
they base their ignoble appeal. They
would have us retain the outworn creed
of Christianity because it has been an
inspiration to character-forming, and
because character and a quick sense of
honour are amongst the most valuable
qualities of life. They do not see that
if honour, and sobriety, and high aims
are of value in and for themselves,
humanity will not lightly part with them,
whether or no it reject the miraculous
setting of them which the preacher com
mends. If “ to eat and drink and be
merry,” to extinguish all ambition of
spirit, to forego the visions of an Emerson
or a Mazzini, to pour one’s whole energy
into money-making and sensual pleasure
—if all these are social dangers and
personal misfortunes, humanity will see
to it that they are restrained. The issue
is plain. If moral qualities may dis
appear without the faculties of man being
stunted and the grace and glory of life
being endangered, they will disappear.
No power on earth will prevent it, now
that man has begun to reflect. But if
justice, and honour, and truthfulness,
and self-control, and kindness are
qualities that enrich and gladden the
personal and the social life, they will be
cultivated on that account. And as a
fact, if we take a broad and true survey,
the world was never richer in those
qualities, yet the influence of dogma was
never less. What does the humanitarian
movement mean ? What the movement
for the extinction of the flames of war,
the increase in philanthropic effort, the
�THE ETHIC AND RELIGION OF MONISM
growing social service of the rich, and a
score of other movements ? What has
shattered the barbaric doctrine of hell,
and extinguished for ever the fires of
persecution? A development of men’s
moral and humane feeling, which has
proceeded simultaneously with a decay
of belief.
But, we are told, you are still so near
to the age of universal belief that the
Christian ethic is in your blood in spite
of you. You are severed twigs that are
still green with the sap of the tree. I
reply, firstly, that it is the modern
rationalist and humanitarian movement
that has reformed Christianity. Compare
the degraded condition of Spain, where
the Church has been able to stifle criti
cism, with England and Germany, where
a century of criticism has been directed
upon Christianity from the otitside. And
I reply, secondly, that we are perfectly
conscious that the sap of Christianity is
in our moral fibres. 11 We firmly adhere
to the best part of Christian morality,”
says Haeckel (p. 120): and “ the idea of
the good in our monistic religion co
incides for the most part with the
Christian idea of virtue.” Why should
we be so foolish as to set aside the moral
experience of the last 2000 years ? It is
the heritage of the race. We have been
lifted above that petty sectarian attitude
that distinguishes the church-member.
We survey the whole moral and religious
life of humanity as one broad stream.
Christianity is a stage, a phase, in the
continuous history of the world.
It
borrowed its ethic from Judaea, from
Greece, and from Egypt. It was made
in Alexandria, the centre at that time of
the civilised world, and the converging
point of three great spiritual streams.
There is not a single ethical element in
primitive Christianity that cannot be
traced to its predecessors. Moreover,
the notion that the Hebrews had a
“genius for morality” has no longer
even the semblance of plausibility.
Read the 125th chapter of confessions
or protestations in the Egyptian Bible,
and you will find, a great Egyptologist
95
(Budge) says, a system of morality
“second to none among those which
have been developed by the greatest
nations of the world.” And this chapter
was compiled, from very much earlier
teaching, fifteen centuries before Christ
appeared, and at a time when the
Hebrews were yet uncivilised. The
Book of the Dead, as Dr. Washington
Sullivan says, is so lofty that “ if every
vestige of Christianity were obliterated
from the earth, it would provide an ad
mirable ethical outfit for the reorganisa
tion of morality in Europe.” Further, we
have within the last two years discovered
the very source of that lofty morality with
which the Hebrew prophets lifted their
nation from its barbaric level. At a date
when the Hebrews were sacrificing
human victims to their idols, two thousand
years before the decalogue in the Old
Testament was written, the Babylonians
(from whom the Hebrews obtained their
wisdom and civilisation) were living at a
very high level of moral idealism. The
Code of Laws of Khammurabi—laws
promulgated between 2285 and 2242 B.c.
—is seen to be the foundation of the
“ Mosaic legislation.” We now know,
Dr. Washington Sullivan says, that the
Hebrews “ were positively the last of all
the peoples of remote antiquity to dis
cover those high truths of the moral life
which constitute the unchanging founda
tion of society.”1
But, while, in taking over from
Christianity the moral heritage of
humanity, we owe it gratitude for new
development in some directions, we
must with Haeckel acknowledge that it
has overlaid moral truth with false ideals
that must be set aside. I am not
speaking merely of those mediaeval
horrors which all Christians avoid and
evade to-day. I am thinking of some of
the most distinctive features of the
composite Christ-ideal. When Mr.
1 Ancient Morality. The reader will find in
this admirable booklet a fuller account of this
and the preceding point. It can be obtained at
a moderate price from “ The Ethical Religion
Society,” Steinway Hall.
�96
THE ETHIC AND RELIGION OF MONISM
Campbell
says that Christ “ has
manufactured more nobleness than all
the moral codes in all the world put to
gether,” we see at a glance how little he
knows of “all the moral codes” and
what they have done. We who watch
the advance of comparative religion and
ethics, and of the criticism of the New
Testament, know what will eventually
become of this kind of Christianity
which stakes its existence on the
historical truth of the Gospels. Christ
is dissolving year by year. But even
when apologists have removed the stress
from the (largely, at least) legendary
person of Christ to that moral teaching
which appears in the first century as
“primitive Christianity,” we still join
issue with them. Haeckel has indicated
several features of the Christian ethic
which we cannot receive. Some of
these features are already abandoned
by our Christian neighbours. There is
the ascetic principle, one of the most
prominent elements of the Christ-teaching, which even the Catholic Church is
quietly dropping. There is the Gospel
of opposing violence by submission and
Hooliganism by emptying your pockets,
which one honest Anglican bishop has
pronounced “ impracticable.” There is
the contempt of art and nature, which
follows from the ascetic principle. There
is the commendation of virginity, which
no one regards to-day, with its implica
tion of the inferiority of marriage, so ex
pressly preached by the Church fathers.
There is the suppression of woman, in
spired by the Old Testament teaching,
which, as Mr. Lecky has shown, put
back her emancipation (which the
Romans were initiating) for more than a
thousand years. All these were errors
of the enthusiastic but ignorant com
pilers of the Christ-ideal, and the modern
world agrees to abandon them.
We claim, further, that this moral
teaching must be set once for all on a
purely humanist ground.
“ With eyes
fixed on the future,” says the great
Mazzini, “ we must break the last links of
the chain which holds us in bondage to
the past, and with deliberate stages move
on. We have freed ourelves from the
abuses of the old world; we must now
free ourselves from its glories. . . To-day
we have to found the polity of the nine
teenth century—to climb through philo
sophy to faith ; to define and organise
association, proclaim humanity, initiate
the New Age.” The doctrine of Hell
and Heaven is no longer a fitting founda
tion for moral conduct, as most edu
cated Christians recognise to-day. But
the personality of God or the personality
of Christ is just as little fitted. Have
you ever seen how the little-minded
villagers, along those parts of our coast
where the sea is steadily invading the
land, build time after time close to the
edge of the cliff? “ My grandfather lived
there,” some old man will tell you, point
ing his lean finger out into the sea. And
he knows that in twenty years more the
cottage he has himself built will be un
dermined and swept away. That is
the procedure of those theologians who
base their ethic on the successively dis
solving dogmas of Christianity. Their
grandfathers staked the moral condition
of the community on a belief in Hell;
their fathers grounded it on faith in the
supernatural character of the Bible.
They are basing it to-day on belief in
God and the historical reality of Christ.
And year by year the waves of criticism
and the tunnels of research are under
mining their position. Let us retreat
once for all from the land of dogma.
Morality is too important a matter to be
left at the mercy of scientific or historical
controversies. Cling to your beliefs if
you must—if you can ; but in view of the
controversy that surrounds them, and
will soon thicken about them a hundred
fold, do not seek to bind up the moral
tone of the community with so frail a
speculation.
People who imagine that this pro
posal to transfer the moral interest
from the care of the Churches has a
violent and unnatural character are
little acquainted with the history of the
subject. The leading writers on com-
�THE ETHIC AND RELIGION OF MONISM
parative religion assure us that, in the
words of Professor Tiele, “ in the be
ginning religion had little or no con
nection with morality.” In other words,
morality had a quite different and inde
pendent origin from theology. It was
only at a fairly advanced stage in the
development of priesthood that the
notion was advanced of the gods being
the authors and the priests the guardians
of the moral law. We have seen how
Babylon had the decalogue and an
elaborate moral code centuries before the
supposed giving of the tables to Moses
on Mount Sinai. The existence of a fullydeveloped moral sentiment can thus be
discovered ages before the first claim of
a revelation. If, further, we study the
moral feeling of the lowliest tribes, and
ascend gradually through the semibarbaric peoples known to history, such
as the ancient Mexicans or our own
forefathers, we can trace clearly enough
the growth of the moral ideal. When
men began to live in community they
discovered that certain restraints must
be placed on individual impulses. They
saw the enormous advantages to each of
a communal life, of co-operation and the
division of labour, of mutual help and
service, of substituting trial or arbitration
for bloody combats, and of being able to
trust each other. In other words, they
discovered that, if they were to advance
in the construction of social life, which
promised so many advantages, certain
new habits or rules or qualities were
necessary.
Justice, kindness, respect
for age, care of youth, truthfulness,
sobriety, and self-control were necessary.
In proportion as they acquired these
qualities their social life was healthy and
effective.
The individual gained far
more than he had relinquished in the
occasional restraint of his impulses.
And in proportion as they fell away from
this ideal their social life was enfeebled
and disturbed. Thus there grew up a
sense of the importance of the moral
ideal—such a sense as we find, for
instance, amongst the ancient Germans
long before their contact with Chris
97
tianity. In this way the decalogue came
to be written. Man was its author.
The experience of 200,000 years was
his inspiration. And to-day, when we
see how vitally necessary moral fibre
is for progress in the exacting race of
our national and international life, it is
hardly likely that we shall return to the
lawlessness of prehistoric life. There came
a stage in the evolution of the moral ideal
when men considered it so wonderful
a thought that they hailed it as a gift of
the gods, just as the Hebrews did when
they composed, or borrowed, the legend
of the giving of the law on Sinai. In
this way morality became intimately
associated with theology. It is probable
that, whilst this association has hindered
moral development in some ways—com
pare the stagnancy of the “ages of
faith ” with the great ethical advance of
this “ age of unbelief ”—it has in other
ways greatly promoted it.
However that may be, the time has
come for humanity to claim its own from
the gods. There is an obvious danger
that, as the theological structure with
which morality has so long been asso
ciated breaks up, morality may suffer for
a time. Scepticism about the one natur
ally leads to scepticism about the other.
To say that we should on that account
refrain from hastening the dissolution of
theology is the very reverse of wisdom or
statesmanship. We must insist on the
formation of a purely humanitarian ethic.
We must jealously remove this deeply
important interest from the arena of
controversy. Our children must not be
taught, as they are still taught, to restrain
their impulses to lying, stealing, and
unhealthy practices, merely on the ground
of certain religious beliefs. In a few years
they will hear those beliefs ridiculed and
torn to shreds on every side, and it may
be that the whole structure of their
moral habits will be shaken to the ground.
This is a grave social and humanitarian
problem.
Our educational authorities
insist that moral training shall be given
by the teacher only in connection with
' the legends of the Old Testament, which
G
�98
THE ETHIC AND RELIGION OF MONISM
are not taken to Be historical by clerical
Scholars themselves to-day, or with the
stories of the New Testament that are
being rapidly reduced to myths. The
child is too unsophisticated to see what
is called a “symbolic truth” in these,
and it is well known that the teachers in
our schools, often with great repugnance
to their own feelings, have to treat these
stories as historical, or leave them to be
considered historical.
It is a pitiful
situation, and ought not to be tolerated
even by those who still adhere to
religious beliefs.
An organisation has been created to
meet this situation; to agitate for the
introduction of purely humanitarian
moral instruction for the children in our
elementary schools, and to formulate
schemes of such teaching and provide
model-lessons and expert teachers to
show its practicability. Already several
local educational authorities have adopted
the ideas of this organisation. But over
the country at large the moral instruction
of our children is still totally bound up
with that teaching of the Bible which is
to-day so seriously controverted. Every
man, and especially every woman, who
is alive to the folly and the danger of
our present system should consider the
aim and work of this organisation.1
A more difficult question arises when
we turn to consider moral culture
amongst the adult portion of the
community. Dr. Haeckel is of opinion,
as are very many rationalist writers, that
we need look forward to no substitute
for the Churches in this respect, except
for a certain minority of the community.
“The modern man,” he says, “who has
‘ science and art,’ and therefore ‘ re
ligion,’ needs no special church, no
narrow, enclosed portion of space. For
through the length and breadth of free
nature, wherever he turns his gaze, to
1 I am referring to the Moral Instruction
League. Its central office is at 19 Buckingham
Street, Strand, Loudon, W.C. ; any inquiries
addressed there will be promptly answered by
the secretary. Branches of the League have
been formed in various parts of the country.
the whole universe or to any single
part of it, be finds indeed the grim
struggle for life, but by its side are ever
1 the good, the true, and the beautiful ’
his church is commensurate with the
whole of glorious nature. Still, there
will always be men of special tem
perament who will desire to have
decorated temples or churches as places
of devotion, to which they may with
draw.” No doubt, - 'when we have
introduced an adequate scheme of
purely natural moral instruction into our
primary and secondary- schools instead
of leaving this most important section
of the child’s education to the casual
observations of a reluctant and untrained
teacher in the course of a Bible lesson,
there will not be the same need for
church-assemblies in later life. But it
would seem that the tendency to form
new groups and organisations for moral
and humanitarian culture is on the
increase. Already there is in the field
an important “ Ethical movement,” with
branches in America,' England, France,
and Germany, and with an international
organ (The International Journal of
Ethics) and international congresses.
The English branch includes some
fifteen societies in London and the
provinces, most of which are gathered
into a Union of Ethical Societies,1 and
is spreading rapidly. It has an organ
of its own (Ethics, one penny weekly),
and takes an active part in all social and
humanitarian work. There is also the
Positivist Movement; and there are num
bers of Humanitarian, Tolstoyan, and
other societies with similar aims. Even
churches and chapels are slowly casting
off their raiment of dogma and specula
tion, and restricting their aim to moral
culture. In many parts of England
this transformation has already com
pletely taken place. The tendency
everywhere is in the direction of an
abandonment of dogma, and a relin
quishment of cosmic speculation to the
philosopher and the scientist. Some
1 Central office at 19 Buckingham Street,
London, W.C.
J
�THE POSITION OF DR. A. R. WALLACE
day our Churches will perceive at length
that the belief in God is itself a cosmic
speculation, exposed: to a hundred
hazards of discovery and controversy.
Then, in the words of. Emerson, “there
will be a new Church, founded on moral
science ; at first cold and naked, a babe
in a manger again, the algebra and
mathematics of ethical law, the
Church of men to come, without
shawms, or psaltery, or sackbut, but it
will have heaven and earth for its beams
and rafters, science for symbol and
illustration; it will fast enough gather
beauty, music, picture, and poetry.”
That Haeckel is right in this, his final
judgment and expectation, none will
question who have long observed the
development of religious thought and
church life. Strong and eloquent voices
plead already within the Churches for
the elimination of dogma, for an ex
clusive concern for moral culture. If the
modem art of anticipation have any
validity, it is certain that theological
speculation and moral culture are
severing their long association. We are
taking the step that some of the great
religions of the world took ages ago.
Buddha, wiser in this than the founders
of Christianity, pleaded solely for moral
reform, and coldly discountenanced
theological speculation.
Enlightened
Buddhists hold to the spirit of his
teaching, though Buddhism has, as a
j
'
■ .i . J
99
whole, been unfaithful to his spirit. But
another great Oriental religion, Con
fucianism, the religion of the cultured
Chinese and Japanese, had taken the
step we are taking to-day centuries before
Christ was born. The followers of
Kung-Tse have for ages maintained
moral culture without dogma. Their
Bible, the Bushido, is the model
Bible of the world. It is the turn of
Christianity to make religion “ the service
of man ” instead of “ the service of God.”
If there be a God, he needs not the
sacrifices, and he must disdain the flattery
and adoration, of' a poverty-stricken
humanity. We must turn at length from
the land of shadows, where the super
natural lurks, and pour the whole intense
stream of religious emotion into the task
of uplifting ourselves and our fellows.
We must free the religious and moral
ideal from every entanglement of contro
verted dogma, and set it on a natural
base. Then will cease the long anxiety
and the foolish resistance to every ad
vance of thought. Then each new
discovery will shed new light on our
ideal, and science will be. eagerly
pursued.
“ Oh Science, lift aloud thy voice that stills
The pulse of fear, and through the conscience
thrills—
Thrills through the conscience with the
news of peace—
How beautiful thy feet are on the hills ! ”
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Chapter X
THE POSITION OF DR. A. R. WALLACE
The reader will probably remember
a famous passage in one of Huxley’s
essays where the anxiety that theologians
betray, as the mechanical interpretation
of the universe advances, is compared to
the terror which savages exhibit during
an eclipse of the sun. Whether Huxley
had had a rude experience of that
D 2
�IOO
THE POSITION OF DR. A. R. WALLACE
ecclesiastical rhetoric, of which we have
seen so much under the name of
“ criticism ” of Haeckel, and had yielded
to a malicious impulse in his choice of
an analogy, we need not inquire. We
have seen that the apologists are still
eager to. throw every obstacle they can
suggest in the way of the advance, or of
the acceptance, of the mechanical view.
We have encountered them at every step
in our course. Sometimes, indeed, we
have found ecclesiastics with scientific
qualifications desperately recommending
us to read criticisms that aim at dis
crediting scientific procedure; as when
Mr. Ballard tells his readers to study
Stallo s Concepts of Modern Physics, a
work “the.most of which,” says Sir O.
Lodge, “is occupied in demolishing
constructions of straw.” But these
tactics have long ago ceased to be
effective. Science has won too solid a
position in modern life to be shaken by
the ill-informed criticism of Stallo or the
academic subtleties of Professor Ward.
Nor is the general reader greatly moved
by the efforts of our modern theologians
to sit in judgment on science in its own
domain. The obvious plan for the
Churches to adopt with the largest hope
of success was to obtain, and give a wide
publicity to, utterances by prominent
scientists that tend to rehabilitate
theology. I am not suggesting that
these distinguished scientists only speak
out under a strong pressure from the
clergy. On the part of Sir O. Lodge, for
instance, and Dr. A. R. Wallace, there
is a very clear concern for religion,
which is entitled to our full respect.
But it cannot be denied that the use
which is made by the clergy of these
occasional utterances is gravely mislead
ing.
We have already seen this in
the case of those German scientists to
whom Haeckel refers as having changed
their views. The only statement that
Haeckel makes is that they have ceased
to defend the positive views which he
expounds in the Riddle • yet almost
every clerical writer represents them as
having, to use Dr. Plorton’s words,
“ come to recognise spirit as the author
of consciousness ”—this in spite of the
fact that Haeckel expressly mentions
Du Bois-Reymond’s agnosticism on this
point (p. 6). Dr. Horton, with his
inclusion amongst the elect of the most
notorious materialists that ever lived,
has a title to leniency, in a sense, because
of his obvious ignorance of the entire
subject. The position of those apologists
who have some scientific culture is more
serious. These German scientists—
Wundt, Baer, Virchow, and Du BoisReymond — are
agnostics. Professor
Haeckel assures me that in Germany the
clerical writers call them “atheists.”
They lend no support whatever to even
the. most advanced and liberal form of
theism.
Writers who so thoroughly
mi-lead the English public as to their
position have little right to discuss
the taste of Haeckel’s analysis of
his. colleagues’ views.
The oriental
saying about straining at the gnat
and. swallowing the camel is painfully
pertinent.
We have now to examine those utter
ances on the part of English men of
science which are so much quoted of
late, and we shall find how little support
they really give to the religious position.
Of the later views of G. J. Romanes I will
speak later, when we come to deal with
the somewhat similar ideas of Mr. W.
Mallock. Romanes saw to the end the
terrible strength of the scientific position.
It was only by an appeal to “extrarational ” and unscientific testimony
that he sought to evade it. With Sir O.
Lodge we need not deal in detail. His
chief line of argument is of a teleological
nature, and is exposed to the difficulties
we have already indicated. Nor do I
propose to deal with the spiritist convic
tions of Sir O. Lodge or Dr. Wallace, or
(if they still exist) Sir W. Crookes, or
(in a degree) Professor James. Spiritist
evidence is a subject for personal investi
gation. We may also hold ourselves
dispensed from dealing in detail with
the views of the late Dr. St. George
Mivart. They are not urged upon us to-
�THE POSITION OF DR. A. R. WALLACE
day.1 But there have lately been published
two remarkable pronouncements by dis
tinguished English scientists, Dr. Wallace
and Lord Kelvin, and these it is incum
bent on us to examine. It is chiefly on
the strength of these utterances, that
clerical apologists talk of a reconciliation
of science and religion, if not of “a
rehabilitation of religion. by science.”
These utterances have, in their bald
and misleading outline, been published
throughout the country. We shall see,
in this and the following chapter, how
wholly ineffectual they were, how swiftly
they were torn to shreds by the proper
experts on the subjects involved, and
how clearly the episodes show that the
science of to-day is overwhelmingly
favourable to the positions we have
defended against Haeckel’s critics.
Dr. A. R. Wallace, one of the most
distinguished naturalists of our time, has
long been famous for his opposition to
the doctrine of the evolution of the
human mind. This opposition, main
tained in face of a remarkable and
increasing consensus of scientists and
scientific theologians, is ceasing to im
press inquirers as it once did. The
opinions of a man of such ability, expert
knowledge, and candour, must always be
examined with respect. But we have
seen that the problem is very different
to-day from what it was thirty years ago.
To-day we all admit that evolution is a
cosmic law: Haeckel says it is “ the
second law of substance,” and the theo
logians say it is God’s way of making
things. We all admit the evolution of
matter and the evolution of solar
systems; and most of us admit the
evolution of life and the evolution of
species. On the other hand, we trace
back the distinctive human institutions
of to-day—art, civilisation, science, phi1 Had Mivart lived, the public would have seen
a sensational development in the exposition of
his later opinions. He told me, some years
before his death, that he intended to speak out
fully before he quitted the stage, and he frankly
admitted that his scepticism was deep and his
concern for religion little more than a belief in
its moral efficacy.
IOI
losophy, religion, moral codes, and lan
guage—along a line of evolution to very
primitive beginnings. Grant a glimmer
of intelligence and reason in early man,
and we can very well conceive the natural
development of these institutions in the
course of the last 200,000 years. We
must, indeed; because we know that the
prehistoric man, whose remains we un
earth to-day, had not these things. We
have, therefore, only to bridge the interval
between the brain of the Neanderthal
man and that of the anthropoid ape,
between the mind of the highest animal
and that of the lowest man. The dif
ference is one of degree, not of kind.
Comparative psychology finds in animals
the same emotions and reasoning power
as in man, only less highly developed.
Further, we have a period of at least
600,000 years in which the advance
might be effected. The anthropoid apes
appear in the Miocene period (about
900,000 years ago). Man is not held
to be developed from them, but from a
common ancestor with them; so that
from that period to the time when we
find unmistakable trace of man (250,000
to 220,000 years ago) natural selection
must have been at work.
Finally, we
have lately discovered a most important
link in the chain of development (the
pithecanthropus), and the study of the
brain is, as we saw, suggesting some very
remarkable and illuminating possibilities.
If Canon Aubrey Moore could say that
Mr. Wallace’s view “ had a strangely un
orthodox look ” sixteen years ago, it has
certainly not lost its singularity in our
day. When Dr. Haeckel went to Java,
two years ago, on a scientific expedition,
the Press assured us that he had gone to
search for more bones of the pithecan
thropus. As a fact, though his researches
and travels took him within a hundred
miles of the spot where Dubois found
the famous remains in 1894, he did not
go there. The evidence for the complete
natural development of man is so great
that such discoveries are unnecessary.
But Dr. Wallace has very recently
I entrenched his position with a very
�102
THE POSITION OF DR. A. R. WALLACE
remarkable attack on current scientific
conceptions. He purports to undo a
large and important section of the scien
tific procedure of our earlier chapters,
and we must enter upon a thorough
examination of his statements.1
He
says that the “ new astronomy ” entirely
disciedits that “ cosmological perspec
tive ” which we have taken from Haeckel
and supported with recent evidence.
Instead of finding indications of infinity,
he says, modern astronomers have dis
covered very definite limits to the
material universe. Instead of our sun
being a . neglected and unimportant
element in the stellar universe, it is the
very centre, or near the centre, of the
whole system. Instead of our earth
being a very ordinary fragment of matter,
torn, in some way, from the central mass,
and forming a casual crust at its cooled
surface, it. is a unique body in the uni
verse ; it is fitted to support life in a way
that no other planet of our system is,
and that most probably no other planet
in the universe is. Thus, instead of
man being a mere casual product of
natural development, he is the very
centre and culmination of its processes,
a unique creation, for whose production
the whole universe seems to be one vast
and orderly mechanism, set up for that
purpose by a Supreme Intelligence.
If this is true, it is one of the most
startling and dramatic discoveries ever
made. Let me point out at once that if
all this (except the last line) were estab
lished to-morrow it would not add one
grain of evidence to the religious position,
and would not break a line in the essen
tial structure of Monism. The universe
would still be a mechanism, with no
indication of ever having begun to exist;
and Dr. Wallace’s teleological plea for a
guiding intelligence would be as illogical
as we have seen that argument to be.
This new discovery would greatly impress
(because it would greatly unsettle) the
1 The book he announces is not published as
I write, so that I follow the two articles he wrote
in the Fortnightly Review (March and Sep
tember, 1903).
imagination, but would have no philo
sophical significance. Dr. Wallace says
we could no longer attribute the appear
ance of life to chance ; but we do not
attribute it now to “chance.”
We
attribute it to a mechanism which is not
erratic, but fixed, in its action. Setting
aside the imagination and the emotions,
there is no more philosophic significance
in the fact of the materials and conditions
of life being found in just one cosmic
body than in a million. Dr. Wallace
seem(> to make much of the “ re markable: coincidence” of these curious
privileges of our planet with the actual
appearance of life on it. Most people
will think there would be some reason
to use the word remarkable if the con
ditions were here and the life was not
forthcoming.
There is no religious
significance in all that Dr. Wallace urges.
But it is- in direct opposition to much
that we have established in the earlier
stages of .Haeckel’s position, and we
must examine the evidence adduced in
support of it. If it is true, Monism can
assimilate, it without strain. We shall
see that it is not only not proved, but
the attempt to prove it only shows again
the correctness of even Haeckel’s minor
positions, r
It is, naturally, to astronomy that Dr.
Wallace turns for evidence. He is not
an expert, in that science, but, of course,
every philosophic thinker must borrow
material from many different sciences.
The truth is, however, that no sooner
were Dr. Wallace’s views published than
there was immediately a loud and unani
mous condemnation of them on the part
of astronomers. The astronomers of
France and Germany were frankly cynical
about, them, two of the leading French
astronomers writing to combat them in
Knowledge. Our chief English astrono
mers, of all schools, at once repudiated
the alleged evidence. Professor Turner,
the Savilian Professor of Astronomy at
Oxford, said that Dr. Wallace had “ not
suggested, anything new which was in
the least likely to be true. He seems to
me to have unconsciously got his facts
�THE POSITION OF DR. A. R. WALLACE
distorted, and to indicate practically
nothing wherewith to link them to his
conclusion.” Dr. Maunder pronounced
the new theory “a myth,” and was not
sure if Dr. Wallace intended the article
to be taken as “a serious one.” A
number of other astronomers joined in
the discussion, and, apart from one or
two details in his evidence,,not a single
expert undertook to defend him. But
we must examine his several positions in
succession, so as to bring out once more
the fact that Haeckel is supported by
the most recent science.
The first point, and the most interest
ing for our purpose, is the contention
that the new astronomy discovers the
universe to have a d.efinite limit. We
have urged that Haeckel was in harmony
with the evidence when he spoke of the
universe as “ infinite,” so that here is a
clear contradiction. It need not be said
that the validity of Monism is not at
stake in the matter. Whether the uni
verse is limited or unlimited, it remains
a Monistic universe. The question is
whether Haeckel has misread the evi
dence of astronomy on this incidental
question of limit or no limit. It is well
to remember that “ infinity ” is a nega
tive idea. It merely denies that there is
a limit to the scheme of things. What
we have to see, then, is whether the most
recent investigations of astronomy point
to the existence of such a limit or not.
The evidence for a limit on which Dr.
Wallace lays most stress is, instead of
being a study in “ the new astronomy,”
a very old and threadbare fallacy.
Flammarion says1 it was “ the subject of
long and learned discussions during the
course of the eighteenth century and up
to the middle of the nineteenth,” and he
adds that “ it would not be difficult to
settle it to-day.” The argument is that
if the number of luminous stars were
infinite the sky would be at night as
bright as it is at noonday. The infinite
number would compensate for the dis
tance. But the actual star-light is only
1 Knowledge, June, 1903.
103
about one-fortieth the light of themoon,
and that is only a five-thousandth of the
intensity of the light of the sun. Dr.
Wallace has taken this specious calcula
tion from Professor Newcomb, but has,
as Dr. Maunder points out, omitted two
conditions which Newcomb carefully
gives, and which make the speculation
totally inapplicable to the actual uni
verse. Newcomb’s calculation assumed
that no star-light was lost in transmission,
and that “ every region of space of some
great but finite extent is, on the average,
occupied by at least one star.” Neither
of these conditions is found in our uni
verse. Light is absorbed in its passage
to us; and the stars are distributed with
nothing approaching the uniformity
which the speculation demands. The
second point needs no proof.
The
irregular structure of our stellar system
is familiar enough; and there is not the
slightest scientific difficulty about sup
posing that other stellar worlds may be
separated from ours by immeasurable
deserts of space. As to the absorption
of light, a number of causes are pointed
out. In the first place, we now know that
there are dark as well as luminous stars.
No astronomer supposes that these are
less numerous than the light stars. Sir
Robert Ball thinks they are so much
more numerous that to count the stars
by the light and visible spheres would be
like estimating the number of horse
shoes in England by the number of
those which are red-hot at a given
moment. These dark stars must inter
cept the light of their incandescent
fellows.1 Dr. Maunder says that if we
take them as a basis of our calculation
1 In his second article Dr. Wallace replies
that Mr. Monckhas shown that, even if the dark
stars were 150,000 times more numerous than
the light ones, the sky would, if these were in
finite, be as bright as moonlight. Once more
Dr. Wallace omits a condition stipulated by his
authority, who says this would be so- if they
“were distributed in anything approaching a
similar density.” For that we have no assurance
whatever. Moreover, Dr. Wallace almost ignore
the other and more important sources of absorp
tion.
�104
THE POSITION OF' DR. A. R. WALLACE
we could prove that “we are shut in by
a veil wnich no light from an infinite
distance could pierce.”
But in addition to these incalculable
dark stars there are other sources of
absorption. The astronomer to whom
Dr. Wallace appeals, Mr. Monck, holds
that ether itself absorbs light. At any
rate we know that space is full of cosmic
dust—meteorites, etc.—and that this
must be an important source of ab
sorption. Mr. Monck says that, “ if
sufficiently remote, the star would thus
for all practical purposes be blotted out.”
And Sir N. Lockyer also emphasises this
factor. Moreover, we have just learned
a further source. Before Newcomb’s
latest work was published, in February,
1901, a new cosmic element was dis
covered in the shape of a dark nebula.
Certain peculiarities of a new star led to
the discovery that it was surrounded by
a nebula that reflected its light. Thus,
we have the presence in space of another
and powerful screen in the shape of dark
nebulae, the number and distribution of
which we are unable to conjecture. Our
universe is something infinitely removed
from that theoretical system to which
Professor Newcomb’s calculations might
apply. Ihus, once more, does the very
latest science come to our assistance.
We may add that, even apart from the
absorption of light and the irregular dis
tribution of the stars, the calculation is
enfeebled by another possibility. We
have no proof that ether is continuous
throughout infinite space. There may
be several galaxies or stellar systems,
unconnected by ether, so that one would
not be visible to another. Assuming
that (according to a calculation of Lord
Kelvin’s) there are a thousand million
stars in our system, “there may be,”
says Flammarion, “ a second thousand
beyond an immense void, or a third, or
fourth or more.” And, finally, Professor
Pickering has shown that, even with a
continuous infinite ether, our present
star-light is quite consistent with the
existence of an infinite number of
luminous stars, “ if the distance between
the stars becomes (on the average)
greater the farther we go from the solar
system,” if we assume this to be central.
Thus the most emphatic of Dr.
Wallace s proofs has been absolutely
riddled by expert astronomical opinion.
It is “ founded,” says Dr. Maunder, “ on
a careless reading of Professor New
comb s book,” and cannot be sustained
for a moment.1 Nor is his other line of
argument more capable of defence. He
urges that, although up to a certain point
an increase in the power of the telescope
reveals new worlds in greater number,
this increase is not sustained in the case
of our largest telescopes; and, in the
case of photographs of the stars, an
exposure beyond three or four hours does
not bring us into touch with an increas
ing number of worlds. From this he
would infer that the powerful instru
ments we use to-day have exhausted the
universe and brought us to its extremities.
If the number of stars were infinite, an
increase of power or exposure should
always reveal new worlds. Once more,
Dr. Wallace has drawn his conclusion
too precipitately. In the first place, as I
said, there is the possibility of other
systems being cut off from ours by
empty space. But there is a simpler
and readier answer to his argument. The
fact to which he appeals—in so far as it
is fact; a study of the long-exposure
photographs of Dr. Isaacs by no means
sustains it 2—really means that we are
approaching the limit of the effective
range of the telescope, not the limit of
objective reality. Every increase in the
aperture of a refracting telescope means
1 Nor is Professor Newcomb’s book itself above
dispute, great as is the authority of the writer.
Mr. R. A. Gregory, reviewing it in Nature
(March, 1902), says that “ the outlook described
is not only limited, but imperfect,” and points
out a number of errors in it.
2 In his second article Dr. Wallace appeals to
these photographs, but makes it clear that he
has in mind photographs of nebulae and star
clusters. It is obvious that there must be a limit
to the number of stars in a given cluster or
nebula; but the eight-hour exposure photo
graphs of other parts of the heavens read
differently.
�105
THE POSITION OF DR. A. R. WALLACE
an increase in the absorption of light by
the lens itself. We are, Dr. Maunder
says, approaching the limit beyond which
the absorption will neutralise the advan
tage of a large objective. So in the case
of stellar photography, it is only when
we deal with “ medium luminosities ”
that a longer exposure avails. Thus Dr.
Wallace not only exaggerates the fact—
Mr. Monck, for instance, speaks of
“ the constant detection of additional
stars by more powerful instruments ”—
but he misinterprets its significance. He
has not, says M. Moye, “brought any
convincing proof against the universe
being infinite.”
“ Space cannot be
otherwise than infinite,” says M. Flammarion; a limit to either space or time
is unthinkable. The latest researches
of astronomers bring us no nearer than
ever to a limit of the material universe.
Dr. Wallace’s second point, that our
planet occupies a significant central
position in the universe, collapses of
itself when he fails to prove that that
universe is finite. There is no centre
in infinity. But, as Dr. Wallace has
committed the radical error of “ reason
ing from the area we see to the infinite,”
it is at least interesting to examine how
far our sun may be described as occupy
ing a central position in the vast stellar
combination we call the Milky Way.
Now, it has long been obvious that our
sun is roughly in the centre of this huge
system. We have only to glance at the
great belt of light the system forms around
us in the heavens to see this.
But
astronomers once more totally reject the
expression of this fact which Dr. Wallace
presents.
The system is so irregular
in structure that we could not with pro
priety assign a definite centre to it if our
knowledge were greater than it is. You
may talk of the centre of a bowl, says
Professor Turner, but you cannot talk of
the centre of a saucepan ; and there is
a projection of the system visible in the
southern heavens which answers to the
“handle” in this figure. Flammarion
believes there are clusters in the heavens
that do not belong to our system at all.
Moreover, even if we consent to speak
of a “ centre ” of this irregular structure,
with its clefts and projections, it is wholly
inaccurate to say that our sun is awarded
that position by astronomy. Mr. Monck
doubts “ if any astronomer could go
within one thousand light years of the
centre of the star system as at present
known ” ; that is to say, in non-technical
language, no astronomer would venture
to assign a centre within the broad limit
of 6000 billion miles ! Other astronomers
think it clear that we are nearer one side
of the system than its opposite, and
point out that if the motion of our sun
(about ten miles a second) is in a curve
determined by gravitation (as it surely is)
round the centre of gravity of the solar
system, it must be at an enormous dis
tance from that centre, as we can learn
from the analogy of motion in a globular
cluster.
All agree that we have no
greater right to consider ourselves in a
central position than are fifty other suns,
the nearest of which is twenty-five billion
miles away from us.
Thus Dr. Wallace has once more
considerably strained the evidence in
order to vindicate a central position for us.
But there is a further consideration
which must be taken into account.
Our sun is calculated by astronomers to
be travelling through space at about ten
miles per second. Dr. Wallace seeks to
enfeeble this doctrine of astronomy,
when it is turned against him, by urging
that the motion is relative; it may be
the stars that move while we remain
stationary. That is to say, he would
suggest an anomalous character for our
sun without a shadow of proof and
in direct opposition to the law of gravita
tion, which he himself invokes at other
times. The idea of a vast central sun,
round which all the stars in the Milky
Way would revolve, as planets do round
a sun, has been long since rejected by
astronomers. Its mass would have to
be incalculable; and the mass of our
sun is small compared with that of its
measurable neighbours. To save itself
) _ from being sucked in (or impelled
H
�106
THE POSITION OF DR. A. R. WALLACE
towards) its gigantic double and triple
neighbours it must move. It is probable
that it follows a curved path round the
common centre of gravity of our system
(not a central mass). In any case the
curve of its path is so great that
astronomers can as yet detect no curve
at all. It follows that, if to-day we
happen to occupy a central position, it is
only a temporary occupation. Many of
Dr. Wallace’s critics argued on the sup
position that our path lay in a straight
line through the universe, but others
pointed out the probable curve, so that
Dr. Wallace does not escape the point
by rejecting rectilinear motion. He had
argued that the special advantages which
this supposed central position gave to
our sun had been enjoyed by it during
the whole period of the evolution of
life. Astronomy wholly discredits that
assumption even when we bear in mind
all that he urges as to the relativity of
cosmic movements.
Let us next examine the advantages
which our planet is supposed by Dr.
Wallace to possess in the way of habita
bility. The conditions of life which he
enumerates are the usual conditions of a
certain temperature (say, between o° C.
and 75° C.), a circulation of water, and
an atmosphere of proper density and
extent to effect this. Our own distance
from the sun, with an atmosphere and
tidal movements to equalise the distri
bution of heat and cold, ensures a
moderate temperature. Our deep, per
manent oceans hold a supply of water,
which is admirably circulated by the
heat of the sun, controlled by the atmo
sphere, and assisted by the dust which
our deserts and volcanoes largely con
tribute.. Thus we have, he thinks, in
the position of our planet, its distribution
of land and water, its atmosphere, its
satellite, and its physical features, a com
bination of favourable circumstances
that is not likely to be found elsewhere,
The distance of the other planets from
the sun is either too great or too little.
Atmosphere is largely determined by
mass, and so Mars is in this respect dis
qualified. Venus has no moon, and
this “ may alone render it quite incapable
of developing high forms of life.” We
know, he says, with “ almost complete
certainty” that this combination of
favourable conditions is not found on
any other.planet in our solar system.
To this series of affirmations the
expert astronomical critics oppose a very
decided series of negatives. “In our
solar system,” says Flammarion, “this
little earth has not obtained any special
privileges from Nature.” M. Moye re
gards our earth and sun as “ very or
dinary orbs, having no special character
istics, and as no more suitable for life
than innumerable other suns and
planets.” Mr. Mo.nck has “sufficient
faith in the principle of evolution to
think that man might accommodate
himself to the conditions of life on
almost any of the planets, provided that
the change were sufficiently gradual, and
a sufficient time were allowed to elapse ”
It is true that Miss Clerke says, “ Dr.
Wallace’s contention, that our earth is
unique as being the abode of intellectual
life, corresponds in a measure with the
recent trend of astronomical research.”
Miss Clerke, it is not impertinent to
observe, approaches the subject with the
same prejudice as Dr. Wallace about the
uniqueness of man, but the phrase “ in
a measure ” saves the passage from in
accuracy.; and she later makes an ex
ception in favour of Mars. But the
whole, idea of seeking identical condi
tions in other planets is erroneous. “ To
limit the work of Nature to the sphere of
our knowledge is,” says Flammarion,
“to reason with singular childishness.”
They are of the same material as earth,
and have been evolved by the same
forces; there is likely to be a general
likeness of features, and that is enough
for our purpose, when we remember the
infinite adaptability of the life force.
M. Moye examines in detail the condi
tions Dr. Wallace lays down, and points
out many errors. To say that Mars is
disqualified on account of its smaller
mass than the earth is “ a purely
�THE POSITION OF DR. A. R. WALLACE
gratuitous assumption.” Aqueous va
pour has been detected by the spectro
scope in the atmospheres of at least
Venus and Jupiter. Tidal motion is
caused by the sun as well as the moon,
and may be so caused in Venus ; nor is
it essential to life. “ The distance from
the sun to the earth in the general, plan
of Our solar system is not peculiar or
extraordinary in any way.”
While,
as to deserts, each of the other planets
must, on Wallace’s theory, be one
vast desert; nor have we any ground
for thinking that deep, permanent
oceans are a peculiar feature of our
planet.
It would, of course, be no more than
an interesting discovery, of no grave
consequence to Monism, if our planet
were proved to be the only habitable
body in our solar system; but astronomers
utterly discountenance-the idea. “Life
is universal and eternal,” says Flammarion, almost in the words of Haeckel.
“ Yesterday the moon, to-day the earth,
to-morrow Jupiter . . . Let us open the
eyes of our understanding, and. let us
look beyond ourselves in the infinite
expanse at life and intelligence in all its
degrees in endless evolution.”
Professor Turner points out that Dr.
Wallace has completely failed to show,
after all his laborious proof of our central
position, that this would give our earth
any advantage in the way of habitability.
He says that Dr. Wallace, “with the
deftness of a conjurer,” has substituted
for this question a discussion of the
impossibility of there being life at the con
fines of the universe. It is true that Dr.
Wallace has since admitted that he had
no proof to offer at the time, but will
present one in his forthcoming work.
However, we may profitably close with a
glance at his attempt to prove that, life
is impossible towards the imagined
limits of our system. Even his fellow
io7
spiritualist, Miss A. Clerke, protests that
“ it cannot be reasonably supposed that
the conditions of vitality deteriorate with
remoteness from the centre ; and Dr.
Wallace has been forced to admit that
the reasons he suggested were ill-con
sidered and erroneous. He surmised
that gravitation might be less at the
verge of the system; which is not only
“ a pure assumption,” but is opposed by
our knowledge of the most distant
double stars. He compares the move
ments of the stars with the molecules of
a gas, and is eventually compelled to
acknowledge that “ there is probably no
justification for the idea.” And he quite
gratuitously supposes that. the action of
electric and similar rays is different at
the edge of our stellar system than it is
elsewhere.
■
We may conclude, then, that Dr.
Wallace’s excursion into astronomy has
been singularly and painfully disastrous.
In general and in detail his theory is
shattered to fragments by the criticisms
of all the experts who join in the discus
sion. The idea of man’s spiritual unique
ness obtains no support whatever from
the great cosmic investigations of ‘ the
new astronomy.” On the contrary, the
most recent discoveries and speculations
confirm the “ cosmological perspective
which Haeckel urges in his Riddle of the
Universe. We have no ground in
scientific evidence for assigning limits of
time or space to the material universe,
we have no ground for believing that
man is a unique outcome of natural
evolution, and that “ the supreme end
and purpose of the vast universe was
the production and development of the
living soul in the perishable body of
man”; and we have no. ground for
thinking there is so peculiar a combina
tion of circumstances in our planet as
to force us to appeal to a Supreme
Intelligence.
�LORD KELVIN INTERVENES
io8
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Chapter
XI
MB fail: : ■ < 1
LORD KELVIN INTERVENES
Whilst this storm of astronomical
indignation was beating about the luck
less pronouncement of Dr. A. R. Wallace,
the second intervention on behalf of
religion, of which I spoke, took place.
Once more, it is important to observe,
the intervention consisted of a declara
tion by a distinguished scientist that
some science other than his own tended
to support conventional religion by its
recent investigations. Dr. Wallace, the
naturalist, purported to speak for as
tronomy ; and we have seen what the
astronomers themselves made of his
declarations. Lord Kelvin, the most
distinguished living physicist, assured
the world that biology was coming to
recognise a field of phenomena with
which it was so incompetent to deal that
it was retreating to the old notion of a
“vital principle” and the action of
“Creative Power.” We have now to
see what our biologists had to say about
this statement of their attitude.
The circumstances of Lord Kelvin’s
pronouncement will be easily recalled.
Certain of the students of the University
College, London, have formed them
selves, or been formed, into a “ Christian
Association,” and have lately set about
“ converting ” their less religious fellows
to the belief in their particular cosmic
speculations. A series of lectures was
arranged for the spring of this year, the
Botanical Theatre of the University
College was somehow secured, and a
certain show of scientific names was
scattered over the programme. The
first lecture was by the Rev. Professor
Henslow (M.A., F.L.S., F.G.S.), and
a vote of thanks was accorded to the
lecturer by Lord Kelvin for his “ examina
tion of Darwinism.” The second lecture,
on “ The Book of Genesis,” was given by
the Dean of Canterbury, and the chair
was taken by Sir Robert Anderson
(K.C.B., LL.D.). The Rev. Professor
Margoliouth gave the third lecture, on
“The Synoptic Gospels,” and was sup
ported by a distinguished physician (Sir
Dyce Duckworth) and a military man.
The other two lectures were also given
by reverend lecturers, and were supported
by Sir T. Barlow, M.D., and Mr.
Augustine Birrell. Lord Kelvin was the
lion of the display, and his few closing
words were at once published from end
to end of England. He claimed that
“modern biologists were coming once
.more to the acceptance of something,
and that was a vital principle.” He
asked : “ Was there anything so absurd
as to believe that a number of atoms by
falling together of their own accord
could make a crystal, a sprig of moss, a
microbe, a living animal?” And he
concluded that this was an appeal to
“creative power.” On the following day
he re-affirmed his opinion, with a distinc
tion, in a letter to the Times. He wrote :
“ I desire to point out that while ‘ fortui
tous concourse of atoms ’ is not an inap
propriate description of the formation of
a crystal, it is utterly absurd in respect
to the coming into existence, or the
growth, or the continuation of the
molecular combinations presented in the
bodies of living things. Here scientific
thought is compelled to accept the idea
of Creative Power. Forty years ago I
asked Liebig, walking somewhere in the
country, if he believed that the grass
and flowers which we saw around us
grew by mere mechanical forces. He
answered, ‘No, no more than I could
believe that a book of botany describing
them could grow by mere chemical
forces.’ ”
�LORD KELVIN INTERVENES
The echo of this sturdy utterance is
still reverberating through the provinces,
soothing the anxious feelings of thou
sands of believers, and being triumph
antly quoted against the unbeliever. In
London its echo was quickly drowned in
a chorus of condemnation.
Lord
Kelvin’s letter was at once followed in
the Times by letters from three of our
most eminent experts on the subject he
had ventured to touch, as well as by
letters from Mr. W. H. Mallock, Profes
sor Karl Pearson, and Sir O. Lodge.
The three experts unanimously con
demned Lord Kelvin’s statement, as did
also Mr. Mallock and Professor Pearson ;
and even Sir O. Lodge said that “ his
wording was more appropriate to a
speech than a philosophical essay,” it
had a “subjective interest,” but he
“ would not use the phrase himself.” Sir
W. T. Thiselton-Dyer, our most dis
tinguished botanist, complained that
Lord Kelvin “ wiped out by a stroke of
the pen the whole position won for us
by Darwin,” said that the reference to a
fortuitous concourse of atoms was
“ scarcely worthy of Lord Kelvin,” and
“ denied the fact ” that “ modern biolo
gists were coming to accept the vital
principle.” Sir J. Burdon-Sanderson,
the Regius Professor of Medicine at
Oxford, while resenting the strong terms
of Sir W. T. Thiselton-Dyer’s censure of
Lord Kelvin’s personal procedure, said
that it had been demonstrated to the
satisfaction of physiologists that “ the
natural laws which had been established
in the inorganic world govern no less
absolutely the processes of animal and
plant life, thus giving the death-blow to
the previously prevalent vitalistic doctrine
that these operations of life are domi
nated by law$ which are special to them
selves.” Professor Karl Pearson was
astonished that an institution with
accredited professors in biology “ should
open its doors to irresponsible lecturers
on ‘ directivity,’ ” and said that “ if Lord
Kelvin wishes to attack Darwinism, let
him leave the field of emotional theo
logical belief and descend into the plane
109
where straightforward biological argu
ment meets like argument.”
'
Professor E. Ray Lankester, from the
side of zoology, said : “ I do not myself
know of anyone of admitted leadership
among modern biologists who is showing
signs of ‘ coming to a belief in the exist
ence of a vital principle,’ ” and that “we
biologists, knowing the paralysing in
fluence of such hypotheses in the past,
are unwilling to have anything to do
with a ‘ vital principle,’ even though
Lord Kelvin erroneously thinks we are
coming to it,” and “ we take no stock in
these mysterious entities.” Sir O. Lodge,
drawn by an allusion to his belief in
telepathy, took occasion to disclaim and
deprecate Lord Kelvin’s use of the
phrases “ creative power ” and “ fortui
tous concourse of atoms.”
With these weighty and emphatic
pronouncements from some of the ablest
biologists in this country—without. a
single line in defence of Lord Kelvin,
either by himself or by any known ex
pert—we might dismiss Lord Kelvin’s
intervention as the most unfortunate
episode of his career, and as a pitiful
failure to give the slenderest support to
the reverend lecturers of the Christian
Association. But an appeal to authori
ties is a fallacious and unsatisfactory
settlement. We shall better vindicate
the strength of Haeckel’s position by a
brief analysis of this most recent attempt
to demolish it.
Let us see, then, first what truth there
is in the statement that “ modern biolo
gists are coming once more to a firm
acceptance of the vital principle.”
This three of our most representative
biologists, Sir W. T. Thiselton-Dyer, Pro
fessor Ray Lankester, and Sir J. BurdonSanderson, flatly deny. Clearly Lord
Kelvin was guilty of the gravest impro
priety in saying that “ modern biologists
are coming,” &c., and “scientific thought
is compelled,” &c. The implication of
these phrases is obvious, and it is totally
untrue. When Professor Ray Lankester,
one of the most distinguished biologists,
tells us he does “ not know of anyone
�IIO
LORD KELVIN INTERVENES
of admitted leadership among modern
biologists” who is accepting the vital
principle, it is clear that the statement
was gravely misleading. That there is
a certain revival of vitalistic ideas is
another matter. The clergy need not
have waited for Lord Kelvin’s assurance
to that effect. In the fourteenth chapter
of the Riddle of the Universe Professor
Haeckel long since informed us of that
revival. It would not be surprising—
ironic as the circumstance would be—to
learn that Lord Kelvin obtained the grain
of fact which underlay his assertion
from Haeckel’s book. In all countries
there have been of late years a few
scientific men of secondary rank who
have urged the acceptance of something
more or less resembling the old vital
force. Professor Lionel Beale and Dr.
Mivart are well-known advocates of
“ vitality” in this country; several French
biologists still speak of the vague idee
directrice which Pasteur imagined to
control the growth of the organism; in
America, Cope and Asa Gray advocate a
form of vitalism ; in Germany it is urged
by Nageli, Bunge, Rindfieisch, Dreisch,
and Benedikt, in Italy (more or less) by
Gallardi, in Denmark by the botanist
Reinke. The ideas of these writers
differ considerably, but they agree in
holding that some directive or “domi
nant ” principle must be superadded to
the physical and chemical forces of the
organism.
We have seen in an earlier chapter
how “modern biologists” as a class,
and “ scientific thought ” as a whole,
wholly reject the vitalistic hypothesis,
and maintain that we have no reason to
go beyond ordinary natural forces. We
have seen what Professor Le Conte,
Professor Ward, Sir A. Riicker, Sir J.
Burdon-Sanderson, Professor Dewar, and
others, say of the condition of “scientific
thought.” “For the future the word
vital, as distinctive of physiological pro
cesses, might be abandoned altogether,”
said Sir J. Burdon-Sanderson, and our
recent authorities fully concur with him.
Professor Beale is one of those scientists
who would sing a joyful Nunc Dimittis
if he saw any important sign of the
revival of vitalism. But if Lord Kelvin
consults his most recent publications
he will find only a deepening of the
pessimism which Professor Beale has
expressed on the matter for the last
twenty years. In Vitality— V, published
two years ago, he tells us the very
reverse of the assurance of Lord Kelvin.
“Probably no hypotheses or doctrines
known to philosophy or science,” he
says in his preface, “have been so
generally favoured, and more persistently
forced on the public by ‘Authority,’ and
therefore widely accepted and taught by
educated and intelligent persons, than
doctrines of physical life and its origin
in non-living matter ” (p. vii); and later
he says: “Purely mechanical views of
life are again, possibly for the last time,
becoming very popular” (p. 5). Further
on he quotes Professor Dolbear as say
ing (in his Matter, Ether, and Motion)
that “ there is little reason to doubt that
when chemists shall be able to form the
substance Protoplasm it will possess all
the properties it is now known to have,
including what is called life; and one
ought not to be surprised at its announce
ment any day”; and he refers us to the
appendix of Professor Dolbear’s book
for a long list of weighty pronounce
ments in favour of the mechanical hypo
thesis. We may, therefore, dismiss once
for all the attempt to commit “ modern
biologists,” as a class, to a belief in vital
principles and creative powers as a
serious, though unintentional, misstate
ment—one that it is painful to find over
the name of Lord Kelvin.
Haeckel was perfectly right. He
awarded a larger proportion to Neo
Vitalism than any of our own biologists
(even Dr. Beale) are prepared to do, but
he rightly claimed that the mechanical
view of life was the predominant one in
biology to-day. Sir W. T. ThiseltonDyer, writing of Huxley {Nature, June
5th, 1902), said: “Huxley was firmly
imbued with what is ordinarily called a
‘ materialistic conception’ of the universe.
�LORD KELVIN INTERVENES
I think myself that this is probably a
true view.” The representation that
Haeckel is alone, or almost alone, in his
view of life is a gross and audacious misrepresentation.
And when we come to examine on its
merits this revival of vitalism—such as
it is—we find it has no promise what
ever of gaining wide scientific recogni
tion, because it rests essentially on a
familiar fallacy. The reader who wishes
to study the grounds of it may consult
Professor Beale’s various editions of his
Vitality, or Reinke’s Welt als That, or
Dreisch’s Die organischen Regulationen,
where all the evidence of the NeoVitalists is ably mastered. Happily it is
not necessary for us to cover the whole
ground of this evidence even superfi
cially. As we saw in the case of teleology,
the principle of the argument is one,
however infinite may be its applications;
and it is the principle itself that lacks
logical validity. There are, the NeoVitalist urges, scores of features of the
life of the animal or plant that the
biologist cannot explain by chemical and
physical forces ; therefore we must have
recourse to a non-mechanical or new kind
of force—an idee directrice, a “ domi
nant,” a “ vital power,” and so forth.
What these inexplicable phenomena are
we need not consider at any length;
they are such phenomena as—the pro
cesses of segmentation and differentia
tion in the growth of the embryo, the
selection of food from the blood or sur
rounding media, the replacing of tissues
or organs that have been cut away (in the
hydra, the newt, and even higher
animals), the formation by an animal of
a protective anti-toxin, the acquisition of
protective mimicry, the power of adapta
tion in organs to changes in environ
ment, and so on.
There are, every
biologist admits, scores of phenomena
which are not as yet capable of ex
planation by mechanical forces ; and the
new vitalist urges that these point to the
presence of a specific principle in the
animal or plant. “ Up to this day,”
says Professor Beale, “ no cause, no ex
in
planation, can be found, and therefore
we attribute those vital phenomena to
Power—to Power which is special and
peculiar to life only, power which we
know cannot be derived from matter.
Is it not, therefore, perfectly reasonable
to believe that all vital power has come
direct from God?”1
The reader will at once recognise the
principle of the argument. It is that
familiar sophism which has made the the
istic doctrine “ a fugitive and vagabond”
(to borrow the words of Dr. Iverach) in
scientific territory for the last century or
more. It is the sophism that Laplace
expelled from astronomy, Lyell from
geology, Darwin from phylogeny, and
that we have found desperately clinging
to every little imperfection of our scien
tific knowledge of the universe. It is a
philosophy of “ gaps.” It is the familiar
procedure of taking advantage of the
temporary imperfectness of science. It
is an argument that has been wholly
discredited by the advance of science,
sweeping it from position after position;
it is as superficial philosophically as it
is unsound in logic and prejudicial in
science. “The action of physical and
chemical forces in living bodies can
never be understood,” said Sir A. Rucker,
“ if at every difficulty and at every check
in our investigations we desist from
further attempts in the belief that the
laws of physics and chemistry have been
interfered with by an incomprehensible
vital force.” “ The revival of the vitalistic conception in physiological work,”
said the president of the physiological
section (Prof. Halliburton, M.D., F.R.S.)
at the British Association meeting of
1902, “appears to me a retrograde step.
To explain anything we are not fully
able to understand in the light of physics
and chemistry by labelling it as vital, or
something we can never hope to under. )
1 Dr. Beale’s last conclusion is not, of course^
shared by the continental Neo-Vitalists. Even
if we were forced to admit a specific vital prin
ciple, it would not “come from God” any more
than other natural forces. But the analogy with
I Lord Kelvin’s vague phraseology is noticeable.
�112
lord kelvin intervenes
stand, is a confession of ignorance, and,
what is still more harmful, a bar to
progress. ... I am hopeful that the
scientific workers of the future will
discover that this so-called vital force
is due to certain physical or chemical
properties of living matter, which have
not yet been brought into line with the
known chemical and physical laws that
operate in the inorganic world. . . .
When a scientific man says this or that
vital phenomenon cannot be explained
by the laws of chemistry and physics, and
therefore must be regulated by laws of
some other nature, he most unjustifiably
assumes that the laws of chemistry and
physics have all been discovered.” “We
think,” says Prof. Ray Lankester, “ it is
a more hopeful method to be patient
and to seek by observation of, and ex
periment with, the phenomena of growth
and development to trace the evolution
of life and of living things without
the facile and sterile hypothesis of a
vital principle.” If we accepted it,
says Weismann, “we should at once
cut ourselves off from all possible
mechanical explanation of organic
nature.”
It is very difficult to reconcile Lord
Kelvin’s present attitude with the prin
ciple he laid down in 1871, and pre
sumably still holds. . “Science,” he said,
“is bound by the everlasting law of
honour to face fearlessly every problem
which is presented to it. If a probable
solution, consistent with the ordinary
course of nature, can be found, we must
not invoke an abnormal act of Creative
Power.” Prof. Dewar reproduced this
passage in this very application in his
presidential speech of last year; and
within a few months we find Lord Kelvin
approving the attitude of those few
biologists who depart from that principle
to-day, and, impatient at the slow growth
of our knowledge, rush to the conclusion
that science must abandon this portion
of the cosmological domain to the
theologian once more. Lord Kelvin
quotes Liebig, who was not a biologist,
and who lived in an earlier scientific
period.1 But immense progress has been
made since Liebig’s day in the mechani
cal interpretation of life.2 Lord Kelvin
also would have us think that the only
alternative to the “vital principle” is “the
fortuitous concourse of atoms.” Even
Sir O. Lodge is stirred to protest against
this descent from the level of science to
the level of Christian Evidence lecturing.
We have seen that science discovers
only the work of fixed, determinate
forces, not erratic and confused agencies.
“The whole order of nature,” says Prof.
Ray Lankester, “ including living and
lifeless matter—man, animal, and gas —
is a network of mechanism.” There is
nothing “fortuitous” whatever in the
concourse of atoms.”
We have, then, to set aside the un
fortunate and undefended utterance of
Lord Kelvin, and the claims of old3 It is not a little amusing to find that this
famous German chemist, whom Lord Kelvin
introduces as a friend to Christian Associations
in England, was regarded as an atheist by similar
bodies in Germany in his own time. When
Bishop Ketteler urged the Grand-Duke of Hesse
to take restrictive measures against materialists,
the Grand-Duke pointed out that Liebig had
recently undertaken to refute them. “ Don’t
make too much of that, your highness,” said
Ketteler; “ Liebig is a materialist himself at
the bottom of his heart.” (Buchner’s Last Words
on Materialism, p. 42.)
2 Dr. Horton assures us, about Haeckel’s
carbon-theory, that “ no leading man of science
treats it seriously, and it only has its whimsical
and uncertain place in the rationalist Press which
gulls the ignorance of the public.” One wonders
what it is not possible to say from a pulpit.
Compare the words of the expert reviewer of
Professor Ver worn’s Biogen-hypothese in Nature
(February 26, 1902): “ It seems quite clear from
the results of numerous investigators that, what
ever the nature of the sequence of chemical
events, the carbohydrates are proximately the
substances that are most intimately affected.”
Let me add here also a reference to a letter from
Sir O. Lodge to Nature (December 4, 1902)
in which he points out the possibility of germs
being preserved intact in the cold of space. It
was thereupon shown, not only that Lord Kel
vin’s old hypothesis of the origin of life assumed
a new importance, but that, as W. J. Calder
said, “if it is proved that vitality can survive
for a protracted period in such circumstances,
the conclusion that it is a molecular function
seems inevitable.” The most recent experiments
of life at very low temperatures confirm this.
�LORD KELVIN INTERVENES
11.3
those laws.” Thus life becomes “ some
thing the full significance of which lies
in another scheme of things, but which
touches and interacts with the material
universe in a certain way, building its
particles into notable configurations for
a time—oak, eagle, man—and then
evaporating whence it came.”
The objections to Sir O. Lodges
theory (which seems to be not unlike
that vaguely suggested by Pasteur.) may
be well indicated by following his own
words. He will not admit that life is a
form of energy (thus rejecting both the
old Vitalist and the Monistic theories)
because “ energy can transform itself
into other forces, remaining constant in
quantity, whereas life does not transmute
itself into any form of energy, nor does
death affect the sum of energy m any
way.” The sentence is hardly consis
tent. If death has not affected the sum
of energy it must have transmuted it, for
most certainly the energies in the dead
body differ from those of the living. To
assume that the energies are the same,
but that which differs is not. energy, looks
like a begging of the question. Indeed,
it is impossible to conceive life otherwise
than as energy. We might regard the
structure as a static force in. Sir Oliver’s
sense, but there must be a living energy
in addition. The death of the animal is
like the death of the motor-car. The
energy has been transmuted, or has re
turned into the elemental forms belong
ing to the several parts of the now irre
parable structure. Then,.as a later writer
in Nature points out, it is the place and
the ambition of science to explain the
direction or determination of working
energy as well as the origin of the energy.
Sir Oliver gives the illustration of a stone
falling over the cliff; it may make a
harmless dent in the sand, or it may be
guided to the firing of a charge of
1 At the eleventh hour I discover a lengthy
dynamite. So with the passage of a pen
reference to the Riddle of the Universe in an
over paper ; it may make a series of un-,
obscure corner (p. 65) of Dr. Beale’s Vitality ■ V.,
meaning daubs (if it rolls mechanically)
so that the announcement in the I'imes was not
or it may be guided in the signing of a
wholly in vain. But as the notice does not con
tain a line of definite and tangible refutation of
treaty of war or peace. But it is in each
any statement in the Riddle I am compelled to
one of these cases the function of scien-
fashioned Vitalists like Dr. Beale1 and
Neo-Vitalists like Reinke. Our knowledge
of vital phenomena, and of chemical
and physical forces, is as yet.very imper
fect. The vitalist hypothesis supposes
that our knowledge is complete, and that
we clearly see certain features of life to
be beyond the range of mechanical
explanation.
We see ourselves how
illogical and temporary such a position
is, and we are not surprised to find the
leading biologists standing solid with
Prof. Haeckel for a mechanical interpre
tation and mechanical origin.
Sir O. Lodge, the persuasive and able
and ever courteous leader of the
Birmingham University, offers another
version of Neo-Vitalism which it is
proper to consider. In a paper which
he read to the Synthetic Society at
London on February 20 of this year
(published in Nature, April 23) he
observes that “ if guidance or control
can be admitted into the scheme by no
means short of refuting or modifying the
laws of motion, there may be. every
expectation that the attitude of scientific
men will be perennially hostile to the
idea of guidance or control.” He there
fore proposes a theory of guidance (to
apply to the divine guidance of the
world, the human will, and the vital
principle) without interference. He dis
tinguishes between force and energy—or
static and dynamic power. A column
supporting a building, or a channel guid
ing a stream, is a force, but does not
produce energy. The action of life is to
be conceived as that, “of a groove, or
slot, or channel, or guide.” “ Guidance
and control are not forms of energy,
and their superposition upon the scheme
of physics perturbs physical, and
mechanical laws no whit, though it may
profoundly affect the consequences of
forego the pleasure of dealing with it.
Bishopsgate InstitntOo
�ii4
MR. MALLOCICS OLIVE-BRANCH
tific explanation to trace the energies
which determine the line of motion as
well as to trace their origin and proper
motion. We cannot conceive of energies
being directed except by energies. In
the case of the upbuilding of an organism
it is impossible to conceive the particles
being guided to their several places, or
the energies being impelled to put them
in their several places, by something
that is not an energy. In the parallelism
which Sir Oliver suggests we can only
see “ life ” as a superfluous partner. If
the mechanical scheme is complete, as
he seems to suggest it will be, it must
contain an explanation of the direction
of energy. To say otherwise is to declare
again the inadequacy of mechanical
theory (solely because its ever-growing
material is as yet comparatively scanty)
and to court the “perennial hostility”
of men of science.
Thus the second attempt to prove that
Haeckel’s views rest on “ the science of
yesterday,” and are contradicted by the
science of to-day, fails as ignominiously
as did that of Dr. Wallace. Our leading
biologists declare emphatically that they
and their science accept the mechanical,
if not (as Sir W. T. Thiselton-Dyer says)
the materialistic view of life. This inter
pretation of life must for some time to
come leave unexplained considerable
tracts of vital phenomena. Haeckel has
never pretended that he “ has explained
everything.” But so far as our know
ledge goes, we find only ordinary natural
forces at work in the living organism,
and we should be wholly unjustified in
the present condition of science in
assuming that they are incompetent to
explain the whole of life. We gain no
thing whatever philosophically by simply
sticking the label “vital” on these
mysterious phenomena, and we are
forbidden by the elementary laws of
logic and scientific procedure to bring
in such entities as “creative power”
and “vital principles” as long as
“a solution consistent with the or
dinary course of Nature ” can be
suggested.
:
• fl!
Chapter XII
MR. MALLOCK’S OLIVE-BRANCH
The last critic of Haeckel’s position
last, that is to say, in the logical order
which it seems expedient to follow—is
the distinguished essayist, Mr. W. H.
Mallock. Professor Haeckel, it will be
remembered, intended his work to be,
not only a comprehensive statement of
his views, but a summary of the issues
of the. many conflicts between religion
and science in which he had played so
conspicuous a part during the nineteenth
century. Mr. Mallock, declaring that
neither theologian nor scientist was
competent to analyse those issues quite
impartially, undertook, as a neutral
observer, to balance the controversial
ledgers of the departed century on his
own account. It may be granted that
Mr. Mallock occupies a position of some
advantage for the discharge of this
function. . He is adequately informed,
philosophic in temper, and neutral in
the sense that he clearly does not
believe in theology, yet strongly opposes
the final conclusions of the scientists.
To use an expressive colloquial phrase,
�MR. MALLOCK'S OLIVE-BRANCH
he has sat on the fence throughout the
last forty years, and shot his sharp
criticisms at the combatants on both
sides with a certain impartiality. . But
those who are acquainted with his at
tractive writings know that he has really
only riddled the theologians for their
ultimate advantage ; whilst he has at
tacked the Agnostics in the interest of
religion. However, an analysis of his
last publication, Religion as a Credible
Doctrine, will serve not only to clear up
the popular mystery about his position,
but to show us an interesting plea for
the retention of theology, even admitting
that we have fully established the theses
of the preceding chapter.
Mr. Mallock emphatically rejects the
idea of hampering scientists on their
own territory, and he fully admits that
H the whole cosmological domain ” is
their territory. ? He would have no
sympathy with efforts, like those of
Dr. Wallace and Lord Kelvin, to restrict
the ambition of the mechanical theory,
Or to try to wrest some shred of evi
dence for theism out of the teaching of
science. We shall see that he falls away
from his ideal here and there, but in his
deliberate mood he fully accepts the
conclusion that, on scientific and philo
sophic evidence, “the whole world”—
in the words of Huxley—“living and
non-living, is the result of the mutual
interaction, according to definite laws,
of the powers possessed' by the mole
cules of which the primitive nebulosity
was composed.” I have, in fact, freely
drawn upon Mr. Mallock s excellent
book for support in the vindication of
Professor Haeckel. He takes the Riddle
of the Universe as the finest summary of
the scientific hostility to religion. He
accepts Haeckel’s statement that the
three essential propositions in religion
are the belief in a personal God, the
liberty of the will, and the immortality
of the soul; and he assures Haeckel’s
critics, often in more vigorous language
than Haeckel presumes to use, that their
arguments are utterly fruitless and their
positions untenable.
After devoting
115
eight chapters to the struggle over these
doctrines, he concludes (p. 217): “The
entire intellectual scheme of religion—
the doctrines of immortality, of freedom,
and a God who is, in his relation to our
selves, separable from this [cosmic]
process—is not only a system which is
unsupported by any single scientific fact,
but is also a system for which, amongst
the facts of science, it is utterly im
possible for the intellect to find a place.
Yet Mr. Mallock has announced that he
is going to prove that these fundamental
doctrines of religion are “worthy of a
reasonable man’s acceptance.” How
will he accomplish this?
In the first place he does not intend
to evade the difficulties by an appeal to
the “ religious feelings ” or “ religious
instinct
at all events, not primarily ;
he is going to appeal to us “ as perfectly
reasonable beings.” He quite realises
that the growing habit of taking refuge
in the emotions is little more sensible
than the fabled practice of the ostrich.
He devotes three chapters to a closely
reasoned plea for the retention of the
doctrines, as to which he has so far
cordially endorsed Haeckel’s arguments.
Before entering on a careful analysis of
his reasoning I will state his.argument as
concisely as is compatible with justice to
it. These beliefs are to be retained on
the ground of their moral and spiritual
value to humanity. They are the chief
source of all higher aspiration and
effort, and are essential for the mainte
nance of our mental, moral, and social
progress. So far the argument is more
familiar than Mr. Mallock imagines.
The peculiarity of his position is that he
says they may be true, although they are
flatly and most properly contradicted by
science.
And he justifies this by
attempting to show that our accepted
doctrines, even in science, freely contra
dict each other, and that such contradic
tion is not at all an indication of falsity.
We may, and must, accept all that
Haeckel says, and then add to it all that
Dr. Horton says, without his “ worthless
and hopeless arguments.”
■!•.<
�MR. MALLOCK'S OLIVE-BRANCH
In an age of scepticism like ours such
peculiar evasions of the advancing
criticism are not infrequent.
Mr.
Balfour’s famous attempt to show the
rest of the world an escape from Ag
nosticism is still fresh in the memory,
though already too antiquated to detain
us. The later thoughts of G. J. Romanes
we will consider presently, as they are
much quoted in opposition to Haeckel.
Other singular attempts at pacification,
of a less distinguished order, are met
almost monthly. There is somehow a
conviction abroad that Agnostics are
languishing for some rehabilitation of
their old beliefs, or that humanity at
large always excluding the peace
makers themselves—cannot maintain
its advance without religious belief.
Hence arises the singular spectacle of
sceptical writers constructing elaborate
defences of the conventional beliefs,
which they do not share. The reception
of Mr. Mallock’s book hardly suggests
the belief that his olive-branch will be
respected by either group of combatants ;
but its ability and interest, and its indi
cation of a possible ground for religion
when all we have advanced has been
fully established, compel us to examine
it with respect.
Mr. Mallock begins with his proof
that all our knowledge ends in contradic
tions when we analyse it, so that we
may reconcile ourselves to Haeckel’s
disproofs. He first shows this in the
teaching of theology, where, as he
observes, the Monist will cordially agree
with him. But he goes on to say that
Haeckel’s “substance” is no less con
tradictory, yet we accept it. The ele
mentary substance (ether or prothyl)
either consists of minute separate par
ticles, or it is continuous. If ether
consists of disjointed atoms, separated
by empty spaces, all action must be an
“action at a distance,” which science
rejects as absurd and impossible. If
ether is continuous, yet the atoms of
ponderable matter arise from it by con
densation, then we are postulating
condensation and rarefaction in a sub
stance which has no particles to be
pushed closer together or thrust wider
asunder. But the elementary substance
must be either one or the other, so that
in either case we accept a contradictory
proposition. Further, when we say that
the nebula with its varied elements was
evolved out of a homogeneous ether by
a rigidly determined process, we are at
once saying the ether was simple and
homogeneous, yet was of so specific a
structure as to grow into an elaborately
varied cosmos. Again, we say time is
infinite, yet an addition is made to
it every moment; and we say space
is infinite, yet it is divisible, and each
part must be infinite (and so equal
to the whole), or else we make up infinity
from a finite number of finite quantities.
Thus our scientific doctrines hold innu
merable contradictions. Therefore, the
contradiction between religious and
scientific teaching need not deter us
from accepting both.
Now, in the first of these illustrations
Mr. Mallock has devised a fictitious
contradiction ; in the second he is fol
lowing the vulgar fashion of building an
argument on the imperfect condition of
scientific knowledge; and in the third he
is giving us some familiar metaphysical
quibbling. Dr. Haeckel inserted in his
work the theory of ether which was in
favour amongst physicists at the time he
wrote. Physics is changing yearly as to
such theories; all is as yet tentative and
provisional. But this is certain ; physi
cists will never adopt any theory of
matter that is self-contradictory. If the
pyknotic theory, or the vortex-theory, or
the strain-theory, of the atom reveals any
such contradiction, it has no chance of
acceptance. It is thus quite false to say
we here complacently accept contradic
tories. It is, moreover, clear that Mr.
Mallock’s dilemma is “lame in one
horn,” at least. It supposes that these
discrete particles are at rest. Science
on the contrary supposes them to be
eternally in motion, so that the empty
space only facilitates their impact and
mutual interaction. In the second case,
�MR. MALLOCK'S OLIVE-BRANCH
Mr. Mallock is, as I said, merely drawing
our attention to the acknowledged fact
that we have as yet nothing more than
vague conjectures about the origin of
atoms ; but we embrace no contradic
tion whatever, and no theory will be
received that contains such.
The
prothyl is conceived by scientists (apart
from philosophers) to be just as simple
and homogeneous as the scientific
evidence will allow it to be. There is
no disposition whatever to credit it
with contradictory attributes.
In the
third case, Mr. Mallock is serving up to
us metaphysical arguments, for theism
from those very theologians whose
methods he has so severely denounced.
Almost any recent Catholic apologist
gives these subtleties of word-play. The
contradiction is fictitious. When we say
that, as far as the astronomic evidence
goes, the universe is unlimited, we . do
not expose ourselves to this metaphysical
antithesis of finite and infinite. Both
as to space and time (in the concrete)
the argument makes us say far more
than we do.
Mr. Mallock thus entirely fails to
show that we accept contradictory
propositions as true. On the contrary,
in scientific procedure the emergence of
a contradiction is at once greeted as an
indication of falseness, and is forthwith
acted upon by the rejection of one of
the contradictory theses. The ground
work and most essential and novel part
of his structure of reasoning is invalid.
He proceeds, however, to show (ch. xii)
that science is not the only source, or
the only test, of our convictions. There
are as good grounds for accepting these
particular contradictions as for admitting
those of science.
It is at once apparent that we have in
fact a large number of convictions which it
is not the function of science to establish
or examine. Our comparative judgment
of conduct, of beauty, of spiritual values
generally, is not tested by standards that
the scientific reason sets up. Our belief
in “ the sanctity of human life ” does not
rest on scientific grounds; and the
117
influence of religious ideas—the truth of
which science criticises—is also a
subject for non-scientific . judgment.
We might, indeed, complain at once
that Mr. Mallock has here com
pletely lost his accustomed lucidity.
If he means by “ science ” the dis
ciplines
which
to-day bear
that
name, it is true that many of our
judgments lie outside them. But what
will lie outside the range of the
science of to-morrow it would be
difficult to say. The science of aesthe
tics and the science of ethics are
obviously creeping over much of that
territory which Mr. Mallock holds to be
extra-scientific. As a matter of fact the
very question he is leading us to—the
question of the mental and moral
influence of religious ideas—is mainly a
question for ethics and sociology to
determine by objective and scientific
standards. If Mr. Mallock means that
the ethical standard is not scientifically
determinable, he is begging an important
question. However, let us hasten to
examine the vital part of his eleventh
chapter.
He says that it “ has never occurred
to Haeckel ” to ask himself whether the
ethic of Christianity, which he accepts,
may not chance to be inseparable from
its dogmas. In face of the nineteenth
chapter of the Riddle this is a hard
saying. Haeckel cuts away most of the
ethic which is at all peculiar to
Christianity, and finds that the valuable
remainder is a purely humanitarian ethic.
We have already seen this. But Mr.
Mallock is thinking of that great
problem of his whole career—the
problem of free will or determinism—
and he holds emphatically that on
Haeckel’s principles morality is abso
lutely impossible. Suppose, he says,
that we in theory set up a world with
a general belief in the determinism of
the will. From such a world all moral
condemnation and all moral . appre
ciation must disappear ; in it vice and
virtue are indistinguishable ; men and
women are no more responsible for
�118
MR. MALLOCK'S OLIVE-BRANCH
their characteristics than the apple is
for its colour or shape. Now one of
the most effective parts of Mr. Mallock’s
book is that in which he shows that
scientific determinism is absolutely
irresistible. The contradiction he would
ask us to accept is therefore the
sharpest conceivable.
He asks us
to accept
this
contradiction—this
irrefutable proof that the will is not
free and this equally irrefutable proof
that it must be free—on account of the
moral importance of the belief in
freedom. On the same ground we are
to admit the beliefs in God and immor
tality which the scientific evidence has
wholly disproved; the effect of our
rejecting them would be “a shrinkage
in the importance, interest, and signifi
cance which we are able to attribute to
human life in general, and to the part
played in it by ourselves in particular;
and with the growth of scientific know
ledge, and the habit of completely
assimilating it, the shrinkage would
become more marked, and its moral
results more desolating.” . Hence, since
we are prepared in other cases to
swallow contradictories, we must yield
to these grave reasons and embrace the
contradictory theses of science and
religion.
The second fallacy in Mr. Mallock’s
procedure seems to be worse than the
first. Let us grant, for argument’s sake,
that these religious beliefs had all the
efficacy Mr. Mallock claims for them
whilst they were uncontradicted by
science and philosophy, were sincerely
and serenely held, and were thought to
be based on tangible cosmic evidence.
It is surely a monstrous fallacy to suppose
they will retain that power when their
position is so seriously changed; when
men are assured that, in Mr. Mallock’s
own words, “ it is utterly impossible for
the intellect to find a place for them
amongst the facts of science.” We are,
in fact, invited to regard these beliefs as
efficacious because they are really held,
and then to hold them because they are
efficacious. To say that these considera
tions—if they are correct—should dis
suade us from promulgating or defending
Haeckel’s views is an arguable, though a
mistaken, position.
But Mr. Mallock
has just concluded one of the most
vigorous and skilful attacks on the
evidence for these doctrines that has
appeared of late years. Does he imagine
that people who read that attack will be
disposed to cling to these beliefs because
it would be morally beneficial to hold
them ? that people are so simple as to
accept moral efficacy as the guarantee of
the truth of doctrines which can only be
morally efficacious when they are believed
to be true ? It reminds one of the
American critic who said that J. S. Mill
negotiated a certain difficulty by getting
under himself and carrying himself across.
Surely the simplest and the only possible
procedure is to fasten on this very im
portance of moral idealism as a humani
tarian gospel, and to show the world
that it will taste a very real hell, here on
earth, if it allows moral culture to be
swept away along with the cosmic specu
lations with which it has so long been
associated.
The difficulty about the
freedom of the will may turn out to be
largely due to our slavery to language.
That which formerly went by the name
of freedom is disproved by science. But
the fact remains—and it is a scientific, a
psychological, fact—that we are con
scious of being able to influence our
character and our actions, and so
we cannot deny our responsibility
within limits.
It is for ethics and
psychology to determine those limits
and to re-adjust our terms and con
ceptions.
I have only granted for the sake of
the argument that these doctrines have
all that moral importance which Mr.
Mallock claims for them. He says this
is clear from the attempts of Agnostic
thinkers to find a substitute for them.
Their ethical reasoning is irreproachable,
but they recognise that they must also
make “an appeal to the moral and
spiritual imagination of the individual.”
Prof. Huxley does this with a plea for
�MR. MALLOCPCS OLIVE-BRANCH
■lreverence and love for the ethical ideal,”
and Mr. Spencer urges reverence for
the Unknowable and recognition of
our unity with it. Mr. Mallock is very
scornful about both, and he may be right
that reverence of this cosmic order will
pass away with the passing of theology.
Haeckel has not appealed to such rever
ence, so that he may contemplate its
disappearance without undue concern.
He has urged us to find the practical
ground for moral culture in the future in
the recognition of its value to humanity.
No one recognises this value more clearly
than Mr. Mallock. It is the chief support
of his whole argument. The loss of the
higher aspiration would, he says, spell
ruin to a nation, and the “ belief in
human nature is as essential to civilisation
as is a good circulation to the healthy
body.” Now, if all this is true, as it is,
it seems perfectly obvious that, when
men have got over the confusion and
reaction caused by the decay of ethical
theology, they will turn to moral culture
for its own sake. It is inconceivable
how a subtle thinker, who believes men
are capable of continuing to worship
God and dream of immortality because
it is useful to do so, though contradicted
by the most solid evidence, cannot see
the possibility of setting up moral culture
on a sociological base. Confucians have
done it for ages, and with quite as great
success, to say the least, as Christianity.
The bulk of cultured people, like Mr.
Mallock, have done so for several
generations.
Theoretically, we should expect that
the transition from a divine to a humani
tarian ethic will be attended with a
certain amount of moral disorder. But
as a fact, the change is taking place
without any such disorder. The working
class, which is irreligious to the extent of
nine-tenths to-day, is no worse than it was
a century or five centuries ago; it is, in fact,
far nearer to “a belief in human nature.”
The middle-class, still largely religious,
is hardly likely to deteriorate. The
educated class—to ignore the money-line
—is almost wholly without those beliefs
119
in a personal God and personal im
mortality which Mr. Mallock thinks
essential, yet will compare very favour
ably with its class in almost any former
age. In a word, if we consult the facts
of ‘life instead of theory, we find no
ground for supposing that moral culture
—not to speak of intellectual, artistic,
and social aspiration—is bound up with
certain “cosmic speculations.” Under
neath all the transcendental imagery
with which the Churches have clothed
morality, there has always been an in
stinctive feeling that it was a very human
affair, and this feeling asserts itself as the
theological imagery passes away. There
will be changes, of course. The proud in
tolerance and arrogance of the old moral
ists, with the horrible persecutions they
inspired, have gone for ever; the ascetic
contempt of “the flesh” is going and
must wholly disappear; humility and
meekness have no sociological value;
virginity is a matter of taste, but marriage
is a more virtuous condition; the stress
on chastity (in a transcendental sense)
has led to an appalling amount of real
immorality in every age, because few
were prepared to respect it; the old
classification of virtues and vices, as so
many rigid moral boxes to put other
people’s conduct in, must go; the old
antithesis of selfishness and altruism
will be replaced by an organic conception
of man’s relation to his fellows; the
relation of the sexes will be subject only
to a purely rational ethic, grounded on
justice, not sentiment, and so there may
be at length some hope of putting an
end to hypocrisy and vice. When
writers like Mr. Wells, or Mr. G. B.
Shaw, or Mr. Karl Pearson, talk of the
disappearance of ethics, they are thinking,
of one or other of these changes. But.
ethics will only gain by such changes.
“ Many are called, but few are chosen,”
said the founder of Christianity. It was
a profound anticipation of the influence
of Christian morality throughout. the
ages. Apart from certain special periods,
apart from the relatively small areas that
could be reached. by a St. Bernard, or a;
�120
MR. MALLOCK'S OLIVE-BRANCH
St. Francis, Christian morality has been
a stupendous failure. It was too trans
cendental, too false to the natural moral
sense of the ordinary individual, to be
otherwise. The cultivation of a kindly and
humane disposition, of a sense of justice
and honour, of tolerance and broad
mindedness, of concern for health of
body and mind, of temperance and self
control, of honesty and truthfulness, is
what humanity really needs; and all this
it can and will have for its own inherent
worth.
Thus Mr. Mallock has failed to prove
that we anywhere complacently accept
contradictions in our beliefs; and that,
even if we did (to the utter confusion of
any notion of truth), there is any special
reason for retaining these theological
doctrines ; or that, if we did retain them
in the teeth of scientific teaching to the
contrary, they would be of the slightest
value. There are, however, one or two
confirmatory thoughts in his last chapter
which we may still consider. It follows,
he says, that our judgment deals with
two worlds, the cosmic and the moral,
the world of objective facts and the
world of subjective values. One is the
world of science, the other is reached by
some other faculty of mind. It would
be equally absurd to question the validity
of our judgment as to either. In fact,
there is, in the long run, a similarity in
the ground of judgment in both cases.
It is a mistake to suppose that in the
scientific world everything is “ proved.”
The fundamental belief, the conviction
that there is a material world at all, is
quite unprovable. If it is an inference
from our sensations, reason refuses to
ratify it. It is the outcome of “ an
original instinct”; and it is just such an
instinct that is at the root of our judg
ment of moral values. Science must
study the objective world; “ analytic
reason and a study of human character ”
must investigate the moral world. They
find these three beliefs essential to
progress, and their decision is as valid
as that of science in its own sphere.
The contradiction between the two need
not trouble us. The mind is limited,
and can “ grasp the existence of nothing
in its totality.” “We must learn, in
short,” is his closing sentence, “ that the
fact of our adoption of a creed which
involves an assent to contradictories is
not a sign that our creed is useless or
absurd, but that the ultimate nature of
things is for our minds inscrutable.”
. This reasoning is only a new formula
tion of the argument of his preceding
chapters, but one or two points call for
notice. In the first place, it is perfectly
true that all our convictions are not
capable of “proof,” because they cannot
all be inferences. Our knowledge must
ultimately be grounded on facts which
are directly intued. These are gathered
into general laws and principles, and
from these inferences are drawn. And
it is true that our perception of the
external world is—in its rudiments—
intuitive. It is not an inference from
our states of consciousness; it would
not be valid if it were. When meta
physics has grown tired of the current
idealism, it will probably tell us more
about this intuition. But Mr. Mallock’s
attempt to set up a number of little
oracles in the mind in the shape of
“ primitive instincts ” must be carefully
watched. Further, what he calls the
subjective or moral world is by no means
wholly subjective. It is useful for his
purpose to lead us on from sesthetic
judgments to moral. We may, fortu
nately, leave out of consideration the
difficulty of our sesthetic judgments,
because our moral judgment is purely
objective. The effects which Mr. Mal
lock anticipates from a Monistic ethic
are emphatically objective; and so are
the effects he claims for the Christian
ethic.
The determination of those
effects, and so of the relative value of
the two systems, is a study in objective
reality. “The sanctity of human life”
has nothing to do with it. The “ belief
in human nature ” is a conviction that,
of the various phases of life which
humanity has experienced—virtue and
vice, strength and enervation, social
�MR. MALLOCK'S OLIVE-BRANCH
order and anarchy, mental culture and
sensual dissipation—the former alter
natives are the most conducive to peace
and happiness, which we happen to
desire. That conviction is, therefore,
wholly based on an objective inquiry.
Hence the antithesis of the subjective
and objective worlds does not help Mr.
Mallock. And in point of fact the
sooner we apply scientific methods to
his second world, to the determination
of moral values, the better it will be for
us.
Finally, there is in Mr. Mallock’s closing
observations an important confusion of
ideas. That the mind is limited, that
we can only focus it on successive spots
in the great panorama of reality, is a
familiar truth. It is further true that
we may not be able to see the con
nection between our little areas of
knowledge, as they are often separated
by leagues of ignorance. In this passive
sense we may say we are unable to
reconcile ” them. But to admit two or
more statements that are clearly con
tradictory is quite another matter. To
do so in one single instance is to admit
the most radical and irreparable scepti
cism. Even the Catholic Church has
strongly denounced the principle that
“ a thing may be true in theology yet
false in philosophy.” If contradictories
may be true, we cannot rely on a single
affirmation of the mind. Some primi
tive instinct ” may yet find out that it is
also false. We should disci edit our
knowledge in its very source. Mr.
Mallock is likely to remain to the end a
Peri at the gate of Eden. Theology is
not more likely than science to give ear
to such a proposal.
I have said that Mr. Mallock’s theory
in some respects recalls the later
thoughts of Mr. Romanes, and as these
are much quoted in correction of
Haeckel’s procedure we may glance at
them in conclusion. In his later years
Mr. Romanes, once a thorough Monist,
jotted down some of his “ thoughts on
religion,” and they were published after
his ° death by Bishop Gore.
This
121
solitary “ conversion ” amongst the
scientific men of the last century has
naturally attracted some interest, but it
is not usually properly understood. In
the first place the works of both Mrs.
Romanes and Bishop Gore repel the
Rationalist inquirer by the offensive and
insulting insinuation that character had
anything to do with ■ the matter.
“ Blessed are the pure in heart for they
shall see God,” they both constantly
exclaim. The inference as to those
who do not see God is obvious. In the
second place, Mr. Romanes, though he
died in the communion of the Anglican
Church, seems to have reached a
theology of a very slender character.
His God is pantheistically immanent in
nature. All causation, he suggests, may
be Divine action, so that God melts into
the forces of the universe. The dis
tinction between the natural and super
natural he wholly rejects j and he thinks
the determinism of the will, established
by science, is consistent with the belief
that all causation is an act of Divine will.
And thirdly, without discussing the
illness which overcast the later years of
Mr. Romanes, these “thoughts, on
religion” contain some sorry sayings.
“ The nature of man without God is
thoroughly miserable,” he. says, pro
jecting his morbid condition on the
world at large; and “ there is a vacuum
in the soul which nothing can fill but
God.” Again, “ Unbelief is usually due
to indolence, often to prejudice, and
never a thing to be proud of.”. How
ever, let us examine his position in itself.
It may be said in a word that he
appeals to a religious instinct or intui
tion, which is independent of reason.
“If there be a God, he must be a.first
principle—-the first of all first piinciples
—-hence knowable by intuition and not
by reason.” Of the two temperaments
—the scientific or rational and the
“ spiritual ” or mystic—he says “ there is
nothing to choose between the two in
point of trustworthiness. Indeed, if
choice has to be made, the mystic
might claim higher authority for his
�122
MR. MALLOCK'S OLIVE-BRANCH
direct intuitions.” “ No one can believe
in God, or a 'fortiori in Christ, without
a severe act of will.” He shows how
often belief , is influenced by desire in
politics and is by no means an outcome
of reasoning, and adds: “ This may be
all deplorable enough in politics and in
all other beliefs secular; but who.shall
say it is not exactly as it ought to *be in
the matter of belief religious ? ” And,
speaking of “the continual sacrifices
which Christianity entails,” he says
“ the hardest of these sacrifices to an in
telligent .man is that of his own intellect.”
We will not do Romanes the injustice
of analysing in detail these sad reflec
tions of a suffering and diseased con
dition. . It is with reluctance that a
Rationalist approaches the question at
all, but it is forced on us. Just as I
write, an American correspondent sends
me a copy of the Literary Digest for
September 26.
It appears that Pro
fessor J. Orr, of the Glasgow Free
Church College, has been telling the
Americans that there is in England a
strong current from scepticism to faith.
He “claims to speak as an expert,” and
“ has in his possession a list of some
twenty-eight Secularist leaders in England
and Scotland who have become Chris
tians.” The truthfulness of this assertion
may be judged from the fact that he
only gives three names—Joseph Barker,
Thomas Cooper, and G. J. Romanes. The
former two were, I learn, men who were
associated with the Secularist activity
years ago, but were of no intellectual
standing and are hardly to be termed
“ leaders.” Romanes, he says, “ bit by bit
came under the power of the gospel, and
died a Christian in full communion with
the Church of England, avowing the
faith of Jesus, his deity and his atone
ment, and the resurrection of the dead,
and every other great article of our
faith.”1 We are thus forced to set in its
1 To finish with this miserable effusion—
quoted by the Digest from Zion's Herald—I
must add that he then goes on to speak of
Germany, where Haeckel’s Riddle “ has been
discarded for fully a quarter of a century” (the
true light the death-bed communion of
Romanes. As he says, it was by the
sacrifice of his intellect, by ignoring his
scientific temperament, by an effort of
will, that he succeeded in assenting to
what he calls “pure Agnosticism.”
In a sense, however, his idea of a
“ religious intuition ” is widely accepted
in the decaying Churches. Many dis
pense themselves on the ground of this
intuition or instinct from examining the
criticisms that are urged. We need only
make two observations on this last resort
of the theist. Firstly, this “ intuition ”
has, in the course of the last few thou
sand years, given men the most contra
dictory messages, and it is to-day sup
porting a hundred divergent beliefs
about. God and the future life. Its own
vagaries sternly condemn it as a channel
of truth. Secondly, modern psycholo
gists agree to regard instinct as an
inherited tendency or disposition.1 It
follows that if we have an “ original
instinct ” impelling us to accept religious
doctrines—I say if, because I am con
scious of no such instinct, nor is any
other person of whom I have inquired—
this is only the disposition towards them
which we have inherited, and has nothing
whatever to do with their truth or un
truth. It means, at the most, that our
fathers have accepted these beliefs for
many generations. We were aware of
that already.
first edition appeared a very few years ago).
Professor Orr says that “nearly all the great
scientific authorities that Haeckel quotes changed
their views some thirty or forty or twenty-five
years ago.” He will give “ the names of one or
two of them,” and out come the inevitable Vir
chow, Wundt, and Du Bois-Reymond. The
last-named “has reaffirmed the soul of man, re
affirmed the spiritual principle in man, and re
affirmed the supernatural element in man”—
compare what Haeckel does say of this Agnostic
writer on p. 6 of the Riddle. If these things are
not untruths, one wonders what is. One thinks
of poor Romanes’s awful statement that “ this
may be all deplorable enough in politics, but
who shall say it is not exactly as it ought to be
in religion ? ”
1 See Villa’s Contemporary Psychology, p. 292;
Sully’s Human Mind, I, 137 ; and Lloyd Mor
gan, Wundt, Ribot, and Masci.
�123
CONCLUSION
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CONCLUSION
We find, then, that the recent efforts
to evade the onward march of Monistic
science do not promise. any great
measure of success. Neither the specu
lations of Dr. Wallace, nor the assurances
of Lord Kelvin, nor the suggestions of
Mr. Mallock, provide a safe path of
retreat, if the positions of our earlier
chapters have been established.
As
long as scientists were willing to remain
silent on these cosmic speculations, it
was possible for ecclesiastical writers to
assume that they were not hostile, even
to assume that they were friendly, and so
to represent Professor Haeckel as a
Quixotic and isolated defender of an
extreme position which mature science
had deserted. It is certainly not pos
sible to do so with any regard for ac
curacy to-day. I have throughout sup
ported his positions with the most recent
utterances of scientific leaders, and the
excursions of Dr. Wallace and Lord
Kelvin have only served to show how
far science is to-day from lending sup
port to theology.
It may not be without interest, in conV eluding, to resume my work from the
point of view and in the order which one
finds in the Riddle itself. Chaps. II. to
V. are devoted to the proof that man is
descended, as regards his bodily frame,
from some earlier animal species. This
position is not now challenged by a
single anthropologist of the first or
second rank, and it is almost universally
admitted by cultivated theologians.
Chaps. VI. to X. are occupied with the
proof that the mind of man has been
developed from the mind of an animal
of an earlier species.
Dr. A. R.
Wallace is almost the only anthropolo
gist (if we may describe him as such) of
high rank who still questions that this
fact has been established, and we have
seen that theologians acquainted with
the facts began twenty years ago to
acquiesce in this truth. The majority of
the scientifically cultured apologists of
our day admit it. We have noticed the
overwhelming mass of evidence in favour
of it, and the fact that the most recent
researches of anthropologists tend to
elucidate it more and more. We have
seen that so critical a theist as Professor
J. Ward speaks of the doctrine of the
evolution of man, mind and body, being
“accepted with unanimity by biologists
of every school.”
When, however,
Haeckel goes on (Chap. . X.) to con
clude, in the purely scientific spirit, that
mind-force is therefore only an upward
and more elaborate extension of the
world-force that gradually advances from
the inorganic to the organic universe,
we find him denounced as “ crude ” and
“ unscientific.”
We have seen how
wholly logical and scientific his proce
dure is. When, further, he goes on to
say that this explanation of the origin of
the human soul leaves no room for those
claims of unique prerogatives on which
man once based his hope of immortality,
we again find the advanced company of
apologists at variance. Some think the
question is “ insoluble by philosophy ” ;
others elaborate novel speculations about
the aim of the cosmic process which we
have patiently considered.
The very
latest scientific researches, we saw, do
no tend to ascribe any peculiar signifi
cance to human life or to the planet we
inhabit.
Thus, in the first half of the book,
which deals with man, we find that all
Haeckel’s scientific assertions are sup
ported, almost without exception, by his
colleaguesin the anthropological sciences,
�124
CONCLUSION
and are admitted by most of the apolo
gists. . His conclusions from these facts,
touching the nature and the destiny of
the soul, are not denied by his colleagues
(who do not now, as a rule, trouble
themselves about the relation of their
knowledge to religious belief), but are
contested in the name of religion by the
theologians.. They appeal to philosophy,
and by philosophy we have judged
them.
The second half of the work deals with
a number of problems. Chaps. XII. to
XV. are occupied with the nature of the
cosmic substance, its unity, and its
evolution, through the inorganic world,
to the forms of living organisms. On
the nature of matter and force Haeckel
correctly gives the theories of the time
he wrote, and his system readily as
similates any modification of these which
the advance of physics may entail. The
unity he claims for inorganic nature is
undisputed, as is its evolution. When he
proceeds to unify the inorganic and the
organic worlds—to assume that life arose
by evolution, and that the life-force is not
of a specific or isolated character—he
has all the leading biologists and most
of the leading theists with him. We
have seen what befel Lord Kelvin when
he questioned this. He then (Chap. XV.)
attacks the question of the existence of
God. Here, save for a vague allusion to
a “creative power” or a “directive
principle” on the part of a few great
scientists and the fuller theology of a
small number of other Veil-known men of
science, he again advances beyond his
colleagues. Most of the scientists of our
day (including those German scientists
who are so much quoted) are Agnostics,
and do not concern themselves about
religion. Haeckel here speaks as a
philosopher. He is confronted with
certain metaphysical considerations which
purport to prove the existence of God.
We saw that for most of the cultured
apologists this merely means a principle
immanent in nature, and not distinguish
able from it.
In other words, the
ultimate question is : Is the evolution of
this Monistic universe of such a nature
that we are compelled to suppose there
was an intelligence guiding it from the
outset ? That is the problem on which
all forces are concentrating. The de
fence of gaps is falling into disrepute,
and, as a policy, is disdained by the very
men who practise it. We saw that the
forces which have evolved the world are
not erratic in their action, and so needed
no control; that science points to no
beginning of the scheme of things, and
so we need no creator; and that, on the
other hand, the cosmic process shows
many features which are inconsistent
with the existence of a supreme designer
and controller.
When Haeckel passes on to the moral
sciences, we saw that he is substantially
borne out by the latest research. Biblical
criticism and comparative mythology
have thoroughly shaken the belief in the
miraculous life of Christ; and whether
Haeckel has or has not the right version
of his paternity is not an important
matter. His judgment on the natural
growth and the limited influence of
Christianity is that of most historians.
His theory of a humanitarian ethic is in
harmony with the whole trend of ethical
discussion to-day.
We have seen, on the other hand,
how scattered and mutually conflicting
are the critics of Haeckel’s position.
We have been able, during quite twothirds. of our course, to silence the
majority of these critics with the weapons
of the minority. The majority of those
amongst them who have a wide scientific
culture are warning their smaller-minded
or less-informed colleagues to desert the
defence of gaps.
Almost the whole
library of apologetics up to within the
last ten years is useless to-day. The
apologists of yesterday mistook gaps in
scientific knowledge for gaps in the
course of natural development. A few
not very clear-minded theologians do so
still; and the old instinct is so strong,
and the fallacy appeals so strongly to the
imagination, that we have found even
the most advanced critics occasionally
�CONCLUSION
falling from grace. The tendency is,
however, to-day to allow that science
may build up a complete mechanical in
terpretation of the universe and all its
contents; the apologist is content to
hope that he may enter at the close with
his transcendental speculations on the sup
posed origin of the cosmic elements and
the alleged purpose of the cosmic process.
We have seen that already cultured and
sympathetic observers like Mr. Mallock
are telling them that this last position
will be no better than the first, and that
science allows them no foothold what
ever in the objective world.
That it is the ambition of science to
give a mechanical explanation of the
whole contents of the universe has been
made clear.
The dream of Tyndall
and Huxley is by no means abandoned.
For the inorganic universe no one
seriously doubts that this is only a ques
tion of time. And the angry resentment
by our leading biologists at Lord Kelvin’s
interference in their domain amply.shows
how little they are disposed to give up
the ideal of a mechanical interpretation
of life. So far the vast majority of the
leading scientists of the world are with
Haeckel. I do not say that they endorse
all his suggestions on points of detail.
His system, we saw, is not a rigidly
uniform structure, for all parts of which
he claims equal weight. He throws out
theories, and hypotheses, and suggestions,
in advance of the demonstrated conclu
sions. These are temporary and pro
visional.
That scientists reject or
dispute about any of these detailed
suggestions—whether it be on the evo
lution of ether, or the first formation of
protoplasm, or the fatherhood of Jesus—
does not affect his main position, or his
attitude towards religion. He frankly
says he may very well be wrong in these
details, and that he merely suggests that
the evidence so far seems to point in
this or that direction.
Whether the
advance of science proves or disproves
these suggestions does not affect the
main issue. The main issue is the unity
and evolution of nature. So far, as I
125
said, scientists in general are with him.
When he goes on to deal with conscious
ness, creation, design, and religion, it
cannot be said that they are with him.
But it is a gross deception to represent
that they are with his opponents. They
are Agnostics, as a rule. They prefer
not to concern themselves with these
subjects. They are Monists in the sense
that they accept the unity and evolution
of the cosmos, and refuse to see any
positive breach in the continuity of
nature. But they are, as Dr. Ward says,
“Agnostic Monists,” in the sense that
they are content with a negative attitude
on these later problems. The number
of great scientists who give a positive
and explicit support to personal theism
may be counted on one’s fingers.
In conclusion, I would respectfully
submit to these Agnostic men of science,
and the vast cultured following they
have in every educated country to
day, two considerations. The first is a
request that they will reflect on the spirit
and procedure of the apologists for con
ventional religion, as these are exhibited
in the attack on Dr. Haeckel, one of the
most distinguished and most honourable
of living scientists. If he cares to invade
every department of thought in search
of anti-theological arguments, and to
throw out scores of positive explanations
in the teeth of the theologians, he must,
of course, expect battle. It is just what
he desires. But he desires honourable
warfare. Truth is a frail spirit that must
be sought with patient and calm investi
gation. Its pursuit should be conducted
with dignity and especially with a scru
pulous honesty. We have seen that,
on the contrary, this campaign against
Haeckel’s views has been marked by
malignant abuse and persistent misrepre
sentation, by statements which cannot be
conceived as other than untruths, by
gross perversion of the teaching of modern
science, and by a score of devices and
stratagems that would disgrace the con
duct of a heated political campaign. It
is by these means that one-fourth of the
people are held attached to the old
�126
CONCLUSION
beliefs—people who, to a great extent,
would carry into the new humanitarian
religion a humane and proper spirit that
would enormously facilitate the transition
to a new inspiration. Is it conducive to
the interest of truth, or of science, or of
human welfare, that this corporation of
the clergy should continue in the twen
tieth century that mistaken conceit about
the truth of their cosmic views which
inspires them with such dishonourable
tactics ?
Secondly, I would ask whether it is
not too late in the history of the world
to be inventing fanciful theories for the
detention of the people in the Churches.
Three-fourths of the people are wholly
beyond the influence of the clergy, and
as these controversial devices become
known the defection is bound to increase.
It is too late to speak of the welfare of
the race depending on a religion which
the great majority have for ever aban
doned. Scepticism is in the atmosphere
of the world to-day.
The more we
educate the more we extend its influence.
If this is so the true humanitarian will
desire the change to be effected as
speedily as possible, and the moral ideal
to be swiftly disentangled from its decay
ing frame of dogma. In one respect the
world is in a pitiful plight to-day. Thou
sands of the clergy of all denominations
are only too eager to disavow the old
formulae and to devote themselves
to character-building alone. They are
prevented by the lingering concern of
the majority of church-members for
dogma. They are forced to utter un
truths (“ symbolically ”) at the very
moments when they are pleading for
truth, andhonour, and sincerity. We have
the spectacle of ecclesiastical scholars of
all denominations being forced to1
disavow the convictions which have
crept to their lips, and of Christian
journals complaining that the lack of
honesty is one of the most prominent?
features of theological literature. How
this state of things is held to be conducive
to the social good it is hard to imagine.
One of the great social needs of our
time is to sweep away the whole totter
ing structure of conventional religion and
worship. Whilst we talk of “ continuity ”
the world is deserting it altogether. The
moral tone of the clergy is lowered by
their corporate alliance with cosmic
speculations. The stream of enthusiasm
which has so long flowed through the
religions of the world is being dissipated.
Only one change will infuse new life into
the Churches and rehabilitate religion—
the swift abandonment to metaphysicians
of all these cosmic speculations. When
that revolution has been completed we
shall have given a new meaning to
religion that will change the present
contempt into concern. It will be an
affair of this world, a visibly important
element of this life. Men will turn their
eyes from the clouds to discover new
potencies in earth. That is the socio
logical basis of the work of the Rationalist
Press Association. Behind it are scores
of humanitarian constructive movements
ready to guide and inform the religious
or idealist ardour. Its work is the attack
on unthinking superstition, the war
against hypocritical professions, the
promulgation of a standard of intellec
tual honesty, the cultivation of a virile
and rational attitude on all the problems
of life.
It claims and deserves the sup
port of every man or woman who is sanely
and sincerely concerned for progress.
�INDEX
Christian World, the, 11, 12
Christianity, “triumph” of, 89, 90
Churches, advantages of the, 92 ;
decay of the, 92, 93
Clarke, Dr. W. N., 32, 39, 50, 67, 72 ;
on the origin of man, 50
Clarion, campaign of the, 11, 92
Colour, nature of, 27
Confucianism, 80
Consciousness, 54, 57, 58, 79
Constantine, conversion of, 89
Contradictions, alleged, in our know
ledge, Il6, 117, 121
Conversion of German scientists, 17 ;
Babylon, morality of ancient, 95
G. J. Romanes, 17, 121
Baer, K., 10, 17
Cook, Dr., 14
Bain, Prof., 16
Cooper, Thomas, 122
Balfour, Mr., 116
Creative action, 45, 77, 108, in, 124
Ball, Sir R., on dark stars, 103
Ballard, the Rev. F., criticisms of, 9, Croll, Dr. J., 14; on free-will, 60; on
the evolution of species, 48; on
10-14,16, 35, 36, 38, 46, 69, 79, 82,
teleology, 70, 72
85, 86, 93, 100; on determinism,
12 ; on evolution, 69 ; on physical Cunningham, Prof., on the evolution
of mind, 59
theories, 24, 25 ; on spontaneous
generation, 12, 13, 40, 41 ; on teleo
logy, 72 ; on the outlook of Chris Daily Chronicle, criticism of the, 33
Daily News, census of church-gomg,
tianity, 91
92 ; teaching Pantheism, 77
Barker, Joseph, 122
Beale, Prof. L., 14, 16, 32, 41, 43, 46, Dallinger, the Rev. Dr., 14, 23, 36,
70, 71 ; on Haeckel, 9; on the
iro; advertises in the Times, 13,
finite universe, 23, 32 ; on the origin
43, IX3
of man, 51
Beauty of the world, 75, 76
Beginning of the universe, 30-32, 76, 77 Dark nebulae, 104 ; stars, 30, 33, 103
Dawson, Sir J. W., 14, 31
Belgium, religion in, 92.
Design, 54, 58, 69-74 _
Belittling effect of Monism, 35
Determinism and morality, 117, 118
Berkeley, 21, 77
Bible, supposed uniqueness of the, Dewar, Prof., 28, 44, 50; on Dar
winism, 50 ; on idealism, 22
87, 88
Biologists and the vital principle, 199, Diplomas, Haeckel’s, 8
Dogma a dangerous base for morality,
iro
96 ; dangerous to religion, 15
Bischoff, Dr. E., 82, 83
Dolbear, Prof, (quoted), no
Blatchford, Mr., it, 13, 52
Dreisch, in
Blathwayt, Mr. R., on Haeckel, 6
Booth,Mr. C.,on religion in London, 92 Dualism, 20, 59
Brierley, the Rev. J. B., ri, 12, 63, Dubois, Dr., 49
Du Bois-Reymond, 10, 17
83, 9i
Duns Scotus on immortality, 61
Buchner, L., 10, 17, 19, 42, 49, 66
Buddhism, 80, 99
Ecclesiastical history, character of, 87,
Budge (quoted), 95
89, 9°
Burdon-Sanderson, Sir J., on Lord Egyptian Bible, the, 95
Kelvin, 109 ; on vitalism, 43, 109
Electrons, 33
Bushido, the, 99
Embryo, development of the, 58
Emerson (quoted), 99
Caird, Dr., 22
Encyclopaedia Biblica, the, 87
Campbell, the Rev. R. J., on Chris End of the universe, 32, 33
tianity, 81, 94, 96; on religious Entropy, theory of, 31, 33, 34, 77
statistics, 93
Epicureans, the, 61
Candour in the pulpit, theologians on, Eternity of the universe, 30-34
12
Ether, 24, 25, 30, 104, 116
Carbon-theory of Haeckel, 112
Ethic of Monism, the, 93-96, 117
Case, Prof., on Agnosticism and Ethical Movement, the, 98
Monism? 16 ; on consciousness, 58 ; Ethics, 98
on idealism, 22
Ethics, changes in, 119
Celsus on the fatherhood of Christ, 85 Evolution, 35-37, 41, 42, 101
Central sun, idea of a, 105
Eye, evolution of the, 74
Centre of the universe, 105
Chance, 71, 72-74
Facial expression, relation to mind, 59
Chapman, Principal, on the origin of Fiske, Mr., 14 ; admissions of, 48, 51,
life, 42
77 ; on immortality, 66 ; on teleo
Christian history, supposed uniqueness
logy 70, 73, 74
.
of, 89 ; morality, defects of, 96, 117 ; Flammarion on Dr. Wallace s views,
true conception of, 94, 96
103, 105, 106
Abiogenesis, 39-46
I
Action at a distance, 116, 117
j
Agnostic scientists, 16, 17, 20
_
|
Agnosticism, its relation to Monism,
16, 17, 20, 125
|
Ambrose, St., work of, 20
1
America, religion in, 92
Apes, the, and man, 49, 56, 101
Asceticism, 96
Atheism, 75
Atom, the, 28, 30, J3, 116
Australia, religion in, 92
Flower, Prof., 14 ; on evolution, 47
Force, unity of, 26
France, religion in, 92
Gaps, the theology of, 36, 37, 69, 124
Generelle Morphologic, the, 8
Germany, religion in, 92
Gore, Bishop, 121
Gospels, date of the, 84, 87, 88
Grimthorpe, Baron, 14, 16, 33
Haeckel, alleged dogmatism of, 11,
12, 23 ; pessimism of, 35 ; cardinal
offence of, 84; circulation of his
work, 91 ; early training of, 7 ; on
chance, 73; on Christian dogmas,
81 ; on Christian ethics, 96 ; on
the future of the Churches, 98 ; on
the person of Christ 84, 88; on
the validity of speculation, 80;
system of, 17-19
Halliburton, Prof., on vitalism, 111
Hand, connection of with the brain, 59
Harnack, 87, 88
Hebrews no genius for morality, 95
Henslow, Prof., 80
Herbert, Prof., 59
Heredity, 58, 67
Horton, Dr., criticisms of, 10, 17, 18,
40, 43, 46, 52, 62, 64, 82, 85, 86, 93,
100, 112 ; on Vogt and Buchner, 10,
17
Huxley, Prof., 16, 99
Idealism criticised, 21, 22, 120 ; and
Christianity, 21
Immaculate Conception, the, 85
Immanence of God in Nature, 78
Immortality of the sou , 61-68
Infinity of space and time, 116, 117
Infinity of the universe, 23,103-105, 116
Inquirer, criticism in the, 27
Instinct only hereditary disposition,
122
Intelligibility of the universe, 79
International Journal ofEthics, the,
98
Iverach, the Rev. Dr., criticisms of,
14, n6, 21, 29, 32, 36, 39, 45, 47, 50,
53, ?r, 72> 75> 79 > on idealism, 21
James, Prof. W., 14; on immortality,
65 ; on theism, 78
Kant, 26, 64, 71
Kelvin, Lord, 14, 44, 45 ; on vitalism,
108-114
Kennedy, the Rev. Mr., 14, 17, 75
Khammurabi, laws of, 95
Knowledge, review in, 9, 27
Language, 59
Lankester, Prof. E. Ray, 16, 43 ; on
Darwinism, 47; on Lord Kelvin,
109, in
Law, nature of, 28 ; of substance, 27,
28
Leap of the gospels, the, 83
Le Conte, Prof., 14, 50, 69 ; on evolu
tion, 36; on God and Nature, 77;
on immortality, 65 ; on life-force, 43
Leyden, congress at, 49
�128
Liberty of the will, 12
Liebig, 108, 112
Life, conditions of, 106 ; development
of, 48 ; in other worlds, 32, 106,
107 ; in space, 112 ; the nature of,
41, 42-44, 46; the origin of, 39-46
Light, criticisms of, 25, 62
Limits of the universe, alleged, 23,
103-105
Lodge, Sir O., 14, 24, 25, 28, 33, 100,
109, 112 ; on entropy, 33 ; on life
force, 113, 114 ; on the nature of
matter, 33
Loofs, Dr., criticisms of, 82-86; on
the birth of Christ, 85-87
Macalister, Dr. A., 14
Mallock, Mr. W. H., 9, 15, 20, 22, 31,
33, 4L 5.6, 73, 75 on design, 75, 76 ;
on dualist difficulties, 36; on free
will, 60 ; on Haeckel, 9, 15 ; on
science and religion, 114, 115; on
the credibility of religion, 115-121 ;
on the evolution of mind, 57 ; on
theological arguments, 15
Man, origin of, 50-60
Manchester Guardian, criticism in
the, 28
Manicheans, the, 89
Materialism, real nature of, 19
Materiarii, the, 61
Matter and force, 18, 19, 55; inde
structibility of, 28 ; nature of, 27,
28, 33, 116 ; unity of, 24-26
Maudsley, Dr., 16
Maunder, Dr., on Dr. Wallace’s
views, 103
Mechanism as the ideal of science,
48, 58, 68-70, 76, no, 125
Memory, 54
“ Merlin,” 40
Milky Way, the, 105
Mind and brain, relation of, 55, 5760, 63, 64, 67 ; evolution of, argu
ments for the, 56, 57, 101
Miracles of Unbelief, the, 11-13, 43
Mithraists, the, 89
Mivart, Dr., 32, 39, 50, 100, no
Moleschott, 19
Monera, 45
Monism, 17-20, 93
Moore, Canon A. L., 42, 45, 47, 51, 71 ;
on tbe origin of man, 50
Moral Instruction League, the, 98
Moral training for children, 97, 98
Morality of unbelievers, 93, 94, 118,
119; origin of, 97; real nature of,
94, 117, 118
Miinsterberg, Prof., 51 ; on immor
tality, 56, 64, 65
Music compared to thought, 63
Nageli, Prof., 40, no
Natural History of Creation, the, 8,
W
Natural selection, 47, 59
Nebular hypothesis, the, 28, 116
INDEX
Necessity, 71, 73
Neo-Vitalism, 42-45, 110-113
New Testament, criticism of the, 87, 88
Newcomb, Prof., 103, 104
Nicaea, Council of. 86
Species, origin of, 47-49
Spectroscope, the, 24
Spencer, Mr., 16, 76
Spiritism, 68
Spiritists, 25
Spontaneous generation, 39-46 ; in the
Middle Ages, 42
Old Testament, the, 87
Stallo, views of, 25, xoo
Organic substances produced, 45
Stars, distance of the, 23 ; distribution
Origin of Species, the, 7
of the, 104, 105 ; nature of the, 24,
Orr, Prof., on unbelievers, 122
6r ; number of tbe, 23, 104
Statistics of religion, 86, 92
Paganism and Christianity, 90; de Stettin, Congress at, 7
struction of, 90
Subconscious mind, the, 57
Paleyism, 71
Substance, the universal, 26, 116
Pandera, 84-86
Sully, Prof., 16
Pantheism of modern evolutionary Sun, motion of the, 105, 106
theists, 77, 78
Synodicon, the, 83
Pasteur, 41, 42
Pearson, Prof. Karl, 16; on Lord Tactics of religious apologists, 125
Kelvin, 109
Talmage, Dr., on evolution, 52
Phenomena and substance, 26
Teleology, 37, 38, 48, 69-74
Pithecanthropus erectus, the, 49, 50, Thiselton-Dyer, Sir W. T., on Lord
101
Kelvin, 109; on the materialistic
Planets, habitability of the, 106, 107
view of life, in
Pope, the Rev. A., criticisms of, 18, Thompson, Sir Henry, on God, 78 ;
36, 53, 70; on Monism, 18, 19
on the future of religion, 91
Profeit, the Rev. Mr., 14, 38, 39, 71, Thought as a brain function, 63
73
Turner, Prof., on Dr. Wallace’s
Prothyl, 30, 34, 116
views, 102, 105, 107
Protoplasm, .45, 46, 54, 55, no
Turner, Sir W., on Darwinism, 47 ;
Psycho-physics, 57
on the development of man, 51, 58 ;
Psychoplasm, 54
on life, 42
Pyknotic theory, the, 24, 25, 116
Tyndall, Prof., 16, 42, 50
Quiller-Couch, Mr., on Agnostics, 94
Radium, 33
Rationalist Press Association, 91, 126
Reformer, criticism of the, 25
Reinke, in
Religion, decay of, 93, 119, 126
Religious instinct or intuition, 122
Riddle of the Universe, circulation of
the, 9
Robertson, Mr. J. M., on Christ, 88
Romanes, 17 ; conversion of, 12 r, 122
Row, Mr., 14
Royce, Prof., on God and man, 78 ;
on immortality, 64
Rucker, Sir A., 25, 27 ; on idealism,
22 ; on the nature of matter, 25 ; on
vitalism, 44
Union of Ethical Societies, the, 98
Unity of the Universe, 24, 26, 27
Virchow, 17, 49
Vital force, 41, 42, 43, 109-113
Vogt, 10, 17, 19
Wallace, Dr. A. R., 14, 41, 50, 51,
101-107, 123 ; the recent articles of,
101-107
Ward, Prof. J., 16, 23, 36, 43, 47, 51,
70, 77 ; On Agnosticism and Monism,
16 ; on vital force, 43
Washington Sullivan, Dr. (quoted), 95
Wells, Mr. H. G., on the future of
religion, 77, 91
Westminster Review on Haeckel, 9,
11
Will, freedom of the, 59, 60, 118
Sadducees, the, 61
Williams, the Rev. Rhondda, criti
Schultze, 89
Scientists who support religion, 14
cisms of, 12, 18, 19, 26, 36, 37, 53-56>
69, 72, 78, 79, 93 ; on conscious
Schmiedel, Dr., on the Gospels, 87, 88
ness, 54; on the beginning of the
Sepher Toldoth Jeschua, the, 85
world, 31 ; on the decay of the
Sheffield Daily Telegraph, the, on
Churches, 15 ; on Monism, 18 ; on
Haeckel, 11
the origin of man, 51 ; rejects dualism,
Smyth, the Rev. Newman, 14, 36, 37,
47> 5L 7°, 72 >on immortality, 66, 67 ;
77
Wilson, the Rev. Archdeacon, 87
on tbe origin of life, 39
Soul of the atom or cell, 54
Winchell, Dr., 14
Woman and Christianity, 96
Sound, nature of, 27
Wundt, 17
Spain, condition of, 94
�R.P.A. PUBLICATIONS,
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A
Bv DENNIS HIRD (Principal of Ruskin College, Oxford). Written in the S1™P^
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busy general reader to grasp the arguments in favour of Evolution as they now stand.
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The serious student, desirous of
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Victorian Blogging
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A collection of digitised nineteenth-century pamphlets from Conway Hall Library & Archives. This includes the Conway Tracts, Moncure Conway's personal pamphlet library; the Morris Tracts, donated to the library by Miss Morris in 1904; the National Secular Society's pamphlet library and others. The Conway Tracts were bound with additional ephemera, such as lecture programmes and handwritten notes.<br /><br />Please note that these digitised pamphlets have been edited to maximise the accuracy of the OCR, ensuring they are text searchable. If you would like to view un-edited, full-colour versions of any of our pamphlets, please email librarian@conwayhall.org.uk.<br /><br /><span><img src="http://www.heritagefund.org.uk/sites/default/files/media/attachments/TNLHLF_Colour_Logo_English_RGB_0_0.jpg" width="238" height="91" alt="TNLHLF_Colour_Logo_English_RGB_0_0.jpg" /></span>
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Haeckel's critics answered
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McCabe, Joseph [1867-1955]
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Place of publication: London
Collation: 128 p. ; 22 cm.
Series title: R.P.A. Extra Series
Series number: No. 2
Notes: Part of the NSS pamphlet collection. Includes bibliographical references and index. Printed in double columns. Issued for the Rationalist Press Association, Limited. Stamp on title page and elsewhere: 'Bishopsgate Institute Reference Library'. Selections from publisher's list and R.P.A. Cheap Reprint series listed inside back cover and back page respectively.
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1903
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RA821
N444
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Philosophy
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Ernst Haeckel
Evolution
Monism
NSS
Religion and science
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Text
IMMANUEL KANT
IN HIS RELATION TO MODERN HISTORY.
PAPER READ BEFORE THE FELLOWS OF THE ROYAL
HISTORICAL SOCIETY ON THE lUh MARCH 1875,
BY
Dr G. G. ZERFFI, F.R.S.L., F.RHist.S.,
ONB OF THE LECTURERS IN H.M. DEPARTMENT OF SCIENCE AND ART.
PUBLISHED BY THOMAS SCOTT,
NO. 11, THE TERRACE, FARQUHAR ROAD,
UPPER NORWOOD, LONDON, 8.E.
Price Sixpence.
��IMMANUEL KANT.
INGLE individuals stand to the general historical
in the
Sdo development of humanity corbels, same relation as
detached stones, statues,
spires, or weather
cocks to a building. The individual, in the eyes of
the philosophical historian, has only so far an interest
as he forms a link in the great chain of human activi
ties, or one stone in the historical dome. The indivi
dual is the outgrowth of his times, his dwelling-place
or country, the intellectual and social atmosphere in
which he has been reared and nourished. In propos
ing to read a paper on Immanuel Kant I did not
intend to take up your time with his private life, little
biographical notices of his character, but to place
before you my objective views as to his influence on
our modern mode of thinking, as the basis of our
modern history. I purpose to keep to the general
principles which I laid down before you in my paper
“ On the possibility of a strictly scientific treatment of
Universal History ” (see vol. III. Transactions of the
E. H. S., page 380) ; and shall try to apply those
principles in sketching the development of an indivi
dual in whom the static and dynamic forces w’orking
in humanity were well balanced. Kant, as philoso
pher, is merely a link in a long chain of mighty spe
culative and empirical, or deductive and inductive
thinkers, who serve to illustrate, that from the earliest
times of the awakening consciousness of humanity man
tried to bring about an understanding of the natural
�6
Immanuel Kant
and intellectual phenomena surrounding him. The
method which these thinkers pursued was either a
priori or a posteriori ; they either started with general
principles, and reasoned from them down to particu
lars ; or they followed the more thorny path of arguing
from particulars in order to come to general conclu
sions. Finally, Kant stands by himself in founding a
system which succeeded in bringing harmony into
these two conflicting methods. He may be said to
have been the only “ deducto-inductive ” philosopher ;
he was a genius, able to grasp mind and matter, the
noumenal and phenomenal in their innermost connec
tion, and succeeded in destroying a one-sidedness in
philosophy which often had been detrimental to the
real progress of science.
Bacon and Descartes opposed the old methods of
philosophy, and endeavoured to explain the various
phenomena of nature on a merely mechanical basis.
But Bacon, after all, was a reviver of the atomistic
theory of Demokritos, whilst Leibnitz, in opposing
Bacon, Descartes, and Spinoza, and their teleological
principles, turned back to Plato and Aristotle, in order
to unite d priori the conflicting elements of the two
Greek philosophers in his theory of monads. Kant is
neither exclusively empirical nor teleological, he is the
creator of an entirely new mode of thinking and study
ing. All philosophy before Kant was more or less
theology. The circle of experience was extremely
narrow ; and theology bore all before it : no one could
gainsay it. Explanations and hypotheses drawn from
the fertile sources of imagination and intuition, pro
ductive of surmises and conjecture, had full play and
ruled supreme. Free-will, the senses, perception,
matter, spirit, body, soul, nature, God, and universe,
were settled as entities out of the inner consciousness
of poets, prophets, or philosophers. By degrees and
slowly, experience tried to collect and heap up obser
vations ; which were at first isolated; often in con
�In his Relation to Modern History.
7
tradiction to certain d priori settled assumptions, but
subsequently they were arranged and brought into
mutual relation, and we see natural sciences take a
position apparently opposed to theology, philosophy,
and metaphysics. Matter affecting and impressing our
senses, acting and reacting on them, was pronounced to
be the only thing we could grasp, or know anything of.
The experimentalist grew angry with the metaphy
sicians or theologians, and blamed the efforts of those
who argued on matters which he was trying to dis
cover by means of scientific observation. “ Either the
theologians come to the same final results as we men of
science, then they are entirely superfluous ; or they
persist in opposing us with false assumptions, propa
gating thus errors which are detrimental to the progress
of knowledge, and then they are worse than super
fluous ; they are altogether pernicious.” From this
conflict also a division in the scientific world arose.
Some devoted themselves exclusively to “ realism,”
others to “ idealism.” Everywhere at this period we
see strife and warfare.
In ancient times, as in the Middle Ages, the experi
mental sciences were but unruly and undisciplined
children, continually finding fault with their mother,
speculation; history was yet unknown, mere chronicles,
or at the most biographies, existed. The knowledge of
connecting laws was wanting, all was guess work, all
was a disconnected heap of facts in sciences as well as
in history. The discovery of America and the Refor
mation suddenly changed the very mode of thinking.
Without the Reformation, no philosopher of the stamp
of Bacon could have been possible. Philosophy
detached itself through Bacon from theology, and
entered the lists of experimental sciences ; so intimate
was the connection between philosophy and experiment,
that we in England speak of a microscope as a philo
sophical instrument, and might even call a new method
of dyeing silk, or a new way of manuring, a philoso
�8
Immanuel Kant
phical invention. In consequence of this one-sided
ness, inagurated by Bacon, we became more and more
devoted to a realistic, or as some people have it, matejealistic and practical philosophy, and failed to see that
there was a power in us which has to arrange, to system
atize, and even to apply what has been gathered on
the fields of experience. Opposed to this realistic
school were first Descartes and Leibnitz. The pure
intellect was to be the source of all knowledge;
nothing was worth studying, except what could be
reduced to an algebraic formula. Spinoza brought
this theory to perfection. Not only nature, but all
human life, with all its fluctuating passions, was to be
explained by mathematical rules. Man’s sufferings,
actions, intentions, and motives were to be treated as
planes, triangles, spheres, cubes, squares, pyramids, or
polyhedrons, &c. Leibnitz tried to save philosophy
from these matter-of-fact tendencies. He discovered
in mathematics the differential and infinitesimal “ cal
culus ; ” and in physics a new law—motion. He
strove to establish a union between primitive and final
causes. He had an idea that the contrast between
inorganic and organic, natural and spiritual, mechanical
and moral elements must cease through the notion of
continuity in the unity of gradually progressive, selfacting forces. His system reached its climax in his
“ Theodicy,” altogether beyond the comprehension of
human intellect. He dimly felt that there ought to be
a union between metaphysics and experience, but the
solution of this problem was beyond his powers.
Professor Christian Wolf was a thorough dogmatist.
Philosophy was to him the knowledge of everything
possible. Anything was possible that could be brought
under a strict logical law, according to the “principium,
identitatis,” “ contradictionis,” and “ rationis sufficientis.” We were taken back by him to the categories
of Aristotle. Experimental philosophy and meta
physics were again separated; the latter was to make
�In his Relation to Modern History.
9
us acquainted with the essence of things from a specu
lative point of view, this was treated of by Wolf in his
Ontology, under the heading “ De Entitate ; ” compris
ing the simple, compound, final, infinite, perfect, im
perfect, accidental, and necessary substances. The
universe, soul, and God were discussed according to
these ontological categories, as subjects of Wolf’s cos
mology, pneumatology, and theology. Dogmatism in
philosophy celebrated its greatest triumphs before the
dazzled eyes of Europe. Dialectics ruled supreme.
Explanations were given, and the unfathomable was
again fathomed — of course only in words. Kant
stepped on the philosophical platform when the dog
matism of Wolf was in its zenith ; he was himself a
pupil of this mighty metaphysician. The struggle
between the sciences, a priori and those a posteriori,
was recommenced. The foundations of metaphysics un
dermined by Bacon, Descartes, Leibnitz, and Spinoza,
stood propped up by Wolf’s ingenuity, but his system
was terribly shaken again by the mighty sceptical
philosophers of England and Scotland. Bacon already
denied that metaphysics, treating of the supernatural,
could be a science. Locke went further ; he set down
experience and perceptions as the basis upon which to
build up a system of philosophy. Sensation and
reflection were to be the leading elements. Bacon
declared the supernatural to be an impossibility, and
Locke pronounced even the supersensual a mere fiction,
opposing Descartes as the latter opposed Bacon. Locke’s
final dogma was, that experience cannot make us
acquainted with the essence of things, but merely with
their impressions on our senses. Berkeley, in analys
ing sensual impressions, found them producing per
ceptions, and therefore turned upon the realists and
proclaimed triumphantly that after all everything is
“ idea.” He thus confounded effect and cause, and
pronounced them to be identical. All observations are
mere impressions on our senses, but these produce
B
�IO
Immanuel Kant
perceptions, perceptions are ideas, therefore everything
is mere idea. All material things if deprived of our
perception are nothing. There are only perceiving and
perceived elements or ideas in us, which take their
origin in God. Berkeley's dogma may he summed up
thus : God has endowed us with the faculty of percep
tion through impression, all knowledge is therefore of
divine origin. His dogmatism led to Hume’s scepticism.
Hume started by endeavouring to find out, whether
we may become conscious of the impressions made by
perceptions on our senses, and whether knowledge were
possible beyond such perceptions. He assumes only
one possible science—mathematics—the conclusions of
which are analytic (according to him) by means of
equations. Empirical conclusions he wishes only to
be based on the law of causation (the nexus causalis),
and the whole of his philosophy may be reduced to the
question : is a cognisable causal “ nexus ” between the
objects of experience and their impressions on our
senses, possible ? He denies this most peremptorily.
Reason cannot connect different impressions, and at
the same time trace their causes with certainty; her
conclusions are only analytic but never synthetic. All
conclusions drawn by experience can therefore never
be strictly demonstrated, as we can only recognise the
effect but never the necessary cause. Neither reason
nor experience can give us real insight into causality,
and this very causality is one of the essential factors of
science. What we are capable of attaining is a con
tinuation of facts and impressions. The post hoc
becomes a propter hoc, or the “after” a “therefore.”
This change is performed through our reasoning faculty.
The causal nexus is a mere assumption, it is a faith, a
belief, like any other, and not a reality. This will
suffice to characterise the philosophical stand-point at
the period when Kant began his career.
Glancing at the political and social condition of his
times, we find him entering the University when Wolf
�In his Relation to Modern History.
11
returned, to Halle, and Frederic II. ascended the throne.
The seven years’ war interrupted his academical
studies. He finished his great work at the time when
Frederic the Great ended his glorious life. He was
attacked and persecuted under the government of
Frederic William II., but ended his career, once more
allowed to breathe a free and independent thinker
under Frederic William III. Kant was born on the
22nd of April 1724 at Konigsberg. His ancestors were
of Scotch origin, thus Kant indirectly is a countryman
of the great Scotchman David Hume, from whom he
descended in a direct spiritual line as philosopher. It
is often interesting to trace the general law of action
and reaction in single individuals. The most influential
agents have been educated by those who were to fall
a sacrifice to the destructive intellectual powers of their
pupils. Bacon was educated by Scholastics; Descartes
by Jesuits; Spinoza by Rabbis; and Kant by
Pietists. Kant never could understand the unhealthy
and deadening principles of his pietistic masters; he
learned from them a certain discipline of the mind for
which he was always grateful. He was a stern moralist
in thought and deed all his life.
Seven years, from 1733 to 1740 he frequented the
“Collegium Fredericianum”—nine years (from 17461755) he was tutor in three different families ; and
on the 12th of June 1755 he took his degree with a
dissertation “on fire.” In April 1756 he was made a
private teacher at the University, and he had to spend
fifteen years of his life in that position till he was at
last appointed “Professor Ordinarius” at the University
at Konigsberg.
In the year 1756 he delivered his first Lecture; he
was so nervous that his voice nearly failed him, and he
was scarcely heard—but the next Lecture was better,
and at last he became famous for his learning and the
amiability of his delivery. He continually asserted
that his intention was not to teach what had been
�12
Immanuel Kant
taught, but to suggest and to rouse the minds of his
hearers to self-thought and self-reasoning. He declared
publicly that his students would not learn philosophy
from him—but how to think for themselves. From
the year 1760 he took up various subjects besides
Philosophy. He lectured to the theological faculty
on “ Natural Theology ; ” to large audiences on “ An
thropology” and “Physical Geography.” In 1763 and
1764 he published his “ Only possible means to prove
the existence of the Divinity,” and his “ Observations
on the Beautiful and Sublime ”—and gave Lectures on
these two subjects. In 1781 appeared his greatest
work under the title “ Critique of pure reason,” 1783 he
published his “ Prolegomena of any possible Meta
physics,” 1785 his “Principles of a Metaphysic of
Morals,” 1786 his “Metaphysical Introduction to
Natural Sciences,” 1788 his “Critique of Practical
Reason,” and 1790 his “ Critique of our Reasoning
Faculty,” 1793 his “ Religion within the limits of Pure
Reason.”
He died on the 12th of February 1804. What a
period—what a life from 1724-1804 ! He witnessed
the Seven Years’ war, the French Revolution, the
establishment of the American Republic; the fall of
the convention, the rise of Napoleon—the political and
social change of everything in Europe. Schiller and
Goethe were inspired by him—-he saw action and
reaction, flux and reflux in human thoughts and
achievements—Sciences of unknown subjects sprang
up—Geology under Werner began hypothetically to
step forward with uncertainty and timidity—Oken
proclaimed his theory of evolution in unintelligible
alchemistic phrases. Everything appeared to assume
new phases. Men were either inclined to Voltairian
incredulity, to Rousseau’s fanaticism; Hume’s scep
ticism; or Jesuitic bigotry. Mysticism went hand in
hand with a negation of all things. Swedenborg stood
in the foreground with his supernatural epileptic fits ;
�In his Relation to Modern History.
13
whilst Holbach, Grimm, and D’Alembert denied even
our spiritual faculty of “ negation.” The intellectual
state of Europe was but a reflex of the social and
political condition of those times. Old mediaeval
Erance, with her centralised organization grown out of
the grossest feudalism, was in dissolution; Germany
sighed under 240 major and minor despots, and a
childish, almost Chinese, over-regulation in public
matters ; England was at least parliamentarily free, the
abode of the greatest orators that ever raised their
voices for the public welfare. America possessed a
Washington; France a Robespierre and Napoleon;
England a Chatham and Burke; and Germany a Kant,
a Hamann, Herder, and Jacobi.
Like a bright sun shedding lustre around, the Teuton
philosopher stands high above his times witnessing in
serene splendour the intellectual, religious, and political
chaos beneath him, out of which grew our 19th
Century. Not without meaning has he been placed on
the monument of Frederic the Great as the first amongst
the mighty generals of the still mightier king. Socially
and politically Frederic II., and intellectually and
philosophically Immanuel Kant understood the pro
gressively advancing spirit of their times. And therein
consists the real merit of a historical character. No
glorious battles, no victories, no extensions of territory,
no artificially embellished towns, no momentary
prosperity in commercial enterprises, can make up for a
misunderstanding, or according to my theory for an
untimely disturbance of the acting and reacting moral
and intellectual forces in humanity. He who in
history or sciences dares to touch that balance and
disturb its equilibrium, can but bring trouble on
humanity, for he forces generation after generation to
readjust that balance. Kant’s private as well as public
life was one great and successful effort to keep our
morals and our intellect within the boundaries of the
possible.
�14
Immanuel Kant
Independence and the most punctual legality were
to be the basis of the individual and of the state, as
but an aggregate of individuals; Pure moral principles,
without any admixture of dogmatic dross, were to be
the moving springs of humanity; our knowledge ' was
to be based on a full consciousness of the possibility and
certainty of our conclusions. The most important step
to attain this was to trace in the phenomena of human
thoughts and actions a certain law. To show how far
we, as finite beings, endowed with intellect, might
grasp space and time, the infinite, the invisible, the
transcendental, and the supersensual, so as not to waste
our faculties on matters which must remain for ever
unapproachable in the dominion of science, was to
render the very greatest service to humanity. Kant
achieved this task. His “Critique of Pure Season”
was partly misunderstood, or rather generally not
understood at all, or was distorted because some felt it
to be a death-warrant of all speculative efforts, meta
physical verbiage and dogmatic quarrels. The book
was decried as unintelligible transcendentalism and
incomprehensible dialecticism. Kant’s interpretation
of transcendentalism was one which some people
would not like to admit; by this expression he meant
simply, to transcend, “ to step over ” the boundaries of
dogmatism, and to ascertain after having shaken off
this dead weight, how far we might proceed in the
regions of the Supersensual. His great merit was to
prove that our transcending certain limits leads to
-nothing but to mere assumptions; whether such
assumptions and surmises are necessary for certain
emotional purposes, he does not decide. He affirms
our capacity of becoming conscious of perceptions and
tries to trace the conditions under which perceptions
may be systematized and thus increase our scientific
acquirements.
His philosophy is therefore not sceptic, but criti
cal. His very first principle in starting on the thorny
�In his Relation to Modern History.
15
path of philosophy was 11 never to take an assertion for
granted, without having carefully examined it.”
“ Neither affirm nor deny without the most minute in
vestigation.”
Who does not see in these propositions the germ, of
our modern mode of thinking ? who does not perceive
that the intellectual development of humanity was to
be based on principles differing totally from those of
antiquated authority or blind faith ? He was by no
means an anti-dogmatist; he only looked on dogmatic
metaphysics and experimental philosophy as two un
known quantities. The more the latter increased, the
more the former decreased in value; till, when experi
mental philosophy went over into scepticism, the stand
point of metaphysics was brought down to Zero; at
this point Kant pronounced it not only valueless, but
utterly useless. The mere playing with words on words,
dialectical contortions and distortions, metaphysical
writhings and grimaces were utterly repulsive to his
noble, straightforward nature. The power that thought
in us and was conscious of the process, namely, mind,
he not only recognised, but tried to discipline.
He began his philosophical studies in 1740, and
thirty years later, he founded his new system. The
first work with which he inaugurated his new method
of reasoning was published in 1768, and his last ap
peared in 1798, again, after exactly thirty years of
mature reflection. Each decennary had its task. Dur
ing the first three, he approaches step by step the solu
tion of his system, whilst during the last three, we see
him applying his discovery, and bringing his system to
perfection. During the first two decennaries (17401760), Kant investigates and follows up the postulates
of the Leibnitz-Wolf philosophy ; during the third
(1760-1770), he is occupied withan analysis of the
leading English philosophers, especially with Hume’s
scepticism; and in 1770 he raises himself far above the
dogmatic metaphysicians and the dry experimentalists,
and takes his own lofty position. During the fourth
�16
Immanuel Kant
decennary, he is silent; during the fifth, he publishes
his “Critique of Pure Reason,” (1780-1790), and de
fines the extent to which we may trust our power to
draw conclusions, and tries in the last decennary to
apply his well-founded system to solve the positive
problems of universal history.
During the first period, he enters into an inquiry on
the moving forces of the universe; and endeavours to
establish a nexus between cause and effect.
During the second period, he traces the possibility
or impossibility of proving a first cause. If cause, why
first, and how so first ? He then comes to the only
possible mode of proving the existence of a first cause,
namely, the ontological. Out of the mere notion,
“God,” the existence of God cannot be proved; but,
taking all the attributes necessary to form the concep
tion of God, such a being may not only be assumed to
exist, but must necessarily exist. In following up
Kant’s critical reasoning, we arrive at a mathematical
conviction of the existence of God, which is of greater
value than the mere dogmatic assumption. Anything
not in itself contradictory, is cognisable, say the ideal
ists ; only that is cognisable which exists, say the real
ists. Supposing nothing existed, then we could think
nothing. In denying these two conditions, we should
deny every intellectual and material possibility. As
suming that something is possible, we must look upon
it as the sequence of something that existed previously.
There must be for everything a final cause. This final
cause cannot be denied ; its existence, on the contrary,
must be assumed. There must be a something before
anything is possible without which nothing could
be possible. This necessary existence may be con
ceived as indivisible in its essence, simple in its ele
ment, spiritual in its being, eternal in its duration, un
changeable in its condition—in one word, it must be
God 1 This once enunciated and assumed, he went on a
step farther and examined the modus operand! of our
mind, with its intellectual and reasoning faculties.
�In his Relation to Modern History.
What, he asked, is within the range of real cognition ?
He compares metaphysics and mathematics, and finds,
that whilst the former is entirely based on analysis, the
latter is founded on synthesis.
By drawing a strict distinction between analytic and
synthetic conclusions, Kant created an entirely new
stand-point for all our studies. He distinguishes be
tween the emotional, as our moral and sesthetical, and
-between the intellectual as our reasoning and scientific
faculties. As morals and beauty, so are strict reason
ing and science analogous elements. Here he is at
issue with Hume, who assumes analysis as the basis in
mathematics. Kant asserts the very opposite. Quan
tities and forms are the objects of mathematics—but
these quantities and forms are not given, but,constructed,
they are combined, built up synthetically. To become
conscious of a triangle, is to construct the required for
mal conditions, enabling us to perceive in them a tri
angle. Metaphysicians, however, have only analysis at
their command. Analytic judgments or conclusions are
those in which the predicate is already contained in the
subject, by which a part of a whole is merely detached.
In the assertion, “ God is omnipotent,” I detach an
attribute of the subject God, and assert in reality nothing
but that God is God. For, if I have a conception of
God, I have also a knowledge of his omnipotence.
Such conclusions as these may be very ingenious, but
they do not contribute to a widening of our knowledge,.
Synthetic conclusions are those in which a predicate
is joined to a subject which is altogether extraneous to,
and often apparently in contradiction with, it. As “ water
freezes,” I have to prove how, under what conditions,
and why water freezes. I have to know what water
and what freezing is ; whether in such a condition water
ceases to be a fluid, and if it cease, what is its condi
tion in a state of crystallisation, what are crystals ; does
water in a frozen condition still contain heat; what is
heat; how can heat be latent in ice; does water freeze
�i8
Immanuel Kant
if mixed with salt, why should it freeze with greater
difficulty if so mixed. The amount of knowledge ac
quired through synthetic conclusions is ever increasing
—analysis is a mere repetition of the same things.
Kant took a mediating position between Descartes
and Leibnitz, between Leibnitz and Newton, be
tween Wolf and Crusius, and between Crusius and
Hume. Between the English experimentalists and
German metaphysicians there appeared always to
be an insurmountable gulf. Kant tried to bridge
over this gulf. Metaphysics was to be turned into an
experimental science. He establishes the principles of
natural theology and morals, out of the very properties
of things, though we may for ever remain ignorant of
their real essence. With reference to the existence of
the divinity, he tried this with his ontological proof.
With reference to morals, he proceeded in the same
way. Every moral action must have an aim or pur
pose—either an aim for another secondary aim, or for
its own final purpose. In both instances, the action is
caused and necessary ; but, in the first instance, it is
conditional, and in the second, unconditional. An
action done for a secondary purpose, for hope of re
ward or for fear of punishment, is at the utmost right,
clever, or reasonable, but it is not absolutely moral. In
order to become moral, it must be done unconditionally,
for its own sake. This led him to the contemplation
of the beautiful which Hutcheson and Shaftsbury be
fore him closely connected with our moral feelings.
Morals and aesthetics are so closely allied, that our
moral feelings are but a taste for right action ; Shafts
bury calls morals the beautiful in our emotions, the
harmony in our sentiments, the right proportion be
tween our self-love and benevolence. Virtue is beauty
of action ; our sense of virtue is but our aesthetical feel
ing put into practice; whilst art puts it into forms.
Virtue and taste are innate forces in human nature,
like any other faculty of our mind, but they have to be
�In his- Relation to Modern History.
19
developed, cultivated and fostered. For morals and
aesthetics have one common root, they complete one an
other. Art was thus elevated to its very highest stan
dard. How Kant’s lofty and sublime ideas influenced
poetry may be best studied in the works of the im
mortal Schiller, whose writings are permeated with
Kant’s theories and principles. To suggest was the
principal aim of all his writings of this period. The
student was not to be filled with given thoughts, .he
was to be excited to think ; he was neither to be carried
or led, he was to be made to walk for himself. “ In
inverting this method of teaching, the students pick
up some kind of reasoning before ever their intellect
has been cultivated, and they carry about a mere bor
rowed science. This is the cause that we meet with
learned men, who have so little intellect, and why our
academies send so many more muddled (abgeschmackte)
heads into the world than any other state of the com
munity.”
During the third period of his mental evolution
Kant occupied himself with a close investigation of
our mental functions. Psychology and physiology are
with him not separated but closely united studies.
The workings of the brain and the mind were in his
eyes in close relation, and he attributed all visions,
fanaticism, melancholy and sentimental amativeness
to a greater or lesser degree of mental aberration ; the
cause of which must be sought in the derangement of
our cerebral organs.
If the phantoms of our imagination turn into
visions ; if our inner sensations become outwardly
perceptible, our senses are in a state of dream. If our
reason assumes certain conceptions of its own as
realities our reason is in a state of dream. “ There are
emotional dreams, and there are dreams of our intellec
tual faculty. Visions belong to the first class;
metaphysics, undoubtedly, to the second.” He thus
arrives at a point when metaphysics and madness are
�20
Immanuel Kant
treated as equal aberrations of our emotional and mental
nature, though their origin is distinct, according to
our different organization.
Dogmatists and Meta
physicians, visionaries and ghost-seers are declared to
be but “airy architects of imaginary worlds.” Let
them dream on as long as they like—that they but
dream, becomes day by day clearer. Metaphysics were
developed by Kant’s inquiries into a study to make
ourselves acquainted with the limitation of human
reason. We may, with its aid, as Goethe says in a
Kantian sense
“ There see that you can clearly explain
What fits not into the human brain. ”
This slow and gradual destruction of all hollow
knowledge led us to a greater culture of those sciences
which are possible, and have become an ever-growing
barrier to false and credulous sentimentalism, and
emotional dogmatism.
The “ supersensual ” is not
within the boundaries of human reason. Transcendental
philosophy has to deal with experience, and not to
ignore it.
No knowledge is possible beyond the
domains of our direct perception; of the essence of
things we know nothing; the noumenal is and must
remain to us a mystery ; the phenomenal is within our
grasp. An absolute psychology, cosmology, or theology
is impossible. Kant thus does not deny the existence
of the “ supersensual,” he only denies our faculty of
becoming cognisant of it. What an immense stride
towards a really human, and, at the same time, humane
investigation of all those elements, which ought to
form the basis of our possible studies. Kant then goes
farther and proves with his trenchant power of criticism
that morals are independent of metaphysics, that
humanity in general and every individual in particular
carry the regulating force of morals already in their
very organization. He distinguishes between opinion,
faith, and knowledge. We may have reasons to make
�In.his Relation to Modern History.
21
a statement, but these reasons may be based on an utterly
subjective conviction, such a conviction is but an opinion
and does not exclude doubt; if, however, our convic
tions are based on objective observation, our opinion
rises into the reliable domain of knowledge; if again
our convictions are based on subjective elements
supported by doubtful objective proofs, we may,
individually, be convinced of certain assumed facts,
we may believe in them, but we do not know. In
applying these important distinctions to the whole
sphere of our intellectual and material world, we
were induced by Kant to draw more definite distinc
tions between the possible and impossible, the necessary
and merely accidental. In the mighty circle of religion
we have to bear three points in view. 1. If all faith in
a supernatural world be based on morals (Ethic actions)
religion cannot have any other essential and real
object than a purely moral one; all elements that do
not foster pure morality will be secondary, strange,
indifferent, or even dangerous. Religion, in fact, with
Kant becomes pure Ethics. 2. Ethics are not based
on a strictly scientific cognition, or theoretical convic
tion but on moral actions and practical necessity. Not
theoretical assumption, but practical reason becomes
thus the basis of religious faith. 3. Granting this, it
follows that our practical reason is independent of
mere logical operations, that it discards as will and
moral force all such boundaries as are erected by
speculation, and drives us to conform to laws which
must be common to the whole of humanity.
During the fourth period he is silent. The storm of
sceptic doubt was conquered. In this period we best
perceive the positive results of the convulsions which
brought forth Criticism instead of Scepticism—for,
though we acknowledge the force of doubt, we think it
should be subject to a regulating higher power—viz. :
Criticism. During the fifth period he shakes off the
fetters of idealism and materialism, and defines in his
�22
Immanuel Kant
a Critique of Pure Reason ” the boundaries of man’s
understanding. In accomplishing this he assumes two
principles upon which all knowledge and philosophy
must rest. The one is idealistic—subjective, and the
other empirical—objective. The inborn intellectual
faculty—mind—can as little be neglected as the outer
world with its impressions acting on our idealistic
subjectivity. He thus founded cosmology—worked
out by Alex. v. Humboldt—Geology by Leopold Buch,
and Sir Charles Lyell,* and then he paved the way to
the grand theory of Darwinism, or the theory of the
gradual development of matter; he excited to Anthro
pology and Ethnology, for he strove, through exper
ience, to trace law in all the phenomena surrounding
us, in nature as well as in the subtle regions of our
mental operations.
These principles changed the whole system of our
philosophical and historical studies. Creation was not
assumed as having taken place according to a certain
dictum, but we had to investigate the earth’s crust to
see how far we might trace the gradual formation
of our globe. Kant’s method produced compara
tive philology and mythology. Language was not to
be a settled gift, but was to be traced back to its first
origin ; this was the case with the different religions
of ancient times. We were not to suppose that millions
were left without religious comfort, but to investigate
and ascertain how far the religious systems are rooted
in the impressions of nature, how far they represent
the moral and social condition of certain groups of
mankind. This distinction led to a closer study of the
nature of man, leading to biology and sociology, but
above all to a deeper and systematic study of history.
There is no branch of learning which should be culti
vated with greater care than history, that is history
* Whose recent death we must all deeply regret—though he left us
his immortal works as the most glorious monument of his earthly
existence.
�In his Relation to Modern History.
23
from a scientific point of view. What appears in single
individuals as mere chance, or the result of coincidence
might perhaps be looked upon as subject to law like
any other natural phenomenon j though, in the latter
case, unconscious material particles are the elements,
whilst in history, man with his consciousness, his as
sumed free will, passions, intellectual and bodily facul
ties, is the complicated agent. Kant affirmed, (and he
can claim the honour of having been the first to do so,)
in 1784, when statistical tables were still in their in
fancy, that in looking on humanity as a whole, appa
rently disconnected incidents may be brought under
the sway of certain laws acting with stern regularity.
He drew attention to the complicated phenomena of
the changes in the weather, the growth of plants under
certain climatological conditions, the course of streams
and their influences on the progress of civilization.
Individuals, like whole nations, are entirely unconsci
ous of the fact, that whilst they appear to work against
one another, or have only their own egotistic aims in
view, they are working according to certain laws to
accomplish the grand destiny of mankind. If it may
be assumed as an axiom, “ that the natural capacities
of a creature have to develop according to a purpose,”
we may assert that this must be the case with man too.
Applied to animals, we find this law obeyed, and pro
ducing natural selection. Any organ not wanted is
thrown off. Taking man, we find, that though he is
the only consciously reasoning creature on earth, his
natural capacities are destined to be developed in the
genus, and not in the individual. Thus, the study of
a single individual is like the analysis of a single in
sect without any cognisance of the different varieties
of animals. Historical progress is not only not the
result of the exertions of single individuals, but those
very individuals are but the outgrowths of generations
after generations, inheriting their mode of thinking and
acting, and finally maturing the innate intellectual
�24
Immanuel Kant
germ to a fruit which in its turn is again the seed of
further developments. For the first cause has willed
that man, if we except the automatic function of his
animal nature, should evolve everything necessary for
his happiness and perfection, in opposition to his natu
ral instincts, out of his own reason, or rather out of the
sum total of reason, existing in humanity. “The
means which nature employs to attain this aim,” is,
according to Kant, “ antagonism,” which, in its turn,
becomes the very basis of legal order and social com
fort. History is but one long series of wars, murders,
conquests, intrigues, opposition of individuals against
individuals, of families against families, of tribes against
tribes, and of nations against nations, as if man only
delighted in destruction and ruin. But is this so ?
On the contrary, what unphilosophical minds bewail,
is but a process in operation to attain in the end the
greatest amount of happiness for mankind. Man was
not destined to be idle, but he has to learn how to use
his bodily and intellectual faculties.
Wars, controversies, passions, and strife lead to
activity, and activity is life. Wars engender peace;
controversies, truth ; covetousness, commercial enter
prise ; passion, virtue; and strife, brotherly love and
good will. Antagonism drives us to seek the solution
of the only problem that should occupy humanity, to
form one grand community, ruled by the laws of right.
The most ingenious institutions, all our philosophical
systems, all our religious efforts, are but continuous pro
gressive attempts to lead humanity from a savage state
to that of civilization. To further the solution of this
difficult problem, we want a guide, a leader, and this we
find in the consciousness of our nature and knowledge
of the past, enabling us to make ourselves acquainted
with our destiny. We have not to look to an indi
vidual for guidance, but to the supreme principles of
right. Individual rulers are only instruments to watch
over these principles and see them practised. This
�In his Relation to Modern History.
25
problem of a perfect constitution of humanity will only
be attained when man will form a grand international
tribunal which will settle the disputes of nations ac
cording to just laws binding on humanity at large.
As Kant saw in his mind’s eye the necessity for the
existence of a planet beyond Saturn, the then last
known planet of our solar system (1754), which planet,
“ Uranus,” was discovered twenty-six years later, by
Herschel (1781); so he foresaw in 1784, that which
America and England inaugurated in Geneva nearly
ninety years later. An international tribunal settling
the disputes of two of the greatest nations of the world
at a table covered with green baize, by means of quiet
arguments, and not on blood-stained battlefields with
the sacrifice of wealth, happiness, and the lives of in
numerable human beings. Kant clearly saw that
history is but the outer garb of inward forces working
in humanity according to a pre-arranged law, which
law must be assumed to be as fixed as that by which
the solar systems are brought into order and cohesion.
The endeavours of modern historians should be to trace
this law.
Law has to deal with forces, producing as causes—
effects, and these forces must act and react, because a
stationary force would be lifeless. The two forces
working in antagonism and conflict can but be our moral
and intellectual faculties, which, in their disturbed
balances explain all the phenomena of history. Kant
must be looked upon as the real founder of modern
thought, for his ideas, like those of every powerful mind,
pervade our whole intellectual and social atmosphere.
The writers following Kant, whether in England
or Erance, consciously or unconsciously continue in
the path which he began to hew out for coming
generations. Eichte, his antagonist, really strengthened
the position he attacked. Schelling worked out, like
Comte, with copious verbosity, Kant’s principles.
Their terminology differs from that of Kant, but in
�26
Immanuel Kant
essence they add nothing to his first principles.
Schelling proclaims his immanence of spirit in nature,
which immanence we can only trace in law. In assert
ing that the universe has its ground in what in God is
not God, Schelling deviates from Kant, and leads us
to the Pythagorean Monad and Dyad, a severance of
mind and matter, or of God and creation, which is
mere verbiage.
Hegel built on Kant with the difference, that with
him the subjective becomes the absolute; whilst the
objective is turned into the differentiation of the abso
lute • adding to these phenomena a third one when the
absolute turns from its externality back into itself.
Schoppenhauer and Hartmann continued to develope
Kant’s principles in an idealistic direction, whilst the
host of naturalists, geologists, physiologists, biologists,
psychologists, ethnologists, and comparative gramma
rians follow him, cured of all cravings after the super
sensual, and try to ascertain what we may learn in the
ever varying empire of the phenomenal.
Kant did not destroy thrones, he made no kings or
kinglets, he did not brandish a blood-stained sword,
command armies, hold levees, create marshalls, com
manders-in-chief, shoot free-thinking men, or trample
under foot the rights of nations and individuals, like
so many a phantom of glory, that could only be reared
in the chaotic disorder of our ill-balanced moral and
intellectual forces. Unlike these he did not vanish
like a thunder-storm, which purifies the air but leaves
wreck and ruin behind.
The mighty warriors often are like swollen mountain
streams after a violent shower ; bubbling noisily, these
streams rush down in torrents, tear down fences and
houses, inundate plains and fields—carrying devastation
in every one of their waves, and then disappear; whilst
the philosopher, of the stamp of the great and immortal
Kant, resembles a broad and majestic intellectual river,
cutting deeply through mountains, meadows, fields,
�In his Relation to Modern History.
27
villages, and towns, flowing slowly and noiselessly, but
spreading happiness, fertility, and abundance around,
serving as a mighty high-road to connect nations through
their most noble outgrowths, their philosophers and
searchers for truth into one grand progressively advanc
ing community.
The great and inexhaustible means for furthering
this union is an indefatigable study of history. For is
it not a calumny of the Creator, whose wisdom we
continually praise in a thousand tongues, to assume,
that we ought to study only certain of his works, and
neglect altogether the Creator’s fairest product, man
in his gradual development 1 In the unconscious
regions of the empire of nature, in stars and nebulae,
solar systems, crystallisations and chemical combina
tions we trace wisdom, law, and order; only the stages
of man’s intellectual activity, as they present them
selves in history, are looked upon as an eternal re
proach to the Creator, who is’ assumed to have acted
on firm principles in the minutest of his inorganic or
organic creatures, but who is thought to have left
humanity without aim, law, or purpose on this globe,
so that we are forced to turn our eyes despairingly
from this world and to hope for the fulfilment of our
destiny in unknown regions.
History treated from a scientific point of view
teaches us, that this is not the case.
History as it is usually written without the basis of
a general principle or merely as an accumulation of
disconnected facts, state-enactments, or copied docu
ments collected in musty archives, is only very useful
building material, out of which we have to construct
an intelligible and comprehensive system of history.
It is distressing to contemplate what later generations
may do 'with history if details grow at the ratio of the
last twenty or seventy years. Unfortunately, professed
historians, ignorant as they too often are, assert that
“ history is a mere child’s box of letters out of which
�28
Immanuel Kant.
the historian picks what he wants to spell out; ” but
this is the view of a narrow-minded state-paper copyist;
and not of a philosophical historian, whose aim can never
be to glorify individuals or to distort facts according to
the wants of a party or the fashion of a period, but to
look upon humanity as one great whole, and to trace in
its complicated actions, order based on law.
The historical world is as little barred as the ideal
world—both are open; it is our faculty of seeing
blinded by details, it is our mind confused by isolated
facts, that will or cannot comprehend the stern law
that drives man towards his real destiny : the greatest
possible happiness of all united into one common
brotherhood.
TURNBULL AND SPEARS, PRINTERS, EDINBURGH.
�
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Conway Hall Ethical Society
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Immanuel Kant in his relation to modern history: paper read before the Fellows of the Royal Historical Society on the 11th March 1875
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Zerffi, G. G. (Gustavus George)
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Place of publication: London
Collation: 28 p. ; 18 cm.
Notes: From the library of Dr Moncure Conway. Printed by Turnbull and Spears, Edinburgh.
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Thomas Scott
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[1875]
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G5515
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Philosophy
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Conway Tracts
History
Immanuel Kant