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Victorian Blogging
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A collection of digitised nineteenth-century pamphlets from Conway Hall Library & Archives. This includes the Conway Tracts, Moncure Conway's personal pamphlet library; the Morris Tracts, donated to the library by Miss Morris in 1904; the National Secular Society's pamphlet library and others. The Conway Tracts were bound with additional ephemera, such as lecture programmes and handwritten notes.<br /><br />Please note that these digitised pamphlets have been edited to maximise the accuracy of the OCR, ensuring they are text searchable. If you would like to view un-edited, full-colour versions of any of our pamphlets, please email librarian@conwayhall.org.uk.<br /><br /><span><img src="http://www.heritagefund.org.uk/sites/default/files/media/attachments/TNLHLF_Colour_Logo_English_RGB_0_0.jpg" width="238" height="91" alt="TNLHLF_Colour_Logo_English_RGB_0_0.jpg" /></span>
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Conway Hall Library & Archives
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2018
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Conway Hall Ethical Society
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False divinities or, Moses, Christ & Mahomet
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A Foreign Theolologist
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Place of publication: London
Collation: 83, [1] ; p. 22 cm.
Series number: no.7
Notes: Annotations in ink. Donated by Mr Garley. Published anonymously by 'A Foreign Theologist'.
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F. Truelove
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1870
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G5082
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Atheism
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<a href="http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/mark/1.0/"><img src="http://i.creativecommons.org/p/mark/1.0/88x31.png" alt="Public Domain Mark" /></a><span> </span><br /><span>This work (False divinities or, Moses, Christ & Mahomet), identified by </span><a href="https://conwayhallcollections.omeka.net/items/show/www.conwayhall.org.uk"><span>Humanist Library and Archives</span></a><span>, is free of known copyright restrictions.</span>
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English
Atheism
Deism
Jesus Christ
Moses
Muhammad
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■
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V,
Tlut^Js k^w?i> tX-| tvJ<Si>,
“IS IT REASONABLE
TO
WORSHIP GO D?”
VERBATIM REPORT
OF
TWO NIGHTS’ DEBATE AT NOTTINGHAM
BETWEEN
THE REV. R. A. ARMSTRONG
AND
CHARLES BRADLAUGH.
LONDON:
FREETHOUGHT PUBLISHING COMPANY,.
28, Stonecutter Street, E.C.
1878.
I
�LONDON :
PRINTED BY ANNIE BESANT AND CHARLES BRADLAUGH
28, STONECUTTER STREET.
�PREFACE.
I have been invited to prefix a few sentences to this
debate in its published form, and I am glad to avail myself
of the opportunity so courteously accorded.
Many have criticised my conduct in consenting to meet
in public debate one whose teachings, both theological
(or anti-theological) and social, they and I alike regard as.
in many respects of pernicious tendency. My reply is, that
those teachings are influencing large numbers of men and
women; that to denounce them, is simply to intensify their
influence in some quarters; and that they must be met
face to face if their force is to be diminished. I regard oral
public discussion as one of the least efficient methods for
the discovery of truth; but I cannot blind myself to the
fact that it is almost the only method by which what I hold
to be true, can get the ear and the attention of some classes
of the community; and I perceive that if a man can trust
his temper and is also interested in his cause and not in
himself, he may in this way do some good which he can do
in no other. If it be given him to touch one heart or
enlighten one soul, it is a cheap price to pay, that a laugh
may go against him, or even that some good and sincere
persons may think he has acted wrongly.
The debate itself can only touch the edge of subjects so
stupendous as Theism and Worship. But some may be
�IV
PREFACE.
led by it to thought or to study, on which they would not
otherwise have entered.
I select three points in this debate for a further word or
two :
(i.) I said Mr. Bradlaugh could not “ conceive a better
world.” The expression is ambiguous. He and I both con
ceive and strive to promote a better state of things than that
now existing. But we can conceive no better constitution
for a world than that of a world so constituted as to evoke
the effort of mankind to advance its progress and improve
ment. The evil is not in itself good; it is only the
necessary condition of good. The moment you conceive
a world existing from first to last without evil, you conceive
a world destitute of the necessary conditions for the
evolution of noble character; and so, in eliminating the evil,
you eliminate a good which a thousand times outweighs
the evil.
(2.) “ Either,” argues Mr. Bradlaugh, in effect, “ God could
make a world without suffering, or he could not. If he could
and did not, he is not all-good. It he could not, he is not
all-powerful.” The reply is, What do you mean by allpowerful? If you mean having power to reconcile things
in themselves contradictory, we do not hold that God is
all-powerful. But a humanity, from the first enjoying
immunity from suffering, and yet possessed of nobility of
character, is a self-contradictory conception.
(3.) I have ventured upon alleging an Intelligent Cause
of the phenomena of the universe; in spite of the fact that
in several of his writings Mr. Bradlaugh has described
intelligence as implying limitations. But though intelli
gence, as known to us in man, is always hedged within
limits, there is no difficulty in conceiving each and every
limit as removed. In that case the essential conception of
�V
PREFACE.
intelligence remains the same precisely, although the change
of conditions revolutionises its mode of working.
The metaphysical argument for Theism, though I hold
it in the last resort to be unanswerable, can never be the
real basis of personal religion. That must rest on the facts
of consciousness verified by the results in character flowing
from the candid recognition of those facts. It is useless, as
well as unscientific, for the Atheist either to deny or to
ignore those facts. The hopeless task that lies before him,
ere Theism can be overturned, is to prove that experiences
which to many a Theist are more real and more unquestion
able than the deliverances of sight, of hearing, or of touch,
are mere phantasies of the brain.
I addressed the following letter to the Editor of the
National Reformer after the debate.
TO THE EDITOR OF THE “ NATIONAL REFORMER.”
Sir,—Some of those who heard or may read the recent discussion
between Mr. Bradlaugh, and myself may be willing to pursue the
positive argument for Theism and Worship which I adopted—-as distin
guished from and supplementary to the ordinary metaphysical argument
—at greater length than the limits of time permitted me to expound it in
the debate. Will you allow me to recommend to such persons three
works which will specially serve their purpose ? These are—Theodore
Parker’s “Discourse of Matters Pertaining to Religion” (eighteenpence, British and Foreign Unitarian Association, 37, Norfolk Street,
Strand) ; F. W. Newman’s “ Hebrew Theism ” (half-a-crown, Triibner);
and the Rev. Charles Voysey’s “Mystery of Pain, Death, and Sin”
(Williams & Norgate, 1878). I would gladly add to these Professor
Blackie’s “ Natural History of Atheism ”—a book of much intellectual
force—were it not that he indulges too often in a strain of superior
contempt with which I have no sympathy.—I am, &c.,
Richard A. Armstrong.
Nottingham,
Sept, <pth, 1878.
�vi
PREFACE.
I only now further desire to refer the reader to Mr. Brown
low Maitland’s “Theismor Agnosticism” (eighteen-pencer
Christian Knowledge Society, 1878).
Tennyson shall utter. for me my last plea with the
doubter to throw himself upon the bosom of God in
prayer:—
“Speak to him, thou, for he hears, and spirit with spirit can.
meet,—
Closer is he than breathing, and nearer than hands and feet.”
R. A. Armstrong.
Nottingham,
Sept. 23rd, 1878.
�Is it Reasonable to Worship God?”
The first of two nights’ debate in the Co-operative Hall,
Nottingham, between the Rev. R. A. Armstrong and Mr.
Charles Bradlaugh; G. B. Rothera, Esq., in the chair.
The Chairman : Ladies and Gentlemen,—I have had
the pleasure, during the last few weeks, of spending a very
pleasant holiday on the heather-covered mountains of
Scotland. On reaching Edinburgh on my way homeward,
I received a letter from my friend, Mr. Armstrong, inform
ing me of the arrangements for to-night’s debate, and
of the wish that was felt that I should preside. Though a
private communication, yet as it contains the grounds
upon which the request was made, and in part also
those upon which I was induced to comply, I shall
be glad if Mr. Armstrong will kindly give me per
mission to read that letter to you. It is as follows :—“ My Dear Sir,—I have obtained your address from your
son, and you must blame him for enabling me to molest you
with my importunities in the midst of your holiday.
“ Circumstances have led to my receiving an invitation from
the local branch of the National Secular Society, and from Mr.
Bradlaugh, to debate with the latter on the reasonableness of
religious worship. At first strongly disposed to decline, I have
been led, together with the friends whom I have consulted, to
believe that it was my duty to accept the task, and, however
distasteful, I am now in for it.
“ It is to take place at the Co-operative Hall, on two consecu
tive nights, Thursday and Friday, September 5 and 6, and we
are most anxious to secure the services—which I hope will be
chiefly formal—of a competent chairman who will possess the
respect of both parties. My own friends and the Secularists
independently suggested your name, and we all feel that we
should be deeply indebted to you if you would preside over us
on the two nights. My earnest desire is to throw such a tone
into the meetings as shall make them really helpful to genuine
�8
truth-seekers, and I have good ground for believing that manysuch will be present.
■ “ I sincerely hope you will do us all this favour. I do not
know where else to turn for a chairman that will be so acceptable
to all concerned. Your speedy and favourable reply will be very
welcome to yours truly,
R. A. Armstrong.
“Burns Street, Nottingham, Aug. 24, 1878.
“ G. B. Rothera, Esq.”
Now, ladies and gentlemen, on receiving that letter my
first impulse was, I think naturally, to decline, and that
for two reasons—first, I find that as one gets on in life there
is a stronger and stronger disposition to avoid the excite
ment of public meetings, to seek more and more the ease
of one’s own arm-chair, and to enjoy that best of all society,
our books (hear). Beyond this I had real misgivings as to
my ability to fill, as I ought, the duties sought to be put upon
me. Nevertheless, on slight reflection, these difficulties
vanished. I felt that there were occasions, of which this,
probably, was one, when it becomes us to lay aside con
siderations of personal ease and convenience in the hope to
meet the wishes of, and to be useful to, one’s neighbours
and friends. Now, in occupying this position I must not
be considered to identify myself with either the one party
or the other (hear). I may agree with either, or with
neither. I am here, as I believe you are here, interested in
a question of the gravest concern to all of us, as an earnest
inquirer, anxious to learn and not afraid to hear (applause).
My position, I take it, is very much akin to that of the
Speaker of the House of Commons. I have simply to
regulate the order of debate, and to ask at your hands
—what I am sure I shall receive—such orderly and consis
tent behaviour as will become an assembly of English gentle
men. Now,in those who have charged themselves with the
responsibility of this debate we have men of acknowledged
ability and high culture (applause)—men who, I am sure
will know well how to reconcile the duties of courtesy with
the earnestness of debate. In addressing themselves to the
present question, it must, I think, be clearly understood
that the question, as it appears upon the paper, is not to be
narrowed to a simple inquiry whether it is reasonable that
we should worship God. A much wider issue must be
covered by the debate, if it is to satisfy the expectations
of this audience. The question is one, I take, it between
�9
Theism and Atheism. It is not enough to postulate a Deity,
and then ask whether it is reasonable or not to worship him.
What I think we have a right to ask is, tfyat the gentle
man charged with the affirmative of the proposition
shall adduce such evidence as will establish satisfactorily
the conclusion that there is a Deity to worship.
The
position of the Atheist, I take it, is not one of disbelief,
but of simple unbelief.
He does not say that God
is not, but he affirms the lack of evidence for the
position that God is (hear). He does not even say
that there may not be a God. What he does say is that
if there is a God he has failed to manifest himself, either by
the utterance of his voice, in audible revelation, or by the
impression of his hand upon visible nature. I take it, there
fore, and think Mr. Armstrong will be prepared to
accept the position, that it will be incumbent upon him, at
the outset of the discussion, to address himself to a con
sideration of the proofs in favour of the position that there
is a God to worship. If he succeed in this, then, I
think, there will be a very difficult and trying ordeal before
Mr. Bradlaugh to prove that, God, being existent, is not
entitled to the reasonable worship of his creatures (applause).
Pardon me these remarks by way of introduction. Before
calling on Mr. Armstrong to open the debate, I may just say
that, by arrangement between them, Mr. Armstrong, upon
whom the affirmative rests, is to be allowed half-an-hour
to open the discussion; Mr. Bradlaugh half-an-hour in
reply ; that then the next hour will be divided into quarters,
each speaker having a quarter of an hour alternately
(applause). The result of this arrangement will be that
Mr. Armstrong will open the debate to-night, which will
be closed by Mr. Bradlaugh, while to-morrow night Mr.
Bradlaugh will open the debate and Mr. Armstrong will
■close it. This, I think, you will regard as a satisfactory
arrangement, and a liberal one, inasmuch as Mr. Bradlaugh
concedes to Mr. Armstrong the advantage of the last word
(applause).
Mr. Armstrong, who was cordially received, said : Mr.
Chairman and friends—I wish to say two or three words at
the outset of this debate as to its origin. You are many of
you aware that a short time ago Mr. Bradlaugh visited this
town, and gave a lecture in defence of Atheism, from this plat
form, in answer to Professor Max Muller’s Hibbert lectures.
I was led to be present then, and I offered some remarks
�IO
at the close. Mr. Bradlaugh rejoined, and in the course of
his rejoinder threw out, in a courteous manner, a challenge
for me to meet him and discuss these weighty matters at fur
ther length. I thought no more of it then, not conceiving it
to be my duty to take up that challenge. A few days after
wards, however, I received a letter from the Secretary of
the Nottingham branch of the National Secular Society
stating that many persons had been much interested in the
words that fell from me, and that they would consider it an
obligation conferred upon them, and others earnestly in pur
suit of truth, if I consented to meet Mr. Bradlaugh in this
manner. I replied, that for my own part, I was but little
sanguine of any good effects, or a balance of good effects,
resulting from such a meeting; but that the invitation being
couched in such courteous and earnest terms, I would con
sult with friends on whose judgment I placed reliance, before
finally replying. I consulted these friends, and at the same time
thought the matter over further; and I came to the conclusion
that, though it has undoubtedly happened that on too many
occasions theological debates have been the root of bitter
ness and strife, yet, nevertheless, two men really in earnest
about what they have to say, and speaking to persons also
in earnest, who have come neither for amusement nor ex
citement—-I came to the conclusion that a debate, con
ducted with tact and temper on both sides, might (may I
say by the blessing of God ?) conduce rather to good than
to evil (applause). Under these circumstances, I accepted
the challenge. I did so, though, as I said in my letter to
the chairman, it is distasteful to me, because if I make any
thing of this occasion it can only be by exhibiting to you
my inmost heart. We are not going to talk in a superficial
manner—we are not going to bandy compliments, nor, I
hope, exchange rebukes; but, each of us is going to search
his inner consciousness, and try to express to the audience
that which he finds therein. It is, perhaps, more distasteful
to me on this occasion than to Mr. Bradlaugh, since I find,
or believe myself to find, in my inner consciousness certain
facts which Mr. Bradlaugh will no doubt tell you he does
not find in his inner consciousness. These facts are to me
of the most solemn and sacred nature conceivable, and to
expose them before a large and public audience is a thing
very like a sort of martyrdom. If I were not confident
that, however little you may sympathise with what I say,
you will treat it with respect or consideration, I woul
�11
never consent to drag the sacred thoughts of my soul before
you to hold them up as an exhibition (hear). I am to
maintain to-night—not to demonstrate (as you will see
if you look at the bills)—the proposition that it is
reasonable to worship God. Mr. Bradlaugh has not
necessarily to disprove, but to impugn, that proposition.
Now, all I have any hope of doing to-night is this—to
show that it is reasonable for me and for others conscious of
mental phenomena in themselves more or less akin to those
of which I am conscious, to worship God. Would that I
could touch you with the beauty and the sweetness
of this belief—would that I could hold up before you, in all
its glory and sublimity, in all its strength and holiness, the
beauty and the sweetness of the worship of God. Could
I succeed in doing so, I should take your imaginations
captive. I think I should get the suffrage of your reason.
It is as though, sir, to-night, I had been called upon to
prove that my dearest friend is worthy to be loved—ay,
•even that my dearest friend exists; for, if God is aught to
us, he is our dearest, nearest friend—present when all
others are taken from us, a sure refuge in every moment of
temptation and of woe ; the very highest and most intimate
reality of which the mind can conceive—the sum and sub
stance of all existence. Well, now, how do I know this
God ? Who is this God of whom I speak ? Let me try to
tell you how it seems to me that I have made acquaintance
with him. I find that at certain moments of my life there
is that which I can best describe aS a voice—though it is a
metaphor—addressed to me, influencing largely my conduct.
I find that there are in me, as in all men, strong instincts,
strong desires, strong self-interests—some lower, some
higher, some less worthy, some more worthy, than others.
I find that but for this voice of which I speak I should be
entirely swayed thereby, as, so far as I can see, the brutes
of the field and the forest are swayed thereby. But I find
that sometimes, at moments when these instincts are the
very strongest within me, and when I am about to throw
myself into their realisation and give them expression in
■fact—I find, sometimes, at these moments that there comes
to me somewhat which, so far as my consciousness delivers,
is not myself. There comes to me somewhat stopping me
from indulging these instincts and bidding me to curb them.
Ifindatothertimesthatmyinstinctsof self-preservation, of self
regard, of pleasure-loving, and so forth—my appetites—
�12
would lead me to hold back from a certain course of action.
So far as I can judge, looking into my own mind, myself is
against that course of action. It appears to my reasoning
powers and inclinations that I had better keep out of it.
But there comes now somewhat which comes from outside,,
and which is no part of myself, which says, “ Go and do it.”
That was so when I received the invitation to this debate.
Again, I find that on certain occasions—alas! that I should
have to say it—I have defied this monitor, I have done that
which it told me not to do, or not done that which it bade
me to do. I find then that there enter into me from some
where—I know not from whence—pangs of remorse keener
than ever came from any personal sorrow, more biting than
ever came from any physical pain. There have been times,
however—let me thank God I can say so !—when I have
obeyed this voice, followed its dictates in spite of all myself
seeming to drag me from it; and my experience is that on
these occasions there has entered my soul, from whence I
cannot tell you, a peace surpassing that given us in any
other circumstances—a peace in the light of which the
sorrows that at other times might cut me to the heart seem
light and small, a peace in the beauty and holiness of which
these'sorrows seem wonderfully diminished. I will tell you what
I call the source of that voice which I fancy speaks to me
in that fourfold manner. I call the source of that voice
“ God,” and that is the first thing I mean by God. I call the
source of all these monitions and admonitions, these ex
hortations and rebukes, this voice of reproval and of
approval, the voice of God; because I must give it some
name, and that seems to me the simplest and the truest name
I can give it. I might, perhaps, be inclined to doubt
whether all this was not fancy (though I hardly think I
should) if, so far as I could gather, it were an unique experi
ence of my own; but I find that it is not so. I find that
this voice is recognised by every true man and woman I
meet. They may obey it or not, but they recognise it, and
allow that it is there. I behold the picture by Millais
of the day before the awful massacre of St. Bartho
lomew. I see the maiden leaning on her lover’s bosom
whilst he looks down upon her with looks of love and
tenderness, and she strives to tie around his arm a scarf.
She knows of the impending massacre, that all Protestants
are to be slaughtered, and she would fain put this badge
upon his arm as a secret signal to preserve him from the
�13
sword. Does he accept this method of escape ? Although
his inclination is to remain with his beloved, the strength of
his right hand is given to tear the badge from his arm, and
he faces death, not with joy, but with an exceeding bitter
sorrow for the moment—he faces death in simple loyalty
and obedience to the voice which has spoken to his heart.
That is an experience which you will all recognise—one
which, in less or in greater force, we have all had. What
ever explanation may be given—and, doubtless, Mr. Brad’
laugh has an explanation of his own—this voice of con
science is to me one of the primary evidences of the exist
ence of God. Nay, I will not call it an evidence; it
is God speaking to me (applause). This conscience
has been described by Mr. Voysey, in his recentlypublished sermons in refutation of Atheism, as fol
lows : “ The collision is so complete between the higher
voice and the impelling instinct, that one can only feel that
the two are radically different in nature, and. must have had
a different source. . . .To have the power of doing
intentionally what one shrinks from doing, and to
deny one’s self the pleasure which is so fascinating,
and which one longs to do, is to prove the immense superi
ority of our inner selves over the visible universe.”
To have the power, as that man, that Huguenot, must have
had it, to deny one’s self the pleasure which is so fascinating,
and for which one longs, is to prove the immense superiority
of our inner selves when hearing the voice of God over the
visible universe. Again, speaking of conscience, Voysey says :
“The conscience which makes us mortify our flesh with its
affections and lusts, and which often mars our happiness and
embitters our pleasure, upbraids us with reproaches and
stings us with remorse, that voice which hushes our cry for
happiness, which will not endure a single selfish plea, but
demands unquestioning obedience, and bids us fall down in
the very dust before the Majesty of Duty—we all, in our
secret hearts, revere this power, whether or not we obey it
as we should. At least, we pay to it the homage of our inmost
souls, and feel how great and grand it is to be its slave.”
Now, sir, I desire to pass on to another method, by which it
seems to me that I apprehend this being. Having made the
acquaintance with this awful voice—and the philosopher
Kant said two things filled him with awe, the starry
heavens and the moral nature in man—I pass on to another
matter. Behold the starry heaven itself. I know not how
�14
it is with you, but I will tell you my experience—and we are
told by scientific men that we must bring everything to the test
of experience. Sometimes when I have been out oftemper—as I
am sometimes, like other people—sometimes, when I have been
much distracted with cares, when troubles and pains have
been thick upon me, it falls to my lot to go out beneath the
starry heaven. What is it that I experience in my soul ? I
go through no process of metaphysical reasoning, I do not
argue with myself, but I simply feel that there is a Divine
presence there, in whose hand are all these stars and all
these worlds—a great voice singing, “ I am strong and I am
good, and you are safe nestling in my hand.” I know not
if that corresponds with the experience of all here,
but that it corresponds with the experience of many, I
feel sure ; and let me ask such not to drive away these
holy feelings, but to trust them as the assurance which
God gives of his presence. It may be that in those lakes
and mountains which you, sir, have seen of late, you
may have heard a message whispering to your soul of a
peace beyond the peace of earth—of a presence before
which all things are well. In others, not so sensitive per
haps to the beauties of natural scenery, such experience
comes in the tones of music—in some grand symphony or
some sweet song; and they feel lifted away from the things
of earth,' and they feel lifted into some presence in which it
is a joy to be, and which fills their soul with peace. That
presence I call, having no other name for it, the presence of
God. Observe, that in this I am not philosophising about
the cause—I am not saying that God is the cause and so
on; I am only relating the experience of my consciousness,
reported to you as faithfully and truly as I can read it. Let
me read what Professor Blackie wrote the other day:
“ Many things can be known only by being felt, all vital
forces are fundamentally unknowable.” And, says Francis
Newman, that arch-heretic : “ The astronomer is ever aware
of the presence of gravitation and the electrician sees all
things pervaded by electricity—powers descried by the mind,
unwitnessed by any sense, long unknown to the wise, still
unknown or undiscerned by the vulgar j yet this percep
tion of things hidden is not esteemed cloudy.” Now,
having made some acquaintance with this awful, inscrutable
something, to which I venture to give the name of God, I
venture to lift up to it the voice of my soul, and strive
to throw myself towards that Being. And what is my
�i5
experience ? Let us go to experience again: I find
when my mind is bewildered and in doubt, when it
is all involved with difficulties, that somehow, when I
address that Being, there comes to my soul . “ clear
shining,” and I see things plainer and more beautiful than
before. I appeal to him in pain and sorrow—not with the
coward’s prayer, but simply asking that I may feel his pre
sence, to endure it j and the pain and sorrow have become
light on the instant assurance that God is there to comfort
and console. I pray to him in weakness, when my strength
fails, and what is the result? That a new manhood
comes to me, and I feel that wondrous power which
over-arches all the worlds, and I feel that I have in me
also somewhat of his strength. I appeal to him, last of all,
in temptation, when the wrong deed presses closely on my
inclinations, and what do I find ? That strength is given
me to stand up against temptation, and he answers
according to the immemorial prayer of Christendom:
deliver us from temptation, This is experience, or I fancy
it is. It is not theory. Again, I am in gladness. When
is my gladness greatest, and when is it richest? Why,
when it flows up and out, in thankfulness and adoration, to
the source to which I trace it. Then my gladness seems to
receive an influence which lifts it up above. No gladness
is the true gladness without that. Let me conclude this
half-hour by reading a very short extract from Professor
Newman. Speaking of the instincts of mankind, he says:—
And the instinct of Religion is the noblest of them all,
The bravest, the most enduring, the most fruitful in mighty
deeds,
The source of earliest grandeur, unitress of scattered tribes ;
Even in the crudeness of its infancy,when unpurified by science,
Yet teeming with civilisation, with statesmanship, with letters.
Mistress of all high art, and parent of glorious martyrs.
And if from it have come wars, and bigotries, and cruelties,
Through infantine hot-headedness and unripeness of mind,
We take your aid, O Sceptics ! to purge it from all such evils,
And kindly honour we pay to you for your battles against super
stition ;
Yet the very evils ye deplore, prove Religion’s mighty energy,
And the grasp deeply seated which she has within human
hearts.”
(Loud applause.)
Mr. Bradlaugh : Thanking you, sir, for acceding to the
request which I would have gladly joined in had I had any
�right of acquaintance to entitle me to make it; thanking you
for undertaking what is always a troublesome duty, however
well a debate may be conducted, of presiding over a dis
cussion, permit me to say one word only as to the opening
which fell from your lips. There is only one phrase in that
which I desire to note, so as to save myself from the possi
bility of misapprehension. I quite agree with the view you
put of the position the Atheist takes, except that if Dualism
be affirmed, if more than Monism be affirmed, if more than
one existence be affirmed, and if it be the beyond of that one
existence which is called God, then the Atheist does not
say there may be one, but says there cannot be one; and
that is the only distinction I wish to put as against the very
kind words with which you introduced the speakers this
evening The question for our debate is : “ Is it reasonable
to worship God ?” and to determine this question it is
necessary to define the words “worship” and “God,”and next
to decide whether belief in God is reasonable or unreason
able ; and, secondly, whether worship is, under any, and
if any, what,. circumstances, reasonable or unreasonable.
And I am afraid I must here except that, in the speech to
which I have just listened, and which, from its tone and
kindly style, is perfectly unexceptionable, there is not one
word at present—it may possibly come later on—which may
fairly be taken as approaching a definition either of the word
“ God ” or the word “ worship. ” By worship I mean act of rever
ence, respect, adoration, homage, offered to some person.
According to this definition, worship cannot be offered to the
impersonal, and according to this definition it would be
unreasonable to advocate worship to be offered to the im
personal. Under the term “worship” I include prayer—which
is, evidently, from the opening, also included in the term
“worship” by the rev. gentleman who maintains the opposite
position to myself—praise, sacrifice, offerings, solemn ser
vices, adoration, personal prostration. For the word “God,”
not having a definition of my own, I take—not having yet
gathered, in what has fallen from Mr. Armstrong, enough to
enable me to say that I understand what he means by it—I
take the definition of “ God” given in Professor Flint’s Baird
lectures ; not meaning by that that Mr. Armstrong is bound
by that definition, but asking him to be kind enough to note
where he thinks that definition is incorrect, and to kindly tell
me so, for my guidance in the latter portions of the debate.
By “ God,” for the purpose of this debate, I shall mean a self-
�i7
existent, eternal being, infinite in power and in wisdom, and
perfect in holiness and goodness ; the maker of heaven
and earth. And by “self-existent" I mean, that, the con
ception of which does not require the conception of
antecedent to it. For example, this glass is phenomenal,
conceived, as all phenomena must be conceived, by the
characteristics or qualities which enable you to think
and identify it in your mind, but which cannot be con
ceived except as that of which there is possible ante
cedent and consequent, and which, therefore, cannot be
considered as self-existent according to my definition. By
“eternal”and by “infinite” I only mean illimitable, indefinite,
tome—applying the term “eternal ” to duration, and the word
“ infinite ” to extension. I take Professor Flint, or whoever
may hold the definition I have given of God, by “ maker ”
to mean originator; and then I am in the difficulty that the
word “ creator,” in the sense of origin, is, to me, a word
without meaning. I only know creation as change ; origin
of phenomena, not of existence; origin of condition, not
origin of substance. The words “ creation ” and “ de
struction ” are both words which have no other
meaning to my mind than the meaning of change.
I will now try to address myself to some of the argu
ments that were put forward by Mr. Armstrong. He
said that to him the notion of entering into this debate was
distasteful to him, and he addressed somewhat of an in
quiry as to my own feeling on the matter. No ! the dis
cussion of no one subject more than any other is distasteful
to me, unless it be of a personal character, in which it might
involve my having to say things upon which I should not like
to mislead and upon which it would be painful to me to
state the facts. Then a discussion would be distasteful to
me; but such a discussion as this is not any more distaste
ful to me than the discussion of an astronomical or geolo
gical problem; and I will urge to those who go even further
and say, that not only is such a matter distasteful, but that the
discussion of Theism is really immoral, to such I would read
from a recent volume entitled “ A Candid Examination of
Theism”:—“If there is no God, where can be the harm
in our examining the spurious evidence of his existence ?
If there is a God,- surely our first duty towards him must
be to exert to our utmost, in our attempts to find him, the
most noble faculty with which he has endowed us—as care
fully to investigate the evidence which he has seen fit to
�furnish of his own existence, as we investigate the evidence
of inferior things in his dependent creation. To say that
there is one rule or method for ascertaining truth in the
latter case which it is not legitimate to apply in the former
case, is merely a covert way of saying that the Deity—if
he exists—has not supplied us with rational evidence of
his existence.” Now, that is the position I am going to
put to you; and there ought to be nothing distasteful
to anyone in proving most thoroughly the whole of the
evidence upon which his supposed belief in God’s existence
rests. The grounds of his belief ought to be clear to him
self, or they are no sufficient grounds for his belief, even to
himself. If they are clear to himself they ought to be
clearly stateable to others; because, if not, they lie under
the suspicion of not being clear to himself. That which is
sufficient to him to convince him, is either capable of being
clearly stated—although it may not carry conviction to
another—or it is not. If it is not capable of being clearly
stated, I would suggest it is because it does not clearly exist
in his own mind. Now Mr. Armstrong says that he feels as if
called upon to prove that his dearest friend ought to be
loved, as if called upon to prove that his dearest friend
exists. He spoke of God as being to him his dearest
friend, and he followed that with some words as to which I am
not quite sure whether he intended to use them in the sense in
which they fell upon my ears. He described God as “ the
sum and substance of all existence.” I do not want to
make any verbal trick, and if I am putting more on Mr.
Armstrong than he meant to convey I should like to be put
right when he rises again, and I will ask him if he considers
God to be the sum and substance of all existing; and, if
he does not, I will ask him in what respect he distinguishes
between God, in his mind, and the sum and substance of
all existence ; because clearly, when he used those words he
had some meaning in his mind, and I should like to know
these two things : First, do you identify God in your mind
with the sum and substance of all existence ? If not, in
what respects do you distinguish God in your mind from
the sum and substance of all existence ? If you say that
you identify God with the sum and substance of all exist
ence, then I ask, are we included in that, sum and substance
of all existence ? And if we are included in that sum and
substance of all existence, is it reasonable for one phe
nomenon or for a number of phenomena, to offer worship
�T9
to any of, and to how much of, what remains ? Then he
addressed himself to the very old argument, which he put
so beautifully, when he said : “How do I know God?” and
launched into what is known as the argument from conscience,
an argument very fully stated by Professor Flint in the
Baird lectures to which I have referred. Mr. Armstrong
said, and here I will take a little exception; he said : “ In
me, as in all men here, are strong instincts; in me, as in all
men, there are strong desires; in me, as in all men, there is
a voice.” That is just the blunder; that is not true. I do
not mean that in any sort of disrespectful sense. If you
take a volume like Topinard’s “ Anthropology ” you find
that men’s desires, men’s emotions, and men’s instincts all
vary with race, all vary with locality, with type, all vary with
what Buckle called “Food, climate, soil, and life surround
ings and I ask, if there be this variance in individuals of
different races, nay, more, if there be this variance in in
dividuals of the same race at the same moment, and if the
members of the same race vary in different places and ages,
as to their instincts, desires, and emotions, I ask you whether
there has been the same variation in the source of it? You
say the source is God, and if so, how can a variable source
be a reliable object of worship ? Then let us see a little
more. “ I do not desire to do something, but my monitor
says ‘ Do ” or the reverse; and thus voice is the evidence
of Deity. I should have been obliged if Mr. Armstrong
had defined exactly what it was he meant by conscience,
because here we are going terribly to disagree. I am going
to deny the existence of conscience altogether, except as a
result of development upon organisation, including in that,
transmitted predisposition of ability to possible thought or
action. But if that be so, what becomes of this “ still small
voice,” of those desires and instincts? The mere fact
that the mother may have worked in a cotton-mill while
childbearing and have had bad food, or that the father may
have beaten her—his brutality may result in the awakening
of a desire and instinct exactly the opposite of that which Mr.
Armstrong has, and the organisation fitted for repeating
which may be handed down through generations. I stood
this morning for other purposes at the doors of Coldbath
fields Prison. One man who came out gave a sort of shrill
whistle and plunged into the crowd with a defiant and a
mocking air, showing that his conscience, his monitor, said
nothing to him except that he was glad he was outside, and
�20
ready to war with the world again (applause). I am not
wishing to press this view in any fashion unkindly or unfairly; '
I am only wanting to put the thing as it appears to me. I
want to.know: “ Does Mr. Armstrong contend that there is a
faculty identical in every human being which he calls con
science, which does decide for each human being, and
always decides, in the same manner, what is right and what
is wrong ? Or does he mean that this ‘ monitor,’ as he calls
it, decides differently in different men and in different
countries ? And if ‘ yes,’ is the source different in each case
where there is a different expression ? And if ‘ yes,’ is it
justifiable and reasonable to offer worship to an uncertain
source, or to a source which speaks with a different voice, or
to a source which is only one of a number, and of which you
do not know how far its limit extends, and where its juris
diction begins or ends ? ” Let us follow this out a little
more. We have not only to define conscience, but we have
also to define right and wrong, and I did not hear Mr. Arm
strong do that. I did hear him say that when he had done
something in opposition to his monitor he felt remorse. I
did hear him say there was struggling between himself and
his monitor, and here I had another difficulty. What is the
himself that struggles, as distinguished in his mind from the
monitor that he struggles against ? If the struggle is a
mental one, what is mind struggling against ? and if it is not,
how does Mr. Armstrong explain it ? Let us, if you please,
go to right and wrong. By moral I mean useful. I mean
that that is right which tends to the greatest happiness of the
greatest number, with the least injury to any. I am only
following Jeremy Bentham. That is my definition of right.
Many matters which have been held to come within that
definition in one age have been found in another age not to
come within it, and the great march of civilisation is that
from day to day it instructs us in what is useful. I submit
that instead of adoring the source of contradictory verdicts
it is more reasonable to find out for ourselves some rule we
can apply. For example, here Mr. Armstrong’s conscience
would not raise any particular objection to his taking animal
food, unless he happens to be a vegetarian, and then, I am
sure, he would conscientiously carry it out; but the majority
of people’s consciences in England would raise no great
objection to taking animal food. Yet in China and in
Hindustan hundreds of thousands of human beings have
died because vegetable food was not there for them, and
«
�21
their consciences made them prefer death to tasting
animal food' I want to know whether the conscience is
from the same source here as in Hindustan, and I want to
know, if that is so, which people are justified in worshipping
the source ? Take the case of murder. Mr. Armstrong’s
conscience would clearly tell him that it was wrong to murder
me. And yet there are many people in this country who
would not go to that extent. But I am going to take a
stronger illustration. There are a number of people who
think it perfectly right to bless the flags of a regiment, and to
pray to the God whom Mr. Armstrong asks me to worship,
that a particular regiment, whose flags are blessed, may kill
the people of some other particular regiment as rapidly as
possible. This shows that there are confusions of mind as
to what is meant by murder, and a like confusion exists on
a number of other matters on which the monitor is
misrepresenting.
And then Mr. Armstrong has said^
“ I mean by God the source of admonition, rebukes,
remorse, trouble,” and he says: “ It is a conscience-voice
which is recognised by every true man and woman.”
I am sure he would not wish to put any position
stronger than it should be put, and he put it, too, that this
was the feature in which man differed from the brutes. I
am inclined to tell him that not only there is not that recog
nition to-day amongst the physiological and psychological
teachers, but that we have a number of. men whose re
searches have been collected for us, who show us that what
you call the “ still small voice,” this monitor, these desires,
instincts, emotions, are to be found—varied, it is true
—right through the whole scale of animal life. Whereever there is a nervous encephalic apparatus sufficient
you have—except in the fact of language—wider distinc
tion between the highest order of human race and the
lowest, than you have between the lowest order of human
beings and those whom you are pleased to call brutes. I
will now only take the illustration of the eve of St. Bartho
lomew, which is fatal to the argument of Mr. Armstrong.
He gave the Protestant lover—a very fine character—reject
ing the symbolic bandage, and preferring to die for his faithy
or, .as Mr. Armstrong put it, “ to face death in simple
loyalty rather than play the hypocrite, and the source of that
feeling was God.” Was that the source of the feeling
which led Bruno to be burnt at the stake as if for Atheism,
or for Vanini, burnt for Atheism ; or for Lescynski, burnt
�for Atheism; or for Mrs. Besant, robbed of her child because
of her avowal of Atheism (hisses) ? You are hissing ; wait
whilst I answer. Is the source of your hissing, God ? Then
what a cowardly and weak thing, and little fitted for worship
must be that source (applause). I desire to deal with this
subject in all gravity, in all sincerity, in all kindness, but I
plead for a cause—weakly, it is true—for which great and
brave men and women have died, and I will permit no insult
to it in my presence—(cheers)—knowingly I will pass none.
I believe my antagonist to meet me loyally, honourably, and
honestly, and I believe him to meet me earnestly and
sincerely. I believe he has no desire to wound my feel
ings, and I 'do not wish to wound his ; and I ask you, the
jury here, to try to follow the same example set by him
in this debate (cheers).
Mr. Armstrong, being received with cheers, said:
It is very difficult indeed to think on these deep
problems under consideration with excitement amongst
the audience present, therefore I hope that you will be as
quiet as you can. I will begin at once with a confession
—and this, at any rate, will be a testimony of my candour—
by saying that the moment I had spoken certain words in
my opening speech I thought: “'Mr. Bradlaugh will have
me there;” and he had me (laughter). The words
were those in which I spoke of God as the sum and
substance of all existence. Now, to me, God is a much
simpler word than the phrase, “ sum and substance of all
existence.” Whether God be the “ sum and substance of
all existence ” I know not, for those words convey to me
less clear meaning than the word “God” conveys to me. The
source, moreover, of my immediate knowledge of God is
such that it can make no asseverations whatever upon deep
questions of metaphysics, as to what the “ sum and sub
stance of all existence” may consist. Mr. Bradlaugh has taken
a definition of God from Professor Flint. He is a Scotchman,
and Scotchmen are very fond of definitions (a laugh). Very
often, too, their definitions obscure their subject-matter, and
it is far harder to get any proper significance from them than
in the thing which they intended to define. I am
utterly incapable of saying whether that definition of Pro
fessor Flint’s is an accurate definition of God or not. What I
mean by “God,” and perhaps Mr. Bradlaugh will take it as the
best definition I can here give, is the source, whatever it be, of
this metaphorical voice—of these intimations or monitions,
�23
that come to me in certain experiences which I have. Mr.
Bradlaugh, of course, devoted much time to answering Pro
fessor Flint. He asked whether God was the source of that
loyalty with which the Atheists he mentioned went to the
stake, and’I say from the bottom of my heart, that he was. God
knows the Atheist though the Atheist knows not him. God
is the source of loyalty of heart, in whomsoever it may be.
If others are led to propound propositions which I believe
to be false, and if they dispute other propositions which I
believe to be true, do you think that God is going to judge
them for that, so long as they have been true and faithful to
their own reasoning powers (applause) ? Mr. Bradlaugh
noticed the phrase which fell from me, about a discussion
like this being distasteful to me. I did not say that the
matter under discussion was distasteful to me. I did not say
that a discussion under other conditions would be distasteful
to me. I did not say that it was at all distasteful to me to
search the grounds of my own belief, for my own belief
would be poor indeed were not such search my constant
practice (hear, hear). Mr. Bradlaugh laid great stress,
during the greater part of his speech, upon what
appear to be, in different races and in different
climes, the different and contradictory deliverances of
conscience. That difficulty is one which has been
felt by many persons, and dealt with, well and ill, by
various writers. The difficulty is one of importance, and it
arises, perhaps, from the word “ conscience ” being used in
various different senses. My use of the word “ conscience ” is
simply as being that voice of God (as I still call it) which says,
“Do the right; don’t do the wrong.” It does not in anyway say
what is right or what is wrong. That which I call the right,
like so much of our manhood, is the gradual development
and evolution of history, and it is largely dependent, as
Mr. Bradlaugh, says, upon climate and other external sur
roundings. We have to reason about what is right and wrong.
We must have gradual education of the individual and
of the race to get a clearer and more worthy conception of
the right and wrong ; and all I claim for conscience is that
the man, having resolved in his own mind what is right and
what is wrong,this conscience says, “Do the right,and do not
the wrong.” Therefore, instates of barbarous society, where
misled reason has induced persons to think certain things
were right which we look upon as crimes, still the voice of
conscience must necessarily tell them to do the right. The
�24
thing is right to the individual if he thinks it right. It may
be a terrible mistake of his—it may be a terrible mistake to
believe or teach certain things; nevertheless, the voice of
conscience says, “ Do the rightit does not define what
the right is. That is one of the things which God leaves to
be developed in humanity by slow degrees. Thank God, we
see that the idea of the right and the wrong is purifying—is
clarifying in the course of history. The conception of what
is right and what is wrong is better now than it was a
hundred years ago; the conception of what is right
and what is wrong is better still than it was a thou
sand years ago.
Many of the things then considered
laudable are now considered base; and many of the things
then considered base are now considered laudable. This
voice of which I speak, however, like all other voices, may
not be equally perceived at all times. Supposing that you
were at school, and a certain bell rang at six o’clock every
morning. If you accustom yourself to rising when the bell
rings, you will naturally enough go on hearing it; but if you
get into the habit of disregarding it, and turning over on the
other side for another nap, the bell may sound loudly but
you will cease to hear it. So it is, I take it, with the voice
of God, which ever speaks—which ever pleads—but against
which man may deafen himself. He may make himself so
dull of understanding that he may not hear it clearly. Not
only the individual man’s own obstinacy may make
him dull of hearing, but it must be conceded that this
dulness of hearing may descend to him from long
generations of those from whom he proceeds. It may
be a part of his inheritance. But it does not follow that
this voice does not exist, and that it does not still plead with
him if he had the ear to hear it. No man is so lost but that
if he strives to hear, that voice will become to him clearer and
more clear. I ask you here whether you find any difficulty
in deciding what, to you, is right or wrong? Mr. Bradlaugh
is very fond of definitions. The words “right’’and “wrong’’are
so simple that any definition of them would only obscure
them. I know, andyou know, what you m ean by right and wrong.
If I say of a thing, “ That is not right, don’t do it,” you know
what I mean. Can I speak in any plainer way than to say
of a thing, “ That is not right ” ? If there is no better way
of explaining what you mean than this—if there is no plainer
way—it is best not to attempt to define the word, because
the definition would only tend to obscure it. Not being
4
>
�25
much accustomed to debates of this description, much of
what I desired to say in the first half-hour was not said. I
am told that all this experience which I have been trying
to relate to you is fancy, and I am asked to prove that there
is some being who can be imagined to be this God whom I
believe I hear speaking to me. I might ask : “ Is it not
enough that not only do I think I hear this voice, but that
so many hundreds and thousands of the great and good
have also thought so ? Is it not enough that many of the
great reformers, many of the great leaders in the paths of
righteousness and mercy, in this England of ours, tell us that
they hear this voice ? You must, if you deny it, either think
they lie or that they are deluded. When Newman, Voysey,
Theodore Parker—the glorious abolitionist of America—
say that it is their most intimate experience, it is somewhat
shallow to assert that there is nothing in it. I am not one
of those who think that the existence of a God can be
proved to the understanding of every one in a large audience
on a priori grounds. At the same time the balance of
probability on a priori grounds seems to be, to me, strongly
in favour of Theism. I find that there is, in my own.
mental constitution, a demand for cause of some kind for
every phenomenon. I want to know what has led to thephenomenon, and I find a good many other people are apt to
inquire in the like direction. Even very little children,
before they are sophisticated by us teachers and parsons,
want to be informed as to the causes of things. Another
point — I cannot help believing that all cause must beintelligent. Yes, I knew that would go down in Mr. Brad
laugh’s notes; but I say again, I cannot conceive of any
cause which is not intelligent in some sort of way (applause).
Mr. Brad laugh : There are two things which are evidently
quite certain so far as my opponent is concerned; one is that
we shall have a good-tempered debate, and the other that we
shall have a candid debate. Mr. Armstrong has said frankly,
with reference to the definition of God, that he is perfectly in
capable of saying whether the definition of Professor Flint is
correct or not, and he has, I think I may say, complained that
I am too fond of definitions. Will he permit me on this to read
him an extract from Professor Max Muller’s recent lecture :
“ It was, I think, a very good old custom never to enter
upon the discussion of any scientific problem without giving,
beforehand definitions of the principal terms that had to be
employed. A book on logic or grammar generally opened
�with the question, What is logic? What is grammar ? No
one would write on minerals without first explaining what he
meant by a mineral, or on art, without defining, as well as
he might, his idea of art. No doubt it was often as trouble
some for the author to give such preliminary definitions as
it seemed useless to the reader, who was generally quite
incapable in the beginning of appreciating their full value.
Thus it happened that the rule of giving verbal definitions
came to be looked upon after a time as useless and obsolete.
Some authors actually took credit for no longer giving these
definitions, and it soon became the fashion to say that the
only true and complete definition of what was meant by
logic or grammar, by law or religion, was contained in the
books themselves which treated of these subjects. But
what has been the result ? Endless misunderstandings and
controversies which might have been avoided in many cases
if both sides had clearly defined what they did and what
they did not understand by certain words.” I will show you
presently where this need of accurate definition comes so
very strongly. Mr. Armstrong is quite clear that he knows
what right means ; he is also quite clear that you know
what he means. That may be true, but it also may not, and
I will show you the difficulty.
Suppose there were a
thorough disciple, say of some bishop or church, who thought
it right to put to death a man holding my opinions. That
man would think the capital punishment for heresy right,
Mr. Armstrong would not. That man’s conscience would
decide that it was right, Mr. Armstrong’s would decide that
it was not. What is the use of saying you both know what
is right ? The word right is a word by which you label
certain things, thoughts, and actions, the rightness of which
you have decided on some grounds known only to yourselves.
It may be they are pleasant to you or disagreeable to your
antagonist. I, in defining morality, gave you my reason for
labelling the thing with the name “right.” Mr. Armstrong has
given you no reason whatever. Mr. Armstrong says that
conscience is the voice of God which says : “ Do that which
is right, don’t do that which is wrong.” Yet the divine voice
does not tell you what is right and what is wrong. Hence
that conscience talking to the cannibal: “ It is right to eat
that man, he’s tender; it’s wrong to eat that man, he’s
tough ”—(laughter)—and the voice of God says : “eat the
tender men because it is right; don’t eat the tough men
because it is wrong.” I ask how that illustration is to be
�27
dealt with? If the voice does not in any way enable you to
determine the character of the act, then it simply means
that what you call the voice of God asks you to continue
committing every error which has been bequeathed you
from past times as right, and to avoid every good thing
because in past times it has been condemned and is yet con
demned as wrong. If that is to be the conclusion, then
I say that the voice of God is not a voice to be worshipped,
and that it is not reasonable to worship such a voice
and taking that to be the definition I submit that upon
that a negative answer must be given in this debate.
Mr. Armstrong very frankly and candidly says that the
conception of what is right and wrong is being cleared
and purified ‘ day by day. That is, the conception now is
different to what it was one hundred years ago, and better
still than it was a thousand years ago; but the voice of
God, a thousand years ago, told the Armstrong and Brad
laugh then living, to do that which conscience said to them
was right, and which the conscience to-day says is wrong.
Was God governed by the mis-education, the mis-informa
tion, and the mis-apprehension of the time ? If the God
was outside the ignorance of the day, why did he not set the
people right ? Was he powerless to do it ? In which case,
how do you make out that he is God ? Or had he never the
willingness to do it ? In which case how do you make out
that he was God good ? And if he preferred to leave them
in blindness, how do you reconcile that? Then we are told
the voice is not always clear, but that you may make it more
clear by a habit of obedience. That is so I suppose. And you
may transmit the predisposition to the habit of galloping tohorses on this side the ocean, the predisposition to the
habit of trotting to horses on the other side the ocean;' tothinking MahommedanisminTurkey,and to thinking another
“ ism ” in England, and some other “ism” in Hindustan.
You do not transmit the actual thought any more than you
transmit the actual gallop or trot, but you transmit the pre
disposition, given the appropriate surroundings to reproduce
any action physical or mental. And the source of this is
God, is it ? I vow I do not understand how the Theist is to
meet the contradiction thus involved. Then, Mr. Arm
strong says that when he uses the word “ right,” he defies
anyone to make it plainer. Let us see what that means :
I forge a cheque; Mr. Armstrong says that’s wrong. Why?
Oh ! it is a dishonest and dishonourable thing, it tends to
�28
injure, and so on. But let us see whether you are always
quite clear about these things ? When you are annexing a
country, for example; praying to your God that you may
annex successfully, and that he will protect you when you
have annexed, does not your conscience run away with you,
or does not God mislead you in some of these things ? Is
it not true that the moment you get outside the definition
of the word “ right,” and the moment you say : “ I have a
standard of right which I will not tell you, because nothing
I tell you will make it clear ” you are launched at once into
a heap of absurdities and contradictions ? You think it is
right to have one wife, the Turk thinks it right to have two.
How are you to determine between them ? It only means,
that one of you has labelled bigamy “ right ” and the other
has labelled it “ wrong.” You must have some kind of ex
planation to justify what you are talking about it. We had
an argument offered by Mr. Armstrong which, if it meant
anything, meant that the voice of the majority should pre
vail. Mr. Armstrong said, that it was not only his experience
but that of thousands of others. Does he mean to tell me
that problems of this kind are to be determined by an un
trained majority, or by the verdict of a skilled minority ?
If by a majority, I have something to say to him, and if by
the skilled minority, how are you to select them ? In his
first speech, which I did not quite finish replying to, we
were told that God’s peace and beauty were apprehended in
lakes and mountains. But I have seen one lake—-Michigan—
the reverse of peace and beauty; I have seen little vessels
knocked about by the waves, and dashed to pieces ; and I
have seen Mount Vesuvius when it has been the
very opposite of calm and beautiful, and I have
heard of the houses at Torre del Grecco—though I
have never seen it—being burned in the night by the fiery
lava stream. Where is the peace and beauty of that scene ?
You can take peace. Given a lake, and I can show you a
tornado. Given a mountain and I can give you Vesuvius
with the fiery stream burning the huts of the fishers on the
slope of Torre del Grecco. Did God do this ? Did God
run the two vessels into one another on the Thames and
have those hundreds of people drowned? If you take
credit for the beauty you must also take debit for the
pain and misery (applause). Well, then, I am told that re
ligion is the noblest of all instincts. Max Muller tells us—
whether that be true or not, as Francis Newman puts it—that
�29
religion is a word about which people never have agreed in
any age of the world; about which there have been more
quarrels than about any other word, and about which people
have done more mischief than about any other word; and
I will ask our friend to explain, if it be the noblest of all
instincts, how is it that people have racked each other, and
beheaded each other, and tortured each other by, or in the
name of, this religion ? We are told, and I am thankful to
hear it, that we sceptics have purged it of a great deal of
mischief, and we hope to do more in that way as we go on
(applause). And here—and I want to speak with as much
reverence as I can on the subject of prayer, and it is ex
tremely difficult to touch upon it without giving my oppo
nent pain—so I will deal with it as a general, and not a
personal question. Mr. Armstrong said, after speaking of
how he prayed against temptation : “ He answered me as he
has answered the immemorial prayer of Christendom and
delivered me from temptation.” Why does he not deliver
from the temptation that misery, poverty, and ignorance
bring to the little one who did not choose that he should be
born in a narrow lane, or a back street, in an atmosphere
redolent of squalor and filth ? This little one, whom God
can lift out of temptation, but whom he lets still be cold and
miserable, whom he sees famishing for food, him whom he
sees go famishing to the baker’s, watching to steal the
loaf to relieve his hunger—why won’t he deliver this little
one ? Does Mr. Armstrong say: “ Oh, the little one must
know how to pray before God will answer him ” ? Oh, but
what a mockery to us that the source of all power places
within the reach of the temptation—nay, puts as though
surrounded by a mighty temptation trap, so that there should
be no possible escape—that little one, and then gives way to the
skilled entreaty, high tone, habit-cultured voice which Mr.
Armstrong uses, while he is deaf to the rough pleading of the
little one, and allows him to sink down, making no effort
for his recovery ! I have only one or two words more to
say to you before I again finish, and I would use these to
ask Mr. Armstrong to tell me what he meant by the word
“ cause,” and what he meant by saying “ cause must be
intelligent ” ? By cause, I mean, all that without which an
event cannot happen—the means towards an end, and by
intelligence I mean the totality of mental ability—its activity
and its results in each animal capable of it.
Mr. Armstrong: Mr. Bradlaugh has just been re-
�3°
buking me for my laxness with respect to defini
tions, and has come down upon me with a great autho
rity. Now, it is a habit of mine not to think much
of authorities as authorities, but rather of the value
of what they say. Mr. Bradlaugh came down upon
me with Max Muller, and read a sentence in reference to the
value of definitions, to the effect that they were wonderful
things for preventing and avoiding controversies and dis
putes. Is it, I ask, Mr. Bradlaugh’s experience that the
number of definitions given from public platforms in his
presence has tended to less controversy or to more ? Has
there been more or less talk with all these definitions, than
there would have been without them ? I fancied that Mr.
Bradlaugh’s career had been one very much connected with
controversies, and that the definitions which he has been ac
customed to give have not had the effect of leaving him in peace
from controversy. I am perfectly amazed at Mr. Brad
laugh’s memory, at the wonderful manner in which he
manages to remember, with tolerable accuracy, what I have
said, and to get down as he does the chief points of my
speeches.
I have, unfortunately, a miserable memory,
although I have an excellent shorthand which I can write,
and I cannot generally read it (laughter). Trusting, however,
to those two guides, I must endeavour to reply. Mr. Brad
laugh unintentionally misrepresented me when he alleged
that I had said that the voice of God, called conscience, was
not always clear. I did not say that that voice was not always
clear -—- what I said was that it was not always clearly
heard. I illustrated this by the simile of the bell, the sound
of which was perfectly clear of itself, but which was not
heard by those who would not heed.
Mr. Bradlaugh
also accused me of going in for the authority of majori
ties, because I quoted a number of names and said
that I might quote many more who concurred in the
belief in Deity grounded upon the sort of experi
ence which I said that I had myself enjoyed. Now, the
opinions of the majority have no authority—at least they go
for what they are worth, but are not a binding or an absolute
authority. But the experience of a majority, or of a minority,
or of a single individual, has authority. The experience
of a single man is a fact, and all the rest of the world not
having had that experience, or thinking that they have not
had it, does not make it less the fact. Therefore, if you
have half-a-dozen men upon whose words you can rely, who
�3i
say that they have had a certain experience, because Mr.
Bradlaugh says he has not had such experience, that makes
it none the less the fact. Now I approach that awful question
which stares in the face of the Theist—and which
ioften seems to stare most cruelly—this question of the evil
in the world. It is a question upon which the greatest
intellects of mankind have broken themselves, one which
has never been really explained or made clear, either by
the Theist or the Atheist, but which is probably beyond the
solution of the human faculties. All that we can do is to
fringe the edge of the mystery, and to see whether the best
feelings within us seem to guide us to anything approaching
a solution. Do you think that these things of which Mr.
Bradlaugh has spoken do not touch me as they touch
him ? Look, say, at the poor child born in misery, and
living in suffering; it would absolutely break my heart if I
thought that this could be the end of all. I believe that it
would weigh me down so that I could not stand upon a
public platform, or perform the ordinary business of life, if I
believed that there were beings in the world of whom misery
and sin were the beginning and the end. But I thank God that
I am enabled to maintain my reason upon its seat, and my
trust intact. I know, or I think I know, God as a friend. If he
be a friend to me, shall he not be a friend to all ? If I know
by my own experience his wondrous loving kindness, can I
not trust him for all the rest of the world, through all the
ages of eternity ? You may see a son who shall be familiar
with his father’s kindness, who shall always be kindly treated
by his father ; and there shall be a great warm love between
them. But the child sees certain actions on the part of his
father which he cannot explain. He beholds suffering
apparently brought by his father upon others, and is,
perhaps, inclined to rebel against his father’s authority. But
which is the truest child—the child who, having himself
experienced his father’s love, says : “ Well, this is strange, it
is a mystery; I would it were not so, but I know that my father
is good, and will bring some good out of this which could
not have been obtained otherwiseor the child who says :
“All my experience of my father’s goodness shall go to the
winds. I see a problem which I cannot explain, and I will,
therefore, throw up my trust, rebel against the paternal
goodness, and believe in my father’s love no more ! ” It
would be base in such of you as may be Atheisst
to rest in such a trust, since vou do not know the
�32
love of God; but were you touched with that love
this trust would come to you. It would come to you in
your best and truest moments, the moments when you feel
that you are most akin with all that is good and holy, and
when you feel, as it were, lifted above what is base. ’ This
problem of the evil in the world, I have said, surpasses the
faculties of humanity to solve, either from the platform of
the Theist, the Atheist, or the Pantheist. . I ask you what
you conceive to be the highest good to humanity ? Is not
the highest good, virtue ? You say, it may be, happiness is
better. Take the Huguenot. One way, with him, led to
happiness, the other to destruction. Was the choice he made
the better or the worse ? You say the better ? Then you
hold that virtueis betterthan happiness. Withregardto virtue
imagine, if you can, a world free from every sort of suffer
ing, from every sort of temptation, every sort of trial, what
a very nice world to live in, but what very poor creatures we
should all be ! Where would be virtue, where valour, where
greatness, where nobility, where would be all thos’e high
functions which call forth our reverence, and make
us look up from men to the God of man ? The world
is not made of sugar-plums. I, for my own part, can
not conceive how virtue, the highest good which we can
conceive, could possibly come about in human character
unless human character had evil against which it had to
contend (applause). If you can tell me how we could have
a world in which men should be great, and good, and
chivalrous, and possess all such qualities as raise feelings of
reverence in our bosoms, where nevertheless all should be
smooth and easy, you will have told me of something which,
I think, has never been told to any human being (applause).
Mr. Bradlaugh : A large number of definitions lead to
more controversy or to less. If the definitions are offered
to the minds of people well educated, and thoroughly
understanding them—to much less controversy and to more
accuracy; and when they are offered to people who are yet
ignorant, and have yet to understand them, then they lead
to more controversy, but even there, also, to more accuracy.
I am asked: Can you tell me how to make a world ? I
cannot. Do you intend to base your conclusions on my
ignorance ? If there be an onus, it lies on you, not on me.
It is your business to show that the maker you say ought to
be adored, has made the world as good as it can be. It is
not my business at all to enter upon world-making. Then
�33
I am not sure—while I am quite ready to be set right upon
a verbal inaccuracy—I am not sure there is very much dis
tinction between the voice not being heard, and not being
clearly heard. It is said to be the voice of God that speaks;
but he made the deafness or otherwise of the person to
whom he speaks, or he is not the creator, preserver, “ the
dearest friend in whom I trust, on whom I rely”—these
are Mr. Armstrong’s words. If God cannot prevent the
deafness, then the reliance is misplaced; if he made rhe
deafness, it is of no use that he is talking plainly; if he
has made the person too deaf to hear his voice, then the
voice is a mockery. Then I had it put to me, that the
opinions of majorities were not binding as authority; they
only had their value as expressions of opinion ; but that i
the experiences of individuals are binding. What does
that mean? Is there such a certitude in consciousness
that there can be no mistake in experience ? What do
you mean? When you have a notion you have had an
experience, and I have a notion you have not had it?
Supposing, for example, a man says : “ I have ex
perience of a room which raced with the Great Northern
train to London ; it was an ordinary room, with chairs and
tables in it, and none of them were upset, and it managed
to run a dead heat with the Great Northern express.” You
would say : “ My good man, if you are speaking seriously,
you are a lunatic.” “ No,” he would say, “ that is my ex
perience.” Mr. Armstrong says that that experience de
serves weight. I submit not unless you have this : that the
experience must be of facts coming within the possible range
of other people’s experience; and mustbe experience which is
testable by other people’s experience, with an ability on the
part of the person relating to clearly explain his ex
perience, and that each phenomenon he vouches to you, to
be the subject possible of criticism on examination by your
self, and that no experience which is perfectly abnormal,
and which is against yours, has any weight whatever with
you, or ought to have, except, perhaps, as deserving ex
amination. When it possibly can be made part of your
experience, yes; when it admittedly cannot be made part
of your experience, no. A man with several glasses of
whisky sees six chandeliers in this room ; that is his ex
perience—not mine. I do not refuse to see; I cannot see
more than three. Mr. Armstrong says the problem of evil
never has been made clear by Atheist or Theist. There is
D
�34
no burden on us to make it clear. The burden is upon
the person who considers that he has an all-powerful friend
of loving kindness, to show how that evil exists in con
nection with his statement that that friend could prevent
it. If he will not prevent it, he is not of that loving
kindness which is pretended. Mr. Armstrong says: “My
dear friend is kind to me, shall I not believe that he is
kind to the little lad who is starving?” What, kind
to the lad whom he leaves unsheltered and ill-clad
in winter, whose mother is drunken because the place
is foul, whose father has been committed to gaol ?
Where is the evidence to that lad of God’s loving kind
ness to him ? God, who stands by whilst the little child
steals something; God, who sets the policeman to catch
him, knowing he will go amongst other criminals, where he
will become daily the more corrupted; God, who tells him
from the Bench through the mouth of the justice, that he
has given way to the temptation of the devil, when it is the
very God has been the almighty devil (applause). That
may be a reason for Mr. Armstrong adoring his friend, but
it is no reason for this poor boy to adore. “ Ah,” Mr.
Armstrong says, “ my reason for homage is this. I should
be dissatisfied if this were going to last for ever, or if this
were to be the whole of it; that is so bad I should be in
anguish were there no recompense.” You condemn it if it
is to continue. How can you worship the being who allows
that even temporarily which your reason condemns ? Has
he marked his right to be adored as God by the
little girl who is born of a shame-marked mother in the
shadow of the workhouse walls, who did not select the
womb from which she should come, and whose career, con
sequent on her birth, is one of shame and perhaps crime
too. Ah ! that friend you love, how his love is evidenced
to that little girl is yet to be made clear to me. Then
comes another problem of thought which I am not sure I
shall deal fairly with. Is the highest good virtue or happi
ness ? But the highest happiness is virtue. That act is
virtuous which tends to the greatest happiness of the greatest
number, and which inflicts the least injury on any—that
which does not so result in this is vice. When you put happi
ness and virtue as being utterly distinguished, in your mind
they may be so, but not in my mind. You have confused
the definition of morality which I gave on the first opening;
you have, without explaining it, substituted another in lieu
�35
•of it. You would be right to say my definition is wrong,
■and give another definition, but you have no right to ignore
my definition and use my word in precisely the opposite
sense to that in which I used it. A very few words now will
determine this question for this evening, and I will ask you
to remember the position in which we are here. I am
Atheist, our friend is Theist. He has told you practically
that the word “ God ” is incapable of exact definition,
and if this is so, then it is incapable of exact belief. If it is
incapable of exact definition, it is incapable of exact
thought. If thought is confused you may have prostration of
the intellect, and this is all you can have. Our friend says
that he prays and that his prayer is answered daily, but he
forgot the millions of prayers to whom God is deaf. In his
peaceful mountains and lakes—Vesuvius and Lake Michi
gan escaped him. The fishers in Torre del Grecco, they on
whom the lava stream came down in the night, had their
lips framed no cry for mercy ? Did not some of those
hundreds who were carried to death on the tide of the muddy
Thames, did not they call out in their despair ? and yet he
was deaf to them. He listened to you, but it is of those
to whom he did not listen of whom I have to speak. If
he listens to you and not to them he is a respecter of
persons. He may be one for you to render homage to, but
not for me. First, then, the question is : “ Is it reasonable
to worship God?” and the word “worship” has been left
indistinctly defined. I defy anyone who has listened to
Mr. Armstrong to understand how much or how little he
would exclude or include in worship. I made it clear how
much I would include. Our friend has said nothing
whatever relating to the subject with which we have had to
deal.. His word “God” has been left utterly undefined;
the words “ virtue ” and “ happiness,” and the words “ right”
and “ wrong,” are left equally unexplained; the questions I
put to him of cause and intelligence have been left as
though they were not spoken. I do not make this a re
proach to him, because I know it is the difficulty of the
subject with which he has to deal. The moment you tell
people what you mean, that moment you shiver the Vene
tian glass which contains the liquor that is not to be touched.
I plead under great difficulty.
I plead for opinions that
have been made unpopular; I appeal for persons who, in
the mouths of their antagonists, often have associated with
them all that is vicious. It is true that Mr. Armstrong has
B 2
�36
no such reproach. He says that God will only try me
by that judgment of my own reason, and he makes my
standard higher than God’s on the judgment day. God
made Bruno; do you mean that Bruno’s heresy ranks as
high as faith, and that Bruno at the judgment will stand
amongst the saints ? This may be high humanity, but it is
no part of theology. Our friend can only put it that because
in his own goodness he makes an altar where he can worship,
and a church where he would make a God kind and loving
as himself, and that as he is ready to bless his fellows, so
must his God be; but he has shown no God for me to
worship, and he has made out no reasonableness to wor
ship God except for himself, to whom, he says, God is kind.
Alas ! that so many know nothing of his kindness (applause).
I beg to move the thanks of this meeting to Mr. Rothera
for presiding this evening.
Mr. Armstrong : I wish to second that.
Carried unanimously.
The Chairman : Permit me just to express the obliga
tions I feel under to you for having made my duty so
simple and pleasant. My position as chairman necessarily
and properly excludes me from making any judgment what
ever upon the character and quality of what has been
addressed to you. Notwithstanding that, I may say this i
that it is, I believe, a healthy sign of the times when a num
ber of men and women, such as have met together in this
room, can listen to such addresses as have been made to
night, for it will help on our civilisation. And if you want
a definition of what is right, I say that our business is to
learn what is true, then we shall do what is right (applause).
�37
SECOND
NIGHT.
The Chairman, who was much applauded, said : Ladies
and Gentlemen—It is with much satisfaction that I re
sume my duties as chairman this evening. No one occupy
ing this position could fail to be gratified with the high tone
and excellent temper of the debate which we listened to
last night (hear, hear), or, in noting as I did, the earnest,
sustained, and intelligent attention of a large and much
over-crowded audience (applause). I regard this as a health
ful sign of the times. There are those who look upon such
a discussion as this as dangerous and irreverent. I do not
share in that opinion (hear, hear). There is an intelligence
abroad that no longer permits men to cast the burden of
their beliefs upon mere authority, but which compels them
to seek for reasons for the faith that is in them (hear, hear).
To those, I think, such discussion as this, maintained in the
spirit of last evening, cannot fail to be useful. It is obvious
that the first requisite of religion is, that it be true. Fear of
the results of investigation, therefore, should deter no one
from inquiry. That which is true in religion, cannot be
shaken, and that which is false no one should desire to pre
serve (applause). Now, as you are aware, Mr. Armstrong in
this discussion is charged with the duty of maintaining the
proposition that it is reasonable in us to worship God. The
negative of that proposition is supported by Mr. Bradlaugh.
Under the arrangement for the debate, Mr. Bradlaugh is to
night entitled to half-an-hour for his opening, Mr. Arm
strong to half-an-hour for his reply. After that a quarterhour will be given to each alternately, until Mr. Armstrong
will conclude the debate at ten o’clock. I have now great
pleasure in asking Mr. Bradlaugh to open the discussion
(applause).
Mr. Bradlaugh, who was very warmly received, said :
In contending that it is not reasonable to worship God, it
seemed to me that I ought to make clear to you, at any
�38
rate, the words I used, and the sense in which I used them,
and to do that I laid before you last night several definitions,
not meaning that my definitions should necessarily bind
Mr. Armstrong, but meaning that, unless he supplied some
other and better explanations for the words, the meaning
I gave should be, in each case, taken to be my meaning all
through. I did not mean that he was to be concluded by
the form of my definition if he were able to correct it, or if
he were able to give a better instead ; but I think I am now
entitled to say that he ought to be concluded by my defini
tions, and this, from the answer he has given (hear, hear).
The answer was frank—very frank—(hear) and I feel
reluctant to base more upon it than I ought to do in a dis
cussion conducted as this has been. If I were meeting an
antagonist who strove to take every verbal advantage, I
might be tempted to pursue only the same course; but
when I find a man speaking with evident earnestness, using
language which seems to be the utter abandonment of his
cause, I would rather ask him whether some amendment
of the language he used might not put his case in a
better position. His declaration was that he was perfectly
incapable of saying whether the definition, which I had taken
from Professsor Flint, of God, was correct or not (hear,
hear). Now, I will ask him, and you, too, to consider the
consequence of that admission. No definition whatever is
given by him of the word “ God.” There was not even the
semblance, or attempt of it. The only words we got which
were akin to a definition, except some words which, it
appears, I took down hastily, and which Mr. Armstrong
abandoned in his next speech, the only words bearing even
the semblance of a definition, are “ an awful inscrutable
somewhat” (laughter and hear, hear). Except these words,
there have been no words in the arguments and in the
speeches of Mr. Armstrong which enabled me, in any
fashion, to identify any meaning which he may have of it,
except phrases which contradict each other as soon as you
examine them (applause). Now, what is the definition of which
Mr. Armstrong says that he is incapable of saying whether or
not it is correct? “ That God is a self-existent, eternal being,
infinite in power and wisdom, and perfect in holiness and
goodness, the maker of heaven and earth.” Now, does
Mr. Armstrong mean that each division of the definition
comes within his answer ? Does he mean that in relation to
no part of that which is predicated in this definition is he
�39
capable of saying whether it is correct or not ? Because, if
he does, he is answered by his own speech, as a portion of
this defines God as being perfect in holiness and goodness,
in power and wisdom; and it defines him as eternal in
duration and infinite in his existence; and also defines him
as being the creator of the universe. Now, if Mr. Armstrong
means that “ as a whole, I can’t say whether it is correct or
not,” or if, in defending his position, he means that, haying
divided the definition in its parts, he cannot say whether it is,
in any one part, correct or not, then I must remind him that,
in this debate, the onus lies upon him of saying what it is he
worships, and what it is he contends it is reasonable of us
to worship (hear, hear). If he cannot give us a clear and
concise notion of what he worships, and of what he says it
is reasonable for us to worship, I say that his case has fallen
to the ground. It must be unreasonable to worship that of
which you, in thought, cannot predicate anything in any way
—accurately or inaccurately (applause). Mr. Armstrong
evidently felt—I hope that you will not think that the feel
ing was justified—that there was a tendency on my part to
make too much of, and to be too precise as to, the meaning
of words used. Permit me to say it is impossible to be too
precise; it is impossible to be too clear ; it is impossible to
be too distinct—(hear, hear)—especially when you are dis
cussing a subject in terms which are not used by everybody
in the same sense, and which are sometimes not used by the
mass of those to whom you are addressing yourself at all
(applause). It is still more necessary to be precise when
many of those terms have been appropriated by the teachers
of different theologies and mythologies, such teachers having
alleged that the use of the words meant something which, on
the face of it, contradicted itself, and by other teachers who,
if they have not been self-contradictory, have attached meanings
widely different to those given by their fellows (hear, hear).
I will ask you, then, to insist with me that what is meant by
God should be given us in such words that we can clearly
and easily identify it (hear, hear). If you cannot even in
thought identify God, it is unreasonable—absolutely un
reasonable—to talk of worshipping “ it ” (applause). What
is “ it ” you are going to worship ? Can you think clearly
what it is you are going to worship ? If you can think clearly
for yourself what it is, tell me in what words you think it.
It may be that my brain may not be skilled enough to fully
comprehend that, but, at any rate, we shall then have an
�4°
opportunity of testing for ourselves how little or how much
clear thought you may have on the subject (laughter and ap
plause). If you are obliged to state that it is impossible to
put your thoughts in words so clear and so distinct that I may
understand the meaning of it as clearly as you do, or that
a person of ordinary capacity cannot comprehend the words
in which you describe it—if that is impossible, then it is un
reasonable to ask me to worship it (loud applause). I say it
is unreasonable to ask me to worship an unknown quantity
—an unrecognisable symbol expressing nothing whatever.
If you know what it is you worship—if you think you know
what it is you worship—I say it is your duty to put into
words what you think you know (hear, hear). We have had
in this debate some pleas put forward, which, if they had
remained unchallenged, might have been some sort of pleas
for the existence of a. Deity, but each of those pleas has in
turn failed. I do not want to use too strong a phrase, so I
will say that each in turn has been abandoned. Take, for
instance, the plea of beauty, harmony, and calmness of
the world, as illustrated by lakes and mountains, to
which I contrasted storms and volcanoes. Mr. Arm
strong’s reply to that was: “ But this involves problems
which are alike insoluble by Theist and Atheist.” If it is
so, why do you worship what is non-capable of solution ?
If there be no solution, why do you put that word “ God ”
as representative of the solution which you say is unattain
able, and ask me to prostrate myself before it and adore it ?
(applause).
We must have consistency of phraseology.
Either the problem is soluble—then the onus is upon you
to state it in reasonable terms; or it is insoluble, and then
you have abandoned the point you set out to prove, because
it must be unreasonable to worship an insoluble proposition
(applause). Howdoyou know anything of that God you askus
to worship ? I must avow that, after listening carefully to what
has fallen from Mr. Armstrong, I have been unable to glean
what he knows of God or how he knows it (hear, hear). I
remember he has said something about a “ voice of God,”
but he has frankly admitted that the voice in question has
spoken differently and in contradictory senses in different
ages (loud cries of “no, no,”)—and those who say “no,”
will do better to leave Mr. Armstrong to answer for him
self as to the accuracy of what I state (hear, hear). I say
he frankly admitted that the voice he alluded to had spoken
differently and contradictorily in different ages. (Renewed
�4i
cries of “ no ”). I say yes, and I will give the evidence of
my yes. (Cries of “ no, no,” “ order,” and “ hear, hear.”)
I say yes, and I will give the evidence of my yes (hear,
hear, and applause).
Mr. Armstrong said that in one
hundred years there had been a purification, and an
amelioration, and a clearing away; and that that change
had been vaster still since one thousand years ago (ap
plause). He is responsible for admitting what I said
about the definition of morality being different in one
age and amongst one people, to what it is in another
age and amongst another people; and if that does not mean
exactly what I put substantially to you, it has no meaning
at all (loud applause).
I strive not to misrepresent
that which I have to answer; I will do my best to under
stand what it is that is urged against me. Those who hold
a different judgment should try, at least, to suspend it until I
have finished (hear, hear, and applause). In the Baird
Lectures, to which I referred last night—and let me here
say that I don’t think that any complaint can be fairly made
of my quoting from them—something was said last night
about my using great men as an authority. Now I do not do
that; but if I find that a man, whose position and learning
gave him advantages with regard to a subject upon which
I am speaking, and he has expressed what I wished to say
better than I can do—if I use his language it is right
I should say from where I have taken my words (hear, hear)
And if I remember right, we had, last night, quotations from
Charles Voysey, Professor Newman, Professor Blackie, and
a host of similar writers on the other side. I take it they
were given in the same fashion that I intended in giving the
names of the writers of the quotations I have cited—not for
the purpose of overwhelming me with their authority, but
simply to inform me and you from whence were got the
words used (hear, hear). Now, Professor Flint, in his book
on Atheism, directed against the position taken up by men
like myself, says : “ The child is born, not into the religion
of nature but into blank ignorance; and, if left entirely to
itself, would probably never find out as much religious truth
as the most ignorant of parents can teach it.” Again, on page
23 he says : “The belief that there is one God, infinite in
power, wisdom, and goodness, has certainly not been
wrought out by each one of us for himself, but has been
passed on from man to man, from parent to child: tradi
tion, education, common consent, the social medium, have
�42
exerted great influence in determining its acceptance and
prevalence.” Now, what I want to put to you from this is
that, just as Max Muller and others have done, you must try
to find out whether what is to be understood by the word
“ God ” is to be worshipped or not, by tracing backwards
the origin and growth of what is to-day called religion. You
will have to search out the traditions of the world, should
there fail to be any comprehensible meaning come from the
other side. Now, what God is it that we are to worship ?
Is it the Jewish God? Is it the Mahometan God? Is it
the God of the Trinitarian Christian ? Is it one of the
gods of the Hindus ? Or is it one of the gods of the old
Greeks or Italians, and, if so, which of them ? And in each
case from what source are we to get an accurate definition
of either of those gods ? Perhaps Mr. Armstrong will say
that it is none of these. He will probably decline to
have any of these Gods fastened upon him as the proper
God to worship ; but the very fact that there are so many
different gods—different with every variety of people—contra
dictory in their attributes and qualities—the very fact that
there is a wide difference in believers in a God makes it but
right that I should require that the God we are asked to
worship should be accurately defined (applause). In
the current number of the /Jonteinporary Review, Professor
Monier Williams, dealing with the development of Indian
religious thought, has a paragraph which is most appro
priate to this debate. He says, on page 246 : “ The early
religion of the Indo-Aryans was a development of a still earlier
belief in man’s subjection to the powers of nature and his
need of conciliating them. It was an unsettled system,
which at one time assigned all the phenomena of the uni
verse to one first Cause; at another, attributed them to
several Causes operating independently; at another, sup
posed the whole visible creation to be a simple evolution
from an eternal creative germ. It was a belief which,
according to the character and inclination of the
worshipper was now monotheism, now tritheism, now
polytheism, now pantheism.
But it was not yet
idolatry. Though the forces of nature were thought of as
controlled by divine persons, such persons were not yet
idolised. There is no evidence from the Vedic hymns that
images were employed. The mode of divine worship con
tinued to be determined from a consideration of human
liking and dislikings. Every worshipper praised the gods
'
�43
because he liked to be praised himself. He honoured them
with offerings because he liked to receive presents himself.
This appears to have been the simple origin of the sacrificial
system, afterwards closely interwoven with the whole re
ligious system. And here comes the difficult question—
What were the various ideas expressed by the term sacrifice?
In its purest and simplest form it denoted a dedication of
some simple gift as an expression of gratitude for blessings
received. Soon the act of sacrifice became an act of pro
pitiation for purely selfish ends. The favour of celestial
beings who were capable of conferring good or inflicting
harm on crops, flocks, and herds, was conciliated by offerings
and oblations of all kinds. First, the gods were invited to
join their worshippers at the every-day meal. Then they
were invoked at festive gatherings, and offered a share of
the food consumed. Their bodies were believed to be com
posed of ethereal particles, dependent for nourishment on
the indivisible elementary essence of the substances presented
to them, and to be furnished with senses capable of being
gratified by the aroma of butter and grain offered in fire
(homa); and especially by the fumes arising from libations
of the exhilarating juice extracted from the Soma plant.”
I will allege that .you cannot give me a definition of
God that does not originate in the ignorance of man as to
the causes of phenomena which are abnormal to him, and
which he cannot explain. The wonderful, the extraordinary,
the terrific, the mysterious, the mighty, the grand, the
furious, the good, the highly beneficent—all these
that he did not understand became to him God. He
might have understood them on careful investigation
had his mind then been capable for the search,
but instead of that he attributed them to huge per
sonifications of the Unknown—the word behind which
to-day is God, and it is the equivalent for all he observed,
but did not comprehend, for all that happened of which he
knew not the meaning (applause). It was not education but
ignorance which gave birth to the so-called idea of a God
(hear, hear). And I will submit to you that, in truth, all
forms of worship have arisen from exaggeration and mis
application of what men have seen in their fellow-men and
fellow-women. A man found that a big furious man might
be pacified and calmed by soothing words; that a big
avaricious man might be satisfied and pleased with plenteous
gifts ; that this one might be compelled to do something by
�44
angry words or harsh treatment; and that this one could be
won by supplications to comply with his wishes—and what
he imagined or observed as to his fellows he applied to the
unknown, thinking, no doubt, that that which he had found
efficacious in the known experience, might also be efficacious
in that in which he had no experience. And what did you
find ? You found the sailor at sea, who’did not understand
navigation, offering candles to his Deity, or special saint,
and promising more offerings of a similar character if the
Deity brought him safe into port. I say it is more reason
able to teach him how to steer than how to worship, and also
more reasonable to know something about the science of
navigation. That would prove much more serviceable than
worship, for when he relied upon candles, he ran upon rocks
and reefs, but as soon as he understood navigation, he
could bring his own ship safely into port (applause).
Prayer is spoken of by Mr. Armstrong as an act of wor
ship. What does it imply ? It implies a belief held on the
part of the person who prays, that he may be noticed by the
being to whom he prays; and it also implies that he is
asking that being to do something which he would have left
undone but for that prayer. Then does he think that he can
influence the person whom he addresses by his rank or by his
position ? Does he think he can influence his Deity by his
emotion ? Does he think that as he would win a woman’s
love, so he would gain God, by passionate devotion ?
Does he think that, as he would frighten a man,
so he would influence God through fear ? Does he appeal
to God’s logic, or to his pity? Does he appeal to his
mercy or to his justice ? or does he hope to tell God one
thing he could not know without the prayer ? (loud applause.)
I want an answer, here, clear and thorough, from one
who says that prayer is a reasonable worship to be offered to
God (renewed applause). Something was said last night
about a cause being necessarily intelligent, and I think, in
my speech afterwards, I challenged the assertion. Nothing
was said to explain what was meant, nothing was done to
further explain the matter, and although I defined what I
meant by cause, and defined what I meant by intelligence,
no objection was taken. Now, I have seen a hut crushed
by an avalanche falling on it, as I have been crossing the
Alps.
Does Mr. Armstrong mean to tell me that the
avalanche which crushed the hut was intelligent, or that it
had an intelligent wielder? If the avalanche is intelligent,
�45
why does he think so ? If the avalanche has an intelli
gent wielder, please explain to me the goodness of that
intelligent wielder who dashes the avalanche on the cottage ?
(applause). If you tell me that it is a mystery which you
cannot explain, I say it is unreasonable to ask me to worship
such a mystery—(renewed applause)—and as long as you
call it a mystery, and treat it as that which you cannot explain,
so long you have no right to ask me to adore it. There was
a time when man worshipped the lightning and thunder,
and looked upon them as Deity. But now he has grown
wiser, and, having investigated the subject, instead of
worshipping the lightning as a Deity, he erects lightningconductors and electric wires, and chains the lightning and
thunder God; knowledge is more potent than prayer (ap
plause). As long as they were worshipped • science could
do nothing, but now we see to what uses electricity has been
brought. When they knew that the lightning-conductor
was more powerful than the God they worshipped, then
science was recognised the mighty master and ruler, instead
of ignorant faith (applause). I have already submitted that
there has not been the semblance of proof or authority for
the existence of any being identifiable in words to whom it
would be reasonable to offer worship, and I will show you
the need for pressing that upon you. A strong statement
was made last night which amounted to an admission that
there was wrong here which should not be, and that, but for
the hope on the part of the speaker that that wrong would
be remedied at some future time, he would be in a state of
terrible despair. He gave no reason for the hope, and no
evidence why he held the hope. He only contended that
things were so bad here that they would be indefensible
except for the hope that they woutd be remedied. This
admission is fatal to the affirmation of God to be worshipped
in the way here mentioned.
Then we had something said
about experience. All experience must be experience of the
senses : you can have no other experience whatever. To
quote again from Max Muller: “ All consciousness begins
with sensuous perception, with what we feel, and hear, and
see. Out of this we construct what may be called con
ceptual knowledge, consisting of collective and abstract
concepts. What we call thinking consists simply in addi
tion and subtraction of precepts and concepts. Conceptual
knowledge differs from sensuous knowledge, not in sub
stance, but in form only. As far as the material is con
�46
cerned, nothing exists in the intellect except what existed
before in the senses.” It is the old proposition put in
different, forms , by Locke, Spinoza, and others, over and
over again, but it has to be taken with this qualification that
you have innumerable instances of hallucinations of the
senses. Delusions on religious matters are open to the re
mark that of all hallucinations of the senses—as Dr H
Maudsley shows in the Fortnightly Review—all halluci
nations of the senses those on religious matters only keep
current with the religious teachings of the day. Sight, touch
smell, hearing, feeling—all are the subject of illusion as is
shown over and over again. Any man bringing as evidence
to us the report of experience which is only of an abnor
mal character, is bound to submit it to a test which is some
thing beyond in severity that which we should apply to
normal events. . The more abnormal it is the more par
ticularity in detail do I wish, in order to examine it, so that
I may be able to identify it; and the more curious the state
ment the more carefully do I wish to test it. Loose words in
theology will not do, and here I submit that at present
we stand, with, at any rate, on one side, nothing whatever
affirmed against me. I gathered last night—I hope incor
rectly—I gathered last night—I hope the words were spoken
incautiously—that Mr. Armstrong held it to be natural that
a man should have to struggle against wrong, vice, and folly,
for the purpose of bringing out the higher qualities, and that
it was alleged that it was to that struggle we were indebted
for our virtue. If that were a real thought on the part of
Mr. Armstrong it is but a sorry encouragement to any
attempts, at reformation and civilisation. Why strive to re
move misery and wrong if the struggle against them is con
ducive to.virtue ? It would take a long time to bring about
any ameliorating change in society if such doctrine were
widely held (loud applause).
The Rev. R. A. Armstrong, who was applauded on rising,,
said : Mr. Chairman and Friends—I wish, in justice to
myself, to say that I freely offered Mr. Bradlaugh the choice
of parts as to the order of speaking. I know not which way
the balance of advantage lies; but after the speech we
have listened to, I think you will agree with me that he who
speaks, first the second night has a considerable pull (laughter).
Last night as I passed down that awful flight of stairs, which
they must climb who, in this town, would soar from the nether
world to the celestial realms of Secularism, I heard many
�47
•comments, and among others one man just behind me said:
“Oh ! Armstrong is nowhere in Bradlaugh’s hands. Bradlaugh
can do just what he likes with him ” (laughter). Now, my
friend said the very truth in a certain sense. As a debater
I am nowhere compared with Mr. Bradlaugh. He has
fluency-—I compute that in thirty minutes I can string
together some 4,000 words, while, I fancy, Mr. Bradlaugh’s
score would be just about 6,000—so that to equalise our
mere mechanical advantages I ought really to have three
minutes to every two of his. If I have omitted many things
which I ought to have said, it is due to this reason (laughter
and hear, hear)—for I have not been silent during the time
assigned to me. Of course, I do not complain of this.
Then, to say nothing of Mr.'Bradlaugh’s powerful intellect, to
which I do not pretend, and his wide reading, he is in
constant practice at this work so new to me, so much so that
I find almost every thought he expressed last night, and in
almost—sometimes precisely—identical language, printed in
his pamphlets, and much of it even spoken in one or other o
his numerous debates. Take this, along with his prodigious
memory, and you will see that the doctrine of Atheism has,
indeed, in him, the very ablest defender that its friends could
wish. And if what he says is not enough to demolish
Theism, then you may be sure that Theism cannot be
demolished (applause). But then, friends, I do want you not to
look on this as a personal struggle between Mr. Bradlaugh
and myself at all. I no more accept it in that light than I would
accept a challenge from him to a boxing match, and I think
you will all agree with me that in that case, in discretion I should
show the better part of valour (hear, hear, and laughter).
We are both speaking in all earnestness of what we hold to be the
truth. Neither of us, I presume, in the least, expects to make
converts on the spot: converts so quickly made would be
like enough to be swayed back the other way next week.
But we do desire that the seed of our words should sink
into your minds; that you should give them your reverent
attention, that, in due season, so far as they are good
and true, they may ripen into matured convictions of
the. truth (applause). And now let me look back at the
position in which this conference was left last night. I am
the more at liberty to do so, as to-night Mr. Bradlaugh has
only—or chiefly—done two things, namely, repeated some
things whichhe saidlast night, andanswered certain arguments
of Professor Flint. That is perfectly fair, but it is equally fair
�48
for me to leave Professor Flint to answer for himself (hear
hear, and applause). And I complain that Mr. Bradlaugh
either did not listen to, or did not understand, what I
endeavoured to put in plainest words about the function of
that voice of God which we call conscience (hear, hear).
Observe, that while in different climesand ages, ay, in the same
manat different times, the conceptions of the particular deeds
that come under the head of right differ, the idea of rightness
itself, of rectitude, is always and invariably the same, from its
first faint glimmer in the savage little removed comparatively
from the lower animal, from which he is said to be
developed, to the season of its clear shining, luminous and
glorious, in hero, prophet, martyr, saint—in Elizabeth Fry,
in Mary. Carpenter, in Florence Nightingale. To speak
metaphysically, the abstract subjective idea of right is the
same and one, but our ideas of the concrete and objective
right develop and progress ever towards a purer and more
beautiful ideal. We have by our own powers to satisfy our
selves as best we can what is right. But when we have
made up our minds, the voice of God sounds clear as a
bell upon the soul and bids us do it (applause). This I
stated again and again last night, yet to-night again Mr.
Bradlaugh has confounded the two things. Mr. Bradlaugh
raised a laugh with his story of the cannibal objecting to the
tough, and choosing the tender meal. That cannibal, in so
far, does but illustrate how a man is swayed by those lower
instincts and desires which I rigorously and definitely'dis
tinguished and separated from conscience. Why Mr. Brad
laugh confounded this with a case of the deliverance of
conscience I cannot think, because I am so sure it wasneither to make you grin nor to confuse your minds (hear,
hear). The latter part of the first night’s debate turned on
the mystery of evil. But Mr. Bradlaugh did not then ven
ture to allege the possibility of a world in which noble character
could be developed without the contact with suffering and
pain (hear, hear). He said he was not called upon to make
a world ; happily not; but at any rate he should not question
the excellence of the world in which he lives unless he can at
least conceive abetter—(loud applause)—and I say that where
evil had never been, or what we call evil, manliness, bravery,
generosity, sympathy, tenderness, could never be (applause).
A world without temptation would be a world without
virtue (hear, hear). A world all pleasurable would be a
world without goodness, and even the pleasurable itself
�49
would cease by sheer monotony to give any pleasure at all. A
world not developed out of the conflict of good and evil,
or joy and pain, would necessarily be an absolutely neutral
world, without emotion of any sort. Unless the whole
tint is to be neutral, you must have light and shade; and the
only test by which to judge whether the power controlling the
world is good or evil—God or Devil, as Mr. Bradlaugh says—
(applause)—is to note whether light or darkness preponderates;
and not only that, but whether the movement, the tendency,
the development, the drift of things is towards the gradual
swallowing up of darkness by the light, or light by darkness;
w'hether freedom, happiness, virtue, are in the procession
of the ages losing their ground, or slowly, surely wanning
ever fresh accession (applause). I take it, then, that if we
are to have a final predominance of goodness—nay, even of
happiness, if you make that the highest good—it can only be
by these things winning their way by degrees out of the evil
which is their shadow. And I invite you once more to test
this from experience. My own experience, clear and sure,
and that of every other devout man, is simply this : that
whatever sorrow, whatever pain we suffer, though it wring
our very heart, the time is sure to come when, looking back
thereon, we thank God that it was given us, perceiving that
it was good, not evil, that befel us, being the means, in
some wray or other, of our further advance in happiness or
goodness, or nearness to our heavenly Father. You tell meit is
all very well for me; but you point to those whose lot is cast in
less pleasant places, and ask me what of them ? Is God
good to them? Well, I will take you to a dark and dismal
cellar beneath the reeking streets of a mighty city. And
this picture is not drawn from fancy, it is a photograph
from the life of one I know of. In that dark and poor abode you
shall enter, and you shall see an aged woman to whom that
spot is home. She is eaten up with disease, the inheritance,
doubtless, of her forefathers’ sin. For fifty years her simple
story has been of alternations between less pain and more.
Beside her are two orphan children, no kith or kin of hers,
but adopted by her out of the large love which she nurtures
in her heart, to share the pence she wins from the mangle,
every turn of which is, to her, physical pain. Well, surely,
she knows nought of God, has none of those “ experiences ”
which Mr. Bradlaugh treats as if they were luxuries confined
to the comfortable Theist in his easy-chair, or on his softlypillowed bed. Ay, but she is rising from her knees to
�5°
turn to the dry crust on the board, which is all she has to
share with the children. And what says she as you enter ?
“ Oh, sir, I was only thanking God for his good
ness, and teaching these poor children so.” Now,
if Mr. Bradlaugh is right in declaring we can know
nought of God, then that old woman ought never
to have eased her laden heart by the outburst of her prayer,
ought to have cast out of her as a freak of lunacy the peace
that stole upon her there as she rose from her knees, ought to
have shunned teaching those children, whose lot was like to be
as hard as hers, one word about the reliance that she had
on God (applause). Instead of that she taught the pros
perous man who stumbled down the broken stair into her
abode, a lesson of trust and faith in the goodness and pre
sence of God, which he never forgot as long as he lived
(hear, hear and applause). I sat the other day beside a
dying girl. Her body was in hideous pain, but her face was lit
with a light of beauty and of love which told a wondrous tale of
her spirit’s life. She died, and her mother and her sisters
weep to-day. But a new love, a new gentleness, a new
sense of the nearness of the spirit - world has already
blossomed in their home, and, I am not sure that they
would call her back even if their voices could avail. So it
is; this woe which we call evil is the sacred spring of all
that is beautiful and good (hear, hear). To the Atheist the
world’s sorrow must, indeed, be insupportable. If he be
sincere and have a heart, I do not know how he can ever
eat and drink and make merry, still less how he can make a
jest and raise a titter in the very same speech in which he
dwells with all the skill of practised eloquence upon that
woe (applause). If I were an Atheist I hardly think I could
ever throw off the darkness of this shadow. But, believing
in God, whom I personally know, and know as full of love,
I am constrained to trust that, though this evil be a mystery
the full significance of which I cannot understand, and
though relatively to the little sum of things here and now it
seem great, yet that relatively to the whole plan and sum of
the universe it is very small, and that that poor child, born
of sin and shame, who knew no better than to steal the loaf,
shall one day wear a diadem of celestial glory, and be by no
means least in the Kingdom of Heaven. And when I see
the Atheist smiling, laughing, having apparentlya lightheart in
him, I am bound to suppose that he too, somehow, trusts that
..goodness and happiness are going to win in the end—that
�is, that goodness is the ultimately overruling power. And.
if he believes that, he believes in the power which men
call God (applause). Now, Mr. Bradlaugh has casti
gated me with some severity for not obliging him
with definitions. It is impossible, he says, to be too
precise in the use of words, and I agree with him.
But by definitions I cannot make the simplest words
in the English language more plain to you (hear, hear).
He, himself, has given us some . specimens of defini
tions which I do not think have made things much clearer
than they were before. There are three words of import
ance in the title of this debate, and I will try, since Mr.
Bradlaugh has experienced difficulty in understanding me,
whether I can tell him more distinctly what I mean by them.
Those three words are “ reasonable,” “ worship,” “ God.”
When I say it is reasonable to do a thing, I do not mean
that I can demonstrate to you with the precision of, mathe
matics that every proposition, the truth of which is assumed
in that act, is true; but Ido mean that the propositions, on the
assumption of which the act proceeds, are, at least, sufficiently
probable to win the verdict of an unbiassed judgment, and
that the act itself is likely to be found to be a good. Mr.
Bradlaugh himself has defined “ worship ” as including
“ prayer, praise, sacrifice, offerings, solemn services, adora
tion, and personal prostration.” If Mr. Bradlaugh will kindly
occupy his next fifteen minutes by defining to me exactly
what he means by each of those terms, I may be better able
to tell him whether I include them all in worship, and
whether he has left anything out. But at present I do not
find that any one of them is simpler or more comprehensible
than the term worship, while “prayer, praise, sacrifice, and
offerings,’’each might mean at least two very different things
“ solemn services ” is hopelessly vague ; “ adoration,” as I
understand it, is included in some of the others; and before
we know what “personal prostration” means, we must
define “ person ”—no easy matter—and then explain what'
we mean by the “ prostration ” of that person (laughter and.
applause). Meanwhile, I have described, at the very outset,
that energy of my soul which I call worship, namely, that in
which I address myself to God as to one immeasurably sur
passing me in goodness, in wisdom, in power, in love (hear,
hear). I don’t think this is plainer than the good old Saxon
word “worship;” I think that word conveys a pretty clear
meaning to most men. But Mr. Bradlaugh finds it easier to
�52
understand long phrases than simple Saxon words; and my
. only fear now is that he will want me to define all the
words in my definition—(laughter)—and though I am ready
enough to do that, I fear it would take a week (renewed
laughter, and hear, hear). God:—You ask me to define God,
and you say I have not in any way done so. You quote
the metaphysical definition of Flint, and want me to enter
into metaphysics. What do you mean by defining ? Do
you mean to draw a circle round God, so as to separate him
from all else ? If you do, I reply, I can’t; because, as far as
I can see, or my imagination can extend, I discern no
boundaries to God. But if you mean to ask simply what I
mean by God, I mean—and I said this again and again
last night—the source of the command that comes to me
to do right, to abjure wrong ; the source of the peace
that comes to me even in pain, when I have done right,
and of the remorse that comes to me even in prosperity
when I have done ill. I mean also the source—which
I believe to be identical — of the wondrous sense of
a divine presence which seizes me in the midst of
nature’s sublimest scenes — ay, and even of nature’s
awful catastrophes. I mean also the source of the
moral and spiritual strength that comes to me in response to
the worship which my soul pours forth; and if you want to
know what I mean by my soul, I mean myself. What else
besides the source of these things God maybe, I cannot tell you.
It is only so—in his relation to me—that I directly know him.
Beyond that he is the subject of philosophy, but not of im
mediate knowledge. I believe him to be very much more;
but that does not affect the reasonableness of worshipping
him, and that is the subject of our debate (hear, hear). So
that I cannot define God in the way I can define Notting
ham, or Europe, or the earth (hear, hear). I cannot tell
how much is included in his being \ how much, if any, is
excluded. I can tell you what he is to me, in relation to me—
and that is the only way in which any entity can be defined—
and I can tell you what other men testify by word, by deed,
by martyrdom, he is to them (hear, hear). Beyond that I
have no instruments by which to measure; and therefore
I take up no pen with which to write down the measure
ments, or define (applause). But Mr. Bradlaugh says if
we cannot exactly define an object we are incapable of exact
thought or belief concerning it. Did Mr. Bradlaugh do al
gebra at school ? That most exact and prosaic science con-
�•sists largely in reasoning about unknown quantities ; that is,
about some x or_y, of which you only know that it has some
one or perhaps two definite relations to certain other things.
You don’t know what x or y is in itself—only some function
by which it is related to a and b and c. From that relation you
reason, and sometimes from it you get by subtle processes
to infer a vast deal more, and it will perhaps prove just from
that relation that x must be such and such a number, or that
it must be infinite. Does Mr. Bradlaugh say we can have
no exact thought about the x in the algebraic equation,
before we have worked out the whole sum ? Yes, we know
it in its relations or some of them. Yet the very essence
of algebra is that x is undefined. The human soul is the a, b,
•or q the well-known, the familiar; God is the x, related wondrously thereto, yet none has ever yet worked out that sum.
The supremestphilosophers, who hereare school-boys indeed,
have only displayed workings on their slates which, to
use again mathematical language, show that x approaches
towards a limit which is equal to infinity (hear, hear). But
Mr. Bradlaugh says there should be no belief in that which we
•cannot define. Now, I challenge Mr. Bradlaugh in all re
spect and sincerity to define himself (applause). If he de
clines or fails, I will not say we must cease to believe in Mr.
Bradlaugh, but that is the necessary inference from his
maxims. Mr. Bradlaugh says all experience must be the
experience of the senses. By which sense does he experience
love, indignation, or all the varied sentiments which bind him
to his fellow-men and women (applause) ? Mr. Bradlaugh
told us in his concluding speech last night that no ex
perience of another man’s can be anything at all to him
until tested by his own. Is, then, a man born blind un
reasonable if he believes that others have experience of
some wonderful sensation, making objects very vividly
present to them, which they call sight ? Shall the man born
■deaf say he does not believe there is such a thing as sound ?
I know not whether Mr. Bradlaugh has any personal ex
perience of the heat of the torrid zone. Does he believe
it ? Has he tested the height of Mont Blanc ? If not, does
he hold his belief in suspense as to whether it is 15,000 feet
high or not ? The fact is the enormous majority of the
beliefs on which we act every day of our lives with perfect
•confidence are founded either on sheer Faith, untested and by
us untestable, or on Testimony, that is the recorded experience
■of others which we have not tested. But Mr. Brad
�54
laugh says that if the alleged experience of another
is “ abnormal ” we must not believe it. He did
not define “abnormal,” and I want to know who is
to be judge whether my experience of the command that
comes to me in conscience is abnormal or not. Mr. Brad
laugh ? This audience ? With confidence I accept the ver
dict of any gathering of my fellow-men and women, knowing
that my experience herein has a sure echo in their own. But
Mr. Bradlaugh says, if someone said a room ran a race,
you would call him a lunatic. That argument means
nothing, or else it means that Martineau and Newman, and
all great and good who have recognised God—ay, and Voltaire
and Thomas Paine—Theistsboth—are to be counted lunatics
(hear, hear). Time has prevented—I hope it may not still
prevent—my stating clearly what I mean, when I proceed on
philosophical grounds to allege my belief that there is an
intelligent cause. “Intelligent ” I shall not stop to define,
unless I am challenged to it, because I presume intelligence
in you (applause). “ If there were no such supreme intelli
gence,” says Mr. Voysey, “ the universe, supposing it to be
self-evolved (and of course unconscious, since it is not intel
ligent) has only just come into self-consciousness through
one of its parts—viz., man. It had been, so to speak,
asleep all these cycles of ages till man was born and his
intellect dawned upon the world, and, for the first time, the
universe realised its own existence through the intelligent
consciousness of one of its products. I do not think
absurdity could go further than that. If there be no self
conscious intelligence but man, then the universe is only
just now, through man, becoming aware of its own exist
ence ” (hear, hear, and applause). “ Cause,” Mr. Brad
laugh, I think, has defined, in language which in
cluded the words, “ means towards an end.” A mean o:
means, however, is, by the very conception of the word, the
second term in a series of three of which the end is the
third, and “means” implies some power making use of
those means, and that power is the first term in the series.
Now, I claim that cause is that first term, whether there be
two more, or only one. By “ cause ” I mean—and you
mean, if you will search your thought—the initiating power,
that which begins to produce an effect. Now, my mind is so
constituted that to speak to me of a power which initiates
effects, yet is not conscious, intelligent, is sheer nonsense;
therefore I hold the power which displays itself as one in the
�55
%
uniformity of the laws of nature, and lies behind all phe
nomena—the growth of the grass, the rush of the cataract,
the breath of the air, the stately sailing of the stars through
their geometric paths, to be intelligent, conscious, to do it
all by distinct purpose; and I can in no way otherwise con
ceive. I conceive this source of the geometric motion of
all the spheres and of the minutest dance of protoplasm in the
nettle’s sting as always, everywhere, ofpurpose producing these
effects. And the worship which I gave God as I know him
in relationship to me is refined and glorified by the conception which thus dawns on me of his being. And in the
words of Francois Marie Arouet Voltaire, I commune thus
with myself: “ Where,” says he, “ is the eternal geometrician ?
Is he in one place, or in all places without occupying space ?
I know not. Has he arranged all things of his own sub
stance? I know not. Is he immense without quantity
and without quality ? I know not. All I know is, that we
must adore him and be just ” (loud applause).
Mr. Bradlaugh : It is perfectly true that what I have said
here I have said before, and very much of what I have said I
have printed before. I am quite sure that Mr. Armstrong
did not intend that as any blame upon me. [Mr. Arm
strong : Certainly not.] In fact, if any advantage accrued,
it would accrue to him, because, having what I had to say
on the subject to refer to, he would be better able to answer
it by previous preparation. Why I mention it is because
one person seemed to think that it was very reprehensible on
my part to say here anything that was not perfectly new.
I make no claim to originality, but try to say the truest
thing I can in the clearest way I can (hear, hear, and
applause). Then I am told that I did not pay attention
enough to what was said last night about the functions of
the voice of God. I have been told to-night that the idea of
righteousness and rectitude has always been one and the
same amongst all human beings, from the savage to the
highest intellect. If telling me so is evidence of it, then,
of course, I must be content. But, unfortunately, I am not
content, but say that the evidence is all the other way (hear,
hear, and a laugh). I have read carefully Wake’s latest book
on the evolutions of morality, tracing out the growth of
notions of morality amongst savages. I have read Tylor,
Broca, Lubbock, Agassiz, Gliddon, Pritchard, Lawrence,
and I think I am familiar with the best of ancient and
modern authors on the subject; and I say it is
�56
absolutely contrary to the fact that the notions of
morality are, and always have been identical from
the lowest savage to the highest intellect. It is abso
lutely contrary to the fact that one and the same idea of
right always and everywhere prevails (hear, hear). It is not
a question of my opinion ; it is a question of the conclusive
evidence laboriously collected on the subject, and I am
sorry to have to put it in that plain and distinct way (hear,
hear). Then I am told, and I am sure Mr. Armstrong
would not have said that unless he thought he did, that he care
fully separated last night the lower instincts which were not
included in conscience from the higher mental qualities.
But to my memory this was not so, and I have read the
whole of the speeches to-day in the reporter’s notes, and I
must say I found nothing of the kind. Now we have a.
greater difficulty. How much and how many—how much
of the mental instincts, and how many of the mental faculties
—are we to class as going to make up conscience, and how
much not ? I do not pretend to make the classification.
It rests upon the person who has the burden of proof here..
I deny there has been, as yet, even an attempt at classifica
tion, and I call for some statement which shall enable me
to understand that; without it is to be foregone. Then I
had it returned upon me that I had no right to criticise this
world unless I could conceive a better. The very act of
criticism involves the conception of the better. When I
point out something insufficient or wrong, that criticism
implies the conception of something conceivably better if’
that were changed. If you want, now, an illustration of
something possibly better, I would point to the famine in
China. There, actually, millions of people are dying for
want of food, and, for the purpose of sustaining life a little
longer in themselves, the members of families are eating
their own relations. If I were God I should not tolerate
that—(applause)—nor could I worship a God who does.
Mr. Armstrong, in his speech, pointed out what he terms an
intelligent purpose. It may be for an intelligent purpose that
millions of the Chinese should die of starvation, and actually
eat one another for want of food ; but if it is, I cannot
understand the goodness of the intelligent purposer. You
cannot take one illustration and say that it is the work of an
intelligent person, and then take another and say that it is.
not. If it is the intelligence of God displayed in one caseit must be in another, unless Mr. Armstrong contends that
�57
there are a number of Gods, amongst which number there
must be a good many devils (laughter and loud applause).
There are many things of a similar kind I could point out,
and ask the same question with regard to; where is the intelli
gence of God as displayed in permitting the Bulgarian
atrocities, the Russo-Turkish war, the Greek insurrection—
or in the world nearer home, its crime, misery, and want
(hear, hear, and applause). I do not draw the same moral
from the story of the starving woman that Mr. Armstrong
would draw. While you thank God for the crime, pauperism,
misery, and poverty, I say that you are degrading yourself.
The Atheist deplores the misery, the poverty, and the crime,
and does all he can to prevent it by assisting the sufferers to
extricate themselves, instead of spending his time in blessing
and praising a God for sending the woe and attributing it to
his superior intelligence (applause). Then there was an
astounding statement which came more in the sermon part
of the speech than in the argumentative portion of it
(laughter). Perhaps that may account for the wealth of its
assumption, and also for deficiency of its basis. It was that
freedom, happiness, and virtue, through the power of God,
were continually winning their way. How is it that an intelli
gent and omnipotent God does not look after them more,
and see that they overcome opposition a little faster than
they have done ? Mr. Armstrong says that I fight shy of
experience. I don’t do anything of the kind. I fight shy of
experience which will not submit itself to any test; I fight
shy of experience which cannot bear examination and
investigation; I fight shy of such experience only. Our
friend gives us the experience of a dying girl. Now, I do
not mean to say that every religion in the world has not
been a consolation to dying people—that belief in a God
has not been a consolation to persons who have enjoyed the
full power of their mental faculties on their death-beds. Since
I was in America some time ago I saw a copy of a sermon
preached by a New York clergyman, who had attended,
what he believed to be the dying bed of an Atheist, and he
said that he hoped that Christians would learn to die as
bravely and as calmly as the Atheist seemed prepared to
die. Luckily that Atheist did not die. He is alive to
night to answer for himself (applause and hear, hear). I
don t think an illustration of personal experience in that way
can go for much. The man and woman who die in possession
of their faculties, with strong opinions, will generally die
�strong in those opinions. Men have been martyred for
false gods as well as for the one you would have me worship.
It is useless to make this kind of an appeal in a discussion,
in which there was room and need for much else. Heavenly
stars, a crown, and that kind of thing are not as certain as
they ought to be in order to be treated as material
in this discussion. And then Mr. Armstrong says what he
would do and how he would feel if he were an Atheist.
Charles Reade wrote a novel, which he entitled “ Put yourself
in his Place.” Mr. Armstrong has been trying to put him
self in the Atheist’s place, but he has not been very success
ful (hear, hear). The Atheist does not think that all the
evil which exists in this world is without remedyj he does
not think that there is no possible redemption from sorrow,
or that there is no salvation from misery (hear, hear). He
thinks and believes that the knowledge of to-day a little,
and to-morrow more, and the greater knowledge of the day
that will yet come, will help to redeem, will help to rescue
the inhabitants of this world from their miserable position ;
and further, that this is not to be in some world that is to
come, but in the world of the present, in which the salva
tion is self-worked out (loud applause). The Atheist will
not make promises of something in the future as a compen
sation for the present miseries of man. Instead of saying
that for prayers and worship the poor woman or man will
have the bread of life in future, he tries to give her and him
the strength to win bread here to sustain and preserve life as
long as it is possible to do so (applause). The diadems,
too—which our friend has to offer to the poor—which are to
be worn in heaven by those who have had no clothes here
—possess no attraction to the Atheist; therefore he does nor
offer them, but, instead, tries to develop such self-reliant
effort as may clothe and feed those who are naked and
hungry while they are here. He directs his efforts towards
human happiness in the present, and believes that in the
future humanity must be triumphant over misery, want, and
wrong (applause). A diadem of celestial glory may or may
not be a very good thing; of that I do not look upon my
self as a judge, so long as I have no belief in its possibility.
That there is much misery and suffering in the world I
know, and it rests with Mr. Armstrong to prove whether it
is better to try and remedy it here or to worship its author
in the doubtful endeavour to obtain as recompense a crown
of celestial glory (hear, hear, and applause). But which
�59
God is it that we are to worship ? Is it the Mahometan
God, or the Jewish God? Is it one of the Gods of the
Hindus ? Is it the Christian’s God ? If so, which sect of
Christians? You must not use phrases which mean
different things in different mouths (hear, hear). Then we
come to definitions, and, having objected that there was
no necessity for defining, or having objected that defining
would not make things more clear, with the skill and tact of
a practical debater, my friend goes through every word
(laughter). Prayer, we were told, has two distinct meanings.
Might I ask in which sense it was used in the first speech
made last night? You did not tell us then that prayer had
two senses. I ask why you did not tell us ? I might have
thought it was one fashion when you meant another. I ask
what meaning you meant when you used it ? What two
senses has prayer towards God ?—in which of the two senses
did you use prayer—and, knowing it had two meanings,
why did you not tell us in which sense you used it ? Then
praise, too, you said, is to thank God for his goodness; and
as you used the word many times last night you knew what
you meant by it, having relied upon it so firmly that it
seemed to be an evidence of God’s existence (applause).
By sacrifice I mean an act of real cowardice. The coward
does not dare to pay in his own person for the wrong which
he has done, so he offers something or somebody weaker in
his stead. He tries by offering a sacrifice to avert the ven
geance which would fall—and, according to his creed,
ought to fall—upon himself. Sacrifice is the act of a
coward (applause). Offerings are of flowers, of fruits;
offerings of young animals, lambs, kids; sometimes the
offerings are things which come the nearest to their hands;
sometimes the sacrifice consists of inanimate things which
had a special value to the worshipper; sometimes the
first fruits of their fields or flocks, which they offer
to the source, as they think, of the plenty in those
fields and flocks.
In later times, offerings have got
to be much more complex; but even now you will still find
them, in modified fashions, in the Churches of England
and Rome. The mutual system is that which operates in
every form of worship which makes any sort of claim to re
ligion. The word “ worship ” was only used as a general
word which covers the whole of those forms, leaving our
friends to select and repudiate, and in any case the burden
is on Mr. Armstrong to make the meaning clear (hear,
�6o
hear). I read the whole of the speeches of last night with
out finding any repudiation or question about the definitions
I presented ; and I submit it is scarcely fair, after what has
passed, to ask me to further define them at this late stage
of the debate. I should have had no objection had it been
invited at the earliest outset (applause). Well, now, we
have worship defined as “ the energy of my soul.” Well,
but you have not explained your soul. Why do you call it
soul ? Where is its place in your body ? Is there any
thing about soul you can notice so as to enable me to know
anything at all about it ? Will you take your definition of
soul from Voltaire, whom you have quoted against me?
When you reply, will you tell us what Voltaire, Professor
Newman, Paine, or Martineau say upon the subject of God,
and in which of their writings you will find that which all
the others would accept as a definition ? You must
remember the Theist of Paine’s time is not the Theist of
to-day, and I want you to tell us what are the specific
opinions of each of those you have quoted—of Francis
William Newman, of John William Newman, of Martineau,
of Thomas Paine, of Voltaire—as to the questions I have
asked (applause). Which of the Gods is it that I am to
understand Mr. Armstrong as defending and asking me to
worship (loud applause) ?
Mr. Armstrong : Mr. Chairman, Ladies, and Gentle
men,—I am somewhat at a loss as to which of the numerous
questions I am to answer first. I shall not take them in
any logical order, but simply pick out of my note-book
the most important of them. Mr. Bradlaugh has said
that the act of criticism of the world implied the conception
of a better world. Mr. Bradlaugh has tried to describe his
conception of the better world, and I have tried in my pre
vious speeches to show that he would not make it better.
And I again submit that, instead of being better, it would
be worse (hear, hear). He says he does not draw the same
conclusion from that poor woman in the cellar that I
do. He says that while you are content to suffer, you de
grade yourself. Now, there are two kinds of content.
You may be content like the sloth or the sluggard, or you
may be content like that poor woman, who while trying to
improve her position, still remained poor to the end of her
days, and yet at the same time felt the peace of God in
her heart.
Does the belief in a God, as a fact,
make men less energetic and vigorous in improving
�6i
their own condition, or trying to improve that of
others ? I don’t believe it does (applause). I believe you
have Theists as well as Atheists, who devote their kindly
sympathies to the good of their fellow creatures. They are
content in one sense and discontent in another sense.
They have that holy discontent which makes them anxious
to remedy the world’s evil, and that content which makes
them see God, who is working from evil to good (applause).
We have been told by Mr. Bradlaugh what the Atheist will
do ; how he will give the bread of this life to the hungry
child; the Theist will do the same (applause). The
Theist will—but no, I will not institute these comparisons ;
we are each, I feel sure, striving to do our best; so I won’t
enter into comparisons (rounds of applause). He says it
is unreasonable to worship an insoluble proposition. A
proposition is a grammatical term signifying a statement,
and I am not aware that I asked anyone to worship a
statement or proposition at all. I have called upon you
to worship God (applause). He says I did not separate
the lower instincts from the higher mental qualities in
man. I do not say I did. But I did separate the lower
instincts from the voice of God in conscience. I said that
it was entirely distinct from the lower instincts in man. I
said that the voice had a right to command and rule these
lower instincts (hear, hear). He asks me which God it is
that I am preaching. I will tell you what God I ask you to
worship—the best that you can conceive, whatsoever it is
(applause). I want you all to worship the best that you can
conceive (rounds of applause). If the Hindu’s idea is the
best he can conceive, let him, by all means, worship it
(hear, hear). If the Jew’s God is the best he can imagine,
let him pay homage to it. If the Christian’s idea of God
is the highest he can conceive, let him be true to it and
worship it, and it will make him a nobler man (applause).
It is not mere names which signify in a matter of this
kind. Though each sect may give him different names,
it is still the same God (hear, hear). Mr. Bradlaugh
wants to know which of them all I uphold as God ;
which of the different types I acknowledge, or ask you
to acknowledge.
Is it the God of Martineau, of New
man, of Parker, or of whom else ? I say it is that which is
common among them all—namely, the conception of good
ness and excellence which you will find in every one
of their definitions.
It is that God which they
�62
-all recognise, and concerning which they only go wrong
when they begin to try and define it metaphysically
{hear, hear). Mr. Bradlaugh wants me to define God;
further than I have done so, I cannot. In the words of
the Athanasian Creed an attempt is made to define the undefinable. The Athanasian Creed tries to explain the whole
of that which overrules the universe instead of describing
simply that which is in relationship to you. I have always
been under the supposition that that was a practice of the
theologian which had greatly retarded the progress of the
world. Mr. Bradlaugh spoke of prayer as implying a hope
—a hope to induce God to do what he would not do with
out prayer; and he wanted to know in what sense I used
the word “prayer” in my speeches. I have not used the
word “ prayer ” without describing what I meant. At least,
I have not done so to my knowledge ; if I have, I am
sorry for it (applause). Mr. Bradlaugh says that prayer im
plies a hope of inducing God to do what he would not do
without it. For my part, I doubt whether some things
that have been called prayers, such as the prayers for the
recovery of the Prince of Wales—(loud hisses and laughter)
—for wet weather, and for fine weather, have very much
influenced the divine counsels (hear, hear and applause).
But what do I mean by prayer ? As I have said before,
the addressing of my soul to this power which I feel and
recognise above me; and the law of the answer of prayer—
and it is as much a law as any law of nature—is that they
who do thus energise themselves towards Godbecomethereby
more susceptible to the energising of God towards them. The
law is that he who energises or addresses himself towards
God, consciously, reverently, and of set purpose, thereby sets
at motion a law by which he becomes more susceptible to
God’s addressing of himself to him, and so he gains to him
self the strength, moral and spiritual, which we find in prayer
(hear, hear). Mr. Bradlaugh picked out one of the words from
his own definition of worship. By sacrifice he said he meant
the act of a man who was too cowardly to bear the result of his
own actions. As far as that definition goes, I may say I do
not include it in my idea of worship (applause). Now, sir,
I have striven to the best of my power to be precise and
clear in my words. It is true I have not dealt with the
matter from a platform purely metaphysical. lama positivist
in most things, understanding by a positivist one who founds
his philosophy on observed phenomena. I have passed out
�63
of the stage in which men believe that theological theories
will solve all the problems of the universe. I have passed
out of the stage in which Mr. Bradlaugh now is, in which
metaphysics are looked upon as the best ground of reason
ing we can have. I have passed into the stage in which
positive thought, the recognition of phenomena, is recog
nised as the best starting-point we can have from which
to get at the truth. Auguste Comte traces the progress of
the thought of the world and of the individual from the
theological stage to the metaphysical stage, and from that
to the positive stage. I invite Mr. Bradlaugh to look
at things from that stage, and to see whether he cannot
make his thoughts clearer by the use of the positive method
than by the use of the metaphysical (loud applause).
Mr. Bradlaugh : The curious thing is that I have never
used the word metaphysics, and I have offered to affirm no
proposition that does not relate to phenomena. I am as
tounded to hear that I am a metaphysician (laughter and
applause). Is it because I only used language which I can
make clear that my opponent gave me that title ? It is
because he does not use language that is related to phe
nomena that he is obliged to commend his Theism by
speaking of it as a problem which is insoluble (applause).
I have not done anything, as far as my case is concerned,
except use language relating to phenomena. Now, I have
only a few moments, and this speech will be my last in this
debate. I would, therefore, like you to see the position in
which we stand. I am told that the improvement I would
suggest would in no sense tend to virtue. I must refer again
to the state of things in China, where the members of the
same family are eating each other for want of food. Would
it not tend to virtue if their condition was remedied (ap
plause) ? I wish my friend and myself to look at things
from this point of view, and, as he is in the positive way of
thinking, let him put himself in the same state as they are,
and then ask whether an amendment of the condition
would not tend to greater virtue (renewed applause). What
God is it that we are to worship ? Oh, the God it is reasonable
to worship is the best we can conceive—but no conception has
yet been put before us. You have been told a great deal
about stars, but the more important facts and arguments
still remain unchallenged (hear, hear). Now, I am asked,
does belief in God hinder philanthropy ? Yes, when it is
held as those do hold it in some parts of the world, who.
�64
think that God has designed, in his thought and intelligence,
and for good purposes, that a famine should take place, such
as the one in China (hear, hear). There are at least people
among the Mahometans and the Hindus whose virtue has
been clearly shown to have suffered much more from religion
than from civilisation (applause). The case put as to prayer is
one which I think has something peculiar about it. We are
told first of the law of prayer, which is said to be as much
a law of nature as any other law. Well, now, by law of
nature (Mr. Armstrong : Hear, hear)—I don’t know if I am
misrepresenting you—I only mean observed order of
happening (pouring water from glass); I do not mean
that there has been some direction given that this water shall
fall, but that, given the conditions, the event ensues. Law
of nature is order of sequence or concurrence, the observed
order of phenomena. What observed order of phenomena
is there in the order of prayer ? When the prayer prays
“ himself he sets a law in motion.” Is this so? We are
told that the prayer for the recovery of the Prince of
Wales did not much tend to alter the divine counsel. Mr.
Armstrong did not tell you how he knew that.
His
own admission here proves that prayer is sometimes
offered in vain, taking the observed order of its phenomena
(hear, hear). He spoke of the holy discontent in pious
men which set them to seek to remedy evil. Holy discon
tent against the state of things which God in his intelligent
purpose has caused ! Then the holy discontent is dissatis
faction with God’s doings. How can you worship the God
with whom you are dissatisfied (applause) ? But what is the
truth of the matter ? In the early ages of the world man
saw the river angry and prayed to the river-god; but science
has dispelled the river-god, and has substituted for prayer,
weirs, locks, dykes, levels, and flood-gates (hear, hear). You
see the same thing over the face of nature wherever you go.
What you have found is this : that in the early ages of the
world gods were frightful, gods were monstrous, gods were
numerous, because ignorance predominated in the minds of
men. The things they came in contact with were not under
stood, and no investigation then took place ; men wor
shipped. But gradually men learned first dimly, then more
clearly, and god after god has been demolished as science
has grown. The best attempt at conception of God is
always the last conception of him, and this because God
has to give way to science. The best conception of God is
�65
in substituting humanity for deity, the getting rid of, and
turning away from, the whole of those conceptions and
fancies which men called God in the past, and which they
have ceased to call God now (applause). Mr. Armstrong
thought that it was because men had given different names to
God that I tried to embarrass him by bidding him choose
between them. It was not so; it is the different characteristics
and not the different names that I pointed out as a difficulty.
We have gods of peace, gods of war, gods of love, a god of
this people, or of that tribe, a god of the Christians, a
god of misery, of terror, of beneficence—these are all
different suppositions held by men of the gods they have
created. It has well been said that the gods have not
created the men, but the men have created the gods, and
you can see the marks of human handicraft in each divine
lineament (applause). I cannot hope, pleading here to
night, to make many converts. I can and do hope that all
of you will believe that the subject treated wants examina
tion far beyond the limits of this short debate. I have a very
good hopeindeed,and reallybelieve thatsome good has been
done when it can be shown that two men of strong opinions,
and earnest in their expressions, can come together without
one disrespectful word to each other, or want of respect in
any way; without any want of due courtesy to the other;
and with a great desire to separate the truth and the false
hood (applause). If there has been unwittingly anything
disrespectful on my part, I am sorry for it. I have to thank
Mr. Armstrong for coming forward in the manner in which
he has done, and I can only ask all to use their services in
making the spread of virtue, truth, and justice easier than
it has been. I am aware that I have nominally a vast
majority against me, but I do not fear on that ground, and
still shall continue to point out falsehood wherever I may
find it. At any rate, the right of speech is all I ask, and
that you have conceded. I have only an earnest endeavour
to find out as much as I can that will be useful to my
fellows, and to tell them as truly as I can how much I
grasp. It is for you—-with the great harvest of the unreaped
before you—who can do more than I, to gather and show
what you have gathered; it is for you who have more truth
to tell it more efficiently; and when you answer me I put it
to you that so far as the world has redeemed itself at all, it
has only redeemed itself by shaking off in turn the Theistic
religions which have grown and decayed. So far, it seems
c
�to be a real and solid redemption (applause). When re
ligion was supreme through the ignorance of men, the people
were low down indeed, and a few devoted men had to
grapple with the hereafter theory and all the content with
present wrong which the belief in it maintained. Take a
few hundred years ago, when there was little or no scepticism
in the world. Only a very few able to be heretical—the mass
unable and too weak to doubt or endure doubt. Look at the
state of things then, and look at it now. Could a discussion
like this have taken place then ? No. But it can since the print
ing-press has helped us; it can since the right of speech has
been in good part won. Two hundred years ago it could not
have been. Two hundred years ago I could not have got the
mass of people together to listen as you have listened last night
and to-night, and had not men treated your religion as I treat it,
we should not have therightof meeting even now (applause)’
If you want to convince men like myself, hear us; answer
us if you can—say what you have to say without making it
more bitter than we can bear. We must believe it if it is
reasonable, and if not we must reject it. So long as there
is any wrong to redeem we shall try to redeem it our■selves (applause). We may be wrong in this, but at
least we do our part.
I do not mean that in the same
ranks as my friend there are not men as sincere and as earnest,
men as devoted, men as human-redemption seeking as myself,
but I, or the best of those for whom I plead, urge that their
humanity is not the outcome of their theology (applause).
Then their experience of right, their hope of life, and their
experience of truth rest entirely on what they do here. And
I will ask you this : do you not think it is quite possible, as
Lessing says, that he who thinks he grasps the whole truth
may not even grasp it at all ? like the one deceived by the
juggler's trick, he may think he holds something in his hand,
but when it is opened it is empty (hear, hear). Take the
truth as you can—not from me, not from him, not from any
one man. There is none of the bad which is all bad, none of
the good all good, none of the truth all true: it is for you to
select, to weigh, to test for yourselves (hear, hear). Many
of us stumble in trying to carry the torch in dark places in
the search for truth, but even in our trembling steps the
sparks we scatter may enable some to find the grains of truth
we miss ourselves (loud and prolonged applause).
Mr. Armstrong : Mr. Bradlaugh, the body to which I
belong also have the majority against them; over that
�we can shake hands. Let us try, each in our own way, as
may best seem to us, to serve what we hold to be true (ap
plause). Depend upon it, whether there be a God or
not, we each shall do best so. If there be no God, then
you tell me I shall still do well to serve humanity. And
if there be a God, he will gather you also, my brother, to
his arms, so long as you are true—true and absolutely sincere
in those convictions which come to you from the reason
which he has given you (loud applause). You have
told us that while religion held sway men were down-trodden.
While superstition held sway it is true they were (applause) ;
while false ideas of a cruel and lustful God held sway, it is
true they were (applause); but just in proportion as men’s
thoughts of Godt have purified and clarified, just in pro
portion as they have restored to Christianity its sweet
meaning, just in that proportion religion has risen to be a
power in the world of all that is good and sweet and holy
(applause). Now, sir, to speak of what I said about the
prayers for the recovery of the Prince of Wales. I said I
thought they had been of little avail.
But the prayer for
spiritual purity from a Christian man does win its answer by
a law—a law of nature, I will now say, since you have defined .
a law of nature as the observed sequence of phenomena;
but I dared not so call it until I knew what your definition
■of nature might be. But let us come back from these philo.sophisings, in which it is so easy to go wrong, to the test of
experience. Mr. Bradlaugh says I do not submit the ex
periences of which I have spoken, to the test. I invite you to
test them, and see whether Mr. Bradlaugh has upset them
or not. If you test them fairly and then find them false,
then come and tell me so. They are neither uncommon
nor abnormal experiences, but the experiences of nearly every
man and woman. It may be that their hearing is dull, but
still they know the voice. You all know those in which the
initiative comes from God, the voice of conscience, of which
I spoke ; you all know the solemn feeling which comes over
you in the presence of the majesty of nature. You all may know
the other things in which you have to take the initiative.
Heed those things whether you believe they come from God
or not, and you all may know the other—that of worship
—and its answer. My contention solely is, that it would
be reasonable for you to seek for that experience, that it is
reasonable in us to practise it (hear, hear). And now I will
tell you a little story for the end of this debate, of a little
�68
family of children; and as I shall not found any argument upon
. it, I do not think it will be unfair. They sat one Christ
mas Eve in a chamber where the wintry gloom of early
twilight fell. The eldest son sat and talked of the good
ness of their father, and how, from the earliest days he
could recollect, his tenderness had sheltered him, and how
he seemed to have a heart to love every little child all
through the world, and how he was surely even now prepar
ing some sweet surprise for them every one But John, the
second boy, had lived all his life at a school on the far sea
coast, where he had been sent, that rough ocean breezes might
strengthen his weakly frame, and now, tanned and burly,
he had just come home for Christmas, and he had not even,
seen his father yet. And he said he did not believe they
had a father ; that Theophilus, declaring he had seen him,
was nothing to him, for if there was one thing he had learned
at school, it was not to trust the experience of other people
till tested by his own. But Edward said he, too, knew they
had a father; he, too, had seen him, but he was very stern,
and he thought they could all do as well without him, and
what could be more unkind than to leave them there in
. twilight solitude on Christmas Eve. And little Tom sat
apart in the very darkest corner of the room, with a tearstained face, crying as if his heart would break, over
the hard sums set him there to do, and thinking that
his brothers were a selfish lot of fellows, to talk and talk, and.
not care for him and his hard task. And Theophilus had
just come to steal his arm around little Tom’s waist, and dry
his tears, and try if he could not help him to do his sum,
when the door of the next room was thrown open and a
blaze of light flashed upon their faces, and one after the other
they all rushed in and beheld their father standing by such a
glorious Christmas-tree as boys never beheld before. And
for each and all there were gifts so rare and precious—the
very things they had longed for all the by-gone half. And for
John, who had been so far away and had not known his father,
there was a grasp of the father’s hand so strong and tender,
and a kiss from the father’s lips so sweet and loving, that he
felt as if he had known that dear father all his life ; and as
for little Tom, all his tears were dissolved in rippling
laughter, and he quite lorgot his sum, for on his brow was
set the brightest coronet on all the tree, and they told him
he should be king through all the long Christmasday to follow. And now, dear friends, may the peace of
�69
God which passeth all understanding, that peace which the
perishing things of the world can neither give nor take away,
that peace promised to the weary by our dear brother,
Jesus Christ, even in the midst of all his suffering and woe,
be with you for ever. Amen (applause).
Mr. Armstrong having sat down, rose again and said,
—And now, Mr. Chairman, I desire to move to you the
hearty thanks of this meeting for your conduct in the chair,
for your impartial manner of ruling over us, and the kind
words you have spoken. I thank you, Mr. Bradlaugh, for
the courtesy and fairness with which you have conducted
your part in this debate; and I thank you, sir, for presiding
over us (applause).
Mr. Bradlaugh : I second that motion. I cannot say
that we can thank you for your fairness, for, fortunately, you
have had no opportunity of showing it. But I thank you most
heartily for accepting a position which might have been one
of great difficulty and the taking of which may cause you
to be misrepresented. I also thank Mr. Armstrong for having
met me, and for the kindly manner in which he has spoken
(applause).
The vote of thanks was put and carried unanimously.
The Chairman : Ladies and Gentlemen,—the thanks
which have been given to me are due rather to the gentle
men who have spoken. I cannot but praise the admirable
way in which they have rendered my position almost a
sinecure. This debate has shown that a subject of such
great importance can be discussed fairly, liberally, honestly,
as this has been, and that no danger threatens him who
occupies the chair, or those who lay their honest and earnest
views before you. I feel that I have derived much know
ledge from the truth which has been laid before us ; and I
do feel that there is a growing interest in things of this
sort, which is itself a proof that discussions of this kind are
very useful (applause).
�•wk
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Dublin Core
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Title
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Victorian Blogging
Description
An account of the resource
A collection of digitised nineteenth-century pamphlets from Conway Hall Library & Archives. This includes the Conway Tracts, Moncure Conway's personal pamphlet library; the Morris Tracts, donated to the library by Miss Morris in 1904; the National Secular Society's pamphlet library and others. The Conway Tracts were bound with additional ephemera, such as lecture programmes and handwritten notes.<br /><br />Please note that these digitised pamphlets have been edited to maximise the accuracy of the OCR, ensuring they are text searchable. If you would like to view un-edited, full-colour versions of any of our pamphlets, please email librarian@conwayhall.org.uk.<br /><br /><span><img src="http://www.heritagefund.org.uk/sites/default/files/media/attachments/TNLHLF_Colour_Logo_English_RGB_0_0.jpg" width="238" height="91" alt="TNLHLF_Colour_Logo_English_RGB_0_0.jpg" /></span>
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Conway Hall Library & Archives
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2018
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Conway Hall Ethical Society
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Is it reasonable to worship God?
Creator
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Armstrong, R.A. [Rev.]
Bradlaugh, Charles
Description
An account of the resource
Place of publication: London
Collation: 69 p. ; 18 cm.
Notes: Verbatim report of two nights' debate at Nottingham between the Rev. R. A. Armstrong and Charles Bradlaugh. Inscription in ink: "Mr M.D. Conway, with RAA's kind regards." From the library of Dr Moncure Conway.
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Freethought Publishing Company
Date
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1878
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CT78
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<a href="http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/mark/1.0/"><img src="http://i.creativecommons.org/p/mark/1.0/88x31.png" alt="Public Domain Mark" /></a><span> </span><br /><span>This work ("Is it reasonable to worship God?"), identified by </span><a href="https://conwayhallcollections.omeka.net/items/show/www.conwayhall.org.uk"><span>Humanist Library and Archives</span></a><span>, is free of known copyright restrictions.</span>
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Text
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English
Subject
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Atheism
Free Thought
Theism
Apologetics
Atheism
Conway Tracts
Free Thought-Controversial Literature
Religious Disputations
Theism
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Title
A name given to the resource
Victorian Blogging
Description
An account of the resource
A collection of digitised nineteenth-century pamphlets from Conway Hall Library & Archives. This includes the Conway Tracts, Moncure Conway's personal pamphlet library; the Morris Tracts, donated to the library by Miss Morris in 1904; the National Secular Society's pamphlet library and others. The Conway Tracts were bound with additional ephemera, such as lecture programmes and handwritten notes.<br /><br />Please note that these digitised pamphlets have been edited to maximise the accuracy of the OCR, ensuring they are text searchable. If you would like to view un-edited, full-colour versions of any of our pamphlets, please email librarian@conwayhall.org.uk.<br /><br /><span><img src="http://www.heritagefund.org.uk/sites/default/files/media/attachments/TNLHLF_Colour_Logo_English_RGB_0_0.jpg" width="238" height="91" alt="TNLHLF_Colour_Logo_English_RGB_0_0.jpg" /></span>
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Conway Hall Library & Archives
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2018
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Conway Hall Ethical Society
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The myth of the resurrection
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Besant, Annie Wood [1847-1933]
Description
An account of the resource
Place of publication: London
Collation: 133-144 p. ; 19 cm.
Series title: Atheistic Platform
Series number: No. 9
Notes: Extensive annotations in ink. Short pieces from other journals or pamphlets cut out and stuck in. Donated by Mr Garvey. Publisher's series list on preliminary pages. Printed by Annie Besant and Charles Bradlaugh, 63 Fleet Street, London.
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Freethought Publishing Company
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1884
Identifier
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G5084
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Christianity
Atheism
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Text
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English
Atheism
Resurrection
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(V
national secular society
Qlatfarivi.
XII.
WHY SHOULD
I ATHEISTS BE
PERSECUTED?
BY
ANNIE
BESANT.
LONDON:
FREETHOUGHT
PUBLISHING
63, FLEET STREET, E.C.
1 8 84.
PRICE
ONE
PENNY.
COMPANY,
�THE ATHEISTIC PLATFORM.
Under this title is being issued a fortnightly publi
cation, each number of which consists of a lecture
delivered by a well-known Freethought advocate. Any
question may be selected, provided that it has formed the
subject of a lecture delivered from the platform by an
Atheist. It is desired to show that the Atheistic platform
is used for the service of humanity, and that Atheists war
against tyranny of every kind, tyranny of king and god,
political, social, and theological.
Each issue consists of sixteen pages, and is published at
one penny. Each writer is responsible only for his or her
own views.
1. —“ What is the use of Prayer ? ” By Annie Besant.
2. —“ Mind considered as a Bodily Function.” By At,tor
Bradlaugh.
3. —“ The Gospel of Evolution.” By Edward Aveling,
D.Sc.
4. —“England’s Balance-Sheet.” By Charles Bradlaugh.
5. —“ The Story of the Soudan.” By Annie Besant.
6. —“ Nature and the Gods.” By Arthur B. Moss.
These Six, in Wrapper, Sixpence.
7.—“ Some Objections to Socialism.” By Charles Bradlaugh.
8. —“Is Darwinism Atheistic ?” By Charles Cockbill
Cattell.
9. —“The Myth of the Resurrection.” By Annie
Besant.
10. —“ Does Royalty Pay ? ” By George Standring.
11. —“ The Curse of Capital.” By Edward Aveling, D.Sc.
Part II. of the “Atheistic Platform,” containing Lec
tures 7—12 can be had in paper wrapper, Price Sixpence.
Also Parts I. and II., bound in one, forming a book of
192 pages, can be had, price One Shilling.
�WHY SHOULD ATHEISTS BE
PEESECUTED ?
Friends,—In. the old days, when Christianity was feeble
and Paganism was strong, when Christians had to plead
to Pagans for toleration as Atheists have to plead to Chris
tians now, Christians from time to time pnt forth an
Apology for their faith. Thus Justin Martyr pleaded
before the Emperor Antoninus, and other Apologies are to
be found in the literature of the early Christian Church.
The word Apology was not used in its modern sense of
excuse, of submissive phrase; it was an Apologia, a
defence of the faith believed in, a vindication of the
principles held. To-day, I Atheist, in a Christian com
munity, stand as did the Christian in the second century in
a Pagan society ; and I put forth an Apologia, a defence, a
vindication of my faith. Faith, in the noblest sense of that
much-abused word, for it is a belief based on reason, in
tellectually satisfying, morally regulative, socially re
formatory.
I will take it for granted, for the purposes of this lec
ture, that the majority of you present here—as of the
wider public outside—-belong to the religion known as
Christian. It is to Christians that this vindication of
Atheism is addressed, and my aim in this lecture is a welldefined one; I am not going to ask from you any agree
ment in my speculative views; I am not going to try to
convince you that Atheism is speculatively accurate ; I am
only going to propose to you, and to answer in the nega
tive, the following question : Granted an Atheist or a small
number of Atheists, in a Christian community, is there any
reason why he or they should be persecuted, for the intel
lectual, moral, or social doctrines held and published ? Is
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THE ATHEISTIC PLATFORM.
there anything in Atheism, in its intellectual speculations,
in its moral teaching, in its social theories, which makes it
dangerous to the prosperity, progress and well-being of
the society in which it is professed ?
Such is the question I propose to you. I of course shall
answer it in the negative, and shall try to show you that
whether Atheistic speculations be true or false, the Athe
istic spirit isl of vital importance to society. And at the
very outset let me remind you of the remarkable testi
mony borne to the social aspect of Atheism by the great
philosopher Bacon: ‘‘Atheism leaves a man to sense, to
philosophy, to natural piety, to laws, to reputation, all of
which may be guides to an outward moral virtue, though
religion were not; but superstition dismounts all these and
erecteth an absolute monarchy in the mind of men; there
fore Atheism never did perturb States, for it makes men
wary of themselves, as looking no further ; and we see the
times inclined to Atheism, as the times of Augustus Csesar,
were civil times; but superstition has been the confusion
of many States.” Yet though he thus wrote, Bacon was
not an Atheist, for he said (I here quote from memory):
“A little knowledge inclineth a man to Atheism, but
deeper search brings him back to religion.” These are
not, therefore, the words of the Atheist on his own behalf,
but the testimony of an opponent who has studied the his
tory of the past.
Strange, indeed, it is to those who know that record of
history to remark how Superstition is condoned to-day,
while Atheism is condemned. The wildest vagaries of
Superstition are excused, while the very word Atheism is
held to connote immorality. Take the Salvation Army ; it
may shut up young lads and lasses for an “ all-night ser
vice,” in which they “creep for Jesus” in a hall with
locked doors; when the natural result follows of gross
immorality, excuses are made for the leaders that “their
motives are good.” But let a man be known as an Atheist,
and though his life be spotless, his honor unstained, his
integrity unsoiled, there is no slander too vile to be be
lieved of him, no libel too baseless or too foul to be credited
about his character. Superstition has lighted stakes, built
Inquisitions, turned the wheels of the rack, made red-hot
the pincers to tear men’s flesh, has slaughtered, tormented,
burned and ravaged, till the pages of her history are
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181
blotted with, tears and drip with, blood. Atheism, has slain
none, tortured none; yet men welcome the cubs of the
wolf that will prey on them, and hunt down the watch-dog
that would protect.
1. Is there anything in Atheism in its intellectual aspect
which should make-it mischievous to society ? To answer
this part of the question we must analyse the Atheistic
type of mind and seek its chief and essential character
istic. If you do this you will, I think, find that the
Atheistic mind is essentially of the challenging, the
questioning, the investigating type. It is of that type
which will not accept a thing because it is old, nor believe
it because it is venerable. It demands to understand before
it admits, to be convinced before it believes. Authority,
qua authority, it does not respect; the authority must
prove itself to be based on reason and on knowledge before
cap may be doffed to it or knee bent in homage. Nor is
this questioning silenced by an answer that really leaves
unresolved the problem. The Atheistic spirit remains un
satisfied until it has reached, to use an expressive Ameri
canism, “the bed-rock” of the matter in hand. If an
answer is not to be had, the Atheistic spirit can contentedly
keep its opinion in suspense, but cannot believe.
Now there is no doubt that this type of mind—which is
in the psychical world like the explorer in the physical—is
one which is very unpleasant to the mentally lazy, and
unfortunately the majority, even in a civilised land, is
composed of mentally lazy people. Words are very loosely
used by most folk, and they are apt to be angry when they
are forced, by questioning, to try and think what they really
do mean by the phrases they employ as a matter of course.
We all know how impatient foolish mothers and nurses
grow with a child’s ceaseless questions. A bright, healthy,
intelligent child is always asking questions, and if it is
unlucky enough to live among careless, thoughtless people,
it too often happens that, unable to answer fully, and too
conceited to say “I do not know,” the elder person will
give it a slap, and tell it not to be so tiresome. The Atheist
questioner meets with similar treatment; society, too ig
norant, or too lazy to grapple with his enquiries, gives him
a slap and puts him in the corner.
None the less is this challenging, questioning type of the
most priceless value to society. Without it, progress is
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THE ATHEISTIC PLATFORM.
impossible. _ Without it every childish superstition would
be immortal, every mouldy tradition would reign for ever
over men. And the challenge is useful, whether addressed
to truth or to falsehood. It injures no truth. A truth is
vindicated by enquiry ; those who hold a truth only become
more certain of it when questioning forces them to re
examine the grounds on which it rests. But a lie perishes
under investigation as a moth shrivels in the flame.
Progress can be made only by re-affirming truth known,
by discovering truth hitherto unknown, and by destroying
ancient falsehoods. Hence the value to society of the
challenging Atheistic type, whether its speculations be
right or wrong.
Professor Tyndall has proclaimed in noble words his pre
ference for intellectual effort, rather than for intellectual
sleep. In his celebrated Presidential Address at the meet
ing of the British Association at Belfast, he said, dealing
with his own views, and in warning to his hearers : “ As
regards myself, they are not the growth of a day; and as
regards you, I thought you ought to know the environment
which, with or without your consent, is rapidly surrounding
you, and in relation to which some adjustment on your
part may be necessary. A hint of Hamlet’s, however,
teaches us all how the troubles of common life may be
ended; and it is perfectly possible for you and me to
purchase intellectual peace at the price of intellectual
death. The world is not without refugees of this
description; nor is it wanting in persons who seek
their shelter, and try to persuade others to do the
same. The unstable and the weak have yielded, and
will yield to this’ persuasion, and they to whom repose is
sweeter than the truth. But I would exhort you to refuse
the offered shelter and to scorn the base repose—to accept,
if the choice be forced upon you, commotion before stag
nation, the leap of the torrent before the stillness of the
swamp.”
It is this leap of the torrent which the Atheist faces,
feeling that he can better breast the rapids, even if drown
ing be the penalty, than float idly on down the lazy
current of popular opinion. To “ refuse the offered shelter
and to scorn the base repose” is to show the martyr-spirit
that welcomes death rather than dishonor, and the noblest
faith in Truth that man can have is proved when he flings
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183
himself into the billows of fact, let them cast him up on
what shore they may.
Well was it said by a noble and earnest thinker that
Atheism was oft-times “ the truest trust in Truth.” A
legend says that in a pagan land a God was worshipped,
at whose shrine was sacrificed all that was most precious
and most beloved. At last, revolt was made against the
hideous deity, and one man, young and brave, stood forth
to challenge the wrath of the mighty God. Round the
statue of the deity stood thousands of his worshippers; amid
■dead silence walked forth the heroic youth, a javelin in his
hand. Face to face he stood with the God, and poising his
weapon, he cried aloud: “God, if God thou be, answer
with thy thunderbolt the spear I fling! ” And as he spoke,
the strong right arm launched the javelin, and it struck full
and fair, and quivered in the heart of the God. An awful
silence fell on the crouching multitude, as they waited for the
lightning which should flash out in answer to the insult.
But lo! there was none, nor any that regarded, and the
silence brooded unbroken over the pierced statue, and the
blasphemer who had defied the God. There was silence.
Then, a long breath of relief ; then, a cry of rapture ; and
the crowd who had knelt flung itself on the riven statue
and only a heap of dust told where a God had been. Athe
ist was that bold challenger, that questioner of a long-held
faith; and he freed his nation from the yoke of a spectre,
and shivered one of the superstitions of his time. Atheist
is each who challenges an ancient folly, and who, greatly
daring, sets his life as wager against a lie.
This same questioning spirit, applied to the God-idea,
has given Atheism its distinctive name. It finds the God
idea prevalent and it challenges it. It does not deny, but
it “wants to know” before it accepts, it demands proof
before it believes. The orthodox say: “Do you believe
in God?” The Atheist answers: “What is God? You
must tell me what you believe in, ere I can answer your
question.” And then arises the difficulty, for the word
“God” is used “rather to hide ignorance, than to express
knowledge ” (Bradlaugh), and the worshipper anathema
tises the Atheist because he does not adore that which he
himself cannot explain or define.
Sometimes the Atheist analyses the metaphysical defi
nitions of God and finds them meaningless. One instance
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THE ATHEISTIC PLATFORM.
will here serve as well as a dozen. Take the phrase that
“ God is Absolute Being.” Bnt, says Dean Mansel, in his
famous Bampton lectures (2nd. Ed., pp. 44, 45, 49), “ by
the Absolute is meant that which exists in, and by itself,
having no necessary relation to any other being............
That which is conceived as absolute and infinite, must be
conceived as containing within itself the sum, not only of
all actual, but of all possible modes of being. Eor if any
actual mode can be denied of it, it is related to that mode,
and limited by it; and if any possible mode can be
denied of it, it is capable of becoming more than it
now is, and such a capability is a limitation...............
The absolute cannot be conceived as conscious, neither
can it be conceived as unconscious; it cannot be con
ceived as complex, neither can it be conceived as simple ;
it cannot be conceived by difference, neither can it be
conceived by the absence of difference; it cannot be
identified with the universe, neither can it be distin
guished from it.” Such is the description of the Abso
lute, given by a great Christian philosopher. If then
by knowledge or by worship I enter into a relation with
God, I at once destroy him as the Absolute. If he be Ab
solute Existence, he is for ever unknowable to man. Why
should the Atheist be persecuted because he refuses either
to affirm or to deny that which by the definition of the'
believer cannot be known or distinguished ?
Pass from metaphysics, and take God as “the First
Cause.” “Every effect must have a cause, and therefore
the universe must have a creator.” Will you kindly tell
me, ere I examine your argument, what you mean by the
word “effect” ? Only one definition can be given : some
thing that results from a cause. “Everything that results
from a cause must have a cause.” Granted. “ Therefore
the universe must have a creator.” Stop, not so fast.
You must show that the universe is an effect, i.e., that it
results from a cause, before you can logically make this
statement, and that is the very point you set out to prove.
You are begging the very question in dispute. Besides
if your argument were valid, it would go too far, for then
behind your creator of the universe, you would need a
creator of the creator, and so on backwards ad infinitum.
The truth is that in speaking of causation we must keep
within the realm of experience; we might as well try to
�WHY SHOULD ATHEISTS BE PERSECUTED ?
185-
plumb the mid-Atlantic with a five-fathom line, as try to
fathom the mystery of existence with our brief experi
mental sounding lead. Christians believe where their
knowledge ends; Atheists suspend their judgments and
wait for light.
“God is the designer of the world, and it shows the
marks of his handiwork.” Did he design the beast of
prey, the carnivorous plant, the tape-worm, the tsetze?
did he design that life should be sustained by slaughter,,
and the awful struggle for existence ? did he design the
pestilence and the famine, the earthquake and the volcanic
eruption ? Is “Nature, red in tooth and claw with ravin,”
the work of all-loving God ?
“God is all-good.” Then whence comes evil? As
long as man has thought, he has wearied himself over the
problem of the existence of evil in the work of an all-good
God. If evil be as eternal as good, then the Persian view
of the co-equal powers of darkness and light as fashioners
of the world is more rational than the Christian. If it be
not eternal, if there were a time when only God existed
and he was good, then evil can only have resulted from
his creative will, and sustained approval. Man Friday’s
question, “Why does not God kill the Devil? ” puts in a
concrete form the problem that no Christian philosopher
has ever solved. The scientific student recognises the
nature and the reason for what we call evil; the Christian
gazes with hopeless bewilderment at the marring of the
work of his all good and almighty God.
Further; from his examination of the many Gods of
the world, the Atheist comes to the conclusion that they
are man-made. The God of every nation is in the same
stage of civilisation as is the nation itself. Such variety
would be incredible if there were an entity behind the
fancy. Compare the God of the savage and of the
European philosopher; the savage worships a concrete
being, brutal, bloody, ferocious as himself; the philoso
pher an abstract idea, a tendency “not ourselves, which
makes for righteousness.” Is there one reality which is
worshipped by the King of Dahomey and by Matthew
Arnold ? In face of such varieties what can the Atheist
think but that “ God” is the reflexion of man, an image
not an object ?
The Atheist waits for proof of God. Till that proof
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THE ATHEISTIC PLATFORM.
■comes he remains, as his name implies, without God. His
mind is open to every new truth, after it has passed the
warder Reason at the gate. AR his hope for a true theory
■of the world is fixed on Science, Science which has written
for us the only trustworthy record of the past, and which
is daily writing new pages of the book of knowledge.
What is there in all this to make men persecute the
Atheist ? In this intellectual attitude there is surely no
■crime. Some people say that Atheists lack a sense possessed
by others, in that they do not intuit God, as blind men
lack the vision others enjoy. Suppose it be so, is that any
reason for persecuting them ? Do the people who can see
try to hunt down those who are blind ? I could understand
their pitying us if they possess a joy we do not share, but
I cannot understand their wanting to make us suffer be
cause we are bereft of a faculty enjoyed by them. And
indeed I believe that the noblest and best Christians thus
regard the matter, and regard Atheists with generous
sorrow, not with hatred. But the vast majority have but
little faith in God and little love to man. Our outspoken
unbelief stirs the hidden doubts which lie in their own
minds, and they fear lest we should wake them into activi
ty. They want to believe, because belief is easy and un
belief hard, belief is profitable and unbelief dangerous, and
so they hate and persecute those whose courage is a reproach
to their cowardice. It is not Christian faith nor Christian
truth that incites to modern persecution; it is Christian
hypocrisy and Christian doubt.
Turn from the intellectual to the moral aspect of Atheism
and it is on this that the bitterest attacks are made. Athe
ism being without God, it must seek in man the basis for
its moral code,' and being without immortality it must find
its motives and its sanctions on this side the grave. Athe
istic morality must be founded on man as a social being,
■and must be built up by observation and reflexion. Clearly,
then, it must be Utilitarian; that is, it must set before it
Happiness as the obj ect of life; all that, generally practised,
tends to increase the general happiness is Right; all that,
generally practised, tends to decrease the general happiness
is Wrong.
To this theory the objection is often raised that Virtue
and not Happiness should be the end of life. But what
are virtues save those qualities which tend to produce
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187
happiness, vices those which tend to produce misery and
social disorganisation ? If murder strengthened respect
for human life ; if falsehood increased confidence between
man and man; if love and trust and purity shattered the
society in which they flourished; in a word if virtue made
society miserable while vice raised and ennobled it, do you
think that vice would long be stamped with social disap
proval ? Men are unconsciously Utilitarian, and what is
•called virtue is the means to the end, happiness. By the
Law of Association the means and the end become joined
in thought, and the longing for the end brings about love
of the means.
Let me illustrate what I mean by a case in which pre
judice is less felt than in that of virtue and happiness.
Money is valuable as a means to all it can purchase; when
a man earns and saves money, he earns and saves it not
for itself but for all which he can procure with it. The
little bits of gold and silver have no value in themselves ;
they are valuable only for the comfort, the enjoyment, the
leisure which they symbolise. Yet sometimes the means,
money, takes the place of the end it is generally used to
procure, and the miser, forgetting the end, sets his heart
on the means for itself, and he loves the coins and gathers
them together and heaps them up, and denies himself all
money could buy for the sake of hoarding the gold. In
similar fashion have men learned to love virtue, first for
the sake of the happiness it brought, and then by natural
transition for itself.
But, it is said, the renunciation of personal happiness is
often right; how can Utilitarianism be consistent with the
noblest of human virtues, self-sacrifice. When is the
renunciation of personal happiness right ? WTien the re
nunciation of happiness by one renders needless the renun
ciation of happiness by many; that is, when it tends to the
general good. The man who sacrifices himself for nothing
is a lunatic; he who sacrifices himself to save others from
suffering is a hero. The individual suffers loss, but the
general good is increased.
A curious volte-face is often made by our antagonists.
After declaring that Utilitarianism is low and selfish, they
suddenly assert that the Utilitarian motive is too high to
affect ordinary folk. The “ general good,” they say, is
too vague and abstract a thing to be used for moralising
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THE ATHEISTIC PLATFORM.
the populace. I deny it. If a man is exceptionally de
graded, you may find your only appeal must be to himself
or to his immediate surroundings, but the great majority
answer to a wider summons, as do plants to the sunlight.
For your lowest type of man you must use selfish motives,
but even with him you may endeavor to at least touch him
with family, if not with social claims, and so gradually
train him to regard himself as a unit in a community rather
than as an isolated existence. Penalty must educate the
lowest types into recognition of social duty, but the ma
jority of civilised mankind respond to a higher call. And
that this is so we may prove by a mere appeal to statistics.
The Atheists, with no fear of hell nor hope of heaven, with
only the general good as motive and social happiness as
aim, contribute fewer, in proportion to their number, to
the criminal classes, than does any Christian sect, with all
the supposed advantages of Christianity. If Atheism be
morally dangerous to Society, why should Atheism have a
cleaner record than that of any Christian body ?
I ask again : What is there in our Atheistic Utilitarian
code of morals that should justify our persecution ? It
tends to make us seek the happiness of Society in pre
ference to our own, and to put the general before our
individual good. Christians who look to be rewarded for
their goodness may scoff at our disinterestedness, but at
least it does not injure them, and they lose nothing because
we seek not a crown on the other side the grave. To us
“ Virtue is its own reward ; ” we sing with Alfred Tenny
son, ere he sank into a Baron :
“ Glory of warrior, glory of orator, glory of song,
Paid with a voice flying by to be lost on an endless sea—•
Glory of virtue to fight, to struggle, to right the wrong—
Nay, but she aimed not at glory, no lover of glory she;
Give her the glory of going on, and still to be.”
But is there anything in the social views of theAtheist which may, perchance, justify his ostracism ? And
here, at last, we shall come to the crux of our difficulty.
The Atheist, being without God, cannot recognise as
Divine the present order of Society; he claims happinessfor all, and he sees one portion of Society rioting in luxury
while another is steeped in penury; at one end of the
social scale he sees men so wealthy that they cannot even
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189
waste fast enough the riches they own, while at the other
men are so poor that they cannot even feel sure whence
shall come their next week’s food; he notes that the
wealthiest are the idlest, while the poorest are the most
laborious; that those who produce least consume most,
while those who produce most consume least; and he
demands social reconstruction.
No one with a brain and a heart can contrast the dif
ferent conditions into which the children of the rich and
the poor are born, and remain satisfied with Society as it
is. The rich man’s child is born into pure air, into healthy
surroundings; its food is carefully suited to its delicate
organs; its clothes vary with the changes of the weather ;
the most watchful care fosters and cherishes it; as its
faculties expand it is guarded from every injurious influ
ence ; it is coaxed along the right road; all good is made
easy and attractive to it, all evil difficult and repulsive;
the best education is given to the growing lad that money
can buy; body and brain are alike tended and developed ;
in manhood, life’s prizes are open to him, and if he plunges
into crime he does it from an inborn tendency that no
purity of environment has been able to eradicate.
Now contrast the case of the child born into some filthy
overcrowded den in a thieves’ quarter. Its father is a
burglar, its mother a harlot. It is born into squalor, and
foul air, and noisome surroundings; 'its mother’s milk is
gin-polluted; its clothes are filthy rags ; its education con
sists of kicks and curses; foul language is its grammar,
foul thoughts its mental, food; crime is a necessity of its
life; there is no possibility open to it save the reeking
court and the gaol.
The case of the child of the honest but poor worker is
far other than this, but it is not what it should be. The
family is but too often overcrowded and underfed; the
father is over-burdened with wage-winning; the mother
over-sharpened with anxiety; education is rushed through;
work comes too early in life; and while dauntless courage,
unwearying patience and mighty brain power may raise
the poor man’s son into prominence, he can only win by
most exceptional endowment that which comes to the rich
man’s son by chance of birth. Again I say, that looking
at these tremendous inequalities, the Atheist must demand
social reconstruction.
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THE ATHEISTIC PLATFORM.
And first, he declares that every adult member of society
should be a worker, that none should live who does not
labor. There is a certain amount of work to be done, and
if some shoulders bear none of the burden, others must
bear more than ought fairly to fall to their lot. If an
idle class exists in a community, an over-worked class
must exist to balance it. The Christian declares that
labor is a curse ; the Atheist that labor is a good; neither
brain nor muscle can be developed without exercise, and
both mental and physical effort are necessary for the due
growth of man. Even the idle classes recognise that
physical exertion is necessary for physical strength, and
there is no reason why the muscle developed by them in
games, should not be developed equally well, and with
equal physical enjoyment, in useful work. I do not want
to see games abolished, but I do want to see them more
equally distributed. All would be the better if the athletic
“ aristocrat ” spent some of his strength in labor, and the
artisan some of his in sport.
Further, the Atheist declares that each should have time
of leisure. Without leisure, no mental improvement is
possible. If a man is wearied out physically, he is not fit
to toil mentally, and only as all take their share of work
can all enjoy their share of leisure. Those who make
society’s wealth have but small share of leisure to-day;
and remember that leisure should include time for mental
work and for complete relaxation. Healthy human life
should be made up of physical effort, mental effort, play,
food-time and sleep. Not one of these can be omitted
from a healthy life.
And see the gain in enjoyment brought about by the train
ing of mental faculty. Lately I went for a brief holiday into
a lonely part of Scotland; there was no “ society” there,
but there were hills and water and clouds; glorious fight
and shade and color ; radiant glow of flowers and plash of
mountain rills. To me, the beauty, the stillness, the ripple
of water, the glory of moor and wood, gave the most ex
quisite enjoyment. But imagine a woman taken from
some filthy London court, and set down in the midst of
that solitude ; ere a day was over she would be wearying
for the revelry of the gin-palace, the excitement of the
fifth-rate music-hall. Why such difference between her
and me ? Because I am educated and she is not. Because
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191
my faculties have been drawn out, trained, and cultured..
Hers have been dwarfed, withered and destroyed.
I claim for all the joy that I have in life, in beauty, in
nature and in art. Why should Society have bestowed so>
much on me, while it leaves my sister beggared ?
But in order that the adult may be cultivated, the child
must be educated. The school-life of the workers is too
short. The children’s pennies are wanted to swell thewages of the family, whereas the father’s wage should be
sufficient for all until the children grow into manhood and
womanhood. And the children should have technical, as
well as book education. In Germany all children learn a
trade, and the present Crown Prince is said to be a cabi
net-maker, some of his palace furniture having been made
by his own hands. If all children were trained in brain
and in fingers, then ability, not birth, would decide the
path in life. There is many a brain now lying fallow in
workshop and behind the plough, which might have been of
priceless service to England had it been set to its fit work;
and there is many a brain, high in the council-chambers
of the nation, scarce fit to direct the fingers in the most
unskilled labor. A just system of national education would
classify thinkers and manual laborers aright, and would
draft the one for higher education, the other for rougher
forms of toil, without regard to the superstition of birth,
or to anything save the capacities given by Nature to each
child.
Moreover this education should be really “national.”
All children, rich and poortogether, should go to the National
Schools. There should be no distinctions, no differences
of rank permitted in the schools, save the distinctions of
ability and of merit. Thus would class-distinctions be
eradicated, and those who had sat side by side on the
same schoolbench could never, in later life, dream they
were of different clay. To such suggestion as this it is
sometimes objected that the vulgar manners of the poor
child would coarsen those of the rich. Friends, the Atheist
seeks to destroy that vulgarity; it is the outcome of
neglected education, of that absence of refinement of
thought and of life, that results from the shutting up of
the poor into one dreary round of ceaseless toil. The
difficulty would only arise during the first generation of
common school-life, and the teachers by careful supervision
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THE ATHEISTIC PLATFORM.
might easily prevent any real harm from arising. If any
children were found to use coarse language, they could be
separated off, until they understood that indecency would
not be tolerated. As a rule, absolute coarseness of language
and gesture would be found only in the children of the
'Criminal classes, and they should be taught in different
schools.
The Atheist looks forward to, and works towards, a
Society in which class-distinctions shall have vanished, in
which all shall be equal before the law, all shall be given
equal opportunities, and shall share equal education in
their youth. From that Society both crime and poverty
shall have vanished; the workhouse and the gaol shall
have passed away. Small wonder then that the Atheist
should be persecuted; he is hated by the idle wealthy, by
the aristocratic pauper who lives on other men’s toil; these
set the fashion of social ostracism, and the fashion is
followed by the thousands who ape and echo those above
them in the social scale. None the less is the Atheist hope
already shining above the horizon, and sunned in tlie
warmth of that radiance he waits patiently for the coming
noon.
Printed by Annie Besant and Charles Beajdlaugh, 63, Fleet Street,
London E.C.
�
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Why should atheists be persecuted?
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Besant, Annie Wood [1847-1933]
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Place of publication: London
Collation: [179]-192 p. ; 18 cm.
Series title: Atheistic Platform
Series number: 12
Notes: Printed by Annie Besant and Charles Bradlaugh. Part of the NSS pamphlet collection.
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Freethought Publishing Company
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1884
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Atheism
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Atheism
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■
1
-
-
NATIONAL SECULAR SOCIETY
WH¥ I DO NOT BELIEVE
IN GOD.
BY
I
ANNIE BESANT.
r
J./
LONDON:
FREETHOUGHT PUBLISHING COMPANY,
63, FLEET STREET, E.C.
1 887.
PRICE
THREEPENCE.
.
�LONDON :
PRINTED BY ANNIE BESANT AND CHARLES BBADLAUGH,
63, ELEET STREET, E.C.
�WHY I DO NOT BELIEVE IN GOD.
■There is no doubt that the majority of people in most
parts of the world—save in those in which Buddhism is
supreme—believe in the existence of a God. The kind of
God may vary indefinitely, but there is generally “some God
Or other ”. Now a growing minority in every civilised
■Country finds it intellectually impossible to make the affir
mation which is necessary for belief in God, and this
growing minority includes many of the most thoughtful
and most competent minds. The refusal to believe is
unfortunately not always public, so cruel is the vengeance
Worked by society on those who do not bow down to its
dretish.es; but as John Stuart Mill said: ‘1 The world would
be. astonished if it knew how great a proportion of its
brightest ornaments—of those most distinguished even in
popular estimation for wisdom and virtue—are complete
sceptics in religion” (“Autobiography,” p. 45).
It is sad that all should not recognise that, as the late
Professor Clifford put it, Truth is a thing to be shouted
from the housetops, not to be whispered over the walnuts
and wine after the ladies have left; for only by plain and
honest speech on this matter can liberty of thought be
won. Each who speaks out makes easier speech for others,
and none, however insignificant, has right of silence here.
Nor is it unfair,. I think, that a minority should be chal
lenged on its dissidency, and should be expected to state
clearly and definitely the grounds of its disagreement with
the majority.
Ere going into detailed argument it may be well to remind
the reader that the burden of affording proof lies on the
afiirmer of a. proposition; the rational attitude of the
human mind is not that of a boundless credulity, accepting
every statement as true until it has been proved to be
false, but is that of a suspension of judgment on every
�4
WHY I DO NOT BELIEVE IN GOD.
statement which, though not obviously false, is not sup
ported. by evidence, and of an absolute rejection of a state
ment self-contradictory in its terms, or incompatible with
truth® already demonstrated. To remove this position
from the region of prejudice in which theological discus
sion is carried on, it may be well to take the following*
illustration : a man asks me, “Do you believe that Jupiter
is inhabited by a race of men who have one eye in the
middle of their foreheads, and who walk about on three
legs, with their heads under their left arms ? ” I answer
“No, I do not believe it; I have no evidence that such
beings exist”. If my interlocutor desires to convince mo
that Jupiter has inhabitants, and that his description of;
them is accurate, it is for him to bring forward evidence
in support of his contention. The burden of proof evi
dently lies on him; it is not for me to prove that no such
beings exist before my non-belief is justified, but for him
to prove that they do exist before my belief can be fairly
claimed. Similarly, it is for the affirmer of God’s existence
to bring evidence in support of his affirmation; the burden
of proof lies on him.
Tor be it remembered that the Atheist makes no general
denial of the existence of God; he does not say, “There is
no God”. If he put forward such a proposition, which he
can only do intelligently if he understand the term “God”,
then, truly, he would be bound to bring forth his evidence
in support. But the proof of a universal negative requires
the possession of perfect knowledge of the universe of
discourse, and in this case the universe of discourse
is conterminous with the totality of existence. No*
man can rationally affirm “There is no God”, until
the word “ God ” has for him a definite meaning, and until
everything that exists is known to him, and known with
what Leibnitz calls “perfect knowledge”. The Atheist’s
denial of the Gods begins only when these Gods are defined
or described. Never yet has a God been defined in terms
which were not palpably self-contradictory and absurd ;•
never yet has a God been described so that a concept of
him was made possible to human thought. Again I fall
back on an illustration unconnected with theology in order
to make clearly apparent the distinction drawn. If I am
asked: “Do you believe in the existence of a triangle in
space on the other side of Saturn?” I answer, “I neither
�WHY I HO HOT BELIEVE IN GOD.
5
lielieve in, nor deny its existence; I know nothing about it”.
But if I am asked: “Do you believe in the existence
there of a boundless triangle, or of a square triangle ? ”
-then my answer is : “I deny the possibility of the exist
ence of such triangles”. The reason for the different
answers to the two questions is that as I have never visited
the other side of Saturn I know nothing about the exist
ence or non-existence of triangles there ; but I deny the
possibility of the existence of a boundless triangle, because
the word triangle means a figure enclosed by three limiting
lines; and I deny the possibility of the existence of a square
triangle, because a triangle has three sides only while a square
has four, and all the angles of a triangle taken together
ar® equal to two right angles, while those of a square are
equal to four. I allege that anyone who believes in a
square triangle can have no clear concept either of a
triangle or of a square. And so while I refuse to say
“there is no God”, lacking the knowledge which would
justify the denial, since to me the word God represents no
.concept, I do say, “there is no infinite personality, there
is no infinite creator, there is no being at once almighty
and all-good, there is no Trinity in Unity, there is no
-eternal and infinite existence save that of which each one
• of us is mode”. Dor be it noted, these denials are justified
.by our knowledge: an undefined “God” might be a
limited being on the far side of Sirius, and I have no
knowledge which justifies me in denying such an existence;
but an infinite God, i.e., a God who is everywhere, who
has no limits, and yet who is not I and who is therefore
limited by my personality, is a being who is self-contra
dictory, both limited and not-limited, and such a being
■ cannot exist. No perfect knowledge is needed here. “ God
is an infinite being” is disproved by one being who is not
God. “God is everywhere ” is disproved by the finding
• of one spot where God is not. The universal affirmative
-is disproved by a single exception. Nor is anything
gained by the assertors of deity when they allege that he
is incomprehensible. If “God” exists and is incompre
hensible, his incomprehensibility is an admirable reason
for being silent about him, but can never justify the affirma
tion of self-contradictory propositions, and the threatening
. of people with damnation if they do not accept them.
I turn to examine the evidence which is brought forward
�6
WHY I DO NOT BELIEVE IN GOD.
in support of the existence of God, taking “ God ” to mean
some undefined being other than and superior to the
various forms of living and non-living things on thisearth—or those forming part of the 1 ‘material universe”
in which we exist—and related to these as creator and
controller. Now the existence of anything may be sensated or it may be inferred; the astronomer believed in
the existence of Saturn because he saw it; but he also
believed in the existence of the planet afterwards named
Neptune before he saw it, attaining this belief by way of'
induction from the otherwise inexplicable behavior of
Uranus. Can we then by the senses or by the reason find
out God ?
The most common, and to many the most satisfactory
and convincing evidence, is that of the senses. A child
bom into the world has open to him these sense avenues
of knowledge; he learns that something exists which is
not he by the impressions made on his senses; he sees, he
feels, he hears, he smells, he tastes, and thus he learns to
know. As the child’s past and present sensations increase
in number, as he begins to remember them, to compare,
to mark likenesses and unlikenesses, he gathers the
materials for further mental elaboration. But this sen
sational basis of his knowledge is the limit of the area on
which his intellectual edifice can be built; he may rear it
upward as far as his powers will permit, but he can neverwiden his foundation, while his senses remain only what
they are. All that the mind works on has reached it by
these senses; it can dissociate and combine, it can break
in pieces and build up, but no sensation no percept, and
no percept no concept.
When this fundamental truth is securely grasped it will'
be seen of what tremendous import is the admitted fact
that the senses wholly fail us when We seek for proof of
the existence of God. Our belief in the existence of all
things outside ourselves rests on the testimony of the
senses. The “objective universe” is that which we sensate. When we reason and reflect, when we think of love,,
and fear, when we speak of truth and honor, we know
that all these are not susceptible of being sensated, thatis, that they have no objective existence; they belong to
the Subject universe. Now if God cannot be sensated healso must belong to the Subject world; that is, he must
�WHY I DO NOT BELIEVE IN GOD.
7
be a creation of the mind, with no outside corresponding
reality. Granted that we can never know “the thing in
itself ” ; granted that all we know is only the effect on the
■mind produced by something which differs from the effect
it produces ; yet this fundamental physiological distinction
remains between the Object and the Subject worlds, that
the Object world announces itself by nervous action which
is set up at the periphery, while the Subject world results
from the centrally initiated travail of the brain.
It might., indeed, be argued by the Theist that God may
exist, but may be incognisable by our senses, we lacking
the sense which might sensate deity. Quite so. There
may be existences around us but unknown to us, there
being no part of our organism differentiated to receive
from them impressions. There are rays beyond the solar
spectrum which are invisible to us normally, the existence
of which was unknown to us some years ago, but some
of which apparently serve among light rays for the ant;
so there may be all kinds of existences in the universe
of which we are unconscious, as unconscious as we were
of the existence of the ultra-violet rays until a chemical
reagent rendered them visible. But as we cannot sensate
them, for us they do not exist. This, then, cannot avail
the Theist, for an incognisable God, a God who can enter
into no kind of relation with us, is to us a non-existent
God. We cannot even conceive a sense entirely different
from those we possess, let alone argue over what we should
find out by means of it if we had it.
It is said that of old time the evidence of the senses for
the existence of God was available; the seventy elders
“ saw the God of Israel” ; Moses talked with him “ face
to face ”; Elijah heard his “ still small voice ”. But these
experiences are all traditional; we have no evidence at
first hand; no witness that we can examine ; no facts that
we can investigate. There is not even evidence enough
to start a respectable ghost story, let alone enough to bear
the tremendous weight of the existence of God. Yet, if
some finite “God” exist—I say finite, because, as noted
above, the co-existence of an infinite God anda finite creature
is impossible—how easy for him to prove his existence;
if he be too great for our “comprehension”, as some
Theists argue, he might surely bestow on us a sense which
■might, receive impressions from him, and enable us to
�8
WHY I DO NOT BELIEVE IN GOD.
reach, at least a partial, an imperfect, knowledge of him.
But if he exist, he wraps himself in darkness; if he exist,
he folds himself in silence. Leaning, as it were, over the
edge of being, men strive to pierce the dark abyss of the
unknown, above, below; they strain their sight, but they
see nothing; they listen, but nothing strikes their ear;
weary, dizzy, they stagger backwards, and with the dark
ness pressing on their eyeballs they murmur 11 God!
Bailing to discover God by way of the senses, we turn to
such evidence for his existence as may be found by way of
the reason, in order to determine whether we can establish
by inference that which we have failed to establish by
direct proof.
As the world is alleged to be the handiwork of God, it
is not unreasonable to scrutinise the phenomena of nature,
and to seek in them for traces of a ruling intelligence, of
a guiding will. But it is impossible even to glance at
natural phenomena, much less to study them attentively,
without being struck by the enormous waste of energy,
the aimless destruction, the utterly unintelligent play of
conflicting and jarring forces. For centuries “nature”
has been steadily at work growing forests, cutting out
channels for rivers, spreading alluvial soil and clothing it
with grass and flowers ; at last a magnificent landscape is
formed, birds and beasts dwell in its woods and on its
pastures, men till its fertile fields, and thank the gracious
God they worship for the work of his hands; there is a
far-off growl which swells as it approaches, a trembling
of the solid earth, a crash, an explosion, and then, in a
darkness lightened only by the fiery rain of burning lava,
all beauty, all fertility, vanish, and the slow results of
thousands of years are destroyed in a night of earthquake
and volcanic fury. Is it from this wild destruction of
slowly obtained utility that we are to infer the existence
of a divine intelligence and divine will ? If beauty and
use were aimed at, why the destruction? If desolation
and uselessness, why the millenniums spent in growth ?
During the year 1886 many hundreds of people in
Greece, in Spain, in America, in New Zealand, were killed
or maimed by earthquakes and by cyclones. Many more
perished in hurricanes at sea. Many more by explosions
in mines and elsewhere. These deaths caused widespread
misery, consigned families to hopeless poverty, cut short
�WHY I DO NOT BELIEVE IN GOD.
9
•careers of use and of promise. They were caused by
“ natural ” forces. Is “ God ” behind nature, and are all
these horrors planned, carried out, by his mind and will ?
•John Stuart Mill has put the case clearly and forcibly :
“Next to the greatness of these cosmic forces, the quality
which most forcibly strikes everyone who does not avert his
•eyes from it is their perfect and absolute recklessness. They
go straight to their end, without regarding what or whom they
crush on the road. Optimists, in their attempts to prove that
‘ whatever is, is right ’, are obliged to maintain, not that nature
‘ ever turns one step from her path to avoid trampling us into
destruction, but that it would be very unreasonable in us to
•expect that she should. Pope’s ‘ Shall gravitation cease when
you go by ?’ may be a just rebuke to anyone who should be so
silly as to expect common human morality from nature. But
if the question were between two men, instead of between a
man and a natural phenomenon, that triumphant apostrophe
Would be thought a rare piece of impudence. A man who
should persist in hurling stones or firing cannon when another
man ‘ goes by ’, and having killed him should urge a similar
plea in exculpation, would very deservedly be found guilty of
murder. In sober truth, nearly all the things which men are
hanged or imprisoned for doing to one another, are Nature’s ,
■everyday performances. Killing, the most criminal act recog
nised by human laws, Nature does once to every being that
lives; and in a large proportion of cases, after protracted
tortures such as only the greatest monsters whom we read of
ever purposely inflicted on their living fellow creatures. If, by
an arbitrary reservation, we refuse to account anything murder
but what abridges a certain term supposed to be allotted to
human life, nature also does this to all but a small percentage
of lives, and does it in all the modes, violent or insidious, in
which the worst human beings take the lives of one another.
Nature impales men, breaks them as if on the wheel, casts them
to be devoured by wild beasts, burns them to death, crushes
them with stones like the first Christian martyr, starves them ;
With hunger, freezes them with cold, poisons them by the quick
■ or slow venom of her exhalations, and has hundreds of other
hideous deaths in reserve, such as the ingenious cruelty of a
Nabis or a Domitian never surpassed. All this, Nature does
with the most supercilious disregard both of mercy and of
Justice, emptying her shafts upon the best and noblest indiffer
ently with the meanest and worst; upon those who are engaged
in the highest and worthiest enterprises, and often as the direct
consequence of the noblest acts; and it might almost be imagined
as a punishment for them. She mows down those on whose
existence hangs the wellbeing of a whole people, perhaps the
�10
WHY I DO NOT BELIEVE IN GOD.
prospects of the human race for generations to come, with aslittle compunction as those whose death is a relief to them
selves, or a blessing to those under their noxious influence”"
(“Three Essays on Religion,” pp. 28, 29, ed. 1874).
It is not only from the suffering caused by the unde
viating course of the phenomena which from the invariable
sequence of their happening are called “laws of nature”
that we infer the absence of any director or controller of
these forces. There are many absurdities as well as
miseries, caused by the “uniformity of nature”. Dr.
Buchner tells us of a kid he saw which was born perfect
in all parts save that it was headless (“Force and Matter”,
page 234, ed. 1884). Here, for weeks the kid was a-forming,
although life in the outer world was impossible for it.
Monstrosities occur in considerable numbers, and each one
bears silent witness to the unintelligence of the forces that
produced it. Nay, they can be artificially produced, as
has been shown by a whole series of experiments, eggstapped during incubation yielding monstrous chickens. In
all these cases we recognise the blind action of unconscious
forces bringing about a ridiculous and unforeseen
result, if turned slightly out of their normal course.
From studying this aspect of nature it is certain that we
cannot find God. So far from finding here a God to
worship, the whole progress of man depends on his
learning to control and regulate these natural forces, so asto prevent them from working mischief and to turn them,
into channels in which they will work for good.
If from scrutinising the forces of nature we study the
history of the evolution of life on our globe, and the
physical conditions under which man now exists, it is
impossible from these to infer the existence of a benevolent
power as the creator of the world. Life is one vast battle
field, in which the victory is always to the strong. More
organisms are produced than can grow to maturity; they
fight for the limited supply of food, and by means of this
struggle the weakest are crushed out and the fittest survive
to propagate their race. Each successful organism stands
on the corpses of its weaker antagonists, and only by this
ceaseless strife and slaying has progress been possible.
As the organisms grow more complex and more developed,
added difficulties surround their existence; the young of
the higher animals are weaker and more defenceless at-
�WHY I DO NOT BELIEVE IN GOD.
ii
■birth than those of the lower, and the young of man, the
highest animal yet evolved, is the most helpless of all, and
his hold of life the most precarious during infancy.
So clumsy is the “plan of creation” that among the
most highly-evolved animals a new life is only possibleby peril to life already existing, and the mother must
pass through long weeks of physical weariness and
hours of acute agony ere she can hold her baby in her
arms. All these things are so “natural” to us that weneed to think of them, not as necessary, but as deliberately
planned by a creative power, ere we can realise the mon
strous absurdity of supposing them to be the outcome of’
“design”. Nor must we overlook the sufferings caused
hy the incomplete adaptation of evolving animals to the
conditions among which they are developing. The human
race is still suffering from its want of adaptation to theupright position, from its inheritance of a structure from
quadrupedal ancestors which was suited to the horizontal
position of their trunks, but is unsuited to the vertical
position of man. The sufferings caused by child-birth,
and by hernia, testify to the incomplete adaptation of therace to the upright condition. To believe that all the
slow stages of blood-stained evolution, that the struggle
for existence, that the survival of the fittest with its other
side, the crushing of the less fit, together with a million
subsidiary consequences of the main “plan”, to believethat all these were designed, foreseen, deliberately selected
as the method of creation, by an almighty power, to believe
this is to believe that “ God ” is the supreme malignity, a
creator who voluntarily devises and executes a plan of the
most ghastly malice, and who works it out with a cruelty
in details which no human pen can adequately describe.
But, again, the condition and the history of the world
are not consistent with its being the creation of an
almighty and perfect cruelty. While the tragedy off
life negates the possibility of an omnipotent goodness asits author, the beauty and happiness of life negate equally
the possibility of an almighty fiend as its creator. Thedelight of bird and beast in the vigor of their eager life
the love-notes of mate to mate, and the brooding ectasy of
the mother over her young; the rapture of the song which
sets quivering the body of the lark as he soars upwards
in the sun-rays; the gambols of the young, with every
�12
WHY I DO NOT BELIEVE IN GOD.
curve telling of sheer joy in life and movement; the
beauty and strength of man and woman; the power of
intellect, the glory of genius, the exquisite happiness of
■sympathy; all these things could not find place in the
handiwork of a power delighting in pain. We cannot,
then, from the study of life on our globe infer the exist
ence of a God who is wholly good ; the evil disproves
him: nor can we infer the existence of a God who is
wholly evil; the good disproves him. All that we learn
from life-conditions is that if the world has a creator his
■character must be exceedingly mixed, and must be one
to be regarded with extreme suspicion and apprehension.
Be it noted, however, that, so far, we have found no reason
to infer the existence of any creative intelligence.
Leaving the phenomena of nature exclusive of man, as
yielding us no information as to the existence of God, we
turn next to human life and human history to seek for
traces of the “divine presence”. But here again we are
met by the same mingling of good and evil, the same
waste, the same prodigality, which met us in non-human
nature. Instead of the “Providence watching over the
affairs of men” in which Theists believe, we note that
“there be just men, unto whom it happeneth according to
the work of the wicked; again, there be wicked men, to
whom it happeneth according to the work of the righteous ”.
A railway accident happens, in which a useful man, the
mainstay of a family, is killed, and from which a profligate
escapes. An explosion in a mine slays the hardwork
ing breadwinners at their toil, and the drunken idler
whose night’s debauch has resulted in heavy morning
sleep is “providentially” saved as he snores lazily at
home in bed. The man whose life is invaluable to a
nation perishes in his prime, while the selfish race-haunt
ing aristocrat lives on to a green old age. The honest
•conscientious trader keeps with difficulty out of the bank
ruptcy court, and sees his smart, unscrupulous neighbor
pile up a fortune by tricks that just escape the meshes of
the law. If indeed there be a guiding hand amid the
vicissitudes of human life, it must be that of an ironical,
mocking cruelty, which plays with men as puppets for
the gratification of a sardonic humor. Of course, the real
■explanation of all these things is that there is no common
factor in these moral and physical propositions; the
�WHY I BO NOT BELIEVE IN GOD.
1®
quantities are incommensurable; the virtues or vices of
a man ar® not among the causes which launch, or do not
launch, a chimney pot at his head.
Outside these “changes and chances” of human life,,
the thoughtful mind feels conscious of a profound
dissatisfaction with many of the inevitable conditions
of human existence: the sensative faculties are at
their keenest when the intelligence is not sufficiently
developed to utilise them; the perceptive faculties begin
to fail as the reflective touch their fullest development;
and when experience is ripest, judgment most trained,
knowledge most full, old age lays its palsy on thebrain, and senility shakes down the edifice just
when a life’s toil has made it of priceless value. To-,
recognise our limitations, to accept the inevitable, to amend
—so far as amendment is possible—both ourselves and
our environment, all this forms part of a rational philo
sophy of life ; but what has such self-controlled and keen
eyed sternness of resolve to do with hysterical outcries for
help to some power outside nature, which, if it existed as
creator, must have modelled our existence at its pleasure,
and towards which our attitude could be only one of bit
terest, if silent, rebellion ? To bow to the inevitable evil,
While studying its conditions in order to strive to make it
the evitable, is consistent with strong hope which lightens
life’s darkness; but to yield crushed before evil delibe
rately and consciously inflicted by an omnipotent intelli
gence—in such fate lies the agony of madness and despair.
Nor do we find any reliable signs of the presence of a
God in glancing over the incidents of human history.
We note unjust wars, in which right is crushed by might,
in which victory sides with “the strongest battalions”, in
the issue of which there appears no trace of a “ God that
judgeth the earth”. We meet with cruelties that sicken
us inflicted on man by man; butcheries that desolate a
city, persecutions that lay waste a province. In every
civilised land of to-day we see wealth mocking poverty,,
and poverty cursing wealth ; here, thousands wasted on a
harlot, and there children sobbing themselves in hunger to
sleep. Our earth rolls wailing yearly round the sun,
bearing evidence that it has no creator who loves and
guides it, but has only its men, children of its own
womb, who by the ceaseless toil of countless genera
�14
WHY I DO NOT BELIEVE IN GOD.
lions are hewing out the possibility of a better and gladder
world.
Similar testimony is borne by the slow progress of the
human race. Truth is always fighting; each new truth
undergoes a veritable struggle for existence, and if Her
cules is to live to perform his labors he must succeed in
strangling the serpents that hiss round his cradle. The
new truth must first be held only by one, its discoverer ; if
he is not crushed at the outset, a few disciples are won;
then the little band is persecuted, some are martyred, and,
it may be, the movement destroyed. Or, some survive,
and gain converts, and so the new truth slowly spreads,
winning acceptance at the last. But each new truth must pass
through similar ordeal, and hence the slowness of the up
ward climb of man. Look backwards over the time which
has passed since man was emerging from the brute, and
then compare those millenniums with the progress that has
been made, and the distance which still separates the race
from a reasonably happy life for all its members. If a
God cannot do better for man than this, man may be well
content to trust to his own unaided efforts. Weturn from
the phenomena of human life, as from those of non-human
nature, without finding any evidence which demonstrates,
or even renders probable, the existence of a God.
There is another line of reasoning, however, apart from
the consideration of phenomena, which must, it is alleged,
lead us to believe in the existence of a God. This is
the well-used argument from causation. Every effect
must have a cause, therefore the universe must have a
cause, is a favorite enthymeme, of which the suppressed
minor is, the universe is an effect. But this is a mere
begging of the question. Every effect must have a
cause; granted; for a cause is defined as that which
produces an effect, and an effect as that which is pro
duced by a cause; the two words are co-relatives, and
the one is meaningless separated from the other. Prove
that the universe is an effect, and in so doing you will
have proved that it has a cause; but in the proof of that
quietly-suppressed minor is the crux of the dispute. We
see that the forces around us are the causes of various
effects, and that they, the causes of events which follow
their action, are themselves the effects of causes which
preceded such action. From the continued observation
�WHY I DO NOT BELIEVE IN GOD.
■of these sequences, ourselves part of this endless chain,
the idea of causation is worked into the human mind,
and becomes, as it were, part of its very texture, so that
we cannot in thought separate phsenomena from their
causes, and the uncaused becomes to us the incon
ceivable. But wo cannot rationally extend reasoning
wholly based on pheenomena into the region of the noumenon. That which is true of the phsenomenal universe
gives us no clue when we try to pass without it, and to
penetrate into the mystery of existence per se. To call
God “the first cause” is to play with words after their
meaning has been emptied from them. If the argument
from causation is to be applied to the existence of the
universe, which is, without any proof, to be accepted as
an effect, why may it not with equal force be applied to
“ God ”, who, equally without any proof, may be regarded
as an effect ? and so we may create an illimitable series of
Gods, each an assumption unsupported by evidence. If we
once begin puffing divine smoke-rings, the only limit to the
exercise is our want of occupation and the amount of suit
able tobacco our imagination is able to supply. The belief
of the Atheist stops where his evidence stops. He believes
in the existence of the universe, judging the accessible proof
thereof to be adequate, and he finds in this universe sufficient
cause for the happening of all pheenomena. He finds no
intellectual satisfaction in placing a gigantic conundrum be
hind the universe, which only adds its own unintelligibility
to the already sufficiently difficult problem of existence.
Our lungs are not fitted to breathe beyond the atmosphere
which surrounds our globe, and our faculties cannot
breathe outside the atmosphere of the phsenomenal. If I
went up in a balloon I should check it when I found it
carrying me into air too rare for my respiration; and I
decline to be carried by a theological balloon into regions
wherein thought cannot breathe healthily, but can only
fall down gasping, imagining that its gasps are inspiration.
There remain for us to investigate two lines of evidence,
either of which suffices, apparently, to carry conviction to
a large number of minds; these are, the argument from
human experience, and the argument from design.
I have no desire to lessen the weight of an argument
drawn from the sensus communis, the common sense, of
mankind. It is on this that we largely rely in drawing
�16
WIIY I DO NOT BELIEVE IN GOD.
distinctions between the normal and the abnormal; it isthis which serves as test between the sane and the insane
no thoughtful student can venture to ignore the tre
mendous force of the consensus of human experience.
But while he will not ignore, he must judge : he must
ask, first, is this experience universal and unanimous ?
Secondly, on what experimental or other evidence is it
based ? The universal and unanimous verdict of human
experience, based on clear verifiable experience, is one
which the thinker will challenge with extreme hesitation.
Yet cause may arise which justifies such challenge.
Perhaps no belief has at once been so general, and so
undeniably based on the evidence of the senses, as the
belief in the movement of the sun and the immobility of
our globe. All but the blind could daily see the rising of'
the sun in the eastern sky, and its setting in the west; alL
could feel the firmness of the unshaken earth, the solid
unmoving steadfastness of the ground on which we tread.
Yet this consensus of human experience, this universality
of Tinman testimony, has been rejected as false on evidence
which none who can feel the force of reasoning is able to
deny. If this belief, in defence of which can be brought
the no plus ultra of the verdict of common sense, be not
tenable in the light of modern knowledge, how shall a
belief on which the sensus communis is practically non
existent, on which human testimony is. lacking in many
cases, contradictory in all others, and which fails to main
tain itself on experimental or other evidence, how shall it
hold ground from which the other has been driven ?
The reply to the question, “Is the evidence universal
and unanimous ? ” must be in the negative. The religion
of Buddha, which is embraced by more than a third of the
population of the globe, is an Atheistic creed; many
Buddhists pay veneration to Buddha, and to the statues of
their own deceased ancestors, but none pretend that these
objects of reverence are symbols of a divine power. Many
of the lower savage tribes have no idea of &od. Darwin
writes: “There is ample evidence, derived not from hasty
travellers, but from men who have long resided with
savages, that numerous races have existed, and still exist,
who have no idea of one or more Gods, and who have no
words in their language to express such an idea” (“Descent
of Man,” pp. 93, 94, ed. 1875). Buchner (“Force and
�WHY I DO NOT BELIEVE IN GOD.
17
Matter,” pp. 382—393) has collected a mass of evidence
showing that whole races of men have no idea of God at
all. Sir John Lubbock has done the same. When
savages reach a stage of intelligence at which they begin
to seek the causes of phenomena, they invariably postulate
many Gods as causes of the many objects around them.
A New Zealander who was told of the existence of the one
God by a missionary, asked him scoffingly if, among
Europeans, one man made things of every sort; and he
argued that as there were various trades among men, so
there were various Gods, each with his own business, and
one made trees, another the sea, another the animals, and
so on. Only when intelligence has reached a comparatively
high plane, is evolved the idea of one God, the creator and
the rurs^of the universe. Moreover this idea of “God”
is essentially an abstract, not a concrete idea, and the fancy
that there ia an entity belonging to it is but a survival of
Realism, a/meory which is discredited in everything save
in this one theological remnant.
It has been alleged by some writers that, however
degraded may be the savage, he still has some idea of
supernatural existences, and that error on this head has
arisen from the want of thoroughly understanding the
savage’s ideas. But even these writers do not allege that
the belief of these savages touches on a being who can be
called by the most extreme courtesy “God”. There may
be a vague fear of the unknown, a tendency to crouch
before striking and dangerous manifestations of natural
forces, an idea of some unseen power residing in a stone
or a relic—a fetish; but such things—and of the existence
of even these in the lowest savages evidence is lacking—
can surely not be described as belief in God.
Not only is the universal evidence a-wanting, but such
evidence as there is wholly lacks unanimity. What at
tribute of the divine character, what property of the
divine nature, is attested by the unanimous voice of human
experience ? What is there in common between the
Mumbo-Jumbo of Africa, and the “heavenly Father”, of
refined nineteenth century European Theism.? What tie,
save that of a common name, unites the blood-dripping
Tezcatlepoca of Mexico with him “ whose tender mercy is
over, all his works ” ? Even if we confine ourselves to the
Gods of the Jews, the Christians, and the Mahommedans,
�18
WHY I DO NOT BELIEVE IN GOD.
how great is the clash of dissension. The Jew proclaims
it blasphemy to speak of a divine Trinity, and shrinks
with horror from the thought of an incarnate God. The
Christian calls it blasphemy to deny the deity of the man
Christ Jesus, aqd affirms, under anathema, the triune
nature of the Godhead. The Mahommedan asserts the
unity of God, and stamps as infidel everyone who refuses
to see in Mahommed the true revealer of the divinity.
Each is equally certain that he is right, and each is
equally certain that the others are wrong, and are in peril
of eternal damnation for their rejection of the one true
faith. If the Christian has his lake of fire and brimstone
for those who deny Christ, the Mahommedan has his drinks
of boiling water for those who assert him. Among 'this
clash of tongues, to whom shall turn the bewildered
enquirer after truth ? All his would-be teachers are
equally positive, and equally without evidence. All are
loud in assertion, but singularly modest in their offers of
proof.
Now, it may be taken as an undeniable fact that where
there is confusion of belief there is deficiency of evidence.
Scientific men quarrel and dispute over some much con
troverted scientific theory. They dispute because the
experimental proofs are lacking that would decide the
truth or the error of the suggested hypothesis. While
the evidence is unsatisfactory, the controversy continues,
but when once decisive proof has been discovered all
tongues are still. The endless controversies over the ex
istence of God show that decisive proof has not yet been
attained. And while this proof is wanting, I remain
Atheist, resolute not to profess belief till my intellect can
find some stable ground whereon to rest.
We have reached the last citadel, once the apparently
impregnable fortress of Theism, but one whose walls are
now crumbling, the argument from design. It was this
argument which so impressed John Stuart Mill that he
wrote in his Essay on “ Theism ” : “I- think it must be
allowed that, in the present state of our knowledge, the
adaptations in Nature afford a large balance of probability
in favor of creation by intelligence. It is equally certain
that this is no more than a probability ” (“ Three Essays
on Religion ”, p. 174). This Essay was, however, written
between the years 1868 and 1870, and at that time the
�■WHY I DO NOT BELIEVE IN GOD.
19
tremendous effect of the hypothesis of evolution had not
yet made itself felt; Mill speaks (p. 172) of the “recent
speculations ” on “ the principle of the ‘ survival of the
of the fittest’ ”, and recognising that if this principle were
sound “there would be a constant though slow general
improvement of the type as it branched out into many
different varieties, adapting it to different media and
modes of existence, until it might possibly, in countless
ages, attain to the most advanced examples which now
exist ” (p. 173), he admits that if this be true “ it must be
acknowledged that it would greatly attenuate the evidence
for ” creation. And I am prepared to admit frankly that
until the “how” of evolution explained the adaptations
in Nature, the weight of the argument from design was
very great, and to most minds would have been absolutely
decisive. It would not of course prove the existence of an
omnipotent and universal creator, but it certainly did
powerfully suggest the presence of some contriving intel
ligence at work on natural phenomena. But now, when
we can trace the gradual evolution of a complex and highly
developed organ through the various stages which separate
its origin from its most complete condition ; when we can
study the retrogression of organs becoming rudimentary
by disuse, and the improvement of organs becoming
developed by use; when we notice as imperfections in the
higher type things which were essential in the lower: what
wonder is it that the instructed can no longer admit the
force of the argument from design ?
The human eye has often been pointed to as a trium
phant proof of design, and it naturally seemed perfect in
the past to those who could imagine no higher kind of
optical instrument; but now, as Tyndall says, “Along
list of indictments might indeed be brought against the
eye—its opacity, its want of symmetry, its lack of achro
matism, its absolute blindness, in part. All these taken
together caused Helmholtz to say that, if any optician sent
him an instrument so full of defects, he would be justified
in sending it back with the severest censure” (“On
Light”, p. 8, ed. 1875). It is only since men have made
optical instruments without the faults of the eye, that we
have become aware how much better we might see than
we do. Nor is this all; the imperfections which would
show incompetence on the part of a designer become inte
�20
WHY I DO NOT BELIEVE IN GOD.
resting and significant as traces of gradual development,
and the eye, which in the complexity of its highest form
seemed, notwithstanding its defects, to demand such great
intelligence to conceive and fashion it, becomes more in
telligible when we can watch it a-building, and, as it were,
See it put together bit by bit. I venture to quote here
from a pamphlet of my own a very brief statement of the
stages through which the eye has passed in its evolution:
“ The first definite eye-spot that we yet know of is a little
colored speck at the base of the tentacles of some of the
Hydromedusse, jelly-fish in common parlance. They are
only spots of pigment, and we should not know they were
attempts at eyes were it not that some relations, the Discophora, have little refractive bodies in their pigment
spots, and these refractive bodies resemble the crystalline
cones of animals a little higher in the scale. In the next
class (Vermes), including all worms, we find only pigment
spots in the lowest; then pigment spots with a nerve
fibre ending in them; pigment spots with rod-shaped cells,
with crystalline rods ; pigment spots with crystalline cones.
Next, the cones begin to be arranged radially; and in
the Alciopidse the eye has become a sphere with a lens
and a vitreous body, layer of pigment, layer of rods, and
optic nerve. To mark the evolution definitely in another
way, we find the more highly developed eye of the
adult appearing as a pigment spot in the embryo, so
that both the evolution of the race and the evolution
of the individual tell the same story. In the Echino
derma (sea-urchins, star-fishes) we find only pigment
spots in the lower forms, but in the higher the rod-shaped
cells, the transparent cones projecting from pigment cells.
In the Arthropoda (lobsters, insects, etc.,) the advance
continues from the Vermes. The retina is formed more
definitely than in the Alciopidm, and the eye becomes more
complex. The compound eye is an attempt at grouping
many cones together, and is found in the higher members
of this sub-kingdom. In the lowest vertebrate, the Amphioxus, the eye is a mere pigment spot, but in the others
the more complex forms are taken up and carried on to
the comparative perfection of the mammalian eye” (“Eyes
and Ears”, pp. 9, 10). And be it noted that in the
most complex and highly developed eye there is still the
same relation of pigment layer, rod layer, cone layer,
�WHY I DO NOT BELIEVE IN GOD.
21
seen in its earliest beginnings in the Discophora and the
worms.
The line of argument here applied to the eye may be
followed in every instance of so-called design. The ex
quisite mechanism of the ear may be similarly traced, from
the mere sac with otoliths of the Medusse up to the elabo
rate external, middle, and internal ears of man. Man’s
ear is a very complex thing. Its three chambers ; the
curious characteristics of the innermost of these, with its
three “semi-circular canals”, its coiled extension, like a
snail-shell, called the cochlea, its elaborate nervous mechan
ism ; the membrane between the middle and outer cham
bers, which vibrates with every pulsation of the air; we
can trace all these separate parts as they are added one to
one to the auditory apparatus of the evolving race. If we
examine the edge of the “ umbrella ” of the free-swimming
Medusa, we shall find some little capsules containing one
or more tiny crystals, the homologues of the inner ear; the
lower forms of Vermes have similar ears, and in some there
are delicate hairs within the capsule which quiver con
stantly ; the higher worms have these capsules paired and
they lie close to a mass of nervous matter. Lobsters and
their relations have similar ears, the capsule being some
times closed and sometimes open. In many insects a
delicate membrane is added to the auditory apparatus, and
stretches between the vesicle and the outer air, homologue
of our membrane. The lower fishes have added one semi
circular canal, the next higher two, and the next higher
three : a little expansion is also seen at one part of the
vesicle. In the frogs and toads this extension is increased,
and in the reptiles and birds it is still larger, and is curled
a little at the further end. In the lowest mammals it is
still only bent, but in the higher it rolls round on itself
and forms the cochlea. The reptiles and birds have the
space developed between the vesicle and the membrane,
and so acquire a middle ear; the crocodile and the owl
show a trace of the external ear, but it is not highly
developed till we reach the mammals, and even the lowest
mammals, and the aquatic ones, have little of it developed.
Thus step by step is the ear built up, until we see it com
plete as a slow growth, not as an intelligent design.
And if it be asked, how are these changes caused, the
answer comes readily : “ By variation and by the survival of
�22
WHY I DO NOT BELIEVE IN GOD.
the fittest ”. Since organisms and their environments re-act
on each other, slight variations are constantly occurring;
living organisms are ever in very unstable equilibrium,
chemical association and disassociation are continually going
on within them. Some of these changes are advantageous
to the organism in the struggle for existence; some are
indifferent; some are disadvantageous. Those that are
advantageous tend to persist, since the organism possessing
them is more likely to survive than its less fortunate com
petitors, and — since variations are transmissible from
parents to progeny—to hand on its favorable variation to
its young. On the other hand the disadvantageous varia
tions tend to disappear, since the organism which is by
them placed at a disadvantage is likely to perish in the
fight for food. Here are the mighty forces that cause evo
lution ; here the “ not ourselves which makes for righteous
ness”, i.e., forever-increasing suitability of the organism
to its environment.
It is, of course, impossible in so brief a statement as
this to do justice to the fulness of the explanation of all
cases of apparent design which can be made in this fashion.
The thoughtful student must work out the line of argu
ment for himself. Nor must he forget to notice the argu
ment from the absence of design, the want of adaptation,
the myriad failures, the ineptitudes and incompetences of
nature. How, from the point of view of design, can he
explain the numerous rudimentary organs in the higher
animals ? What is the meaning of man’s hidden rudimen
tary tail? of his appendix coeci vermiformis? of the
branchial clefts and the lanugo of the human being dur
ing periods of ante-natal life ? of the erratic course of the
recurrent laryngeal? of the communication between the
larynx and the alimentary canal ? I might extend the list
over a page. The fact that uninstructed people do not
appreciate these difficulties offers no explanation to the
instructed who feel their force; and the abuse so freely
lavished on the Atheist does not carry conviction to the
intellect.
I do not believe in God. My mind finds no grounds
on which to build up a reasonable faith. My heart revolts
against the spectre of an Almighty Indifference to the pain,
of sentient beings. My conscience rebels against the
injustice, the cruelty, the inequality, which surround me
�WHY" I DO NOT BELIEVE IN GOD.
23
on every side. But I believe in Man. In man’s redeeming
power; in man’s remoulding energy; in man’s approach
ing triumph, through knowledge, love, and work.
��
Dublin Core
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Title
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Victorian Blogging
Description
An account of the resource
A collection of digitised nineteenth-century pamphlets from Conway Hall Library & Archives. This includes the Conway Tracts, Moncure Conway's personal pamphlet library; the Morris Tracts, donated to the library by Miss Morris in 1904; the National Secular Society's pamphlet library and others. The Conway Tracts were bound with additional ephemera, such as lecture programmes and handwritten notes.<br /><br />Please note that these digitised pamphlets have been edited to maximise the accuracy of the OCR, ensuring they are text searchable. If you would like to view un-edited, full-colour versions of any of our pamphlets, please email librarian@conwayhall.org.uk.<br /><br /><span><img src="http://www.heritagefund.org.uk/sites/default/files/media/attachments/TNLHLF_Colour_Logo_English_RGB_0_0.jpg" width="238" height="91" alt="TNLHLF_Colour_Logo_English_RGB_0_0.jpg" /></span>
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Conway Hall Library & Archives
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2018
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Conway Hall Ethical Society
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Title
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Why I do not believe in God
Creator
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Besant, Annie Wood [1847-1933]
Description
An account of the resource
Place of publication: London
Collation: 23 p. ; 18 cm.
Notes: Printed by Annie Besant and Charles Bradlaugh. Part of the NSS pamphlet collection.
Publisher
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Freethought Publishing Company
Date
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1887
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N074
Subject
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Atheism
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<a href="http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/mark/1.0/"><img src="http://i.creativecommons.org/p/mark/1.0/88x31.png" alt="Public Domain Mark" /></a><span> </span><br /><span>This work (Why I do not believe in God), identified by </span><a href="https://conwayhallcollections.omeka.net/items/show/www.conwayhall.org.uk"><span>Humanist Library and Archives</span></a><span>, is free of known copyright restrictions.</span>
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application/pdf
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Text
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English
Atheism
God
NSS
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Text
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The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Victorian Blogging
Description
An account of the resource
A collection of digitised nineteenth-century pamphlets from Conway Hall Library & Archives. This includes the Conway Tracts, Moncure Conway's personal pamphlet library; the Morris Tracts, donated to the library by Miss Morris in 1904; the National Secular Society's pamphlet library and others. The Conway Tracts were bound with additional ephemera, such as lecture programmes and handwritten notes.<br /><br />Please note that these digitised pamphlets have been edited to maximise the accuracy of the OCR, ensuring they are text searchable. If you would like to view un-edited, full-colour versions of any of our pamphlets, please email librarian@conwayhall.org.uk.<br /><br /><span><img src="http://www.heritagefund.org.uk/sites/default/files/media/attachments/TNLHLF_Colour_Logo_English_RGB_0_0.jpg" width="238" height="91" alt="TNLHLF_Colour_Logo_English_RGB_0_0.jpg" /></span>
Creator
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Conway Hall Library & Archives
Date
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2018
Publisher
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Conway Hall Ethical Society
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Original Format
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Dublin Core
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Title
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Did Charles Bradlaugh die an atheist?
Creator
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Bonner, Hypatia Bradlaugh [1858-1935]
Description
An account of the resource
Place of publication: London
Collation: 12, [2] p. ; 20 p.
Notes: Works by and about Charles Bradlaugh, and chief works of Thomas Paine, with extracts from reviews, listed on unnumbered pages at the end. Printed by A. Bonner, Took's Court, London.
Publisher
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A. & H.B. Bonner
Date
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1898
Identifier
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G4346
Subject
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Atheism
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Atheism
Charles Bradlaugh
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A PLEA EOR ATHEISM,
Bf C. BEADLAUGH.
Gillespie says that “ an Atheist propagandist seems a nos^
descript monster created by nature in a moment of mad
ness.” Despite this opinion, it is as the propagandist of
Atheism that I pen the following lines., in the hope that I
may succeed in removing some few of the many prejudices
which have been created against not only the actual holders
of Atheistic opinions, but also against those wrongfully sus
pected of entertaining such ideas. Men who have been
famous for depth of thought, for excellent wit, or great
genius, have been recklessly assailed as Atheists, by those
who lacked the high qualifications against which the spleen
of the calumniators was directed. Thus, not only has
Voltaire been without ground accused of Atheism, but
Bacon, Locke, and Bishop Berkeley himself, have, amongst
others, been denounced by thoughtless or unscrupulous
pietists as inclining to Atheism, the ground for the accusa
tion being that they manifested an inclination to improve
human thought.
It is too often the fashion with persons of pious reputation
to speak in unmeasured language of Atheism as favouring
immorality, and of Atheists as men whose conduct is neces
sarily vicious, and who have adopted atheistic views as a
desperate defiance against a Deity justly offended by the
badness of their lives. Such persons urge that amongst
the proximate causes of Atheism are vicious training, im
moral and profligate companions, licentious living, and the
like. Dr. John Pye Smith, in his “ Instructions on Chris
man Theology,” goes so far as to declare that “ nearly all
the Atheists upon record have been men of extremely
debauched and vile conduct.” Such language from the
Christian advocate is not surprising, but there are others
arho, professing great desire for the spread of Freethought,
�2
A PLEA FOE ATHEISM,
and with pretensions to rank amongst acute and liberal
thinkers, declare Atheism impracticable, #nd its teachings
cold, barren, and negative. In this brief essay I shall
except to each of the above allegations, and shall en
deavour to demonstrate that Atheism affords greater possi
bility for human happiness than any system yet based on
Theism, or possible to be founded thereon, and that the
lives of true Atheists must be more virtuous, because more
human, than those of the believers in Deity, the humanity
of the devout believer often finding itself neutralised by
a faith with which it is necessarily in constant collision.
The devotee piling the faggots at the auto da fe of an
heretic, and that heretic his son, might, notwithstanding, be
a good father in every respect but this. Heresy, in the
eyes of the believer, is highest criminality, and outweighs
all claims of family or affection.
Atheism, properly understood, is in nowise a cold,
barren negative; it is, on the contrary, a hearty, fruitful
affirmation of all truth, and involves the positive assertion
and action of highest humanity.
Let Atheism be fairly examined, and neither condemned
—its defence unheard—on the ex parte slanders of the pro
fessional preachers of fashionable orthodoxy, whose courage
is bold enough while the pulpit protects the sermon, but
whose, valour becomes tempered with discretion when a free
platform is afforded and discussion claimed; nor misjudged
because it has been the custom to regard Atheism as so
unpopular as to render its advocacy impolitic. The best
policy against all prejudice is to assert firmly the verity.
The Atheist does not say “ There is no God,” but he says,
“ I know not what you mean by God ; I am without idea
of God; the word ‘ God ’ is to me a sound conveying no
clear or distinct affirmation. I do not deny God, because
I cannot deny that of which I have no conception, and' the
conception of which, by its affirmer, is so imperfect that
he is unable to define it to me.” If you speak to the
Atheist of God as creator, he answers that the conception
of creation is impossible. We are utterly unable to construe
it in thought as possible that the complement of existent has
been either increased or diminished, much less can we con
ceive an absolute origination of substance. We cannot con
ceive either, on the o^e hand, nothing becoming something,
�A PLEA FOR ATHEISM.
or on the other, something becoming nothing.
3
The Theis t
who speaks of God creating the universe, must either sup
pose that Deity evolved it out of himself, or that he pro
duced it from nothing. But the Theist cannot regard the
universe as evolution of Deity, because this would identify
Universe and Deity, and be Pantheism rather than Theism.
There would be no distinction of substance—in fact no crea
tion. Nor can the Theist regard the universe as created
out of nothing, because Deity is, according to him, necessa
rily eternal and infinite. His existence being eternal and
infinite, precludes the possibility of the conception of
vacuum to be filled by the universe if. created. No one can
even think of any point of existence in extent or duration
and say, here is the point of separation between the creator
and the created. Indeed, it is not possible for the Theist to
imagine a beginning to the universe. It is not possible to
conceive either an absolute commencement, or an absolute
termination of existence; that is, it is impossible to con
ceive beginning before which you have a period when the
universe has yet to be ; or to conceive an end, after which
the universe, having been, no lunger exists. It is impos
sible in thought to originate or annihilate the universe.
The Atheist affirms that he cognises to-day effects, that
these are at the same time causes and effects—causes to the
effects they precede, effects to the causes they follow.
Cause is simply everything without which the effect would
not result, and with which it must result. Cause is the
means to an end, consummating itself in that end. The
Theist who argues for creation must assert a point of time,
that is, of duration, when the created did not yet exist. At
this point of time either something existed or nothing;
but something must have existed, for out of nothing no
thing can come. Something must have existed, because the
point fixed upon is that of the duration of , something.
This something must have been either finite or infinite;
if finite, it could not have been God, and if the something
were infinite, then creation was impossible, as it is impos
sible to add to infinite existence.
If you leave the question of creation and deal with the
government of the universe, the difficulties of Theism are
by no means lessened. The existence of evil is then a
terrible stumbling-block to the Theist.
Pain, misery,
�4
A
PLEA FOB. ATHETSM.
crime, poverty, confront the advocate of eternal goodness,
and challenge with unanswerable potency his declaration of
Deity as all-good, all-wise, and all-powerful. Evil is either
caused by God, or exists independently; but it cannot be
caused by God, as in that case he would not be all-good;
nor can it exist independently, as in that case he would not
be all-powerful. Evil must either have had a beginning,
or it must be eternal; but, according to the Theist, it can
not be eternal, because God alone is eternal. Nor can it
have had a beginning, for if it had it must either have ori
ginated in God, or outside God; but, according to the
Theist, it cannot have originated in God, for he is all-good,
and out of all-goodness evil cannot originate; nor can evil
have originated outside God, for, according to the Theist,
God is infinite, and it is impossible to go outside of or
beyond infinity.
To the Atheist this question of evil assumes an entirely
different aspect. He declares that evil is a result, but not
a result from God or Devil. He affirms that by conduct
founded on knowledge of the laws of existence it is possible
to ameliorate and avoid present evil, and, as our knowledge
increases, to prevent its future recurrence.
Some declare that the belief in God is necessary as a check
to crime. They allege that the Atheist may commit murder,
lie, or steal without fear of any consequences. To try the
actual value of this argument, it is not unfair to ask—Do
Theists ever steal? If yes, then in each such theft, the
belief in God and his power to punish has been inefficient
as a preventive of the crime. Do Theists ever lie or mur
der ? If yes, the same remark has further force—hell-fire fail
ing against the lesser as against the greater crime. The
fact is that those who use such an argument overlook a great
truth—i.e., that all men seek happiness, though in very
diverse fashions. Ignorant and miseducated men often mis
take the true path to happiness, and commit crime in the
endeavour to obtain it. Atheists hold that by teaching
mankind the real road to human happiness, it is possible to
keep them from the by-ways of criminality and error.
Atheists would teach men to be moral now, not because God
•ffers as an inducement reward by and by, but because in
the virtuous act itself immediate good is ensured to the doer
and the circle surrounding him. Atheism would preserve
�A
PLEA FOR ATHEISM.
O
man from lying, stealing, murdering now, not from fear of
an eternal agony after death, but because these crimes make
this life itself a course of misery.
While Theism, asserting God as the creator and governor
of the universe, hinders and checks man’s efforts by de
claring God’s will to be the sole directing and controlling
.< power, Atheism, by declaring all events to be in accordance
, with natural laws—that is, happening in certain ascertain'■ able sequences — stimulates man to discover the best condi
tions of life, and offers him the most powerful inducements
to morality. While the Theist provides future happi
ness for a scoundrel repentant on his death-bed, Atheism
affirms present and certain happiness for the man who does
his best to live here so well as to have little cause for re
penting hereafter.
Theism declares that God dispenses health and inflicts
disease, and sickness and illness are regarded by the Theist
as visitations from an angered Deity, to be borne with meek
ness and content. Atheism declares that physiological
knowledge may preserve us from disease by preventing our
infringing the law of health, and that sickness results not
as the ordinance of offended Deity, but from ill-ventilated
dwellings and workshops, bad and insufficient food, exces
sive toil, mental suffering, exposure to inclement weather,
and the like—all these finding root in poverty, the chief
source of crime and disease ; that prayers and piety afford
no protection against fever, and that if the human being be
kept without food he will starve as quickly whether he be
Theist or Atheist, theology being no substitute for bread.
When the Theist ventures to affirm that his God is an.
existence other than and separate from the so-called mate
rial universe, and when he invests this separate, hypothe
tical existence with the several attributes of omniscience,
omnipresence, omnipotence, eternity, infinity, immutability,
and perfect goodness, then the Atheist, in reply, says—“ I
deny the existence of such a being.”
It becomes very important, in order that injustice may
not be done to the Theistic argument, that we should have
—in. lieu of a clear definition, which it seems useless to ask
for—the best possible clue to the meaning intended to be
conveyed by the word God. If it were not that the word
is an arbitrary term, invented for the ignorant, and the
�6
A PEEA FOR ATHEISM.
notions suggested by which are vague and entirely contin
gent upon individual fancies, such a clue could be probably
most easily and satisfactorily obtained by tracing back the
word “ God,” and ascertaining the sense in which it was
used by the uneducated worshippers who have gone before
us ; collating this with the more modern Theism, qualified
as it is by the superior knowledge of to-day. Dupuis
says—“ De mot Dieu parait destine a exprimer l’idee de la
force universelie et eternellement active qui imprime le
mouvement a tout dans la Nature, suivant les lois d’une
harmonie constant et admirable, qui se developpe dans les
diverses formes que prend la matiere organisee, qui se mele i
tout, anime tout, et qui semble etre une dans ses modifica
tions infiniment variees, et n’appartenir qu’a elle-meme.”
“ The word God appears intended to express the force uni
versal, and eternally active, which endows all nature with
motion according to the laws of a constant and admirable
harmony; which develops itself in the diverse forms of
organised matter, which mingles with all, gives life to all;
which seems to be one through all its infinitely varied modi
fications, and inheres in itself alone.”
In the “ Bon Sens ” of Cure Meslier, it is asked, “ Qu’estce que Dieu?” and the answer is “ C’est un mot abstrait fait
pour designer la force cachee de la nature; ou c’est un
point mathematique qui n’a ni longueur, ni largeur, ni profundeur.” “ It is an abstract word coined to designate the
hidden fo'rce of nature, or rather it is a mathematical point
having neither length, breadth, nor thickness.”
The orthodox fringe of the Theism of to-day is Hebraistio
in its origin—that is, it finds its root in the superstition
and ignorance of a petty and barbarous people nearly desti
tute of literature, poor in language, and almost entirely
wanting in high conceptions of humanity. It might, as
Judaism is the foundation of Christianity, be fairly expected
that the ancient Jewish Records would aid us in our search
after the meaning to be attached to the word « God.” The
most prominent words in Hebrew rendered God or Lord in
English are nin11 Jeue, and
-A-leivn. The first word
Jeue, called by our orthodox Jehovah, is equivalent to “ that
which exists,” and indeed embodies in itself the only possible
trinity in unity—i.e., past, present, and future. There is
nothing in this Hebrew word to help you to any such defini—
�A
PLEA FOE ATHEISM.
7
tion as is required for the sustenance of modern Theism.
The most you can make of it by any stretch of imagination is
equivalent to the declaration “ I am, I have been,I shall be.’’
The word iTin'1 is hardly ever spoken by the religious Jews
who actually in reading substitute for it, Adonai, an entirely
different word. Dr. Wall notices the close resemblance
in sound between the word Yehowa or Yeue, or Jehovah,
and Jove. In fact Zevc iran)p Jupiter and Jeue—pater
(God the father) present still closer resemblance in sound.
Jove is also Zevg or Qeog or Aevc, whence the word Deus
and our Deity. The Greek mythology, far more ancient
than that of the Hebrews, has probably found for Christi
anity many other and more important features of coincidence
than that of a similarly sounding name. The word 0eoc
traced back affords us no help beyond that it identifies Deity
with the universe. Plato says that the early Greeks thought
that the only Gods (0EOY3) were the sun, moon, earth,
stars, and heaven. The word
Aleiin, assists us
still less in defining the word God, for Parkhurst translates
it as a plural noun signifying “ the curser,” deriving it from
the verb
(Ale) to curse. Finding that philology aids
us but little, we must endeavour to arrive at the meaning
of the word “ God ” by another rule. It is utterly impos
sible to fix the period of the rise of Theism amongst any
particular people, but it is notwithstanding comparatively
easy, if not to trace out the development of Theistic ideas,
at any rate to point to their probable course of growth
amongst all peoples.
Keightley, in his “ Origin of Mythology,” says—“ Sup
posing, for the sake of hypothesis, a race of men in a state
of total or partial ignorance of Deity, their belief in many
gods may have thus commenced. They saw around them
various changes brought about by human agency, and hence ?
they knew the power of intelligence to produce effects, j
When they beheld other and greater effects, they ascribed
them to some unseen being, similar but superior to man.”
They associated particular events with special unknown
beings (gods), to each of whom they ascribed either a pecu
liarity of power, or a sphere of action not common to other
gods. Thus one was god of the sea, another god of war,
another god of love, another ruled the thunder and lightning;
�8
A
PLEA FOB ATHEISM.
and thus through the various elements of the universe and
passions of humankind, so far as they were then known.
This mythology became modified with the advancement of
human knowledge. The ability to think has proved itself
oppugn ant to and destructive of the desire to worship.
Science has razed altar after altar heretofore erected to the
unknown gods, and pulled down deity after deity from the
pedestals on which ignorance and superstition had erected
them. The priest who had formerly spoken the oracle of
God lost his sway, just in proportion as the scientific teacher
succeeded in impressing mankind with a knowledge of the
facts around them. The ignorant who had hitherto listened
unquestioning during centuries of abject submission to their
spiritual preceptors, at last commenced to search and examine
for themselves, and were guided by experience rather than
by church doctrine. To- day it is that advancing intellect
challenges the reserve guard of the old armies of super
stition, and compels a conflict in which humankind must in
the end have great gain by the forced enunciation of the
truth.
From the word “ God” the Theist derives no argument
in his favour; it teaches nothing, defines nothing, demon
strates nothing, explains nothing. The Theist answers that
this is no sufficient objection, that there are many words
which are in common use to which the same objection
applies. Even admitting that this were true, it does not
answer the Atheist’s objection. Alleging a difficulty on the
one side.is not a removal of the obstacle already pointed out
on the other.
The Theist declares his God to be not only immutable,
but also infinitely intelligent, and says:—‘‘Matter is either
essentially intelligent, or essentially non-intelligent; if mat
ter were essentially intelligent, no matter could be without
intelligence; but matter cannot be essentially intelligent,
because some matter is not intelligent, therefore matter is
essentially non-intelligent: but there is intelligence, there
fore there must be a cause for the intelligence, independent
of matter—this must be an intelligent being—i.e., God.”
The Atheist answers, I do not know what is meant,
in the mouth of the Theist, by “ matter.” “ Matter,”
* substance,” “ existence,” are three words having the
�A
PLEA FOR ATHEISM.
9
same signification in the Atheist’s vocabulary. It is not
certain that the Theist expresses any very clear idea
when he uses the words “ matter” and “ intelligence.’
Beason and understanding are sometimes treated as
separate faculties, yet it is not unfair to presume
*> that the Theist would include them both under the word
v intelligence. Perception is the foundation of the intellect.
| The perceptive faculty, or perceptive faculties, differs or differ
I in each animal: yet in speaking of matter the Theist uses
the word “ intelligence” as though the same meaning were
to be understood in every case. The recollection of the per
ceptions is the exercise of a different faculty from the per
ceptive faculty, and occasionally varies disproportionately;
thus an individual may have great perceptive faculties, and
very little memory, or the reverse—yet memory, as well as
perception, is included in intelligence. So also the faculty
for comparing between two or more perceptions ; the faculty
of judging and the faculty of reflecting—all these are subject
to the same remarks, and all these and other faculties are in
cluded in the word intelligence. We answer, then, that
“ God” (whatever that word may mean) cannot be intelligent.
He can never perceive ; the act of perception results in the
obtaining a new idea, but if God be omniscient, his ideas
have been eternally the same. He has either been always, ana
always will be perceiving, or he has never perceived at all.
But God cannot have been always perceiving, because if he
had he would always have been obtaining fresh know
ledge, in which case he must have some time had less know
ledge than now, that is, he would have been less perfect;
that is—he would not have been God : he can never
recollect or forget, he can never compare, reflect, nor
judge. There cannot be perfect intelligence without un
derstanding ; but following Coleridge, “ understanding is
the faculty of judging according to sense.” The faculty
of whom? Of some person, judging according to that
person’s senses ? But has “ God” senses ? Is there any
thing beyond “ God” for “ God” to sensate ? There
' cannot be perfect intelligence without reason. By reason
we mean that faculty or aggregation of faculties which avails
itself of past experience to predetermine, more or less
accurately, experience in the future, and to affirm truths
which sense perceives, experiment verifies, and experience
�10
A PLEA FOE ATHEISM.
confirms. To God there can be neither past nor future,
therefore to him reason is impossible. There cannot be per
fect intelligence without will, but has God will ? If God
wills, the will of the all-powerful must be irresistible; the
will of the infinite must exclude all other wills.
God can never perceive. Perception and sensation are
identical. Every sensation is accompanied by pleasure or
pain. But God, if immutable, can neither be pleased nor
pained. Every fresh sensation involves a change in mental
and perhaps in physical condition. God, if immutable, cannot
change. Sensation is the source of all ideas, but it is only
objects external to the mind which can be sensated. If God
be infinite there can be no objects external to him, and
therefore sensation must be to him impossible. Yet without
perception where is intelligence ?
God cannot have memory or reason—memory is of the
past, reason for the future, but to God immutable there can
be no past, no future. The words past, present, and future
imply change; they assert progression of duration. If God
be immutable, to him change is impossible. Can you
have intelligence destitute of perception, memory, and
reason? God cannot have the faculty of judgment—judg
ment implies in the act of judging a conjoining or dis
joining of two or more thoughts, but this involves change
of mental condition. To God the immutable, change is
impossible.
Can you have intelligence, yet no per
ception, no memory, no reason, no judgment ? God
cannot think. The law of the thinkable is, that the
thing thought must be separated from the thing which
is not thought. To think otherwise would be to think
of nothing—to have an impression with no distinguishing
mark, would be to have no impression. Yet this separation
implies change, and to God, immutable, change is impossible.
Can you have intelligence without thought ? If the Theist
replies to this, that he does not mean by infinite intelligence
as an attribute of Deity, an infinity of the intelligence found
in a finite degree in humankind, then he is bound to explain,
clearly and distinctly, what other a intelligence” he means,
and until this be done the foregoing statements require
answer.
The Atheist does not regard “ substance” as either essen
tially intelligent or the reverse. Intelligence is the result of
�A PLEA POE ATHEISM.
11
certain conditions of existence. Burnished steel is bright—
that is, brightness is the necessity 01 a certain condition of
existence. Alter the condition, and the characteristic of the
condition no longer exists. The only essential of substance
is its existence. Alter the wording of the Theist’s objection.
Matter is either essentially bright, or essentially non-bright.
If matter were essentially bright, brightness should be the
essence of all matter I but matter cannot be essentially
bright, because some matter is not bright, therefore matter
is essentially non-bright; but there is brightness, therefore
there must be a cause for this brightness independent of
matter—that is, there must be an essentially bright being—
e.,
i. God.
Another Theistic proposition is thus stated:—“ Every
effect must have a cause ; the first cause universal must be
eternal: ergo, the first cause universal must be God.” This
is equivalent to saying that “ God” is “ first cause.” But
what is to be understood by cause ? Defined in the absolute,
the word has no real value. “ Cause,” therefore, cannot be
eternal. What can be understood by “ first cause ?” To us
the two words convey no meaning greater than would be
conveyed by the phrase “ round triangle.” Cause and effect
are correlative terms—each cause is the effect of some prece
dent ; each effect the cause of its consequent. It is impossible
to conceive existence terminated by a primal or initial cause.
The “ beginning,” as it is phrased, of the universe, is not
thought out by the Theist, but conceded without thought.*
To adopt the language of Montaigne, “ Men make themselves
believe that they believe.” The so-called belief in Creation
is nothing more than the prostration of the intellect on the
threshold of the unknown. We can only cognise the ever
succeeding phenomena of existence as a line, in continuous
and eternal evolution. This line has to us no beginning;
we traee it back into the misty regions of the past but a little
way, and however far we may be able to journey, there is still
the great beyond. Then what is meant by “ universal cause ?”
Spinoza gives the following definition of cause, as used in its
absolute signification, “By cause of itself I understand that,
the essence of which involves existence, or that, the nature of
which can only be'considered as existent.” That is, Spinoza
treats “ cause” absolute and “ existence” as two words
having the same meaning. If his mode of defining the word
�12
A PLEA FOE ATHEISM.
be contested, then it has no meaning other than its relative
signification of a means to an end. “ Every effect must have
a cause.” Every effect implies the plurality of effects, and
necessarily that each effect must be finite ; but how is it
1 possible from a finite effect to logically deduce an universal—
e.,
i. infinite cause ?
4
There are two modes of argument presented by Theists,
I and by which, separately or combined, they seek to demonstrate the being of a God. These are familiarly known as
the arguments a priori and a posteriori.
The a posteriori argument has been popularised in Eng
land by Paley, who has ably endeavoured to hide the weak
ness of his demonstration under an abundance of irrelevant
illustrations. The reasoning of Paley is very deficient in
the essential points where it most needed strength. It is
utterly impossible to prove by it the eternity or infinity of
Deity. As an argument founded on analogy, the design
argument, at the best, could only entitle its propounder to
infer the existence of a finite cause, or rather of a
multitude of finite causes. It ought not to be forgotten
that the illustrations of the eye, the watch, and the
man, even if admitted as instances of design, or rather
of adaptation, are instances of eyes, watches, and men,
designed or adapted out of pre-existing substance, by a
being of the same kind of substance, and afford, there
fore, no demonstration in favour of a designer, alleged
•to have actually created substance out of nothing, and also
alleged to have created a substance entirely different from
himself.
The a posteriori argument can never demonstrate infinity
' for Deity. Arguing from an effect finite in extent, the most
it could afford would be a cause sufficient for that effect,
j such cause being possibly finite in extent and duration.
?. And as the argument does not demonstrate God’s infinity,
neither ean it, for the same reason, make out his omniscience,
as it is clearly impossible to logically claim infinite wisdom
for a God possibly only finite. God’s omnipotence re
mains unproved for the same reason, and because it is
clearly absurd to argue that God exercises power where he
may not be. Nor can the a posteriori argument show God’s
absolute freedom, for as it does nothing more than seek to
prove a finite God. it is quite consistewi with the argument
�k PLEA FOB ATHEISM.
13
that God’s existence is limited and controlled in a thousand
ways. Nor does this argument show that God always existed;
at the best the proof is only that some cause, enough for the
effect, existed before it, but there is no evidence that this
cause differs from any other causes, which are often as
transient as the effect itself. And as it does not demon
strate that God has always existed, neither does it demon
strate that he will always exist, or even that he now exists.
It is perfectly in accordance with the argument, and with
the analogy of cause and effect, that the effect may remain
after the cause has ceased to exist. Nor does the argument
from design demonstrate one God. It is quite consistent with
this argument that a separate cause existed for each effect,
or mark of design discovered, or that several causes con
tributed to some or one of such effects. So that if the
argument be true, it might result in a multitude of petty
deities, limited in knowledge, extent, duration, and power;
and still worse, each one of this multitude of gods may have
had a cause which would also be finite in extent and dura*
ition, and would require another, and so on, until the design
argument loses the reasoner amongst an innumerable crowd
of deities, none of whom can have the attributes claimed for
God.
The design argument is defective as an argument from
analogy, because it seeks 'to prove a Creator God who
designed, but does not explain whether this God has been
eternally designing, which would be absurd; or, if he at
some time commenced to design, what then induced him so
to commence. It is illogical, for it seeks to prove an im
mutable Deity, by demonstrating a mutation on the part of
Deity.
It is unnecessary to deal specially with each of the many
writers who have used from different stand-points the a
posteriori form of argument in order to prove the existence
of Deity. The objections already stated apply to the whole
class; and, although probably each illustration used by the
theistic advocate is capable of an elucidation entirely at
variance with his argument, the main features of objection
are the same. The argument a posteriori is a method of
proof in which the premises are composed of some position
of existing facts, and the conclusion asserts a position ante
cedent to those facts.* The argument is from given effects
�14
A PLEA FOB ATHEISM.
to their causes. It is one form of this argument which
asserts that man has a moral nature, and from this seeks
to deduce the existence of a moral governor. This form
has the disadvantage that its premises are illusory., In
alleging a moral nature for man, the theist overlooks the
fact that the moral nature of man differs somewhat in each
individual, differs considerably in each nation, and differs
entirely in some peoples. It is dependent on organisation
and education: these are influenced by climate, food, and
mode of life. If the argument from man’s nature could de
monstrate anything, it would prove a murdering God for
the murderer, a lascivious God for the licentious man, a
dishonest God for the thief*, and so through the various
phases of human inclination. The a priori arguments are
methods of proof in which the matter of the premises exists
in the order of conception antecedently to that of the con
clusion. The argument is from cause to effect. Amongst
the prominent theistic advocates relying upon the d priori
argument in England are Dr. Samuel Clarke, the Rev.
Moses Lowman, and William Gillespie. As this last
gentleman condemns his predecessors for having utterly failed
to demonstrate God’s existence, and, as his own treatise
on the “Necessary Existence of God” comes to us certified
by the praise of Lord Brougham and the approval of Sir
William Hamilton, it is to Mr. William Gillespie that the
reader shall be directed.
The propositions are first stated entirely, so that Mr.
Gillespie may not complain of misrepresentation :—
1. Infinity of extension is necessarily existing.
2. Infinity of extension is necessarily indivisible.
Corollary.—Infinity of extension is necessarily immov
able.
3. There is necessarily a being of infinity of extension.
4. The being of infinity of extension is necessarily of
unity and simplicity.
Sub-proposition.—The material universe is finite in ex
tension.
5. There is necessarily but one being of infinity of expan
sion.
Part 2, Proposition 1.—Infinity of duration is neces
sarily existing.
2. Infinity of duration is necessarily indivisible.
�A TLEA FOB ATHEISM.
15
-Corollary.—Infinity of duration is necessarily immovable.
3. There is necessarily a being of infinity of duration.
4. The being of infinity of duration is necessarily of unity
and simplicity.
Sub-proposition.—The material universe is finite in dura
tion.
Corollary.—Every succession of substances is finite in
duration.
5. There is necessarily but one being of infinity of dura
tion.
Part 3, Proposition 1.—There is necessarily a being of
infinity of expansion and infinity of duration.
2. The being of infinity of expansion and infinity of dura
tion is necessarily of unity and simplicity.
Division 2, Part 1.—The simple sole being of infinity of
expansion and of duration is necessarily intelligent and
all-knowing.
Part 2.—-The simple sole being of infinity of expansion
and of duration, who is all-knowing, is necessarily allpowerful.
Part 3.—The simple sole being of infinity of expansior
and of duration, who is all-knowing and all-powerful, i
necessarily entirely free.
Division^.—The simple sole being of infinity of expansion
and of duration, who is all-knowing, all-powerful, and en
tirely free, is necessarily completely happy.
Sub-proposition.— The simple sole being of infinity of
expansion and of duration, who is all-knowing, all-powerful,
entirely free, and completely happy, is necessarily perfectly
good.
The first objection against the foregoing argument is, that
it seeks to prove too much. It affirms one existence (God)
infinite in extent and duration, and another entirely
different and distinct existence (the material universe)
finite in extent and duration. It therefore seeks to sub
stantiate everything and something more. The first pro
position is curiously worded, and the argument to demon
strate it is undoubtedly open to more than one objection.
Mr. Gillespie has not defined infinity, and it is possible
therefore his argument may be misapprehended in this
paper. Infinite signifies nothing more than indefinite.
When a person speaks of infinite extension he can on!)
�16
A
PLEA FOB ATHEISM.
mean to refer to the extension of something to which he
has been unable to set limits. The mind cannot conceive
extension per se, either absolute or finite. It can only
conceive something extended. It might be impossible
mentally to define the extension of some substance. In
such a case its extension would be indefinite j or, as Mr.
Gillespie uses the word, infinite. No one can therefore
possibly ha^b any idea of infinity of extension. Yet it is
upon the existence of such an idea, and on the impossibility
of getting rid of it, that Mr. Gillespie grounds his first pro
position. If the idea does not exist, the argument is des
troyed at the first step.
Mr. Gillespie argues that it is utterly beyond the power
of the human mind to conceive infinity of extension non
existent. He would have been more correct in asserting
that it is utterly beyond the power of the human mind to
conceive infinity of extension at all, either existent or non
existent. Extension can only be conceived as quality of
substance. It is possible to conceive substance extended.
It is impossible in thought to limit the possible extension
of substance. Mr. Gillespie having asserted that we cannot
but believe that infinity of extension exists, proceeds to
declare that it exists necessarily. For, he says, everything
the existence of which we cannot but believe, exists neces
sarily. It is not necessary at present to examine what Mr.
Gillespie means by existing necessarily; it is sufficient to
have shown that we do not believe in the existence of infinity
of extension, although we may and do believe in the existence
of substance, to the extension of which we may be unable to
set limits. But, says Mr. Gillespie, “ everything the ex
istence of which we cannot but believe is necessarily exist
ing.” Then as we cannot but believe in the existence of
> the universe (or, to adopt Mr. Gillespie’s phrase, the ma| terial universe), the material universe exists necessarily. If
I by “ anything necessarily existing,” he means anything the
essence of which involves existence, or the nature of which
can only be considered as existent, then Mr. Gillespie, by
demonstrating the necessary existence of the universe,
refutes his own later argument, that God is its creator.
Mr. Gillespie’s argument, as before remarked, is open to
misconception, because he has left us without any definition
of some of the most important words he uses. To avoid the
�A PLEA EOK ATHEISM.
17
same objection, it is necessary to state that by substance or
existence I mean that which is in itself and is conceived
per se—that is, the conception of which does not involve
the conception of anything else as antecedent to it. By
quality, that by which I cognise any mode of existence. By
mode, each cognised condition of existence. Regarding
extension as quality of mode of substance, and not as sub
stance itself, it appears absurd to argue that the quality
exists otherwise than as quality of mode.
The whole ofthe propositions following the first are so built
upon it, that if it fails they are baseless. The second proposi
tion is, that infinity of extension is necessarily indivisible.
In dealing with this proposition, Mr. Gillespie talhs of the
parts of infinity of extension, and winds up by saying that
ne means parts in the sense of partial consideration only.
Now not only is it denied that you can have any idea of
infinity of extension, but it is also denied that infinity
can be the subject of partial consideration. Mr. Gillespie’s
whole proof of this proposition is intended to affirm that the
parts of infinity of extension are necessarily indivisible from
each other. I have already denied the possibility of con
ceiving infinity in parts ; and, indeed, if it were possible to
conceive infinity in parts, then that infinity could not be
indivisible, for Mr. Gillespie says that, by indivisible, he
means indivisible, either really or mentally. Now each part
of anything conceived is, in the act of conceiving, mentally
separated from, either other parts of, or from the remainder
of, the whole of which it is part. It is clearly impossible
to have a partial consideration of infinity, because the part
considered must be mentally distinguished from the uncon
sidered remainder, and, in that case, you have, in thought,
the part considered finite, and the residue certainly limited,
at least, by the extent of the part under consideration.
If any of the foregoing objections are well-founded, they are
fatal to Mr. Gillespie’s argument.
The argument in favour of the corollary to the second pro
position is, that the parts of infinity of extension are ne
cessarily immovable amongst themselves ; but if there be no
such thing as infinity of extension—that is, if extension be
only a quality and not necessarily infinite; if infinite mean
only indefiniteness or illimitability, andif infinity cannot have
parts, this argument goes for very little. The acceptance of the
�18
A PLEA FOB AtfHElSliG
argument that theparts of infinity of extension are immovable,
is rendered difficult when the reader considers Mr. Gillespie’s
sub-proposition (4), that the parts of the material universe
are movable and divisible from each other. He urges that
a part of the infinity of extension or of its substratum must
penetrate the material universe and every atom of it. But
if infinity can have no parts, no part of it can penetrate the
material universe. If infinity have parts (which is absurd),
and if some part penetrate every atom of the material uni
verse, and if the part so penetrating be immovable, how
can the material universe be considered as movable, and
yet as penetrated in every atom by immovability ? If pene
trated be a proper phrase, then, at the moment when the
part of infinity was penetrating the material universe, the
part of infinity so penetrating must have been in motion.
Mr. Gillespie’s logic is faulty. Use his own language, and
there is either no penetration, or there is no immovability.
In his argument for the fourth proposition, Mr. Gillespie
—having by his previous proposition demonstrated (?) what
he calls a substratum for the before demonstrated (?) in
finity of extension—says, “it is intuitively evident that the
substratum of infinity of extension can be no more divisible
than infinity of extension.” Is this so ? Might not a com
plex and divisible substratum be conceived by us as possible
to underlie a (to us) simple and indivisible indefinite exten
sion, if the conception of the latter were possible to us ?
There cannot be any intuition. It is mere assumption, as,
indeed, is the assumption of extension at all, other than as
the extension of substance. In his argument for proposi
tion 5, Gillespie says that “ any one who asserts that he
can suppose two or more necessarily existing beings, each
of infinity of expansion, is no more to be argued with
than one who denies, Whatever is, is. Why is it more dif
ficult to suppose this than to suppose one being of infinity,
and, in addition to this infinity, a material universe? Is it
impossible to suppose a necessary being of heat, one of light,
and one of electricity, all occupying the same indefinite
expansion ? If it be replied that you cannot conceive two
distinct and different beings occupying the same point at
the same moment, then it must be equally impossible to
conceive the material universe and God existing together.
The sec md division of Mr. Gillespie’s argument is also open
�A PLEA FOE ATHEISM.
19
to grave objection. Having demonstrated to his own satis
faction an infinite substance, and also having assumed in
addition a finite substance, and having called the first, infi
nite “ being•” perhaps from a devout objection to speak of
God as substance, Mr. Gillespie seeks to prove that the infi
nite being is intelligent. He says, “ Intelligence either
began to be, or. it never began to be. That it never began
to be is evident in this, that if it began to be, it must have
had a cause; for whatever begins to be must have a cause.
And the cause of intelligence must be of intelligence; for
what is not of intelligence cannot make intelligence begin
to be. Now intelligence being before intelligence began to
be, is a contradiction. And this absurdity following from
the supposition, that intelligence began to be, it is proved
that intelligence never began to be: to wit, is of infinity of
duration.” Mr. Gillespie does not condescend to tell us
why ** what is not of intelligence cannot make intelligence
begin to bebut it is not unfair to suppose that he means
that of things which have nothing in common one cannot
be the cause of the other. Let us apply Mr. Gillespie’s
argument to the material universe, the existence of which is
to him so certain that he has treated it as a self-evident
proposition.
The material universe—that is, matter, either began to be,
or it never began to be. That it never began to be, is evi
dent in this, that if it began to be, it must have had a cause;
for whatever begins to be must have a cause. And the cause
of matter, must be of matter; for what is not of matter,
cannot make matter begin to be. Now matter being
before matter began to be, is a contradiction. And this
absurdity following from the supposition that matter—i.e.,
the material universe, began to be, it is proved that the mate
rial universe never began to be—to wit, is of indefinite
duration.
The argument as to the eternity of matter is at least as
logical as the argument for the eternity of intelligence.
Mr. Gillespie may reply, that he affirms the material
universe to be finite in duration, and that by the argument
for his proposition, part 2, he proves that the one infinite
being (God) is the creator of matter. His words are, “ As
the material universe is finite in duration, or began to be, it
must have had a cause; for, whatever begins to be must have
�20
A PLEA FOB ATHEISM.
•
And this cause must be [Mr. Gillespie does not
explain why], in one respect or other, the simple sole
being of infinity of expansion and duration, who is all-know
ing [the all-knowing or intelligence rests on the argument
which has just been shown to be equally applicable to matter]
inasmuch as what being, or cause independent of that being,
could there be ? And therefore, that being made matter
begin to be.” Taking Mr. Gillespie’s own argument, that
which made matter begin to be, must be of matter, for what
is not matter, cannot make matter begin to be; then Mr.
Gillespie’s infinite being (God) must be matter. But there
is yet another exception to the proposition, which is, that
the infinite being (God) is all-powerful. Having as above
argued that the being made matter, he proceeds, “ and this
being shown, it must be granted that the being is, necessarily,
all-powerful.” Nothing of the kind need be granted. If it
were true that it was demonstrated that the infinite being
(God) made matter, it would not prove him able to make
anything else; it might show the being cause enough forthat
effect, but does not demonstrate him cause for all effects.
So that if no better argument can be found to prove God allpowerful, his omnipotence remains unproved.
Mr. Gillespie’s last proposition is that the being (God)
whose existence he has so satisfactorily (?) made out, is ne
cessarily completely happy. In dealing with this proposition,
Mr. Gillespie talks of unhappiness as existing in various
kinds and degrees. But, to adopt his own style of argu
ment, Unhappiness either began to be, or it never began to
be. That it never began to be is evident in this, that what
ever began to be must have had a cause ; for whatever be
gins to be must have a cause. And the cause of unhappi
ness must be of unhappiness, for what is not of unhappiness
cannot make unhappiness begin to be. But unhappiness
2 being before unhappiness began to be, is a contradiction;
therefore unhappiness is of infinity of duration. But pro
position 5, part 2, says there is but one being of infinity of
duration. The one being of infinity of duration is therefore
necessarily unhappy. Mr. Gillespie’s arguments recoil on
himself, and are destructive of his own affirmations.
In his argument for the sub-proposition, Mr. Gillespie
says that God’s motive, or one of his motives to create, must
be believed to have been a desire to make bappin^-ss., besides
a cause.
�A PLEA FOB ATHEISM,
„
-j
|
•
■
21
his own consummate happiness, begin to be. That is God,
who is consummate happiness everywhere for ever, desired
something. That is, he wanted more than then existed.
That is, his happiness was not complete. That is, Mr. '
Gillespie refutes himself. But what did infinite and eternal complete happiness desire ? It desired (says Mr. Gil- '
lespie) to make more happiness—that is, to make more than
an infinity of complete happiness. Mr. Gillespie’s proof, on
the whole, is at most that there exists necessarily substance,
the extension and duration of which we cannot limit. Part
of his argument involves the use of the very a posteriori
reasoning justly considered regarded by himself as utterly
worthless for the demonstration of the existence of a being
with such attributes as orthodox Theism tries to assert.
If Sir William Hamilton meant no flattery in writing
that Mr. Gillespie’s work was one of the “ very ablest ” on
the Theistic side, how wretched indeed must, in his opinion,
have been the logic of the less able advocates for Theism.
Every Theist must admit that if a God exists, he could have
so convinced all men of the fact of his existence that doubt,
disagreement, or disbelief would be impossible. If he could
not do this, he would not be omnipotent, or he would not
be omniscient—that is, he would’ not be God. Every
Theist must also agree that if a God exists, he would wish
all men to have such a clear consciousness of his existence
and attributes that doubt, disagreement, or belief on this
subject would be impossible. And this, if for no other
reason, because that out of doubts and disagreements on
religion have too often resulted centuries of persecution,
strife, and misery, which a good God would desire to prevent.
If God would not desire this, then he is not all-good—that
is, he is not God. But as many men have doubts, a large
majority of mankind have disagreements, and some men
have disbeliefs as to God’s existence and attributes ; it follows either that God does not exist, or that he is not all- ■'
wise, or that he is not all-powerful, or that he is not all
good.
Every child is born into the world an Atheist; and if he
grows into a Theist, his Deity differs with the country
in which the believer may happen to be born, or the people
amongst whom he may happen to be educated. The belief
is the result of education or organisation. Religious
�22
A PLEA FOE ATHEISM.
belief is powerful in proportion to the want of scien
tific knowledge on the part of the believer. The more
ignorant, the more credulous. In the mind of the Theist
“ God ” is equivalent to the sphere of the unknown ; by
the use of the word he answers without thought problems
which might otherwise obtain scientific solution. The more
ignorant the Theist, the greater his God. Belief in God
is not a faith founded on reason; but a prostration of
the reasoning faculties on the threshold of the unknown.
Theism is worse than illogical; its teachings are not only
without utility, but of itself it has nothing to teach. Sepa
rated from Christianity with its almost innumerable sects,
from Mahomedanism with its numerous divisions, and sepa
rated also from every other preached system, Theism is a
Will-o’-the-wisp, without reality. Apart from othodoxy,
Theism is a boneless skeleton; the various mythologies give
it alike flesh and bone, otherwise coherence it hath none.
What does Christian Theism teach ? That the first man
made perfect by the all-powerful, all-wise, all-good God,
was nevertheless imperfect, and by his imperfection brought
misery into the world, where the all-good God must have
intended misery should never come. That this God made
men to share this misery, men whose fault was their being
what he made them. That this God begets a son, who is
nevertheless his unbegotten self, and that by belief in the
birth of God’s eternal son, and in the death of the undying
who died to satisfy God’s vengeance, man may escape the
consequences of the first man’s error. Christian Theism
declares that belief alone can save man, and yet recognises
the fact that man’s belief results from teaching, by establish
ing missionary societies to spread the faith. Christian
Theism teaches that God, though no respector of persons,
selected as his favourites one nation in preference to all
others; that man can do no good of himself or without
God’s aid, but yet that each man has a free will; that God
is all-powerful, but that few go to heaven and the majority
to hell; that all are to love God, who has predestined from
eternity that by far the largest number of human beings are
to be burning in hell for ever. Yet the advocates for Theism
venture to upraid those who argue against such a faith.
It is not pretended that this inefficient Plea for Atheism
contains either a refutation of all or even the majority of
�A
PLEA FOB ATHEISM,
23
Theistic arguments, or that it offers an explanation of every
objection against Atheism; but it is hoped that enough is
here stated to induce some one of ability on the Theistic
side to write for the better instruction of such as entertain
the views here advocated—views held sincerely, views pro
pagated actively, and views which are permeating more
widely than is generally supposed.
Either Theism is true or false. If true, discussion must
help to spread its influence; if false, the sooner it ceases
to influence human conduct the better for human kind. It
will be useless for the clergy to urge that such a pamphlet
deserves no reply. It is true the writer is unimportant,
and the language in which his thoughts find expression
lacks the polish of a Macaulay, and the fervour of a Burke;
but they are nevertheless his thoughts, uttered because it is
rot only his right, but his duty to give them utterance. And
this Plea for Atheism is put forth challenging the Theists to
battle for their cause, and in the hope that the strugglers
being sincere, truth may give laurels to the victor and the
vanquished; laurels to the victor in that he has upheld
the truth; laurels still welcome to the vanquished, whose
defeat crowns him with a truth he knew not of before.
London: Austin & Co., Printers and Publishers, 17, Johns«u’s Court|
Fleet Street, E.C.
�
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A plea for atheism
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Bradlaugh, Charles
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Place of publication: [London]
Collation: 23 p. ; 18 cm.
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NATIONAL SECULAR SOCIETY
IS THERE A GOD?
By CHARLES BRADLAUGH.
The initial difficulty is in defining the word “ God ”. It is
equally impossible to intelligently affirm or deny any pro
position unless there is at least an understanding, on the
part of the affirmer or denier, of the meaning of every
word used in the proposition. To me the word “God”
standing alone is a word without meaning. I find the
word repeatedly used even by men of education and refine
ment, and who have won reputation in special directions of
research, rather to illustrate their ignorance than to ex
plain their knowledge. Various sects of Theists do affix
arbitrary meanings to the word “ God ”, but often these
meanings are in their terms self-contradictory, and usually
the definition maintained by one sect of Theists more or
less contradicts the definition put forward by some other
sect. With the Unitarian Jew, the Trinitarian Christian,
the old Polytheistic Greek, the modern Universalist, or the
Calvinist, the word “God” will in each case be intended
to express a proposition absolutely irreconcilable with those
of the other sects. In this brief essay, which can by no
means be taken as a complete answer to the question
which forms its title, I will for the sake of argument take
the explanation of the word “God” as given with great
carefulness by Dr. Robert Elint, Professor of Divinity in
the University of Edinburgh, in two works directed by
him against Atheism. He defines God (“ Antitheistic
Theories,” p. 1,) as “a supreme, self-existent, omnipotent,
omniscient, righteous and benevolent being who is dis
tinct from and independent of what he has created ” ; and
(“Theism”, p. 1,) as “a self-existent, eternal being, in
finite in power and wisdom, and perfect in holiness and
goodness, the maker of heaven and earth”; and (p. 18,)
“the creator and preserver of nature, the governor of
nations, the heavenly father and judge of man ” ; (p. 18,)
�2
IS THERE A GOD ?
“ one infinite personal ” ; (p. 42,) “ the one infinite being ”
who “is a person—is a free and loving intelligence”;
(p. 59,) “the creator, preserver, and ruler of all finite
beings”; (p. 65,) “not only the ultimate cause, but the
supreme intelligence”; and (p. 74,) “the supreme moral
intelligence is an unchangeable being”. That is, in the
above statements “ God” is defined by Professor Flint to
be : M supreme, self-existent, the one infinite, eternal, omni
potent, omniscient, unchangeable, righteous, and benevolent, per
sonal being, creator and preserver of nature, maker of heaven
and earth ; who is distinct from and independent of what he has
created, who is a free, loving, supreme, moral intelligence, the
governor of nations, the heavenly father and judge of man.
The two volumes, published by William Blackwood and
Son, from which this definition has been collected, form the
Baird Lectures in favor of Theism for the years 1876 and
1877. Professor Flint has a well-deserved reputation as a
clear thinker and writer of excellent ability as a Theistic
advocate. I trust, therefore, I am not acting unfairly in
criticising his definition. My first objection is, that to me
the definition is on the face of it so self-contradictory that
a negative answer must be given to the question, Is there
such a God ? The association of the word “ supreme ” with
the word “ infinite ” as descriptive of a “ personal being ”
is utterly confusing. “Supreme” can only be used as
expressing comparison between the being to whom it is
applied, and some other being with whom that “ supreme ”
being is assumed to have possible points of comparison and
is then compared. But “ the one infinite being ” cannot be
compared with any other infinite being, for the wording of
the definition excludes the possibility of any other infinite
being, nor could the infinite being—for the word “one”
may be dispensed with, as two infinite beings are unthink
able—be compared with any finite being. “ Supreme” is
an adjective of relation and is totally inapplicable to “the
infinite”. It can only be applied to one of two or more
finites. “Supreme” with “omnipotent” is pleonastic.
If it is said that the word “supreme” is now properly
used to distinguish between the Creator and the created,
the governor and that which is governed, then it is clear
that the word “supreme” would have been an inappli
cable word of description to “theone infinite being ” prior
to creation, and this would involve the declaration that the
�IS THERE A GOD?
3
exact description of the unchangeable has been properly
changed, which is an absurdity. The definition affirms
“creation”, that is, affirms “ God” existing prior to such
creation—i.e., then the sole existence; but the word
“ supreme ” could not then apply. An existence cannot be
described as “highest” when there is none other ; there
fore, none less high. The word “ supreme” as a word of
description is absolutely contradictory of Monism. Yet
Professor Flint himself says (“Anti-Theistic Theories”,
p. 132), “ that reason, when in quest of an ultimate expla
nation of things, imperatively demands unity, and that only
a Monistic theory of the universe can deserve the name of
U philosophy ”. Professor Flint has given no explanation
of the meaning he attaches to the word “ self-existent ”.
Nor, indeed, as he given any explanation of any of his
words of description. By self-existent I mean that to which
you cannot conceive antecedent. By “infinite” I mean
immeasurable, illimitable, indefinable ; i.e., that of which I
cannot predicate extension, or limitation of extension. By
‘(eternal ” I mean illimitable, indefinable, i.e., that of which
I cannot predicate limitation of duration or progression of
duration.
“ Nature ” is with me the same as “ universe ”, the same
as “ existence ”; i.e., I mean by it: The totality of all
phenomena, and of all that has been, is, or may be neces
sary for the happening of each and every phsenomenon. It
is from the very terms of the definition, self-existent, eternal,
infinite. I cannot think of nature commencement, discon
tinuity, or creation. I am unable to think backward to the
possibility of existence not having been. I cannot think
forward to the possibility of existence ceasing to be. I have
no meaning for the word “ create ” except to denote change
of condition. Origin of “universe” is to me absolutely
unthinkable. Sir William Hamilton (“ Lectures and Dis
cussions,” p. 610) affirms: that when aware of a new ap
pearance we are utterly unable to conceive that there has
originated any new existence ; that we are utterly unable to
think that the complement of existence has ever been either
increased or diminished; that we can neither conceive no
thing becoming something, or something becoming nothing.
.Professor Flint’s definition affirms “God ” as existing “ dis
tinct from, and independent of, what he has created ”. But
what can such words mean when used of the “ infinite ? ”
�IS THERE A GOD ?
Does “distinct from” mean separate from? Does the
“ universe ” existing distinct from God mean in addition to ?
and in other place than ? or, have the words no meaning ?
Of all words in Professor Flint’s definition, which would
be appropriate if used of human beings, I mean the
same as I should mean if I used the same words in the
highest possible degree of any human being. Here I
maintain the position taken by John Stuart Mill in his
examination of Sir W. Hamilton (p. 122). Righteous
ness and benevolence are two of the words of descrip
tion included in the definition of this creator and governor
of nations. But is it righteous and benevolent to create
men and govern nations, so that the men act crimi
nally and the nations seek to destroy one another in
war? Professor Flint does not deny (“Theism,” p. 256)
“ that God could have originated a sinless moral system”,
and he adds: “I have no doubt that God has actually made
many moral beings who are certain never to oppose their
own wills to his, or that he might, if he had so pleased, have
created only such angels as were sure to keep their first
estate ”. But it is inaccurate to describe a “ God ” as right
eous or benevolent who, having the complete power to
originate a sinless moral system, is admitted to have origi
nated a system in which sinfulness and immorality were
not only left possible, but have actually, in consequence of
God’s rule and government, become abundant. It cannot
be righteous for the “omnipotent” to be making human
beings contrived and designed by his omniscience so as to
be fitted for the commission of sin. It cannot be benevo
lent in “ God ” to contrive and create a hell in which he is
to torment the human beings who have sinned because
made by him in sin. “ God ”, if omnipotent and omnis
cient, could just as easily, and much more benevolently,
have contrived that there should never be any sinners, and,
therefore, never any need for hell or torment.
The Bev. B. A. Armstrong, with whom I debated this
question, says:—
“ ‘Either,’ argues Mr. Bradlaugh, in effect, ‘God could
make a world without suffering, or he could not. If he
could and did not, he is not all-good. If he could not, he
is not all-powerful.’ The reply is, What do you mean by
all-powerful? If you mean having power to reconcile
things in themselves contradictory, we do not hold that
�IS THERE A GOD ?
5
God is all-powerful. But a humanity, from the first en
joying immunity from suffering, and yet possessed of no
bility of character, is a self-contradictory conception.”
That is, Mr. Armstrong thinks that a “sinless moral
system from the first is a self-contradictory conception ”.
It is difficult to think a loving governor of nations
arranging one set of cannibals to eat, and another set of
human beings to be eaten by their fellow-men. It is im
possible to think a loving creator and governor contriving
a human being to be born into the world the pre-natal
victim of transmitted disease. It is repugnant to reason
to affirm this “free loving supreme moral intelligence”
planning and contriving the enduring through centuries of
criminal classes, plague-spots on civilisation.
The word “unchangeable ” contradicts the word “ crea
tor”. Any theory of creation must imply some period
when the being was not yet the creator, that is, when yet
the creation was not performed, and the act of creation
must in such case, at any rate, involve temporary or
permanent change in the mode of existence of the being
creating. So, too, the words of description “governor of
nations” are irreconcileable with the description “un
changeable ”, applied to a being alleged to have existed
prior to the creation of the “nations”, and therefore,
of course, long before any act of government could be
exercised.
To speak of an infinite personal being seems to me pure
contradiction of terms. All attempts to think “person”
involve thoughts of the limited, finite, conditioned. To
describe this infinite personal being as distinct from some
thing which is postulated as “what he has created” is
only to emphasise the contradiction, rendered perhaps still
more marked when the infinite personal being is described
as “intelligent”.
The Rev. R. A. Armstong, in a prefatory note to the
report of his debate with myself on the question “Is it
reasonable to worship God?”, says: “I have ventured
upon alleging an intelligent cause of the pheonomena of
the universe, in spite of the fact that in several of his
writings Mr. Bradlaugh has described intelligence as im
plying limitations. But though intelligence, as known to
us in man, is always hedged within limits, there is no diffi
culty in conceiving each and every limit as removed. In
�6
IS THERE A GOD?
that case the essential conception of intelligence remains
the same precisely, although the change of conditions
revolutionises its mode of working.” This, it seems to
me, is not accurate. The word intelligence can only be
accurately used of man, as in each case meaning the
totality of mental ability, its activity and result. If you
eliminate in each case all possibilities of mental ability
there is no “conception of intelligence” left, either essential
or otherwise. If you attempt to remove the limits, that
is the organisation, the intelligence ceases to be thinkable.
It is unjustifiable to talk of “ change of conditions ” when
you remove the word intelligence as a word of application
to man or other thinking animal, and seek to apply the
word to the unconditionable.
As an Atheist I. affirm one existence, and deny the possi
bility of more than one existence; by existence meaning,
as I have already stated, “the totality of all pheenomena,
and of all that has been, is, or may be necessary for the
happening of any and every pluenomenon ”. This exist
ence I know in its modes, each mode being distinguished
in thought by its qualities. By “mode” I mean each
cognised condition; that is, each pheenomenon or aggre
gation of phenomena. By “quality” I mean each charac
teristic by which in the act of thinking I distinguish.
The distinction between the Agnostic and the Atheist
is that either the Agnostic postulates an unknowable, or
makes a blank avowal of general ignorance. The Atheist
does not do either; there is of course to him much that
is yet unknown, every effort of inquiry brings some of this
within reach of knowing. With “the unknowable” con
ceded, all scientific teaching would be illusive. Every real
scientist teaches without reference to “God” or “the
unknowable ”. If the words come in as part of the
yesterday habit still clinging to-day, the scientist conducts
his experiments as though the words were not. Every
operation of life, of commerce, of war, of statesmanship,
is dealt with as though God were non-existent. The
general who asks God to give him victory, and who thanks
God for the conquest, would be regarded as a lunatic by
his Theistic brethren, if he placed the smallest reliance
on God’s omnipotence as a factor in winning the fight.
Cannon, gunpowder, shot, shell, dynamite, provision, men,
horses, means of transport, the value of these all estimated,
�IS THERE A GOD?
7
then the help of “ God ” is added to what is enough with
out God to secure the triumph. The surgeon who in
performing some delicate operation relied on God instead
of his instruments—the physician who counted on the
unknowable in his prescription—these would have poor
clientele even amongst the orthodox; save the peculiar
people the most pious would avoid their surgical or
medical aid. The “God” of the Theist, the “unknowa
ble” of the Agnostic, are equally opposed to the Atheistic
affirmation. The Atheist enquires as to the unknown,
affirms the true, denies the untrue. The Agnostic knows
not of any proposition whether it be true or false.
Pantheists affirm one existence, but Pantheists declare
that at any rate some qualities are infinite, e.g., that
existence is infinitely intelligent. I, as an Atheist, can
only think qualities of phsenomena. I know each pheno
menon by its qualities. I know no qualities except as the
qualities of some phenomenon.
So long as the word “ God ” is undefined I do not deny
“ God”. To the question, Is there such a God as defined
by Professor ..Plint, I am compelled to give a negative
reply. If the word “ God ” is intended to affirm Dualism,
then as a Monist I negate “ God ”.
_ The attempts to prove the existence of God may be
divided into three classes:—1. Those which attempt to
prove the objective existence of God from the subjective
notion of necessary existence in the human mind, or from
the assumed objectivity of space and time, interpreted as
the attributes of a necessary substance. 2. Those which
*{ essay to prove the existence of a supreme self-existent
cause, from the mere fact of the existence of the world by
the application of the principle of causality, starting with
the postulate of any single existence whatsoever, the world,
or anything in the world, and proceeding to argue back
wards or upwards, the existence of one supreme cause is
held to be regressive inference from the existence of these
effects”. But it is enough to answer to these attempts,
that if a supreme existence were so demonstrable, that
bare entity would not be identifiable with “God”. “A
demonstration of a primitive source of existence is of no
formal theological value. It is an absolute zero.”
3. The argument from design, or adaptation, in nature,
the fitness of means to an end, implying, it is said, an
�8
IS THERE A GOD?
architect or designer. Or, from the order in the universe,
indicating, it is said, an orderer or lawgiver, whose intelli
gence we thus discern.
But this argument is a failure, because from finite
instances differing in character it assumes an infinite cause
absolutely the same for all. Divine unity, divine per
sonality, are here utterly unproved. 11 Why should we rest
in our inductive inference of one designer from the alleged
phenomena of design, when these are claimed to be so
varied and so complex ? ”
If the inference from design is to avail at all, it must
avail to show that all the phenomena leading to misery
and mischief, must have been designed and intended by a
being finding pleasure in the production and maintenance
of this misery and mischief. If the alleged constructor of
the universe is supposed to have designed one beneficent
result, must he not equally be supposed to have designed
all results? And if the inference of benevolence and
goodness be valid for some instances, must not the in
ference of malevolence and wickedness be equally valid
from others ? If, too, any inference is to be drawn from
the illustration of organs in animals supposed to be
specially contrived for certain results, what is the inference
to be drawn from the many abortive and incomplete organs,
muscles, nerves, etc., now known to be traceable in man
and other animals ? What inference is to be drawn from
each instance of deformity or malformation? But the
argument from design, if it proved anything, would at the
most only prove an arranger of pre-existing material; it
in no sense leads to the conception of an originator of
substance.
There is no sort of analogy between a finite artificer
arranging a finite mechanism and an alleged divine creator
originating all existence. Brom an alleged product you
are only at liberty to infer a producer after having seen a
similar product actually produced.
PRICE ONE PENNY.
London: Printed by Annie Besant and Charles Bradlaugh,
63, Fleet Street, London, E.C.—1887.
�
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Is there a god?
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Bradlaugh, Charles [1833-1891]
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NATIONAL secular society
HUMANITY’S GAIN from UNBELIEF.
BY
CHARLES BRADLAUGH.
[Reprinted from the “North American Review” of March, 1889.J
LONDON:
•FREETHOUGrHT
PUBLISHING-
63 FLEET STREET, E.C.
1 8 8 9.
PRICE
TWOPENCE.
COMPANY,
�LONDON :
PRINTED BY ANNIE BESANT AND CHARLES BRADLAUGH,
63
ELEET STREET, E.C.
�HUMANITY’S GAIN FROM UNBELIEF.
As an unbeliever, I ask leave to plead that humanity has
been real gainer from scepticism, and that the gradual
and growing rejection of Christianity—like the rejection
of the faiths which preceded it—has in fact added, and
Will add, to man’s happiness and well being. I maintain
that in physics science is the outcome of scepticism, and
that general progress is impossible without scepticism on
matters of religion. I mean by religion every form of
belief which accepts or asserts the supernatural. I write
as a Monist, and use the word “nature ” as meaning all
phenomena, every phenomenon, all that is necessary for
the happening of any and every phenomenon. Every
religion is constantly changing, and at any given time is
the measure of the civilisation attained by what Guizot
described as theywszte milieu of those who profess it. Each
religion is slowly but certainly modified in its dogma and
practice by the gradual development of the peoples amongst
whom it is professed. Each discovery destroys in whole
or part some theretofore cherished belief. No religion is
suddenly rejected by any people ; it is rather gradually
out-grown. None see a religion die ; dead religions are
like dead languages and obsolete customs; the decay is
long and—like the glacier march—is only perceptible to
the careful watcher by comparisons extending over long
periods. A superseded religion may often be traced in the
festivals, ceremonies, and dogmas of the religion which has
replaced it. Traces of obsolete religions may often be
found in popular customs, in old wives’ stories, and in
children’s tales.
�4
humanity’s GAIN FROM UNBELIEF.
It is necessary, in order that my plea should be under
stood, that I should explain what I mean by Christianity ;
and in the very attempt at this explanation there will, I
think, be found strong illustration of the value of unbelief,
Christianity in practice may be gathered from its more
ancient forms, represented by the Roman Catholic and the
Greek Churches, or from the various churches which have
grown up in the last few centuries. Each of these churches
calls itself Christian. Some of them deny the right of the
others to use the word Christian. Some Christian churches
treat, or have treated, other Christian churches as heretics
or unbelievers. The Roman Catholics and the Protestants
in Great Britain and Ireland have in turn been terribly
cruel one to the other; and the ferocious laws of the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, enacted by the
English Protestants against English and Irish Papists, are
a disgrace to civilisation. These penal laws, enduring
longest in Ireland, still bear fruit in much of the political
mischief and agrarian crime of to-day. It is only the
tolerant indifference of scepticism that, one after the other,
has repealed most of the laws directed by the Established
Christian Church against Papists and Dissenters, and also
against Jews and heretics. Church of England clergymen
have in the past gone to great lengths in denouncing non
conformity ; and even in the present day an effective sample
of such denunciatory bigotry may be found in a sort of
orthodox catechism written by the Rev. F. A. Gace, of
Great Barling, Essex, the popularity of which is vouched
by the fact that it has gone through ten editions.
This catechism for little children teaches that “ Dissent is
a great sin ”, and that Dissenters “ worship God according
to their own evil and corrupt imaginations, and not ac
cording to his revealed will, and therefore their worship is
idolatrous ”. Church of England Christians and Dissent
ing Christians, when fraternising amongst themselves,
often publicly draw the line at Unitarians, and positively
deny that these have any sort of right to call themselves
Christians.
In the first half of the seventeenth century Quakers
were flogged and imprisoned in England as blasphemers ;
and the early Christian settlers in New England, escaping
from the persecution of Old World Christians, showed
scant mercy to the followers of Fox and Penn. It is
�humanity’s gain from unbelief.
5
customary, in controversy, for those advocating the claims
of Christianity, to include all good done by men in nomi’
nally Christian countries as if such good were the result of
Christianity, while they contend that the evil which exists
prevails in spite of Christianity. I shall try to make out
that the ameliorating march of the last few centuries has
been initiated by the heretics of each age, though I quite
concede that the men and women denounced and per
secuted as infidels by the pious of one century, are fre
quently claimed as saints by the pious of a later genera
tion.
What then is Christianity ? As a system or scheme
of doctrine, Christianity may, I submit, not unfairly be
gathered from the Old and New Testaments. It is true
that some Christians to-day desire to escape from submis
sion to portions, at any rate, of the Old Testament; but this
very tendency seems to me to be part of the result of
the beneficial heresy for which I am pleading. Man’s
humanity has revolted against Old Testament barbarism;
and therefore he has attempted to disassociate the Old Testa
ment from Christianity. Unless Old and New Testaments
are accepted as God’s revelation to man, Christianity has
no higher claim than any other of the world’s many
religions, if no such claim can be made out for it apart
from the Bible. And though it is quite true that some
who deem themselves Christians put the Old Testament
completely in the background, this is, I allege, because
they are out-growing their Christianity. Without the
doctrine of the atoning sacrifice of Jesus, Christianity,
as a religion, is naught; but unless the story of Adam’s
fall is accepted, the redemption from the consequences
of that fall cannot be believed. Both in Great Britain
and in the United States the Old and New Testaments
are forced on the people as part of Christianity; for it is
blasphemy at common law to deny the scriptures of the
Old and New Testaments to be of divine authority; and
such denial is punishable with fine and imprisonment,
or even worse.
The rejection of Christianity intended
throughout this paper, is therefore the rejection of the
Old and New Testaments as being of divine revelation.
It is the rejection alike of the authorised teachings of the
Church of Rome and of the Church of England, as these
may be found in the Bible, the creeds, the encyclicals,
�6
HUMANITY S GAIN FKOM UNBELIEJ’.
the prayer book, the canons and homilies of either or both
of these churches. It is the rejection of the Christianity
of Luther, of Calvin, and of Wesley.
A ground frequently taken by Christian theologians is
that the progress and civilisation of the world are due to
Christianity; and the discussion is complicated by the
fact that many eminent servants of humanity have been
nominal Christians, of one or other of the sects. My
allegation will be that the special services rendered to
human progress by these exceptional men, have not been
in consequence of their adhesion to Christianity, but in
spite of it; and that the specific points of advantage to
human kind have been in ratio of their direct opposition
to precise Biblical enactments.
A. S. Farrar says1 that Christianity “ asserts authority
over religious belief in virtue of being a supernatural
communication from God, and claims the right to control
human thought in virtue of possessing sacred books, which
are at once the record and the instrument of the communi
cation, written by men endowed with supernatural inspira
tion ”. Unbelievers refuse to submit to the asserted
authority, and deny this claim of control over human
thought: they allege that every effort at freethinking must
provoke sturdier thought.
Take one clear gain to humanity consequent on unbelief,
i.e., in the abolition of slavery in some countries, in the
abolition of the slave trade in most civilised countries, and
in the tendency to its total abolition. I am unaware of
any religion in the world which in the past forbade slavery.
The professors of Christianity for ages supported it; the
Old Testament repeatedly sanctioned it by special laws ; the
New Testament has no repealing declaration. Though we
are at the close of the nineteenth century of the Christian
era, it is only during the past three-quarters of a century
that the battle for freedom has been gradually won. It is
scarcely a quarter of a century since the famous emancipa
tion amendment was carried to the United States Constitu
tion. And it is impossible for any well-informed Christian
to deny that the abolition movement in North America was
most steadily and bitterly opposed by the religious bodies
in the various States. Henry Wilson, in his “Itise and
1 Farrar’s “ Critical History of Fieethought ”,
�humanity’s
GAIN
from unbelief.
7
Fall of the Slave Power in America ” ; Samuel J. May, in
his “Recollections of the Anti-Slavery Conflict ” ; and J.
Greenleaf Whittier, in his poems, alike are witnesses that
the Bible and pulpit, the Church and its great influence,
were used against abolition and in favor of the slave
owner. I know that Christians in the present day often
declare that Christianity had a large share in bringing
about the abolition of slavery, and this because men pro
fessing Christianity were abolitionists. I plead that these
so-called Christian abolitionists were men and women
whose humanity, recognising freedom for all, was in this
in direct conflict with Christianity. It is not yet fifty years
since the European Christian powers jointly agreed to
abolish the slave trade. What of the effect of Christianity
on these powers in the centuries which had preceded ?
The heretic Condorcet pleaded powerfully for freedom
whilst Christian France was still slave-holding. For many
centuries Christian Spain and Christian Portugal held
slaves. Porto Rico freedom is not of long date; and
Cuban emancipation is even yet newer. It was a Christian
King, Charles 5th, and a Christian friar, who founded in
Spanish America the slave trade between the Old World
and the New. For some 1800 years, almost, Christians kept
slaves, bought slaves, sold slaves, bred slaves, stole slaves.
Pious Bristol and godly Liverpool less than 100 years ago
openly grew rich on the traffic. During the ninth century
Greek Christians sold slaves to the Saracens. In the
eleventh century prostitutes were publicly sold as slaves in
Rome, and the profit went to the Church.
It is said that William Wilberforce, the abolitionist, was
a Christian. But at any rate his Christianity was strongly
diluted with unbelief. As an abolitionist he did not believe
Leviticus xxv, 44-6; he must have rejected Exodus xxi,
2-6 ; he could not have accepted the many permissions
and injunctions by the Bible deity to his chosen people to
capture and hold slaves. In the House of Commons on
18th February, 1796, Wilberforce reminded that Christian
assembly that infidel and anarchic France had given
liberty to the Africans, whilst Christian and monarchic
England was “obstinately continuing a system of cruelty
and injustice”.
Wilberforce, whilst advocating the abolition of slavery,
found the whole influence of the English Court, and the
�8
HUMANITY S GAIN FBOM UNBELIEF.
great weight of the Episcopal Bench, against him. George
III, a most Christian king, regarded abolition theories
with abhorrence, and the Christian House of Lords was
utterly opposed to granting freedom to the slave. When
Christian missionaries some sixty-two years ago preached
to Demerara negroes under the rule of Christian England,
they were treated by Christian judges, holding commission
from Christian England, as criminals for so preaching. A
Christian commissioned officer, member of the Established
Church of England, signed the auction notices for the sale
of slaves as late as the year 1824. In the evidence before
a Christian court-martial, a missionary is charged with
having tended to make the negroes dissatisfied with their
condition as slaves, and with having promoted discontent
and dissatisfaction amongst the slaves against their lawful
masters. For this the Christian judges sentenced the
Demerara abolitionist missionary to be hanged by the
neck till he was dead. The judges belonged to the Estab
lished Church ; the missionary was a Methodist. In this
the Church of England Christians in Demerara were no
worse than Christians of other sects : their Boman Catholic
Christian brethren in St. Domingo fiercely attacked the
Jesuits as criminals because they treated negroes as though
they were men and women, in encouraging “two slaves
to separate their interest and safety from that of the
gang ”, whilst orthodox Christians let them couple pro
miscuously and breed for the benefit of their o wners like
any other of their plantation cattle. In 1823 the Royal
Gazette (Christian) of Demerara said :
“We shall not suffer you to enlighten our slaves, who are by
law our property, till you can demonstrate that when they are
made religious and knowing they will continue to be our
slaves.”
When William Lloyd Garrison, the pure-minded and
most earnest abolitionist, delivered his first anti-slavery
address in Boston, Massachusetts, the only building he
could obtain, in which to speak, was the infidel hall owned
by Abner Kneeland, the “infidel” editor of the Boston
Investigator, who had been sent to gaol for blasphemy.
Jlvery Christian sect had in turn refused Mr. Lloyd Garri
son the use of the buildings they severally controlled.
|jloyd Garrison told me himself how honored deacons of
�humanity’s GAIN UHOM UNBELIEF.
9
a Christian Church, joined in an actual attempt to hang
him.
When abolition was advocated in the United States in
1790, the representative from South Carolina was able to
plead that the Southern clergy “did not condemn either
slavery or the slave trade ” ; and Mr. Jackson, the repre
sentative from Georgia, pleaded that “from Genesis to
Revelation ” the current was favorable to slavery. Elias
Hicks, the brave Abolitionist Quaker, was denounced as
an Atheist, and less than twenty years ago a Hicksite
Quaker was expelled from one of the Southern American
Legislatures, because of the reputed irreligion of these
abolitionist “ Friends ”.
When the Fugitive Slave Law was under discussion in
North America, large numbers of clergymen of nearly
every denomination were found ready to defend this
infamous law. Samuel James May, the famous aboli
tionist, was driven from the pulpit as irreligious, solely
because of his attacks on slaveholding. Northern clergy
men tried to induce “silver tongued” Wendell Philips to
abandon his advocacy of abolition. Southern pulpits rang
with praises for the murderous attack on Charles Sumner.
The slayers of Elijah Lovejoy were highly reputed
Christian men.
Guizot, notwithstanding that he tries to claim that the
•Church exerted its influence to restrain slavery, says
(“European Civilisation”, vol. i., p. 110) :
“It has often been repeated that the abolition of slavery
among modern people is entirely due to Christians. That, I
think, is saying too much. Slavery existed for a long period
in the heart of Christian society, without its being particularly
astonished or irritated. A multitude of causes, and a great
development in other ideas and principles of civilisation, were
necessary for the abolition of this iniquity of all iniquities.”
And my contention is that this “development in other
ideas and principles of civilisation ” was long retarded by
Governments in which the Christian Church was dominant.
The men who advocated liberty were imprisoned, racked,
and burned, so long as the Church was strong enough to
be merciless.
The Rev. Francis Minton, Rector of Middlewich, in his
recent earnest volume1 on the struggles of labor, admits
1 “ Capital and Wages”, p. 19.
�10
humanity’s gain from unbelief.
that “ a few centuries ago slavery was acknowledged
throughout Christendom to have the divine sanction..........
Neither the exact cause, nor the precise time of the
decline of the belief in the righteousness of slavery can
be defined. It was doubtless due to a combination of
causes, one probably being as indirect as the recognition
of the greater economy of free labor. With the decline
of the belief the abolition of slavery took place.”
The institution of slavery was actually existent in
Christian Scotland in the 17th century, where the white
coal workers and salt workers of East Lothian were
chattels, as were their negro brethren in the Southern
States thirty years since; they “ went to those who
succeeded to the property of the works, and they could be
sold, bartered, or pawned”? “There is”, says J. M.
Robertson, “no trace that the Protestant clergy of Scot
land ever raised a voice against the slavery which grew
up before their eyes. And it was not until 1799, after
republican and irreligious France had set the example,
that it was legally abolished.”
Take further the gain to humanity consequent on the
unbelief, or rather disbelief, in witchcraft and wizardry.
Apart from the brutality by Christians towards those
suspected of witchcraft, the hindrance to scientific initia
tive or experiment was incalculably great so long as belief
in magic obtained. The inventions of the past two centuries,
and especially those of the 18th century, might have benefitted mankind much earlier and much more largely, but
for the foolish belief in witchcraft and the shocking
ferocity exhibited against those suspected of necromancy.
After quoting a large number of cases of trial and punish
ment for witchcraft from official records in Scotland, J. M.
Robertson says: “The people seem to have passed from
cruelty to cruelty precisely as they became more and more
fanatical, more and more devoted to their Church, till after
many generations the slow spread of human science began
to counteract the ravages of superstition, the clergy resist
ing reason and humanity to the last ”.
The Rev. Mr. Minton1 concedes that it is “ the advance
2
of knowledge which has rendered the idea of Satanic
1 “ Perversion of Scotland,” p. 197.
2 “ Capital and Wages ”, pp. 15, 16.
�HUMANITY S GAIN FROM UNBELIEF.
11
agency through the medium of witchcraft grotesquely
ridiculous”. He admits that “ for more than 1500 years
the belief in witchcraft was universal in Christendom ”,
and that “ the public mind was saturated with the idea of
Satanic agency in the economy of nature ”. He adds:
“ If we ask why the world now rejects what was once so
unquestioningly believed, we can only reply that advancing
knowledge has gradually undermined the belief ”.
In a letter recently sent to the Pall Mall Gazette against
modern Spiritualism, Professor Huxley declares,
“that the older form of the same fundamental delusion—the
belief in possession and in witchcraft—gave rise in the fifteenth,,
sixteenth, and seventeenth centuries to persecutions by Chris
tians of innocent men, women, and children, more extensive,
more cruel, and more murderous than any to which the
Christians of the first three centuries were subjected by the
authorities of pagan Borne.”
And Professor Huxley adds :
“No one deserves much blame for being deceived in these
matters. We are all intellectually handicapped in youth by
the incessant repetition of the stories about possession and
witchcraft in both the Old and the New Testaments. The
majority of us are taught nothing which will help us to
observe accurately and to interpret observations with due
caution.”
The English Statute Book under Elizabeth and under
James was disfigured by enactments against witchcraft
passed under pressure from the Christian churches,
which Acts have only been repealed in consequence of the
disbelief in the Christian precept, ‘1 thou shalt not suffer a
witch to live”. The statute 1 James I, c. 12, condemned
to death “all persons invoking any evil spirits, or con
sulting, covenanting with, entertaining, employing, feed
ing, or rewarding any evil spirit ”, or generally practising
any “infernal arts”. This was not repealed until the
eighteenth century was far advanced. Edison’s phono
graph would 280 years ago have insured martyrdom for
its inventor; the utilisation of electric force to transmit
messages around the world would have been clearly the
practice of an infernal art. At least we may plead that
unbelief has healed the bleeding feet of science, and made
the road free for her upward march.
�12
humanity’s gain from unbelief.
Is it not also fair to urge the gain to humanity which
has been apparent in the wiser treatment of the insane,
consequent on the unbelief in the Christian doctrine that
these unfortunates were examples either of demoniacal
possession or of special visitation of deity? For centuries
under Christianity mental disease was most ignorantly
treated.
Exorcism, shackles, and the whip were the
penalties rather than the curatives for mental maladies.
From the heretical departure of Pinel at the close of
the last century to the position of Maudsley to-day, every
step illustrates the march of unbelief. Take the gain to
humanity in the unbelief not yet complete, but now
largely preponderant, in the dogma that sickness, pesti
lence, and famine were manifestations of divine anger,
the results of which could neither be avoided nor pre
vented. The Christian Churches have done little or
nothing to dispel this superstition. The official and
authorised prayers of the principal denominations, even
to-day, reaffirm it. Modern study of the laws of health,
experiments in sanitary improvements, more careful
applications of medical knowledge, have proved more
efficacious in preventing or diminishing plagues and
pestilence than have the intervention of the priest or
the practice of prayer. Those in England who hold
the old faith that prayer will suffice to cure disease are
to-day termed “peculiar people”, and are occasionally
indicted for manslaughter when their sick children die,
because the parents have trusted to God instead of
appealing to the resources of science.
It is certainly a clear gain to astronomical science that
the Church which tried to compel Galileo to unsay the
truth has been overborne by the growing unbelief of the
age, even though our little children are yet taught that
Joshua made the sun and moon stand still, and that for
Hezekiah the sun-dial reversed its record. As Buckle,
arguing for the morality of scepticism, says1 :
“ As long as men refer the movements of the comets to the
immediate finger of God, and as long as they believe that an
eclipse is one of the modes by which the deity expresses his
anger, they will never be guilty of the blasphemous presump
tion of attempting to predict such supernatural appearances.
1 “ History of Civilisation,’’ vol. i, p. 345.
�HUMANITY S GAIN FROM UNBELIEF.
13
Before . they could dare to investigate the causes of these
mysterious phenomena, it is necessary that they should believe,
or at all events that they should suspect, that the phenomena
themselves were capable of being explained by the human
mind.”
As in astronomy so in geology, the gain of knowledge
to . humanity has been almost solely in measure of the
rejection of the Christian theory. A century since it was
almost universally held that the world was created 6,000
years ago, or at any rate, that by the sin of the first man,
Adam, death commenced about that period. Ethnology
and Anthropology have only been possible in so far as,
adopting the regretful words of Sir W. Jones, “intelligent
and virtuous persons are inclined to doubt the authenticity
of the accounts delivered by Moses concerning the primi
tive world ”.
Surely it is clear gain to humanity that unbelief has
sprung up. against the divine right of kings, that men no
longer believe that the monarch is “God’s anointed” or
that “the powers that be are ordained of God”. In the
struggles for political freedom the weight of the Church
was mostly thrown on the side of the tyrant. The
homilies of the Church of England declare that “even the
wicked rulers have their power and authority from God ”,
and. that “such subjects as are disobedient or rebellious
against their princes disobey God and procure their own
damnation ”. It can scarcely be necessary to argue to the
citizens of the United States of America that the origin of
their liberties was in the rejection of faith in the divine
right of George III.
Will any one, save the most bigoted, contend that it is
not . certain gain to humanity to spread unbelief in the
terrible doctrine that eternal torment is the probable fate
of the great majority of the human family? Is it not
gain to have diminished the faith that it was the duty of
the wretched and the miserable to be content with the lot
in life which providence had awarded them ?
If it stood alone it would be almost sufficient to plead as
justification for heresy the approach towards equality and
liberty for the utterance of all opinions achieved because
of growing unbelief. At one period in Christendom each
Government acted as though only one religious faith could
be true, and as though the holding, or at any rate the
�14
humanity’s gain from unbelief.
making known, any other opinion was a criminal act
deserving punishment. Under the one word “ infidel”,
even as late as Lord Coke, were classed together all who
were not Christians, even though they were Mahommedans,
Brahmins, or Jews. All who did not accept the Christian
faith were sweepingly denounced as infidels and therefore
//ors de la loi. One hundred and forty-five years since, the
Attorney-General, pleading in our highest court, said1 :
“What is the definition of an infidel? Why, one who
does not believe in the Christian religion. Then a Jew is
an infidel.” And English history for several centuries
prior to the Commonwealth shows how habitually and
most atrociously Christian kings, Christian courts, and
Christian churches, persecuted and harassed these infidel
Jews. There was a time in England when Jews were
such infidels that they were not even allowed to be sworn
as witnesses. In 1740 a legacy left for establishing an
assembly for the reading of the Jewish scriptures was
held to be void2 because it was “ for the propagation of
the Jewish law in contradiction to the Christian religion”.
It is only in very modern times that municipal rights have
been accorded in England to Jews. It is barely thirty
years since they have been allowed to sit in Parliament.
In 1851, the late Mr. Newdegate in debate3 objected “that
they should have sitting in that House an individual who
regarded our Redeemer as an impostor”. Lord Chief
Justice Raymond has shown4 how it was that Christian
intolerance was gradually broken down. “A Jew may
sue at this day, but heretofore he could not; for then they
were looked upon as enemies, but now commerce has
taught the world more humanity.”
Lord Coke treated the infidel as one who in law had no
right of any kind, with whom no contract need be kept, to
whom no debt was payable. The plea of alien infidel as
answer to a claim was actually pleaded in court as late as
1737.5 In a solemn judgment, Lord Coke says6: “ All
infidels are in law perpetui inimici; for between them, as
1 Omychund v. Barker, 1 Atkyns 29.
2 D’Costa v. D’Pays, Arab. 228.
3 3 Hansard cxvi. 381.
4 1 Lord Raymond’s reports 282, Wells v. Williams.
5 Ramkissenseat v Barker, 1 Atkyns 51.
6 7 Coke’s reports, Calvin’s case.
�humanity’s gain from unbelief.
15
with, the devils whose subjects they be, and the Christian,
there is perpetual hostility ”. Twenty years ago the law
of England required the writer of any periodical publica
tion or pamphlet under sixpence in price to give sureties
for £800 against the publication of blasphemy. I was
the last person prosecuted in 1868 for non-compliance
with that law, which was repealed by Mr. Gladstone in
1869. Up till the 23rd December, 1888, an infidel in Scot
land was only allowed to enforce any legal claim in court
on condition that, if challenged, he denied his infidelity.
If he lied and said he was a Christian, he was accepted,
despite his lying. If he told the truth and said he was an
unbeliever, then he was practically an outlaw, incompetent
to give evidence for himself or for any other. Fortunately
all this was changed by the Royal assent to the Oaths Act
on 24th December. Has not humanity clearly gained a
little in this struggle through unbelief ?
For more than a century and a-half the Roman Catholic
had in practice harsher measure dealt out to him by the
English Protestant Christian, than was even during that
period the fate of the Jew or the unbeliever. If the
Roman Catholic would not take the oath of abnegation,
which to a sincere Romanist was impossible, he was in
effect an outlaw, and the “jury packing” so much com
plained of to-day in Ireland is one of the habit survivals
of the old bad time when Roman Catholics were thus by
law excluded from the j ury box.
The Scotsman of January 5th, 1889, notes that in 1860
the Rev. Dr. Robert Lee, of Grey friars, gave a course of
Sunday evening lectures on Biblical Criticism, in which he
showed the absurdity and untenableness of regarding
every word in the Bible as inspired ; and it adds :
“We well remember the awful indignation such opinions
inspired, and it is refreshing to contrast them with the calm
ness with which they are now received. Not only from the
pulpits of the city, but from the press (misnamed religious)
were his doctrines denounced. And one eminent U.P. minister
went the length of publicly praying for him, and for the
students under his care. It speaks volumes for the progress
made since then, when we think in all probability Dr. Charteris,
Dr. Lee’s successor in the chair, differs in his teaching from the
Confession of Faith much more widely than Dr. Lee ever did,
and yet he is considered supremely orthodox, whereas the
stigma of heresy was attached to the other all his life.”
�16
humanity’s gain from unbelief.
And this change and gain to humanity is due to the
gradual progress of unbelief, alike inside and outside the
Churches.
Take from differing Churches two recent
illustrations: The late Principal Dr. Lindsay Alexander,
a strict Calvinist, in his important work on “ Biblical
Theology”, claims that
“ all the statements of Scripture are alike to be deferred to as
presenting to us the mind of God ”.
Yet the Rev. Dr. of Divinity also says:
“We find in their writings [i.e., in the writings of the sacred
authors] statements which no ingenuity can reconcile with
what modern research has shown to be the scientific truth—
i.e., we find in them statements which modern science proves
to be erroneous.”
At the last Southwell Diocesan Church of England Con
ference at Derby, the Bishop of the Diocese presiding, the
Rev. J. G. Richardson said of the Old Testament that
“ it was no longer honest or even safe to deny that this noble
literature, rich in all the elements of moral or spiritual grandeur,
given—so the Church had always taught, and would always
teach—under the inspiration of Almighty God, was sometimes
mistaken in its science, was sometimes inaccurate in its history,
and sometimes only relative and accommodatory in its morality.
It assumed theories of the physical world which science had
abandoned and could never resume; it contained passages oi
narrative which devout and temperate men pronounced dis
credited, both by external and internal evidence; it praised,
or justified, or approved, or condoned, or tolerated, conduct
which the teaching of Christ and the conscience of the Christian
alike condemned.”
Or, as I should urge, the gain to humanity by un
belief is that “the teaching of Christ ” has been modi
fied, enlarged, widened, and humanised, and that “the
conscience of the Christian ” is in quantity and quality
made fitter for human progress by the ever increasing
additions of knowledge of these later and more heretical
days.
�
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Humanity's gain from unbelief
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Bradlaugh, Charles [1833-1891]
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Place of publication: London
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Atheism
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i Z'^'4H 113-1
NATIONAL SECULAR SOCIETY
W Atheistic ^UHorm.
VIII.
IS
DARWINISM
ATHEISTIC?
BY
CHARLES COCKBILL CATTELL.
Author of “A Search
for the
First Man,'’
etc
LONDON:
EREETHOUGHT
PUBLISHING
63, FLEET STREET E.C.
1 8 8 4.
PRICE
ONE
PENNY.
COMPANY,
�THE ATHEISTIC PLATFORM.
Under this title is "being issued a fortnightly publi
cation, each number of which consists of a lecture
delivered by a well-known Freethought advocate. Any
question may be selected, provided that it has formed the
subject of a lecture delivered from the platform by an
Atheist. It is desired to show that the Atheistic platform
is used for the service of humanity, and that Atheists war
against tyranny of every kind, tyranny of king and god,
political, social, and theological.
Each issue consists of sixteen pages, and is published at
one penny. Each writer is responsible only for his or her
own views.
i 1.—“ What is the use of Prayer ? ” By‘Annie Besant.
2. —Mind considered as a Bodily Function. By Alice
Bradlaugh.
3. —“ The Gospel of Evolution.” By Edward Aveling,
D.Sc.
4. —“ England’s Balance-Sheet.” By Charles Bradlaugh,
5. —“ The Story of the Soudan.” By Annie Besant.
6. —“ Nature and the Gods.” By Arthur B. Moss.
These Six, in Wrapper, Sixpence.
7. —“ Some Objections
laugh.
to
Socialism.” By Charles Brad
�IS DARWINISM ATHEISTIC?
In the concluding words of the “Descent of Man ” “w? are
?rntfiere-pC°nCemed
hopes or fears> only with the
truth as far a8 0llr reason permits mt0 discover it”(p
lor? th!
is not Atheism. aijy
eludes the otfS^7
A?r0I10W’ Net whether one el
eiuo.es tne othei is a question which the
unanswered. The Theist looks on the ea^th Ad r •
things as a series of fixed and unchangeable fim™?
the?cXtioSnUnThe n„8'- “
"v ™ the fcst daX »*
eir creation lhe universe, according to his view conlrl
can make to the question’pr°Pfi answer he
aSd vegetXl^Ct^tC^
“They exist bv an
? ClvAlsed, uatl°ns are familial-:
the unlimited ‘existencein
‘and
existences animate and inanimate. I hl
�116
THE ATHEISTIC PLATFORM.
and. men only. Others again bring in a bill of divorce
ment for the severance of the universe from the creator,
and introduce the law of nature to take the place of an
active God. Hence in most popular works we meet with
the first cause and secondary causes. By general agree
ment scientific men attribute all the present operations of
nature to second causes, and express their conclusions,
based on observation and experience in terms now popular
—the laws of nature. Even George Combe, a man of
undoubted piety, penned the following sentence:
“ Science has banished the belief in the exercise-by the
Deity in our day of special acts of supernatural power as
a means of influencing human affairs.” Baden Powell
went still further (Inductive Philosophy, p. 67): “There
is not, there never has been, any ‘ creation ’ in the original
and popular sense of the term,” which is now adopted as
“a mere term of convenience.” To this the appearance
of man is no exception, and in no way violates the essential
unity and continuity of natural causes. Again, “by equally
regular laws in one case as in the other, must have been
evolved all forms of inorganic and equally of . organic
existence.” Any single instance of birth or origin as an
exception to physical laws “is an incongruity so prepos
terous that no inductive mind can for a moment entertain
it. All is sub j ect to pre-arranged laws, and the disruption
of one single link in nature’s chain of order would be the
destruction of the whole.” All this was written before
Darwin broached his theory, and I well remember the
reply given more than thirty years ago. “ Why then cry
unto God ? There is no God in nature, only an exhibition
of his legislative power as evinced in his pre-arranged
laws! ” This appears to me an answer. Under this head
may fittingly be placed Darwin’s predecessors, E. G. St.
Hilaire, Lamarck, Erasmus Darwin, and Goethe, all of
whom attribute changes and modifications to a process of
nature. A brief summary of their views may be read in
Dr. Aveling’s “Darwinian Theory.”
Strange as it may appear, Professor Mivart quotes
Aquinas and Augustine as writing that “ in the first insti
tution of nature we do not look for miracles, but for the
laws of nature,” and he himself says “that throughoiit
the whole process of physical evolution—the first mani
festation of life included—supernatural action is not to be
�IS DARWINISM ATHEISTIC ?
117
looked for.” Mr. Mungo Ponton holds that no organism
•can be said to be created. “It is neither necessary nor
reasonable to suppose the Creator himself to act directly
in the organisation of any organism.” How such lan
guage must shock the pious writer who exclaimed: “ The
hand that made me is divine.”
The genial poet duly shuddered at Baden Powell, who
after all only repeated the words of the Saints of the
JRoman Church:
“ Take thine idol hence,
Cold Physicist!
Great Absentee ! and left His Agent Law
To work out all results.
Nature, whose very name
Implies her wants, while struggling into birth,
Demands a Living and a Present God.”
I fully enter into the spirit of these words, and in my
first work of importance (1864) I urged that such a con■ception negatives all science. There can be no scientific
fact established and reliable, if it is true that there is a
•God
“ Whose power o’er moving worlds presides,
Whose voice created, and whose wisdom guides,”
It appears manifest that there can be nothing certain in
nature if God ever interferes. No prediction of the ap
pearance of a comet or any description of the motion of a
planet is possible, if we allow the possibility of any un
known person interfering with the calculations on which
the predictions are based. This is not a matter of opinion
or belief—it is a self-evident truth. We understand that
two added to two equal four, but the Theistic theory
admits the possibility that they may, under divine control,
be either more or less. If any say no, they admit the
Atheistic position. A God who never interferes is no God
at all.
Those who put Law in place of God explain nothing
Law can no more create, modify, or sustain nature than
God can. It is, in fact, only removing the Divine operator
one step back without any advantage. Such persons think
they thus obviate certain objections to terrible calamities
�118.
THE ATHEISTIC PLATFORM.
and sufferings by saying instead of “God did it,” “ the
Law did it.” It matters not whether it be the landlord or
his agent, if we are evicted without compensation, and
starve on the highway.
Mr. M. Ponton (“ Beginning: How and When ? ” p. 357)
may be quoted as a very good illustration of this view. He
contends that God acts in the living organisms only
“mediately, through the instrumentality of the organiser.
We might as well suppose every instinctive action of an
organised being to be a direct act of the creator, as that
every unconscious action contributing to the development,
growth, maintenance, or reproduction of the organism is a
direct act of Divine interference.” Certainly, that is so—
but why not? H the development, growth, and repro
duction goes on without direct interference, there must be
some reason for it, and here it is—“the imperfections and
occasional monstrosities occurring in individual organisms
forbid our supposing these to be the immediate products of
unerring creative wisdom and power.” The blundering is
shifted on to the “organiser”—but whence the organiser
who or which acts so monstrously ?
The parentage is clearly set forth by Mr. Ponton (p.
356) himself, who, in describing all existing organisms,
says : “ But the first in each series must have been, in thestrict sense of the term, a creation—a being brought into
existence by the mere will of the creator.” Now taking
these two statements as an explanation of the mode of
origin of living organisms, I contend that the same login
that forbids us to accept monster from “unerring wisdom ”
equally forbids us attributing the origin of an agent
capable of producing them to the same unerring cause.
A good designer of a good organism is accepted—while
all is plain and fair sailing; but immediately Mr. Ponton
stumbles over an imperfect or monstrous one, he sends theunerring cause flying back into the unknown mist, to
assist at the formation of things in their primeval inno
cence and purity. This is exploded theology over again,
as taught in our dame schools.
A similar idea is developed in religion. The brutal God
of the lews is transformed into a humane God by the
Christians—a God of love.
But if we assume one source of power, it follows that all
efficient causes of good and evil are traceable to that one?
�IS DARWINISM ATHEISTIC?
119
source, so that there is no advantage in a liberal and loving
philosophy clothing the modern God with only a humane
and beneficent character. Many devout persons have
written books to reconcile us to Theism by picturing the
design in nature to produce the beautiful and beneficent.
If we accept their theory, we are confronted by fact, at
tested before our eyes and recorded in the rocks up to the
earliest time—that animals have been created and sent on
the earth for the purpose of devouring each other. There
is no design or purpose plainer than this.
The world is one vast slaughter-house—one half the
animal kingdom lives in and on other animals. So long
as the lion roams the forest and the tigers seek their prey,
so long the doctrine of benevolent design in nature will
have a living palpable refutation. A power outside nature
that can prevent pain is one of the grossest impositions
the ingenuity of man has ever attempted to prove the
existence of, or by implication to infer, as evidenced by
God “in his works which are fair.”
The only answer that can be made is that it is a good
thing to be devoured! I have heard naturalists describe
the beautiful adaptations by which one creature can and
does kill another I All this takes place by the intention
of a personal God who directs it, or his under unerring and
beneficent laws of nature, according to whichever view is
held.
There was a time, not so distant, when the whole of
nature was believed to be under .the personal direction of
God. Thunder, lightning, storms, eclipses of the sun and
moon, and the motions of the heavenly bodies, all came
under this description. Travellers assure us that savages
usually look upon nature with similar eyes.
All attempts to remove a capricious will of God from
the operations of nature have been denounced as Atheistic.
All discoverers and announcers of new truth have been
denounced as Atheists through all time. A Frenchman
filled a whole dictionary with their names. All science is
necessarily Atheistic in the original sense of the word—
Atheist means ivithout God. Of course it is used in other
senses by some—for instance the denial of God, against
God, an active opposition to Theism, &c. The broad dis
tinction I wish to make is: by Theism we understand a
�120
THE ATHEISTIC PLATFORM.
system based upon the Supernatural ; by Atheism, a system
based upon the Natural.
As regards the subject of the present enquiry, the only
great difficulty all along has been the popular conception
of the earth’s recent appearance and its transitory nature.
Called into existence only yesterday and liable to vanish
in smoke to-morrow, it afforded no scope for the evolution
of living things during myriads of ages, millions of years.
So long as minds were occupied with the fall of man
behind them and penal fires before them, and all nature in
a state of possible instantaneous combustion, nothing cer
tain could be expected, no science was possible.
In the presence of a first cause and a last cause and
secondary causes, only confusion could arise. When it
became known that in science a first and last cause was
equally unknown, that changes in nature being intermin
able, so likewise are causes and effects—the names by
which they are known, what we rightly call human know
ledge became possible. The first society started in Eng
land for the collection and diffusion of this sort of know
ledge was the Royal Society for the special study of
Natural, in contradistinction to Supernatural, knowledge.
As regards man, the study has been greatly facili
tated by the discovery of his high antiquity, but aid to
the interpretation of nature in general comes from the
chemist.
To explain anything in the terms of science as a process
of nature required the evidence afforded by quantitative
chemistry. This assures us that, though all nature is con
stantly changing, nothing is lost—hence the indestructi
bility of matter is an established fact. What bearing has
this on our subject? To my mind it is clear that the in
destructible is a never-ending and never-beginning attri
bute.' This being accepted as a logical inference from an
indisputable fact, a beginning and a beginner are both
dispensed with. All are agreed that there is a selfexistent, eternal something—a necessity of human thought;
this appears to me to be the indestructible nature we
know—by whatever name we call it.
In illustration of this, I have often quoted a beautiful
passage from Herschell (Nat. Phil.), who, after referring
to the fact that one of the great powers, gravitation, the
�16 DARWINISM ATHEISTIC?
121
main bond and support of the universe, has undergone
no change from a high antiquity, says: “So that, for
aught we know to the contrary, the same identical atom
may be concealed for thousands of centuries in a limestone
rock; may at length be quarried, set free in the lime-kiln,
mix with the air, be absorbed from it by plants, and, in
succession, become a part of the frames of myriads of liv
ing beings, till some occurrence of events consigns it once
more to a long repose, which, however, in no way unfits it
for again assuming its former activity.”
There are some who admit the indestructibility of
matter and its illimitable existence in space and time, who
nevertheless allow there may be something underlying ox*
behind the nature we know. I see no advantage in mul
tiplying assumptions, nor do I see where logically we can
stop if we do. If I assume a self-existent, eternal universe,
and there stop, no one else can do more than repeat the
same proposition containing the same idea. I do not pro
fess to account for it—no one can account for it. Why
anything exists without limit in space and time no man
can tell.
In support of this view, let me quote a passage from the
voluminous writings of Herbert Spencer: “Those who
cannot conceive a self-existent universe .... take for
granted that they can conceive a self-existent creator.”
The mystery they see surrounding them on every side they
transfer to an alleged source, “ and then suppose they have
solved the mystery. But they delude themselves............
Whoever agrees that the Atheistic hypothesis is untenable
because it involves the impossible idea of self-existence,
must perforce admit that the Theistic hypothesis is unten
able if it contains the same impossible idea. ... So that,
in fact, impossible as it is to think of the actual universe as
■self-existing, we do but multiply impossibilities of thought
by every attempt we make to explain its existence.” (“First
Principles,” p. 35.)
Some who do not admit that nature is all in all, reject
the notion I have described as a person creating and sus
taining all existing things—on the ground that it is an
thropomorphic. Be it so, the long name does not alter the
fact. I hold that Paley was right and has never been
answered, when he said that a designer and contrivei’
of nature must be a person. A Man- God is the only rational
�122
THE ATHEISTIC PLATFORM.
ancl intelligible conception the human intellect can
form, and they who reject it are manifestly without God—
Atheist.
Those who place Law where Grod used to be are in
advance of Theism, my only difference with them being as
to the meaning they attach to the word Law. I also
believe in the laws of nature, but only thereby express the
invariable order manifested—the way nature acts. They
use Law not to denote the fact that water seeks its own
level, but as though they meant the law either pushed or
pulled the water down the river. In all their writings
they speak of nature, her laws, and the lawgiver. I only
know nature and mode or method. When I say nature
works thus, I add nothing to the fact; they speak of law
as something impressed on matter, something having a
separate existence.
Where I speak of living matter, they speak of matter
endowed with life, endowed with intelligence, &c. This leads
up to the particular question under discussion—does Dar
winism come under the latter view ? A few phrases are
frequently quoted to prove that it does. Darwin writes
that 11 probably all the organic beings which have ever
lived on this earth have descended from some one primor
dial form, into which life was first breathed by the
Creator.” In another place he writes : “The Creator ori
ginally breathed life into a few forms, perhapsfour or five.”
Here we have the word Creator, and the work ascribed to
him, or it, is breathing life into one or perhaps five organ
isms. Darwin’s mind was apparently unsettled with
regard to theology all his life. If he had devoted as many
years to that as he did to the observation of plants and
animals, he would doubtless have uttered a more certain
sound. But his use of popular modes of expression, theo
logical phrases, must be judged by his later utterances.
Theists quote his words about breathing as though he was
in accord with Moses. Surely his tracing man’s origin to
the quadruped and aquatic animals is slightly at variancewith the words of Genesis ! Again it is urged that the
use of the word Creator implies creation, but he has placed
that view beyond all dispute.
The belief in God he traces to natural causes in
“Descent of Man,” p. 93, and points out numerous races
of men of past and present time, who have no idea of God
�IS DARWINISM ATHEISTIC ?
123-
and no word to express such, an idea. With regard to the
existence of a creator and ruler of the universe, he says : •
“.This has been answered in the affirmative by some of thehighest intellects,” but he does not answer it himself.1 Ho
mentions a savage who with “justifiable pride, stoutly
maintained there was no devil in his land.”
. With regard to organisms being the work of a creator,
his later utterances in “Descent of Man,” p. 61, are very
clear. He states that in writing “ Origin of Species” he
had two objects in view, “firstly, to show that species had
not been specially created.” The concluding paragraph
runs: “I have at least, I hope, done good service in airb'ng
to overthroio the dogma of separate creations.” On the
same page, I think, he gives ample explanation of his use
of current theological phrases. “I was not, however, able
to annul the influence of my former belief then almost
universal, that each species had been purposely created.”
Hetraces the objections to his theory to the “arrogance
of our forefathers which made them declare that they were
descended from demi-gods,” and says that before long it
will be thought wonderful that naturalists should have
believed in separate creations. The concluding words of
the volume attest his freedom from dogmatism and his con
siderateness for the. feelings of others. His words are :
The main conclusion arrived at in this work, namely,
that man is descended from some lowly organised form,
will, I regret to think, be highly distasteful to many,”
In another place, he says, p. 613 : “I am aware that theconclusion, arrived at in this work will be denounced by
some as highly irreligious.” Whatever maybe said about
it, Darwin says (p. 606): “The grounds upon which this
conclusion rests will never be shaken.” Viewed in the
hght of our. knowledge of the whole organic world : “ The
great principle of evolution stands up clear and firm,”
because it is founded on “facts which cannot be disputed.”'
Darwin s anticipation of the judgment passed upon his
views has been more than realised. The great objection
to his view is commonly expressed in the words—what it
leads to.. There can be no doubt that it leads to the
assumption of natural instead of supernatural causes.* I
�124
THE ATHEISTIC PLATFORM.
well remember the same objection was made to Combe’s
theory that the brain was the organ of mind—it would
lead to materialism. Astronomy was objectionable because
it was no longer possible to keep up the dignity of the
earth and its inhabitants as occupying the central position
in the universe, having all the heavenly host surrounding
them as lights and ornaments. It was a manifest degra
dation to reduce the comparative size of the earth to a
pin’s nob surrounded by specks two or three miles in
diameter. A remarkable illustration of this occurred
recently. A gentleman of education and position opened
my “First Man” at the page where I place the last glacial
period at 100,000 years ago. He said: “I can read no
more, not a line.” “Why?” “Because I see what it leads
to—the giving up of all I have been taught to believe as
the infallible word of God.” There can be no manner of
doubt but that is the honest way tt> look at it. Either a
man must have his mind open to new knowledge and new
truth, or remain in ignorance and error. Those who do
not wish to relinquish their notion of the supernatural
producing, sustaining, and guiding the natural had better
leave Darwin alone.
Hugh Miller held that animals preceded each other, man
being last, but not ‘that one was produced by the modifi
cations of others. The present Duke of Argyll admits
that changes in the forms of animal life have taken place
frequently, but not in the course of nature. Professor
Owen argued that as all vertebrate animals had rudi
mentary bones found in the human skeleton they were
types of man—the earliest created perhaps millions of
years ago, being planned to undergo certain modifications
resulting in the appearance of man long before such a
creature as man was known. All these whimsical assump
tions are overthrown by Darwin’s theory, which accounts
for the modification by natural processes. He justly lays
claim to his theory as the only natural solution of the
appearance of rudimentary organs. It is not at all
to be wondered at that such a theory should be called
Atheistic, and Darwin the Apostle of the Infidels—and
that a bishop described him as burning in hell a few days
after he was buried. The opposition of ministers of re
ligion of all denominations might reasonably be expected,
since, as they say, he banishes the creator as an intruder
�IS DARWINISM ATHEISTIC?
125.
in nature, and takes away the foundation on which the
Christian religion is built. The difference between the
clergy and Darwin is a gulf that can never be bridged
over—they find man made in the image of God, whatever
that may mean, while Darwin finds him made exactly in
the image of the ape of the old world, now supposed to be
extinct. The first Adam of Moses is an essential to the
second Adam of Christianity—symbols of death and life
in the human race. Besides ministers of religion, the
Atheistical tendency of Darwinism has been pointed out
by Agassiz and Brewster; the latter stating distinctly that
his hypothesis has a tendency “to expel the Almighty
from the universe.” Reviews, magazines, and many
newspapers put it that Darwinism is practically Atheism;
in which description I think they accurately represent the
fact.
Professor Dawson, who is recognised by all the re
ligious reviewers as a trustworthy exponent of their views,
refers to this subject in his “Story of the Earth,” p. 321,
1880. In discussing whether man is the product of an in
telligent will or an evolution from lower organisms, he
says: “ It is true that many evolutionists, either unwilling
to offend, or not perceiving the consequences of their own
hypothesis, endeavor to steer a middle course, and to main
tain that the creator has proceeded by way of evolution.
But the bare hard logic of Spencer, the greatest English
authority, leaves noplace for this compromise, and shows that
that theory, carried out to its legitimate consequences, ex
cludes the knowledge of a creator and the possibility of his
works.” Again, on page 348, speakingof absolute Atheists
who follow Darwin: “They are more logical than those
who seek to reconcile evolution with design .... The
evolutionist is in absolute antagonism to the idea of crea
tion, even when held with all due allowance for the varia
tion of all created things within certain limits.” It is evi
dent, therefore, from this orthodox authority, that Darwin
ism, is in the estimation of popular Theists, undoubtedly
Atheistic. This might be explained away on the ground
of bigotry, prejudice, or misrepresentation, if the facts ad
duced by Darwin could be quoted in support of the accusa
tion. But the inexorable logic of facts points in the direc
tion of Professor Dawson’s inference, and, however objec
tionable the conclusion may be to him, it rests on a basis
�126
THE ATHEISTIC PLATFORM.
'which, can never be moved, on grounds that will never be
■shaken.
Still, Asa Gray and George St. Clair think it reconcilable
with theology, the latter devoting a large volume to prove
his case. Being an acquaintance, and a fellow townsman
now, I read Mr. St. Clair three times, but with unsatis
factory result. It is a book which evinces great ability,
and is full of information, but as regards the particular
point in question, all that bears upon it is assumption and
.assertion. All theology consists of assumptions and
assertions. Every book upon it we open may be described
as stating : There must have been a commencement, and
that could not be without a causing or creating, and that
■could not be without a First Cause or Creator.
Simple as this appears, it contains a contradiction, and
refutes itself. To account for any existence by assuming
a cause before it, implies non-existence, and the .trans
formation of one into the other. If we assume a self
existing, eternal anything, we at once dispose of “there
must have been a commencement.” The evidence of design
-can only be applied to forms (even if there were any evi
dence that any existing animal Or plant had been at any
time designed), therefore the matter of which forms are
built up, and which in its nature is unchangeable, cannot
be referred to any cause limited to time. If the assumption,
as applied to forms of life, gave us any explanation, it
might be tolerated ; but, as it does not, it is worthless. To
justify the assumption of a commencement, it is necessary
that we should have some evidence of destruction.
We are triumphantly referred to the destruction going
-on in animal and plant life, but the facts connected with it
form the foundation of a belief in the order of perpetual
change, without which neither could exist at all on this
earth. If any live, some must die.
The air we breathe has been breathed before, the part
icles of our bodies are but the elements of the dead past, as
are the luscious fruit we eat and the odorous flowers we
smell—even the blood that is the life itself is derived from
the same source. Our finely-built towns, our marble halls,
the very paths in which we walk, all are made of the rocks
which are but the ashes that survive—the tombs of myriads
-of living things. Composition, decomposition, and recom
position is the order of nature. Times innumerable have
�IS DARWINISM ATHEISTIC ?
127
•all natural forms passed through the process of corruption,
decay, and death—
“ Ever changing, ever new.”
The “ Bard of Avon” has been quoted, saying that
“ The great globe itself,
Yea, all which it inherit, shall dissolve,”
and it is true he does; but the lines which follow should be
read in conjunction :—
“Bear with my weakness : my old brain is troubled.”
Astronomy has been brought into the controversy, and the
possibility of Pope’s words being realised has not wanted
believers, when he wrote :—
‘ ‘ Atoms or systems into ruin hurled,
And now a bubble burst, and now a world.”
Some slight weight was given to this by the brilliant,
Frenchman, who accounted for the earth by a comet, which,
having mistaken its way, knocked a piece off the sun.
It is a consolation, however, to be told by Christian
astronomers that we do not find within itself the elements
of destruction in our planetary system, that all is in motion
and change everywhere. After millions of years all the
planets will return to their original places only to go
round again, the great bell of their judgment day will never
be sounded. Playfair says : “In the planetary motions,
where geometry has carried the eye so far into "the future
and the past, we discover no symptom either of a commence
ment or termination of the present order . . .
and as re
gards the latter “we may safely conclude that this great
catastrophe will not be brought about by any of the laws
now existing; and that it is not indicated by anything
which we perceive.”
If the “undevout astronomer is mad,” the devout one
surely is not. Name-calling in serious discussions of this
kind is, in my judgment, not only offensive, but inex
cusable. It is not uncommon to find in expensive works
the main proposition of the Theist described as being so
simple and familiar that any one who doubts it may be
laughed at as a fool or be pitied as insane. To me such
language betrays want of thought, ignorance, or vulgarity
�128
THE ATHEISTIC PLATFORM.
of speech. In every case, on whichever side, the writer
who steadfastly avoids the use of such expressions is a
praiseworthy contributor to a refinement in the inter
change of thought so desirable in a civilised community.
Printed by Annie Besant and Charles Bradlaugh, at 63, Fleet
Street, London, E.C.—1881.
�
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Is Darwinism Atheistic?
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Cattell, Charles Cockbill
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Place of publication: London
Collation: [115]-128 p. ; 18 cm.
Series title: Atheistic Platform
Series number: 8
Notes: Printed by Annie Besant and Charles Bradlaugh. Part of the NSS pamphlet collection.
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1884
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Darwinism
Atheism
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Atheism
Charles Darwin
Darwinism
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