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NATIONAL secular society
HUMANITY’S GAIN from UNBELIEF.
BY
CHARLES BRADLAUGH.
[Reprinted from the “North American Review” of March, 1889.J
LONDON:
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�HUMANITY’S GAIN FROM UNBELIEF.
As an unbeliever, I ask leave to plead that humanity has
been real gainer from scepticism, and that the gradual
and growing rejection of Christianity—like the rejection
of the faiths which preceded it—has in fact added, and
Will add, to man’s happiness and well being. I maintain
that in physics science is the outcome of scepticism, and
that general progress is impossible without scepticism on
matters of religion. I mean by religion every form of
belief which accepts or asserts the supernatural. I write
as a Monist, and use the word “nature ” as meaning all
phenomena, every phenomenon, all that is necessary for
the happening of any and every phenomenon. Every
religion is constantly changing, and at any given time is
the measure of the civilisation attained by what Guizot
described as theywszte milieu of those who profess it. Each
religion is slowly but certainly modified in its dogma and
practice by the gradual development of the peoples amongst
whom it is professed. Each discovery destroys in whole
or part some theretofore cherished belief. No religion is
suddenly rejected by any people ; it is rather gradually
out-grown. None see a religion die ; dead religions are
like dead languages and obsolete customs; the decay is
long and—like the glacier march—is only perceptible to
the careful watcher by comparisons extending over long
periods. A superseded religion may often be traced in the
festivals, ceremonies, and dogmas of the religion which has
replaced it. Traces of obsolete religions may often be
found in popular customs, in old wives’ stories, and in
children’s tales.
�4
humanity’s GAIN FROM UNBELIEF.
It is necessary, in order that my plea should be under
stood, that I should explain what I mean by Christianity ;
and in the very attempt at this explanation there will, I
think, be found strong illustration of the value of unbelief,
Christianity in practice may be gathered from its more
ancient forms, represented by the Roman Catholic and the
Greek Churches, or from the various churches which have
grown up in the last few centuries. Each of these churches
calls itself Christian. Some of them deny the right of the
others to use the word Christian. Some Christian churches
treat, or have treated, other Christian churches as heretics
or unbelievers. The Roman Catholics and the Protestants
in Great Britain and Ireland have in turn been terribly
cruel one to the other; and the ferocious laws of the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, enacted by the
English Protestants against English and Irish Papists, are
a disgrace to civilisation. These penal laws, enduring
longest in Ireland, still bear fruit in much of the political
mischief and agrarian crime of to-day. It is only the
tolerant indifference of scepticism that, one after the other,
has repealed most of the laws directed by the Established
Christian Church against Papists and Dissenters, and also
against Jews and heretics. Church of England clergymen
have in the past gone to great lengths in denouncing non
conformity ; and even in the present day an effective sample
of such denunciatory bigotry may be found in a sort of
orthodox catechism written by the Rev. F. A. Gace, of
Great Barling, Essex, the popularity of which is vouched
by the fact that it has gone through ten editions.
This catechism for little children teaches that “ Dissent is
a great sin ”, and that Dissenters “ worship God according
to their own evil and corrupt imaginations, and not ac
cording to his revealed will, and therefore their worship is
idolatrous ”. Church of England Christians and Dissent
ing Christians, when fraternising amongst themselves,
often publicly draw the line at Unitarians, and positively
deny that these have any sort of right to call themselves
Christians.
In the first half of the seventeenth century Quakers
were flogged and imprisoned in England as blasphemers ;
and the early Christian settlers in New England, escaping
from the persecution of Old World Christians, showed
scant mercy to the followers of Fox and Penn. It is
�humanity’s gain from unbelief.
5
customary, in controversy, for those advocating the claims
of Christianity, to include all good done by men in nomi’
nally Christian countries as if such good were the result of
Christianity, while they contend that the evil which exists
prevails in spite of Christianity. I shall try to make out
that the ameliorating march of the last few centuries has
been initiated by the heretics of each age, though I quite
concede that the men and women denounced and per
secuted as infidels by the pious of one century, are fre
quently claimed as saints by the pious of a later genera
tion.
What then is Christianity ? As a system or scheme
of doctrine, Christianity may, I submit, not unfairly be
gathered from the Old and New Testaments. It is true
that some Christians to-day desire to escape from submis
sion to portions, at any rate, of the Old Testament; but this
very tendency seems to me to be part of the result of
the beneficial heresy for which I am pleading. Man’s
humanity has revolted against Old Testament barbarism;
and therefore he has attempted to disassociate the Old Testa
ment from Christianity. Unless Old and New Testaments
are accepted as God’s revelation to man, Christianity has
no higher claim than any other of the world’s many
religions, if no such claim can be made out for it apart
from the Bible. And though it is quite true that some
who deem themselves Christians put the Old Testament
completely in the background, this is, I allege, because
they are out-growing their Christianity. Without the
doctrine of the atoning sacrifice of Jesus, Christianity,
as a religion, is naught; but unless the story of Adam’s
fall is accepted, the redemption from the consequences
of that fall cannot be believed. Both in Great Britain
and in the United States the Old and New Testaments
are forced on the people as part of Christianity; for it is
blasphemy at common law to deny the scriptures of the
Old and New Testaments to be of divine authority; and
such denial is punishable with fine and imprisonment,
or even worse.
The rejection of Christianity intended
throughout this paper, is therefore the rejection of the
Old and New Testaments as being of divine revelation.
It is the rejection alike of the authorised teachings of the
Church of Rome and of the Church of England, as these
may be found in the Bible, the creeds, the encyclicals,
�6
HUMANITY S GAIN FKOM UNBELIEJ’.
the prayer book, the canons and homilies of either or both
of these churches. It is the rejection of the Christianity
of Luther, of Calvin, and of Wesley.
A ground frequently taken by Christian theologians is
that the progress and civilisation of the world are due to
Christianity; and the discussion is complicated by the
fact that many eminent servants of humanity have been
nominal Christians, of one or other of the sects. My
allegation will be that the special services rendered to
human progress by these exceptional men, have not been
in consequence of their adhesion to Christianity, but in
spite of it; and that the specific points of advantage to
human kind have been in ratio of their direct opposition
to precise Biblical enactments.
A. S. Farrar says1 that Christianity “ asserts authority
over religious belief in virtue of being a supernatural
communication from God, and claims the right to control
human thought in virtue of possessing sacred books, which
are at once the record and the instrument of the communi
cation, written by men endowed with supernatural inspira
tion ”. Unbelievers refuse to submit to the asserted
authority, and deny this claim of control over human
thought: they allege that every effort at freethinking must
provoke sturdier thought.
Take one clear gain to humanity consequent on unbelief,
i.e., in the abolition of slavery in some countries, in the
abolition of the slave trade in most civilised countries, and
in the tendency to its total abolition. I am unaware of
any religion in the world which in the past forbade slavery.
The professors of Christianity for ages supported it; the
Old Testament repeatedly sanctioned it by special laws ; the
New Testament has no repealing declaration. Though we
are at the close of the nineteenth century of the Christian
era, it is only during the past three-quarters of a century
that the battle for freedom has been gradually won. It is
scarcely a quarter of a century since the famous emancipa
tion amendment was carried to the United States Constitu
tion. And it is impossible for any well-informed Christian
to deny that the abolition movement in North America was
most steadily and bitterly opposed by the religious bodies
in the various States. Henry Wilson, in his “Itise and
1 Farrar’s “ Critical History of Fieethought ”,
�humanity’s
GAIN
from unbelief.
7
Fall of the Slave Power in America ” ; Samuel J. May, in
his “Recollections of the Anti-Slavery Conflict ” ; and J.
Greenleaf Whittier, in his poems, alike are witnesses that
the Bible and pulpit, the Church and its great influence,
were used against abolition and in favor of the slave
owner. I know that Christians in the present day often
declare that Christianity had a large share in bringing
about the abolition of slavery, and this because men pro
fessing Christianity were abolitionists. I plead that these
so-called Christian abolitionists were men and women
whose humanity, recognising freedom for all, was in this
in direct conflict with Christianity. It is not yet fifty years
since the European Christian powers jointly agreed to
abolish the slave trade. What of the effect of Christianity
on these powers in the centuries which had preceded ?
The heretic Condorcet pleaded powerfully for freedom
whilst Christian France was still slave-holding. For many
centuries Christian Spain and Christian Portugal held
slaves. Porto Rico freedom is not of long date; and
Cuban emancipation is even yet newer. It was a Christian
King, Charles 5th, and a Christian friar, who founded in
Spanish America the slave trade between the Old World
and the New. For some 1800 years, almost, Christians kept
slaves, bought slaves, sold slaves, bred slaves, stole slaves.
Pious Bristol and godly Liverpool less than 100 years ago
openly grew rich on the traffic. During the ninth century
Greek Christians sold slaves to the Saracens. In the
eleventh century prostitutes were publicly sold as slaves in
Rome, and the profit went to the Church.
It is said that William Wilberforce, the abolitionist, was
a Christian. But at any rate his Christianity was strongly
diluted with unbelief. As an abolitionist he did not believe
Leviticus xxv, 44-6; he must have rejected Exodus xxi,
2-6 ; he could not have accepted the many permissions
and injunctions by the Bible deity to his chosen people to
capture and hold slaves. In the House of Commons on
18th February, 1796, Wilberforce reminded that Christian
assembly that infidel and anarchic France had given
liberty to the Africans, whilst Christian and monarchic
England was “obstinately continuing a system of cruelty
and injustice”.
Wilberforce, whilst advocating the abolition of slavery,
found the whole influence of the English Court, and the
�8
HUMANITY S GAIN FBOM UNBELIEF.
great weight of the Episcopal Bench, against him. George
III, a most Christian king, regarded abolition theories
with abhorrence, and the Christian House of Lords was
utterly opposed to granting freedom to the slave. When
Christian missionaries some sixty-two years ago preached
to Demerara negroes under the rule of Christian England,
they were treated by Christian judges, holding commission
from Christian England, as criminals for so preaching. A
Christian commissioned officer, member of the Established
Church of England, signed the auction notices for the sale
of slaves as late as the year 1824. In the evidence before
a Christian court-martial, a missionary is charged with
having tended to make the negroes dissatisfied with their
condition as slaves, and with having promoted discontent
and dissatisfaction amongst the slaves against their lawful
masters. For this the Christian judges sentenced the
Demerara abolitionist missionary to be hanged by the
neck till he was dead. The judges belonged to the Estab
lished Church ; the missionary was a Methodist. In this
the Church of England Christians in Demerara were no
worse than Christians of other sects : their Boman Catholic
Christian brethren in St. Domingo fiercely attacked the
Jesuits as criminals because they treated negroes as though
they were men and women, in encouraging “two slaves
to separate their interest and safety from that of the
gang ”, whilst orthodox Christians let them couple pro
miscuously and breed for the benefit of their o wners like
any other of their plantation cattle. In 1823 the Royal
Gazette (Christian) of Demerara said :
“We shall not suffer you to enlighten our slaves, who are by
law our property, till you can demonstrate that when they are
made religious and knowing they will continue to be our
slaves.”
When William Lloyd Garrison, the pure-minded and
most earnest abolitionist, delivered his first anti-slavery
address in Boston, Massachusetts, the only building he
could obtain, in which to speak, was the infidel hall owned
by Abner Kneeland, the “infidel” editor of the Boston
Investigator, who had been sent to gaol for blasphemy.
Jlvery Christian sect had in turn refused Mr. Lloyd Garri
son the use of the buildings they severally controlled.
|jloyd Garrison told me himself how honored deacons of
�humanity’s GAIN UHOM UNBELIEF.
9
a Christian Church, joined in an actual attempt to hang
him.
When abolition was advocated in the United States in
1790, the representative from South Carolina was able to
plead that the Southern clergy “did not condemn either
slavery or the slave trade ” ; and Mr. Jackson, the repre
sentative from Georgia, pleaded that “from Genesis to
Revelation ” the current was favorable to slavery. Elias
Hicks, the brave Abolitionist Quaker, was denounced as
an Atheist, and less than twenty years ago a Hicksite
Quaker was expelled from one of the Southern American
Legislatures, because of the reputed irreligion of these
abolitionist “ Friends ”.
When the Fugitive Slave Law was under discussion in
North America, large numbers of clergymen of nearly
every denomination were found ready to defend this
infamous law. Samuel James May, the famous aboli
tionist, was driven from the pulpit as irreligious, solely
because of his attacks on slaveholding. Northern clergy
men tried to induce “silver tongued” Wendell Philips to
abandon his advocacy of abolition. Southern pulpits rang
with praises for the murderous attack on Charles Sumner.
The slayers of Elijah Lovejoy were highly reputed
Christian men.
Guizot, notwithstanding that he tries to claim that the
•Church exerted its influence to restrain slavery, says
(“European Civilisation”, vol. i., p. 110) :
“It has often been repeated that the abolition of slavery
among modern people is entirely due to Christians. That, I
think, is saying too much. Slavery existed for a long period
in the heart of Christian society, without its being particularly
astonished or irritated. A multitude of causes, and a great
development in other ideas and principles of civilisation, were
necessary for the abolition of this iniquity of all iniquities.”
And my contention is that this “development in other
ideas and principles of civilisation ” was long retarded by
Governments in which the Christian Church was dominant.
The men who advocated liberty were imprisoned, racked,
and burned, so long as the Church was strong enough to
be merciless.
The Rev. Francis Minton, Rector of Middlewich, in his
recent earnest volume1 on the struggles of labor, admits
1 “ Capital and Wages”, p. 19.
�10
humanity’s gain from unbelief.
that “ a few centuries ago slavery was acknowledged
throughout Christendom to have the divine sanction..........
Neither the exact cause, nor the precise time of the
decline of the belief in the righteousness of slavery can
be defined. It was doubtless due to a combination of
causes, one probably being as indirect as the recognition
of the greater economy of free labor. With the decline
of the belief the abolition of slavery took place.”
The institution of slavery was actually existent in
Christian Scotland in the 17th century, where the white
coal workers and salt workers of East Lothian were
chattels, as were their negro brethren in the Southern
States thirty years since; they “ went to those who
succeeded to the property of the works, and they could be
sold, bartered, or pawned”? “There is”, says J. M.
Robertson, “no trace that the Protestant clergy of Scot
land ever raised a voice against the slavery which grew
up before their eyes. And it was not until 1799, after
republican and irreligious France had set the example,
that it was legally abolished.”
Take further the gain to humanity consequent on the
unbelief, or rather disbelief, in witchcraft and wizardry.
Apart from the brutality by Christians towards those
suspected of witchcraft, the hindrance to scientific initia
tive or experiment was incalculably great so long as belief
in magic obtained. The inventions of the past two centuries,
and especially those of the 18th century, might have benefitted mankind much earlier and much more largely, but
for the foolish belief in witchcraft and the shocking
ferocity exhibited against those suspected of necromancy.
After quoting a large number of cases of trial and punish
ment for witchcraft from official records in Scotland, J. M.
Robertson says: “The people seem to have passed from
cruelty to cruelty precisely as they became more and more
fanatical, more and more devoted to their Church, till after
many generations the slow spread of human science began
to counteract the ravages of superstition, the clergy resist
ing reason and humanity to the last ”.
The Rev. Mr. Minton1 concedes that it is “ the advance
2
of knowledge which has rendered the idea of Satanic
1 “ Perversion of Scotland,” p. 197.
2 “ Capital and Wages ”, pp. 15, 16.
�HUMANITY S GAIN FROM UNBELIEF.
11
agency through the medium of witchcraft grotesquely
ridiculous”. He admits that “ for more than 1500 years
the belief in witchcraft was universal in Christendom ”,
and that “ the public mind was saturated with the idea of
Satanic agency in the economy of nature ”. He adds:
“ If we ask why the world now rejects what was once so
unquestioningly believed, we can only reply that advancing
knowledge has gradually undermined the belief ”.
In a letter recently sent to the Pall Mall Gazette against
modern Spiritualism, Professor Huxley declares,
“that the older form of the same fundamental delusion—the
belief in possession and in witchcraft—gave rise in the fifteenth,,
sixteenth, and seventeenth centuries to persecutions by Chris
tians of innocent men, women, and children, more extensive,
more cruel, and more murderous than any to which the
Christians of the first three centuries were subjected by the
authorities of pagan Borne.”
And Professor Huxley adds :
“No one deserves much blame for being deceived in these
matters. We are all intellectually handicapped in youth by
the incessant repetition of the stories about possession and
witchcraft in both the Old and the New Testaments. The
majority of us are taught nothing which will help us to
observe accurately and to interpret observations with due
caution.”
The English Statute Book under Elizabeth and under
James was disfigured by enactments against witchcraft
passed under pressure from the Christian churches,
which Acts have only been repealed in consequence of the
disbelief in the Christian precept, ‘1 thou shalt not suffer a
witch to live”. The statute 1 James I, c. 12, condemned
to death “all persons invoking any evil spirits, or con
sulting, covenanting with, entertaining, employing, feed
ing, or rewarding any evil spirit ”, or generally practising
any “infernal arts”. This was not repealed until the
eighteenth century was far advanced. Edison’s phono
graph would 280 years ago have insured martyrdom for
its inventor; the utilisation of electric force to transmit
messages around the world would have been clearly the
practice of an infernal art. At least we may plead that
unbelief has healed the bleeding feet of science, and made
the road free for her upward march.
�12
humanity’s gain from unbelief.
Is it not also fair to urge the gain to humanity which
has been apparent in the wiser treatment of the insane,
consequent on the unbelief in the Christian doctrine that
these unfortunates were examples either of demoniacal
possession or of special visitation of deity? For centuries
under Christianity mental disease was most ignorantly
treated.
Exorcism, shackles, and the whip were the
penalties rather than the curatives for mental maladies.
From the heretical departure of Pinel at the close of
the last century to the position of Maudsley to-day, every
step illustrates the march of unbelief. Take the gain to
humanity in the unbelief not yet complete, but now
largely preponderant, in the dogma that sickness, pesti
lence, and famine were manifestations of divine anger,
the results of which could neither be avoided nor pre
vented. The Christian Churches have done little or
nothing to dispel this superstition. The official and
authorised prayers of the principal denominations, even
to-day, reaffirm it. Modern study of the laws of health,
experiments in sanitary improvements, more careful
applications of medical knowledge, have proved more
efficacious in preventing or diminishing plagues and
pestilence than have the intervention of the priest or
the practice of prayer. Those in England who hold
the old faith that prayer will suffice to cure disease are
to-day termed “peculiar people”, and are occasionally
indicted for manslaughter when their sick children die,
because the parents have trusted to God instead of
appealing to the resources of science.
It is certainly a clear gain to astronomical science that
the Church which tried to compel Galileo to unsay the
truth has been overborne by the growing unbelief of the
age, even though our little children are yet taught that
Joshua made the sun and moon stand still, and that for
Hezekiah the sun-dial reversed its record. As Buckle,
arguing for the morality of scepticism, says1 :
“ As long as men refer the movements of the comets to the
immediate finger of God, and as long as they believe that an
eclipse is one of the modes by which the deity expresses his
anger, they will never be guilty of the blasphemous presump
tion of attempting to predict such supernatural appearances.
1 “ History of Civilisation,’’ vol. i, p. 345.
�HUMANITY S GAIN FROM UNBELIEF.
13
Before . they could dare to investigate the causes of these
mysterious phenomena, it is necessary that they should believe,
or at all events that they should suspect, that the phenomena
themselves were capable of being explained by the human
mind.”
As in astronomy so in geology, the gain of knowledge
to . humanity has been almost solely in measure of the
rejection of the Christian theory. A century since it was
almost universally held that the world was created 6,000
years ago, or at any rate, that by the sin of the first man,
Adam, death commenced about that period. Ethnology
and Anthropology have only been possible in so far as,
adopting the regretful words of Sir W. Jones, “intelligent
and virtuous persons are inclined to doubt the authenticity
of the accounts delivered by Moses concerning the primi
tive world ”.
Surely it is clear gain to humanity that unbelief has
sprung up. against the divine right of kings, that men no
longer believe that the monarch is “God’s anointed” or
that “the powers that be are ordained of God”. In the
struggles for political freedom the weight of the Church
was mostly thrown on the side of the tyrant. The
homilies of the Church of England declare that “even the
wicked rulers have their power and authority from God ”,
and. that “such subjects as are disobedient or rebellious
against their princes disobey God and procure their own
damnation ”. It can scarcely be necessary to argue to the
citizens of the United States of America that the origin of
their liberties was in the rejection of faith in the divine
right of George III.
Will any one, save the most bigoted, contend that it is
not . certain gain to humanity to spread unbelief in the
terrible doctrine that eternal torment is the probable fate
of the great majority of the human family? Is it not
gain to have diminished the faith that it was the duty of
the wretched and the miserable to be content with the lot
in life which providence had awarded them ?
If it stood alone it would be almost sufficient to plead as
justification for heresy the approach towards equality and
liberty for the utterance of all opinions achieved because
of growing unbelief. At one period in Christendom each
Government acted as though only one religious faith could
be true, and as though the holding, or at any rate the
�14
humanity’s gain from unbelief.
making known, any other opinion was a criminal act
deserving punishment. Under the one word “ infidel”,
even as late as Lord Coke, were classed together all who
were not Christians, even though they were Mahommedans,
Brahmins, or Jews. All who did not accept the Christian
faith were sweepingly denounced as infidels and therefore
//ors de la loi. One hundred and forty-five years since, the
Attorney-General, pleading in our highest court, said1 :
“What is the definition of an infidel? Why, one who
does not believe in the Christian religion. Then a Jew is
an infidel.” And English history for several centuries
prior to the Commonwealth shows how habitually and
most atrociously Christian kings, Christian courts, and
Christian churches, persecuted and harassed these infidel
Jews. There was a time in England when Jews were
such infidels that they were not even allowed to be sworn
as witnesses. In 1740 a legacy left for establishing an
assembly for the reading of the Jewish scriptures was
held to be void2 because it was “ for the propagation of
the Jewish law in contradiction to the Christian religion”.
It is only in very modern times that municipal rights have
been accorded in England to Jews. It is barely thirty
years since they have been allowed to sit in Parliament.
In 1851, the late Mr. Newdegate in debate3 objected “that
they should have sitting in that House an individual who
regarded our Redeemer as an impostor”. Lord Chief
Justice Raymond has shown4 how it was that Christian
intolerance was gradually broken down. “A Jew may
sue at this day, but heretofore he could not; for then they
were looked upon as enemies, but now commerce has
taught the world more humanity.”
Lord Coke treated the infidel as one who in law had no
right of any kind, with whom no contract need be kept, to
whom no debt was payable. The plea of alien infidel as
answer to a claim was actually pleaded in court as late as
1737.5 In a solemn judgment, Lord Coke says6: “ All
infidels are in law perpetui inimici; for between them, as
1 Omychund v. Barker, 1 Atkyns 29.
2 D’Costa v. D’Pays, Arab. 228.
3 3 Hansard cxvi. 381.
4 1 Lord Raymond’s reports 282, Wells v. Williams.
5 Ramkissenseat v Barker, 1 Atkyns 51.
6 7 Coke’s reports, Calvin’s case.
�humanity’s gain from unbelief.
15
with, the devils whose subjects they be, and the Christian,
there is perpetual hostility ”. Twenty years ago the law
of England required the writer of any periodical publica
tion or pamphlet under sixpence in price to give sureties
for £800 against the publication of blasphemy. I was
the last person prosecuted in 1868 for non-compliance
with that law, which was repealed by Mr. Gladstone in
1869. Up till the 23rd December, 1888, an infidel in Scot
land was only allowed to enforce any legal claim in court
on condition that, if challenged, he denied his infidelity.
If he lied and said he was a Christian, he was accepted,
despite his lying. If he told the truth and said he was an
unbeliever, then he was practically an outlaw, incompetent
to give evidence for himself or for any other. Fortunately
all this was changed by the Royal assent to the Oaths Act
on 24th December. Has not humanity clearly gained a
little in this struggle through unbelief ?
For more than a century and a-half the Roman Catholic
had in practice harsher measure dealt out to him by the
English Protestant Christian, than was even during that
period the fate of the Jew or the unbeliever. If the
Roman Catholic would not take the oath of abnegation,
which to a sincere Romanist was impossible, he was in
effect an outlaw, and the “jury packing” so much com
plained of to-day in Ireland is one of the habit survivals
of the old bad time when Roman Catholics were thus by
law excluded from the j ury box.
The Scotsman of January 5th, 1889, notes that in 1860
the Rev. Dr. Robert Lee, of Grey friars, gave a course of
Sunday evening lectures on Biblical Criticism, in which he
showed the absurdity and untenableness of regarding
every word in the Bible as inspired ; and it adds :
“We well remember the awful indignation such opinions
inspired, and it is refreshing to contrast them with the calm
ness with which they are now received. Not only from the
pulpits of the city, but from the press (misnamed religious)
were his doctrines denounced. And one eminent U.P. minister
went the length of publicly praying for him, and for the
students under his care. It speaks volumes for the progress
made since then, when we think in all probability Dr. Charteris,
Dr. Lee’s successor in the chair, differs in his teaching from the
Confession of Faith much more widely than Dr. Lee ever did,
and yet he is considered supremely orthodox, whereas the
stigma of heresy was attached to the other all his life.”
�16
humanity’s gain from unbelief.
And this change and gain to humanity is due to the
gradual progress of unbelief, alike inside and outside the
Churches.
Take from differing Churches two recent
illustrations: The late Principal Dr. Lindsay Alexander,
a strict Calvinist, in his important work on “ Biblical
Theology”, claims that
“ all the statements of Scripture are alike to be deferred to as
presenting to us the mind of God ”.
Yet the Rev. Dr. of Divinity also says:
“We find in their writings [i.e., in the writings of the sacred
authors] statements which no ingenuity can reconcile with
what modern research has shown to be the scientific truth—
i.e., we find in them statements which modern science proves
to be erroneous.”
At the last Southwell Diocesan Church of England Con
ference at Derby, the Bishop of the Diocese presiding, the
Rev. J. G. Richardson said of the Old Testament that
“ it was no longer honest or even safe to deny that this noble
literature, rich in all the elements of moral or spiritual grandeur,
given—so the Church had always taught, and would always
teach—under the inspiration of Almighty God, was sometimes
mistaken in its science, was sometimes inaccurate in its history,
and sometimes only relative and accommodatory in its morality.
It assumed theories of the physical world which science had
abandoned and could never resume; it contained passages oi
narrative which devout and temperate men pronounced dis
credited, both by external and internal evidence; it praised,
or justified, or approved, or condoned, or tolerated, conduct
which the teaching of Christ and the conscience of the Christian
alike condemned.”
Or, as I should urge, the gain to humanity by un
belief is that “the teaching of Christ ” has been modi
fied, enlarged, widened, and humanised, and that “the
conscience of the Christian ” is in quantity and quality
made fitter for human progress by the ever increasing
additions of knowledge of these later and more heretical
days.
�
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Humanity's gain from unbelief
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S'txOASié3l
MORE RATIONAL?
DISOtrSSION
I
BETWEEN
4
Mr. JOSEPH SYMES
GEORGE
■ ♦
LONDON :
FREETHOUGHT PUBLISHING COMPANY,
28, STONECUTTER STREET
E.C.
�H
�NATIONAL SECULAR SOCIETY
... .IS ATHEISM OR THEISM THE MORE
RATIONAL!
LETTER I.
From Mr. J. Symes to Mr. G. St. Clair.
Some weeks ago, Mr. St. Clair delivered a discourse in Bir
mingham on “ The Folly of Atheism.” When informed
thereof, I wrote to that gentleman, respectfully inviting him
to a public oral debate on the question now at the head of
this letter. This he courteously declined, but suggested a
written discussion instead. It now falls to my lot to furnish
the first of. twelve letters,, six by each disputant, to appear
alternately at intervals of not more than a fortnight. Mr.
Bradlaugh deserves our best thanks for'So readily opening
the columns of the National Reformer for this discussion.
Without any “ beating about the bush,” I shall at once
proceed to show why I regard Atheism as being more
rational than Theism. Theism is belief in a God, or deus,
or theos. Atheism is the absence of that belief, with the
general implication, as I apprehend, that the individual
destitute of that belief has done his best to weigh the merits
of conflicting theories, to sift the Theistic evidence, and has
logically concluded that Theism is irrational.
Atheism, requires no direct evidence, nor is it susceptible
of "it. It is arrived at,^n the most logical fashion, by a
course of destructive criticism applied to the God-theorjt.
This theory, when fairly examined, crumbles to dust, and
then evaporates, leaving the investigator without a Godiiand
without belief in one.
As I desire this contest to be definite, earnest, and real,
1 will state my objections to Theism plainly and fairly,
'so jthat my opponent may have the best opportunity of
refuting them. And let it be borne in mind that to state
valid objections to Theism is to put forward equally valid
reasons in favor ofAtheism. Now, as Theistic arguments
usually- take two forms, the intellectual and the moral; as
�4
ATHEISM OR THEISM?
Theism is as much an assertion of or belief in God’s moral
attributes as in his natural attributes or in his bare existence,
I cannot be straying from the subject in discussing the
moral aspects of the question. To show that the moral
attributes of God are fictions will go very far indeed towards
refuting Theism and justifying Atheism. The following
questions will covey most of the ground :—
I. Does there «Assist an infinitely good God ?
II. Does there exist an infinite God whose goodness
exceeds his evilness ?
III. Does there exist an infinitely wise God ?
IV. Does there exist an infinite God whose wisdom exceeds
his folly ?
V. Does there exist a God of absolutely unlimited power?
VI. Does there exist a God whose power exceeds his
weakness ?
VII. Does there exist a God who is in any sense infinite?
VIII. Does there exist any God at all ?
I. The first question, Does there exist an inhnitelugood God?
may be dismissed without any discussion ; for infinite good
ness would render all evil for ever impossible. Infinite
goodness could produce nothing less than infinite good.
Evil, if existent, must limit goodness ; evil does exist; there
fore infinite goodness does not.
II. Does there exist an infinite God whose goodness exceeds
his evilness ? I am sorry to have to use so uncouth a word
as “ evilness,” but I have no other that will so well express
my meaning.
1. It is generally held among Theists that an Infinite God
created all other things. If so, what motive could have
prompted the act ? That motive could not have been an
■exterior one. From the nature of the hypothesisJLit musthave been one confined solely to himself, arising from his
own unrestrained, uninfluenced desires. In a word, he must
ha^made the universe for his own sake, his own ends, his
own pleasure.
Now a being who accomplishes his own pleasure or profit
by or through the pleasure or profit of others, and no ptherwise, must be pronounced just and benevolent. But he who
gains his own ends irrespective of the rights, the profit,
and the pleasure of others, is selfish. He who sends others,
who are helplessly under his sway, on errands for his
�ATHEISM OR THEISM ?
5
personal advantage alone, and knowing they must suffer
excruciating pain and die in the undertaking, is a horrible
^Tr-is said that an infinite God created the universe, and peopled it with sentient beings. Those sen
tient beings, in the nature of the case, could not
be consulted beforehand: their life, organisation, circum
stances of all kinds were decided for Hem and imposed
upon them. And a being more good than evil would have
felt himself in honor and justice bound to provide for the
happiness of those creatures before giving them life while
a being more evil than good would have consulted his own
pleasure chiefly, if not entirely, and have cared little or
nothing for the happiness of his creatures. The last clause
seeems to me to describe, but partially only, the action of the
hypothetical God who is supposed to have created the uni
verse. For pain and misery have been the cruel lot of
his creatures from the remotest epoch to which geology
carries U8 back.
“The whole creation groaneth and
travaileth in pain together until now.” Want, disappoint
ment, bitter warfare, pain, and death are the normal con
dition of the universe as far as it is known. No natural
law has been more fully ascertained than this :—Life is an
endless strife; and each combatant must must kill or be
killed, must eat or be eaten. Another law is, That victor
and vanquished succumb to another foe and die, despite their
struggle for existence. These laws hold good not merely as
regards individuals: races also die out. And if there be
purpose and plan in nature it can only be such purpose and
plan as uses sentient beings for the pleasure of the creator,
who cai®s no more for their welfare than the worst of slave
owners does for his human chattels.
.
2. Nay! more. According to the creation hypothesis,
every pang endured by the creature must have been fore
seen and provided for beforehand. The man who invents
an infernal taachine, say Thomassen of Bremer Haven
notoriety, must be immensely less selfish than the creator
of the world. Thomassen had some want to supply,,^ome
sort of excuse for his awful deed. But an infinite and
eternal being is without excuse; and a being that does
wrong without excuse, knowing what he is doing, must be
actuated by pure malignity ; especially when, as is the case
�ATHEISM OR THEISM?
of all creatures of this hypothetical God, his victims are
absolutely helpless:—they cannot resist him, cannot out
manoeuvre him, and can get no sort of redress for any wrong
they may suffer.
It may perhaps be safely laid down, that he is extremely
good, who does good according to his knowledge and power.
But he “ who know^th to do good and doeth it not, to him
it is sin.” An infinite God knows everything, and his
power is unlimited. Why does he not do good “ as he hath
opportunity ? ”
The only conceivable reason must be
that he is unwilling. He must therefore be extremely evil.
When to this is added the fact that he does immeasurable
evil to helpless beings, we shall at once perceive that the
Theistic object of worship must be totally evil; for even
the seeming good he does is done merely to please himself.
Even if the world contained as much good as evil, theft
would not prove the creator good, for reasons I have given.
But the existence of only one evil would legitimately raise
the suspicion that he was evil, because a moment’s effort on
his part would remove that evil and replace it by good.
But when we find that evil is inseparably mixed with the
universe; when we find that during all its ascertainable
history, and in every direction, at least as much evil as good
has prevailed, we cannot hesitate, except in deference to
old prejudices, to pronounce judgment to the -effect that the
world’s creator is the embodiment of selfishness and ma.bgnity, and destitute of any discoverable redeeming trait in
his character.
It is at present unnecessary to enlarge upon this subject.
But if the goodness of the hypothetical creator cannot
logically be maintained, and if the extreme contrary can be
p logically'and truthfully propounded, as I contend, the next
i question to be answered is,
I
III. Does there exist an infinitely wise God? This, too,
' must be examined and answered by the study of the facts of
Nature ; and it need not delay us longer than did the ques
tion of infinite goodness. If there were infinite wisdom^Mo
such things as fools and folly would exist. These are enor
mously plentiful; whence come they ? Wisdoniicannot
produce folly; a perfectly wise being could not produce a
fool. Some say the great majority of men are fools;
certain it is that large numbers are such. Who made them
�ATHEISM OR THEISM?
7
so ? If there be a creator, he makes the philosopher and the
dolt, the mathematician and the idiot. No wise father
would have an idiot son, if he foresaw its possibility and
knew how to prevent it. Yet the great father, as people
call their deity, produces idiots by the score and fools by the ,
million. Infinite wisdom, therefore, is no better than a
myth, nor more accordant with known facts than the infalli
bility of the Pope.
Want of space compels me here to break off my argument abruptly, though I hope to resume it in my next.
LETTER IT.
From Mr. G. St. Clair to Mr. J. Symes.
As I expect to find in Mr. Symes an honest and fair
opponent, I shall not require a definition of all the terms he
uses, but I may point out that if his definition of Atheism
is correct, we shall want some other word to set forth the
denial of God’s existence. Theism is belief in a God ; and,
according to Mr. Symes, Atheism is simply the absence of
that belief, and valid objections to Theism are equally
valid-reasons in favor of Atheism. I should have thought
this more accurately described Agnosticism than Theism;
but as I am equally opposed to both, perhaps it will not
matter. If the Deity is said by one person to be dead, and
by another to be dumb, I confute them both if I prove that
he speaks. It is only fair I should allow that one sentence
of Mr. Symes’s seems to separate the Atheist from the
Agnostic—the sentence, namely, which says that the Atheist
has logically concluded Theism to be irrational. The
Agnostic does not pretend to do that. At the same time
the question is here begged, or else the language is a little
loose, for, if I am right, no individual can logically conclude
that Theism is irrational, but can only come to such a
conclusion illogically.
I am prepared to prove the existence of an intelligent
Creator of man, and to defend his perfect goodness. I shall
not attempt to defend all the positions which Mr. Symes
sets out to assault. His eight questions, which he says will
cover most of the ground, would no doubt do so, and lead
�8
ATHEISM OR THEISM?
us into oceans of talk as well. I have no desire to meddle
much with the unfathomable and the incomprehensible, and
must decline to be drawn into a discussion of the infinite,
which I do not understand. Six questions out of Mr. Symes’s
eight concern the infinite ! They were, perhaps, prompted
by his idea of what I, as a believer in God, would be likely
to assert; for he says, “It is generally held among Theists
that an Infinite God created all other things.” When he
understands that I maintain a humbler thesis, perhaps he
will withdraw or modify some of these questions. I main
tain that there is an intelligent Creator of Man, against
whose perfect goodness nothing can be proved. If man has
a Creator, that Creator must be called God.; and if there
is a God, the evidence of whose action is to be seen in us
and about us, then Atheism is irrational. It is a larger
question whether God is infinite in all his attributes. It is
another question whether God created all things, matter
and its properties included. I am certainly not going to
maintain that every attribute of God is infinite ; for the
clue and the key to the mystery of evil are to be found in
limitation of power. Like John Stuart Mill, I conceive a
limit to Omnipotence, and that enables me to maintain God’s
perfect goodness. Or rather, I define omnipotence to be the
power of effecting all things which are possible, and I show
that some things are impossible to any worker, because they
involve mathematical or physical contradictions. When,
therefore, Mr. Symes advances to show that “ the moral
attributes of God are fictions,” I have an answer for him
which some Theists have not.
The first question of the eight is in the form, “ Does there
exist an infinitely good God ? ” and in the answer to it there
is a semblance of mathematical demonstration. But I
venture to think that the word “ infinite ” leads to a little
unconscious conjuring. I shall be satisfied to defend God’s
perfect goodness against all attacks. I will not say whether
the goodness is infinite, and what ought, to follow then; but
I calmly assert that the bare fact that “ evil does exist” is
no proof that perfect goodness does not. Mr. Symes con
cludes his demonstration with the Q. E. D. that “ therefore
infinite goodness does not.” I should be glad if he would'
come out of the unfathomable and tell me what he has to
show against perfect goodness. I admit that some evil exists
�ATHEISM OR THEISM ?
9
but limited evil for a limited time is quite consistent with
perfect goodness. It was consistent with goodness in the
case of a father I knew, who submitted his child to the
operation of tracheotomy in order to save its life. Limited
evil for a limited time is forced upon every child who is
kept to his lessons; and it argues no want of goodness
in the parent, but only a certain intractableness in things,
making it impossible to attain desired results except
by means and methods which may sometimes be a little
unpleasant. I feel myself at liberty to use these human
illustrations because I have left out the word “ infinite ” and
am considering the action of a Deity who creates and educates
man. The Iggfiitions of all work are similar, whether the
worker be human or divine.
Space exists, and matter exists. Mr. Symes must allow
that they can exist without having been created, because he
does not believe in a Creator at all. So far I am inclined
to agree with him that space and matter may always have
existed. But whether matter has been created or not is
of little importance in this discussion, if it be allowed
that without matter and space nothing could be made
and no processes could go on—that for instance there
could be no world like this and no human creatures to com
plain of its arrangements. In fact there could be no
arrangements, if there were nothing to arrange and no space
to arrange it in. The Creator is, we may say, bound to have
matter—whether created or uncreated—if he is to accom
plish anything at all. No blame, therefore, can attach to
him on account of the mere existence of matter. All
depends upon what use he will make of it. Now the mere
existence of matter implies certain properties, such as
extension and impenetrability. Further, nothing can be
done with matter without moving it, to bring its parts and
particles into new positions. But the motion of matter in
space is according to the laws of motion, which cannot well
be imagined to be different from what they are. Without
these laws of motion and properties of matter there could
be no universe and no human life, and no printing of this
discussion in the pages of the National, RefdjSffier. At the
same time the Worker, using these mean^and materials,
does his work under conditions which preclude certain results
as physically impossible, as for instance that there should be
�10
ATHEISM OR THEISM?
adjacent mountains without a valley ; and which sometimes
involve concomitant results which may not be wished for,
as when a sculptor chisels out a statue but makes a mess of
chippings ¿ha dust. The end desired is achieved, and more
than compensates for the temporary inconvenience. The
inconvenience is no accident and no surprise, but is foreseen
and deliberately accepted, on account of the good that shall
follow.
Seeing that I regard the matter in this way, many things
which Mr. Symes has said shoot wide of my position. I
am not obliged to consider what motive induced the Deity
to create the universe—whether it was an exterior motive
or one confined solely to himself. I maintain that he
Seated man. I allow that he must have found his own end
in doing it. I do not allow that he has done it regardless
of the good of his creatures: else creatures so logical
ought all to commit suicide at once. Mr. Symes defines
the Creator’s obligations to his creatures in a way which
ought to prevent most men from marrying and becoming
fathers. Because sentient creatures suffer pain and misery,
a good Being, he says—even a Being more good than evil—
would have refrained from creating them without consulting
them. The force or weakness of such an argument depends
very much upon the amount of pain and misery compared
with enjoyment, and very much upon the question whether
pain and misery are to be temporary or permanent. On
both points Mr. Symes holds a view which in my estimation
is not justified by the facts. He dwells on the struggle for
existence—which he describes as a law that each combatant
must either kill or be killed, either eat or be eaten—he
describes the strife as prevailing from the earliest geologic
ages ; and he infers that the Creator cares no more for the
welfare of his creatures than the worst of slave owners does
for his human chattels. But here, in the first place, some
illusion is produced by looking down a long vista of pain
and death. When we look along a grove the trees seem to
touch one another; yet in reality the open spaces are more
than the trees. We may, if we choose, look down that vista
of the ages and see young life and happiness, and mother’s
love and joy at every stage. Nor is it the fact that there are
no deaths but such as are violent. Nor is it the case that
violent deaths occasion much pain and misery. Follow the
�ATHEISM OR THEISM ?
11
life of an individual bird, or dog, or human being, and
inquire whether misery or enjoyment preponderates : that is
the fair way to judge, and not by bringing all the misery of
long ages into a near focus.
And then, as to the permanence of pain, misery, evil, Mr.
Symes declares that “ evil is inseparably mixed with the
universe.” This statement he emphasises, and gives no hint
that he expects evil to work itself out. I should have
thought that, as an Agnostic and an Evolutionist, he would
have followed Herbert Spencer in this as well as in other
things; and Spencer has a chapter to show that evil must be
evanescent. By the law of evolution the human race is
progressive—the purpose of nature (the Creator’s purpose,
as I should say) is being worked out, stage after stage. It
is therefore delusive to judge the present condition of the
world as though it were intended to be final ; it is unfair to
judge the past and present without taking into account the
drift and tendency of things. In a manufactory we don’t
judge in that way of the things which are being made, and
which we chance to see “ in the rough.” If evil is evanes
cent, and the consummation of things is to be glorious, it is
not irrational to believe that present pain is like the tem
porary evil of the sculptor’s chippings, the passing irksome
ness of the school-boy’s discipline, and that “ the sufferings
of this present time are not worthy to be compared with the
glory which shall be revealed to us-ward.”
And here, Mr. Editor, I must break off abruptly, like
Mr. Symes, having come to the end of the space allotted.
Else I could easily double the length of this letter, without
departing from the text Mr. Symes has given me : for he
does at least say something.
LETTER III.
From Mr. J. Symes to Mr. G. St. Clair.
The first paragraph of Mr. St. Clair’s letter requires no
remark; the second may detain us for a few minutes. The
infinity of deity, it appears, is given up. That being so,
Mr. St. Clair should have clearly defined the term god.
The sense he attaches to the word must be exceedingly
�12
ATHEISM OR THEISM ?
different from that which Theists in general attach to it;,
and, as I am totally at a loss to know what his god is, I
can neither aecept nor attack his views until he favors me
with them. I shall feel obliged if in his next he will define,
as clearly as possible, “god,” “ creator,” “created,” “intel
ligent creator.” A further favor will be conferred upon me
if Mr. St. Clair will give his reasons in detail for believing
that man was created by “ an intelligent creator,” and also
his grounds for supposing that creator to possess “ perfect
goodness.” At present he merely declares his belief ; I need
his evidence.
Why does my opponent call limited power Omnipotence ?
Is it not equivalent to limited illimitability ? or finite
infinity ?
Mr. St. Clair is prepared to defend the perfect goodness
of man’s creator. But how can a finite, that is, an imperfect
being, be perfect in any respect? My former objections to
infinite goodness press with equal force against perfect good
ness, for perfect and infinite are here the same. Goodness,
perfect or imperfect, finite or infinite, must from its very
nature prevent or remove evil in the direct ratio of its power
or ability. Mr. St. Clair contends that “ limited evil for a
limited time is quite consistent with perfect goodness.” He
may as rationally contend that “limited darkness for a
limited time is consistent with perfect light.” Darkness,
however limited, is incompatible with perfect light; so evil,
though but for a day, and covering but an area of one square
inch, would prove that perfect goodness did not exist. The
illustrations used—the case of tracheotomy and the unplea
sant processes of education—are both as wide of the mark
as possible. They are not cases of perfect goodness resort
ing to temporary evil, but of imperfect goodness and limited
power choosing the less of two evils where it is impossible to
shun both.
“ The conditions of all work are similar, whether theworker be human or divine.” This may, for aught I know,
be true, for I have no notion of a divine worker. But does
Mr. St. Clair mean to say that his god is compelled to
choose between two or more evils, just as we are? If so,
what necessity urges him ? We are driven to labor by
hunger, cold, storms, and innumerable pains and diseases.
Does god, too, labor for his bread, his clothes, shelter, or
�ATHEISM OR THEISM ?
13
medicine? If not, how are “ the conditions of all labor
similar, whether the worker be human or divine ? ” Will
Mr. St. Clair explain ?
How does my worthy opponent know that evil is limited
as to time ? Can he assure me that any square foot of the
earth’s surface is or ever was totally free from evil ? How
does he know, or why does he assume, that any square foot
of the earth’s surface ever will be entirely free from evil ?
That many evils will diminish in process of time, through
man’s growing wisdom, I cheerfully believe. But, no
thanks to deity for that. Man is improving on god’s
work, and removing evils that ought never to have been in
it. Here the consumer has to labor and suffer and spend
all his energy rectifying the blunders of the manufacturing
deity, or making improvements he never thought of, or else
was too idle, or too weak, or too evil, to introduce.
But does any man conceive that all evil will ever be
removed ? Will the storms be hushed into eternal calm ?
the earthquake heave its final throb and cease for ever ?
the volcano spout no more its terrible agents of destruction?
disease and death prey no longer upon animals and men ?
If these are ever conquered, man must do it, for they are
god’s agents for destroying men—if god there be. Can
Mr. St. Clair name one evil his god ever removed ?
Mr. St. Clair seems to hold the eternity of matter. Is
god also eternal; and if so, how do you ascertain that ?
I am not just now much concerned to inquire whether the
creator found matter ready to his hand, or first made it; but
I contend that he who arranges matter as we find it in
Nature (not in art) is not good. The tree is known by its
fruit. Matter is so arranged as to give pain, produce
misery, and death universal! And if so arranged by an
intelligent creator, he must therefore be more evil than
good. When Mr. St. Clair speaks of the “ end desired ” in
the “ chippings and dust ” of the sculptor, I can pretty well
understand him; but does he know the aim and end of the
creator ? If not, what is the value of his illustration ?
It is of no use to say that creatures “ ought to commit
suicide,” if my contention is correct—ought not to marry,
&c. Has not the creator rendered that impossible for most
men by passion and an invincible love of life ? And is it
kind to stretch a poor wretch longer upon the rack of this
�14
ATHEISM OR THEISM?
rude world by so forbidding him to die, though his every
breath is on® of pain ? Goodness never arranged it thus.
I am not concerned with striking the balance between evil
and good; I merely contend that goodness cannot originate
evil, except unwittingly; that perfect goodness would render
all evil impossible. I do not yet see any just cause to retract
or soften a single statement in my first letter; and shall
therefore proceed now to deal with my questions as far as
space will permit.
But Does there exist an infinite god whose wisdom
exceeds his folly ? Wisdom conducts its affairs with reason,
prudence, economy, and directs its energies to the attain
ment of some definite and worthy end. Does any man
know the final cause of the universe, the latest and highest
end aimed at by the creator ? It seems only reasonable that
the Theist should know this before he ventures to attribute
wisdom to his deity.
I grant that if the “ works ” of Nature exhibited evidences
of wisdom as far as men can observe them, and no cases of
evident folly were discoverable, the Theist would have the
best of reasons for assuming that all the universe was equally
well arranged and conducted. But if the known parts of
Nature exhibit folly in its worst conceivable forms, then
the only rational view to take is that the universe at large is
a blunder, and its creator a blunderer.
It is frequently assumed that a fool is reprehensible for
his folly, and that if men are fools, it must be their own
fault. But that cannot be the case, for no man makes him
self. The creator must take all the responsibility. He who
made men made most of them fools ; therefore he must be
more foolish than wise. And man, be it remembered, is
according to Theists the most important part of the creation
hereabouts. Man, they say, is the crowning piece of his
creator’s workmanship; and all else in the solar system is
subservient to his welfare. Be it so ! But what folly to
make all this and then to people the world with fools !
Such folly cannot be excelled, even by the lowest of
intelligent creatures. And my objections to the wisdom or
“ intelligence ” of deity are equally forceful, whether god
be finite or infinite; for I contend that he is far more foolish
than wise.
The folly of the hypothetical creator, whatever his
�ATHEISM OR THEISM ?
15
power, is seen everywhere—at least, I know of no spot free
from it. Here grow beautiful grass, and herbs, and trees ;
and human industry turns the region into a paradise, dotted
over with towns and villages. The people increase rapidly,
and their flocks, and herds, and farm produce keep pace
with them. Civilisation in all its branches rises and pro
gresses. There dawns a day when the sun shines in
splendor, the breezes gently blow, birds pour out their
melody, and man is contented and happy in some degree;
but there comes a dismal sound, and a mysterious shaking;
and ashes, and stones, and dust shower down in torrents
burying all life in a burning tomb. If an “ intelligent
creatoiiS makes men, why does he thus destroy them ? If
they need destroying, why did he make them so ? Those
creatures of his are of all ages from the youngest embryo to
the oldest man. Why destroy what is scarcely begun ?
Why begin what is to be so quickly destroyed ?
This “ intelligent creator ” produces blossoms in spring,
and then nips them by senseless frosts ; he makes the grain
to grow, and then destroys it by wet or a summer storm, or
parches it by drought; splendid crops of potatoes to flourish,
and then turns them to corruption by the fungus known as
“ the diseasethe cattle to multiply, only to die by
pleuro-pneumonia or foot and mouth disease ; a whole human
population to flourish for years, only to die by famine and
fever. And all this is the constant, every-day conduct of
man’s “ intelligent creator ! ”
I am deeply interested and anxious to see how my re
spected opponent will be able to reconcile divine “ intelli
gence ” or goodness with the phenomena of the earth.
The next question I have set down for discussion is:
VI. Does there exist a God whose power exceeds his weak
ness ? This question, to my surprise, has been answered
already by Mr. St. Clair, by implication at least; for he
informs us that, “Like John Stuart Mill, he conceives a
limit to Omnipotence.” That conception, when rendered
into plain English, can only mean that Mr. St. Clair’s god
is of merely finite power ; and as finite power can bear no
comparison with infinite power, we must conclude that Mr.
St. Clair’s deity has infinitely greater weakness than
strength.
If I were contending merely with Mr. St. Clair, I could
�16
ATHEISM OR THEISM ?
at once pass on to the next question; but I am attacking
Theism in its broadest sense ; and, with all due respect to
my opponent, must decline to narrow the ground to the
dimensions of his peculiar Theism, except by easy and
logical stages.
I hold the doctrine, that force or power can be measured
only by its effects. A force may produce motion in several
phases, or it may be expended in resistance, stress, etc.
But in every case the effect is exactly equivalent to the
cause. An infinite cause could result in nothing short of
infinite effect. But infinite effect does not exist; nor can
any conceivable sum of finite effects amount to one infinite
effect; therefore no infinite cause or infinite power exists.
Now Theists do not pretend to know their god except as
a cause—unless I am mistaken. But if no infinite cause
exists, their god must be finite. But that which is finite
can bear no comparison with the infinite; therefore the power
of a finite being, however great, must be immensely less
than his weakness.
I will close by asking whether it was good, or wise, or
honest for a being of such limited capital, that is, power,
etc., to undertake so great a work as the creation and
direction of the universe ? Though he may be making his
own fortune and ensuring his own pleasure, he is doing it
by the most reckless expenditure of human and animal life,
and by the infliction of unspeakable misery upon helpless
beings. A god of honor and mercy, it seems to me, must
either have stopped the machine in utter disgust, or else
have committed suicide countless ages ago.
LETTER IV.
From Mr. G-. St. Clair to Mr. J. Symes.
Space did not permit me to deal with the whole of Mr.
Symes’ first letter ; and now I must let it go, because his
second letter gives me text enough for a second reply. In
this discussion I should be glad if a respectful tone can be
observed in speaking about the Deity. It cannot serve the
purpose of my opponent, nor of the Editor, that Theists who
begin to read our arguments should throw down the paper
�ATHEISM OR THEISM?
17
in disgust. Mr. Symes expresses himself “ totally at a loss
-to know what my god Is.” I shall be grateffflF if he will
•oblige me by spelling the word with a capital G, because, for
one thing, my God is not the same as Mumbo Jumbo or
any little imaginary divinity worshipped by an African
tribe. Mr. Symes asks for definitions of “ god,” “ creator,”
“ created,” “intelligent creator;” but probably a dictionary
will supply his want at the present stage. In my previous
letter I told him distinctly enough what I understand the
tgrm God to mean: God is the intelligent Creator of man.
This is sufficient for our present purpose. To believe in a
.Creator of man—not a blind force, not an unguided pro
cess wjkich has resulted in his coming into existence, but in
an intcmigent being who made him—this is to be a Theist.
And since the evidence of God’s operation is to be seen in
man’s own frame, this theistic belief is rational, and the
opposite is irrational. This is what we have to argue about,
-and I should be glad if my opponent would keep to the
subject. If it could be shown that the Creator of man is
an evil Being, it might be reasonably maintained that he
ought to be called a Devil instead of a God ; and therefore
I have undertaken to rebut all attacks upon his perfect
goodness. In my last letter I repelled some objections of
this kind, and was enabled to do so successfully, because I
did not foolishly contend that the Deity possesses infinite
power, adequate to the accomplishment of all manner of
impossibilities.
Mr. Symes exclaims, “ The infinity of Deity, it appears,
is given up.” I never maintained it, and therefore I have
not given up anything. It seems to be inconvenient to my
opponent that I do not maintain it. He declines, he says,
“ to be narrowed to my Theism; he attacks Theism in its
broadest sense.” That is to say, he is confident that he
could confute other Theists, but he cannot easily confute
me. I showed him that his eight propositions about the
Infinite, mostly shoot wide of my position ; but he thinks it
well to return to them, and persists in attacking the impos
sible compound which he has set up as the God of those
who believe in God. No doubt he can do some amount of
iconoclastic work here; but what is that to me? If-he
amuses himself and your readers by wasting half the space
at his disposal, perhaps I ought not to complain ; but I am
�18
ATHEISM OR THEISM?
not bound to follow him into this region, and shall only do
so when I can spare the time. I will pursue him just a little
way now. He considers that a Theist ought to know the
final cause of the universe before he ventures to attribute
wisdom to the Deity 1 But surely I may admire the struc
ture of the eye, and perceive it to be well adapted for
seeing, without waiting to examine the heart or learn the
use of the spleen. I may study and admire the human
frame as a whole, and not feel obliged to be dumb concern
ing it because I have not begun the consideration of the
solar system. My opponent wants me to begin at the cir
cumference of the universe, because it has no boundsg and
he wishes to see me bewildered and floundering^ Yet
immediately he himself ventures to judge of the universe as
a whole, and pronounces it a blunder, and its creator a
blunderer, on the strength of some exhibitions of folly (a£
he counts them) in its known parts.
One exhibition of folly, he considers, is the creation of
fools. Repeating a statement of his former letter, he asserts
that most men are fools, and that he who created them so
must himself be more foolish than wise. My reply is that,
whatever the actual proportion of fools, ignorance comes
before knowledge, folly before wisdom, in the natural order
of things. The crude and unfashioned material must date
earlier than the wrought and finished. The educated man
is a production of a more advanced sort than the ignorant
and uncultured man ; he is the same creature in a later stage
of development. But Mr. Symes—whom nothing will satisfy
save impossibilities—demands the later before the earlier.
My opponent thinks that infinite goodness is incompatible
with the existence of the slightest evil at any time. He
imagines that infinite goodness in the creator would prevent
any evil outside of him. To my mind this is not so, unless
the creator, besides being infinitely good, is also omnipotent,
and omnipotent in a sense which enables him to overcome
physical and mathematical contradictions and accomplish
impossibilities. But, to simplify the discussion, I refrain
from contending for infinite goodness, and contend for per
fect goodness. My opponent does not see the difference,
but conceives that his former objections to infinite goodness
press with equal force against perfect goodness. He con
tinues his unconscious legerdemain with the word infinite.
�; ■ w:./ -’
ATHEISM OR THEISM ?
•
w’
19
He asks, “ How can a finite, that is, an imperfect being, be
perfect in any respect ? ” Amazing! We am to suppose
there is no perfect circle conceivable unless it be infinite in
its dimensions, and that no man could be perfectly truthful,
no child perfectly innocent, no flower perfect in its beauty.
The flower must be as large as the universe, it seems, before
its beauty can be perfect. The argument against the per
fect goodness of Jesus Christ would have to run in the form
that his body and soul together were not so big in cubic
measure as all the worlds and spaces which make up the
TCT7rai/, or grtffttall! “ Goodness will prevent or remove evil
to the extent of its ability.” Yes; but since no ability
whatever can be sufficient to surmount impossibilities, limited
^evil nifty exist for a limited time, and be subservient to
greater good (like the inconvenience of scaffolding during
the building of a house). Mr. Symes uses what he supposes
to be a parallel, that limited darkness is not consistent with
perfect light. But this shows some obscurity of thought.
Darkness and light are opposites, and so are good and evil ;
but not goodness and evil. I did not say that limited evil
was consistent with perfect good, as an existing condition
of things everywhere; I said it was consistent with perfect
goodness as an element of character existing in the Deity.
With God, in the higher plane of his operations, as with
man on a lower, it may be wise and good to “ choose the
less of two evils where it is impossible to shun both.”
“ How do I know that evil is limited as to time ? ” How
does Mr. Symes know that it is not ? Let him read Herbert
Spencer’s chapter on the “ Evanescence of Evil.” Let him
ask himself what prospect there is of the eternal duration
of a thing which is continually diminishing in amount. He
admits that evils are diminishing through man’s agency,
man’s growing wisdom. So they ought some day to end.
But he declines to give God the glory. Now the Creator of
man is the author of man’s wisdom. He employs man as
his best instrument to improve the face of the earth and
weed out evils from society. To a Theist this is so, of
course; the creator of man’s body is the author of his spirit
and the guide of his course. But with curious blindness to
the Theistic position, Mr. Symes seeks to infer that man is
wiser than his maker. He reckons disease and all destructive
forces as God’s agents for evil, but does not reckon physi
�20
ATHEISM OR THEISM?
cians, philanthropists and reformers as his agents for good.
He fails to see that on the theistic hypothesis the evils which
man remov^God removes.
Mr. Symes contends that “ he who arranged matter as we
find it, is not good,” because it produces pain and other evils.
He would not say this of any human operator. When I
saw him the other day at a public meeting, he complained
of neuralgia and talked of going to a dentist. I am afraid
the dentist would have to arrange matter so as to give tem
porary pain, and yet the dentist might be good and might do
good. It is not the poser which my oppontml thinks it is,
to ask me whether I equally know the end and aim of fhp
Creator. I’m not going to search for it among the infinities.
Looking at the human jaws, and the apparatus of the teeth,
in connexion with food and the digestive organs, I think I
know the aim and end of the Creator in giving us teeth. It
is that we may chew our victuals. And then their occa-wr
sionally aching is an incidental evil, which may have some
bearing on his omnipotence, but does not bear witness against
his goodness. Mr. Symes’ next paragraph is curiously con
tradictory. He considers life a torture, every breath pain,
death preferable ; but does not commit suicide because lie
has an invincible love of life !
I have agreed with Mr. J. S. Mill that physical “ con
ditions ” put some limit to omnipotence as we might other
wise conceive it. Mr. Symes pounces upon this, but does
not seize it well. He says, “ Here is an admission of finite
power, and since finite bears no comparison to infinite we
must conclude that Mr. St. Clair’s deity has infinitely greater
weakness than strength.” Does this sound conclusive ? I
may correspondingly argue as follows,—My God can do
something, therefore his weakness is not utter inability, not
infinite weakness ; it is finite, and bears no comparison with
the infinite, therefore he has infinitely greater strength than
weakness. Why does not Mr. Symes give up dabbling in
this ocean of the infinite, which is too deep for both of us,
but where, if I choose to follow him, I can make quite as
great a show as he of letting down a plumb-line ? He wants
me to tell him—“ Is god eternal, and how do I ascertain
it?” What I think on the subject, I’ll tell him another
time : at present I assert that the human frame had a
creator—it is a designed machine, and machines must have
�ATHEISM OR THEISM ?
21
intelligent makers—and I challenge him to show that this,
my belief, is irrational.
“ Why do I call limited power omnipotence ? ” If power
to do all possible things is not to be called omnipotence we
must drop the term. I found the term in use and I used it:
but it is not essential to my argument. If Mr. Symes can
imagine the ability to do impossible things, he has powers
of imagination which transcend mine. I do not expect the
Deity to cause two and two to be five, and the whole to be
less than one of its quarters; I do not look for him to
make squares without angles, and a succession of days without
intervening nights. I believe in a Deity who can do all
¿lings not Involving contradictions. Can Mr. Symes show
that this belief of mine is irrational ? The kind of world
which my opponent demands—brand-new and straight off—
would involve impossibilities. His cry is for the moon.
He wants blossoms which never suffer from frost; he asks
for anjunbroken succession of good crops; he desires the
absence of all liability to disease in man and beast. Can
he suggest how a fleshly body, or any animal organism
could be made free from all liability to disease ? His
notion of the universe leaves no room for incidental evils,
necessary concomitants, “ partial evil, universal good ”—in
which I find the explanation of many difficulties.
I have only space to assert afresh that the human
frame is a machine, the human eye is an instrument;
machines and instruments have to be made ; the maker of
man is God; therefore Theism is true and it is rational to
believe it.
LETTER V.
From Mr. J. Symes to Mr. G. St. Clair.
I cannot say if it was my fault or the printer’s that “God”
was spelt with a small g ; but I am not anxious to be read
by those who would throw down the paper in disgust for
such a trifle. I cannot induce Mr. St. Clair to give me a
sight of his deity, and therefore do not know what it is he
worships. It is not Mumbo Jumbo, nor yet an infinite god;
it is “ the intelligent creator of man,” he informs me. But
�22
ATHEISM OR THEISM ?
no such being exists, as far as I can ascertain ; and why
should I give a capital G to a myth ? My opponent is
illogical in demanding honor for his god before he has
proved that he has one worthy of honor, especially when all
known facts are so strongly against his position. I respect
Mr. St. Clair, for I know him ; I don’t know his god ; to
give him capital letters might be construed to signify that
I both knew and honored him.
“The intelligent creator of man” is no more a description
of deity than “the tree that bears oranges” is of the orange
tree. I wish to know what the deity is; he merely speaks
of what he does. What was he before creating man ?
What is he apart from that action altogether ? I cannot
believe Mr. St. Clair knows, nor do I believe he has any
god at all. He can confute and confound me by a real
exhibition of his deity in his next letter.
My opponent rather unceremoniously sends me to “a
dictionary ” for definitions of “ God,” etc. I go. “ GOD,
n. [Sax., god; G., gott; D., god; Sw. and Dan., gud;
Goth., goth or guth.~\ 1. The Supreme Being ; Jehovah ;
the Eternal and Infinite Spirit, the Creator, and the Sove
reign of the Universe,” etc. (Webster’s Improved Diet. ;
Glasgow, W. Mackenzie.) What am I to think of Mr. St.
Clair’s consistency ? In both letters he has, almost indig
nantly and with something akin to sneering, repudiated the
“ infinity ” of god ; and yet I find this attribute duly set
out in the only definition of his deity which he has as yet
condescended so much as to indicate ! I must now pi ess
him to be candid : Is the definition to which he directed me
correct? If so, why does he reject the “infinity” or
decline to “maintain” it? If this definition be incorrect,
why did he refer me to it ?
I will next deal with a few of the fallacies and mistakes
of his second letter. 1. Mr. St. Clair is mistaken in as
suming that he “ successfully repelled ” any objections of
mine to god’s goodness. The strength of my objections
lies in the well-known and horrible facts of nature, which
cannot be explained away. Goodness, finite or infinite,
removes or prevents every evil in its power. Does Mr. St.
Clair venture to assert that there is no evil now in the world
which his deity could remove if he would ? If be cannot
remove so much as one of them—say cancer or neuralgia—
�ATHEISM OR THEISM ?
23
why call such a weakling god ? If he can and will not,
where is his goodness ? I demand no “ impossibilities ” of
deity, unless he is extremely weak. If he is not able to do
immensely more than I require, he should retire from his
post.
2. Mr. St. Clair, in not “ maintaining ” the infinity of !
I his god, “gives it up”—in the only sense I intended. I
j have suffered no sort of “ inconvenience ” from this. Oh
i dear, no! The only inconvenience I feel in this contest '■
lies in the fact that I have nothing but shadows and tinCertainties to contend with, phantoms,
“That flit e’er you can point the place.”
Would Mr. St. Clair kindly furnish me with one or two
stubborn Theistic facts, if he has them ?
3. It is amusing to learn that I waste “ half my space ”
in demolishing the “infinite” god, the very deity my
opponent sent me to the dictionary for! I presume that
must be his own ? 4. “ Ignorance comes before knowledge,
folly before wisdom.” No doubt. And in many millions
of cases the ignorance and the folly are never superseded by
anything better. Does Mr. St. Clair hold that, “whatever
is best ” ? What point has his remark else ? A perfectly
good and wise god would have permitted no folly, nor have
left his creatures ignorant of anything necessary to be
known. I expect Mr. St. Clair to contend in his next that
folly argues the wisdom, and evil the goodness, of his deity,
while inability to remove evils is proof positive of his
omnipotence.
5. My opponent jumbles mathematics, morality, and
botany in the most edifying manner in his allusion to the
circle, the child, and the flower. Geometrical conceptions
are not “ beings;” they are abstractions. Innocence and
beauty may be perfect in a very imperfect and extremely
limited sense ; is that so with god’s goodness ? Mr. St.
Clair is extremely unfortunate in his analogies. All that
he has yet tried are failures. Or else his god is one of
very slender means. He is a surgeon performing “ tracheo
tomy,” a sculptor chipping stones into shape, a parent
“ educating ” his children, a builder employing “ scaffolds,”
etc. Before he has done, I fear he will rouse my sympathy
for this god as the most unfortunate victim of circumstances
�24
ATHEISM OK THEISM?
that ever lived. The orthodox divinity is certainly superior
to this. He never loses his power, and is self-reliant all
throughout his career. But Mr. St. Clair’s deity is so com
pletely under the control of circumstances, mostly adverse
ones, that I expect my opponent to announce next that a
memorial of condolence is to be despatched to him, and a
subscription opened to replenish his exhausted exchequer.
With the old-fashioned Christian god “ all things were
possible ; ” with Mr. St. Clair’s it seems quite the reverse.
No excuse could possibly be urged for any wrong done by
the orthodox deity ; nothing hut excuses have yet been urged
for this new one. I point out his misdeeds and show up his
criminal conduct. But Mr. St. Clair is ever ready with an
apology—“ Well, yes, but he couldn’t help it.” And this
poor thing must have a capital G-! Well, well. He needs
one!
6. Unless Mr. St. Clair knows that his god has removed
one evil, it is irrational to expect him to remove all. If
evil and good are compatible at all, and “ for a limited
time,” why not for ever ? How long must evil last to be
inconsistent with goodness ? “ Darkness and light are
opposites, so are good and evil; but not goodness and evil.”
Is that “ legerdemain ” or theology? It cannot be called
“ confusion of thought,” for thought is absent. We were
informed in Mr. St. Clair’s first that the conditions of all
labor were the same. What now does he mean by in
sinuating that man works on a “ lower plane ” than god ?
How is that assumption to be reconciled with the further
statement that god works by man ? God’s work is man’s
work, and man’s is god’s, if that be so. I shall be delighted
to be assured that all evil will be removed. But what are
its laws ?—laws of origin, progress, and decay ? Will
death and pain go ? Suppose they did go; the crime of
their introduction or creation remains.
7. God employs man to “ improve the face of the earth
and to weed out evils from society.” Assertion without
evidence. If true, what must be thought of a god that
creates evils and nourishes and perpetuates them for indefinite
periods, and ultimately uses man as his catspaw to remove
them ? How horribly they burn their fingers often in the work!
What confusion of thought and of moral perception must
possess a man who can count the author of all evil good,
�ATHEISM OR THEISM?
25
and thank him for removing evils by the agency of human
suffering. What a monument that deity would have if all
the bones of his miserable agents could be collected and
reared into one stupendous pyramid—the bones of the
swarming millions who have perished horribly in removing
divine evils, of the poor blind slaves whipped on by the
crudest taskmaster that ever lived to undo the mischiefs
his folly or malice created. What can be the state of mind .
that supposes the “ physician ” who does his best to heal
sickness to be incited thereto by the author of that sick
ness—that the philanthropist who shelters, feeds, and
clothes the orphan is inspired by the being who murders the
parents ? When you “ gather grapes of thorns or figs of
thistles,” then may the author of evil incite to good deeds.
Or must we suppose the deity to be destitute of moral
qualities, and engaged in supernal legerdemain, throwing
in evils with one hand and removing them by the other, using
men as sentient and suffering marionettes in operating his
play ?
8. A dentist would have no calling if deity had not
“ scamped ” his work. If he inflict more than necessary
pain, he is considered cruel. An infinite god, such as I was
sent to the dictionary for, could have been under no
necessity to inflict any pain. Mr. St. Clair’s god seems able
enough for mischief, but almost powerless for good—a being
that needs endless apologies.
9. If my opponent’s deity renders death infinitely desirable
as a refuge from bis tyranny, and yet blocks the path to
it by inspiring an invincible love of life, wherein lies the
“ contradiction ” of my reference to it ?
10. I must leave my opponent for the present floundering
in the hopeless task of proving that his deity must be infi
nitely powerful because he can do “something.” Not I, '
but he, is the one who “ dabbles in the ocean of the infinite.”
11. Mr. St. Clair seems to hold that omnipotence is equiva
lent to the power to do all possible things. Is that new? I
never heard of its being used to signify the power to do
impossible things. I thought from his former letter that
“ omnipotence ” with him designated limited power ; it now
returns to its old condition, and in this letter signifies what
is indicated above. I wish Mr. St. Claii’ would be a little more
definite. He now “ believes in a deity who can do all things
�26
ATHEISM OR THEISM ?
not involving contradictions.” Well, I have asked for no
contradictions, the very reverse. This belief of Mr. St.
Clair’s is highly irrational. You cannot possibly know how
many things could be done not involving contradictions ;
nor can you possibly know what power might be necessary
to perform them ; nor is it possible you should have any
reason for believing your deity to possess such power. If
that confession of faith is not a “ dabbling in an infinite
ocean,” what is it ? It is immensely amusing to see how
Theists and semi-Theists talk ! Their knowledge and ex
perience is about on a par with ours; yet they profess
belief in that into which, in the very nature of the case,
they can have no insight. But faith not founded on know
ledge must be irrational. Thus I show Mr. St. Clair’s creed
to be baseless and destitute of reason.
12. Perhaps my opponent will kindly show that a world
such as I desire would involve “ impossibilities,” or that a
God such as he believes in could not have made such a one ?
I do want “ blossoms that never suffer from frost; ” who
does not ? I do desire “ an unbroken succession of good
crops ; ” will Mr. St. Clair say that he does not ? Else why
is he pleased at the thought that all evil will ultimately
cease ? To judge from my opponent’s remarks, one might
suppose that it were a fault to desire good and not evil. Is
it so ? I hope it is no sign of depravity to hate evil and to
protest against evil-doers, even when they are deities. Does
Mr. St. Clair enjoy evil ? Would he not remove it all, if he
could ? He hates evil as I do ; but, like a lawyer with an
utterly indefensible client, he struggles to show a case
where there is none, and tries to defend an incongruous
rabble of half-formed and contradictory conceptions, mostly
remnants and tatters of old superstitions, loosely and unsymmetrically strung together on verbal threads, and col
lectively called God. It is pitiable to see a man of his
intellect and goodness engaged in hot conflict defending
error against truth, and palliating and excusing all evil for
the sake of the fancied author of it all.
�ATHEISM OR THEISM ?
27
LETTER VI.
From Mr. G. St. Clair to Mr. J. Symes.
I regret that Mr. Symes should persist in speaking con
temptuously of the Deity. The little matter of the little
g ” in the name of God, if it was the printer’s fault, he
now makes his own. He considers he is not called upon to
give a capital G to a myth. No, but until he has proved God
to be a myth, he must allow the possibility of his existence;
and he ought to speak respectfully. In this third letter he
uses language about the Deity which renders it painful for
me to continue this discussion. It is a smaller matter that
he should forget the courtesy due to an opponent, and
insinuate a want of candour, as he does by “ now pressing
me to be candid.”
The question we were to discuss is set forth thus : “ Is
Atheism or Theism the more rational ? ” As Mr. Symes is
a professed Atheist, one would expect him to advance
reasons for believing that Atheism is rational, that there is
Ho God, and that the word ought to be spelt with a small g.
But it would be a difficult task, and as yet he has not at
tempted it. He would have to explain how things came to
be as they are without any intelligence either originating,
guiding, or controlling. His position is, that the eye was
not made to see with, the teeth were not made for mastica
tion, the human frame was not made at all. Like Topsy,
he “ specks it growed !” He knows that steam-engines do
Hot grow, except under the hand and mind of intelligent
engineers, but he thinks that human bodies do. He is
aware that telescopes and opera glasses have to be fashioned,
but he imagines that that'more wonderful instrument, the
human eye, is a sort of accident. Human intelligence has
grown up out of the dust; and there is no other origin for a
mother’s love or a martyr’s self-devotion. There is intelli
gence in every workshop, and at the head of every successful
business in the world, but none presiding over the universe.
Out of the fountain head have come greater things than
ever were in it. These are a few of the things which Mr.
�28
ATHEISM OR THEISM ?
Symes has to defend and show to be rational. No wonder
that he defers the task !
He has not even fairly set about the alternative task of
showing Theism to be irrational. I have let him know
that I believe in an intelligent creator of man, worthy to be
called God because of the greatness of his power and the
goodness displayed in his operations. I have explained that
by “ creator ” of man I mean former of man out of pre
existing materials, and author of him as man. I have
urged that this belief of mine is rational, because the human
frame is a machine—in fact, much more, for it is a compli
cation of machines and instruments—and all machines and
instruments at all comparable to the bodily parts and organs
have required intelligence to form them. Telescopes are made,
and for a purpose; so must eyes have been: steam-engines
are made, and for a purpose, and so is the machine of the
human body. This is my rational belief. To deny these
things is to deny that similar effects require similar causes
to produce them, and is quite irrational. But instead of
showing my Theism to be irrational my opponent sets forth
a form of Theism which is irrational, and, therefore, easy to
refute, and picks out some inconsistencies in that. His
method may be summarised as follows:—“ Theism is belief
in an infinite God, a God of infinite power can do all things,
a God of infinite goodness would do all good things, but all
conceivable good things have not been done, therefore, a
God does not exist.” But this argument is fallacious : all
that follows is that either the power or the goodness of God
is less than infinite, and 1 have shown that we have no
right to credit the Deity with a power of effecting impossi
bilities. Omnipotence must be limited in that sense and to
that extent, and we must not expect to see contradictions
reconciled. God’s goodness I defend, and undertake to
show the inconclusiveness of anything which may be urged
against it. I do not contend for infinite power in the sense
of power to effect impossibilities. I do not deny almightiness if properly defined; though it is not essential to my
argument to contend for it, since something less than
almightiness may have sufficed for the creation of man.
Mr. Symes does waste ink in trying to commit me to his
absurd definition of Deity. The “infinite God” whom he
considers that he demolishes is only the image which he
�ATHEISM OR THEISM ?
29
himself had set up and wrongly exhibited as mine. I can
not allow it is mine any the more because he has found one
something like it in “Webster’s Dictionary.” Certainly,
when he demanded definitions, I said that a dictionary
might serve his purpose at that stage ; but I did not say it
would serve or satisfy me at all stages. Mr. Symes also
amuses me by his awkward gymnastics in the ocean of the
infinite. I followed him into the deep just to drive him out ;
so now he tries to get to shore before me, and shouts out
that it is I who am dabbling in the bottomless sea. Seeing
that I am leaving the waters, he tries to entice me back
again. He protests that he will now be reasonable. He
will confess himself confuted and confounded if I will afford
him, in my third letter, a real exhibition of my Deity!
Very likely; but I really cannot allow myself to make the
attempt. Regarding myself as only a creature, inferior to
my Creator, I do not presume to comprehend all his great
ness, so as to be able to give an exact description, or paint
an adequate portrait. I have heard of genii being induced
to go into a bottle, and I can imagine a Goliath taking a
Tom Thumb in his hand; but I for my part do not profess
to have th’s superiority over God. To define God would be
to chalk out his limits. As I decline to contend for a Deity
possessing contradictory infinities, my opponent wishes to pin
me to the equally foolish alternative of a God with no infinity
at all, a very limited marionette figure, such as I might
comprehend all round and put forth upon the stage for
Mr. Symes to laugh at. If God is not infinite in all senses,
I am to describe him ! But I do not feel shut up to any
such dilemma. God is the intelligent Being who consciously
and deliberately gave existence to man.
Mr. Symes complains that “ intelligent Creator of man ”
is no description. I have not promised a description, and
my argument does not require it. I judge that man had a
maker, as I judge that Cologne cathedral had an architect.
The architect of that cathedral is not known ; his name has
not come down to us, and no description could be given that
should distinguish him from others ; but the cathedral is
sufficient evidence that he existed. It is more rational to
believe in an architect than to disbelieve. I defend the
rationality of believing in God. I am not bound to give an
exact description of him. The question “ What was he
�30
ATHEISM OR THEISM?
before creating man ? ” I am not obliged to answer. I offer
Mr. Symes the “stubborn Theistic facts” which he asks for.
Human eyes are instruments superior to opera-glasses;
opera-glasses are designed for a purpose, and formed only
under intelligent direction; therefore nothing less than
intelligence will account for the existence of human eyes.
The human frame is a machine, including within itself
several subordinate machines of engines and levers ; repeat "
the above argument. A mother’s affection is intended for !
the good of her offspring, for the preservation of its life, for
securing the succession of generations ; and yet this affection
is not accounted for by saying it is of human origination ;
it owes its origin to the author of life, who planned the
succession of generations. These are Theistic facts, so
stubborn that no Atheist can satisfactorily dispose of them,
if I may judge from such attempts as I have seen As I
gave my opponent two out of these three facts before, he
had no ground for crying out that he has nothing but
shadows to contend with.
I define omnipotence to be the power of doing all things
not involving contradiction and impossibility. Mr. Symes
questions whether this view is new. I am not much con
cerned about that: it is the view I hold and I challenge
him to prove it irrational. He says he never heard of
“ omnipotence ” being used to signify the power to do im
possible things. If, then, my view is the only one he has
ever heard of, why does he ridicule it and allude to it as
semi-theistic? why does he say the orthodox divinity is
superior to mine ? why does he complain that I give him no
sight of the deity I worship ? But in truth my opponent
himself assumes that omnipotent goodness ought to do im
possible things—ought to give us the full-blown flower of
creation before the bud, and accomplish grand results
without processes involving incidental evil. He wishes me
to explain to him how it is that a God, such as I believe in,
cannot make such a world as is asked for. I have only to
say that no God could do it, because all operations must
have a beginning, a process and an end, and no conceivable
power, out of Hibernia, can make the end come before the
beginning. Will my opponent show me how it is to be
done ? Will he state a method by which the earth and
moon may be allowed to keep their present orbits, and light
�ATHEISM OR THEISM ?
o1
01
remain subject to its present laws, and yet eclipses be
rendered impossible ? Can he devise a human body that
can live and move and yet not be at all composed of flesh
subject to wounds ? Does he not see that a great and good
result may carry some minor undesirable concomitants along
with it ? Does he think he could show that any of the
evils he complains of are not of this sort ?
He seems to have great difficulty in grasping the thought
that all operations imply a process, take up time, and
involve incidental results which are not directly bargained
for. They may not be desired, yet may be foreseen and
accepted, because they lie in the path by which greater good
is to be attained. Mr. Symes says that he points out the
misdeeds and shows up the criminal conduct of God, and that
when he does so I reply, “ Yes, but he couldn’t help it.”
This is my opponent’s way of admitting that when he
charges the sufferings of mortals upon the Deity, as a Being
who could prevent them but will not, I have a reply for
him. I show that instead of limiting God’s good intent and
beneficent action, it is equally a solution of the difficulty if
we suppose a limitation of power. Then I show that limita
tions actually exist, in the ever-present conditions under
which operations are performed and ends wrought out. This
view of mine, which I reverently maintain, the language
of my opponent grossly misrepresents as equivalent to
making God “ the most unfortunate victim of circumstances
that ever lived.” It makes him and it leaves him almighty.
The alternative would have been to maintain that the power
of deity is without limits of any sort—that he can make
squares without angles, or diffuse a limited quantity of
material through a greater space without spreading it thinner.
This might have pleased Mr. Symes, who now parades
“the orthodox divinity who never loses his power, the oldfashioned Christian God with whom all things were pos
sible.” He never heard of any view of omnipotence different
from that which I maintain ; but he has heard of this oldfashioned Christian God so different from mine, and thinks
such a conception of God preferable. Naturally so, because
it is the conception which he feels able to demolish, as it is
composed of inconsistent parts.
Mr. Symes, unable to comprehend the temporary use of
scaffolding, except for human builders, inquires how long
�32
ATHEISM OR THEISM ?
evil must last to be inconsistent with goodness ? Probably
as long as the good process which necessitates it as a con
comitant is still proceeding, and has not got beyond the
stage which requires it. I am surprised it should appear1
to Mr. Symes’s intelligence that the evil which is compatible
with goodness for a limited time, may as well be so for ever.
A stormy voyage may be endured because of the desirability
of migrating to a better country; but surely the storms
must be differently regarded if it is known that they are to
be perpetual and there is no port to be reached. Mr. Symes
forms his impression of the storms while he is sea-sick,
and refuses beforehand to find any compensation in reaching
the haven of rest. Suppose the storms go, he maintains
that the crime of their introduction or creation remains.”
He persists in charging all evils upon the Deity as crimes, as
though he knew enough of the ultimate issues of things to
justify him in saying there has been the least departure
from wise and good arrangements. If impossibilities could
be effected we might have the fruit before the bud, and ripe
apples before sour ones. If Mr. Symes is going to be
reasonable he must not ask for such things. He does ask
for them when he demands wisdom before ignorance and
declares that a good and wise God would not have left his
creatures ignorant of anything necessary to be known. And
he does ask for them, in my opinion, when he complains
against God on account of any evil whatever. He cannot
show that whatever is is not best, in the sense of being the
best possible at the present stage of the general progress.
As usual I leave much unsaid for want of space.
LETTER VII.
From Mr. J. Symes to Mr. G. St. Clair.
Mr. St. Clair’s third is no stronger in facts or arguments
than his two former letters. It would, however, be unkind
to grumble, as he cannot present a strong case for Theism,
for the very sufficient reason that no such case exists.
He complains of my “ language about the deity.” Well,
in that he shows himself as unreasonable, though not so
cruel, as Nebuchadnezzar when he sent the three Hebrews
�ATHEISM OR THEISM ?
33
to the fiery furnace for refusing to worship his image. Mr.
St. Clair thinks I should “ advance reasons for believing
Atheism to be rational.” Each of my letters has teemed
with such reasons, not one of which has been yet refuted.
Has my opponent read what I have written ? I have also
shown how irrational it is to believe in a good and omni
potent god. The facts of nature proclaim aloud that no
good god exists; and there does not exist one fact, or one
aggregation of facts, to warrant the belief that an omni
potent god lives. Therefore Mr. St. Clair’s belief is
irrational. The believers in Mumbo Jumbo, the infalli
bility of the Pope, transubstantiation, or witchcraft, are not
more irrational than a Theist. They all believe, no doubt,
sincerely enough, but without any adequate reason.
In my last I expressed the anticipation that my opponent
would in his next argue the omnipotence of his deity from
his “ inability to remove evils.” Mr. St. Clair, in the
penultimate paragraph of his third letter, obligingly fulfils
my prediction by affirming that “ a limitation of power ”
, . . “ makes and leaves god almighty.”
Mr. St. Clair takes umbrage at my request that he would
be “ candid.” The request arose from that reference to the
dictionary and its necessary connexions. I do not yet know
whether the dictionary contains a definition he approves.
It seems to me—I may be in error—but it seems to me that
candor would have set me at rest on that before now.
At length Mr. St. Clair plunges into the Design Argu
ment—the most fallacious and ill founded of all the argu
ments for divine existence.
1. Adaptation argues an adapter, and an intelligent one.
Does it? Water is as well adapted for drowning land
animals as it is for marine animals to live in. Fire is
beautifully adapted to burn men; falling stones, trees, etc.,
storms, floods, explosions, fevers, famines, wild beasts, earth
quakes, and a thousand other evils are delightfully fitted to
kill them. Old age, too, will do it equally well. It cannot
be denied that the processes of decay and destruction show
as much regularity of action and as perfect adaptation of
means to ends as the processes which result in life. Perhaps
Mr. St. Clair regards an earthquake, a cantier, or any other
destructive agency as a “ sort of accident;” he fails to see,
probably, how beautifully, cunningly, and maliciously
�34
ATHEISM OR THEISM ?
they are fitted for their work of destruction and misery 1
Certain skin diseases, tic-doloreux, sciatica, cramps, the
stone—how beautifully they are all adapted to the work of
inflicting pain ! Racks, wheels, stakes, gyves, “ boots,”
thumbscrews, bastinadoes, swords, guns, etc., are all made,
and argue or imply makers ; but earthquakes, plagues, frost
and snow, floods, famines, wild beasts, fevers, small-pox,
cancer, and what not, are immensely superior as agents of
pain and death, and yet Mr. St. Clair seems to see no design
in them, and fails to recognise the existence of a perfectly
malignant god, who made them all for his own pleasure !
Can perversity of intellect proceed farther? My worthy
opponent can readily enough perceive the design and the
malice of an infernal machine, and yet fails to recognise
the design and the malice of diseases and famines! He
recognises the folly or the malice of warriors, murderers,
and tyrants who kill or torture a few; and yet cannot admit
that there must be an omnipotent god, who cunningly con
trives and maliciously sets in motion the grand and perfect
machinery of nature to destroy all living things 1 He admits
the existence of folly and malice amongst mankind, and yet
refuses to admit that far greater folly and malice “ preside
over the universe ! ”
Of course, it cannot rationally be contended that god is
infinitely foolish and malicious, though he is “ perfectly” so.
He cannot do “ impossibilities,” nor things involving “ con
tradiction.” He found matter to his hand, and had to work
under the “ same condition of labor ” that men work under ;
and so, though the universe is not absolutely and infinitely
bad, yet it is as bad as the deity could possibly make it.
And, further, we are not to argue that because some scraps
of good, or seeming good, really do exist, that therefore the
good is eternal; for “ limited good for a limited time ” may
be consistent with perfect evil, and the deity is working by
various agencies to remove all good from his universe; and
then nought but evil will remain for ever!
There is Mr. St. Clair’s argument simply reversed.
2. But I must notice in detail the very few natural pheno
mena my opponent condescends to mention. The eye he
instances as a proof of design and beneficent divine work
manship. He says it is superior to opera-glasses. The best
eyes, no doubt, are better than opera-glasses. But our best
�ATHEISM OR THEISM ?
35
telescopes and microscopes far transcend the eye as optical
instruments. Its qualities are coarse and rudimentary com
pared with theirs. Eyes ! They are beautiful and ugly,
of good color and of disagreeable ; there are blear eyes,
goggle eyes, squint eyes, wall eyes ; color-blindness is a
defect observed in many thousands. Millions upon millions
of eyes never see at all. Were they made to see with ?
Had a beneficent creator made eyes, he would have
ensured their good performance. Had he meant them
for human advantage, he would have turned out
respectable workmanship. I wonder he did not do that
for his own credit. What optician could follow his example ?
All over the civilised world are ophthalmic institutions,
where men are constantly engaged patching up, or actually
improving, the work of Mr. St. Clair’s divine manufacturer,
who made eyes of water, jelly and soft fibres, whereas they
should have been made of hard and tough material, so that
disarrangement and destruction were next to impossible.
And these eyes, good, bad, useless, are palmed off upon us
by the maker, whether we like them or not. He gives no
guarantee for their performance either, as a respectable
jnanufacturei’ would, nor does he ever repair them when
dace out of order. There is no sense of honesty, decency or
shame in this deity. If he bestows eyes as a duty, they
ought all to be good ; if out of charity, it is a mockery to
give a poor wretch the eyes we often see !
If the eye is a divinely-manufactured article, as Mr. St.
Clair says (without attempting to prove it), then the worker
knew less of optics than I do, or else carelessly did his
work. The eye is not achromatic, and it has too many
lenses, the many surfaces of which waste light. It has the
defect of astigmatism, which shows that its maker did not
know much of mathematical optics. This grand instru
ment, the crowning work of an almighty god, has two
odd curves in the front—that is, in the cornea.
Everyone knows that the common run of spectacles
have a longer curve horizontally than perpendicularly,
and so has the eye !
Our best lenses are ground to
mathematical correctness, and the same curve prevails all
over the same side ; but the eye is herein defective. Hence
we cannot see, at the distance of clear vision, a horizontal
and perpendicular line distinctly at once : one of them is in
�36
ATHEISM OR THEISM ?
focus when the other is out. Had there been a wise and
beneficent creator, he would long since have corrected this
defect, for opticians pointed it out generations ¡fince in
their critiques upon the eye. The eye, therefore, if made at
all, must be considered as the work of a mere amateur, and
-of one who worked more for his own amusement than for
human welfare.
3. The teeth! First of all, we are born without any;
later we “cut” them in misery, convulsions, often at the
expense of life.' The teeth thus cut are not permanent,
after all; in a few years they drop out, or are pushed out
by the so-called permanent teeth. And these!—in many
cases they begin to decay in a very few years ; henceforth
the victim of this dishonest tooth-maker is subject to tooth
ache, neuralgia, and dyspepsia. He also has to go to the
expense of new teeth, stuffing, etc., if he can afford them.
And may I ask my opponent what he would think of a
dentist who furnished him with teeth that ached, and
and decayed, and tumbled out ? What would he say if any
dentist treated him half so badly as his deity treats thousands?
If eyes and teeth are really manufactured by deity, Mr. St.
Clair must refute my criticisms, or admit that his deity is a
clumsy or careless worker, and also very dishonest and cr^jel.
These facts must be met and explained before Theism can
be shown to be rational.
4. But Mr. St. Clair seems to me virtually to give up all
possible right to use the Design Argument by admitting, as
he does, the independent existence of matter. If there be a
mystery in nature, then the existence of matter is that
mystery. And, further, there must be, from the nature of the
case, as much, at least, as much, if not more, design and
adaptation in the very elements of matter as in any living
thing. And, further still, I am not aware that anyone has
yet drawn the line between living matter and non-living
matter, nor have I any reason to suppose such a line
possible. All matter is probably alive, and always was
so, and ever will be so, though in far different degrees.
I affirm, too, that the adaptation between the molecules,
or atoms, or whatever the ultimate elements of matter may
be called, must be more perfect than between the parts of a
man. No man is perfect; nor is his best organ beyond the
range of adverse criticism. No man is perfectly adapted to
�ATHEISM Oli THEISM ?
37
his environment—at best his adaptation is but a makeshift,
a “ roughing it,” a period of unstable equilibrium, a tight
rope dance for dear life, with absolute certainty in every
case of a fatal fall by way of finale.
Turning from man, look at the ocean. Its waves swell
and roar and break a million million times ; but its water
changes not. Its atoms of hydrogen and oxygen are in
perfect equilibrium, in perfect mutual adaptation. So was
it when the first water flowed ; so will it be for ever. And
could that adaptation, so perfect, so absolute, so time-defy
ing, be the result of an accident, or natural result of merely
natural forces, as Mr. St. Clair implies ? And will he con
tend that the most perfect adaptations require no adapter,
while asserting that the imperfect, evanescent, and miserable
adaptations seen in man required for their production
an almighty and intelligent god ? To do so may be
prime theology, but it is not philosophy, nor science, nor
reason.
Mr. St. Clair now admits that he cannot define deity. I
suspected as much—he has no deity to define. Then why
does he contend for what he does not understand ? Like
the woman of Samaria, he “ worships he knows not what.”
“A mother’s affection is intended for the good of her off
spring,” my opponent informs me. It is impossible that he
can know that it is “ intended” for anything; that it does
effect the good of her offspring, though not invariably, is at
once conceded. What more does Mr. St. Clair know about
it ? And what is a mother’s hate “ intended ” for ? And
this hate “ owes its origin to the author of life.” Rabbits
frequently eat their young; is that also at the instigation
of deity ? Such arguments as my opponent deals in are
not “ Theistic facts,” as he supposes; they are merely
superstitious fictions unworthy the respect of a man
like Mr. St. Clair. To talk about deity caring for a
mother’s offspring is to me simply shocking. Who is
it' kills children in millions by measles, whooping cough,
convulsions, fever, small-pox, by earthquake, flood and
famine ? If there really does exist a deity, he kills millions of
children every century by famine. Has Mr. St. Clair ever
reflected on that fact ? Why, if a mother’s love has any
“ intention ” at all, it is to defend her child as long as
possible against the murderous attacks of this very deity,
�88
ATHEISM OR THEISM ?
who meets us at every turn and “ seeks to kill us ” at every
stage of life.
Will Mr. St. Clair give me one proved Theistic fact in
his next ?
LETTER VIII.
From Mr. Gr. St. Clair to Mr. J. Symes.
Robinson Crusoe was puzzled as to his whereabouts in the
great ocean, but he was able to explore his little island;
and he might have made canoe voyages and gradually
extended the area of his knowledge, though hopeless of
including all the world. Mankind, in like manner, have
mapped the solar system, and delved down to the Silurian
rocks with their fossils, and they find their knowledge real
and useful, though it brings them no nearer to the beginning
of time or the boundaries of space. Our inability to com
prehend the Infinite is not a reason for undervaluing the
things within our reach. It is foolish to say we explain
nothing, because we cannot fully understand the first origin.
Things are explained, in a degree which gives the mind
some satisfaction, when we trace them back to their causes.
The trade winds, for instance, are accounted for by the
sun’s heat and the earth’s rotation : and this explanation is
not rendered inaccurate by pointing out that the cause of
the earth’s rotation is not known, and that the sun’s heat
itself requires accounting for. I, in my Crusoe fashion,
explore, and am obliged to be content with something less
than infinite knowledge. I trace some things to man’s intel
ligent action as their cause, and am convinced that certain
steam-engines, pumps, microscopes, &c., would not have
existed but for his operation. I find other things which I
can only explain by ascribing them to an intelligence which
is not man’s. The worker is not seen, but the work is seen;
and I know there must have been an architect of the human
frame, as I know there must have been a designer of
Cologne cathedral.
The human eye would be enough evidence if I had no
other. “ Was the eye constructed without skill in optics ? ”
asks that great mathematician, Sir Isaac Newton—“ or the
�ATHEISM OR THEISM?
S9
ear without knowledge of sounds ? ” The argument is a
thousand-fold stronger for regarding the human frame as a
designed structure taking it as a whole ; for the eye stands
to the body only as the east window to the cathedral. The
teeth are a beautiful apparatus, surpassing human inven
tions, when we consider their growth, their enamelled pro
tective covering, their office, and their position at the
entrance of the alimentary canal, in proximity to the
tongue and the sources of saliva. The valves in the blood- vessels are so manifestly placed there with a view of securing
the circulation of the blood that Harvey inferred the Crea
tor’s intention, and so was guided to his discovery. It is a
question which all great investigators ask—“ What is the
creative intention in this arrangement ?■ ” for they find it a
clue to discovery. I must not linger over the human body:
let Atheists read Paley, Brougham, and Bell, and some of
them will give up their Atheism and take to refuting Mr.
Symes’s worn-out objections. Every creature is admirably
adapted to its mode of life and to the element in which
it lives. If we desired to give the body of a fish the best
form for moving through the water we should have to
fashion it as a solid of least resistance. “ A very difficult
chain of mathematical reasoning, by means of the highest
branches of algebra, leads to a knowledge of the curve which,
by revolving on its axis, makes a solid of this shape ....
and the curve resembles closely the face or head part of a
fish.” Let the young reader, perplexed by Mr. Symes’s
objections, read more of this in Lord Brougham’s “ Objects,
Advantages and Pleasures of Science.” The feathers of the
wings of birds are found to be placed at the best possible
angle for assisting progress by their action on the air. In
the Duke of Argyll’s “ Reign of Law ” there is a chapter
concerning the admirable mechanism of the bird’s wing. A
bird is heavier than the air in which it is sustained, and it
has to make headway against a resisting atmosphere. Man’s
poor attempts to make wings usually result in the disaster
of Imlac in Dr. Johnson’s “ Rasselas ” ; man’s attempts to
navigate the air by balloons are so poor that the Customs
Officers have no fear of being eluded. If we wish to see
how material laws can be so bent as to effect a designed
purpose we must study the problem of a bird’s flight.
Leaving birds for insects, how marvellous it is that the
�40
ATHEISM OR THEISM?
cabbage butterfly should always lay its eggs on the cabbage,
the leaves of which are so suited for the nourishment of the
young grubs, and will be so much relished! That butter
fly has no taste for cabbage leaves itself, and it will not live
to see its offspring, yet its instinct—which is not of its own
creation—guides it aright. These are samples of Theistic
facts, in one department. When Mr. Symes has dealt with
them I can furnish more.
In my Crusoe fashion, I discern an intelligence at work
which is not my own, nor that of my brother man, which
immensely transcends mine and his, though, with my Crusoe
limitations, I have not the means of deciding the measure
of its greatness. I discern a worker, whether infinite or
not—a worker operating under conditions, whether the con
ditions be self-imposed or not. He accomplishes many
things which I can appreciate ; He seems to be working
out greater purposes which I do but dimly grasp.
As an evolutionist I discern something of a purpose
running through the ages, independent of the will of kings
and legislators. I perceive a gradual advance to higher
platforms of life, at present culminating in man. Man did
not come until the earth had been prepared for him, and
stores of coal and iron laid up for his use. Apparently he
could not come without lower creatures preceding him ;
because he had to be born from them. As a race, we have
had to go through our schooling, for in no other way could
we become educated; our struggle with difficulty makes
men of us, unless we neutralise it by taking the discipline
sulkily. Had the Creator been perpetually at our elbow to
do our lessons for us, to work for us while we slept, and to
help us over all stiles, we should never have attained intel
lectual manhood and moral strength. Man is progressing
still, and therefore will be a nobler creature by and bye.
His surroundings are subject to an evolution and improve
ment, which advances pari passu with himself. He himself
is the Creator’s latest-fashioned and best-adapted instru
ment for effecting these desirable adaptations, commissioned
to carry on and carry out some of the highest purposes of
God. It is a great thing to be conscious of this ; and I am
bold to say that thousands of good people are conscious of
communion with a Higher Soul, of inspirations received
from him, and of tasks assigned by him, the act omplish*
4
�ATHEISM OR THEISM?
41
meut of which is another phrase for co-operation with him
and doing his will on earth.
This Divine Worker seems to be limited by “the con
ditions of all work.” rAs regards ourselves and our own
work, we candlbt conceive how we could live at all in a
dreamy, shifting, chance world, not subject to fixed con
ditions. We are finite and conditioned, and cannot realise
an utterly different kind of existence. It would follow from
this alone that anything which the Creater may do with us
or for us must be conformable to the conditions of the
world we live in if it is to be comprehensible to us. Although,
therefore, He be great beyond all assignable limits, he must
necessarily look limited to us. Where we see him operating
we see him making use of natural forces, moulding and
directing them. The natural forces in themselves are neither
moral nor immoral—steam, electricity, and strychnine have
no conscience, and are not to be blamed or praised for their
effects. They may be turned to good uses or to bad uses—
strychnine to poison or to relieve, steam to work a locomo
tive or propel a murderous bullet. We infer a worker and
his moral character from the use made of natural forces.
Mr. Symes does not distinguish between forces working
blindly and forces working under intelligent direction, but
insists on ascribing all results to God, or else none. This
is not what I discern, for I perceive that some things have
been contrived by some Intelligence, and of other things I
do not perceive it.
An enlightened evolutionist ought to know that “ Evil ”
is “ Good in the making.” It has been so in the past,
again and again. Perfect goodness is producing more and
more good constantly (evil, as Spencer shows, is evanes
cent) and may probably produce infinite good in the course
of time. But Mr. Symes is not content to have it produced,
he wants his bread before the cake is baked.
Mr. Symes finishes his last by asking “Will I give him one
proved Theistic fact?” Well, something depends upon
what is allowed to be “ proof,” and that again depends upon
whether you have to convince a man of common sense or a
man of uncommon obstinacy. If folk possess eyes it is no
guarantee that light will reach their minds, if they choose
to live in a camera obscura. My opponent closes the shutters
and then complains that things are dark. What can I do
�42
ATHEISM OR THEISM?
with a man who does not believe that eyes are given him
to see with ? On the same principle his faculties are not
given him to enable him either to reason correctly or to
understand arguments. Perhaps I ought not to be surprised
that my proofs are thrown away upon him.
1 have noticed in going through a cut-glass manufactory
that although the workmen are skilful and the processes are
ingenious by which the crude “ metal” is blown, annealed,
ground on wheels of iron for the pattern, and on wheels of
stone and wood for smoothing and polishing—I have noticed
that accidents are liable to occur at every stage, and some
few cruets, wine-glasses, decanters, etc., get broken and
thrown into the waste tub. But if I want to see what is
being produced, and was designed before it was manufac
tured, I go not to the waste-tub, but to the show-room.
Certainly even a fractured salt-cellar in the waste-tub
would show design—a formative design accidently baulked,
not a design to produce fracture and waste—but a wise man
will rather go to the show-room. Mr. Symes, I imagine,
would go to the waste-tub and refuse to see anything out
side of it. He invites us to contemplate blind eyes, rotten
teeth and people suffering from cancer. He assures us that
had a beneficent Creator made our eyes He would have
ensured their good performance. I should reply that He
does so. “ Not in all cases,” says my querulous friend,
“ why I find squinting eyes and blind eyes, and here are
ophthalmic institutions ! ” True, man’s heart of pity leads
him to heal. Man’s intelligence enables him to understand
something of optics. In both respects he is growing up in
the ways of his Heavenly Father. The modest Newton
admired the Divine skill in optics: but Mr. Symes claims
to “ know more of optics himself,” and to be able to teach
the Creator his business. The eye “ought to have been made
not of water, jelly, and soft fibres, but of hard and tough
material.” Surely Alphonso of Castile has come back again.
That monarch said that had he been of the privy council of
the Deity he could have advised the formation of the solar
system on a better plan ! Had he said this concerning the
actual solar system instead of against the false system of
Ptolemy, it would have been irreverent, not to say blasphe
mous. I count it rather inconsistent in Mr. Symes to want
any uyes at all, as he thinks they were not made to see with
�ATHEISM OR THEISM ?
43
and are an endlass bother. Perhaps the hard and tough one£
which he would substitute would be faulty in their re
fraction (for all work is conditioned by the material).
Can my opponent assure me that it would not be so ? Has
he got any of these eyes ready-made, and do they answer
perfectly ? or is this an empty boast of his about improving
upon the Creator’s work ? I doubt not that there is a good
reason for employing soft humors and delicate fibres in the
eye, and then I admire the care and wisdom which have
provided so well for the protection of such a delicate organ,
by the position given to it, in a bony socket defended by lids
and lashes and ramparts. “ But the eye lacks achromatism,
and has the defect of astigmatism, and follows the pattern
of inferior spectacle-glasses in having two curves in the
cornea.” Rather random assertions these : take for instance
the first. Chromatism is color-ism; a double convex lens
or magnifying glass causes objects to appear with rainbow
colored fringes. This was a defect for a long time in
telescopes, and telescopes free from the defect are called
achromatic. Well, are we troubled and inconvenienced by
seeing these colored fringes when we use the naked eye ?
Is any reader conscious of it ? Now what is the fact ? All
telescopes were defective in this particular, and Sir I.
Newton had said that there could be no remedy, until it
occurred to an ingenious optician that the difficulty must
have been overcome by the Maker of the eye. So he
examined the eye till he discovered how it was overcome,
and then by imitation of the Creator’s method invented the
first achromatic telescope. I would call my opponent’s
attention to this, but I suppose it is of no use ; he will
persist in regarding the eyes as clumsy workmanship and in
complaining that they are palmed off upon us whether we
like it or not. The traveller Vambery mentions that in
Bokhara they punish slaves by gouging out their eyes. Mr.
Symes, to be consistent, ought not to protest against the
■cruelty, since in his estimation it involves no loss, and the
Chief cruelty is in having the eyes thrust upon us. But in
answer to his astounding assertion that the eye is not
respectable workmanship and that the best telescopes far
transcend it as optical instruments, it is sufficient to say
that we can see with our eyes, unaided by telescopes, whereas
we cannot see with telescopes unaided by eyes.
�44
ATHEISM OR THEISM ?
My opponent not only damns his eyes, but curses his
Jreth. First because he is born without them! On his
theory this ought to be an advantage, so far as it goes. But,
considering that other beautiful provision of the beneficent
Creator, which supplies a fountain of milk for the infant
lips to draw from, teeth are not only not required for a milk
diet, but would be inconvenient to the mother. Then Mr.
Symes cries out, “ We cut them in misery! ” He is always
afraid of a little pain. “The first set are not permanent.”
No, becau-e the child will grow, the jaws will lengthen, and
there will be room enough for larger teeth, and for thirtytwo instead of twenty. Mr. Symes, as a child, had less
jaw; which reminds me, however, of a pun made by John
Hunter, the famous surgeon. While he was once lecturing,
and pointing out that in the higher animals the jaw is
shorter, while the intelligence, of course, is greater, his
pupils were chattering nonsense to one another. “ Gentle
men,” said Hunter, “let us have more intellect and less
jaw!” I don’t know whether those young men had attained
their wisdom-teeth. Mr. Symes is annoyed that even the
second set of teeth are subject to neuralgia and decay.
This he considers a great Atheistic fact. The evil appa
ratus of the teeth is thrust upon us in the same cruel
manner as our clumsily-made eyes, and we may any day
have an attack of neuralgia. At length, however, the
teeth decay and leave us, and then what do we do ? Why,
it appears, we have to go to the expense of a new set, so
essential are they, and this is made an additional subject of
complaint! By the bye, I suppose I must not pass over the
question put—what should I say if a dentist supplied me
with teeth that ached ? I should say that he was cleverer
than any other dentist I had met with, for the aching was
proof that he had connected the teeth with nerves, and made
them live. I should say I was glad to have living teeth in.
my mouth, instead of dead ivory, and that I was satisfied
the teeth were contrived for me to eat with, while their very
occasional aching was only an unpleasant incident, and per
haps brought on by my own folly. Careful people will not
often catch cold in the face, and good, moral people will not
so devote themselves to Venus and mercury that their teeth
fall out.
Let us come to adaptations. Of course I am not going.
�ATHEISM OR THEISM ?
45
to be pinned to any definition which makes adaptation the
same thing as design. Some adaptations may not be
designed. There’s a distinction to be drawn between mere
fitness to produce a result, and purposive fitness which intends
to secure the result. But Mr. Symes as usual does not
perceive distinctions which make all the difference. He
says that water is adapted for drowning and fire for burning.
Granted: but are they purposely adapted, deliberately
designed and fitted ? This is the very essence of the question.
When the jeweller’s boy drops a watch, gravity and “ the
law of falling bodies” are adapted to smash it; but that is
an accidental adaptation, not to be compared with the
adaptation of part to part in the construction of the watch
—not to be compared with it, but rather contrasted.
Humpty-Dumpty had a great fall, and the egg thus smashed
could not say that gravity was unadapted to produce the
result ; but compare this with the purposive adaptation of
an egg, as I will now epitomise it from Professor Owen’s
lecture on “ Design.” An egg is made convex and dome
like, to bear the weight of the sitting bird. It contains a
whitish spot, which is the germ, in which the development
of the chick begins. The germ is on one side of the yolk,
quite near to the shell, for it is necessary that it should be
brought as close as possible to the hot brooding skin of the
sitting hen. Now it is a fact that though you take as many
eggs as you please, and turn them about as often as you
like, you will always find this opaque white spot at the
middle of the uppermost surface of the yolk. Hunter com
pared this phasnomenon to the movements of the needle to
the pole. Of course there is an apparatus -which secures
this result; but it is an apparatus, a piece of machinery.
“ As the vital fire burns up, organic material is reduced to
carbon ; a membrane, over which the blood spreads in a
net-work of minute vessels, like a gill or lung, then extends
from the embryo to the inner side of the shell, between it
and the white; the shell is made porous to allow the air
access to this temporary respiratory organ ; and the oxygen
combining with the carbon, it exhales as carbonic acid. As
the chick approaches the period of its extrication, it is able
to breathe by its proper lungs, and in the vesica aeris, or
collection of air at the great end of the egg, it finds the
wherewithal to begin its feeble inspirations, and to utter the
�46
ATHEISM OR THEISM ?
Jow chirp which may be heard just before it chips the shell.
And how does it effect this ? By means of a hard knob
specially formed upon the end of the upper beak, and which,
after it has done its work, disappears.” All this appears to
me something very different from the adaptedness of the
hard ground to break the egg if it falls; but Mr. Symes
would have us believe that the adaptation is of the same
sort! His words are, “ It cannot be denied that the pro
cesses of decay and destruction show as perfect adaptation i
of means to ends as processes which result in life.”
He argues that if anything is designed, earthquakes,
plagues, cancer, etc., are designed to cause pain, and must
be regarded as proving a malignant God. But can he show
that the fitness or adaptation in these agencies is purposive ?
I can see design in an infernal machine ; oh yes ! but I am
not convinced that earthquakes are an infernal arrangement,
much less that teeth are a diabolical invention because
they sometimes ache. The adaptedness of the teeth for
mastication bears the appearance of a good purpose; the
adaptedness of an earthquake to rock down houses is
not clearly purposive at all. There are influences of
destruction and of decay, I admit; but the constructive
operations are what I see design in. If I don’t attribute
the former to God, my opponent must not object, since he
does not either.
I have a word to say which must be fatal to this idea
that the forces of decay and destruction are purposive, if
any are, and prove a malignant deity. A malignant deity
finding pleasure in destruction, would soon destroy every
thing. But, in fact, the agencies which build up are
stronger than the agencies which destroy; construction
gains upon decay, good gains upon evil. For evil is evanes
cent as Herbert Spencer shows, in a chapter which Mr.
Symes will not deal with. Even if destruction had to be
ascribed to a destroying deity, construction would have to be
ascribed to a deity engaged in building up. Then, as the
same being would hardly build up with one hand and destroy
with the other, Mr. Symes would be landed in Dualism, or
the old Persian belief in two Gods. The further fact that
construction is gaining upon decay, good gaining upon evil,
would force him to admit that the good deity was the
stronger. The way out of this difficulty is only to be found
�ATHEISM OR THEISM ?
47
fai Theism as I advocate it—one God, operating under con|
ditions. One proof and test of this Theism consists in the
fact that evil and decay do not carry purpose on the face of
them, while organised adaptations do.
If the reader grasps this fact he will see through my
opponent’s curious attempt to turn my argument round and
make it appear equally good for proving the existence of a
malignant deity. He suggests such a being, “ laboring
under conditions ” which prevent infinite evil from being
effected at once, but “ working by various agencies to remove
all good from his universe.” He does not seem to see
that this implies a universe of “ good ” to begin with, and
that this is another form of his irrational demand that the
finished thing should exist before the crude and unwrought,
the perfect v^ork before there has been time for its elabora
tion. He wants his cake before it is baked, before the flour
is kneaded, before the wheat is grown.
LETTER IX.
From Mr. J. Symes to Mr. G. St. Clair.
Mr. St. Clair says he “ knows ” there must have been
an “ architect of the human frame,” as he knows there
must have been “ a designer of Cologne Cathedral.” Well,
then, the human frame must be an architectural production,
or building. Of what Order, of what Style is it ? I never
saw it described in any book on Architecture : how is that ?
So baseless is my opponent’s Theism that he confounds
language in order to support it. If he will prove that
man’s frame is an architectural structure, I will prove
Cologne Cathedral to be a mushroom, of an edible sort, too.
Mr. St. Clair having no case, no real god, no facts to
support his superstition, cherishing a blind belief in an
impossibility, resorts to the unconscious legerdemain of
deceiving himself and his readers by the use of poetical and
mythical language, in which the distinction between natural
objects and human manufactures is ignored, and a potato
is dubbed a building and a building designated a turnip.
This is what the “Design argument” resolves itself into;
and under its witchery, men, not otherwise unfair or
�4 <8
ATHEISM OR THEISM?
^logical, run through fantastic mazes of bewilderment,
vainly persuading themselves that they are reasoning, when
they arc only floundering in “ Serbonian bogs,” following
the Theistic will-o’-the-wisp, manifestly benighted and lost,
and yet assuring you with the utmost gravity that they and
they alone are perfectly self-possessed and well know their
whereabouts, and whither they are tending.
With Mr. St. Clair, teeth are yet a beautiful apparatus
designed and intended for mastication. Has he never
reflected that nutrition is totally independent of mastication
and teeth in countless millions of beings ? The child lives
without teeth, so does many an old man ; sheep and cows
have no front teeth in the upper jaw; the whale, the
dugong, the ornithorhynchus, ant-eaters, and all birds are
destitute of teeth. If presence of teeth argues design, what
does their absence argue ? If ^od gives a man teeth to eat
with, I presume he means him to cease eating when he
destroys them. Instead of that, my opponent and other
irreverent and disobedient Theists, either misunderstanding
or disregarding the divine intimation, rush away to the
dentist and get other teeth wherewith to obstruct the divinf
intentions ! Will he explain his conduct?
Of course, I admit that nature can in some departments
immensely exceed man, but that does not prove any exis
tence ctbopc nature. The valves of the blood-vessels are
manifestly placed there to secure the circulation of the
blood, says my opponent. He might as well affirm that a
river-bed is manifestly placed where it is to secure the flow
of the river that way. Which existed first, rivers or river
beds? Which existed first, valves or blood-circulation?
There is in the animal world abundant circulation without
valves or veins. The cetaceans (whales, dolphins, porpoises,
&c.) have no valves in their veins; and yet, I presume,
their blood circulates as well as ours. Circulation goes on
in a speck of protoplasm where there is no structure at all.
Even in organisms, the heart may be very diverse, and yet
serve the owner as well as we are served. In frogs, toads,
&c., there is but one ventricle; in most fish there is but one
auricle and one ventricle; in the lancelet there is but a
single tube. But their blood circulates as well as ours.
Had Mr. St. Clair’s deity felt any deep concern for
human welfare, he would have placed, had it occurred to
�ATHEISM OR THEISM ?
49
him, valves in the deep arteries, so that the poor wretcH
who ruptures one of them should not bleed to death.
I grew out of Paley, Brougham, and Bell’s theology years
ago. What naturalist or physiologist to-day shows any
respect to their crude Design argument ? Besides, Mr. St.
Clair has no right to refer to them; his god is not theirs—
theirs was almighty and infinitely wise; his a poor puny
thing for whom his single high priest is ever making
apologies.
If every creature were adapted, !< admirably ” or not, “to
the element in which it lives,” it wmuld never die. Geological
strata furnish absolute proofs that no creatures, no race of
creatures, were ever yet “ admirably adapted to their con
ditions.” Whole races have died out. Will my opponent
kindly explain ? Has he ever read of famines, coal-pit
disasters, earthquakes? What sort of a world does he live in?
Has he never passed a shambles or a cemetery ? Do the
creatures of his marvellously concocted god die of excessive
adaptation to their environments, or what ?
The fish is of just the right shape—the solid of hast
resistance fits it for its element. This looks learned and
imposing. But are all inhabitants of the water of one shape?
How is the solid of least resistance realized in the spermaceti
whale, with its big, blunt, square-fronted head ? In the
hammer-head? In the “ Portuguese man-of-war ? ” In
those slow ones that fall a prey to the swift ? Mr. St. Clair
reminds me of that venerable lady who could not sufficiently
admi re the ■wisdom of god in making rivers run down hill
and along the valleys. That, certainly, is a very strong
proof of divine existence; for rivers would run the other
way if there were no god, just as surely as fishes would be
of divers shapes, instead of being all of one pattern as they
now are, if there were not a god to make them all in his own
image.
The feathers of a bird’s wings are placed, I am informed,
at the “ best possible angle for assisting progress,” etc.
And cold is found in the best possible conditions for freezing
the early buds and blossoms and for killing men and children
exposed to it. Heat is well adapted to warming purposes.
Had there been no god, heat would probably freeze things,
and frost would roast, boil, or burn them. There is as much
design in the one case as in the other. Mr. St. Clair may
�50
ATHEISM OR THEISM?
next tell us the design in the wings of a penguin, a moa, or
an apteryx.
The cabbage butterfly deposits its eggs by instinct, says my
opponent. How does he know that sight or smell does not
guide it ? Has he consulted the insect ? What is instinct ?
And what right has Mr. St. Clair’s god to destroy my cabbages
by the disgusting caterpillars which spring from those eggs ?
Gardeners kill those caterpillars by myriads every year; but
the real destroyer of our gardens is Mr. St. Clair’s god.
Whose instinct or instigation leads the ichneumon to deposit
its eggs right in the body of a caterpillar, so that its
murderous brood should eat up their living host ? Whose
instinct guides the tapeworm to a human body ? Whose
instinct guides the locusts to lay waste a country and produce
a famine ?
My opponent says that butterflies and other objects men
tioned in his second paragraph are “ samples of theisti®'
facts.” So much the worse for deity and Theism, if true. I
had supposed, however, that Mr. St. Clair knew the differ
ence between Theology and Natural Science 1 Must I
enlighten him ? The eye and the circulation of the blood
are anatomical and physiological facts, not Theistic; birds
and fishes are subjects in zoology, and insects belong to the
sub-science of entomology. Cannibalism is as much, possibly
more, a Theistic fact as any yet named. Though if my
opponent will claim for his god the credit of creating all
noxious and destructive pests, including fleas, bugs, tape
worms, etc., I suppose an Atheist need not complain.
What my opponent says of “ discerning an intelligence
at work,” a “ worker .... whether infinite or not,” a
“ purpose running through the ages,” etc., is no doubt
borrowed from one of his discourses; and sure I am it
edified all the devout who listened to it. But discussion is
not a devotional exercise exactly, and I must beg him to
translate those liturgical scraps into plain language,
specially that about the “purpose running through the
ages.” The language is good ; I wonder if the purpose is.
I am in a fever-heat of anxiety to hear what it is my
opponent discerns, whether anyone else may get a glimpse
of it—at not too great a cost. The man that can “ discern
a purpose running through the ages ” of human history
must be either very much clearer sighted or immensely
�ATHEISM OB THEISM ?
51
more superstitious than anyone that I know. Indeed, I
must, till evidence be forthcoming, regard the boast as
nothing more than a rhetorical flourish. Is Mr. St. Clair a
clairvoyant, I wonder, or subject to second sight ?
“Man,” we are gravely told, “did not come until the earth
had been prepared for him.” Neither did the tapeworm, till
man had been prepared for him. It is worthy of note, too, that
pickpockets, forgers, swindlers, fortunetellers, inquisitors,
aristocrats, and vermin generally “ did not come till the
«
earth had been prepared for them.” And, who would credit
it ? there never was a chimney sweep till chimneys existed !
In that fact “ I discern ” a profound “ purpose ” of a two
fold nature:—1st. Chimneys were intended and designed to
be swept, and to this end divine Providence made coals
black and sooty, else sweeps would never have had any
work; 2nd. He made the sweeps in order to clear the flues
of their foulness. Mr. St. Clair may close his eyes to these
facts as long as he pleases ; they are Theistic facts—if any
and are a most remarkable proof of design and
intelligence. It was just as impossible for man to antedate
his necessary epoch, or to postpone it, as for sweeps to precede chimneys. Man’s coming was the natural and inevitable Outcome or result of all the phænomena that preceded
him io-flis own line of development. You have no better
proof that water is a natural product than that man is such.
He had nbJntelligent creator, nor was one required. Man
is a natural, not supernatural, phænomenon. His so-called
creator is Really his creation, a fancy, a bugbear, and
nothing more. It is high time for Atheists, I think, to
cease beating about the bush, and tell the Theist bluntly
that his gods are figments neither useful nor ornamental,
th® offspring of ignorance, fear, and slavery—to-day mere
grim and curious survivals of the epochs when superstition
was unchecked in its growth and sway.
Mr. St. Clair at length takes refuge in inspiration and
. infallibility. “ I am bold to say,” says he, “ that thousands
of good people are conscious of communion with a higher
soul, of inspirations received from him, and of tasks assigned
by him.” Here my opponent chooses for his comrades the
phrenzied prophets and priestesses of ancient superstitions ;
the hysterical nuns who converse with Mary at Lourdes and
where not; Johanna Southcott, Joseph Smith Edward
�52
ATHEISM OR THEISM?
Irving, Brigham Young, Mother Girling, et hoc genus
omne, whose name is legion, whose “ inspirations ” and god
given “ tasks ” have been “ thick as autumnal leaves in
Vallombrosa,” and have included every absurdity and every
crime known to history. What has god not “inspired?”
What has he not imposed as a task? “I could a tale
unfold,” but space forbids.
Will my opponent name one syllable of truth or an original
idea that either he or any other person ever derived from
“inspiration” or in “communion” with this higher soul?
Ah, me! This world is very wonderful. Socrat^ had a
deemon, Prospero was served by Ariel, Faust had his Mephistopheles, and Mr. St. Clair has his “ higher soul,” spelt with
initial capitals ! This higher soul of his—I may speak
with some authority—is but himself, in dim, shadowy, and
magnified outline, a very Brocken Spectre, projected on the
soft clouds of his superstition. I once had the diswg^
badly, but recovered long since. Do not despair, good sir;
the rising sun of common-sense and healthy Atheistic
thought will soon fling his powerful beams on the very spot
where your magnified and ghostly shadow now sits, and the
mists which form the throne of your deity will rarify and
vanish along with the occupant!
But to claim inspiration is to claim infallibility. If you
are sure you have communion with some one, to discuss the
question of his existence, to ask if belief in it is rational, are
highly improper—you have settled the matter by fact, and
there is an end of it. There is no arguing with an inspired
man ; nor should he himself attempt reason, it is unneces
sary. An inspired man should merely dogmatise—as Mr.
St. Clair does. He never argues, he merely states. I under
stand him now; he is weak in logic, but invincible in
faith. Men who hold communion with higher souls rarely
argue well. The reason is obvious:—no man that can
reason well and has a good case ever thinks of rushing into
inspiration. Inspiration is the despair of logic; it is the
refuge of those who are bankrupt of reason. Mr. St. Clair
must no more grumble with the Pope and his infallibility ;
he claims it too, and for exactly the same reasons. Had
the Pope been able to prove his other claims, he would have
had no excuse for claiming infallibility and “ communion
with the higher souls.” Just so, if Mr. St. Clair had been
�ATHEISM OR THEISM?
53
able to make out even a passable, lame, blind, and limping
case in this discussion, we should have heard nothing about
inspiration and “ consciousness ” of deity. Any devout
worshipper can extort just as much real inspiration from
old clouts and mouldy bones as my opponent derives from
his god. Of course there is no arguing with this new
Moses—he is up among the crags of Sinai contemplating his
god, speaking to him face to face, reflecting on his feet, or
viewing other “ parts ” of his splendid person. I hope he
will publish his inspirations when he descends.
I should not show any respect to Mr. St. Clair were I to
notice some few sentences in his letter, one close to the end
for example. No man not near his wit’s end could permit
himself deliberately to publish that about gouging out
eyes, &c.
Lastly, Mr. St. Clair has written four out of his six
betters, and yet no shadow of a Theistic fact. Assertions
—-bold enough many of them—we have had in abundance,
but no sound reasoning, no evidence of a divine existence
yet. Is he reserving his arguments and facts for his last
letter, and does he intend to overwhelm me then without
leaving me the possibility of reply? I should like to know
what his god is. Has he not yet made up his mind about
him ?
____
Postscriptum.—I have now, Friday evening, seen the
conclusion of Mr. St. Clair’s long letter. I understood
we were to confine ourselves to two columns and a-half each
letter; but here is one from my opponent of nearly five
columns. If his logic were equal to the length of his
epistles, I should soon be hors de combat, but the logic is in
the inverse ratio of the cubes of the lengths, and so I have
but little to do.
The first sentence of his supplement seems very much like
swearing. I do not “ damn eyes ” or “ curse teeth ; ” I
point out their faults and thus damn their maker, if there be
one. All I have done is to employ fair and honest criticism
respecting the manufactures of this new deity manufactured
by Mr. St. Clair. The really good things of Nature I no
more ignore nor despise than my opponent; I merely show
what sort of a god he has, if he has one. The excuses and
apologies he makes for his most unfortunate deity sufficiently
�54
ATHEISM OR THEISM?
show that Mr. St. Clair feels what I say and cannot refute
my criticisms. This is all I desire of him. He cannot deny
my facts, nor can he successfully defend his poor god upon
one single point, except by representing him as being weak
to contempt. Why contend for such a god ?
Considering how much Mr. St. Clair can write without
saying anything to the point, how long are his letters, how
weak his arguments, how many his words, how few his facts,
and how pointless even those are which he produces, it seems
to me that Hunter’s joke about the “ Jaw ” should have
been reserved for his own behoof. I have nothing at all to
do with the size of the jaw. If the deity made the jaw toe
small for its purpose, my opponent will need to make another
apology for him. I beg to ask : could Mr. St. Clair’s deity
have made the jaw and teeth so that they could grow at an
equal rate, or could he not? Could he have given every
person a good set of teeth that would do their work without
aching, or could he not ? Does he know when producing a
set of teeth that they will begin to decay almost as soon as
completed ? Does he intend them to do so ? Does he intend
them to give pain, or not ? I ask the same about the eyes.
Does this poor deity know when making a pair of blind eyes
that they will never see? Does he intend them to see, or
not? Mr. St. Clair will not answer these questions; his
false position will not allow him.
He would like a dentist who could give him an aching set
of teeth! I have long suspected him of joking, now I am
sure of it. If two of his new teeth pinched his gum, he
would return to the dentist to have them rectified. It is
only when Quixotically defending his poor god that he
pretends to despise pain. It seems to me very heartless to
speak of “ Venus and Mercury ” as he does when he must
know that many people, children for example, who devote
themselves to neither, suffer horrible pain both in connexion
with teeth and eyes—ay, every organ of the body. Is
human suffering a thing to be joked with? Evidently
“ communion with that higher soul ” whom he supposes to
have made this dreadful world, has produced its natural
effects and rendered my opponent callous to the sufferings
around him. Of course, it is only when the spirit of the
lord is upon him and he rises in wrath to do battle for his
deity that he feels no sympathy for human pain. It was
�ATHEISM OR THEISM?
i
1
5S
converse with fancied deities that led to all the atrocit’js
of the middle ages. Once believe in a god that inflicts pain,
that makes people deformed, sickly, that afflicts them with
all the horrible diseases that flesh is heir to, and you make
, light of all pain but your own, out of sympathy for your
god and in acquiescence with his supposed intentions. This,
1 I fear, is my opponent’s condition. During this discussion
' he has persevered in ignoring suffering, and has spoken of
all evils as if they were flea-bites. It is, I am sure, his
irrational Theism that makes him do so.
The egg is descanted upon by my opponent. Well, did it
never occur to him that, here, as in every other case he can
mention, the creator, if such there be, must have made the
necessity for his design and adaptation before meeting that
necessity by contrivances? Young are produced in a great
variety of ways. Was it necessary that eggs should be
laid and then brooded over for weeks by the bird ? If so,
whence came that necessity? And does the deity know
whe# he is so carefully constructing an egg that it will
never be laid ? that fowl and egg will both die and rot
together? Or does he know that Mr. St. Clair will eat
g it for breakfast ? What a silly deity to manufacture such
countless millions of eggs, eggs of fishes, and eggs of fowls,
for the purpose of developing them into animals, when he
knows all the while that only a very few of them can
possibly reach their destination ! If he does not know their
destiny, he must be equally contemptible.
Mr. St. Clair tries to establish a distinction between
a mere fitness to produce a result, and purposive fitness
which intends to secure the result. This is a bold flight.
He won’t be “ pinned to definitions,” but he will assume
ability to distinguish between accidents and purposed events
in Nature. I presume his “ communion with the higher
soul ” must have been exceedingly close to authorise him to
speak thus. Is he the grand vizier of his deity, or who ?
Does he suppose his god would overdo his adaptation?
The destructive forces and processes of nature are just as
much organised and arranged for the set purpose of destroy
ing as anything that can be named. To the point: Does
Mr. St. Clair argue or hold that all pain is accidental?
That death is not intended, not designed ? Will he venture
to give a direct answer to these questions ? Are the teeth
�56
ATHEISM OR THEISM?
of cats, tigers, lions, etc., less evidently adapted to their
work of killing than the egg for its supposed intention ? Is
an earthquake less adapted to the destruction of life than
warmth and eggs are to produce or extend it ? Is a famine
less adapted to destroy than a harvest to sustain ? Is the
Spring more fit to produce blossoms than the frost is to nip
them ?
No; a malignant deity would not at once destroy every
thing, for two reasons : 1st. He might be too weak, as Mr. St.
Clair’s is ; 2nd. He would lose most of his horrible pleasure.
Malignancy would do just what my opponent’s god is doing,
raise up generation after generation, as long as he is able,
for the gratification of torturing and destroying them. No .
doubt, if Theism be at all rational, Dualism is the only '
logical form it can take. I am neither Monotheist nor
Duotheist: the whole belief appears to me so irrational and
absurd that I cannot think that civilised men of to-day
would be swayed by it, were their minds not perverted in
that direction in early life.
Indeed, it vastly surprises me to find a partial sceptic,
like my opponent, resuscitating the Design Argument,
which the “ Bridgewater Treatises ” so long ago elaborated
to death. I wish he would say a word or two on the tape
worm, the trichina, and other pests. It is so delightfully
amusing to me to hear a Theist expatiating on the goodness
of deity as displayed in the evils of life 1 “Evil and decay
do not carry purpose on the face of them, while organised
adaptations do.” Indeed 1 What would become of all new
organisms if the old were not cleared off by decay and
death? Beasts, birds, and fishes of prey, are not then
organised to destroy ? The wings of the hawk, the legs of
the tiger, the shape and tail of the dolphin were not
organised to enable them to destroy their prey ? The smut,
a fungus that destroys wheat, the dry rot, barnacles that
eat ships to destruction, locusts, caterpillars, phylloxera,
the empusa muscoo, a fungus that kills flies, the botrytis
bassiana, a fungus which attacks the silkworms, and reduced
the annual production of cocoons in France between the
years 1853 and 1865 from 65,000,000 to 10,000,000; thepotato disease, which caused such suffering and misery in
Ireland—these fungi are not organised, Mr. St. Clair, by im
plication, affirms! What will not Theism lead a man to say?
�ATHEISM OR THEISM?
57
He quotes Professor Owen—Does he not know that Owen
and other great Naturalists can tell by the examination of
a tooth whether an unknown animal was a carnivore or a
vegetarian, etc. ? Were the teeth, muscles, viscera, etc.,
of a carnivore “purposively” adapted for killing, tearing,
, and digesting other animals, or not ? Yes, or no ? pray.
!■
My opponent must try again—I wish to encourage him.
He has not yet laid the first stone of rational Theism. No
Theistic fact has he given us yet, no argument or criticism
of mine has he upset so far. I don’t blame him. He has
undertaken an impossible work. All material, all force,
all arrangements (except those of art), all causes, all effects,
all processes, are natural; the supernatural is but a dream.
LETTER X.
From Mr. G-. St. Clair to Mr. J. Symes.
Mr. Symes, in his postscript, again tilts at somebody who
believes in the supernatural. When I spoke of conscious
jbommunion with a Higher Soul, and inspirations received
from Him, I knew 1 was saying something the seeming
refutation of- which was easy; sol prefaced it with—“I
am bold to say.” No doubt all sorts of fanatics have
claimed inspiration. But I do not contend for the divine
ness of phrensies, nor argue for the special inspiration of the
Hebrew prophets. I hold reasonably that all new light of
knowledge and all new impulse to duty is inspiration. Tracing
effects back to causes, I come at last to One Divine Fount.
To Him I ascribe all life, all faculty in man, all insight
into truth, and all the development, improvement and refine
ment which are synonymous with progressive civilisation.
So, when I am requested to name one syllable of truth or a
single original idea derived from inspiration, I name all, for
there is not one which has had any othei’ ultimate source.
I may be referred to secondary or proximate sources, but
that would be like referring me to the printer’s types and
the compositor’s muscular exertions as an explanation of
Tennyson’s poem on “ Despair ” in the November number
of the Nineteenth Century. I am told that the Higher Soul
of which I speak is but myself projected in magnified form
�58
ATHEISM OR THEISM?
on a cloud, and there is just that modicum of truth in as
sertions of this sort which serves to lead some persons into
Atheism. Mr. Symes need not address me as though I were
ignorant of all that has been urged in the way of proving
that “ man makes God in his own image.” I believe man
has often done so, and I employ myself sometimes in destroy
ing such images. But just as there is true astronomy,
notwithstanding early and still-lingering superstitions of
astrology, so there is a true theology. I have shown that
there are evidences of purpose in nature—proofs of a Mind
at work—and there is a mind in man which reads and
understands the realised thoughts in nature and the designs
in progress. Hence it is true to say there is a God, and
that man, intellectually, is made after his likeness.
The closing paragraph of the postscript shows again how
Mr. Symes mistakes the issue. He says: “ All material,
all force, all arrangements (except those of art), all causes,
all effects, all processes, are natural; the supernatural is but
a dream.” Is this supposed to be good against me? I might
almost claim it as my own. My opponent denies the dis
tinction between the natural and the supernatural. So do I,
unless you define “ supernatural” to be the action of mind,
whether human or divine. He maintains a distinction be
tween the natural and the artificial. So do I. I perceive
for myself, and I point out to him, that all “ arrangements ”
made by man, and therefore called artificial, are effected by
the use of “ material ” and “ forces ” and “ causes ” ; so
that to judge whether they be artificial or not we have to
look for evidences of mind, purpose, design. Then I point
out that, judged in this way, the human eye is an artificial
production ; yet not a production of man’s art, and therefore
must be the work of some other Artificer. For similar
reasons, I am forced to the same conclusion regarding many
other things, and in a general way regarding the evolution
of the human race and the progress of the world,
“ I see in part
That all, as in some piece of art,
Is toil co-operant to an end.”
I don’t call these works supernatural; but seeing that they
are superhuman I reckon them as divine art. But Mr.
Symes, because it is po-sible to distinguish between divine
art and human, denies all resemblance; as though that
�ATHEISM OR THEISM?
59
followed ! In his first paragraph, flippant and foolish, be
cause he does not find the human frame classed with orders
of architecture, he objects to my saying it has been built
up. He ought to have read a little book called “ The
House I live in”—a work on the human body. But he
would like, if he could, to laugh my legitimate analogies out
of court.
Paley, Brougham, and Bell—my God is not theirs. If
he means that my theology is not quite the same as theirs,
I assent, for I take into account Evolution, which they, in
their day, could not do. The arguments of Paley only
want restating in terms of the Evolution theory. The
machinery, and arrangements, and adaptations which Paley
ascribed to the Creator, some Atheists now ascribe to Evo
lution, as though Evolution were an intelligent creative
entity. Mr. Symes has been slow in launching this
boomerang, probably being little familiar with it, or know
ing it to be ineffective against Theism as I defend Theism ;
but now, for lack of better missiles he hurls it, though
timidly, as one who fears it will come back upon himself.
He disputes my argument that the valves in the blood
vessels are intended to secure the circulation of the blood,
OD the ground that a river makes its own channel. A few
zoological facts are adduced to support the inference, I
imagine, that the blood has constructed the blood-vessels
and given them a gradually increasing complication as we
advance from protoplasm through animals of low organisa
tion, up to man. This is an argument from Evolution.
So there is a gradual advance, is there? with increasing
Complication in the apparatus, and with the noble frame of
man as the result, and yet no design in any of it! Topsy
’spects it comes of itself! natural causes account for it!
Topsy does not comprehend that in divine art, as well as
in human, what is designed by the mind has to be accom
plished by the aid of ‘‘natural” instruments. All that the
eye can see is the instrument and the process; for the
existence of the originating mind has to be mentally
inferred, the guiding and governing spirit is only spiritually
discerned.
Alphonso suggests an improvement in the circulating
apparatus ; he would “ place valves in the deep arteries, so
that the poor wretch who ruptures one of them should not
�60
ATHEISM OK THEISM?
bleed to death.” It seems that valves in the blood-vessels'
might be placed there for a purpose if Alphonso were taken
into counsel! Now there are valves in the arteries, which
allow the blood to flow out from the heart, through the
system, and prevent its regurgitating. If this is the very
thing which Alphonso considers a wise arrangement, why
does he object to it when I call it wise? Or would he make
them to open the reverse way ? Then certainly the heart’s
blood would not pour through an accidental rupture, but
neither would it flow through the system at all, and there
fore we could not live. The arrangement suggested for the
arteries is that which does prevail in the veins; and there
fore there is much less danger from a ruptured vein than
from a ruptured artery. But how could you have circula
tion, if both sets of valves were adapted for sending blood
to the heart, and neither set would allow it to come away ?
Alphonso here shows himself very wise indeed. He is
again asking for contradictory arrangements; he again
fails to see that the Creator is working under conditions.
Mr. Symes, who has not a syllable to say in the way of
proving his Atheism to be rational, can only find material
for his letters by drawing out his opponent—“ Could God
make jaws and teeth in a certain way?” .“What isinstinct?” “Will I make plainer the purpose running
through the ages ? ” etc. Though aware of the trick, I will
say as much as my space allows, about Evolution. Briefly,.
Evolution explains the introduction of new species on to
this planet, in the following way. Taking some alreadyexisting species, the offspring inherit the parental likeness
with variations ; afterwards, in their individual life, they
may undergo modifications, which in turn they transmit to
their offspring. The particular varieties best suited to
external conditions, survive, and leave offspring equally
well suited, or even better suited. Variation upon variation,
in successive generations, causes the difference from the
original to become great, and the creatures are then classed
as a distinct species. In this way one species is born from
another, as truly as an individual is born of its parents.
This inheritance with modifications, is creation by birth.
If external conditions change, the modification takes a
direction which adapts the creature to them. If the crea
ture changes its habits, or migrates and comes under new
�ATHEISM OR THEISM?
61
conditions, the modification takes the form of increased
growth in the organs and parts now especially called into
use, and diminished growth of the parts disused. It is no
poser for Mr. Symes to ask me the design of the wings of
the penguin, the moa and the apteryx: their wingshave
become reduced to remnants too small to fly with, because
they changed their habits, because they found a paradise
and preferred not to fly away from it. The wings of their
progenitors served their purpose well; inheritance repro
duced them as long as they were wanted; and when new
conditions or changed habits demanded the greater growth
of other organs, the forces of development were turned in
that direction. Could any self-acting arrangement be more
beautiful ? This is creation from age to age. This is part
of the method by which the purpose of the ages is being
elected. I am not contending for the supernatural instan
taneous creation of elephants with tusks full grown, but for
creation by natural means ; and here we see it going on.
Does Mr. Symes know anything at all about Evolution ?
Has he even read Darwin and Herbert Spencer? His
notion of creation seems to exclude evolution, and his
notion of evolution to exclude creation : but there are two
things he cannot do.: (1) explain any possible process of
creation without evolution, (2) explain how Evolution got
itself into geai’ without a Creator—I mean into such gear
as we find, when its machinery produces organised creatures
of higher and higher sort, culminating in man ; yes, in man,
with his marvellous frame and flesh, blood and brain, reason
and conscience, heart and hopes.
God created man; that is to say, the human race
has been born in fulfilment of the divine purpose. The
i idividual, tracing his parentage backwards, must pass
beyond “Adam” to some creature who was the common
progenitor of men and apes. Of course, man could no
more antedate his necessary epoch and come before his
time than sweeps could precede chimneys, to' use Mr.
Symes’s sooty illustration. I will grant Mr. Symes that; I
will grant him that man could not be born before his parents.
With equal readiness I assent to the proposition that, just as
with the individual infant, the human race was the necessary
result of the phenomena which preceded it in its own line of
development. That is to say, man is a product of natural
�62
ATHEISM OR THEISM?
causes, “ a natural and not a supernatural phenomenon.”
But if this is supposed to exclude a creative Mind, which
designed and fashioned man, I need only ask whether the
statue of Priestley, in Mr. Symes’s town of Birmingham, is
not at once the production of the sculptor’s design and the
inevitable result of particular movements of chisels upon a /'■
block of marble. There is no human production except by
the agency of natural causes ; there are no marks of inten
tion stamped upon such productions without a mind to give 5
them origin and authorship.
Mr. Symes, because I twitted him for crying so much
about his toothache, wrongfully represents me as being
callous to human sufferings. I think, if he had studied
Evolution, he would hardly speak of “ a God that inflicts
pain .... and afflicts people with all the horrible diseases
that flesh is heir to.” He wishes to know, “ Do I hold that
all pain is accidental ? and will I venture to give a direct
answer ? ” Of course I will. As I understand this discus
sion, Mr. Symes does hold that all pain is accidental.
Topsy ’spects that all pain comes of its own self. I, for my
part, have no hesitation in saying that the capacity to suffer
pain is deliberately designed, is manifestly for the gcod of
the individual, and a necessary factor in the evolution of
the higher animals. It may seem a paradox to say that
pain, when it occurs, is a good thing, and yet that it should
be removed as quickly as possible. Nevertheless I say it,
and can show it to be true. If you rest your hand on a
heated iron plate, it will disorganise the flesh. That is un
desirable, because it deprives you of a handy servant. The
pain which tells you that you are running this risk is no
evil, but a sentinel’s warning, a red-light danger signal, a
telegraphic intimation to use caution. We should be badly
off without the capacity for pain, while we should be want
ing in sense not to try and get rid of it by removing its
cause. Returning to “ the purpose runuing through the ,
ages,” it will be found that the animals with the most highly
developed nervous system and greatest capacity for pain
have become the higher animals in other respects, and are
classed high by the naturalist. Sensibility to pain has saved
theii’ progenitors from many dangers, has given them an
advantage in the “ struggle for existence,” and has promoted
their upward evolution in proportion to its acuteness.
�ATHEISM OR THEISM?
63
Mr. Symes, who, two or three letters back, thought life
not worth living, has a great objection to death. I thought
so, because when I showed that he ought logically to commit
suicide it was not agreeable to him. When he passes a
cemetery, or reflects that whole races of creatures have died
out, he is much concerned, and marvels that I can retain
my Theism. As with pain, so with death, he demands to
know, “ Do I hold that death is not intended or designed ? ”
and how about beasts of prey—“Yes or no, pray ”? This
peremptory attitude, when used on a platform, might cow a
timid man, and at all events helps to produce an impression
that he is shirking a difficulty. To shirk difficulties is not
my custom. But when Mr. Symes adduces the earthquake
as apparently designed to destroy men, I cannot accept the
instance, because I cannot see that earthquakes are pur
posely adapted to rock down cities. Having some idea of
geological facts, I believe that earthquakes were before
cities in the order of time, and men in their ignorance have
built their cities on the earthquake lines. But the tiger’s
claws and fangs I accept as being plainly designed to fit the
animal for catching and tearing prey. I have before asserted-—and my opponent cannot disprove it—that every
organ is for the good of its possessor. If any exceptions
can be brought forward, I will show that they literally
prove the rule. The tiger’s organs are for the tiger’s
advantage ; so far there is design, and even beneficence.
It is equally true, of course, that the tiger’s claws are a dis
advantage to the tiger’s prey—to the individuals which fall
victims. This has been a great difficulty to the minds of
many good people who have not ransacked nature to find
atheistic arguments. I have only space to say that the
weeding-out of inferior and ill-adapted animals, with the
survival of the fittest, who leave offspring “fit” as them
selves, is a necessary part of the machinery for the evolu
tion of the higher animals. Without this arrangement
there never would have been a race of mankind. It ill
becomes us to quarrel with the process which gave us birth.
The death of those weak individuals is for the good of the
species, and the entire arrangement adds to the sum of
animal enjoyment. Death, in the form in which it comes
to the lower animals, is generally unexpected and seldom
painful; death, as it comes to man, is no evil if it be the
�64
ATHEISM OR THEISM?
portal to higher life. But Atheists, of course, are without
hope. The moral difficulties of the “ struggle for life ” are
dealt with in a volume which may be seen in the British
Museum and in the Birmingham Free Library—a volume
called “ Darwinism and Design,” written by George St.
Clair.
LETTER XI.
From Mr. J. Symes to Mr. G. St. Clair.
Mr. St. Clair entered upon this discussion with the
ostensible object of showing that Theism is rational and
more rational than Atheism. But either he has never
seriously engaged in the work or else has wofully failed in
spite of honest and earnest effort. • What a iheos, deus, or
god is has yet to be learned—my opponent has no settled
opinions upon the subject. If he has, why does he not
straightforwardly state the proposition he intends to main
tain, and then allege only such facts and employ only such
reasoning as may tend to establish his theory ?
His Theism has evidently never been thought out ; he has
adopted it as he adopted the fashion of his coat, and has
never investigated the one or the other critically. If he has
investigated his Theism and really does understand its
nature, ramifications, and bearings, he most scrupulously
keeps it all secret, as Herodotus did much of what he was
told about the gods in Egypt—the most secret mysteries he
refused, from the most pious motives, to reveal. This is to
be regretted, especially as my opponent has so much to
reveal, if he could be induced to do it, being imbued with
plenary inspiration. Though, like most modest men, now
that I ask him to let us know what his god has told him, I
find his bashfulness so overpowers him that he cannot
summon up sufficient courage to give the world a single
syllable of what he heard or saw on Horeb or in the third
heaven. It is a pity the deity did not select a more appro
priate prophet ; but the ways of divine providence are
notoriously odd, capricious, uncertain, contradictory, and
insane.
Mr. St. Clair asks if I know anything of evolution. No
�ATHEISM OR THEISM ?
65
doubt that is intended to be a tit for some tat of
mine,
I may say that I understand Darwin and the
resMf the evolutionists sufficiently to know that evolution
is purely Atheistic, that nature is all-sufficient for all her
operations; that no god is wanted, needed, or desirable for
‘ any of her processes. I am obliged to Mr. St. Clair for
calling attention to his own book on the subject, though fir
the purposes of this discussion it was unnecessary ; and, if
Mr. St. Clair does not understand Darwin far better than
he does his poor deity, the book cannot be worth reading.
A man who can write five long letters on Theism without
naming one Theistic fact, or attempting a logical or rational
argument in support of his position—five letters full of
irrelevancies, side-issues, platitudes, uncertainties apologies
for deity, misrepresentation of natural facts, pompous
boasts of divine inspiration, and ability to “ discern the
purpose” of god “running through the ages,” and the dis
tinction between accidents and “purposive” events in
nature—whatever knowledge such a man may have, his
temper and disposition, his total want of ballast and critical
acumen must unfit him entirely for writing a work on
-evolution or any other philosophical subject.
If nature operates her own changes, evolution is a
beautiful theory ; but admit a god who works by means of
evolution, and the whole aspect of the subject is changed;
evolution becomes the most perfect system of red-tapism
that can be conceived. If evolution results in good, all
that good was as much needed millions of years back as
now; but red-tape decided that whole generations must
perish, that evils and abuses could not be removed, except
by an interminable and bewildering and murderous process,
complex beyond expression or thought—whereas an honest
■ and able god would have done the work out of hand and
i shown as much respect for the first of his children as for
later ones. But Mr. St. Clair’s murders generation after
J generation of his family for the sake of working out some
change, the evolution of a new organ, the gradual atrophy
or decay of old ones, the rise of a new species or the
destruction of aboriginal races.
I shall not further follow up Mr. St. Clair’s remarks.
They are not to the point, even approximately. He con
founds language and mingles art and nature, and thus
�66
ATHEISM OR THEISM?
bewilders his unwary reader instead of informing him. Long
since I should have ignored what my opponent says, only
my action would have been misunderstood. To prove
Theism rational one must prove that there is a god. This
has not been done. Then you must connect god and nature.
This has not been done; in fact, Mr. St. Clair is reduced to
the necessity of admitting that his god is weak and even a
part of nature—a big, stupid giant, most probably living in
that region to which the celebrated Jack climbed up by a
bean-stalk.
Here follow some positive evidences that there is no god
existing, except the mere idols and fictions of worshippers,
etc.—
1. No trace of one has been observed, no footstep, copro
lite, or what not. The only life of which mankind has any
knowledge is animal life and vegetable life; and it is in
conceivable that there should be any other.
2. The world was never made, nor any natural product
in it ; and therefore a maker is impossible.
3. The universe, so far as it is known, is not conducted
or governed, nor is any department of it, except those de
partments under the influence of living beings. Nature’s
processes consist in the interaction, attraction, repulsion,
union and disunion of its parts and forces, and of nothing
else.
4. All known substances and materials have definite and
unalterable quantities and attributes or qualities. Their
only changes are approximation, recession, combination, and
disunion; and all the phenomena of nature are the sole re
sults of these, one class of phenomena being no more
accidental or designed than another. Design is nowhere
found beyond the regions of animal action, and animal
action is nothing more nor anything less than the outcome
or the result, however complex, of the total forces and
materials which alternately combine and segregate in all
animals. An animal is what he is by virtue of his ante
cedents, his physical combinations and disunions, and his
environments.
All known facts lead logically to the above conclusions,
and it is naught but superstition or irrational belief that
assumes or predicates the contrary. Nor is any honest result
ever gained by assuming the existence of a god: it explains
�ATHEISM OR THEISM ?
67
nothing, it leads to nothing but confusion. More than that,
it is an attempt to explain nature’s mystery by creating a
still ^eater mystery, which is unphilosophical. Further
still, it is an attempt to expound nature by (1) that which
is not nature, or (2) by a natural phenomenon or set of
phenomena; for your god must be either natural, super1 natural, or artificial. Mr. St. Clair’s is not supernatural,
but natural. Very well; if it be natural, as he says, it is
an unknown phenomenon, or substance, or force ; and there
fore cannot be utilised in any way by reason. A false
philosophy or imposture may appeal to the unknown to
explain difficulties ; the whole round of religion consists of
nothing else than examples of it. But true philosophy
never attempts to explain the known by the unknown.
5. Mr. St. Clair believes in evolution, and yet holds the
dogma of a former creation. That is to play fast and loose
with reason; for why do you ascribe any power to physical
causes, if you refuse to regard them as sufficiently power
ful to originate, as well as to develope the phsenomena of
Nature ? Mr. St. Clair ascribes all the evils of life to
second causes, all its goods to deity. That is good Theology,
but the worst Philosophy. If life is physically sustained,
developed, and modified, it must be physically originated.
The only logical conclusion to be drawn from Theistic pre
misses is that each event, each phenomenon, each change is
the work of a separate god, or fairy, or devil—beings of
whom nothing is known beyond the fact that everyone of
them was created by man for the express purpose of creating
and governing the world or parts of it. But the philosopher
will never think of using them in any way till their real
existence and action have been placed beyond a doubt.
6. If the world was really made, it was not intelligently
made,, for it is chiefly a scene of confusion, strife, folly,
insanity, madness, brutality, and death. No intelligent
creator could endure the sight of it after making it:—be
would put his foot on it and crush it, or else commit suicide
in disgust. In geology the world is but a heap of ruins ; in
astronomy an unfortunate planet, so placed as regards the
sun that one part roasts while another freezes.
7. Men talk of the wisdom and goodness seen in God’s
creation ! He made man, and left him naked and houseless,
ignorant of nearly all he needed to know, a mere brute. He
�68
ATHEISM OR THEISM?
showed neither goodness nor wisdom here. It is only by a
painful process “ running through the ages,” a prqgtes of
blood, murder, starvation, and the death of millions %pon
millions that our civilisation has been achieved; and what
is it even now ? A civilisation of fraud, brutality slightly
veiled, hypocrisy wholesale, superstitions the most costly
and profound, a civilisation that houses the dead better than
the living, that pauperises survivors to bestow costly tombs
upon the dead, that builds splendid temples for gods and
priests to sport in, and leaves men and women to rot physi
cally, mentally and morally, in dens !
8. But this god never interferes for human good. This
governor of men never governs. He might prevent all
crime ; he prevents none. What is the use of a god who
could not or would not prevent the murder of Lincoln, Gar
field, and thousands of others ? If he could, and was by,
he is an accessory or worse ; if he couldn’t, he has in man
a creature he cannot control, and is therefore contemptible.
9. I am aware that some Theists urge that god could not
interfere, as I suggest, without violating man’s free-agency.
Whether Mr. St. Clair holds that opinion I cannot just now
say; but all along I have aimed at a much wider Theism
than that of Mr. St. Clair, and shall therefore make a remark
or two on this subject.
(1.) All government interferes with free-agency. And no
one complains that a government should try to prevent
crime. Indeed, that is one of its main functions. And a
government that does not, to its utmost knowledge and
power, prevent crime, is a bad government. Well, the socalled divine government prevents none ; what is its use?
Not to prevent crime is to encourage its commission. This
the divine government does.
(2) The free-agency plea is silly. Every murderer, every
tyrant destroys the free-agency of his victim. Does god
respect the free-agency of the victim less than that of the
villain ? Does he scrupulously refrain from checking the
latter while he inflicts wrong and death upon the former ?
Human laws are professedly (many of them really) framed
to protect the innocent and weak, and to restrain the strong
and vicious; divine laws must have a contrary intention, if
the free-agency plea is correct.
Finally.
I am well aware that my style of treating thia
�ATHEISM OR THEISM?
69
subject must be very offensive to some. But I make no
apoloev for it. I adopt it deliberately and of set purpose.
I regard Theism as immensely stupid, so much so that
serious argument is wasted upon it, just as it would be
waste labor to try to disprove transubstantiation or to
show that Laputa could not fly as Gulliver describes.
Uncompromising ridicule seems to me the best weapon
wherewith to attack this miserable fetishism of my
opponent. I have used it unsparingly and heartily, and hope
my opponent has enjoyed the discussion as much as I
have.
I close without a spark of ill-will towards Mr. St. Clair,
and beg to express the opinion that his failure is not due
to any intellectual defect in him, but to the utterly im
possible proposition he undertook to defend. It is no
disgrace to fail where success is impossible. Nor do I
claim any credit to myself—Atheism is so easy to defend
that I must have been totally excuseless to have failed in it.
LETTER XII.
Fi‘‘om Mr. G. St. Clair to Mr. J. Symes.
Mr. Symes goes off the platform with a laugh, and tells the
audience he has won a victory ; but he must be conscious
all the time that he has not dislodged his antagonist from
his entrenchments. I have been disappointed in my op
ponent. His first letter confirmed the assurance which he
had given to me privately—that this discusssion should be
“ definite, earnest, real ”—but his last contains the con
fession that he has deliberately adopted an offensive style
and dealt in uncompromising ridicule, because he considers
that serious argument would be wasted upon so stupid a
subject as Theism.
All through this discussion I have only used half the
notes made on a first reading of Mr. Symes’s letters, and
now, in order to find room for a general summing up, I
must withhold the detailed reply which I could give to his
last. It is annoying to have to leave so many fallacies
unanswered ; but I think I have replied to most statements
which could claim to be arguments, as far as my space
allowed.
�70
ATHEISM OR THEISM?
Mr. Symes opened the discussion, and ought to have
advanced some reasons for considering Atheism rational;
but he confessed at once that he had nothing positive to
urge in favor of his negative, but should confine himself to
picking holes in Theistic arguments. His letters have
abounded with peremptory questions, and every answer I
have given has afforded material to tear to pieces or snarl
at. My opponent began by asking eight questions, six of
which involved a discussion of the infinite, the infinite being
easy to juggle with. The definition of God which he pre
ferred was the vulgar definition, which involves a contradic
tion, and would therefore have given him an opportunity of
dialectical victory. He wished me to say that God is a
Being infinite in power and infinite in goodness, and he
wanted the former part of this definition to mean that the
power of Deity is adequate to accomplish things which are
in their very nature impossible. Then he would have argued
that infinite goodness would desire to free the world at once
from all evil, pain and inconvenience; that infinite power
could accomplish this ; but that it is not done, and there
fore no God exists. I refused to define Deity in the way
dictated to me, but it was all the same to my opponent—
his arguments were only good against the vulgar definition,
and so he attacked that. He set forth at large that there
was a good deal of pain and trouble in the world, which, to
his mind, must be inconsistent with the existence of an
infinite God. Of course, it is not really so unless, besides
possessing infinite goodness of nature, the Creator possesses
unlimited power, and that in a mathematical sense. Now, I
have shown that the Creator cannot possess unlimited power
in this sense, and therefore my opponent’s objection to God’s
existence on the ground that “ evils ” exist is not conclusive.
The analogy of human labor employed in building a
cathedral shows us that a fine pile may be completed in the
course of time. It leads us to compare past phases of the
world with the present, that we may discover the movement
and tendency of things, for
“We doubt not, through the ages one increasing purpose runs.”
We go as deep down into the past as Evolution will enable
us to do, and, beginning at the lowliest forms of life, we
find a gradually ascending series. At length we come to
�ATHEISM OR THEISM?
71
man, who, even as a savage, is superior to all that went
be£a^. But the savage, as Gerald Massey says in his
“TSe of Eternity,” is only the rough-cast clay model of the
perfect statue. The savage advances into the condition of
a barbarian, and the barbarian, in time, becomes civilised.
But God has not yet finished the work of creating man into
his own image. It is astonishing that any student of Evolu
tion, possessing two eyes, should go to the quarry and fetch
out fossils for the purpose of showing that creatures have
suffered and died, and should fail to get any glimpse of “ a
purpose running through the ages.” But this is the case
with my opponent, to whose eye Evolution “ is purely
atheistic.” He also fails to see that, on this rational view
of creation, evils may be only temporary ; nay, more, that
they are certainly diminishing, and tend to vanish altogether.
I have invited my opponent three times over to find any
flaw in the reasoning of Herbert Spencer, where he main
tains that evil is evanescent; but it would have suited him
better if he could have quoted Spencer in a contrary sense.
The Creator’s power is exerted under conditions and
limitations arising out of the mathematical relations of
space “and time. It is, therefore, not “ in fining’ in the
vulgar sense. The vulgar definition of God wants mending;
and this is about all that Mr. Symes has been able to show.
As I, for my part, never put forth the vulgar definition, he
ought not to have given us a panorama of the evils of the
world, much less have made it revolve ad nauseam. The
rational Theism which I hold is not overturned by the
temporary occurrence of evil. But, when Mr. Symes found
this out, he took to ridiculing my God as a being who is
less than infinite in the vulgar sense, and professed to find
the orthodox God immensely superior.
Besides exposing the fallacy of the chief objections
brought against the existence of a Divine Being, I have
advanced positive proofs, from the marks of design in his
works. I lay stress on the fact that organs such as the
eye, and organisms such as the body, are instruments and
machines comparable to those designed and made by man,
and which never come into existence except when contrived
by intelligence. We never see the human mind going
through the process of designing. We never see the mind
at all. We have to look for marks of design in the work.
�72
ATHEISM OR THEISM?
It is the same with regard to the Divine Spirit. Objection
is made to Design, on the ground that Evolution explains
all things without a Creator; but I have shown that this is
not the case. Mr. Symes has hunted up all the blind eyes
he can find, and the perverted instincts, which do not effect
their asserted purpose, and is daring enough to say that
eyes are not made to see with. The difficulty is fully
explained by what I have said of the analogy between
divine and human work, performed under conditions, and
with concomitants of evil. I have challenged our clever
Alphonso to show us a pair of those superior eyes which he
says he could make, but he does not do so. He had only
made an empty boast.
Connected with Design is Adaptation. Mr. ¡Etames is
irrational enough to say that if anything is designed all
things are designed, and if Adaptation is seen in anything
it is seen iu all things. He sees it as much in the accidental
smashing of an egg as in the wonderful formation of the
egg to be the ark of safety for an embryo chick. This
astounding nonsense is forced upon him by his Atheism,
and must be charged to the irrational theory rather than to
the man4 But in seeking to bolster it up, Mr. Symes made
use of one argument which might seem to possess force un
less I exposed its weakness, and I had no space to do that
in reply to his fourth letter. He said that if there be design
anywhere it must be in the elements of matter especially,
where I do not seem to see it, as I bring forward organised
structures, living things. He says all matter is probably
alive—“ probably ! ” An instance of modesty in Mr. Symes,
though immediately afterwards he becomes positive again,
and says “ I affirm.” He affirms something about invisible
atoms, namely, that there is adaptation between the atoms,
and “ an equilibrium stable, perfect, time-defying,” far
superior to the unstable adaptation of living creatures to
their surroundings. My reply must be brief. An atom is
that which has no parts. It cannot therefore have any
organs, nor be an organism, nor possess life. Out of atoms,
as out of bricks, larger things are built up, and in some of
them I discern a certain architecture which speaks of Design.
Whether the bricks themselves are a manufactured article
does not affect my conclusion. The “ adaptation between
the atoms ” which Mr. Symes discerns and affirms cannot be
�ATHEISM OR THEISM ?
73 ’
in their interiors, for they are without parts. If he means
an adaptation of atom to atom, as in the chemistry of water,
I ne«d not deny it, though two or three bricks in combina
tion don’t impress me like the cathedral of the human body;
and as to the “ perfect, time-defying equilibrium ” of the
atoms of oxygen and hydrogen which form water, electricity
will unsettle it at once.
Has Mr. Symes proved Atheism to be rational? He
began by declaring that “ Atheism requires no direct evi
dence,” which I must interpret to mean it has none to offer.
What he now pretends to offer in his last comes late, and is
not good. Has he disproved the rationality of Theism ?
No, not as I present Theism to him. He said, very early,
that he “ must decline to narrow the ground ” to Theism as
I preset it, and, accordingly, what he has chiefly attacked
has be$n the vulgar definition of Theism. Now the dictionary
definition may go as far as I am concerned, but God remains.
If there are some difficulties on the theory of Theism,
they are only increased when we fly to Atheism. Atheism
accounts for nothing. Pain and misery, which are so much
complained of, are just as much facts whether there be a
God or no. Atheism does nothing to explain them, to
release us from them, to help us to bear them. An en
lightened Theism shows that sensibility to pain is a gracious
provision, warning us in time to escape greater evils and
contributing to our upward evolution. Evil is accounted
for as “ good in the making” or the necessary accompani
ment of greater good, or the temporary inconvenience lying
in the path to some glorious goal. Whatever is, is the best
possible at the present stage, if only all the relations of
things were known to us. Death enters into the great
scheme, for, by the removal of the aged, room is made for
younger life, and the total amount of enjoyment is increased.
At the same time, this is no hardship to those who pass
away, for the life of the individual soul is continued here
after and carried higher. This belief brightens the whole
of life and gives a very different aspect to pain and trouble and
death, which might fairly cause perplexity if death were the
final end.
The one advantage I derive from Mr. Symes’s letters is
that they seem to show me how men become Atheists.
There are certain questions which cannot be answered, and
�74
ATHEISM OK THEISM?
they are always asking those questions. There are certain
difficulties of belief, and these they cherish in preference to
the stronger reasons for faith and hope. There is sunshine
and shadow in the world, and they prefer to dwell in the
gloom. They search out all the crudities and failures, stinks
and sores, diseases and evils which the world affords, or ever
has afforded, and look at them through a magnifying glass.
Impressed with the magnitude of the loathsome heap, and
oblivious of everything else in creation, they presume to
think they could have advised something better if the
Creator had only consulted them. Had there been a wise
Creator he surely would have done so 1 Henceforth they
shriek out that there is no God; and nevertheless, illogical
as they always are, they whimper at pain instead of bearing
it, and complain of evils as though therewere some God
who was inflicting them. They complain that life is not
worth living, and yet speak of death as though it were
maliciously desigued and the greatest evil of all. They
have got into a world which is “ a fatherless Hell, “ all
massacre, murder and wrong,” and ought logically to commit
suicide, like the couple of Secularists in Mr. Tennyson’s
“ Despair!’ But, alas ! not even death will land them in
any better place. They are
• “ Come from the brute, poor souls—no souls
—and to die with the brute 1 ”
Yet that couple cherished love for one another and pity for
all that breathe, and ought to have inferred thence that
unless a stream can rise higher than its source, there must
be much more pity and love in the Great Fount and Heart
of All Things.
�Three Hundred and. Seventy-second Thousand.
January, 1882.
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Is atheism or theism more rational? A discussion between Mr. Joseph Symes and Mr. George St. Clair
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Symes, Joseph [1841-1906]
Saint Clair, George
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Notes: Part of the NSS pamphlet collection. Publisher's list, dated January 1882, on pages at the end numbered [1]-8 and 17-22, i.e. p.9-16 are missing. Printed by Annie Besant and Charles Bradlaugh.
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Theism
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Atheism
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i Z'^'4H 113-1
NATIONAL SECULAR SOCIETY
W Atheistic ^UHorm.
VIII.
IS
DARWINISM
ATHEISTIC?
BY
CHARLES COCKBILL CATTELL.
Author of “A Search
for the
First Man,'’
etc
LONDON:
EREETHOUGHT
PUBLISHING
63, FLEET STREET E.C.
1 8 8 4.
PRICE
ONE
PENNY.
COMPANY,
�THE ATHEISTIC PLATFORM.
Under this title is "being issued a fortnightly publi
cation, each number of which consists of a lecture
delivered by a well-known Freethought advocate. Any
question may be selected, provided that it has formed the
subject of a lecture delivered from the platform by an
Atheist. It is desired to show that the Atheistic platform
is used for the service of humanity, and that Atheists war
against tyranny of every kind, tyranny of king and god,
political, social, and theological.
Each issue consists of sixteen pages, and is published at
one penny. Each writer is responsible only for his or her
own views.
i 1.—“ What is the use of Prayer ? ” By‘Annie Besant.
2. —Mind considered as a Bodily Function. By Alice
Bradlaugh.
3. —“ The Gospel of Evolution.” By Edward Aveling,
D.Sc.
4. —“ England’s Balance-Sheet.” By Charles Bradlaugh,
5. —“ The Story of the Soudan.” By Annie Besant.
6. —“ Nature and the Gods.” By Arthur B. Moss.
These Six, in Wrapper, Sixpence.
7. —“ Some Objections
laugh.
to
Socialism.” By Charles Brad
�IS DARWINISM ATHEISTIC?
In the concluding words of the “Descent of Man ” “w? are
?rntfiere-pC°nCemed
hopes or fears> only with the
truth as far a8 0llr reason permits mt0 discover it”(p
lor? th!
is not Atheism. aijy
eludes the otfS^7
A?r0I10W’ Net whether one el
eiuo.es tne othei is a question which the
unanswered. The Theist looks on the ea^th Ad r •
things as a series of fixed and unchangeable fim™?
the?cXtioSnUnThe n„8'- “
"v ™ the fcst daX »*
eir creation lhe universe, according to his view conlrl
can make to the question’pr°Pfi answer he
aSd vegetXl^Ct^tC^
“They exist bv an
? ClvAlsed, uatl°ns are familial-:
the unlimited ‘existencein
‘and
existences animate and inanimate. I hl
�116
THE ATHEISTIC PLATFORM.
and. men only. Others again bring in a bill of divorce
ment for the severance of the universe from the creator,
and introduce the law of nature to take the place of an
active God. Hence in most popular works we meet with
the first cause and secondary causes. By general agree
ment scientific men attribute all the present operations of
nature to second causes, and express their conclusions,
based on observation and experience in terms now popular
—the laws of nature. Even George Combe, a man of
undoubted piety, penned the following sentence:
“ Science has banished the belief in the exercise-by the
Deity in our day of special acts of supernatural power as
a means of influencing human affairs.” Baden Powell
went still further (Inductive Philosophy, p. 67): “There
is not, there never has been, any ‘ creation ’ in the original
and popular sense of the term,” which is now adopted as
“a mere term of convenience.” To this the appearance
of man is no exception, and in no way violates the essential
unity and continuity of natural causes. Again, “by equally
regular laws in one case as in the other, must have been
evolved all forms of inorganic and equally of . organic
existence.” Any single instance of birth or origin as an
exception to physical laws “is an incongruity so prepos
terous that no inductive mind can for a moment entertain
it. All is sub j ect to pre-arranged laws, and the disruption
of one single link in nature’s chain of order would be the
destruction of the whole.” All this was written before
Darwin broached his theory, and I well remember the
reply given more than thirty years ago. “ Why then cry
unto God ? There is no God in nature, only an exhibition
of his legislative power as evinced in his pre-arranged
laws! ” This appears to me an answer. Under this head
may fittingly be placed Darwin’s predecessors, E. G. St.
Hilaire, Lamarck, Erasmus Darwin, and Goethe, all of
whom attribute changes and modifications to a process of
nature. A brief summary of their views may be read in
Dr. Aveling’s “Darwinian Theory.”
Strange as it may appear, Professor Mivart quotes
Aquinas and Augustine as writing that “ in the first insti
tution of nature we do not look for miracles, but for the
laws of nature,” and he himself says “that throughoiit
the whole process of physical evolution—the first mani
festation of life included—supernatural action is not to be
�IS DARWINISM ATHEISTIC ?
117
looked for.” Mr. Mungo Ponton holds that no organism
•can be said to be created. “It is neither necessary nor
reasonable to suppose the Creator himself to act directly
in the organisation of any organism.” How such lan
guage must shock the pious writer who exclaimed: “ The
hand that made me is divine.”
The genial poet duly shuddered at Baden Powell, who
after all only repeated the words of the Saints of the
JRoman Church:
“ Take thine idol hence,
Cold Physicist!
Great Absentee ! and left His Agent Law
To work out all results.
Nature, whose very name
Implies her wants, while struggling into birth,
Demands a Living and a Present God.”
I fully enter into the spirit of these words, and in my
first work of importance (1864) I urged that such a con■ception negatives all science. There can be no scientific
fact established and reliable, if it is true that there is a
•God
“ Whose power o’er moving worlds presides,
Whose voice created, and whose wisdom guides,”
It appears manifest that there can be nothing certain in
nature if God ever interferes. No prediction of the ap
pearance of a comet or any description of the motion of a
planet is possible, if we allow the possibility of any un
known person interfering with the calculations on which
the predictions are based. This is not a matter of opinion
or belief—it is a self-evident truth. We understand that
two added to two equal four, but the Theistic theory
admits the possibility that they may, under divine control,
be either more or less. If any say no, they admit the
Atheistic position. A God who never interferes is no God
at all.
Those who put Law in place of God explain nothing
Law can no more create, modify, or sustain nature than
God can. It is, in fact, only removing the Divine operator
one step back without any advantage. Such persons think
they thus obviate certain objections to terrible calamities
�118.
THE ATHEISTIC PLATFORM.
and sufferings by saying instead of “God did it,” “ the
Law did it.” It matters not whether it be the landlord or
his agent, if we are evicted without compensation, and
starve on the highway.
Mr. M. Ponton (“ Beginning: How and When ? ” p. 357)
may be quoted as a very good illustration of this view. He
contends that God acts in the living organisms only
“mediately, through the instrumentality of the organiser.
We might as well suppose every instinctive action of an
organised being to be a direct act of the creator, as that
every unconscious action contributing to the development,
growth, maintenance, or reproduction of the organism is a
direct act of Divine interference.” Certainly, that is so—
but why not? H the development, growth, and repro
duction goes on without direct interference, there must be
some reason for it, and here it is—“the imperfections and
occasional monstrosities occurring in individual organisms
forbid our supposing these to be the immediate products of
unerring creative wisdom and power.” The blundering is
shifted on to the “organiser”—but whence the organiser
who or which acts so monstrously ?
The parentage is clearly set forth by Mr. Ponton (p.
356) himself, who, in describing all existing organisms,
says : “ But the first in each series must have been, in thestrict sense of the term, a creation—a being brought into
existence by the mere will of the creator.” Now taking
these two statements as an explanation of the mode of
origin of living organisms, I contend that the same login
that forbids us to accept monster from “unerring wisdom ”
equally forbids us attributing the origin of an agent
capable of producing them to the same unerring cause.
A good designer of a good organism is accepted—while
all is plain and fair sailing; but immediately Mr. Ponton
stumbles over an imperfect or monstrous one, he sends theunerring cause flying back into the unknown mist, to
assist at the formation of things in their primeval inno
cence and purity. This is exploded theology over again,
as taught in our dame schools.
A similar idea is developed in religion. The brutal God
of the lews is transformed into a humane God by the
Christians—a God of love.
But if we assume one source of power, it follows that all
efficient causes of good and evil are traceable to that one?
�IS DARWINISM ATHEISTIC?
119
source, so that there is no advantage in a liberal and loving
philosophy clothing the modern God with only a humane
and beneficent character. Many devout persons have
written books to reconcile us to Theism by picturing the
design in nature to produce the beautiful and beneficent.
If we accept their theory, we are confronted by fact, at
tested before our eyes and recorded in the rocks up to the
earliest time—that animals have been created and sent on
the earth for the purpose of devouring each other. There
is no design or purpose plainer than this.
The world is one vast slaughter-house—one half the
animal kingdom lives in and on other animals. So long
as the lion roams the forest and the tigers seek their prey,
so long the doctrine of benevolent design in nature will
have a living palpable refutation. A power outside nature
that can prevent pain is one of the grossest impositions
the ingenuity of man has ever attempted to prove the
existence of, or by implication to infer, as evidenced by
God “in his works which are fair.”
The only answer that can be made is that it is a good
thing to be devoured! I have heard naturalists describe
the beautiful adaptations by which one creature can and
does kill another I All this takes place by the intention
of a personal God who directs it, or his under unerring and
beneficent laws of nature, according to whichever view is
held.
There was a time, not so distant, when the whole of
nature was believed to be under .the personal direction of
God. Thunder, lightning, storms, eclipses of the sun and
moon, and the motions of the heavenly bodies, all came
under this description. Travellers assure us that savages
usually look upon nature with similar eyes.
All attempts to remove a capricious will of God from
the operations of nature have been denounced as Atheistic.
All discoverers and announcers of new truth have been
denounced as Atheists through all time. A Frenchman
filled a whole dictionary with their names. All science is
necessarily Atheistic in the original sense of the word—
Atheist means ivithout God. Of course it is used in other
senses by some—for instance the denial of God, against
God, an active opposition to Theism, &c. The broad dis
tinction I wish to make is: by Theism we understand a
�120
THE ATHEISTIC PLATFORM.
system based upon the Supernatural ; by Atheism, a system
based upon the Natural.
As regards the subject of the present enquiry, the only
great difficulty all along has been the popular conception
of the earth’s recent appearance and its transitory nature.
Called into existence only yesterday and liable to vanish
in smoke to-morrow, it afforded no scope for the evolution
of living things during myriads of ages, millions of years.
So long as minds were occupied with the fall of man
behind them and penal fires before them, and all nature in
a state of possible instantaneous combustion, nothing cer
tain could be expected, no science was possible.
In the presence of a first cause and a last cause and
secondary causes, only confusion could arise. When it
became known that in science a first and last cause was
equally unknown, that changes in nature being intermin
able, so likewise are causes and effects—the names by
which they are known, what we rightly call human know
ledge became possible. The first society started in Eng
land for the collection and diffusion of this sort of know
ledge was the Royal Society for the special study of
Natural, in contradistinction to Supernatural, knowledge.
As regards man, the study has been greatly facili
tated by the discovery of his high antiquity, but aid to
the interpretation of nature in general comes from the
chemist.
To explain anything in the terms of science as a process
of nature required the evidence afforded by quantitative
chemistry. This assures us that, though all nature is con
stantly changing, nothing is lost—hence the indestructi
bility of matter is an established fact. What bearing has
this on our subject? To my mind it is clear that the in
destructible is a never-ending and never-beginning attri
bute.' This being accepted as a logical inference from an
indisputable fact, a beginning and a beginner are both
dispensed with. All are agreed that there is a selfexistent, eternal something—a necessity of human thought;
this appears to me to be the indestructible nature we
know—by whatever name we call it.
In illustration of this, I have often quoted a beautiful
passage from Herschell (Nat. Phil.), who, after referring
to the fact that one of the great powers, gravitation, the
�16 DARWINISM ATHEISTIC?
121
main bond and support of the universe, has undergone
no change from a high antiquity, says: “So that, for
aught we know to the contrary, the same identical atom
may be concealed for thousands of centuries in a limestone
rock; may at length be quarried, set free in the lime-kiln,
mix with the air, be absorbed from it by plants, and, in
succession, become a part of the frames of myriads of liv
ing beings, till some occurrence of events consigns it once
more to a long repose, which, however, in no way unfits it
for again assuming its former activity.”
There are some who admit the indestructibility of
matter and its illimitable existence in space and time, who
nevertheless allow there may be something underlying ox*
behind the nature we know. I see no advantage in mul
tiplying assumptions, nor do I see where logically we can
stop if we do. If I assume a self-existent, eternal universe,
and there stop, no one else can do more than repeat the
same proposition containing the same idea. I do not pro
fess to account for it—no one can account for it. Why
anything exists without limit in space and time no man
can tell.
In support of this view, let me quote a passage from the
voluminous writings of Herbert Spencer: “Those who
cannot conceive a self-existent universe .... take for
granted that they can conceive a self-existent creator.”
The mystery they see surrounding them on every side they
transfer to an alleged source, “ and then suppose they have
solved the mystery. But they delude themselves............
Whoever agrees that the Atheistic hypothesis is untenable
because it involves the impossible idea of self-existence,
must perforce admit that the Theistic hypothesis is unten
able if it contains the same impossible idea. ... So that,
in fact, impossible as it is to think of the actual universe as
■self-existing, we do but multiply impossibilities of thought
by every attempt we make to explain its existence.” (“First
Principles,” p. 35.)
Some who do not admit that nature is all in all, reject
the notion I have described as a person creating and sus
taining all existing things—on the ground that it is an
thropomorphic. Be it so, the long name does not alter the
fact. I hold that Paley was right and has never been
answered, when he said that a designer and contrivei’
of nature must be a person. A Man- God is the only rational
�122
THE ATHEISTIC PLATFORM.
ancl intelligible conception the human intellect can
form, and they who reject it are manifestly without God—
Atheist.
Those who place Law where Grod used to be are in
advance of Theism, my only difference with them being as
to the meaning they attach to the word Law. I also
believe in the laws of nature, but only thereby express the
invariable order manifested—the way nature acts. They
use Law not to denote the fact that water seeks its own
level, but as though they meant the law either pushed or
pulled the water down the river. In all their writings
they speak of nature, her laws, and the lawgiver. I only
know nature and mode or method. When I say nature
works thus, I add nothing to the fact; they speak of law
as something impressed on matter, something having a
separate existence.
Where I speak of living matter, they speak of matter
endowed with life, endowed with intelligence, &c. This leads
up to the particular question under discussion—does Dar
winism come under the latter view ? A few phrases are
frequently quoted to prove that it does. Darwin writes
that 11 probably all the organic beings which have ever
lived on this earth have descended from some one primor
dial form, into which life was first breathed by the
Creator.” In another place he writes : “The Creator ori
ginally breathed life into a few forms, perhapsfour or five.”
Here we have the word Creator, and the work ascribed to
him, or it, is breathing life into one or perhaps five organ
isms. Darwin’s mind was apparently unsettled with
regard to theology all his life. If he had devoted as many
years to that as he did to the observation of plants and
animals, he would doubtless have uttered a more certain
sound. But his use of popular modes of expression, theo
logical phrases, must be judged by his later utterances.
Theists quote his words about breathing as though he was
in accord with Moses. Surely his tracing man’s origin to
the quadruped and aquatic animals is slightly at variancewith the words of Genesis ! Again it is urged that the
use of the word Creator implies creation, but he has placed
that view beyond all dispute.
The belief in God he traces to natural causes in
“Descent of Man,” p. 93, and points out numerous races
of men of past and present time, who have no idea of God
�IS DARWINISM ATHEISTIC ?
123-
and no word to express such, an idea. With regard to the
existence of a creator and ruler of the universe, he says : •
“.This has been answered in the affirmative by some of thehighest intellects,” but he does not answer it himself.1 Ho
mentions a savage who with “justifiable pride, stoutly
maintained there was no devil in his land.”
. With regard to organisms being the work of a creator,
his later utterances in “Descent of Man,” p. 61, are very
clear. He states that in writing “ Origin of Species” he
had two objects in view, “firstly, to show that species had
not been specially created.” The concluding paragraph
runs: “I have at least, I hope, done good service in airb'ng
to overthroio the dogma of separate creations.” On the
same page, I think, he gives ample explanation of his use
of current theological phrases. “I was not, however, able
to annul the influence of my former belief then almost
universal, that each species had been purposely created.”
Hetraces the objections to his theory to the “arrogance
of our forefathers which made them declare that they were
descended from demi-gods,” and says that before long it
will be thought wonderful that naturalists should have
believed in separate creations. The concluding words of
the volume attest his freedom from dogmatism and his con
siderateness for the. feelings of others. His words are :
The main conclusion arrived at in this work, namely,
that man is descended from some lowly organised form,
will, I regret to think, be highly distasteful to many,”
In another place, he says, p. 613 : “I am aware that theconclusion, arrived at in this work will be denounced by
some as highly irreligious.” Whatever maybe said about
it, Darwin says (p. 606): “The grounds upon which this
conclusion rests will never be shaken.” Viewed in the
hght of our. knowledge of the whole organic world : “ The
great principle of evolution stands up clear and firm,”
because it is founded on “facts which cannot be disputed.”'
Darwin s anticipation of the judgment passed upon his
views has been more than realised. The great objection
to his view is commonly expressed in the words—what it
leads to.. There can be no doubt that it leads to the
assumption of natural instead of supernatural causes.* I
�124
THE ATHEISTIC PLATFORM.
well remember the same objection was made to Combe’s
theory that the brain was the organ of mind—it would
lead to materialism. Astronomy was objectionable because
it was no longer possible to keep up the dignity of the
earth and its inhabitants as occupying the central position
in the universe, having all the heavenly host surrounding
them as lights and ornaments. It was a manifest degra
dation to reduce the comparative size of the earth to a
pin’s nob surrounded by specks two or three miles in
diameter. A remarkable illustration of this occurred
recently. A gentleman of education and position opened
my “First Man” at the page where I place the last glacial
period at 100,000 years ago. He said: “I can read no
more, not a line.” “Why?” “Because I see what it leads
to—the giving up of all I have been taught to believe as
the infallible word of God.” There can be no manner of
doubt but that is the honest way tt> look at it. Either a
man must have his mind open to new knowledge and new
truth, or remain in ignorance and error. Those who do
not wish to relinquish their notion of the supernatural
producing, sustaining, and guiding the natural had better
leave Darwin alone.
Hugh Miller held that animals preceded each other, man
being last, but not ‘that one was produced by the modifi
cations of others. The present Duke of Argyll admits
that changes in the forms of animal life have taken place
frequently, but not in the course of nature. Professor
Owen argued that as all vertebrate animals had rudi
mentary bones found in the human skeleton they were
types of man—the earliest created perhaps millions of
years ago, being planned to undergo certain modifications
resulting in the appearance of man long before such a
creature as man was known. All these whimsical assump
tions are overthrown by Darwin’s theory, which accounts
for the modification by natural processes. He justly lays
claim to his theory as the only natural solution of the
appearance of rudimentary organs. It is not at all
to be wondered at that such a theory should be called
Atheistic, and Darwin the Apostle of the Infidels—and
that a bishop described him as burning in hell a few days
after he was buried. The opposition of ministers of re
ligion of all denominations might reasonably be expected,
since, as they say, he banishes the creator as an intruder
�IS DARWINISM ATHEISTIC?
125.
in nature, and takes away the foundation on which the
Christian religion is built. The difference between the
clergy and Darwin is a gulf that can never be bridged
over—they find man made in the image of God, whatever
that may mean, while Darwin finds him made exactly in
the image of the ape of the old world, now supposed to be
extinct. The first Adam of Moses is an essential to the
second Adam of Christianity—symbols of death and life
in the human race. Besides ministers of religion, the
Atheistical tendency of Darwinism has been pointed out
by Agassiz and Brewster; the latter stating distinctly that
his hypothesis has a tendency “to expel the Almighty
from the universe.” Reviews, magazines, and many
newspapers put it that Darwinism is practically Atheism;
in which description I think they accurately represent the
fact.
Professor Dawson, who is recognised by all the re
ligious reviewers as a trustworthy exponent of their views,
refers to this subject in his “Story of the Earth,” p. 321,
1880. In discussing whether man is the product of an in
telligent will or an evolution from lower organisms, he
says: “ It is true that many evolutionists, either unwilling
to offend, or not perceiving the consequences of their own
hypothesis, endeavor to steer a middle course, and to main
tain that the creator has proceeded by way of evolution.
But the bare hard logic of Spencer, the greatest English
authority, leaves noplace for this compromise, and shows that
that theory, carried out to its legitimate consequences, ex
cludes the knowledge of a creator and the possibility of his
works.” Again, on page 348, speakingof absolute Atheists
who follow Darwin: “They are more logical than those
who seek to reconcile evolution with design .... The
evolutionist is in absolute antagonism to the idea of crea
tion, even when held with all due allowance for the varia
tion of all created things within certain limits.” It is evi
dent, therefore, from this orthodox authority, that Darwin
ism, is in the estimation of popular Theists, undoubtedly
Atheistic. This might be explained away on the ground
of bigotry, prejudice, or misrepresentation, if the facts ad
duced by Darwin could be quoted in support of the accusa
tion. But the inexorable logic of facts points in the direc
tion of Professor Dawson’s inference, and, however objec
tionable the conclusion may be to him, it rests on a basis
�126
THE ATHEISTIC PLATFORM.
'which, can never be moved, on grounds that will never be
■shaken.
Still, Asa Gray and George St. Clair think it reconcilable
with theology, the latter devoting a large volume to prove
his case. Being an acquaintance, and a fellow townsman
now, I read Mr. St. Clair three times, but with unsatis
factory result. It is a book which evinces great ability,
and is full of information, but as regards the particular
point in question, all that bears upon it is assumption and
.assertion. All theology consists of assumptions and
assertions. Every book upon it we open may be described
as stating : There must have been a commencement, and
that could not be without a causing or creating, and that
■could not be without a First Cause or Creator.
Simple as this appears, it contains a contradiction, and
refutes itself. To account for any existence by assuming
a cause before it, implies non-existence, and the .trans
formation of one into the other. If we assume a self
existing, eternal anything, we at once dispose of “there
must have been a commencement.” The evidence of design
-can only be applied to forms (even if there were any evi
dence that any existing animal Or plant had been at any
time designed), therefore the matter of which forms are
built up, and which in its nature is unchangeable, cannot
be referred to any cause limited to time. If the assumption,
as applied to forms of life, gave us any explanation, it
might be tolerated ; but, as it does not, it is worthless. To
justify the assumption of a commencement, it is necessary
that we should have some evidence of destruction.
We are triumphantly referred to the destruction going
-on in animal and plant life, but the facts connected with it
form the foundation of a belief in the order of perpetual
change, without which neither could exist at all on this
earth. If any live, some must die.
The air we breathe has been breathed before, the part
icles of our bodies are but the elements of the dead past, as
are the luscious fruit we eat and the odorous flowers we
smell—even the blood that is the life itself is derived from
the same source. Our finely-built towns, our marble halls,
the very paths in which we walk, all are made of the rocks
which are but the ashes that survive—the tombs of myriads
-of living things. Composition, decomposition, and recom
position is the order of nature. Times innumerable have
�IS DARWINISM ATHEISTIC ?
127
•all natural forms passed through the process of corruption,
decay, and death—
“ Ever changing, ever new.”
The “ Bard of Avon” has been quoted, saying that
“ The great globe itself,
Yea, all which it inherit, shall dissolve,”
and it is true he does; but the lines which follow should be
read in conjunction :—
“Bear with my weakness : my old brain is troubled.”
Astronomy has been brought into the controversy, and the
possibility of Pope’s words being realised has not wanted
believers, when he wrote :—
‘ ‘ Atoms or systems into ruin hurled,
And now a bubble burst, and now a world.”
Some slight weight was given to this by the brilliant,
Frenchman, who accounted for the earth by a comet, which,
having mistaken its way, knocked a piece off the sun.
It is a consolation, however, to be told by Christian
astronomers that we do not find within itself the elements
of destruction in our planetary system, that all is in motion
and change everywhere. After millions of years all the
planets will return to their original places only to go
round again, the great bell of their judgment day will never
be sounded. Playfair says : “In the planetary motions,
where geometry has carried the eye so far into "the future
and the past, we discover no symptom either of a commence
ment or termination of the present order . . .
and as re
gards the latter “we may safely conclude that this great
catastrophe will not be brought about by any of the laws
now existing; and that it is not indicated by anything
which we perceive.”
If the “undevout astronomer is mad,” the devout one
surely is not. Name-calling in serious discussions of this
kind is, in my judgment, not only offensive, but inex
cusable. It is not uncommon to find in expensive works
the main proposition of the Theist described as being so
simple and familiar that any one who doubts it may be
laughed at as a fool or be pitied as insane. To me such
language betrays want of thought, ignorance, or vulgarity
�128
THE ATHEISTIC PLATFORM.
of speech. In every case, on whichever side, the writer
who steadfastly avoids the use of such expressions is a
praiseworthy contributor to a refinement in the inter
change of thought so desirable in a civilised community.
Printed by Annie Besant and Charles Bradlaugh, at 63, Fleet
Street, London, E.C.—1881.
�
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Is Darwinism Atheistic?
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Cattell, Charles Cockbill
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Place of publication: London
Collation: [115]-128 p. ; 18 cm.
Series title: Atheistic Platform
Series number: 8
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1884
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Darwinism
Atheism
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Atheism
Charles Darwin
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■
--------- ~
V,
Tlut^Js k^w?i> tX-| tvJ<Si>,
“IS IT REASONABLE
TO
WORSHIP GO D?”
VERBATIM REPORT
OF
TWO NIGHTS’ DEBATE AT NOTTINGHAM
BETWEEN
THE REV. R. A. ARMSTRONG
AND
CHARLES BRADLAUGH.
LONDON:
FREETHOUGHT PUBLISHING COMPANY,.
28, Stonecutter Street, E.C.
1878.
I
�LONDON :
PRINTED BY ANNIE BESANT AND CHARLES BRADLAUGH
28, STONECUTTER STREET.
�PREFACE.
I have been invited to prefix a few sentences to this
debate in its published form, and I am glad to avail myself
of the opportunity so courteously accorded.
Many have criticised my conduct in consenting to meet
in public debate one whose teachings, both theological
(or anti-theological) and social, they and I alike regard as.
in many respects of pernicious tendency. My reply is, that
those teachings are influencing large numbers of men and
women; that to denounce them, is simply to intensify their
influence in some quarters; and that they must be met
face to face if their force is to be diminished. I regard oral
public discussion as one of the least efficient methods for
the discovery of truth; but I cannot blind myself to the
fact that it is almost the only method by which what I hold
to be true, can get the ear and the attention of some classes
of the community; and I perceive that if a man can trust
his temper and is also interested in his cause and not in
himself, he may in this way do some good which he can do
in no other. If it be given him to touch one heart or
enlighten one soul, it is a cheap price to pay, that a laugh
may go against him, or even that some good and sincere
persons may think he has acted wrongly.
The debate itself can only touch the edge of subjects so
stupendous as Theism and Worship. But some may be
�IV
PREFACE.
led by it to thought or to study, on which they would not
otherwise have entered.
I select three points in this debate for a further word or
two :
(i.) I said Mr. Bradlaugh could not “ conceive a better
world.” The expression is ambiguous. He and I both con
ceive and strive to promote a better state of things than that
now existing. But we can conceive no better constitution
for a world than that of a world so constituted as to evoke
the effort of mankind to advance its progress and improve
ment. The evil is not in itself good; it is only the
necessary condition of good. The moment you conceive
a world existing from first to last without evil, you conceive
a world destitute of the necessary conditions for the
evolution of noble character; and so, in eliminating the evil,
you eliminate a good which a thousand times outweighs
the evil.
(2.) “ Either,” argues Mr. Bradlaugh, in effect, “ God could
make a world without suffering, or he could not. If he could
and did not, he is not all-good. It he could not, he is not
all-powerful.” The reply is, What do you mean by allpowerful? If you mean having power to reconcile things
in themselves contradictory, we do not hold that God is
all-powerful. But a humanity, from the first enjoying
immunity from suffering, and yet possessed of nobility of
character, is a self-contradictory conception.
(3.) I have ventured upon alleging an Intelligent Cause
of the phenomena of the universe; in spite of the fact that
in several of his writings Mr. Bradlaugh has described
intelligence as implying limitations. But though intelli
gence, as known to us in man, is always hedged within
limits, there is no difficulty in conceiving each and every
limit as removed. In that case the essential conception of
�V
PREFACE.
intelligence remains the same precisely, although the change
of conditions revolutionises its mode of working.
The metaphysical argument for Theism, though I hold
it in the last resort to be unanswerable, can never be the
real basis of personal religion. That must rest on the facts
of consciousness verified by the results in character flowing
from the candid recognition of those facts. It is useless, as
well as unscientific, for the Atheist either to deny or to
ignore those facts. The hopeless task that lies before him,
ere Theism can be overturned, is to prove that experiences
which to many a Theist are more real and more unquestion
able than the deliverances of sight, of hearing, or of touch,
are mere phantasies of the brain.
I addressed the following letter to the Editor of the
National Reformer after the debate.
TO THE EDITOR OF THE “ NATIONAL REFORMER.”
Sir,—Some of those who heard or may read the recent discussion
between Mr. Bradlaugh, and myself may be willing to pursue the
positive argument for Theism and Worship which I adopted—-as distin
guished from and supplementary to the ordinary metaphysical argument
—at greater length than the limits of time permitted me to expound it in
the debate. Will you allow me to recommend to such persons three
works which will specially serve their purpose ? These are—Theodore
Parker’s “Discourse of Matters Pertaining to Religion” (eighteenpence, British and Foreign Unitarian Association, 37, Norfolk Street,
Strand) ; F. W. Newman’s “ Hebrew Theism ” (half-a-crown, Triibner);
and the Rev. Charles Voysey’s “Mystery of Pain, Death, and Sin”
(Williams & Norgate, 1878). I would gladly add to these Professor
Blackie’s “ Natural History of Atheism ”—a book of much intellectual
force—were it not that he indulges too often in a strain of superior
contempt with which I have no sympathy.—I am, &c.,
Richard A. Armstrong.
Nottingham,
Sept, <pth, 1878.
�vi
PREFACE.
I only now further desire to refer the reader to Mr. Brown
low Maitland’s “Theismor Agnosticism” (eighteen-pencer
Christian Knowledge Society, 1878).
Tennyson shall utter. for me my last plea with the
doubter to throw himself upon the bosom of God in
prayer:—
“Speak to him, thou, for he hears, and spirit with spirit can.
meet,—
Closer is he than breathing, and nearer than hands and feet.”
R. A. Armstrong.
Nottingham,
Sept. 23rd, 1878.
�Is it Reasonable to Worship God?”
The first of two nights’ debate in the Co-operative Hall,
Nottingham, between the Rev. R. A. Armstrong and Mr.
Charles Bradlaugh; G. B. Rothera, Esq., in the chair.
The Chairman : Ladies and Gentlemen,—I have had
the pleasure, during the last few weeks, of spending a very
pleasant holiday on the heather-covered mountains of
Scotland. On reaching Edinburgh on my way homeward,
I received a letter from my friend, Mr. Armstrong, inform
ing me of the arrangements for to-night’s debate, and
of the wish that was felt that I should preside. Though a
private communication, yet as it contains the grounds
upon which the request was made, and in part also
those upon which I was induced to comply, I shall
be glad if Mr. Armstrong will kindly give me per
mission to read that letter to you. It is as follows :—“ My Dear Sir,—I have obtained your address from your
son, and you must blame him for enabling me to molest you
with my importunities in the midst of your holiday.
“ Circumstances have led to my receiving an invitation from
the local branch of the National Secular Society, and from Mr.
Bradlaugh, to debate with the latter on the reasonableness of
religious worship. At first strongly disposed to decline, I have
been led, together with the friends whom I have consulted, to
believe that it was my duty to accept the task, and, however
distasteful, I am now in for it.
“ It is to take place at the Co-operative Hall, on two consecu
tive nights, Thursday and Friday, September 5 and 6, and we
are most anxious to secure the services—which I hope will be
chiefly formal—of a competent chairman who will possess the
respect of both parties. My own friends and the Secularists
independently suggested your name, and we all feel that we
should be deeply indebted to you if you would preside over us
on the two nights. My earnest desire is to throw such a tone
into the meetings as shall make them really helpful to genuine
�8
truth-seekers, and I have good ground for believing that manysuch will be present.
■ “ I sincerely hope you will do us all this favour. I do not
know where else to turn for a chairman that will be so acceptable
to all concerned. Your speedy and favourable reply will be very
welcome to yours truly,
R. A. Armstrong.
“Burns Street, Nottingham, Aug. 24, 1878.
“ G. B. Rothera, Esq.”
Now, ladies and gentlemen, on receiving that letter my
first impulse was, I think naturally, to decline, and that
for two reasons—first, I find that as one gets on in life there
is a stronger and stronger disposition to avoid the excite
ment of public meetings, to seek more and more the ease
of one’s own arm-chair, and to enjoy that best of all society,
our books (hear). Beyond this I had real misgivings as to
my ability to fill, as I ought, the duties sought to be put upon
me. Nevertheless, on slight reflection, these difficulties
vanished. I felt that there were occasions, of which this,
probably, was one, when it becomes us to lay aside con
siderations of personal ease and convenience in the hope to
meet the wishes of, and to be useful to, one’s neighbours
and friends. Now, in occupying this position I must not
be considered to identify myself with either the one party
or the other (hear). I may agree with either, or with
neither. I am here, as I believe you are here, interested in
a question of the gravest concern to all of us, as an earnest
inquirer, anxious to learn and not afraid to hear (applause).
My position, I take it, is very much akin to that of the
Speaker of the House of Commons. I have simply to
regulate the order of debate, and to ask at your hands
—what I am sure I shall receive—such orderly and consis
tent behaviour as will become an assembly of English gentle
men. Now,in those who have charged themselves with the
responsibility of this debate we have men of acknowledged
ability and high culture (applause)—men who, I am sure
will know well how to reconcile the duties of courtesy with
the earnestness of debate. In addressing themselves to the
present question, it must, I think, be clearly understood
that the question, as it appears upon the paper, is not to be
narrowed to a simple inquiry whether it is reasonable that
we should worship God. A much wider issue must be
covered by the debate, if it is to satisfy the expectations
of this audience. The question is one, I take, it between
�9
Theism and Atheism. It is not enough to postulate a Deity,
and then ask whether it is reasonable or not to worship him.
What I think we have a right to ask is, tfyat the gentle
man charged with the affirmative of the proposition
shall adduce such evidence as will establish satisfactorily
the conclusion that there is a Deity to worship.
The
position of the Atheist, I take it, is not one of disbelief,
but of simple unbelief.
He does not say that God
is not, but he affirms the lack of evidence for the
position that God is (hear). He does not even say
that there may not be a God. What he does say is that
if there is a God he has failed to manifest himself, either by
the utterance of his voice, in audible revelation, or by the
impression of his hand upon visible nature. I take it, there
fore, and think Mr. Armstrong will be prepared to
accept the position, that it will be incumbent upon him, at
the outset of the discussion, to address himself to a con
sideration of the proofs in favour of the position that there
is a God to worship. If he succeed in this, then, I
think, there will be a very difficult and trying ordeal before
Mr. Bradlaugh to prove that, God, being existent, is not
entitled to the reasonable worship of his creatures (applause).
Pardon me these remarks by way of introduction. Before
calling on Mr. Armstrong to open the debate, I may just say
that, by arrangement between them, Mr. Armstrong, upon
whom the affirmative rests, is to be allowed half-an-hour
to open the discussion; Mr. Bradlaugh half-an-hour in
reply ; that then the next hour will be divided into quarters,
each speaker having a quarter of an hour alternately
(applause). The result of this arrangement will be that
Mr. Armstrong will open the debate to-night, which will
be closed by Mr. Bradlaugh, while to-morrow night Mr.
Bradlaugh will open the debate and Mr. Armstrong will
■close it. This, I think, you will regard as a satisfactory
arrangement, and a liberal one, inasmuch as Mr. Bradlaugh
concedes to Mr. Armstrong the advantage of the last word
(applause).
Mr. Armstrong, who was cordially received, said : Mr.
Chairman and friends—I wish to say two or three words at
the outset of this debate as to its origin. You are many of
you aware that a short time ago Mr. Bradlaugh visited this
town, and gave a lecture in defence of Atheism, from this plat
form, in answer to Professor Max Muller’s Hibbert lectures.
I was led to be present then, and I offered some remarks
�IO
at the close. Mr. Bradlaugh rejoined, and in the course of
his rejoinder threw out, in a courteous manner, a challenge
for me to meet him and discuss these weighty matters at fur
ther length. I thought no more of it then, not conceiving it
to be my duty to take up that challenge. A few days after
wards, however, I received a letter from the Secretary of
the Nottingham branch of the National Secular Society
stating that many persons had been much interested in the
words that fell from me, and that they would consider it an
obligation conferred upon them, and others earnestly in pur
suit of truth, if I consented to meet Mr. Bradlaugh in this
manner. I replied, that for my own part, I was but little
sanguine of any good effects, or a balance of good effects,
resulting from such a meeting; but that the invitation being
couched in such courteous and earnest terms, I would con
sult with friends on whose judgment I placed reliance, before
finally replying. I consulted these friends, and at the same time
thought the matter over further; and I came to the conclusion
that, though it has undoubtedly happened that on too many
occasions theological debates have been the root of bitter
ness and strife, yet, nevertheless, two men really in earnest
about what they have to say, and speaking to persons also
in earnest, who have come neither for amusement nor ex
citement—-I came to the conclusion that a debate, con
ducted with tact and temper on both sides, might (may I
say by the blessing of God ?) conduce rather to good than
to evil (applause). Under these circumstances, I accepted
the challenge. I did so, though, as I said in my letter to
the chairman, it is distasteful to me, because if I make any
thing of this occasion it can only be by exhibiting to you
my inmost heart. We are not going to talk in a superficial
manner—we are not going to bandy compliments, nor, I
hope, exchange rebukes; but, each of us is going to search
his inner consciousness, and try to express to the audience
that which he finds therein. It is, perhaps, more distasteful
to me on this occasion than to Mr. Bradlaugh, since I find,
or believe myself to find, in my inner consciousness certain
facts which Mr. Bradlaugh will no doubt tell you he does
not find in his inner consciousness. These facts are to me
of the most solemn and sacred nature conceivable, and to
expose them before a large and public audience is a thing
very like a sort of martyrdom. If I were not confident
that, however little you may sympathise with what I say,
you will treat it with respect or consideration, I woul
�11
never consent to drag the sacred thoughts of my soul before
you to hold them up as an exhibition (hear). I am to
maintain to-night—not to demonstrate (as you will see
if you look at the bills)—the proposition that it is
reasonable to worship God. Mr. Bradlaugh has not
necessarily to disprove, but to impugn, that proposition.
Now, all I have any hope of doing to-night is this—to
show that it is reasonable for me and for others conscious of
mental phenomena in themselves more or less akin to those
of which I am conscious, to worship God. Would that I
could touch you with the beauty and the sweetness
of this belief—would that I could hold up before you, in all
its glory and sublimity, in all its strength and holiness, the
beauty and the sweetness of the worship of God. Could
I succeed in doing so, I should take your imaginations
captive. I think I should get the suffrage of your reason.
It is as though, sir, to-night, I had been called upon to
prove that my dearest friend is worthy to be loved—ay,
•even that my dearest friend exists; for, if God is aught to
us, he is our dearest, nearest friend—present when all
others are taken from us, a sure refuge in every moment of
temptation and of woe ; the very highest and most intimate
reality of which the mind can conceive—the sum and sub
stance of all existence. Well, now, how do I know this
God ? Who is this God of whom I speak ? Let me try to
tell you how it seems to me that I have made acquaintance
with him. I find that at certain moments of my life there
is that which I can best describe aS a voice—though it is a
metaphor—addressed to me, influencing largely my conduct.
I find that there are in me, as in all men, strong instincts,
strong desires, strong self-interests—some lower, some
higher, some less worthy, some more worthy, than others.
I find that but for this voice of which I speak I should be
entirely swayed thereby, as, so far as I can see, the brutes
of the field and the forest are swayed thereby. But I find
that sometimes, at moments when these instincts are the
very strongest within me, and when I am about to throw
myself into their realisation and give them expression in
■fact—I find, sometimes, at these moments that there comes
to me somewhat which, so far as my consciousness delivers,
is not myself. There comes to me somewhat stopping me
from indulging these instincts and bidding me to curb them.
Ifindatothertimesthatmyinstinctsof self-preservation, of self
regard, of pleasure-loving, and so forth—my appetites—
�12
would lead me to hold back from a certain course of action.
So far as I can judge, looking into my own mind, myself is
against that course of action. It appears to my reasoning
powers and inclinations that I had better keep out of it.
But there comes now somewhat which comes from outside,,
and which is no part of myself, which says, “ Go and do it.”
That was so when I received the invitation to this debate.
Again, I find that on certain occasions—alas! that I should
have to say it—I have defied this monitor, I have done that
which it told me not to do, or not done that which it bade
me to do. I find then that there enter into me from some
where—I know not from whence—pangs of remorse keener
than ever came from any personal sorrow, more biting than
ever came from any physical pain. There have been times,
however—let me thank God I can say so !—when I have
obeyed this voice, followed its dictates in spite of all myself
seeming to drag me from it; and my experience is that on
these occasions there has entered my soul, from whence I
cannot tell you, a peace surpassing that given us in any
other circumstances—a peace in the light of which the
sorrows that at other times might cut me to the heart seem
light and small, a peace in the beauty and holiness of which
these'sorrows seem wonderfully diminished. I will tell you what
I call the source of that voice which I fancy speaks to me
in that fourfold manner. I call the source of that voice
“ God,” and that is the first thing I mean by God. I call the
source of all these monitions and admonitions, these ex
hortations and rebukes, this voice of reproval and of
approval, the voice of God; because I must give it some
name, and that seems to me the simplest and the truest name
I can give it. I might, perhaps, be inclined to doubt
whether all this was not fancy (though I hardly think I
should) if, so far as I could gather, it were an unique experi
ence of my own; but I find that it is not so. I find that
this voice is recognised by every true man and woman I
meet. They may obey it or not, but they recognise it, and
allow that it is there. I behold the picture by Millais
of the day before the awful massacre of St. Bartho
lomew. I see the maiden leaning on her lover’s bosom
whilst he looks down upon her with looks of love and
tenderness, and she strives to tie around his arm a scarf.
She knows of the impending massacre, that all Protestants
are to be slaughtered, and she would fain put this badge
upon his arm as a secret signal to preserve him from the
�13
sword. Does he accept this method of escape ? Although
his inclination is to remain with his beloved, the strength of
his right hand is given to tear the badge from his arm, and
he faces death, not with joy, but with an exceeding bitter
sorrow for the moment—he faces death in simple loyalty
and obedience to the voice which has spoken to his heart.
That is an experience which you will all recognise—one
which, in less or in greater force, we have all had. What
ever explanation may be given—and, doubtless, Mr. Brad’
laugh has an explanation of his own—this voice of con
science is to me one of the primary evidences of the exist
ence of God. Nay, I will not call it an evidence; it
is God speaking to me (applause). This conscience
has been described by Mr. Voysey, in his recentlypublished sermons in refutation of Atheism, as fol
lows : “ The collision is so complete between the higher
voice and the impelling instinct, that one can only feel that
the two are radically different in nature, and. must have had
a different source. . . .To have the power of doing
intentionally what one shrinks from doing, and to
deny one’s self the pleasure which is so fascinating,
and which one longs to do, is to prove the immense superi
ority of our inner selves over the visible universe.”
To have the power, as that man, that Huguenot, must have
had it, to deny one’s self the pleasure which is so fascinating,
and for which one longs, is to prove the immense superiority
of our inner selves when hearing the voice of God over the
visible universe. Again, speaking of conscience, Voysey says :
“The conscience which makes us mortify our flesh with its
affections and lusts, and which often mars our happiness and
embitters our pleasure, upbraids us with reproaches and
stings us with remorse, that voice which hushes our cry for
happiness, which will not endure a single selfish plea, but
demands unquestioning obedience, and bids us fall down in
the very dust before the Majesty of Duty—we all, in our
secret hearts, revere this power, whether or not we obey it
as we should. At least, we pay to it the homage of our inmost
souls, and feel how great and grand it is to be its slave.”
Now, sir, I desire to pass on to another method, by which it
seems to me that I apprehend this being. Having made the
acquaintance with this awful voice—and the philosopher
Kant said two things filled him with awe, the starry
heavens and the moral nature in man—I pass on to another
matter. Behold the starry heaven itself. I know not how
�14
it is with you, but I will tell you my experience—and we are
told by scientific men that we must bring everything to the test
of experience. Sometimes when I have been out oftemper—as I
am sometimes, like other people—sometimes, when I have been
much distracted with cares, when troubles and pains have
been thick upon me, it falls to my lot to go out beneath the
starry heaven. What is it that I experience in my soul ? I
go through no process of metaphysical reasoning, I do not
argue with myself, but I simply feel that there is a Divine
presence there, in whose hand are all these stars and all
these worlds—a great voice singing, “ I am strong and I am
good, and you are safe nestling in my hand.” I know not
if that corresponds with the experience of all here,
but that it corresponds with the experience of many, I
feel sure ; and let me ask such not to drive away these
holy feelings, but to trust them as the assurance which
God gives of his presence. It may be that in those lakes
and mountains which you, sir, have seen of late, you
may have heard a message whispering to your soul of a
peace beyond the peace of earth—of a presence before
which all things are well. In others, not so sensitive per
haps to the beauties of natural scenery, such experience
comes in the tones of music—in some grand symphony or
some sweet song; and they feel lifted away from the things
of earth,' and they feel lifted into some presence in which it
is a joy to be, and which fills their soul with peace. That
presence I call, having no other name for it, the presence of
God. Observe, that in this I am not philosophising about
the cause—I am not saying that God is the cause and so
on; I am only relating the experience of my consciousness,
reported to you as faithfully and truly as I can read it. Let
me read what Professor Blackie wrote the other day:
“ Many things can be known only by being felt, all vital
forces are fundamentally unknowable.” And, says Francis
Newman, that arch-heretic : “ The astronomer is ever aware
of the presence of gravitation and the electrician sees all
things pervaded by electricity—powers descried by the mind,
unwitnessed by any sense, long unknown to the wise, still
unknown or undiscerned by the vulgar j yet this percep
tion of things hidden is not esteemed cloudy.” Now,
having made some acquaintance with this awful, inscrutable
something, to which I venture to give the name of God, I
venture to lift up to it the voice of my soul, and strive
to throw myself towards that Being. And what is my
�i5
experience ? Let us go to experience again: I find
when my mind is bewildered and in doubt, when it
is all involved with difficulties, that somehow, when I
address that Being, there comes to my soul . “ clear
shining,” and I see things plainer and more beautiful than
before. I appeal to him in pain and sorrow—not with the
coward’s prayer, but simply asking that I may feel his pre
sence, to endure it j and the pain and sorrow have become
light on the instant assurance that God is there to comfort
and console. I pray to him in weakness, when my strength
fails, and what is the result? That a new manhood
comes to me, and I feel that wondrous power which
over-arches all the worlds, and I feel that I have in me
also somewhat of his strength. I appeal to him, last of all,
in temptation, when the wrong deed presses closely on my
inclinations, and what do I find ? That strength is given
me to stand up against temptation, and he answers
according to the immemorial prayer of Christendom:
deliver us from temptation, This is experience, or I fancy
it is. It is not theory. Again, I am in gladness. When
is my gladness greatest, and when is it richest? Why,
when it flows up and out, in thankfulness and adoration, to
the source to which I trace it. Then my gladness seems to
receive an influence which lifts it up above. No gladness
is the true gladness without that. Let me conclude this
half-hour by reading a very short extract from Professor
Newman. Speaking of the instincts of mankind, he says:—
And the instinct of Religion is the noblest of them all,
The bravest, the most enduring, the most fruitful in mighty
deeds,
The source of earliest grandeur, unitress of scattered tribes ;
Even in the crudeness of its infancy,when unpurified by science,
Yet teeming with civilisation, with statesmanship, with letters.
Mistress of all high art, and parent of glorious martyrs.
And if from it have come wars, and bigotries, and cruelties,
Through infantine hot-headedness and unripeness of mind,
We take your aid, O Sceptics ! to purge it from all such evils,
And kindly honour we pay to you for your battles against super
stition ;
Yet the very evils ye deplore, prove Religion’s mighty energy,
And the grasp deeply seated which she has within human
hearts.”
(Loud applause.)
Mr. Bradlaugh : Thanking you, sir, for acceding to the
request which I would have gladly joined in had I had any
�right of acquaintance to entitle me to make it; thanking you
for undertaking what is always a troublesome duty, however
well a debate may be conducted, of presiding over a dis
cussion, permit me to say one word only as to the opening
which fell from your lips. There is only one phrase in that
which I desire to note, so as to save myself from the possi
bility of misapprehension. I quite agree with the view you
put of the position the Atheist takes, except that if Dualism
be affirmed, if more than Monism be affirmed, if more than
one existence be affirmed, and if it be the beyond of that one
existence which is called God, then the Atheist does not
say there may be one, but says there cannot be one; and
that is the only distinction I wish to put as against the very
kind words with which you introduced the speakers this
evening The question for our debate is : “ Is it reasonable
to worship God ?” and to determine this question it is
necessary to define the words “worship” and “God,”and next
to decide whether belief in God is reasonable or unreason
able ; and, secondly, whether worship is, under any, and
if any, what,. circumstances, reasonable or unreasonable.
And I am afraid I must here except that, in the speech to
which I have just listened, and which, from its tone and
kindly style, is perfectly unexceptionable, there is not one
word at present—it may possibly come later on—which may
fairly be taken as approaching a definition either of the word
“ God ” or the word “ worship. ” By worship I mean act of rever
ence, respect, adoration, homage, offered to some person.
According to this definition, worship cannot be offered to the
impersonal, and according to this definition it would be
unreasonable to advocate worship to be offered to the im
personal. Under the term “worship” I include prayer—which
is, evidently, from the opening, also included in the term
“worship” by the rev. gentleman who maintains the opposite
position to myself—praise, sacrifice, offerings, solemn ser
vices, adoration, personal prostration. For the word “God,”
not having a definition of my own, I take—not having yet
gathered, in what has fallen from Mr. Armstrong, enough to
enable me to say that I understand what he means by it—I
take the definition of “ God” given in Professor Flint’s Baird
lectures ; not meaning by that that Mr. Armstrong is bound
by that definition, but asking him to be kind enough to note
where he thinks that definition is incorrect, and to kindly tell
me so, for my guidance in the latter portions of the debate.
By “ God,” for the purpose of this debate, I shall mean a self-
�i7
existent, eternal being, infinite in power and in wisdom, and
perfect in holiness and goodness ; the maker of heaven
and earth. And by “self-existent" I mean, that, the con
ception of which does not require the conception of
antecedent to it. For example, this glass is phenomenal,
conceived, as all phenomena must be conceived, by the
characteristics or qualities which enable you to think
and identify it in your mind, but which cannot be con
ceived except as that of which there is possible ante
cedent and consequent, and which, therefore, cannot be
considered as self-existent according to my definition. By
“eternal”and by “infinite” I only mean illimitable, indefinite,
tome—applying the term “eternal ” to duration, and the word
“ infinite ” to extension. I take Professor Flint, or whoever
may hold the definition I have given of God, by “ maker ”
to mean originator; and then I am in the difficulty that the
word “ creator,” in the sense of origin, is, to me, a word
without meaning. I only know creation as change ; origin
of phenomena, not of existence; origin of condition, not
origin of substance. The words “ creation ” and “ de
struction ” are both words which have no other
meaning to my mind than the meaning of change.
I will now try to address myself to some of the argu
ments that were put forward by Mr. Armstrong. He
said that to him the notion of entering into this debate was
distasteful to him, and he addressed somewhat of an in
quiry as to my own feeling on the matter. No ! the dis
cussion of no one subject more than any other is distasteful
to me, unless it be of a personal character, in which it might
involve my having to say things upon which I should not like
to mislead and upon which it would be painful to me to
state the facts. Then a discussion would be distasteful to
me; but such a discussion as this is not any more distaste
ful to me than the discussion of an astronomical or geolo
gical problem; and I will urge to those who go even further
and say, that not only is such a matter distasteful, but that the
discussion of Theism is really immoral, to such I would read
from a recent volume entitled “ A Candid Examination of
Theism”:—“If there is no God, where can be the harm
in our examining the spurious evidence of his existence ?
If there is a God,- surely our first duty towards him must
be to exert to our utmost, in our attempts to find him, the
most noble faculty with which he has endowed us—as care
fully to investigate the evidence which he has seen fit to
�furnish of his own existence, as we investigate the evidence
of inferior things in his dependent creation. To say that
there is one rule or method for ascertaining truth in the
latter case which it is not legitimate to apply in the former
case, is merely a covert way of saying that the Deity—if
he exists—has not supplied us with rational evidence of
his existence.” Now, that is the position I am going to
put to you; and there ought to be nothing distasteful
to anyone in proving most thoroughly the whole of the
evidence upon which his supposed belief in God’s existence
rests. The grounds of his belief ought to be clear to him
self, or they are no sufficient grounds for his belief, even to
himself. If they are clear to himself they ought to be
clearly stateable to others; because, if not, they lie under
the suspicion of not being clear to himself. That which is
sufficient to him to convince him, is either capable of being
clearly stated—although it may not carry conviction to
another—or it is not. If it is not capable of being clearly
stated, I would suggest it is because it does not clearly exist
in his own mind. Now Mr. Armstrong says that he feels as if
called upon to prove that his dearest friend ought to be
loved, as if called upon to prove that his dearest friend
exists. He spoke of God as being to him his dearest
friend, and he followed that with some words as to which I am
not quite sure whether he intended to use them in the sense in
which they fell upon my ears. He described God as “ the
sum and substance of all existence.” I do not want to
make any verbal trick, and if I am putting more on Mr.
Armstrong than he meant to convey I should like to be put
right when he rises again, and I will ask him if he considers
God to be the sum and substance of all existing; and, if
he does not, I will ask him in what respect he distinguishes
between God, in his mind, and the sum and substance of
all existence ; because clearly, when he used those words he
had some meaning in his mind, and I should like to know
these two things : First, do you identify God in your mind
with the sum and substance of all existence ? If not, in
what respects do you distinguish God in your mind from
the sum and substance of all existence ? If you say that
you identify God with the sum and substance of all exist
ence, then I ask, are we included in that, sum and substance
of all existence ? And if we are included in that sum and
substance of all existence, is it reasonable for one phe
nomenon or for a number of phenomena, to offer worship
�T9
to any of, and to how much of, what remains ? Then he
addressed himself to the very old argument, which he put
so beautifully, when he said : “How do I know God?” and
launched into what is known as the argument from conscience,
an argument very fully stated by Professor Flint in the
Baird lectures to which I have referred. Mr. Armstrong
said, and here I will take a little exception; he said : “ In
me, as in all men here, are strong instincts; in me, as in all
men, there are strong desires; in me, as in all men, there is
a voice.” That is just the blunder; that is not true. I do
not mean that in any sort of disrespectful sense. If you
take a volume like Topinard’s “ Anthropology ” you find
that men’s desires, men’s emotions, and men’s instincts all
vary with race, all vary with locality, with type, all vary with
what Buckle called “Food, climate, soil, and life surround
ings and I ask, if there be this variance in individuals of
different races, nay, more, if there be this variance in in
dividuals of the same race at the same moment, and if the
members of the same race vary in different places and ages,
as to their instincts, desires, and emotions, I ask you whether
there has been the same variation in the source of it? You
say the source is God, and if so, how can a variable source
be a reliable object of worship ? Then let us see a little
more. “ I do not desire to do something, but my monitor
says ‘ Do ” or the reverse; and thus voice is the evidence
of Deity. I should have been obliged if Mr. Armstrong
had defined exactly what it was he meant by conscience,
because here we are going terribly to disagree. I am going
to deny the existence of conscience altogether, except as a
result of development upon organisation, including in that,
transmitted predisposition of ability to possible thought or
action. But if that be so, what becomes of this “ still small
voice,” of those desires and instincts? The mere fact
that the mother may have worked in a cotton-mill while
childbearing and have had bad food, or that the father may
have beaten her—his brutality may result in the awakening
of a desire and instinct exactly the opposite of that which Mr.
Armstrong has, and the organisation fitted for repeating
which may be handed down through generations. I stood
this morning for other purposes at the doors of Coldbath
fields Prison. One man who came out gave a sort of shrill
whistle and plunged into the crowd with a defiant and a
mocking air, showing that his conscience, his monitor, said
nothing to him except that he was glad he was outside, and
�20
ready to war with the world again (applause). I am not
wishing to press this view in any fashion unkindly or unfairly; '
I am only wanting to put the thing as it appears to me. I
want to.know: “ Does Mr. Armstrong contend that there is a
faculty identical in every human being which he calls con
science, which does decide for each human being, and
always decides, in the same manner, what is right and what
is wrong ? Or does he mean that this ‘ monitor,’ as he calls
it, decides differently in different men and in different
countries ? And if ‘ yes,’ is the source different in each case
where there is a different expression ? And if ‘ yes,’ is it
justifiable and reasonable to offer worship to an uncertain
source, or to a source which speaks with a different voice, or
to a source which is only one of a number, and of which you
do not know how far its limit extends, and where its juris
diction begins or ends ? ” Let us follow this out a little
more. We have not only to define conscience, but we have
also to define right and wrong, and I did not hear Mr. Arm
strong do that. I did hear him say that when he had done
something in opposition to his monitor he felt remorse. I
did hear him say there was struggling between himself and
his monitor, and here I had another difficulty. What is the
himself that struggles, as distinguished in his mind from the
monitor that he struggles against ? If the struggle is a
mental one, what is mind struggling against ? and if it is not,
how does Mr. Armstrong explain it ? Let us, if you please,
go to right and wrong. By moral I mean useful. I mean
that that is right which tends to the greatest happiness of the
greatest number, with the least injury to any. I am only
following Jeremy Bentham. That is my definition of right.
Many matters which have been held to come within that
definition in one age have been found in another age not to
come within it, and the great march of civilisation is that
from day to day it instructs us in what is useful. I submit
that instead of adoring the source of contradictory verdicts
it is more reasonable to find out for ourselves some rule we
can apply. For example, here Mr. Armstrong’s conscience
would not raise any particular objection to his taking animal
food, unless he happens to be a vegetarian, and then, I am
sure, he would conscientiously carry it out; but the majority
of people’s consciences in England would raise no great
objection to taking animal food. Yet in China and in
Hindustan hundreds of thousands of human beings have
died because vegetable food was not there for them, and
«
�21
their consciences made them prefer death to tasting
animal food' I want to know whether the conscience is
from the same source here as in Hindustan, and I want to
know, if that is so, which people are justified in worshipping
the source ? Take the case of murder. Mr. Armstrong’s
conscience would clearly tell him that it was wrong to murder
me. And yet there are many people in this country who
would not go to that extent. But I am going to take a
stronger illustration. There are a number of people who
think it perfectly right to bless the flags of a regiment, and to
pray to the God whom Mr. Armstrong asks me to worship,
that a particular regiment, whose flags are blessed, may kill
the people of some other particular regiment as rapidly as
possible. This shows that there are confusions of mind as
to what is meant by murder, and a like confusion exists on
a number of other matters on which the monitor is
misrepresenting.
And then Mr. Armstrong has said^
“ I mean by God the source of admonition, rebukes,
remorse, trouble,” and he says: “ It is a conscience-voice
which is recognised by every true man and woman.”
I am sure he would not wish to put any position
stronger than it should be put, and he put it, too, that this
was the feature in which man differed from the brutes. I
am inclined to tell him that not only there is not that recog
nition to-day amongst the physiological and psychological
teachers, but that we have a number of. men whose re
searches have been collected for us, who show us that what
you call the “ still small voice,” this monitor, these desires,
instincts, emotions, are to be found—varied, it is true
—right through the whole scale of animal life. Whereever there is a nervous encephalic apparatus sufficient
you have—except in the fact of language—wider distinc
tion between the highest order of human race and the
lowest, than you have between the lowest order of human
beings and those whom you are pleased to call brutes. I
will now only take the illustration of the eve of St. Bartho
lomew, which is fatal to the argument of Mr. Armstrong.
He gave the Protestant lover—a very fine character—reject
ing the symbolic bandage, and preferring to die for his faithy
or, .as Mr. Armstrong put it, “ to face death in simple
loyalty rather than play the hypocrite, and the source of that
feeling was God.” Was that the source of the feeling
which led Bruno to be burnt at the stake as if for Atheism,
or for Vanini, burnt for Atheism ; or for Lescynski, burnt
�for Atheism; or for Mrs. Besant, robbed of her child because
of her avowal of Atheism (hisses) ? You are hissing ; wait
whilst I answer. Is the source of your hissing, God ? Then
what a cowardly and weak thing, and little fitted for worship
must be that source (applause). I desire to deal with this
subject in all gravity, in all sincerity, in all kindness, but I
plead for a cause—weakly, it is true—for which great and
brave men and women have died, and I will permit no insult
to it in my presence—(cheers)—knowingly I will pass none.
I believe my antagonist to meet me loyally, honourably, and
honestly, and I believe him to meet me earnestly and
sincerely. I believe he has no desire to wound my feel
ings, and I 'do not wish to wound his ; and I ask you, the
jury here, to try to follow the same example set by him
in this debate (cheers).
Mr. Armstrong, being received with cheers, said:
It is very difficult indeed to think on these deep
problems under consideration with excitement amongst
the audience present, therefore I hope that you will be as
quiet as you can. I will begin at once with a confession
—and this, at any rate, will be a testimony of my candour—
by saying that the moment I had spoken certain words in
my opening speech I thought: “'Mr. Bradlaugh will have
me there;” and he had me (laughter). The words
were those in which I spoke of God as the sum and
substance of all existence. Now, to me, God is a much
simpler word than the phrase, “ sum and substance of all
existence.” Whether God be the “ sum and substance of
all existence ” I know not, for those words convey to me
less clear meaning than the word “God” conveys to me. The
source, moreover, of my immediate knowledge of God is
such that it can make no asseverations whatever upon deep
questions of metaphysics, as to what the “ sum and sub
stance of all existence” may consist. Mr. Bradlaugh has taken
a definition of God from Professor Flint. He is a Scotchman,
and Scotchmen are very fond of definitions (a laugh). Very
often, too, their definitions obscure their subject-matter, and
it is far harder to get any proper significance from them than
in the thing which they intended to define. I am
utterly incapable of saying whether that definition of Pro
fessor Flint’s is an accurate definition of God or not. What I
mean by “God,” and perhaps Mr. Bradlaugh will take it as the
best definition I can here give, is the source, whatever it be, of
this metaphorical voice—of these intimations or monitions,
�23
that come to me in certain experiences which I have. Mr.
Bradlaugh, of course, devoted much time to answering Pro
fessor Flint. He asked whether God was the source of that
loyalty with which the Atheists he mentioned went to the
stake, and’I say from the bottom of my heart, that he was. God
knows the Atheist though the Atheist knows not him. God
is the source of loyalty of heart, in whomsoever it may be.
If others are led to propound propositions which I believe
to be false, and if they dispute other propositions which I
believe to be true, do you think that God is going to judge
them for that, so long as they have been true and faithful to
their own reasoning powers (applause) ? Mr. Bradlaugh
noticed the phrase which fell from me, about a discussion
like this being distasteful to me. I did not say that the
matter under discussion was distasteful to me. I did not say
that a discussion under other conditions would be distasteful
to me. I did not say that it was at all distasteful to me to
search the grounds of my own belief, for my own belief
would be poor indeed were not such search my constant
practice (hear, hear). Mr. Bradlaugh laid great stress,
during the greater part of his speech, upon what
appear to be, in different races and in different
climes, the different and contradictory deliverances of
conscience. That difficulty is one which has been
felt by many persons, and dealt with, well and ill, by
various writers. The difficulty is one of importance, and it
arises, perhaps, from the word “ conscience ” being used in
various different senses. My use of the word “ conscience ” is
simply as being that voice of God (as I still call it) which says,
“Do the right; don’t do the wrong.” It does not in anyway say
what is right or what is wrong. That which I call the right,
like so much of our manhood, is the gradual development
and evolution of history, and it is largely dependent, as
Mr. Bradlaugh, says, upon climate and other external sur
roundings. We have to reason about what is right and wrong.
We must have gradual education of the individual and
of the race to get a clearer and more worthy conception of
the right and wrong ; and all I claim for conscience is that
the man, having resolved in his own mind what is right and
what is wrong,this conscience says, “Do the right,and do not
the wrong.” Therefore, instates of barbarous society, where
misled reason has induced persons to think certain things
were right which we look upon as crimes, still the voice of
conscience must necessarily tell them to do the right. The
�24
thing is right to the individual if he thinks it right. It may
be a terrible mistake of his—it may be a terrible mistake to
believe or teach certain things; nevertheless, the voice of
conscience says, “ Do the rightit does not define what
the right is. That is one of the things which God leaves to
be developed in humanity by slow degrees. Thank God, we
see that the idea of the right and the wrong is purifying—is
clarifying in the course of history. The conception of what
is right and what is wrong is better now than it was a
hundred years ago; the conception of what is right
and what is wrong is better still than it was a thou
sand years ago.
Many of the things then considered
laudable are now considered base; and many of the things
then considered base are now considered laudable. This
voice of which I speak, however, like all other voices, may
not be equally perceived at all times. Supposing that you
were at school, and a certain bell rang at six o’clock every
morning. If you accustom yourself to rising when the bell
rings, you will naturally enough go on hearing it; but if you
get into the habit of disregarding it, and turning over on the
other side for another nap, the bell may sound loudly but
you will cease to hear it. So it is, I take it, with the voice
of God, which ever speaks—which ever pleads—but against
which man may deafen himself. He may make himself so
dull of understanding that he may not hear it clearly. Not
only the individual man’s own obstinacy may make
him dull of hearing, but it must be conceded that this
dulness of hearing may descend to him from long
generations of those from whom he proceeds. It may
be a part of his inheritance. But it does not follow that
this voice does not exist, and that it does not still plead with
him if he had the ear to hear it. No man is so lost but that
if he strives to hear, that voice will become to him clearer and
more clear. I ask you here whether you find any difficulty
in deciding what, to you, is right or wrong? Mr. Bradlaugh
is very fond of definitions. The words “right’’and “wrong’’are
so simple that any definition of them would only obscure
them. I know, andyou know, what you m ean by right and wrong.
If I say of a thing, “ That is not right, don’t do it,” you know
what I mean. Can I speak in any plainer way than to say
of a thing, “ That is not right ” ? If there is no better way
of explaining what you mean than this—if there is no plainer
way—it is best not to attempt to define the word, because
the definition would only tend to obscure it. Not being
4
>
�25
much accustomed to debates of this description, much of
what I desired to say in the first half-hour was not said. I
am told that all this experience which I have been trying
to relate to you is fancy, and I am asked to prove that there
is some being who can be imagined to be this God whom I
believe I hear speaking to me. I might ask : “ Is it not
enough that not only do I think I hear this voice, but that
so many hundreds and thousands of the great and good
have also thought so ? Is it not enough that many of the
great reformers, many of the great leaders in the paths of
righteousness and mercy, in this England of ours, tell us that
they hear this voice ? You must, if you deny it, either think
they lie or that they are deluded. When Newman, Voysey,
Theodore Parker—the glorious abolitionist of America—
say that it is their most intimate experience, it is somewhat
shallow to assert that there is nothing in it. I am not one
of those who think that the existence of a God can be
proved to the understanding of every one in a large audience
on a priori grounds. At the same time the balance of
probability on a priori grounds seems to be, to me, strongly
in favour of Theism. I find that there is, in my own.
mental constitution, a demand for cause of some kind for
every phenomenon. I want to know what has led to thephenomenon, and I find a good many other people are apt to
inquire in the like direction. Even very little children,
before they are sophisticated by us teachers and parsons,
want to be informed as to the causes of things. Another
point — I cannot help believing that all cause must beintelligent. Yes, I knew that would go down in Mr. Brad
laugh’s notes; but I say again, I cannot conceive of any
cause which is not intelligent in some sort of way (applause).
Mr. Brad laugh : There are two things which are evidently
quite certain so far as my opponent is concerned; one is that
we shall have a good-tempered debate, and the other that we
shall have a candid debate. Mr. Armstrong has said frankly,
with reference to the definition of God, that he is perfectly in
capable of saying whether the definition of Professor Flint is
correct or not, and he has, I think I may say, complained that
I am too fond of definitions. Will he permit me on this to read
him an extract from Professor Max Muller’s recent lecture :
“ It was, I think, a very good old custom never to enter
upon the discussion of any scientific problem without giving,
beforehand definitions of the principal terms that had to be
employed. A book on logic or grammar generally opened
�with the question, What is logic? What is grammar ? No
one would write on minerals without first explaining what he
meant by a mineral, or on art, without defining, as well as
he might, his idea of art. No doubt it was often as trouble
some for the author to give such preliminary definitions as
it seemed useless to the reader, who was generally quite
incapable in the beginning of appreciating their full value.
Thus it happened that the rule of giving verbal definitions
came to be looked upon after a time as useless and obsolete.
Some authors actually took credit for no longer giving these
definitions, and it soon became the fashion to say that the
only true and complete definition of what was meant by
logic or grammar, by law or religion, was contained in the
books themselves which treated of these subjects. But
what has been the result ? Endless misunderstandings and
controversies which might have been avoided in many cases
if both sides had clearly defined what they did and what
they did not understand by certain words.” I will show you
presently where this need of accurate definition comes so
very strongly. Mr. Armstrong is quite clear that he knows
what right means ; he is also quite clear that you know
what he means. That may be true, but it also may not, and
I will show you the difficulty.
Suppose there were a
thorough disciple, say of some bishop or church, who thought
it right to put to death a man holding my opinions. That
man would think the capital punishment for heresy right,
Mr. Armstrong would not. That man’s conscience would
decide that it was right, Mr. Armstrong’s would decide that
it was not. What is the use of saying you both know what
is right ? The word right is a word by which you label
certain things, thoughts, and actions, the rightness of which
you have decided on some grounds known only to yourselves.
It may be they are pleasant to you or disagreeable to your
antagonist. I, in defining morality, gave you my reason for
labelling the thing with the name “right.” Mr. Armstrong has
given you no reason whatever. Mr. Armstrong says that
conscience is the voice of God which says : “ Do that which
is right, don’t do that which is wrong.” Yet the divine voice
does not tell you what is right and what is wrong. Hence
that conscience talking to the cannibal: “ It is right to eat
that man, he’s tender; it’s wrong to eat that man, he’s
tough ”—(laughter)—and the voice of God says : “eat the
tender men because it is right; don’t eat the tough men
because it is wrong.” I ask how that illustration is to be
�27
dealt with? If the voice does not in any way enable you to
determine the character of the act, then it simply means
that what you call the voice of God asks you to continue
committing every error which has been bequeathed you
from past times as right, and to avoid every good thing
because in past times it has been condemned and is yet con
demned as wrong. If that is to be the conclusion, then
I say that the voice of God is not a voice to be worshipped,
and that it is not reasonable to worship such a voice
and taking that to be the definition I submit that upon
that a negative answer must be given in this debate.
Mr. Armstrong very frankly and candidly says that the
conception of what is right and wrong is being cleared
and purified ‘ day by day. That is, the conception now is
different to what it was one hundred years ago, and better
still than it was a thousand years ago; but the voice of
God, a thousand years ago, told the Armstrong and Brad
laugh then living, to do that which conscience said to them
was right, and which the conscience to-day says is wrong.
Was God governed by the mis-education, the mis-informa
tion, and the mis-apprehension of the time ? If the God
was outside the ignorance of the day, why did he not set the
people right ? Was he powerless to do it ? In which case,
how do you make out that he is God ? Or had he never the
willingness to do it ? In which case how do you make out
that he was God good ? And if he preferred to leave them
in blindness, how do you reconcile that? Then we are told
the voice is not always clear, but that you may make it more
clear by a habit of obedience. That is so I suppose. And you
may transmit the predisposition to the habit of galloping tohorses on this side the ocean, the predisposition to the
habit of trotting to horses on the other side the ocean;' tothinking MahommedanisminTurkey,and to thinking another
“ ism ” in England, and some other “ism” in Hindustan.
You do not transmit the actual thought any more than you
transmit the actual gallop or trot, but you transmit the pre
disposition, given the appropriate surroundings to reproduce
any action physical or mental. And the source of this is
God, is it ? I vow I do not understand how the Theist is to
meet the contradiction thus involved. Then, Mr. Arm
strong says that when he uses the word “ right,” he defies
anyone to make it plainer. Let us see what that means :
I forge a cheque; Mr. Armstrong says that’s wrong. Why?
Oh ! it is a dishonest and dishonourable thing, it tends to
�28
injure, and so on. But let us see whether you are always
quite clear about these things ? When you are annexing a
country, for example; praying to your God that you may
annex successfully, and that he will protect you when you
have annexed, does not your conscience run away with you,
or does not God mislead you in some of these things ? Is
it not true that the moment you get outside the definition
of the word “ right,” and the moment you say : “ I have a
standard of right which I will not tell you, because nothing
I tell you will make it clear ” you are launched at once into
a heap of absurdities and contradictions ? You think it is
right to have one wife, the Turk thinks it right to have two.
How are you to determine between them ? It only means,
that one of you has labelled bigamy “ right ” and the other
has labelled it “ wrong.” You must have some kind of ex
planation to justify what you are talking about it. We had
an argument offered by Mr. Armstrong which, if it meant
anything, meant that the voice of the majority should pre
vail. Mr. Armstrong said, that it was not only his experience
but that of thousands of others. Does he mean to tell me
that problems of this kind are to be determined by an un
trained majority, or by the verdict of a skilled minority ?
If by a majority, I have something to say to him, and if by
the skilled minority, how are you to select them ? In his
first speech, which I did not quite finish replying to, we
were told that God’s peace and beauty were apprehended in
lakes and mountains. But I have seen one lake—-Michigan—
the reverse of peace and beauty; I have seen little vessels
knocked about by the waves, and dashed to pieces ; and I
have seen Mount Vesuvius when it has been the
very opposite of calm and beautiful, and I have
heard of the houses at Torre del Grecco—though I
have never seen it—being burned in the night by the fiery
lava stream. Where is the peace and beauty of that scene ?
You can take peace. Given a lake, and I can show you a
tornado. Given a mountain and I can give you Vesuvius
with the fiery stream burning the huts of the fishers on the
slope of Torre del Grecco. Did God do this ? Did God
run the two vessels into one another on the Thames and
have those hundreds of people drowned? If you take
credit for the beauty you must also take debit for the
pain and misery (applause). Well, then, I am told that re
ligion is the noblest of all instincts. Max Muller tells us—
whether that be true or not, as Francis Newman puts it—that
�29
religion is a word about which people never have agreed in
any age of the world; about which there have been more
quarrels than about any other word, and about which people
have done more mischief than about any other word; and
I will ask our friend to explain, if it be the noblest of all
instincts, how is it that people have racked each other, and
beheaded each other, and tortured each other by, or in the
name of, this religion ? We are told, and I am thankful to
hear it, that we sceptics have purged it of a great deal of
mischief, and we hope to do more in that way as we go on
(applause). And here—and I want to speak with as much
reverence as I can on the subject of prayer, and it is ex
tremely difficult to touch upon it without giving my oppo
nent pain—so I will deal with it as a general, and not a
personal question. Mr. Armstrong said, after speaking of
how he prayed against temptation : “ He answered me as he
has answered the immemorial prayer of Christendom and
delivered me from temptation.” Why does he not deliver
from the temptation that misery, poverty, and ignorance
bring to the little one who did not choose that he should be
born in a narrow lane, or a back street, in an atmosphere
redolent of squalor and filth ? This little one, whom God
can lift out of temptation, but whom he lets still be cold and
miserable, whom he sees famishing for food, him whom he
sees go famishing to the baker’s, watching to steal the
loaf to relieve his hunger—why won’t he deliver this little
one ? Does Mr. Armstrong say: “ Oh, the little one must
know how to pray before God will answer him ” ? Oh, but
what a mockery to us that the source of all power places
within the reach of the temptation—nay, puts as though
surrounded by a mighty temptation trap, so that there should
be no possible escape—that little one, and then gives way to the
skilled entreaty, high tone, habit-cultured voice which Mr.
Armstrong uses, while he is deaf to the rough pleading of the
little one, and allows him to sink down, making no effort
for his recovery ! I have only one or two words more to
say to you before I again finish, and I would use these to
ask Mr. Armstrong to tell me what he meant by the word
“ cause,” and what he meant by saying “ cause must be
intelligent ” ? By cause, I mean, all that without which an
event cannot happen—the means towards an end, and by
intelligence I mean the totality of mental ability—its activity
and its results in each animal capable of it.
Mr. Armstrong: Mr. Bradlaugh has just been re-
�3°
buking me for my laxness with respect to defini
tions, and has come down upon me with a great autho
rity. Now, it is a habit of mine not to think much
of authorities as authorities, but rather of the value
of what they say. Mr. Bradlaugh came down upon
me with Max Muller, and read a sentence in reference to the
value of definitions, to the effect that they were wonderful
things for preventing and avoiding controversies and dis
putes. Is it, I ask, Mr. Bradlaugh’s experience that the
number of definitions given from public platforms in his
presence has tended to less controversy or to more ? Has
there been more or less talk with all these definitions, than
there would have been without them ? I fancied that Mr.
Bradlaugh’s career had been one very much connected with
controversies, and that the definitions which he has been ac
customed to give have not had the effect of leaving him in peace
from controversy. I am perfectly amazed at Mr. Brad
laugh’s memory, at the wonderful manner in which he
manages to remember, with tolerable accuracy, what I have
said, and to get down as he does the chief points of my
speeches.
I have, unfortunately, a miserable memory,
although I have an excellent shorthand which I can write,
and I cannot generally read it (laughter). Trusting, however,
to those two guides, I must endeavour to reply. Mr. Brad
laugh unintentionally misrepresented me when he alleged
that I had said that the voice of God, called conscience, was
not always clear. I did not say that that voice was not always
clear -—- what I said was that it was not always clearly
heard. I illustrated this by the simile of the bell, the sound
of which was perfectly clear of itself, but which was not
heard by those who would not heed.
Mr. Bradlaugh
also accused me of going in for the authority of majori
ties, because I quoted a number of names and said
that I might quote many more who concurred in the
belief in Deity grounded upon the sort of experi
ence which I said that I had myself enjoyed. Now, the
opinions of the majority have no authority—at least they go
for what they are worth, but are not a binding or an absolute
authority. But the experience of a majority, or of a minority,
or of a single individual, has authority. The experience
of a single man is a fact, and all the rest of the world not
having had that experience, or thinking that they have not
had it, does not make it less the fact. Therefore, if you
have half-a-dozen men upon whose words you can rely, who
�3i
say that they have had a certain experience, because Mr.
Bradlaugh says he has not had such experience, that makes
it none the less the fact. Now I approach that awful question
which stares in the face of the Theist—and which
ioften seems to stare most cruelly—this question of the evil
in the world. It is a question upon which the greatest
intellects of mankind have broken themselves, one which
has never been really explained or made clear, either by
the Theist or the Atheist, but which is probably beyond the
solution of the human faculties. All that we can do is to
fringe the edge of the mystery, and to see whether the best
feelings within us seem to guide us to anything approaching
a solution. Do you think that these things of which Mr.
Bradlaugh has spoken do not touch me as they touch
him ? Look, say, at the poor child born in misery, and
living in suffering; it would absolutely break my heart if I
thought that this could be the end of all. I believe that it
would weigh me down so that I could not stand upon a
public platform, or perform the ordinary business of life, if I
believed that there were beings in the world of whom misery
and sin were the beginning and the end. But I thank God that
I am enabled to maintain my reason upon its seat, and my
trust intact. I know, or I think I know, God as a friend. If he
be a friend to me, shall he not be a friend to all ? If I know
by my own experience his wondrous loving kindness, can I
not trust him for all the rest of the world, through all the
ages of eternity ? You may see a son who shall be familiar
with his father’s kindness, who shall always be kindly treated
by his father ; and there shall be a great warm love between
them. But the child sees certain actions on the part of his
father which he cannot explain. He beholds suffering
apparently brought by his father upon others, and is,
perhaps, inclined to rebel against his father’s authority. But
which is the truest child—the child who, having himself
experienced his father’s love, says : “ Well, this is strange, it
is a mystery; I would it were not so, but I know that my father
is good, and will bring some good out of this which could
not have been obtained otherwiseor the child who says :
“All my experience of my father’s goodness shall go to the
winds. I see a problem which I cannot explain, and I will,
therefore, throw up my trust, rebel against the paternal
goodness, and believe in my father’s love no more ! ” It
would be base in such of you as may be Atheisst
to rest in such a trust, since vou do not know the
�32
love of God; but were you touched with that love
this trust would come to you. It would come to you in
your best and truest moments, the moments when you feel
that you are most akin with all that is good and holy, and
when you feel, as it were, lifted above what is base. ’ This
problem of the evil in the world, I have said, surpasses the
faculties of humanity to solve, either from the platform of
the Theist, the Atheist, or the Pantheist. . I ask you what
you conceive to be the highest good to humanity ? Is not
the highest good, virtue ? You say, it may be, happiness is
better. Take the Huguenot. One way, with him, led to
happiness, the other to destruction. Was the choice he made
the better or the worse ? You say the better ? Then you
hold that virtueis betterthan happiness. Withregardto virtue
imagine, if you can, a world free from every sort of suffer
ing, from every sort of temptation, every sort of trial, what
a very nice world to live in, but what very poor creatures we
should all be ! Where would be virtue, where valour, where
greatness, where nobility, where would be all thos’e high
functions which call forth our reverence, and make
us look up from men to the God of man ? The world
is not made of sugar-plums. I, for my own part, can
not conceive how virtue, the highest good which we can
conceive, could possibly come about in human character
unless human character had evil against which it had to
contend (applause). If you can tell me how we could have
a world in which men should be great, and good, and
chivalrous, and possess all such qualities as raise feelings of
reverence in our bosoms, where nevertheless all should be
smooth and easy, you will have told me of something which,
I think, has never been told to any human being (applause).
Mr. Bradlaugh : A large number of definitions lead to
more controversy or to less. If the definitions are offered
to the minds of people well educated, and thoroughly
understanding them—to much less controversy and to more
accuracy; and when they are offered to people who are yet
ignorant, and have yet to understand them, then they lead
to more controversy, but even there, also, to more accuracy.
I am asked: Can you tell me how to make a world ? I
cannot. Do you intend to base your conclusions on my
ignorance ? If there be an onus, it lies on you, not on me.
It is your business to show that the maker you say ought to
be adored, has made the world as good as it can be. It is
not my business at all to enter upon world-making. Then
�33
I am not sure—while I am quite ready to be set right upon
a verbal inaccuracy—I am not sure there is very much dis
tinction between the voice not being heard, and not being
clearly heard. It is said to be the voice of God that speaks;
but he made the deafness or otherwise of the person to
whom he speaks, or he is not the creator, preserver, “ the
dearest friend in whom I trust, on whom I rely”—these
are Mr. Armstrong’s words. If God cannot prevent the
deafness, then the reliance is misplaced; if he made rhe
deafness, it is of no use that he is talking plainly; if he
has made the person too deaf to hear his voice, then the
voice is a mockery. Then I had it put to me, that the
opinions of majorities were not binding as authority; they
only had their value as expressions of opinion ; but that i
the experiences of individuals are binding. What does
that mean? Is there such a certitude in consciousness
that there can be no mistake in experience ? What do
you mean? When you have a notion you have had an
experience, and I have a notion you have not had it?
Supposing, for example, a man says : “ I have ex
perience of a room which raced with the Great Northern
train to London ; it was an ordinary room, with chairs and
tables in it, and none of them were upset, and it managed
to run a dead heat with the Great Northern express.” You
would say : “ My good man, if you are speaking seriously,
you are a lunatic.” “ No,” he would say, “ that is my ex
perience.” Mr. Armstrong says that that experience de
serves weight. I submit not unless you have this : that the
experience must be of facts coming within the possible range
of other people’s experience; and mustbe experience which is
testable by other people’s experience, with an ability on the
part of the person relating to clearly explain his ex
perience, and that each phenomenon he vouches to you, to
be the subject possible of criticism on examination by your
self, and that no experience which is perfectly abnormal,
and which is against yours, has any weight whatever with
you, or ought to have, except, perhaps, as deserving ex
amination. When it possibly can be made part of your
experience, yes; when it admittedly cannot be made part
of your experience, no. A man with several glasses of
whisky sees six chandeliers in this room ; that is his ex
perience—not mine. I do not refuse to see; I cannot see
more than three. Mr. Armstrong says the problem of evil
never has been made clear by Atheist or Theist. There is
D
�34
no burden on us to make it clear. The burden is upon
the person who considers that he has an all-powerful friend
of loving kindness, to show how that evil exists in con
nection with his statement that that friend could prevent
it. If he will not prevent it, he is not of that loving
kindness which is pretended. Mr. Armstrong says: “My
dear friend is kind to me, shall I not believe that he is
kind to the little lad who is starving?” What, kind
to the lad whom he leaves unsheltered and ill-clad
in winter, whose mother is drunken because the place
is foul, whose father has been committed to gaol ?
Where is the evidence to that lad of God’s loving kind
ness to him ? God, who stands by whilst the little child
steals something; God, who sets the policeman to catch
him, knowing he will go amongst other criminals, where he
will become daily the more corrupted; God, who tells him
from the Bench through the mouth of the justice, that he
has given way to the temptation of the devil, when it is the
very God has been the almighty devil (applause). That
may be a reason for Mr. Armstrong adoring his friend, but
it is no reason for this poor boy to adore. “ Ah,” Mr.
Armstrong says, “ my reason for homage is this. I should
be dissatisfied if this were going to last for ever, or if this
were to be the whole of it; that is so bad I should be in
anguish were there no recompense.” You condemn it if it
is to continue. How can you worship the being who allows
that even temporarily which your reason condemns ? Has
he marked his right to be adored as God by the
little girl who is born of a shame-marked mother in the
shadow of the workhouse walls, who did not select the
womb from which she should come, and whose career, con
sequent on her birth, is one of shame and perhaps crime
too. Ah ! that friend you love, how his love is evidenced
to that little girl is yet to be made clear to me. Then
comes another problem of thought which I am not sure I
shall deal fairly with. Is the highest good virtue or happi
ness ? But the highest happiness is virtue. That act is
virtuous which tends to the greatest happiness of the greatest
number, and which inflicts the least injury on any—that
which does not so result in this is vice. When you put happi
ness and virtue as being utterly distinguished, in your mind
they may be so, but not in my mind. You have confused
the definition of morality which I gave on the first opening;
you have, without explaining it, substituted another in lieu
�35
•of it. You would be right to say my definition is wrong,
■and give another definition, but you have no right to ignore
my definition and use my word in precisely the opposite
sense to that in which I used it. A very few words now will
determine this question for this evening, and I will ask you
to remember the position in which we are here. I am
Atheist, our friend is Theist. He has told you practically
that the word “ God ” is incapable of exact definition,
and if this is so, then it is incapable of exact belief. If it is
incapable of exact definition, it is incapable of exact
thought. If thought is confused you may have prostration of
the intellect, and this is all you can have. Our friend says
that he prays and that his prayer is answered daily, but he
forgot the millions of prayers to whom God is deaf. In his
peaceful mountains and lakes—Vesuvius and Lake Michi
gan escaped him. The fishers in Torre del Grecco, they on
whom the lava stream came down in the night, had their
lips framed no cry for mercy ? Did not some of those
hundreds who were carried to death on the tide of the muddy
Thames, did not they call out in their despair ? and yet he
was deaf to them. He listened to you, but it is of those
to whom he did not listen of whom I have to speak. If
he listens to you and not to them he is a respecter of
persons. He may be one for you to render homage to, but
not for me. First, then, the question is : “ Is it reasonable
to worship God?” and the word “worship” has been left
indistinctly defined. I defy anyone who has listened to
Mr. Armstrong to understand how much or how little he
would exclude or include in worship. I made it clear how
much I would include. Our friend has said nothing
whatever relating to the subject with which we have had to
deal.. His word “God” has been left utterly undefined;
the words “ virtue ” and “ happiness,” and the words “ right”
and “ wrong,” are left equally unexplained; the questions I
put to him of cause and intelligence have been left as
though they were not spoken. I do not make this a re
proach to him, because I know it is the difficulty of the
subject with which he has to deal. The moment you tell
people what you mean, that moment you shiver the Vene
tian glass which contains the liquor that is not to be touched.
I plead under great difficulty.
I plead for opinions that
have been made unpopular; I appeal for persons who, in
the mouths of their antagonists, often have associated with
them all that is vicious. It is true that Mr. Armstrong has
B 2
�36
no such reproach. He says that God will only try me
by that judgment of my own reason, and he makes my
standard higher than God’s on the judgment day. God
made Bruno; do you mean that Bruno’s heresy ranks as
high as faith, and that Bruno at the judgment will stand
amongst the saints ? This may be high humanity, but it is
no part of theology. Our friend can only put it that because
in his own goodness he makes an altar where he can worship,
and a church where he would make a God kind and loving
as himself, and that as he is ready to bless his fellows, so
must his God be; but he has shown no God for me to
worship, and he has made out no reasonableness to wor
ship God except for himself, to whom, he says, God is kind.
Alas ! that so many know nothing of his kindness (applause).
I beg to move the thanks of this meeting to Mr. Rothera
for presiding this evening.
Mr. Armstrong : I wish to second that.
Carried unanimously.
The Chairman : Permit me just to express the obliga
tions I feel under to you for having made my duty so
simple and pleasant. My position as chairman necessarily
and properly excludes me from making any judgment what
ever upon the character and quality of what has been
addressed to you. Notwithstanding that, I may say this i
that it is, I believe, a healthy sign of the times when a num
ber of men and women, such as have met together in this
room, can listen to such addresses as have been made to
night, for it will help on our civilisation. And if you want
a definition of what is right, I say that our business is to
learn what is true, then we shall do what is right (applause).
�37
SECOND
NIGHT.
The Chairman, who was much applauded, said : Ladies
and Gentlemen—It is with much satisfaction that I re
sume my duties as chairman this evening. No one occupy
ing this position could fail to be gratified with the high tone
and excellent temper of the debate which we listened to
last night (hear, hear), or, in noting as I did, the earnest,
sustained, and intelligent attention of a large and much
over-crowded audience (applause). I regard this as a health
ful sign of the times. There are those who look upon such
a discussion as this as dangerous and irreverent. I do not
share in that opinion (hear, hear). There is an intelligence
abroad that no longer permits men to cast the burden of
their beliefs upon mere authority, but which compels them
to seek for reasons for the faith that is in them (hear, hear).
To those, I think, such discussion as this, maintained in the
spirit of last evening, cannot fail to be useful. It is obvious
that the first requisite of religion is, that it be true. Fear of
the results of investigation, therefore, should deter no one
from inquiry. That which is true in religion, cannot be
shaken, and that which is false no one should desire to pre
serve (applause). Now, as you are aware, Mr. Armstrong in
this discussion is charged with the duty of maintaining the
proposition that it is reasonable in us to worship God. The
negative of that proposition is supported by Mr. Bradlaugh.
Under the arrangement for the debate, Mr. Bradlaugh is to
night entitled to half-an-hour for his opening, Mr. Arm
strong to half-an-hour for his reply. After that a quarterhour will be given to each alternately, until Mr. Armstrong
will conclude the debate at ten o’clock. I have now great
pleasure in asking Mr. Bradlaugh to open the discussion
(applause).
Mr. Bradlaugh, who was very warmly received, said :
In contending that it is not reasonable to worship God, it
seemed to me that I ought to make clear to you, at any
�38
rate, the words I used, and the sense in which I used them,
and to do that I laid before you last night several definitions,
not meaning that my definitions should necessarily bind
Mr. Armstrong, but meaning that, unless he supplied some
other and better explanations for the words, the meaning
I gave should be, in each case, taken to be my meaning all
through. I did not mean that he was to be concluded by
the form of my definition if he were able to correct it, or if
he were able to give a better instead ; but I think I am now
entitled to say that he ought to be concluded by my defini
tions, and this, from the answer he has given (hear, hear).
The answer was frank—very frank—(hear) and I feel
reluctant to base more upon it than I ought to do in a dis
cussion conducted as this has been. If I were meeting an
antagonist who strove to take every verbal advantage, I
might be tempted to pursue only the same course; but
when I find a man speaking with evident earnestness, using
language which seems to be the utter abandonment of his
cause, I would rather ask him whether some amendment
of the language he used might not put his case in a
better position. His declaration was that he was perfectly
incapable of saying whether the definition, which I had taken
from Professsor Flint, of God, was correct or not (hear,
hear). Now, I will ask him, and you, too, to consider the
consequence of that admission. No definition whatever is
given by him of the word “ God.” There was not even the
semblance, or attempt of it. The only words we got which
were akin to a definition, except some words which, it
appears, I took down hastily, and which Mr. Armstrong
abandoned in his next speech, the only words bearing even
the semblance of a definition, are “ an awful inscrutable
somewhat” (laughter and hear, hear). Except these words,
there have been no words in the arguments and in the
speeches of Mr. Armstrong which enabled me, in any
fashion, to identify any meaning which he may have of it,
except phrases which contradict each other as soon as you
examine them (applause). Now, what is the definition of which
Mr. Armstrong says that he is incapable of saying whether or
not it is correct? “ That God is a self-existent, eternal being,
infinite in power and wisdom, and perfect in holiness and
goodness, the maker of heaven and earth.” Now, does
Mr. Armstrong mean that each division of the definition
comes within his answer ? Does he mean that in relation to
no part of that which is predicated in this definition is he
�39
capable of saying whether it is correct or not ? Because, if
he does, he is answered by his own speech, as a portion of
this defines God as being perfect in holiness and goodness,
in power and wisdom; and it defines him as eternal in
duration and infinite in his existence; and also defines him
as being the creator of the universe. Now, if Mr. Armstrong
means that “ as a whole, I can’t say whether it is correct or
not,” or if, in defending his position, he means that, haying
divided the definition in its parts, he cannot say whether it is,
in any one part, correct or not, then I must remind him that,
in this debate, the onus lies upon him of saying what it is he
worships, and what it is he contends it is reasonable of us
to worship (hear, hear). If he cannot give us a clear and
concise notion of what he worships, and of what he says it
is reasonable for us to worship, I say that his case has fallen
to the ground. It must be unreasonable to worship that of
which you, in thought, cannot predicate anything in any way
—accurately or inaccurately (applause). Mr. Armstrong
evidently felt—I hope that you will not think that the feel
ing was justified—that there was a tendency on my part to
make too much of, and to be too precise as to, the meaning
of words used. Permit me to say it is impossible to be too
precise; it is impossible to be too clear ; it is impossible to
be too distinct—(hear, hear)—especially when you are dis
cussing a subject in terms which are not used by everybody
in the same sense, and which are sometimes not used by the
mass of those to whom you are addressing yourself at all
(applause). It is still more necessary to be precise when
many of those terms have been appropriated by the teachers
of different theologies and mythologies, such teachers having
alleged that the use of the words meant something which, on
the face of it, contradicted itself, and by other teachers who,
if they have not been self-contradictory, have attached meanings
widely different to those given by their fellows (hear, hear).
I will ask you, then, to insist with me that what is meant by
God should be given us in such words that we can clearly
and easily identify it (hear, hear). If you cannot even in
thought identify God, it is unreasonable—absolutely un
reasonable—to talk of worshipping “ it ” (applause). What
is “ it ” you are going to worship ? Can you think clearly
what it is you are going to worship ? If you can think clearly
for yourself what it is, tell me in what words you think it.
It may be that my brain may not be skilled enough to fully
comprehend that, but, at any rate, we shall then have an
�4°
opportunity of testing for ourselves how little or how much
clear thought you may have on the subject (laughter and ap
plause). If you are obliged to state that it is impossible to
put your thoughts in words so clear and so distinct that I may
understand the meaning of it as clearly as you do, or that
a person of ordinary capacity cannot comprehend the words
in which you describe it—if that is impossible, then it is un
reasonable to ask me to worship it (loud applause). I say it
is unreasonable to ask me to worship an unknown quantity
—an unrecognisable symbol expressing nothing whatever.
If you know what it is you worship—if you think you know
what it is you worship—I say it is your duty to put into
words what you think you know (hear, hear). We have had
in this debate some pleas put forward, which, if they had
remained unchallenged, might have been some sort of pleas
for the existence of a. Deity, but each of those pleas has in
turn failed. I do not want to use too strong a phrase, so I
will say that each in turn has been abandoned. Take, for
instance, the plea of beauty, harmony, and calmness of
the world, as illustrated by lakes and mountains, to
which I contrasted storms and volcanoes. Mr. Arm
strong’s reply to that was: “ But this involves problems
which are alike insoluble by Theist and Atheist.” If it is
so, why do you worship what is non-capable of solution ?
If there be no solution, why do you put that word “ God ”
as representative of the solution which you say is unattain
able, and ask me to prostrate myself before it and adore it ?
(applause).
We must have consistency of phraseology.
Either the problem is soluble—then the onus is upon you
to state it in reasonable terms; or it is insoluble, and then
you have abandoned the point you set out to prove, because
it must be unreasonable to worship an insoluble proposition
(applause). Howdoyou know anything of that God you askus
to worship ? I must avow that, after listening carefully to what
has fallen from Mr. Armstrong, I have been unable to glean
what he knows of God or how he knows it (hear, hear). I
remember he has said something about a “ voice of God,”
but he has frankly admitted that the voice in question has
spoken differently and in contradictory senses in different
ages (loud cries of “no, no,”)—and those who say “no,”
will do better to leave Mr. Armstrong to answer for him
self as to the accuracy of what I state (hear, hear). I say
he frankly admitted that the voice he alluded to had spoken
differently and contradictorily in different ages. (Renewed
�4i
cries of “ no ”). I say yes, and I will give the evidence of
my yes. (Cries of “ no, no,” “ order,” and “ hear, hear.”)
I say yes, and I will give the evidence of my yes (hear,
hear, and applause).
Mr. Armstrong said that in one
hundred years there had been a purification, and an
amelioration, and a clearing away; and that that change
had been vaster still since one thousand years ago (ap
plause). He is responsible for admitting what I said
about the definition of morality being different in one
age and amongst one people, to what it is in another
age and amongst another people; and if that does not mean
exactly what I put substantially to you, it has no meaning
at all (loud applause).
I strive not to misrepresent
that which I have to answer; I will do my best to under
stand what it is that is urged against me. Those who hold
a different judgment should try, at least, to suspend it until I
have finished (hear, hear, and applause). In the Baird
Lectures, to which I referred last night—and let me here
say that I don’t think that any complaint can be fairly made
of my quoting from them—something was said last night
about my using great men as an authority. Now I do not do
that; but if I find that a man, whose position and learning
gave him advantages with regard to a subject upon which
I am speaking, and he has expressed what I wished to say
better than I can do—if I use his language it is right
I should say from where I have taken my words (hear, hear)
And if I remember right, we had, last night, quotations from
Charles Voysey, Professor Newman, Professor Blackie, and
a host of similar writers on the other side. I take it they
were given in the same fashion that I intended in giving the
names of the writers of the quotations I have cited—not for
the purpose of overwhelming me with their authority, but
simply to inform me and you from whence were got the
words used (hear, hear). Now, Professor Flint, in his book
on Atheism, directed against the position taken up by men
like myself, says : “ The child is born, not into the religion
of nature but into blank ignorance; and, if left entirely to
itself, would probably never find out as much religious truth
as the most ignorant of parents can teach it.” Again, on page
23 he says : “The belief that there is one God, infinite in
power, wisdom, and goodness, has certainly not been
wrought out by each one of us for himself, but has been
passed on from man to man, from parent to child: tradi
tion, education, common consent, the social medium, have
�42
exerted great influence in determining its acceptance and
prevalence.” Now, what I want to put to you from this is
that, just as Max Muller and others have done, you must try
to find out whether what is to be understood by the word
“ God ” is to be worshipped or not, by tracing backwards
the origin and growth of what is to-day called religion. You
will have to search out the traditions of the world, should
there fail to be any comprehensible meaning come from the
other side. Now, what God is it that we are to worship ?
Is it the Jewish God? Is it the Mahometan God? Is it
the God of the Trinitarian Christian ? Is it one of the
gods of the Hindus ? Or is it one of the gods of the old
Greeks or Italians, and, if so, which of them ? And in each
case from what source are we to get an accurate definition
of either of those gods ? Perhaps Mr. Armstrong will say
that it is none of these. He will probably decline to
have any of these Gods fastened upon him as the proper
God to worship ; but the very fact that there are so many
different gods—different with every variety of people—contra
dictory in their attributes and qualities—the very fact that
there is a wide difference in believers in a God makes it but
right that I should require that the God we are asked to
worship should be accurately defined (applause). In
the current number of the /Jonteinporary Review, Professor
Monier Williams, dealing with the development of Indian
religious thought, has a paragraph which is most appro
priate to this debate. He says, on page 246 : “ The early
religion of the Indo-Aryans was a development of a still earlier
belief in man’s subjection to the powers of nature and his
need of conciliating them. It was an unsettled system,
which at one time assigned all the phenomena of the uni
verse to one first Cause; at another, attributed them to
several Causes operating independently; at another, sup
posed the whole visible creation to be a simple evolution
from an eternal creative germ. It was a belief which,
according to the character and inclination of the
worshipper was now monotheism, now tritheism, now
polytheism, now pantheism.
But it was not yet
idolatry. Though the forces of nature were thought of as
controlled by divine persons, such persons were not yet
idolised. There is no evidence from the Vedic hymns that
images were employed. The mode of divine worship con
tinued to be determined from a consideration of human
liking and dislikings. Every worshipper praised the gods
'
�43
because he liked to be praised himself. He honoured them
with offerings because he liked to receive presents himself.
This appears to have been the simple origin of the sacrificial
system, afterwards closely interwoven with the whole re
ligious system. And here comes the difficult question—
What were the various ideas expressed by the term sacrifice?
In its purest and simplest form it denoted a dedication of
some simple gift as an expression of gratitude for blessings
received. Soon the act of sacrifice became an act of pro
pitiation for purely selfish ends. The favour of celestial
beings who were capable of conferring good or inflicting
harm on crops, flocks, and herds, was conciliated by offerings
and oblations of all kinds. First, the gods were invited to
join their worshippers at the every-day meal. Then they
were invoked at festive gatherings, and offered a share of
the food consumed. Their bodies were believed to be com
posed of ethereal particles, dependent for nourishment on
the indivisible elementary essence of the substances presented
to them, and to be furnished with senses capable of being
gratified by the aroma of butter and grain offered in fire
(homa); and especially by the fumes arising from libations
of the exhilarating juice extracted from the Soma plant.”
I will allege that .you cannot give me a definition of
God that does not originate in the ignorance of man as to
the causes of phenomena which are abnormal to him, and
which he cannot explain. The wonderful, the extraordinary,
the terrific, the mysterious, the mighty, the grand, the
furious, the good, the highly beneficent—all these
that he did not understand became to him God. He
might have understood them on careful investigation
had his mind then been capable for the search,
but instead of that he attributed them to huge per
sonifications of the Unknown—the word behind which
to-day is God, and it is the equivalent for all he observed,
but did not comprehend, for all that happened of which he
knew not the meaning (applause). It was not education but
ignorance which gave birth to the so-called idea of a God
(hear, hear). And I will submit to you that, in truth, all
forms of worship have arisen from exaggeration and mis
application of what men have seen in their fellow-men and
fellow-women. A man found that a big furious man might
be pacified and calmed by soothing words; that a big
avaricious man might be satisfied and pleased with plenteous
gifts ; that this one might be compelled to do something by
�44
angry words or harsh treatment; and that this one could be
won by supplications to comply with his wishes—and what
he imagined or observed as to his fellows he applied to the
unknown, thinking, no doubt, that that which he had found
efficacious in the known experience, might also be efficacious
in that in which he had no experience. And what did you
find ? You found the sailor at sea, who’did not understand
navigation, offering candles to his Deity, or special saint,
and promising more offerings of a similar character if the
Deity brought him safe into port. I say it is more reason
able to teach him how to steer than how to worship, and also
more reasonable to know something about the science of
navigation. That would prove much more serviceable than
worship, for when he relied upon candles, he ran upon rocks
and reefs, but as soon as he understood navigation, he
could bring his own ship safely into port (applause).
Prayer is spoken of by Mr. Armstrong as an act of wor
ship. What does it imply ? It implies a belief held on the
part of the person who prays, that he may be noticed by the
being to whom he prays; and it also implies that he is
asking that being to do something which he would have left
undone but for that prayer. Then does he think that he can
influence the person whom he addresses by his rank or by his
position ? Does he think he can influence his Deity by his
emotion ? Does he think that as he would win a woman’s
love, so he would gain God, by passionate devotion ?
Does he think that, as he would frighten a man,
so he would influence God through fear ? Does he appeal
to God’s logic, or to his pity? Does he appeal to his
mercy or to his justice ? or does he hope to tell God one
thing he could not know without the prayer ? (loud applause.)
I want an answer, here, clear and thorough, from one
who says that prayer is a reasonable worship to be offered to
God (renewed applause). Something was said last night
about a cause being necessarily intelligent, and I think, in
my speech afterwards, I challenged the assertion. Nothing
was said to explain what was meant, nothing was done to
further explain the matter, and although I defined what I
meant by cause, and defined what I meant by intelligence,
no objection was taken. Now, I have seen a hut crushed
by an avalanche falling on it, as I have been crossing the
Alps.
Does Mr. Armstrong mean to tell me that the
avalanche which crushed the hut was intelligent, or that it
had an intelligent wielder? If the avalanche is intelligent,
�45
why does he think so ? If the avalanche has an intelli
gent wielder, please explain to me the goodness of that
intelligent wielder who dashes the avalanche on the cottage ?
(applause). If you tell me that it is a mystery which you
cannot explain, I say it is unreasonable to ask me to worship
such a mystery—(renewed applause)—and as long as you
call it a mystery, and treat it as that which you cannot explain,
so long you have no right to ask me to adore it. There was
a time when man worshipped the lightning and thunder,
and looked upon them as Deity. But now he has grown
wiser, and, having investigated the subject, instead of
worshipping the lightning as a Deity, he erects lightningconductors and electric wires, and chains the lightning and
thunder God; knowledge is more potent than prayer (ap
plause). As long as they were worshipped • science could
do nothing, but now we see to what uses electricity has been
brought. When they knew that the lightning-conductor
was more powerful than the God they worshipped, then
science was recognised the mighty master and ruler, instead
of ignorant faith (applause). I have already submitted that
there has not been the semblance of proof or authority for
the existence of any being identifiable in words to whom it
would be reasonable to offer worship, and I will show you
the need for pressing that upon you. A strong statement
was made last night which amounted to an admission that
there was wrong here which should not be, and that, but for
the hope on the part of the speaker that that wrong would
be remedied at some future time, he would be in a state of
terrible despair. He gave no reason for the hope, and no
evidence why he held the hope. He only contended that
things were so bad here that they would be indefensible
except for the hope that they woutd be remedied. This
admission is fatal to the affirmation of God to be worshipped
in the way here mentioned.
Then we had something said
about experience. All experience must be experience of the
senses : you can have no other experience whatever. To
quote again from Max Muller: “ All consciousness begins
with sensuous perception, with what we feel, and hear, and
see. Out of this we construct what may be called con
ceptual knowledge, consisting of collective and abstract
concepts. What we call thinking consists simply in addi
tion and subtraction of precepts and concepts. Conceptual
knowledge differs from sensuous knowledge, not in sub
stance, but in form only. As far as the material is con
�46
cerned, nothing exists in the intellect except what existed
before in the senses.” It is the old proposition put in
different, forms , by Locke, Spinoza, and others, over and
over again, but it has to be taken with this qualification that
you have innumerable instances of hallucinations of the
senses. Delusions on religious matters are open to the re
mark that of all hallucinations of the senses—as Dr H
Maudsley shows in the Fortnightly Review—all halluci
nations of the senses those on religious matters only keep
current with the religious teachings of the day. Sight, touch
smell, hearing, feeling—all are the subject of illusion as is
shown over and over again. Any man bringing as evidence
to us the report of experience which is only of an abnor
mal character, is bound to submit it to a test which is some
thing beyond in severity that which we should apply to
normal events. . The more abnormal it is the more par
ticularity in detail do I wish, in order to examine it, so that
I may be able to identify it; and the more curious the state
ment the more carefully do I wish to test it. Loose words in
theology will not do, and here I submit that at present
we stand, with, at any rate, on one side, nothing whatever
affirmed against me. I gathered last night—I hope incor
rectly—I gathered last night—I hope the words were spoken
incautiously—that Mr. Armstrong held it to be natural that
a man should have to struggle against wrong, vice, and folly,
for the purpose of bringing out the higher qualities, and that
it was alleged that it was to that struggle we were indebted
for our virtue. If that were a real thought on the part of
Mr. Armstrong it is but a sorry encouragement to any
attempts, at reformation and civilisation. Why strive to re
move misery and wrong if the struggle against them is con
ducive to.virtue ? It would take a long time to bring about
any ameliorating change in society if such doctrine were
widely held (loud applause).
The Rev. R. A. Armstrong, who was applauded on rising,,
said : Mr. Chairman and Friends—I wish, in justice to
myself, to say that I freely offered Mr. Bradlaugh the choice
of parts as to the order of speaking. I know not which way
the balance of advantage lies; but after the speech we
have listened to, I think you will agree with me that he who
speaks, first the second night has a considerable pull (laughter).
Last night as I passed down that awful flight of stairs, which
they must climb who, in this town, would soar from the nether
world to the celestial realms of Secularism, I heard many
�47
•comments, and among others one man just behind me said:
“Oh ! Armstrong is nowhere in Bradlaugh’s hands. Bradlaugh
can do just what he likes with him ” (laughter). Now, my
friend said the very truth in a certain sense. As a debater
I am nowhere compared with Mr. Bradlaugh. He has
fluency-—I compute that in thirty minutes I can string
together some 4,000 words, while, I fancy, Mr. Bradlaugh’s
score would be just about 6,000—so that to equalise our
mere mechanical advantages I ought really to have three
minutes to every two of his. If I have omitted many things
which I ought to have said, it is due to this reason (laughter
and hear, hear)—for I have not been silent during the time
assigned to me. Of course, I do not complain of this.
Then, to say nothing of Mr.'Bradlaugh’s powerful intellect, to
which I do not pretend, and his wide reading, he is in
constant practice at this work so new to me, so much so that
I find almost every thought he expressed last night, and in
almost—sometimes precisely—identical language, printed in
his pamphlets, and much of it even spoken in one or other o
his numerous debates. Take this, along with his prodigious
memory, and you will see that the doctrine of Atheism has,
indeed, in him, the very ablest defender that its friends could
wish. And if what he says is not enough to demolish
Theism, then you may be sure that Theism cannot be
demolished (applause). But then, friends, I do want you not to
look on this as a personal struggle between Mr. Bradlaugh
and myself at all. I no more accept it in that light than I would
accept a challenge from him to a boxing match, and I think
you will all agree with me that in that case, in discretion I should
show the better part of valour (hear, hear, and laughter).
We are both speaking in all earnestness of what we hold to be the
truth. Neither of us, I presume, in the least, expects to make
converts on the spot: converts so quickly made would be
like enough to be swayed back the other way next week.
But we do desire that the seed of our words should sink
into your minds; that you should give them your reverent
attention, that, in due season, so far as they are good
and true, they may ripen into matured convictions of
the. truth (applause). And now let me look back at the
position in which this conference was left last night. I am
the more at liberty to do so, as to-night Mr. Bradlaugh has
only—or chiefly—done two things, namely, repeated some
things whichhe saidlast night, andanswered certain arguments
of Professor Flint. That is perfectly fair, but it is equally fair
�48
for me to leave Professor Flint to answer for himself (hear
hear, and applause). And I complain that Mr. Bradlaugh
either did not listen to, or did not understand, what I
endeavoured to put in plainest words about the function of
that voice of God which we call conscience (hear, hear).
Observe, that while in different climesand ages, ay, in the same
manat different times, the conceptions of the particular deeds
that come under the head of right differ, the idea of rightness
itself, of rectitude, is always and invariably the same, from its
first faint glimmer in the savage little removed comparatively
from the lower animal, from which he is said to be
developed, to the season of its clear shining, luminous and
glorious, in hero, prophet, martyr, saint—in Elizabeth Fry,
in Mary. Carpenter, in Florence Nightingale. To speak
metaphysically, the abstract subjective idea of right is the
same and one, but our ideas of the concrete and objective
right develop and progress ever towards a purer and more
beautiful ideal. We have by our own powers to satisfy our
selves as best we can what is right. But when we have
made up our minds, the voice of God sounds clear as a
bell upon the soul and bids us do it (applause). This I
stated again and again last night, yet to-night again Mr.
Bradlaugh has confounded the two things. Mr. Bradlaugh
raised a laugh with his story of the cannibal objecting to the
tough, and choosing the tender meal. That cannibal, in so
far, does but illustrate how a man is swayed by those lower
instincts and desires which I rigorously and definitely'dis
tinguished and separated from conscience. Why Mr. Brad
laugh confounded this with a case of the deliverance of
conscience I cannot think, because I am so sure it wasneither to make you grin nor to confuse your minds (hear,
hear). The latter part of the first night’s debate turned on
the mystery of evil. But Mr. Bradlaugh did not then ven
ture to allege the possibility of a world in which noble character
could be developed without the contact with suffering and
pain (hear, hear). He said he was not called upon to make
a world ; happily not; but at any rate he should not question
the excellence of the world in which he lives unless he can at
least conceive abetter—(loud applause)—and I say that where
evil had never been, or what we call evil, manliness, bravery,
generosity, sympathy, tenderness, could never be (applause).
A world without temptation would be a world without
virtue (hear, hear). A world all pleasurable would be a
world without goodness, and even the pleasurable itself
�49
would cease by sheer monotony to give any pleasure at all. A
world not developed out of the conflict of good and evil,
or joy and pain, would necessarily be an absolutely neutral
world, without emotion of any sort. Unless the whole
tint is to be neutral, you must have light and shade; and the
only test by which to judge whether the power controlling the
world is good or evil—God or Devil, as Mr. Bradlaugh says—
(applause)—is to note whether light or darkness preponderates;
and not only that, but whether the movement, the tendency,
the development, the drift of things is towards the gradual
swallowing up of darkness by the light, or light by darkness;
w'hether freedom, happiness, virtue, are in the procession
of the ages losing their ground, or slowly, surely wanning
ever fresh accession (applause). I take it, then, that if we
are to have a final predominance of goodness—nay, even of
happiness, if you make that the highest good—it can only be
by these things winning their way by degrees out of the evil
which is their shadow. And I invite you once more to test
this from experience. My own experience, clear and sure,
and that of every other devout man, is simply this : that
whatever sorrow, whatever pain we suffer, though it wring
our very heart, the time is sure to come when, looking back
thereon, we thank God that it was given us, perceiving that
it was good, not evil, that befel us, being the means, in
some wray or other, of our further advance in happiness or
goodness, or nearness to our heavenly Father. You tell meit is
all very well for me; but you point to those whose lot is cast in
less pleasant places, and ask me what of them ? Is God
good to them? Well, I will take you to a dark and dismal
cellar beneath the reeking streets of a mighty city. And
this picture is not drawn from fancy, it is a photograph
from the life of one I know of. In that dark and poor abode you
shall enter, and you shall see an aged woman to whom that
spot is home. She is eaten up with disease, the inheritance,
doubtless, of her forefathers’ sin. For fifty years her simple
story has been of alternations between less pain and more.
Beside her are two orphan children, no kith or kin of hers,
but adopted by her out of the large love which she nurtures
in her heart, to share the pence she wins from the mangle,
every turn of which is, to her, physical pain. Well, surely,
she knows nought of God, has none of those “ experiences ”
which Mr. Bradlaugh treats as if they were luxuries confined
to the comfortable Theist in his easy-chair, or on his softlypillowed bed. Ay, but she is rising from her knees to
�5°
turn to the dry crust on the board, which is all she has to
share with the children. And what says she as you enter ?
“ Oh, sir, I was only thanking God for his good
ness, and teaching these poor children so.” Now,
if Mr. Bradlaugh is right in declaring we can know
nought of God, then that old woman ought never
to have eased her laden heart by the outburst of her prayer,
ought to have cast out of her as a freak of lunacy the peace
that stole upon her there as she rose from her knees, ought to
have shunned teaching those children, whose lot was like to be
as hard as hers, one word about the reliance that she had
on God (applause). Instead of that she taught the pros
perous man who stumbled down the broken stair into her
abode, a lesson of trust and faith in the goodness and pre
sence of God, which he never forgot as long as he lived
(hear, hear and applause). I sat the other day beside a
dying girl. Her body was in hideous pain, but her face was lit
with a light of beauty and of love which told a wondrous tale of
her spirit’s life. She died, and her mother and her sisters
weep to-day. But a new love, a new gentleness, a new
sense of the nearness of the spirit - world has already
blossomed in their home, and, I am not sure that they
would call her back even if their voices could avail. So it
is; this woe which we call evil is the sacred spring of all
that is beautiful and good (hear, hear). To the Atheist the
world’s sorrow must, indeed, be insupportable. If he be
sincere and have a heart, I do not know how he can ever
eat and drink and make merry, still less how he can make a
jest and raise a titter in the very same speech in which he
dwells with all the skill of practised eloquence upon that
woe (applause). If I were an Atheist I hardly think I could
ever throw off the darkness of this shadow. But, believing
in God, whom I personally know, and know as full of love,
I am constrained to trust that, though this evil be a mystery
the full significance of which I cannot understand, and
though relatively to the little sum of things here and now it
seem great, yet that relatively to the whole plan and sum of
the universe it is very small, and that that poor child, born
of sin and shame, who knew no better than to steal the loaf,
shall one day wear a diadem of celestial glory, and be by no
means least in the Kingdom of Heaven. And when I see
the Atheist smiling, laughing, having apparentlya lightheart in
him, I am bound to suppose that he too, somehow, trusts that
..goodness and happiness are going to win in the end—that
�is, that goodness is the ultimately overruling power. And.
if he believes that, he believes in the power which men
call God (applause). Now, Mr. Bradlaugh has casti
gated me with some severity for not obliging him
with definitions. It is impossible, he says, to be too
precise in the use of words, and I agree with him.
But by definitions I cannot make the simplest words
in the English language more plain to you (hear, hear).
He, himself, has given us some . specimens of defini
tions which I do not think have made things much clearer
than they were before. There are three words of import
ance in the title of this debate, and I will try, since Mr.
Bradlaugh has experienced difficulty in understanding me,
whether I can tell him more distinctly what I mean by them.
Those three words are “ reasonable,” “ worship,” “ God.”
When I say it is reasonable to do a thing, I do not mean
that I can demonstrate to you with the precision of, mathe
matics that every proposition, the truth of which is assumed
in that act, is true; but Ido mean that the propositions, on the
assumption of which the act proceeds, are, at least, sufficiently
probable to win the verdict of an unbiassed judgment, and
that the act itself is likely to be found to be a good. Mr.
Bradlaugh himself has defined “ worship ” as including
“ prayer, praise, sacrifice, offerings, solemn services, adora
tion, and personal prostration.” If Mr. Bradlaugh will kindly
occupy his next fifteen minutes by defining to me exactly
what he means by each of those terms, I may be better able
to tell him whether I include them all in worship, and
whether he has left anything out. But at present I do not
find that any one of them is simpler or more comprehensible
than the term worship, while “prayer, praise, sacrifice, and
offerings,’’each might mean at least two very different things
“ solemn services ” is hopelessly vague ; “ adoration,” as I
understand it, is included in some of the others; and before
we know what “personal prostration” means, we must
define “ person ”—no easy matter—and then explain what'
we mean by the “ prostration ” of that person (laughter and.
applause). Meanwhile, I have described, at the very outset,
that energy of my soul which I call worship, namely, that in
which I address myself to God as to one immeasurably sur
passing me in goodness, in wisdom, in power, in love (hear,
hear). I don’t think this is plainer than the good old Saxon
word “worship;” I think that word conveys a pretty clear
meaning to most men. But Mr. Bradlaugh finds it easier to
�52
understand long phrases than simple Saxon words; and my
. only fear now is that he will want me to define all the
words in my definition—(laughter)—and though I am ready
enough to do that, I fear it would take a week (renewed
laughter, and hear, hear). God:—You ask me to define God,
and you say I have not in any way done so. You quote
the metaphysical definition of Flint, and want me to enter
into metaphysics. What do you mean by defining ? Do
you mean to draw a circle round God, so as to separate him
from all else ? If you do, I reply, I can’t; because, as far as
I can see, or my imagination can extend, I discern no
boundaries to God. But if you mean to ask simply what I
mean by God, I mean—and I said this again and again
last night—the source of the command that comes to me
to do right, to abjure wrong ; the source of the peace
that comes to me even in pain, when I have done right,
and of the remorse that comes to me even in prosperity
when I have done ill. I mean also the source—which
I believe to be identical — of the wondrous sense of
a divine presence which seizes me in the midst of
nature’s sublimest scenes — ay, and even of nature’s
awful catastrophes. I mean also the source of the
moral and spiritual strength that comes to me in response to
the worship which my soul pours forth; and if you want to
know what I mean by my soul, I mean myself. What else
besides the source of these things God maybe, I cannot tell you.
It is only so—in his relation to me—that I directly know him.
Beyond that he is the subject of philosophy, but not of im
mediate knowledge. I believe him to be very much more;
but that does not affect the reasonableness of worshipping
him, and that is the subject of our debate (hear, hear). So
that I cannot define God in the way I can define Notting
ham, or Europe, or the earth (hear, hear). I cannot tell
how much is included in his being \ how much, if any, is
excluded. I can tell you what he is to me, in relation to me—
and that is the only way in which any entity can be defined—
and I can tell you what other men testify by word, by deed,
by martyrdom, he is to them (hear, hear). Beyond that I
have no instruments by which to measure; and therefore
I take up no pen with which to write down the measure
ments, or define (applause). But Mr. Bradlaugh says if
we cannot exactly define an object we are incapable of exact
thought or belief concerning it. Did Mr. Bradlaugh do al
gebra at school ? That most exact and prosaic science con-
�•sists largely in reasoning about unknown quantities ; that is,
about some x or_y, of which you only know that it has some
one or perhaps two definite relations to certain other things.
You don’t know what x or y is in itself—only some function
by which it is related to a and b and c. From that relation you
reason, and sometimes from it you get by subtle processes
to infer a vast deal more, and it will perhaps prove just from
that relation that x must be such and such a number, or that
it must be infinite. Does Mr. Bradlaugh say we can have
no exact thought about the x in the algebraic equation,
before we have worked out the whole sum ? Yes, we know
it in its relations or some of them. Yet the very essence
of algebra is that x is undefined. The human soul is the a, b,
•or q the well-known, the familiar; God is the x, related wondrously thereto, yet none has ever yet worked out that sum.
The supremestphilosophers, who hereare school-boys indeed,
have only displayed workings on their slates which, to
use again mathematical language, show that x approaches
towards a limit which is equal to infinity (hear, hear). But
Mr. Bradlaugh says there should be no belief in that which we
•cannot define. Now, I challenge Mr. Bradlaugh in all re
spect and sincerity to define himself (applause). If he de
clines or fails, I will not say we must cease to believe in Mr.
Bradlaugh, but that is the necessary inference from his
maxims. Mr. Bradlaugh says all experience must be the
experience of the senses. By which sense does he experience
love, indignation, or all the varied sentiments which bind him
to his fellow-men and women (applause) ? Mr. Bradlaugh
told us in his concluding speech last night that no ex
perience of another man’s can be anything at all to him
until tested by his own. Is, then, a man born blind un
reasonable if he believes that others have experience of
some wonderful sensation, making objects very vividly
present to them, which they call sight ? Shall the man born
■deaf say he does not believe there is such a thing as sound ?
I know not whether Mr. Bradlaugh has any personal ex
perience of the heat of the torrid zone. Does he believe
it ? Has he tested the height of Mont Blanc ? If not, does
he hold his belief in suspense as to whether it is 15,000 feet
high or not ? The fact is the enormous majority of the
beliefs on which we act every day of our lives with perfect
•confidence are founded either on sheer Faith, untested and by
us untestable, or on Testimony, that is the recorded experience
■of others which we have not tested. But Mr. Brad
�54
laugh says that if the alleged experience of another
is “ abnormal ” we must not believe it. He did
not define “abnormal,” and I want to know who is
to be judge whether my experience of the command that
comes to me in conscience is abnormal or not. Mr. Brad
laugh ? This audience ? With confidence I accept the ver
dict of any gathering of my fellow-men and women, knowing
that my experience herein has a sure echo in their own. But
Mr. Bradlaugh says, if someone said a room ran a race,
you would call him a lunatic. That argument means
nothing, or else it means that Martineau and Newman, and
all great and good who have recognised God—ay, and Voltaire
and Thomas Paine—Theistsboth—are to be counted lunatics
(hear, hear). Time has prevented—I hope it may not still
prevent—my stating clearly what I mean, when I proceed on
philosophical grounds to allege my belief that there is an
intelligent cause. “Intelligent ” I shall not stop to define,
unless I am challenged to it, because I presume intelligence
in you (applause). “ If there were no such supreme intelli
gence,” says Mr. Voysey, “ the universe, supposing it to be
self-evolved (and of course unconscious, since it is not intel
ligent) has only just come into self-consciousness through
one of its parts—viz., man. It had been, so to speak,
asleep all these cycles of ages till man was born and his
intellect dawned upon the world, and, for the first time, the
universe realised its own existence through the intelligent
consciousness of one of its products. I do not think
absurdity could go further than that. If there be no self
conscious intelligence but man, then the universe is only
just now, through man, becoming aware of its own exist
ence ” (hear, hear, and applause). “ Cause,” Mr. Brad
laugh, I think, has defined, in language which in
cluded the words, “ means towards an end.” A mean o:
means, however, is, by the very conception of the word, the
second term in a series of three of which the end is the
third, and “means” implies some power making use of
those means, and that power is the first term in the series.
Now, I claim that cause is that first term, whether there be
two more, or only one. By “ cause ” I mean—and you
mean, if you will search your thought—the initiating power,
that which begins to produce an effect. Now, my mind is so
constituted that to speak to me of a power which initiates
effects, yet is not conscious, intelligent, is sheer nonsense;
therefore I hold the power which displays itself as one in the
�55
%
uniformity of the laws of nature, and lies behind all phe
nomena—the growth of the grass, the rush of the cataract,
the breath of the air, the stately sailing of the stars through
their geometric paths, to be intelligent, conscious, to do it
all by distinct purpose; and I can in no way otherwise con
ceive. I conceive this source of the geometric motion of
all the spheres and of the minutest dance of protoplasm in the
nettle’s sting as always, everywhere, ofpurpose producing these
effects. And the worship which I gave God as I know him
in relationship to me is refined and glorified by the conception which thus dawns on me of his being. And in the
words of Francois Marie Arouet Voltaire, I commune thus
with myself: “ Where,” says he, “ is the eternal geometrician ?
Is he in one place, or in all places without occupying space ?
I know not. Has he arranged all things of his own sub
stance? I know not. Is he immense without quantity
and without quality ? I know not. All I know is, that we
must adore him and be just ” (loud applause).
Mr. Bradlaugh : It is perfectly true that what I have said
here I have said before, and very much of what I have said I
have printed before. I am quite sure that Mr. Armstrong
did not intend that as any blame upon me. [Mr. Arm
strong : Certainly not.] In fact, if any advantage accrued,
it would accrue to him, because, having what I had to say
on the subject to refer to, he would be better able to answer
it by previous preparation. Why I mention it is because
one person seemed to think that it was very reprehensible on
my part to say here anything that was not perfectly new.
I make no claim to originality, but try to say the truest
thing I can in the clearest way I can (hear, hear, and
applause). Then I am told that I did not pay attention
enough to what was said last night about the functions of
the voice of God. I have been told to-night that the idea of
righteousness and rectitude has always been one and the
same amongst all human beings, from the savage to the
highest intellect. If telling me so is evidence of it, then,
of course, I must be content. But, unfortunately, I am not
content, but say that the evidence is all the other way (hear,
hear, and a laugh). I have read carefully Wake’s latest book
on the evolutions of morality, tracing out the growth of
notions of morality amongst savages. I have read Tylor,
Broca, Lubbock, Agassiz, Gliddon, Pritchard, Lawrence,
and I think I am familiar with the best of ancient and
modern authors on the subject; and I say it is
�56
absolutely contrary to the fact that the notions of
morality are, and always have been identical from
the lowest savage to the highest intellect. It is abso
lutely contrary to the fact that one and the same idea of
right always and everywhere prevails (hear, hear). It is not
a question of my opinion ; it is a question of the conclusive
evidence laboriously collected on the subject, and I am
sorry to have to put it in that plain and distinct way (hear,
hear). Then I am told, and I am sure Mr. Armstrong
would not have said that unless he thought he did, that he care
fully separated last night the lower instincts which were not
included in conscience from the higher mental qualities.
But to my memory this was not so, and I have read the
whole of the speeches to-day in the reporter’s notes, and I
must say I found nothing of the kind. Now we have a.
greater difficulty. How much and how many—how much
of the mental instincts, and how many of the mental faculties
—are we to class as going to make up conscience, and how
much not ? I do not pretend to make the classification.
It rests upon the person who has the burden of proof here..
I deny there has been, as yet, even an attempt at classifica
tion, and I call for some statement which shall enable me
to understand that; without it is to be foregone. Then I
had it returned upon me that I had no right to criticise this
world unless I could conceive a better. The very act of
criticism involves the conception of the better. When I
point out something insufficient or wrong, that criticism
implies the conception of something conceivably better if’
that were changed. If you want, now, an illustration of
something possibly better, I would point to the famine in
China. There, actually, millions of people are dying for
want of food, and, for the purpose of sustaining life a little
longer in themselves, the members of families are eating
their own relations. If I were God I should not tolerate
that—(applause)—nor could I worship a God who does.
Mr. Armstrong, in his speech, pointed out what he terms an
intelligent purpose. It may be for an intelligent purpose that
millions of the Chinese should die of starvation, and actually
eat one another for want of food ; but if it is, I cannot
understand the goodness of the intelligent purposer. You
cannot take one illustration and say that it is the work of an
intelligent person, and then take another and say that it is.
not. If it is the intelligence of God displayed in one caseit must be in another, unless Mr. Armstrong contends that
�57
there are a number of Gods, amongst which number there
must be a good many devils (laughter and loud applause).
There are many things of a similar kind I could point out,
and ask the same question with regard to; where is the intelli
gence of God as displayed in permitting the Bulgarian
atrocities, the Russo-Turkish war, the Greek insurrection—
or in the world nearer home, its crime, misery, and want
(hear, hear, and applause). I do not draw the same moral
from the story of the starving woman that Mr. Armstrong
would draw. While you thank God for the crime, pauperism,
misery, and poverty, I say that you are degrading yourself.
The Atheist deplores the misery, the poverty, and the crime,
and does all he can to prevent it by assisting the sufferers to
extricate themselves, instead of spending his time in blessing
and praising a God for sending the woe and attributing it to
his superior intelligence (applause). Then there was an
astounding statement which came more in the sermon part
of the speech than in the argumentative portion of it
(laughter). Perhaps that may account for the wealth of its
assumption, and also for deficiency of its basis. It was that
freedom, happiness, and virtue, through the power of God,
were continually winning their way. How is it that an intelli
gent and omnipotent God does not look after them more,
and see that they overcome opposition a little faster than
they have done ? Mr. Armstrong says that I fight shy of
experience. I don’t do anything of the kind. I fight shy of
experience which will not submit itself to any test; I fight
shy of experience which cannot bear examination and
investigation; I fight shy of such experience only. Our
friend gives us the experience of a dying girl. Now, I do
not mean to say that every religion in the world has not
been a consolation to dying people—that belief in a God
has not been a consolation to persons who have enjoyed the
full power of their mental faculties on their death-beds. Since
I was in America some time ago I saw a copy of a sermon
preached by a New York clergyman, who had attended,
what he believed to be the dying bed of an Atheist, and he
said that he hoped that Christians would learn to die as
bravely and as calmly as the Atheist seemed prepared to
die. Luckily that Atheist did not die. He is alive to
night to answer for himself (applause and hear, hear). I
don t think an illustration of personal experience in that way
can go for much. The man and woman who die in possession
of their faculties, with strong opinions, will generally die
�strong in those opinions. Men have been martyred for
false gods as well as for the one you would have me worship.
It is useless to make this kind of an appeal in a discussion,
in which there was room and need for much else. Heavenly
stars, a crown, and that kind of thing are not as certain as
they ought to be in order to be treated as material
in this discussion. And then Mr. Armstrong says what he
would do and how he would feel if he were an Atheist.
Charles Reade wrote a novel, which he entitled “ Put yourself
in his Place.” Mr. Armstrong has been trying to put him
self in the Atheist’s place, but he has not been very success
ful (hear, hear). The Atheist does not think that all the
evil which exists in this world is without remedyj he does
not think that there is no possible redemption from sorrow,
or that there is no salvation from misery (hear, hear). He
thinks and believes that the knowledge of to-day a little,
and to-morrow more, and the greater knowledge of the day
that will yet come, will help to redeem, will help to rescue
the inhabitants of this world from their miserable position ;
and further, that this is not to be in some world that is to
come, but in the world of the present, in which the salva
tion is self-worked out (loud applause). The Atheist will
not make promises of something in the future as a compen
sation for the present miseries of man. Instead of saying
that for prayers and worship the poor woman or man will
have the bread of life in future, he tries to give her and him
the strength to win bread here to sustain and preserve life as
long as it is possible to do so (applause). The diadems,
too—which our friend has to offer to the poor—which are to
be worn in heaven by those who have had no clothes here
—possess no attraction to the Atheist; therefore he does nor
offer them, but, instead, tries to develop such self-reliant
effort as may clothe and feed those who are naked and
hungry while they are here. He directs his efforts towards
human happiness in the present, and believes that in the
future humanity must be triumphant over misery, want, and
wrong (applause). A diadem of celestial glory may or may
not be a very good thing; of that I do not look upon my
self as a judge, so long as I have no belief in its possibility.
That there is much misery and suffering in the world I
know, and it rests with Mr. Armstrong to prove whether it
is better to try and remedy it here or to worship its author
in the doubtful endeavour to obtain as recompense a crown
of celestial glory (hear, hear, and applause). But which
�59
God is it that we are to worship ? Is it the Mahometan
God, or the Jewish God? Is it one of the Gods of the
Hindus ? Is it the Christian’s God ? If so, which sect of
Christians? You must not use phrases which mean
different things in different mouths (hear, hear). Then we
come to definitions, and, having objected that there was
no necessity for defining, or having objected that defining
would not make things more clear, with the skill and tact of
a practical debater, my friend goes through every word
(laughter). Prayer, we were told, has two distinct meanings.
Might I ask in which sense it was used in the first speech
made last night? You did not tell us then that prayer had
two senses. I ask why you did not tell us ? I might have
thought it was one fashion when you meant another. I ask
what meaning you meant when you used it ? What two
senses has prayer towards God ?—in which of the two senses
did you use prayer—and, knowing it had two meanings,
why did you not tell us in which sense you used it ? Then
praise, too, you said, is to thank God for his goodness; and
as you used the word many times last night you knew what
you meant by it, having relied upon it so firmly that it
seemed to be an evidence of God’s existence (applause).
By sacrifice I mean an act of real cowardice. The coward
does not dare to pay in his own person for the wrong which
he has done, so he offers something or somebody weaker in
his stead. He tries by offering a sacrifice to avert the ven
geance which would fall—and, according to his creed,
ought to fall—upon himself. Sacrifice is the act of a
coward (applause). Offerings are of flowers, of fruits;
offerings of young animals, lambs, kids; sometimes the
offerings are things which come the nearest to their hands;
sometimes the sacrifice consists of inanimate things which
had a special value to the worshipper; sometimes the
first fruits of their fields or flocks, which they offer
to the source, as they think, of the plenty in those
fields and flocks.
In later times, offerings have got
to be much more complex; but even now you will still find
them, in modified fashions, in the Churches of England
and Rome. The mutual system is that which operates in
every form of worship which makes any sort of claim to re
ligion. The word “ worship ” was only used as a general
word which covers the whole of those forms, leaving our
friends to select and repudiate, and in any case the burden
is on Mr. Armstrong to make the meaning clear (hear,
�6o
hear). I read the whole of the speeches of last night with
out finding any repudiation or question about the definitions
I presented ; and I submit it is scarcely fair, after what has
passed, to ask me to further define them at this late stage
of the debate. I should have had no objection had it been
invited at the earliest outset (applause). Well, now, we
have worship defined as “ the energy of my soul.” Well,
but you have not explained your soul. Why do you call it
soul ? Where is its place in your body ? Is there any
thing about soul you can notice so as to enable me to know
anything at all about it ? Will you take your definition of
soul from Voltaire, whom you have quoted against me?
When you reply, will you tell us what Voltaire, Professor
Newman, Paine, or Martineau say upon the subject of God,
and in which of their writings you will find that which all
the others would accept as a definition ? You must
remember the Theist of Paine’s time is not the Theist of
to-day, and I want you to tell us what are the specific
opinions of each of those you have quoted—of Francis
William Newman, of John William Newman, of Martineau,
of Thomas Paine, of Voltaire—as to the questions I have
asked (applause). Which of the Gods is it that I am to
understand Mr. Armstrong as defending and asking me to
worship (loud applause) ?
Mr. Armstrong : Mr. Chairman, Ladies, and Gentle
men,—I am somewhat at a loss as to which of the numerous
questions I am to answer first. I shall not take them in
any logical order, but simply pick out of my note-book
the most important of them. Mr. Bradlaugh has said
that the act of criticism of the world implied the conception
of a better world. Mr. Bradlaugh has tried to describe his
conception of the better world, and I have tried in my pre
vious speeches to show that he would not make it better.
And I again submit that, instead of being better, it would
be worse (hear, hear). He says he does not draw the same
conclusion from that poor woman in the cellar that I
do. He says that while you are content to suffer, you de
grade yourself. Now, there are two kinds of content.
You may be content like the sloth or the sluggard, or you
may be content like that poor woman, who while trying to
improve her position, still remained poor to the end of her
days, and yet at the same time felt the peace of God in
her heart.
Does the belief in a God, as a fact,
make men less energetic and vigorous in improving
�6i
their own condition, or trying to improve that of
others ? I don’t believe it does (applause). I believe you
have Theists as well as Atheists, who devote their kindly
sympathies to the good of their fellow creatures. They are
content in one sense and discontent in another sense.
They have that holy discontent which makes them anxious
to remedy the world’s evil, and that content which makes
them see God, who is working from evil to good (applause).
We have been told by Mr. Bradlaugh what the Atheist will
do ; how he will give the bread of this life to the hungry
child; the Theist will do the same (applause). The
Theist will—but no, I will not institute these comparisons ;
we are each, I feel sure, striving to do our best; so I won’t
enter into comparisons (rounds of applause). He says it
is unreasonable to worship an insoluble proposition. A
proposition is a grammatical term signifying a statement,
and I am not aware that I asked anyone to worship a
statement or proposition at all. I have called upon you
to worship God (applause). He says I did not separate
the lower instincts from the higher mental qualities in
man. I do not say I did. But I did separate the lower
instincts from the voice of God in conscience. I said that
it was entirely distinct from the lower instincts in man. I
said that the voice had a right to command and rule these
lower instincts (hear, hear). He asks me which God it is
that I am preaching. I will tell you what God I ask you to
worship—the best that you can conceive, whatsoever it is
(applause). I want you all to worship the best that you can
conceive (rounds of applause). If the Hindu’s idea is the
best he can conceive, let him, by all means, worship it
(hear, hear). If the Jew’s God is the best he can imagine,
let him pay homage to it. If the Christian’s idea of God
is the highest he can conceive, let him be true to it and
worship it, and it will make him a nobler man (applause).
It is not mere names which signify in a matter of this
kind. Though each sect may give him different names,
it is still the same God (hear, hear). Mr. Bradlaugh
wants to know which of them all I uphold as God ;
which of the different types I acknowledge, or ask you
to acknowledge.
Is it the God of Martineau, of New
man, of Parker, or of whom else ? I say it is that which is
common among them all—namely, the conception of good
ness and excellence which you will find in every one
of their definitions.
It is that God which they
�62
-all recognise, and concerning which they only go wrong
when they begin to try and define it metaphysically
{hear, hear). Mr. Bradlaugh wants me to define God;
further than I have done so, I cannot. In the words of
the Athanasian Creed an attempt is made to define the undefinable. The Athanasian Creed tries to explain the whole
of that which overrules the universe instead of describing
simply that which is in relationship to you. I have always
been under the supposition that that was a practice of the
theologian which had greatly retarded the progress of the
world. Mr. Bradlaugh spoke of prayer as implying a hope
—a hope to induce God to do what he would not do with
out prayer; and he wanted to know in what sense I used
the word “prayer” in my speeches. I have not used the
word “ prayer ” without describing what I meant. At least,
I have not done so to my knowledge ; if I have, I am
sorry for it (applause). Mr. Bradlaugh says that prayer im
plies a hope of inducing God to do what he would not do
without it. For my part, I doubt whether some things
that have been called prayers, such as the prayers for the
recovery of the Prince of Wales—(loud hisses and laughter)
—for wet weather, and for fine weather, have very much
influenced the divine counsels (hear, hear and applause).
But what do I mean by prayer ? As I have said before,
the addressing of my soul to this power which I feel and
recognise above me; and the law of the answer of prayer—
and it is as much a law as any law of nature—is that they
who do thus energise themselves towards Godbecomethereby
more susceptible to the energising of God towards them. The
law is that he who energises or addresses himself towards
God, consciously, reverently, and of set purpose, thereby sets
at motion a law by which he becomes more susceptible to
God’s addressing of himself to him, and so he gains to him
self the strength, moral and spiritual, which we find in prayer
(hear, hear). Mr. Bradlaugh picked out one of the words from
his own definition of worship. By sacrifice he said he meant
the act of a man who was too cowardly to bear the result of his
own actions. As far as that definition goes, I may say I do
not include it in my idea of worship (applause). Now, sir,
I have striven to the best of my power to be precise and
clear in my words. It is true I have not dealt with the
matter from a platform purely metaphysical. lama positivist
in most things, understanding by a positivist one who founds
his philosophy on observed phenomena. I have passed out
�63
of the stage in which men believe that theological theories
will solve all the problems of the universe. I have passed
out of the stage in which Mr. Bradlaugh now is, in which
metaphysics are looked upon as the best ground of reason
ing we can have. I have passed into the stage in which
positive thought, the recognition of phenomena, is recog
nised as the best starting-point we can have from which
to get at the truth. Auguste Comte traces the progress of
the thought of the world and of the individual from the
theological stage to the metaphysical stage, and from that
to the positive stage. I invite Mr. Bradlaugh to look
at things from that stage, and to see whether he cannot
make his thoughts clearer by the use of the positive method
than by the use of the metaphysical (loud applause).
Mr. Bradlaugh : The curious thing is that I have never
used the word metaphysics, and I have offered to affirm no
proposition that does not relate to phenomena. I am as
tounded to hear that I am a metaphysician (laughter and
applause). Is it because I only used language which I can
make clear that my opponent gave me that title ? It is
because he does not use language that is related to phe
nomena that he is obliged to commend his Theism by
speaking of it as a problem which is insoluble (applause).
I have not done anything, as far as my case is concerned,
except use language relating to phenomena. Now, I have
only a few moments, and this speech will be my last in this
debate. I would, therefore, like you to see the position in
which we stand. I am told that the improvement I would
suggest would in no sense tend to virtue. I must refer again
to the state of things in China, where the members of the
same family are eating each other for want of food. Would
it not tend to virtue if their condition was remedied (ap
plause) ? I wish my friend and myself to look at things
from this point of view, and, as he is in the positive way of
thinking, let him put himself in the same state as they are,
and then ask whether an amendment of the condition
would not tend to greater virtue (renewed applause). What
God is it that we are to worship ? Oh, the God it is reasonable
to worship is the best we can conceive—but no conception has
yet been put before us. You have been told a great deal
about stars, but the more important facts and arguments
still remain unchallenged (hear, hear). Now, I am asked,
does belief in God hinder philanthropy ? Yes, when it is
held as those do hold it in some parts of the world, who.
�64
think that God has designed, in his thought and intelligence,
and for good purposes, that a famine should take place, such
as the one in China (hear, hear). There are at least people
among the Mahometans and the Hindus whose virtue has
been clearly shown to have suffered much more from religion
than from civilisation (applause). The case put as to prayer is
one which I think has something peculiar about it. We are
told first of the law of prayer, which is said to be as much
a law of nature as any other law. Well, now, by law of
nature (Mr. Armstrong : Hear, hear)—I don’t know if I am
misrepresenting you—I only mean observed order of
happening (pouring water from glass); I do not mean
that there has been some direction given that this water shall
fall, but that, given the conditions, the event ensues. Law
of nature is order of sequence or concurrence, the observed
order of phenomena. What observed order of phenomena
is there in the order of prayer ? When the prayer prays
“ himself he sets a law in motion.” Is this so? We are
told that the prayer for the recovery of the Prince of
Wales did not much tend to alter the divine counsel. Mr.
Armstrong did not tell you how he knew that.
His
own admission here proves that prayer is sometimes
offered in vain, taking the observed order of its phenomena
(hear, hear). He spoke of the holy discontent in pious
men which set them to seek to remedy evil. Holy discon
tent against the state of things which God in his intelligent
purpose has caused ! Then the holy discontent is dissatis
faction with God’s doings. How can you worship the God
with whom you are dissatisfied (applause) ? But what is the
truth of the matter ? In the early ages of the world man
saw the river angry and prayed to the river-god; but science
has dispelled the river-god, and has substituted for prayer,
weirs, locks, dykes, levels, and flood-gates (hear, hear). You
see the same thing over the face of nature wherever you go.
What you have found is this : that in the early ages of the
world gods were frightful, gods were monstrous, gods were
numerous, because ignorance predominated in the minds of
men. The things they came in contact with were not under
stood, and no investigation then took place ; men wor
shipped. But gradually men learned first dimly, then more
clearly, and god after god has been demolished as science
has grown. The best attempt at conception of God is
always the last conception of him, and this because God
has to give way to science. The best conception of God is
�65
in substituting humanity for deity, the getting rid of, and
turning away from, the whole of those conceptions and
fancies which men called God in the past, and which they
have ceased to call God now (applause). Mr. Armstrong
thought that it was because men had given different names to
God that I tried to embarrass him by bidding him choose
between them. It was not so; it is the different characteristics
and not the different names that I pointed out as a difficulty.
We have gods of peace, gods of war, gods of love, a god of
this people, or of that tribe, a god of the Christians, a
god of misery, of terror, of beneficence—these are all
different suppositions held by men of the gods they have
created. It has well been said that the gods have not
created the men, but the men have created the gods, and
you can see the marks of human handicraft in each divine
lineament (applause). I cannot hope, pleading here to
night, to make many converts. I can and do hope that all
of you will believe that the subject treated wants examina
tion far beyond the limits of this short debate. I have a very
good hopeindeed,and reallybelieve thatsome good has been
done when it can be shown that two men of strong opinions,
and earnest in their expressions, can come together without
one disrespectful word to each other, or want of respect in
any way; without any want of due courtesy to the other;
and with a great desire to separate the truth and the false
hood (applause). If there has been unwittingly anything
disrespectful on my part, I am sorry for it. I have to thank
Mr. Armstrong for coming forward in the manner in which
he has done, and I can only ask all to use their services in
making the spread of virtue, truth, and justice easier than
it has been. I am aware that I have nominally a vast
majority against me, but I do not fear on that ground, and
still shall continue to point out falsehood wherever I may
find it. At any rate, the right of speech is all I ask, and
that you have conceded. I have only an earnest endeavour
to find out as much as I can that will be useful to my
fellows, and to tell them as truly as I can how much I
grasp. It is for you—-with the great harvest of the unreaped
before you—who can do more than I, to gather and show
what you have gathered; it is for you who have more truth
to tell it more efficiently; and when you answer me I put it
to you that so far as the world has redeemed itself at all, it
has only redeemed itself by shaking off in turn the Theistic
religions which have grown and decayed. So far, it seems
c
�to be a real and solid redemption (applause). When re
ligion was supreme through the ignorance of men, the people
were low down indeed, and a few devoted men had to
grapple with the hereafter theory and all the content with
present wrong which the belief in it maintained. Take a
few hundred years ago, when there was little or no scepticism
in the world. Only a very few able to be heretical—the mass
unable and too weak to doubt or endure doubt. Look at the
state of things then, and look at it now. Could a discussion
like this have taken place then ? No. But it can since the print
ing-press has helped us; it can since the right of speech has
been in good part won. Two hundred years ago it could not
have been. Two hundred years ago I could not have got the
mass of people together to listen as you have listened last night
and to-night, and had not men treated your religion as I treat it,
we should not have therightof meeting even now (applause)’
If you want to convince men like myself, hear us; answer
us if you can—say what you have to say without making it
more bitter than we can bear. We must believe it if it is
reasonable, and if not we must reject it. So long as there
is any wrong to redeem we shall try to redeem it our■selves (applause). We may be wrong in this, but at
least we do our part.
I do not mean that in the same
ranks as my friend there are not men as sincere and as earnest,
men as devoted, men as human-redemption seeking as myself,
but I, or the best of those for whom I plead, urge that their
humanity is not the outcome of their theology (applause).
Then their experience of right, their hope of life, and their
experience of truth rest entirely on what they do here. And
I will ask you this : do you not think it is quite possible, as
Lessing says, that he who thinks he grasps the whole truth
may not even grasp it at all ? like the one deceived by the
juggler's trick, he may think he holds something in his hand,
but when it is opened it is empty (hear, hear). Take the
truth as you can—not from me, not from him, not from any
one man. There is none of the bad which is all bad, none of
the good all good, none of the truth all true: it is for you to
select, to weigh, to test for yourselves (hear, hear). Many
of us stumble in trying to carry the torch in dark places in
the search for truth, but even in our trembling steps the
sparks we scatter may enable some to find the grains of truth
we miss ourselves (loud and prolonged applause).
Mr. Armstrong : Mr. Bradlaugh, the body to which I
belong also have the majority against them; over that
�we can shake hands. Let us try, each in our own way, as
may best seem to us, to serve what we hold to be true (ap
plause). Depend upon it, whether there be a God or
not, we each shall do best so. If there be no God, then
you tell me I shall still do well to serve humanity. And
if there be a God, he will gather you also, my brother, to
his arms, so long as you are true—true and absolutely sincere
in those convictions which come to you from the reason
which he has given you (loud applause). You have
told us that while religion held sway men were down-trodden.
While superstition held sway it is true they were (applause) ;
while false ideas of a cruel and lustful God held sway, it is
true they were (applause); but just in proportion as men’s
thoughts of Godt have purified and clarified, just in pro
portion as they have restored to Christianity its sweet
meaning, just in that proportion religion has risen to be a
power in the world of all that is good and sweet and holy
(applause). Now, sir, to speak of what I said about the
prayers for the recovery of the Prince of Wales. I said I
thought they had been of little avail.
But the prayer for
spiritual purity from a Christian man does win its answer by
a law—a law of nature, I will now say, since you have defined .
a law of nature as the observed sequence of phenomena;
but I dared not so call it until I knew what your definition
■of nature might be. But let us come back from these philo.sophisings, in which it is so easy to go wrong, to the test of
experience. Mr. Bradlaugh says I do not submit the ex
periences of which I have spoken, to the test. I invite you to
test them, and see whether Mr. Bradlaugh has upset them
or not. If you test them fairly and then find them false,
then come and tell me so. They are neither uncommon
nor abnormal experiences, but the experiences of nearly every
man and woman. It may be that their hearing is dull, but
still they know the voice. You all know those in which the
initiative comes from God, the voice of conscience, of which
I spoke ; you all know the solemn feeling which comes over
you in the presence of the majesty of nature. You all may know
the other things in which you have to take the initiative.
Heed those things whether you believe they come from God
or not, and you all may know the other—that of worship
—and its answer. My contention solely is, that it would
be reasonable for you to seek for that experience, that it is
reasonable in us to practise it (hear, hear). And now I will
tell you a little story for the end of this debate, of a little
�68
family of children; and as I shall not found any argument upon
. it, I do not think it will be unfair. They sat one Christ
mas Eve in a chamber where the wintry gloom of early
twilight fell. The eldest son sat and talked of the good
ness of their father, and how, from the earliest days he
could recollect, his tenderness had sheltered him, and how
he seemed to have a heart to love every little child all
through the world, and how he was surely even now prepar
ing some sweet surprise for them every one But John, the
second boy, had lived all his life at a school on the far sea
coast, where he had been sent, that rough ocean breezes might
strengthen his weakly frame, and now, tanned and burly,
he had just come home for Christmas, and he had not even,
seen his father yet. And he said he did not believe they
had a father ; that Theophilus, declaring he had seen him,
was nothing to him, for if there was one thing he had learned
at school, it was not to trust the experience of other people
till tested by his own. But Edward said he, too, knew they
had a father; he, too, had seen him, but he was very stern,
and he thought they could all do as well without him, and
what could be more unkind than to leave them there in
. twilight solitude on Christmas Eve. And little Tom sat
apart in the very darkest corner of the room, with a tearstained face, crying as if his heart would break, over
the hard sums set him there to do, and thinking that
his brothers were a selfish lot of fellows, to talk and talk, and.
not care for him and his hard task. And Theophilus had
just come to steal his arm around little Tom’s waist, and dry
his tears, and try if he could not help him to do his sum,
when the door of the next room was thrown open and a
blaze of light flashed upon their faces, and one after the other
they all rushed in and beheld their father standing by such a
glorious Christmas-tree as boys never beheld before. And
for each and all there were gifts so rare and precious—the
very things they had longed for all the by-gone half. And for
John, who had been so far away and had not known his father,
there was a grasp of the father’s hand so strong and tender,
and a kiss from the father’s lips so sweet and loving, that he
felt as if he had known that dear father all his life ; and as
for little Tom, all his tears were dissolved in rippling
laughter, and he quite lorgot his sum, for on his brow was
set the brightest coronet on all the tree, and they told him
he should be king through all the long Christmasday to follow. And now, dear friends, may the peace of
�69
God which passeth all understanding, that peace which the
perishing things of the world can neither give nor take away,
that peace promised to the weary by our dear brother,
Jesus Christ, even in the midst of all his suffering and woe,
be with you for ever. Amen (applause).
Mr. Armstrong having sat down, rose again and said,
—And now, Mr. Chairman, I desire to move to you the
hearty thanks of this meeting for your conduct in the chair,
for your impartial manner of ruling over us, and the kind
words you have spoken. I thank you, Mr. Bradlaugh, for
the courtesy and fairness with which you have conducted
your part in this debate; and I thank you, sir, for presiding
over us (applause).
Mr. Bradlaugh : I second that motion. I cannot say
that we can thank you for your fairness, for, fortunately, you
have had no opportunity of showing it. But I thank you most
heartily for accepting a position which might have been one
of great difficulty and the taking of which may cause you
to be misrepresented. I also thank Mr. Armstrong for having
met me, and for the kindly manner in which he has spoken
(applause).
The vote of thanks was put and carried unanimously.
The Chairman : Ladies and Gentlemen,—the thanks
which have been given to me are due rather to the gentle
men who have spoken. I cannot but praise the admirable
way in which they have rendered my position almost a
sinecure. This debate has shown that a subject of such
great importance can be discussed fairly, liberally, honestly,
as this has been, and that no danger threatens him who
occupies the chair, or those who lay their honest and earnest
views before you. I feel that I have derived much know
ledge from the truth which has been laid before us ; and I
do feel that there is a growing interest in things of this
sort, which is itself a proof that discussions of this kind are
very useful (applause).
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Victorian Blogging
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A collection of digitised nineteenth-century pamphlets from Conway Hall Library & Archives. This includes the Conway Tracts, Moncure Conway's personal pamphlet library; the Morris Tracts, donated to the library by Miss Morris in 1904; the National Secular Society's pamphlet library and others. The Conway Tracts were bound with additional ephemera, such as lecture programmes and handwritten notes.<br /><br />Please note that these digitised pamphlets have been edited to maximise the accuracy of the OCR, ensuring they are text searchable. If you would like to view un-edited, full-colour versions of any of our pamphlets, please email librarian@conwayhall.org.uk.<br /><br /><span><img src="http://www.heritagefund.org.uk/sites/default/files/media/attachments/TNLHLF_Colour_Logo_English_RGB_0_0.jpg" width="238" height="91" alt="TNLHLF_Colour_Logo_English_RGB_0_0.jpg" /></span>
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Conway Hall Library & Archives
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2018
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Conway Hall Ethical Society
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Is it reasonable to worship God?
Creator
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Armstrong, R.A. [Rev.]
Bradlaugh, Charles
Description
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Place of publication: London
Collation: 69 p. ; 18 cm.
Notes: Verbatim report of two nights' debate at Nottingham between the Rev. R. A. Armstrong and Charles Bradlaugh. Inscription in ink: "Mr M.D. Conway, with RAA's kind regards." From the library of Dr Moncure Conway.
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Freethought Publishing Company
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1878
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CT78
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<a href="http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/mark/1.0/"><img src="http://i.creativecommons.org/p/mark/1.0/88x31.png" alt="Public Domain Mark" /></a><span> </span><br /><span>This work ("Is it reasonable to worship God?"), identified by </span><a href="https://conwayhallcollections.omeka.net/items/show/www.conwayhall.org.uk"><span>Humanist Library and Archives</span></a><span>, is free of known copyright restrictions.</span>
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Text
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English
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Atheism
Free Thought
Theism
Apologetics
Atheism
Conway Tracts
Free Thought-Controversial Literature
Religious Disputations
Theism
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Text
NATIONAL SECULAR SOCIETY
IS THERE A GOD?
By CHARLES BRADLAUGH.
The initial difficulty is in defining the word “ God ”. It is
equally impossible to intelligently affirm or deny any pro
position unless there is at least an understanding, on the
part of the affirmer or denier, of the meaning of every
word used in the proposition. To me the word “God”
standing alone is a word without meaning. I find the
word repeatedly used even by men of education and refine
ment, and who have won reputation in special directions of
research, rather to illustrate their ignorance than to ex
plain their knowledge. Various sects of Theists do affix
arbitrary meanings to the word “ God ”, but often these
meanings are in their terms self-contradictory, and usually
the definition maintained by one sect of Theists more or
less contradicts the definition put forward by some other
sect. With the Unitarian Jew, the Trinitarian Christian,
the old Polytheistic Greek, the modern Universalist, or the
Calvinist, the word “God” will in each case be intended
to express a proposition absolutely irreconcilable with those
of the other sects. In this brief essay, which can by no
means be taken as a complete answer to the question
which forms its title, I will for the sake of argument take
the explanation of the word “God” as given with great
carefulness by Dr. Robert Elint, Professor of Divinity in
the University of Edinburgh, in two works directed by
him against Atheism. He defines God (“ Antitheistic
Theories,” p. 1,) as “a supreme, self-existent, omnipotent,
omniscient, righteous and benevolent being who is dis
tinct from and independent of what he has created ” ; and
(“Theism”, p. 1,) as “a self-existent, eternal being, in
finite in power and wisdom, and perfect in holiness and
goodness, the maker of heaven and earth”; and (p. 18,)
“the creator and preserver of nature, the governor of
nations, the heavenly father and judge of man ” ; (p. 18,)
�2
IS THERE A GOD ?
“ one infinite personal ” ; (p. 42,) “ the one infinite being ”
who “is a person—is a free and loving intelligence”;
(p. 59,) “the creator, preserver, and ruler of all finite
beings”; (p. 65,) “not only the ultimate cause, but the
supreme intelligence”; and (p. 74,) “the supreme moral
intelligence is an unchangeable being”. That is, in the
above statements “ God” is defined by Professor Flint to
be : M supreme, self-existent, the one infinite, eternal, omni
potent, omniscient, unchangeable, righteous, and benevolent, per
sonal being, creator and preserver of nature, maker of heaven
and earth ; who is distinct from and independent of what he has
created, who is a free, loving, supreme, moral intelligence, the
governor of nations, the heavenly father and judge of man.
The two volumes, published by William Blackwood and
Son, from which this definition has been collected, form the
Baird Lectures in favor of Theism for the years 1876 and
1877. Professor Flint has a well-deserved reputation as a
clear thinker and writer of excellent ability as a Theistic
advocate. I trust, therefore, I am not acting unfairly in
criticising his definition. My first objection is, that to me
the definition is on the face of it so self-contradictory that
a negative answer must be given to the question, Is there
such a God ? The association of the word “ supreme ” with
the word “ infinite ” as descriptive of a “ personal being ”
is utterly confusing. “Supreme” can only be used as
expressing comparison between the being to whom it is
applied, and some other being with whom that “ supreme ”
being is assumed to have possible points of comparison and
is then compared. But “ the one infinite being ” cannot be
compared with any other infinite being, for the wording of
the definition excludes the possibility of any other infinite
being, nor could the infinite being—for the word “one”
may be dispensed with, as two infinite beings are unthink
able—be compared with any finite being. “ Supreme” is
an adjective of relation and is totally inapplicable to “the
infinite”. It can only be applied to one of two or more
finites. “Supreme” with “omnipotent” is pleonastic.
If it is said that the word “supreme” is now properly
used to distinguish between the Creator and the created,
the governor and that which is governed, then it is clear
that the word “supreme” would have been an inappli
cable word of description to “theone infinite being ” prior
to creation, and this would involve the declaration that the
�IS THERE A GOD?
3
exact description of the unchangeable has been properly
changed, which is an absurdity. The definition affirms
“creation”, that is, affirms “ God” existing prior to such
creation—i.e., then the sole existence; but the word
“ supreme ” could not then apply. An existence cannot be
described as “highest” when there is none other ; there
fore, none less high. The word “ supreme” as a word of
description is absolutely contradictory of Monism. Yet
Professor Flint himself says (“Anti-Theistic Theories”,
p. 132), “ that reason, when in quest of an ultimate expla
nation of things, imperatively demands unity, and that only
a Monistic theory of the universe can deserve the name of
U philosophy ”. Professor Flint has given no explanation
of the meaning he attaches to the word “ self-existent ”.
Nor, indeed, as he given any explanation of any of his
words of description. By self-existent I mean that to which
you cannot conceive antecedent. By “infinite” I mean
immeasurable, illimitable, indefinable ; i.e., that of which I
cannot predicate extension, or limitation of extension. By
‘(eternal ” I mean illimitable, indefinable, i.e., that of which
I cannot predicate limitation of duration or progression of
duration.
“ Nature ” is with me the same as “ universe ”, the same
as “ existence ”; i.e., I mean by it: The totality of all
phenomena, and of all that has been, is, or may be neces
sary for the happening of each and every phsenomenon. It
is from the very terms of the definition, self-existent, eternal,
infinite. I cannot think of nature commencement, discon
tinuity, or creation. I am unable to think backward to the
possibility of existence not having been. I cannot think
forward to the possibility of existence ceasing to be. I have
no meaning for the word “ create ” except to denote change
of condition. Origin of “universe” is to me absolutely
unthinkable. Sir William Hamilton (“ Lectures and Dis
cussions,” p. 610) affirms: that when aware of a new ap
pearance we are utterly unable to conceive that there has
originated any new existence ; that we are utterly unable to
think that the complement of existence has ever been either
increased or diminished; that we can neither conceive no
thing becoming something, or something becoming nothing.
.Professor Flint’s definition affirms “God ” as existing “ dis
tinct from, and independent of, what he has created ”. But
what can such words mean when used of the “ infinite ? ”
�IS THERE A GOD ?
Does “distinct from” mean separate from? Does the
“ universe ” existing distinct from God mean in addition to ?
and in other place than ? or, have the words no meaning ?
Of all words in Professor Flint’s definition, which would
be appropriate if used of human beings, I mean the
same as I should mean if I used the same words in the
highest possible degree of any human being. Here I
maintain the position taken by John Stuart Mill in his
examination of Sir W. Hamilton (p. 122). Righteous
ness and benevolence are two of the words of descrip
tion included in the definition of this creator and governor
of nations. But is it righteous and benevolent to create
men and govern nations, so that the men act crimi
nally and the nations seek to destroy one another in
war? Professor Flint does not deny (“Theism,” p. 256)
“ that God could have originated a sinless moral system”,
and he adds: “I have no doubt that God has actually made
many moral beings who are certain never to oppose their
own wills to his, or that he might, if he had so pleased, have
created only such angels as were sure to keep their first
estate ”. But it is inaccurate to describe a “ God ” as right
eous or benevolent who, having the complete power to
originate a sinless moral system, is admitted to have origi
nated a system in which sinfulness and immorality were
not only left possible, but have actually, in consequence of
God’s rule and government, become abundant. It cannot
be righteous for the “omnipotent” to be making human
beings contrived and designed by his omniscience so as to
be fitted for the commission of sin. It cannot be benevo
lent in “ God ” to contrive and create a hell in which he is
to torment the human beings who have sinned because
made by him in sin. “ God ”, if omnipotent and omnis
cient, could just as easily, and much more benevolently,
have contrived that there should never be any sinners, and,
therefore, never any need for hell or torment.
The Bev. B. A. Armstrong, with whom I debated this
question, says:—
“ ‘Either,’ argues Mr. Bradlaugh, in effect, ‘God could
make a world without suffering, or he could not. If he
could and did not, he is not all-good. If he could not, he
is not all-powerful.’ The reply is, What do you mean by
all-powerful? If you mean having power to reconcile
things in themselves contradictory, we do not hold that
�IS THERE A GOD ?
5
God is all-powerful. But a humanity, from the first en
joying immunity from suffering, and yet possessed of no
bility of character, is a self-contradictory conception.”
That is, Mr. Armstrong thinks that a “sinless moral
system from the first is a self-contradictory conception ”.
It is difficult to think a loving governor of nations
arranging one set of cannibals to eat, and another set of
human beings to be eaten by their fellow-men. It is im
possible to think a loving creator and governor contriving
a human being to be born into the world the pre-natal
victim of transmitted disease. It is repugnant to reason
to affirm this “free loving supreme moral intelligence”
planning and contriving the enduring through centuries of
criminal classes, plague-spots on civilisation.
The word “unchangeable ” contradicts the word “ crea
tor”. Any theory of creation must imply some period
when the being was not yet the creator, that is, when yet
the creation was not performed, and the act of creation
must in such case, at any rate, involve temporary or
permanent change in the mode of existence of the being
creating. So, too, the words of description “governor of
nations” are irreconcileable with the description “un
changeable ”, applied to a being alleged to have existed
prior to the creation of the “nations”, and therefore,
of course, long before any act of government could be
exercised.
To speak of an infinite personal being seems to me pure
contradiction of terms. All attempts to think “person”
involve thoughts of the limited, finite, conditioned. To
describe this infinite personal being as distinct from some
thing which is postulated as “what he has created” is
only to emphasise the contradiction, rendered perhaps still
more marked when the infinite personal being is described
as “intelligent”.
The Rev. R. A. Armstong, in a prefatory note to the
report of his debate with myself on the question “Is it
reasonable to worship God?”, says: “I have ventured
upon alleging an intelligent cause of the pheonomena of
the universe, in spite of the fact that in several of his
writings Mr. Bradlaugh has described intelligence as im
plying limitations. But though intelligence, as known to
us in man, is always hedged within limits, there is no diffi
culty in conceiving each and every limit as removed. In
�6
IS THERE A GOD?
that case the essential conception of intelligence remains
the same precisely, although the change of conditions
revolutionises its mode of working.” This, it seems to
me, is not accurate. The word intelligence can only be
accurately used of man, as in each case meaning the
totality of mental ability, its activity and result. If you
eliminate in each case all possibilities of mental ability
there is no “conception of intelligence” left, either essential
or otherwise. If you attempt to remove the limits, that
is the organisation, the intelligence ceases to be thinkable.
It is unjustifiable to talk of “ change of conditions ” when
you remove the word intelligence as a word of application
to man or other thinking animal, and seek to apply the
word to the unconditionable.
As an Atheist I. affirm one existence, and deny the possi
bility of more than one existence; by existence meaning,
as I have already stated, “the totality of all pheenomena,
and of all that has been, is, or may be necessary for the
happening of any and every pluenomenon ”. This exist
ence I know in its modes, each mode being distinguished
in thought by its qualities. By “mode” I mean each
cognised condition; that is, each pheenomenon or aggre
gation of phenomena. By “quality” I mean each charac
teristic by which in the act of thinking I distinguish.
The distinction between the Agnostic and the Atheist
is that either the Agnostic postulates an unknowable, or
makes a blank avowal of general ignorance. The Atheist
does not do either; there is of course to him much that
is yet unknown, every effort of inquiry brings some of this
within reach of knowing. With “the unknowable” con
ceded, all scientific teaching would be illusive. Every real
scientist teaches without reference to “God” or “the
unknowable ”. If the words come in as part of the
yesterday habit still clinging to-day, the scientist conducts
his experiments as though the words were not. Every
operation of life, of commerce, of war, of statesmanship,
is dealt with as though God were non-existent. The
general who asks God to give him victory, and who thanks
God for the conquest, would be regarded as a lunatic by
his Theistic brethren, if he placed the smallest reliance
on God’s omnipotence as a factor in winning the fight.
Cannon, gunpowder, shot, shell, dynamite, provision, men,
horses, means of transport, the value of these all estimated,
�IS THERE A GOD?
7
then the help of “ God ” is added to what is enough with
out God to secure the triumph. The surgeon who in
performing some delicate operation relied on God instead
of his instruments—the physician who counted on the
unknowable in his prescription—these would have poor
clientele even amongst the orthodox; save the peculiar
people the most pious would avoid their surgical or
medical aid. The “God” of the Theist, the “unknowa
ble” of the Agnostic, are equally opposed to the Atheistic
affirmation. The Atheist enquires as to the unknown,
affirms the true, denies the untrue. The Agnostic knows
not of any proposition whether it be true or false.
Pantheists affirm one existence, but Pantheists declare
that at any rate some qualities are infinite, e.g., that
existence is infinitely intelligent. I, as an Atheist, can
only think qualities of phsenomena. I know each pheno
menon by its qualities. I know no qualities except as the
qualities of some phenomenon.
So long as the word “ God ” is undefined I do not deny
“ God”. To the question, Is there such a God as defined
by Professor ..Plint, I am compelled to give a negative
reply. If the word “ God ” is intended to affirm Dualism,
then as a Monist I negate “ God ”.
_ The attempts to prove the existence of God may be
divided into three classes:—1. Those which attempt to
prove the objective existence of God from the subjective
notion of necessary existence in the human mind, or from
the assumed objectivity of space and time, interpreted as
the attributes of a necessary substance. 2. Those which
*{ essay to prove the existence of a supreme self-existent
cause, from the mere fact of the existence of the world by
the application of the principle of causality, starting with
the postulate of any single existence whatsoever, the world,
or anything in the world, and proceeding to argue back
wards or upwards, the existence of one supreme cause is
held to be regressive inference from the existence of these
effects”. But it is enough to answer to these attempts,
that if a supreme existence were so demonstrable, that
bare entity would not be identifiable with “God”. “A
demonstration of a primitive source of existence is of no
formal theological value. It is an absolute zero.”
3. The argument from design, or adaptation, in nature,
the fitness of means to an end, implying, it is said, an
�8
IS THERE A GOD?
architect or designer. Or, from the order in the universe,
indicating, it is said, an orderer or lawgiver, whose intelli
gence we thus discern.
But this argument is a failure, because from finite
instances differing in character it assumes an infinite cause
absolutely the same for all. Divine unity, divine per
sonality, are here utterly unproved. 11 Why should we rest
in our inductive inference of one designer from the alleged
phenomena of design, when these are claimed to be so
varied and so complex ? ”
If the inference from design is to avail at all, it must
avail to show that all the phenomena leading to misery
and mischief, must have been designed and intended by a
being finding pleasure in the production and maintenance
of this misery and mischief. If the alleged constructor of
the universe is supposed to have designed one beneficent
result, must he not equally be supposed to have designed
all results? And if the inference of benevolence and
goodness be valid for some instances, must not the in
ference of malevolence and wickedness be equally valid
from others ? If, too, any inference is to be drawn from
the illustration of organs in animals supposed to be
specially contrived for certain results, what is the inference
to be drawn from the many abortive and incomplete organs,
muscles, nerves, etc., now known to be traceable in man
and other animals ? What inference is to be drawn from
each instance of deformity or malformation? But the
argument from design, if it proved anything, would at the
most only prove an arranger of pre-existing material; it
in no sense leads to the conception of an originator of
substance.
There is no sort of analogy between a finite artificer
arranging a finite mechanism and an alleged divine creator
originating all existence. Brom an alleged product you
are only at liberty to infer a producer after having seen a
similar product actually produced.
PRICE ONE PENNY.
London: Printed by Annie Besant and Charles Bradlaugh,
63, Fleet Street, London, E.C.—1887.
�
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Is there a god?
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Bradlaugh, Charles [1833-1891]
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iTftg Atheistic ffllaffarm*
VI.
‘
z 4’- ■
NATURE
AND
THE GODS.
ARTHUR B. MOSS.
LONDON:
FREETHOUGHT
PUBLISHING
63, FLEET STREET, E.C.
1 8 8 4.
PRICE
ONE
PENNY.
COMPANY,
�THE ATHEISTIC PLATFORM.
-------------
Under this title it is proposed to issue a fortnightly publi
cation, each number of which shall consist of a lecture
delivered by a well-known Freethoug’ht advocate. Any
question may be selected, provided that it has formed the
subject of a lecture delivered from the platform by an
Atheist. It is desired to show that the Atheistic platform
is used for the service of humanity, and that Atheists war
against tyranny of every kind, tyranny of king and god,
political, social, and theological.
Each issue will consist of sixteen pages, and will be
published at one penny. Each writer is responsible only
for his or her own views.
I. “ What is the use of Prayer ?” By Annie Besant.
II. “ Mind considered as a Bodily Function.”
Alice Bradlaugh.
III. “ The Gospel of Evolution.”
ling, D.Sc.
IV. “Englxnd’s Balance-Sheet.”
laugh.
V. “The Story
of the
Soup, n.”
By
By Edward Ave-
By Charles Brad
By Annie Besant.
�NATURE AND THE GODS.
Ladies and Gentdeaien,—No word has played a more
important part in the discussion of scientific and philo
sophical questions than the word Nature. Everyone
thinks he knows the mbaning of it. Yet how few have
used it to express the same idea; indeed it has been
•employed to convey such a variety of impressions that
John Stuart Mill asserts that it has been the “fruitful
source” of the propagation of “false taste, false philo
sophy, false morality, and even bad law.” Now, I propose
in this lecture that we start with some clear ideas concern
ing the meaning of such words, upon the right understand
ing of which the whole force of my arguments depends.
What, then, is meant by the word Nature ? When used
by a materialist it has two important meanings. In its
large and philosophical sense it means, as Mr. Mill says:
‘ ‘ The sum of all ph.8enom.ena, together with the causes
which produce them, including not only all that happens,
but all that is capable of happening—the unused capabili
ties of matter being as much a part of the idea of Nature
as those which take effect.” But the wor^. Nature is often
used, and rightly used, to distinguish the “natural ” from
the “artificial” object—that is, to indicate the difference
between a thing produced spontaneously by Nature, from
a thing wrought by the skill and labor of man.
But it must not be supposed that the artificial object
forms no part of Nature. All art belongs to Nature. Art
simply means the adaptation, the moulding into certain
forms of the things of Nature, and therefore the artistic
productions of man are included in the comprehensive
’sense of the term Nature which I just now used.
�84
THE ATHEISTIC PLATFORM.
Now in Nature there is a permanent and a changeableelement, but man only takes cognisance of the changeable
or pheenomenal element; of the substratum underlying phe
nomena he knows and can know nothing whatever ; that is,
man does not know what matter and force are in them
selves in the abstract, he only knows them in the concrete,
as they affect him through the medium of his senses.
Now I allege that nearly all the mistakes of theology
have arisen from the ignorance of man in regard to Nature
and her mode of operation. Let us consider for a moment
a few facts in reference to man. Of course I don’t want to
take you back to his origin. But suppose we go back no
further than a few thousand years, we shall find that man
lived in holes in the earth; that he moved about in fear
and trembling; that not only did he fight against bis
fellow creatures, but that he went in constant fear of animals who sought him as their prey. Under these eiroirmstances he looked to Nature for assistance. He felt how
itnspeakab'ly helpless he was, and he cried aloud for help.
(Sometimes he imagined that he received what in his,
agony he had yearned for. Then it was that he thought
that Nature was most kind. Perhaps he wanted food to
eat and had tried in vain to procure it. But presently a
poor beast comes across his path, and he slays it and satis
fies his hunger. Or perhaps he himself is in danger. A
ferocious animal is in pursuit of him and he sees no means
of escape, but presently comes in view a narrow stream of
water which he can swim across, but which his pursuer
cannot. When he is again secure he utters a deep sigh of
relief. In time he makes rapid strides of progress. He
learns to keep himself warm while the animals about him
are perishing with cold; he learns to make weapons where
with to destroy l^s enemies; but his greatest triumph of
all is when he has learned howto communicate his thoughts
to his fellows. Up to now it would be pretty safe to say
that, man was destitute of all ideas concerning the existence of god or gods. But he advances one stage further,
and his thoughts begin to take something like definite
shape. He forms for himself a theoiy as to the cause of
the events happening about him. And now the reign of
the gods begins. Man is still a naked savage; as Voltaire
truly says : ‘ ‘ Man had only his bare skin, which continu
ally exposed to the sun, rain and hail, became chapped,
�NATURE AND THE GODS.
85
tanned, and spotted. The male in our continent was dis
figured by spare hairs on his body, which rendered him
frightful without covering him. His face was hidden by
these hairs. His skin became a rough soil which bore a
.forest of stalks, the roots of which tended upwards and the
branches of which grew downwards. It was in this state
that this animal ventured to paint god, when in course of
time he learnt the art of description ” (“ Philosophical Dic
tionary,” vol. ii., page 182).
Naturally enough man’s first objects of worship were
fetishes—gods of wood, stone, trees, fire, water. By-andbye, however, he came to worship living beings; in fact,
-any animal that he thought was superior in any way to.
himself was converted into an object of worship. But
none of these gods were of any assistance to him in pro
moting his advancement in the world. And neither did
he receive any assistance from the spontaneous action of
Nature. In fact he advanced in the road of civilisation
■only in proportion as he offered ceaseless war against the
hurtful forces of nature, using one force to counteract the
■destructive character of another. Think what the earth
must have been without a solitary house upon it, without
a man who yet knew how to till the soilI Must it not have
been a howling wilderness fit only for savage beasts and
brutal barbarians? In course of time, however, man
made great' strides. He began to live in communities,
which. afterwards grew into nations. He betook himself
also to the art of agriculture, and supplied himself and his
fellows with good, nutritious food. And with this growth
of man the gods underwent a similar transition. Now
instead of bowing down before fetishes, man transferred
his worship to gods and goddesses who were supposed to
dwell somewhere in the sky. And these gods were of a
•very peculiar kind. Each of them had a separate depart
ment to himself and performed only a certain class of
actions. One made the sun to shine and the trees to grow;
one had a kind of dynamite factory to himself, and manu
factured lightning and thunder; another was a god of
love ; another secretary for war; another perpetual presi
dent of the Celestial Peace Society. Some had several
heads; some had only one eye or one arm; some had
wings, while others appeared like giants, and hurled
.thunderbolts at the heads of unoffending people. But
�86
THE ATHEISTIC PLATFORM.
these gods were of no more service to man than those that
preceded them. If man advanced it was by his own effort,
by virtue of using his intelligence, by strife, warfare, and
by suffering.
Neither Nature nor the gods taught man to be truth
ful, honest, just, nor even to be clean. No god came to
tell him that he must not lie, nor steal, nor murder. All
virtues are acquired, all are the result of education. And
it was only after coming together and being criticised by
one another; men being criticised by women who no
doubt taught them that when they came a-wooing they
would have a very slight chance if they were not clean and
respectable; living in societies and being governed by
the wisest among their fellows, who were able to judge as
to what kind of actions produced the most beneficial
results, that laws against theft, adultery, and murder, and
other evil actions, were established. From Polytheism, or
belief in many gods, the next great step was to Mono
theism, or belief in one god. This was an important
transition, and meant the clearing from the heavens of
many fictitious deities. But though the monotheist
believed only in one god, that did not prevent others from
believing in an entirely different deity. The ancient Jew
worshipped Jahveh, but that did not prevent the Baalites
from having a god of their own, to whom they could
appeal in the hour of need. And just let me here observe
that the early monotheist always worshipped an anthropo
morphic or man-like deity. And he worshipped such a
god because man was the highest being of whom he had
any conception. His god was always the counterpart of
himself and reflected all the characteristics of his own
nature. Was he brutal and licentious? So was his god.
Was he in’favor of aggressive wars? Sowas his god.
Was he a petty tyrant, in favor of slavery? So was his
god. Was he a polygamist? Sowas his god. Was he
ignorant of the facts of life ? So was his god. Was he
revengeful and relentless ? So was his god.
And in whatever book we find a deity described as a
malevolent or fiendish wretch depend upon it, by what
ever name that book may be known, and by whomsoever
it may be reverenced, it was written by one who possessed
in his own person precisely the same characteristics as»
those he depicted in the character of his deity.
�NATUIIE AND TlTE GODS.
Th e Jewish, god, Jahveh, it must be understood, was not
a spiritual being, although it is sometimes pretended that
he was. No. He was a purely material being. True he
lived somewhere up above, but he made very frequent
visits to the earth. Once he walked in the garden of Eden
“in the cool of day,” or “his voice” did for him (Gen.
iii., 8). Once he stood upon a mountain, whither Moses,
Aaron, Nadab and Abihu had gone to hold a consultation
with him (Ex. xxiv., 10). Once he talked with Moses
“face to face” (Ex. xxxiii., 11).
And not only was Jahveh a material being, but on the
whole he was not a very formidable deity. In point of
truth he was a very little fellow. And by way of diversion
he was sometimes drawn about in a small box, or ark,
two feet long and three feet wide (Sam. vi., 6, 7). As
evidence that even among professional Christians to-day
Jahveh is not looked upon as a very stalwart fellow, Mr.
Edward Gibson, in the House of Commons, a short time
ago said that if Mr. Bradlaugh were admitted into that
assembly the effect of it would be that god would be
“thrown out of the window.”
And if you want to find a man with “small ideas” on
general matters it is only necessary to know the kind of
god he worships to be able to determine the intellectual
width and depth of such a man’s mind.
Why is this ? Because all ideas of god were born in
the fertile imaginations of men, and a man’s idea of god
is invariably the exact measurement of himself, morally
and intellectually. It may be urged by some Theists that
man is indebted to Jahveh for his existence, and that he
owes his moral and intellectual advancement to the fact
that this deity, through the medium of Moses and the
other inspired writers, laid down certain commandments
for his guidance in life. When it is remembered, however,
that if man is indebted in any way to Jahveh for his ex
istence, he owes him only the exact equivalent of the
benefits he has received, I think it will be seen that on the
whole man’s indebtedness to this deity is very small indeed.
Was Adam indebted to Jahveh for the imperfect nature
which compelled him to commit the so-called sin which
imperilled the future destiny of human race ? Were all
the “miserable sinners”—the descendants of the first
pair—indebted to Jahveh for their “corrupt” natures?
�88
THE ATHEISTIC PEATFORM.
If yes, what kind of god was man indebted to ? To a god
who once drowned the whole of mankind except one family ?
To a god who said that he was a jealous being who “ visir ted the sins of the father upon the children unto a third
and fourth generation (Ex. xx., 5) ? To a god who sanc
tioned slavery (Lev. xxv., 44, 45) and injustice of all
kinds ? To a god who said “ thou shalt not suffer a witch
to live” (Ex. xxii., 18), and gave instructions for men to
kill the blasphemers among their fellows (Lev. xxiv., 16) ?
To a god who told Moses to go against the Midianites and
slay every man among them, preserving only the virgins
among the women to satisfy the lustful natures of a brutal
horde of soldiers (Numbers xxxi., 7—18) ? To a god to
whom, as Shelley says, the only acceptable offerings were
the steam of slaughter, the dissonance of groans, and
the flames of a desolate land” (Dialogue between
“ Eusebes and Theosophus,” prose writings, page 300) ? I
deny that man has ever been in any way indebted to such
a god, and I say moreover that such a deity never had any
leal existence, except in the base imaginations of ignorant
and brutal men. But the next stage was from the
material to the spiritual god. Many ages must have
elapsed before this more elevating though equally absurd
belief_ became to be accepted, ^ven by a small minority of
mankind. But the time eventually did come—a time
which happily is now rapidly passing away—when intel
lectual men believed that the proposition of the existence
of god could be demonstrated to all rational minds. Some
said that god’s existence was self-evident to every intelli
gent mind; others that Nature and men could not have
come by “chance”; that they must have had a cause;
some said that the harmony existing’ in the universe proved
god’s existence; others that everybody except fools “felt
in their hearts ” that there was a god. But these imagin
ary proofs did not always convince. At last there came
forth philosophers who said that there was a mode of
reasoning, the adoption of which “leads irresistibly up to
the belief in god,” and that that mode was called the
mode a priori. Another school said that the a priori, or
reasoning from cause to effect, was an altogether fallacious
method, and that the only satisfactory mode of establish
ing god’s existence was the d posteriori, or reasoning from'
effect to cause.
�NATURE AND THE GODS.
89
Another school said that taken singly neither of these
modes of reasoning established the existence of deity, but
that both taken together “formed a perfect chain” of
reasoning that was quite conclusive on the point. Neither
of these schools, however, showed how two bad arguments
could possibly make one good one. But let me iust briefly
examine these arguments put forward so confidently by
leading Theists. The first method—d priori—invariably
takes the form of an attempt to establish what is called a
Great hirst Cause.”.
When it is said, that there must be a “first cause” to
account for the existence of Nature, such language, to say
the least, shows a total misapprehension of the meaning of
e word cause,” as used by scientific men, “ First
cause, as applied to Nature as a whole, remembering the
definition I have given, is an absurdity. Cause and effect
apply only to phenomena. Each effect is a cause of some
subsequent effect, and each cause is an effect of some
antecedent cause. The phaenomena of the universe form a
complete chain of causes and effects, and in an infinite
. regression there can be no first cause. Let me explain
what I mean more fully. For instance, here is a chainsuppose it is to form a perfect circle, every link in which
is perfect; now if you were to go round and round this
cham from now to doomsday you would never come to the
first lmk It is the same m Nature. You can go back,
and back, and back through successive causes and effects
but you will never come to a “first cause ” ; you will not
be able to say “here is the end of Nature, and here the
beginning of something else.” There is no brick wall to
mark the boundary line of Nature. You cannot “look
through Nature up to Nature’s God,”—the poet Pope not
withstanding—for Nature seems endless, and you can
neither penetrate her heights nor fathom her depths. And
1 have one other word to say in reference to this d priori
method, before finally disposing of it. It is this, that it is
an altogether unscientific method. Man knows nothing
whatever of cause except in the sense that in the imme
diate antecedent of an effect. Man’s experience is of effects •
these he takes cognisance of; of these he has some know
ledge but of cause, except as a means to an end, he has none.
But this brings me to the second mode of reasoning in
proof of God s existence, the d posteriori, and this has one
�90
THE ATHEISTIC PLATFORM.
advantage in its favor, and that is, that it is a scientific
method. It reasons from known effects up to the supposed
causes of them. Now this generally assumes the form,
no matter under what guise, of the famous 1 ‘ design argu
ment.” Dr. Paley stated it many years ago, and it has not
been much improved since his day. It is generally stated
m this way: “The world exhibits marks of design; that
design must have had a designer; that designer must be
a person ; that person is God.” A number of illustrations
are then brought forward to support this contention. For
instance, it is argued that when a man observes a watch
or a telescope, or any article that has been made to answer
a certain purpose, and the mechanism of which is sc>
adjusted as to effect the desired object, it is said that from
the marks of design or contrivance observed .in the
mechanism, he infers that these articles are the products
of some human designer. And so it is said that when we
look around the world and see how beautifully things are
designed, the eye to see, the ear to hear; how admirably
things are adapted the one to the other, are we not justi
fied by similar reasoning in concluding that these are the
productions of an almighty and infinite designer ? Briefly
stated that is the argument. Now' let me examine it.
And in the first place it will be observed that it is assumed
that- there is a great resemblance between the works of
Nature and the artistic works of man. But is this really a
fact? Man simply moulds natural objects into certain
forms; they are then called artificial objects. We know
that man designs watches and telescopes; it is a fact
within our experience. But there is not the slightest
similarity between the process of manufacture and the
natural process of growth; so that when we see various
objects of Nature, we do not conclude, however har
moniously the parts may work together, that they were
designed. We know a manufactured article from a natural
object, we could not mistake the one for the other. But
let us suppose that we did not know' that men made
watches; it is very probable that we should then think
that a watch was not made at all, but that it was a natural
object. Take an illustration. Suppose that I were to lay
a watch upon the earth somew'here in South Africa:
suppose that in a short time a savage wandering near the
spot where the watch was deposited should observe it,
�.NATURE AND THE GODS.
should take it into his hand and handle it—I am assuming’
that the savage had never seen a watch before, and was .
not aware that men designed and constructed watches— fl
think you that he would for a moment notice that it
exhibited marks of design? No, I think he would be morelikely to come to the opinion that it was alive. The design <■
argument therefore is purely an argument drawn from
experience. But what experience has man of god?
Speaking for myself I can say that I have absolutely no-1. '■'u
experience of him at all, and I am not acquainted with
anybody who has. Man does not know god as a designer
or constructor; he neither knows of his capabilities, nor
his existence; and he therefore cannot reasonably say that
god is the designer of anything.
The human eye is very often adduced by the Theist as
an illustration of design. Now nobody can deny that the
eye is a delicate, complicated, and beautiful structure ; no- '
body could fail to see and acknowledge with feelings of
admiration the wonderful adjustment and harmonious uj
working of its various parts; and all would readily ac
knowledge how admirably it is fitted to perform its func
tions. But yet to acknowledge all this is not to admit
that the eye is designed. To point to the combinations
and conditions which produce this result, without showing
that these conditions were designed, is to beg the whole
question. And it must be distinctly understood that the
onus probandi, as the lawyers say, lies with the affirmer of
the design argument and not with him who does not see
evidence in it sufficient to command belief. To show that
a thing is capable of effecting a certain result does not
prove that it was designed for that purpose.
For example. I hold this glass in my hand; I now re
lease my hold from it and it instantly falls to the ground ;
that does not surely prove either that I was designed to
hold up that glass, or that the glass was designed to fall ; | ]
on withdrawing my grasp from it. At most it only proves
that I am capable of holding it, and that when I release it,
it is impelled by the law of gravitation to fall towards the
earth.
But there is another view of this question I wish to pre
sent to you. From this argument it is not quite clear that
there is only one supreme god of the universe. Admit
tedly this is an argument based upon experience. What
�92
THE ATHEISTIC PLATFORM.
does experience teach us in respect to a person ? Simply
this. That a person must have an organisation, and a
person with an organisation must he a limited being. Has
god an organisation ? If he has not, he cannot be intelli
gent, cannot perceive, recollect, judge; and if he has,
then an organisation implies contrivance, and contrivance
implies a contriver, and this again instead of leading up to
one god, leads to an innumerable tribe of deities each
mightier and more complicated than the other.
If the Theist retorts that a person need not have an
■organisation, the Atheist at once replies that neither need
the designer of Nature be a person.
But these are not the only objections to be used against
the design argument. The d priori theologians have some
very potent arguments to advance. Mr. William Gillespie
has discovered twenty-four defects of d posteriori arguments,
and I think he has conclusively shown that all the attri
butes claimed for deity are impeached by this method.
In my humble opinion the design argument has grown
•out of the arrogance and conceit of man, who imagines
that the earth and all the things existing upon it were
•created especially for his benefit.
Suppose that I admit that there is design in Nature, the
Theist has then to account for some awkward and many
horrible designs. How will he get over the fact that
Nature is one vast battle-field on which all fife is engaged
in warfare ? What goodness will he see in the design
that gives the strong and cunning the advantage over the
weak and simple ? What beneficence will he detect in the
fact that all animals ‘‘prey” upon one another? and that
man is not exempt from the struggle ? Famine destroys
thousands ; earthquakes desolate a land; and what tongue
-can tell the anguish and pain endured by the very poor in
all great countries of the earth? Think of the “ills to
which flesh is heir.” Think of the diseases from which
so many thousands suffer. Think how many endure agony
from cancer or tumor, how many have within their bodies
parasites which locate themselves in the fiver, the muscles,
and the intestines, causing great agony and sometimes
death. Think how many are born blind and how many
become sightless on account of disease. Think of the deaf
and the dumb, and of the poor idiots who pass a dreary
mid useless existence in asylums. Then think of the acci-
�NATURE ANU THE GODS.
dents to which all men are liable. Think of the many
who are killed or injured on railways every year. Think of men and boys who injure or destroy their limbs in
machinery during the performance of their daily work.
Think of the thousands who find a premature and watery
grave. In one of our London workhouses I saw recently
a young man who had met with a dreadful accident; who
had had his hand frightfully lacerated by a circular saw,
which will prevent him from ever working again. Think
of his suffering. Think of the misery his wife and chil
dren will have to bear on account of it. It almost makes
one shed bitter tears to think of it; and yet we are to be
told, we who are striving to alleviate suffering and mit,igate the evils which afflict our fellow creatures, we are to
be told that an infinitely wise and good god designs these
things.
Oh the blasphemy of it! Surely an infinite fiend could
not do worse; and if I thought that Nature were intelli
gent, that Nature knew of the suffering she inflicted on all
kinds of living beings and had the power to prevent it, but
would not, I would curse Nature even though the curse in
volved for me a sudden and painful death. But Nature
heareth not man’s protests or appeals—she is blind to his
sufferings and deaf to his prayers.
Oh, but it’s said: “ See what harmony there is in the
Universe : ” per se there is neither harmony nor chaos in
Nature; we call that harmony which pleasantly affects us,
and that chaos which does the reverse. Some Theist may
say: “ Suppose that I grant that I cannot prove that god
exists, what then ? You cannot prove your own existence,
and yet you believe that you exist.” I am well aware that
I cannot prove my own existence; I don’t want to prove
it; it’s a fact, and it stands for itself—to me it is not a
matter of belief, it is a matter of certainty. I know that
I exist. Cannot god make the evidence of his existence as
clear as my own is to me ? If he cannot, what becomes of
his power ? and if he will not, what of his goodness ?
And it must be remembered that there are thousands of
intelligent Atheists in the world to-day. Now, either god
does not wish man to believe in him, or if he does he lacks the power to produce conviction. 0 Theist—you who
profess to be conversant with the ways of the almighty—
explain to me, now, how it is that in proportion as men
�•94
THE ATHEISTIC PLATFORM.
•cultivate their minds and reason on theological questions
that the tendency is for them to disbelieve even in the
ethereal deity of modern Theism. And it will not do in
the nineteenth century to put Jesus forward as a god. He
was no god. He possessed many good qualities, no doubt,
as a man—but not one attribute which is claimed for god.
He was neither all-wise, nor all-good, nor all-powerful, and
he was only a finite being. And how can it be pretended
by sensible persons that a finite man living on the earth,
born of a woman, and dying like any other ordinary being,
could possibly be the infinite god of the Universe ? Is it
not absurd ? I cannot believe it, and anybody with brains
that devotes a moment’s thought to the matter, must ac
knowledge either that it is incomprehensible, or that it is
monstrously absurd.
In this country we are not asked to believe in any of the
“foreign gods”—the gods of ancient Greece or Home—
the gods of China, India, or Egypt, etc.—and we need not
now discuss as to how far these deities have influenced
human conduct for good or for ill. England, as a civilised
country, is not very old. And civilisation has always
meant a banishment of the gods. While men considered
how to please the gods, they neglected in a great measure
the work of the world. As Plato said : “ The gods only
help those who help themselves.” Well they are just the
persons who do not want help ; and I shall never worship
any god who leaves the helpless and the unfortunate to
perish.
If god only “helps those who help themselves,” he
might as well leave the helping alone, because even as
we find the world to-day, the whole of life seems to be
based on the principle that, “ unto him that hath shall be
given, and he shall have in abundance, and from him that
hath not shall be taken away even that which he seemeth
to have.” The man who has a strong constitution may
struggle successfully in the world; the man with great
affluence may win an easy victory over his fellows; the
man who has plenty of “influential friends” has good
prospects ; but the poor, the weakly, the ignorant, what
hope have they—they have to suffer and toil, and toil and
suffer from the cradle to the tomb.
How is it, then, you may ask, if man has received no
assistance from without, either from Nature or the gods,
�NATURE AND THE GODS.
95
that he has achieved such splendid results in the world ?
The answer is simple enough. The great struggle for life
—the desire to get food, clothing, habitation, comfort—
these have been the motives which have urged men on.
The desire to get food caused men to till the soil, and, as
the demand increased, the methods of cultivation improved;
with improved taste came improved raiment and dwellings
for the rich; plain dress and decent habitation for the
poor. Men having given up the worship of Nature, began
to study her; they found that by diligent investigation,
and the application of their augmented knowledge, they
were able to beautify the world, and render their lives
happy. Then we began to have great scientific discoveries.
Navigation, steam-power, telegraphy, electricity; by a
knowledge of the use of these powers man has been able
to conquer the destructive character of many natural
forces, and to transfer a world of misery into a home
of comparative comfort. And I say that the world is
indebted far more to those who built houses, made
clothes, navigated ships, made machinery, wrote books,
than to all the gods and their clerical representatives the
world has ever known. Belief in god never helped a man
to supersede the sailing vessel by the steamship, the old
coach by the railroad, the scythe by the reaping machine,
nor the fastest locomotion by the telegraph wires. Man’s
necessities ahured him on to all these achievements. One
Stephenson is worth a thousand priests—one Edison of
more value to the world than all the gods ever pictured by
the imagination. And we must not forget the men who freed
the human intellect from the fetter's of a degrading supersti
tion. We must n ot forget what the world owes to our Brunos,
our Spinozas, our Voltaires, our Paines, .our Priestleys; for
these, by teaching men to rely on their reason, have opened
out channels of thought that were previously closed, and
mines of intellectual and material wealth that have since
yielded great results. And so it must now be said that
man is master of Nature, and he finds that she is just as
good as a servant as she was bad as a master.
But the earth is not yet a Paradise. Theology is not yet
entirely banished; the debris of the decayed beliefs still
cumber our path and impede our progress. There is
even now much that remains to be done. Plenty of labor
to be performed. Ignorance, poverty, and crime and
�96
THE ATHEISTIC PLATFORM.
misery still exist and exert their evil influence in the
world. The philanthropist and the reformer have still
their work to do. The ignorant have yet to he instructed,
the hungry have yet to bo fed, the homeless have yet to be
provided for. And I have come to the opinion after years
of experience, that ignorance is the. real cause of all the
misery and suffering in the world: that that man is truly
wise who sees that it is against his own interest to do a
paltry act, to perform an evil deed. All actions carry with
them their consequences, and you can no more escape the
effects of your evil deeds than you ('an evade the law of
gravitation, or elude the grim monster Death when the
dread hour arrives.
No. If you would be happy you must act virtuously—
act as you would desire all others to do to promote your
happiness. Say to yourselves : if every one were to act
as I am doing, would the world he benefited ? and if you
come to the opinion that th<* world would not be improved
by such conduct, depend upon it your actions are not good.
Remember that once you perform a deed in Nature it is
irrevocable ; and if it is bad repentance is worse than use
less. All actions either have an evil or a good result.
Every deed leaves its indelible impress on the book of
Nature, from which no leaves can be torn and nothing can
be expunged. And remember, too, that the man who
makes his fellow-creatures happy cannot displease a god
who is good; and a god who is not good is neither deserv
ing of admiration nor service.
An infinite and all-powerful god cannot need the assist
ance of man ; but man needs the assistance of his brothers
and sisters to diffuse the glorious light of knowledge
through the world; needs assistance to alleviate suffering,
to remove injustice, and secure the possibility of freedom
and happiness for all. Therefore I urge you td abate not
your enthusiasm, but work bravely on: and when the
evening of your life approaches, with wife by your side
and your children playing joyously about you, with many
friends to cheer and thank you—then will you know that
vour life’s labor has not been in vain.
Printed by Annie Besant and Charles Bradlaugh, at 63, Fleet
Street, London, E.C.—1881.
�
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Victorian Blogging
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Conway Hall Ethical Society
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Title
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Nature and the gods
Creator
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Moss, Arthur B.
Description
An account of the resource
Place of publication: London
Collation: [83]-96 p. ; 18 cm.
Series title: Atheistic Platform
Series number: 6
Notes: Printed by Annie Besant and Charles Bradlaugh. Part of the NSS pamphlet collection.
Publisher
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Freethought Publishing Company
Date
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1884
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N503
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Atheism
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<a href="http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/mark/1.0/"><img src="http://i.creativecommons.org/p/mark/1.0/88x31.png" alt="Public Domain Mark" /></a><span> </span><br /><span>This work (Nature and the gods), identified by </span><a href="https://conwayhallcollections.omeka.net/items/show/www.conwayhall.org.uk"><span>Humanist Library and Archives</span></a><span>, is free of known copyright restrictions.</span>
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Text
Language
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English
Atheism
Gods
Nature
NSS
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CT 53
ON THE
CAUSES OF ATHEISM.
A LECTURE
Delivered at Bristol, on February 7, 1871.
BY
PROFESSOR F. W. NEWMAN.
PUBLISHED BY THOMAS
MOUNT PLEASANT, RAMSGATE.
Price Sixpence.
SCOTT,
�2
‘Wtt
.yr/s
eSoav,
Saris itor’ el av, Svardiraaros eiSevat,
Zeii, eir anayKi) (pvaeas etre vovs fipurcbv,
Trpo<rn]v^dp.-r)v ere. irdvra yap. Si a$6<pov
fia'.uwv Ke\eudov, Kara Sik-qv rd &vrir' &yeis.
Euripides (Troades, 884.)
�CAUSES OF ATHEISM.
---------------- 4--------------9
VERY great phenomenon has a history. Theism
has a history, as well as Atheism, and each is
instructive. But Atheism, being a more limited fact,
may be treated in a narrower space ; and I venture
to hope, its stimulating causes may be so expounded
as to aid towards some result. This hope induced me
to invite your attention this evening.
I called Atheism a limited fact; yet in an impor
tant sense of the word, and, some may think, the
truest sense, it is painfully common even among pro
fessing Christians. Such is the use of the word by
Paul to the Ephesians, who during their immoral
Pagan state, he says, were “ without God in the
world,” or, (closer to the Greek,) “Atheists in the
world.” As I understand him, to believe in God is
not merely to assent with the intellect that there is
something in the Universe superior to man, but to
revere that superior existence. He who reveres
nothing, who worships nothing above him, but lives
unconscious of allegiance to God, is in the estimate
of Paul an Atheist. Wherever sensuality or avarice
is widely spread, in whatever form men live to self,
there Atheism widely prevails. But if this phraseo
logy be thought too ambiguous, I will modify it, as
follows : He who gives intellectual assent to the being
of a God, yet neither reveres God nor regards man,
is worse than an Atheist. In contrast I will add, He
who finds intellectual difficulties in the doctrine of a
God, and knows not what to think of it, yet is intel-
E
�6
Causes of Atheism.
lectually modest and morally reverential, has the
heart of a Theist, and may eminently deserve esteem.
The short of it is, that Religion is in the heart, not
in the dry mind. Intellectual Belief may be barren,
bnt Moral Faith is the parent of true virtue, and a
natural companion of those noblest virtues, Reverence
and Love. Yet in this short statement we do not
embrace the whole. A man may be admired for the
power or accuracy of his intellect, but he is not
therefore esteemed or loved: on the other hand, what
ever the deficiencies of his intellect, he deserves
esteem, if he be good. If we love God Himself, it is
for His goodness, not for His power or high intelli
gence ; and the same law of love mnst be applied to
man. Thus there are two sorts of Theists, and two
sorts of Atheists. One who is intellectually a Theist
may either be reverential or destitute of reverence ;
and so may an Atheist. But Reverence is the vital
element of moral and spiritual character. In an
intellectual Theist this element may be dead or stag
nant, and in an intellectual Atheist it may be active.
If we fully possess ourselves with this thought, we
shall come to the discussion of the Theistic argument
with a chastened, calmer, and wiser heart.
It is an old saying, among Pagan Greeks as well
as Hebrews, that “ Reverence is Wisdom.” The
wisest of the Greeks, in the midst of their highest
cultivation, were so conscious of the extreme imper
fection of their knowledge, that in their addresses to
God Atheistic doubt seems to blend with Theistic
faith. There is a celebrated passage in Euripides
(Troades, 884,) which I beg to read to you, translated
as I am best able :
Oh Thou on whom Earth rideth, who on Earth
Art firmly seated ! Jove! whoe’er Thou art,—
Hard to be guess’d, whether Necessity
In Nature fix’d, or Mind in mortal men;—•
Thee I adore: for Thou, by noiseless track
Passing, dost justly all things mortal guide.”
�Causes of Atheism.
7
An anecdote is told among the Greeks, that Hiero,
military ruler of Syracuse, requested the accomplished
poet Simonides, to tell him what was his belief con
cerning God. The poet asked leave to defer his reply
until the next day : but when the next day came, he
asked yet another day to shape his thoughts more
accurately; and after that, a third day. At length
he confessed, that the longer he meditated, the harder
he found it to define a reply. You see the elements
of this doubt in the passage which I have read from
Euripides. The poet begins by identifying God with
the ether in which this earth floats or rides ; but adds,
that He hath also firm seat on earth: that is, He is
not merely external to earth, but also resident and
persistent upon it. The poet then, to the current
formula, “ Whosoever Thou art,”—expressive of
wide uncertainty,—annexes : “ Hard to be guessed,
whether Thou art Necessity of Nature, or the Mind
that pervades mortal men.” Thus he embraces,
though doubtfully, in the being of God, first all the
natural forces of the Universe, such as we now call
Gravitation, Cohesion, Electricity, and such like;
next, the Mind by which we think and know and
feel. If he had stopped in saying that God was only
the Necessity of Nature, a blind force, it would have
been Atheism. When he adds the opinion that God
is the Universal Mind, some will say, Is not this
Pantheism ? No : for he regards God as worthy not
only of wonder, but also of adoration; and closes by
emphatically ascribing to Him the Righteous Govern
ment of the human world.
Observe the gradation of doubt and of faith. Con
cerning the physical constitution of God (if the
phrase may be allowed) the Greek poet was reve
rentially doubtful; but concerning His moral govern
ment of the world, concerning the rightfulness of
adoring Him, and virtually concerning His goodness,
he expresses no doubt. And is not this exactly the
�8
Causes of Atheism.
reasonable posture for a finite man, in reverentially
essaying’ to define some thoughts concerning the
infinite God ? Consider of what kind is our know
ledge of our fellow-men. How little do we know of
their essential being; how late and limping is physical
science in the history of man : yet our moral know
ledge is old and certain. Love, goodness, virtue,
esteem, trust, gratitude,—are very ancient experiences
and confident beliefs : but, what is a Soul physically ;
when it begins to exist, and whether it ceases to
exist; are comparatively very obscure speculations.
In all human knowledge, properties are learned first;
the essence of things is learned later, if ever. In
other words, and perhaps more accurately, we appre
hend things on the side in which we are in contact
with them, but we comprehend very few things at all.
Consider again the instructive analogy furnished
by the knowledge which the brutes may have of man.
N o one will imagine that an affectionate dog has any
other knowledge of his master than a limited appre
hension. What guess could Sir Isaac Newton’s
favourite spaniel have of the quality, powers, and
range of his master’s mind ? yet he had no doubt
whatever that his master loved him, and deserved to
be loved, though to comprehend his master’s nature
was utterly beyond his capacity. Just so, the cardinal
point of practical Theism lies in an energetic develop
ment of the moral relation of God to Man and Man
to God; and its wisdom lies in great diffidence con
cerning the essential nature and powers of God, whom
with one voice we avow to be incomprehensible.
Since we know not His limits, nor have reason to
assign any, we call Him unlimited, boundless, infinite,
as to Space and as to Time: and again, since we
have no reason to imagine that he changes with Time,
we call him Unchangeable as well as Eternal. There
is nothing of obscure or doubtful metaphysics here.
But as of all things outward and visible our know
�Causes of Atheism.
9
ledge is very limited and our ignorance is infinite,
how much more must this be true of our acquaintance
with an invisible eternal Spirit ?
After these preliminary remarks, let me proceed to
the historical origin of Atheism. In all the most
intelligent races of men, and those with whose early
mind we have best acquaintance. Atheism does not
grow up with men’s first speculations concerning the
Universe, but develops itself at a later stage; and, as
I believe, prevalently as a reaction from errors into
which Theists fall.
When it is our duty to sit in judgment on the sin
of others, our mental vision is purified, and we be
come fairer, wiser judges, if we begin by inward
confession of our own sin. Just so, if Theists are to
judge truly of Atheists, or aid to convert them,
Theists need to examine their own errors which have
led Atheists astray, or have driven them into reaction.
I hope it is not needful to remind you that Christians
are Theists. To the errors of Christian Theists I
must refer presently; but I first speak of the earlier
developments of Atheism, as known to us.
Ancient Greece is the world in historical miniature,
politically and religiously. We have their infant reli
gion laid before us in the poems of Homer. Though
the Greeks were so very intelligent a race,, yet their
early conceptions of Deity scarcely admitted moral
elements. Theism was with them a physical specula
tion only, and rested unduly on the violent phenomena
of nature. In Thunder and Lightning, in Earthquakes
and Storms, they saw the agency of their chief gods.
Yet they did not overlook more tranquil processes,
as vegetation, birth, and the recurrence of Day and
Night; also the more eminent powers of the human
mind. Inferior deities were assigned to these. The
gods were supposed to punish occasionally the greater
sins of mortals, but by no means to conform their
own conduct to any law of morality. The national
�io
Causes of Atheism.
religion, having its source in private and various
fancies, was combined and popularized by poets, under
whose treatment its wildness was exaggerated into
folly, caprice, or brutality. Necessarily, the growing
intellect of the nation scorned such a religion.
Nevertheless, it does not appear that any conscious
and systematic Atheism broke out, until a serious at
tempt had been made to defend the wretched and
baseless mythology by mystical interpretation and
other subtle devices. Then the indignation of free
thought led, first to universal Doubt, next to positive
Atheism. The Doubters held that no truth is attain
able on such subjects; the Atheists, that though
there may be Superior Spirits, yet they have nothing
to do with the creating or maintaining of the universe,
and stand in no moral relation whatever to men. The
name of Epicurus was best known in Greece as the
advocate of the latter doctrine; to us the Epicurean
views are most accessible in the poem of his de
voted disciple, the Roman Lucretius; and in him
we see most distinctly that disgust at the coarse, wild,
and mischievous conceptions put forth as Religion
was the animating principle of his Atheism.
What happened then, is sure to happen again in
like circumstances.^If the ostensible teachers of reli
gion hold up for men’s homage and reverence a God
whose qualities and dealings shock our moral nature,
it must not be expected that all who reject such a
creed will be able to separate its falsehoods from its
truth. Many will reject it in the mass, and become
Atheists; but by far the largest number of them will
keep their unbelief to themselves. It is notorious
that, as among the priests of ancient Rome contem
porary with Cicero, so in the priests of Spain, Italy,
and France, Atheism has been a common result of
corrupt religion./ Protestantism does not offend
common sense (at least in my opinion) so violently as
Romanism; nevertheless, all who heard the scalding
�Causes of Atheism.
11
words of Mr Bradlaugh in this room against the creed
called orthodox in England, will permit me to insist,
that an ingenuous scorn of what he regards as a de
grading portraiture of God gives impulse and motive to
his Atheism. ,/English Protestants are not guiltless in
this matter. They have persecuted the frank and
bold men who avow their disbelief, hereby driving
more timid men into silence and suppression. Chris
tians have certainly taken no pains to instruct
Atheists; but if they had, how could they expect
instruction to be well received, while the public law
treated Atheists as criminals, and gave them fines and
imprisonment for arguments ?/
But I return to the point. If the men and system
typical of a national religion present for reverential
homage the portraiture of an unjust, unmerciful,
capricious, or impotent God, the unbelief and scorn
which justly follows will, through human infirmity,
carry not a few into a disbelief of God altogether; in
which case the folly of Theists is largely responsible
for the Atheism. I do not wish to go into detail, as
Mr Bradlaugh did, and point at the special errors
which arouse indignation; it suffices to say that there
are opinions concerning God or the gods, which
nothing can prove. It avails not to quote books
called sacred, or to alledge miracles, if the doctrine
itself be such as the human conscience loathes or the
human intellect finds to be contemptible. If sacred
books uphold such things, so much the worse for the
books. Books cannot have proof of infallibility so
strong, as is the disproof of a doctrine which mars
and pollutes the divine character. Christians habit
ually confute other religions by this very topic, and
stigmatize as Paganism or Heathenism this very error
of holding unjust, or impure, or self-indulgent, pam
pered gods; and insist that such a religion is neces
sarily evil to the votary’s mind ; hence it destroys its
own claim of reverence.
�12
Causes of Atheism.
Let it also be carefully considered that the great basis \
of popular knowledge is, moral truth. All social action,
all national cohesion, all reverence for law, all sanctity
in rule, is founded upon man’s moral conscience';
much more is all rational or worthy religion. “ He
who loves not his brother whom he hath seen, how
shall he love God, whom he hath not seen ? ” He to
whom the words Justice, Righteousness, Mercy, Holi
ness, Goodness, have no positive and consistent mea.ning, can have no reason within him for worship and
reverence. Practical Religion must be based on these
great moral ideas. A creed which violates them
demoralizes men, when it does not drive them into
unbelief. If a national religion be totally corrupt,
widespread Atheism is nothing but the natural death
of a creed which has lost moral vitality. If the
Atheism spring from moral indignation, I believe that
it can only be a temporary winter of the national
soul in preparation for a more fruitful summer. If
a very corrupt national creed,—say, like that of Hindooism,—were swept away by Atheism when other
agencies had failed, we perhaps ought to regard the
Atheism as a beneficial visitation, like a hurricane
which destroys pestilence.
I have tried to set forth one cause which I believe
must always tend to produce Atheism, namely—if
morally offensive features be ascribed to the Most
High in a really national creed; but, coupled with
this, there too often is met a presumptuous familiarity
and dogmatic pretension quite inconsistent with a
reasonable estimate of the human intellect. A Roman
writer said, sarcastically, “ This man fancies he knows
accurately what Jupiter said in private to Juno.”
Well, we see the outrageousness of such mythology.
But how less is Milton blameable, who supposed him
self competent to expound the discourses held by God
the Father with his only begotten Son ? Theology
has been garrulous and confident, where modesty or
�Causes of Atheism.
13
silence alone becomes us. Men who call God incom
prehensible seem to forget this fundamental principle
precisely when it is most needed. One truth surely
is quite open to every intellect,—that the knowledge
of man is limited. We see distinctly what is near,
and perhaps seem to know it; but what is extreme in
remoteness we cannot see at all. In the interva
there is generally a region of half light, halt shade ;
what is called penumbra; where we see a few strong
outlines and all the rest dimly; or, it may be, we
think at one moment that we see, and the next
moment doubt whether we saw aright. These pheno
mena of sight have their close correspondences in the
mind, which in consequence is sure of some things
with the greatest certainty permitted to man, is in
blank ignorance of others, and finds between these
extremes a region of half-knowledge, with a few
certainties pervading it, but in general affording
matter for modest or reverential opinion, not for
light-minded and off-hand decision, nor for scho
lastic dogmatism. If Theists transgress modesty
in dealing with this region of thought, how can they
expect modesty or tenderness from Atheists ?
But I proceed to a second deplorable phenomenon,
equally baneful, namely-—the tangle of Metaphysics
in which Theistic advocates have involved their doc
trine. Christianity from the beginning had as its
boast, “ Unto the poor the gospel is preached.
A
religion which addresses itself to the human lace
must be intelligible to simple minds. If men and
women, if the great mass of a nation, are intended
by God to revere and worship Him, the grounds
of believing in God must be on the level of very
ordinary intellects. Theism, equally with Chris
tianity, cuts away the ground from under its own feet,
if it teaches that difficult questions of Metaphysics
must be settled before we can reasonably believe in
God. We know familiarly how much the conversion
�T4
Causes of AtkeisTU.
of heathens to Christianity is hindered when two
missionaries teach opposite doctrines, refuting one
^no,,ei*'
su°h case no one can reprove the
eathen,—every one must say he is blameless,—if he
reply to those who desire to convert him, that one of
hem must convert the other before it is worth his
w lie to attend to them. So, too, candour demands
trom us the admission that Atheists say nothing
unreasonable, if (being in no other respect presump.
or Reverent) they avow that the inconsistencies
ot lheistic advocates wholly discourage them from
spending study on so doubtful a subject. Such appears
to me to be the position of George Jacob Holyoake
In fact, when Mr Bradlaugh in this room claimed
+
T AJheist’ 1 did not think it right to con
tradict, though to me his Atheism is, at any rate, of a
widely different complexion from Mr Bradlaugh’s. I
reel that George Jacob Holyoake is a very modest
man, very reverential, and very anxious to learn from
all whom he sees to be sincerely and earnestly strivingtor truth. I believe he distrusts his own power of
judging, where he finds the advocates of Theism
ff in§> hheir doctrine in modes so obscure and
subtle and mutually inconsistent. I must attempt to
set before you some of the controverted questions,
even at the risk of getting out of my own depth.
When 1 see able men devoting their lives to Meta
physics and coming to opposite conclusions, I cannot
but teel great, diffidence in my own power to deal
with such subjects, and am always earnestly desirous
to keep clear of them. In fact, if anything could
make me an Atheist, it would be the jangling of
lheistic metaphysicians.
Let me then state to you some of the controversies,
w ich are supposed to need decision, before we can
attain a reasonable conviction that there is a God
an
at he deserves and accepts from us reverence,
trust, and adoration.
�Causes of Atheism.
15
“ Can the human intellect form a positive concep
tion of the Infinite and the Unconditioned ? Can we
investigate the nature and origin of the Uncondi
tioned as a psychological phenomenon. Does our
consciousness of the Finite involve a consciousness
of the Infinite ?
Is our knowledge necessarily
limited to phenomena?
Can we know only the
limited and the conditionally limited, or are we also
capable of construing positively the unconditionally
unlimited?
Can we conceive either an absolute
whole or an absolute part ? Is our notion of the
Infinite realized by a course of addition or progres
sion, which, starting from the finite, seeks to reac
the infinite ? Can we infer the infinitely great from
the indefinitely great ? Is our notion of the Infinite
a fact or ultimate datum of consciousness . Can
inductive generalization draw from finite data more
than they contain ? ”
Who can expect such questions to be even under
stood by any who have not made scholastic meta
physics and logic a special study ? As I have, more
or less, been acquainted with them myself for full
forty-five years, I naturally have a positive opinion
on some of the questions, indeed on. most of them;
but I should despair of Theism, if I _ believed it
necessary to a sound belief that the believer should
have discussed them at all. Some of the questions
indeed, about the Unconditioned, and the Uncondi
tionally Unlimited, might seem to have been started,
not by a sincere Theist, but by a crafty Atheist, for
the express purpose of throwing dust into our eyes.
The attempt to establish any practical religion by such
processes of thought, seems to me worse than useless,
being in fact subversive of its avowed object. Not
only scornful and presumptuous minds, but equally the
reverential, the modest, and the philanthropic, are
liable to be deterred from religious inquiry, if invited
�i6
Causes of Atheism.
into it through such a road. Justly may a philan
thropic person say,-“ Man needs the service of our
eneigies : God, if there be a God, needs neither our
aid, nor our worship : surely he cannot desire us to
waste time and effort in questions of metaphysics,
troversy11”^ °PP°Slte Professors are in endless con-
And now, I might seem to have fulfilled my task,
only that the metaphysicians will say to me, that I
cannot justly disown their controversies, without
s owing ,PW Theism can be established indepen
dently of them To reply fully to such a challenge,
would be to undertake a lecture on Theism. I there
forereply historically. I say, that Theism never was
established by metaphysicians through metaphysical
teaching ; nay, that no appreciable effect on practical
Snr phaS ®ve^been exerted by it. Historically,
the belief in God has always rested on the common
perceptions of common men. The fact relieves me
rom the imputation of rashness, when I say, that the
busmess of Mental Science is here critical and nega
te only and that philosophers err in thinking that
Philosophy,—I. mean scholastic science,—can be
crea we m religion. Its sole duty is to prune away
the errors into which the ill-informed? and half
cultivated intellect naturally falls; which duty I
a mit and maintain to be a very important one. But
m order to fulfil it at all, philosophy must condescend
to speak m a purely popular dialect, and altogether
abstain from the hideous jargon so dear to meta
physicians. If it be true that their thoughts cannot
be expressed m so copious and powerful tongue as
the popular English, then the popular religion, it
seems, must be unsound, until we learn to think and
talk metaphysically. But if the great bulk of the
human race have hitherto been incapacitated for sound
�Causes of Atheism.
*7
religion, I for one cannot have confidence that by
means of scholastic culture a small oligarchy ot
mankind becomes the select priesthood of God.
The Natural History of Theism displays many
phases, which might make an instructive volume,
but in every case two stages at least seem inevitable.
In the former, men discover in the great universe the
action of Mind superior to man, and generally believe
in many superior spirits, co-ordinate in rank, though
among these one may be Supreme. The relation of
God or the Gods to man is conceived ot, as that ot a
Patron to a dependent. The Gods are supposed to
care, certainly for men collectively, probably for some
eminent men specially; and also to punish very
flagrant guilt. Concerning the mental qualities ot
the Gods, equally as of their habits, the more sober
nations abstain from thought in this first stage; those
of wilder imagination confidently ascribe to them the
enjoyments and pastime, the passions and vices, of
mortals
This is the earlier or puerile stage of
religion, and implies both deficient information con
cerning the great world, and immature faculties in
the observers. In the second or manly stage of
religion, it is recognised that there is no adequate
ground for supposing more than one God. Spirits
there may be, superior to men; if so, let them be
called angels; but they must be, like us, dependent
on God. On the doctrine of One God naturally
follows the belief of his entire freedom from those
disturbances of mind and clouds of passion to which
man is subject; freedom therefore from caprices ot
love and hatred; though men may be very slow in
working out the result that God is no respecter ot
persons, and uses no arbitrary favouritism. Because
we cannot even guess at any reason which should mar
his serenity, we attribute to him this perfectly un
ruffled and impartial state of mind. Moreover, as it
is inevitable to believe that whatever high and pure
�18
Causes of Atheism.
qualities and powers we possess, must be higher and
perfect in. Hvm, therefore, from consciousness of
disinterested Love in ourselves, we attribute dis
interested Love to Him. Naturally we can have no
ideas whatever of a Divine Mind, but such as are
suggested by consciousness of our own minds
In shaping the second stage of Theism which I
fetched, a more cultivated intellect un
doubtedly played a highly useful part in cutting awav
the superfluous fancies of barbaric imagination. But
+? T\rr^ean1 Christendom, at least as long back as
the Mediaeval Schoolmen, a pretentious Science has
struggled to define things which ought to be left
indefinite and to transmute negatives into positives,
lhe word Infinite, or Boundless, which meant that
we are wholly incapable of assigning bounds to God
1A-KPriG^endemi t0 be P0Sltive, or is exchanged for
Absolute. The sobriety of declaring that we know
no bounds to God’s power, is thus turned into a
scientific dogma that he is All-powerful; while with
antiquity, when the word was used, it was only a
burst of poetry, not a deliberate assertion concerningthings which the human mind cannot know. From
the same school came the notion that the belief in
(xod rose out of speculating on Causation, and disc°vered (°r, as an Atheist would say, invented) God
as the First Cause; thus they carried the mind into
the impenetrable cloudiness of Past Eternity and
Cosmogony, that is, the birth of the Universe. The
Hebrew book of Genesis does, indeed, tell of a
Beginning of Creation, but very little is afterwards
based on it; and the main stream of Hebrew litera
ture is very far from excluding the idea of God’s
continuous perpetual creation. It treats all workings
of the elements, organic and inorganic, a^s actings of
n
Pin?.o:C
’ so ^kat each of us was created by
God in birth, as truly as Adam originally. In the
older view there was no such idea as that God in the
�Causes of Atheism.
19
■beginning created Matter : which is another example
of dogmatizing where man is necessarily ignorant;. it
is a later invention of metaphysical science. Again,
the antagonism of God and Matter was a notion im
ported from Oriental metaphysics, and conld have no
place in the mind of Hebrew sages, who saw God
permanent in nature, hereby agreeing with the
doctrine of the most enlightened of the Greeks; to
which also, I believe, modern Theists more and more
converge. The notion that God created matter, and
set a machine at work; wound up the spring, and
then withdrew from the scene of action; has been
propagated by persons who meant to be philosophic,
and were not. The result has been mischievous.
For in healthful and practical religion the relation
of man to God is a present abiding fact, and the
central point of knowledge. We come close to Him
now and here; in Him we live and move and have
our being; from Him come all our vital and mental
powers. Our present contact with Him is the main,
the cardinal point; we are not thrown back into the
history, if history it can be called, of a Creation in
very dim distance, for our indirect origin from
Him. We apprehend God in the present, and in the
vastness of what we see; we do not try to compre
hend Him in the regions of invisibility, nor to grasp
Eternity and Infinitude in our knowledge. If He is
the life "of our life, He is in the interior of our spirits
and a witness to our consciousness. This is practical
and popular religion, whose central origin and action
is now and here; but metaphysical and scholastic
Theism, which begins at Past Eternity or First
Causation, cannot be expected to give more heat than
moonshine gives.
Now, the question between us and the Atheist is
very simple, and goes into a short compass. In my
opinion it needs no metaphysicians to mediate between
us and him. The question is this: Were ancient
�20
Causes of Atheism.
men wrong in seeing Mind in the Universe ? For if
they were wrong, we are wrong. I seem to myself to
see Mind at work in the Universe as distinctly as I
Seu-1Vn
Each is a direct perception,
w ich cannot be made clearer by argumentation. It
was impossible to argue with that curious sect of
ancient doubters who held that nothing beyond the
existence of Self was certain. If any one assert that
the world is a dream, he may rest assured that we
cannot refute him. Of course I cannot prove that
mens actions, which seem to me to imply purpose
and mind, do not proceed from blind forces of Nature.
I have no inward consciousness of any mind but my
own. If any one tell me that my ascription of
design to other men has no logical demonstration, and
does not deserve belief, I have to confess that it is
logically demonstrable, and yet I insist that it does
deserve belief—at least until refuted. He may brinoproof that it is false, if he can ; but it is useless to tell
me that I cannot prove it. I do not pretend to prove
that other men have minds; but I seem to myself to
^ee
verapi'ty °f our bodily senses is not cer
tain ; they sometimes make mistakes : yet when the ’
senses of many men concur, we accept the conclusions
and are satisfied, even though there are cases in which
appearances are deceptive. So is it with the mW.
An individual may be rash and blundering. If I, one
man, form judgments which most others, who have
powers and advantages equal to mine, reject, it may
e most reasonable to suspect that my judgments are
unsound. But when we believe that we see a superior
Mind m the Universe, and the rest of mankind with
so great unanimity chime-in that some have defined
Manas “ a religious animal;” the direct perception
ot a Superior Mind is similar in kind to our direct
perception of Mind in other men. No doubt, in the
latter case, from the sameness of our wants and in
stincts, we have far greater facility in tracing the
�Causes of Atheism.
21
course of mind, and are less in danger of mistaking
the direction of design; but this does not ^rfere
with the assertion that the process of thought is
similar in the two cases.
I repeat, the sole question between us and the
Atheist is—whether there are or are not marks in the
Universe of superior Mind. What are the qualities,
the power, the purposes of the Spirit whom we discern
andPwhether there are many such Spirits, are questions
for Theists among themselves, with which the Atheis ,
while he keeps to his argument, has nothing to do. 1
cannot but think that, if the mist
blown aside by Theists, simple-hearted working-men
would be less liable to the delusion that they are ad
vancing in wisdom by adopting ^eAtheistictheory
and if they saw Theists willing to follow truth wher
ever truth led, they would have less reason to.give
special honour to the courage which contradicts man s
deep and wide-spread conviction that a God above us
exists, blessed for ever, and the source of blessing.
�LONDONS
printed by c. w. reynell, LITTLE pulteney street
HAYMARKET, W.
�
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On the causes of atheism: a lecture delivered at Bristol, on February 7, 1871
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Newman, Francis William [1805-1897]
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ON THE
CAUSES OF ATHEISM.
A LECTURE
Delivered at Bristol, on February 7, 1871.
BY
PROFESSOR F. W. NEWMAN.
PUBLISHED
BY
THOMAS SCOTT,
MOUNT PLEASANT, RAMSGATE.
Price Sixpence.
�2 7’7$ «X’7M« K«’ri 7’7$ exan' (Soar,
Sorts •kot> el cri>, Svardiraaros elSevat,
ZeB, err’ avdyicr) (pvcreais elre vovs fiporuv,
irpoffi)v^dn7)v <re. iravra yap, 8t’ a\p6<f>ou
Palvwv Ke\ei0ov, Kara S'iKf)v Tct Ojojt* &yeis.
Euripides (Troades, 884.)
�CAUSES OF ATHEISM.
VERY great phenomenon has a history. Theism
has a history, as well as Atheism, and each is
instructive. But Atheism, being a more limited fact,
may be treated in a narrower space ; and I venture
to Lope, its stimulating causes may be so expounded
as to aid towards some result. This hope induced me
to invite your attention this evening.
I called Atheism a limited fact; yet in an impor
tant sense of the word, and, some may think, the
truest sense, it is painfully common even among pro
fessing Christians. Such is the use of the word by
Paul to the Ephesians, who during their immoral
Pagan state, he says, were “ without God in the
world,” or, (closer to the Greek,) “ Atheists in the
world.” As I understand him, to believe in God is
not merely to assent with the intellect that there is
something in the Universe superior to man, but to
revere that superior existence. He who reveres
nothing, who worships nothing above him, but lives
unconscious of allegiance to God, is in the estimate
of Paul an Atheist. Wherever sensuality or avarice
is widely spread, in whatever form men Eve to self,
there Atheism widely prevails. But if this phraseo
logy be thought too ambiguous, I will modify it, as
follows : He who gives intellectual assent to the being
of a God, yet neither reveres God nor regards man,
is worse than an Atheist. In contrast I will add, He
who finds inteUectual difficulties in the doctrine of a
God, and knows not what to think of it, yet is intel
E
�6
Causes of Atheism,
lectually modest and morally reverential, has the
heart of a Theist, and may eminently deserve esteem.
The short of it is, that Religion is in the heart, not
in the dry mind. Intellectual Belief may be barren,
but Moral Faith is the parent of true virtue, and a
natural companion of those noblest virtues, Reverence
and Love. Yet in this short statement we do not
embrace the whole. A man may be admired for the
power or accuracy of his intellect, but he is not
therefore esteemed or loved: on the other hand, what
ever the deficiencies of his intellect, he deserves
esteem, if he be good. If we love God Himself, it is
for His goodness, not for His power or high intelli
gence ; and the same law of love must be applied to
man. Thus there are two sorts of Theists, and two
sorts of Atheists. One who is intellectually a Theist
may either be reverential or destitute of reverence;
and so may an Atheist. But Reverence is the vital
element of moral and spiritual character. In an
intellectual Theist this element may be dead or stag
nant, and in an intellectual Atheist it may be active.
If we fully possess ourselves with this thought, we
shall come to the discussion of the Theistic argument
with a chastened, calmer, and wiser heart.
It is an old saying, among Pagan Greeks as well
as Hebrews, that “Reverence is Wisdom.” The
wisest of the Greeks, in the midst of their highest
cultivation, were so conscious of the extreme imper
fection of their knowledge, that in their addresses to
God Atheistic doubt seems to blend with Theistic
faith. There is a celebrated passage in Euripides
(Troades, 884,) which I beg to read to you, translated
as I am best able:
“ Oh Thou on whom Earth rideth, who on Earth
Art firmly seated ! Jove! whoe’er Thou art,—
Hard to be guess’d, whether Necessity
In Nature fix’d, or Mind in mortal men;—
Thee I adore: for Thou, by noiseless track
Passing, dost justly all things mortal guide.”
�Causes of Atheism.
7
An anecdote is told among the Greeks, that Hiero,
military ruler of Syracuse, requested the accomplished
poet Simonides, to tell him what was his belief con
cerning God. The poet asked leave to defer his reply
until the next day: but when the next day came, he
asked yet another day to shape his thoughts more
accurately; and after that, a third day. At length
he confessed, that the longer he meditated, the harder
he found it to define a reply. You see the elements
of this doubt in the passage which I have read from
Euripides. The poet begins by identifying God with
the ether in which this earth floats or rides; but adds,
that He hath also firm seat on earth : that is, He is
not merely external to earth, but also resident and
persistent upon it. The poet then, to the current
formula, “ Whosoever Thou art,”—expressive of
wide uncertainty,—annexes : “ Hard to be guessed,
whether Thou art Necessity of Nature, or the Mind
that pervades mortal men.” Thus he embraces,
though doubtfully, in the being of God, first all the
natural forces of the Universe, such as we now call
Gravitation, Cohesion, Electricity, and such like;
next, the Mind by which we think and know and
feel. If he had stopped in saying that God was only
the Necessity of Nature, a blind force, it would have
been Atheism. When he adds the opinion that God
is the Universal Mind, some will say, Is not this
Pantheism ? No : for he regards God as worthy not
only of wonder, but also of adoration; and closes by
emphatically ascribing to Him the Righteous Govern
ment of the human world.
Observe the gradation of doubt and of faith. Con
cerning the physical constitution of God (if the
phrase may be allowed) the Greek poet was reve
rentially doubtful; but concerning His moral govern
ment of the world, concerning the rightfulness of
adoring Him, and virtually concerning His goodness,
he expresses no doubt. And is not this exactly the
�8
Causes of Atheism,
reasonable posture for a finite man, in reverentially
essaying to define some thoughts concerning the
infinite God ? Consider of what kind is our know
ledge of our fellow-men. How little do we know of
their essential being; how late and limping is physical
science in the history of man : yet our moral know
ledge is old and certain. Love, goodness, virtue,
esteem, trust, gratitude,—are very ancient experiences
and confident beliefs : but, what is a Soul physically;
when it begins to exist, and whether it ceases to
exist; are comparatively very obscure speculations.
In all human knowledge, properties are learned first;
the essence of things is learned later, if ever. In
other words, and perhaps more accurately, we appre
hend things on the side in which we are in contact
with them, but we comprehend very few things at all.
Consider again the instructive analogy furnished
by the knowledge which the brutes may have of man.
No one will imagine that an affectionate dog has any
other knowledge of his master than a limited appre
hension. What guess could Sir Isaac Newton’s
favourite spaniel have of the quality, powers, and
range of his master’s mind ? yet he had no doubt
whatever that his master loved him, and deserved to
be loved, though to comprehend his master’s nature
was utterly beyond his capacity. Just so, the cardinal
point of practical Theism lies in an energetic develop
ment of the moral relation of God to Man and Man
to God; and its wisdom lies in great diffidence con
cerning the essential nature and powers of God, whom
with one voice we avow to be incomprehensible.
Since we know not His limits, nor have reason to
assign any, we call Him unlimited, boundless, infinite,
as to Space and as to Time: and again, since we
have no reason to imagine that he changes with Time,
we call him Unchangeable as well as Eternal. There
is nothing of obscure or doubtful metaphysics here.
But as of all things outward and visible our know-
�Causes of Atheism.
9
ledge is very limited and our ignorance is infinite,
how much more must this be true of our acquaintance
with an invisible eternal Spirit ?
After these preliminary remarks, let me proceed to
the historical origin of Atheism. In all the most
intelligent races of men, and those with whose early
mind we have best acquaintance, Atheism does not
grow up with men’s first speculations concerning the
Universe, but develops itself at a later stage; and, as
I believe, prevalently as a reaction from errors into
which Theists fall.
When it is our duty to sit in judgment on the sin
of others, our mental vision is purified, and we be
come fairer, wiser judges, if we begin by inward
confession of our own sin. Just so, if Theists are to
judge truly of Atheists, or aid to convert them,
Theists need to examine their own errors which have
led Atheists astray, or have driven them into reaction.
I hope it is not needful to remind you that Christians
are Theists. To the errors of Christian Theists I
must refer presently; but I first speak of the earlier
developments of Atheism, as known to us.
Ancient Greece is the world in historical miniature,
politically and religiously. We have their infant reli
gion laid before us in the poems of Homer. Though
the Greeks were so very intelligent a race, yet their
early conceptions of Deity scarcely admitted moral
elements. Theism was with them a physical specula
tion only, and rested unduly on the violent phenomena
of nature. In Thunder and Lightning, in Earthquakes
and Storms, they saw the agency of their chief gods.
Yet they did not overlook more tranquil processes,
as vegetation, birth, and the recurrence of Day and
Night; also the more eminent powers of the human
mind. Inferior deities were assigned to these. The
gods were supposed to punish occasionally the greater
sins of mortals, but by no means to conform their
own conduct to any law of morality. The national
�IO
' Causes of Atheism.
religion, having its source in private and various
fancies, was combined and popularized by poets, under
whose treatment its wildness was exaggerated into
folly, caprice, or brutality. Necessarily, the growing
intellect of the nation scorned such a religion.
Nevertheless, it does not appear that any conscious
and systematic Atheism broke out, until a serious at
tempt had been made to defend the wretched and
baseless mythology by mystical interpretation and
other subtle devices. Then the indignation of free
thought led, first to universal Doubt, next to positive
Atheism. The Doubters held that no truth is attain
able on such subjects; the Atheists, that though
there may be Superior Spirits, yet they have nothing
to do with the creating or maintaining of the universe,
and stand in no moral relation whatever to men. The
name of Epicurus was best known in Greece as the
advocate of the latter doctrine; to us the Epicurean
views are most accessible in the poem of his de
voted disciple, the Roman Lucretius; and in him
we see most distinctly that disgust at the coarse, wild,
and mischievous conceptions put forth as Religion
was the animating principle of his Atheism.
What happened then, is sure to happen again in
like circumstances. If the ostensible teachers of reli
gion hold up for men’s homage and reverence a God
whose qualities and dealings shock our moral nature,
it must not be expected that all who reject such a
creed will be able to separate its falsehoods from its
truth. Many will reject it in the mass, and become
Atheists; but by far the largest number of them will
keep their unbelief to themselves. It is notorious
that, as among the priests of ancient Rome contem
porary with Cicero, so in the priests of Spain, Italy,
and France, Atheism has been a common result of
corrupt religion. Protestantism does not offend
common sense (at least in my opinion) so violently as
Romanism; nevertheless, all who heard the scalding
�Causes of Atheism.
11
words of Mr Bradlaugh in this room against the creed
called orthodox in England, will permit me to insist,
that an ingenuous scorn of what he regards as a de
grading portraiture of God gives impulse and motive to
his Atheism. English Protestants are not guiltless in
this matter. They have persecuted the frank and
bold men who avow their disbelief, hereby driving
more timid men into silence and suppression. Chris
tians have certainly taken no pains to instruct
Atheists; but if they had, how could they expect
instruction to be well received, while the public law
treated Atheists as criminals, and gave them fines and
imprisonment for arguments ?
But I return to the point. If the men and system
typical of a national religion present for reverential
homage the portraiture of an unjust, unmerciful,
capricious, or impotent God, the unbelief and scorn
which justly follows will, through human infirmity,
carry not a few into a disbelief of God altogether; in
which case the folly of Theists is largely responsible
for the Atheism. 1 do not wish to go into detail, as
Mr Bradlaugh did, and point at the special errors
which arouse indignation; it suffices to say that there
are opinions concerning God or the gods, which
nothing can prove. It avails not to quote books
called sacred, or to alledge miracles, if the doctrine
itself be such as the human conscience loathes or the
human intellect finds to be contemptible. If sacred
books uphold such things, so much the x»orse for the
books. Books cannot have proof of infallibility so
strong, as is the disproof of a doctrine which mars
and pollutes the divine character. Christians habit
ually confute other religions by this very topic, and
stigmatize as Paganism or Heathenism this very error
of holding unjust, or impure, or self-indulgent, pam
pered gods ; and insist that such a religion is neces
sarily evil to the votary’s mind; hence it destroys its
own claim of reverence.
�12
Causes of Atheism.
Let it also be carefully considered that the great basis
of popular knowledge is, moral truth. All social action,
all national cohesion, all reverence for law, all sanctity
in rule, is founded upon man’s moral conscience;
much more is all rational or worthy religion. “ He
who loves not his brother whom he hath seen, how
shall he love God, whom he hath not seen ? ” He to
whom the words Justice, Righteousness, Mercy, Holi
ness, Goodness, have no positive and consistent mean
ing, can have no reason within him for worship and
reverence. Practical Religion must be based on these
great moral ideas. A creed which violates them
demoralizes men, when it does not drive them into
unbelief. If a national religion be totally corrupt,
widespread Atheism is nothing but the natural death
of a creed which has lost moral vitality. If the
Atheism spring from moral indignation, I believe that
it can only be a temporary winter of the national
soul in preparation for a more fruitful summer. If
a very corrupt national creed,—say, like that of Hindooism,—were swept away by Atheism when other
agencies had failed, we perhaps ought to regard the
Atheism as a beneficial visitation, like a hurricane
which destroys pestilence.
I have tried to set forth one cause which I believe
must always tend to produce Atheism, namely—if
morally offensive features be ascribed to the Most
High in a really national creed; but, coupled with
this, there too often is met a presumptuous familiarity
and dogmatic pretension quite inconsistent with a
reasonable estimate of the human intellect. A Roman
writer said, sarcastically, “This man fancies he knows
accurately what Jupiter said in private to Juno.”
Well, we see the outrageousness of such mythology.
But how less is Milton blameable, who supposed him
self competent to expound the discourses held by God
the Father with his only begotten Son ? Theology
has been garrulous and confident, where modesty or
�Causes of Atheism.
J3
silence alone becomes us. Men who call God incom
prehensible seem to forget this fundamental principle
precisely when it is most needed. One truth surely
is quite open to every intellect,—that the knowledge
of man is limited. We see distinctly what is near,
and perhaps seem to know it; but what is extreme in
remoteness we cannot see at all. In the interval
there is generally a region of half light, half shade ;
what is called penumbra ; where we see a few strong
outlines and all the rest dimly; or, it may be, we
think at one moment that we see, and the next
moment doubt whether we saw aright. These pheno
mena of sight have their close correspondences in the
mind, which in consequence is sure of some things
with the greatest certainty permitted to man, is in
blank ignorance of others, and finds between these
extremes a region of half-knowledge, with a few
certainties pervading it, but in general affording
matter for modest or reverential opinion, not for
light-minded and off-hand decision, nor for scho
lastic dogmatism. If Theists transgress modesty
in dealing with this region of thought, how can they
expect modesty oi’ tenderness from Atheists ?
But I proceed to a second deplorable phenomenon,
equally baneful, namely—the tangle of Metaphysics
in which Theistic advocates have involved their doc
trine. Christianity from the beginning had as its
boast, “Unto the poor the gospel is preached.” A
religion which addresses itself to the human race
must be intelligible to simple minds. If men and
women, if the great mass of a nation, are intended
by God to revere and worship Him, the grounds
of believing in God must be on the level of very
ordinary intellects. Theism, equally with Chris
tianity, cuts away the ground from under its own feet,
if it teaches that difficult questions of Metaphysics
must be settled before we can reasonably believe in
God. We know familiarly how much the conversion
�14
Causes of Alheisn*.
of heathens to Christianity is hindered when two
missionaries teach opposite doctrines, refuting one
another. In such case no one can reprove the
heathen,—every one must say he is blameless,—if he
reply to those who desire to convert him, that one of
them must convert the other before it is worth his
while to attend to them. So, too, candonr demands
from ns the admission that Atheists say nothing
unreasonable, if (being in no other respect presump
tuous or irreverent) they avow that the inconsistencies
of Theistic advocates wholly discourage them from
spending study on so doubtful a subject. Such appears
to me to be the position of George Jacob Holyoake.
In fact, when Mr Bradlaugh in this room claimed
him as an Atheist, I did not think it right to con
tradict, though to me his Atheism is, at any rate, of a
widely different complexion from Mr Bradlaugh’s. I
feel that George Jacob Holyoake is a very modest
man, very reverential, and very anxious to learn from
all whom he sees to be sincerely and earnestly striving
for truth. I believe he distrusts his own power of
judging, where he finds the advocates of Theism
defending their doctrine in modes so obscure and
subtle, and mutually inconsistent. I must attempt to
set before you some of the controverted questions,
even at the risk of getting out of my own depth.
When I see able men devoting their lives to Meta
physics, and coming to opposite conclusions, I cannot
but feel great diffidence in my own power to deal
with such subjects, and am always earnestly desirous
to keep clear of them. In fact, if anything could
make me an Atheist, it would be the jangling of
Theistic metaphysicians.
Let me then state to you some of the controversies,
which are supposed to need decision, before we can
attain a reasonable conviction that there is a God,
and that he deserves and accepts from us reverence,
trust, and adoration.
�Causes of. Atheism,
15
“ Can the human intellect form a positive concep
tion of the Infinite and the Unconditioned ? Can we
investigate the nature and origin of the Uncondi
tioned as a psychological phenomenon ? Does our
consciousness of the Finite involve a consciousness
of the Infinite ? Is our knowledge necessarily
limited to phenomena?
Can we know only the
limited and the conditionally limited, or are we also
capable of construing positively the unconditionally
unlimited ?
Can we conceive either an absolute
whole or an absolute part ? Is our notion of the
Infinite realized by a course of addition or progres
sion, which, starting from the finite, seeks to reach
the infinite ? Can we infer the infinitely great from
the indefinitely great ? Is our notion of the Infinite
a fact or ultimate datum of consciousness ? Can
inductive generalization draw from finite data more
than they contain ? ”
Who can expect such questions to be even under
stood by any who have not made scholastic meta
physics and logic a special study ? As I have, more
or less, been acquainted with them myself for full
forty-five years, I naturally have a positive opinion
on some of the questions, indeed on most of them;
but I should despair of Theism, if I believed it
necessary to a sound belief that the believer should
have discussed them at all. Some of the questions
indeed, about the Unconditioned, and the Uncondi
tionally Unlimited, might seem to have been started,
not by a sincere Theist, but by a crafty Atheist, for
the express purpose of throwing dust into our eyes.
The attempt to establish any practical religion by such
processes of thought, seems to me worse than useless,
being in fact subversive of its avowed object. Not
only scornful and presumptuous minds, but equally the
reverential, the modest, and the philanthropic, are
liable to be deterred from religious inquiry, if invited
�16
Causes of Atheism.
into it through such a road. Justly may a philan
thropic person say,—“ Man needs the service of our
energies : God, if there be a God, needs neither our
aid, nor our worship : surely he cannot desire us to
waste time and effort in questions of metaphysics,
about which opposite professors are in endless con
troversy.”
And now, I might seem to have fulfilled my task,
only that the metaphysicians will say to me, that I
cannot justly disown their controversies, without
showing how Theism can be established indepen
dently of them. To reply folly to such a challenge,
would be to undertake a lecture on Theism. I there
fore reply historically. I say, that Theism never was
established by metaphysicians through metaphysical
teaching; nay, that no appreciable effect on practical
religion has ever been exerted by it. Historically,
the belief in God has always rested on the common
perceptions of common men. The fact relieves me
from the imputation of rashness, when I say, that the
business of Mental Science is here critical and nega
tive only, and that philosophers err in thinking that
Philosophy,—I mean scholastic science,—can be
creative in religion. Its sole duty is to prune away
the errors into which the ill-informed and half
cultivated intellect naturally falls; which duty I
admit and maintain to be a very important one. But
in order to fulfil it at all, philosophy must condescend
to speak in a purely popular dialect, and altogether
abstain from the hideous jargon so dear to meta
physicians. If it be true that their thoughts cannot
be expressed in so copious and powerful tongue as
the popular English, then the popular religion, it
seems, must be unsound, until we learn to think and
talk metaphysically. But if the great bulk of the
human race have hitherto been incapacitated for sound
�Causes of Atheism.
17
religion, I for one cannot have confidence that by
means of scholastic culture a small oligarchy of
mankind becomes the select priesthood of God.
The Natural History of Theism displays many
phases, which might make an instructive volume,
but in every case two stages at least seem inevitable.
In the former, men discover in the great universe the
action of Mind superior to man, and generally believe
in many superior spirits, co-ordinate in rank, though
among these one may be Supreme. The relation of
God or the Gods to man is conceived of, as that of a
Patron to a dependent. The Gods are supposed to
care, certainly for men collectively, probably for some
eminent men specially; and also to punish very
flagrant guilt. Concerning the mental qualities of
the Gods, equally as of their habits, the more sober
nations abstain from thought in this first stage; those
of wilder imagination confidently ascribe to them the
enjoyments and pastime, the passions and vices, of
mortals. This is the earlier or puerile stage of
religion, and implies both deficient information con
cerning the great world, and immature faculties in
the observers. In the second or manly stage of
religion, it is recognised that there is no adequate
ground for supposing more than one God. Spirits
there may be, superior to men; if so, let them be
called angels; but they must be, like us, dependent
on God. On the doctrine of One God naturally
follows the belief of his entire freedom from those
disturbances of mind and clouds of passion to which
man is subject; freedom therefore from caprices of
love and hatred; though men may be very slow in
working out the result that God is no respecter of
persons, and uses no arbitrary favouritism. Because
we cannot even guess at any reason which should mar
his serenity, we attribute to him this perfectly un
ruffled and impartial state of mind. Moreover, as it
is inevitable to believe that whatever high and pure
�i8
Causes of Atheism.
qualities and powers we possess, must be higher and
perfect in Him, therefore, from consciousness of
disinterested Love in ourselves, we attribute dis
interested Love to Him. Naturally we can have no
ideas whatever of a Divine Mind, but such as are
suggested by consciousness of our own minds.
In shaping the second stage of Theism which I
have thus sketched, a more cultivated intellect un
doubtedly played a highly useful part in cutting away
the superfluous fancies of barbaric imagination. But
in European Christendom, at least as long back as
the Mediaeval Schoolmen, a pretentious Science has
struggled to define things which ought to be left
indefinite, and to transmute negatives into positives.
The word Infinite, or Boundless, which meant that
we are wholly incapable of assigning bounds to God,
is pretended to be positive, or is exchanged for
Absolute. The sobriety of declaring that we know
no bounds to God’s power, is thus turned into a
scientific dogma that he is All-powerful; while with
antiquity, when the word was used, it was only a
burst of poetry, not a deliberate assertion concerning
things which tide human mind cannot know. From
the same school came the notion that the belief in
God rose out of speculating on Causation, and dis
covered (or, as an Atheist would say, invented) God
as the First Cause ; thus they carried the mind into
the impenetrable cloudiness of Past Eternity and
Cosmogony, that is, the birth of the Universe. The
Hebrew book of Genesis does, indeed, tell of a
Beginning of Creation, but very little is afterwards
based on it; and the main stream of Hebrew litera
ture is very far from excluding the idea of God’s
continuous perpetual creation. It treats all workings
of the elements, organic and inorganic, as actings of
the Spirit of God ; so that each of us was created by
God in birth, as truly as Adam originally. In the
older view there was no such idea as that God in the
�Causes of Atheism,
*9
beginning created Matter : which is another example
of dogmatizing where man is necessarily ignorant; it
is a later invention of metaphysical science. Again,
the antagonism of God and Matter was a notion im
ported from Oriental metaphysics, and could have no
place in the mind of Hebrew sages, who saw God
permanent in nature, hereby agreeing with the
doctrine of the most enlightened of the Greeks; to
which also, I believe, modern Theists more and more
converge. The notion that God created matter, and
set a machine at work; wound up the spring, and
then withdrew from the scene of action; has been
propagated by persons who meant to be philosophic,
and were not. The result has been mischievous.
For in healthful and practical religion the relation
of man to God is a present abiding fact, and the
central point of knowledge. We come close to Him
now and here; in Him we live and move and have
our being; from Him come all our vital and mental
powers. Our present contact with Him is the main,
the cardinal point; we are not thrown back into the
history, if history it can be called, of a Creation in
very dim distance, for our indirect origin from
Him. We apprehend God in the present, and in the
vastness of what we see; we do not try to compre
hend Him in the regions of invisibility, nor to grasp
Eternity and Infinitude in our knowledge. If He is
the life of our life, He is in the interior of our spirits
and a witness to our consciousness. This is practical
and popular religion, whose central origin and action
is now and here; but metaphysical and scholastic
Theism, which begins at Past Eternity or First
Causation, cannot be expected to give more heat than
moonshine gives.
Now, the question between us and the Atheist is
very simple, and goes into a short compass. In my
opinion it needs no metaphysicians to mediate between
us and him. The question is this: Were ancient
�20
Causes of Atheism.
men wrong in seeing
in the Universe ? For if
they were wrong, we are wrong. I seem to myself to
see Mind at work in the Universe as distinctly as I
see it in my fellow-men. Each is a direct perception,
which cannot he made clearer by argumentation. It
was impossible to argue with that curious sect of
ancient doubters who held that nothing beyond the
existence of Self was certain. If any one assert that
the world is a dream, he may rest assured that we
cannot refute him. Of course I cannot prove that
men’s actions, which seem to me to imply purpose
and mind, do not proceed from blind forces of Nature.
I have no inward consciousness of any mind but my
own. If any one tell me that my ascription of
design to other men has no logical demonstration, and
does not deserve belief, I have to confess that it is
not logically demonstrable, and yet I insist that it does
deserve belief—at least until refuted. He may bring
proof that it is false, if he can; but it is useless to tell
me that I cannot prove it. I do not pretend to prove
that other men have minds; but I seem to myself to
see it. The veracity of our bodily senses is not cer
tain ; they sometimes make mistakes : yet when the
senses of many men concur, we accept the conclusions
and are satisfied, even though there are cases in which
appearances are deceptive. So is it with the mind.
An individual may be rash and blundering. If I, one
man, form judgments which most others, who have
powers and advantages equal to mine, reject, it may
be most reasonable to suspect that my judgments are
unsound. But when we believe that we see a superior
Mind in the Universe, and the rest of mankind with
so great unanimity chime-in that some have defined
Man as “ a religious animal; ” the direct perception
of a Superior Mind is similar in kind to our direct
perception of Mind in other men. No doubt, in the
latter case, from the sameness of our wants and in
stincts, we have far greater facility in tracing the
�Causes of Atheism.
21
course of mind, and are less in danger of mistaking
the direction of design; but this does not interfere
with the assertion that the process of thought is
similar in the two cases.
I repeat, the sole question between us and the
Atheist is—whether there are or are not marks in the
Universe of superior Mind. What are the qualities,
the power, the purposes of the Spirit whom we discern,
and whether there are many such Spirits, are questions
for Theists among themselves, with which the Atheist,
while he keeps to his argument, has nothing to do. I
cannot but think that, if the mist of metaphysics were
blown aside by Theists, simple-hearted working-men
would be less liable to the delusion that they are ad
vancing in wisdom by adopting the Atheistic theory;
and, if they saw Theists willing to follow truth wher
ever truth led, they would have less reason to give
special honour to the courage which contradicts man’s
deep and wide-spread conviction that a G-od above us
exists, blessed for ever, and the source of blessing.
�LONDON:
PRINTED BY C. W. REYNELL, LITTLE PULTENEY STREET
HAYMARKET, W.
�
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On the causes of atheism: a lecture delivered at Bristol, on February 7, 1871
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Cl 2^
Ph ases of Atheism,
DESCRIBED, EXAMINED, AND ANSWERED.
BY
SOPHIA
DOBSON
COLLET.
“ An Atheist by choice is a phenomenon yet to be discovered, among thousands
who are Atheists by conviction.”—The Reasoner, July 31, 1859.
“Thou hast made us for Thyself, and our heart is restless till it resteth in
Thee.”—St. Augustine’s Confessions, Book I., s. 1.
I860.
�LONDON :
JOHN WATTS, PRINTER, 147, FLEET STREET, E.C.
�PREFACE.
The following Essay is reprinted, with revisions and additions,
from the American Christian Examiner for November, 1859.
Its original form as a magazine article will explain its limitation
to the writings of a few authors only. My object has been to
show—first, that the purely Secular view which, regarding
religion as a mere intellectual uncertainty, endeavours to avoid
that uncertainty by virtually eliminating the spiritual element
from daily life, misses the richest and highest influences that life
can receive, and cramps the full and natural development of the
human soul. Secondly, that the more ideal Atheism which
escapes this error, does so only to fall into another equally
serious. Preserving the religious sentiment, and alive to all the
intuitions of ideality and devotion, yet unable to link them with
any source of personal trust beyond the reach of human frailty,
“ Religious Atheism” struggles at every step under the impos
sible attempt to make the finite human conscience and the frail
earth-bound affections meet the infinite claims made upon both
by the tasking realities of life; and under the perpetual, haunting
sense of grief and failure thence resulting, is driven to question
—and most justly so—whether the absence of a Divine Helper
from the world of moral conflict, does not virtually amount to
the Supremacy of Evil.
Those who have the happiness to believe in the God of Con
science as the Life of their life, ever leading them on through
tempest and calm, humiliation and conquest, to a deeper sym
pathy and a completer self-surrender to His infinite goodness,
are surely bound to do all that in them lies to lift aside the
obstacles which cast these shadows of Atheism on the minds and
lives of their fellow-creatures. No one can be more sensible
than myself to how small a share in such a work this brief
Essay can pretend. But if only a few of the suggestions here
made should lead any of my Atheist readers but a single step
nearer to the God whom, under the names of “ Truth ” and
“Duty,” they may already have unconsciously sought and
served, these pages will not have been written in vain.
London, January, 1860.
S. D. C.
�■
_______
■-
H
�PHASES
OF
ATHEISM.
1. The Life and Character of Richard Carlile. By George Jacob
Holyoake. 1849.
2. The Last Trial by Jury for Atheism in England; a Fragment of
Autobiography. By George Jacob Holyoake. 1851.
3. The Case of Thomas Pooley. By G. J. Holyoake. 1857.
4. The Trial of Theism. By G. J. Holyoake. 1858.
5. Shadows of the Past. By Lionel H. Holdreth. 1856.
6. The Affirmations of Secularism ; in Seven Letters to G. J. Holyoahe.
By L. H. Holdreth. Published in the Reasoner for 1857.
7. Conscience and Consequence. A Tale for the Times. By Lionel
H. Holdreth. Published in the Reasoner for 1858. London :
Holyoake and Co.
Among the many signs of the times which demand the study of
religious thinkers, few are so little known in proportion to their
importance as the recent developments which Atheism has assumed
among the working-classes of England. These developments are in
many respects widely different from those which were current about
thirty or forty years ago. There is no less a chasm between the
Deism of Thomas Paine and the “ Natural Religion ” of Theodore
Parker, than between the crude “ infidelity ” of Richard Carlile and
the devout Stoicism of Lionel Holdreth. We do not thoroughly
appreciate any form of religion till we know what are the classes of
minds that reject it, and what sort of principles they accept in pre
ference. And when the rejection of religion is itself tinged with a
religious spirit, we may safely predict, not only that the current creed
is too narrow for the age, but that a wider and deeper faith is already
striking its roots in the hearts of men.
The popularization of Atheism in the working-class mind of Eng
land owes its first impulse to the labours of Richard Carlile, the
editor of “ The Republican.” Untutored, antagonistic, and coarse,
but brave, devoted, and sincere, he initiated and sustained a twenty years’
struggle for the free publication of the extremest heresies in politics
and religion, at the expense of nine years’ imprisonment (at different
times, ranging from 1817 to 1835) to himself, and frequent incar
cerations of his wife, sister, and shopmen. This movement, though
vigorous to the point of fanaticism, was not widely supported, and it
virtually died out, as a sort of drawn game between the government
and the heretics. A somewhat milder revival of it took place in
1840-1843, when “ The Oracle of Reason” was set on foot by a few
energetic young Atheists, and several prosecutions took place. It
B
�2
PHASES OF ATHEISM.
was this movement which first introduced to the public the name of
George Jacob Holyoake, who, having served his apprenticeship to
propagandism by a six months’ imprisonment, rose in a few years
to be the acknowledged leader of the sect. Under his influence, it
has not only increased immensely in numbers, but has passed into a
far higher stage of character, both moral and intellectual. This is
strikingly illustrated in the case of Thomas Pooley, a poor, half
crazed Cornish labourer, who was in 1857 sentenced to a long im
prisonment for “ blasphemy.” Fifteen years previously, Mr. Holyoake’s own imprisonment excited but little notice beyond a small
circle, and not one petition was presented to Parliament for his
release. But by the time that Pooley’s case occurred, the Freethinking movement was strong enough to reach the sympathies of
liberal men in all sects, and thus to effect the reversal of an iniquitous
*
sentence.
This event also illustrates the progress of Freethought
in another direction. The coarse language for which the poor
labourer was indicted—language only too frequent in the pre-IIolyoake
era—found no defenders among the Secularists who petitioned for
his release, but was unanimously objected to, as degrading to Freethought. And this double change, bringing both parties one step
nearer to each other, is, there can be no doubt, mainly owing to the
good sense, rectitude, and devotedness of George Jacob Holyoake.
But Mr. Holyoake’s influence is not the only one observable in the
Atheist party. Like many others, that party now possesses its right,
left, and centre. For the improvement which took its rise from the
establishment of the Reasoner, in 1846, has gradually come to tell
upon the mixed elements of the Freethinking party ; and in 1855 a
sort of reactionary “split” took place, and the ultra-Atheistic Secu
larists set up a rival journal, the Znveó'tig,ator,f for the avowed pur
pose of returning to the old traditions of hatred and ridicule, in opposi
tion to Mr. Holyoake’s more catholic and fraternal policy. The
utterly shameless spirit in which the Investigator habitually treats of
the human side of religion is quite sufficient to stamp its incapacity
for touching what pertains to the Divine; and its malignant and
calumnious enmity towards Mr. Holyoake is a sufficient indication of
the divergence between his advocacy and that of “ Old Infidelity,” as
it is expressively termed. Counting this reactionary party as the
lowest development of English Atheism, we next come to the party
of the centre, namely, that party which is represented by Mr. Holy
oake. This is much the largest of the three. Its idea may be
stated in Mr. Holyoake’s words,—“ that the light of duty may be
* Pooley was sentenced to twenty-one months’ imprisonment. He was par
doned at the end of five months, most of which was spent in the county lunatic
asylum, to which it soon became necessary to remove him. He was so judi
ciously treated there, however, that on the receipt of his pardon he was restored
to his family.
t Delunct in August, 1859.
�PHASES OF ATHEISM.
3
seen, that a life of usefulness may be led, and the highest desert may
be won, though the origin of all things be hidden from us, and the
revelations of every religious sect be rejected ;”* in short, that Life,
Nature, and Morals are self-sufficient, and independent of religion.
Beyond this aspect of Atheism is yet another, numbering at present
no definitely attached adherents besides its enthusiastic propounder,
but evidently received with pleasure by many listeners during the
last three years. This new Gospel owns to the paradoxical title of
Religious Atheism, and is put forth by Mr. Lionel Holdreth, the most
cultivated and coherent thinker of whom the Atheist party can boast. He
does not, in fact, belong to the working-classes either by birth or educa
tion, although his sympathies with them are of the warmest. A little
volume of poems, entitled “ Shadows of the Past,” is the only separate
volume he has published; and all his other communications to the
Freethinking public have been made through the columns of the
Reasoner. The reactionary “ infidels ” hate religion: Mr. Holyoake
wishes to be neutral to it: Mr. Holdreth desires to re-incarnate it in
another form. Such are the three phases of the Atheistic party in
England,—the central body shading off into the two others at either
extremity. Passing by the first section, as presenting mere hollow
word-controversy, untinged by any real passion for Truth, we pro
pose to examine the second and third sections at some length.
The disintegrated state of Theology in the present, day has given
rise to the necessity for preaching the Gospel of Free Utterance,
wholly distinct from any decision as to what is to be uttered. To
preach this Gospel has been, in the main, Mr. Holyoake’s vocation.
But now that the right to speak has been so largely won, the question
arises, “ What have you to say ?” and the metaphysical and spiritual
bearings of the subject come into prominence. To this question Mr.
Holyoake has endeavoured to give some coherent reply in his recent
work, “ The Trial of Theism,” in which he has reprinted and revised
the chief papers on theological subjects which he had written during
the previous ten years, with other matter here first published. It is
a singular book; utterly destitute of anything like systematic thought,
and scarcely less deficient in any arrangement of its materials ; pain
fully unequal, both in substance and tone. Frequently we come
upon noble, earnest, manly writing, which indicates real intellectual
power, aud fine perception; then comes some passage so puerile, so
weak, so indiscriminating, as to cause quite a revulsion of feeling in
the reader’s mind. What makes this frequently-recurring contrast
more singular is, that those chapters which are reprints of former
papers are mostly revised with minute care, the alterations often indi
cating delicate discrimination and real expansion of mind. (Chapter
27, which is a reprint of “ The Logic of Death,” is an instance of this.)
Yet the entirely new matter is often of quite inferior quality, both in
Cowper Street Discussion, p. 221.
�4
PHASES OF ATHEISM.
thought and expression. It would seem inexplicable how a writer
who could give us the better portions of this book could endure to
put forth some other parts of it, were not this inequality a pheno
menon of such frequent recurrence in literature as to be one of its
standing anomalies. Intellectual harmony is almost as rare as moral
consistency, and men of even the finest genius too often cultivate one
side of their nature to the positive neglect of others. The prominent
side of Mr. Holyoake’s nature is the moral and practical. He belongs
to the concrete world of men, rather than to the abstract World of
ideas. The best parts of his book are the delineations of character,
some of which are very felicitous. Chapter 14, on Mr. Francis New
man, and Chapter 29, on “Unitarian Theism,” give the high-water
mark of his religious character-sketches. A man who could thus
appreciate the leading ideas of his opponents might (one would think)
do great things in theological reform. But note the limiting condi
tion of his power ;—he can appreciate these ideas when incarnated in
another human mind, but it is mainly through his human sympathies
that he does so. Neither the religious instincts nor the speculative
intuitions are sufficiently magnetic and passionate in his own nature
to force their way to an independent creative existence. Whenever
he turns to the region of abstract thought, his power seems to depart
from him. And this book, which deals almost exclusively with
speculative themes, is a marked illustration of it. It manifests all the
weaknesses, and but very little of the best strength, of his mind. Thus
it affords no clue to the real benefits which, in spite of grave errors,
his movement has produced for many among the working classes;
while it shows plainly the barriers which must ever limit any move
ment, however sincere, which excludes religion from the field of
human life.
We ought not, however, to quit this point without quoting the
author’s apology for some of the imperfections of his work:—
“ If anything written on the following pages give any Theist the
impression that his views, devoutly held, are treated with dogmatism
or contempt, the writer retracts the offending phrases. Theological
opinion is now so diversified, that he has long insisted on the propriety
of classifying, in controversy, the schools of thought, and identifying
the particular type of each person, so that any remarks applied to
him alone shall not be found ‘ at large ’ reflecting upon those to
whom they were never intended to apply. If just cause of offence
is found in this book, it will be through some inadvertent neglect of
this rule.
“ The doctrine is quite just, that crude or incomplete works ought
to be withheld from publication ; and the author reluctantly prints
so much as is here presented. If this book be regarded, as it might
with some truth, as a species of despatch from the field of battle, the
reader will tolerate the absence of art and arrangement in it. The
plan contemplated—that of taking the authors on the side of Theism
�PHASES OF ATHEISM.
5
who represented chronological phases of thought—required more time
than the writer could command. From these pages, as they stand,
some unfamiliar with the present state of Theistical discussion uiay
obtain partial direction in untrodden paths. Hope ot leisure in which
to complete anything systematic has long delayed the appearance of
this book, after the writer had seen that many might be served even
by so slender a performance. At length he confesses, in a literary
sense (if he may so use words which bear a spiritual meaning), —
‘ Time was he shrank from what was right,
From fear of what was wrong:
He would not brave the sacred fight,
Because the foe was strong.
‘ But now he casts that finer sense
And sorer shame aside ;
Such dread of sin was indolence,
Such aim at Heaven was pride.’—Lyra Apostólica." *
In seeking for the central pivot of the movement which Mr. Holyoake represents, we find it in the Independence and Self-sufficiency of
Ethics,—their independence of Theology, their sufficiency in them
selves to the needs of man. This doctrine is a compound of several
elements, some of which are doubtless valuable truths, while others
are serious errors. To disentangle these from each other is now our
task. The following passages sufficiently sketch Mr. Holyoakes
position. The first is from an early number of the Reasoner, the
second will be found in the “ Trial of Theism —
“Anti-religious controversy, which was originally, and ever should
be, but a means of rescuing morality from the dominion of future world
*
speculation, became an end,—noisy, wordy, vexed, capricious, angry,
imputative, recriminative, and interminable.
“ To reduce this chaos of aims to some plan, to discriminate objects,
to proportion attention to them, to make controversy just as well as
earnest, and, above all, to rescue morality from the ruins of theological
arguments, were the intentions of the Reasoner. It began by announ
cing itself ‘ Utilitarian in Morals,’ and resting upon utility as a basis.
In all reforms it took unequivocal interest, and only assailed Theology
when Theology assailed Utility. The Reasoner aimed, not so much to
create a party, as to establish a purpose. It threw aside the name of
‘ Infidel,’ because it was chiefly borne by men who were disbelievers in
secret, but who had seldom the honour to avow it openly. It threw
aside the term ‘ Sceptic’ as a noun, as the name of a party, because it
wished to put an end to a vain and cavilling race, who had made the
negation of Theology a profession, and took advantage of their dis
belief in the Church to disbelieve in honour and truth.’’f
“ Let any one look below the mere surface of pulpit declamation,
* Preface to “ The Trial of Theism.”
t “ Reasoner,” No. 57.
�6
PHASES OF ATHEISM.
and ask himself two questions : What has even Atheism, on the whole,
meant ? What has it, on the whole, sought, even in its negative and
least favourable aspect ? It has, in modern times, disbelieved all ac
counts of the origin of nature by an act of creation, and of the govern
ment of nature by a Supreme Being distinct from nature. It has felt
these accounts to be unintelligible and misleading, and has suggested
that human dependence and morals, in their w’idest sense, should be
founded on a basis independent of Scriptural authority; and it has done
this under the conviction, expressed or unexpressed, that greater sim
plicity, unanimity, and earnestness of moral effort would be the result.
This is what it has meant, and this is what it has sought. The main
popular force of speculative argument has been to show that morals
ought to stand on ground independent of the uncertain and ever-con
tested dogmas of the churches.”f
Now this desire to sever life and ethics from “ the dominion of
future-world speculation,” is not without its true side. When the •
great synthetic conceptions of life which arose out of deep religious
impulses are breaking up through the imperfections of the doctrinal
forms in which they are incarnated, it is necessary to deal with each
element separately, before the general mind can reach the point at
which it becomes possible to recast the whole. And in these periods
of transition, we often see special teachers whose vocation seems to be
the preaching of those supplementary truths which are needed to
bridge the chasms—to detach moral realities from the crude doctrinal
form in which they were no longer credible, and so to prepare us for
a completer view, in which they shall hold a truer position. The
connection of Morals with Theology has hitherto been frequently
taught on an incomplete basis—namely, that the ground of duty was
only to be found in God’s command. Thus whatever was held to be
God’s command was exacted from men as duty; and any criticism of
the supposed command, as violating conscience or reason, was at once
condemned as rebellion—God’s will being represented as the only
criterion of right. In early and unreflective stages of development,
the errors of this doctrine were mostly latent; but when the moral
and intellectual elements in spiritual life arrive at a distinct and
separate existence, a fuller and more discriminating estimate of the
truth becomes imperative. That Moral Obligation is inherently sacred,
and that the sense of this obligation does not necessarily imply belief
in a Person who claims our obedience, is true; and it is a truth which
needs to be clearly recognised, and which is recognised by many of
the most religious thinkers of the day. It is also true that a common
possession of moral truth forms a positive ground of union for its
votaries ; and this, too, is important in an age when so much differ
ence exists between good men on religious subjects. So far as Mr.
Holyoake has preached the independent foundation and positive nature
f “ Trial of Theism,” p. 135.
�PHASES OF ATHEISM.
7
of Ethics, he has been working on solid ground, and his work has
been productive of useful results, which may long outlive their
polemic environment. But when he proceeds to erect these doctrines
into a basis of neutrality to religion, he enters new ground. He does
not actually say that Ethical Truth is the only supersensible reality
attainable by man; but he implies that it is so to himself, and he
evidently believes it to be so for an increasing majority of mankind.
That his Atheism is suspensive rather than dogmatic, is indubitable
from many touching passages scattered throughout his writings ; but
*
the fact remains, that he deems this suspensive position capable of
being incorporated as a permanent element in the philosophy of life,
not only for himself, but for human creatures in general—that he
studiously cultivates neutrality to religion as a principle of action.
Baffled by the difficulties which obstruct his intellectual comprehension
of the universe, he has no spiritual apprehension of its fundamental
realities sufficiently vivid to fall back upon ; and although “ in hours
of meditation he confronts with awe the great Mystery,” his “ baffled
speculation returns again to the Secular sphere,”f and he deems it
possible and desirable to divide the secular from the spiritual with a
sharpness that can entitle the former to support a whole philosophy
of life. Now such a philosophy is quite conceivable on the supposi
tion that the spiritual does not and cannot exist; and for thoroughly
materialised Atheists such a philosophy is consistent and right. This
is the ground taken by the reactionary “ Infidels.” But Mr Holyoake
evidently means something different from this : he means that a man
may pass through life as satisfactorily as man can, without being
thoroughly convinced of the truth of either Theism or Atheism; that
the chief part of human life is independent of religion; that to the
Secularist’s aspirations “ the idea of God is not essential, nor the
* “ I see the influence men can exert on society, and that life is a calculable
process. But why is it so ? There my curiosity is baffled, and my knowledge
ends. In vain I look back, hoping to unravel that mysterious destiny with
which we are all so darkly bound. That is the channel through which all my con
sciousness seems to pass out into a sea of wonder; and if ever the orient light of
Deity breaks in on me, it will, I think, come in that direction. The presence of
law in mind is to me the greatest fact in nature.”—“ Trial of Theism,” p. 69.
“ When pure Theists, as Mazzini and Piofessor Newman, explain their fine
conception of God as the Deity of duty, or of moral aspiration, the imagination,
borne on the golden wings of a reverence untinged by tenor, soars into the
radiant light of a possible God. But the Possible is not the Actual. Hope is not
proof. . . .
“ Had I been taught to conceive of Deity as either of tbe writers just named
conceive of Him, I think it likely that I should never have ceased to hold Theism
as true: and if it were not misleading to one’s self to covet opinion, I could even
wish to be able to share their convictions. But having once well parted from my
early belief, I am free to inquire and resolute to know,And I seek for evidence
which will not only satisfy my present judgment, but evidence with which I can
defy the judgment of others. He who can supply me with this can command me.”
—Ibid., pp. 115, 113.
f Ibid., p. 115.
�8
PHASES OF ATHEISM.
denial of the idea necessary.”* “ What help has the Theist which
the Atheist has not also
he asks, evidently unaware how the per
ception of religious reality modifies the whole of life, altering its pro
portions, and often even reversing its purposes. Take, for instance,
the subject of death. How widely different are the feelings with
which we must regard the vicissitudes and problems of life, on the
supposition that our career is not ended by death, from those feelings
which are forced upon us by the supposition that it is so terminated!
This is a case in which the reality must lie either with the one
alternative or the other : either we shall, or we shall not, survive our
present existence; and except in those cases where excessive misery
or mental torpor has produced a state of abnormal indifference to life
altogether, a neutral feeling on the subject is scarcely possible. Our
affections, hopes, pursuits—the whole conduct and tone of our lives
—must inevitably be influenced to an incalculable extent by the con
clusion which we adopt. It is quite true that Duty is equally binding
on us, whether our term of life be mortal or immortal. But the
absence of a futurity must alter the line of our duty in an infinity of
directions, and it is unavoidable that we act from one hypothesis or
the other. Even suspensive Atheism, though not shutting out the
chance of a futurity, is obliged to act on the other theory. Mr.
Holyoake, though far more open to spiritual influences than his party
generally, is obliged to base his world on the Secular alone. His
superiority on these points is purely individual, and is constantly
overborne in party and polemic life by the inevitable tendency of his
principles.
There is an instinctive feeling in men’s minds that
religion is either a great reality or a great mistake, but that it cannot
be a matter of indifference. And this perception is beginning to show
itself in the Secularist party. They are dividing more and more
visibly into positive and negative sections,—the one repudiating
religion, the other reapproaching it more or less distinctly.^ For
human nature is so constituted that men cannot for ever rest at the
parting of the ways. Individuals there have always been, to whom a
peculiar combination of temperament and culture renders a decision
on the great problems of life less easy to the intellect, and perhaps
less imperative to the character, than to the generality of mankind ;
but, whatever other services to human welfare such minds may render,
they cannot aid in the development of those primary spiritual intui
tions which have formed the deepest basis of human life in all ages.
But Mr. Holyoake may plead that it is quite legitimate to prefer
one of two influences without absolutely pronouncing against the
other, if the one be certain and the other uncertain,—the one close at
hand and the other .afar off. And this is his view of the Secular as
contrasted with the Spiritual. He does not presume to say that God
* “ Trial of Theism,” p. 175.
f Ibid., p. 121.
J See Appendix A.
�PHASES OP ATHEISM.
9
does not exist ; but he holds that, whether God is or is not, the
*
course of human affairs is left to humanity alone,—that human effort
is the only practical agency which it is of any use to invoke. Take
the following passages, for instance, from “The Two Providences.”
“ It is said we are without God in the world ; but remember, if it
be so, that it is not our fault. We would rather that the old theories
were true, and that light could be had in darkness, and help in the
hour of danger. It better comports with human feebleness and harsh
destiny that it should be so. But if the doctrine be not true, surely
it is better that we know it. Could the doctrine of Divine aid be
reduced to intelligible conditions, religion would be reinstated in its
ancient influence. For a reasonable certainty and an unfailing trust,
men would fulfil any conditions possible to humanity. Faith no
longer supplies implicit confidence, and the practical tone of our day
is impatient of that teaching which keeps the word of promise to the
ear, and breaks it to the hope.
“ Could we keep before us the first sad view of life which breaks in
upon the working man, whether he be a white slave or a black one,
we should be able to see self-trust from a more advantageous point.
We should learn at once sternness and moderation. Do we not find
ourselves at once in an armed world where Might is God and
Poverty is fettered? Every stick and stone, every blade of grass,
every bird and flower, every penniless man, woman, and child, has an
owner in this England of ours no less than in New Orleans. The
bayonet or baton bristles round every altar, at the corner of every
lane and every street. Effort, in its moral and energetic sense, is
the only study worth a moment’s attention by the workman or the
slave.....................
“Now it is not needful to contend that prayer never had any
efficacy,—it may have been the source of material advantage once ;
but the question is, Will it bring material aid now ? It is in vain
that the miner descends into the earth with a prayer on his lips, unless
he carries a Davy lamp in his hand. A ship-load of clergymen
would be in danger of perishing, if you suffer the Amazon once to
take fire. During the prevalence of a pestilence an hospital is of more
value than a college of theologians. When the cholera visitation is
near, the physician, and not the priest, is our best dependence, and
those whom medical aid cannot save must inevitably die. Is it not,
therefore, merciful to say that science is the Providence of life ? . . .
Science represents the available source of help to man, ever augment
ing in proportion to his perspicacity, study, courage, and industry.
We do not confound science with nature. Nature is the storehouse
of riches, but when its spontaneous treasures are exhausted, science
enables us to renew them and to augment them. It is the well* “ Does the most absolute Atheism do more than declare the secret of nature
to be unrevealed ? ”—“ Trial of Theism,” p. 143.
�10
PHASES OF ATHEISM.
devised method of using nature. It is in this sense that Science is the
Providence of Man. It is not pretended that Science is a perfect
dependence; on the contrary, it is admitted to be narrow, and but
partially developed; but though it should be represented as a limited
dependence, we must not overlook the fact that it is the only special
dependence that man has; and however infantine now, it is an evergrowing power.” *
But in what respect is it needful that the study of Nature, and the
methodising of its agencies for the material benefit of man, should be
regarded as invalidating the existence of a Divine purpose in Nature ?
Surely nothing can be more congruous with Theism than that Nature
and Man should be found in harmony with each other. In exploring
our relation to the home in which we are placed, and in utilizing every
material within our reach, we are in no sense turning away from the
Author and Animator of Nature, but rather acquainting ourselves
with His infinite resources of power and beauty. The real question
between the Theist and the Atheist lies far deeper down ; it is,
whether we have any means of reaching the Power displayed in the
Universe beyond that which we gain from the study of Nature,—
whether that power is a Conscious Soul, with which we can com
mune, and whence we can derive help and guidance when the visible
world ceases to afford us aid,—whether, when “Nature”is dumb, He
will speak,—whether, when all “materialadvantage” shall have been
reaped by material science, the affections and the conscience must yet
be left entirely to themselves, possessing no power of contact with
any Personal Reality beyond that of erring fellow-mortals. Yet, if
such contact be possible, it must affect our moral lite to an incalcu
lable extent; and the moral life of those who do not cherish any
relation to that Personal Reality must miss one of its most important
elements. In contrast, therefore, to the Secularist theory, on the one
hand, which holds that Ethics as a whole, both in theory and prac
tice, is attainable without Religion,—and to the orthodox theory, on
the other hand, which maintains that the unassisted human mind can
neither know nor do anything in Morals without the conscious recog
nition of Religion,—we hold that Conscience and Faith are, each of
them, primary sentiments in man; that each may arise independ
ently of the other, and may grow up separately, to a certain point of
development,—a point varying relatively to the temperament and
culture of each individual,—but that beyond that point each tends to
call forth a need of the other, and deteriorates if that need be not
supplied. He in whose glowing heart spiritual love precedes the
strong sense of duty becomes a bigot or a dreamer, if his idea of God
long fails to suggest a free and reasonable standard of conscience.
And he who finds his purely human conscience really all-sufficient to
his needs, can scarcely have much fulness of moral life requiring to
* “Trial of Theism,” Chap. XXII.
�PHASES OF ATHEISM.
11
be guided. And here it is to the point to remark, that the absence of
any reliance on such higher Personality has a visibly cramping effect
on the minds of Ethical Atheists. There are innumerable cases in
life where human sympathy and reciprocation must fail ; nay, where
the very fact of virtue implies the renunciation of sympathy. In
such cases it may too often be seen that the Atheist is thrown back
upon himself, in a way which tempts him either to yield the point
for the sake of sympathy, or to hold by the point in a way which
is apt to overstrain his sense of duty done. In Atheistic defences
we frequently see a recapitulation of facts brought forward to de
monstrate the rectitude of the party, or of its champions, which even
generous minds cannot save from a tone of “ self-righteousness,”
while to commonplace speakers the danger is not even perceptible.
Now it is fatal to the healthiness of virtue to look back in this way
at its own achievements. The love of Goodness is kept safe and
sound by being constantly directed to that which is before, and not
behind it. Otherwise, it is apt to sink into ?elf-complacency with
having been virtuous, and rather to test its aspirations by its perform
ances, than to feel that the only good of its performances is derived
from the aspirations which they but imperfectly realise. Broadly
speaking, there is a certain climate of tendency observable in dif
ferent communions—a gravitation of influences towards certain levels,
—which determines the tone of average minds, and which the higher
thinkers only escape by lying open to other inlets of thought and
feeling. The Secularistic idealisation of human duty as the only
source of moral life, must ever give rise to the tendency to glory in
“merits.” It is inevitable that this temptation should come to minds
vividly conscious of honest and faithful purpose, and anxious to
defend that purpose against coarse and base aspersions, but not con
scious of receiving, from an Infinite Source above them, far more
than the most devoted of human lives can ever re-express, and whose
human fatigues and disappointments are thus unrefreshed by that
repose and re-invigoration which are essential to the elasticity of the
highest human endeavour.
Now this strain on the nobler faculties which results from the
absence of Divine sympathy, must necessarily vary greatly according
to the need of sympathy in different minds. Many upright, unimpulsive men, in whom conscience scarcely rises into affection, do not
feel it at all. Others, of generous and affectionate natures, are yet
so far free from the disturbing influences of passion as to be able to
live habitually from a sense of duty alone. To observers at a little
distance, the benumbing effect of a merely Secular faith may be visible
in such natures, confirming their constitutional defects, and cutting
them off from rousing influences; yet the Secularist’s own mind
may not be distinctly conscious of the want. But now and then
comes a passionate soul, that feels the need of the Divine with a
keenness that cannot be suppressed. The mind may be entirely per
�12
PHASES OF ATHEISM.
suaded of the untenability of Theism; but the intellectual convic
tion in such cases is at war with the whole bent of the soul. To
such a nature, the needs of the affections must be recognised dis
tinctly, whether for satisfaction or abnegation : they are primary reali
ties which cannot be passed by in any accepted theory of human life.
And here does Ethical Atheism culminate in the religious sentiment,
not only virtually, but avowedly, as we shall find by passing on to the
latest development of Atheism, as propounded by Mr. Lionel Holdreth.
With Mr. Holdreth the relation of Ethics to Theology takes an
altogether different aspect from that which it assumes in Mr. Holyoake’s system. Mr. Iloldreth utterly eschews all neutrality; his
Atheism is far more decisive than that of his friend. Ilis Secularism
is confessedly based on the rejection of Spiritualism, and he is fully
aware of their essential incompatibility. But, on the other hand, his
natural feelings toward religion are of a very different nature from
those manifested by Mr. Holyoake. The latter can respect the reli
*
gious sentiment, but he does not appear to have ever been deeply
conscious of it in himself, since the unreflecting period of his boy
hood ; all the realities of life which take hold of him most strongly,
bring no irrepressible longing for anything beyond humanity. But
with Mr. Iloldreth the religious sentiment is woven into his very
nature, and the intensity of his Atheism makes this only the more
apparent. The first specimens we shall present of his writings are
two passages which, taken together, strike the key-note of his whole
conception of life and faith.
“ In advocating the claim of Secularism to rank among religions,
and in asserting its inherent superiority to all other forms of reli
gion in point of truth, purity, and directness, I had in view, not
merely the assertion of a fact, but the attainment for Secularism of a
position, without which I do not conceive it possible that it can
maintain its ground. I wish to render it stable by defining and con
solidating its principles ; I wish to weaken the enemy by depriving
them of the monopoly of that principle—the religious—which always
must exercise a paramount influence over the minds of men. Human
nature is not a mere bundle of faculties, under the direction of a
supreme and infallible intellect; if it were, then we might rely
solely upon the intellect, not merely to teach men what is right, but
to compel them to follow its teaching. But as things are constituted
it is only the first of these points which the intellect can achieve;
we have to look for some other motive influence which shall induce
men to do what they know to be right. This can only be found in
their emotions or affections. It is on these that the religious senti
ment has its hold, and therefore, apart from the religious sentiment,
_• He calls Mr. Newman’s work on “The Soul” “a book conceived in the
highest genius of proselytism, which must command respect for the religious
sentiment wherever it is read.”—“ Trial of Theism,” p. 60.
�PHASES OF ATHEISM.
13
you can rarely hope to find steady and thoroughgoing virtue in any
life; never, except in minds peculiarly well balanced by nature, and
well disciplined by the education of life and action, of teachers and of
circumstances. Here and there, it is true, you may find a man or
woman who docs right by habit or by impulse ; but these are motives
which can hardly be relied upon to resist the pressure of strong
temptation. For the strength here needed we must look to a prin
ciple which can exercise complete control over the affections, and
wield their whole power in such a struggle ; a commander-in-chief of
the faculties of our moral nature. Such a principle is that of Reli
gion, and such is no other. This principle is embodied in the faith of
the Christian and the Deist, of Socrates and of Paul, of Isaiah and
of Mazzini, of Plato, ay, and of Paine. None of these were or are
Atheists; they write and speak of a God in tones of reverence and
adoration ; and it is in this religious sentiment which is embodied in
their creed that they find consolation in sorrow, and strength in the
hour of conflict. Such a strength and such a consolation must be
found in any faith which is ever to attain an empire over the hearts
of men; such a principle of power must there be in a creed, call it
philosophical or religious, on which our morality is to be based, and
by which our life is to be directed, or we shall be sure to find it fail
us in our hour of need. And I maintain that, as a fact, Secularism, as
taught by Mr. Holyoake, and as accepted by myself, does contain such
a principle, in its religious sense of duty; a duty derived from natural
principles, and referable to natural laws; a duty binding on men as
fractions of mankind, and on mankind as a portion of the cosmic whole.”*
“ I believe in no true, honourable, virtuous life but in this reli
gion ; and in proportion as the supernatural creeds have contained
this essential religious element, have they been useful and saving
faiths. Christianity had far more of it than Paganism, Theism than
Christianity; but pure Secularism is the pure religion—faith in a
grand principle its sole guide of life, its sole source of strength,
unalloyed by timid dependence on a Father’s arm, unpolluted by
selfish thoughts of a reward hereafter. To this Religion of Duty—
the One True Faith, the one true principle giving life and spirit
to the bodies of false doctrine wherein it hath been incorporated—do
I look for all strength for each of us, all guidance for all men, all
progress for mankind.’’^
In this remarkable declaration there are three main propositions :—
First. That “ any faith which is to attain an empire over the hearts
of men” must contain “a principle which can exercise complete con
trol over the affections, and wield their whole power in the struggle."
No truer ideal of faith could be laid down than this.
Second. “That Secularism does contain such a principle, in its
religious sense of duty.”
* “ Reasoner,” No. 600.
t “ Reasoner,” No. 579.
�14
PHASES OF ATHEISM.
Third. That Secularism is “superior to all other forms of religion
in truth, purity, and directness,” because it holds this sense of duty
unalloyed by any dependence on a Father, or any hope of a hereafter.
Now that “ Secularism, as taught by Mr. Holyoake, and accepted
by Mr. Holdreth, does contain a religious sense of duty,” may be
readily granted. Mr. Holdreth elsewhere says, that “ Sacrifice for
the sake of others, not in the hope of future reward, is a principle
which, though glimpses of it were occasionally visible through the
mists of the future to Prophets and Apostles, waited for its full
recognition until a faith arose which knew nothing of an eternal
retribution.”* And there is a truth in this which should not be
forgotten. The absence of any settled hope of futurity does throw
into keener relief the absolute disinterestedness of virtue; and
although there have been Theists, as well as Atheists, who leave the
question of immortality as an insoluble problem, yet it is the noblest
characteristic of Ethical Atheism to have preached, deliberately and
fearlessly, that virtue is a present rectitude, utterly irrespective of
pleasant “ consequences,” whether in this world or in any other.
The popularization of this truth is one of the most valuable contri
butions that Secularism has made to the moral education of Free
Thought. But it is one thing to assert that Moral Obligation is a
primary element of our nature, “ derived from natural principles,
and referable to natural laws
and it is quite another thing to main
tain that no extra-human Personality exists, of whose parental rela
tion to us, those natural laws are but an outward visible expression.!
It is one thing to assert that the idea of virtue excludes, per se, the
very notion of reward; and it is quite another thing to maintain
that our sentient existence cannot extend beyond our life in this
visible plar.et. The connection between ethical truth and cosmical
fact is one that cannot be thus assumed a priori. Moreover, although
the ethical truth on which Mr. Holdreth bases his whole system is
one which can scarcely be over estimated in its own place, it is’clearly
incapable of fulfilling all the requirements of the ideal which he
previously sketched as essential to a complete Faith. Is Duty, as a
matter of fact, “ a principle that can exercise complete control over
the affections, and wield their whole power in the struggle?” We
apprehend that no mortal soul, however saintly, could ansiver “Yes.”
It is true that almost any amount of self-sacrificing heroism may be
gradually attained by a dutiful nature, even to a degree that would
at first appear incalculably beyond the power of human nature to
support. Let the capacity for “service and endurance ” be granted
to the full, untainted by any notion of “ reward,” either in earth or
heaven. But the province of effort, which is active and voluntary, is
distinct from the province of affection, which is receptive and involun
tary. Duty may, indeed, be taught to exercise control over the
* “ Reasoner,” No. 596.
t See Appendix B.
�PHASES OF ATHEISM.
15
affections, in the sense of coercing them; but that is clearly not the
sort of control of which Mr. Holdreth is here speaking. The con
trolling principle that he desiderates is one that shall “ wield the
whole power of the affections in the struggle." It must therefore
respond to their fullest longings, and dominate them by an Objective
Reality that can rightly command them. But how is this possible
if the object loved be an unconscious one ? Only a person (in the
sense of a conscious mind) can wield the whole power of the affec
tions, for only a person can reciprocate them—and what affection
ever comes to its full maturity until it is reciprocated ? And what
person can wield that complete control over our highest and purest
affections which is here sought, but One who shall be above us all—
the realisation of Infinite Perfection ? The admission of the affec
tions into the “ religious sense of duty ” naturally implies the idea of
an Object on which to repose them; and the absence of any such
object in Mr. Holdreth’s theory is an incongruity somewhat like that
exhibited by Tycho Brahe, who admitted that the planets revolved
round the sun, but maintained that the sun and the planets together
revolved round the earth- In the same way, Mr. Holdreth holds
that all our faculties should be under the complete control of reli
gion, but that religion itself is only dependent upon man—that is, upon
the very being who needs the control. Perhaps he would reply with
the heroic but most melancholy saying of Spinoza, “ He who loves
God aright must not expect that God should love him in return;” an
idea which implies that the power of loving has been, in some mys
terious way, monopolised by mortals, and is the only quality for
which the Great Cosmos has no capacity. Now if the affection we
receive from our fellow-creatures were in itself perfectly satisfying,
and always at our command when deserved, there would be much
plausibility in the theory that we have no concern with any other
affection. But that such is not the case in human life, it would be
superfluous to prove. Moreover, if there be one feature of Mr.
Holdreth’s writings more characteristic than the rest, it is the keen
ness and distinctness of his desire after an Infinite Object of affec
*
tion.
It is therefore to the point to discover the estimate he himself
takes of this desire. The fullest notice he has taken of it, as an
argument for Theism, is as follows:—
“ Some have urged that, since in Nature is found no want without
a satisfaction, no appetite but for a purpose, it were contrary to
nature to suppose man’s natural instinct of worship, and—so to
speak—desire of Deity implanted only to be balked. But to this it
* Many critics of his poems were misled by this characteristic to under-esti
mate the reality of his Atheism—a very easy mistake to arise in the minds of
those who see the religious instinct, and who do not see the complicated intellec
tual difficulties which may coexist with it. We have frequently heard the
remark, “Mr. Holdreth will not long remain an Atheist.” But the question
remains, Why is he an Atheist now ?
�16
PHASES OF ATHEISM.
may be replied, that for artificial desires Nature provides not always
gratifications; nor for all natural needs, except to those who have
the capacity to seek their satisfaction aright. Accordingly, it is
nowise to be accounted an anomaly in Nature, if she provide not a
personal object of worship, such as shall satisfy the artificially
excited imaginations and feelings of men and women, educated from
youth to worship; or if she yield no gratification to those whose
neglected intellect and uncultivated conscience can reverence naught
that is not personal, and love only where they expect reward for
loving. But for so much of this devotion as is natural in minds
sound and healthily trained, there is a sufficient object in the Order,
the Truth, the Beauty of Nature herself—in the Duty which springs
from Law, and in the authority which belongs to Conscience.”*
Such is Mr. Holdreth’s theoretical conviction. But what are the
utterances of his natural feeling ? Scrupulously passing by all such
passages as he might possibly reject or modify now, we will illustrate
this point by a few quotations. The first is from the opening of a
lecture delivered in 1856, entitled “Theism the Religion of Senti
ment.”
“ Stern indeed and strong must that heart be—if indeed it be not
utterly callous and insensible—-that has not at times, at many times,
sighed after such a comfort. The strongest spirit has its hours of
weakness, the most hopeful and elastic nature its moments of deep
and hopeless depression. What comfort is theirs who in these
moments can cast themselves on the ever-present arm of an Eternal
Father, in calm reliance on his unfailing power and inexhaustible
kindness! In the hours of loneliness and melancholy, when the
heart feels itself as it were alone amid a deserted universe, how
enviable is their state who feel that they are not alone—that with
them and around them is a Friend who sticketh closer than a brother
—a very present help in time of trouble. To the labourer whose
twelve hours’ toil can barely suffice to earn bread for his suffering
wife and his sickly children ; to the slave who sees before him no rest,
no mercy, no escape but in the grave ; to the lonely student on his
solitary couch of sickness ; to the starving and sorely tempted seam
stress in her fireless and foodless garret; to the martyr of conscience
in his dismal prison, or yet more dismal liberty ; to the patriot exile,
inclined almost to despair of the cause for which he has given all that
was dear in life—what happiness to turn from the harshness and the
misery of earth to the Father which is in heaven !
“ And, on the other hand, how hard seems their fate who have no
such hope and no such comfort—who must endure through life the
hardships of poverty, the sorrows of obscurity, the misery of unbe
friended loneliness, and must at last pass to their graves with the
bitter thought, that they have lived in vain for others, and worsc* “Reasoner,” No. 629.
�PHASES or ATHEISM.
17
than in vain for themselves. Truly, it is no light, no easy matter to
be, much more to become, an Atheist.”*
(How much, by the way, is implied in that parenthesis,—“much
more to become an Atheist.”) The next passage we quote appeared
considerably later, and occurred in a review of the “ Eclipse of Faith.”
After quoting the only passage in that book which can be said to
contain “ any indication of an insight into the real feelings and posi
tion of a true Sceptic,” Mr. Holdreth remarks on it thus :—
“ I presume that there is no thoughtful mind, which has ever been
truthful and honest enough to enter earnestly upon the quest of truth,
that has not very early in its career passed through the Slough of
Despond that is here described. But this is assuredly not the
language of a matured and deliberate scepticism; it is that of a mind
which has floundered about in the quicksands into which it first
plunged on quitting the barren rocks of Christianity, and which has
never succeeded in reaching the shore beyond. Those who have gone
through this state do not speak in this tone. They are satisfied either
that there is no God, or that there is, or that we cannot tell whether
there be or no. At any rate, they remain satisfied: if there be no
God, the crying after him is childish and unmanly; if we cannot
know him, it is futile and absurd; in either case experience soon
teaches us that what we cannot in course of nature expect to have can
be naturally dispensed with. It is only during the first stage of
mental progress, while still enfeebled by the habit of dependence,
still unaccustomed to love Truth as Truth, to pursue Duty as Duty,
to repose confidence in Law as Law, independently of a God and a
Lawgiver, that we hear these echoes of the bitter cry, 1 My God, my
God ! why hast thou forsaken me ?’ ”f
'
Thus it is evidently felt by the writer, that the crying after God
would not necessarily be childish and unmanly if He did exist; and
that it is only because we cannot have Divine sympathy, that we must
learn to do without it. Still further, our Atheist acknowledges that
it is only after a painful process that the heart weans itself from this
affection, and learns to cease “ sighing after such a comfort.” This
is resignation, but not satisfaction; it is the manly endurance of a
harsh necessity, but it is not a faith “ which can exercise complete
control over the affections, and wield their whole power in the
struggle."
How such a theory as Mr. Holdreth’s would work in actual life, is
a question which naturally suggests itself; and towards this we have
a partial approximation in his novelette of “ Conscience and Conse
quence,” designedly written to show what life would be to a genuine
Atheist. Our author has here endeavoured to realize his faith in
duty and his disbelief in God, side by side, in all their bearings, and
the result is so unique as to demand special analysis.
* “ Reasoner,” No. 535.
c
f Ibid., No. 603.
�18
PHASES OF ATHEISM.
The plot of the story is a bold interpolation into the history of
religious opinion in England. The hero, Ernest Clifford, is expelled
from Cambridge for Atheism; his father disinherits him in con
sequence, and he joins an Atheist propaganda in London, the leader
of which, Francis Sterne, is the model Atheist of the tale, and the
life and soul of a movement which would certainly not have been
forgotten if it had ever existed. The date of the story is about the
period of the passing of the Catholic Emancipation Bill (1829). At
that time the Carlile agitation was going on, and it certainly contained
many such adherents as the Hatherley and Carter whose coarse but
genuine earnestness Mr. Holdreth has here depicted; but the Freethinking newspapers of that day could boast of no such editor as
“ Arthur Clayton, the Melancthon of Atheism,” nor did they possess
among their contributors any such men as Francis Sterne or Ernest
Clifford. The whole tale is an arabesque, in which all the combina
tions of circumstance are nearly impossible. As the author must be
perfectly aware of this, we attribute to him the intention of aiming
at coherence merely in ideal respects. Conceding to him this liberty,
however, we see, by the elements of which he builds his world, which
are the points in the relation of theology to life that have most importance for him, either in feeling or observation.
In the first place, it should be remarked that, although the romance
has great faults as a work of art, it displays one characteristic which
many works of greater finish do not possess. It is a genuine attempt
to paint from life, rather than to construct from mere fancy or theory.
Although the dialogue is very defective in easy, natural flow, the
conception and description of character indicate close observation and
delicate perception. Especially does the writer’s attention seem to
have been given to the varying styles of character among Free
thinkers. Nearly all the dramatis personae are Atheists, yet all differ
from each other as people do in real life; they are not sketched from
their creed, inwards, but from their character, outwards. Perhaps
Sterne is an exception to this rule; but Ernest, Clayton, Seaton,
Louis, Arnott, and the rest, are clearly drawn from observation, and
not from theory,—and this is no small merit in a tale written to
exemplify a theory. It is a merit, too, in a deeper sense than at first
appears. For this endeavour to paint men as they are, under the
creed of Atheism, has thrown a light upon the effects of that creed
which no Atheist ever gave us before. The author has laid bare the
weak points of his own faith with the candour of one who has no
purpose to serve but the perfect truth. We have not space to
illustrate this as fully as we could wish, and must confine ourselves to
the more salient points alone.
The first “ consequence ” which the “ conscience ” of the Atheist
entails upon him is, of course, the external loss of friends and
position; but this is plainly subordinate in the author’s view to the
internal consequences resulting from the change. It is not only the
�PHASES OF ATHEISM.
19
human affections that Ernest is called upon to renounce,—he has to
part with hopes that had outsoared death, and to forsake the peace
with which
“ the heavenly house he trod,
And lay upon the breast of God.”
“ He regretted keenly the old hymns of the Church, in which he
could never join again, as formerly, with simple, heart-felt faith. He
regretted the Incarnate God, dear for Ilis human love, and still
dearer for His human sorrow, who had gradually dwindled before his
eyes into a man, of the common stature of men, or at least less than
the greatest. He regretted the Bible he had trusted so implicitly, but
could never take up now without lighting on some page defiled by
blood or blotted with error and ignorance. He regretted the atoning
martyr, whose dying pardon to his enemies, and dying promise to the
penitent thief, had been the delight of his early meditations. He re
gretted the Heaven which his friend had resolved into its cloud
elements ; that beautiful Fata Morgana of Christianity,—or more
truly of Spiritualism,—where it is promised us that we shall meet
hereafter the loved and lost on earth. Above all, he regretted the
God who was vanishing into thin air before the opened eyes of his reason;
God, the avenger of human suffering, the Redressor of human wrong,
the Consoler of human sorrow; God, whose wisdom can never err,
and whose love shall never fail.................................... We must not
blame Ernest Clifford too severely, therefore, if, in the first bitterness
of this disappointment, when finding the most cherished visions of
his heart fade from the clear light of reason, he was hardly conscious
that there was aught left behind to make life worth living.’'*
Nor does the author give us to understand that this grief was
merely the dark transition-period leading to a happier, fuller, and
richer faith. The only growth of character which he depicts as
resulting from Atheism is a development of the power of endurance.
In his view, the allegiance to Truth not only entails many painful
consequences in its progress to a nobler life, but it is the inlet to a
whole world of suffering, unrelieved by any gleams of sunlight; it
excites the active impulses, but tortures the receptive side of our
nature with cruel starvation.^ We must give some illustration
of this from Ernest’s history. Expelled from his home, he is forced
to part from his sister, without any hope of a future meeting.
* “ Reasoner,” No. 632. The italics here and elsewhere are our own.
+ Those who know Keats’s Life and Letters may be here reminded of his
beautiful parable of human life (Vol. 1. p. 140), where the keen vision of the
world’s misery first assails the young soul,—“ whereby this Chamber of MaidenThought becomes gradually darkened, and at the same time on all sides of it
many doors are set open,—but all dark,—all leading to dark passages. We see
not the balance of good and evil; we are in a mist, we are in that state, we feel
the ‘ Burden of the Mystery.’ . . . Now if we live, and go on thinking, we
too shall explore these dark passages,”
�20
PHASES OP ATHEISM.
“A heavy weight lay on Ernest’s heart, which all the courage
given by a clear conscience, all the resolution of martyrdom, all the
strength of despair, barely sufficed to endure. He could say but
little to his darling sister; but the child knew the mood, and was
content to lie on his arms, dreaming not of the most terrible trouble
she had known, which was to come from those lips that had never
breathed anything but tenderness and peace to her.................... ‘ And
now, dear Alice, farewell. May you be happy, my darling, my
treasure, my first and last hope in life!’
“ How one misses, on such an occasion, the old Saxon ‘ God Hess you P
which consigns the loved one to a higher and stronger care, yet one as
tender as our own! He strained the child to his breast for one long
embrace. Then he unclasped her little arms from his neck, kissed
her once more, and was gone........................... ‘ Farewell!’ he re
peated, bitterly. ‘ And all this misery comes of doing my duty.
Certainly, then, there ¿s no God !’ ”*
“ But if Duty lead to destruction, what matters it ? Soldiers
sworn into allegiance to that sacred name, whither she commands,
thither are we bound to march ; ay, to Hell, if need should be.
‘ Ours not to make reply ;
Ours not to reason why ;
Ours but to do or die.’
There is more of martyrdom still in this world than the world dreams
of. Every step in advance that mankind makes, is made not only
over the bodies of fallen defenders of the ancient Evil. The road is
paved with the noblest, the truest, the bravest hearts that have
struggled or suffered in the good cause: and it is by trampling on our
wounded brethren that we advance to victory. It is the law; who
shall gainsay it ? Ask of the Almighty God, if there be one, why he
constructed the world so clumsily. Remember that Nature, working
ever by fixed rules, and with imperfect instruments, can only attain
the final happiness of the Many by constant sacrifices of the Few.
And will the Few complain of this sacrifice? If they do, it will be
neither wisely nor justly. Pre-eminent sorrow is the price of pre
eminence ; ■ ■ . the finest, noblest, loftiest minds of every age have it
as their assigned destiny—as the finest bull or ram was slain before
the gods of olden time—to be sacrificed at the altar of Progress.
The hemlock of Socrates, the cross of Jesus, the scaffold of More, are
not strange and unnatural accidents in the career of benefactors of
mankind, but only extreme and marked examples of the natural fate
of those whose moral and intellectual pre-eminence renders them
prominent marks for the hostility of the ‘powers of darkness.’
‘ Serve and enjoy,’ is Nature’s commandment to mankind; those whom
she deigns to honour with a special mandate are charged to serve and
endure.”f
* “ Reasoner,” No. 639.
f “ Reasoner,” No. 635.
�PHASES OF ATHEISM.
21
This is the first mention in Mr. Holdreth’s writings of “ the powers
of darkness,”—but it is not the last. In the following chapter of
“Conscience and Consequence,” we hear that Superstition is “the
worst and most terrible of all the emanations of the Evil Principle ;
the spirit on whom alone no holy name seems to have power, whom
no exorcism can cast out, and with whom no spiritual strength can
grapple.”* And at length we come to the following plain state
ment of the terrible alternative. Ernest is speaking to a Sicilian
patriot, who has been expressing his fervent faith in God.
“ But may we not ask, Signor, if there be a God, why are you
here, and Francis the poltroon on the throne of the Two Sicilies ? Is
this God’s world, or the Devil’s? Must we not rather say—when-we
look to the men who fill the thrones of Europe on the one side, and
to those who crowd her dungeons on the other—when we think of
the darkness that broods over the souls and minds of her millions of
inhabitants, and remember that here we have the best and highest
forms of human life—whether or no there be a Devil, assuredly there is
no God /”f
Thus our author’s keen sense of Moral Evil leads him to regard its
wide-spread existence as invalidating the reality of a Divine Purpose
in the world. That this bitter “ fountain of tears ” is the central
source of his Atheism, is evident from the whole tenor of his writings.
It will, however, be useful here to quote the exact form in which he has
summed up his view of the subject as a whole. We quote from a
letter of Sterne’s to Ernest.
“ Let me point out to you our arguments as against God’s existence.
“ First: evil exists. God, being omnipotent, could crush evil with
out diminishing good—that is, without causing any moral deteriora
tion on our part for want of something to contend against, or the like.
God, being utterly good, would do so. But it is not done ; evil is al
lowed to exist; therefore God either does not exist, or is deficient either
in power or goodness. If in the former, we cannot trust Him, since
we know not the limits of His power; and if in the latter, we decline
to worship an imperfect Being.
“ Second: God’s foreknowledge, being absolute, is incompatible
with Man’s free will.
“ But the Atheist’s grand argument is that the Theist has none.
There is no credible evidence whatsoever that God exists, and the
burden of proof rests with those who affirm that He does.”|
Every phase of disbelief must be viewed in relation to that belief
which it negatives. We see here what is the sort of Theism to
which Mr. Holdreth enters so decided an opposition. It is the faith
* “ Reasoner,” No. 637. This is said, not by any person in the story, but by the
narrator himself. We have carefully avoided quoting any passages as illustrative
of the author’s views, which are not clearly meant to be so understood.
f Ibid., No. 648.
X Ibid., No. 626.
�22
PHASES OP ATHEISM.
in an Autocratic Power, who is capable of creating good and evil by an
arbitrary fiat of volition,—a Power whose absolute and all-pervading
personality excludes all free and self-modifying existence in all His
creatures. No wonder that such a faith should strain and break down
under the pressure of life’s realities. This sort of Theism is a com
pound of two elements,—the Despot-God of Calvinistic Orthodoxy,
and the Law-God of physical science. The essentially immoral and
unphilosophical nature of the former conception renders superfluous
any argument against it on our part; but the latter idea contains a
partial truth. Inorganic nature indubitably bears the impress of
Cosmic Law. The stars in their orbits, the plants in their growth, ex
press rather than obey the changeless rules of Nature. Unconscious
of pain, undisturbed by temptation, their beautiful life is the incarna
tion of an Orderly Force, whose movements we can (within small, but
yet widening limits) calculate beforehand. Fascinated by this great and
apparently benevolent Power, philosophers have worshipped the God of
Nature as the Supreme. But when this conception of Deity is
carried into the regions of the human will, it is utterly inadequate to
interpret the most important of phenomena; it is dumb concerning all
those moral problems which are specially characteristic of human
life, and distinguish it from the inorganic or irrational departments of
nature. Some thinkers, like Mr. Buckle, fall back on the notion that
the fluctuations of good and evil in the history of individual man are
of small importance, and that the only permanent interests of
humanity consist in what can be generalised and classified. Not so
Mr. Holdreth: he stands fast by the moral realities of individual
life, as being far more important to us than mere general laws, and he
has the courage to maintain that, although, to him, all sight of a Divine
Purpose has vanished from the world,—though the Ordinances of
Nature ruthlessly crush the weak, and wrong the innocent,—yet
still, virtue and sin in man are now, as ever, infinitely opposed; and
that, even under the half-diabolic Shadow which saddens an im
perfect Universe, we should fight to the death for the sacredness of
*
Good.
But now, starting from the point of Man’s Free Will, in which Mr.
Holdreth vehemently believes,f why should this exclude the possible
existence of a God ? Is no other conception of Him possible than the
mere Law-God of Science, or the Arbitrary Despot of Orthodoxy?
* Nor is it only an external warfare that he urges ; he speaks of moral conflict
as one who knows the meaning of temptation, and who has recognised the need
felt by every sensitive conscience of coercing internal as well as external foes. And
it is from this point that his ideal of a faith is conceived, as may he seen in the
first extract we have given from his writings.
+ “The doctrine of Necessity is contradictory to instinct, to reason, to ex
perience. It is a renunciation of morality, a blasphemy against duty, an Atheism
to Nature. . . . My instinct revolts against such degradation. I feel that I
am free, as I feel that I think, that I move, that I exist,” etc.—“ Theism the
Religion of Sentiment,” “ Reasoner,” No. 537.
�PHASES OF ATHEISM.
23
To merely speculative intellects, who care only to hold “views” of
theology, no satisfying insight into the truth is attainable. But to
those in whose minds, as in Mr. Iloldreth’s, moral action forms an essen
tial part of that life of which speculative thought is but the exponent,
there is a vision possible, which we will attempt (however imperfectly)
to indicate.
1. We believe that God, by giving us Free Will to use or misuse
our faculties, has put into our hands a large amount of independent
power, which precludes His possession of that absolute foreknowledge
of our individual course which many popular theories attribute to
Him. But by confining our capacities to a certain range in relation
to the other forces of the universe, lie has insured that our individual
aberrations shall never pass beyond a preordained limit, after which
the compensations of nature restore the general equilibrium. With
respect to our capacity, therefore, we are governed by the necessity
of God’s ordinances; with respect to the use we make of our capacity,
He leaves our individuality in our own hands. What He seeks from
us, there, is not the mechanical acquiescence of a plant or a bird, that
must obey the laws of its nature; but the free service of the Eternal
Right, the unconstrained love of the Infinite Goodness. Now such
freedom cannot be given without the power to choose wrongly. What
is virtue ? Not the mere absence of Evil, but the preference of Good,
—the devotion to Good as Good. Were there no distinctive
differences between right actions and wrong ones, no perception of
excellence could exist. Were there not in man a capacity for choosing
and following evil, no struggle of the will could arise at all: the
very existence of the idea of Duty—the Ought—implies that there is
a course which we ought not to follow. Some thinkers maintain that
this doctrine implies the subjection of God to an extraneous Fate; but
surely such thipkers overlook the true state of the case. Can we
conceive of God as creating a square circle, or as causing rain to fall
and not to fall at the same time and place ? These are self-contra
dictory requirements in physics, and the inability to combine them
does not imply any want of power. And is it not our greater inex
perience in Morals which alone renders it possible to us to conceive of
them as not amenable to fixed consistencies, and capable of being
moulded at pleasure by the caprice of an arbitrary Will? “If
Wisdom and Holiness are historical births from His volition, they are
not inherent attributes of His being.”* To resolve the conception of
God into the single attribute of volition, is to lose the substance of
Deity for an impossible phase of Omnipotence. For if we imagine
Him to be without a consistent manner of existence, we lose all that
makes Him the Object of our reverence and trust. “ Let Him
precede good and ill, and His Eternal Spirit is exempt alike from the
one and from the other, and recedes from our aspirations into perfect
moral indifierence.”j’
2. God has established a limit to the “ powers of darkness.” Beyond
* “ Prospective Review,” November, 1815. Review of Whewell’s “ Elements
of Morality.”
f “ Prospective Review,” ut supra.
�24
PHASES OF ATHEISM.
a certain point, crime leads to the destruction of its agents; the con
tact with nature and reality is fatal to evil in the long run. Death
and Birth perpetually tend to restore the balance of things, by re
moving the incurably corrupt, and filling the world with new life,
capable of healthier development. Thus much God grants to us as
“general law
more complete salvation we cannot have without our
own individual exertions. Now, that mankind have in many direc
tions gone very near the limit of human capacity to do evil, there can
be no doubt. The state of the Roman Empire for several centuries,
the horrors of religious persecution in all ages, the present state of
American slavery, are all testimonies to the awful capacity in man for
deliberate and consummate wickedness. But however wide may be the
shadow which human guilt can cast, it can never exceed the measure
of those faculties which occasion it, and consequently it must always
be possible for the right exercise of those faculties to attain an
equally wide development. It may be replied, that to do wroDg is
easier than to do right; or, in other terms, that our powers of action
and enjoyment tend to an over-selfish degree of gratification. That
they have such a tendency is most true ; but we have another tendency,
of an opposite nature. “ It is not more true that the flesh lusteth
against the spirit, than that the spirit lusteth against the flesh.”*
And it is this power of choice between the lower and the higher ten
dency, that makes us moral beings. The perennial alternative is,
whether we will cultivate our faculties for the sake of self alone, or
whether we will train them to be ministers in the service of that Pure
Goodness which can alone set our hearts free. And that there is an impulse
in man which seeks the pure, unselfish service of Goodness and Right,
and that this impulse ought to be the ruling authority of man’s heart,
is no secret to the best Atheists; indeed, it forms the acknowledged
groundwork of Mr. Holdreth’s faith. What is required for the salva
tion of mankind is this,—that the souls of men should love the Right
above all else, and promote it personally and publicly, with all their
strength and mind and heart. Of individual heroism and holiness the
experience of the race already affords many bright examples; but
these qualities have yet to be developed in social forms. Something
of this has been approached when a great moral enthusiasm has com
municated itself to a large body of men, animating them with one
common sentiment, burning up their littlenesses, and developing them
into a new life. Partial and incomplete as such results have been, they
have sufficiently manifested the fact that mankind are capable of a
social conscience, in the development of which individual excellence
may attain its ripest fulness. And “ if” (as Mr. Iloldreth says) “ we
were all now to begin to do our duty,”—if every single individual who
is troubled by the shadow of moral evil were to exert himself to the
utmost to assail it,—the combined efforts of so many workers would
assuredly, before the lapse of many generations, visibly diminish the
* Francis W. Newman, “ The Soul,” Chap. II I. “ The Sense of Sin.’
�PHASES OF ATHEISM.
25
extent of that shadow. It is Action that we want,—moral devoted
ness to realise what moral and intellectual study have shown to be
the true needs of man.
3. Now comes the question, what light would such combined social
action throw upon the problem of the Universe? We believe it
would reveal much. For, although discouragements abound, from
the stubbornness of sin and the waywardness of passion, yet there is
an under-current of hope which persistent and faithful souls can
scarcely miss. There is, underneath the accumulated refuse of past
errors, a real thirst in human nature for right, and truth, and good
ness, which gradually becomes visible to genuine explorers, and which
is capable of infinite expansion. For we are so constituted that, how
ever long we may wander in darkness and falsehood, we can only
thrive in light and reality. The world is based on truth. Good and
Evil are not coequal powers, but Goodness, because it is Goodness, is
the mightier of the two when once fairly fledged. Evil may indefinitely
delay the advent of Good in the rebellious human heart; but directly
we turn to clasp and serve the Good in real earnest, we gain some of
its own power in addition to our own—a power which, if we are
faithful, will increase in us ever more and more, freeing us from the
bondage of selfish desires, and inspiring us with strength, peace, and
blessedness.
4. But, asks Mr. Holdreth, why should the consequences of guilt
be allowed to fall upon the guiltless ?
“ We that have sinned may justly rue,
Sin grows to pain in order due—
Why do the sinless suffer too ?”*
Without assuming to fathom the whole depth of the difficulty, we
would reply, that there is one obvious reason for this ordinance. The
tie of a common sensibility is the necessary postulate of social life,
which could not even exist, if the pains and pleasures of separate
individuals did not extend beyond themselves. If our actions affected
ourselves alone, what would become of all the relations of family,
friendship, country, and race ? We might as well be dwelling in
solitary and separate worlds. And it is not, in the nature of things,
possible that we should receive joy from our human sympathies,
without being also capable of receiving sorrow from them. The same
constitution which makes us open to improvement from the influences
of virtue, renders us liable to contagion from the contact of vice. Is
this an immoral doctrine ? Far from it. By testifying to the great
ness of social influences, it indirectly suggests how widely they may
minister to human improvement. Like all other extensions of our
sensibility and capacity, its consequences for good only demand our co
operation to outweigh infinitely its consequences for evil. One of the
first incitements that can move a sympathetic nature to self-discipline,
is the perception that his failures in virtue cazmoOnjure himself alone,
but must inevitably bring mischief and misery upon others also. To
* “ Shadows of the Past,” p. 36.
�26
PHASES OF ATHEISM.
see the untamed evil in their own hearts reflected back upon them in
the marred lives of the innocents whom they love, is a punishment
■which may recall many self-willed natures, who, in the recklessness
of passion, care but little for such consequences as only affect them
selves. Even the best of us continually need to see the right and
wrong of our actions illuminated by the well-being or injury of the
human creatures around us, in order to realise the full responsibility
imposed by that just and awful law, “Whatsoever thou sowest, that
also shalt thou reap.”
And when guilt seems to have passed beyond the human chances
of redemption, when long courses of evil-doing have hardened vice
and crime into “ established institutions,” then is it not our pity for
the victims that moves us to seek redress ? Probably the tyrants of
power, in all cases, are more fearfully injured by sin, than their
victims by suffering. Yet, clearly as we may perceive the degrada
tion caused by slavery and tyranny to the oppressing races or rulers,
human nature is not so constituted that this perception can act as a
sufficient motive-power on the general heart of man to induce the
reformation of the offenders. It is our pity for the innocent that
moves us to overthrow the oppressor. True, the arresting his career
is the best service we can do lor him ; but it is not for his sake that
we do it. He has, by wilful persistence in evil, put himself beyond
the pale of direct human service; it is only indirectly that we can
benefit him, by destroying his power to do evil. That indirect
service, however, shows that the tie of human brotherhood still
remains, and the blow which breaks the chain of the sufferer restores
the balance of the world, and gives another chance even to the oppressor.
The “ Innocents ” were said to be the earliest of Christian martyrs,
and their place is yet sacred in the roll of the world’s benefactors.
When, therefore, we see that the power to distinguish and choose
between Good and Evil is essential to the perception and service of
Good, both in the life of individuals and in the wider sensibilities of
social existence; when we see that, however terribly our choice of
Evil may injure ourselves and others, we have, all of us, chance upon
chance of redemption offered, and natural limits placed to our
capacity for evil-doing; when we see that the service of Good is
capable of being made as wide as the service of Evil has too often been,
and moreover that the inherent vitality of Good excels that of Evil,
in being capable of an infinite expansion and development in harmony
with nature, instead of in discord with it—surely, however much is still
hidden from us on this subject, we see enough to reassure us that the
Great Mystery is not a maleficent one.
*
* Probably it requires Infinite Perfection to formulate the whole truth concern
ing Good and Evil. The humblest efforts of conscience enable us to see clearer
in morals than the most acute intellect can ever penetrate without them; and it
may well be, that, as moral insight increases with moral worth, it can only be
complete where Goodness and Intellect are both entire and coequal, in the mind
of the Only Perfect One.—See Appendix C.
�PHASES OP ATHEISM.
27
Here it is necessary to take up Mr. Holdreth’s conception of
“Nature” from another point, and to examine his reason for main
taining that cosmical harmony does not imply a Personal Unity. Mr.
Holdreth adopts Mr. Holyoake’s doctrine on this point, which he thus
briefly re-states:—
“ The Atheist looks to the universe, under the guidance of the
divine; and the divine points to the traces of law, and cries, ‘ There
you behold the finger of God.’ The pupil asks why this is known to
be a finger-mark of Deity; and the reply is, when reduced to a logical
form, ‘ Fitness proves design, design an intelligent author—and this
author we name God.’ Objects his auditor, ‘ Then the fitness of God
proves an author of God ?’ ‘ Not so.’ ‘ Then how came you to say
that the universe must have an author ?’ ‘ How else comes it to
exist ?’ says the theologian. ‘ How comes God to exist ?’ is the natural
retort. ‘ An eternal universe is as easy of conception as an eternal
God.’ ”*
In this argument there is a mixture of truth and error which
requires to be carefully disentangled. The Theist does not, or at any
rate should not, affirm that the mere fitness or perfection of any
object indicates its design from another hand. What he maintains is
this : that when we see the exercise of Force in the direction of a
urpose, we, by an inevitable inference, attribute the phenomenon to
some conscious agent. You may call this an assumption, if you will,
but it is the necessary postulate of all our conceptions of consciousness.
What other test of consciousness can we imagine but this ? And how
can we dissever the perception from the inference? Now when the
purpose attained by any existence is clearly not resultant from forces
consciously exerted by it—as in the motions of the stars, the growth
of plants from their seeds, the propagation and support of animal
life from the exercise of blind instincts, etc.—we say that such results
must have been intended by some Intelligence extraneous to the
objects themselves. And when we see such exercise of purposeful
force pervading the Universe with a coherent harmony which implies
an unmistakable Cosmical Unity, we cannot but attribute to that
force a consciousness of the results which it produces. In spite of
their rejection of this inference, Atheists perpetually speak of
“ Nature ” as a causal source, both of force and order. Mr. Holdreth
does this most markedly, as may be seen in the following passages
from his “ Affirmations of Secularism : ”—
“ To be saved from perdition, moral and material, we must have
faith in the laws by which Nature has provided for our deliverance,
and upon that faith we must act. . . . Nature demands from us
that we should believe in her, obey her; and she will not fail to
enforce belief by moral penalties, and to punish disobedience by
material sufferings. . . . Nature’s government is a despotism,
* “ Reasoner,” No. 627.
�28
PHASES OF ATHEISM.
with the eternal accident heureux of a beneficent ruler. And I, for
one, am glad that it is so. I, for one, have more faith in the order
and harmony of Nature than in the justice or wisdom of men, and am
rejoiced that it is not left to the latter to arrange the politics of the
ethical world at their will.”*
Mr. Holdreth is, however, far from being consistent on this point.
The foregoing passage implies the attribution of a higher and firmer
morality to Nature than is to be found in man ; but elsewhere our
author maintains that “ the one appalling fact stands every day more
and more clearly visible before the eyes of every thoughtful inquirer,
that Nature is not governed on principles of moral equity; that good
is only attained through evil, and that the justice which is exacted
from just men is not dealt to them ; in a word, that the Author of
Nature, if there be one, is not a Moral Governor, but a stern and
ruthless Machinist.”f
Being pressed with this discrepancy by a Theistic correspondent of
the Reasoner, Mr. Holdreth gave the following explanation:—
“ The Cosmist sees in Nature a machine, which works according to
definite laws which it did not create, and which were not created, but
which it cannot violate. . . If the machine crushes his child or maims
himself, he blames but his own folly, or pities his own misfortune, but
still recognises the value and beneficence of the mechanism. The
Theist, believing Nature an instrument in the hands of a conscious
Being, must see in her workings the designed operations of that Being,
and the evidence of His character. And since those workings often
operate injustice and cruelty in individual cases, he ought to suppose
that Being careless of justice and benevolence, or unable to execute
His own will. Seeing a disregard of morality (which the Cosmist
considers the consequence, not the cause of natural law) in Nature’s
operations, he is bound to believe the operator devoid of moral
character.”!
Thus, then, we come to this point. The general laws of Nature
are “ ever active and ever beneficentbut, as we see the welfare of
individuals perpetually sacrificed to that of the whole, we must
“ believe the operator devoid of moral character,” unless we resort to
the darker theory that the individual injustice was itself planned by
a Designing Devil—an idea which certainly seems to present itself
occasionally to Mr. Holdreth’s mind, though it would scarcely appear
that he actually believes it. In contrast to these theories, we have
endeavoured to show that the capacity for individual sin and suffering
is the indispensable postulate of all our virtue and happiness—the
material out of which all sensitive and active life is moulded, and
through which alone we can attain the truest good of which our
nature is capable. Moreover, we believe that those apparently
exceptional phenomena of our lives, which to the human judgment
* “ Reasoner,” No. 583.
t Ibid., No. 594.
Î Ibid., No. 607.
�PHASES OF ATHEISM.
29
appear most inexplicable and distressing, are often the very means of
leading us into nobler and richer fields of life, not otherwise attainable.
If we faithfully meet the new trouble in a spirit of obedience and
trust, it gradually unfolds its hidden meaning, and reveals to us beyond
our bounded imaginations and imperfect efforts, the presence of
One whose Reality transcends our highest ideals, and who, in His
exhaustless love, is ever seeking our perfection, and pleading with us
for the free devotion of our hearts to Ilis service. Among the earliest
tokens of this filial relationship are our longings after an inexhaust
ible Source of love and truth, who shall guide and respond to us
where man’s help must stop short. There are some striking illustra
tions of this tendency in Mr. Holdreth’s novelette. One of the most
prominent is the depiction of the way in which the hero partially
fills up the void in his heart caused by the loss of his religion, with
an intense devotion to his “ Master,” Sterne, who does, in fact, take
the place of a God to him. He accepts the whole responsibility of
Ernest’s life, for which Ernest gives, in return, an almost childlike
obedience. Thus, such comfort as he does find is gained by reposing
on a higher and stronger will than his own. Any such need in
Sterne’s own character is obviated by the coldly-calm temperament
ascribed to him. “ Having no passionate love for any other object
than his sister, having no cause to serve in whose success his soul was
absorbed, and serving the cause of Atheism simply from a quiet, un
impassioned conviction of its truth and necessity, he felt no need of
any assistance or protection from without. He was sufficient to him
self, and his conscience was sufficient to him.”
Yet, with a perceptiveness which singularly contrasts with the
author’s admiration for his ideal Atheist, he has painted Sterne’s
inability to train his wayward sister Annie, with a verisimilitude that
is only too painfully real. The need of influences beyond humanity
to solve such problems of character as hers is so clearly manifested in
this little episode of Atheist life, that we must extract enough to show
its main features. Sterne is the guardian of his two orphan sisters.
A scene of contention with the elder child has just taken place, in
which Sterne has tried in vain to bring her to reason.
“ The child understood ; that much, -at least, was clear. But she
would not seem to feel. And Sterne bit his lip, and turned away
sadly to take the hand of his favourite, as she danced into the room.
.... Annie sat by the window, where she could see them depart,
and notice her brother’s tenderness towards the tiny creature, who
in the midst of her laughter, was even then murmuring a word of pity
for ‘ poor Annie,’—more needed than Emily could know. The sullen
girl bowed her head on her hands, and gave way to a passionate burst
of grief and vexation. ‘ How be loves her! and I—no one loves me!
Well, I won’t care ; I hate them;’—but the word was sobbed forth
with an intensity of rage which belied it; and it was long ere Annie
could resume her usual quiet and sullen behaviour. Pity that her
�30
PHASES OF ATHEISM.
brother had’not'seen those tears, and heard that bitter cry of desola
tion, ‘ No one loves me.’ He who knows no Father in heaven is doubly
bound to be tender toward the fatherless on earth. Sterne knew and
felt this. He had done his duty by his sisters nobly and kindly;
and Annie would have had no reason to complain, were it possible for
Duty to command love, despite all the faults and unloveliness of its
object. Sterne did his duty; and here his task ended. He could
not love one so thoroughly unamiable.”—Chap. VI.
“ She returned to her seat (after doing a kindness to Emily), not
unnoticed by her brother, whose conscientious vigilance seldom
missed a single trait of character in either of his wards. ‘ Thank you,
Annie,’ he said, in a tone of more gentleness, and even tenderness,
than it was his wont to use towards the wayward and vexatious
child. What a pity that the shadow of the fireplace screened the
light of the candle from Annie’s face, and forbade her brother to
notice the glow of momentary pleasure which illumined it. It was
but for a moment; then came the thought, ‘ If it had been his
favourite, he would have said, Thank you, darling,' and all the
sullenness returned to her face and her demeanour, as she resumed
her old attitude and her solitary musings. It is a fearful power that
the words and tones of one human being exercise over the mind of
another; a power so inevitable and yet so incalculable that it is
hard for him or her who wields it to have the slightest clue to its
right use. Indeed, it is perhaps as well that we have in general so
little ability to direct our use of this influence; for one who could
calculate beforehand the effect his every word and gesture would pro
duce might be a despot of no common kind. Yet it is grievous to
think that an accidental variation of phrase or tone, which we could
not possibly remember or foresee, should affect so fatally the peace or
the character of another. A single word of affection then spoken
might have saved years of discomfort, sorrow, and self-reproach; yet
could Sterne have known that it was wanted, or would be felt, it bad
certainly not been withheld.”—Chap. VIII.
It would be impossible to depict more clearly the inadequacy of the
bare sense of Duty to compass all the work which is given us to do.
What Sterne needed was to break up the ice round his sister’s heart,
by penetrating to the human feeling underneath her pride and
waywardness. And what could have enabled him to do this so well
as a faith in an Infinite Causal Love beyond, within, and around them
both ? Failing this, all the most delicate and tender growths of
affection are (as our author sees) at the mercy of the slightest physical
accident, and continually liable to waste away in aimless wanderings,
or to fester in morbid pride. Yet in one of the few cases where the
novelist has allowed an Atheist to love happily, we see that even
when affection is mutual and satisfying, it can never be relied upon
by an Atheist as a permanent and integral part of his being. In the
touching chapter entitled “ The Valley of the Shadow,” narrating the
�PHASES OF ATHEISM.
31
death of Emily Sterne, we see the point from which the author
endeavours to deal with this poignant grief of eternal separation, from
the principle supplied by “ the Religion of Duty.”
“ Ernest could not leave his friend in this great sorrow, and his
presence was evidently a diversion to Sterne’s melancholy, and a
pleasure to the dying child. For dying she certainly was,—fading
away from life like a gathered rose-bud, but slowly and quietly, her
self half conscious but fearless, sorrowful only for the misery which
all her adored brother’s self-command could not conceal from her
loving eyes. And she would make him sit close beside her, and clasp
her little hand in his, while his thoughts were darkened by the
shadow of the coming day, when he should never clasp that loving
little band again. Few of us know what is the anguish of the
meaning he had uttered in those bitter words, ‘ my all in life.’ She
—this beautiful and innocent little one—was the object of dll his care,
dll his labour, dll his hope. When she should be gone from him,
what would he have left but a dreary, dark, cheerless path to a goal
of utter nothingness? In those hours of torture, few could have seen
further than this, even of men less capable of passionate love, filling
the inmost recesses of existence; but Sterne was of a few. Men of
his mould are not to be found in the every-day walks of life, though
one or two such there are on earth, perhaps, if we but knew where to
seek them when we want heroes to lead us and martyrs to die for us.
Dark and waste and dreary indeed his after-life must be, but it might
be trodden boldly and faithfully; for the darkness was not all.
Even amid that long and cruel agony he remembered the work that
lay before him ; and knew that he would not do it the less bravely
and constantly, because he had no other love on earth, no other hope
on earth or in heaven. For him Duty was God and Nature was His
prophet; and though the God’s mandates were hard, and the prophet
prophesied no smooth things, Sterne was not one to lose hold of his
faith because of tribulation, nor to fling it aside in madly clasping at
a staff which, in the utmost need of those who lean thereon, cannot
but prove a broken reed................
“ ‘ What advantageth it us, if the dead rise not ? Let us eat and
drink, for to-morrow we die.’
“ Sterne sat by the side of his sleeping sister, who, lulled to rest for
a short time by heavy opiates, was not to be roused by their lowtoned conversation. He was bending over her, and his face was
hidden. But as his proselyte spoke these bitter words, he looked up;
and the first harsh sentence Ernest had ever heard him speak was his
reply.
“ ‘ Ernest Clifford, look at your own life, and at mine ; look here,
where all I have to love or hope in the universe is passing away from
me; and remember that I, in this utter desolation, have never
forgotten that I have no right to die with my work undone. It may
be, when you have known what such wretchedness as this is, that you
�32
PHASES OF ATHEISM.
will learn a better faith than that borrowed Epicureanism of Paul,
and bethink you that those who have so much to do before they die
to-morrow have need to make the utmost use of to-day.’
“Ernest was somewhat abashed, yet could not but recognise the
justice of the rebuke. If this man did not sink into utter despair,
what right had he to murmur ?”
Thus, one by one, fade the stars of love and hope from the Atheist’s
sight, and he is left alone, with nothing but the work which Duty
prescribes. “ He would not do it the less bravely and constantly,
because he had no other love on earth, no other hope on earth or in
heaven.” But if it be possible for all love and hope on earth or in
heaven to be thus destroyed, what work remains possible, and what
objects remain to be worked for? What is then the value of life—
not merely its relative value to this or that sufferer, but its absolute
value to man as man ? How can such a mutilated and benumbing
conception of duty “ exercise complete control over the affections, and
wield their whole power in the struggle ?" “ Nature” must be not only
“devoid of moral character,”—she must be absolutely Diabolical, if
she condemns her truest children to this terrible crushing of their
noblest yearnings. The universal heart of man refuses to believe in
such an anomalous dissonance, and, springing to the embrace of the
Infinite Goodness, echoes the cry of St. Augustine,—“ Thou hast
made us for Thyself, and our heart is restless till it resteth in Thee1”
Here we must close our remarks, although we have but touched
the mere outline of the subject. Our aim has not been to furnish a
short and easy guide to the mysteries of this infinite Universe, but
simply to indicate a few of the clues to the great underlying Reality,
which no worshipper can ever wholly comprehend, but which unfolds
itself ever more and more to wise and patient hearts. That Reality
must be sought by each soul singly and alone. That such a mind as
Mr. Iloldreth’s cannot seek it in vain, we feel assured. It may be
nearly impossible for any one to help such seekers in solving a
problem w’hich so largely depends on the individual experience of
life. But our task will not have been valueless if we have succeeded
in showing that there is, in these recent forms of Atheism, a faith in
truth and in virtue which commands the sympathy of religious
thinkers, and which is in itself a hopeful sign of the times. “ When
people assume that an Atheist must live without God in the world,”
■f says an able and generous writer, “ they assume what is fatal to their
own Theism.” And those who recognise in all human goodness the
sustaining hand of the Creator, will hold fast to the faith that no
genuine truth-seeker can ever be forsaken by the tender care of Him
of whom it is said that the pure in heart shall see God.
�APPENDIX.
THE RELATION OF SECULARISM TO THEISM.
Note A,page 8.
I. In illustration of this, it may be mentioned that in July, 1857, a
Society of Materialists was formed, “ for a union of Freethinkers for a more
definite object than appeared possible under the diffusive principles which
were represented under the name of Secularism.”* In the first meeting
called to consider the proposal, all the speakers in favour of the new
Society lamented the admission of “ persons of spiritualistic tendencies ”
into the Secular body, as a drag upon the efforts of Freethinkers. Soon
afterwards, Mr. Holyoake and “ Iconoclast ” held some discussions on the
position of Secularism, in which “ Iconoclast ” “ denied that there was any
middle standing between Atheism and Theism,” and maintained “ that
Secularism was impracticable when separated from Atheism, urging that
the plan of Secularism was essentially Atheistic.”! To the same class of
views belong the well-known “ Religious Confessions ” of Mr. Joseph
Barker, who, from having been successively a Methodist, an Unitarian, and
a Theistic Secularist, became an Atheistic Secularist, holding Secularism
“ as the sole concern and business of mankind,” and blending it inex
tricably with Atheism, which, according to him, “ occupies the position of
positive science, and is a mighty reformatory principle.’’J On the other
hand may be quoted the numerous articles of Mr. Holdreth, who has
always maintained that “ it is both better and easier to win for Secularism
a front place among religions, than to obtain respect or tolerance for
irreligión :”§ and who has lately (since the first edition of this Essay was
sent to the press) withdrawn himself from the public advocacy of Secu
larism, because “ his views of it differ so widely from those which have
determined the aspect it has recently assumed.”||
II. Mr. Holyoake, however, still believing in the possibility of a neutral
faith, has lately published a little pamphlet, entitled “ Principles of
Secularism,” in which he endeavours to define and consolidate his owr
position. He there maintains the following points.
1. That Secularism is a “ synonym of Freethought,” in harmony with
“ the hereditary characteristics of Freethinking” (p. 4); that “Secularism
is the name given to a series of principles of Positivism, intended for the
guidance of those who find Theology indefinite, or inadequate, or deem it
unreliable” (p. 7).
2. That a Secularist “ concerns himself with present time and materiality,
neither ignoring nor denying the future and spiritual, which are indepen
dent questions ” (p. 6).
3. That, “ occupying, as Secularism intends to do, the ground of Nature,
it may refuse to engage itself with Atheism, Theism, or Biblicism. So long
as he [the Secularist] chooses to remain within the sphere of his own
principles, he simply ignores all outlying sectarian systems, and is no
more to be put down as opposed to any such views than the geologist is to
be cried down as the enemy of music, or the chemist as the opponent of
geometry, because he ignores those subjects, and confines his attention to
his own. Honour those who advisedlv, and for the public good, com
promise themselves ; only take care that associates are not affected by
this conduct of others. And this will never take place so long as the
simple and pure profession of common principles is kept intrinsically in
dependent and unassailably neutral ” (p. 18).
But this is precisely what the Secularists have never done. It is as
a “ synonym of Freethought,” i.e., of unfettered speculative inquiry, that the
very name of Secularism is put forth: and not only are five-sixths of the
* “ Reasoner,” No. 582.
§ Ibid , No. 584.
f Ibid, Nos. 584, 591.
t Ibid, Nos. 646, 649
|| Ibid, No. 690, August 14,1859.
�34
APPENDIX.
Secularists thorough-going Atheists, but by far the greatest amount of
their activity as a party is given to the discrediting of religion. It is even
one of Mr. Holyoake’s own definitions of Secularism, that its principles
“ are intended for the guidance of those who find Theology indefinite, or in
adequate, or deem it unreliable.” How, then, can Secularist principles be
ever regarded as intrinsically independent, and unassailably neutral?
How can a Secularist claim that he is no more to be put down as opposed
to religion, than the geologist is to be cried down as the enemy of music, or
the chemist as the opponent of geometry? The researches of the geologist
in no way assail the theories of the musician, nor does the chemist discredit
the principles of the geometer. But Secularism, if it does really “ neither
ignore nor deny the future and the spiritual,” and claims Theistic adherents
on that ground—must be in direct opposition to Atheism, by which the
affirmations of religion are necessarily either ignored or denied.
III. Is it, then, impossible for Theists and Atheists to combine together for
purposes of practical usefulness which both may have equally at heart?
God forbid. It is only impossible when a speculative theory is made the
condition of union. The Association for the Promotion of Social Science
may be regarded as a happy instance of a true Secular Society, in the only
sense in which that term can be accepted by both parties, t.e., its stand
point is the importance of earthly work, not the doing it from merely earthly
motives. Consequently, the Association exacts from its members no defi
nition of the relation of work to faith, nor of this world to the next, but
leaves the human and the Divine to find their natural and ever-varying
proportions in the mind and life of each individual. Mr. Holyoake’s
Secularism, on the other hand, “ draws the line of separation between the
things of time and the things of eternity;” “selects for its guidance the
principle that ‘ human affairs should be regulated by considerations purely
human,’” and regards the beliefs of religion as “ supplementary specula
tions.”* Now there are stages of suspensive Atheism and of imperfect
Theismf with which these declarations may consist; and it is important
that such intermediate stages of belief should be clearly distinguished from
dogmatic Atheism. But, nevertheless, the views held by these inter
mediate thinkers are not those of a mature and consistent Theism. To a
true Theist, the Being of God is no “ supplementary speculation,” but the
underlying Reality of the Universe; and so far from seeking to regulate
human affairs by considerations purely human, he regards the life of
humanity as perpetually needing to be interpreted by the light of the
Divine. And while the Secularist “inculcates the practical sufficiency of
natural morality, apart from ” any spiritual basis, the Theist holds that that
“ natural morality ” only exists by virtue of His existence who is the
fountain alike of nature and of grace. But, on the other hand, a consistent
Theist will never deny that a man may himself be morally estimable and
reliable who does not hold this belief. For Character and Speculation
are by no means co-ordinate in their development, and a man’s character
is the man himself, while his speculations only give us the conscious pro
gramme adopted by him. Frankly should we say to those Atheists who
command our respect, “ We will work with you wherever we can
agree, because, believing in God as the source of all human goodness
and truth, we recognise every good impulse and true thought in you as
coming from Him, and therefore as equally sacred with our own.” But
* “ Principles of Secularism,” pp. 6, 7.
t See an interesting letter, signed “ Truth-Seeker,” in “ Reasoner,” No. 588,
from a correspondent who professes himself to be “ a believer (at least pro
visionally) in the being of a God and the immortality of the soul,” and who
earnestly contends that Mr. Holyoake’s Atheism does not assume any certainty
of negation. See also, the criticisms of some Theistic Secularists (“ Reasoner,”
Nos. 650, 651, 659, 668) on Mr. Barker’s Confessions.
�APPENDIX.
35
this is essentially different from giving our adherence to a system which
regards the main foundations of our faith as “ supplementary speculations,”
“ indefinite, inadequate, or unreliable.”
I am especially anxious to clear up this point, because it is one Hpon
which there has been considerable misapprehension on both sides. Many
Theists have hesitated to give full scope to their natural liberality of feel
ing, from the fear lest they should, in some sense, be obscuring their
fidelity to religion by co-operating with Atheists, even in matters involving
no profession of disbelief. Surely, where such a fear exists, the true
difference between Theism and Atheism cannot have been clearly dis
criminated, still less can the true relation between Theists and Atheists
have been explored in all its fulness of light and shadow. The true difference
between the Theist and the Atheist (to borrow the words of one of the most
spiritual of living preachers “ is not that the one has God and the other
)
*
has Him not, but that the one sees him and the other sees him not.” Our
charge against speculative Atheism is not that it necessarily cuts men off
from the teaching, still less from the tenderness, of God; but that it pre
vents them from consciously seeking and cherishing that teaching and tender
ness, and thus confines the voluntary range of character to that growth
alone which can be self-evolved.f But we can never bring the question up
to this point, which is the real heart of the matter, until we have, by word
and deed, made unmistakably plain that the goodness which we seek for our
selves is essentially one with that to which right-minded “ Freethinkers ”
also aspire, and that when we decline to subscribe the creed of the Secu
larist, it is in allegiance to a faith which can never prohibit our human
fellowship with the Atheist.
Note B., page 14.
Upon this point, I cannot forbear from quoting the following suggestive
passage from a review of Theodore Parker’s “ Theism, Atheism,” etc.,
which appeared in the Inquirer for Nov. 12th, 1853.
“ It is a favourite maxim with physiologists and secularists, that no
physical conditions of health and strength can be disregarded without
causing the pain which always indicates that something is wrong. It is
clear that such pain, not being self-caused, but being forced upon us by
those rules of our bodily constitution which we have no power to alter, is
a sign that physical tendencies within us are checked or thwarted, that
constant forces are not allowed their normal play. Keep the body bound
in one position, and violent pain soon ensues. Of what is that pain the
sign? It indicates that physical impulses tending to motion and change of
posture are disregarded and restrained—that a vital force, not under our
own control, is asking for its natural liberty, and is denied it. So far the
Atheist concurs. He says that so it is, but that the vital force, not under
* “ I never can believe that God retires from a man who is perplexed and unable
to discover Him. Is a man deserted by his God because he cannot find Him ?
For my own part, I believe there is a secret grace of God in the heart of every man,
and that God is there, whether he sees Him, or whether he sees Him not. The
difference between a Christian and an unbeliever is not that the one has God and
the other has Him not, but that the one sees Him and the other sees Him not.”
Speech of the Rev. James Martineau at Stourbridge, reported in the “Inquirer”
for Nov. 6, 1858.
f See an earnest and able paper on Self-knowledge (entitled “ A True Prophet”)
in “Reasoner,” No. 683,in which the writer maintains that “ Self-knowledge is to
the Secularist what grace is to the Christian.” He does not take into account
that self-knowledge is only an intellectual pre-condition of moral progress,
and that its value in any case wholly depends upon the moral use to which it is
put, and especially on the power of self-coercion or self-surrender to the desired
ideal. Now “ grace ” not only shows us our errors and dangers, but leads us out
of them by pouring into us a new life, and uniting us to an All-conquering Love.
’
�36
APPENDIX,
our control, is a development of the eternal, blind, dead forces of the
universe. But apply the same reasoning to our moral constitution. Let a
man try to descend from his own conceptions of right to a lower moral
level. What is the result?—that a moral misery, the sense of a moral
resistance, not under our own control, not of ourselves, immediately results
checking us in our own efforts to do wrong. Now, what is the meaning of
saying that such a resisting force is part of ourselves? We have no means
of getting rid of it, we cannot ignore it, we cannot cause it. It is in us,
but not of us; it is a force eatmg into our nature, and yet it is a moral
force, it cannot be identified with mere physical tendencies, it must be from
a mind, for matter could not plead with us, and rivet our gaze to the sin
we are committing. We are in actual conflict with a power, which it is
mere self-contradiction to call a material power, and which yet we know to
be other than our own will If it be replied that it is one part of our
nature contending against the other, still here are two powers, both of
them moral and spiritual, one subject to our control, and ope not so subject,
of which we call the former, ourself; what, then, are we to call the other
which we recognise as intruding its suggestions upon us from sources we
cannot fathom? This is but the very essence of the meaning which a Theist
expresses by the word ‘ God.’ ”
Of course, all our ideas of duty are necessarily relative rather than abso
lute, and it is only a comparative goodness that can be suggested, even by
God Himself, to creatures of limited and progressive capacity. But were
all our ideas of right merely self-evolved, without contact (more or less
conscious) with a Higher Personality, we could not experience this sensa
tion that, in wilful wrong-doing, we are resisting the pleadings of an
Infinite Moral Being. (See this theme treated at length in Mr. F. W.
Newman s “ Theism,” Book I., Sect. 5. “ God in Conscience.”)
Note C., page 27.
Since this Essay was sent to the press, Mr. Holdreth has published a
short paper on “ The Existence of Evil,”* stating that “ after mature con
sideration, he feels called upon to qualify ” his argument on that subject.
“ It is (he says), logically conceivable that matter may have an independent
existence and laws of its own, of which it was as impossible for the
Creator to make a perfect world, as it would have been for Him to make
two and two equal to five. Therefore, all that is really proved by the
argument from the suffering and sin around us, is, that the world was not
formed by a Creator at once perfect in power, and -perfect in beneficence
it is not shown that it might not have been framed by a God of perfect
goodness but limited power. ... Of course, this in no way affects the
grand argument of Atheism—the total absence of evidence of Creation.”
What is here.meant by ‘‘creation” is not clear, and in none of Mr.
Holdreth s writings has he done more than touch the subject incidentally.
I therefore confine myself to remarking that the theory which he does accept,
under the name of Cosmism, appears to stop short of Theism for a moral
reason only. It is because the Cosmist sees “ a disregard of morality in
Nature s operations,” that “ he is bound to believe the operator devoid of
moral character.” But if it be granted that, in the very nature of things,
it may have been “as impossible for the Creator to make a perfect world,
as it would have been for Him to make two and two equal to five,” that
moral objection becomes sensibly diminished. It cannot, however, disappear
entirely, until it be also granted that the moral perfection which God could
not make in the human world, He can, and does enable us to approximate
to more and more for ever, by the joint action of our free will in accord
with His grace.
THE END.
* “ Reasoner,” No. 686.
�
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Phases of atheism, described, examined, and answered
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Collet, Sophia Dobson
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Notes: Inscription in ink on page 32 "R. H. Hulton. National Review, No. 3. "Atheism". Includes bibliographical references. From the library of Dr Moncure Conway. 'The relation of secularism to theism.' Printed by John Watts, Fleet Street, London. "The following Essay is reprinted, with revisions and additions, from the American Christian Examiner for November, 1859". [From Preface]. Discusses four works by Holyoake and three by Lionel H. Holdreth. Sophia Dobson Collet was a 19th-century English feminist freethinker. She wrote under the pen name Panthea in George Holyoake's Reasoner, wrote for The Spectator and was a friend of the leading feminist Frances Power Cobbe.
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1860
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Atheism
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5
IM e$( v ° NATIONAL secular society
B'7-(X5
NJ633 PHILOSOPHIC ATHEISM.
■---- *—God
or no
God ?
I.
It has, been long my conviction—arrived at, I may. say,
against my deepest prejudices and the oldest tendencies of
my mind—that Atheism is not merely a logical position or
mental state, but as logical as any.
It appears , to me
that, approach the subject from which side we will—-the
purely intellectual or the moral—philosophy leads inevitably
up to Atheism. I can fully sympathise with the millions
who look upon Atheism as a monster, of absurdity and
immorality, for I once had the same ideas and feelings
myself, and no more dreamt of journeying to Atheism than
to the moon. I have discovered several things in recent
years which I formerly deemed impossible; among others,
that Atheism is not in the least like what popular prejudice
represents, and that Theism is as unfounded as Transubstantiation. Every argument yet produced in evidence of
divine existence fails even to satisfy a previous believer.
Judging from my own experience, I should say that the
most unshaken faith in a God is found in him who never
argued; the reasoner, even on the very smallest scale, starts
I doubts on the subject that can never be solved or destroyed. Once pass beyond the bounds of that innocent
state of spontaneous faith, possible only to early life or to
imbecility, and wrestle with a doubt respecting a God’s
■existence, and I question if the struggle will ever terminate
.entirely, except in Atheism or death. It is true, Orthodoxy
■promises you peace and rest, a solution of your difficulties,
■to be found in certain arguments, which, if rightly con■ ducted, will infallibly lead up to satisfaction. Alas ! how
fallacious the promise and the hope I I spent many years
R in following this will-o’-the-wisp ; but neither logic, prayer,
nor faith, nor all together could give settled satisfaction,
r This is not surprising, when the matter is fully examined.
Let us see.
The teleological argument is no doubt the oldest of the
so-called proofs of divine existence; it is, at least, as old as
Xenophon’s Memorabilia, and seems to have been used by
�4
PHILOSOPHIC ATHEISM.
Socrates. The argument, which is based upon a fallacy,
runs thus:—“We see in works of handicraft and Art
evidences of Design and adaptation of means to ends; we
see similar marks of design, &c., in Nature; and as
evidences of design in Art imply a designer, so do they in
Nature.” This, if logical, would be an exceedingly “ short
and easy method” of settling the dispute; but there is
really not one point of analogy between Art and Nature,
regarded either as a whole or in detail.
1. But for our education or experience in handicraft, &c.,
we could not possibly suspect anything like it in Nature.
We could never have gathered the conception of design
even from a work of art, were we not able, in some cases, at
least, to see both the means and the end, and to watch the
one resulting in the other. Now who can say what is the
end of Nature in any one department, to say nothing of
the final cause or ultimate aim of the whole ? This I shall
return to by-and-bye; at present I merely point to the want
of analogy between an art production (whose whole theory
•and action, inception and results, we can grasp) and any
particular part of Nature of which we know little or nothing
beyond the barest phenomena.
2. The analogy fails in another and more serious point.
We have seen and can see the maker of any human produc
tion. The identical man may be out of our reach, but we
have thousands like him all around us continually; ancL
though we may never have seen a given work in course onI
manufacture, yet we have seen artificers at work upon other!
artificial productions; and as all artificial things have!
certain points of resemblance, by the observation of which ,
we can readily pass from the known to the unknown, we
have little or no difficulty in recognising as a work of art
even an article we never saw before. Now where is the
analogy between this and any natural thing ? In Nature
the artificer has never once been seen, nor any one of his
fellows; we never saw any one making a single natural
product. Where, then, is the analogy? To establish it
you must show us some natural thing in course of produc
tion, and the maker himself, or some part of him, must be
seen at his work. Let this be done and our disputes end ;
but until we see some one making things in Nature—I don’t
say all things, but some—we have no right to institute an
analogy between a thing we know to be made and one that
may not be made at all.
�PHILOSOPHIC ATHEISM.
5
3. It is idle to say that the 11 Great Artificer ” is invisible;
that begs the question.
First prove your Artificer, and
then we must perforce admit his invisibility until we see
him. We see all around us the processes of Nature going
on—the revolution of the planets, and alternations of day
and night, storm and calm, summer and winter. We see all
this, but we never see the maker.
4. Not only have we never seen the Artificer of Nature,
we may further say that we have never seen Nature’s Art.
Is there not necessarily a distinction between the two
departments of Nature and Art ? And is not that distinction
essential? It is the height of linguistic- impropriety to
apply the terms of Art to the subjects and phenomena of
Nature. We have the best of proofs that artificial things
are made. Nature was never made ; it is not in any sense
a manufacture, it is an eternal existence as a whole, and its
various phenomena are growths, not Art productions. To
say the contrary is to abuse language and bewilder the
reader. I ask any intelligent man to take a coat and a
sheep, and say if there be any analogy between them. The
animal was not made, it grew; the coat did not grow, it
was made. The materials of the coat also grew; the act
of putting them together was the making of something that
did not and could not grow, any more than the sheep
could have been made. To talk, therefore, of animals
being made is not less incorrect than to speak of coats,
boots, chairs, &c., growing. A wise man will try to avoid
such confusion of • language, while the wisest will see in
natural phenomena nought but pure growths, and will thus
. escape the need of looking for a maker where none is
possible. Theology and false philosophy have done much
to confuse people on these matters, but there can be nothing
more incorrect, in the present state of human knowledge,
than to speak of the making or creation of the earth or of
any natural thing in it. Therefore it is not reason that
desiderates a maker or creator, it is faith that both demands
and supplies one or more, according to its whims or circum
stances.
5. But more serious objections remain. If nature does
manifest design we can discover the fact only by discovering
both the means and the end. This must be apparent at
once. In Art, did we not know why things are made, the
notion of design would be impossible; I don’t say in every
case. We cannot tell why some things have been made,
�6
PHILOSOPHIC ATHEISM.
they puzzle us; but these exceptions prove the rule, for if
we were not accustomed to recognise the end or object in
the majority of cases, we could never feel either curiosity or
doubt respecting the end to be answered by the few excep
tions. Now where is the man who will pretend to tell why
Nature was created? Consider its vastness, its intricacy,
how small a speck of the whole is known to us, and the
immense periods occupied in some of its processes. Who
can guess the meaning and the end of such immense and
intricate changes ? Only the most consummate rashness
would venture to attempt an explanation here. And if we
cannot tell the final cause of the whole, by what right do we
pretend to explain the design of a part ? Every part must
contribute to the total results, and must therefore be sub
ordinate to the whole, and without knowing the final upshot,
the end and aim cannot be guessed. Let the bold theologian
show us Nature’s means and her ultimate aim, or confess
that, like the rest of us, he is in total darkness respecting them.
If we cannot discover the end and means of Nature in
her immensity, let us try on a smaller scale. Take the
solar system. Was it designed, or is it the result of
accident ?—that is, the interaction of the materials and
forces of the system ? If designed, why are some planets
iso much farther from the sun than others? All might have
“been accommodated at distances much more nearly equal.
¡As it is there is a great waste of light and heat. If two
thousand millions of globes, each equal to the earth, were
/placed round the sun, side by side, and all at the same
/distance (from 90,000,000 to 100,000,000 miles), they
i would form a complete (omitting interstices) shell, with the
I sun in its centre. Now with the present expenditure of
[ light and heat, the sun would light up and warm the whole
interior of that enormous shell as brilliantly and intensely
as he does the earth at present. Think of what this means.
The sun which could, with the present emission of
1 energy, amply supply with light and heat an area of
1100,000,000,000,000,000 square miles and more, actually
«supplies about 50,000,000 square miles ! In this estimate
U omit all the planets except the earth, for their aggregate
receipts of light and heat are a trifle compared with the
lolar waste.
If, then, the solar system does manifest
Resign, it is not design executed by either wisdom or
aconomy.
Then consider how unequally the distances of the planets
�PHILOSOPHIC ATHEISM.
7
are arranged. How hot must Mercury or Vulcan (?) b<!
how cold Uranus and Neptune ! Besides, some of the
planets have satellites, others none, as far as yet known.
Where is the design here ? Our earth has but one satellite^
though it is well known we could do with more. What!
do we not need moonlight as much when it is absent as
when it is shining ? If one moon is good, it is my firm
belief that two would be twice as good.
Leaving the earth as a mere planet, let us descend fb
particulars, regarding it as a home for man and oth|r
animals. Look at the distribution of light and heat. Ip.
the tropics the people have far too much of both; in the
temperate regions, the alternations are dreadfully sever®
but in polar regions they are simply monstrous. A loi|g
day of six months’ duration is by-and-bye replaced by^,
night of equal length ! Does that show design and wisdor^?
Then consider the cold—land and sea frozen to an extent
to us almost incredible. What is the object? Is it to test
the enduring powers of seals and polar bears ? or to grfe
the Esquimaux an opportunity of displaying his voracity
upon blubber and his dexterity in travelling over the snow4?
Is there one good thing accomplished by such exaggerate^
cold ? Will the natural theologian explain ? He sees the
<£ hand of God ” and the “ footsteps of deity ” everywhere^
his eyes are so completely opened that he sees “ good in
everything.” He might, therefore, enlighten us a little on
these mysteries of nature. I have never yet heard of an
Esquimaux praising God for his wisdom and goodness as
displayed in Arctic nights and snows. They are people of
a milder clime, and whose civilisation enables them to defy
the malice of Nature, that praise the blessings of so;
extreme a cold.
Winds and rains show equal want of design.
One
country is devastated by storms, another is panting for a
breeze; one land is flooded by excessive rains, another is
parched and famine-stricken for want of water. During
the recent famines in Bengal, Bombay, and China, England
was flooded. Is this design ?—this wisdom ? Let a water
company follow the example of Nature, and flood one part
of a town week after week, while the rest is parched and
dusty as a desert, and your very Tories will demand reform.
Where and what is that supernal wisdom, which cannot be
imitated, except at the expense of common sense ? What
good thing is ever accomplished by a flood?—by a famine?
�8
PHILOSOPHIC ATHEISM.
by a hurricane? If the arrangements and processes of
Nature manifest wisdom, the best and most regular actions
of men are foolish in the extreme.
Now since we cannot discover the end or aim in the
above cases, and multitudes more that time forbids me to
mention, how can any one pretend to be able to discover
design in them ? And—
6. If we cannot discover the object or final cause of
Nature’s details, how can we discover it in any large depart
ment—say in the whole earth? Why was this planet made?
—for the sake of man ? Let us adopt that supposition, and
then proceed to test it by human experience. If the earth
was really made for man’s sake, if man is the final cause of
its creation and arrangement, I think he has abundant
reason to grumble, being at once so honoured and so grossly
outraged and insulted. He has no choice—it is not left to
him to take this world or some other. He enters it as he
enters into being; Nature throws him up like a waif tossed
to shore by the waves. If he can endure her treatment
and dodge her malicious blows, he survives; if not, he dies
before he fairly lives. Let him survive, for what does he
live? Ignorance, superstition, want, cold, hunger, fever,
accidents, tempests, volcanoes, wars, and death 1 This the
final cause of the world ! What!—the lord of the estate
knocked about in this fashion ! He for whom all was made
treated with contempt, get his bones broken, his blood cor
rupted, his person maltreated by the ill-arrangement of his
natural and only home 1 How grotesque ! How silly is
theology ! Was it worth while to expend all this care, pains,
and thought in the production of man, if he was to be
treated after all like the most worthless of beings ?
It is here that theology most completely collapses; after
going to the expense of producing what theology regards as
the final cause of the world, the final cause is treated as of
no conceivable value ! Either, therefore, man is not the
final cause of the world’s creation, or the wisdom displayed
in creation ends in a wretched farce. And if we cannot
find the ultimate end aimed at, by what right can we assume
that Nature shows any marks of design ? And, further, is
it not preposterous to speak of a final cause, or ultimate
aim, in an endless series of natural and inevitable events ?
The natural theologian is neither scientist nor philosopher ;
he is a man of faith; and faith can find its basis anywhere
—except in the region of fact and experience.
�PHILOSOPHIC ATHEISM.
9
7. If Nature in one or most parts manifests design, we
must be prepared to find it in all; for every event of Nature
must be as much designed as any that may be named. This
consideration the divine quietly and conveniently ignores.
He recognises design and divine goodness and wisdom in
all agreeable things; the rest are explained or overlooked.
It is our duty, however, to correct his mistakes and bring
up his omissions.
Let us grant then that Nature does undoubtedly manifest« ’
design.
(1) A hurricane that spreads devastation over
large tracts of the globe must be designed for that purpose. |
Smashing houses, rooting up trees, sinking ships, and i
drowning or killing men and animals are the chief works |
performed by those storms. Let the divine show the i
wisdom and goodness of his deity in them. (2) The I
eruption of Vesuvius that buried Pompeii and Herculaneum 1
must have been intended for that work; and the earthquake |
that swallowed up Lisbon was equally designed for that |
purpose. (3) The malaria that rises from the swamp and |
breeds a yellow fever epidemic, is designed for that; else
why does it exist ? What else does it accomplish ? The
evaporation that by-and-bye distils in the fruitful shower is
not more natural than the rise of the poisonous effluvia that
cause the death of thousands. (4) The coals stored up in
the earth’s strata were originally intended for—what?—to
torture poor men, women, and children in extracting them,
to exhale gases that should explode and kill the daring
intruders into Nature’s preserves, to burst steam boilers, I
and to drive machinery by which workers are maimed or ■
crushed to death, to manufacture cannon, torpedoes, and
other deadly instruments. And those coals perform evil
deeds with as much earnestness and effect as good ones ; a j
fire made of them will boil the kettle for tea or burn a child j
to death with equal indifference. What were they designed |
for ? Only stupidity can assert that they were designed for |
good, and not evil.
If design shows itself in one part of Nature, we must ex
pect it in all parts. (5) Theologians recognise design when
Nature turns out a Newton, they are silent when she pro
duces an idiot. And yet, there may be as great an expendi
ture of force and pains in producing the one as the other.
Is the idiot designed or not ? It is idle to lay the blame
upon parents or adventitious circumstances—the forces and
conditions that resulted in that idiot are as truly natural—
B
�IO
PHILOSOPHIC ATHEISM.
as much a portion of the original plan as those were which
culminated in the philosopher. How will the divine secure
his dogmas in face of this ? And what is the final cause of
an idiot ?
(6) I once read of the birth of an animal—a dog, I
think—perfect and beautiful in all things, except in one
respect—it lacked its head. Let us pause ! In this case
Nature worked as carefully as she ever does—bones, muscles,
blood-vessels, skin, hair, and everything were carefully made,
and all for what ? A being that could not live. Did Nature,
or Nature’s author and ruler, know that the head was want
ing ? If so, why was the work not stopped, or the defect
supplied? Now, either this dog was designed, or Nature
worked independently of her maker; if it was designed, it
reflects the highest discredit upon the designer, and the
keenest ridicule. We have all heard of the wright who built
a waggon in an upper room, never once considering how it
was to be got out after it was finished. Is this case any more
ridiculous than that of Nature turning out a dog that had no
head? Verily, those who use the design argument employ
a sword with two edges, a weapon that cuts its owners far
more than their enemies. I beg the reader to consider
that in speaking of Nature “ making ” and “ working,” I
merely use the language of theology.
(7) A year or two since I visited a curious little museum
kept by an old sailor in Stockton-on-Tees, and among
other “ queer ” things I saw two that impressed me. One
was a little piggy Siamese twins. They were perfect, as far
as I could see, but fastened together, breast to breast, by a
short tube, so that walking would have been an utter im
possibility. The other was more curious still. It was a
lamb, single as to the head and neck, but double from the
shoulders backwards. There were eight legs and eight feet,
and the two bodies slightly receded from each other the
whole length behind the shoulders. One might have thought
Nature would have been content without sporting or blunder
ing further; but no. From the double shoulders of this
compound animal there grew an extra pair of legs, which
stretched backwards and slightly hung down between the
two bodies. They were fully grown, and had their front
parts turned upwards. I am writing from memory, but can
vouch for the general correctness of what I say. Now, what
could Nature mean—if she really meant anything—by pro
ducing such monsters ? Twin pigs that could never have
�PHILOSOPHIC ATHEISM.
II
lived, and a compound lamb dreadfully overdone with
bodies and limbs ! Was it divine wisdom that produced
these, or did blind Nature, operating by necessity, give rise
to them ? Let theologians say.
8. Many things in Nature are designed and adapted to
produce pain, if designed at all, and they never do or can
produce anything else. I may mention, as examples, ex
cessive heat and cold, stings of insects, poisons of serpents,
scorpions, &c., bites of beasts—many diseases, such as in
flammation, cancer, and others. Perhaps one of the most
dreadful is childbirth. What pangs, and how perfectly
objectless! There is not one good thing, as far as I can
learn, ever accomplished by any of the above. Indeed, if
I am not much mistaken, ninety-nine per cent, of all the
pain in the world is worse than useless. Theologians say
that, under given circumstances, “ labour is rest and pain is
sweet ” ; but you should not understand them literally. As
a French proverb says, “ One can regard evils with equani
mity—when they are another’s.” Theologians are no
more fond of pain than the rest of us, and they despise it
most thoroughly when they don’t feel it. They may preach
up the benefits of pain as long as they please; pain is pain,
call it by what names you may, and the world has a deal too
much of it to endure. If it was ever intended to do good,
the world’s designer miscalculated, and should long since
have tried to work on some other plan.
It has been asserted by some who are anxious to defend
their fancied deity, that animals which are devoured by
beasts and birds of prey feel no pain. Their own Bible
might have confuted them. Did Jonah feel no sort of pain
in the whale’s belly ? And does not Paul say, “ The whole
creation groaneth and travaileth in pain together until
now ” ? Perhaps a bite from a tiger, or even from a dog,
might bring those divines to their senses. One thing is
certain, the animals that are eaten up by others show all the
signs of pain that man shows except those of speech, and
none but the perverse can doubt that they really feel pain.
The question to be answered is, Was pain designed ? If so,
what can be said of its designer? Did he ever feel pain, or
would he like to ?
9. Turn we next to another class of topics. What is to
be. said by a believer in design respecting parasites? I
believe the true parasites cannot live except in or on the
other living beings they inhabit. Which way shall we read
�12
PHILOSOPHIC A'IHEISM.
Nature’s declaration of design in these cases ? Must we
read it, “Parasites were designed for other animals,” or
“ Other, animals were designed for their parasites ” ? This is
a puzzle, and no divine can explain it. Leaving the less
important parasites, let us ponder for a moment the case of
trichina spiralis. This minute worm cannot live except in
an animal body. In the muscles of a pig or of a man he
can make himself very comfortable, though he gives great
pain to his guest and living habitation.. The tapeworm is
worse still—the very thought of it is sufficient to give one
the horrors ! But to the point—Is man designed as the
habitation of the trichina and tapeworm ? If so, which is
the greater, and which, after all, is the final cause of this
world—the man who protects and feeds the tapeworm, or
the tapeworm that dwells in and lives at the expense of the
man ? I think it cannot be doubted that the worm has the
best of it. The man he inhabits is tortured with a horrible
disease ; the worm has every want supplied, and is as happy
as his nature and conditions permit. It seems then, that not
man, but the tapeworm, or some other human parasite,
must be the great end of this world’s creation ! What an
issue and a fate for the celebrated “argument from
design ” !
Having shown that the design argument, when fairly
conducted to its logical conclusion, leads to the interesting
discovery that human parasites are the final cause of the
existence of the earth, I must next proceed to attack Theism
in other directions. I do not think the above conclusion in
the least flattering to human vanity ; but that reflection by
no means militates against its correctness. I suppose no
one will deny that the less, where adaptation prevails, is
subservient to the greater. It cannot be denied, the theo
logian affirms, that Nature manifests design, and it will not
be pretended that man is benefited by the trichina, or tape
worm; it is equally impossible to deny that these most
interesting beings, like princes and priests, are furnished
gratuitously with everything they desire by and at the ex
pense of man. If those parasites are of a superstitious
turn, no doubt they spend much of their time in chanting
“ Te Deums ” to the Bountiful Parent of All Good, who has
created such a delightful world as a human body for them
to dwell in.
�PHILOSOPHIC ATHEISM.
13
II.
But leaving this subject, let us next survey the doctrine
of cause and effect. This doctrine I accept, though I deny
emphatically that it logically conducts us to a first cause or
to a final cause. I suppose the materials and forces of the
universe—that is, the complete round of existence—to be
eternal. I shall not just now attempt to prove the doctrine,
or even to give any reason for my faith in it; the reader will
please observe that I merely assume it here for the sake of
argument. Whether it be true or not, no one can deny that
we find ourselves in the very midst of an exceedingly long
series of causes and effects. We also find ourselves in the
very midst of infinite space, partially occupied, though pos
sibly not entirely so; we are, further, in the very midst of
infinite time or duration. I shall not stop to discuss the
nature of these two infinities, but assume that most people
are agreed respecting their existence, at least.
Now let me ask the theologian if he can put his finger
upon the central point in space, or tell us how far off is the
circumference or limit of space in any direction he may
prefer. To say that this demand is absurd is no objection
to it, for I make it for the purpose of exposing another
absurdity, exactly parallel, though not quite so obvious.
I may assume, I think, that none but an enthusiast, a circlesquarer, or a maniac will try to find either the centre of
space or one of its limits.
Next, I ask, will the theologian find for me the middle,
the last, or the first moment (or any other unit of time) in
eternal duration? I need not press this either, since all
must see its absurdity as soon as it is fairly propounded.
But why cannot my demands be met ? The reason is,
Space has no centre, no limit; Time or duration no begin
ning, no end. We cannot conceive that, though we travelled
in one direction for ever, we should ever come to a spot
beyond which there was no space, or that we should be any
nearer its limit than we now are. It is the same with time
or duration; there never was a first moment, there never
can be a last.
Well, is it not equally absurd to speak of a First Cause
and a First Moment? There were former moments and
former causes; but a first is inconceivable in either case.
Had theologians set up a First Moment in capital letters,
thrown round it an air of mystery, and spoken of it with
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PHILOSOPHIC ATHEISM.
bated breath, it would have been worshipped ; temples and
churches would have started up by thousands, and the priest
hood would have grown rich upon devotion’s offerings ;
gushing songs would have been composed to the Great First
Moment, the Fount of Eternity, the Source of Being, and
the Ever-adorable Mystery ! I am afraid it is too late now ;
but had theologians begun in time, the Great First Moment
would have brought them a world of wealth and influence.
They have accomplished their purpose, however, by invent
ing and parading their Great First Cause, a fiction equally
absurd with the Great First Moment.
The bewilderment of the theologian is really one of the
most amusing features in the history of our race. He can
not account for the succession of events, or of causes and
effects, as he sees them occurring around him ; so he
deliberately concludes that there must have been a Great
First Cause, and this hypothesis seems to content him. But
sober reason can never rest in such an assumption; for (i)
Why suppose a First Cause ? The sole reason is to account
for phenomena you cannot otherwise explain, and which
you think are explained by your assumption. Really, then,
the First Cause is but a phrase invented to hide human
ignorance, a mere fiction to save appearances, and to keep
men from confessing frankly that they do not know what lies
beyond the circle of their knowledge. (2) But it won’t
serve them. To say there is a First Cause is equivalent to
the confession, “ I don’t know anything at all about the
matter, and am too idle to inquire further.” To assume the
existence of a First Cause certainly does shift the difficulty
one degree farther back, and affords a fictitious explanation
of Nature’s phenomena ; but it is not logical. A is a
mystery you wish to explain ; B explains it ; but what ex
plains B? C will do it. True; but can we stop at C?
“ Yes, if we call it the First Cause,” say you. But how
can you know that D does not precede it ?
Besides, as all must admit, if there really is a First Cause,
the mystery of its existence must be far deeper than that of
all other existences combined. It is not philosophical to
explain a phenomenon by something still more inexplicable ;
to attempt it only deepens the mystery. What then must
be said of thè attempt to explain an inexplicable chain of
causes and effects by the assumption of a great First Cause,
which is infinitely more inexplicable still ? The attempt
may be the result of credulity and ignorance ; most certainly
�logic never led people to it. The mind can no more rest
upon a so-called First Cause than it could on a pre
tended First Moment; in each case it demands what pre
ceded the one, and what caused the other. This difficulty
is not obviated by calling the fiction God, or printing it in
capitals ; investigation may be. forbidden for a time, but at
length the human mind demands a sight of your First
Cause, walks round, and finds an unexplored region at the
back of it. Once tell us how your First Cause rose without
a prior cause, and you will teach us to dispense with all
causes-, for if the infinite First Cause holds his being without
cause, surely the finite phenomena of nature may be allowed
a similar privilege.
Besides, if the infinite is without cause, why look for
cause and effect anywhere ? The doctrine is exploded if
theologians are correct; and thus, in the discovery of
the First Cause they demonstrate that no cause was needed,
and they and their system fall together in the very success of
their undertaking. If the doctrine of cause and effect be
true, every cause must be the effect of some prior cause ; if
they find a cause that is not an effect, an uncaused cause,
the doctrine they start with cannot be true; and thus success
in either direction is destructive of their position. If the
doctrine of cause and. effect be true, no First Cause is
possible ; if it is not true no such cause is required. Let them
take which horn they please.
III.
If Theists find no support from the Design Argument,
and if their First Cause is shown to be a very late effect
—of ignorance, what have they else to rest their faith
upon ? There is one more refuge to which they may run,
but it it can prove nothing but a temporary shelter, for the
pitiless “hail” of modern thought “shall sweep away the
refuge of lies, and the water ” of common sense “ shall
overflow the hiding-place.” The case of orthodoxy, whether
we begin at one end or the other, needs but to be stated in
plain words to be refuted. Not willing to ascribe any
inherent power to what is known and familiar to everybody,
they credulously credit some totally unknown substance
with all possible power, and assign to it the task of impart
ing to matter all its attributes and qualities. It is
impossible, say they, that “blind,” “dead ” matter should
�PHILOSOPHIC ATHEISM.
move itself, and assume all the beautiful and wonderful
forms we see. The world could not have made itself; there
are to be seen in it beauty, splendour, intelligence; these
could not have originated in mere matter; they must have
been bestowed by a being who himself possesses
them.” All this is specious but hollow, prime faith but
not logic.
Is matter so “dead” and “blind” a thing as they
represent ? Do not divines discredit matter to enhance the
greatness of their fictitious deity ? Those who divest their
minds of prejudice find in matter food for ceaseless wonder ;
and it is quite gratuitous to tell us matter cannot think, feel,
&c. How do you know? Matter has shown such mar
vellous properties, single and combined, that he must be
reckless who will venture to say that he knows all its attri
butes. The facts of nature—the glowing of suns, the
ceaseless revolutions of planets, the endless currents in the
air and sea, the ever changing face of the sky, the resur
rection in spring, the marvels of vegetation and animal
life—all proclaim the power of matter, and rebuke the
ignorance of those who call it “blind” and “dead.”
What! a thing that is in eternal flux, ever changing into
shapes and motions more enchanting than all romances
—this thing “ dead ” and “ blind ” ! Because its mode of
life is different from yours, dare you say it does not live at
all ? Because it sees not as you do through lenses, does it
therefore not see at all? In sooth, you are fine judges of
such profound mysteries !
We see the magnet attract steel; we see chemical action
day by day; we observe the mutual attraction of the earth
and bodies near its surface; this experience is our sole
reason for supposing that the magnet and the earth do at
tract, that elements possess chemical cohesion. In orga
nised bodies, on the other hand, we see all the phenomena
of what we are pleased to call “ life,” and in the higher
ones of intelligence. Why ascribe magnetism to that piece
of soft iron, if you won’t ascribe life to the tree or the man ?
The magnetism is an essential attribute of the magnet, the
life is such of the man. Why suppose there is a living
being who bestows the life, unless you also assume a mag
netic being to bestow the magnetism? Really orthodox
talk on this subject is mere trifling. They say that a being
cannot bestow an attribute itself does not possess. Very
well; if that be so, their God must be a curiosity.
�PHILOSOPHIC ATHEISM.
17
Let us suppose that they are correct; then their God
must have had, in his own person, all the qualities now pos
sessed by all matter—weight, size, colour, shape, taste,
odour, extension—he must be solid, liquid, and gaseous;
freezing, boiling, burning ; must be magnetic and non-inagnetic, gravitating, attracting, repelling; must be both resting
and moving, living and dead, blind and seeing, intelligent
and foolish, good and bad, beautiful and ugly, rough and
smooth, etc. These are but a few of the qualities we
observe around us, they must be native or imported, belong
ing essentially to matter, or else imparted by some other
substance which possessed them all before. The Deist
may .charge me with trifling and flippancy; but I am merely
delivering his own doctrines, and trying as bestaI can to
show their real absurdity.
IV.
I do not think logic or common sense requires more than
is given above, but orthodoxy is so slippery, so protean in
its shapes; so unscrupulous, so plausible, and gifted with
such astonishing powers of turning and twisting, that I feel
impelled to track it into another region still. The best way
to deal with divines is to admit (for argument’s sake) their
fundamental principles or assumptions, and then proceed to
show their logical consequences. Now, the orthodox
assure us that there exists a being whose nature is infinite,
whose presence is everywhere; and these terms they use in
their absolute or unlimited sense—at least they did in my
orthodox days. Be it so, then ; there is one infinite being;
he must have or must be an infinite substance, no matter
what that substance may be. Now every substance or
being must necessarily occupy some space, since no real
being can exist which is not more or less extended; and
every being must fill space exactly commensurate with itself;
indeed, we have no means of ascertaining or conceiving
the size of anything except by ascertaining or conceiving the
quantity of space it fills, that is, its extension in one, two,
or three directions.
If the above be correct, an infinite being cannot occupy
less than infinite space; all possible space must be so full of
it that nothing more could be introduced anywhere; for if
there be but space enough left for the insertion of one
atom, molecule, or the smallest possible division of sub
�Io
PHILOSOPHIC ATHEISM.
stance, the being we are supposing must be less than
infinite, which is contrary to the hypothesis. Now since
an infinite being fills by itself or by its own substance all
possible space, there can be no space left to be occupied by
any other being or substance whatsoever, and thus we are
inevitably led to the interesting discovery that there is no
existence, no being, except the infinite one; that the ortho
dox God is alone, is everything, that nothing but itself
exists or can exist, for there is no unoccupied space for it to
fill. The divine, therefore, is reduced to this dilemma;
either he must give up his infinite substance or all other
substances ; he must renounce his God, or deny existence
to Nature, including himself. If we say that it is past
denying that we and other beings do really exist, and that we
occupy space commensurate with our substance—that being
so, we occupy some, of that space which an infinite being
must have occupied if he had existed; therefore no infinite
being exists. There is but one refuge for the divine from
this conclusion, namely^ to say that all Nature is but a part
of God; though I do not suppose that any one will per
manently abide in such a mental condition.
But let us allow the theologian his infinite God, and
doing so, let us analyse the conception. An infinite God 1
Such a being must be an absolute WzT, for all space must be
filled to its utmost capacity by its substance. It must also
be immovable. It would take infinite time for an infinite
being to move, no matter at what rate he did it. In an
absolute solid there can be no internal motion ; in an infinite
being ho external motion is possible, for there is no space
except what it already fills absolutely. Such a being could
not feel, think, will, or act in any way; for it would take a
whole eternity for a throb to pass through it The think
ing faculty or apparatus must be either located in a par
ticular part, or else diffused through the whole; in either
case thought would be impossible, except only a mere part
of the being thought. There is no act, mental or physical,
possible to any being butwhat takes time in its performance,
and the said time must bear a certain ratio to the size,
structure, organisation, or nature of that being. An infinite
one, therefore, could not perform the most simple or ele
mentary action without spending eternity in doing it, even
on the supposition that it could do it at all.
An infinite God, then, must be helpless, thought-less,
motionless; as void of sense as a block of marble. The
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PHILOSOPHIC ATHEISM.
19
conception is a conglomeration of the wildest absurdities;
nay, it is not a conception, since none ever conceived it—
it would take eternity to do so. The word God, as used
by Pagans, generally meant something; in orthodoxy it
stands for nought, a label covering the very darkest corner
of the human mind, a word without meaning, a symbol
symbolising nothing.
.
.
It is idle for the divines to appeal to spirit; for an infinite
spirit must be a substance of some kind, and must fill
infinite space, and must be infinitely powerless. Besides,
What is spirit? “Breath, wind,” say I. “Nay,” replies
the theologian, “ it is something more refined; it has no
weight, shape, colour, taste, smell, or sound.”. Exactly so;
it is abstract. To find spirit I give the following receipt:
Take a man, remove his physical being—all that you can
weigh, touch, taste, smell, see, or burn—in a word, all that
is material. Next remove from him all that you can possibly
conceive; persevere and exhaust the subject completely.
Well, all that is left is spirit. Yes; that imponderable, im
measurable, intangible, inodorous, invisible, tasteless, sound
less, and inconceivable nothing—this purest of abstractions—
is the spirit or soul. The believer is heartily welcome to his
■ “find.” If his God is a spirit, we can only say, as Paul
said of other Gods : “ Now we know that an idol is nothing
in the world,” or, in the language of Jesus, we may say to
the most devout: “ Ye worship ye know not what ”—in fact,
Nothing.
If I am not vastly-deceived, on all lines of intellectual
inquiry, the orthodox belief leads inevitably to absurdity. I
shall be glad to be corrected if I am in error, .and if some
one who is able will take the trouble to grind my notions to
powder, I shall take it as a favour. I hate wrong ideas;
they are amongst the foremost of human evils. Will some
one, therefore, do his best to enlighten me, as I am sincerely
trying to enlighten others ?
&
jL-
§
V.
I am not sufficiently vain to suppose that what I have
written previously on this subject has been exhaustive; I
have merely touched some of the more important intel
lectual difficulties that surround and interpenetrate the
Theistic position, and have endeavoured to show howabsurd is the orthodox belief. Just now I shall turn from
3
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PHILOSOPHIC ATHEISM.
the purely intellectual aspects of the subject and point out
a few of the Moral difficulties which meet the Theist__ diffi
culties he either ignores or explains in a very unsatisfactory
way.
J
The Theist proclaims a God who is infinitely good—
goodness itself, in fact ; whose “ tender mercies are over all
nis works, who is Humanity’s Great Father, and whose
nature is Love. Now all this might have continued undis
turbed in the world’s creed, if, unfortunately, the facts of
every-day life did not ceaselessly protest against such false
doctrines.
If infinite goodness really existed, such a thing as evil
would be impossible. I suppose no one will deny the
existence of evil; even the most thorough optimist must
sometimes be in doubt as to the correctness of his creed,
except he be too stupid to reflect. A fit of the gout,
sciatica, or a cancer would, I should suppose, convert the
most devout optimist into something more or less rational.
In the esteem of most men both physical and moral evils
exist in far too great plenty. Let us therefore reflect, i. If
I had the power I would remove every evil out of nature
and leave only what is useful and good. This I cannot
do for lack of ability. Give me the power and I will under
take the task. But if I have the power to remove one evil
and don t do it, you have the best of reasons for saying that
I am not so good as I should be. Now the orthodox
preach a God who, they solemnly assure us, is infinite in
being and in all his attributes j his power and knowledge
are absolutely infinite, and his goodness equal to either.
But this muet.be false, for such-a being could never have
suffered to exist any evil whatever, even for one moment.
A being infinitely good must will the existence of nothing
but good ; if he has all power and knowledge these must be
subservient to his will—if he be sane. But evils do exist:
these are the result (i) of his design or arrangement, for
nothing could slip in unawares to him; or (2) he had not
power to prevent nor is able now to destroy them ; or (3) he
is careless about their existence, and so does not wish them
to be destroyed; or (4) he desires their existence, and
actively favours their continuance. Which of these hypo
theses is correct ? No matter which , any one of the four
is. fatal to orthodoxy. If he arranged for evils in the
original creation, or introduced them subsequently, he must
himself be evil in the direct ratio of his knowledge and
�PHILOSOPHIC ATHEISM.
21
power; that is, on orthodox showing, he must be infinitely
evil, for he is infinitely knowing and able. Did a being of
boundless power and knowledge create evils, or create
materials and forces that in their “ workings ” must evolve
evils? The orthodox creed fairly implies this, though
believers shrink from its open and blank avowal. So be it—
the conclusion is inevitable, that he who made Nature, sup
posing it ever was made, and had full knowledge of what
he did, must be solely responsible for all that Nature
evolves.
Evils and goods are equally his offspring, not
begotten by momentary impulse, but after an eternity’s
(aparte ante) deliberation. But herein lies a contradiction;
goods and evils, or in the abstract, good and evil, are
diametrically opposed and incompatible. Therefore, an
infinite being could not will both goods and evils, except
alternately; and in that case they could not exist simulta
neously, for infinite power would instantly execute any wish
such a being might have ; the moment he willed evils goods
would cease, and vice versa. If the orthodox prefer to
suppose a God who wills both goods and evils simulta
neously, I will not at present contend with such an
absurdity.
Again, no Theist would aver that evils crept into Nature
or sprang up in its midst without his God’s knowledge or
power to prevent, as that would involve the conception of
ignorance or weakness. Nor could the orthodox suppose
that he without whom “ a sparrow falleth not,” and who
“ numbereth the very hairs of your head,” could be careless
of the existence of evils—that would un-God the deity at
once. Lastly, to suppose the creator and ruler of Nature
to desire the existence of evils, argues such a wicked or
malicious state of mind as really to shock the most callous
dogmatist in the world. What, therefore, can the Theist
say? Evils exist. How can he hold the doctrine of an
infinitely good, powerful, and wise God, with these un
deniable facts so constantly around him ?
Of course, most believers resort to the fiction of a future
life, and thus create a Utopian world to redress the wrongs
of this ; but that does not explain, it merely evades the
difficulty. For the question is, not the continuance or
redress of evils, but their existence. If the Theist could
prove that evils existed but for one moment, he would still
have to reconcile their existence with his God-theory—the
length of time is quite another affair. If, again, the believer
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PHILOSOPHIC ATHEISM.
could demonstrate that all evils would be redressed and
fully compensated, either here or hereafter, still that leaves
the real point untouched; for the question is, How does he
reconcile the existence of infinite goodness with the exist
ence of evils? Compensation may make amends, it never
can undo. Evils exist and the children of men groan
under them. Bitter are the tears that daily run down
sorrow s cheeks ; deep are the pangs and woes of humanity.
What ! can they be compensated ? Never. An eternity of
unmitigated bliss would not obliterate the furrows ploughed
by some woes that last but for an hour ■ if it could, what
of the existence of the evil, no matter how short its life ?
/ It seems to me beyond dispute that logic and common
/sense require the Theist to prove that no evil exists or ever
( did, or else give up his belief in an infinitely good God.
To talk of his “ permission ” of evil for wise but mysterious
reasons is mere shuffling. He who “permits” a known
evil he has power to destroy or prevent is so far guilty of
wrong ■ but with an Almighty God, to “ permit ” is to do,
since there is no power but his existing, and hence the evil
that results from his so-called “ permission ” is as actively
produced by him as any other thing he ever effects. When
man “permits ” he merely declines to check the operation
of certain forces not his own; when Almightiness “permits ”
he as actively works as he ever does.
Besides, it is sheer assumption to affirm that the unknown
purposes of the deity are wise. We can never know that a
man is wise except from his words and deeds : he whose
words and deeds are best we regard as the wisest. Now we
can read the character of God only in his deeds, for his
voice we never hear. It is only those works that strike us
as wise that can argue the wisdom of the designer of
nature and its ruler. If some of his deeds are wise, others
very doubtful, and others exceedingly unwise, tested by our
own and our only standard, we can but conclude that his
character is similarly mixed, uncertain, or heterogenous,
rv Theist will, prove the existence and perfect wisdom
of his deity by independent means, then we will readily
ajdmit that we have the best of reasons for supposing even
the most perplexing and staggering processes of nature are all
wise and good, only at present we are too ignorant to com
prehend how they are so. But the Theist first proves the
existence of his God from these very processes of nature, and
then argues the absolute perfection of his character from
�PHILOSOPHIC ATHEISM.
23
the same data; whereas nature merely presents evidence of
an imperfect, unwise, weak, and very evil-disposed or else
unfortunate deity. To argue perfection of character fromimperfect works; absolute goodness from a mixture of
goods and evils, in which the latter predominate; and;
infinite wisdom from a course of action in which wisdom;
and folly are freely mingled, is to ignore logic and to per-|
petrate an outrage upon common sense. And that the1
“constitution and course of Nature” do exhibit evils andt
goods, and at least as much folly as wisdom, none can!
intelligently deny.
■
’
On the whole I cannot avoid the conclusion that the
Theistic belief in a being of infinite goodness is entirely at
variance with the evidence. There is not, so far as I am
aware, a single fact or logical argument to support it; while
on the other hand, we know for certainty that infinite good
ness does not exist, for if it did, evils would be impossible.
What should we say in reply to one who asserted the theory
of an infinite light ? The only reply necessary would be to
point to one dark corner ! this would at once destroy the
hypothesis. Just so the existence of one evil is sufficient to
destroy all rational belief in infinite goodness. It is surely
time for the orthodox, if they wish to escape universal scorn,
to bethink themselves, and furnish some reasonable basis
for their faith; So far they have done nothing of the kind;
their whole creed is subjective, a genuine picture of their
own imagination, but as destitute of objective reality as
witchcraft or astrology.
But I shall be told, perhaps, that to destroy the belief in
a God is to annihilate the very basis and sanctions of
morality ! There are people, by no means insane, who' still
use this bugbear to frighten people into the orthodox fold.
It is curious to note how in every proposed change, the
timid and the designing raise the silly cry that reformers
are opening the floodgates, bursting the bonds of society,
and otherwise ruining the world! Alas ! how often this
world has been ruined by reformers, inventors, discoverers,
and others. I suggest that the theologian should go a step
further, and declare roundly that, without belief in a God
men would not know how to make boots, to till the ground,
to eat or drink, to build houses, and so forth. This would
be no more absurd than their cry about morality. I once
heard a man in serious debate affirm that we should have no
era to reckon the flight of time from, but for Christ! This
�24
PHILOSOPHIC ATHEISM.
I heard myself, and I was the unfortunate being who had to
reply to it. I further heard once of a monarchist who
solemnly assured a republican, that if we abolished the
present form of government we could have no current
money ! “ for,” he queried, with invincible logic, “ whose
head could we put upon the coins but the queen’s ? ”
Many believers are astonished when you tell them that
morality, like science, art, money, manners, language, etc.,
is a purely social growth or production, in fact, no more
divine than the art and weapons of war, or the skill and
weapons of the poisoner. And yet it would be quite as
easy to prove that money came from heaven as to prove
that morality did. It is not my intention at present to go
into the abstract question of morality, nor shall I attempt a
philosophy of ethics; I shall merely show that the Theist
has no monopoly of morality, that his theory respecting it is
.incorrect, and that, whencesoever its sanctions may be drawn,
they do not arise from theology. Let us see:
I. The Bible is held by a very large number of European
Theists to be a book inspired by God, and a sufficient moral
and a religious guide for man. I say they hold these doc
trines, that is, have them in their creeds and formulas, but
the best of them in real life, ignore the Bible, and walk by
higher rules than it contains. As to the divine origin of
the Bible, that has never been proved; the so-called evi
dence is unsatisfactory in the highest degree; and it would
be nothing less than a calamity if such a book could be
proved to have had any higher origin than other ancient
works. It contains the silliest of stories—told, too, with all
solemnity—the worst morality in the world; and we are
assured it is all divine. Its precepts the churches them
selves never think of obeying; its examples they dare not
follow, while large portions of it shock and horrify all
civilised persons. The best morality of the Bible is common
place enough, though paraded with such solemnity as to
impose upon many tolerably enlightened people. The
Bible is certainly not the source, nor can it ever be the
standard of the world’s Morality.
Let us next see if the Theist can draw lessons or
elements of morality from Nature. I speak now of Nature
apart from society, and I roundly affirm that Nature knows
nought of morality, nor do ethics enter at all into her
processes.
i. All through Nature the strong oppresses and eats up
�PHILOSOPHIC ATHEISM.
25
the weak, and the life of one being involves the destruction
of another, often of thousands daily. This is not morality,
and if done by the arrangement, or even connivance, of a
being able to have prevented it, it must be characterised as
monstrous iniquity.
2. Nature nowhere, in no way, manifests government.
An overruling Providence finds a place in creeds—that is,
in the fictions of the churches; but it exists nowhere else.
Consider these few undeniable facts: (i) Nature has never
yet been able to distinguish, in the very simplest cases,
between right and wrong, crime and accident, sin and mis
fortune. For example—if a man jump down a precipice he
is dashed to pieces—perhaps he deserves it; but if he should
accidentally fall down he suffers to precisely the same
extent; yes,-if he is wilfully flung down by murderers, it is
all the same in the end. Is that justice? Let us compare.
A jumps wilfully off a house and is killed; B accidentally
falls off, and meets the same fate; C is flung off by his
enemies, and is also killed. The three bodies are taken
before a coroner, and the jury, after being made acquainted
with all the facts of each case, return the same verdict for
all three. What should we say if they pleaded that, whereas
A, B, and C did all come by their deaths by too precipitate
a descent from the top of the house, therefore A, B, and C
all alike deserved the fate they met ? Such a verdict and
defence of it would involve about equal quantities of truth,
absurdity, and injustice. But Nature would justify that
stupid jury, and they might plead in self-defence that,
whereas the three died in consequence of their respective
falls, it was evident that Nature regarded them as equally
guilty, and they did not in the least desire to improve upon
the ways of Nature. Now, if Nature must be taken as the
exponent of deity, we can only conclude that deity cannot
distinguish between right and wrong, for in the course of
Nature, by which he governs (?) the sentient beings of this
world, he treats accidents, mistakes, and the greatest mis
fortunes as if they were the greatest crimes, and oftener
inflicts pain upon the innocent than upon the guilty.
(2) Further, if Nature teaches anything in the cases just
supposed, it teaches that murder is an innocent deed, if not
a commendable one; for, while the three who are the sub
jects of accident, suicide, and crime are killed summarily
by the forces of Nature, those who murdered the one not
only survive him, but possibly, as often happens, actually
�26
PHILOSOPHIC ATHEISM.
enjoy property and pleasures that honestly • belonged to
their victim. And it must not be forgotten that all natural
forces are, ifTheists speak truth, forces of God; in fact,
mere results of his own will.
This is a point so often ignored that I must spend another
sentence or two upon it to impress it on the reader’s mind.
All that is was created, so Theists say, by an Almighty and
otherwise Infinite God. That being so, the forces of Nature
are such only by derivation, nay, not derivation even—they
are merely the power or powers of God himself, exhibited
under certain circumstances or conditions. Now all natural
processes must be nothing more than actions of deity—he
does all that is done—if the premises of Theism are correct.
This being so, the destructive processes of Nature, and
those that give pain, are actions of God equally with those
which evolve new life or mantle the face of man with,
pleasure. If all this is true, we have in Nature a clear,
constant, and truthful exponent of God’s moral character;
and what a character ! Justice and wisdom are entirely
absent. Indeed, you look in vain to Nature, that is (in
directly) to God, for any one of those qualities esteemed
among men, while many of those society everywhere punishes
are very painfully and palpably present.
(3) To pursue this somewhat further, we may look for a
few moments at some of the frightful evils that have and
still do curse the world :
In an earthquake, a flood, or a storm, we see the deity
roused to fury and venting his rage indiscriminately upon
all who happen to be within reach. Not one of the victims
deserves such treatment, as far as we know; certainly the
infants don’t; yet they are ground to powder, drowned or
otherwise killed, as if they were the greatest offenders. . Is
that government ? and moral government ? The Turkish
manner of ruling Bulgaria was a trifle to this !
Again, how deaf the deity is to cries and prayers ! In
railway collisions, falls of bridges, shipwrecks, and other
catastrophes, you may call, no matter how passionately, to
the ruler of Nature.
He no more attends you than does
the wind, the wave, the iron, the rocks that surround you.
He might help without the smallest trouble or inconveni
ence, for he knows all, he hears all, is ever present, and has
almighty power— so Theists say. A man who will not help
when he sees calamity fall upon his fellows, is next to a
murderer, and is justly execrated. Yet he may plead some
�PHILOSOPHIC ATHEISM.
27
seeming or partial excuses. What could we say, if we were
certain there really existed a God who could look coolly on
in the direst calamity that ever befals men ? The thought
is so sickening I dare not dwell upon it. .Yet that is only
one part of the subject. Human calamity! It is all planned
and executed by the deity; no wonder he does not move to
the rescue. And what does he, can he gain ? It is all for
nought! The devil is said to torment for his pleasure;
not so the Almighty—he can never want a pleasure.
There have been millions of occasions in the world’s
history when the worst government worthy of the name must
have interposed to prevent or remedy mischiefs among its
subjects. What priesthood ever existed that did not speak
and act in the name, and professedly by the authority
of God, the Great Ruler ? Where was that ruler when
Moses and Joshua perpetrated such horrible villanies in his
name? Where was he.when the Pope and the Inquisition
were perpetrating horrid lies in his name, and burning Jews
and heretics for his pleasure ? Did he ever interpose to
prevent or close a war, or famine, or pestilence ? When ?
One case stands out in glaring colours as I sweep the
horizon of the world’s history. A company of fanatics or
knaves concocted a scheme for conveying letters to the
Virgin. Mary in heaven. It was the Feast of the Immaculate
Conception, and the church of La Compania, in Santiago,
Chili, was crammed with 2,000 women, deceived in the name
of Deity, and panting to communicate with the Mother of
God. Thousands of lamps lit up the temple, and thousands
of yards of muslin festooned the place. Suddenly rose the
flames, and played in horrid sport along the drapery. There
is a panic, wild and horrible ! a stampede for the doors,
which are soon choked with quivering, dying humanity, and
all exit is stopped. The ceiling catches fire, and streams
of molten lead pour down upon their living flesh ! The
paraffin lamps burst in the heat, and shower down their
contents in sheets and jets and wreaths of fire !
What an opportunity for a God ! Where was he that he
missed it! The people across the street could look through
the church windows and see the agonised victims running
to and fro in that hell, wringing their hands, and calling
upon men, and angels, and God, to save them. Not a
person who saw that sight—except Ugarte, the fiend-priest,
who saved the Virgin’s image and his own carcase, while he
left the women to seethe and burn—except him, no other
�28
PHILOSOPHIC ATHEISM.
being in the universe would have hesitated to risk his own
life to snatch one of those women from perdition ! But
Theist, where was your God? Your great ruler of the
world ? Your Father which is in heaven and everywhere ?
Whose tender mercies are over all his works? Did he
know ? Was he by ? O, Sir ! you are the blasphemers,
not we
You invent a God and give him all power, make
him all-knowing, and invest him with absolute and bound
less rule—then you write history, every page of which
proclaims your deity an infinite fiend! Sir, burn your
creed, or destroy history! Confess your errors, or else
reconcile the course of the world with the character of your
God ! At present you outrage our best sentiments. Be
ashamed and blush ! Your Bible tells us your God at one
time could so far demean himself as to order Aaron a bran
new suit of holiday clothes, giving minute directions for
every article, even to the pantaloons ! At another time he
stood or sat in stolid indifference, watching the agony of
2000 burning women deceived in his name, whose bodies
were roasting in 7zA own fire—for that fire would not have
burned had he not supplied the power.
I might pursue this subject, but there is no need. I do
not pretend to understand Nature; glimpses and broken
gleams of truth are all that fall to my share. But what little
I do know is all in favour of Atheism. The best light I
have leads up that path; the purest and noblest feelings of
my nature make me shudder at the God-conception—
yea ! even for its own sake. I cannot endure the thought that
any being exists so great and so wicked as the ordinary
orthodox God. The conception is altogether monstrous,
unnecessary, and full of mischief; for the history of Godism
is also the record of the densest ignorance, the worst folly,
the deepest degradation, and the foulest crimes of our most
unfortunate and bewildered race.
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By J. SYMES, formerly Wesleyan Minister.
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Victorian Blogging
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A collection of digitised nineteenth-century pamphlets from Conway Hall Library & Archives. This includes the Conway Tracts, Moncure Conway's personal pamphlet library; the Morris Tracts, donated to the library by Miss Morris in 1904; the National Secular Society's pamphlet library and others. The Conway Tracts were bound with additional ephemera, such as lecture programmes and handwritten notes.<br /><br />Please note that these digitised pamphlets have been edited to maximise the accuracy of the OCR, ensuring they are text searchable. If you would like to view un-edited, full-colour versions of any of our pamphlets, please email librarian@conwayhall.org.uk.<br /><br /><span><img src="http://www.heritagefund.org.uk/sites/default/files/media/attachments/TNLHLF_Colour_Logo_English_RGB_0_0.jpg" width="238" height="91" alt="TNLHLF_Colour_Logo_English_RGB_0_0.jpg" /></span>
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Conway Hall Library & Archives
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Conway Hall Ethical Society
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Dublin Core
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Philosophic atheism : a bundle of fragments
Creator
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Symes, Joseph [1841-1906]
Description
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Place of publication: London
Collation: 28, 4 p. ; 18 cm.
Notes: Part of the NSS pamphlet collection. Publisher's advertisements on two unnumbered pages at the end. Marginal markings in red pencil. Date of publication from KVK.
Publisher
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Freethought Publishing Company
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[1879]
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RA1778
N633
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Atheism
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application/pdf
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Text
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English
Atheism
NSS