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NATIONAL SECULAR SOCI «TY
Atheism
AND
A Reply
SUICIDE.
to
ALFRED TENNYSON, Poet Laureate.
BY
G-. W. FOOTE.
------- ♦-------
Mr. Tennyson has written some fine poetry in his old age,
and he has also written a good deal of trash. Most of the
latter has appeared in the hospitable columns of the Nine
teenth Century. Mr. James Knowles, the editor of that
magazine, is an excellent man of business and knows what
takes with the British public. He is fully aware that Mr.
Tennyson is the popular poet of the day, and with com
mendable sagacity, he not only accepts the poet-laureate’s
verses whenever he can get them, but always prints them in
the largest type. Mr. Tennyson opened the first number
of his magazine with a weak sonnet, in which men like Pro
fessor Clifford were alluded to as seekers of hope “ in sunless
gulfs of doubt.” That little germ has developed into the
longer poem on “Despair” that appears in the current
number of the Nineteenth Century.
The critics have lauded this poem. Nothing else could be
expected of them. Mr. Tennyson is the popular poet, the
household poet, the Christian poet, and scarcely a critic dares
give him aught but unstinted praise. The ordinary gentle
men of the press write to order; they describe Mr. Tenny
son’s poetry as they describe Mr. Irving’s acting; they are
fettered by great, and especially by fashionable reputations ;
and when the publi? has settled who are its favorites they
never resist its verdict but simply flow with the stream. In
the course of time there grows up a sanctified cant of
criticism. If you are rash enough to doubt the favorite’s
greatness, you are looked upon as a common-place person
incapable of appreciating genius. If you object to the
popular poet’s intellectual ideas, you are rebuked for not
seeing that he is divinely inspired. Yet it is surely indis
putable that ideas are large or small, true or false, whether
they are expressed in verse or in prose. When poets con
descend to argue they must be held amenable to the laws of
reason. The right divine of kings to govern wrong is an
exploded idea, and the right divine of poets to reason wrong
should share the same fate.
�2
Mr. Tennyson’s poem is not too intelligible, and with a
proper appreciation of this he has told the gist of the story
in a kind of “ argument.”
“ A man and his wife having lost faith in a God, and hope of a
life to come, and being utterly miserable in this, resolved to end
themselves by drowning. The woman is drowned, but the man
is rescued by a minister of the sect he had abandoned.”
Now Mr. Tennyson has not worked fairly on these lines.
The question “ Does Atheism, as such, incline men to self
destruction ?” is not touched. The Atheist husband of
“ Despair” loses more than belief in God and hope of a life
to come. His wife suffers from a malady only curable, if at
all, by the surgeon’s knife. His eldest son has forged his
name and ruined him, while it is hinted that another son has
sunk to a still worse depth of vice. And he describes him
self as “ a life without sun, without health, without hope,
without any delight.” All this is very inartistic. An
Atheist under such a burden of trouble might commit suicide
just as a Christian might. Dr. Newman well says that by
a judicious selection of facts you may prove anything, and
Mr. Tennyson has judiciously selected his facts. He could
not kill his hero with Atheism, and so he brings in bad
health, a diseased wife, cruel and criminal children, and a
ruined home. Any one of these might prompt to suicide,
without the introduction of Atheism at all.
Mr. Tennyson’s lack of art in this poem goes still farther.
He makes the husband and wife drown themselves theatri
cally. They walk out into the breakers near a lighthouse.
This is mere melodrama. Why did they not take poison
and die in each other’s arms ? The only answer is that Mr.
Tennyson wanted to use that lighthouse, and as he could not
bring the lighthouse to them he took them to the lighthouse.
He wished to make the husband think to himself as he
looked at its rolling eyes—
“Does it matter how many they saved? We are all of us
wreck’d at last.”
This is an old trick of Mr. Tennyson’s. He is always
making his wonderful and vivid perceptions of external
nature compensate for his lack of spiritual insight and
power.
The melodrama of “ Despair ” is continued to the end.
The wife is successfully drowned as she was not required
any further in the poem, but the husband is rescued by (of
all men in the world!) the minister of the chapel he had
�3
forsaken. He loaths and despises this preacher, yet he tells
him all his domestic secrets and reveals to him all his
motives. Nay more, he wastes a great of denunciation on
his rescuer, and vehemently protests his intention to do for
himself despite his watcher’s “lynx-eyes.” Why all this
pother? Earnest suicides are usually reserved and very
rarely make a noise. Why not hold his tongue and quietly
seize the first opportunity ? But Mr. Tennyson’s heroes are
generally infirm of purpose. He can make his characters
talk, but he cannot make them act.
Another defect of Mr. Tennyson’s heroes is their abnormal
self-consciousness. The hero of “ Maud ” rants about him
self until we begin to hope that the Crimea will really
settle him. The hero of “ Locksley Hall” is a selfish cad
who poses through every line of faultless eloquence, until at
last we suspect that “ cousin Amy ” has not met the worst
fate which could befall her. And the hero of “ Despair ”
is little better. After powerfully describing the walk with
his wife to the breaker’s edge of foam, he says that they
kissed and bade each other eternal farewell. There he
should have stopped. But he must go on with—
“ Never a cry so desolate, not since the world began!
Never a kiss so sad, no, not since the coming of man ! ”
This little speculation could not be verified or disproved. It
is one which selfish people usually entertain. They nearly
always think their own sorrows the greatest the world ever
saw. Fortunately, although it may be news to Mr. Tenny
son, all Atheists are not of that kind. Some of them, at
least, are capable of the heroic joys of life, and of con
suming their personal sorrows in the fire of enthusiasm for
lofty and unselfish aims.
Mr. Tennyson should remember the sad end of Brutus in
“Julius Caesar.” Perhaps he does, for some of his language
seems borrowed from it. Brutus has lost what he most
values. His country’s liberties, for which he has fought
and sacrificed all, are lost, and his noble wife has killed her
self in a frenzy of grief. He kills himself too rather than
witness the dishonor of Rome and minister to the usurper’s
pride. But he does not pule and whine. He also bids his
dearest left adieu—
“ For ever, and for ever, farewell, Cassius !
If we do meet again, why, we shall smile;
If not, why then, this parting was well made.”
And Cassius replies in the same magnanimous vein. There
�4
is a large and noble spirit which can face even suicide with
dignity and without repining.
So infected with selfishness is Mr. Tennyson’s Atheist
that he doubts the utility of virtue—
“ Does it matter so much whether crown’d for a virtue, or
hang’d for a crime ? ”
Yes, it does matter; or why does he cry out against his
son’s wickedness ? If the young man’s crime “ killed his
mother almost,” other people’s crime injures mankind, and
that is its condemnation. The real Atheist has his moral
creed founded on fact instead of fancy, and therefore, when
things go wrong with him, he does not rail against virtue.
He knows it to be good in the long run to the human family
whatever may be his own fate.
The hero of “Despair” had evidently been a Calvinist.
He reminds the minister of his having “ bawled the dark
side of his faith, and a God of eternal rage.” And he
exclaims—
“What! I should call on that Infinite Love that has served us
so well ?
Infinite wickedness rather that made everlasting Hell,
Made us, foreknew us, foredoom’d us, and does what he will
with his own;
Better our dead brute mother who never has heard us groan !
Hell? if the souls of men were immortal, as men have been
told,
The lecher would cleave to his lusts, and the miser would yearn
for his gold,
And so there were Hell for ever! but were there a God as you
say,
His Love would have power over Hell till it utterly vanish’d
away.”
Now Calvinism is certainly not the creed any man could
regret to find untrue. And to our mind a man who could
live for years in the belief that the evils of this life are
ordained by God, and will be followed by an ordained hell
in the next life, is not likely to destroy himself when he finds
that the universe has no jailer and that all the evils of this
life end with it.
The man and his wife turn from the “ dark fatalist
creed ” to the growing dawn
“ When the light of a Sun that was coming would scatter the
ghosts of the Past,
And the cramping creeds that had madden’d the peoples would
vanish at last.”
�5
But when the dawn comes, they find that they have “ past
from a cheerless night to the glare of a drearier day.”
They are without a real God, for what deity remains is only
a cloud of smoke instead of a pillar of fire. Darwinism
they find to be very cold comfort, and they wail over them
selves as “poor orphans of nothing,” which is a comical
phrase, and one which we defy Mr. Tennyson or anybody
else to explain. If the Poet Laureate thinks that Darwinian
Atheists go about bemoaning themselves as poor orphans, he
is very much mistaken. He had better study them a little
before writing about them again. They are quite content
to remain without a celestial father. Earthly parents are
enough for them, earthly brothers and sisters, earthly wives,
and earthly friends. And most of them deem the grasp of
a father’s hand, and the loving smile on a mother’s face,
worth more than all the heavenly parentage they are satisfied
to lack.
Mr. Tennyson’s husband and wife, being utterly forlorn,
resolve to drown themselves, and the husband gives their
justication:—
“ Why should we bear with an hour of torture, a moment of
pain
If every man die for ever, if all his griefs are in vain,
And the homeless planet at length will be wheel’d thro’ the
silence of space,
Motherless evermore of an ever-vanishing race,
When the worm shall have writhed its last, and its last brother
worm will have fled
From the dead fossil skull that is left in the rocks of an earth
that is dead ? ”
Now all this will no doubt happen. Many millions of years
hence this world will be used-up like the moon; and there
fore, according to Mr. Tennyson’s argument, we should
commit suicide rather than put up with the toothache. It
will be all the same in the end. True ; but it is a long
while to the end. And people who act on Mr. Tennyson’s
principle must either forget this, or they must resemble the
man who refused to eat his dinner unless he had the
guarantee of a good dinner for ever and ever, with a dessert
by way of Amen.
Elsewhere they express pity for others as well as for them
selves—
“ Pity for all that aches in the grasp of an idiot power,
And pity for our own selves on an earth that bore not a flower;
Pity for all that suffers on land or in air, or the deep,
And pity for our own selves till we long’d for eternal sleep.”
�6
Mr. Tennyson may well make his Atheist husband say “ for
we leaned to the darker side.” This is an earth without a
flower! In every sense it is untrue. There are flowers of
beauty in the natural world, and flowers of greater beauty
in the human garden, despite the weeds. This suicidal pair
are fond of what Mr. Tennyson has himself called “the
falsehood of extremes.”
Sincere pessimists do not advocate suicide. Schopenhauer
himself condemns it as a superlative act of egoism. If here
and there a pessimist destroys himself, how can that make
things better for the masses who are governed by instinct
and not by metaphysics ? Mr. Tennyson does not see that
the most confirmed pessimist may, like George Eliot, believe
in Meliorism ; that is, not in perfection, but in improvement.
Nature, we may be sure, will never produce a race of beings
with a general taste for suicide; and it is therefore the duty
of those who deplore the ineradicable evils of life, to stay
with their brethren and to do their share towards improving
the common lot. If they cannot really make life happier,
they may at least make it less miserable, which is very much
the same thing.
Has Mr. Tennyson been reading that grand and powerful
poem of Mr. James Thomson’s, and is “ Despair ” the result?
If so, it is a poor outcome of such a majestic influence.
Mr. Tennyson has misread that great poem. Its author has
his joyous as well as his sombre moods, and he has himself
indicated that it does not cover the whole truth. Pessimists,
too, are not so stupid as to think that the extinction of a
few philosophers will affect the general life, or that a
universal principle of metaphysics can determine an isolated
case. They know also that philosophy will never resist
Nature or turn her set course. They see that she is enor
mously fecund, and is able to spawn forth life enough to
outlast all opposition, with enough instinct of self-preserva
tion to defy all the hostility of sages. And it is a note
worthy fact that the chief pessimists of our century have
not courted death themselves except in verse. Schopen
hauer lived to seventy-two ; Hartmann is one of the happiest
men in Germany; Leopardi died of disease ; and the author
of “The City of Dreadful Night’’has not yet committed
suicide and probably never will. It is one thing to believe
that, considered universally, life is a mistake, and quite
another thing to cut one’s own throat. The utmost that
even Schopenhauer suggested in the way of carrying out his
principles, was that when the human race had become far
�7
more intellectual and moral, and far less volitional and
egoistic, it would cease to propagate itself and so reaeh.
Nirvana. Whoever expects that to happen has a very farreaching faith. If the sky falls we shall of course catch
larks, but when will it fall ?
Atheists, however, are not necessarily pessimists, and in
fact few of them are so. Most of them believe that a large
portion of the world’s evil is removable, being merely the
result of ignorance and superstition. Mr. Tennyson might
have seen from Shelley’s writings that an Athest may
cherish the noblest hopes of progress. Perhaps he would
reply that Shelley was not an Atheist, but few will agree
with him who have read the original editions of that glorious
poet and the very emphatic statements of his friend Trelawny.
Does Atheism prompt men to suicide ? That is the
question. Mr. Tennyson appears to think that if it does
not it should. We cannot, however, argue against a mere
dictum. The question is one of fact, and the best way to
answer it is to appeal to statistics. Atheists do not seem
prone to suicide. So far as we know no prominent Atheist
has taken his own life during the whole of this century.
But let us go farther. There has recently been published
an erudite work * on “ Suicide, Ancient and Modern,” by
A. Legoyt, of Paris. He has given official tables of the
reasons assigned for suicides in most of the countries of
Europe; and although religious mania is among these
causes, Atheism is not. This dreadful incitement to self
destruction has not yet found its way into the officia
statistics even of Germany or of France, where Atheist
abound I
Suicides have largely increased during the last twenty
years. In England, for instance, while from 1865 to 1876
the population increased 14-6 per cent., suicides increased
27T per cent. In France, Prussia, Austria, Russia, Swit
zerland and Belgium the increase is still more alarming.
But during the same period lunacy has wonderfully in
creased ; and the truth is that both are caused by the everincreasing velocity and complexity of modern life, which
makes greater demands on our cerebral power than we are
able to answer. By-and-bye this will rectify itself through
* Ze /Swicicfe, Ancien et Moderne. Etude Historique, Philosophique
Morale et Statistique. Par A. Lïgott. Paris : A. Drouin.
�8
natural selection, but for the present our brains are not
strong enough for their sudden access of work. Hence the
increase of nervous derangement, lunacy, and suicide.
But it may be urged that religion keeps down the number
of suicides which would be still more plentiful without it.
That, however, is a mere matter of opinion, which can
hardly be verified or disproved. Religion does not restrain
those who do commit suicide, and that fact outweighs all
the fine talk about its virtue in other cases.
Some Christian apologists have made much capital out of
George Jacob Holyoake’s meditation on suicide in Gloucester
jail, when he was imprisoned for “ blasphemy,” or in other
words, for having opinions of his own on the subject of
religion. Mr. Holyoake’s mental torture was great. His wife
was in want, and his favorite daughter died while he was in
prison. Fearing that his reason might forsake him, and
being resolved that the Christian bigotry which had made
him suffer should never reduce him to an object of its derision,
he prepared the means of ending his life if the worst should
happen. “ See,” say these charitable Christians, “ what a
feeble support Atheism is in the hour of need! Nothing
but belief in Christ can enable us to bear the troubles of life.”
But our answer is that Mr. Holyoake did not commit suicide
after all; while, on the other hand, if we may judge by our
own notes during the past six months, one parson cuts his
throat, or hangs, or drowns, or poisons himself, on an
average every month.
Recurring finally to Mr. Tennyson, we say that his poem
is a failure. He does not understand Atheism, and he fails
to appreciate either its meaning or its hope. We trust that
he will afflict us with no more poetical abortions like this,
but give us only the proper fruit of his genius, and leave
the task of holding up Atheists as a frightful example to
the small fry of the pulpit and the religious press.
November 14iA, 1881.
PRICE ONE PENNY.
London : Fbeethought Publishing Company, 28, Stonecutter Street,
Farringdon Street, E.C.
�
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Atheism and suicide : a reply to Alfred Tennyson, Poet Laureate
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Place of publication: London
Collation: 8 p. ; 18 cm.
Notes: Includes bibliographical references. Part of the NSS pamphlet collection.
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Foote, George W., 1843-1886
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1881
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Freethought Publishing Company
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Atheism
Suicide
Ethics
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<img src="http://i.creativecommons.org/p/mark/1.0/88x31.png" alt="Public Domain Mark" /><br /><span>This work (Atheism and suicide : a reply to Alfred Tennyson, Poet Laureate), identified by </span><span><a href="https://conwayhallcollections.omeka.net/items/show/www.conwayhall.org.uk">Humanist Library and Archives</a></span><span>, is free of known copyright restrictions.</span>
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Alfred Tennyson
Atheism
NSS
Suicide
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&A708Z
Second Edition, Revised and Enlarged
THE
GLORY OF UNBELIEF.
---- BY----
CHARLES WATTS,
Editor of “ Secular Thought
Author of ‘‘ Teachings of Secularism Compared with Orthodox Christianity,’’
Evolution and Special Creation,” “ Secularism: Constructive and De
structive,” Glory of Unbelief,” li Saints and Sinners : Which?”
“Bible Morality,” ‘‘ Christianity : Its Origin, Nature and
Influence,” li Agnosticism and Christian Theism:
Which is the More Reasonable? ” “Reply to
Father Lambert,” Etc., Etc.
CONTENTS:
Wherein does the Glory of Unbelief Consist ? Unbelief Wide-spread
amongst all Classes. What is Unbelief ? Its True Nature Defined.
Can it be Dispensed With ? The Advantages of Unbelief. What
It has Done for the World.
TORONTO:
“ SECULAR THOUGHT ” OFFICE,
31 Adelaide 'tr. Eait
PRICE
TEN
CENTS.
��THE GLORY OF UNBELIEF
•
The Glory of Unbelief is a phrase the relevancy of which many
persons will at first fail to recognize. It may be thought that
but little glory can surround that which has too frequently been
associated with obloquy and persecution. Yet a little reflection
will bring to view the fact that, allied with unbelief, there have
been a fidelity of conviction, a grandeur of conduct, and a bril
liancy of action that add a splendour and a lasting honour to the
fame of Unbelievers in all ages and in every clime. These are
the reformers of the world who have aspired to the true glory
spoken of by Pliny, which consists in having done something
worth the writing, having written something worth the reading,
and having made the world better and happier through having
lived in it. The Glory of Unbelief consists in its being the em
ancipator of the human mind, the liberator of human thought,
and the precursor of all advanced civilization.
Physical slavery, from its very nature, has been a curse to hu
manity, an injustice to the poor slave, and a disgrace to the up
holders of the inhuman traffic. For centuries this crying evil was
perpetuated through a devout belief that slavery was sanctioned
by a divine providence. When the period of practical unbelief
dawned emancipation followed, men condemned serfdom and re
fused to believe in its theological justification. A similar pro
cess has been observed in reference to intellectual bondage, which
for ages proved a nightmare to the human mind, depriving soci
ety of the advantages of freedom of thought and liberty of speech.
For generations the claims of ecclesiastical supremacy and priest
ly domination enslaved the intellect of the race, but with the
advent of unbelief these chains were snapped asunder and pro
portionately mental freedom was the result.
�2
THE GLORY OF UNBELIEF.
Unbelief is the basis of all Secular philosophy. So long as
people maintain a blind belief in the teachings of the past, so
long as their minds are fettered by the decrees of Councils and
the dogmas and creeds of the Church, so long will the develop
ment of Secular philosophy be retarded. Let, however, disbelief
in ancient errors be supplanted by the belief in modern truth and
Secular progress will thereby be promoted.
The fact that Unbelief extensively exists among all classes of
society is beyond reasonable doubt. It is prominent in our poli
tics, in our poesy, in our philosophy, and in the various scientific
expositions of the present day. It dominates the press, it agi
tates the pulpit, and it permeates our national seats of learning.
As the Rev. Daniel Moore in “ The Age and the Gospels ” admits
(pp. 10-14): “The tendencies to scepticism at the present day
show themselves more or less in every direction.” And the Rev.
Dr. Herbert Vaughan, in his pamphlet on “ Popular Education
in England,” written in 1868, observes (p. 53):—
“ The most thorough, the most logical, and the most distinct school
opposed to us is that of the Secularists. It would be vain to close our
eyes to the fact that their numbers are large and rapidly increasing.”
Referring to the progress of Unbelief in the English Universi
ties, the Westminster Review for October, 1860, remarks:—
“ Few, perhaps, are aware how far the decay of belief extends be
neath those walls. . . ‘ Smouldering scepticism,’ indeed ! When they
are honeycombed with disbelief, running through every phase, from
mystical interpretation to utter atheism. Professors, tutors, fellows,
and pupils are conscious of this widespread doubt.” “ It must be a
profound evil,” continues the writer, “ that all thinking men should
reject the national religion.” . . . “ The newspaper, the review, the
tale by every fireside, is written almost exclusively by men who have
long ceased to believe. So also the school-book, the text-book, the
manuals for study of youth and manhood, the whole mental food of
the day; science, history, morals, and politics, poetry, fiction and
essay ; the very lesson of the school, the very sermon from the pulpit.”
This testimony, recorded some years since, has been more than
ever confirmed within the last two decades. Go into what soci
ety we may ; move in what circle of life we will; Unbelief, either
active or dormant, confronts us on every side. The clergy con
template this sceptical progress, while they acknowledge their
inability to “ stem the tide of modern scepticism.”
�THE GLORY OF UNBELIEF.
3
While there can be no reasonable doubt as to the rapid increase
of unbelief in all phases of modern life, differences of opinion
may obtain as to the nature and authority of this unbelief.
For instance, it may be asked, Can unbelief have a philosophy ?
According to the majority of men who have been trained in what
is termed, orthodoxy, and who profess to accept the popular
teachings of the Christian faith, the answer would be a most
emphatic negative. But the impartial observer of the develop
ment of modern thought will doubtless think otherwise, and con
sider that he has ample reasons for the conclusion at which he
has arrived. If there is a philosophy of belief, why should there
not be a philosophy of unbelief ? The one may be true and the
other false, still both may be formulated in philosophic terms.
Unbelief has been so long branded as a crime, and so persistently
looked upon as a sin against God and as an enemy to all human
society, that the world has come largely to argue that it
has no philosophic basis. Ever and anon it is being declared
from the thousands of pulpits in the land that unbelief is the
great bane of the age, and that what mankind needs is more
faith in dogmas, at which an orthodox preacher himself declared,
“ Reason stands aghast and Faith herself is half confounded.”
Unbelief is not only condemned as being a crime, but it is pro
nounced as the worst of crimes. The Rev. C. H. Spurgeon, who.
is deemed by most persons as being no mean authority on ortho
dox questions, exclaims in pious fervour : “ Talk of decrees, I will
tell you of a decree, ‘ He that believeth not shall be damned?
That is a decree and statute that can never change. Be as good
as you'please, be as moral as you can, be as honest as you will,
walk as uprightly as you may ; there stands the unchangeable
threatening, ‘ He that believeth not shall be damned.’ ” This is
a sample of orthodox teaching in Christian England in this glori
ous nineteenth century—this age of progress, of civilization and
culture. The unbeliever is viewed as a man who voluntarily or
wilfully rejects the light of truth, who clings to error knowing
it to be evil, and who consequently deserves no mercy of any
God, and no consideration on the part of his fellow man. The
very name Unbeliever or Sceptic is looked upon as a byword or
.
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THE GLORY OF UNBELIEF.
reproach; and the term Infidel, with many people, has a more
horrible meaning than that of thief or murderer. To quote
again from Mr. Spurgeon : “ Could you take murder and blas
phemy and lust and adultery and fornication, and everything that
is vile, and unite them into one vast globe of black corruption,
they would not equal the sin of unbelief. This is the monarch
sin, the quintessence of guilt, the mixture of the venom of all
crimes, the dregs of the mine of Gomorrah; it is the A 1 sin, the
masterpiece of Satan, the chief work of the Devil.” Unbelief is
a sort of intellectual bugbear by which the simple-minded are
held in the worst kind of slavery—that of intellectual bondage.
Whenever a man begins to think differently from the Church a
hue-and-cry of “ Infidelity” is raised against him, and many are
compelled, if they would preserve their positions in business and
retain the good opinion of their fellow men, to retrace their foot
steps and enter again the fold of believers, where doubt comes
not and where enquiry has no place. For let a man be guided
by the dogmas of antiquity, declare that reason is a blind guide
and logic a weapon of the Devil; let him denounce with all the
power he can command the great and illustrious men of the earth
who have doubted the various theologies of the world, and such
a man’s respectability is safe in this world, and his salvation is
regarded as being secured in the next. “ Only believe,” says the
poet of Methodism—
‘ ‘ Only belie re, your sins forgiven ;
Only believe, and yours is heaven.”
No one can believe everything, and some must consequently
be unbelievers in all that which does not fall within the range
of his or her thought. Want of faith, therefore, so far from
being criminal, is a necessary condition of the human mind. No
one can escape it, do what he may. The Christian is an unbe
liever to the Mohammedan, the Buddhist, the Parsee, and other re
ligious devotees, as they are all unbelievers to him and to each
other. The question here is not which of these systems, or whether
any of them, is true; but the point to be observed is that the
advocate of each disbelieves in the dogma of the other, showing
that unbelief is a necessity, since the various faiths are all in
�THE GLORY OF UNBELIEF.
5
some respects antagonistic. The Agnostic is, of course, an unbe
liever ; but is any Christian minister in the world less so ? As
the great Lord Shaftesbury once remarked: “ The best Christian
in the world, who, being destitute of the means of certainty, de
pends only on history and traditions for his belief in these par
ticulars, is at best but a Sceptic Christian.” The fact is, both the
Agnostic and the Christian disbelieve in what the other teaches.
Why, then, does the Christian consider himself justified in apply
ing to the Agnostic an epithet which is used in an offensive
sense, and resent the same epithet when applied to himself ?
The Christian, no doubt, will reply that his opinions are true,
and those of the Agnostic false. But that is just the point in dis
pute and has no right to be assumed; and besides, might not the
Agnostic justify the use of the word in the same way ?
Before unbelief, even in religion, can be dispensed with advan
tageously—and even then, perhaps, it could not rationally be
discarded—three qualifications must be shown to be possessed
by the believer who talks in the language of ordinary Christian
men. First, he must be infallible; secondly, he must be strictly
honest, for infallibility does not necessarily imply honesty, and
thirdly, his system must be perfect. In the absence of any one of
these, he may mislead those who listen to and follow his teaching.
And no man can possibly have a right to proclaim a system,
which he demands to have accepted under pain of penalties in
this world, and worse penalties in some world to come, unless he
is prepared with demonstrative proof that he and his system are
possessed of these three qualifications. With regard to the first
no man can profess seriously to claim infallibility but the Pope of
Rome; and his claim is not only not attempted to be made good, but
we are told that it must be accepted without any proof whatever.
Besides, half the Christians themselves not only dispute this
claim, but denounce it in language as strong as that which they
apply to unbelievers. In fact, infallibility can only exist in
connection with Omniscience, because to be certain that one could
have made no mistake it is essential that he should have a perfect
knowledge of everything that is in any and every part of the
universe. If there be any one fact or circumstance with which
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THE GLORY OF UNBELIEF.
he is unacquainted, this very fact or circumstance may contain
an additional truth not present to his mind, which, if known,
would considerably modify existing views.
The Protestant, however, does not even pretend to claim infalli
bility, and, therefore, quite unconsciously, although very ra
tionally, foregoes a great part of his authority. With him the
certainty of being right is transferred to some extent from the
individual to the system, and hence, although personally he lays
no claim to being infallible, he still demands implicit faith in his
teachings. Infallibility in his case is not in his own mind, nor
in the head of the Church, but in his text-book. The Bible, he
declares, cannot err, although he can. But, even if this claim
were established, it would not be sufficient, since it is not required
as a substitute for personal infallibility, but in addition to it.
An infallible book would be of little value without an infallible
interpreter, because a million different infallible minds will deduce
a million different conclusions, nine hundred and ninety-nine thou
sand nine hundred and ninety-nine of them being erroneous—and,
perhaps, the other one also—which multiplies the chances of
error so extensively that the alleged infallibility disappears.
But to claim infallibility for the Bible is really to claim it for
the writers of the various books which make up that volume,
and the same arguments hold good against its possession by
them as by the Pope of Rome or any other human being. Even
supposing that the infallibility of the original version of the
Bible were conceded, nothing would thereby be gained, since such
an infallible original is no longer in existence. The volume that we
have is simply a translation from the Greek executed by fallible,
erring men. Thus the first qualification necessary to the disposal
of unbelief we find to be absent. The second is that such
teachers must be honest. It is only stating a well-known truism
to say that all men are not honest, particularly in theological
matters. Insincerity is the great curse of the Church, too many
of its members endeavouring to make people think they believe
creeds and doctrines in which, in reality, they have no practical
faith whatever. Unless, therefore, we could be quite certain,
beyond a shadow of a doubt, as to the conscientious honesty
�THE GLORY OF UNBELIEF.
7
of the infallible teacher, even his infallibility would prove of
no avail. In business matters men always endeavour to act
upon the principle that honesty is the most important element
in life. They will not, as a rule, trust a dollar in the hands of
another person, unless thoroughly convinced both of his honesty
and of his capability to comply with the terms of the agreement
made. Yet these same men will stake their all in what they term
hereafter—the supposed eternal welfare of their souls—on the
ipse dixit of a priest or minister, without any guarantee of his
honesty or competence to perform his brilliant promises. Truly
man is a remarkable being, and, under the influence of theology,
his ways are marvellously strange and past finding out. The
very course which he applauds in secular transactions he not
only ignores in religious proceedings, but adopts the very opposite.
And yet we are told that the two lines of conduct—secular and
religious—are harmonious. In spite of all reckless condemnation
to the contrary, unbelief is a necessity of the human mind, to
escape which is altogether impossible.
There is but one state of mind in which it may be said un
belief can have but little or no place, and that is in a condition
of total ignorance. Perfect knowledge would, of course, remove
all unbelief of truth; but even with it there would be unbelief
as regards error. But, as this condition is unattainable, it need
not be discussed. Total ignorance does not disbelieve, because
.there is, in that case, nothing present to the mind in reference
to which unbelief can be exercised. This will go a long way to
explain the fact that, in times of supreme ignorance, unbelief
was comparatively unknown. Priestcraft held its sway, mental
stagnation obtained, and men and women were blind believers
O
in, and followers of, the then prevailing errors. But the moment
progress, from the condition of ignorance, commenced, new
forms of thought became present to the mind, new opinions weref
perceived, new theories sprang up, investigation took place, and
unbelief became a necessary consequent. And this belief will be
sure to increase with increasing knowledge. In childhood the
first impressions we receive we naturally enough imagine to be
indisputably correct, whether in religion, in philosophy, or in the
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THE GLORY OF UNBELIEF.
ordinary commonplace affairs of life. The first impressions asto religion and to philosophy we receive from our parents or
teachers, and hence tradition frequently deceives us. As Dryden
says:—
“ By education most have been misled,
So we believe because we so were bred ;
The priest continues what the nurse began,
And thus the boy imposes on the man.”
In the morning of existence theories in abundance crowd in.
upon the mind, the major part of them only to be subsequently
dismissed as untenable, and we become, perforce of necessity,
unbelievers to much that is presented to the mind. Each indi
vidual will probably accept some different theory to the others
but all will be unbelievers in those notions which have been
rejected. Much that comes before us has to be rejected as
utterly untenable, and we are unbelievers, whether we will or no.
We shall, of course, not all arrive at the same views; but that
will make no difference to the fact of our unbelief, since each
will disbelieve that which does not accord with his own deduc
tions ; and hence he becomes an unbeliever in all that is opposed
to the conclusions at which he has arrived. This unbelief will
deepen with increasing knowledge, because, the more we know,,
the greater the variety of the theories that will present them
selves to the mind, and the larger,, therefore, the number of these
that will have to be rejected. It will follow, as a necessary
consequence, that the unbelief will be commensurate with the
knowledge possessed. It is quite possible that some truth may
be rejected by a man as error; but that does not affect the question,
•under discussion. The real position is that unbelief in the
abstract is a necessity of the constitution of the human mind,
and the more the mind is instructed and cultivated, the more
extensive will be the unbelief. Thus Scepticism arises from the
very nature of things, and has its foundation in the universal
mentality of the race; and instead of deploring this fact, it is
one that should be rejoiced at, because it is a safeguard against
error; it stimulates and enriches human thought, and ennobles
the intellectual character of mankind. As Tennyson writes:—
�THE GLORY OF UNBELIEF.
9
“ There is more faith in honest doubt,
Believe me, than in half the creeds. ”
Seeing that there is so much that must come before the
human mind to be at once dismissed, and that so many various
and conflicting theories will present themselves before the intel
lect of every person who thinks upon ever so limited a scale,
the greater portion of which will doubtless have to be rejected,
our duty in regard to the matter is as evident as the sun at
noonday. Truth is a gem of which all men are professedly in
search, and all are obligated to discover and take hold of as
much of it as possible; and the only way in which this can be
done is by rejecting the error,—or that which appears to the
searcher to be such—for his own intellectual powers are the only
tests which he can apply to ascertain what is truth and what is
falsehood. Hence he must reject that which appears to him to
be irrational, and thus so far he becomes an unbeliever. If it is
said that this unbelief refers only to error, the question will arise,
What is error ? For is it not clear that, as no two minds are
constituted alike, and as no two persons can possibly follow out,
in every particular and in precisely the same manner, the same
line of thought and investigation, the conclusions reached can
not be the same always in the case of different individuals ? It
is possible that all will discover some truth; but truth, like man,
is many-sided; and, hence, some things which seem phases of
truth to one man will be classed with error by another. Free»
thought teaches the great fundamental truth—namely, that man
has an absolute right to think freely, unfettered by tradition and
uncontrolled by creeds and dogmas. This is the essence of all
true thinking ; for no one can think successfully in shackles,
and truth can never be properly reached while thought is in
chains. Protestantism boasts that it not only allows the right
■of private judgment, but that such right is its cardinal principle
and watchword. Now, true private judgment means the right
to arrive at any opinion which can be legitimately reached by
the laws of thought and the canons of logic, or the term is a mis
leading misnomer. It was the violation of this principle that
�10
THE GLORY OF UNBELIEF.
made the conduct of the Protestant reformers so thoroughly
inconsistent. They robbed private judgment of its real essence
by compelling its conclusions to harmonize with their own, and
thus limiting that freedom which is absolutely necessary toprivate judgment.
The Rev. George Armstrong once said of the Church of Eng
land, and the same statement is equally applicable to some other
Protestant sects :—“ I am allowed the right of pi'ivate judgment
on condition that I arrived at the opinions settled beforehand
for me by the Church.” And he remarks: “ If I deny the right
of private judgment, the Church calls me a Romanistif I
acknowledge it and act upon it, she brands me as a heretic.”
Such inconsistency as this is foreign to the genius of Freethought. Unless a person’s right to think at all is denied, he
must be permitted the full right to arrive at any conclusion
which may seem to him rational. Every man has a right to his
views, even though he stand alone in their advocacy. Infalli
bility alone can possess the right to suppress any opinion, be
cause only infallibility can declare for certain that an opinion is
necessarily an error; and as, of course, infallibility does not
exist, such right is not to be found. A strong presumption that
the opinion sought to be suppressed is an erroneous one will not
be sufficient; because, in the first place, strong presumption is
not a proof, and, in the second place, very strong presumptions
have existed in the past in favour of the falsity of certain
opinions, which only a small minority held, but which afterwards
turned out to be true. The Roman Catholic denies the right of
private judgment altogether, and yet, strangely enough, he
always makes an appeal to it when seeking to make converts.
If a man says, I believe in the Roman Catholic Church, and
therefore I deny that you have any such right as that of private
judgment, I ask at once, “ Why are you a Roman Catholic ?” He
will, no doubt, proceed forthwith to give his reasons, thereby
admitting that he has exercised his own private judgment in the
matter—the very thing which he refuses me the right to do.
There is, and can be, no fixed standard of belief for all men,
unless the right of private judgment be entirely given up ; nor
�THE GLORY OF UNBELIEF.
11
scarcely then, as a matter of fact, for the standard itself will
have to be accepted or rejected according to evidence.
*’he Nonconformists who were persecuted even unto death, were,
like all other believers in creeds and dogmas, unable to resist the
temptation of oppressing others, when, by a turn of the wheel of
fortune, fate gave them an opportunity of so doing. The love of
rule and of lording it tyrannically over conscience is common to
all theologies and all theologians alike—to those of eld Paganism,
mediaeval Christianity, and that of Mohammedanism. The
doctrine that a wrong belief, the holding of an erroneous creed,
will lead to the consignment of the soul to eternal fire, “ where
the worm dieth not and the fire is not quenched,” prompts men
(and seems to justify them in so doing) to exert all their powers
towards preserving their fellow men from becoming a prey to
Satan and from being irretrievably lost to God. Thus the bigot
has been always found prepared to plead, in extenuation of his
intolerance, his zeal on behalf of souls. Hence he has always
been ready to—
“ Deal damnation round the land
On each I deem thy foe.”
All persecution for unbelief is a crime and should be condemned
as such. No man, or society of men, can have the right to im
pose any restriction upon the liberty of thought or speech. Who
ever persecutes “ for conscience’ sake ” invades the dearest rights
and privileges of the human race, and really endangers and im
perils its highest and most cherished interests.
The Nonconformity of the present day appears to be ashamed
of its opinions. Instead of boldly adhering to- the true principle
Df private judgment, no matter whither it may lead, it adopts a
/policy of reservation. The modern Dissenter scarcely deems it
worth his while to combat the errors of ecclesiasticismand sacerdot
alism ; he himself is half a Churchman; and henow comes forwardas
the antagonist and opponent of what he terms the “ Unbelief of
the age.” But what is this Unbelief of which we hear so much ?
Is it not a logical carrying out and application of those principles
which gave the early reformers an excuse—a legitimate and
valid reason—for endeavouring to subvert and overthrow
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THE GLORY OF UNBELIEF.
Romanism and its man-destroying superstitions and prostrations
of the intellect to dogma and faith. The principle of free inquiry
once given to the world, and once admitted by mankind, it is
absurd and illogical for any new “ minister ” to attempt to forge
new intellectual shackles, or to say to the human mind, “ Thus
far shalt thou come, but no farther ! ” Whoever is opposed to
this right is an enemy to human freedom. As Milton has writ
ten :—
“ This is true liberty, when free-born men,
Having to advise the public, may speak free ;
Which he who can, and will, deserves high praise;
Who neither can, nor will, may hold his peace :
What can be juster in a State than this ? ”
But to disbelieve is not only a right, it is also a duty ; for every
man is under an obligation to deny and to do his best to destroy
that which, after careful and deliberate examination, appears to
him to be false. No doubt the orthodox believers fear the legi
timate exercise of Freethought, simply because they are alarmed
that their own views will not stand the test; but this really
ought to be evidence to them that there is something unsound
somewhere in their connections. There is a fashion in these
matters, as in the cut of a coat, and the great masses of society
do not like to be out of the fashion. But fashion will seldom
stand criticism. “ There is more power,” said an old writer,
“in an ounce of custom than in a ton of argument.” Now, this
is just the state of things that requires to be changed. Moreover,
few will admit that they are guided by it, which is a tacit
admission that even they hold that it cannot be defended. They
profess to exercise their private judgments, to think and to
investigate even when they are bound hard and fast in the chain of
a despotic custom—which proves that they, too, recognize the
right to differ, which is really the right of unbelief.
There can be no progress without unbelief, for disbelief in an
old system must ever precede the introduction of a new one.
Progress always implies change and change is the outcome of
unbelief in that which is old and no longer able to serve the
world, added, of course, to what is considered to be a new truth.
�THE GLORY OF UNBELIEF.
13
’Thus we find that those who oppose Scepticism are usually
adverse to change of any kind; their motto is, “The same yester
day, to-day, and forever.” Among such persons there exists a
deep-rooted prejudice against everything that is new, and this
stubborn clinging to the teachings of the past has sapped the
very vitals of progress and perpetuated errors and hypocrisy to
an unknown extent. The man who changes his views and
embraces a conviction contrary to that which he was known
previously to hold is usually stigmatised by all sorts of offensive
epithets among his fellow men, and often he is regarded as being
a very dangerous character. Now, change—assuming that it is
in the right direction—is always desirable, and such change must
of necessity arise out of unbelief. No man can trace the progress
■of human thought and opinion from the crude and unformed
ideas of the ancients up to the brilliant discoveries and marvel
lous inventions of the present day, without feeling a thrill of joy
run through his frame that his lot has been cast in these later
times. First one erroneous notion and then another has been
got rid of, until, although the old tree of error still stands, its
branches are shrivelled, its trunk is decaying, and its root is
loosening i-n the soil in which it stood so firmly rooted a few
centuries ago. And every step in the world’s advancement has
been brought about by unbelief. This fact is fully demonstrated
by Buckle in his “ History of Civilization.” This eminent writer,
after showing that until doubt began civilization was impossible,
-and that the religious tolerance we now have has been forced
from the clergy by the secular classes, states “ that the act of
doubting is the originator, or at all events the necessary ante
cedent, of all progress. Here we have that Scepticism, the very
name of which is an abomination to the ignorant, because it
disturbs their lazy and complacent minds; because it troubles
their cherished superstitions ; because it imposes on them the
fatigue of inquiry; and because it rouses even sluggish under
standings to ask if things are as they are commonly supposed,
and if all is really true which they from their childhood have
been taught to believe. The more we examine this great prin
ciple of Scepticism, the more distinctly shall we see the immense
�14
THE GLORY OF UNBELIEF.
part it has played in the progress of European civilization. . . ..
It may be said that to Scepticism we owe the spirit of inquiry
which, during the last two centuries, has gradually encroached
on every possible subject; has reformed every department of
practical and speculative knowledge; has weakened the authority
of the privileged classes, and thus placed liberty on a surer
'foundation; has chastised the despotism of princes; has re
strained the arrogance of the nobles, and has even diminished
the prejudices of the clergy. In a word, it is this which has
remedied the three fundamental errors of the olden time—errors
which made the people, in politics too confiding, in science too
credulous, in religion too intolerant.”
Lecky, in his “ History of European Morals,” tells us that
“nearly all the greatest intellectual achievements of the last
three centuries have been preceded and prepared by the growth
of Scepticism. . . The splendid discoveries of physical science
would have been impossible but for the scientific scepticisms of
the school of Bacon. . . . Not till the education of Europe
passed from the monasteries to the universities ; not till Moham
medan science and classical Freethought and industrial indepen
dence broke the sceptre of the Church, did the intellectual
revival of Europe begin.” Thus the lesson of all history is that'
unbelief in the old has ever preceded the introduction of the new.
Christianity itself came based upon the disbelief in Paganism,,
and the Pagans, feeling outraged at the proposed change, called
the first Christians not only unbelievers, but even Atheists.
Martin Luther disbelieved in the mysteries and mummeries of
Boman Catholicism, and the result was what is called the Protest
ant Reformation. Copernicus and Galileo disbelieved in the Bible
cosmogony, with its theory of the heavens; and this Scepticism
gave birth to correct views upon the great science of astronomy.
Modern geologists reject the Bible story of Creation, and the
consequence is more faith in Nature’s records than in the absurdi
ties of the Christian Bible. In philosophy the same thing has
occurred over and over again, as also in the political world. Thus,
unbelief has ever been the herald of change and improvement,
while its enemy has always been that superstitious conservatism
�THE GLORY OF UNBELIEF.
15.
that eschews all advancement, frowns down every new discovery*,
taboos all change, and keeps its anchor firmly fixed in the errors
of the past. With such persons mildew is more sacred than sun
shine, and decay preferable to the opening violet shedding its
fragrance in the morning air.
Unbelief is always spoken of as though it were a mere
negation, whose only mission could be to doubt and destroy.
The consequence of this misconception is, that the Freethought
party is denounced as being composed of members whose aim
is to pull down, without having any desire to reconstruct. The
pious orthodox believer looks upon the Sceptic as a sort of
modern Goth or Vandal, dangerous to the well-being of society,,
and to be avoided by all who care for the public good. These
are the wild fanatical notions, born of the theological delusion,,
which are held in reference to unbelievers. But such views are
most erroneous, to say nothing of their injustice. Some of the
greatest benefactors of the race who ever lived have been
unbelievers, that is, they have rejected those creeds and dogmas
which are clung to so tenaciously by the Church. “ It is his
torically true,” remarks J. S. Mill, “ that a large proportion of
Infidels, in all ages, have been persons of distinguished integrity
a,nd honour. . . . Persons in greatest repute with the world
both by virtues and attainments, are well-known, at least to
their intimates, to be unbelievers. ... It can do truth no
good to blink the fact, known to all who have the most ordinary
acquaintance with literary history, that a large portion of the
noblest and most valuable moral teachings has been the work,
not only of men who’ did not know, but of men who knew and.
rejected, the Christian faith” (“On Liberty ”). And Mill was
quite right, for some of the noblest men and women who have
adorned the history of their times, and given to the world a.
record of the most useful deeds, have been unbelievers. Lucretius,
Spinoza, Goethe, Humboldt, Dr. Priestley, Newton, Voltaire,
Paine, Robert Owen, Lyell, Darwin, Tyndall, Huxley, and Harriet
Martineau are prominent in the Pantheon of the world’s bene
factors ; and these were all unbelievers from the orthodox stand
point. In France, nearly all the scientific men are heretics
�16
THE GLORY OF UNBELIEF.
and Germany—the most Philosophic land of modern days—is
notoriously sceptical.
Unbelief is, of course, negative on the one side ; but there is
always another aspect of it to be seen, if one will only take the
trouble to look fairly for it. Unbelief in one thing means
belief in the opposite, and it is quite possible that such opposite
may be the more worthy of the two. This is another instance
how the word unbelief is used in a sense that is most certainly
not justifiable, because it conveys an idea of reproach, and
-almost of crime; and those to whom it is applied are thereby
singled out for ignominious attack and violent denunciation. It
may probably be replied here that the word is only employed in
this sense when it refers to disbelief in things which are infallibly
true, and too sacred to be tampered with, and far too well
established to admit of the possibility of doubt in regard to them.
But the position here assumed is absurd, since things which can
be demonstrated to be true beyond the possibility of doubt
cannot be disbelieved. No sane man can disbelieve in a proposi
tion of Euclid, or even the simple statement that two and two
make four. The fact, therefore, of the very existence of unbelief
in regard to any matter proves that it has not been demonstrated
to be true. As to infallibility, that idea has already been dis
posed of. Now, to say that anything is too sacred to be tampered
with, simply means that it is sacred in the eyes of those who
accept it; for it cannot be sacred to him who disbelieves it. To
assert that I am not at liberty to disbelieve in any dogma or
principle because some one else holds it to be sacred is to say that
he is infallible, and that I must, therefore, defer to his judgment,
surrender my own right to think at all, and take my opinions
ready-made from any one who is arrogant enough to claim the
right to dictate. Moreover, this view is self-destructive, because
a half-dozen different bodies may each be claiming the same
allegiance, and, as their views will probably be conflicting and
irreconcilable, to believe the pretensions of the one would be to
-disbelieve the claims of the others. But, if a person disbelieves
he also believes ; his disbelief is the negative side of his faith‘
-and his belief is the positive side.
�THE GLORY OF UNBELIEF.
17
Disbelief in an error, or in that which is held to be an error,,
by any man involves belief in the opposite of the error, which is
truth, or at all events that which is recognized as such by him
who receives it. To describe a man as an unbeliever without
having regard to what it is that he disbelieves, and consequently
what he believes as the opposite of his unbelief, is not fair to
him, and is equally unfair to those who from this description
learn to estimate his views. Unbelief and belief must run hand
in hand, and cannot be separated. The most devout believer is
equally an unbeliever with him whom the world calls “ Infidel ”
and stigmatises with reproachful terms and epithets in conse
quence of his Scepticism. They differ, of course, as to the sphere
of their faith and doubt; but the one has no more right to be
called a believer par excellence than has the other. All of us
claim to have some truth on our side, and in that truth we are
firm believers. Our faith in it is the basis of our disbelief in
error, and the mainspring of our actions in the advocacy of our
views and the efforts which we make to bring others to our own
way of thinking. We are only negationists so far as a pulling
down and a clearing of the ground may be necessary to prepare
the way for the new building that is to be erected. Just as Luther
disbelieved in Romanism and sought to destroy it, in order tomake way for Protestantism, so Secularists to-day disbelieve in
the errors of the Church, and are thereby inspired to work for the
establishment of greater and grander truths than theology ever
rocognized or the Church ever possessed. The old Church called
Luther an unbeliever, and it was right so far; but a large por
tion of society came to recognize him as a true believer. His
positive work was the outcome of his unbelief, and but for that
it could have had no existence. Christianity owes its existence
to unbelief. If Christ and St. Paul had not rejected many of the
teachings of paganism and Judaism the religious change which
it is alleged occurred two thousand years ago, would in all prob
ability never have taken place. Thus unbelief has ever been
the precursor of a newer and truer faith; it is the herald of
progress, the forerunner of improvement, and the harbinger of.
coming good.
�.18
THE GLORY OF UNBELIEF.
Unbelievers are supposed to have no right to the term sacred,
whereas it belongs to them in a much higher sense than it does
to the Church. What is truly sacred ? The beautiful in art
the true in philosophy, the noble and pure in human conduct—
these are all sacred, because they are in harmony with the higher
instincts of man, and tend to elevate and regenerate the race.
True sacredness does not consist in supernatural power, priestly
arrogance, or assumption of authority to our fellow-man. Things
are made holy by the temper and conduct of him who uses them.
Man is his own consecrator, whether in his home, at church, or
in the temple of science. Where mind speaks to mind, either
orally or in writing, and thus impresses for good : where intellect
• diffuses its choicest blessings abroad among mankind; where
learning and thought rise into higher regions of light and truth ;
where poetry illumines and art charms; where liberty goes forth
breaking asunder the chains of the captive; where knowledge
•dwells and love manifests its power ; where virtue reigns
supreme and justice bears the sway—there, and there alone, is
true sanctification to be found, encircled in the temple of Reality
and enthroned upon the pinnacle of Humanity.
Instead of regarding the term sacred as representing these
great enobling qualities and mental activities, the popular believ
ers associate it with certain places, buildings, and theological
ceremonies. For instance, Palestine is called the Holy Land, and
is looked upon as sacred in consequence of the notion that it
was the birthplace of Christianity. It is a most significant
fact that if Palestine were sufficiently prolific to produce a
religion, it has been comparatively barren in science, philosophy,
and general education. A church is termed a sacred building,
and is thought to be made so through some bishop or other
•ecclesiastical official performing a ceremony called consecration,
in which prayers are offered and forms complied with of a
strictly religious character, and thus the building becomes trans
formed into a holy temple totally unlike what it was before.
The very stones are sacred now, and cannot be used for another
.purpose without profanation. Can anything in the world be more
absurd ? Is it not derogatory to man and an insult to human
�THE GLORY OF UNBELIEF.
19
.genius ? What possible effect upon bricks and stones and
mortar and cement can the words of a bishop or any official
have ? And yet modern professors of theology stand aghast at the
folly displayed by Pagan worshippers. It would be exceedingly
interesting to have the modus operandi of this process of making
such things sacred explained to us—to be told what is the nature
of the conversion they undergo, and in what sense they differ
after consecration from their condition before.
Worse still, the same piece of theological legerdemain is
practised in our burial grounds. These, too, must be conse
crated—that is, made sacred, or sacred bones, it is feared, could
not rest in them. In cemeteries part of the ground is generally
^consecrated, and part left in its usual state. The physical
difference—and there can be no spiritual, for it will not be main
tained that mould is capable of spiritual impressions—that has
been effected by this process is more puzzling than the Athanasian Creed. How deep down does the consecration extend? And
does it cover any clods of earth that might afterwards be
brought to the spot, but which were not there at the time the
•ceremony was performed ? Is the grass that will hereafter
grow also consecrated ? And, if so, what will be the effect of the
•eating of the said grass upon the bodies of unconsecrated cattle ?
Shall we get, as a result, consecrated beef and mutton ?
But, in all seriousness, what is consecrated ground ? And
what power has priest or bishop or pope, by the reciting of any
form of words, to accomplish anything of the kind ? One of
•our poets has well written, as a rebuke to these miserable
superstitions :—
“ What’s hallowed ground ? ’Tis what gives birth
To sacred thoughts in souls of worth.
Peace ! Independence ! Truth ! Go forth
Earth’s compass round,
And your high priesthood shall make earth
All hallowed ground.”
'This is the true consecration, the real making holy; for not by
ridiculous ceremony, but by noble thoughts, is everything hal
lowed and made sacred on earth.
�20
THE GLORY OF UNBELIEF.
Unbelief leaves the mind free to receive new truths. The
greatest opponent that truth has ever had to contend with is dog
matism. A black cloud hangs over the mind of the dogmatist,
shutting out every ray of the bright and gladdening beams of
the sun of truth, and encircling all his mental powers in the
deepest darkness. To such an one improvement is nearly
impossible, and advancement in intellectual growth is never tobe dreamed of. His motto is always, “ As you were,” and his
watchword, if he has any, is like that of which Mackay preaches,
“ Backward, ye deluded nations ; man to misery is born.” When
a man dogmatically asserts that he has found all the truth which,
is capable to be found, and that his system contains perfect
verity without any mixture of error, his views become stereo
typed, and it is quite impossible that any change can take place
in his opinions. His mind is not open to receive new light from
any source whatever, and thought with him is a useless and
vain operation and investigation the quintessence of folly. For
him to receive any new truth would be to admit that what hepossessed before was in some way defective and imperfect, and
this his creed protests against with the authority of an infallible
mandate. His position is necessarily stationary ; he stands just
where his grandsires stood ages past, and where he would wish
his descendants to remain for ages to come. Now, surely un
belief is far in advance of such a condition as this, for it leaves
its possessor, without bias and prejudice, waiting the new know
ledge that is continually to be had for the seeking. It allows his
mind full scope to grow and advance in wisdom, because he does
not for one moment believe that he has reached aperfection beyond
which it is impossible to proceed. In connection with unbelief
there i-s always a certain amount of suspension of judgment—
that is to say, there is such an absence of dogmatism that any new
discovery of science, any fresh thought in philosophy, or better
and clearer ideas in religion, are always welcomed as an addition
to the stores of knowledge already in possession. A calm repose
rests on his mental powers : there is, to use the words of Harriet
Martineau, a “ clearness of moral purpose,” which “ naturally
ensues”—a “healthy activity of the moral faculties.” The un-
�THE GLORY OF UNBELIEF.
21
believer, not being biassed by any settled views which he thinks
■came from heaven, is ever ready to learn and be taught. There
is about him a lofty liberty which he alone can enjoy. From
whatever source the truth may come he is willing—nay, desirous
—to receive it. He is ever ready, as Dr. Watts observes, to—
.
“ Seize on truth where’er ’tis found,
On heathen or on Christian ground.”
The principal argument against unbelief is based upon the
supposition that we have an infallible guide, whereas the fact is
that we neither have nor can have anything of the kind ; and,
what is more, if we had such a guide, we could not understand
it, and therefore it would be no guide to us. All that man
requires is a reasonable probability, and his nature is so con
stituted that he is not capable of more. Besides, unbelief is not
voluntary, and the power of belief is not under the control of
the will.
Belief is the result of conviction, conviction of
evidence; and no man can believe either without or against
■evidence, or disbelieve in the face of evidence sufficiently strong
to carry conviction. Opinions change, theories pass away; old
faiths decay, and new ones appear in their places.
In connection with the Christian profession at the present time
we have an illustration of such inconsistency as is not to be
found in any other of the great religions of the world. History
fails to record in association with those faiths such a marked
difference between profession and action as we discover in the
Christian Church. In Confucianism, Brahmanism, Buddhism,
there is a persistent and earnest effort to regulate personal con
duct in accordance with the alleged sayings and injunctions of
their respective founders. But it is not so with Christianity.
Where are the professing Christians to-day who even make the
attempt to adopt the advice, practice, and precepts ascribed to
Jesus of Nazareth ?' He was in every sense opposed to this
world, and, in most emphatic terms, he denounces its enjoyments,
iijs pride, its requirements, and particularly its riches. With
him, heaven was of greater importance than earth, submission a
ihigher duty than resistance, and poverty a greater virtue than
�22
THE GLORY OF UNBELIEF.
wealth. Christ urged that practice was more valuable than pro
fession, and that the grace of God was more efficacious than the
ethics of man. Where, in the present day, do we find these
views practically endorsed even by Christians ? They are really
disbelievers to what they proclaim as being essential both for
life and for death. Consistency, where indeed is thy blush ? Before
professing Christians condemn us for our unbelief, let them show
us their genuine belief. Before they denounce us for rejecting
what we regard to be error, let them prove that they practice
that which they avow to be true. In the one case there is
honesty of purpose and sincerity of conviction; in the other
there is hypocrisy of profession and cant of fashion. Therefore
in the words of Polonius, we say to the Christian ;—
•
“ This above all, to thine own self be true ;
And it must follow, as the night the day,
Thou canst not then be false to any man. ”
Wherein then consists the advantage of Unbelief ? It is the
symbol of mental freedom, the mark of intellectual dignity, the
genius of cultivated reason, the wisdom of being guided by pro
gressive thought, of replacing old fancies with new realities, of
proving all things and holding fast that which reason and
experience, not tradition and theology, decide to be true ; of
resisting to the very utmost all despotic sway over the intellect,
and of vindicating to the fullest extent the right of personal
independence. The advantage of unbelief is shown in its inspiring
mankind, not, in the words of Tyndall, “ to purchase intellectual
peace at the price of intellectual death. The world is not with
out refugees of this description, nor is it wanting in persons who
seek their shelter and try to persuade others to do the same. I
would exhort you to refuse such shelter, and to scorn such base
repose—to accept, if the choice be forced upon you. commotion
before stagnation, the leap of the torrent before the stillness of
the swamp. In the one there is, at all events, life, and therefore
hope ; in the other, none.” This, then, is the essence of unbelief
—not blind adherence to the past, but a loyal allegiance to the
ever-present. If it is asked what should a person disbelieve ? the
�THE GLORY OF UNBELIEF.
23
■answer is, everything that he cannot believe after honest investi
gation. Secularism condemns no one for not believing that
which fails to commend itself to his or her reason and judgment.
Hence, we do not believe in the necessity of priestcraft, the
wisdom of allowing the church to control the education of the
young, the necessary inferiority of women, the utility of death
bed repentance, and finality in thought, morality, or religion.
But we do believe in the right of individual opinion, unfettered
reason, moral excellence and intellectual discipline.
Unbelief asserts that every man and woman should be allowed
absolute freedom to test every religion by the light of reason,
and then either to accept one or reject all in accordance with the
dictates of his or her understanding ! By the revival of learning
at the Renaissance a great impetus and new momentum were
imparted to the human mind. The limits beyond which the
Roman Church had for centuries prohibited any advance, on
pain of the axe, the rack, the dungeon, and the stake, were now
overstepped by the aspiring, emancipated intellect. Those old
landmarks of the limits of former inquiry were now justly
despised, as the memorials of barbarian ignorance; and an appeal
was made from the dogmas of sacerdotal authority to human
nature, human science, and human thought. This latter, the
intellect, again asserted its supremacy, as it had of old time in
Greece and Rome. A bright and radiant future was before it;
it stood, as it were, upon an elevation from which it could take
a wide and enlightened survey of the complicated interests of
life. The master-spirits of the age soon proclaimed their deliver
ance from an irrational and degrading bondage, and demanded
that the nations of the European world should come out of the
darkness, the Egyptian bondage, of old Rome’s superstitions, to
emancipate themselves, to assert the dignity of their nature, and
to maintain the potency of their reason.
Mental freedom being secured, Unbelief refuses to be again
fettered; it has gone on from discovery to discovery; it has
tested the value of the cardinal doctrines of orthodox Christi
anity—tested them and found them worthless. What has now
�24
THE GLORY OF UNBELIEF.
become of the Genesaic theory of the creation of the world ?
what of the age of the earth ? what of the origin of sin and evil ?
what of the doctrine of human depravity ? what of the belief in the
vicarious sufferings of Christ ? what of the old notion of eternal
punishment ? what of the destruction of the world by the deluge ?
what of the exodus of the Jews from Egypt ? what of the miracles
of Joshua, Elijah, and Elisha? what of the age of the Pentateuch?
what of the contention for the verbal inspiration of the Scriptures ?
whatof the testimony respecting the Jesus Christ of the four Gospels ?
It is well known what science says to all these old-world doc
trines. It simply discredits them ; treats them as figments of
the undisciplined imagination, and passes them by as unworthy
of serious notice. This has been the noble work of Unbelief.
Being unbelievers in orthodoxy we prefer fact to fiction, reality
to imagination, and good conduct to mere profession 1 In the
words of Mazzini: “We propose progressive improvement, the
transformation of the corrupted medium in which we are now
living, the overthrow of all idolatries, shams, lies and conven
tionalities. We want man to be not the poor, passive, cowardly
phantasmagoric unreality of the actual time, thinking in one
way and acting in another, bending to a power which he hates
or despises, carrying empty Popish or Thirty-nine Article formu
laries on his breast and none within. We would make man a
fragment of the living truth—a real individual, being linked to
collective humanity, the bold seeker of things to come, the gentle,
mild, loving, yet firm uncompromising apostle of all that is great,
heroic and good.” Herein lies the Glory of Unbelief.
�
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The glory of unbelief
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Place of publication: Toronto
Collation: 24 p. ; 22 cm.
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Watts, Charles, 1836-1906
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[1890]
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Atheism
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Atheism
Secularism
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iTftg Atheistic ffllaffarm*
VI.
‘
z 4’- ■
NATURE
AND
THE GODS.
ARTHUR B. MOSS.
LONDON:
FREETHOUGHT
PUBLISHING
63, FLEET STREET, E.C.
1 8 8 4.
PRICE
ONE
PENNY.
COMPANY,
�THE ATHEISTIC PLATFORM.
-------------
Under this title it is proposed to issue a fortnightly publi
cation, each number of which shall consist of a lecture
delivered by a well-known Freethoug’ht advocate. Any
question may be selected, provided that it has formed the
subject of a lecture delivered from the platform by an
Atheist. It is desired to show that the Atheistic platform
is used for the service of humanity, and that Atheists war
against tyranny of every kind, tyranny of king and god,
political, social, and theological.
Each issue will consist of sixteen pages, and will be
published at one penny. Each writer is responsible only
for his or her own views.
I. “ What is the use of Prayer ?” By Annie Besant.
II. “ Mind considered as a Bodily Function.”
Alice Bradlaugh.
III. “ The Gospel of Evolution.”
ling, D.Sc.
IV. “Englxnd’s Balance-Sheet.”
laugh.
V. “The Story
of the
Soup, n.”
By
By Edward Ave-
By Charles Brad
By Annie Besant.
�NATURE AND THE GODS.
Ladies and Gentdeaien,—No word has played a more
important part in the discussion of scientific and philo
sophical questions than the word Nature. Everyone
thinks he knows the mbaning of it. Yet how few have
used it to express the same idea; indeed it has been
•employed to convey such a variety of impressions that
John Stuart Mill asserts that it has been the “fruitful
source” of the propagation of “false taste, false philo
sophy, false morality, and even bad law.” Now, I propose
in this lecture that we start with some clear ideas concern
ing the meaning of such words, upon the right understand
ing of which the whole force of my arguments depends.
What, then, is meant by the word Nature ? When used
by a materialist it has two important meanings. In its
large and philosophical sense it means, as Mr. Mill says:
‘ ‘ The sum of all ph.8enom.ena, together with the causes
which produce them, including not only all that happens,
but all that is capable of happening—the unused capabili
ties of matter being as much a part of the idea of Nature
as those which take effect.” But the wor^. Nature is often
used, and rightly used, to distinguish the “natural ” from
the “artificial” object—that is, to indicate the difference
between a thing produced spontaneously by Nature, from
a thing wrought by the skill and labor of man.
But it must not be supposed that the artificial object
forms no part of Nature. All art belongs to Nature. Art
simply means the adaptation, the moulding into certain
forms of the things of Nature, and therefore the artistic
productions of man are included in the comprehensive
’sense of the term Nature which I just now used.
�84
THE ATHEISTIC PLATFORM.
Now in Nature there is a permanent and a changeableelement, but man only takes cognisance of the changeable
or pheenomenal element; of the substratum underlying phe
nomena he knows and can know nothing whatever ; that is,
man does not know what matter and force are in them
selves in the abstract, he only knows them in the concrete,
as they affect him through the medium of his senses.
Now I allege that nearly all the mistakes of theology
have arisen from the ignorance of man in regard to Nature
and her mode of operation. Let us consider for a moment
a few facts in reference to man. Of course I don’t want to
take you back to his origin. But suppose we go back no
further than a few thousand years, we shall find that man
lived in holes in the earth; that he moved about in fear
and trembling; that not only did he fight against bis
fellow creatures, but that he went in constant fear of animals who sought him as their prey. Under these eiroirmstances he looked to Nature for assistance. He felt how
itnspeakab'ly helpless he was, and he cried aloud for help.
(Sometimes he imagined that he received what in his,
agony he had yearned for. Then it was that he thought
that Nature was most kind. Perhaps he wanted food to
eat and had tried in vain to procure it. But presently a
poor beast comes across his path, and he slays it and satis
fies his hunger. Or perhaps he himself is in danger. A
ferocious animal is in pursuit of him and he sees no means
of escape, but presently comes in view a narrow stream of
water which he can swim across, but which his pursuer
cannot. When he is again secure he utters a deep sigh of
relief. In time he makes rapid strides of progress. He
learns to keep himself warm while the animals about him
are perishing with cold; he learns to make weapons where
with to destroy l^s enemies; but his greatest triumph of
all is when he has learned howto communicate his thoughts
to his fellows. Up to now it would be pretty safe to say
that, man was destitute of all ideas concerning the existence of god or gods. But he advances one stage further,
and his thoughts begin to take something like definite
shape. He forms for himself a theoiy as to the cause of
the events happening about him. And now the reign of
the gods begins. Man is still a naked savage; as Voltaire
truly says : ‘ ‘ Man had only his bare skin, which continu
ally exposed to the sun, rain and hail, became chapped,
�NATURE AND THE GODS.
85
tanned, and spotted. The male in our continent was dis
figured by spare hairs on his body, which rendered him
frightful without covering him. His face was hidden by
these hairs. His skin became a rough soil which bore a
.forest of stalks, the roots of which tended upwards and the
branches of which grew downwards. It was in this state
that this animal ventured to paint god, when in course of
time he learnt the art of description ” (“ Philosophical Dic
tionary,” vol. ii., page 182).
Naturally enough man’s first objects of worship were
fetishes—gods of wood, stone, trees, fire, water. By-andbye, however, he came to worship living beings; in fact,
-any animal that he thought was superior in any way to.
himself was converted into an object of worship. But
none of these gods were of any assistance to him in pro
moting his advancement in the world. And neither did
he receive any assistance from the spontaneous action of
Nature. In fact he advanced in the road of civilisation
■only in proportion as he offered ceaseless war against the
hurtful forces of nature, using one force to counteract the
■destructive character of another. Think what the earth
must have been without a solitary house upon it, without
a man who yet knew how to till the soilI Must it not have
been a howling wilderness fit only for savage beasts and
brutal barbarians? In course of time, however, man
made great' strides. He began to live in communities,
which. afterwards grew into nations. He betook himself
also to the art of agriculture, and supplied himself and his
fellows with good, nutritious food. And with this growth
of man the gods underwent a similar transition. Now
instead of bowing down before fetishes, man transferred
his worship to gods and goddesses who were supposed to
dwell somewhere in the sky. And these gods were of a
•very peculiar kind. Each of them had a separate depart
ment to himself and performed only a certain class of
actions. One made the sun to shine and the trees to grow;
one had a kind of dynamite factory to himself, and manu
factured lightning and thunder; another was a god of
love ; another secretary for war; another perpetual presi
dent of the Celestial Peace Society. Some had several
heads; some had only one eye or one arm; some had
wings, while others appeared like giants, and hurled
.thunderbolts at the heads of unoffending people. But
�86
THE ATHEISTIC PLATFORM.
these gods were of no more service to man than those that
preceded them. If man advanced it was by his own effort,
by virtue of using his intelligence, by strife, warfare, and
by suffering.
Neither Nature nor the gods taught man to be truth
ful, honest, just, nor even to be clean. No god came to
tell him that he must not lie, nor steal, nor murder. All
virtues are acquired, all are the result of education. And
it was only after coming together and being criticised by
one another; men being criticised by women who no
doubt taught them that when they came a-wooing they
would have a very slight chance if they were not clean and
respectable; living in societies and being governed by
the wisest among their fellows, who were able to judge as
to what kind of actions produced the most beneficial
results, that laws against theft, adultery, and murder, and
other evil actions, were established. From Polytheism, or
belief in many gods, the next great step was to Mono
theism, or belief in one god. This was an important
transition, and meant the clearing from the heavens of
many fictitious deities. But though the monotheist
believed only in one god, that did not prevent others from
believing in an entirely different deity. The ancient Jew
worshipped Jahveh, but that did not prevent the Baalites
from having a god of their own, to whom they could
appeal in the hour of need. And just let me here observe
that the early monotheist always worshipped an anthropo
morphic or man-like deity. And he worshipped such a
god because man was the highest being of whom he had
any conception. His god was always the counterpart of
himself and reflected all the characteristics of his own
nature. Was he brutal and licentious? So was his god.
Was he in’favor of aggressive wars? Sowas his god.
Was he a petty tyrant, in favor of slavery? So was his
god. Was he a polygamist? Sowas his god. Was he
ignorant of the facts of life ? So was his god. Was he
revengeful and relentless ? So was his god.
And in whatever book we find a deity described as a
malevolent or fiendish wretch depend upon it, by what
ever name that book may be known, and by whomsoever
it may be reverenced, it was written by one who possessed
in his own person precisely the same characteristics as»
those he depicted in the character of his deity.
�NATUIIE AND TlTE GODS.
Th e Jewish, god, Jahveh, it must be understood, was not
a spiritual being, although it is sometimes pretended that
he was. No. He was a purely material being. True he
lived somewhere up above, but he made very frequent
visits to the earth. Once he walked in the garden of Eden
“in the cool of day,” or “his voice” did for him (Gen.
iii., 8). Once he stood upon a mountain, whither Moses,
Aaron, Nadab and Abihu had gone to hold a consultation
with him (Ex. xxiv., 10). Once he talked with Moses
“face to face” (Ex. xxxiii., 11).
And not only was Jahveh a material being, but on the
whole he was not a very formidable deity. In point of
truth he was a very little fellow. And by way of diversion
he was sometimes drawn about in a small box, or ark,
two feet long and three feet wide (Sam. vi., 6, 7). As
evidence that even among professional Christians to-day
Jahveh is not looked upon as a very stalwart fellow, Mr.
Edward Gibson, in the House of Commons, a short time
ago said that if Mr. Bradlaugh were admitted into that
assembly the effect of it would be that god would be
“thrown out of the window.”
And if you want to find a man with “small ideas” on
general matters it is only necessary to know the kind of
god he worships to be able to determine the intellectual
width and depth of such a man’s mind.
Why is this ? Because all ideas of god were born in
the fertile imaginations of men, and a man’s idea of god
is invariably the exact measurement of himself, morally
and intellectually. It may be urged by some Theists that
man is indebted to Jahveh for his existence, and that he
owes his moral and intellectual advancement to the fact
that this deity, through the medium of Moses and the
other inspired writers, laid down certain commandments
for his guidance in life. When it is remembered, however,
that if man is indebted in any way to Jahveh for his ex
istence, he owes him only the exact equivalent of the
benefits he has received, I think it will be seen that on the
whole man’s indebtedness to this deity is very small indeed.
Was Adam indebted to Jahveh for the imperfect nature
which compelled him to commit the so-called sin which
imperilled the future destiny of human race ? Were all
the “miserable sinners”—the descendants of the first
pair—indebted to Jahveh for their “corrupt” natures?
�88
THE ATHEISTIC PEATFORM.
If yes, what kind of god was man indebted to ? To a god
who once drowned the whole of mankind except one family ?
To a god who said that he was a jealous being who “ visir ted the sins of the father upon the children unto a third
and fourth generation (Ex. xx., 5) ? To a god who sanc
tioned slavery (Lev. xxv., 44, 45) and injustice of all
kinds ? To a god who said “ thou shalt not suffer a witch
to live” (Ex. xxii., 18), and gave instructions for men to
kill the blasphemers among their fellows (Lev. xxiv., 16) ?
To a god who told Moses to go against the Midianites and
slay every man among them, preserving only the virgins
among the women to satisfy the lustful natures of a brutal
horde of soldiers (Numbers xxxi., 7—18) ? To a god to
whom, as Shelley says, the only acceptable offerings were
the steam of slaughter, the dissonance of groans, and
the flames of a desolate land” (Dialogue between
“ Eusebes and Theosophus,” prose writings, page 300) ? I
deny that man has ever been in any way indebted to such
a god, and I say moreover that such a deity never had any
leal existence, except in the base imaginations of ignorant
and brutal men. But the next stage was from the
material to the spiritual god. Many ages must have
elapsed before this more elevating though equally absurd
belief_ became to be accepted, ^ven by a small minority of
mankind. But the time eventually did come—a time
which happily is now rapidly passing away—when intel
lectual men believed that the proposition of the existence
of god could be demonstrated to all rational minds. Some
said that god’s existence was self-evident to every intelli
gent mind; others that Nature and men could not have
come by “chance”; that they must have had a cause;
some said that the harmony existing’ in the universe proved
god’s existence; others that everybody except fools “felt
in their hearts ” that there was a god. But these imagin
ary proofs did not always convince. At last there came
forth philosophers who said that there was a mode of
reasoning, the adoption of which “leads irresistibly up to
the belief in god,” and that that mode was called the
mode a priori. Another school said that the a priori, or
reasoning from cause to effect, was an altogether fallacious
method, and that the only satisfactory mode of establish
ing god’s existence was the d posteriori, or reasoning from'
effect to cause.
�NATURE AND THE GODS.
89
Another school said that taken singly neither of these
modes of reasoning established the existence of deity, but
that both taken together “formed a perfect chain” of
reasoning that was quite conclusive on the point. Neither
of these schools, however, showed how two bad arguments
could possibly make one good one. But let me iust briefly
examine these arguments put forward so confidently by
leading Theists. The first method—d priori—invariably
takes the form of an attempt to establish what is called a
Great hirst Cause.”.
When it is said, that there must be a “first cause” to
account for the existence of Nature, such language, to say
the least, shows a total misapprehension of the meaning of
e word cause,” as used by scientific men, “ First
cause, as applied to Nature as a whole, remembering the
definition I have given, is an absurdity. Cause and effect
apply only to phenomena. Each effect is a cause of some
subsequent effect, and each cause is an effect of some
antecedent cause. The phaenomena of the universe form a
complete chain of causes and effects, and in an infinite
. regression there can be no first cause. Let me explain
what I mean more fully. For instance, here is a chainsuppose it is to form a perfect circle, every link in which
is perfect; now if you were to go round and round this
cham from now to doomsday you would never come to the
first lmk It is the same m Nature. You can go back,
and back, and back through successive causes and effects
but you will never come to a “first cause ” ; you will not
be able to say “here is the end of Nature, and here the
beginning of something else.” There is no brick wall to
mark the boundary line of Nature. You cannot “look
through Nature up to Nature’s God,”—the poet Pope not
withstanding—for Nature seems endless, and you can
neither penetrate her heights nor fathom her depths. And
1 have one other word to say in reference to this d priori
method, before finally disposing of it. It is this, that it is
an altogether unscientific method. Man knows nothing
whatever of cause except in the sense that in the imme
diate antecedent of an effect. Man’s experience is of effects •
these he takes cognisance of; of these he has some know
ledge but of cause, except as a means to an end, he has none.
But this brings me to the second mode of reasoning in
proof of God s existence, the d posteriori, and this has one
�90
THE ATHEISTIC PLATFORM.
advantage in its favor, and that is, that it is a scientific
method. It reasons from known effects up to the supposed
causes of them. Now this generally assumes the form,
no matter under what guise, of the famous 1 ‘ design argu
ment.” Dr. Paley stated it many years ago, and it has not
been much improved since his day. It is generally stated
m this way: “The world exhibits marks of design; that
design must have had a designer; that designer must be
a person ; that person is God.” A number of illustrations
are then brought forward to support this contention. For
instance, it is argued that when a man observes a watch
or a telescope, or any article that has been made to answer
a certain purpose, and the mechanism of which is sc>
adjusted as to effect the desired object, it is said that from
the marks of design or contrivance observed .in the
mechanism, he infers that these articles are the products
of some human designer. And so it is said that when we
look around the world and see how beautifully things are
designed, the eye to see, the ear to hear; how admirably
things are adapted the one to the other, are we not justi
fied by similar reasoning in concluding that these are the
productions of an almighty and infinite designer ? Briefly
stated that is the argument. Now' let me examine it.
And in the first place it will be observed that it is assumed
that- there is a great resemblance between the works of
Nature and the artistic works of man. But is this really a
fact? Man simply moulds natural objects into certain
forms; they are then called artificial objects. We know
that man designs watches and telescopes; it is a fact
within our experience. But there is not the slightest
similarity between the process of manufacture and the
natural process of growth; so that when we see various
objects of Nature, we do not conclude, however har
moniously the parts may work together, that they were
designed. We know a manufactured article from a natural
object, we could not mistake the one for the other. But
let us suppose that we did not know' that men made
watches; it is very probable that we should then think
that a watch was not made at all, but that it was a natural
object. Take an illustration. Suppose that I were to lay
a watch upon the earth somew'here in South Africa:
suppose that in a short time a savage wandering near the
spot where the watch was deposited should observe it,
�.NATURE AND THE GODS.
should take it into his hand and handle it—I am assuming’
that the savage had never seen a watch before, and was .
not aware that men designed and constructed watches— fl
think you that he would for a moment notice that it
exhibited marks of design? No, I think he would be morelikely to come to the opinion that it was alive. The design <■
argument therefore is purely an argument drawn from
experience. But what experience has man of god?
Speaking for myself I can say that I have absolutely no-1. '■'u
experience of him at all, and I am not acquainted with
anybody who has. Man does not know god as a designer
or constructor; he neither knows of his capabilities, nor
his existence; and he therefore cannot reasonably say that
god is the designer of anything.
The human eye is very often adduced by the Theist as
an illustration of design. Now nobody can deny that the
eye is a delicate, complicated, and beautiful structure ; no- '
body could fail to see and acknowledge with feelings of
admiration the wonderful adjustment and harmonious uj
working of its various parts; and all would readily ac
knowledge how admirably it is fitted to perform its func
tions. But yet to acknowledge all this is not to admit
that the eye is designed. To point to the combinations
and conditions which produce this result, without showing
that these conditions were designed, is to beg the whole
question. And it must be distinctly understood that the
onus probandi, as the lawyers say, lies with the affirmer of
the design argument and not with him who does not see
evidence in it sufficient to command belief. To show that
a thing is capable of effecting a certain result does not
prove that it was designed for that purpose.
For example. I hold this glass in my hand; I now re
lease my hold from it and it instantly falls to the ground ;
that does not surely prove either that I was designed to
hold up that glass, or that the glass was designed to fall ; | ]
on withdrawing my grasp from it. At most it only proves
that I am capable of holding it, and that when I release it,
it is impelled by the law of gravitation to fall towards the
earth.
But there is another view of this question I wish to pre
sent to you. From this argument it is not quite clear that
there is only one supreme god of the universe. Admit
tedly this is an argument based upon experience. What
�92
THE ATHEISTIC PLATFORM.
does experience teach us in respect to a person ? Simply
this. That a person must have an organisation, and a
person with an organisation must he a limited being. Has
god an organisation ? If he has not, he cannot be intelli
gent, cannot perceive, recollect, judge; and if he has,
then an organisation implies contrivance, and contrivance
implies a contriver, and this again instead of leading up to
one god, leads to an innumerable tribe of deities each
mightier and more complicated than the other.
If the Theist retorts that a person need not have an
■organisation, the Atheist at once replies that neither need
the designer of Nature be a person.
But these are not the only objections to be used against
the design argument. The d priori theologians have some
very potent arguments to advance. Mr. William Gillespie
has discovered twenty-four defects of d posteriori arguments,
and I think he has conclusively shown that all the attri
butes claimed for deity are impeached by this method.
In my humble opinion the design argument has grown
•out of the arrogance and conceit of man, who imagines
that the earth and all the things existing upon it were
•created especially for his benefit.
Suppose that I admit that there is design in Nature, the
Theist has then to account for some awkward and many
horrible designs. How will he get over the fact that
Nature is one vast battle-field on which all fife is engaged
in warfare ? What goodness will he see in the design
that gives the strong and cunning the advantage over the
weak and simple ? What beneficence will he detect in the
fact that all animals ‘‘prey” upon one another? and that
man is not exempt from the struggle ? Famine destroys
thousands ; earthquakes desolate a land; and what tongue
-can tell the anguish and pain endured by the very poor in
all great countries of the earth? Think of the “ills to
which flesh is heir.” Think of the diseases from which
so many thousands suffer. Think how many endure agony
from cancer or tumor, how many have within their bodies
parasites which locate themselves in the fiver, the muscles,
and the intestines, causing great agony and sometimes
death. Think how many are born blind and how many
become sightless on account of disease. Think of the deaf
and the dumb, and of the poor idiots who pass a dreary
mid useless existence in asylums. Then think of the acci-
�NATURE ANU THE GODS.
dents to which all men are liable. Think of the many
who are killed or injured on railways every year. Think of men and boys who injure or destroy their limbs in
machinery during the performance of their daily work.
Think of the thousands who find a premature and watery
grave. In one of our London workhouses I saw recently
a young man who had met with a dreadful accident; who
had had his hand frightfully lacerated by a circular saw,
which will prevent him from ever working again. Think
of his suffering. Think of the misery his wife and chil
dren will have to bear on account of it. It almost makes
one shed bitter tears to think of it; and yet we are to be
told, we who are striving to alleviate suffering and mit,igate the evils which afflict our fellow creatures, we are to
be told that an infinitely wise and good god designs these
things.
Oh the blasphemy of it! Surely an infinite fiend could
not do worse; and if I thought that Nature were intelli
gent, that Nature knew of the suffering she inflicted on all
kinds of living beings and had the power to prevent it, but
would not, I would curse Nature even though the curse in
volved for me a sudden and painful death. But Nature
heareth not man’s protests or appeals—she is blind to his
sufferings and deaf to his prayers.
Oh, but it’s said: “ See what harmony there is in the
Universe : ” per se there is neither harmony nor chaos in
Nature; we call that harmony which pleasantly affects us,
and that chaos which does the reverse. Some Theist may
say: “ Suppose that I grant that I cannot prove that god
exists, what then ? You cannot prove your own existence,
and yet you believe that you exist.” I am well aware that
I cannot prove my own existence; I don’t want to prove
it; it’s a fact, and it stands for itself—to me it is not a
matter of belief, it is a matter of certainty. I know that
I exist. Cannot god make the evidence of his existence as
clear as my own is to me ? If he cannot, what becomes of
his power ? and if he will not, what of his goodness ?
And it must be remembered that there are thousands of
intelligent Atheists in the world to-day. Now, either god
does not wish man to believe in him, or if he does he lacks the power to produce conviction. 0 Theist—you who
profess to be conversant with the ways of the almighty—
explain to me, now, how it is that in proportion as men
�•94
THE ATHEISTIC PLATFORM.
•cultivate their minds and reason on theological questions
that the tendency is for them to disbelieve even in the
ethereal deity of modern Theism. And it will not do in
the nineteenth century to put Jesus forward as a god. He
was no god. He possessed many good qualities, no doubt,
as a man—but not one attribute which is claimed for god.
He was neither all-wise, nor all-good, nor all-powerful, and
he was only a finite being. And how can it be pretended
by sensible persons that a finite man living on the earth,
born of a woman, and dying like any other ordinary being,
could possibly be the infinite god of the Universe ? Is it
not absurd ? I cannot believe it, and anybody with brains
that devotes a moment’s thought to the matter, must ac
knowledge either that it is incomprehensible, or that it is
monstrously absurd.
In this country we are not asked to believe in any of the
“foreign gods”—the gods of ancient Greece or Home—
the gods of China, India, or Egypt, etc.—and we need not
now discuss as to how far these deities have influenced
human conduct for good or for ill. England, as a civilised
country, is not very old. And civilisation has always
meant a banishment of the gods. While men considered
how to please the gods, they neglected in a great measure
the work of the world. As Plato said : “ The gods only
help those who help themselves.” Well they are just the
persons who do not want help ; and I shall never worship
any god who leaves the helpless and the unfortunate to
perish.
If god only “helps those who help themselves,” he
might as well leave the helping alone, because even as
we find the world to-day, the whole of life seems to be
based on the principle that, “ unto him that hath shall be
given, and he shall have in abundance, and from him that
hath not shall be taken away even that which he seemeth
to have.” The man who has a strong constitution may
struggle successfully in the world; the man with great
affluence may win an easy victory over his fellows; the
man who has plenty of “influential friends” has good
prospects ; but the poor, the weakly, the ignorant, what
hope have they—they have to suffer and toil, and toil and
suffer from the cradle to the tomb.
How is it, then, you may ask, if man has received no
assistance from without, either from Nature or the gods,
�NATURE AND THE GODS.
95
that he has achieved such splendid results in the world ?
The answer is simple enough. The great struggle for life
—the desire to get food, clothing, habitation, comfort—
these have been the motives which have urged men on.
The desire to get food caused men to till the soil, and, as
the demand increased, the methods of cultivation improved;
with improved taste came improved raiment and dwellings
for the rich; plain dress and decent habitation for the
poor. Men having given up the worship of Nature, began
to study her; they found that by diligent investigation,
and the application of their augmented knowledge, they
were able to beautify the world, and render their lives
happy. Then we began to have great scientific discoveries.
Navigation, steam-power, telegraphy, electricity; by a
knowledge of the use of these powers man has been able
to conquer the destructive character of many natural
forces, and to transfer a world of misery into a home
of comparative comfort. And I say that the world is
indebted far more to those who built houses, made
clothes, navigated ships, made machinery, wrote books,
than to all the gods and their clerical representatives the
world has ever known. Belief in god never helped a man
to supersede the sailing vessel by the steamship, the old
coach by the railroad, the scythe by the reaping machine,
nor the fastest locomotion by the telegraph wires. Man’s
necessities ahured him on to all these achievements. One
Stephenson is worth a thousand priests—one Edison of
more value to the world than all the gods ever pictured by
the imagination. And we must not forget the men who freed
the human intellect from the fetter's of a degrading supersti
tion. We must n ot forget what the world owes to our Brunos,
our Spinozas, our Voltaires, our Paines, .our Priestleys; for
these, by teaching men to rely on their reason, have opened
out channels of thought that were previously closed, and
mines of intellectual and material wealth that have since
yielded great results. And so it must now be said that
man is master of Nature, and he finds that she is just as
good as a servant as she was bad as a master.
But the earth is not yet a Paradise. Theology is not yet
entirely banished; the debris of the decayed beliefs still
cumber our path and impede our progress. There is
even now much that remains to be done. Plenty of labor
to be performed. Ignorance, poverty, and crime and
�96
THE ATHEISTIC PLATFORM.
misery still exist and exert their evil influence in the
world. The philanthropist and the reformer have still
their work to do. The ignorant have yet to he instructed,
the hungry have yet to bo fed, the homeless have yet to be
provided for. And I have come to the opinion after years
of experience, that ignorance is the. real cause of all the
misery and suffering in the world: that that man is truly
wise who sees that it is against his own interest to do a
paltry act, to perform an evil deed. All actions carry with
them their consequences, and you can no more escape the
effects of your evil deeds than you ('an evade the law of
gravitation, or elude the grim monster Death when the
dread hour arrives.
No. If you would be happy you must act virtuously—
act as you would desire all others to do to promote your
happiness. Say to yourselves : if every one were to act
as I am doing, would the world he benefited ? and if you
come to the opinion that th<* world would not be improved
by such conduct, depend upon it your actions are not good.
Remember that once you perform a deed in Nature it is
irrevocable ; and if it is bad repentance is worse than use
less. All actions either have an evil or a good result.
Every deed leaves its indelible impress on the book of
Nature, from which no leaves can be torn and nothing can
be expunged. And remember, too, that the man who
makes his fellow-creatures happy cannot displease a god
who is good; and a god who is not good is neither deserv
ing of admiration nor service.
An infinite and all-powerful god cannot need the assist
ance of man ; but man needs the assistance of his brothers
and sisters to diffuse the glorious light of knowledge
through the world; needs assistance to alleviate suffering,
to remove injustice, and secure the possibility of freedom
and happiness for all. Therefore I urge you td abate not
your enthusiasm, but work bravely on: and when the
evening of your life approaches, with wife by your side
and your children playing joyously about you, with many
friends to cheer and thank you—then will you know that
vour life’s labor has not been in vain.
Printed by Annie Besant and Charles Bradlaugh, at 63, Fleet
Street, London, E.C.—1881.
�
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Nature and the gods
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Moss, Arthur B.
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An account of the resource
Place of publication: London
Collation: [83]-96 p. ; 18 cm.
Series title: Atheistic Platform
Series number: 6
Notes: Printed by Annie Besant and Charles Bradlaugh. Part of the NSS pamphlet collection.
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Freethought Publishing Company
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1884
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Atheism
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Atheism
Gods
Nature
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B3S
NATIONAL secular
5
conex-
THERE IS A GOD.
’•
“ This Plea for Atheism,” writes Mr. Bradlaugh in
conclusion to the pamphlet bearing that tit le, “ is put
forth as a challenge to Theists to do battle for their cause.”
The challenge we step forward to accept, but wish
beforehand our intentions to be clearly understood, and
our mode of warfare as well aB our plan of battle, briefly
explained.
If we accept, it is not with even the remotest fear as
regards the strength of our cause, which is in no want of
a champion, and has stood for ages by its own unassailable
force. Nor do we dread that our adversary may succeed
in imbuing the minds of his numerous hearers and readers
with anything like the Atheism of which he professes to
be so profoundly convinced. In so momentous a question,
however, as that of the existence of God, were he to
succeed only to raise the shadow of a doubt in the minds
of his hearers, that shadow would, we feel certain, be
attended with the most fatal results. There are moments
when men, urged onwards by the torrent of their pas
sions, would not—even though sure of eternal torments
immediately following their act—hesitate to commit crime;
and much more numerous still are the occasions on
which they would act, if they could only imagine that
they doubted of the existence of a Supreme Avenger
of guilt. We do not here intend to affirm that Mr.
Bradlaugh upholds a system of direct immorality; we only
point out the reasons which make it worth our while to
oppose him. The apparent doubt* he may too often raise
• We employ purposely the words, apparent doubt, to mean a pretext
for acting as if there were a real doubt. Whether we admit or no that
there can be a real doubt as to the existence of God, will appear in our
answers to the objections.
�THERE IS A GOD.
fig
minds of uninstructed men removes a check to crime
®jB»<'heck which, however powerless it may be in the great
^^■xysms of passion, is most certainly of continual use in
rne ordinary circumstances of life. So, in endeavouring to
’confute Mr. Brad laugh, and prove the existence of God,
we are actuated by the hope of destroying the mists he
may have raised in some minds, of hindering them from
being raised in others, and thus, of contributing indirectly
to public morality and virtue, by defending the strongest
of all checks to immorality and vice.
In this essay we shall oppose Mr. Bradlaugh’s theories
in one way, and in one way only, i.e., by appealing to
common sense. We are convinced that the common sense
of a moderately intelligent and earnest man suffices amply
to solve the problem,—and for a good reason too. If
God’s existence could be proved only by abstruse meta
physical demonstrations, the immense majority of mankind
would never understand, and consequently would have a
right to doubt them. But one cannot at the same time
be a doubter and a believer; so iu that case the immense
majority of men would have a right to be practically
Atheists. That, of course, is what we must necessarily
deny ; and our denial supposes that the fact of God’s
existence can be made clear, even to the uninstructed, by
the only method of reasoning which they possess,—com
mon sense.
We therefore, keeping as closely as possible to this plan
of action all through,* except where the arguments of our
adversary oblige us to follow him on to metaphysical
ground, intend firstly to state the objections against
Theism, which have led Mr. Bradlaugh to reject that doc
trine, expounding his arguments, not of course at length
and in his own terms, but with their full force of argument,
and indeed trying rather to add strength to them than to
* We must make an exception for one of the proofs of God’s exist
ence, based upon the existence of eternal truth ; but this proof is so
beautiful and so conclusive to a reflecting- mind that we could not leave
it out. As for the others, if they are found too metaphysical, we can
only say that we have done our best to make them plain, clear, and
intelligible to all.
’
�THERE 13 A GOD.
5
lessen their power. We shall then set forth the con
clusions to which he has arrived, or, in other words, ex
pound the Atheistic system set up by him. All this part of
the discussion is required by the commonest sense of fair
play and impartiality ; and our side being the side of truth,
we feel free to give the opposite party the first innings.
We then, of course, proceed to point out the shortcomings
of his system, and then to demonstrate the truth of our
own.
After the demonstration, we might leave Mr. Bradlaugh’s
objections unanswered ; when the truth of a proposition is
proved, the arguments against it are evidently false. Still,
it would hardly be just or polite to refuse answering such
easily solvable objections; for we may inform Mr. Brad
laugh that there are other difficulties much more subtle,
and much less easy to be apswered, than those he brings
forward. When he finds them out we shall be willing to
try our hand at solving them as well as we can. In the
meanwhile we shall endeavour to conclude this essay by
answering satisfactorily to the objections which to our
adversary appear so weighty and so important.
It will first be necessary to state them, i.e., the principal
ones. Mr. Bradlaugh has published two pamphlets on the
question of Theism ; the first entitled, “Is there a God?”
and the second, “A Plea for Atheism.” In his debates he
generally either attacks Theism connected with some
peculiar religious system, or, when he brings out a direct
argument against the existence of God, he only repeats
what has already been written in the above-mentioned
essays; so it becomes unnecessary to quote anything of
his debates, except one or two seemingly new arguments
against Mr. Cooper.
First of all, let us take some selections from the essay,
“Is there a God?” Mr. Bradlaugh accepts Professor
Flint’s definition of God : A supreme, self existent, the one
infinite, eternal, omnipotent, omniscient, unchangeable,
righteous and benevolent, Personal Being, creator and pre
server of nature, maker of heaven and earth, who is distinct
from, and independent of what He has created, who is a
free, loving, supreme, moral intelligence, the governor of
�6
THERE IS A GOD.
nations, the heavenly father and judge of man. Thia defini
tion once set down, he proceeds to deny the existence of a
being corresponding to the definition.
1. * According to Professor Flint, God is the Supreme
Being. Now, (as Mr. Bradlaugh argues,) according to
reason He cannot be supreme. But what is at once su
preme and not supreme is absurd : therefore the idea of
God involves an absurdity. That God is supreme, ac
cording to Professor Flint, is undoubtedly true. That, ac
cording to reason, He cannot be supreme is also evident;
for the definition supposes Him to be infinite. Now, “su
preme" is a superlative, and includes the idea of a com
parison made between two or more individuals. But there
are not, there cannot be, two infinite beings to compare
together: therefore God cannot be called infinite by relation
to any other such being. Neither can He be said to be
supreme in relation to finite beings, for between the Infinite
and the finite there is no proportion, and consequently all
comparison is impossible. But even allowing comparison
to be possible, God would not always have been supreme;
for Professor Flint affirms Creation, and God would only
have been supreme over finite beings since then ; be
fore, there could be no comparison, as there was nothing
to compare ; now, the idea of God having become supreme,
after having been otherwise, gives us to conclude that His
very definition has been changed, whereas Professor Flint
says He is unchangeable.
2. Secondly, if God existed, He would be Creator and
not Creator at one and the same time; which being absurd,
it follows that God does not exist. Creator according to
the definition itself, not Creator because of the impossi
bility of creation. Creation is the making of existence ;
now, if existence were made, before it was made nothing
existed, for what could exist when existence itself had not
been made yet? Now, it is impossible to admit that at any
moment of the past there existed nothing at all; otherwise
whence would that which now exists come from ? So
existence must have always existed, and cannot have been
• The numbers refer to the answers, infra.
�THERE IS A GOD.
7
made; therefore creation is impossible, and God is at once
Creator and not Creator: which is absurd.
3. Thirdly, God would be at the same time infinitely
benevolent and not infinitely benevolent,—a self-contra
dictory proposition. All the difficulty, admitting that Pro
fessor Flint proves Him satisfactorily to be benevolent, will
now be to demonstrate that He is not so. As is generally
admitted by Theists, God might have created a sinless world
if such had been His will.* Why therefore has He not
done so? All will allow that He might at least have made
a less sinful one, if, for instance, He had given more grace
to man, or created him with more strength of mind to
rule his passions. “ But, argue the Theists, God is not
obliged to do that; the idea of duty is incompatible with
that of the supreme and independent Being.” No answer
could be more worthless. A benevolent man is not the
man who does his duty, but one who does more than his
duty. It follows therefore that a being infinitely benevo
lent should do infinitely more than his duty, and either
create a sinless world, if that be possible; or, if not,
create at least a world much less sinful than the one in
which we live.
4. Fourthly, God would be personal and impersonal,—a
doctrine which no one in his senses can admit. The idea of
God, as stated by Professor Flint, proves Him to be per
sonal, but the same idea will also prove His impersonality.
A personal being is something limited ; now, God is either
infinite, i.e., unlimited, or not God. Therefore, if He be
infinite, He cannot be personal; but He must be so, since
He is the intelligent Maker of heaven and earth. There
fore God is a personal impersonal being.
5. Fifthly, infinite and finite. Infinite, since there are
no bounds to His perfection; finite, since He possesses
one perfection which by itself supposes limitation,—intelli
gence. Intelligence is essentially clear, definite, precise,
* We here state the argument as brought to bear upon those whose
Convictions coincide with our own, for we do not admit, with Mr. Arm
strong, that the conception of a sinless world is self-contradictory.
Against those who share his opinions the argument can be framed
otherwise, and, we believe, unanswerably.
�8
THERE IS A GOD.
and consequently limited : therefore all things intelligent
are limited beings. But God is intelligent, therefore He
must be finite; and yet we have already seen that He
cannot be so.
The following objections are taken, in substance, from
the “ Plea for Atheism.”
6. Theism checks man’s efforts, it is therefore a doctrine
Dot to be admitted. It teaches that all things depend
absolutely upon the will of God. Such teaching is a check
upon the activity of man ; for in all things we may say : If
this be contrary to God’s will it will never take place, and
if it be according to God’s will it will take place, whether
we exert ourselves or no.
7. God cannot be intelligent. Intelligence comprises
perception, memory, and reasoning. Neither of these acts
are possible to God. Perception results in the obtaining a
new idea; God, being omniscient, has the same ideas
eternally, and therefore cannot perceive. Memory recalls
the past; for an unchangeable God there is no past, and
consequently no memory. Beason implies a succession of
acts; in God there is no succession, and so He is deprived
of reason by His very immutability. If God can neither
perceive, nor remember, nor reason, can He judge or think ?
To judge is to join two ideas together ; but whatever is
joined was not joined previously, and this is contrary to
immufability. To think is to separate that which is
thought from that which is not thought; that, too, implies
change, and besides contradicts omniscience. If God
knows everything unchangeably, He must ever be un
changeably thinking of everything. But if God can neither
perceive, remember, reason, judge, nor think, He can by
no means be said to be intelligent.
8. God is not all-wise. If He were so He would not
have created beings, or parts of beings, without any use
whatever. That such beings and parts of beings exist
plentitully in nature is a well-known teaching of embry
ology, and indeed of all natural history. If therefore God
be the author of nature, He must be said not to be all-wise.
9. God is not the Creator. For creation either added to
the sum of being already existing, or it did not. If it
�THERE IS A GOD.
9
added anything, then the sum is greater than the part, and
the universe with God better than God without the uni
verse. He is therefore not infinitely good if something can
be better than He. If it added nothing, then the universe
is identically the same as God, which is contrary to Theism.
If it took anything away from the sum of being already
existing, God was not all-wise in creating ; or, if He could
not help creating, He was not all-powerful. Creation
therefore neither adds anything to, nor adds nothing to,
nor takes anything from, the sum of being. Creation
therefore is absurd.
10. Some men are not convinced of God’s existence.
Now, if God existed, He could convince men of His exist
ence, so as to leave in their minds no doubt about the
matter. If He could not, it would be because He did not
know how to, or had not enough power. Therefore He
will not; but if so, He is not infinitely good, for by so
doing He could spare men a very great deal of misery.
These are the most important arguments put forth by
Mr. Bradlaugh in the two essays to which we have already
alluded. We have been obliged to choose, for in many
places there are as many as nine or ten arguments crowded
together, with rare conciseness, in one page ; nay, some
times one argument is so worded that it may be taken in
two very different senses. But we trust we have chosen
the most important objections; and as for shortening them,
our only excuse is that it is impossible to do otherwise
without writing a commentary upon each of these essays,
(which we should do with great pleasure,) pointing out
one by one all the fallacies employed by our opponent.
11. In the debate with. Mr. Cooper, there are also two
arguments that can be mentioned, although they are but
variantes of others already stated. The first runs pretty
nearly as follows. Theism supposes a motionless cause
which is the principle of the universe, i.e., which acts to
create the world. If so, they can explain how action with
out motion is possible. That, however, is inexplicable ;
therefore the hypothesis of Theism cannot be admitted.
12. Another is : Two beings cannot be in the same place
at the same time. But God is everywhere; therefore, to
�10
THERE IS A GOD.
make room for the universe He must retire from “ some
where,” and is no longer infinite; or else He must make
the universe out of “everywhere,” that is, nowhere. The
first alternative contradicts the idea of God ; the second is
self-contradicted by facts. It follows that God has not
created the world.
Such are the difficulties which have prevailed so far upou
Mr. Bradlaugh, that he thinks himself justified in taking a
position of defiance to nearly the whole human race, and
building a system of which the denial of God’s existence
forms the principal point. This system we now wish to
state as clearly as possible.
“ I exist.* My existence is either self-existent or created.
It is not created, consequently it is self-existent, and I am
self-existent too. If that existence were created, it would
have been so either by an existence the same as itself, or
else by another existence. Neither can be allowed, and so
it is not created. It cannot have been created by an
existence the same as itself; for then it would have been
only a continuation of the same existence. It cannot have
been created by any existence different from it, for an
existence different from it would have nothing in common
with it, since what has nothing in common with another
thing can have no relation with it. Now creation is really
a relation,—the relation of cause and effect. Creation
therefore being impossible, my existence is self-existent.
“But what has just been proved for my particular
existence can be proved in exactly the same manner for all
existence. And, as all things we see have mutual relations
one with another, it follows that what seems to be different
existences is only the same existence, differently condi
tioned, otherwise they would have nothing in common.
There is therefore but one existence ; the world, which
means the same as ‘ matter,’ or ‘ universe,’ is a great
uncaused being (debate with Dr. Baylee, p. 32), infinite
and eternal. I am but a phenomenon of existence, and
all that we hear, see, or feel, are only separate phenomena,
* Debate with Dr. Baylee, page 41; Plea tor Atheism, appendix;
Debate with Mr. Cooper, passim.
�THERE IS A GOD.
11
not separate beings ; different conditions of existence, and
not different existences.”
“ These phenomena, conditions, or modes of existence
are distinguished in thought by their qualities.” Whether
the modes are really distinct from each other, or only in
thought, is not determined ; whether the qualities which
form the distinction are really different qualities or no is
not stated. “Qualities are characteristics by which in
thought I distinguish that which I think,” says Mr. Bradlaugli, and he says no more. But what if the same ques
tion be again asked, viz., whether those characteristics are
really different from each other, or only rendered different
by the process of thinking? Let us give an example of
the two distinctions. We say that Mr. Bradlaugh is really
distinct from any other man, because it seems that, inde
pendently of our thought, and whether we think about
him or no, he is not the same as another man ; and we say
that their characteristics are really different. We say
that M r. Brad laugh the philosopher can be (in thought)
distinguished from Mr. Bradlaugh the orator, and that the
characteristics of both are only distinguished in thought.
Now the question is, whether Mr. Bradlaugh admits real
distinctions or no; whether all things are, according to
him, only distinguished in thought. To this question no
answer is given in any of the debates aud essays which we
have had the occasion to Bee.
It is only now that our work begins seriously, by re
futing Mr. Bradlaugh’s system. Until this moment we
have but stated his objections and theories, and though we
promised to stand by the logic of common sense, we evi
dently did not intend meaning that such logic should
extend to our opponent. As has already been seen, Mr.
Bradlaugh brings forward some deeply metaphysical ob
jections, and his system is built upon the most metaphysical
of all ideas,—existence. We have, of course, to follow
him wherever he goes, but even in the deepest and most
entangled metaphysical problems we shall ever try to keep
an eye upon common sense.
Waiving for the present a direct answer to the objec
tions accumulated by the adversary of Theism, we think
�12
TBERE IS A GOD.
proper first of all to examine his own system. Even if his
objections were unanswerable, it would Dot follow that
his system is certain. Of his objections, not a single one
is completely new ; some,—for instance, the one against
creation,—dates as far back as Aristotle, a philosopher
well known to be by no means an A theist.* These objec
tions therefore might, if unanswerable, prove the eternity
of matter, a dual principle, positive pantheism, transcen
dentalism, or even Atheism of some sort; but they would
not necessarily prove Mr. Bradlaugh’s Atheism.
Mr. Bradlaugh argues that his own pxistence is not
created; and, according to him, the same may be said of all
existence. But why ? Because creation is the action of
one existence upon another, different from it,—which is
absurd. If Mr. Bradlaugh sees very clearly the absurdity
of one thing acting upon another, different from it, so
much the better for him. For our part, we do believe,—
and shall continue so to do until further notice,—that the
hammer of the smith is different from the inass of red-hot
iron drawn out of the forge, and that the difference in
question does not hinder it from acting on the said mass of
metal. We believe that two prize-fighters are not identi
cally one and the same being, and yet they act upon one
another very forcibly. In our humble opinion, confirmed
by these facts and many others, two different beings can
act upon each other.
Let us, however, examine the axioms brought forward to
sustain the system. What has nothing in common with
another has no relation with it. If you mean by “ having
in common,” to be identically the same, we should think
that nothing has anything in common with another by the
very fact that it is something else. Two drops of dew,
two blades of grass, suppose them as like as you will ; or
take, if you like better, two atoms of exactly the same size,
form, and intensity and direction of movement. We have
said, the same size, and we can say so in one point of view,
* We will, however, give Mr. Bradlaugh credit for having found
these objections out “all by his own self.” Otherwise, how could he *
not be aware that they have all been answered a thousand times, from
the days of Tertulliuu to those of Leibnitz and of Clarke ?
�THERE 19 A GOD.
13
for in our mind the size is the same ; but the expression is
no longer exact if we apply it to the reality t hat exists.
Each has its own size ; that size happens exactly to resem
ble the size of the other; but the quality, though perfectly
alike, is not identically the same. If therelore you take
things in that light, your axiom proves far too much. No
two things have anything in common in that sense; conse
quently, according to you, no two things can act upon
each other, or have any relation with each other. Causes
are no more, effects exist no longer, and ail relations
vanish away.
If, on the contrary, you take the word, “to have in
common,” to mean the possession of something that, al
though not really and identically the same in both, is
exactly alike, owing to a fundamental similitude in both
natures, then indeed we must admit the axiom. The
hammer, were it not as solid as the iron, and more so,
would not be able to act upon it; its action therefore
depends on the mutual solidity of both, one, however,
being greater than the other. A lady could hardly act
upon a prize fighter in the boxing way, because they have
little in common to render a contest possible. If Mr.
Bradlaugh takes it in this manner we admit the axiom.
But now let us see how it works. Is it true that one
existence is either totally identical with another, or so
distinct, so different, as to have nothing alike,* having
either everything in common, or nothing in common,
without a medium ? In the first signification of the word
this might be true; one existence is completely and
totally different from another, for the very reason that it
is another. Every particular and individual thing exists in
a way that excludes participation with any other, whatever
it may be. If A is A, and B is B, then A is by no means
and in no wise B, and B is by no means and by no wise A.
This is not metaphysics ; it is mere common sense. Ask
the simplest-minded boor whether he be auy thing else but
* It is so in Mr. Bradlaugh’s system, for by existence he understands
whatever exists ; there can therefore be but one. But we are now
attacking the demonstration of his system, to defend which he has no
right to suppose the conclusion as already demonstrated.
�14
THERE IS A GOD.
himself: the answer would soon be made, and unhesi
tatingly. Yes, this is true ; but in this souse the axiom,
we have already seen, is false. Because I am not anybody
else, it does not follow that I have no relation with any
body else.
It is only true in the second sense: things which have
nothing in common, {i e., nothing alike in their nature,)
can have no relation with each other. Well, precisely iu
this sense it is monstrously untrue to say that two exist
ences have either everything in common or nothing iu
common. They can have, as everybody is aware, like
qualities, and even like essences. All men possess intelli
gence to a certain degree, and by means of this intelligence
they can act upon each other. Stones are not intelligent,
and precisely from this point of view men cannot act upon
stones, nor stones on men. But both have in common that
they are solid bodies, capable of movement; as such they
can and do act reciprocally. So we see that in the grand
argument by which Mr. Bradlaugh proves his own exist
ence to be uncaused and eternal, if we admit one part we
must deny the other, unless, as we pass from the former to
the latter, we change the sense of the words.
Now, by changing the sense of words we may prove a
great many things as we go along, to the entire satis
faction of weak-minded people and idiots. For instance—
Puss is a cat;
A cat is a whip ;
A whip is a member of parliament;
A member is a limb ;
A limb is a part of the body;
Therefore Puss is a part of the body.
But, it will be said, this is manifest nonsense that any
body can see through, and if Mr. Bradlaugh’s argument
resembled this one you would not want to write against it.
We should certainly not want to write against it if
everybody was as familiar with the two senses of the words
“ in common " as with the two senses of the words cat,
whip, member. Unfortunately it is not so. Words are
often employed without attention to their precise sense,
and if there are two different senses, of which the difference
�THERE 18 A GOD,
15
does not seem great, the difference is often overlooked.
This may be allowed in ordinary conversation, not in
philosophical debate. A few grains weight, more or less,
matters little at the grocer’s; at the druggist’s the same
difference in quantity may matter a good deal. And the
drugs furnished by the latter, though sufficiently pure for
medical purposes, may be rightly considered by the
analytical chemist as miserably impure. Between Mr.
Bradlaugh’s argument and the ridiculous string of non
sense quoted above, the difference is in the matter only,
not in the manner.
However, let us for the present say no more of the
reasoning in question, and scrutinize with a little closer
attention the system which it is intended to uphold. Ac
cording to Mr. Bradlaugh, the words “matter,” “uni
verse,” and “ existence,” are synonymous. The whole
universe is one great uncaused being. Of that being, each
phenomenon is but a separate condition. Every man, for
instance, exists, i.e., possesses existence, but existence is
identically the same in all. Possessing existence, he is a
being, and yet there is but one being,—the universe. To
explain matters yet more clearly, a stone, a tree, a dog,
and a man, are all the same being, but in a different way.
Here you have the being existing stonily, there arborescently, further on doggedly, and humanly at last. It
weighs in the stone, grows in the tree, barks in the dog,
and thinks in the man. Stone, tree, dog, and man are all
outward appearances, nothing more, somewhat in the same
way (we imagine) that a single drop of dew or prism of
crystal can be seen red, blue, yellow, or green at the same
time by different spectators. Whether the theory be
poetical or no we shall not attempt to decide; as our
opinion is decidedly that “ truth alone is beautiful,”
“Bien n’est beau que le vrai...... ”
we shall only examine whether it be true.
And firstly, let us remark the unpleasant fact that this
theory sets Mr. Bradlaugh by the ears with nearly all
mankind. We do not speak only of the more intelligent
part of men, deeply read in science and in philosophy.
�16
THERE TS A GOD.
We do not even allude to the class of ordinary intelli
gence ; we take the very lowest class of all, and appeal to
those whose uncultured stolidity brings them almost to
the verge of idiocy itself. To them we would say: “A
very intelligent gentleman is of opinion that whatever he,
you, anybody, or anything else may be, we are not several
beings, but only one ; that if you see any difference be
tween yourselves and the clods of earth which surround,
you, it is a mistake to think there is any difference in
reality, it only appears so. Whatever exists in you is
absolutely the same as what exists in the clods of earth ;
you seem to be different, and that is all.” What would
their answer be ? We need not anticipate it.
The system is not only contrary to the universal con
viction, but also to the senses, i.e., to those organs which
set us in communication with the external world. Mr.
Bradlaugh,'having brought forward his one existence, or
oDe being, must necessarily admit that nothing else exists
besides it. Well then, what are the phenomena which we
see going on before our eyes? Are they beings ? No, of
course. Are they one Being? My senses tell me they
are not. I see the balloon ascend and the stone fall. Can
one and the same being receive at the same time two con
trary movements?
Why, even a mathematical point
cannot be imagined thus, much less a real being. Will
you say that these phenomena, modes, conditions,—or
whatever you may call them,—are not really distinct
appearances of the Being, but only Actively so, only seemings of which all the difference proceeds from our own
thought, and has no foundation in the world that is? But
it is impossible for us, when we feel cold or heat, to think
that cold and heat have no foundation but in our thoughts.
If your doctrine of Atheism denies the real difference of
phenomena, we should, to follow it, have to make first of
all a blind act of faith, not in the veracity, but in the
absolute mendacity of our senses. All becomes a dream,
and you cannot expect any reasonable man to admit that.
If, on the contrary, you admit their real difference, your
theory is doomed ; for when I see the balloon and the
stone, and think that they are the same being possessed
�THERE IS A GOD.
17
with contrary movements, I think an absurdity. You
might have escaped this result, if you had anywhere said
that the phenomena in question, which we call substances,
are parts of the same great being. But you nowhere em
ploy that expression ; and rightly, from your point of view;
for to break up one existence into innumerable parts would
be the ruin of your doctrine.
If we turn to the faculty of self-consciousness, we find
other and perhaps greater difficulties still. “ Doubt as I
may,”* says Mr. Bradlaugh, “I cannot doubt of my own
existence.” But seif-consciousness, by the very same act
by which it reveals our existence to us, reveals it as some
thing limited, individual, clearly distinct from all that is
not ourself. In Mr. Bradlaugh’s system our existence is
not different from all existence, and is therefore infinite,
universal, mingling confusedly both us and all other
phenomena together in one great whole. Now the ques
tion is, whether conscience lies, in revealing our existence
to ourselves as it does. If it does not lie, Mr. Bradlaugh’s
system is overthrown ; for either conditioned existence is
the same as existence in itself, or it is not. If it is the
same, it cannot lose all the qualities of existence, merely
by being conditioned. If it is not the same, we may beg
to remark that all existence is conditioned, and that there
fore the one existence, infinite, eternal, indistinctly the
same in all and under all phenomena, is nothing else but
a myth, a creature of imagination. But let us suppose
that Mr. Bradlaugh prefers saying that self-consciousness
is wrong ; that existence is the same in all, but that it
seems—only seems—to self-consciousness to be distinct
from all. The reply comes immediately : “ As the very
same act gives you the knowledge of your existence, and
of the manner of your existence, you cannot separate the
one from the other; you cannot doubt of the manner iu
which you really exist, without doubting of your very exist
ence. You cannot impugn a document that tells against
you, without also attacking the favourable clauses it con
tains. You cannot take down the sail that carries you
where you do not wish to go, without being abandoned to
• Discussion with Dr. Baylee, p. 41,
2
�18
THERE IS A GOD.
the mercy of the waves.” Self-consciousness is the faculty
that tells us what we feel, and in what way we feel it. If
I deny that in doing so it expresses the truth, if I am not
as I feel that I ain, it might as well be that I am not,
although Ifeel that I am. Mr. Bradlaugh has, we believe,
no way of escape from these difficulties, unless indeed he
should affirm that his self-consciousness tells him his
existence is infinite, eternal, and universal; or, at least,
that it gives him no information whatever about it. This
would evidently close the discussion under that head.
Another fact at least as unpleasant is, that Mr. Brad
laugh’s system is the negation of all arithmetic. We
should have been less inclined to note this disagreement, if
our adversary did not continually point out and exaggerate
the contradictions he finds, (or thinks he finds,) between
arithmetic and the different sorts of Theism. He even
makes merry about them, and needs, though at the cost of
spoiling his mirth, to be reminded that those who live in
glass houses should be careful about throwing stones.
Addition is the foundation of all arithmetic, and Mr.
Bradlaugh’s system is contrary to addition. Every school
boy that knows how to read knows that one and one are
two, and one are three, etc. Let us take any object, A
for instance. A exists, or is, i.e., A is being (according to
logic). . But what being is A? Is it all being, or only
some being? It all being, then necessarily nothing can be
added to it. But we can say the same of B, C, D, or any
other object of thought of which being can be predicated
in the same way. Then all together, instead of making up
several beings, (though each is everything!) only make one,
and there is an end of addition. If A is one, (by which unit
we designate all being,) and B is one, then A added to B
ought to make two ; and they only make one. But let us
fancy that the other alternative is taken ; each is only some
being. Then again, if A is distinct from B, A is some
being, B is some other being, and both together, (each
separately being one,) form two beings. But no, that
cannot be ; A is distinct from B, but neither is distinct
from being; and as there is only one, the being A, added to
the being B, cannot form more than one. You can add
�THERE IS A GOD.
19
np phenomena as much as you like, you will never come to
more than an addition of phenomena. Jones exists, there
fore Jones is a being; Smith exists, therefore Smith is a
being ; Brown exists, therefore Brown is a being. But
are Smith, Brown, and Jones, taken together, three beings?
Not in the least ; they are only one being and three
phenomena. Not having had the opportunity of putting
these difficulties to Mr. Bradlaugh himself, we naturally
try to find the most reasonable reply he could make. He
might, it is true, avoid the difficulty to a certain extent, by
saying that one can exist without being ; that he can with
perfect truth say at the same time, “ I exist, and I am not
a being.” But this would only open the way to other and
greater objections ; besides, we should be sorry to load
with unnecessary absurdities a system so heavily laden
already.
By a process resembling that already followed, it might
easily be shown that the system contradicts the ruleB of
subtraction, multiplication, and division; but the proof is
the same, and repetition would be tedious. Should Mr.
Bradlaugh try to escape by saying that his system allows
the counting up of phenomena, and operating upon them
as if they were beings, the terrible question always returns,
Are these phenomena really distinct from each other and
among themselves, or are they but phantoms of the brain ?
If the distinction is real, then there is in them something
real on which the real distinction is founded, and that
something, distinct in each, exists separately from the one
existence mentioned, which is contrary to monism.* If
not, these phenomena are only a succession of seemings, all
false, and to which no reality belongs. Four are not really
* For if one thing exists separately from another, there must be a
sufficient reason for the separation ; and as there is nothing in the
“existing” which is not in “existence” (its intrinsic principle), we
must seek the sufficient reason in “existence” itself. If, therefore,
two phenomena are separate from each other, that quality, “ separate”
must be found in their existence also. Thus their existence is
separate in each. But what is separate is not one, but many, in so
far as it is separate; so, at least under one point of view, there
would be many existences. This is so far contrary to monism ; for
it would be absurd to suppose that many existences could at the same
time be only one, under the same point of view, i. e. as individuals.
�20
THERE IS A GOD.
more than two, but only appear so, like four quantities
added together, all equal to zero. If there is nothing
distinctly real in phenomena, a farthing and a million
sterling only seem to be different, but are not so. A
farthing is existence conditioned in a certain phenomenal
way. A million sterling is the very same existence con
ditioned in the very same way, which way (not which
existence) is repeated 960,000,000 times; but this way
is only an appearance, and so its repetition makes no
difference whatever on the total amount. We doubt, how
ever, whether capitalists, (solvable ones at least,) would be
willing to adopt this very original manner of considering
money.
Finally, all science is destroyed by the system in ques
tion. Either the one existence is distinct from the pheno
mena, or no. If distinct, the phenomena exist apart, and
there are more existences than one. If not, each pheno
menon is existence it self, only modified by the mind:
infinite in itself, rendered finite by our mind ; eternal in
its nature, but mentally circumscribed by time. All that
our mind tells us of these phenomena, eveu with indubit
able evidence, is false, totally false. All that we can learn
of the sun, the stars, the earth, is absolutely untrue.
History, geography, chemistry, physics, all give way, all
are useless pursuits of knowledge. All that is, we know
already ; why should we strive to ascertain that which
only seems ?
We should much regret any unintentional unfairness to
Mr. Bradlaugh as to the exact understanding of his sys
tem ; but even if we had misunderstood him, it would not
be our fault. Our opponent, in all his essays and debates,
keeps to offensive warfare for the most part, and is much
more occupied in at tacking other systems than in stating
his own. A few pages contain all that he says in its favour ;
he does not even appear to dream that anything can be
said against it, and supposes that, with all its consequences,
it will be taken for granted. That we feel some degree of
hesitation in taking it thus will perhaps be understood,
after the perusal of the defects we think we perceive
therein. But Mr. Bradlaugh is very clever, and may be
�THERE IS A GOD.
21
able still to show us that all is right; that existence and
phenomena are identical, though different; that the
addition of several beings to each other only forms one,
although they are many ; and that, while we cannot doubt
of our existence, because we are aware of it, we can still
doubt whether we exist in the manner of which we are
aware. And yet, even though Mr. Bradlaugh should
prove these wondrous things, we submit, that it is hardly
worth while to leave the mysteries of Theism for others
darker still, whether or no there be a direct demonstration
of the existence of a Deity.
Of such existence, however, there are demonstrations,
and in great ’number, some of which we now desire to
bring forward, after having made a few preliminary re
marks concerning one of Mr. Bradlaugh’s assertions.
He complains that the greatest difficulty in a discussion
is to know what is meant by the word “ God ;” because, if
we do not agree about the sense of the word, we shall not
even know what we are disputing about; and to prove
that different meanings are given to the word, he shows
that Pagans, Jews, Mahometans, Arians, Trinitarian Pro
testants, and Catholics, have different views of the attri
butes of God. To this it will be sufficient to reply that all
have the same definition of the u-ord, but a different one
of the Being that the word is intended to name. The
starting point is the same for all ; but, the directions taken,
being various, the goals at which they arrive are various
too. But what can it matter about the goal, if the starting
point is identical for all ? Wherever false systems or
gross ignorance have come to wrong conclusions about
anything, we have the same confusion as to consequent
reasonings upon primitive ideas. Would it not be ridicu
lously absurd for anybody to pretend that we do not
know what is meant by the word “Man”? And yet we
can say that Plato defines him to be “ a two-legged animal
without wings or feathers;” that Aristotle calls him, “a
reasonable animal;” that de Bonald says he is “an intelli
gence served by organs;” that the Christian philosophers
of the middle ages affirm him to be “ an immortal spirit,
substantially united to a mortal body;” that modern
�22
THERE IS A GOD.
naturalists give him the title of “a bimanous mammal-”
and that the negroes of the Gabon coast confound him
with the gorilla, whom they call “ the stupid old man."
Now, from all these expressions, representing widely
different ideas, we might, by the same process of reasoning
that Mr. Bradlaugh uses, gather that nobody really knows
what is meant by the word man.
We^ therefore start from a mere verbal definition of the
word “God,” and afterwards prove that a Being answering
to the sense of the definition really and positively exists.
1 hat is all we intend to do, and we wish it to be understood
at the very outset. Were we to go farther our essay
would become a theological treatise, which We do not wish
it to be. At the bare fact of God’s existence, once proved,
we stop short, admitting of course implicitly all those of
His attributes which may be by argument deduced from
that fact, but not attempting to prove them. Should Mr.
Bradlaugh therefore condescend to examine our demon
strations, let him take the definitions as we give them ;
for as we are to bring forward several demonstrations, so
several definitions shall also be given.
lhe apparent difference of definitions by no means
interferes with the sense of the word itself; only we shall
adnnt that from some it is not possible to draw the idea of
a God infinite in being; but that is of no consequence, if
we can deduce the idea from other definitions. We shall
therefore draw up two series: of adequate definitions and
of inadequate ones. Mr. Bradlaugh will of course not
mn to observe that such proofs as do not demonstrate a
God infinite in being do not demonstrate what is required.
We reply that they prove the existence of a being ausweryig to the definition ; if they do not demonstrate Him to
be infinite, others do; it suffices that they do not prove
Him to be finite. Should our adversary again take excep
tion to our defining the sense of one word in two different
wavs, we can refer him to a well-known example in
geometry. Euclid defines a line as “length without
breadth,^and Legendrecalls it, “the intersection of two
surfaces.
Both define the same word in the same sense
perfectly well, but from different points of view. Differ-
�THERE 13 A GOD.
23
ently worded definitions do not therefore argue different
significations, but different manners of expressing those
significations.
We must also allow that none of our demonstrations
prove immediately, and without the help of farther reason
ing, the unity of God. But they prove that there is
at least One. It is only afterwards that the impossibility
of several Gods appears. This remark applies to some of
Mr. Bradlaugh’s complaints. He would wish for an argu
ment that proved immediately the existence of one, infinite,
eternal, omniscient, immeasurable, all-good Creator. If
such a proof were possible, on its being brought forward
he would doubtless complain again, and insist that it be
given him in one single argument and were it to be thus
given, he would find it still too long. Let him carry this
system of cavilling into the domains of other sciences, and
ask, for instance, why chemical nomenclature and notation
throw no light upon the phenomena of the viscous fermen
tation, or why the Pons' Asinorum is unable to prove that
a sphere is equal to the two-thirds of the circumscribed
cylinder. The answer from both chemist and geometrician
would be, “ Have patience, my friend, we shall come to
that in good time.” Il time is allowed to the geometrician
and the chemist, should it be refused to the theologian ?
Adequate Definitions.—I. By the word “ God,” I
mean the principle of all existence. II. By that word I
mean the priuciple of all possibility. III. By that word I
mean a Being, (or beings, if there be more than one,) to
whom there is none superior. IV. By that word I mean
a Being answering to the idea we have of the Infinite, i.e.,
perfection without end.
Inadequate Definitions.—I. The principle of all
change and variation. II. The principle of all movement.
III. The author of all moral obligation.
First Proof.—All existence must have an existing
principle. Now, this priuciple I call God. (I. Det.)
Therefore God exists.
All existence must have an existing principle. By “ prin
ciple,” I mean a sufficient reason for its existence. Now,
�24
THERE IS A GOD.
evidently nothing can exist without there being a sufficient
reason for its existing.
Existing. If the principle were only ideal and imaginary,
it could not be a sufficient reason for that which exists.
In this proof we have not demonstrated that God is
separate from the universe; so, if this demonstration were
taken apart, Mr. Bradlaugh might say that his views
coincided w'ith our own, that lie admits existence to be its
own principle, that therefore existence is God, or that all
is God.
But we object to the demonstration being taken apart
from the refutation of Mr. Bradlaugh’s theorv ; having
amply shown that the theory of one existence only is ab
surd, we cannot admit that Mr. Bradlaugh quite agrees with
us. True, he might still plead that even if there be many
existences, each of them may be self-existent, or containing
in itself the principle of its being, and that there might
thus be as many gods as there are atoms. We reply,
firstly, that if that were the case, the strength of our
argument would be in no wise diminished. If it pleases
anybody to say that every atom is a God, he may do so
(until proved to be absurd); but he has not the right to
say there is none. We may also answer that the idea of
an atom having in itself the principle of its existence is
contrary to common sense. If it were self-existent, it
would be necessary; if necessary, the supposition that it
might not have existed is absurd ; and yet who would have
missed it? It is only a contingent, not a necessary part
of the universe. Besides, the principle that gives exist
ence, gives all perfection, since existence is the fountain
of perfection. If our atom possessed that fountain in
itself, it would be infinite in all things, for nothing could
bound it except itself, and nothing can limit itself. In
finite therefore in all things, in dimensions, in activity, in
beauty, and at the same time being only an atom, it would
be in all a most elementary and imperfect being. Now,
if anybody was to tell us that all the water of the ocean
was contained in a dew-drop, we should very naturally ask,
How is the dew-drop so little ? And if we see a poor man
who gets by his work only just enough to live, and no
�THERE IS A GOD.
$
,
25
more, and are told that he has an unlimited credit at the
banker’s, the question arises, Why is he not better off?
only in the latter case the answer might be, Because he
does not choose to be so ; whereas a being that is its own
principle can by no means change its nature, and choose
to be otherwise. A man cannot by a wish become a stone:
whatever is essential is necessary.
But this again is a digression. We do not mean to
attack Polytheism now ; we do not mean even to attack
Pantheism. We prefer, if agreeable to all parties, doing
one thing at a time: and, as Mr. Bradlaugh calls himself an
Atheist because he denies all definitions of God, we defy
him to deny this definition, or attack this demonstration.
Second Proof.—Whatever is possible must have an
existing and intelligent principle. Now, that principle I
call God. (II. Def.) Therefore God exists.
We must subjoin to this argument a few words of ex
planation. “Whatever is possible,” means only whatever
is not absurd, i.e., whatever is simply and absolutely true
without reference to time or place. Thus the multiplica
tion table, though invented by Pythagoras, contains a
series of truths which were only discovered by him, and
which were true as independently of him as they are of
the things to which they are applied. Were there not two
calculable beings in the world, still two and two would
make four. In the same manner they are independent of
human reason, that only perceives, but does not makei
them. Were all mankind to go mad, and no longer to
admit that two and two are four, it would be none the less
true for their denial. What is there in that truth ? A
simple possibility, a mere intelligibility, expressed by a
formula independent both of existence and of man.
Now we say that whatever is possible must have an
existing principle, and to prove it we return to the defini
tion of a principle, i.e., a sufficient reason. Would a pos
sible being be the sufficient reason of what is possible?
No ; for nothing would ever have been possible if nothing
had existed. Possibility therefore depends on a certain
existence ; not mine, nor yours, nor any existence which
we know to be subject to change and mutability. Now,
�26
THERE IS A GOD.
the something on which possibility depends is called its
principle, and we call that principle God.
Nextly, we affirm that the principle in question must be
intelligent; not as men are said to be intelligent, since we
have seen that the intelligibility and consequent truth
of things possible has nothing whatever to do with man,
and is completely independent of him. But, knowing
them to be intelligible since all eternity, we ask, Can
anything be eternally intelligible without there being
something eternally intelligent I Fancy for an instant
that intelligence disappears totally from the universe ;
nothing is intelligible any longer. The difference between
the absurd and the non-absurd,—-consisting only in the
contradiction of characteristics, which contradiction cannot
subsist without intelligence,—ceases at once. Now, if
Mr. Bradlaugh does not hesitate to affirm that there is no
difference between what is absurd aud what is not, we
shall not trouble him any longer with our affirmation of
an eternal intelligence; but until he shall make that
declaration we are free to maintain that all eternal,
immutable, and necessary truths depend (to be what they
are) on an eternal, immutable, necessary, and intelligent
existing principle; and this principle we call God.
As already stated, we do not by this argument intend to
prove the unity of God, since that is quite out of the
question for the present. Plato was, if we mistake not,
the first who employed this manner of reasoning, and he
argued thence the existence of ideal forms, unchangeable,
necessary, and eternal. If by “ideal forms” he meant
beings existing separately, these “forms” were so many
gods, and his philosophy ended in Polytheism. However,
though this conclusion might have been false, the argu
ment, as we have stated it, is true, and the number of
gods is, we repeat, only a secondary question. If Mr.
Bradlaugh is struck by its efficacy, he is by no means likely
to fall into the error of Plato ; not being very partial to
the idea of God, one God is probably the most he can
admit, and if he does, we shall ask him no more.
Third Proof.—There exists at least one Being to
�THERE IS A GOD.
,
27
whom none is superior. Now, that Being to whom none
is superior I call God. (Def. III.) Therefore God exists.
It is impossible for Mr. Bradlaugh to take exception,
even in his system, to such an argument; as he admits
only one being, no others can be superior to it, and there
fore his one being is God. But we have already proved
the absurdity of supposing that there is only one being in
the world. There being therefore several, we proceed to
prove our argument from this starting point.
We first of all take for granted, as a fact known by all
who are in their senses, that there is a difference in the
perfection of some beings. We think it not at all hard to
be obliged to admit that Hamlet is superior to Caliban,
that the elephant is something more than the oyster, and
the palm-tree than the blade of grass.
If this be granted, common sense will at once see that
in the series of all beings, some being above others, there
must be some, (or, still more probably, one.) that are
the highest of all, i.e., to whom none is superior : for the
number of existing beings cannot possibly be infinite, and
therefore must be terminated at both ends if we ran»e
them by order of perfection. Anybody can see that no
number can be infinite if he reflects that it would be the
greatest of all numbers possible. Let us suppose that
a hundred quintillions be called infinite; then what would
be a hundred quintillions plus one? And how can any
number be innumerable ?
To those who prefer a more mathematical demonstration
we can give one such. Let x represent the whole number
of beings, ranged by order of perfection, and let us take at
random any part of the more perfect beings: x* will
represent the more perfect part, x" the less perfect. But
among the beings represented by xi, are all equal in per
fection or no ? If all are equal, then we have already the
leing (or beings) to whom none is superior, and the problem
is solved. It not, then by a similar process we find x™
aud xlv; xM representing the more perfect part of the
beings represented by x*. Aud as the number each time
diminishes regularly by at least one unit, it is evident that
we must in time solve the problem, simply by repeating
�28
THERE IS A GOD.
our mode of reasoning often enough. And whether we
come at last to one being who is above all others, or
to several equal to each other, and to which no others are
equal, the question is henceforward, not between Atheism
and Theism, not between Pantheism and the doctrine
which it contradicts, but between Polytheism and Mono
theism. With a Polytheist we should now be willing to
open the debate ; but Mr. Bradlaugh could hardly be con
sidered as such, and so we avoid entering into useless
details.
Fourth Proof.—An absolutely Infinite Being, taken
as we conceive it in our minds, must be either absurd, or
merely possible, or really existing. Now, it is neither
absurd nor merely possible. Therefore it exists, and
therefore (acc. to Def. IV.) God exists,*
We take for granted, first of all, that we possess the
idea of an Infinite Being, i.e., whose perfection is ab
solutely without limit in every way. Secondly, that this
idea is a real idea, i.e., an intellectual representation of an
object. To these two postulata self-consciousness must
bear testimony.
This being settled, we proceed to notice that the Infinite
cannot be absurd if we have a real idea of it. Of a thing
absurd we cannot properly have an idea; as, of a round
square, we have two ideas, the idea of round, the idea of
square; and, if we see that it is absurd, we have, besides,
t he idea of conflict between the two thus brought together.
But not only we have not any idea of conflict when we
say: perfection without end, i e., perfection without imper
fection, or (what comes to the same) being without nonbeing; not only we do not seize the conflict, but the two
intelligible notes of the idea are blended together in one;
that is, we have of the Infinite a true idea. We think
that this fact will be evident to any one who takes the
trouble to examine his thoughts as they occur to him in
* Many, we know, justly criticize the argument a priori for God’s
existence, in which one proves a fact from simple possibilities, and
passes thus from the ideal to the real order of things. But our argu
ment is only exteriorly like the one we allude to. It argues from a fact
to a fact: from the fact of our having the idea of the Infinite, to the
existeuce which this idea implicity includes.
�THERE IS A GOD.
29
' the mind’s laboratory: and so, the Infinite cannot be
absurd.
Still less can the Infinite be a merely possible being.
Non-existence is a very great limitation, a very con
siderable non-entity, and, though not the strongest
possible, yet still a strong negation of being. “ A living
dog is better than a dead lion,” says the proverb ; and
there is no doubt that a merely possible man is incom
parably less perfect than an existing grain of sand. Now
we have already said that our idea of an Infinite Being,
not absurd, supposes Him to have all imaginable per
fections, absolutely without limit. Therefore, if the
Infinite Being were merely possible He would be ab
solutely perfect and at the same time very imperfect,
which is inadmissible. Therefore, in the idea we have of
the Infinite, we must comprise that of real existence,
much in the same way as in the word “I” we comprehend
the idea of our own existence.
Therefore, God exists.
One objection to all the preceding demonstrations has
been perhaps already made by the reader. Setting aside
the possibility of Polytheism, and supposing each demon
stration to prove the existence of a single being, it follows
that we have:
1st. The Being who is the principle of all existence.
2nd. The Being who is the principle of all possibility.
3rd. The Being to whom none is superior.
4ih. The Being whose perfection is infinite.
Assuming tor an instant that these are different beings,
* each very great in his way, but not one and the same,
which of them are we to call God ? And, as long as it is
not proved that they are one and the same, we have the
right, as we please, either to call each of them God, or to
withhold the name from all.
The answer is that, according to our definitions, we
cannot withhold the name, if the Being answering to the
name be proved to exist. We are consequently at liberty
either to consider God as one being, or as four, so long as
it is not proved that these four are one: that the principle
of all existence is also that of all possibility, has no
�30
THERE IS A GOD.
superior, and is infinite. But, once more, and for the last
time, the question of God’s existence is quite different
from that of the numerical unity of the Divine essence.
We must now rapidly set forth a few proofs which by
themselves would not demonstrate the existence of God,
according to all the plenitude of the idea, but which
nevertheless are useful, if employed together with the
proofs already given : what may be wanting to these in
depth will be supplied to them by the former; and on the
other hand, the latter will perhaps be more perspicuous to
certain minds. However, we only use these arguments as
secondary and auxiliary ones, knowing that against some
of them many objections may be raised; they are thus only
stated for the sake of fuller illustration of the subject,
and because we consider the existence of God as a fact
already settled by the four proofs just laid down.*
“ God,” has been previously defined as “the principle of
all change.” By “change,” we understand the passage
from one state to another, by which a beiȣ, having before
existed in one manner, exists afterwards differently. Now,
nothing can change itself alone, without any intervening
cause whatever. Cold water, for instance, is not warm,
and will never become warm of itself; if, therefore, we find
that it has become warm, we naturally conclude that
something external has acted upon it, whether as a pro
ductive or as an occasioning cause. In cold water there
is only the possibility of warmth, not actual warmth ; and
if this mere possibility were left to itself, the water would
doubtless remain eternally cold. In general, nothing can
give itself what it has not; unless, indeed, we admit that *
it is possible to draw money out of an empty purse.
Something external must act upon the water, in order
to change its state. This external agent is subject to the
question: In acting upon the water does it change? does
* Some will be surprised to find that neither in the preceding nor in
the following proofs, any mention is made of the well-known argument
drawn from the order of the universe, that denotes a supreme Intelli
gence. The reason is that the proof, though good, has been so much
impugned in the very principles on which it is based, by the modern
school of Positivists, that it would take too much space to establish
properly here.
�THERE IS A GOD.
31
it pass from the inactive to the active state? If it acts
without change then it is a principle, and as such comes
under the denomination of God. If it changes, then some
other external agent determines the change, which agent
is itself liable to the same enquiry. Now this question
may recur again and again ; but still we must come to an
end at last. An infinite Beries of agents is absurd,
because all such series must be so ■ and even were it not
absurd in itself, it could not be admissible here. If you
construct in imagination an infinite series of agents, you
destroy the very principle of change; for you put it
nowhere. Each particular agent is but the transmitter
(so to speak) or conductor, not the real principle of
change; and if you tell me that change has no beginning,
no origin, you may as well tell that you have received a
letter that had passed through an infinite series of postal
stations, without having been sent off by anybody. An agent
which only produces change by changing itself, is nothing
else but a medium of transmission, not a principle, and, as
all change supposes some degree of activity or actuation,
when I see that activity or actuation I have the right to
inquire whence it proceeds. If my researches lead me
higher and higher, farther and farther, to a First Prin
ciple of mutation, which must exist if mutation exists, I
call this principle God, and affirm its existence. If you
say that there is no first principle of mutation, you deny
that there is any principle, and according to you, that
most universal phenomenon has no sufficient reason for
being what it is.
Another definition describes God as the principle of all
movement. Inertia is the first mechanical law of matter.
And yet matter moves. You will say : It moves because
it is moved by other matter; one ball pushes another for
ward and is itself urged on by a third. Yes: but who
gave the impulsion to the third ? You reply : We do not
know how movement came into the world ; but in the
world it is, and the universe is so fortunately arranged
that no movement is ever lost, but passes on from one
body to another, and so on ; until at last it returns to the
�32
THERE TS A GOD.
place whence it came. By that means we can very well
do without the notion of a First Mover.
You can, can you ? Whether that may be true philo
sophically speaking we do not know; we prefer submitting
your hypothesis to the test—the terribly severe test—of
common sense.
Take an uneducated countryman, as ignorant, as likely
to be imposed upon as you can possibly imagine one.
Show him a circular railroad, of, say a mile, in circum
ference. The whole of this railroad is crowded with
carriages, which form, so to speak, a circular train. There
is no engine, no locomotive; and yet the train moves on ;
one carriage touches another, and communicates the move
ment which it has itself received. Then tell the man that
nobody has set all these in movement; that the carriages
move each other, and that thus the whole moves on ; that
t he idea of a first mover is a totally useless supposition, and
that, since every part moves each other, the whole can be
considered as self-moving. It is very much to be doubted
whether he would take you in earnest; and he would
certainly be right not to do so. And yet there are philo
sophers who claim to be in earnest, and wish us to believe
the great movement of the universe (of which almost every
material part—indeed every material part taken as such—
is quite as inert as any railway carriage) to proceed from
itself, and pass ou from one portion of matter to another,
without having to refer to any First Principle of Move
ment whatever.* Why should that which is absurd and
nonsensical on a small scale, become reasonable and
philosophical on a large one? For our own part, we see
in such a system nothing but magnified absurdity and
gigantic nonsense.
By a third definition, God is called the Author of moral
obligation. We do not, absolutely speaking, allow this
* Mr. Bradlaugh seeks to elude the difficulty by defining the uni
verse as “all that is necessary for the production of every pheno
menon.” He might as well define the train in question as “the
carriages in movement, and all that is necessary to set them in move
ment.” He would thus, by a confusion of terms, be able to say that
the train moves itself, since he therein comprises the mover. But thia
is mere shuffling.
�THERE IS A GOD.
33
proof to be a good one; for we can only deduce the idea
of moral obligation from that of the existence of God : it
would consequently be a vicious circle to prove the exis
tence of God by moral obligation. However, for those
who do admit the existence of moral obligation, the proof
is valid, and runs thus:
Certain acts we know to be wrong, and therefore for
bidden. Now, what is “to forbid?” Is it merely the
promulgation of a consequence: If you act thus, you will
suffer thus? Murder, for instance. “If you commit
murder and are caught, you will be hanged; and even if
you are not caught, you will have to suffer from fears of
the law, and sorrow for having destroyed a member of the
human race.” Is that all ? Then let us suppose that
from a murder committed no evil consequences should
arise in this world: that it is impossible for the action to
be detected, and equally impossible for any sorrow to arise,
the man killed having been the object of the most deadly
hatred on the part of the murderer. Well ; would murder
in this case still be forbidden? Of course it would, all
reply. But then, by whom could it be forbidden ? By
society? Society can go no further than impose a penalty ;
and, if this penalty be eluded, society’s prohibition is vain.
By the murderer’s own nature? But the murderer’s own
nature has prompted him to do deliberately what he has
done; he has not acted under the impulse of passion, but
with cold-blooded craft. How can nature forbid that
which she herself does? You will say that human nature
recoils from murder. So it does in general; but human
nature taken in general is but an abstraction, and an ab
straction cannot forbid a real concrete being. This human
nature at least, i.e.t the murderer’s, has not recoiled, since
it has acted. Now, if man be responsible to none but to
his own nature, his nature will absolve him in each par
ticular case of crime which it has not hindered him from
doing. And yet murder is forbidden? By whom? By
the Author of moral obligation, whom we call God.
Take another instance. Is suicide forbidden ? If we are
answered in the negative, we can only prove it to be so by
God’s eternal prohibition; but we have a great majority
�34
THERE JS A GOD.
of men who consider it; in no case to be allowed. To
those then, we say : Who can forbid it? A man is utterly
wretched in this world. Society cannot punish him for
suicide, by which he escapes all punishment; by destroying
his own human nature he does not punish himself; on the
contrary, he liberates himself from a state which he feels
to be unbearable. Besides, to diminish the sum of misery
in the world may appear a good and virtuous action. And
yet, is suicide forbidden? Yes. Who can forbid it?
Only One on whom human nature depends, and who, in
dependently of punishment, can say with truth: Man has
no right to do wrong. And indeed, all men would, if God
did not exist, have the right to do wrong and suffer the
consequences. According to the Atheist, if a man were
deliberately to choose that which is wrong, taking upon
himself all consequences, he would have not only the
physical power to act thus, but also the moral right.
Each human being has the moral right to do whatever he
chooses, if only he have no physical restraint upon him.
And if this doctrine be contradictory to any one’s idea of
right and wrong, he must confess that by that idea he
implicitly admits the existence of God.
Our work,—all but the part which refers to Mr. BradJaugli’s objections,-:—is now ended. Before we give our
answers to these objections, we wish to say a few words as
to the manner in which he came by them. Sages of all
times, from the first ages of the world’s existence up to
the present day, have by the preceding arguments been,
satisfied, even to the most absolute certainty, that there
exists a God. This great question once answered, they
take up a second as important as the first (if possible),
though entirely dependent upon it, viz.: What is God ?
What may be the nature of that existing and Infinite
Principle of all? By dint of deep thought and profound
meditative labour, they have succeeded in finding out
some of His attributes, which, on one hand, are as certain
as the facts which'prove His existence, since they are only
strict inferences drawn therefrom; and which, on the
other, involve many mysterious problems, so wonderfully
luminous that they almost seem self.contradictory : just as
�THERE IS A GOD.
35
the sun emits a blinding light. So Mr. Bradlaugh collects
all he can find in the way of mysteries, and having brought
them together, says: God must have these and those
attributes; now each of them contradicts the other, there
fore, the idea of God is absurd. He ought, however, to
remember that we only draw our different inferences as to
the attributes of God after having proved His existence;
so our opponent ought first of all to prove invincibly that
our demonstrations are of no value, and only then to
attack those attributes, which are all based upon the said
demonstrations. If God be an absurd being, there must
certainly be a flaw in the proof; why then not point it out
more clearly?* So long as Theists are able to defend
their demonstrations—and that will be very long indeed—
let him not trouble himself about anything else. So long
as any one proof remains standing, it will be an insur
mountable obstacle to Atheism. When we are reduced to
silence, and the existence of God, instead of being an in
dubitable truth, is evidently proved to be a mere hypo
thesis, why, then it will be time to examine whether or no
that hypothesis be absurd. What would become of
science, were a similar method to be pursued, and the
great truths it proclaims to be denied on account of the
minute difficulties which those truths involve? Such
objections are unfair, unless put with the intention, not to
overthrow the truth, but only to cast more light upon the
darker sides of the question. It is therefore in this sense
alone that we are willing to answer them, considering our
answers as only a development of that most fundamental
answer to all difficulties—the demonstration.
1. What strikes Mr. Bradlaugh first of all is, that if
God be Infinite, He cannot be called Supreme. If He
were only the most perfect of all finite beings, He might
receive that title; but, as soon as He is proved to be In
finite, it is impossible. He will not allow us to say that
the Infinite is greater or less than the Finite, or even
» Mr. Bradlangh does indeed assail the demonstrations of the
existence of God ; but, strange to say—or rather, nof at nil strange to
Bay,—he dismisses the most important of them with a few words and
accumulates all the strength of Iris arguments upon the least important.
�36
THERE IS A GOD.
equal to it, if lie follows up his principle, for we are not
permitted to institute any comparison between them ; the
reason is, we suppose, in the axiom : between the Infinite
and the Finite there is no proportion. But how did he
come by the axiom ? was it not by comparing them
with each other? It is, therefore, only in a limited
sense, and not absolutely (as Mr. Bradlaugh does) that we
can say, that there is no proportion. The very axiom
indeed, can be put under the form of a proportion, thus:
The Infinite is to the Finite, as 1 (or any number) is
to 0.
Now the want of proportion between 0 and 1, does not
hinder us from saying that 1 is greater than 0.
But, let us take a more direct view of the question.
That there is between the Infinite and the Finite, con
sidered as such, any other relation than that of inequality
must of course be denied; but that of inequality exists.
If so, the idea “greater than” can at once be applied to
the Infinite in relation with the Finite. But is the idea
“supreme” anything more? It only affirms besides, what
we already know, viz.: that there is nothing greater than
the Infinite.
Moreover, we can consider God independently of His
Infinite attribute, and simply as one of the immense series
of beings. We at once see that He occupies the first rank,
above all others; for it is absurd to suppose that a real
being cannot be classed with other real beings, if we
abscind from what sets him apart from them. Every day
we see naturalists place man at the head of the animal
kingdom, along with monkeys, butterflies, snails and star
fishes, merely because they abscind from the faculty of
reason that sets man apart from all other beings.* Seeing
then that God is First of all things existing and possible,
we can surely call Him supreme by relation to them.
Thus, as Infinite, God is above all finite beings; as a
Being, He is at the head of the whole series. In both
ways He is entitled to be called Supreme.
• And they are perfectly right so to do, reason not being a faculty
that belongs to natural history, which ought only to describe exterior
characteristics of the animated and inanimate world.
�THERE IS A GOD.
37
We shall now try the value of Mr. Bradlaugh’s objection,
by putting it in the same way to other subject-matter.
The Queen cannot be called the supreme ruler of the land,
for she would be supreme either in relation to another
queen, or to subjects. Another queen there is not; but,
“supreme ” means, “ the first of all in a series ;” now, it is
impossible for the Queen to be the first of all her subjects,
since she is no subject. It is, perhaps, a very pretty play
upon words,—we are no judges of such things; but it is
nothing better than that.
He adds to this difficulty a short remark in which he
says, that even if God were Supreme now, He would not
always have been so, the fact of Creation being admitted.
We shall only notice in reply, that the word “ supreme”
is a title referring to the existence of other beings, not to
the nature of God in itself; therefore, even if there were a
change in the idea, it would not be a substantial change in
God, as considered before and after Creation. If I stand
still, and a carriage passes from my left to my right, I may
be said to have been, first at the right of the carriage,
then at the left: and yet my position has not changed in
the least. Suppose the Queen of England, (to return to
our comparison) were one morning to find herself alone in
her kingdom, all her subjects having died suddenly, she
would, of course, be no longer queen ; but would that in
volve any change whatever in her? Titles which proceed
from an external relation are merely names which may be
applicable or no, according as the relation changes.
2. Our adversary fares no better with the next objection,
against the creation of the world. “Creation is the
making of existence.” Of all existence? We deny it
formally; never did we think that God made Himself,
although He is His own principle. Of some existence?
That we are willing to admit. Creation is the making of
a finite, contingent and temporal existence by an Infinite,
necessary, and eternal one. So, before that temporal
existence was, something existed already; and it is grossly
unfair to represent Theism as supposing nature commence
ment, in the sense which Atheists give to “nature,” i.e.}
all that is.
�38
THERE IS A GOD.
Let us try an adaptation of Mr. Bradlaugh’s argument
on creation, and prove that it is impossible to light a fire.
To light a fire is to produce heat: now heat cannot be
produced; for, before heat was produced it was nowhere,
and there was no such a thing as heat in the world. But
I cannot look back to a moment when there was no heat,
for I know that all bodies possess, and ever have possessed,
more or less of it. Consequently, to light a fire is an
impossible undertaking. Such an argument, applied to
the lighting of a fire, would have brought its author to a
cell in Bedlam; applied to the creation of the world, it has
raised him to a seat in the parliament of England.
3. The argument against God’s benevolence has the
merit of being rather more specious. “A benevolent man
is one who does more than his duty; a being infinitely
benevolent ought to do infinitely more. God, in not
creating a sinless world, has not done infinitely more :
consequently God is not infinitely benevolent.”
Indeed ! Pray, what is the duty of God ? He has none,
and owes us nothing. The Supreme Being can be by no
means bound by duty towards those who depend upon
Him in all. Owing us nothing, it follows that in whatever
world we live, and however little God may have done for
us, He will have done infinitely more than His duty, if it
be true that something is infinitely more than nothing, and
that any number is infinitely more than zero. Even the
most ardent Atheist will confess, we hope, that existence
is better than non-existence, that to have a chance of being
happy is better than to be utterly deprived of that chance.
Well, all of us have both existence and a chance of being
happy. God, by that gift, does infinitely more than He
ought, and shows thereby His infinite benevolence. Why
does God not do more still, since our world is not perfect?
That we do not know, and if Mr. Bradlaugh wanted only
to prove that man is not omniscient, he would easily gain
his point; but as a proof that God is not benevolent it fails
completely. We fancy that our opponent is led astray by
a false idea of infinite action, which in his mind would be,
“ to do as much as one possibly can.” Now the fact is,
that an act can be infinite in itself, and yet produce only
�THERE IS A GOD.
y
39
finite results, on account of the debility and imperfection
of the matter on which it works.
4. Another difficulty arises. God cannot be personal,
because He is either infinite or not God. Now, all ideas
of “personality” give us also the idea of limitation. We
beg leave simply to deny the latter proposition without
more ado. Personality we consider as the highest sub
stantial perfection of an intelligent being. If the being in
question involves in its essence limitation and imperfection,
personality will no doubt be limited and imperfect, not
because it is personality, but because it belongs to such
a being. Thus, God having been demonstrated to be in
finite, it follows that His personality is also infinite.
5. This brings us to the next question, whether an in
telligent being can at the same time be infinite. We have
not to ask whether in every known case intelligence is
limited, but whether the very idea of intelligence argues
limitation ; and we answer in the negative. Intelligence
is essentially clear: is the Infinite essentially dim? Intelligence is something definite and precise: is the Infinite
indefinite and vague? Let Mr. Bradlaugh have the kind
ness to go back to our definition of the Infinite Being,—one who possesses perfection without end. Therefore the
Infinite must be infinitely clear, infinitely definite, infinitely
precise, since precision, definitenesBj and clearness are
perfections. All those qualities are qualities of intelligence, and intelligence is itself a perfection ; consequently
God must be intelligent, because He is infinite.
6. “ Theism checks man’s efforts,” says Mr. Bradlaugh.
That depends. A certain Theism, infected by fatalism,
certainly does so. If we believe that whatever happens
happens necessarily according to God’s will alone; if we
annihilate the liberty of man, and suppose that all that is
to happen must take place antecedently to any display of
human activity, and without his choice having any effect
upon that which shall be, then we certainly check man’s
efforts in the most fatal way. But this is far from being
Theism itself, since a great many schools of Theistic doc
trine have declared in the most emphatic manner their
abhorrence of this error. The only effect which we can
�40
THERE IS A GOD.
discern in the ordinary doctrine of submission to the will
of God is that we learu
“ To mend what can,
And bear what can’t be mended
and not only to bear, but be glad of it, since we know that
it is the will of the All-good. A seeming evil menaces us;
our duty is to exert ourselves to the utmost in order to
ward off the peril. But if all our endeavours are useless,
if the seeming evil does really fall upon us, then we are
happy ; for we know that the evil is only a seeming one,
and in reality a great good, since it comes from the Allgood. A true Theist is the most happy of men ; if suc
cessful, he is happy for having done what he wished to do ;
if unsuccessful, he is still more happy for not having done
what was against the Divine will.
But a still more evident proof that Theism does not
check man’s efforts is, that Fatalism can exist independently
of any Theistic doctrine; for Fatalism springs merely from
the denial of human liberty, not from the affirmation of
the power of God. Substitute to “ God’s almighty will ”
the “ laws of nature,” and you have modern fatalism, of
which, if we are not much mistaken, Mr. Bradlaugh is
himself an adept, for he seems clearly to deny free-will iu
man.* Now if, instead of all things proceeding from the
eternal decree of an intelligent being, all proceeds from
the everlasting law of an unintelligent one, we are at a loss
to see how this sort of Atheism differs from that kind of
Theism ; both have the same maxim : What is ivas to he,
and could not be otherwise. Why then give ourselves any
trouble? is the natural consequence of both. We here
detect a second stone which Mr. Bradlaugh throws, un
mindful of the fragility of his own dwelling.
7. The argument we have next quoted, though directed
against God’s intelligence, only proves that the intelligence
of God is of a different nature from ours; which, seeing all
His other attributes, and the immeasurable distance be
tween His nature and ours, was certainly a very likely
conclusion. AV e perceive new ideas, remember old ones,
• “ What did Jesus teach ?” p. 7, “Heresy,” p. 49.
�THERE IS A GOD.
41
and attain by reasoning to higher knowledge. God is
omniscient, and therefore neither perceives, remembers,
nor reasons; consequently, (according to Mr. Bradlaugh,)
to know everything signifies to be without intelligence!
If so, why should not the highest degree of intelligence be
to know nothing? Cannot the gentleman see that if God
does not perceive, remember, or reason, it is because He
does not want those faculties, but has the grand faculty of
omniscience, which transcends and supersedes them all?
Why do we perceive? To fill up a defect in our intelli
gence, which is never in possession of all it is able to know.
Why remember? Because another defect renders our
intelligence unable to have everything present to its mental
vision at the same time. And we reason only to supply a
third defect, which is, that we cannot at once see all the
relations of all ideas one with another, and all the con
clusions that flow therefrom. Mr. Bradlaugh’s enumera
tion of the acts of intelligence is, in fact, only the enu
meration of the defects in our intelligence. Perfect in
telligence is that which knows everything at one glance,
with an implicit judgment contained in that glance. God
has but one idea; this idea represents everything that is,
that was, that will be, and contains in itself all true judg
ments, as the idea of existence affirmed, (z.e , of the identity
between the subject and the predicate,) is comprised in the
idea “I.” Such is the rapid and imperfect outline of God’s
intelligence, which we give for want of space to add more.
“Judgment,” says Mr. Bradlaugh, “implies the joining
of two ideas.” Explicit judgment may do so; implicit
judgment supposes the two ideas joined in one already.
And the one idea which God has, being infinite, being God
Himself, is equal to an infinite multitude of human ideas.
“To think is to separate what is thought from what is not
thought.” Yes, in man, since man’s mind is not able to
think of all things at once and without confusion. But
the Divine is not the human nature ; His thought embraces
all, abscinds from nothing, unites all things in one vast
affirmation, without concentration of mind on one par
ticular object to the detriment of the rest. God’s mind is
concentrated upon all things together. And thus Mr.
�42
THERE IS A GOD.
Bradlaugh’s objections prove only this,—that our intelli
gence is of a very bounded and feeble description, obliged
to aid its flickering gleam by numerous faculties, which,
while they help its action, declare openly its radical
infirmity; just as the numerous members and organs of
the lower animals at the same time supply a want and
reveal an imperfection.
8. “ But G-od is not all-wise, having created beings and
parts of beings that are of no use.”
Of no use? We cannot find words to treat such pre
sumptuous ignorance as it deserves: but here silence is
best, the silence of scorn : not for our opponent, but for his
objection. Besides, another has, long ago already, in
sublimer language than we can command, joined the highest
flight of poetry to the soundest accents of reason in con
demnation of such temerity. Our only answer will be
a quotation from the immortal author of the “ Seasons.”
“Let no presuming impious railer tax
Creative Wisdom, as if aught was made
In vain, or not for admirable ends.
Shall little haughty ignorance presume
His works unwise, of which the smallest part
Exceeds the narrow vision of her mind ?
As if upon a full-proportioned dome,
On swelling columns raised, the pride of art,
A critic fly, whose feeble ray scarce spreads
An inch around, with blind presumption bold,
Should dare to tax the structure of the whole ?
And lives the man, whose universal eye
Has swept at once the unbounded scheme of things,
Marked their dependence so,-and firm accord,
As with unfaltering accent to conclude
That this availeth nought ?”*
9. Creation is again brought forward. “ The sum of
existence,” say you, “ cannot change.” But we also, who
believe in the creation, admit that, and we are algebraically
right. Let us discuss the question algebraically, not that
we intend thereby to decide whether or no algebra can be
applied to philosophical reasoning, but merely as a manner
of stating rather more clearly the point in discussion.
Call what existed before the creation, 00, (i.e., the
* Thompson, “Seasons,” (Summer.)
�THERE IS A GOD.
43
Creator,) and what existed after, CO + a, («.<?., the Creator
and things created ;) we say,
y'
*
00 = 00 + a ;
and we defy any man who knows algebra to say that our
equation is a false one: for nothing finite, however great,
can add anything to that which is infinite already. The
existence or the non-existence of creatures adds nothing
whatever to the sum of existence, or, to speak with more
exactitude, it adds comparatively nothing. Now, the
infinite, to which you add something that is comparatively
nothing, is like a quantity to which you add another in
finitely small; it becomes no greater than it was before.
And yet a may be as real as you like, as great as you like,
as distinct as you like from the infinite, the result will be
always the same. But if things are so according to
algebra, the most precise of all sciences, what more will
you have? If exactitude itself fails to content you, how
can we hope to satisfy your objections?
10. “Some men are not convinced of God’s existence.”
Thereupon Mr. Bradlaugh builds an argument to prove
that the Deity is either not all-wise, or not all-powerful, or
not all-good. To reply, we begin by denying the basis.
There is no man who is not convinced of God’s existence.
Some may be so ignorant that they have never thought
about the matter. Some there are who perversely refrain
from thinking about it; others may strive to raise clouds
before a truth as bright as the sun, accumulate objections
without number, and pile up difficulties without end. But
the honest doubt of a man who wishes sincerely to see his
way to what is true, there certainly is not. And as neither
pride, nor passion, nor wilful ignorance can be laid to the
charge of God; as, moreover, ignorance, it not guilty, is
not punished, we are right in affirming that there are
practically no Atheists. “ The fool hath said in his heart,
There is no God.” Not in his mind, even though he is a
fool: conviction will not enter there. Where then? In
his heart. That is, “ I wish that there be no God. I have
settled that there ought not to be one. I am determined
to seek every reason to prove to myself that there is none.
�44
THERE IS A GOD.
But all that is useless, and the Atheist only succeeds in
being an Atheist in his heart, and remains a fool. Cer
tainly, the expression is strong; but should we use a softer
one for a man who by every possible effort of will strove
to elude the evident truth that two sides of a triangle are
greater than the third ? Now, the existence of God is not
one whit less evident. Of course we do not by these
remarks mean to say that Mr. Bradlaugh is anything but
a very clever man; we only regret he should waste such
abilities as his in so hopeless a cause.
11. He considers Theism as inadmissible, because it
cannot show “ how the first cause, which is motionless,
can have moved to make the world.” In this reasoning
there are two weak points. Firstly, Theism is not bound
to show how things are ; it suffices that it shows that they
are so : and that we have done already. Secondly, we
deny that the First Cause moves to make the world. It
acts without moving. How is that ? we cannot understand
it, but it is proved to be so. “ Action” is not synonymous
with “movement.”* In movement we find an imperfec
tion, a variation, a constant change, which may perhaps
be essential to the action of finite beings, but certainly
not to that of the Infinite One. An eternal immutable
Act, which in eternity is the principle of God’s own
existence, and in time that of all other beings,—such is
God. No movement, no mutation, but a calm, undying,
unchangeable Activity. How can that be ? No man
knows : but nothing is further from absurdity than this
act, the perfection of all acts, and from which every shade
of passivity and inertia is banished.
12. And now we come to the last recorded objection,
which argues either that God, being everywhere, made
the universe nowhere, or that, if the universe is nowhere,
* On the contrary, we find in Mechanics that with levers of the first
class, where the force is applied to the shorter arm, the less the acting
force moves, the greater is the movement it produces: for the shorter
the arm where the force is applied, the longer the other which is put
in motion. Here we have, therefore, a very strong action combined
with very little movement, which produces a very considerable move
ment of matter. Therefore, to act is to produce movement, but not
necessarily to be moved oneself, at least, not at all in proportion with
the intensity of the act.
�THERE IS A GOD.
45
God is not everywhere : and that, by the reason that two
existences cannot be together in the same place. Mr.
Bradlaugh is certainly very pardonable for bringing
forward this difficulty, as it coincides perfectly with his
views on the question. He says he is unable to conceive
anything else but matter, and that for him the words
“ matter” and “ existence” have the same sense. Now
matter is universally allowed to be impenetrable, so that
two different bodies cannot occupy the same place. If,
therefore, we imagine God as a body, the argument might
be very difficult, if not impossible to answer. But that
is precisely what we deny ; God, according to our point
of view, is purely spiritual. Now, though an immaterial
being may occupy space as well as a material one, it does
not occupy space in the same way. It is not extended
into quantitative parts by the proportionate parts of space
which it occupies : it is only present by its action in space,
and that is all. Besides, do we not every day see
examples—not of bodies, it is true,—but of phenomena
which compenetrate each other? A room is full of air; if
you speak in the room, it will be filled with sound. How
is it that sound and air exist at the same time in the same
place ? Because they do not exist in the same way. You
are in a railway carriage ; the train goes full speed, and
you walk across from one window to another. Your body
is in movement, but animated at the same time by two
different motions : one, interior, that proceeds from itself;
another, exterior, that comes from the train. How can
two different movements exist in the same body at the
same time ? Because they do not exist in the same way.
I know that these examples only prove co-existence for
phenomena, and not for substances ; but we say that if
phenomena have the power of co-existing thus, we can
suppose that a substance which is not a body can possess
like qualities. All we humbly beg and pray our adversary
to allow us, is that a spiritual substance can exist and
occupy space in a different way from a corporeal one; it
is very hard to refuse us so little. And yet he grounds
his argument upon the fact that it is absurd to suppose
a spirit that does not behave exactly like a bodily sub-
�46
THERE IS A GOD.
stance. If that is the starting-point, of all his philosophy,
and a self-evident proposition which cannot be proved,
and which it is ridiculous to deny, we are surely in a
very hard case: but then, why so much reasoning? If
spiritualistic philosophy denies your very first principle,
you had better leave it alone, and not seek to prove its
falsity by means of a principle which it denies. If
Tertullian, Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, Bacon, Descartes,
Leibnitz and Clarke, were all so mad as not to have
seen what is self-evident, why should you dispute against
their conclusions, which of course are still more foolish ?
Either agree that your axiom is not self-evident, and then
prove your axiom by something besides itself, or abandon
discussion altogether.
Let us, in conclusion, sum up the whole debate in few
words.
1st. It is certain that in the universe there are many
beings, since everybody admits, or ought to admit, that
there are many phenomena, each existing separately from
the other : for separate existence is all we require for the
notion of a being.
2ndly. Of all the beings which we see or know directly,
not one possesses in itself the principle of its existence.
There must therefore exist another Being, which is at once
its own and their principle of existence. That principle
we call God.
3rdly. All objections here stated against the existence
of that, Being, drawn from its demonstrated attributes,
although they take an obviously unfair advantage, may be
and have been successfully answered.
4th ly. Therefore, Mr. Bradlaugh’s difficulties are utterly
worthless, his doctrines ridiculously absurd, and his
attempts to shake the demonstration of God’s existence
hopelessly inefficient.
5t hly. All this does not in the slightest degree interfere
with hia being, privately and personally, a very remarkable
man.
PRINTED BY RICHARDSON AND SON, DERBY.
�
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A collection of digitised nineteenth-century pamphlets from Conway Hall Library & Archives. This includes the Conway Tracts, Moncure Conway's personal pamphlet library; the Morris Tracts, donated to the library by Miss Morris in 1904; the National Secular Society's pamphlet library and others. The Conway Tracts were bound with additional ephemera, such as lecture programmes and handwritten notes.<br /><br />Please note that these digitised pamphlets have been edited to maximise the accuracy of the OCR, ensuring they are text searchable. If you would like to view un-edited, full-colour versions of any of our pamphlets, please email librarian@conwayhall.org.uk.<br /><br /><span><img src="http://www.heritagefund.org.uk/sites/default/files/media/attachments/TNLHLF_Colour_Logo_English_RGB_0_0.jpg" width="238" height="91" alt="TNLHLF_Colour_Logo_English_RGB_0_0.jpg" /></span>
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Conway Hall Ethical Society
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There is a god : a reply to Mr Bradlaugh's "Plea for atheism"
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Winterton, Francis
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Place of publication: Derby
Collation: [3]-46 p. ; 18 cm.
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Atheism
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Atheism
Charles Bradlaugh
God
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Gr
252-6»
REVIVALISM.
DISCOURSE
DELIVERED BY
MONCURE D, CONWAY,
SOUTH PLACE CHAPEL, FINSBURY,
Sunday, April 4.TH, 1875.
PRICE ONE PENNY.
��REVIVALISM.
Finsbury, April ¿ph, 1875.
It would seem to be the attitude of wisdom to
preserve a cautious respect for popular movements,
a respect that holds many of them at a respectful
distance, and never plunges into any. ’Tis said
the finest wine is pressed from vintages that grow
on fields once inundated with lava. So far we must
respect the lava. But the wine does very little good
to those who lie buried in the lava; and if there be
any religious lava bursting out and streaming
around to-day its far-off results will benefit only
those who keep out of its way. I do not deny that
some good has been reaped in the past from periods
of religious excitement. They have broken up the
old routine; they have set the sultry air in motion;
they have ended that stagnation which is death,
even though the life they substituted might be of a
poor kind. A change in the religious atmosphere
is healthy. In the 55 th Psalm it is said that the
�4
Israelites forgot God because they had no changes ;
and we may still say that where there are no
changes the people suffer by moral fossilisation,—
and a forgetfulness of the true import of their own
dogmas. . Travelling recently in Yorkshire I sat
in the same carriage with an affable merchant, and
our conversation fell on the American revivalists.
This merchant did not like them. He said, “I
don’t believe in this religious excitement; I don’t
believe it brings men to the Saviour.” I remarked,
“ And yet, when one comes to think of it, some
of the doctrines taught us are of rather an ex
citing character. You and I are going to Bradford :
now if we had this moment a divine revelation
that to-night at one o’clock all Bradford was
to be burnt up, and everybody in it burnt unless
they fled the town, surely that would justify some
excitement. It would be only reasonable if, when
we arrived there, we should rush through the streets
shouting to the people and warning them to leave
a place doomed to be burnt. Yet the burning of
Bradford and everybody in it were a small cata
strophe compared with the everlasting fires into
which they are to be plunged unless they are con
verted. If the common doctrines of God’s wrath
and the eternal hell are true, surely we must admit
that the American revivalists are right in raising
�5
some excitement about the matter.” When I had
thus spoken the merchant seemed to disappear into
a shell. He looked out of the window and said he
thought we should have more snow. But not
another word about the revival could I get from
him. I suppose that he is the type of millions of
well-to-do people who find it an easy part of
conventional life to accept a dogmatic system,
but never dream of realising its import. They
hate to have that which they accept for the
sake of ease turned into a source of uneasiness.
What such call their religion is simply a decent
kind of selfishness. The revivalist is a better type
of man.. He has at least the sense to see that if his
dogma be true it is a tremendous truth, and that to
complain of his excitement—to bid him be quiet
about it, is as if you asked a mother to be quiet
when her child has just fallen overboard.
The main thing about this revival, as it is called,
is its character as a confession made by the churches
and chapels of their own long incompetency and
unreality. A few of us have for some time been
telling them that they were mere pretences, that,
unconsciously or not, dogmas were on their lips
which did not correspond with their easy-going
lives, that they had a name to live but were dead.
We told them that men who believed the masses
�6
to be pouring into Hell ought never to rest another
hour, but run through the streets, and cry aloud,
like the prophets of old. When we said it, it was
called infidelity; but now these revivalists are
proving it. They preach with determination dog
mas ordinarily covered over with decorum; and
every preacher, every noble lord, who appears on
their platform, confesses that hitherto he and his
church or chapel have been uttering words without
sincerity or heart. Moreover, they have come—
these revivalists—among a population of sectarians,
each professing to hold the salvation of man above
all things, yet each preaching his own church
before all. These men have kept their sect in
the background, and they have made it evident
that the people have got tired of sectarianism, and
feel that the question of party is an impertinence
in the presence of the overwhelming and eternal
issues presented by the fundamental doctrines of
each and all. This is a step forward, for if it were
not for the partisan spirit engendered by sects and
their rivalries, the dogmas themselves could not
survive the light of one clear day.
But in itself this revival is an anachronism, a
grotesque attempt to galvanise into activity a thing
that is dead. That fact is indeed shown in the arts
employed for the work. They are arts borrowed
�H
rI
11
I
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|
j
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from the stump and the music-hall.
The chief
revivalist is a man who while preaching among
the Germans in Chicago found that they preferred
to pass their Sunday evenings in beer gardens
where entertainments went on, to coming to his
chapel, and he hit on the plan of making his
services a rival entertainment. He got a good
singer, he borrowed the popular ballads, set them
to hymns, told comic stories and Western anecdotes, caught the tricks of the stump-speaker, and
succeeded in getting up an amusement for Sundays
which did not reach the Germans, but did attract
others not so free in their ideas of Sunday.
But this plagiarism from the world was a con
fession that his doctrine could not stand alone.
The world had got the start, and he could only
move forward by linking his chapel on to it,
adopting its minstrelsy and its methods. They
have been remarkably impartial in their appropria
tions of poetic literature. For instance, I once gave
a discourse in a Unitarian chapel in America
on the text “ Nothing but leaves.” A lady of
liberal views who belonged to the congregation
embodied the sentiment of the sermon in a little
poem which she sent me. The poem was printed
in the Unitarian paper of New York, and now Mr.
Sankey is singing it with great unction in Agricul
�8
tural Hall, without in the least caring- about its here
tical origin. Nor is his hymn “ Nothing but leaves ”
the only one which heresy has supplied. I only
wish there were more of them, for too many are of
the silly sentimental order.
However, it is in large part as an amusement
that many are attracted to the meetings. Beyond
the indifferent crowd which attends out of curiosity,
there are thousands who have never been allowed
the usual amusements. Nearly all of the dis
senting sects denounce theatres, music-halls, balls
and other places of entertainment; and there are
many thousands of young people who never
attended any such place in their lives. A religious
service which combines the features of a prayer
meeting with those of the concert and the negro
entertainment, a sermon which interlards piety
with Western slang and newspaper stories, must
present a powerful attraction to the starved tastes
of those poor victims of modern asceticism. But
what moves them is not that gospel which Dr.
Dryasdust has for years been preaching to them
without quickening their torpid pulses; it is an
infusion of life from that very world which the re
vivalist denounces while he utilises it. It is con
fessed that his dogmas in themselves have lost their
power ; that the world has outgrown them; that
�9
something new was needed. Of course it was
necessary that the new power borrowed from
worldly amusement should be tricked out in some
of the cant phrases and current dogmas of the past;
but the effect is that of new cloth patched on to old ;
the patch points out the threadbare condition of the
old cloth that had worn out, and needed mending.
And yet among the thousands who are drawn
by the novelty of this motley mixture of worldly
and pious things how many are the illiterate, the
weak minded, the unreasoning, who are brought
to the verge of insanity by it! The revivalists
claim to have converted vast numbers—no doubt
they have. But neither they nor we can yet see the
outcome of this excitement any more than they
who in a past century preached a crusade against
witchcraft could see the tragical result, as we see it
now. Unlike the movements of Wesley and Fox,
this excitement is against all the learning of this
age, it is an appeal to pure ignorance. With it
there is kindled a flame that may easily spread to
an epidemic fanaticism.
Just consider for a moment the astounding
anomaly of thousands of people in a state of
furious agitation and anxiety about the salvation
of their souls from the wrath of God and the
clutch of Satan ! This is not in ancient Persia
�IO
where Ormuzd was seen every night conquered
by a demon of darkness, and conquering him in
turn every morning. It is not in China, where
lately the goddess of small-pox was worshipped
and prayed to preserve the dying emperor, but
having failed to do so was flogged and burnt.
No, all this outcry to propitiate a barbaric deity is
here in the country of progress—in the age of
science. Messrs. Moody and Sankey are actually
in the same city with Tyndall and Huxley. Their
meetings go side by side with those of the Royal
Society.
Washington Irving has given us a type of
men who are behind the times in Rip Van
Winkle. While he slumbered the world went
forward many years, and when he awaked
and talked as if nothing had happened, it gave
rise to amusing situations. He declares himself
a loyal subject of King George, ignorant that
while he slept America had become a Republic,
and he is roughly handled as a traitor. But one
can fancy in these days a reverse picture. One
can imagine the fable of a man falling asleep
amid the civilisation of this period, and waking
up to find himself amid the Dark Ages. Instead
of railways he would find stage-coaches toiling
through marshes; he would be beset by highway-
�11
men at every turn; he would find a group of
clergymen burning heretics and witches, and when
he expressed his disbelief in witchcraft and claimed
the rights of conscience, he too would be burnt,
and perhaps he would not object to leaving such a
world as that into which he had relapsed. Now
if any reasoning and reading man or woman—any
believer in the science or student of the philosophy
of this age—wishes to pay a visit to the Middle
Ages, or even farther back, he or she has only to
go to the Agricultural Hall. Recently a Unitarian
entered their rooms for private inquiry, and told
the chief revivalist that he had difficulties of a
scientific kind about the Bible. “ Bah! ” replied the
revivalist, “if you want to save your soul you
must never mind what the scientific men say.”
That was quite logical, at any rate. This whole
revivalistic phenomenon is the result of not minding
what science says. It is the natural result of ignor
ing all the knowledge that has been accumulated
for a thousand years. Take away from us all
that we have learned in that time and we should
-all relapse into barbarians, cowering before every
phenomenon of earth or sky, feeling ourselves
waylaid by devils, and offering up the blood of the
Lamb literally to propitiate a divine enemy.
Now, there is considerable curiosity abroad about
�12
the state of mind underlying this movement. Those
who have been educated amid the liberal ideas
of the present day are so far removed from the
terrors, the experiences and operations going on
in these meetings, that it may sometimes occur to
them that there must be something real, something
novel, in these strange ecstasies. For the benefit
of such I will relate what I know about it. It was
my destiny to be born in a region where this kind
of excitement was almost chronic. Revivalists
swarmed, prayer meetings were kept up through
the winter, and I can hardly remember an evening
which was not passed by me in looking on at what
was called the “ mourners’ bench,”—a long bench
where men and women knelt to be prayed for,
and sung over, while they filled the air with their
shrieks for mercy. When the summer came the
leading Methodist families—of which my father’s
was one—went to dwell in the woods in tents.
About two weeks were there spent in praying and
preaching all the day long—pausing only for
meals,—and during all that time the enclosure in
front of the pulpit,—an enclosure as large as
this chapel—was covered over with screaming
men and women, and even frightened children.
For many years after I had become of a conver
tible age I was talked to by preachers and
�I
| prayed with, but could not feel the usual exciteIment which they called “conviction of sin.”
Finally I became very unhappy about it. Most
of my relations and young companions had been
converted, and I felt quite lonely and humiliated
that I had not the same experience. I felt that it
was something that had to be gone through with,
like vaccination.
And at last, during a very
vigorous revival, I went to the mourners’ bench,
resolved never to leave it until I had found all that
the others had. While I was there women came
and wept over me ,• preachers quoted Scripture to
me. Not one whispered to me that I should
resolve to be better, more upright, true, and kind.
Hundreds were converted by my side, and broke
out into wild shouts of joy. But I had no new
experience whatever. More than a week passed ;
every night of it I had knelt in silence from eight
until midnight amid wild scenes. I was not in the
least a sceptic. I believed every word told me.
Yet nothing took place at all. On a certain evening
I swooned. When I came to myself I was stretched
out on the floor with friends singing around me,
and the preachers informed me that I had been
the subject of the most admirable work of divine
grace they had ever witnessed. I took their word
for it. All I knew was that I was thoroughly
exhausted, and was ill for a week.
�14
When I got far enough in time away from that
proceeding to reflect on it, I began to perceive
that its explanation was to be found in physiology,
not in religion. And in the hundreds of conversions
which I subsequently witnessed, I observed that
they generally took place when the body was re
duced to the point of exhaustion. In the so-called
revivals which have been going on in this country
of late, we rarely hear of many conversions at first ;
it is after people have been going for a good many
nights in succession, when the nerves have been
weakened by late hours and unusual habits, that the
delirium sets in, beginning with a sense of depres
sion which results in a reaction. This reaction is
nature’s relief to the overstrained system, and it is
sometimes pleasant enough to be called conversion,
or finding Jesus.
Only utter ignorance of the simplest physio
logical laws can regard this process as having
anything religious or moral in it. On the contrary,
it has a demoralising effect on the individual; like
any other intoxication, its transient elevation is
generally followed by deep depression. The con
vert finds himself no better for having been con
verted, but somewhat worse. I have heard them
confess this in hundreds of cases in the experience
meetings which often accompany revivals. They
�Æ are told by preachers that it is a temptation of the
1 Devil, who is trying to get the soul back again in
-n his grasp. Vast numbers of the converts become open
j 11 backsliders ’’—that is the phrase—while others,
Ij having become members of chapels and churches,
I sink into conscious or unconscious hypocrisy, keeping
up as a heartless form and profession the pietism
which has no reality. The most sincere are those
who perpetually lash themselves into excitements,
and whose morbid condition becomes habitual.
That large multitudes of our people should con
fuse this kind of dissipation with true religious feel
ing argues a mental condition which is most de
plorable. It is the saddest social feature of our
time that, just as the people are advancing in
political power, they are showing themselves in
large part subject to the basest superstitions and
j the most irrational agitations. Any demagogue
I who undertakes to raise a convict into a martyr,
stands a chance of being followed to Hyde Park by
thousands of his dupes, and religious mountebanks
draw vaster numbers than the greatest teachers ot
science. In this ignorance have the people been
left by those who have for centuries held the seats
of learning and the centres of religious instruction.
They have not taught the people to reason ; nay,
they have discouraged reason. They have burned
�i6
in one age those who have tried to enlighten the
masses,—in another age have imprisoned them, and
even now denounce them. As they have sown
they shall reap. For the moment the revival is
mingled with snobbery. It was urged against
Jesus that none of the rulers believed on him, but
these revivalists have live lords and even a lordchancellor around them, and reserved seats for dis
tinguished people. No doubt some of these eminent
persons hope to control the movement for their own
ends; but it is far more likely to control them, and
to degrade wiser men. That which is bom of
one excitement may be swiftly turned by another to
other ends. I sometimes think that a terrible
Nemesis is yet to come from this mass of barbarism
on those who have permitted it to grow,—a retribu
tion which shall flame on the walls of society and
signify to all times and nations the danger that lies
in the propagation of superstition among classes
predestined soon to wield supreme power over
civilisation.
That which is raised up in the country by Revival
ism as religion is the reverse of all real religion. It
is the paralysing spirit of fear. The honest re
vivalist said last week in his sermon, “ If I did not
believe in Hell, I would go back to America to
morrow.” Of course he would. The mainspring
�4« of his movement would be broken. Yet, what is
more base, selfish,—what more essentially irreli«S gious than this yielding to terror of that which
at despised considerations of love or of principle?
Even the Catholic Madame Guion had learned the
grossness of this pious cowardice. She met in her
vision an angel bearing a furnace and a pot of
w water. “ Whither goest thou ? ” she asked. “ I go
w with this furnace to burn up Paradise, with this water
>1 to quench Hell, that men may hereafter love God
without fear, and without hope of reward.” As fear
■reverses the spirit of true religion, noise drowns its
true voice. The tendency of all progress in moral
and inward culture for ages has been to show the
highest power within man to be that which is most
-quiet. It is so in external nature. The fiercest
thunderstorm has not in its ¡lightnings so much
force as the little magnet that silently guides
the ship. The blaze of the sun, and all its colours,
-are not so potent as those rays which cannot be
seen at all, but in their latent power fix and photo
graph each object set before them. I have heard
of an inward kingdom that cometh not with obser
vation ; a power lost sight of when men cry “Lo,
here, and lo, there,” or cry “ Lord, Lord I ” I have
heard of a pure, a silent growth in the heart, akin
to that which clothes the earth with bloom, gliding
�18
softly from winter to spring, revealing in each first
the blade, then the ear, and the full corn in the ear.
But I have not heard that gentle unfolding of the
deeper nature hinted in any of the manifold revivals
I have witnessed. I do not doubt that the deepest
longing of thousands who attend these revivals is
for repose—repose for their tempest-tossed lives,
and for their passion tossed hearts. They seek
repose amid dogmas of danger and despair; dog
mas which would turn their Heaven itself into
horror for every good heart, which must feel
beneath it the abyss of woe. There is but one way
of repose for a humane heart. It is to be freed for
ever from these phantasms out of darkened ages.
But no liberating, no really saving word, shall you
hear in any revival meeting.
You shall have to wait long there to hear man
told of the path that leads from ignorance to know
ledge, from vice to virtue, from conformity with
vulgar creeds to freedom of mind—the only real
new birth of man. This ranting is about imaginary
dangers, their exhortation is to a fictitious salvation.
Every enemy is named that is no enemy; the ven
geance of God, the vengeance of Satan ; no word is
ever said of man’s only real enemy—his own ignor
ance, his animalism. So I turn from the revivalists
of Islington, and journey rather to the mount where
�*9
I p prophet stood, far away in, dim dawn of time, to
>Jearn what even Doctors of Divinity and Lord
ifchancellors it seems have not yet learned;_ As
[^Elijah sat on the mountain, behold a strong- wind
«¡brake in pieces the rocks, but the Lord was not in
rithe wind ; and after the wind an earthquake, but
d|the Lord was not in the earthquake; and after the
^earthquake a flame, but the Lord was not in the
;Bflame; and after the flame a small, still voice. And
ijit was so that when Elijah heard the small, still
«voice, he wrapped his face in his mantle.
WATERLOW AND SONS, PRINTERS, GREAT WINCHESTER STREET, E.C.
�Smtfjj Jlhu (S^apH.
WORKS TO BE OBTAINED IN
THE LIBRARY.
BY MONCURE D. CONWAY, M.A.
. . .
. n
t
PRICES,
The Sacred Anthology: A Book of *. i.
Ethnical Scriptures.............................. 10 0
The Earthward Pilgrimage
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5
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Republican Superstitions................................ 2
6
David Frederick Strauss................................ OS
John Stuart Mill..................................... 0
Sterling and Maurice
..
..
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2
0
Mazzini.................................................0
2
1
BY BABOO KESHUB GHUNDER SEN
The Theists’ Prayer Book..
..
..
0
3
True Faith....................................................... 03
BY HENRY N. BARNETT.
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Religious Enthusiasm
......
0
3
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Victorian Blogging
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A collection of digitised nineteenth-century pamphlets from Conway Hall Library & Archives. This includes the Conway Tracts, Moncure Conway's personal pamphlet library; the Morris Tracts, donated to the library by Miss Morris in 1904; the National Secular Society's pamphlet library and others. The Conway Tracts were bound with additional ephemera, such as lecture programmes and handwritten notes.<br /><br />Please note that these digitised pamphlets have been edited to maximise the accuracy of the OCR, ensuring they are text searchable. If you would like to view un-edited, full-colour versions of any of our pamphlets, please email librarian@conwayhall.org.uk.<br /><br /><span><img src="http://www.heritagefund.org.uk/sites/default/files/media/attachments/TNLHLF_Colour_Logo_English_RGB_0_0.jpg" width="238" height="91" alt="TNLHLF_Colour_Logo_English_RGB_0_0.jpg" /></span>
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Conway Hall Library & Archives
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2018
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Conway Hall Ethical Society
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Revivalism. Discourse delivered by Moncure D. Conway, South Place Chapel, Finsbury, Sunday April 4th 1875
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Conway, Moncure Daniel [1832-1907.]
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An account of the resource
Place of publication: [London]
Collation: 19, [1] p. ; 15 cm.
Notes: Part of Morris Miscellaneous Tracts 1. Printed by Waterlow and Sons, Great Winchester Street, E.C., London. A list of the author's works available from South Place Chapel listed on back unnumbered page.
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South Place Chapel
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[1875]
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G3331
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Christianity
Atheism
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<a href="http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/mark/1.0/"><img src="http://i.creativecommons.org/p/mark/1.0/88x31.png" alt="Public Domain Mark" /></a><span> </span><br /><span>This work (Revivalism. Discourse delivered by Moncure D. Conway, South Place Chapel, Finsbury, Sunday April 4th 1875), identified by </span><a href="https://conwayhallcollections.omeka.net/items/show/www.conwayhall.org.uk"><span>Humanist Library and Archives</span></a><span>, is free of known copyright restrictions.</span>
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English
Morris Tracts
Revivalism
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Text
NATIONAL SECULAR SOCIETY
WITH A SPECIAL REFERENCE TO
R.
MR.
DALE,
W.
M.A.,
On “ Atheism and the House of Commons.”
BY
CHARLES C. CATTELL
Author of “ The Martyrs of Progress" etc.
“ Get knowledge, get wisdom, with all thy getting,
get understanding.”
TWO
PENCE.
LONDON :
WATTS
&
Co.,
84,
FLEET STREET.
�WHAT IS A FREETHINKER?
HE Saxon word Free means not in a state of vassalage,
not under restraint, not ruled or obstructed by arbitrary
or despotic power. When we speak of a Free people
we do not mean a wild, reckless gang of robbers, but people
subject to fixed laws only, living under government—but one
made by the consent of the governed. A Freethinker is one
vho thinks without the restraint of any church, priest, or
king, but under the conditions common to all thinking
beings, the laws of their own nature, and those of the great
universe of which they form a part.
A very good lexicon (Imperial) defines Freethinker—
a Deist, an Unbeliever ; one who discards revelation, and
caHs it “a softer name.”
Secularism has been erroneously called a disguise or a
cover for the harsh sounding names Atheist and Infidel, while
the fact is Secularism expresses the policy of a life based on
purely human considerations, altogether independent of
Atheism and theology of all kinds.
No doubt new names tone down public feeling, cool
infla.-med bigotry, and give reason and common sense a chance
of being heard. But in both these eases here referred to it is
not only a change of names, but also of the things signified,
which are not represented by the old names. Secularism
implies progress towards right and light, and is not a
negation. Forty years ago it was a very common saying—
T
�3
“ Give a dog a bad name and you may as well hang him.”
At that time, and for hundreds of years before, to be even
suspected of being a Freethinker was not free from peril.
Names require new definitions, because with an increase of
knowledge come new distinctions. I remember the social
inconvenience of being called “ a Methodist,” and an
Unitarian was considered a kind of wild animal, whose habits
and peculiarities were not generally known—and hence to be
avoided by all prudent people. At that time Christians never
met on what they call “ common ground.” In fact the
“ common ground ” itself was undiscovered. It is not impos
sible that by the end of the present century persons of every
creed and of no theological creed at all, may meet as men for
the promotion of all political and social measures for the
common good. It will then be seen that the evil is not the
inclusion, of all, but the exclusion of any, who can render
service to society. To ask a man’s theological opinions will
then be thought an unpardonable impertinence, showing
ignorance or a want of good manners. The public are not
very particular in the use of words. Hence Voltaire and
Paine are absurdly called Atheists—a term these two great
Freethinkers would have repudiated with as much justice as
the Bishop of London or Mr. Sturgeon might, if the term
Were applied to them. Those two great defenders of Freethought were devout believers in God and a future state.
The same remarks apply to Hume and Gibbon. The term
“Atheist” is probably the most popular, the most successful,
and certainly the most ancient, of all the names by which
people have been held up to the scorn, hatred, or contempt of
mankind. More than 2,000 years ago one of the best men
alive was called an Atheist: Socrates was distinctly charged
with Atheism. The Christians who are so fond of the epithet
were themselves denounced as Atheists in their early days.
�4
Afterwards Christians denounced each other as Atheists, as
Athanasius did Arius, as the Catholics did Erasmus. In a
work by Marechai entitled, “A Dictionary of Atheists,” it is
shown, as the late George Dawson once said to me, that every
great man from Jesus Christ downwards has been called
Atheist. Persons who first disbelieved in witchcraft were
called Infidels and Atheists by eminent writers of the period.
Even telescopes were denounced as atheistical inventions,
because they extended human vision beyond the limits fixed
by God in the natural eye. The folly or at least the absurdity
indulged in by Christians is singularly displayed in their
calling Deists infidels and atheists, while they show their
affection for Theists as being men and brothers. Deist and
Theist mean the same, the only distinction is that one comes
to us from the Latin and the other from the Greek. They
both believe in God, although they differ about his active
interference in writing books, working miracles, and some
other matters. It has often struck me as peculiar that the
many millions of people in the East who do not believe in a
Supreme Being’ have escaped the wrath of the Christian
missionaries. Perhaps being so numerous, and all alike, the
application of the opprobrious epithet Atheist would prove a
failure. If Atheists were as plentiful as blackberries in
England they would probably be deemed as harmless. The
majority of Freethinkers have been believers in God and a
future state. A Deist, Pantheist, Theist, or an Atheist may
be a Freethinker ; but a Freethinker may not be either.
A milestone may be made of wood or iron or partly of
both—the term indicates now a definite idea apart from its
material. A lunatic now need not necessarily be affected by
the moon, and many persons are now melancholy who are not
always sufferers from black bile. An absurd answer was
such an answer as a deaf person would make, but now many
�5
persons who are not ¿leaf make absurd answers. "We now
say a steamer sails on a certain day, but it may not have a sail
on board.
The word person is said to have originated from a mask
worn by actors. Their personation of great characters led to
others, distinguished by certain forms or peculiarities of
character, being called personators or persons. The word
became associated with events and persons of the highest
importance and the greatest dignity in human affairs—hence
the word person was applied to men, and angels, and even
God himself was called a person. The word Religion, in
early times, meant the obligation of a man to do his duty to
and by the State—now it may mean a sort of theological
pantomime, or it may mean an intelligible creed deduced fiom
the Old and New Testaments.
The chief distinction between a ¿Freethinker and other
thinkers on matters theological is that his own reason is his
authority in determining the value of all evidence submitted
to it. The Bible, the Church, the Pope, and all the articles
of faith, by whomsoever promulgated, are to the Freethinker
only human author ¡ties, to be tested like all other authorities,
and to be accepted or rejected on exactly the same grounds.
If a person believes that the Bible or any other book is infal
lible—inspired by an all-wise supernatural agency, and
entirely exempt from error, he is bound to accept, without
question, whatever the book says, and therefore cannot be in
any rational sense a Freethinker. Of course a Freethinker
may believe that God inspires all great writers and speakers ;
but he holds the right to decide for himself which of the
writers or speakers are inspired, and to what extent they
claim his allegiance. His intellect, by which he judges, is at
least as divine as the intellect which produces the poem or
any work of art. He never expects other Freethinkers to
�6
take the same view as himself, however much he may desire it,
or try to persuade others. All conclusions arrived at after
diligent and honest enquiry are equally justifiable, equally
innocent, although they may, in his opinion, differ vastly in
importance. The concZ-wsw»« of Freethinkers may he, and
doubtless are variable ; but their method of following reason,
guided by knowledge and experience, unawed by all authority
but truth, is clearly distinctive to all who care to understand
in what respect it differs from the method of all other
thinkers. A Freethinker is not, as is commonly asserted, a
person who repudiates all great authorities, and treats lightly
the great faiths of the world. He is the one person, above
all others, who takes the trouble to read and examine them.
It is the believer, and not the unbeliever, who takes things on
trust and assents in most cases without examination. It is a
clear indication of industry, intelligence, and patient research
if a person obtains the reputation of being* a Freethinker.
You will seldom find ignorant Freethinkers, or any who lack
moral courage. A Freethinker is always an earnest thinker—
one who cares to know the truth, and is prepared to suffer the
consequences of the most searching enquiry into the claims of
what others may superstitiously regard as too sacred for
human investigation. It is not a question of dates or great
names or reputed divinity, or heavenly origin, with the Free
thinker, as is the question with other thinkers in arriving at a
conclusion on any subject. It is not what is fashionable or
generally believed that influences this mind. It is not the
opinion of the majority which determines his belief in any
matter. The opinion of a Freethinker on any subject may be
the same as that of the majority—it may be the same as all
great authorities in the Church or out of it. Some people
erroneously imagine that a person who is a Freefbin'k-er
delights in not agreeing with anybody, and some stupidly
�1
assert that it is his desire to appear odd, to be something
unlike anybody else, which induces him to adopt an un
fashionable creed. Let those who sincerely think so come
out from their Church, and see how the world will treat them,
and let us hear the result of the experiment. From what is
called “ a worldly point of view ” a person would be more
likely to “ get on” in the smallest congregation of the most
obscure sect of religionists than by numbering himself among
the fraternity of Freethinkers. He will find neither loaves
nor fishes among the faithless few—it is more like taking the
vow of poverty than rolling in riches. When a person
becomes a Freethinker, the question what shall he get by or
lose by it in a worldly sense does not occur, but how shall he set
himself free from priestcraft and superstition regardless of
cost. To become a Freethinker requires that you should set
a higher price on freedom and truth than on all else in the
world besides. He will forsake all to follow these, believing
they will repay him a hundredfold. Those who know the
uses of money and the advantages of wealth will never dispise them, but he who has tasted freedom will never part
with it for silver or gold. We all prize comfort and joy and
th® pleasures of sense, but without freedom what becomes
of mind, the hope of the world or the worth of human
nature ?
“ ’Tis Liberty alone that gives the flower
Of fleeting life its lustre and perfume,
And we are weeds without it.”
Intellectual freedom is a necessity of progress, one of the con
ditions of human happiness, the pioneer of civilisation. All
that obstructs it, the Freethinker would sweep away—all that
promotes it, he cherishes, as it is the heritage of our race,
and the great deliverer of humanity from priestcraft, king
craft, and all other superstitions which afflict mankind.
�8
A Freethinker is often called a Sceptic, which means one who
is on the look out—a considérer, one not led away bv every
story teller. He is sometimes called a doubter, and the inten
tion is to convey the idea that the terms Sceptic or Doubter
mean something wicked or derogatory. The fact is the world
owes much to Scepticism and doubting. It is the proper state
of mind in relation to many things in this world. In a state
of uncertainty, in the absence of evidence, where demonstra
tion or proof of any kind is wanting, Scepticism or doubt
must prevail in all healthy minds.
What is a Freethinker ? I should describe him as one
who observes, thinks, and judges for himself. He is one who
has freed himself from the bonds of credulity both illiterate
and priestly. His spirit breathes charity or good will to all.
His hopes, desires, and efforts are in the promotion of the
best interests of mankind. He looks on ignorance and poverty
as two of the greatest afflictions of mankind, towards the
removal of which he devotes his best endeavours. If lie has
a religion it is as free from intolerance as it is from supersti
tion. He stands pre-eminent among men in intelligence and
nobleness of mind. He has the sublime reflection that his
life has been spent in the service of humanity : the conscious
ness of this gives him pleasing thoughts in life and enables
him to die in peace.
�9
MR. R. W. DALE’S SERMON.
EING familiar with newspaper reports of Mr. Dale’s
special public utterances, I had formed the erroneous
/
notion that in his case the preacher was absorbed in
the politician. Any one labouring under a similar hallucina
tion will be speedily restored to their right mind by a perusal
of his sermon on “ Atheism and the House of Commons.”
His view would disqualify the Catholic, Jew, and Freethinker.
It is clear that if Mr. Dale were a Chinese he would join the
celestials in their denunciation of the consumption of Cow’s
milk as unnatural and immoral. The sermon in question was
preached in Carr’s Lane Chapel, Birmingham, June 27th.
Referring to what he calls “the remarkable discussions” in
the previous week, which, on the last page, become “these
disastrous discussions,” he says: “We have had it forced
upon our minds that there are men who can find no evidence
that God exists.” At the same time he says the existence of
God has been the subject of discussion “ for many years,”
“ in every part of England,” and among “ all ranks and con
ditions of people.” If this had been only a political question
(which it most assuredly is, simply and purely) Mr. Dale said
he “ should be satisfied with discussing the subject elsewhere.”
He says, “There is a certain heat of passion almost always
created by political discussions.” In days agone it used to be
theological discussions which caused “heat of passion;” it
�10
seems the “ heat ” has been transferred. The leaders of the
House of Commons did not take Mr. Datte’s view : they
attributed the "heat” to its true sources—theological con
fusion and religious intolerance. Whenever theological
incomprehensibilities and religious fanaticism get mixed up
with politics and common sense there is always a fermentation.
This discussion shows Mr. Hale to be entirely in the wrong ;
for it shows that just government is only possible on the
Secular Method—independent of both Theism and Atheism.
If the proceedings of the past few weeks do not make this
truth clear to Mr. Dale and his friends—neither would they
be convinced if one rose from the dead.
“ Many philosophers,” Mr. Dale says, “ have regarded
the existence of God as a metaphysical hypothesis intended
to account for the order of the universe ; ” and on page 3 he
speaks of this same " metaphysical hypothesis invented for
the explanation of the origin of the universe.” There is no
evidence in this sermon to show that he knows there is any
difference between these two statements. The Origin of the
world is one thing, the Order of the world is another thing_
the study of the lattei’ has g’iven us all our knowledge; the
study of the former has resulted in endless disputes of no
value, being what Lord Bacon calls "milking the barren
heifer.” Mr. Dale says God is "infinitely more than the
great First Cause.” These words imply a little first cause,
a second cause, and any number of causes. Then he applies
the words "eternal” and "infinite” to the same. If you
tell me you have an eternal chain, a chain without beginning
and without end, and then ask me what I think of the first
link, my answer is that I don’t think anything„about it, and
am equally sure that you don’t. Then, if you get angry,
I tell you to your face that you do not know what you are
�11
talking about. Il may be well for the sake of some readers
to put clearly before them what all this is about.
Given the Universe, as it exists, the question arises—
How came it ? To answer this question theories have been
proposed. Something is assumed for the purposes of argu
ment to explain what is not understood—and this is
called an hypothesis. There are three theories or supposi
tions before the world about the universe more or less
satisfactory to those who accept them. To put the whole
matter briefly there are three assertions before us about the
Universe:—
1. That it is Self-existent.
2. That it is Self-created.
3. That it was created by an External Agency.
Mr. Date appears to accept the last. In my judgment there
is no theory which explains the Origin of the Material of
which the Universe consists or of what we call Space, or in
any degree enables us to understand their production out of
Nothing.
Cardinal Newman thinks it a great question whether
No. 1 is not as good as No. 3, that is, whether Atheism is not
as consistent with phenomena as Theism.
Sir William Hamilton says, “ The only valid arguments ”
for the existence of God “rest on the ground of man’s
inoral nature,” which Mr. Dale doubtless regards as utterly
corrupt.
Mr. Dale appears to have selected the term “Atheism”
as a peg on which to hang his scathing denunciations of
persons who are not Atheists : a more confusing or mischievous
proceeding is scarcely conceivable. He says that “ Atheism is
of two kinds ” (which in the nature of things is utterly
impossible)—“ practical Atheism” and “ theoretical Atheism.”
He says in “ theoretical Atheism His existence is denied, and
�12
His authority is, therefore, disregarded.” It is not usual to
disregard the authority of a king who does not exist, as he
very seldom has any.
Then “ There is practical Atheism, in which all the active
powers of man refuse to acknowledge the supreme authority
of God, though the fact of His existence is admitted.”
Mr. Dale should use another phrase instead of 11 practical
Atheism ; ” and I suggest “ impractical Theism,” or “ incon
sistent believing in God.’-’ Atheists whether practical or
impractical would not profess to believe in God and act as
though none existed.
The most serious objection to
Mr. Dale is his mixing up Atheism with the denial of all
obligations to morality and virtue. It is the less pardonable in
Mr. Dale because he reports a conversation between a friend
of his and one who said, “ I do not believe in the existence of
God, but if I did, I do not see that my life in any one respect
would be different from what it is : ” and Mr. Dale says this
man’s character was “ honourable and exemplary.” After this,
what right has Mr. Dale to say of theoretical Atheism,
“this is miserable unbelief?” Surely the believer in God
whose conduct is a living lie, ought to be followed by “ this is
a miserable belief.”
The difference between a practical and speculative Atheist
is thus expressed: “In the soul of the practical Atheist the
the dead corpse of faith is still lying,” and “from the soul of
the speculative Atheist the corpse has been removed.” It will
take more than Mr. Dale’s logic and eloquence to persuade an
Atheist, who is also an honest man, to weep over the departed
“ dead corpse of faith.” People seldom miss what they do
not want.
Mr. Dale is shocked at the words used by an M.P.,
“having some God or another” would satisfy the House.
Now it so happens that “the hon. mem.” who used these
�13
words accidentally spoke the truth. It is a fact that any
God ” is sufficient for the taking of the oath. I do not accuse
the M.P. whose “ profanity” is glaring, or Mr. Dale himself,
with a knowledge of the accuracy of the statement he made.
Mr. Dale says, “The God of the Deist ought not to satisfy
you ; ” but he admits it will do for the House of Commons,
for he says the oath “ may be taken by a Deist.” This shows
that the God of the Theist and the God of the Deist are not
alike, but “ one or the other ” will do.
Strange as it may appear in such a discourse Mr. Dale
introduces the old eternal problem of good and evil, a Pagan
notion which found its way into the Old Testament, and
ultimately got fairly landed in Christian doctrine. Here are
Our friends Light and Darkness struggling as of old.
Mr. Dale says, “We think we see Him in a conflict with
evil,” at the same time confident that “ the ultimate victoij-
will be with God.”
The terrible things which happen in the physical and
moral world Mr. Dale says “ sometimes oppress the faith of,
those who are most loyal to Him.” But why should they ?
Christians believe in a God who said, “ I form the light and
create darkness : I make peace and create evil. I the Lord do
all these things.”
It is the assumption that the Lord does not “ do all these
things” which makes all the difficulty. Surely Christians
remember that on one occasion God destroyed “ every living
substance ” on the earth. The destruction of the whole world
was at once so tragical and complete that “ Noah only re
mained alive, and they that were with him in the ark.” On
another occasion He rained fire and brimstone out of heaven,
destroying the cities, inhabitants, and even that which grew
upon the ground.
�14
How can Christians forget that He sent His only begotten
son into the world to suffer death, exclaiming in agony_
“ My God ! My God! why hast thou forsaken me ? ” In the
face of these recorded facts why resort, as Mr. Dale does, to
some revolt having its origin in unknown worlds and under
unknown conditions.” This alternative is utterly uncalled for
and purely imaginary. Incredible as it may sound Mr. Dale
actually says, “ These disorders and evils appear to us to be
the signs of some appalling disturbance of the divine order”
It seems beyond belief that any intelligent man could write
such a statement; for "who can believe it possible to upset
any arrangements made by Almighty power. Alphonso X.
of Castille said if he had been consulted at the creation he
could have suggested a better and simpler plan.
Mr. Dale, in this passage, reminds one of the old Greeks,
to whom the sky was a concave sphere or dome, with the stars
fixed in it, all revolving on a point. It was atheistic to
speak of any but "circular motions;” it would have upset
the divine order of things,” and, in all probability, stopped
the “ music of the spheres.”
Mr. Dale seems to overlook that all things visible and
invisible are the work of God, and known to God from the
beginning of the world. As there is, according to Mr. Dale,
only one source of power in existence, it follows that
whatever happens is according to the will of God, in spite of
the will of God, or without the will of God interfering. In
either case the attributes Mr. Dale applies to Him fade away.
Mr. Dale says God “ satisfies the wants of every livi n g th i n g. ”
Surely that did not apply to those who perished in the flood,
or by famine in India recently, or a third of the population
of France in the 14th century who died of starvation, or to
our own people who daily die of hunger ? Mr. Dale says,
“We live and move and have our being in God.” This
�15
means the Universe and God are one, and not two separate
existences. Is it possible that such a sentence by a Greek
poet, introduced to the Word of God by Paul, and quoted by
Mr. Dale, can express his view ? He refers to the Design
argument approvingly. This argument implies just the oppo
site. It means that we are external to God, the work of His
hand—we are the clay and God the potter. Then again,
Mr. Dale says, “ There is no place which is not consecrated to
the manifestation of His power.”
If we tell Mr. Dale what God has done in the past,
according to His own account in His own inspired word—
if we tell him the plague carried away 5,000 a day, and
sweating sickness killed half the people of England—he says,
“ You may remind me of the disorder and confusion of the
universe.” But of what use to “remind” one who admits
the just and unjust, guilty and innocent, alike suffer and
perish in the presence of God himself? Mr. Dale goes on
with his parable all the same, although virtue and vice are
both disregarded by the author of our common calamities.
He is no respecter of persons ; he smites all alike.
Mr. Date, says, “1 agree with those who regard Atheism
as destructive of the strongest guarantees and defences of
human virtue.” What are the strongest guarantees and
defences of human virtue ? The answer Mr. Dale makes is
faith in a God of perfect righteousness. I “ remind ”
Mr. Dale that this did not furnish guarantees and defences of
virtue, or even human life, or of any living thing, in the cases
here referred to. And if “ the slippery ledge of Theism,” to
use Mr. Gladstone’s expression, does not furnish these
guarantees and defences, how can Atheism be “ destructive ”
of them ? Mr. Dale admits the whole case, but takes refuge
m “ portentous mysteries ” in the face of “tremendous diffi
culties.” Millions upon millions of our fellow creatures have
�16
no Supreme Being- in their religion; yet it stirred men’s
hearts 500 years before Jesus, second to none in antiquity,
it spreads its sway over a fifth of the human race. But they
have no House of Commons containing members who, according
to Mr. Dale “ gamble and get drunk and lead a profligate
life,” and still say—“ So help me God ' ” India has no repre
sentation in the House that rests on 11 the slippery ledge of
Theism,” and therefore no guarantees or defences of political
virtue.
“ Faith in a God of righteousness ” has not afforded
Englishmen “guarantees” of wise and just laws or
“ defences ” against tyranny and robbery. Men may have
“ faith in God” and honestly believe that all men should be
contented, especially if their own situation is a good one.
But suppose a change of places !
“ Faith in God ” lighted the fires of Smithfield, supported
the Inquisition in Spain, made torrents of blood flow in
Europe. “ Faith in God ” and the Bible made the Slave and
closed the door against his Liberator. The Liberators were
embraced by those who had Faith in Humanity, and were
tar’d-and-feathered by those who had faith in God. There is
no tyranny, no persecution, no war, no revolution which men
who have “ Faith in God ” will not frantically support and
promote—if they only have enough of it. Liberty and peace
are only possible in countries where men who have “ Faith in
God ” can be kept in check—be restrained by the sceptical
and indifferent. Not many years ago in this very town, next
door to Mr. Dale’s chapel, Catholics and Protestants would
have torn each other to pieces but for the Secular Powers.
�
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What is a freethinker? with a special reference to Mr. R. W. Dale, M.A., on "Atheism and the House of Commons"
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Cattell, Charles Cockbill
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Text
THE
Logic of Death,
Qi, fclju sfyonlb i^re
fear to
?
By G. J. Holyoake.
“Even in the 'last dread scene of all’ personal conviction Is sufficient to produce
calmness and confidence. There was one, who for three months suffered agonies
unutterable, who evAla-imod in his anguish, ‘ So much torture, O God, to trill a
poor worm! Yet if by one word I could shorten this misery, I would not say it.
And at lasi^ folded his arms, and calmly said, ‘ Now I die!’ Yet this man was
an avowed infidel, and worse, an apostate priest.”—Spoken by Father Nbwmah
yn the Oratory of St. Philip Neri) of Blanco White.
[EIGHTIETH THOUSAND—
ENLARGED AND REVISED EDITION.]
LONDON:
AUSTIN & Co., JOHNSON’S COURT, E.C.
1870.
PRICE
ONE
PENNY.
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Hi
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�THE LOGIC OF DEATH
When the cholera prevailed in London in 1848, many were carried
away without opportunity or power to testify to the stability of
those conclusions which had been arrived at when life was calm, and
the understanding healthy. The slightest summary of opinions,
concientiously prepared, would have been sufficient to prevent mis
representation after death, provided the person who had drawn up
such statements had strength to revert to them, and to make some sign
that a conviction of their correctness remained. Mr. Hetherington
and myself drew up brief statements of tenets which appeared to us
to be true. He, as we know, sealed his in death. In several lectures
delivered, at the time when no man could calculate on life an hour,
I recited the grounds on which the Atheist might repose, and it has
since appeared that their publication would be useful. The book, of
which a second volume has since appeared, entitled 4 The Closing
Scene,’ by the Rev. Erskine Neale (in which the old legends about
infidel death-beds are revived), lauded by the Times, and patronised
by the upper classes, is proof that there are some priests going up and
down like roaring lions, seeking consciences which they may devour,
and proof of the necessity of some protest on this subject.
Since my trial before Mr. Justice Erskine, in 1842,1 have in some
measure been identified with sceptics of theology, and many ask the
opinions of such on death. If the world ask in respect, or curiosity,
or scorn, I answer for myself alike respectfully and distinctly. I love
the world in spite of its frowning moods. For years I have felt
neither anger nor hatred of any living being, and I will not advisedly
resuscitate those distorting passions through which we see the errors
of each other as crimes.
In my youth I was in such rude contact with the orern realities of life,
that the visions with which theology surrounded my childhood were
eventually dispelled, and now (so far as I can penetrate to it) I look
at destiny face to face. Cradled in suffering and dependence, I was
emboldened to think, and I took out of the hands of the churches,
where I was taught to repose them, the great problems of Life, Time,
and Death, and attempted the solution for myself. It was not long
hidden from me that if I followed the monitions of the pulpit, the
�4
THE EOGJC OF DEATH.
Those who must answer for themselves, have the right to think for themselves.
responsibility was all my own : that at the ‘ bar of God,’ before which
I was instructed all men must one day stand, no preacher would take
my place if, through bowing to his authority, I adopted error. As I,
therefore, must be reponsible for myself, I resolved to think for
myself—and since no man would answer for me, I resolved that no
man should dictate to me the opinion I should hold: for he is impo
tent indeed, and deserves his fate, who has not the courage to act
where he is destined to suffer. My resolution was therefore taken,
and I can say with Burke, ‘ my errors, if any, are my own: I have
[and will have] no man’s proxy.’
In the shade of society my lot was cast, and there I struggled
for more light for myself and brethren. For years I toiled, with
thousands of others, who were never remunerated by the means of
paltriest comfort, and whose lives were never enlivened by real
pleasure. In turning from this I had nothing to hope, nor fear, nor lose.
Since then my days have been chequered and uncertain, but they have
never been criminal, nor servile, nor sad: for the luxury of woe, and the
superfluous refinement of despair, may be indulged in, if by any, by
those only who live in drawing-rooms—sorrow is too expensive an
article to be consumed by the cottager or garreteer. The rightminded in the lowest station may be rich, accepting the wise advice
of Carlyle:—‘ Sweep away utterly all frothiness and falsehood from
your heart: struggle unweariedly to acquire what is possible for every
man—a free, open, humble soul; speak not at all, in any wise, till
you have somewhat to speak; care not for the reward of your
speaking : but simply, and with undivided mind, for the truth of your
speaking: then be placed in what section of Space and of Time soever,
do but open your eyes, and they shall actually see, and bring you
real knowledge, wondrous, worthy of belief.’ Thus have I en
deavoured to see life; and it is from this point of view that I explain
my conceptions of death.
The gates of heaven are considered open to those only who believe
as the priest believes. The theological world acts as if we did not come
here to use our understandings, as if all religious truth was ascertained
2000 years ago, and we are counselled to accept the conclusions of the
Church, on pain of forfeiting the fraternity of men, and the favour of
God. I know the risks I am said to run, but ‘ I am in that place,’ to use
the expression of brave old Knox, ‘ in which it is demanded of me to
speak the truth; and the truth I will speak, impugn it whoso lists.'
And after all, the world is not so bad as antagonism has painted it.
It will forgive a man for speaking plainly, providing he takes care to
speak justly. To give any one pain causes me regret; but, while I
respect the feelings of others, I, as conscience and duty admonish me,
respect the truth more—and by this course I may be society’s friend,
for he who will never shock men may often deceive them.
It becomes me therefore to say that I am not a Christian. If I
could find a consistent and distinctive code of morality emanating
from Jesus I should accept it, and in that sense consent to be called
�THE LOGIC OF DEATH.
fl
The four tenets of the popular theology.
•
Christian. Butl cannot do it. Nor am I a believer in the Inspiration
of the Bible. That which so often falls below the language of men,
I cannot, without disrespect, suppose to be the language of God.
Whatever I find in the Bible below morality (and I find much), I
reject; what I find above it, I suspect; what I find coincident with
morality (whether in the Old Testament or the New), I retain. 1
make morality a standard. I am therefore the student of Moralism
rather than Christianity. It seems to me that there is nothing in
Christianity which will bear the test of discussion or the face of day,
nothing whereby it can lay hold of the world and move it, which is
not coincident with morality. Therefore morality has all the strength
of Christianity, without the mystery and bigotry of the Bible.
But I am not a Sceptic, if that is understood to imply general doubt;
for though I doubt many church dogmas, I do not doubt honour, or
truth, or humanity. I am not an Unbeliever, if that implies the
rejection of Christian truth—since all I reject is Christian error.
There are four principal dogmas of accredited Christianity which I
do not hold:—
1. The fall of man in Eden. 2. Atonement by proxy. 3. The siy
of unbelief in Christ. 4. Future punishment.
A disbeliever in all these doctrines, why should I fear to die ? I
will state the logic of death, as I conceive it, in relation to these
propositions.
1. If man fell in the Garden of Eden, who placed him there ? It is
said, God! Who placed the temptation there ? It is said, God!
Who gave him an imperfect nature—a nature of which it was fore
known that it would fall? It is said, God! To what does this amount?
If a parent placed his poor child near a fire at which he knew it
would be burnt to death, or near a well into which he knew it would
fall and be drowned, would any deference to creeds prevent our giving
speech to the indignation we should feel ? And can we pretend to
believe God has so acted, and at the same time be able to trust him ?
If God has so acted, he may so act again. This creed can afford
no consolation in death. If he who disbelieves this dogma fears to
die, he who believes it should fear death more.
2. Salvation, it is said, is offered to the fallen. But man is not
fallen, unless the tragedy of Eden really took place. And before
man can be accepted by God he must, according to Christians, own
himself a degraded sinner. But man is not degraded by the misfortune
of Adam. No man can be degraded by the act of another. Dis
honour can come only by his own hands. Man, therefore, needs not
this salvation. And if he needed it, he could not accept it. Debarred
from purchasing it himself, he must accept it as an act of grace. But
can it be required of us to go even to heaven on sufferance? We
despise the poet who is a sycophant before a patron, we despise the
citizen who crawls before a throne, and shall God be said to have
less love of self-respect than man ? He who deserves to be saved thus
hath most need to fear that he shall perish, for he seems to deserve it.
�6
THE LOGIC OF DEATH.
The offence of sin reaches not to Deity. Proof by Jonathan Edwards.
3. Then in what way can there be a sin of unbelief ? Is not the
understanding the subject of evidence ? A man, with evidence before
him, can no more help seeing it, or feeling its weight, than a man with
his eyes or ears open can help seeing the stars above him or trees
before him, or hearing the sounds made around him. If a man
disbelieve, it is because his conviction is true to his understanding.
If I.disbelieve a proposition, it is through lack of evidence; and the
act is as virtuous (so far as virtue can belong to that which is inevit
able) as the belief of it when the evidence is perfect. If it is meant
that a man is to believe, whether he see evidence or not, it means that
he is to believe certain things, whether true or false—in fine, that he
may qualify himself for heaven by intellectual deception. It is of no
use that the unbeliever is told that he will be damned if he does not
believe; what human frailty may do is another thing; but the judg
ment is clear, that a man ought not to believe, nor profess to believe,
what seems to him to be false, although he should be damned. The
believer who seeks.to propitiate Heaven by this deceit ought to fear
its wrath, not the unbeliever, who rather casts himself on its justice.
4. There is the vengeance of God. But is not the idea invalidated
as soon as you name it ? Can God have that which man ought not
to have—vengeance ? The jurisprudence of earth has reformed itself;
we no longer punish absolutely, we seek the reformation of the
offender. And shall we cherish in heaven an idea we have chased
from earth ? But what has to be punished ? Can the sins of man
disturb the peace of God? If so, as men exist in myriads, and action is
incessant, then is God, as Jonathan Edwards has shown, the most
miserable of beings and the victim of his meanest creatures. Surely
we must see, therefore, that sin against God is impossible. All sin is
finite and relative—all sin is sin against man. Will God punish
this which punishes itself ? If man errs, the bitter consequences are
ever with him. Why should he err ? Does he choose the ignorance,
incapacity, passion, and blindness through which he errs ? Why is
he precipitated, imperfectly natured, into a chaos of crime ? Is not
his destiny made for him ? and shall God punish eternally that sin
which is his misfortune rather than his fault ? Shall man be con
demned to misery in eternity because he has been made wretched,
and weak, and erring in time ? But if man has fallen at his
conscious peril—has thoughtlessly spurned salvation—has wilfully
offended God—will God therefore take vengeance ? Is God with
out magnanimity? If I do wrong to a man who does wrong to
me, I come down (has not the ancient sage warned me ?) to the
level of my enemy. Will God thus descend to the level of vindic
tive man? Who has not thrilled at the lofty question of Volumnia
to Coriolanus ?—
‘ Think’st thou it honourable for a noble man
Still to remember wrongs?’
Shall God be less honourable, and remember the wrong done against
�THE LOGIC OF DEATH.
|
Christ’s death the great testimony against eternal retribution.
him, not by his equals, but by his own frail creatures ? To be un
able to trust God is to degrade him. Those passages in the New
Testament which we feel to have most interest and dignity, are the
parables in which a servant is told to forgive a debt to one who had
forgiven him; in which a brother is to be forgiven until seventy
times seven (that is unlimitedly): and in the prayer of Christ,
where men claim forgiveness as they have themselves forgiven
others their trespasses.
What was this but erecting a high
moral argument against the relentlessness of future punishment of
erring man ? If, therefore, man is to forgive, shall God do less ?
Shall man be more just than God ? Is there anything so grand in
the life of Christ as his forgiving his enemies as he expired on the
cross ? Was it God the Sufferer behaving more nobly than will God
the Judge? Was this the magnificent teaching of fraternity to
vengeful man, or is it to be regarded as a sublime libel on the
hereafter judgments of heaven ? The infidel is infidel to falsehood, but
he believes in truth and humanity, and when he believes in God, he
will prefer to believe that which is noble of him. Holding by no
conscious error, doing no dishonour in thought, and offering his
homage to love and truth, why should the unbeliever fear to die ?
Seeing the matter in this light, of what can I recant ? The perspicuity
of truth may be dimned by the agonies of death, but no amount of
agony can alter the nature of moral evidence.
To say (which is all I do say) that theology has not sufficient
evidence to make known to us the existence of God, may startle those
who have not thought upon the matter, or who have thought through
others—but has not experience said the same thing to us all ? Where
the intellect fails to perceive the truth, it is said that the feelings
assure us of it by its relieving a sense of dependence natural to man.
How ? Man witnesses those near and dear to him perish before his
eyes, and despite his supplications. He walks through no rose-water
world, and no special Providence smoothes his path. Is not the sense
of dependence. outraged already ?
Man is weak, and a special
Providence gives him no strength—distracted, and no counsel—
ignorant, and no wisdom—in despair, and no consolation—in distress,
and no relief—in darkness, and no light. The existence of God,
therefore, whatever it may be in the hypotheses of philosophy,
seems not recognisable in daily life. It is in vain to say, ‘God
governs by general laws.’
General laws are inevitable fate.
General laws are atheistical. They say practically, ‘ We are without
God in the world—man, look to thyself: weak though thou mayest
be, Nature is thy hope.’ And even so it is. Would I escape the keen
wind’s blast, I seek shelter—from the yawning waves, I look up, not
to heaven, but to naval architecture. In the fire-damp, Davy is
more to me than the Deity of creeds. All nature cries with one voice,
‘ Science is the Providence of man.’ Help lies not in priests, nor in the
prayer : it lies in no theories, it is written in no book, it is contained
in no theological creed—it lies in science, art, courage, and industry.
�8
THE LOGIC OF DEATH.
Atheism suspensive worship.
Some who regard all profession of opinion as a mere matter of
policy, and not of the understanding, will tell me that I can believe as
I please, and that I may call the Deity of theology what name I please:
forgetful that names are founded on distinctions, and that he who does
not penetrate to them is unqualified to decide this matter. It is in
vain to say believe as I please, or entitle things as I please—philoso
phical evidence and classification leave no choice in the matter.
The existence of God is a problem to which the mathematics of
human intelligence seem to me to furnish no solution. On the
threshold of the theme we stagger under a weight of words. We
tread amid a dark quagmire bestrewed with slippery terms. Now
the clearest miss their w.Q,y, w the cautions stumble, now the
strongest fall.
If there be a Deity to whom I am indebted, anxious for my grati
tude or my service, I am as ready to render it as any one existent, so
soon as I comprehend the nature of my duty. I therefore protest
against being Cviisidered, as Christians commonly consider the
unbeliever, as one who hates God, or is without a reverential spirit.
Hatred implies knowledge of the objectionable thing, and cannot
exist where nothing is understood. I am not unwilling to believe in
God, but I am unwilling to use language which conveys no adequate
idea to my own understanding.
Deem me not blind to the magnificence of nature or the beauties of
art, because T Zflerjc’et their language differently from others. I
thrill in the presence^of the dawn of day, and exult in the glories of
the setting sun. Whether the world wears her ebon and jewelled
crown of night, or the day walks wonderingly forth over the face of
nature, to me—
‘ Not the lightest leaf but trembling teems
With golden visions and romantic dreams.’
It is not in a low, but in an exalted estimate of nature that my rejec
tion of the popular theology arises. The wondrous manifestations of
nature indispose me to degrade it to a secondary rank. I am driven
to the conclusion that the great aggregate of matter which we call
Nature is eternal, because we are unable to conceive a state of things
when nothing was. There must always have been something, or
there could be nothing now. This the dullest feel. Hence we arrive
at the idea of the eternity of matter. .And in the eternity of matter
we are assured of the self-existence of matter, and self-existence is the
most majestic of attributes, and includes all others. That which has
the power to exist independently of a God, has doubtless the power to
act without the delegation of one. It therefore seems to me that
Nature and God are one—in other words, that the God whom we
seek is the Nature which we know.
I will not encumber, obscure, or conceal my meaning with a cloud
of words. I recognise in Nature but the aggregation of matter. The
term God seems to me inapplicable to Nature. In the mouth of the
�THE LOGIC OS’ DEATH.
The distinction between the Pantheist and the Atheist.
Theist, God signifies an entity, spiritual and percipient, distinct from
matter. With Pantheists the term God signifies the aggregate of
Nature—but nature as a Being, intelligent and conscious. It is my
inability to subscribe to either of these views which prevents me
being ranked with Theists. I can conceive of nothing beyond
Nature, distinct from it, and above it. The language invented
by Pope, to the effect that ‘we look through Nature up to
Nature’s God,’ has no significance for me, as I know nothing be
sides Nature and can conceive of nothing greater. The majesty of
the universe so transcends my faculties of penetration, that I pause
in awe and silence before it. It seems not to belong to man to com
prehend its attributes and extent, and to affirm what lies beyond it.
The Theist, therefore, I leave; but while I go with the Pantheist so
far as to accept the fact of Nature in the plenitude of its diverse,
illimitable, and transcendent manifestations, I cannot go farther and
predicate with the Pantheist the unity of its intelligence and
consciousness. This is the inability, rather than any design of my
own, which has exposed me to the unacceptable designation of
Atheist.
One has said, I know not whether in the spirit of scorn or suffering,
but I repeat it in the spirit of truth—‘ What went before and what
will follow me, I regard as two black impenetrable curtains, which
hang down at the two extremities of human life, and which no living
man has yet drawn aside. Many hundreds of generations have
already stood before them with their torches, guessing anxiously what
lies behind.. On the curtain of futurity many see their own shadows,
the forms of their passions enlarged and put in motion; they shrink
in terror at this image of themselves.. Poets, philosophers,, and
founders of states, have painted this curtain with their dreams, more
smiling or more dark as the sky above them was cheerful or gloomy;
and their pictures deceive the eye when viewed from a distance.
Many jugglers, too, make profit of this our universal curiosity: by
their strange mummeries they have set the outstretched fancy in
amazement. A deep silence reigns behind this curtain ; no one once
within will answer those he has left without; all you can hear is a
hollow echo of your question, as if you shouted into a chasm.’*
Theology boasts that it has obtained an answer. What is it ? The
world will stand still to hear it. Worshipper of Jesus, of Jehovah,
of Allah, of Bramah—in conventicle, cathedral, mosque, temple, or in
unbounded nature—what is the secret of the universe, and the destiny
of man ? What knowest thou more than thy fellows, and what dost
thou adore? He has no secret to tell. You have still the old
dual answer of centuries, given in petulance or contempt—‘ All the
world have heard it, and so has youor, ‘ None can understand the
Infinite, and you must submit.’ The solution of the problem must
therefore be sought independently.
Separate individual man from the traditions of theology, and what
is his history? A few years ago he sprang into existence like 9
�It,
THE LOGIC OF DEATH.
The actuality of life apart from theology
*
bubble on the ocean, or a flower on the plain. He came from the
blank chaos of the past, where consciousness was never known, where
no gleam of the present ever pierces, no voice of the future is ever
heard. He exists—but in what age he appears, or among what people
or circumstances he is thrown, is to him a matter of accident; To him
no control, no choice is vouchsafed. His physical constitution, his
powers and susceptibilities, his proportion of health or disease, are
made for him: and fettered in nature and fixed in sphere, he goes
forth to struggle or to triumph, and encounter the war of elements
and strife of passion, and oppose himself to ignorance, error, and
interest, as best he may.
Three or four years pass away before sentient existence is lighted
with the spark of consciousness, which burns faintly, intensely, or
flickeringly till death. Gradually the phenomena of the universe
disclose themselves to man. The ocean in its majesty, or the earth in
its variety, engage him—spring is exhilarating, summer smiling,
autumn foreboding, winter stern. By day the sun, by night the moon
and stars, look down like the eyes of Time watching his movements.
Above him is inconceivable altitude—around him, unbounded dis
tance—below, unfathomable profundity; and he arrives at such idea
as man has of the infinite. What is, seems to exist of its own inherent
power. It always wvas, or it could not be. The idea of universal
non-entity is instinctively rejected. Utter annihilation never enters
into his most desultory conceptions. The sentiment of the Everlasting
seems the first fruit of meditation, as an impression of the Infinite was
the first lesson of comprehensive observation. Man stands connected
with the infinite by position, and is related to the eternal in his
origin, and an emotion of conscious dignity follows the first exercise
cf his reason—and his pride and his confidence are strengthened by
perceiving that this infinite is the infinite of phenomena, and the
eternal that of matter. He may be but the spray dashed carelessly
against the shore, or the meteor-flash that for a moment illumines a
speck of cloud—or a sand of the desert which the whirlwind sweeps
into a transient elevation with scarcely time for distinction: yet he is
sustained by conscious connection with the ever-existing,though ever
changing—his home is with the everlasting, and when he sinks, it is
into the bosom of nature, the magnificent womb and mausoleum of all
life.
As youth advances, and his experience increases, he finds his
knowledge amplified. With nothing intuitive but the aptitude to
learn, he feels that his wisdom is ever commensurate with his industry
or observation—and as even aptitude is but progressively manifested,
he perceives that to attempt the untried, is to develop his being more.
Prematurely wasted by sudden efforts to change the order of society
or influences of things, he sees that nature never hastens, and that in
measured continuity of action lies the rule of success. Neither the
* Thomas Garlyle.
�THE LOGIC Gif xmCATH.
11
The epitaph of a student of nature.
muscle of the gladiator, nor the brain of Newton, acquired at once
their volume or power—the leveling of the mountain or the raising
of the pyramid is not the result of a single hasty attempt, but of
repeated and patient efforts. Thus, while man learns that his degree
of intelligence depends upon his industry and observation, his con
quests depend on the strength of his perseverance—and he looks to
himself, to the exercise of his faculties, and the right direction of his
exertions, both for his knowledge and his power. His lot may be cast
in barbarian caves, where ignorance and wildness ever frown, or under
gilded pinnacle, where learning and refinement are lustrous : he may
have to tread the very rudimental steps of civilisation, or he may
have but to stretch forth his hand to appropriate its spoils—still what
he will be will depend on his aptitudes, and what he will acquire on
his discrimination, application, assiduity, and intrepidity.
As his improvement, so also his protection depends on his own pre
cautions. lie defends himself from the inclemency of the elements
by suitable clothing—for health he seeks the salubrious locality,
wholesome, nutritious food, exercise, recreation, and rest in due pro
portion, and observes temperance in all things. His security on land
is the well-built habitation—on the sea, the firmly-built vessel. His
relation to the external world, and the conditions of fraternity with
his fellows, are the physical and social problems he has to solve. He
sees the strength of passion and the educative force of circumstances,
and he studies them to control them. The affairs of men are a process
which he seeks to wisely regulate, not blindly and violently thwart.
The world has two ages—those of fear and love. The barbarian and
incipient past has been the epoch of fear. Even now its dark shadows
lower over us. Love has never yet emerged from poesy and passion,
has not yet put forth half its strength, nor kindness half its power.
These graceful forces of humanity, whose victory is that of peace,
have scarcely invaded the dominions of war—but Love will one day
step into the throne of Fear, the arts of peace become the business
of life, and fraternity the watch-word of joyous nations. Plainly, as
though written with the finger of Orion on the vault of night, does
man read this future in his heart. The impulse of affection that leaps
unbidden in his breast, though suppressed in competitive strife, or
withered by cankering cares, yet returns in the woodland walk and
the midnight musing, ever whispering of something better to be
realised than war, and dungeons, and isolated wealth have yet brought
us. The student of self and nature, thus impressed, goes forth in the
busy scene of life, to improve and to please. The attributes which
rationalism prescribes to man, are perennial discretion and kindness.
Thus I have believed. I accepted the order of things I found with
out complaint, and I attempted their improvement without despair—
and it might be written on my tomb,
‘ I was not troubled with the time which drova
O'er my content its strong necessities,
But let determined things to destiny
xlold unbewailed their way.’
�19
THE LOGIC OF DEATH.
The physical fear of death as groundless as the theological.
And looking out from the bed of death, over the dim sea of the
future, on which no voyager’s bark is seen returning, I can place no
dependence on priestly dogmas, which all life has belied. The paltry
visions of gilt trumpets and angels’ wings seem like the visions of
irony or levity. The reality it is more heroic to contemplate. The
darkness and mystery of the future create a longing for unravelment.
The enigma of life makes the poetry of death, and. invests with a
sublime interest the last venture on untried existence.
Many honest and intelligent persons, who do not feat the future,
fear the transit to it. Novelists and dramatists, in illustrating a false
theory of crime, adopted from the Churches, have drawn exaggerated
pictures of the aspects of death, through which the popular idea of
dying has become melodramatic, and as far from truth and nature, as
is the extravagance of melodrama from the pure tone of simple and
noble tragedy.
A little reflection will show us that the physical fear some have of
death is as groundless as the moral. Eminent physicians have shown
that death being always preceded by the depression of the nervous
system, life must always terminate without feeling While appre
hension is vivid, while a scream of terror or pain can be uttered, death
is still remote. Organic disease, or a mortal blow, may end existence
with a sudden pang, but in the majority of cases men pass out of life as
unconsciously as they came into it. To the well-informed, death, in
its gradualness and harmlessness, is, what Homer called it—the half
brother of sleep: and the wise expect it undisturbed; and if they
have no reason to welcome it, bear it like any other calamity.
Were we not from childhood the victims of superstitions, we should
always regard death thus; but priests make death the rod whereby
they whip the understanding into submission to untenable dogmas.
For men know no independence, and are at the mercy of every strong
imposition, while they fear to die. That ancient spoke a noble truth
who said nothing could harm that man—tyranny had no terrors with
which it could subdue him who had conquered the fear of the grave.
How often progress has been arrested—how often good men have
faltered in their course—how often philosophy has concealed its light,
and science denied its own demonstrations, only because the priest
has pointed to his distorted image of death!
Among people of cultivated intelligence the idea of a punishing
God is morally repulsive. It is rejected as a fact because demoralising
as an example. The Unitarian principle, which trusts God and never
fears him, is the instinct of civilisation: it gains ground every day
and in every quarter. The parent coerces his child in order to cor
rect him, because the parent wants patience, or time, or wisdom, or
humanity. But as God is assumed to want none of these qualities, he
can attain any end of government he wishes by instruction, for in
moral discipline ‘it is not conduct but character which has to be
changed.’ In Francis William Newman’s portraiture of Christian
attributes, he enumerates ‘love, compassion, patience, disinterested-
�THE LOGIC OF DEATH.
The Golden Rule considered as a maxim of the Last Judgment.
aess,’ qualities incompatible with the sentiment of eternal punishment
—and as was before observed, God cannot be supposed as falling short
of the virtues of cultivated Christians. If we accept the hypothesis of
God, we must agree with Mr. Newman that ‘ all possible perfectness
of man’s spirit must be a mere faint shadow of the divine perfection.’
‘ The thought that any should have endless woe,
Would cast a shadow on the throne of God,
And darken heaven.’
The greatest aphorism ascribed to Christ, called his Golden Rule,
tells us that we should do unto others as we would others should do
unto us. It is not moral audacity, but a logical and legitimate
application of this maxim, to say that if men shall eventually stand
before the bar of God, God will not pronounce upon any that appalling
sentence, ‘ Cast them into outer darkness : there shall be weeping and
gnashing of teeth;’ because this will not be doing to others as he, in
the same situation, would wish to be done unto himself. If frail man is
to ‘ do good to them that hate him,’ God, who is said to be also Love,
will surely not burn those who, in their misfortune and blindness,
have erred against him. He who is above us all in power, will be also
above us all in magnanimity.
Wonderful is the imbecility of the people! The rich man is con
ceded the holiest sepulchre in the Church, although his wealth be won
by extortion or chicane, or selfishly hoarded while thousands of his
brethren have perished, while children have grown up hideous for
want of food, while women have stooped consumptive over the needle,
and men have died prematurely of care and toil. The priest-soothed
conscience feels no terror on the pillow of plethoric affluence—then
why should the poor man be uneasy in death ? Kings and queens, who
cover their brows with diadems stained with human blood, and main
tain their regal splendour out of taxes extorted from struggling
industry, are, in their last hours, assured by the highest spiritual
authorities of their free admission to Heaven, and Poets-Laureat have
sung of their welcome there—then why should the obscure man be
tremulous as to acceptance at the hand of Him who is called the God
of the poor ? The aristocracy pass from time unmolested by death-bed
apprehensions, although they hold fast to privilege and splendour,
though their tenants expire on the fireless hearth, or on the friendless
mattrass of the Poor Law Union—then why should the people enter
tain dread ? While every tyrant who has fettered his country—and
every corrupt minister who has plotted for its oppression, or betrayed
its freedom to the ‘ Friends of Order ’—is committed to the grave ‘ in
the sure and certain hope of a glorious resurrection ’—why should the
indigent patriot fear to die ? While even the bishop, who federates
with the despots, and gives his vote almost uniformly against the people
—while the Priests, Catholic, Protestant, or Dissenting, work into the
hands of the government against the poor, and fulminate celestial
menaces against those whose free thoughts reject the fetters of
their creeds—while these can die in peace, what have the honest
�14
THE LOGIC OF DEATH.
It is only the slave soul that imagines a tyrant God.
and the independent to fear ?
If the insensate monarch, the
sordid millionaire, the rapacious noble, the false politician, and
the servile clergyman, meet death with assurance, surely humble
industry, patient merit, and enduring poverty, need not own a
tremor or heave a sigh ! If we choose to live as freemen, let us at
least have the dignity to die so, nor discredit the privilege of liberty
by an unmanly bearing. If we have the merit of integrity, we should
also have its peace—while we have the destiny of suffering we should
not have less than its courage !
The truth is, if we do not know how to die, it is because we do not
know how to live. If we know ourselves, we know that when we
can preserve the temper of love, and of service, by which love is
manifested, and of endurance, by which love is proved, we acquire
that healthy sense of duty done which casts out fear. They who
constantly mean well and do well, know not what it is to dread ill.
And the fearless are also the free, and the free have no foreboding.
‘It is only the slave soul which dreads a tyrant God.’* Therefore—
‘ So live, that when thy summons comes to join
The innumerable caravan, that moves
To that mysterious realm where each shall take
His chamber in the silent halls of death,
Thou go not, like the quarry slave at night
Scourged to his dungeon; but approach thy gravo
Like one who wraps the drapery of his couch
About him, and lies down to pleasant dreams.’f
�THE LOGIC OF DEATH*
13
The Queen’s Views.
Since this article was written in 1849, the religions doctrine o'
death in England has entirely changed. The highest minds in
the Church of England, the most cultivated preachers among the
Dissenters have, in some cases, since originated, and in others, now
accept views similar in spirit to those advocated in these pages.
Bishop Colenso found that when the honest and clear thinking
Kafir of Natal was told of the “dreadful judgment of God,” which
an ignorant orthodox Missionary carried to him, he replied with
great simplicity but with natural dignity and resolution—‘ If
that be so we would rather not hear about it;’ and the
Bishop has found the means of proving, even from St. Paul him
self, that the doctrine of eternal punishment is alien to the genius
of Christianity and must be given up. Professor Maurice, the
most influential name in the Church of England, now teaches
that the conception of punishment by physical pain is a gross idea,
and that the sense of having incurred God’s moral displeasure is the
deepest natural punishment to the spiritual man. Her Majesty
the Queen has authorised the publication, since the death of the
Prince, of ‘ Meditations on Death and Eternity, of which the
*
leading idea is that even ‘ sudden death is a sudden benefit ’ to
those who live well, and that those ‘ who endeavour to make
amends for every fault by noble actions’ ought no more ‘to
dread to appear before God ’ ‘ than a child ought to fear to ap
pear before its loving parent, even though it had not yet con
quered all its faults.’ This is nobler and more humane doctrine
than was ever taught by authority in this country before. But
incomparably the finest passage in the whole compass of litera
ture, which depicts the spirit in which all should conduct life so
as to meet death in a patient and noble way, is from the pen of
Mazzini. It occurred in a criticism upon George Sand, in an
article in the Monthly Chronicle in 1839. It contains the whole
of that philosophy which has given to Italy its heroes and its
freedom, .and taught the Italian patriots in so many forlorn
struggles how to die without sadness and without regret. The
sublime passage is this—‘ Schiller, the poet of grand thoughts,
Las said, I Those only love that love without hope.” There is in
these few words more than poetry ; they contain a whole religious
philosophy that we do not yet well understand, but that futurity
will. Life is a mission; its end is not the search after happiness,
but the knowledge andfulfilment of duty. Love is not enjoyment,
it is devotedness. If on the path of duty and devotedness God
sends us some beams of happiness, let us bless God, and bask our
limbs enfeebled by the fatigues of the journey ; but let us not
suspend it for long; let us not say—“We have found the secret
of existence, for the action of the law of our existence cannot be
concentrated in ourselves; its development must be pursued from
'Without. And if we meet only suffering, still march on ; suffer and
�THE LOGIC i'F DEATH.
Mazzini’s Views.
ad. God will measure our progress towards him not by what
we have suffered, but by how much we have desired to diminish the
sufferings of others, by how much our efforts have been directed to
the saving and the perfecting our brethren.''' Of those who believe
in God intelligently, this is the language they hold—and those
who are not Theists, this is the doctrine they trust. People who
say they could not be happy with the convictions of the Atheist,
the Sceptic, or the Heretic, speak merely for themselves; they do
not speak for us. With regard to us, they speak of that of which
they know nothing, and of that of which they have no experience.
With their views what they say may be true. But different views
and different principles bring with them their own consolations.
Conviction makes all the difference. It is not the formal creed
which gives mental support, but the consciousness of truth and
integrity and pure intent. Nothing can disturb the peace of mind
of those armed by a fortitude founded on love and justice, on rec
titude and reason.
�
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Victorian Blogging
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A collection of digitised nineteenth-century pamphlets from Conway Hall Library & Archives. This includes the Conway Tracts, Moncure Conway's personal pamphlet library; the Morris Tracts, donated to the library by Miss Morris in 1904; the National Secular Society's pamphlet library and others. The Conway Tracts were bound with additional ephemera, such as lecture programmes and handwritten notes.<br /><br />Please note that these digitised pamphlets have been edited to maximise the accuracy of the OCR, ensuring they are text searchable. If you would like to view un-edited, full-colour versions of any of our pamphlets, please email librarian@conwayhall.org.uk.<br /><br /><span><img src="http://www.heritagefund.org.uk/sites/default/files/media/attachments/TNLHLF_Colour_Logo_English_RGB_0_0.jpg" width="238" height="91" alt="TNLHLF_Colour_Logo_English_RGB_0_0.jpg" /></span>
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Conway Hall Library & Archives
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2018
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Conway Hall Ethical Society
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The logic of death, or, why should the atheist fear to die?
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An account of the resource
Edition: Enlarged and rev. ed.
Place of publication: London
Collation: 16 p. ; 18 cm.
Notes: Eightieth thousand edition. From the library of Dr Moncure Conway and part of the NSS pamphlet collection.
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Holyoake, G.J.
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Austin & Co.
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1870
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N310
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Death
Atheism
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Atheism
Conway Tracts
Death
Death-Religious aspects-Comparative studies
NSS
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Text
NATIONAL SECULAR SOCIETY
INGERSOLL’S TILT WITH TALMAGE.
Wu ^nsiucr of
ROBT. G. INGERSOLL
TO A SERMON PREACHED
BY THE
REV. DE WITT TALMAGE,
EROM THE TEXT :
“ The fool hath said in his heart, There is no God.”
Trade, supplied l>y
JOHN
HEYWOOD,
DEANSGATE AND RIDGEFIELD, MANCHESTER;
AND 11, PATERNOSTER BUILDINGS,
LONDON.
PRICE TWOPENCE.
�Mr. Ingersoll’s Answer to a Sermon by
the Rev. De Witt Talmage, preached
from the text:
“The fool hath said in his heart, There is no God.”
The text taken by the reverend gentleman is an insult, and
was intended as such. Mr. Talmage seeks to apply this text
to any one who denies that the Jehovah of the Jews was and
is the infinite and eternal Creator of all. He is perfectly
satisfied that any man who differs from him on this question
is a “ fool,” and he has the Christian forbearance and kindness
to say so. I presume he is honest in this opinion, and no
doubt regards Bruno, Spinoza, and Humboldt as idiots. He
entertains the same opinion of some of the greatest, wisest,
and best of Greece and Rome. No man is fitted to reason
upon this question who has not the intelligence to see the
difficulties in all theories. No man has yet evolved a theory
that satisfactorily accounts for all that is. No matter what
his opinion may be, he is beset by a thousand difficulties,
and innumerable things insist upon an explanation. The best
that any man can do is to take that theory which to his mind
presents the fewest difficulties. Mr. Talmage has been edu
cated in a certain way—has a brain of a certain quantity,
quality, and form—and accepts, in spite, it may be, of himself,
a certain theory. Others, formed differently, having lived
under different circumstances, cannot accept the Taimagian
view, and thereupon he denounces them as fools.
Mr. Talmage insists that it takes no especial brain to reason
out a “ design” in Nature, and in a moment afterward says
that “when the world slew Jesus, it showed what it would do
with the eternal God, if once it could get its hands on Him.”
�R. G. Ingersoll’s Reply to Mr. Talmage.
3
Why should a God of infinite wisdom create people who would
gladly murder their Creator? Was there any particular
“ design ” in that ? Does the existence of such people con
clusively prove the existence of a good Designer ? It seems to
me—and I take it that my thought is natural, as I have only
been bom once—that an infinitely wise and good God would
naturally create good people, and if He has not, certainly the
fault is His. The God of Mr. Talmage knew, when He created
Guiteau, that he would assassinate Garfield. Why did He
create him ? Did He want Garfield assassinated 1 Will some
body be kind enough to show the “ design ” in this transaction ?
Is it possible to see “design” in earthquakes, in volcanoes,
in pestilence, in famine, in ruthless and relentless war ? Can
we find design in the fact that every animal lives upon some
other—that every drop of every sea is a battlefield where the
strong devour the weak ? Over the precipice of cruelty rolls
a perpetual Niagara of blood. Is there design in this ? Why
should a good God people a world with men capable of burn
ing their fellow men—and capable of burning the greatest
and best ? Why does a good God permit these things ? It
is said of Christ that He was infinitely kind and generous,
infinitely merciful, because when on earth He cured the sick,
the lame, and blind. Has He not as much power now as He
had then ? If He was and is the God of all worlds, why does
He not now give back to the widow her son ? Why does He
withhold light from the eyes of the blind ? And why does
One who had the power miraculously to feed thousands, allow
millions to die for want of food 1 Did Christ only have pity
when He was part human ? Are we indebted for His kindness
to the flesh that clothed His Spirit? Where is He now?
Where has He been through all the centuries of slavery
and crime? If this universe was designed, then all that
happens was designed. If a man constructs an engine
the boiler of which explodes, we say either that he did
not know the strength of his materials, or that he was
reckless of human life. If an infinite being should con
struct a weak or imperfect machine, he must be held account
able for all that happens. He cannot be permitted to say
that he did not know the strength of the materials. He is
�4
R. Gr. Ingersoll's Reply to Mr. Talmage.
directly and absolutely responsible. So, if this world was
designed by a being of infinite power and wisdom, he is
responsible for the result of that design.
My position is this: I do not know. But there are so many
objections to the personal God theory that it is impossible
for me to accept it. I prefer to say that the universe is all
the God there is. I prefer to make no being responsible. I
prefer to say: If the naked are clothed, man must clothe
them; if the hungry are fed, man must feed them. I
prefer to rely upon human endeavour, upon human intelli
gence, upon the heart and brain of man. There is no
evidence that God has ever interfered in the affairs of man.
The hand of earth is stretched uselessly toward heaven.
From the clouds there comes no help. In vain the ship
wrecked cry to God. In vain the imprisoned ask for release—
the world moves on, and the heavens are deaf and dumb and
blind. The frost freezes, the fire burns, slander smites, the
wrong triumphs, the good suffer, and prayer dies upon the
lips of faith.
My creed is this :
1. Happiness is the only good.
2. The way to be happy is to make others happy. Other
things being equal, that man is happiest who is the nearest
just, who is truthful, merciful, and intelligent.
3. The time to be happy is now, and the place to be
happy is here.
4. Reason is the lamp of the mind, the only torch of
progress; and instead of blowing that out and depending
upon darkness and dogma, it is far better to increase the
sacred light.
5. Every man should be the intellectual proprietor of
himself—honest with himself and intellectually hospitable—
and upon every brain reason should be enthroned as king.
6. That every man must bear the consequences, at least,
of his own actions; that if he puts his hands in the fire, his
hands must smart, and not the hands of another. In other
words, that each man must eat the fruit of the tree he plants.
Mr. Talmage charges me with blasphemy. This is an
epithet bestowed by superstition upon common sense.
�R. G. Ingersoll's Reply to Mr. Talmage.
5
Whoever investigates a religion as he would any department
of science, is called a blasphemer. Whoever. contradicts a
priest, whoever has the impudence to use his own reason,
whoever is brave enough to express his honest thought, is a
blasphemer in the eyes of the religionist. When a missionary
•Speaks slightingly of the wooden god of a savage, the savage
regards him as a blasphemer. To laugh at the pretensions
of Mohammed in Constantinople is blasphemy. To say in
St. Petersburg that Mohammed was a prophet of God is also
blasphemy. There was a time when to acknowledge the
divinity of Christ was blasphemy in Jerusalem. To deny
His divinity is now blasphemy in New York. Blasphemy is
to a considerable extent a geographical question. It depends
not only on what you say, but where you are when you say
it. Blasphemy is what the old calls the new.
The founder of every religion was a blasphemer. The
Jews regarded Christ as a blasphemer. The Athenians had
the same opinion of Socrates. The Catholics have always
looked upon the Protestants as blasphemers, and the Pro
testants have always held the same generous opinion of the
Catholics. To deny that Mary is the Mother of God is
blasphemy. To say that she is the Mother of God is
blasphemy. Some savages think that a dried snake skin
stuffed with leaves is sacred and he who thinks otherwise is
a blasphemer. It was once blasphemy to laugh at Diana of
the Ephesians. Many people think that it is blasphemous
to tell your real opinion of the J ewish J ehovah. Others
imagine that words can be printed upon paper, and the
paper bound into a book covered with sheepskin, and that
the book is sacred, and that to question its sacredness is
blasphemy. Blasphemy is also a crime against God, and yet
nothing can be more absurd than a crime against God. . If
God is infinite you cannot injure Him. You cannot commit a
crime against any being that you cannot injure. Of course,
the infinite cannot be injured. Man is a conditioned being.
By changing his conditions, his surroundings, you can injure
him, but if God is infinite, he is conditionless. If he is con
ditionless, he cannot by any possibility be injured. You
can neither increase nor decrease the well-being of the infinite.
�6
H. G. Ingersoll’s Reply to Mr. Talmage.
Consequently, a crime against God is a demonstrated impossi
bility. The cry of blasphemy means only that the argument
of the blasphemer cannot be answered. The sleight of hand
performer, when some one tries to raise the curtain behind
which he operates, cries “ blasphemer! ” The priest, finding
that he has been attacked by common sense, by a fact,
resorts to the same cry. Blasphemy is the black flag of
theology, and it means no argument and no quarter I It is
an appeal to prejudices, to passions and ignorance. It is the
last resort of a defeated priest. Blasphemy marks the point
where argument stops and slander begins. In old times it
was the signal for throwing stones, for gathering fagots, and
for tearing flesh; now, it means falsehood and calumny.
In my view, any one who knowingly speaks in favour of
injustice is a blasphemer.
Whoever wishes to destroy
liberty of thought, the honest expression of ideas, is a
blasphemer. Whoever is willing to malign his neighbour
simply because he differs with him upon a subject about
which neither of them knows anything for certain is a
blasphemer. If a crime can be committed against God, he
commits it who imputes to God the commission of crime.
The man who says that God ordered the assassination of
women and babes, that He gave maidens to satisfy the lust
of soldiers, that He enslaved His own children, that man is
a blasphemer. In my judgment, it would be far better to
deny the existence of God entirely.
It is also charged against me that I am endeavouring to
“assassinate God.” Well, I think that is about as reason
able as anything Mr. Talmage says. The idea of assassinating
an infinite being is of course infinitely absurd. One would
think Mr. Talmage had lost his reason 1 And yet this man
stands at the head of the Presbyterian clergy. It is for this
reason that I answer him. He is the only Presbyterian
minister in the United States, so far as I know, able to draw
an audience. He is, without doubt, the leader of that denomination. He is orthodox and conservative. He believes
implicitly in the “Five Points” of Calvin, and says nothing
simply for the purpose of attracting attention. He believes
that God damns a man for His own glory j that He sends
�R. G. Ingersoll's Reply to Mr. Talmage.
7
babes to hell to establish His mercy, and that He filled the
world with disease and crime simply to demonstrate His
wisdom. He believes that billions of years before the earth
was, God had made up His mind as to the exact number
that He would eternally damn, and had counted His
saints. This doctrine he calls “glad tidings of great joy.”
He really believes that every man who is true to himself is
waging war against God; that every infidel is a rebel; that
every free-thinker is a traitor, and that only those are good
subjects who have joined the Presbyterian Church, know the
Shorter Catechism by heart, and subscribe liberally toward
lifting the mortgage on the Brooklyn Tabernacle. All the
rest are endeavouring to assassinate God, plotting murder of
the Holy Ghost, and applauding the Jews for the crucifixion
of Christ. If Mr. Talmage is correct in his views as to the
power and wisdom of God, I imagine that his enemies at last
will be overthrown, that the assassins and murderers will not
succeed, and that the Infinite, with Mr. Talmage’s assistance,
will finally triumph. If there is an infinite God, certainly he
ought to have made man grand enough to have and express
an opinion of his own. Is it possible that God can be
gratified with the applause of moral cowards 1 Does he seek
to enhance his glory by receiving the adulation of cringing
slaves ? Is God satisfied with the adoration of the frightened 1
But Mr. Talmage has made an exceedingly important dis
covery. He finds nearly all the inventions of modern times
mentioned in the Bible. I admit that I am somewhat amazed
at the wisdom of the ancients. This discovery has been made
just in the nick of time. Millions of people were losing their
respect for the Old Testament. They were beginning to
think that there was some discrepancy between the pro
phecies of Ezekiel and Daniel, and the latest developments in
physical science. Thousands of preachers were telling their
flocks that the Bible is not a scientific book : that Joshua
was not an inspired astronomer, that God never enlightened
Moses about geology, and that Ezekiel did not understand
the entire art of cookery. These admissions caused some
young people to suspect that the Bible, after all, was not
inspired; that the prophets of antiquity did not know as
�8
7?. G. Ingersoll's Reply to Mr. Talmage.
much as the discoverers of to-day. The Bible was falling into
disrepute. Mr. Talmage has rushed to the rescue. He
shows, and shows conclusively, as anything can be shown
from the Bible, that Job understood all the laws of light
thousands of years before Newton lived ; that he anticipated’
the discoveries of Descartes, Huxley, and Tyndall; that he
was familiar with the telegraph and telephone ; that Morse,
Bell, and Edison simply put his discoveries in successful
operation; that Nahum was, in fact, a master mechanic;
that he understood perfectly the modem railway and
described it so accurately that Trevethick, Foster, and
Stephenson had no difficulty in constructing a locomotive.
He also has discovered that Job was well acquainted
with the trade winds, and understood the mysterious
currents, tides, and pulses of the sea; that Maury was
a plagiarist; that Humboldt was simply a Biblical
student. He finds that Isaiah and Solomon were far
behind Galileo, Morse, Meyer, and Watt. This is a
discovery wholly unexpected to me. If Mr. Talmage
is right, I am satisfied the Bible is an inspired book.
If it shall turn out that Joshua was superior to Laplace,
that Moses knew more about geology than Humboldt,
lhat Job as a scientist was the superior of Kepler, that
Isaiah knew more than Copernicus, and that even the
minor prophets excelled the inventors and discoverers of our
time then I will admit that infidelity must become speech
less for ever. Until I read this sermon, I had never even
suspected that the inventions of modern times were known
to the ancient Jews. I never supposed that Nahum knew
the least thing about railroads, or that Job would have
known a telegraph if he had seen it. I never supposed that
Joshua comprehended the three laws of Kepler. Of course
I have not read the Old Testament with as much care as
some other people have, and when I did read it I was not
looking for inventions and discoveries. I had been told so
often that the Bible was no authority upon scientific
questions, that I was lulled almost into a state of lethargy.
What is amazing to me is that so many men did read it
without getting the slightest hint of the smallest invention.
�R. G. Ingersoll's Reply to Mr. Talmage.
9
To think that the Jews read that book for hundreds and
hundreds of years, and yet went to their graves without the
slightest notion of astronomy or geology, of railroads,
telegraphs, or steamboats. And then to think that the early
fathers made it the study of their lives, and died without
inventing anything! I am astonished that Mr. ' Talmage
does not figure in the records of the Patent Office himself,
I cannot account for this, except upon the supposition that
he was too honest to infringe on the patents of the patriarchs.
After this, I shall read the Old Testament with more care.
Mr. Talmage endeavours to convict me of great ignorance
in not knowing that the word translated “rib” should have
been translated “side,” and that Eve, after all, was not
made out of a rib, but out of Adam’s side. I may have been
misled by taking the Bible as it is translated. The Bible
account is simply this: “And the Lord God caused a deep
sleep to fall upon Adam, and he slept. And He took one of
his ribs and closed up the flesh instead thereof; and the rib
which the Lord God had taken from man made He a woman,
and brought her unto the man. And Adam said: This is
now bone of my bones, and flesh of my flesh; she shall be
called woman, because she was taken out of man.” If Mr.
Talmage is right, then the account should be as follows:
“ And the Lord God caused a deep sleep to fall upon Adam,
and he slept; and He took one of his sides, and closed up
the flesh thereof; and the side which the Lord ’ God had
taken from man made He a woman, and brought her unto
the man. And Adam said : This is now side of my side, and
flesh of my flesh.” I do not see that the story is made any
better by using the word “ side ” instead of “ rib.” It would
be just as hard for God to make a woman out of a
man’s side as out of a rib. Mr. Talmage ought not to
question the power of God to make a woman out of a bone,
and he must recollect that the less the material the greater
the miracle. There are two accounts of the creation of man
in Genesis, the first being in the twenty-first verse of the
first chapter, and the second being in the twenty-first and
twenty-second verses of the second chapter. According to
the second account, “ God formed man of the dust of the
�10
R. G. Ingersoll’s Reply to Mr. Talmage.
ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life.”
And after this, “ God planted a garden eastward in Eden,
and pnt the man” in this garden. After this, “He made
every tree to grow that was good for food and pleasant to
the sight,” and, in addition, “ the tree of life in the midst of
the garden” beside “the tree of the knowledge of good and
eviL” And He “put the man in the garden to dress it and.
keep it,” telling him that he might eat of everything he saw
except of the tree of knowledge of good and evil. After this,
God, having noticed that it was not good for man to be alone,
formed out of the ground every beast of the field, every fowl
of the air, and brought them to Adam to see what he would
call them, and Adam gave names to all cattle, and to the fowl
of the air, and to every beast of the field. “But for Adam there
was not found an helpmeet for him.” We are not told how
Adam learned the language, nor how he understood what God
said. I can hardly believe that any man can be created with the
knowledge of a language. Education cannot be ready made
and stuffed into a brain. Each person must learn a language
for himself. Yet in this account we find a language ready
made for man’s use. And not only man was enabled to
speak, but a serpent also has the powei’ of speech, and the
woman holds a conversation with this animal and with her
husband; and yet no account is given of how any language
was learned. God is described as walking in the garden in
the cool of the day, speaking like a man—holding conversa
tions with the man and woman, occasionally addressing the
serpent. In the nursery rhymes of the world there is nothing
more childish than the creation of man and woman. The
early fathers of the church held that woman was inferior to
man, because man was not made for woman, but woman for
man; because Adam was made first and Eve afterward.
They had not the gallantry of Robert Burns, who accounted
for the beauty of woman from the fact that God practised on
man first, and then gave woman the benefit of his experience.
Think, in this age of the world, of a well educated, intelligent
gentleman telling his little child that about six thousand
years ago a mysterious being called God made the world out
of His “omnipotence;” then made a man out of some dust
�R. G. Ingersoll's Reply to Mr. Talmage.
11
which he is supposed to have moulded into form; that he
put this man in a garden for the purpose of keeping the trees
trimmed j that after a little while he noticed that the man
seemed lonesome, not particularly happy, almost homesick;
that then it occurred to this God that it would be a good
thing for the man to have some company, somebody to help
him trim the trees, to talk to him and cheer him up on
rainy days; that thereupon this God caused a deep sleep to
fall on the man, took a knife, or a long, sharp piece of
“ omnipotence,” and took out one of the man’s sides, or a rib,
and of that made a woman; and then this man and woman
got along real well till a snake got into the garden and
induced the woman to eat of the tree of the knowledge of
good and evil; that the woman got the man to take a bite;
and afterwards both of them were detected by God, who was
walking around in the cool of the evening, and thereupon
they were turned out of the garden, lest they should put
forth their hands and eat of the tree of life and live for ever.
This foolish story has been regarded as the sacred, the
inspired truth, as an account substantially written by God
himself; and thousands and millions of people have supposed
it necessary to believe this childish falsehood, in order to
save their souls. Nothing more laughable can be found in
the fairy tales and folk-lore of savages. Yet this is defended
by the leading Presbyterian divine, and those who fail to
believe in the truth of this story are called “ brazen faced
fools,” “deicides,” and “ blasphemers.”
By this story
woman in all Christian countries was degraded. She was
considered too impure to preach the gospel, too impure to
distribute the sacramental bread, too impure to hand about
the sacred wine, too impure to step within the “holy of
holies,” in the Catholic churches too impure to be touched
by a priest. Unmarried men were considered purer than
husbands and fathers. Nuns were regarded as superior to
mothers, a monastery holier than a home, a nunnery nearer
sacred than the cradle. And through all these years it has
been thought better to love God than to love man, better to
love God than to love your wife and children, better to
worship an imaginary deity than to help your fellow-men.
�12
II. G. Ingersoll's Reply to Mr. Talmage.
I regard the rights of men and women equal. In love’s fair
realm husband and wife are king and queen, sceptred and
crowned alike, and seated on the self-same throne.
Mr. Talmage denies that the Bible sanctions polygamy,
but I see nothing in what he has said calculated to change
my opinion. It has been admitted by thousands of theolo
gians that the Old Testament upholds polygamy. Mr. Talmage
is among the first to deny it. It will not do to say that
David was punished for the crime of polygamy or concu
binage. He was 11a man after God’s own heart.” He was made
a king. He was a successful general, and his blood is said to
have flowed in the veins of God. Solomon was, according to
the account, enriched with wisdom above all human beings.
Was that a punishment for having had so many wives ? Was
Abraham pursued by the justice of God because of the crime
against Hagar, or for the crime against his own wife ? The
verse quoted by Mr. Talmage to show that God was opposed
to polygamy, namely, the eighteenth verse of the eighteenth
chapter of Leviticus, cannot by any ingenuity be tortured
into a command against polygamy. The most that can be
possibly said of it is, that you shall not marry the sister of
your wife while your wife is living. Yet this passage is
quoted by Mr. Talmage as “ a thunder of prohibition against
having more than one wife.” In the twentieth chapter of
Leviticus it is enacted: “ That if a man take a wife and her
mother they shall be burned with fire.” A commandment
like that shows that he might take his wife and somebody
else’s mother. These passages have nothing to do with
polygamy. They show whom you may marry, not how many;
and there is not in Leviticus a solitary word against poly
gamy—not one. Nor is there such a word in Genesis, or
Exodus, or in the entire Pentateuch—not one word. And
yet these books are filled with the most minute directions
about killing sheep and goats and doves—about making
clothes for priests, about fashioning tongs and snuffers—and
yet not one word against polygamy. It never occurred to
the inspired writers that polygamy was a crime. It was taken
as a matter of course. Women were simple property. Mr.
Talmage, however, insists that, although God was against
�R. G. Ingersoll’s Reply to Mr. Talmage.
13
polygamy, he permitted it, and at the same time threw his
moral influence against it. Upon this subject he says : “No
doubt God permitted polygamy to continue for some time,
just as He permits murder, arson, and theft, and gambling
to-day to continue, although He is against them.” If God is
the author of the Ten Commandments, He prohibited mur
der and theft, but He said nothing about polygamy. If He
was so terribly against these crimes, why did He forget to
mention the other. Was there not room enough on the tables
of stone for just one word on this subject? Had He no time to
give a commandment against slavery? Mr. Talmage of course
insists that God has to deal with these things gradually,
his idea being that if God had made a commandment
against it all at once, the Jews would have had nothing more
to do with Him. For instance, if we wanted to break canni
bals of eating missionaries, we should not tell them all at
once that it was wrong, that it was wicked to eat missionaries
raw; we should induce them first to cook the missionaries,
and gradually wean them from raw flesh. This would be the
first great step. We would stew the missionaries, and after
a time put a little mutton in the stew, not enough to excite
the suspicion of the cannibal, but just enough to get him in
the habit of eating mutton without knowing it. Day after
day we would put in more mutton and less missionary, until
finally the cannibal would be perfectly satisfied with clear
mutton. Then we would tell him that it was wrong to eat
missionary. After the cannibal got so that he liked mutton
best, and cared nothing for missionary, then it would be safe
to have a law upon the subject. Mr. Talmage insists that
polygamy cannot exist among people who believe the Bible.
In this he is mistaken. The Mormons all believe the Bible.
There is not a single polygamist in Utah who does not insist
upon the inspiration of the Old and New Testaments. The
Bev. Mr. Newman, a kind of peripatetic theologian, once
had a discussion, I believe, with Elder Heber Kimball at Salt
Lake City, upon the question of polygamy. It is sufficient
to say of this discussion that it is now circulated among the
Mormons as a campaign document. The elder overwhelmed
the parson. Passages of Scripture in favour of polygamy were
�14
-K. G. Ingersoll's Teply to Mr. Talmage.
quoted by the hundred. The lives of all the patriarchs were
brought forward, and poor parson Newman was driven from
the field. The truth is, the Jews at that time were much like
our forefathers. They were barbarians, and many of their
laws were unjust and cruel. Polygamy was the right of all
practised, as a matter of fact, by the rich and powerful, and
the rich and powerful were envied by the poor. In such
esteem did the ancient Jews hold polygamy, that the number
of Solomon’s wives was given simply to enhance his glory.
My own opinion is, that Solomon had very few wives and that
polygamy was not general in Palestine. The country was
too poor, and Solomon in all his glory was hardly able to
support one wife. He was a poor barbarian king with a
limited revenue, with a poor soil, with a sparse population,
without art, without science, and without power. He sus
tained about the same relation to other kings as Delaware
does to other States. Mr. Talmage says that God persecuted
Solomon, and yet, if he will turn to the twenty-second
chapter of I. Chronicles, he will find what God promised to
Solomon. God, speaking to David, says: “ Behold, a son
shall be born to thee, who shall be a man of rest, and I will
give him rest from his enemies round about; for his name
shall be Solomon, and I will give peace and quietness unto
Israel in his days. He shall build a house in my name, and
he shall be my son and I will be his father, and I will
establish the throne of his kingdom over Israel for ever.”
Did God keep his promise ? So he tells us that David was
persecuted by God, on account of his offences, and yet I
find in the twenty-eighth verse of the twenty-ninth chapter
of i. Chronicles, the following account of the death of
David . And he died in a good old age, full of days, riches,
and honour.” Is this true ?
Then I am charged with attacking Queen Victoria, and of
drawing a parallel between her and George Eliot, calculated
to lower the reputation of the Queen. I never said a word
against Victoria. The fact is, unlike Mr. Talmage, I am not
acquainted with her never met her in my life and know but
little of her. I never happened to see her in “ plain clothes,
reading the Bible to the poor in the lane,” neither did I ever
�E. G. Ingersoll’s Eeply to Mr. Talmage.
15
hear her sing. I most cheerfully admit that her reputation
is good in the neighbourhood where she resides. In one of
my lectures I drew a parallel between George Eliot and
Victoria. I was showing the difference between a woman who
had won her position in the world of thought and one who
was queen by chance. This is what I said: “ It no longer
satisfies the ambition of a great man to be a king or emperor.
The last Napoleon was not satisfied with being the Emperor
of the French. He was not satisfied with having a circlet of
gold about his head—he wanted some evidence that he had
something’of value in his head. So he wrote the life of Julius
Csesar that he might become a member of the French Academy.
The emperors, the kings, the popes, no longer tower above
their fellows. Compare King William with the philosopher
Haeckel. The king is one of the “anointed by the Most
High” —as they claim—one upon whose head has been
poured the divine petroleum of authority. Compare this king
with Haeckel, who towers an intellectual Colossus above the
crowned mediocrity. Compare George Eliot with Queen
Victoria. The queen is clothed in garments given her by blind
fortune and unreasoning chance, while George Eliot wears
robes of glory woven in the loom of her own genius. The
world is beginning to pay homage to intellect, to genius, to
art. I said not one word against Queen Victoria, and did not
intend to even intimate that she was not an excellent woman,
wife, and mother. I was simply trying to show that the world
was getting great enough to place the genius above an acci
dental queen. Mr. Talmage, true to the fawning, cringing
spirit of orthodoxy, lauds the living queen and cruelly
maligns the genius dead. He digs open the grave of George
Eliot, and tries to stain the sacred dust of one who was the
greatest woman England has produced. He calls her “ an
adulteress.” He attacks her because she was an atheist—■
because she abhorred Jehovah, denied the inspiration of the
Bible, denied the dogma of eternal pain, and with all her
heart despised the Presbyterian creed. He hates her because
she was great and brave and free—because she lived without
“faith” and died without fear—because she dared to give
her honest thought, and grandly bore the taunts and slanders
�16
R. G. Ingersoll's Reply to Mr. Talmage.
of the Christian world. George Eliot tenderly carried in
her heart the burdens of our race. She looked through
pity’s tears upon the faults and frailties of mankind. She
knew the springs and seeds of thought and deed, and saw
with cloudless eyes through all the winding ways of greed,
ambition, and deceit, where folly vainly plucks with thornpierced hands the fading flowers of selfish joy—the highway
of eternal right. Whatever her relations may have been—
no matter what I think or others say, or how much all regret
the one mistake in all her self-denying, loving life—I feel
and know that in the court where her own conscience sat as
judge, she stood acquitted—pure as light and stainless as a
star. How appropriate here, with some slight change, the
wondrously poetic and pathetic words of Laertes at Ophelia’s
grave—
Leave her i’ the earth ;
And from her fair and unpolluted flesh
May violets spring ! I tell thee, churlish priest,
A ministering angel shall this woman be,
When thou liest howling !
I have no words with which to tell my loathing for a man
who violates a noble woman’s grave.
John Heywood, Excelsior Steam Printing and Bookbinding Works,
Hulme Hall Road, Manchester.
�
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Victorian Blogging
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A collection of digitised nineteenth-century pamphlets from Conway Hall Library & Archives. This includes the Conway Tracts, Moncure Conway's personal pamphlet library; the Morris Tracts, donated to the library by Miss Morris in 1904; the National Secular Society's pamphlet library and others. The Conway Tracts were bound with additional ephemera, such as lecture programmes and handwritten notes.<br /><br />Please note that these digitised pamphlets have been edited to maximise the accuracy of the OCR, ensuring they are text searchable. If you would like to view un-edited, full-colour versions of any of our pamphlets, please email librarian@conwayhall.org.uk.<br /><br /><span><img src="http://www.heritagefund.org.uk/sites/default/files/media/attachments/TNLHLF_Colour_Logo_English_RGB_0_0.jpg" width="238" height="91" alt="TNLHLF_Colour_Logo_English_RGB_0_0.jpg" /></span>
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2018
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Conway Hall Ethical Society
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The answer of Robt. G. Ingersoll to a sermon preached by the Rev. T. De Witt Talmage, from the text: "The fool hath said in his heart, There is no God."
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Ingersoll, Robert Green [1833-1899]
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Place of publication: Manchester; London
Collation: 16 p. ; 18 cm.
Notes: Date of publication from British Library. Stamp on front cover: Freethought Publishing Co., Printing Office, 68 Fleet Street., E.C., A. Bonner, Manager. Part of the NSS pamphlet collection.
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John Heywood
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[1882]
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N330
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Atheism
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Free Thought
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Text
THE BOOK OF ESTHER:
A SPECIMEN OF WHAT PASSES AS THE INSPIRED
WORD OF GOD.
BY AUSTIN HOLYOAKB.
The Book of Esther ! What is there in that worthy of special notice ?
It is a part of Holy Writ seldom or never referred to in the controver
sies of the time, and rarely used to point an argument or adorn a tale
in pulpit sermons. Some may say, why drag an obscure, unimportant
book into prominence, and attack that which is not of much moment
even to Christians ? To this it may be answered, that to a true believer,
nothing in the sacred book is trivial—all is inspired, and therefore all
is vital truth. If we view it in that light, it will be found to be our
strongest argument. The Book of Esther is still retained in all autho
rised editions of the Bible, and the most orthodox members of the
Church maintain that you cannot eliminate a single word or passage
withoiit incurring the wrath of Almighty God ; and we see how even
a bishop may bring down upon his devoted head the severest eccle
siastical censure, and be maligned, and shunned, and prosecuted by his
brethren of the cloth for daring to doubt the accuracy of some accounts
of events which never could have taken place as there related. But it
is not necessary now to go particularly into the question of inspiration.
We will take the book as we find it, and see what passes as the inspired
Word of God, and by following the text closely see how much better it
is than other writings. It must strike any observant reader that there
is nothing whatever on the surface of this part of the Bible that can
account for its being placed as a canonical book. It does not relate
any of God’s doings among his favourite children ; the Lord does not
direct the massacres ; Jehovah is not the patron of Mordecai and his
amiable niece—in short, neither God, the Lord, nor Jehovah are men
tioned at all throughout the whole ten chapters. One might say, if he
possessed the confidence of a priest, that this book was never inspired
by God. There are thousands who believe this book to be inspired,
because they dare not doubt. They have been taught to believe, and
they do believe. The human mind, once given to a belief in the super
natural, is open to receive anything as truth, however absurd or con
trary to experience it may be. Where are you to stop ? What are to
be the bounds of belief? Is not everything possible to a God of infinite
power ? And shall petty mortals dare to limit the eternal ? If an oc
currence is not easily comprehensible, what a relief it is to one’s head
to say, “ God did it.” That is sufficient, with some people, to account
for anything.
The Book of Esther, if perused as a narrative, will be found to be a
plain, unvarnished tale, possessing but few of the graces of rhetoric,
and chronicling the doings of by no means brilliant characters.
In the year 518 before Christ, commenced the reign of Ahasuerus, a
very small hero in his way, but through whose influence and by whose
sanction many extraordinary deeds were done, and many atrocities com
mitted. He was a king reigning over a vast region, extending from
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India to Ethiopia, and including a hundred and twenty-seven provinces.
Marian Evans, in her translation of Feuerbach, says something to the
effect that Christianity is a religion of gourmands, as throughout the
Bible there is a continual record of feasting and jollity. Even the
Lord himself was entertained at dinner by Abraham. Accordingly, the
Book of Esther opens with an account of a great feast given by the
king, in the third year of his reign, to all his princes and his servants;
the power of Persia and of Media, the nobles and princes of the pro
vinces being before him. This carouse lasted a hundred and four score
days, during which time he showed the riches of his glorious kingdom
and the honour of his excellent majesty. Not content with the first
feast, at the end of this time he commenced again, and made a feast
unto all the people that were in Shushan the palace, both unto great
and small, seven days, in the court of the garden of the palace. The
number seven is frequently used in this book, and it is a favourite number
with Bible writers, and no doubt accounts for the fact that the whole
book is in a state of “ sixes and sevens 1” A minute account is given
of the upholstery of the apartments, and of the metal of which the
drinking cups were made. There was royal wine in abundance, and
the drinking was according to law—that is, every man was to do accord
ing to his pleasure, and no doubt many of them took more than was
good for them, for the king himself set the example. Also Vashti, the
queen, made a feast for the women in the royal house. Now, Vashti
is the only woman in the book who displays any virtues or qualities
worthy of admiration ; but her virtues, which should have been her
glory and protection, are her ruin, and the treatment she received can
not be justified in modern times upon any principle of justice or morality.
On the seventh day, when the heart of the king was merry with wine
(in plain English, when he was intoxicated), he commanded his seven
chamberlains to bring Vashti, the queen, before him, with the crown
royal, to show the people and the princes her beauty, for she was fair
to look on. But, like a modest and sedate woman, she refused to pre
sent herself to the rude gaze of the king and his court. Therefore was
the king very wroth, and his anger burned in him. He at once went
to law about the matter, by consulting the wise men who understood
the law, also the seven princes of Persia and Media, among whom wa$
one Memucan. The king asked what should be done with Vashti for
disobeying his orders, for he seemed terribly afraid of a disobedient
wife. Memucan answered and said, the queen hath not done wrong to
the king only, but also to all the princes, and to all the people that are
in all the provinces, when it should become known, for the wives would
despise their husbands if they should learn that the king had allowed
the queen to disobey his commands without rebuke. This noble prince
ended his address for the prosecution by the following suggestion : If
it please the king, let there go a royal commandment from him, ana
let it be written among the laws of the Persians and the Medes, that it
be not altered, that Vashti come no more before King Ahasuerus ; and
let the king give her royal estate unto another that is better than she.
And when the king’s decree which he shall make shall be published
throughout all his empire (for it is great), all the wives shall give to
their husbands honour, both to the great and small. . The queen was
never called upon to offer an explanation or justification of her conduct,
there was no speech for the defence, and the king, who sat as Judge
Ordinary, decided on his own case, and immediately pronounced a
decree nisi, condemning the respondent in all costs. And thus poor
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Vashti was divorced and disgraced for possessing a virtue which is
universally admired among enlightened and refined people.
Now if there is any meaning at all in this disgraceful transaction—
and of course there must be a meaning of deep import in every word
of the sacred book, for do not preachers and commentators weave won
derful discourses out of half lines and incomplete sentences, showing
what the inspired penmen meant to say, and even what the Deity him
self was thinking of, but which unfortunately the text itself in its
entirety furnishes no clue to ?—now if there is any meaning in this dis
graceful divorcement of Queen Vashti, it is, that women are to be
subject to their husbands in all things, whether their personal liberty
be endangered or their moral sense outraged or not. The translators
have called it “the decree of men’s sovereignty.” It is a transaction,
nevertheless, in which all the honour attaches to the queen who was
punished, and the odium to the king who is praised for the deed. It
is continually so with Bible morality—the good is put as the bad, and
the bad as the good. But, happily for humanity, they are rapidly out
growing such misleading teaching.
And out of this questionable transaction arise all the subsequent blood
and murder recorded in this delectable book. If any good is supposed
to have accrued to the world from the doings of Mordecai and Esther,
the Lord does indeed work in mysterious ways ! After the decree had
gone forth, the king cooled down, and when he became sober he thought
of Vashti, and how harsh he had been to her • but those who had coun
selled her banishment, not wishing him to relent, lest their own wives
might expect to be forgiven after having been condemned, suggested
that all the officers in all the provinces should be commissioned with
the very agreeable task of collecting together all the pretty girls they
could find and bringing them to Shushan, for the king to choose one from,
who should be queen instead of Vashti. This idea pleased him, and
he ordered it to be done. Now as the kingdom consisted of 127 pro
vinces, and all the pretty girls were collected together, the bevy of
beauties at Shushan must have been the finest ever seen at one exhibi
tion. But notwithstanding all these charms and counter-charms, the
king was really able to make a choice. The wonder is that the poor
man was not so overpowered, that he resolved to keep the whole of
them ! However, it took him nearly four years to make up his mind.
His choice ultimately fell upon Esther, the lady whose name furnishes
the title to the sacred book in which her career is recorded. She had
seven maidens to wait upon her, and was chosen in the seventh year of
thè reign of the king. We are not told what her age was at this time ;
but that is not remarkable, as it is generally very difficult to learn what
any lady’s age is I Esther was an orphan and a Jewess, but this latter
fact was carefully concealed from the king by order of Mordecai, the
“nursing father” of Esther, as he is called—as fine a specimen of the
cunning Hebrew as is to be found on record. The Jews at this time
were in captivity—a state little better than slavery. Mordecai and
Esther were first cousins, and Mordecai promptly availed himself of the
opportunity of selling his interesting relative to the highest bidder, but
with a shrewd eye to his own interests at the same time. During the
long while Esther was waiting her turn to be presented to the king,
Mordecai walked every day before the court of the women’s house, to
know how Esther did, and what should become of her. As soon as
Esther was crowned, Mordecai came forward, and “sat in the gate of
the king.” It is not clear what this means—it is very much like being
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The Book of Esther.
allowed to sit on the door step. Whilst he was thus “hanging about,”
he overheard two of the door-keepers express some intention of laying
hands on the king. This was an opportunity sent by Providence to
enable Mordecai to show his loyalty. He at once improved the occa
sion, and told Esther, who told the king, at the same time making the
king understand to whom he was indebted for the information. The
two conspirators were hanged, but Mordecai was not rewarded for his
zeal.
Haman was promoted to be chief over all the princes. All the king’s
servants, as in duty bound, bowed down and reverenced Haman ; but
Mordecai, being annoyed at being passed over, refused to bow down,
notwithstanding he was spoken to about it daily. He threw off his
reserve now that his cousin was queen, and told them that he belonged
to the “stiff-necked” race. This incensed Haman very much, and he
resolved to be revenged not alone on Mordecai, but upon his whole tribe.
Haman told the king that there was a certain people scattered abroad
and dispersed among the provinces of the kingdom, whose laws were
different, and who did not obey the king’s laws, therefore it was not for
the king’s profit to suffer them—mildly suggesting that they should be
destroyed, and offering ten thousand talents of silver to the hands of
those who should have the charge of the slaughter. As in the case of
poorVashti, the king without hesitation acquiesced, and seemed in a
hurry to get that bit of business off his hands. Letters were despatched
into every province, written in all the languages of the people, and
sealed with the king’s ring, with orders “ to destroy, to kill, and to
cause to perish, all Jews, both young and old, little children and women,
in one day, and to take the spoil of them for a prey.” After this,
“ the king and Haman sat down to drink.”
It is the fashion with some people to praise Mordecai for his stubborn
will and manly spirit in refusing to bow down to the First Minister of
State, as though he had done it from a wholesome contempt of the
pomp and pride of court hirelings. But there is nothing in the text to
warrant that interpretation. In fact, no word is vouchsafed in explana
tion of why he refused, except that he was a Jew, and that certainly
gave him no virtue in the matter, for if he objected to the pride of
Haman the Gentile, it was only with the greater pride of Mordecai the
Jew. Mordecai belonged to the “ chosen people,” and we see in our
own day how people will strut and plume - themselves when clothed in
the garments of self-righteousness.
When Mordecai heard of the sanguinary decree, of course he was very
much alarmed, and did that silly and dirty trick peculiar to the favour
ites of the Lord—he tore his clothes and put on sack-cloth and ashes.
He went before the palace crying with a loud and bitter cry, but he was
too dusty to be allowed to enter into the king’s gate. Information of
Mordecai’s grief was conveyed to Esther, also of the state of his ward
robe, when she immediately sent him fresh raiment, with orders to take
away the sack-cloth and ashes ; but he preferred his rags and dirt.
Then the queen sent her chamberlain to Mordecai to know what troubled
him, and how it was. He sent her a copy of the decree, together with
all the particulars, with a request that she would go to the king and
make supplication for her people. There was some danger attendant
upon the carrying out of this request, as a law existed whereby all who
came to the king into the inner court without being called, should be
put to death, unless the king pardoned them ; and as the queen had not
seen her loving husband for a month, she was afraid to go to him un-
�The Book of Esther.
5
called. This was conveyed to Mordecai, wno replied—“ Think not
with thyself that thou shalt escape in the king’s house, more than all
the Jews.” This determined Esther, who told Mordecai to gather to
gether all the Jews who were in town, and with them to fast three days
and three nights, and she and her maidens would do likewise. This
species of praying for success, is at best but an empty supplication.
Paine says the Jews never prayed but when they were in trouble, and
never for anything but victory, vengeance, and riches. But she said —
‘ ‘ I will go to the king, which is not according to the law : and if I
perish, I perish.” This was noble—this was daring, and worthy of a
heroine. One might expect from this that Esther was full of all noble
qualities. On the contrary, she had the smoothness of the leopard
with the ferocity of the tiger. Here she resolved, at all hazards to
herself, to beg for the lives of the Jews. But listen to the result of her
mission.
On the third day she ventured unbidden into the royal presence, and
to her great relief the king was overjoyed to see her, and said : “ What
wilt thou, Queen Esther ? and what is thy request ? it shall be even
given thee to the half of the kingdom ?” The king was a mighty man
at a feast, and Esther, knowing his strong point, and also anticipating
it would be favourably received, had prepared a banquet, to which she
invited him, including Haman in the invitation. Throughout Bible
history, it will be found that the pot and the platter formed either the
prelude or the sequel to nearly all great undertakings or events. Of
course the king accepted the invitation to dine out in his own house,
and Haman was only too happy and proud to attend him. After the
wine had gone round, the king again repeated his offer, that whatever
request Esther made, even to the half of his kingdom, it should be
granted. She was still cautious and hesitating, not being sure that the
roystering monarch was fed up to the proper pitch for her purpose; so
she said that if the king and Haman would come to another feast on the
following day, she would then make known her request. This was
agreed to. Then went Haman forth that day joyful and with a glad
heart. But his exultation was of short duration, for he had not gone
far before he nearly fell over that obstinate old Mordecai, who refused
to get up or move out of his way. This filled him with indignation,
but still he restrained himself till he reached home, when he sent for
his friends and for.Zeresh, his wife. “ And Haman told them of the
glory of his riches, and the multitude of his children, and all the things
wherein the king had promoted him,” for he was a man of great self
importance, and was quite overpowered if he did not receive a proper
amount of deference from his presumed inferiors. After recounting
his wonderful position, he said : “Yet all this availeth me nothing so
long a,s I.see Mordecai the Jew sitting at the king’s gate.” His wife
and his friends told him to cheer up, and get a gallows made fifty cubits
high, and at the morrow’s banquet to speak unto the king that Mor
decai might be hanged thereon. This humane suggestion pleased
Haman much, and, like a modern Governor Eyre, he thereupon issued
his order for the erection of that neat piece of architecture—an instru
ment still used in this country to finish the education which the priest
begins.
It so happened, and very fortunately so for Mordecai, that the night
before this second banquet the king was not able to sleep, so he thought
he would read awhile, and therefore ordered the book of records to be
brought, and in this he found chronicled the name and services of Mor*
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The Book of Esther.
decai in informing of the two doorkeepers who had got up a little con
spiracy agaifist himself. The king asked what honour and dignity had
been done to Mordecai for this. He was told nothing. He exclaimed,
Who is in the court ? He was answered, Haman. Now, Haman, un
fortunately for himself, had gone there post haste, not waiting till the
morning, to crave the boon of being allowed to elevate poor Mordecai
fifty cubits high. It was an ominous moment for him. He was ordered
into the king’s presence, who, not giving him time to speak, asked :
“What shall be done unto the man whom the king delighteth to
honour?” Now, Haman thought in his heart, To whom would the
king delight to do honour more than to myself? He therefore resolved
not to underdo the matter, and modestly proposed that the happy indi
vidual should be decked out in the royal apparel, the crown put upon
his head, the whole mounted upon the king’s horse, and led through
the streets of the city by one of the noblest princes, and to be pro
claimed before him, “ Thus shall it be done to the man whom the king
delighteth to honour.” But what was Haman’s utter astonishment and
consternation when he was told to make haste and do all he had said
unto Mordecai the Jew, the man whom he hated above all other men.
But this was not the last time in which Haman was destined to be
caught in his own trap. He hurried home hiding his head, and told
his wife and friends of his disappointment. He was a fallen Minister,
and they all felt that Mordecai, the Benjamin Disraeli of his time, would
lead the Opposition on to the Treasury benches. And while they were
talking, the messenger came to summons Haman to the second banquet
which Esther had prepared. But he was in no mood for eating. He
had not yet digested the bitter pill of Mordecai’s advancement. The
king again asked Esther what boon she craved. She said : “ Let my
life be given me at my petition, and my people at my request. For we
are sold, I and my people, to be destroyed, to be slain, and to perish.”
Though five years had elapsed since their marriage, this appears to have
been the first time the king knew that his wife was a Jewess. He
asked, ‘ ‘ Who is he, and where is he, that durst presume in his heart
to do so ?” The king had forgotten all about the decree he had made
and signed with his own ring, for the utter destruction of the people
who were scattered throughout all his provinces. That was too small
a matter to dwell in his memory. Esther answered and said, “The
adversary and enemy is this wicked Haman.” Thq king rushed into
the garden in great fury, and whilst he was gone Haman became much
alarmed for his own»safety ; and when the king returned he found
Haman on his knees beseeching Esther to intercede with the king on
his behalf. The king mistook the meaning of the supplication, and
became jealous as well as angry. This sealed the fate of poor Haman,
who was immediately seized and his face covered. An obliging cham
berlain who was standing by, with the usual readiness of court syco
phants to help a fallen favourite, told the king that Haman had got
a gallows already erected, which was intended for Mordecai, the rising
minister. Upon this hint the king spake, and told them to hang Haman
thereon. “ So they hanged Haman on the gallows that he had pre
pared for Mordecai. Then was the king’s wrath pacified.” Thus
Haman was literally the architect of his own fortune, and ultimately
graced his own structure. But the king was not blameless in the matter
—he was more to blame than Haman himself, for he signed a san
guinary decree at the first time of asking, and without making the
slightest inquiry into the justice of what he was about to do. Yet this
�The Book of Esther.
7
is the man into whose hands God had committed the care of a portion
of his “ chosen people. ” This justifies the saying that Christianity is
much indebted for its preservation to the vilest and silliest characters in
all ages and countries.
The king, as is the wont of monarchs, bestowed the dead man’s pro
perty upon his favourite, and Esther became enriched by Haman’s
death. Mordecai also experienced rapid promotion, as he was for the
first time introduced to the king as Esther’s relative. And the king
took off his ring, which he had taken from Haman, and gave it unto
Mordecai ; and Esther set Mordecai over Jhe House of Haman. The
Jews’ star was now in the ascendant. The queen then besought the
king to revoke his edict against the Jews, which had been issued at
the instigation of Haman. Being a most yielding man, and having the
amiable weakness of granting everything to everybody at the moment
of asking, whether it was the slaughter of a whole race, or the hanging
of an individual even on his own new gallows, he consented without a
murmur to reverse what he had done a short time before, and com
manded Mordecai, saying—“ Write ye also for the Jews, as it liketh
you, in the king’s name, and seal it with the king’s ring ; for the writ
ing which is written in the king’s name, and sealed with the king’s ring,
may no man reverse. ” Mordecai’s patience and perseverance were at
length rewarded, and his day of triumph had arrived. Having carte
blanche from the king, he availed himself of it to the fullest extent. He
■sent proclamations into all the provinces, in which he said “ the king
had granted the Jews in every city to gather themselves together, and
to stand for their life, to destroy, to slay, and to cause to perish, all
the power of the people and province that would assault them, both
little ones and women, and to take the spoil of them for a prey.” Not
content with telling the Jews they might destroy, slay, and cause to
perish all who assaulted them, he ordered them all to be in readiness
on the thirteenth day of the twelfth month to avenge themselves on their
enemies. Mordecai then strutted out like a peacock to show his fine
feathers. He went out “ in royal apparel of blue and white, and with
a great crown of gold, and with a garment of fine linen and purple :
and the city of Shushan rejoiced and was glad. The Jews had light,
and, gladness, and joy, and honour. And in every province, and in
every city, whithersoever the king’s commandment and his decree came,
the Jews had joy and gladness, a feast and a good day. And many of
the people of the land became Jews ; for the fear of the Jews fell upon
them.”
V
Accordingly, on the fatal thirteenth of the twelfth month, the day on
which the Jews were to have been killed, the order of things was re
versed, for the Jews gathered themselves together in all the cities to lay
hands on such as sought their hurt ; and no man could withstand them ;
for the fear of them fell upon all people. All the king’s officials,
throughout the kingdom, like true time-servers and worshippers of
power, because the Prime Minister was a Jew, joined with the Jews
against their own countrymen ; and thus as bloody a coup a'état was
perpetrated in Asia in the year 509 before Christ, as that which took
place in France on the 2nd of December, 1851 years after this precious
Gospel came to bless mankind ! “ Thus the Jews smote all their
enemies with the stroke of the sword, and slaughter, and destruction,
and did what they would unto those that hated them. And in Shushan
the palace, the Jews slew and destroyed five hundred men.” The ten
sons of Haman slew they, thus carrying out the barbarous doctrine
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The Book of Esther.
taught in this holy book, of visiting the sins of the father upon the
children. “On that day the number of those that were slain in Shushan
were brought before the king. And the king said unto Esther the
queen—The Jews have slain and destroyed five hundred men in Shushan
the palace, and the ten sons of Haman ; what have they done in the
rest of the king’s provinces ? now what is thy petition ? and it shall be
granted thee : or what is thy request further? And it shall be done.”
Mark the fiendish answer of this tigress, sent of course by God to be
an instrument in the preservation of his favourite people. “ Then said
Esther—If it please the kin£, let it be granted to the Jews which are in
Shushan to do to-morrow also according unto this day’s decree, and let
Haman’s ten sons be hanged upon the gallows ! And the king com
manded it so to be done ; and the decree was given at Shushan ; and
they hanged Haman’s ten sons.” This was diabolical ferocity, prompted
by the direst spirit of revenge. Esther could not have forgotten that a
few minutes before the king had told her that the ten sons of Haman
had been slain, and therefore to hang them on the gallows was not with
the idea of killing them a second time, but merely for the gratification
of gloating over the ghastly corpses of ten men who had never injured
her, but who had the misfortune to be the sons of her enemy. This is
Bible morality, of which there are innumerable instances in this sacred
word of God. And so the slaughter went on, and the Jews gathered
themselves together on the fourteenth day, and in Shushan butchered
three hundred more men, and those in the provinces made up the total
number of victims seventy-five thousand. After this the Jews fell to
feasting and rejoicing, and called it a day of gladness, and resolved, at the
suggestion of Mordecai, to celebrate both the thirteenth and fourteenth
of the twelfth month as a festival every year. “ Then Esther the queen,
and Mordecai the Jew, wrote with all authority to confirm this, and
sent letters unto all the Jews in the 127 provinces, with words of peace
and truth.” “For Mordecai the Jew was next unto King Ahasuerus,
and great among the Jqws, and accepted of the multitude of his brethren,
seeking the wealth of bis people, and speaking peace to all his seed. ”
And thus ends this eventful history.
We close this blood-stained Book of Esther with feelings of loathing
and disgust. There is not one principle of morality inculcated through
out the entire narrative ; there is but one estimable or worthy character
depicted therein, and she is a victim ; the incidents recorded are inci
dents of drunkenness, domestic tyranny, lust, ambition, vacillation,
revenge, and wholesale and brutal murder of innocent men, women,
and children. There is no inspiration, no instruction, no moral eleva
tion in it. It is one dull, dead level of brutality aud animal indul
gence. The first chapter commences with a gross outrage upon the
delicacy of a sensitive woman, and ends by her being divorced and
disgraced, that “ man’s sovereignty ” may be upheld and proclaimed.
This can be quoted as an argument in favour of the oppression of one
half the human race, for does it not tally with that other passage in the
Bible, which says that woman shall be subject to the man ? Chapter
ii. enters into particulars of the utterly immoral way in which the king
chose a wife in succession to Vashti, and the calculating manner in
which Mordecai brought his foster daughter and relative to the market,
and sold her to the highest bidder. Chapter iii. is an account of an
ambitious minister, who, on being irritated and annoyed by a man
belonging to a despised race, who presumed upon his relationship to
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9
the queen, seeks to have his enemy and his enemy’s race destroyed ;
and where a king, who should be the guardian of his people, condemns
to death a large number of his subjects at the mere request of one man.
Chapter iv. depicts the real cause of all this mischief and commotion
in a state of the most abject fear. There is no reason why Mordecai
should have hated and annoyed Haman, unless it was from a feeling of
envy at his elevation and good fortune. Chapter v. shows a man so
engrossed with a feeling of hatred, that he builds a gallows of his own
on which to hang his enemy. Chapter vi. pretends to relate how a
king can honour a subject who has served him ; but the story is so
overdone that it becomes outrageously improbable. Chapter vii. is an
attempt to pourtray an instance of retributive justice, but it is a failure,
for the wicked Haman, who dies on his own gallows, is not hanged for
seeking the lives of the Jews, but because the king in his mad fury
mistook the meaning of his subject’s supplication. Chapter viii. shows
a vacillating and sanguinary tyrant playing with the lives of his subjects
at the merest caprice, sparing neither women nor little innocent chil
dren. Chapter ix. contains an account of deeds worthy only of fiends,
the bear recital of which makes one shudder, but over which God’s
chosen cannibals rejoice and make merry, and call it a good day, which
they will celebrate with feasting and rejoicing through all coming time.
And Esther, the heroine of the book, God’s appointed agent to save
his peculiar people, when told of the glorious slaughter which her
brethren had had the first day, begged the boon of one more day of
the hellish work, that the agony might be prolonged, that more wives
might be made widows, that there should be more children made
orphans, that the desolation might be more widespread, and that the
wail of despair might again resound through the affrighted city. And
chapter x. closes the book with the pompous parade of Mordecai’s
greatness in the eyes of the multitude, and of his ‘ ‘ seeking the wealth
of his people, and speaking peace to all his seed.” Oh, bitter mockery !
the peace he had won was the peace of the grave and the silence of
death.
And this is the inspired word of God ; and these are the people for
whom the Lord had an especial liking. What could have been the
object of the concoctors of the Bible in including this book among the
canonical gospels ? It could not have been intended as a compliment
to the Deity, because his name is never mentioned in it under any one
title by which he is known. It does not point the way to mansions in
the skies ; for though death, in all its ghastliness, is constantly present,
any supposed immortality is never alluded to. Even the most besotted
bigot could scarcely maintain that it was intended to convey a moral
lesson in any one chapter or verse. Nothing could be more ferocious
and imbecile than this king, who grants everything that is asked of him
by every favourite of the hour, and who not even by accident performs
a good action. The queen too, who to graces of person should have
added beauties of heart and mind, on the only occasion on which she
possessed the power of doing anything great or good, manifested a dis
position which would disgrace a North American savage when on the
war trail. Then what is the object of this book? It can only be in
tended to show the “providential” preservation of the Jews from a
great peril, and, being the children of God, it was necessary that they
should be spared to carry out God’s plans upon earth. Was anything
ever more monstrous than this ? If what is recorded of the Jews in the
Bible be true, they are as vile a race as ever trod the earth.
�10
The Book of Esther.
And this book is read in Sunday-schools, and these are the lessons
implanted in the young and tender minds of children. From the
earliest moment they are taught to reverence this volume as the sacred
word of God, and not to doubt or call in question, on pain of eternal,
never-ending torments, a single line or word therein ? What does
Theodore Parker say on this point ?—
“To the Bible the minister prostitutes his mind and conscience,
heart and soul ; on the authority of an anonymous Hebrew book, he
will justify the slaughter of innocent men, women, and children, by the
thousand ; and, on that of an anonymous Greek book, he will believe,
or at least command others to believe, that man is born totally de
praved, and God will perpetually slaughter men in hell by the million,
though they had committed no fault, except that" of not believing an
absurd doctrine they had never heard of. Ministers take the Bible in
the lump as divine; all between the lids of the book is equally the
‘ Word of God,’ infallible and miraculous : he that believeth it shall
be saved, and he that believeth not shall be damned ; no amount of
piety and morality can make up for not believing this. No doctor is
ever so subordinate to his drug, no lawyer lies so prone before statute
and custom, as the mass of ministers before the Bible, the great fetish
of Protestant Christendom. The Ephesians did not so worship their
great goddess Diana and the meteoric stone which fell down from
Jupiter. ‘We can believe anything,’ say they, ‘which has a “ Thus
saith the Lord ” before or after it.’ The Bible is not only master of
the soul, it is also a talisman to keep men from harm ; bodily contact
with it, through hand or eye, is a part of religion ; so it lies in railroad
stations, in the parlours and sleeping chambers of taverns, and the
cabins of ships, only to be seen and touched, not read. The pious
mother puts it in the trunk of her prodigal son about to travel, and
while she knows he is Wasting her substance in riotous living, she con
tents herself with the thought that ‘ he has got his Bible with him, and
promised to read a chapter every day !’ So the Catholic mother uses
an image of the ‘Virgin Mother of God,’ and the Rocky Mountain
savage a bundle of grass : it is a fetish."
Now, a God of mercy, and justice, and lovingkindness can never
approve of this. This delusion is perpetuated, and this evil is kept up
by some from interested motives ; by others from ignorance of the real
nature of the book they were taught in their infancy to prostrate their
reason before, and by most from a feeling of fanaticism and supersti
tion. Thomas Paine, who speaks as a Deist, says :—
“ It has been the practice of all Christian commentators on the Bible,
and of all Christian priests and preachers, to impose the Bible on the
world as a mass of truth, and as the word of God ; they have disputed
and wrangled, and have anathematised each other about the supposable
meaning of particular parts and passages therein—one has said and
insisted that such a passage meant such a thing ; another that it meant K
directly the contrary ; and a third, that it neither meant one nor the
other, but something different from both—and this they call understand
ing the Bible. There are matters in that book, said to be done by the
express command of God, that are as shocking to humanity, and to every
idea we have of moral justice, as anything done by Robespierre, by
Carrier, by Joseph le Bon, in France ; by the English Government in
the East Indies ; or by any other assassin in modem times. When we
read in the books ascribed to Moses, Joshua, &c., that the Israelites
came by stealth upon whole nations of people, who, as the history it
�The Book of Esther.
11
self shows, had given them no offence—that they put all those nations
to the sword; that they spared neither age nor infancy; that they utterly
destroyed men, women, and children; that they left- not a soul to
breathe ; expressions that are repeated over and over again in those
books, and that too with exulting ferocity ; are we sure these things are
facts ? Are we sure that the Creator of man commissioned these things
to be done ? Are we sure that the books which tell us so were written
by his authority ? To charge the commission of acts upon the Almighty,
which in their nature, and by every rule of moral justice, are crimes—
as all assassination is, and more especially the assassination of infants—
is matter of serious concern. The Bible tells us that these assassinations
were done by the express commartd of God. To believe therefore the
Bible to be true, we must unbelieve all our belief in the moral justice of
God : for wherein could crying or smiling infants offend ? And to read
the Bible without horror, we must undo everything that is tender,
sympathising, and benevolent in the heart of man. Speaking for my
self, if I had no other evidence that the Bible is fabulous, than the
sacrifice I must make to believe it to be true, that alone would be suf
ficient to determine my choice.”
What can be done to sweep this delusion from the minds of men,
which for nearly eighteen hundred years has been preached to them by
the aid of church and cannon, sword and surplice? For ages the
pioneer of truth was always its martyr, till despair almost entered the
heart of those who sought the service of humanity. But there still re
mained a heroic few who nobly passed the banner of truth from gene
ration to generation, till it has reached our time, and now waves more
freely in the breezes of awakened intelligence, which ere long will swell
i.nto a whirlwind of enlightenment, which shall sweep before it every
vestige of the dark clouds of ignorance and superstition which have
overshadowed the fair face of nature, and been the prolific parents of
all those calamities which have befallen poor humanity groping its way
through the darkness of ignorance, and stumbling at every step over
those things which might be turned into stepping-stones to assist their
onward march, if they had but more mental light with which to illumine
their path through life.
If I were a believer in a Special Providence answering the supplica
tions of men, I would kneel at the “throne of grace,” and importune
the Deity to end this war, and strife, and hatred among his children.
Not with a scoffing tongue do I now say it, but in all seriousness, as
becomes the solemnity of such a task, and I would offer up this
PRAYER.
O God, who art omnipotent, omniscient, and omnipresent; allpowerful, all-wise, and all-just; who existed before time was, and who
made all-things ; who searchest the hearts of all, and knowest our most
secret thoughts—vouchsafe but one word that shall stop at once and
for ever all the horrors that are committed in thy name; utter it in the
thunder that all may hear to the remotest comers of the earth, or write
it across the heavens in characters that all, of every nation and every
tongue, may read and understand. Thou knowest, in thy infinite
wisdom, that men, groping their way by the dim light of ages past,
fail to see the truth they fain would reach. Some by accident find the
precious treasure; others clutch error, and, clinging to it with the
tenacity of despair, make war upon all around them. O thou bene
ficent Deity, one word from thee would open the eyes of all, making
�12
The Book of Esther.
the blind to see and the dull to understand. This Bible, for which men
lie, and cheat, and persecute—which inculcates doctrines the most con
tradictory, immoral, and revolting—which records deeds done in thy
name at which humanity shudders aghast—can it be thy message of
mercy to mankind? Didst thou, in thy boundless benevolence, in
spire its pages, and in thy immutable justice send it as a guide for the
human race ? Is it serving thee for the professors of Bible religion to
rend one another? In one country, Catholic Christians imprison and
torture their Protestant brethren ; in another, the Protestants tax,
persecute, and oppress their Catholio fellow-subjects, and all in thy
name. Eighteen hundred years ago a Jew who preached a new doc
trine was cruelly put to death. An effigy of his mangled and bleeding
body, nailed to a cross, is the emblem of Christians, under which they
have made war, and slaughtered tens and hundreds of thousands of
their fellow creatures. This murdered man is called thy Son, and all
are commanded to worship him, on pain of death in some countries,
and of social persecution and hatred in others. Are we justified, O
God, in thy sight in regarding this symbol of blood and suffering as a
sign of thy love for the family of man ? In England (this small speck
in thy immense universe), there are thousands of thy creatures steeped
in the deepest poverty and crime; thousands lolling in the lap of luxury,
extravagance, and wealth ; thousands of priests paid millions a year,
wrung from the hard earnings of industry, to preach what is called thy
“holy word,” which in one part declares “the poor will not cease
from out the land.” Is this, O Lord, the most perfect state of society to
which men can attain ? Every despot in Europe, who oppresses his
subjects, and slaughters them if they complain, is styled “ Most Chris
tian Majesty,” and he declares that he rules by right divine derived
direct from thee. The Pope of Rome, the head of an ecclesiastical
despotism, which keeps men ignorant and rules them as slaves, is called
thy Vicegerent upon earth. All claim Bible sanction for what they do.
My sense of right revolts at all this, and I beseech thee, O thou God
of justice and righteousness, to direct me in the right path, if I am
erring in my judgment of thy goodness and truth. Rather would I
say, the vast majority of the populations of the world are tortured and
enslaved by the dominant few who rule in thy name, because the
masses are ignorant and therefore helpless. In anguish I cry unto
thee—
“ When wilt thou save the people,
O God of mercy, when ?
Not crowns and thrones, but nations;
Not kings and lords, but men ?”
One word from thy everlasting lips would bind all hearts in one; would
reconcile man to man the world over; would inaugurate the reign of
love and peace, and banish hate and all uncharitableness. Speak this
word, O Lord, I implore thee, that man may go on his way rejoicing,
giving and receiving pleasure ; shed thy radiance on mankind, that they
may feel thy kingdom has come ; establish thy Paradise upon earth ;
and thine be the kingdom, the power, and the glory, for ever and ever.
PRICE TWOPENCE.
London : Printed and Published by Austin & Co., I7> Johnson’s
Court, Fleet Street, E.C.
�
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Victorian Blogging
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A collection of digitised nineteenth-century pamphlets from Conway Hall Library & Archives. This includes the Conway Tracts, Moncure Conway's personal pamphlet library; the Morris Tracts, donated to the library by Miss Morris in 1904; the National Secular Society's pamphlet library and others. The Conway Tracts were bound with additional ephemera, such as lecture programmes and handwritten notes.<br /><br />Please note that these digitised pamphlets have been edited to maximise the accuracy of the OCR, ensuring they are text searchable. If you would like to view un-edited, full-colour versions of any of our pamphlets, please email librarian@conwayhall.org.uk.<br /><br /><span><img src="http://www.heritagefund.org.uk/sites/default/files/media/attachments/TNLHLF_Colour_Logo_English_RGB_0_0.jpg" width="238" height="91" alt="TNLHLF_Colour_Logo_English_RGB_0_0.jpg" /></span>
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Conway Hall Library & Archives
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2018
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Conway Hall Ethical Society
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The book of Esther: a specimen of what passes as the inspired word of God
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Holyoake, Austin [1826-1874]
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Place of publication: London
Collation: 12 p. ; 19 cm.
Notes: From the library of Dr Moncure Conway.
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Austin & Co.
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[n.d.]
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Bible
Atheism
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Atheism
Bible-O.T.-Esther
Conway Tracts
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Text
NATIONAL secular society
HUMANITY’S GAIN from UNBELIEF.
BY
CHARLES BRADLAUGH.
[Reprinted from the “North American Review” of March, 1889.J
LONDON:
•FREETHOUGrHT
PUBLISHING-
63 FLEET STREET, E.C.
1 8 8 9.
PRICE
TWOPENCE.
COMPANY,
�LONDON :
PRINTED BY ANNIE BESANT AND CHARLES BRADLAUGH,
63
ELEET STREET, E.C.
�HUMANITY’S GAIN FROM UNBELIEF.
As an unbeliever, I ask leave to plead that humanity has
been real gainer from scepticism, and that the gradual
and growing rejection of Christianity—like the rejection
of the faiths which preceded it—has in fact added, and
Will add, to man’s happiness and well being. I maintain
that in physics science is the outcome of scepticism, and
that general progress is impossible without scepticism on
matters of religion. I mean by religion every form of
belief which accepts or asserts the supernatural. I write
as a Monist, and use the word “nature ” as meaning all
phenomena, every phenomenon, all that is necessary for
the happening of any and every phenomenon. Every
religion is constantly changing, and at any given time is
the measure of the civilisation attained by what Guizot
described as theywszte milieu of those who profess it. Each
religion is slowly but certainly modified in its dogma and
practice by the gradual development of the peoples amongst
whom it is professed. Each discovery destroys in whole
or part some theretofore cherished belief. No religion is
suddenly rejected by any people ; it is rather gradually
out-grown. None see a religion die ; dead religions are
like dead languages and obsolete customs; the decay is
long and—like the glacier march—is only perceptible to
the careful watcher by comparisons extending over long
periods. A superseded religion may often be traced in the
festivals, ceremonies, and dogmas of the religion which has
replaced it. Traces of obsolete religions may often be
found in popular customs, in old wives’ stories, and in
children’s tales.
�4
humanity’s GAIN FROM UNBELIEF.
It is necessary, in order that my plea should be under
stood, that I should explain what I mean by Christianity ;
and in the very attempt at this explanation there will, I
think, be found strong illustration of the value of unbelief,
Christianity in practice may be gathered from its more
ancient forms, represented by the Roman Catholic and the
Greek Churches, or from the various churches which have
grown up in the last few centuries. Each of these churches
calls itself Christian. Some of them deny the right of the
others to use the word Christian. Some Christian churches
treat, or have treated, other Christian churches as heretics
or unbelievers. The Roman Catholics and the Protestants
in Great Britain and Ireland have in turn been terribly
cruel one to the other; and the ferocious laws of the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, enacted by the
English Protestants against English and Irish Papists, are
a disgrace to civilisation. These penal laws, enduring
longest in Ireland, still bear fruit in much of the political
mischief and agrarian crime of to-day. It is only the
tolerant indifference of scepticism that, one after the other,
has repealed most of the laws directed by the Established
Christian Church against Papists and Dissenters, and also
against Jews and heretics. Church of England clergymen
have in the past gone to great lengths in denouncing non
conformity ; and even in the present day an effective sample
of such denunciatory bigotry may be found in a sort of
orthodox catechism written by the Rev. F. A. Gace, of
Great Barling, Essex, the popularity of which is vouched
by the fact that it has gone through ten editions.
This catechism for little children teaches that “ Dissent is
a great sin ”, and that Dissenters “ worship God according
to their own evil and corrupt imaginations, and not ac
cording to his revealed will, and therefore their worship is
idolatrous ”. Church of England Christians and Dissent
ing Christians, when fraternising amongst themselves,
often publicly draw the line at Unitarians, and positively
deny that these have any sort of right to call themselves
Christians.
In the first half of the seventeenth century Quakers
were flogged and imprisoned in England as blasphemers ;
and the early Christian settlers in New England, escaping
from the persecution of Old World Christians, showed
scant mercy to the followers of Fox and Penn. It is
�humanity’s gain from unbelief.
5
customary, in controversy, for those advocating the claims
of Christianity, to include all good done by men in nomi’
nally Christian countries as if such good were the result of
Christianity, while they contend that the evil which exists
prevails in spite of Christianity. I shall try to make out
that the ameliorating march of the last few centuries has
been initiated by the heretics of each age, though I quite
concede that the men and women denounced and per
secuted as infidels by the pious of one century, are fre
quently claimed as saints by the pious of a later genera
tion.
What then is Christianity ? As a system or scheme
of doctrine, Christianity may, I submit, not unfairly be
gathered from the Old and New Testaments. It is true
that some Christians to-day desire to escape from submis
sion to portions, at any rate, of the Old Testament; but this
very tendency seems to me to be part of the result of
the beneficial heresy for which I am pleading. Man’s
humanity has revolted against Old Testament barbarism;
and therefore he has attempted to disassociate the Old Testa
ment from Christianity. Unless Old and New Testaments
are accepted as God’s revelation to man, Christianity has
no higher claim than any other of the world’s many
religions, if no such claim can be made out for it apart
from the Bible. And though it is quite true that some
who deem themselves Christians put the Old Testament
completely in the background, this is, I allege, because
they are out-growing their Christianity. Without the
doctrine of the atoning sacrifice of Jesus, Christianity,
as a religion, is naught; but unless the story of Adam’s
fall is accepted, the redemption from the consequences
of that fall cannot be believed. Both in Great Britain
and in the United States the Old and New Testaments
are forced on the people as part of Christianity; for it is
blasphemy at common law to deny the scriptures of the
Old and New Testaments to be of divine authority; and
such denial is punishable with fine and imprisonment,
or even worse.
The rejection of Christianity intended
throughout this paper, is therefore the rejection of the
Old and New Testaments as being of divine revelation.
It is the rejection alike of the authorised teachings of the
Church of Rome and of the Church of England, as these
may be found in the Bible, the creeds, the encyclicals,
�6
HUMANITY S GAIN FKOM UNBELIEJ’.
the prayer book, the canons and homilies of either or both
of these churches. It is the rejection of the Christianity
of Luther, of Calvin, and of Wesley.
A ground frequently taken by Christian theologians is
that the progress and civilisation of the world are due to
Christianity; and the discussion is complicated by the
fact that many eminent servants of humanity have been
nominal Christians, of one or other of the sects. My
allegation will be that the special services rendered to
human progress by these exceptional men, have not been
in consequence of their adhesion to Christianity, but in
spite of it; and that the specific points of advantage to
human kind have been in ratio of their direct opposition
to precise Biblical enactments.
A. S. Farrar says1 that Christianity “ asserts authority
over religious belief in virtue of being a supernatural
communication from God, and claims the right to control
human thought in virtue of possessing sacred books, which
are at once the record and the instrument of the communi
cation, written by men endowed with supernatural inspira
tion ”. Unbelievers refuse to submit to the asserted
authority, and deny this claim of control over human
thought: they allege that every effort at freethinking must
provoke sturdier thought.
Take one clear gain to humanity consequent on unbelief,
i.e., in the abolition of slavery in some countries, in the
abolition of the slave trade in most civilised countries, and
in the tendency to its total abolition. I am unaware of
any religion in the world which in the past forbade slavery.
The professors of Christianity for ages supported it; the
Old Testament repeatedly sanctioned it by special laws ; the
New Testament has no repealing declaration. Though we
are at the close of the nineteenth century of the Christian
era, it is only during the past three-quarters of a century
that the battle for freedom has been gradually won. It is
scarcely a quarter of a century since the famous emancipa
tion amendment was carried to the United States Constitu
tion. And it is impossible for any well-informed Christian
to deny that the abolition movement in North America was
most steadily and bitterly opposed by the religious bodies
in the various States. Henry Wilson, in his “Itise and
1 Farrar’s “ Critical History of Fieethought ”,
�humanity’s
GAIN
from unbelief.
7
Fall of the Slave Power in America ” ; Samuel J. May, in
his “Recollections of the Anti-Slavery Conflict ” ; and J.
Greenleaf Whittier, in his poems, alike are witnesses that
the Bible and pulpit, the Church and its great influence,
were used against abolition and in favor of the slave
owner. I know that Christians in the present day often
declare that Christianity had a large share in bringing
about the abolition of slavery, and this because men pro
fessing Christianity were abolitionists. I plead that these
so-called Christian abolitionists were men and women
whose humanity, recognising freedom for all, was in this
in direct conflict with Christianity. It is not yet fifty years
since the European Christian powers jointly agreed to
abolish the slave trade. What of the effect of Christianity
on these powers in the centuries which had preceded ?
The heretic Condorcet pleaded powerfully for freedom
whilst Christian France was still slave-holding. For many
centuries Christian Spain and Christian Portugal held
slaves. Porto Rico freedom is not of long date; and
Cuban emancipation is even yet newer. It was a Christian
King, Charles 5th, and a Christian friar, who founded in
Spanish America the slave trade between the Old World
and the New. For some 1800 years, almost, Christians kept
slaves, bought slaves, sold slaves, bred slaves, stole slaves.
Pious Bristol and godly Liverpool less than 100 years ago
openly grew rich on the traffic. During the ninth century
Greek Christians sold slaves to the Saracens. In the
eleventh century prostitutes were publicly sold as slaves in
Rome, and the profit went to the Church.
It is said that William Wilberforce, the abolitionist, was
a Christian. But at any rate his Christianity was strongly
diluted with unbelief. As an abolitionist he did not believe
Leviticus xxv, 44-6; he must have rejected Exodus xxi,
2-6 ; he could not have accepted the many permissions
and injunctions by the Bible deity to his chosen people to
capture and hold slaves. In the House of Commons on
18th February, 1796, Wilberforce reminded that Christian
assembly that infidel and anarchic France had given
liberty to the Africans, whilst Christian and monarchic
England was “obstinately continuing a system of cruelty
and injustice”.
Wilberforce, whilst advocating the abolition of slavery,
found the whole influence of the English Court, and the
�8
HUMANITY S GAIN FBOM UNBELIEF.
great weight of the Episcopal Bench, against him. George
III, a most Christian king, regarded abolition theories
with abhorrence, and the Christian House of Lords was
utterly opposed to granting freedom to the slave. When
Christian missionaries some sixty-two years ago preached
to Demerara negroes under the rule of Christian England,
they were treated by Christian judges, holding commission
from Christian England, as criminals for so preaching. A
Christian commissioned officer, member of the Established
Church of England, signed the auction notices for the sale
of slaves as late as the year 1824. In the evidence before
a Christian court-martial, a missionary is charged with
having tended to make the negroes dissatisfied with their
condition as slaves, and with having promoted discontent
and dissatisfaction amongst the slaves against their lawful
masters. For this the Christian judges sentenced the
Demerara abolitionist missionary to be hanged by the
neck till he was dead. The judges belonged to the Estab
lished Church ; the missionary was a Methodist. In this
the Church of England Christians in Demerara were no
worse than Christians of other sects : their Boman Catholic
Christian brethren in St. Domingo fiercely attacked the
Jesuits as criminals because they treated negroes as though
they were men and women, in encouraging “two slaves
to separate their interest and safety from that of the
gang ”, whilst orthodox Christians let them couple pro
miscuously and breed for the benefit of their o wners like
any other of their plantation cattle. In 1823 the Royal
Gazette (Christian) of Demerara said :
“We shall not suffer you to enlighten our slaves, who are by
law our property, till you can demonstrate that when they are
made religious and knowing they will continue to be our
slaves.”
When William Lloyd Garrison, the pure-minded and
most earnest abolitionist, delivered his first anti-slavery
address in Boston, Massachusetts, the only building he
could obtain, in which to speak, was the infidel hall owned
by Abner Kneeland, the “infidel” editor of the Boston
Investigator, who had been sent to gaol for blasphemy.
Jlvery Christian sect had in turn refused Mr. Lloyd Garri
son the use of the buildings they severally controlled.
|jloyd Garrison told me himself how honored deacons of
�humanity’s GAIN UHOM UNBELIEF.
9
a Christian Church, joined in an actual attempt to hang
him.
When abolition was advocated in the United States in
1790, the representative from South Carolina was able to
plead that the Southern clergy “did not condemn either
slavery or the slave trade ” ; and Mr. Jackson, the repre
sentative from Georgia, pleaded that “from Genesis to
Revelation ” the current was favorable to slavery. Elias
Hicks, the brave Abolitionist Quaker, was denounced as
an Atheist, and less than twenty years ago a Hicksite
Quaker was expelled from one of the Southern American
Legislatures, because of the reputed irreligion of these
abolitionist “ Friends ”.
When the Fugitive Slave Law was under discussion in
North America, large numbers of clergymen of nearly
every denomination were found ready to defend this
infamous law. Samuel James May, the famous aboli
tionist, was driven from the pulpit as irreligious, solely
because of his attacks on slaveholding. Northern clergy
men tried to induce “silver tongued” Wendell Philips to
abandon his advocacy of abolition. Southern pulpits rang
with praises for the murderous attack on Charles Sumner.
The slayers of Elijah Lovejoy were highly reputed
Christian men.
Guizot, notwithstanding that he tries to claim that the
•Church exerted its influence to restrain slavery, says
(“European Civilisation”, vol. i., p. 110) :
“It has often been repeated that the abolition of slavery
among modern people is entirely due to Christians. That, I
think, is saying too much. Slavery existed for a long period
in the heart of Christian society, without its being particularly
astonished or irritated. A multitude of causes, and a great
development in other ideas and principles of civilisation, were
necessary for the abolition of this iniquity of all iniquities.”
And my contention is that this “development in other
ideas and principles of civilisation ” was long retarded by
Governments in which the Christian Church was dominant.
The men who advocated liberty were imprisoned, racked,
and burned, so long as the Church was strong enough to
be merciless.
The Rev. Francis Minton, Rector of Middlewich, in his
recent earnest volume1 on the struggles of labor, admits
1 “ Capital and Wages”, p. 19.
�10
humanity’s gain from unbelief.
that “ a few centuries ago slavery was acknowledged
throughout Christendom to have the divine sanction..........
Neither the exact cause, nor the precise time of the
decline of the belief in the righteousness of slavery can
be defined. It was doubtless due to a combination of
causes, one probably being as indirect as the recognition
of the greater economy of free labor. With the decline
of the belief the abolition of slavery took place.”
The institution of slavery was actually existent in
Christian Scotland in the 17th century, where the white
coal workers and salt workers of East Lothian were
chattels, as were their negro brethren in the Southern
States thirty years since; they “ went to those who
succeeded to the property of the works, and they could be
sold, bartered, or pawned”? “There is”, says J. M.
Robertson, “no trace that the Protestant clergy of Scot
land ever raised a voice against the slavery which grew
up before their eyes. And it was not until 1799, after
republican and irreligious France had set the example,
that it was legally abolished.”
Take further the gain to humanity consequent on the
unbelief, or rather disbelief, in witchcraft and wizardry.
Apart from the brutality by Christians towards those
suspected of witchcraft, the hindrance to scientific initia
tive or experiment was incalculably great so long as belief
in magic obtained. The inventions of the past two centuries,
and especially those of the 18th century, might have benefitted mankind much earlier and much more largely, but
for the foolish belief in witchcraft and the shocking
ferocity exhibited against those suspected of necromancy.
After quoting a large number of cases of trial and punish
ment for witchcraft from official records in Scotland, J. M.
Robertson says: “The people seem to have passed from
cruelty to cruelty precisely as they became more and more
fanatical, more and more devoted to their Church, till after
many generations the slow spread of human science began
to counteract the ravages of superstition, the clergy resist
ing reason and humanity to the last ”.
The Rev. Mr. Minton1 concedes that it is “ the advance
2
of knowledge which has rendered the idea of Satanic
1 “ Perversion of Scotland,” p. 197.
2 “ Capital and Wages ”, pp. 15, 16.
�HUMANITY S GAIN FROM UNBELIEF.
11
agency through the medium of witchcraft grotesquely
ridiculous”. He admits that “ for more than 1500 years
the belief in witchcraft was universal in Christendom ”,
and that “ the public mind was saturated with the idea of
Satanic agency in the economy of nature ”. He adds:
“ If we ask why the world now rejects what was once so
unquestioningly believed, we can only reply that advancing
knowledge has gradually undermined the belief ”.
In a letter recently sent to the Pall Mall Gazette against
modern Spiritualism, Professor Huxley declares,
“that the older form of the same fundamental delusion—the
belief in possession and in witchcraft—gave rise in the fifteenth,,
sixteenth, and seventeenth centuries to persecutions by Chris
tians of innocent men, women, and children, more extensive,
more cruel, and more murderous than any to which the
Christians of the first three centuries were subjected by the
authorities of pagan Borne.”
And Professor Huxley adds :
“No one deserves much blame for being deceived in these
matters. We are all intellectually handicapped in youth by
the incessant repetition of the stories about possession and
witchcraft in both the Old and the New Testaments. The
majority of us are taught nothing which will help us to
observe accurately and to interpret observations with due
caution.”
The English Statute Book under Elizabeth and under
James was disfigured by enactments against witchcraft
passed under pressure from the Christian churches,
which Acts have only been repealed in consequence of the
disbelief in the Christian precept, ‘1 thou shalt not suffer a
witch to live”. The statute 1 James I, c. 12, condemned
to death “all persons invoking any evil spirits, or con
sulting, covenanting with, entertaining, employing, feed
ing, or rewarding any evil spirit ”, or generally practising
any “infernal arts”. This was not repealed until the
eighteenth century was far advanced. Edison’s phono
graph would 280 years ago have insured martyrdom for
its inventor; the utilisation of electric force to transmit
messages around the world would have been clearly the
practice of an infernal art. At least we may plead that
unbelief has healed the bleeding feet of science, and made
the road free for her upward march.
�12
humanity’s gain from unbelief.
Is it not also fair to urge the gain to humanity which
has been apparent in the wiser treatment of the insane,
consequent on the unbelief in the Christian doctrine that
these unfortunates were examples either of demoniacal
possession or of special visitation of deity? For centuries
under Christianity mental disease was most ignorantly
treated.
Exorcism, shackles, and the whip were the
penalties rather than the curatives for mental maladies.
From the heretical departure of Pinel at the close of
the last century to the position of Maudsley to-day, every
step illustrates the march of unbelief. Take the gain to
humanity in the unbelief not yet complete, but now
largely preponderant, in the dogma that sickness, pesti
lence, and famine were manifestations of divine anger,
the results of which could neither be avoided nor pre
vented. The Christian Churches have done little or
nothing to dispel this superstition. The official and
authorised prayers of the principal denominations, even
to-day, reaffirm it. Modern study of the laws of health,
experiments in sanitary improvements, more careful
applications of medical knowledge, have proved more
efficacious in preventing or diminishing plagues and
pestilence than have the intervention of the priest or
the practice of prayer. Those in England who hold
the old faith that prayer will suffice to cure disease are
to-day termed “peculiar people”, and are occasionally
indicted for manslaughter when their sick children die,
because the parents have trusted to God instead of
appealing to the resources of science.
It is certainly a clear gain to astronomical science that
the Church which tried to compel Galileo to unsay the
truth has been overborne by the growing unbelief of the
age, even though our little children are yet taught that
Joshua made the sun and moon stand still, and that for
Hezekiah the sun-dial reversed its record. As Buckle,
arguing for the morality of scepticism, says1 :
“ As long as men refer the movements of the comets to the
immediate finger of God, and as long as they believe that an
eclipse is one of the modes by which the deity expresses his
anger, they will never be guilty of the blasphemous presump
tion of attempting to predict such supernatural appearances.
1 “ History of Civilisation,’’ vol. i, p. 345.
�HUMANITY S GAIN FROM UNBELIEF.
13
Before . they could dare to investigate the causes of these
mysterious phenomena, it is necessary that they should believe,
or at all events that they should suspect, that the phenomena
themselves were capable of being explained by the human
mind.”
As in astronomy so in geology, the gain of knowledge
to . humanity has been almost solely in measure of the
rejection of the Christian theory. A century since it was
almost universally held that the world was created 6,000
years ago, or at any rate, that by the sin of the first man,
Adam, death commenced about that period. Ethnology
and Anthropology have only been possible in so far as,
adopting the regretful words of Sir W. Jones, “intelligent
and virtuous persons are inclined to doubt the authenticity
of the accounts delivered by Moses concerning the primi
tive world ”.
Surely it is clear gain to humanity that unbelief has
sprung up. against the divine right of kings, that men no
longer believe that the monarch is “God’s anointed” or
that “the powers that be are ordained of God”. In the
struggles for political freedom the weight of the Church
was mostly thrown on the side of the tyrant. The
homilies of the Church of England declare that “even the
wicked rulers have their power and authority from God ”,
and. that “such subjects as are disobedient or rebellious
against their princes disobey God and procure their own
damnation ”. It can scarcely be necessary to argue to the
citizens of the United States of America that the origin of
their liberties was in the rejection of faith in the divine
right of George III.
Will any one, save the most bigoted, contend that it is
not . certain gain to humanity to spread unbelief in the
terrible doctrine that eternal torment is the probable fate
of the great majority of the human family? Is it not
gain to have diminished the faith that it was the duty of
the wretched and the miserable to be content with the lot
in life which providence had awarded them ?
If it stood alone it would be almost sufficient to plead as
justification for heresy the approach towards equality and
liberty for the utterance of all opinions achieved because
of growing unbelief. At one period in Christendom each
Government acted as though only one religious faith could
be true, and as though the holding, or at any rate the
�14
humanity’s gain from unbelief.
making known, any other opinion was a criminal act
deserving punishment. Under the one word “ infidel”,
even as late as Lord Coke, were classed together all who
were not Christians, even though they were Mahommedans,
Brahmins, or Jews. All who did not accept the Christian
faith were sweepingly denounced as infidels and therefore
//ors de la loi. One hundred and forty-five years since, the
Attorney-General, pleading in our highest court, said1 :
“What is the definition of an infidel? Why, one who
does not believe in the Christian religion. Then a Jew is
an infidel.” And English history for several centuries
prior to the Commonwealth shows how habitually and
most atrociously Christian kings, Christian courts, and
Christian churches, persecuted and harassed these infidel
Jews. There was a time in England when Jews were
such infidels that they were not even allowed to be sworn
as witnesses. In 1740 a legacy left for establishing an
assembly for the reading of the Jewish scriptures was
held to be void2 because it was “ for the propagation of
the Jewish law in contradiction to the Christian religion”.
It is only in very modern times that municipal rights have
been accorded in England to Jews. It is barely thirty
years since they have been allowed to sit in Parliament.
In 1851, the late Mr. Newdegate in debate3 objected “that
they should have sitting in that House an individual who
regarded our Redeemer as an impostor”. Lord Chief
Justice Raymond has shown4 how it was that Christian
intolerance was gradually broken down. “A Jew may
sue at this day, but heretofore he could not; for then they
were looked upon as enemies, but now commerce has
taught the world more humanity.”
Lord Coke treated the infidel as one who in law had no
right of any kind, with whom no contract need be kept, to
whom no debt was payable. The plea of alien infidel as
answer to a claim was actually pleaded in court as late as
1737.5 In a solemn judgment, Lord Coke says6: “ All
infidels are in law perpetui inimici; for between them, as
1 Omychund v. Barker, 1 Atkyns 29.
2 D’Costa v. D’Pays, Arab. 228.
3 3 Hansard cxvi. 381.
4 1 Lord Raymond’s reports 282, Wells v. Williams.
5 Ramkissenseat v Barker, 1 Atkyns 51.
6 7 Coke’s reports, Calvin’s case.
�humanity’s gain from unbelief.
15
with, the devils whose subjects they be, and the Christian,
there is perpetual hostility ”. Twenty years ago the law
of England required the writer of any periodical publica
tion or pamphlet under sixpence in price to give sureties
for £800 against the publication of blasphemy. I was
the last person prosecuted in 1868 for non-compliance
with that law, which was repealed by Mr. Gladstone in
1869. Up till the 23rd December, 1888, an infidel in Scot
land was only allowed to enforce any legal claim in court
on condition that, if challenged, he denied his infidelity.
If he lied and said he was a Christian, he was accepted,
despite his lying. If he told the truth and said he was an
unbeliever, then he was practically an outlaw, incompetent
to give evidence for himself or for any other. Fortunately
all this was changed by the Royal assent to the Oaths Act
on 24th December. Has not humanity clearly gained a
little in this struggle through unbelief ?
For more than a century and a-half the Roman Catholic
had in practice harsher measure dealt out to him by the
English Protestant Christian, than was even during that
period the fate of the Jew or the unbeliever. If the
Roman Catholic would not take the oath of abnegation,
which to a sincere Romanist was impossible, he was in
effect an outlaw, and the “jury packing” so much com
plained of to-day in Ireland is one of the habit survivals
of the old bad time when Roman Catholics were thus by
law excluded from the j ury box.
The Scotsman of January 5th, 1889, notes that in 1860
the Rev. Dr. Robert Lee, of Grey friars, gave a course of
Sunday evening lectures on Biblical Criticism, in which he
showed the absurdity and untenableness of regarding
every word in the Bible as inspired ; and it adds :
“We well remember the awful indignation such opinions
inspired, and it is refreshing to contrast them with the calm
ness with which they are now received. Not only from the
pulpits of the city, but from the press (misnamed religious)
were his doctrines denounced. And one eminent U.P. minister
went the length of publicly praying for him, and for the
students under his care. It speaks volumes for the progress
made since then, when we think in all probability Dr. Charteris,
Dr. Lee’s successor in the chair, differs in his teaching from the
Confession of Faith much more widely than Dr. Lee ever did,
and yet he is considered supremely orthodox, whereas the
stigma of heresy was attached to the other all his life.”
�16
humanity’s gain from unbelief.
And this change and gain to humanity is due to the
gradual progress of unbelief, alike inside and outside the
Churches.
Take from differing Churches two recent
illustrations: The late Principal Dr. Lindsay Alexander,
a strict Calvinist, in his important work on “ Biblical
Theology”, claims that
“ all the statements of Scripture are alike to be deferred to as
presenting to us the mind of God ”.
Yet the Rev. Dr. of Divinity also says:
“We find in their writings [i.e., in the writings of the sacred
authors] statements which no ingenuity can reconcile with
what modern research has shown to be the scientific truth—
i.e., we find in them statements which modern science proves
to be erroneous.”
At the last Southwell Diocesan Church of England Con
ference at Derby, the Bishop of the Diocese presiding, the
Rev. J. G. Richardson said of the Old Testament that
“ it was no longer honest or even safe to deny that this noble
literature, rich in all the elements of moral or spiritual grandeur,
given—so the Church had always taught, and would always
teach—under the inspiration of Almighty God, was sometimes
mistaken in its science, was sometimes inaccurate in its history,
and sometimes only relative and accommodatory in its morality.
It assumed theories of the physical world which science had
abandoned and could never resume; it contained passages oi
narrative which devout and temperate men pronounced dis
credited, both by external and internal evidence; it praised,
or justified, or approved, or condoned, or tolerated, conduct
which the teaching of Christ and the conscience of the Christian
alike condemned.”
Or, as I should urge, the gain to humanity by un
belief is that “the teaching of Christ ” has been modi
fied, enlarged, widened, and humanised, and that “the
conscience of the Christian ” is in quantity and quality
made fitter for human progress by the ever increasing
additions of knowledge of these later and more heretical
days.
�
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Victorian Blogging
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Humanity's gain from unbelief
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Bradlaugh, Charles [1833-1891]
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Place of publication: London
Collation: 16 p. ; 18 cm.
Notes: Reprinted from the North American Review of March 1889. Part of the NSS pamphlet collection.
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Freethought Publishing Company
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1889
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N095
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Atheism
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Atheism
NSS