2 10 16 https://d1y502jg6fpugt.cloudfront.net/25778/archive/files/5c5bb91b203ca3ab8802fa5d92729308.pdf?Expires=1779321600&Signature=phEBunIa0%7EsDjcu9-ARUM7anGFkT7YDG7nxFhnNBmLdJOTgOKgT75LIW2D-9NyFy0R3fBXiWImzexSm65JLVmj44D3i1-XB5I6pi8ScgW0MvOPxzaTOL8Yl7hDZQG2aJGZdg9u5qxdNm5wOJYHHjtQ28DpEBmXaciUoKnPWc-WLXyytbneBoYIaL1gsnTnT7td1Vc2ejXRbj8oulgG0Mk99AERT-hE4BIGxEUYtL7Mo6YEPBZDhbw2hyKJFMjq7POdlujsrFNcyGZWuBgH6eSVFqbCltZR3Fu0zE2oAOCAwuNmHfru1kmdwvqDXnLiQb1bZykU3--7P7BIoRKXz3Vw__&Key-Pair-Id=K6UGZS9ZTDSZM 215c14e35028d04475c16375245daeb0 PDF Text Text Agnosticism or... ^ I admit that the title of this pamphlet is illogical. It suggests an alternative where no alternative exists. My excuse for the title is that this and the succeeding pamphlet represent a single essay broken in halves for no other reason than the matter of publication. The purpose of this first half is to prove that a genuine Agnosticism is Atheism masquerading under a lesser socially objectionable name. As presented by the Agnostic himself, no difference between the two terms is discernible. An Atheist is one who does not believe in God. An Agnostic is one who is without belief in God. The difference between not having and being without is too fine for my dull brain. All important words have a history, and in the present case the history of modern “ Agnosticism ’* throws light on the intention which gave it birth. “ Gnostic ” is a very old term, and in the early years of Christianity gave considerable trouble to the Church. The Gnostics were those who claimed, by the aid of some “ inner light,” to know the mysteries of God and the universe. So did the Church, but the gnosis of the Church differed from the gnosis of the Gnostic sects, and when rivals in the mystery busi­ ness quarrel, the conflict is apt to be very fierce. And it is fiercest of all when neither of the two principals know anything of the matter which divides them. One of the disputants in the quarrel we have in mind has seized hold of this old. war-word, Gnostic, with an addition. He does not claim any knowledge (gnosis) of God or gods, he asserts his ignorance, his irremovable ignorance, in the word “ A-gnosticism.” 2 �Nl3o AGNOSTICISM OR ... ? J He agrees with the Atheist in. not having a belief in God, but he disagrees with him as to how that ignor­ ance should be expressed. The Atheist declines to be led astray by the mere change of a word. So, too, would the Christian if Atheism was not there to bear the brunt of his hostility. But the Atheist insists on an identity underlying the verbal difference. The Agnostic accuses the Atheist of “ coarseness,” of saying more than he ought to say, of being definite where he should be hesitant. To this the Atheist retorts that the Agnostic is thinking “ respectably ” where he should be helping to rid a perfectly honest and completely applicable word of the ill-odour with which religious bigotry has surrounded it. That is the existing position in a nutshell. “ Agnostic ” was brought into vogue by the famous scientist, T. H. Huxley, towards the end of the ’eighties. Examining himself he found that he was without belief in a god. In those days being without belief in a God and spelling it A-T-H-E-I-S-T was a much more serious offence than it is to-day. And it was an offence that was peculiarly English. It was not intellectually wrong, but it was socially undesirable. It was coarse and common; it reeked of quart pots and clay pipes, and had a number of other objectionable connotations with which Christian malignity had surrounded it. So Huxley looked round and found a word that enabled him to spell Atheism in another way. He tacked “ a ” on to gnosticism, and Agnosticism was born. In the interests of clarity let us take a number of pertinent definitions from an authoritative modern dictionary, always remembering that dictionaries do not manufacture our vocabulary, they merely record it, and speculate on origins. Here are the relevant definitions numbered for ease of reference: — �4 AGNOSTICISM OR . . . ? (i) God. Origin unknown. Probably an Aryan word meaning that to which sacrifice is made. One of a class of powerful spirits regarded as controlling a department of nature or of human activity. ■ (2) Agnostic. One who does not believe in, and who holds that nothing can be known about, God. (3) Atheist. One who does not believe in the existence of God. (4) Agnosticism. The negative doctrine held by Agnostics. (5) Atheism. Disbelief in God. It will be observed that in the first definition “ God ” leaves us completely in the air. It has not the slightest significance by itself. It implies nothing. If I define a thing as wood, I can relate it to wood in general, leaving the particularization of the many forms of wood for after consideration. But “ God ’’ by itself? We cannot say that “ God ” by any other name would mean as much, for it has no meaning whatever. “ God,” we are told, is probably an Aryan word. But an Aryan language and an Aryan people were both invented about the middle of the last century as a working hypothesis, and are now discarded nearly everywhere—except in Germany. The rest of the definition does tell us something of importance, but it is of no value whatever to Agnos­ ticism; the definition tells us something concerning gods, but the whole significance of Agnosticism is that it indicates something of which nothing can be known. I disclaim all responsibility for this last seven words, it is the strict Agnostic position. And the information given us in the latter part of the definition is fatal to Agnosticism. The latter part of the definition, “ One of a class ot powerful spirits regarded as controlling a department of nature or of human activity,” and “ that to which sacrifice is made,” does tell us something about gods. > �AGNOSTICISM OR ... ? g It indicates the known way in which the gods have come into existence, and it is what people have in mind when they use “ God ” with honesty and intel­ ligibility. But that information is, again, fatal to Agnosticism. “ The God according to religion,” said the late Lord Balfour, is “ a God to whom men can pray, who takes sides, who has preferences.” In plain words, a magnified man, not a mere unintelligible abstraction. Gods, says the great anthropologist, Westermarck, are made by man, and man “ endows them with rights quite after human fashion, and imposes on himself corresponding duties.” Sir James Frazer says, “ By a God I understand a supernatural being of a spiritual and personal nature, who controls the world or some part of it. . . It has been not unusual to apply the name God to very different con­ ceptions. . . I cannot but regard them as illegitimate extensions of the term, in short, an abuse of language.” Professor F. H. Bradley (author of Appearance and Reality') is more directly con­ temptuous in his language. He says, “ Most of those who insist on the personality of God are intellectually dishonest. They desire one conclusion, and to reach it they argue for another. . . The deity they want is, of course ... a person like themselves. . . What is not this is really nothing.” , There is no need to multiply quotations to this end. What I am driving at is this. A proposition to be affirmed or denied, or about the truth of which we suspend judgment, must be intelligible. If I am asked whether my neighbour is guilty of burglary, I may reply, Yes, or No, or say that I cannot decide one way or the other. But then I have a clear con­ ception of what I mean in any one of the three cases. But if I am asked whether “ sloberkums ” “ corifies ” “ ketcherput,” I cannot say I am agnostical on the matter, I can reply only that I do not under­ �6 AGNOSTICISM OR . . . ? stand what is the reference of the questions. I may­ look as wise as the most learned fool that ever existed, but my ignorance remains unaffected. In other words, I am saying that a proposition to be understood must be intelligible, its meaning- must be more or less definite. The answer to whether a “ Whoozelum ” exists is not, “ I do not know, I must wait for evidence one way or the other,” the answer, the only intelligible answer, is that I do not know what my questioner is talking about. Has the Agnostic when he says “ I neither affirm nor deny the existence of God,” anything- in mind? Is his declaration of Agnosticism intelligible to him­ self? Does it really contain anything more than a desire to guard against being identified with that terrible thing “Atheism”? Candidly I can find nothing more than this. Even if we pass the very ambiguous word “ spirit,” the Agnostic cannot mean that he is in doubt as to whether there is a number of spirits controlling nature and human activities. That would bring him straight back to fetichism. By some, Agnosticism is described as a case of sus­ pended judgment. Suspended judgment on what? Does the Agnostic suspend judgment as to whether God ” has ever meant anything other than a mag­ nified man? Many modern religionists deny “ God ” the possession of a physically animal structure. He has not the shape of man. He has neither arms nor legs, he has neither a physical head nor a physical structure such as a-man has. But he is still capable of love, anger, wisdom, etc. Yet these are as much animal and human characteristics as arms and legs. Intelligence, love, desire, are as human as red hair and side-whiskers. What is it about which judgment is suspended ? It is no use to keep up a steady chatter, “ we do not say that God is or God is not,” if one has not the least notion of what God is, and would not know him if he were found. Looking for a black �AGNOSTICISM OR ... ? 7 cat in a black passage on a black night is a very stiff proposition, but at least we do know what “ cat ” and “black” and “passage” stand for. The Agnostic is looking for a “ what-you-may-call-ir " in a “thingumajig ” and a “ whatsisname.” If he ever found it he would never recognize his discovery. The Agnostic warmly declares that he knows nothing about God. That is the foundation of his creed. But if that was all he implied, the statement would hardly be worth making. He obviously means more than this. What he says is, “I know nothing about God.” What he implies as the justification of his own credo is “ Neither does anyone else.” And, as we shall see, when he justifies this, he is justify­ ing precisely the position taken up by the avowed Atheist. Perhaps the most curious attempt to make the Agnostic position intelligible was essayed by the late Sir Leslie Stephen. In his Agnostic's Apology, he solemnly informs us that “ The Agnostic is one who asserts—what no one denies—that there are limits to human understanding.” Of all the apologies that have been put forward this is surely the poorest and the weakest. Where is the necessity to coin a new word to affirm what nobody has ever denied? One might as reasonably establish a society of “ noseites ” and limit the human membership to those who have nasal organs. There might be a certain convenience in adopting a formula that puts one in agreement with everybody, but it is hardly worth while. After all, a definition must define— that is, it must exclude as well as include. And if the meaning of Agnosticism is as given by Sir Leslie Stephen, in what way does it differentiate the Agnostic from the Atheist, or from anyone else ? The Agnostic apparently believes nothing that others do not believe, and says nothing that all others do not say. �8 AGNOSTICISM OR . . . ? Let us, as the professional evangelist would say, get back to God. And I begin with something that everyone actually does believe. The world as we know it (which is the only world we can deal with) is made up of things, or as some would prefer to put it, of events. But all events, whatever they are like, or wherever they occur, are single in their existence. We have collective terms such as “tree,” “ man,” bird,” and so forth, but there is not a tree separate from particular trees, or “ Man ” distinct from par­ ticular men. I stress this consideration because a great deal of the confusion connected with “ God ” is due to its neglect. There are a multitude of gods in the world, as there are a multitude of trees, and in the earlier stages of civilisation g'ods are contemptibly common. Many of them have passed away, and many new ones have been created; but there is no such conceivable thing as a God ” that is distinct from particular gods. The gods can be collected, tabulated, and their common characteristics noted, just as one can collect different men, brown, red, yellow, white, tabulate them and indicate what features they have. Abstract words are very often useful instruments of thought. Without them human thought could not* get very far. But when we mistake abstractions for concrete existences, confusion is certain to follow. Now the gods of the world are as well known and as well understood as the trees of the world. And if we were to take all the g'ods that have ever existed, and add to them the gods that do exist, the Agnostic would not hesitate to dismiss them one after the other as mere figments of the imagination. In the end he would become a deicide on the most elaborate and comprehensive scale. More than that, in terms of his Agnosticism, he would deny the existence of any other god that any people could ever conceive or worship. The gods of existing savages, the gods of �AGNOSTICISM OR ... ? 9 the Mohammedan, the Jew,- the Christian, would all go. But if all gods, past and present, and future, are rejected as having no better existence than the ghost that haunts the old baronial castle, what has he in mind when he says that he does not deny the exist­ ence of God. He is denying the existence of any conceivable god, and an inconceivable proposition is just nonsense. Or if, as is said, the Agnostic suspends judgment as to whether “ God ” exists or not, what “ God ” is it he has in mind ? As I have written elsewhere, if I say that I don’t believe in the existence of the only kind of bird, fish, or tree that is known to me, that I believe they are all creatures of the imagination, but add that I will not say that there does not exist any­ where a fish that has not the structure of a fish and does not live in the water, or that I think there may be in existence a bird that is quite unlike a bird in both structure and habits, or that there may. exist somewhere a tree without roots, trunk or branches, etc., I shall quite properly be told that if I run across these things they are certainly not fish, bird, or tree. Can anyone think of a thing existing which is quite unlike any other thing of the same name or nature ? The man who is looking for a god or a bird that is entirely unlike the bird and the god he knows would not know them for either god or bird if he ran across either or both. We have not vet reached the end of the confusion and self-contradictions of the Agnostic. The only helpful definition of “ God ” that we could find was that God began as one of a company of spirits who exercised control over some part of nature. I accept that definition, not because it suits my own position, but because my position has grown out of the anthro­ pological account of the origin of gods. Every god the world has known began existence as a good or evil spirit, and he was dreaded or loved because he �I© AGNOSTICISM OR ... ? was supposed to be capable of exerting a good or bad influence on human affairs. These are incontro­ vertible facts. No competent person seriously dis­ putes them. Many of these gods have come down to us as fairies, goblins, etc., and many of them have died away altogether. The Agnostic has not the least hesitation in brushing aside whole galaxies of known or conceivable gods as figments of the imagination. He says they are the outcome of an unenlightened imagination, and I agree with him. By what rule does he dismiss these dethroned gods, and also all that are still ruling over very diminished territories, but still insists that he cannot deny the existence of something he knows not what, and would be in no better state of mind if he met it ? All my life I have been asking Agnostics to give me some justification for their “ suspension of judg­ ment.” What is there on which we are to suspend! The Agnostic does pass judgment on the spirits he is told about, and in whom other people believe. Is there any better evidence, or any different evidence, for the probable existence of a spirit called God, than there is for another spirit who, instead of being called God, is called Mumbo-Jumbo? There is sin­ cerity of belief with both these gods, and the evidence for the existence of each is of exactly the same character and quality. Why the differentia­ tion? If I may paraphrase a line in Wilde’s Lady Windermere’s Fan, whenever religion is concerned to be intelligible it is found out. Still further. Less than two centuries ago the belief that men and women might hold intercourse with the devil was very generally held. Witchcraft was then a criminal offence, and many thousands of men, women, and children were tortured and killed for intercourse with devils, in whose existence there is the same religious and Christian warranty as there is for the existence of God. This belief in intercourse �AGNOSTICISM OR . . II with devils was killed, for intelligent men and women, by the knowledge of the conditions that gave this belief being and authority. Yet one never heard an Agnostic say that he suspended judgment con­ cerning that deposed god, Satan. Quite definitely he says with the Atheist that so soon as the origin and history of the belief in human intercourse with the spirit, Satan (God) was known and understood it was at once definitely rejected. He does not say I am agnostic on the subject of demoniacal posses­ sion. He says, I deny that any such being as Satan exists; he owes his existence to the imaginings of the uninstructed mind. The belief is condemned by its history. And this is exactly what has happened to the gods. They have been found out. I do not mean that they have been found out in the sense in which we find out that someone is bad whom we have considered good, or as a liar one whom we thought truthful. The gods have been found out, as people discovered ghosts and fairies an*d demons to be mere “ figments of the imagination.” For the past three hundred years this idea concerning the gods has been gaining ground, and, with and since the publication of the epoch-making Primitive Culture, by E. B. Tylor, the gods have been tracked down and their origin exposed with a devastating accuracy. Such primitive peoples as exist have been carefully studied and the process of god-making has been fully exposed. The whole weight of modern scientific theory is thrown upon the side of the conviction that all gods, ancient and modern, savage and civilized, good and bad, have had their origin in the uninstructed mind of man reading his own feelings into nature, personifying them, and then trembling before the creation of his own imagination. There are, of course, divergences of opinion as to the order of the different stages of this development, just as there are differences �12 AGNOSTICISM OR . . . ? of opinion as to the precise nature and order of that organic evolution which traces the development of living matter from the simplest, to the hig'hest form. From all sides, from that of the study of culture in. general, from the essential nature of such ceremonies as the Christian eating of the god, the incarnate god walking the earth as a man, the general conception of natural happenings as due to! supernatural or superhuman beings, the whole of modern religion can be traced. Now it is possible, although it would be supremely ridiculous at this time of day, for the Agnostic to repudiate the demonstrable findings of the anthro­ pologists. But I have never met an Agnostic who takes up this position. With a lack of logic that runs the Christian Scientist very close for a front place in the race for the absurdity medal, what we find is an acceptance of the scientific account of the origin of the belief in gods, followed by an assertion that one must suspend judgment on the whole question as to whether gods exist. But if one really does accept the account of modern science concerning- the origin of the belief in God, what is there left on which to express doubt? If all the facts of experience, sub­ jective and objective, upon which primitive humanity built the belief in “ spirits ” are otherwise explained, the first interpretation is quite plainly ruled out of court. We cannot, at least we ought not, to accept a conclusion that follows from premises that are demonstrably false. If the mental hesitancy and illogicality displayed by the Agnostic in relation to the idea of God was manifested with regard to the ordinary affairs of life, existence would be impossible. I began this pamphlet with some definitions. I may well end with some more. A correspondent once asked me what reply I would give to a ques- �AGNOSTICISM OR ... ? 13 tioner who at the end of one of my lectures put the following question: — Do you believe that the universe was created or set going by a personal power? I replied in substance to this question, which was obviously considered clear and simple, that the question needed clarifying because in any important controversy a question should have a definite mean­ ing. Words should have a reference to somethingthat one understands. Take, for example, the three cardinal terms in this fifteen-wo rd sentence. Created. In relation to the question this has two meanings. It may carry the theological implication that the world was made out of nothing. That may be set on one side as pure nonsense. It might be recited as an act of faith, but it could not be believed apart from a first-rate miracle. The second meaning of the term might be that indicated when we speak of the creation of a painting, a piece of music, or the design of a building. But this does not lift us out of the realm of human effort, and so cannot have any bearing on the question of Agnosticism. As used, the word is either nonsensical or misleading. Universe. There is a double sense here, that may very easily mislead. The world, or the universe,' whichever term we prefer, does not refer to one thing, but to a vast number of individual things. There is riot indicated in the word “ world ” an exist­ ence that is separate from particular things. “World ” is a short summing up of the total of individual things. But a whole has never an existence separate from the parts. The world, as I have already said, is a world made up of particulars. They form the material of and for our thinking. But there does not exist these things plus another existence, the world. To think otherwise is to get back to the fallacies of the mediaeval schoolmen. • �M AGNOSTICISM OR . . . ? Personal Power. Power means, briefly, the ability or capacity to do something, never any more than this, even though it be spelt with a capital P. Per­ sonal means something pertaining to a person, to a human being, although if anyone chooses to extend it to animals, I should raise no objection. But no “ personal power ” is known or is conceivable that can absolutely originate power. All that happens in nature is the transformation of “ power,” or emerg­ ence of power following from a rearrangement of existing forces. (There is a suggestion of question­ begging here, but it would require a lengthy discus­ sion to put it otherwise, and the reader will, I think, follow my meaning.) If we are to retain a sane meaning to the words we use, the creation of the universe by personal power is simply unthinkable. We are mistaking words for things, which lands us back into the early stages of savage thought. As to how I would reply to one who put the -question given at the end of a lecture I might probably answer as follows : — “ I will put this question into plain English before replying to it. I have been asked whether I believe that every thing has been created by some manlike power—this is what I understand by personal power, because if it means that everything has arisen ent of preceding conditions, the question has no connexion whatever with ‘ God.’ If the first meaning is in­ tended, then I must know what it means. Until then I cannot say I do not know, because even to say that one does not know one must know what it is of which he pleads ignorance. If a question is asked in Greek, how can I say whether I agree with it or not unless I have some understanding of Greek? I do not know and cannot conceive any personal power except that manifested by man. So will you please go home, write out the question you have in mind, giving it an intelligible meaning, so making it a topic for �AGNOSTICISM OR ... ? 15 probable fruitful discussion, and I will see what can be done. At present all the good that has been done by your question depends upon whether I have made it plain that philosophy does not consist in posing unanswerable questions clothed in non-understandable language, but in properly framing an enquiry resting on a known basis, and to work from that known basis to further understanding, And in doing this it may help to bear in mind the fact that profound truth is nearly always simple. It is only complicated error that looks intellectually impressive—until it meets with exposure.” I will conclude with one more attempt to clear up a confusion, and by asking a question. The confusion is a very common one with modern religious apolo­ gists, and it appears to have fooled a great many who are not religious. Jumbling together a purely arti­ ficial question that belongs to a philosophy that has not yet freed- itself from the influence of religious associations, we are told that neither the Atheist nor the Agnostic can solve the problem of the “ mystery of the universe. ” But the mystery of the universe has nothing whatever to do with the validity of the Belief in “ God ” or gods. It is a heritage from the days when neither science nor philosophy had completely freed itself from theology. Besides, science knows nothing of “ mysteries it considers only problems. And a problem must be stated in intelligible terms; it must have reference to knowable facts, and we can only think of what is unknown so far as it falls into the framework of the possible knowable. To use a horse-breeding term, “ The problem of the universe was born of bad metaphysics out of a weakened theology.” The progeny of that line has been simply awful. The final question I put to the Agnostic is this : — The Agnostic says he does not deny the existence of �i6 AGNOSTICISM OR ... ? “ God ” (this does not include the g'ods of all theologies past and present), but denies that if “ God ” exists he cannot be like the gods of any of the religions, otherwise he would not call himself an Agnostic. So my question is : “ As ‘ God ’ standing by itself has no reference to anything known, or to anything that is conceivably known, how would the Agnostic recognize God as God if he ever discovered him—or it ? In other words, how does anyone recog­ nize something as being what it is, if it is totally unlike anything he has ever seen, or anything he can even think about? ” By the time the Agnostic has carefully recon­ sidered his question, I fancy he will have small use for such a word as Agnosticism. . PAMPHLETS FOR THE PEOPLE 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 1'3. 14. 15. 16. Did Jesus Christ Ever Live? Morality Without God. What is the Use of Prayer? Christianity and Woman. Must We Have a Religion? The Devil. What Is Freethought? Gods and Their Makers. Giving ’em Hell. The Church’s Fight for the Child. Deity and Design. What is the Use of a Future Life? Thou shalt not suffer a Witch to Live. Freethought and the Child. Agnosticism Or ... ? Atheism. Postage One Penny. Twopence Each. Issued for the Secular Society Limited, and Printed and Published by Thb Pioneer Press (G. W. Foote & Co., Ltd.), 61, Farringdon Street, London, E.C.4, ENGLAND. 71 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Victorian Blogging Description An account of the resource A collection of digitised nineteenth-century pamphlets from Conway Hall Library &amp; Archives. 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Original Format The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data Pamphlet Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Agnosticism or...? Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Cohen, Chapman [1868-1954] Description An account of the resource Place of publication: [London] Collation: 16 p. ; 18 cm. Series title: Pamphlets for the People Series number: No. 15 Notes: "Issued for the Secular Society Limited." Publisher's series list on back cover. Date of publication from KVK. Part of the NSS pamphlet collection. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Pioneer Press Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource [1914] Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context N130 Subject The topic of the resource Agnosticism Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource <a href="http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/mark/1.0/"><img src="http://i.creativecommons.org/p/mark/1.0/88x31.png" alt="Public Domain Mark" /></a><span> </span><br /><span>This work (Agnosticism or...?), identified by </span><a href="https://conwayhallcollections.omeka.net/items/show/www.conwayhall.org.uk"><span>Humanist Library and Archives</span></a><span>, is free of known copyright restrictions.</span> Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource application/pdf Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Language A language of the resource English Agnosticism NSS https://d1y502jg6fpugt.cloudfront.net/25778/archive/files/9a6614aa4e32e506592f6e8ac0ce5348.pdf?Expires=1779321600&Signature=ECCnrpFFuWKbblRZ3ozgU7eDkdVPDyMxduunTWH56pMQZI-tREiCQnNLbj69Hz5x1sJIVvQas8z6mZ-9FQHkdC-D5e-mfDNv6YWgBvEodIxdXYUsrc9CrJ1Wfm%7EOrooqLR3O9eIBCU5fNc2jYh0HECs-hf6Tgb4ybcDHqC8Do-b2Pf1Ufw0oLkWyCX9FQ0W55OMNC-XRNl-elByqPBOv8lVbL8xDfC62khwj3C9%7EubnD8kGLj93i2HbmTJ05WyrtWFZvQO4WcwCOphpa%7Eq94DDjJlsdSVhrWXkjlQ0xkn5kapckxNHPx8g%7EwA4OrO85J%7EM3CuF52dmtkspMaV-ANwQ__&Key-Pair-Id=K6UGZS9ZTDSZM 808ec0848457e086da0b0464311c6f8d PDF Text Text NATIONAL SECULAR SOCIETY AGNOSTICISM AND IMMORTALITY. BY SAMUEL LAING, Author of “Modern Science and Modern ThoughtilA Modern Zoroastrian,” “Problems of the Future,” etc. ISSUED FOR THE Jress OmmifteL London : WATTS & CO., 17, JOHNSON’S COURT, FLEET St. Price One Penny. �OUR PROPAGANDIST PRESS COMMITTEE. This Committee has been formed for the purpose of assisting in the production and circulation of liberal publications. The members of the Committee are Mr. G. J. Holyoake, Dr. Bithell, Mr. F. J. Gould, Mr. Frederick Millar, and Mr. Charles A. Watts. It is thought that the most efficient means of spreading the principles of Rationalism is that of books and pamphlets. Many will read a pamphlet who would never dream of visiting a lecture hall. At the quiet fireside arguments strike home which might be dissipated by the excitement of a public debate. The lecturer wins his thousands, the penman his tens of thousands. The aim of the various writers will be to obtain converts by persuasiveness rather than undue hostility towards the popular creeds. All who are in sympathy with the movement are earnestly re­ quested to contribute towards the expenses as liberally as their means will allow. The names of donors will not be published without their consent. On the ist of January of each year a report and balance-sheet will be forwarded to subscribers. The books of the Committee are always accessible to donors. Contributions should be forwarded to Mr. Charles A. Watts, 17, Johnson’s Court, Fleet Street, London, E.C. Cheques should be crossed “Central Bank of London, Blackfriars Branch.” PUBLICATIONS ISSUED FOR THE COMMITTEE BY MESSRS. WATTS & CO. Agnostic Problems. Being an Examination of Some Questions ■of the Deepest Interest, as Viewed from the Agnostic Standpoint. By R. Bithell, B.Sc., Ph.D. Cheap Popular Edition, cloth, 2s. 6d. post free. Agnosticism and Immortality. By S. Laing, author of “ Modern Science and Modern Thought,” etc. id., by post ij^d. Special terms for quantities. Humanity and Dogma. By Amos Waters, id., by post i%d. .Special terms for quantities. LIBERTY OF BEQUESTS COMMITTEE. 'This Committee has been formed for procuring the passing of a law legalising bequests for Secular and Free Thought purposes. As the law now stands, all legacies left for the diffusion and main­ tenance of Secular or Free Thought principles can be confiscated. Subscriptions in furtherance of the object of this Committee may ,be sent to Mr. Charles A. Watts, 17, Johnson’s Court, Fleet Street, London, E.C., or to the care of the Hon. Secretary, Mr. H. L. Braekstad, 138, Loughborough Park, London, S.W. �AGNOSTICISM AND IMMORTALITY. a To be, or not to be, that is the question ”—a question which has been asked before and after Hamlet, in all ages and countries where mankind has risen from blank savagery to thought and intelligence. The love of life, the horror of annihilation, are instincts common to men and to the whole animal creation. In civilised man this instinct rises beyond the vague terror of death and fear of the unknown. He “ looks before and after his sense of justice longs for a future life to redress the wrongs and sufferings of the present one; his affections crave for a sight of faces which he has loved and lost; all the feelings of his complex nature cry out for some assurance of a continued existence. On the other hand, all positive knowledge and experience fail to give him this assurance, and rather tell him that, as his individual existence began with birth, so it will terminate with death. How stands this most momentous of all problems in the light of modern science, and of that development of it which is fast invading modern thought under the compendious term of “ Agnosticism ” ? To attack a problem we must begin by clearly defining its conditions. What do we mean when we talk of a “ future life ” and of “ immortality ” ? Clearly, for all practical purposes, we mean a life in which we retain our personal identity and individual consciousness. To be absorbed in some metaphysical essence, or soul of the universe, as some tiny rivulet is in the pathless ocean, is tantamount to annihilation. Extremes meet, and the Nirvana, which is the ultimate goal of the most �2 AGNOSTICISM AND IMMORTALITY. purely metaphysical religion, that of Buddhism, lands us practically in the same conclusion as that of the Mate­ rialist, to whom life and consciousness are but functions of particular modes of cell-motions. It is important to keep this distinction well in mind, for it bears upon the next stage of the inquiry—viz., what are the historical facts of the problem ? What are the views of it which have been entertained by different nations and in different ages ? Do they show such a general consensus of opinion as may establish at any rate a frima facie case for any definite conclusion, and show it to be a necessary product of the evolution of the human mind ? Or are they so conflicting as to neutralise one another, and show that no common con­ clusion holds the field, which remains open for inquiries conducted with all the latest resources of modern know­ ledge ? The answer must be that the latter is undoubt­ edly the true state of the case. If we take immortality to mean the preservation of conscious personal identity after death, the majority of mankind have had no such belief. The countless millions of Brahmins and Buddhists do not get nearer to it than to assume some vague absorption into the soul of the universe, after more or less transmigration through other forms of life. Plato and his followers had much the same idea, in a more refined and philoso­ phical form, of an unconscious pre-existence in the universal- spirit before birth, and return to it after death —a speculation which we find in the creeds of almost all our modern poets, and which is stated with much force and precision by Wordsworth in his ode on “Immortality.” Other nations, such as the Chinese and Japanese, have no distinct ideas on the subject beyond a vague veneration for departed ancestors, and their educated classes accept either the Agnosticism, pure and simple, of Confucius, or some vague concep­ tion of Buddhistic philosophy. The lower classes, and savage and semi-civilised races generally, have a sort of rude faith in ghosts, which are scarcely distinguishable from the evil spirits in which unknown or injurious forces of Nature are personified. The first dawn of a belief in a continued personal �AGNOSTICISM AND IMMORTALITY. 3 existence after death is found in the interments of the neolithic period, in which weapons and food were de­ posited for the use of a departed chief in the happier hunting-ground of another world, and slaves were sacri­ ficed so as to give him an appropriate retinue. From this germ arose the Egyptian creed, which was for so many centuries by far the most powerful and practical exemplification of a belief in a future existence by a great civilised nation. They looked, as Herodotus tells us, on their tombs as their permanent abodes, and the homes in which they lived as mere temporary occu­ pations. Their idea was that every existence, animate or inanimate, consisted of two parts, the material body and the seol, or incorporeal spirit, which could wander about in dreams, and, after death, continue a shadowy existence, living on shadowy food, and taking pleasure in shadowy geese and kine and other belongings. But this seol must have a corporeal body, or semblance of its old material self, as a basis for its existence, and hence the care and expense which were lavished on mummies and on paintings on the walls of tombs. It is remarkable that, wherever the faith in a personal immortality of the soul has been at all strong, it has been associated with an equally strong faith in the resurrection of the body. The old Egyptians and the early Christians equally shared this belief; and even in the more shadowy mythology of the Greek and Roman world due funeral rites to the body were considered necessary to save the departed soul from wandering, as a shivering, bodiless ghost, on the banks of the melan­ choly Styx. Another remarkable nation, the Jews, entirely ignored the idea of a future existence—a most singular circum-, stance, considering that they were so long in contact with the Egyptians, with whom it was the pervading fact of their daily life, and that the Jews were supposed to be a chosen people, specially instructed by Jehovah. And yet nothing can be clearer than that, from the time of Moses down to that of Ecclesiastes—and even later, as held by the Sadducees, the conservative aristocracy, who clung most tenaciously by the old law—the pure Jewish faith was that death was annihilation, and rewards �4 AGNOSTICISM AND IMMORTALITY. and punishments were dispensed either to the individual in this life or to his posterity. Nothing can be more explicit than the words of Ecclesiastes which are put in the mouth of the great preacher, King Solomon, as the result of his long expe­ rience and deep wisdom : “ A living dog is better than a dead lion. For the living know that they shall die, but the dead know not anything, neither have they any more a reward.” And again : “ There is no work, nor device, nor knowledge, nor wisdom, in the grave whither thou goest.” It is not a little surprising that a religion like Chris­ tianity, in which eternal life and future rewards and punishments are such essential elements, should have originated from the matter-of-fact and almost Materialistic creed of Mosaic Judaism. Orthodox theologians will,, of course, say that it was because it pleased God to con­ ceal these things from former generations, and to teach them for the first time by a new revelation. The retort is obvious : if Jehovah were a just and benevolent Deity,, why should he mislead his own chosen people by allowing Moses, Abraham, and other pious patriarchs after his own heart, to believe and teach the direct opposite of these essential truths ? But the retort, however obvious, is effective only against the idolaters of the Bible; for its sincere students it is more to the purpose to observe that the assumption that these Christian dogmas are taught by Divine inspiration is met at the very outset by this staggering objection. What Jesus, St. Paul, and the Apostles taught respecting the immortality of the soul was this: that our personal identity after death would be preserved by a resurrection of the body, which was to take place in the lifetime of some of the existing generation. This is stated over and over again in the most distinct and positive terms, and, if the prophecy failed, there is absolutely nothing in the New Testament to teach us anything certain as to any future life. The last judgment is, in like manner, inextricably mixed up with the advent of Jesus in a cloud, with a trumpet and angels, within the prescribed time. Now, it is historically certain that the prophecy was a mistake; 1800 years have elapsed, and the end of the �AGNOSTICISM AND IMMORTALITY. 5 world, the bodily resurrection, and the Day of Judgment, as described by Jesus and St. Paul, have not come. It is equally certain that, scientifically, no resurrection of the material body is possible. Death resolves the atoms and energies of which it was composed into new and simpler forms, which enter into totally different combi­ nations. What becomes, then, of the superstructure of a personal identity after death, when it is based on two pillars which have crumbled into dust? It is.as though it had never been made, and the fact remains that in no religion of ancient or modern times can we find any reliable information, or general consensus of opinion, as to that greatest of all mysteries—what may be “ behind the veil.” If from Theology we fall back on Science, we have real and accurate information up to a certain point; but the final step escapes us. We know in the most precise and accurate manner that all we call soul, spirit, thought, memory, will, perception, and con­ sciousness are indissolubly connected with definite motions of minute cells in the cortex or grey enveloping matter of the brain. Given the motions of given cells, and the corresponding effects will follow with the same certainty as if we were nothing but an electric battery, with nerves for conducting wires. And, conversely, without the proper inducing motions of nerve-cells the effects will not follow. This has been proved by such innumerable experiments that I shall confine myself to noticing a few which have the most direct bearing on the question of soul or personal identity. Memory is clearly at the bottom of this feeling of personality. It links together past perceptions, and makes us feel that they are not isolated phenomena, but have an unity and connection, as having happened to one and the same person—viz., ourselves. Now, it is quite possible to obliterate portions of the memory by destroying portions of the grey matter of the brain appro­ priated for remembering that particular class of impres­ sions. For instance, there is in the back part of the brain a tract of grey matter, connected by a collection of fine conducting wires, called the optic nerve, with the retina, which enables us to see. Surrounding this is another tract of grey matter, connected with the former, �6 AGNOSTICISM AND IMMORTALITY. which serves as a sort of register office for messages sent from the eye to the central telegraph office—or, in other words, which is appropriated to the memory of visual perceptions. Destroy the first or central office, and we can no longer see. Leave it untouched, but destroy the second or register office, and we can see, but no longer remember what is seen. In like manner with the sense of hearing: there is a central office by which we hear, and a connected register office by which we remember what we have heard. Destroy the latter, and all memory of all we have ever heard passes away from us. Memory, therefore, is clearly proved to be not merely a general function of the brain en masse, but a special function of special portions of the brain, told off for the purpose of converting mechanical impressions received from the outer world, through the senses, into registered messages, which form the raw material of what we call memory, which is itself the substratum of consciousness. The will is another faculty which is commonly attri­ buted to personal identity, and yet it also is indissolubly associated with brain motion. Nothing can well be more mechanical than straining the eye to look at a black wafer stuck on a white wall. And yet, by this purely mechanical process, a state called hypnotism can be frequently induced, in which the will is apparently lost, and the will of another personality—that of the operator—is substituted for it. Thus, in the well-known experiment of Dr. Braid, a puritanical old lady, to whom dancing was an invention of Satan, was sent capering about the room to a reel tune, when told to do so by the Doctor. Nay, further, it is shown, by the careful experiments scientifically conducted at the Salpetriere by eminent French physicians, that a suggestion to an hypnotised patient may affect his or her brain move­ ments in such a way as to give rise to the corresponding actions of nerves and muscles weeks after the suggestion was made and the hypnotic state had passed away. Thus a moral person may be irresistibly impelled to commit an atrocious crime on a specified person at a specified date, which would have been utterly repugnant to the patient’s normal nature. �AGNOSTICISM AND IMMORTALITY. 7 In like manner, visible things may be rendered invis­ ible, and invisible things visible, by this hypnotic sug­ gestion. And, what is even more extraordinary and more directly materialistic, these suggested emotions and perceptions may be transferred into one another by the action of a magnet. A case is recorded in Binet and Fere’s volume on the Salpetriere experiments in which a patient told to hate one of the doctors endeavoured to strike him; but, on a magnet being held near the back of her head, hate was changed into love, and she tried to embrace him. Another case is interesting as bearing on the question of personal identity. A female patient, -On being told that she was one of the doctors, imme­ diately assumed his gait and manner, and stroked an imaginary moustache; and, being asked if she knew her real self, replied : “ Oh, yes, there is an hysterical patient of that name who is not over-wise.” The same phenomenon of a dual personality is fre-quently found in persons who have received some injury to the brain, and are subject to trances. They have two personalities—one of a real, the other of a trance life, which are quite distinct and each unconscious of the •other; so that Smith may be alternately Jones or Smith, .as he falls into or awakes from a succession of trances. In other words, the brain is like a barrel organ, which plays one tune in its normal state and a different one when the stops have been altered by some abnormal influence. In short, the last word of physiological science is that all which we call soul, mind, conscious­ ness, or personality, are functions of matter and motion. Observe, however, that, when we ticket the facts with the word function, we explain nothing, but simply sum up the results by affirming that, as far as human experi­ ence goes, the two phenomena go necessarily and inevit­ ably together. There is another class of experiments recorded by the eminent French physician, M. Binet, in the columns of the Open Court, which bears very directly on this .question of a conscious personality. It is not uncommon with hysterical patients to find portions of the body or particular limbs which are subject to what is called .ansesthesia. That is, they are insensible to pain, as in �8 AGNOSTICISM AND IMMORTALITY. the case of chloroform, and cut off from all connection with the conscious self, as completely as if they were external pieces of matter. But, if certain motions are suggested to the paralysed limb, the same results will follow as if they had been dictated by will and accom­ panied by consciousness. Thus, if a pen be put in the ansesthetic hand between the thumb and the index finger, without the subject seeing or being in any way conscious of it, he will seize it, and his other fingers and arm assume the attitude necessary for writing. Suppose, next, we make the pen write a familiar word, such as the subject’s name ; after a short interval, the unconscious and paralysed hand will write the word over again, some­ times five or six times. And, what is still more extra­ ordinary, if we purposely write the word with a wrong or superfluous letter, when the subject repeats the word the anaesthetic hand will hesitate when it comes to the mistake, and, after several attempts, frequently end by correcting it. Now, in this experiment we have clearly proved, as Binet says, an unconscious perception, an unconscious reasoning and memory, and an unconscious volition. It is clear, therefore, that, in such a case, the essential elements, not merely of unconscious reflex movements of nerve and muscle, but of all that we are accustomed to consider as mind or spirit, have been reduced to un­ conscious or mechanical conditions. As Huxley puts it, you may suppress consciousness, and yet all physiolo­ gical phenomena will continue to be performed auto­ matically just as before; objects will continue to be perceived, unconscious reasonings will develop, followed by acts of adaptation. This is not “ Agnosticism,” but science and hard fact, with which the orthodox believers in soul or spirit have to reckon, just as much as those who fail to discover in the problem anything that can be solved by human faculty. In fact, no one can state this more explicitly than one of the ablest of modern theo­ logians, Principal Caird, in his sermon preached before the British Medical Association in 1888, in which he says : “ Of the thoughts, emotions, volitions, which in endless multiplicity and variety constitute our conscious life, there is not one which is not correlated to some �AGNOSTICISM AND IMMORTALITY. 9 physical change or motion in the brain-matter of the thinker; and, as far as we know, the growth, develop­ ment, decline, the healthy or morbid action of the human mind, is invariably connected with corresponding changes of nervous or brain tissue.” But Dr. Caird, who is not a mere commonplace theologian, but candid, sincere, and. thoroughly acquainted with the latest discoveries of science, falls back on two arguments to refute the con­ clusions of Materialism—the first scientific, the second metaphysical. The first invokes the principle of the “ Conservation of Energy.” Dr. Caird argues that the soul, as distinct from the body, is an energy, and, there­ fore, indestructible. In the first place, if it were true, it would point rather to the Brahminical and Buddhistic doctrine of the transmigration of souls, and ultimate merger in the one universal and eternal energy. But the premise involves the fallacy so common in all theo­ logical arguments, that known to theologians as the petitio principn. It assumes a soul which is at one and the same time immaterial and material. That is, imma­ terial as being subject to none of the ordinary laws of matter, such as gravity, form, and extension; material as being subject to the law of indestructibility, which is known to us only as another attribute of ordinary matter and energy. If there be a soul or spirit, how do we know that this law applies to it; or, if it did, that it is not transformed into some sort of dead or potential energy after the active energy comes to an end with the disso­ lution of the material frame, in association with which we alone have any knowledge of it ? For there is no fact more certain than that we have absolutely no know­ ledge of any soul apart from this association. No man of sane mind will assert that he has any recollection of anything that occurred before he was born, or that he has received any authentic message from any world of spirits inhabited by the dead. The last word of science is—“ Behind the veil.” The second or metaphysical argument is that the very existence of matter implies thought. We know nothing of matter and motion in themselves, but only as they appear to us, which is after they have been transfigured, by something antecedent to and independent of them, �IO AGNOSTICISM AND IMMORTALITY. which we call thought or consciousness. It is argued, therefore, that all phenomena require us to assume the existence of an universal mind in which they are con­ ceived, and that, to constitute the reality of the outward world, the presence and the comparing, discriminating and unifying activity of thought is pre-supposed. There­ fore, there is an universal, eternal thought or soul of the universe, which, expressed in anthropomorphic language, is called God, of whom we may say, with St. Paul: “ Of Him, and through Him, and to Him, are all things.” This seems a stupendous superstructure of assertion to raise on the slender foundation that, as a matter of fact, according to the experience of the inhabitants of our tiny planet, thought or consciousness, and brain or nerve motion, do commonly, though, as we have seen, not invariably, go together. It is not by any means clear, even in man’s limited sphere of knowledge, which of the two is the post hoc and which the propter hoc; and no real assurance can result from the double guess - first, that our own mind is the propter hoc, or originat­ ing fact of our own existence; and, secondly, that, if so, the same is true of all existence in the universe. The fact is that these metaphysical solutions of the mysteries of the universe never give any certain assur­ ance even to the acutest philosopher, and to the great mass of mankind they are not even intelligible. More­ over, it is to be remarked that, even if philosophers could establish the truth of their proposition as to mind and thought, it would not take us one step further towards proving what is the real object of our hopes and fears —the continuance of our personal identity after death. On the contrary, Dr. Caird’s whole argument tends to the conclusion of Brahmins, Buddhists, and Platonists that individual existences come from, and return to, the great universal soul or energy of the universe, like the waves which rise and fall, rippling for an instant the surface of the pathless ocean. To carry this one step further and arrive at a personal God, with intelligence and feelings like those of a magnified man, even such an acute reasoner as Dr. Caird has to fall back on wishes rather than reasons. He finds that “ a God outside of knowledge, the dark, impenetrable background of the �AGNOSTICISM AND IMMORTALITY. II phenomenal world,” is not 11 the boon he wants,” and he accordingly postulates something nearer to him and more in accordance with his personal aspirations and feelings. But wishes are not proofs, and there are many things which, although we desire them ever so ardently, do not come to pass. What can be more intense or more legi­ timate than the longing of a mother to receive some message from a lost child ?—and yet it has never been gratified. How many lovers have been parted, how many minds extinguished, in the full maturity of powers which might have benefitted mankind, and where are their hopes and fears, their ardent affections, their far-reaching plans ? Buried in the grave, where there is “ no work, nor device, nor knowledge ” beyond that “ undiscovered bourne from which no traveller returns.” And it is to be noticed that, even if we were to admit as proved the arguments for a personal God and an inspired revelation, we should not be one step advanced towards any certain assurance of a personal immortality. For what this personal God is assumed to teach us by His inspired record in the Bible is this : Firstly, by the Old Testament, that there is no future life; secondly, by the New Testament, that there is a future life, but coupled with the condition of a resurrection of the body within the lifetime of a generation who have all been dead for 1800 years. Clearly there is nothing in this which approaches within a hundred miles of anything like certain and definite knowledge. What, then, is the attitude of Agnosticism towards this great question of personal immortality ? All gnostic forms of religions and philosophies—that is, all systems which teach that the question is knowable, and within the range of human faculties, either with or without the aid of revelation—break down under critical and candid investigation. If I were placed in the position of a conscientious juryman, who was told that the court is competent and the case closed, and that I was bound to deliver a verdict “Aye” or “No” upon the evidence as it stands, I should feel constrained, however reluctantly, to say “ No.” But this would not be my true deliver­ ance. I should much prefer to return a verdict of “Not proven,” or rather I should say the court has no jurisdic- �12 AGNOSTICISM AND IMMORTALITY. tion, and should walk out without giving any verdict at all. This an Agnostic may do with perfect good faith. He believes that our little knowable world is encircled by a great Unknowable, in which all things are possible. He stands, like the Ulysses of the poet, on the margin of that great ocean beyond the setting sun, on which so many millions of millions have embarked, and not one has returned. He, too, like the rest, must soon follow, and turn his prow westwards. What fate is in store for him ? Shall the gulfs wash him down and merge forever his frail bark of hopes in the fathomless depths of a sleep where there are no dreams; or shall he perchance arrive at some fortunate islands of the West where' he may survive in some newer and better life, “ See the great Achilles whom we knew,” and, dearer than the great Achilles, once more behold the faces of those whom he has loved and lost ? He knows not: no voice on earth, no message from thq dead, ever reaches him, and one thing only remains— to possess his soul with patience, and to oppose “ one equal temper of heroic hearts ” to the decrees of destiny and of the irrevocable future. But in the meantime he may dream his dreams and indulge in his visions without fear of contradiction, and without vitiating his manhood by pretending to believe as certain where there is no certainty. Surely this is better than to pin his faith on assurances of certainty which break down under the first touch of the Ithuriel spear of candid and critical investigation, and leave him either shivering in the cold creed of “ dust thou art and to dust thou shalt return,” or wrapped in an unhealthy mantle of prejudices and prepossessions, impervious to the invigorating breezes of truth, of candour, and of sincerity. �WATTS & CO.’S LIST. A Lay Sermon. By S. Laing (Author of “ Modern Science and Modern Thought and “A Modern Zoroastrian ”). This booklet is an impartial and vigorous statement of the attitude of Agnosticism towards Christianity, and sets forth the moral advantages likely to accrue from the acceptance of Agnosticism. Single copies 6d, by post 7d; 13, 5s post free ; 50, 18s carriage paid. Agnosticism and Christianity. Thoughtful, lucid, practical, liberal in sentiment, and high in moral tone. It is a delightful little book, which does the spirit and the temper good to read, for it is large in charity, never offensive, and most welcome in counsel......... full of thought most lucidly expressed.—Secular Review. Agnostic Morality. By R. Bithell, B.Sc., Ph.D. Single copies 6d, by post 7d ; 13, 5s post free ; 50s, 18s carriage paid. “ Agnostic Morality ” is excellent....... Dr. Bithell has a fair grasp of the subject, and much perspicacity.—Progress. By B. Russell. A Concise and Popular Exposition, in Language Understanded of the People. 4d, by post 5d. The Case for Agnosticism. The Popular Faith Exposed. By Julian. This is a critical and scholarly examination of Orthodox Christianity, and is strongly recommended. Single copies 6d, by post 7^5 13, 5s post free ; 50, 18s carriage paid. Bible Words: Human, not Divine. By Julian. This is a pamphlet setting forth, in common-sense language, and free from exaggeration and vituperation, the most glaring absurdities and contradictions of the Bible. Price 3d, by post 3%d ; 13, 2s 6d post free ; 50, 9s carriage paid. The Future of Morality, as Affected by the Decay of Prevalent Religious Beliefs. By M. S. Gilliland, Single copies 4d, by post 4%d; 13, 3s 6d post free ; 50, 12s carriage paid. The Confession of Agnosticism. By G. M. McC. Chapter I. Introductory. Chapter II. Misconceptions. Chapter III. Fundamentals. Chapter IV. The Perfect Life. Chapter V. The Other Side of Agnosticism. Chapter VI. Faith and Manners. Single copies 6d, by post 7d ; 13, 5s post free ; 50, 18s carriage paid. The Excellent Religion. An Essay on the Relations be­ tween Agnosticism, the Polar Theory of Being, and the Higher Theism. By G. C. Griffith-Jones (Lara). Single copies 6d, by post 7d ; 13, 5s post free 5'50, 18s carriage paid. A Friendly Correspondence with Mr. Gladstone about Creeds. By S. Laing. This pamphlet contains the Articles of the Agnostic Creed drawn up at the request of Mr. Gladstone. 6d, by post 7d. London : Watts & Co., 17, Johnson’s Court, Fleet Street, E.C. �Demy 8vo, handsomely bound in cloth, price 2s. 6d. post free, CHEAP POPULAR EDITION OF AGNOSTIC PROBLEMS. BEING AN EXAMINATION OF SOME QUESTIONS OF THE: DEEPEST INTEREST, AS VIEWED FROM THE AGNOSTIC STANDPOINT. By RICHARD BITHELL, B.Sc., Ph.D. The volume is fascinatingly interesting, remarkably complete, and sothoroughly explains the Agnostic position that the merest tyro in metaphysics may grasp its contents....... “Agnostic Problems” has filled a gap that had remained too long open ; and, without any desire to flatter Dr. Bithell, it may be truthfully said that it has filled it with such solid material that it will re­ quire more than all the united strength of the opponents of Agnosticism to shatter one single stone of the substantial edifice thus put together. The work is one that ought to be read by every thinking man, be he Christian, Jew, Agnostic, or Atheist.—Secular Review. Handsomely bound in cloth, price is. 6d., by post is. 8d., Stepping-Stones to Agnosticism. By F. J. GOULD. With Introduction by G. J. Holyoake. Contents.—I. Ecce Deus; or, A New God. II. Miracles Weighed in the Balances. III. Our Brother Christ. IV. The Immortal Bible. V. The Noble Path. VI. Agnosticism Writ Plain. Bound in cloth, price 2s., by post 2s. 3d., AGNOSTIC FIRST PRINCIPLES. Being a Critical Exposition of the Spencerian System of Thought. By ALBERT SIMMONS (Ignotus). With Preface by Richard Bithell, B.Sc., Ph.D. London : Watts & Co., 17, Johnson’s Court, Fleet Street, E.C. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Victorian Blogging Description An account of the resource A collection of digitised nineteenth-century pamphlets from Conway Hall Library &amp; Archives. This includes the Conway Tracts, Moncure Conway's personal pamphlet library; the Morris Tracts, donated to the library by Miss Morris in 1904; the National Secular Society's pamphlet library and others. 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Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource [1890] Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context N428 Subject The topic of the resource Agnosticism Immortality Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource <a href="http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/mark/1.0/"><img src="http://i.creativecommons.org/p/mark/1.0/88x31.png" alt="Public Domain Mark" /></a><span> </span><br /><span>This work (Agnosticism and immortality), identified by </span><a href="https://conwayhallcollections.omeka.net/items/show/www.conwayhall.org.uk"><span>Humanist Library and Archives</span></a><span>, is free of known copyright restrictions.</span> Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource application/pdf Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Language A language of the resource English Agnosticism Immortality NSS https://d1y502jg6fpugt.cloudfront.net/25778/archive/files/62d3528316601b71d06dead15744cfee.pdf?Expires=1779321600&Signature=aT6dsetvnQH6rFaeY5wHhzvyTM9kWGuTI2CJDSf86Me5Ec9RGSjkhJ3U1cIIXrbM2Ct6WF0KpLnyBCchxGO9yeIzo%7E-PbAV0rJ12jLAdQa3pCNlrxzjv054R%7E6TQStWgbF3C4v4OzEVd9gD5tINmq3NX56EqvJhxLYpSY-71EA2MHlxR0pL0WrnTnSL2hoMSDr-dBDK-fmbM0nePsuXgVhKFV3sAC2zwi1vYJwYbPvkGNWtfmCvV%7E461cIn33M6t4U4GH8m1v0%7EhY0IXbcl3QYADyIxM18xd7uePquQr1ZU5y7CXzEFjjrw3sM8bA6WrzIGIE7KXwFjW3L3O%7EwWPNQ__&Key-Pair-Id=K6UGZS9ZTDSZM 27cd7d425e8712431a4470e175273041 PDF Text Text AGNOSTICISM AND CHRISTIAN THEISM I Which is the More Reasonable ? « By CHARLES WATTS. CONTENTS: (1) What is Agnosticism? (2) Its Relation to the Universe and Christian Theism ; (3) Is it sufficient to satisfy man’s intellectual requirements? The Natural and the Supernatural. Price Ten Cents. SECULAR THOUGHT OFFICE, Toronto, Ont. �omhmm �AGNOSTICISM & CHRISTIAN THEISM : WHICH IS THE MORE REASONABLE ? I. WHAT IS AGNOSTICISM ? This is pre-eminently a critical age, when the right to examine teach­ ings submitted for our acceptance is more than ever recognized. In the light of modern thought, no subject is too sacred for honest criti­ cism, and no opinion too ancient for reasonable investigation. Rea-on is now rapidly taking the place of blind belief, and serfdom to authority issyielding to the influence of mental freedom. Christian Theism as taught by the Churches has been so long regarded by its adherents as being the embodiment of absolute truth, that to in any way question its pretensions has been condemned as almost an unpar­ donable sin. Every new philosophy that has challenged the positive claims of Theism has been avoided and misrepresented apart from its -pertinency and value. This has been the case particularly with the philosophy of Agnosticism. It will, therefore, be interesting to in­ quire, What is this Agnostic phase of thought ? In answering this question, the reply will be classified under three divisions—(1) What is Agnosticism ? (2) Its relation to the Universe and Christian Theism; and (3) Is it sufficient' to satisfy man’s intellectual require­ ments 1 What is Agnosticism ? The word is one that has become tolerably familiar to a large section of society in sound, if not in its strictest philosophical signification. It has come into use within the last few years, and has achieved a great popularity. Friends arid foes alike employ it—the former to approve it and the latter to condemn it, and both to describe a certain phase of thought which is recognised as being very extensive. Like most technical phrases, the term is derived from the Greek, and signifies “ not knowing.” An Agnostic, therefore, is one who confesses that he has no knowledge upon those subjects to which his Agnosticism is applicable. �4 AGNOSTICISM AND CHRISTIAN THEISM : Although the word Agnostic is comparatively new, that which it represents is as old as humanity. Men are not now for the first time discovering that there are questions which lie altogether beyond their gnosis or knowledge. That discovery was made at the dawn of human thought. A knowledge of his own ignorance was one of the qualities which Socrates boasted that he possessed, and which distinguished him. in such a marked manner from his wily antagonists, the Sophists ; and at Athens, two thousand years ago, St. Paul is said to have found an altar, the remaining one of many, dedicated to an “ Unknown God.”' The limits of human knowledge have been recognized by the foremost, men of the race in all lands and in every age. Before the mighty mysteries of the universe the greatest thinkers have stood awe-stricken,, aghast and dumb. The intellect has again and again been paralyzed in its ineffectual attempts to read the riddles of existence, before which those of the Sphinx are lost in their insignificance ; and no GEdipus hasyet been found competent to the task of furnishing the solution. “ Alli things,” said the schoolmen, “ run into the inscrutable,”—a thought equivalent to one to be found in Professor Tyndall’s “ Belfast Address.”' Therein that eminent scientist says : “ All we see around and all wefeel within us....... have their unsearchable roots in a cosmical life....... an infinitesimal span of which is offered to the investigation of man.”' Thus it will be seen that Agnosticism is an old friend with a new name,, and perhaps a few additional qualities. We meet with it under certain, forms in the pages of the history of every age. The profoundest intel­ lects have been familiar with its character, and have not felt themselves ashamed to confess to the attitude of mind which it represents. It should be distinctly understood that Agnosticism is not to be in any way confounded with ignorance as that phrase is used in every-day life. Herein consists ©ne of the errors into which our orthodox op­ ponents are continually falling. They use the words Agnosticism and general ignorance as if they were synonymous, which is misleading, to say ^the least of it—that is, unless the latter term be employed as the direct /antithesis of omniscience. No one pretends to know everything, and the knowledge of many persons is considerably less than they in their own opinion imagine. It is stated that an admirer of Dr. Johnson began on one occasion to praise him for the great extent of his know­ ledge. “Pooh,” said Johnson, “you would say I had great knowledge even though you did not think so.” “ And,” rejoined the admirer, “ you would think so even though I did not say it.” The fault of �WHICH IS THE MORE REASONABLE ? 5 'Over-estimating our own knowledge is very common, and frequently begets an egotism of a very dangerous nature. Invariably, the less a man knows the more dogmatic he becomes, and the weaker the evidence upon which his convictions are based the more positively will he assert them to be true. It should require no extensive self-examination to convince the careful thinker that, even if he knew all that can be known upon every subject within the range of human gnosis, still then the domain into which his knowledge does not extend would be infinitely large compared with that small sphere which his information has covered. In that larger province he is an Agnostic, and it would be very unfair to designate him an ignorant person on that account. Therefore, although Agnosticism means “ not knowing,” it is in no way the equivalent of general ignorance. The word Agnostic, however, in its philosophical sense, has a still broader meaning. An Agnostic is not simply a person who is profossedly ignorant concerning many subjects upon which other persons pretend to have an extensive knowledge ; but he maintains that there are problems the solution of which by man is impossible at the present stage of his mental development. Further, an Agnostic is one who limits the human mind by the measure of its capacity. That the finite can never become infinite is probably a matter about which there can be no difference of opinion, inasmuch as such a statement is a self-evident truth, or as axiomatic as a proposition of Euclid. On the other hand, a mind which is less than infinite cannot possess all knowledge. The ■consequence is, that there must always remain a wide field beyond the range of the human faculties. In relation to that field every man must be Agnostic, for the simple reason that his knowledge cannot penetrate therein. Even the most orthodox believer proclaims his Agnosticism, in a sense—that is, he admits that there are subjects which he not only does not know, but which, from their very nature, he can never know, since they relate to that which lies outside the sphere of thought. As Herbert Spencer observes : “ At the utmost reach of discovery there arises, and must ever arise, the question, What lies beyond ? ” (“First Principles.”) And that beyond does not diminish, but rather widens, •as knowledge increases ; for, the more we know, the more we discover we have to learn. “ The power which the universe manifests to us,” remarks the same writer, “ is utterly inscrutable.” Why should there be any hesitation in admitting this truth ? No one looks upon it as derogatory to human nature to admit that his power is limited, and �6 AGNOSTICISM AND CHRISTIAN THEISM : that there are things which he cannot do. Why, therefore, should it beconsidered humiliating to confess that man’s knowledge, is limited, and that there are topics which he does not and cannot know ? Not simply that he has not advanced sufficiently in intellectual research to grapple with them, but that they lie completely outside his sphere of thought. In nature we can never know more than phenomena; and yet thesevery phenomena involve the necessity of the existence of something which is their ground and support—that something being to us un­ knowable. The unknown is postulated in the very terms we are com­ pelled to use when speaking of the unknown. “ The senses,” as Lewes observes, “perceive only phenomena; never noumena” (“History of Philosophy ”). This opinion is not of modern origin, since Anaxagoras maintained it, and Plato gave it his support. Thus it will be seen that Agnosticism is not only not synonymous with what is generally termed ignorance, but that it is compatible with the very highest and most profound knowledge of which the human mind is capable. Agnosticism being a philosophical, or certainly a quasi-philosophical, question, must be judged of in the same manner as any other subject of philosophy. Dogmatism is out of place in regard to it, and those who accept its teachings must be content to practise humility and to lay aside all arrogant assumptions of their great superiority to other men whose views may not be identical with their own. As the ancient philosopher observed : “We are never more in danger of being sub­ dued than when we think ourselves invincible.” The object of the whole Agnostic system is to learn, as far as possible, the limits of the human mind in reference to the acquisition of knowledge, and, having, done this, to use every effort to effect improvement wherever it is possible, and to leave the useless and impracticable labour of sowing the wind to those who seek to know the unknowable and to perform the impossible. Wesley, in one of his hymns referring to the death of Christ, says : “ Impassive he suffers, immortal he dies ”■—that is, in­ capable of suffering, he did suffer; incapable of dying, he did die. Now, is not this the very height of absurdity ? And yet, in reality, it is not a whit more absurd than much that is put forth by those who claim a knowledge of matters which lie beyond the sphere of human reason. Agnostics, refusing to profess a knowledge they cannot com­ mand, aim to differentiate the knowable from the unknowable, and then devote their time and energies to widening the sphere of that within human gnosis. Whatever else is possible, it is certain that we �WHICH IS THE MORE REASONABLE? 7 can never extend the domain of the known into the unknown by in­ dulging in wild flights of the imagination respecting the unknowable, A® Socrates wisely observes : “ Having searched into all kinds of science, we discover the folly of neglecting those which concern human life and involving ourselves in difficulties about questions which are but mere notions. We should confine ourselves to nature and reason. Fancies beyond the reach of understanding, and which have yet been made the objects of belief—these have been the source of all the dis­ putes, errors and superstitions which have prevailed in the world. Such notional mysteries cannot be made subservient to the right use of humanity.” “ Fear not to scan The deep obscure or radiant light. Heed not the man Who draws old creeds to keep thee tight. Examine all creeds, old and new : Test all with reason through and through.” II. THE RELATION OF AGNOSTICISM TO THE UNIVERSE AND TO THEISM. Agnosticism maintains that the teachings of theology relative to the origin and nature of the universe, the existence of God, and immor­ tality are simply questions of speculation, and that reason, science and general knowledge do not support their dogmatic claims. Tne theologian, on the other hand, contends that sufficient is known upon these teachings to entitle them to our credence. In the face of these two contentions, it will be profitable to ascertain as far as possible which is the correct one. When the truth upon the matter is made manifest, the wisdom of confining ourselves to the known and knowable of existence yill probably be more readily recognized. What, then, are those subjects which are dogmatized upon by the theologian, and to which our attitude is purely Agnostic ? THE ORIGIN OF THE UNIVERSE. This is a question which, to us, is involved in absolute mystery. Not only can it not be fathomed by the human mind, but no approach can be made towards the solution of the'problem by the mightiest efforts of the human intellect. We may go back millions of years in imagination, �8 AGNOSTICISM AND CHRISTIAN THEISM : but even then we are no nearer to a beginning than we were before. Indeed, the possibility of such a beginning at all cannot be thought— in other words, is not thinkable. As Mr. Mansel observes, “ Creation is, to the human mind, inconceivable.” Precisely the same with the other alternative, of an external existence, whether of matter or spirit. It presents no idea that we can deal with intellectually, because it ^sembles nothing of which we have had, or can have, the smallest possible experience. Something must have existed from all eternity ; that is a necessary truth, from which there is no escape. And yet the how of that eternal existence lies utterly beyond the sphere of human thought. To waste time in trying to comprehend it, to say nothing of making it the subject of discussion, much less of dogmatism, is the supremest folly. Nor can we have the slightest idea as to what was, or is, the eternal existence. The dogmatic Theist ascribes it to God, and the positive Atheist declares it to be matter • but what in reality either the one or the other means, in the strictest sense, by the terms used, neither of them knows. For what is God, and what is matter < Are they the same, or are they two different existences ? The Mate­ rialist, of course, denies the existence of spirit, and hence by matter he means something other than spiritj-but what ? Matter is simply a name given to that which originates in us sensations. But all that is known of this is phenomenal, and phenomena, as before pointed out, cannot exist by themselves, but must be supported by something which underlies them. What that something is, however, no one knows, since it lies completely outside the sphere of sensation. Besides, modern science has clearly shown that the existence of which alone we can be said to have any knowledge is not matter, but force. But, then, force can only make itself manifest by motion, and where there is motion something must be moved. Say that this moving body is matter, as it probably is, and then comes the question, Which was the eternal existence, force or matter, or both ? If force, how could it exist as motion when there was nothing to be moved ? And, if matter, how could theje be motion —and we have no conception of matter without motion—in the ab­ sence of force, which is the cause of motion ? If it be contended that both—matter and force—were eternal, then have we not two absolute and infinite existences, which is a contradiction ? The Theist postulates spirit; but that only adds a fresh difficulty, as will be seen presently. Here Agnosticism at once declares the whole subject to be outside of our gnosis, and, therefore, one which does not concern us, and of which �WHICH IS THE MORE REASONABLE? nothing is known, or can be known. Mr. Herbert Spencer remarks that, on the origin of the universe, three hypotheses only are possible: —1. That it is self-existent (Atheism). 2. That it is self-created (Pan­ theism). 3. That it is created by an external agency (Theism). Mr. Spencer has, at very considerable length, examined each of these theories, and shown them all to be unthinkable. His position is, that a self-existent universe, which is a universe existing without a begin­ ning, is inconceivable. We cannot even think clearly of “ existence without beginning.” And, if we could, it would afford no kind of explanation of the universe itself. The first theory, therefore, is un­ tenable. But no less so is the second—that of a created universe. To hold this, it is necessary, in Mr. Herbert Spencer’s words, to “ conceive potential existence passing into actual existence.” Is it possible, how­ ever, to form a conception of potential existence except as something which is, in fact, actual existence—the very thing which it is not I It cannot be supposed as “nothing,” for that involves two absurdities— (1) That nothing can be represented in thought; (2) That some one nothing is so far separated from other nothings as to be capable of passing into something, Again, existence passing from one state to another without some external agency implies a “ change without a cause—a thing of which no one idea is possible.” A self-created uni­ verse is, consequently, inconceivable. There is still left the third theory —that the universe was created by some external agency. But here a difficulty arises in the attempt to think of “ the production of matter out of nothing.” Moreover, there is still greater difficulty if we suppose the creation of space. If space were created, then there was a time when it was non-existent, which is also utterly inconceivable. But suppose all these difficulties overcome, there is yet another, the greatest of all. What is the external agency referred to ? And how came it into being ? These are questions to which no satisfactory answers have been or can be given. Thus the origin of the universe belongs to a regior into which no human mind can enter, and therefore Agnosticism is the only possible attitude of thought we can consistently take with regard to the matter. THE NATURE OF THE UNIVERSE. In connection with this question we encounter speculations in abundance ; but demonstrative facts are nowhere to be discovered. Herbert Spencer has shown that every sensation we experience com­ pels us, whether wo will or not, to infer a cause, and this- �10 AGNOSTICISM AND CHRISTIAN THEISM : idea of causation drives us irresistibly to a First Cause. And yet the moment we have reached it we are landed in all kinds of contradictions and absurdities. For instance, is this First Cause infinite or finite ? If infinite, it is beyond our comprehension, outside the sphere of our knowledge; and if finite, then there must be something beyond its bounds, and it is no longer the First Cause. The Duke of Argyle, in his “ Reign of Law,” observes :— “We cannot reach final causes any more than final purposes ; for every cause which we can detect there is another cause which lies be­ hind ; and for every purpose which we can see, there are other purposes which lie beyond.” By holding that the Universe is infinite, to use the words of Spencer himself, “ we tacitly abandon the hypothesis of causation altogether.” The First Cause must also be either independent or dependent. But if independent, we can have no idea of it at all, because everything we know and think of is dependent. If, however, the First Cause be dependent, then it must, being dependent, depend on something else, and that something else becomes the First Cause, to which the same argument will apply. In a similar manner, this cause must be absolute, and yet, as Mansel has shown, “ A cause cannot, as such, be absolute ; the absolute, as such, cannot be a cause.” The reason of this is very obvious; the cause, as a cause, exists only in relation to the effect. But the absolute must be out of all relation, or it would cease to be absolute. But, in truth, we cannot conceive of the absolute at all. It lies beyond the reach of finite faculties to grapple with; hence, we are compelled to relegate the entire matter to the domain of the unknowable. The power which manifests itself in the universe is utterly inscrutable, and therefore we are driven to Agnos­ ticism to find in it a solid resting-place in reference to the origin and nature of the universe. THE EXISTENCE OF GOD. This is another question which, as already demonstrated, lies beyond z the reach of finite powers. Let us glance at some of the various methods that have been pursued—indeed, are still resorted to—to prove the existence of God. The object in doing this, be it observed, is not to attempt the foolish impossibility of proving the non-existence of God. That would not be Agnosticism ; but the desire here is to indicate that the question of the existence of God is a subject upon which man, to be logical, must, from the very nature of the case be Agnostic. Demonstration of the existence of God will hardly �WHICH IS THE MORE REASONABLE ? II be contended for, except perhaps by the advocates of the a priori method, and that need not be noticed here, since few representative Theists resort to it, and fewer still have any idea what it really means. The kinds of proof that are conceivable to be relied upon in this mat­ ter are as follows :— (a) The Senses.—These, however, can never furnish an argument to prove the existence of God, inasmuch as our organs of sense have no power to perceive anything that does not belong to the mere pheno­ menal part of matter, and, hence, can never show us the noumenon underlying appearances, much less an existence which is said to be in no 5^ay material. If God has given a revelation, such revelation may be seen or heard; but this, of itself, can only prove the revelation, not God. Suppose we heard a voice, in tones of thunder which shook the earth and reached every human ear, declare “ There is a God,” it would prove nothing but the voice—not the God proclaimed. The senses would perceive a sound, to which a very definite meaning might be attached ; but the sound would not be God. It will not be denied by any intelligent Theist that God can never become an object of sense, and, therefore, that method of proof may be dismissed as totally unavailing in the case. (b) Scientific Research.—“ Canst thou by searching find out God 1” is a question that was asked some thousands of years ago, and only one answer has ever been, or probably ever can be, given, and that is a negative one. Science, mighty and potent as it is for good, much as it has done to ameliorate the condition of mankind, and great as its triumphs are likely to be in the future, can never transcend sense knowledge. All its processes are of a material character ; its instru­ ments, together with the subjects which they explore, are material, the phenomena with which it deals are material, and all its discoveries are reported to the bodily organs of sense. Beyond the physical domain of appearances no scientific investigations can ever go ; no telescope or microscope can show us a trace of spirit; nor, in fact, of that, whatever it may be, which underlies phenomena. Scientific facts may lead up to philosophical generalizations ; but such generalizations are reached by ratiocination (process of reasoning), and are no longer exclusively scientific—in fact, are in a sense altogether independent of science. A scientific fact and the interpretation of the fact are totally different things. We may use science as a means for reading the riddles of nature ; the reading, however, is not science, but philosophy; and �19 v. AGNOSTICISM AND CHRISTIAN THEISM : science has but helped us to the facts which process that is not scientific has to explain. The Theist tells us, with Newton, that science leads up to God ; but it will be seen that the upward road has ceased to be withm the domain of science long before its termination is reached. Logveal Reasoning.—Here, of course, it will be argued by the heist that we start on firm and solid ground. A moment’s reflection, however, will show that this is by no means the case. Our starting point and the conclusion at which we seek to arrive lie so far apart that by no process of logic can we pass from one to the other. There is, in truth, a great gulf between them, and we do not and cannot possess the means of bridging it over. Xu all mathematical reasoning we start from some axiom or necessary truth, which we find in our minds, and which, by a law of our mentation, cannot be got rid of. This we make the basis of all our reasoning and the foundation of the entire super­ structure that we desire to erect. In geometry, in arithmetic, and in logic this is equally the case. Now, all these starting points, whether they be axioms relating to space, notions regarding quantity, or mental conceptions, lie in our own minds, and are only known to us by the fact that we find them there. From these we may reason, form­ ing a long chain of logical links, until, at the end, we reach some truth of a marvellous and startling character, which is as easy of demonstra. tion as the concept or axiom with which we started. In this way Theists endeavour to reason up to God. But it requires no very profound thought to show that the process must break down before it reaches that point. For instance, there is the fact that the conclusion must be of the same quality as the starting point. If the primary truth with which we commenced be internal to our minds, so must the conclusion be at which we arrive. Beginning with ourselves, we must continue and end with ourselves, and by no possibility can we reach anything that is exterior to us. If, therefore, we reason up to a concept to which the name of God is given, we shall be as far as ever from a demonstration of his actual being. We. shall still be dealing with an idea which exists simply in our own minds, and may or may not__for here demonstration ceases and the logical argument breaks down_ be a measure of some real existence. But there is another reason why this logical process must fail. The attributes ascribed to God are of that character about which we cannot reason. However exalted the conception at which we arrive, it must be finite, relative, and condi- �\ WHICH IS THE MORE REASONABLE? 13 tioned, while God is said to be infinite, absolute, and unconditioned. It is, therefore, impossible that God can be the last term of a logical induction. Of course, this does not furnish conclusive proof that the absolute and unconditioned has no existence; it does, how■ever, prove that we cannot know everything of it, since it transcends all our powers and faculties. It belongs to a sphere to which we have no access. Hence, in all our research, investigation, and thought, we bait when we approach the domain of the unknowable, bow our heads and unfurl the banner of Agnosticism. For a person to assert positively that he knows that a God exists, who is an infinite personal being, is, in the face of the present limita­ tion of human knowledge, to betray an utter disregard of accuracy of expression. With the majority of orthodox believers, the term God is a phrase used to cover a lack of information. Persons behold certain phenomena ; the why and wherefore they cannot explain • and because to them such events are mysterious, they pause at the threshold of inquiry, and to avoid what appear to be inscrutable difficulties, allege that such phenomena are caused by God. Dr. Young, the Christian Theist, in his “Provinceof Reason,” says :— “ That concerning which I have no idea at all, is to me nothing, in -every sense nothing.............To believe in that respecting which I can form no notion is to believe in nothing; it is not to believe at all.’r This represents t-he position of Christian Theism. Although a person may picture an object in his mind from an analogous subject, it has yet to be shown how an idea can be formed of that upon which no knowledge exists, either analogous or otherwise. All notions that have been entertained of Gods have been but reflexes of human weaknesses, human desires, and human passions, and therefore do not represent an infinite personal Being. Xenophanes is reported to have said, that “ If horses and lions had hands, and should make their deities, they would respectively make a horse and a lion.” Luther, too, remarked : “ God is a blank sheet, upon which nothing is found but what you yourselves have written.” Schiller also stated : “ Man depicts himself in his Gods.” The history of the alleged God-ideas justifies the truth of those statements ; hence, we find that in different nations, at various times, the most opposite objects have been adored as deities. The sun, -moon, and stars, wood, and stone, and rivers, cows, cats, hawks, bats, /monkeys, and rattlesnakes, all have had their worshippers. Even now the professed ideas of God in Christendom are most discrepant. The �14 AGNOSTICISM AND CHRISTIAN THEISM : God acknowledged by “ Advanced Theists ” is not the same Being in many respects as the one depicted by Talmage and his school. Neither does the object worshipped by the Deist correspond with the “Supreme Power of the Pantheist. Then, if we go to the Bible, we discover very different notions of God therein recorded. He is there described as material, and then as immaterial j first as all-wise, and then again as betraying a lack of wisdom j in one place as being all-powerful, and in another as being exceedingly weak ; at one time as being loving, merci­ ful, and unchangeable, at another as being revengeful, cruel and fickle in the extreme. Surely, to rely on such absurd and contradictory descriptions of a Being as these is more unreasonable than to frankly admit that, if God exist, he is and must be unknown to us. This is not a denial, but an honest confession that mentally no more than physically can we perform the impossible. It is alleged that the “God idea” is firmly rooted in the human mind. What folly ! What is meant in this instance by an idea ? A mental picture of something external to the individual. But where is that“ something ” corresponding with the many and varied representations of a God ? The truth is, this supposed “ idea ” is no reality whatever, but simply a vague “ idea ” of an “ idea,” of which, in fact, no idea exists. Besides, the term “ Infinite Personal Being ” is a contradiction. Personality is that which constitutes an individual a distinct being. This definition implies three requisites : First, that the person shall be a personage ; second, that he shall be distinct from other things • and thirdly, that he shall be bounded, that is, limited. But a bounded, limited being is a finite being, and, therefore, cannot be an infinite personal being. Is the assumed personality of God differentm fro mine 1 If so, where is the difference ? Furthermore, is my personality a part of God’s personality ? If it is, my personality is “ divine ; ” if it is not, then there are two personalities, neither of which can possibly be infinite, for where there are two each must be finite. Furthermore,. personality is only known to us as a part of a material organization. If, therefore, God is material, he is part of the universe. If he be a part, he cannot be infinite, inasmuch as the part cannot be equal to the whole. Personality involves intelligence, and intelligence implies ; 1. Acquirement of knowledge, which indicates that the time was when, the person who gained additional information lacked certain wisdom. 2. Memory, which is the power of recalling past events ; but with the • �WHICH IS THE MORE REASONABLE 1 15 "infinite there can be no past. 3. Hope, which is based on limited per­ ception, and which shows the uncertain condition of the mind wherein the aspiration is found. Now, if God possesses these imperfect, faculties he is finite; while, on the other hand, if they do not belong to him, he is not an intelligent being. Neither does the Theistic definition of God, as being infinite, har­ monize with our reasoning faculties. Reason is based upon experience, but an Infinite Being must be outside the domain of experience , reason implies reflection, but we cannot reflect upon infinity, because it is unthinkable ; reason implies comparison, but the Infinite Being cannot be compared, for there is nothing with which to compare him; reason implies judgment, but the finite is totally incompetent to judge of the infinite ; reason is bounded by the capacity of the mind in which it resides, but the mind to conceive the infinite must be unbounded; reason follows perception, but we have no faculties for perceiving or recognizing the infinite. Therefore, is not the Agnostic position of silence as to the unknown the more reasonable ? If it be urged that it is no part of Agnostic philosophy to consider these Theistic assump­ tions, the answer is, that if such notions are well founded on demon­ strated facts, there is no reason for the Agnostic attitude towards them. It is the proving that Theistic allegations are unsupported by observed truths which renders Agnosticism logical and justifiable. Let it be distinctly understood that it is not against the existence and nature of a God, per se, that exception is here taken—of that we know nothing, but against the positive claims urged in reference to these subjects. To these our indictment is directed. The Orthodox notion of the “ innate consciousness of God’s exist­ ence ” does not strengthen the position of the Christian Theist, for the reason that it is groundless in fact. No doubt the error upon this point has arisen with many persons through their regarding consciousness as a separate faculty of the mind, whereas James Mill, Locke, Brown and Buckle have shown it to be a condition of the mind produced by ■early training and surrounding associations. George Grote, in his Review of J. S. Mill’s Examination of Sir William Hamilton’s Phi­ losophy,” aptly remarks : “ Each new-born child finds its religious creed ready prepared for him. In his earliest days of unconscious in­ fancy, the stamp of the national, gentle, phratric God, or Gods, is imprinted upon him by his elders.” Thus it happens that what are too frequently but the consequences of youthful impressions and subsequent �AGNOSTICISM AND CHRISTIAN THEISM : tuition are regarded as veritable realities. If this “ God idea” were innate, is it not reasonable to suppose that all persons would have it ? But there are thousands of persons who are ready to acknowledge that ey have it not; and those who profess to have it are unable to ex­ plain what it is. Probably, if a child never heard of God in the morn­ ing of life, it would have no fancies concerning him in its mature age. t is to be feared that these Theistic pretensions arise from an inade­ quate acquaintance with the now admitted natural forces. There is however, this hope, that as knowledge still more advances, dogmatism will proportionately disappear, priestcraft will yield to mental freedom, and work in controlling Nature and reliance on her prolific resources will more than ever take the place of supplicating for, and dependence on, alleged supernatural help. The once favourite argument drawn from design in the Universe affords no justification for the positive allegations of Theism. As Pro­ fessor Taylor Lewis admits :— “ Nature alone cannot prove the existence of a Deity possessed of moral attributes.” Has it ever occurred to Theists that at the very most the God of the design argument can only be a finite being, for nowhere amongst what are supposed to be the marks of design in Nature is an infinite designer indicated ? Now, a God that is finite isneither omniscient, omnipotent, nor eternal. The design argument, moreover, points to no unity in God. According to natural theology, there may be one God or hundreds of Gods. The Rev. S. Faber fairly observes : “ The Deist never did, and he never can, prove without the aid of Revelation that the Universe was designed by a single­ designer,” Paley’s well-known comparison of the eye and the telescopeproves the very opposite of that for which it was used. It should beremembered that, but for the imperfection of the eye, the telescope had not been required. Plainly, the argument may be stated thus :_ Designer of the telescope, man; designer of the eye, God ; telescope imperfect, hence its designer w^s imperfect; the eye more imperfect, since the telescope was invented to improve its power • ergo, God, the designer of eyes, was still less perfect than man, the designer of telescopes. Dr. Vaughan, in his work “The Age and Christianity,” declares : “ No attempt of any philosopher to harmonize our ideal notions as to the sort of world which it became a Being of infinite perfection to create, with the world existing around us, can ever be pronounced sue- �WHICH IS THE MORE REASONABLE? 17 -cessful. The facts of the moral and physical world seem to justify inferences of an opposite de-cription from the benevolent.” The Rev. George Gilfillan, in his “Grand Discovery of the Fatherhood,” noticing the horrors and the evils that exist around us, asks : “ Is this the spot chosen by the Father for the education of his children, or is it a den of banisment or torture for his foes ? Is it a nursery, or is it a hell ? there is nb discovery of the Father in man, in his science, philosophy, history, art, or in any of his relations.” If nothing else rebuked the dogmatic assumption of the Christian Theist, the existence of so much misery, evil, and inequality in the world, should do so. What man or woman having the power, would hesitate to use it to alleviate the affliction, to cure the wrong, and to destroy the injustice which cast such a gloom over so large a portion of society ? Let the many records of the world’s benevolence, devotion, and kindness give the reply. To lessen the pain of the afflicted, to assist the needy, to help the oppressed, are characteristics of human nature which its noblest sons and daughters have ever felt proud to manifest in their deeds of heroic self-denial. Contemplating the suc­ cess of crime, the triumph of despotism, the prevalence of want, the struggles on the part of many to obtain the mere means of existence, the appalling sights of physical deformity—beholding all these wrongs this sadness and despair, who shall dogmatically exclaim, “ All Nature proclaims a Fatherhood of of ^df?The question of immortality scarcely belongs to the same class of subjects as the others which have here been discussed; nevertheless, even upon this subject, the Agnostic position appears to me to be the correct one. Personally, I refuse to dogmatise either one way or the other; and the question, after all, is but of little consequence. Our business, for the present at all events, is with this world; and the, affairs of the next may be left until we land upon its shores, if such shores there be. To ignore the teachings said to refer to another life is not necessarily to deny the existence of that life. One thing is cer­ tain, and that is our present existence. Furthermore, experience teaches us that time is too short, duties too imperative, and consequences too important to justify us in wasting our resources and displaying a ‘disturbing anxiety about, to us, an unknown future. “ Life’s span forbids us to extend our cares, And stretch our hopes beyond our years.” �18 AGNOSTICISM AND CHRISTIAN THEISM : DOES AGNOSTICISM SATISFY MAN’S INTELLECTUAL REQUIREMENTS 1 There are two objections frequently urged against the Agnostic posi­ tion which with some people have considerable force. The first is, that Agnosticism robs man of the great consolation and incentive imparted by the belief in the certainty of the existence of a “ Heavenly Father” and a future life. In the second place, it is contended that Agnosticism fails to satisfy the demands of the human intellect. Let us exa.m in e these objections, with a view of ascertaining whether or not they pos­ sess any weight bearing upon the present question. The first objection supposes that without Theism and its teachings there is no adequate comfort and peace for the human race ; that this life of itself is but little more than “ a vale of tears,” alike destitute of the sunshine of joy and the power of imparting happiness in every­ day life. Persons who entertain these gloomy ideas regard existence as being necessarily full of trouble, aud think that mankind are incapable with mere natural resources of enjoying a high state of felicity, and that true bliss is only to be secured by believing in God and entertaining the hope of pleasure in another world. Such morbid notions are born of a dismal faith, and find no sanction in the real healthy view of life’s mission. Existence is not a mere blank ; its condition depends largely upon the use mankind make of it. To some the world may be as a garden adorned with the choicest of flowers, and to others as a wilder­ ness covered with worthless weeds. Life of itself is not destitute of beauty, glory, solace and love. True, it is sometimes darkened with clouds, but it is also enlivened with sunshine ; it is degraded by serf­ dom, and elevated by freedom ; it is shaded by isolation, and illumin­ ated by fellowship ; it is chilled by misery and persecution, and warmed by kindness and affection ; it is blasted by poverty and want, and in­ vigorated by wealth and comfort; it is marred by shams and inequalities, and glorified by realities and equity ; it is humiliated by unequal and exce sive toil, and dignified by fair and honest labour; it has its punishments through wrong and neglect, but it has its rewards in right and correct action. The lesson of experience teaches us unmistakably that life is worth having even if Theism and the teachings in reference to a future existence be nothing more than emotional speculations. In the language of the Rev. Minot J. Savage, in his work, “ The Morals of Evolution,” “ I believe there is not a healthy man, woman, or child �WHICH IS THE MORE REASONABLE? 19' on earth who will not join me in saying that life is worth living simply for its own sake, to-day, whether there ever was a yesterday or there ever will be a to-morrow. Have you ever stood, as I have, on a moun­ tain summit, with the broad ocean spread out at your feet on the one side, a magnificent lake or bay on the other, the valley dotted with towns, with growing fields of greenness, or turning brown with har­ vest ? Have you ever looked up at the sky at night, thick with its stars, glorious with the moon walking in her brightness ? Have you listened to the bird-song some summer morning ? Have you stood by the sea, and felt the breeze fan your weary brow, and watched the breakers curling and tumbling in upon the shore ? Have you looked into the faces of little children, seen the joy and delight they experi­ ence simply in breathing and living, beheld the love-light in their eyes,, heard their daily prattle, their laughter, their shouts of joy and play i Have you, in fact, ever tasted what life means 1 Have you realized that, with a healthy body, in the midst of this universe you are an instrument finely attuned, on which all the million fingers of the uni­ verse do play, every nerve a chord to be touched, every sense thrilling with ecstacy and joy ? No matter where I came from, no matter where I am going to, I live an eternity in this instant of time. Is it not a mistake, in the face of facts like these, to say that life is not worth, living unless it is supplemented by a heaven ? ” “ Tell me not, in mournful numbers, Life is but an empty dream.” As to the second objection, it is said that man is born to inquire ; his whole nature is bent in the direction of discovery ; curiosity to pry into the secrets of nature and being forms one of his leading character­ istics ; therefore, Agnosticism, which places a barrier to his further investigation, must be objectionable, because it fixes the limits beyond which he may not’ go. This allegation, if worth anything, must be urged, not against Agnosticism, but against the limit of human powers. To tell man that there are subjects which he can never master, not for lack of time to look into them, but because they lie in a domain to which, by the very nature of the case, he can gain no access, should certainly not be calculated to stop his inquiry with regard to matters upon which knowledge is to be obtained. The Theist believes that he can never fully comprehend God; but does that prevent him from �20 AGNOSTICISM AND CHRISTIAN THEISM. endeavouring to learn what he can? Agnosticism has not placed limits to the human mind, but only defined them; it has not erected the barrier beyond which the human intellect cannot pass, but only described it j it has not invented the line which has separated the knowable from the unknowable, but only indicated its position. The mind of man is, therefore, free to inquire to the utmost extent of its powers, and the complaint that it cannot do more is foolish in the extreme. Agnosticism is sufficient for all the purposes of life, and more than that cannot surely be needed. There is no human duty that it is not compatible with, no human feeling that it does not allow full play to, and no intellectual effort that it would attempt to place restrictions upon. It leaves man in possession of all his mental force, seeking only to direct that force into a legitimate channel where it may find full scope for its use. In a beautiful passage in his Belfast address, Pro­ fessor Tyndall remarks : “ Given the masses of the planets and their distances asunder, and we can infer the perturbations consequent upon their mutual attrac. tions. Given the nature of disturbance in water, or ether, or air, and from the physical properties of the medium we canlinfer how its parti­ cles will be affected. The mind runs along the line of thought which connects the phenomena, and from beginning to end finds no break in the chain. But when we endeavour to pass, by a similar process, from the physics of the brain to the phenomena of consciousness, we meet a problem which transcends any conceivable expansion of the powers we now possess. We may think over the subject again and again, it eludes all intellectual presentation.” These words present a great truth, indicating, as they do, the proper scope of man’s intellectual activity. The Agnostic does not fail to carry on his investigations into Nature to the utmost extent of his ability. He seeks to wring from her secrets hidden through all the ages of the past; he pushes his inquiries from point to point, and learns all that can be known of the marvellous processes of life and mind, and only stops when he confronts the unknowable, beyond whose barrier he cannot pass. His are the fields, the groves, the woods, the sea, and all the earth contains ; the starry sky, too, is his domain to explore All nature, with its majestic varieties, lies before him, presenting sub­ jects of the keenest interest. In these he revels with delight; but the �NATURE AND THE SUPERNATURAL. 21 incomprehensible he seeks not to comprehend, the unknowable he does not make the idle attempt to know. In a word, he is a man, and he aims not at the impossible task of becoming a God. Is not this course more courageous, more dignified, and more candid than that adopted by the dogmatic theologian, who, yearning for a knowledge of the absolute, and yet failing to discover it, lacks the courage to avow his inability to achieve the impossible ? “ Know then thyself, presume not God to scan; The proper study of mankind is man.” NATURE AND THE SUPERNATURAL. There have been a large number of books written on this subject, some of them by men of eminence in their respective departments of thought. It has been dealt with from very different standpoints, and therefore exceedingly conflicting arguments have been brought to bear upon it. Two able American writers, Dr. Bushnell and Dr. McCosh, have discussed it with considerable learning ; but one has to put down their works with a great degree of dissatisfaction, since nothing like clear definition is to be found in their pages. In England the subject has been made the theme of several large works, of hundreds of magazine articles, and of thousands of pulpit discourses, an<J yet the whole subject is enveloped in the densest darkness. There must be some cause for this, and the cause, I think, is not far to seek. The natural we know f but the supernatural, what is that ? Of course, as its name implies, it is something higher than nature—something above nature. But, if there is a sphere higher than nature, and yet often breaking through nature, nature itself must be limited by something, and the question that at once arises is, By what is such limitation fixed, and what is the boundary line which marks it off and separates it from the supernatural ? And this is just what no two writers seem to be agreed upon. But, further supposing such a line to be discovered, and to be well known, so that no difficulty could arise in pointing it out, a still more difficult problem presents itself for solution—namely, how man, who is a part of nature, �-22 NATURE AND THE SUPERNATURAL. and able only to come into contact with nature, can push his knowledge into that other sphere which, being non-natural, cannot be at all ac­ cessible to a natural being ? If the supernatural region be synonymous with the unknowable, it cannot clearly concern us, simply because we have no faculties with which to cognize it, and no powers capable of penetrating into its profound depths. In this case, as far as we are concerned, there is practically no supernatural, for none can operate on that sphere in which man lives and moves and displays his varied and in some respects very marvellous powers. According to many writers, the physical is the supernatural, because dt is not under the control of natural law. But why ? If man be partly a spiritual being, why should not natural law extend into the ■ sphere of his spiritual nature ? Indeed, an able writer on the Christian ■ side,-whose work has been enthusiastically received by all religious denominations—Professor Drummond—has maintained this position, the very title of his book stating the whole case : “ Natural Law in the Spiritual World.” The great German philosopher, Kant, calls nature the realm of sensible phenomena, conditioned by space, and speaks of another sphere as a world above space, depleted of sense, and free from natural law, and therefore supersensible and supernatural. But this is to make the supernatural spaceless and timeless—in fact, a mere negation of everything, and therefore nothing. Now, the only light in which we can look at this subject, with a view to obtain anything like clear and correct views, is that of modern science. By her the boundary of our knowledge has been greatly enlarged, and through her discoveries we have been enabled to obtain more sound information regarding the laws of the universe than it was possible for our fathers, with the limited means at their disposal, to possess. If there be a sphere where the supernatural plays a part and exer­ cises any control, it must clearly be in some remote region, of which we have, and can have, no positive knowledge; and the forces in v operation must be other than those with which we are conversant upon this earth. Science cannot recognize the supernatural, because she has no instruments which she can bring to bear upon, and no means at her disposal for, its investigation. She leaves to the theologian all useless . speculations regarding such a region, contenting herself with reminding him that he is. in all such discussions, travelling outside the domain of facts into a province which should be left to poets and dreamers, and �NATURE AND THE SUPERNATURAL. 23 which belongs solely to the imagination. All law is and must be natural law, from a scientific standpoint, because we can have access to nature, and to nature only. It is impossible to get beyond her domain, even in imagination. The supernatural, if it exist, must reveal itself through nature, for in no other way can it reach us so as to produce any impression upon the human mind. But, if it come through nature, then how can it be distinguished from the phenomena of nature ? It will be quite impos. sible to differentiate between them. We are quite precluded from saying, Nature could not do this, and is unable to do that. No man can fix a limit to the possibilities of power in nature. She has already done a thousand things which our forefathers would have declared im­ possible, and she will doubtless in the future, under further discoveries and advances in science, do much more which would look impossible to us. Whatever, therefore, comes through nature must be natural, for the very reason that it comes to us in that way. And the business of science is to interpret in the light of natural law. Even if she should prove herself incompetent to the task, it would only show that some phenomena had been witnessed which had for a time baffled explana­ tions, not that anything supernatural had occurred. And the business of science would be to at once direct itself to the new class of facts, with a view to finding the key with which to open and disclose the secret of the power by which they were produced. But what is nature ? Of course every man knows what is meant by nature, in part at all events ; and the only difference in opinion or de­ finition that can arise will be as to its totality. There are a thousand facts lying all around us, and a thousand phenomena of which we are every day eye-witnesses, that all will agree to call nature. The ques­ tion, however,, does not concern these, but others, real or imaginary, which differ somewhat from them, and which are supposed, therefore, to be incapable of being classed under the same head. Those who de­ sire to obtain a clear and accurate idea of nature cannot do better than read carefully Mr. John Stuart Mill’s excellent essay on the subject, published after his death. He gives two definitions, or rather two senses, in which we use the word in ordinary, every-day language. The first is that in which we mean the totality of all existence, and the other that in which we use the term as contradistinguished from art— nature improved by man. But it must be borne in mind that this is �24 NATURE AND THE SUPERNATURAL. still . nature. Nature improved by man is only one part of nature modified by another; for man is as much a portion of nature as the earth on which he treads, or the stars which glow in the midnight sky over his head. Nature, therefore, as I understand it, and as Mill de­ fines it m his first sense, is everything that exists, or that can possibly come into existence in the hereafter—that is, all the possibilities of existence, whether past, present, or future. If I am asked on what ground I include in my definition that which to-day does not exist, but may come into existence hereafter, I reply : Because that which will be must be, potentially at least, even now. No new entity can come into being; all that can occur is the commencement of some new form of existence, which has ever had a being potentially anyhow. No new force can appear, some new form of force may. But, then, that, when it comes, will be as much a part of nature as the rest—is indeed even now a part of nature, since it is latent somewhere in the universe. Man’s beginnings were in nature ; his every act is natural, his thoughts are natural, and in the end the great universe will fold him in its embrace, close his eyes in death, and furnish in her own bosom his last and final resting-place. Beyond her he cannot go. She was his cradle, and will be his grave ; while between the two she furnishes the stage on which he plays his every part. And more, she has made him, the actor, to play the part. Nature is one and indivisible. She had no beginning, and can have no end. She is the All-in-all. Com­ bined in her are the One and the Many which so perplexed the philo­ sophers of ancient times. Charles Watts. ��DATE DUE Z7 JU L 2012 I Demco, Inc. 38-293 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. 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Original Format The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data Pamphlet Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Agnosticism and Christian Theism: which is the more reasonable? Description An account of the resource Place of publication: Toronto Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Watts, Charles Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource [n.d.] Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available [s.n.] Subject The topic of the resource Agnosticism Theism Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource <a href="http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/mark/1.0/"><img src="http://i.creativecommons.org/p/mark/1.0/88x31.png" alt="Public Domain Mark" /></a><span> </span><br /><span>This work (Agnosticism and Christian Theism: which is the more reasonable?), identified by </span><a href="https://conwayhallcollections.omeka.net/items/show/www.conwayhall.org.uk"><span>Humanist Library and Archives</span></a><span>, is free of known copyright restrictions.</span> Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context RA1651 RA1853 Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource application/pdf Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Language A language of the resource English Agnosticism Theism https://d1y502jg6fpugt.cloudfront.net/25778/archive/files/675b9647a6d5d889519f669bef7bfb1b.pdf?Expires=1779321600&Signature=ODOShauEFXd56J55%7EdOUOQ4BikMpq9wpN9g0tnwCqaLongyZhV5En2aHM15mm0XxTl9OUpYKzzYYW9%7E44N6OCXei1ZD3d7ChB8EuKMJGJ60GLSo34A1mLIIPyC%7EhLnWTLBRV7RNZLjn1QEpI6MA4wsIqK%7EGWNsFRoLdc9vA79xegzzjNpRK0FJcrQmyPiRcw38G7S0P5SNF8tMEOviVUvK0-xbVInzQATzzeZWJ7MzZqcuj8EpsOV4AX01Ag5pW7fCvozkqpaUepxCAYhJ4bRPnRQHQekNOR5lIGJXrmkkH%7EhVmtHtdz0s51Hhd4M79MCiD98YfM1Q%7EHAZRPb31AWQ__&Key-Pair-Id=K6UGZS9ZTDSZM ea86c81567e681e94a69a7cc9a098528 PDF Text Text By the same Author, “ Life and Times of C. C. Cattell.” One Penny. “ Perils of Genius ” (Illustrious Men who suffered in times past). Published at is., post free, 7d., of C. Cattell, “ Emerson,’’ Boscombe Park, Bournemouth. Agnosticism : AN EXPOSITION AND A DEFENCE. Selected from leading authorities by CHARLES COCKBILL CATTELL. Introduction. Long before I heard of Huxley, or Agnosticism, I held that whatever was presented to the intellect de­ manding assent, must have reasonable grounds for its acceptance—rational proof. In forming a judgment on any subject, faith or authority must never be per­ mitted to usurp the place of facts. We find ourselves living among incessant changes called “causesand effects,” interminable in time and space. These changes have been observed to occur in a certain order ; and such are named “Laws of Nature.” Hence we are led to believe in universal causation—a first or a last cause having no meaning. As to why there is one existence we call “ Nature,” or why there ’is any existence at all—Who) can tell ? The idea of one existence includes all that is and all that is necessary for all that happens. Science in some measure explains how things now existing became what they are ; the conditions of existence appear to determine the duration of their varying qualities and forms. These conditions must have been adequate to produce these effects, or the earth in our time would not supply the varied forms and manifestations of life. But why all this has taken �2 Agnosticism—An Exposition and a Defence. place—Who can tell? Spencer teaches that the power manifested in nature is inscrutable. Those who do not accept the idea of a power indescribable operat­ ing in nature, resort to the alternative of an external power. This much we know—that all the changes observable take place tn the nature we know; hence, a power assumed external to it explains no more than a power assumed to operate within it. As to the durability of Nature, the indestructibility of matter points to unlimited time, an everlasting existence. Our only scope of inquiry is, therefore, clearly Nature and its laws; the latter term being a name for observed changes, and not in any sense implying causes, such use of the term being misleading, although very common. Law is not a cause, an agent, or an in­ strument, but merely the name of the path or way along which forces travel to phenomena. The subject may be made clear by recalling the fact that while the Theist may affirm a God infinite and eternal, and the Atheist may affirm the same of Nature, Agnostics maintain that these terms do not admit of being thought of at all. At most, they convey the idea of indefinite extent in space and time, while every thought implies a boundary, a limit, something definite. Some perverse people insist that “ Agnostic ” stands for Ignorance, and others contend it is adopted through want of courage to avow what we really are. I hold the name is a fitting title to distinguish one who finds it beyond his mental powers to believe in things that have no relation to common knowledge. In formulating a thought about anything, we dis­ cover it implies likeness, relation, and difference, which cannot apply to the terms “infinite” or “ eternal ”—no such thought is possible ; they have no likeness, relation or difference, although no words are more commonly heard in the religious world. The Agnostic’s position is governed by limits found to rule our intellect in forming conclusions. An examination of the formulation of consciousness about the infinite will reveal the fact that parts of known things have been used in its formation, �Agnosticism—An Exposition and a Defence. 3 A popular writer maintains that he can grasp all the ideas which the Agnostic deems beyond our powers to grasp, such as self-existence, eternity, infinity, “ although it is only by consciousness, by feeling that we know.” But no explanation is given as to how finite con­ sciousness (and there is none other) can feel infinite self-existence. Although in former years I wrote at length on this subject, I leave the following extracts to represent my views on the present occasion. The term Agnostic and Agnosticism arose as follows:— “ I took thought and invented what I conceived to be the appropriate title of Agnostic. It came into my head as suggestively antithetic to the ‘ Gnostic ’ of Church history, who professed to know so much about the very things of which I was ignorant. To my satisfaction the term took ; and when the Spectator had stood godfather to it, any suspicion in the minds of respectable people that knowledge of its parentage might have awakened was, of course, completely lulled. That’s the history of the terms. “ And it will be observed that it does not quite agree with the confident assertion of the Rev. Principal of King’s College, that ‘ the adoption of the term Agnostic is only an attempt to shift the issue, and that it involves a mere evasion ; in relation to the Church and Christianity. . . . . The people who call themselves ‘ Agnostics ’ have been charged with doing so because they have not the courage to declare themselves ‘ Infidels,’ have adopted a new name to escape the unpleasantness which attaches to their proper denomination. . . . Agnosticism is not properly described as a ‘negative’ creed, nor, indeed, as a creed of any kind, except in so far as a principle which is as much ethical as intellectual. The principle may be stated ir. various ways, but they all amount to this: that it is wrong for a man to say that he is certain of the objective truth of �4 Agnosticism—An'Exposition and a Defence. any proposition unless he can produce evidence which logically justifies that certainty. That is what Agnosticism asserts, and, in my opinion, it is all that is essential to Agnosticism. That which Agnostics deny and repudiate as immoral, is the contrary doctrine, that there are propo­ sitions which men ought to believe, without logically satisfactory evidence ; and that repro­ bation ought to attach to the profession of dis­ belief in such inadequately supported proposi­ tions. The justification of the Agnostic principle lies in the success which follows its application, whether in the field of natural or in that of civil history ; and in the fact that, so far as these topics are concerned, no sane man thinks of denying its validity. Agnosticism is the essence of science, whether ancient or modern. It simply means that a man shall not say he knows or believes that which he has no scientific grounds for professing to know or believe. Agnosticism says that we know nothing beyond phenomena. . . . . As to the interests of morality, I am disposed to think that if mankind could be got to act up to this principle in every relation of life, a reformation would be effected such as the world has not yet seen ; an approximation to the millenium, such as no supernaturalistic eligion has ever yet succeeded, ior seems likely ever to succeed in effecting.”—Huxley. “ That which persists' unchanging in quantity, but ever changing in form, under the sensible appearances which the universe presents to us, transcends human knowledge and conception, is an unknown and unknowable power, which we are obliged to recognise as without limit in space, and without beginning or end in time. This is in its highest form, the philosophy of Agnos­ ticism. . . . If we ask how came the atoms into existence, endowed with marvellous energy, we can only reply in the words of the poet : ‘ Behind the veil, behind the veil.’ We can only form metaphysical conceptions, or I ought rather �Agnosticism—An Exposition and a Defence. 5 to call them the vaguest guesses. One is, that they were created and endowed with their elementary properties by an all-wise and allpowerful creator. This is Theism. Another, that thought is the only reality, and that all the phenomena of the universe are thoughts and ideas of one universal all-pervading mind. This is Pantheism.” “ Or, again, we may frankly acknowledge that the real essence and origin of things are ‘ behind the veil,’ and not knowable or even conceivable by any faculties with which the human mind is endowed in its present state of existence. This is Agnosticism. Agnostics do not deny that, in the course of evolution, certain feelings and as­ pirations have grown up which find a poetical ex­ pression in the ideas of God and immortality. They simply deny that we have, or can have, any certain, definite and scientific knowledge respect­ ing these mysteries.”—Laing. “ The Agnostic is one who asserts—what no­ body denies—that there are limits to the sphere of intelligence. He asserts, further, what many theologians have expressly maintained, that these limits are such as to exclude at least what Lewes called ‘ metempirical ’ knowledge. But he goes further, and asserts, in opposition to theologians, that theology lies within the forbidden sphere.” “ ‘Trust your reason,’ we have been told until we are tired of the phrase, ‘ and you will become Atheists or Agnostics.’ What right have you to turn round and rate us for being a degree more logical than yourelves ? You say, as we say, that the natural man can know nothing of the Divine nature. That is Agnosticism. Our fundamental principal is not only granted but asserted. . . . Dr. Newman’s arguments (in * Grammar of Assent’) go to prove that man, as guided by reason, ought to be an Agnostic, and that at the present moment, Agnosticism is the only reason­ able faith for, at least, three-quarters of the race. . . . The race collectively is Agnostic, �6 Agnosticism—An Exposition and a Defence. whatever may be the case with individuals. . . There is not a single proof of natural theology of which the negative has not been maintained as vigorously as the affirmative. You tell us to be ashamed of professing ignorance. Where is the shame of ignorance in matters still involved in endless and hopeless controversy ? Is it not rather a duty.”—Sir Leslie Stephen. “ The Agnostic neither believes nor disbelieves in a Superior Existence, from lack of satisfying evidence to warrant affirmation or denial. He is neutral, not because he wishes not to believe, or desires to deny, but because language should be measured by proof of conviction. Huxley’s wise, useful, and honest word ‘ Agnostic ’ has done more to teach theologians to think, and incite in them discrimination and tolerance, than any other word which has been added to the nomencla­ ture of controversy this century.” “ Is it ‘ dodging ’ to refuse to identify yourself with the preposterous presumption of the Theist or the Atheist ? Is it not imposture in any one to adopt a term which implies all-penetrating knowledge, when you know you have it not ? Nature is too illimitable to be conceived, and the past is beyond all human experience. The Agnostic neither decries nor disparages them [Theist and Athiest], but frankly says he is not of their way of thinking. Many now see no distinction between Agnosticism and Atheism. It is the wide distinction between knowing and not knowing. Agnosticism means scruplousness and truth.”—G. ]. Hol'joake. “ The contest between Theology and Agnos ticism is like that between a man in a balloon and one on the solid ground. The balloon man shouts down to his enemy, ‘ Come up here and I will give you a good beating.’ The reply is ‘ No ; I cannot leave the solid ground of fact. I cannot float myself with the gas of sentiment and imagination. But, if you come down to terra firma, I will very soon test the strength of your �Agnosticism—An Exposition and a Defence. 7 balloon. If your silk can stand the sharp edge of my knife—scientific criticism—well and good, you will continue to float above the earth. But if not/and a rent is made, you and your balloon will collapse into nothingness. The balloon man shouts down that his antagonist is a coward, throws some dust into the eyes of the spectators, and so ascends into the heavens. The theologian, so long as he remains in the region of emotion and imagination, is safe from any attack on the part of the scientist; but the moment he touches the ground of fact he must prepare for hostilities ; and it is well that he should understand that such things as miracles, the inspiration of the Bible, etc., are subject to criticism, and will be vigorously combatted.”—John Wilson, M.A. “ If after devoting our best energies and highest endeavours to the investigation of the arguments of Maratheism, Dualism. Polytheism, Pantheism, and Atheism, we find none entirely convincing, there is no cowardice involved in the admission. On the contrary, it becomes our highest duty to confess that all our labour has been without fruit or reward. Though we have fervently sought we have failed to find. We are sceptics or agnostics, and recognise the fact that, even should one or other of these five interpretations of the mystery of existence be accepted as its true solution it is but a proximate solution and thus but removes the essential mystery but a step further back.”—Constance E. Plumptre. “ We get rid of the accursed spirit of condem­ nation, and the setting open wide—as wide as humanity itself—the gates that lead to truth and human progress. For the Agnostic is no narrow pale, on one side of which stand the saved and the other the lost; and no ascription of certain social experiments to a corrupt imaginaand an evil heart......................... “We know nothing of the hereafter—absolutely nothing. But, freed as we are from the trammels of superstition and the strangulation of fear, we �8 Agnosticism—An Exposition and a Defence. deny the eternal Hell, and the omnipotent Devil formulated by old-world ignorance and terror. For us the life of man is emphatically his life in the present, and his merits or demerits are determined by his relations to others. He has, in a word, got rid of night and its dreams, and has come out into the light of waking day of which he does not pre sume to foretell the state of the evening, or the conditions of the night that follows after. All he knows is that there must come this evening, when strength will wane and the light will wax dim ; and that then will steal down the night—into which he cannot peer. Whether that night is to be starless, or brilliant with these “ many mansions ” of light, must be left to time to settle. No, the Agnostic does not waste his time in these speculative futilities. He works for the present and in the present, and he leaves the undiscovered future to take care of itself.—Mrs. Lynn Linton. , “ The essential principles of Agnosticism were known and recognised before the name was in­ vented ; but the introduction of a definite name arrested the attention of the reflecting classes. Their attention once fixed on the subject, people began to say this was what they always thought. The unseen and unknown presents an ample field for speculation, and by contemplative minds must always be viewed with reverence and awe. A con­ sciousness that the sphere of known and knowable phenomena, when expanded to its utmost limits, is very far from embracing the whole universe, very far from exhausting the possibilities of thought and feeling, while the Beyond is, to the upright man and pure in heart, an unfathomable abyss into which he looks with much ground for hope and very little for fear.—Dr. BitheU. London : W. Stewart & Co., 41, Farringdon Street, E.C. ONE PENNY. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Victorian Blogging Description An account of the resource A collection of digitised nineteenth-century pamphlets from Conway Hall Library &amp; Archives. This includes the Conway Tracts, Moncure Conway's personal pamphlet library; the Morris Tracts, donated to the library by Miss Morris in 1904; the National Secular Society's pamphlet library and others. The Conway Tracts were bound with additional ephemera, such as lecture programmes and handwritten notes.<br /><br />Please note that these digitised pamphlets have been edited to maximise the accuracy of the OCR, ensuring they are text searchable. 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Original Format The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data Pamphlet Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Agnosticism : an exposition and a defence, selected from leading authorities... Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Cattell, Charles Cockbill Description An account of the resource Place of publication: [London] Collation: 8 p. ; 18 cm. Notes: Part of the NSS pamphlet collection. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available [W. Stewart & Co.] Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource [n.d.] Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context N118 Subject The topic of the resource Agnosticism Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource <a href="http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/mark/1.0/"><img src="http://i.creativecommons.org/p/mark/1.0/88x31.png" alt="Public Domain Mark" /></a><span> </span><br /><span>This work (Agnosticism : an exposition and a defence, selected from leading authorities...), identified by </span><a href="https://conwayhallcollections.omeka.net/items/show/www.conwayhall.org.uk"><span>Humanist Library and Archives</span></a><span>, is free of known copyright restrictions.</span> Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource application/pdf Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Language A language of the resource English Agnosticism NSS https://d1y502jg6fpugt.cloudfront.net/25778/archive/files/de731c03c6c45a1f68311e96bb83be7b.pdf?Expires=1779321600&Signature=brhEEQarRJz0RwmI221RzH1QDAFhKFgc-U6fpMTWEYe6vvaQyIoE0LAWAONSJU9SEJsEaqtDrXFAOVAvg9HhEZ177vm2e0TiW5gUqurJvQAUVZnNaLvLBhAMWhF-%7Ego9C%7E3of2FqyOKRldhdgRDREXsWJC%7ErLByHogg3a-xw-3tjZVQk6NbL1G1T0x7rba31TMqyzh3h9TdcDQHW76%7EswKzbeYHGAm3UtHylvZi95GW0cYqRacBkaYO4bjKi8EOo0P12x-aP5VGPGjgkfUI9xI3tAgrm9fajcmQ9sC4LLDn7UBut-zFJWJZdQVVOpdPrW0aA88W2ZupMCAjwwpcKhA__&Key-Pair-Id=K6UGZS9ZTDSZM 37feacb69ba8bfdfa58d820541348d09 PDF Text Text NATIONAL SECULAR SOCIETY AGAINST AGNOSTICISM. BY “ HTJMANITAS.” Author of “ Is God the First Caused ”, “ Follies of the Lord’s Prayer Exposed ”, “Thoughts on Heaven’9, “Jacob the Wrestler99, “Mr. Eradlaugh and the Oaths Question", “ How the British House of Commons treated Charles Bradlaugh, M.P,", “ Charles Bradlaugh and the Irish Nation ",“ Socialism a Curse", “ A Fish in Labor; or, Jonah and the Whale ", “ God: Being also a Brief Statement of Arguments Against Agnosticism ", “ Against Socialism ", tc. LONDON: FREETHOUGHT PUBLISHING COMPANY, 63 FLEET STREET, E.C. 1 8 8 9 . PRICE TWOPENCE. �LONDON FEINTED BY ANNIE BESANT AND CHAELES BBADLATOH, 63 FLEET STEEET, E.C. �\T0S3 AGAINST AGNOSTICISM. This pamphlet was originally written as a portion of my larger one on “God ” ; but considering it to be complete in itself—as against Agnosticism—I determined to publish it, in a separate form, hoping thereby to reach many who might not be inclined to buy the larger one. The observations I have made, and the arguments I have endeavored to advance, are made and advanced with great respect and with much diffidence: respect for the opinions of those who, from their longer and closer appli­ cation to the question, and better means of studying it, are more capable of forming a correct opinion than my­ self : and diffidence, because I know the conclusion at which I have arrived is at variance with that opinion. Yet having arrived at it, I must needs express myself; but I do so in the spirit of enquiry, and because what I shall endeavor to put forward seems to me to be real difficulties. If I should appear to be dogmatic, or wanting in respect for greater thinkers, it will be by reason of experiencing a difficulty in finding a method of expressing the thoughts I wish to convey. In my pamphlet on God, of which this forms a part, I have said that God is not, nor could not be. And it is upon the wisdom or unwisdom of thus distinctly denying the existence of God, that I wish to make a few observa­ tions. I believe it is held by all Atheists—no matter how it is put—that God does not exist. And it is true that the whole tone and meaning of this paper is a denial of his existence. And so in reality are all Atheistic writings. �4 AGAINST AGNOSTICISM. But I think I see very marked signs of what may be considered a decay of this robust and thorough Atheism. Leading Freethinkers, it would appear do not now take up this position, but what is considered the safer and more moderate one of Agnosticism ; which would seem to mean that man does not know God. I believe it is also taken to mean that, constituted as man is, he cannot know him; and that therefore he should neither affirm_ nor deny his existence. I am only now putting that portion of Agnos­ ticism which applies directly to God, as contrasted with Atheism, which certainly does deny his existence.. Mr. Laing, as I understand him, takes the above view of Agnosticism; for, in his now famous “articles1 of th© Agnostic creed and reasons for them ”, he holds that, if we cannot prove an affirmative respecting the mystery of a first, cause, and a personal God ; equally, we cannot prove a negative; and adds: “There may be anything in the Unknowable ”. But he qualifies this statement by further saying: “ Any guess at it which is inconsistent with what we really do know, stands, ipso facto, condemned ”. I would here remark that the qualification—certainly for all practical purposes—goes very near to, if not quite, annull­ ing the statement. But he further holds that if the existence of such places as heaven and hell (using them of course to illustrate the idea he is expounding.) be asserted in a general way, without attempt at definition, the pos­ sibility of the correctness of the assertion should be admitted. Well but, if anything and everything is possible in the Unknowable, is it possible that there may exist an uncaused cause of all things? If it, as well as the existence of (I presume) a soul, of heaven, hell, etc., — which be it remembered, those who believe in them, do so on faith, not professing to prove them—is possible, is not three parts of the Christian Theists’ position conceded ? It would however appear to me, reasoning from Mr. Laing’s position, that although anything may be possible in the Unknowable, yet any statement concerning it which is inconsistent with ascertained facts stands condemned, the possibility of the existence of God stands condemned. If anything which is inconsistent with what we really 1 Those which he drew up at the request of the Right Hon. W. E. Gladstone. �AGAINST AGNOSTISISM. 5 know stands, ipso facto, condemned; then the idea of a beginning, the existence of an uncaused cause—£e., God —stands so condemned. And it follows naturally, that a term which embodies that meaning (viz., that what cannot be is not) is more logical than one which either admits of the possibility of the impossible, or evades the direct issue. The position created by Agnosticism, as put by Mr. Laing—and it is the generally accepted one1—on the face -of it, not only appears contradictory but unnecessary. One would seem to have to accept the existence of God—or five thousand Gods for the matter of that—as possible, till tested by the only means we have of testing it, when it is, as a mere matter of course, to be held impossible; the non-possibility actually and practically, and also curiously, forming a part of the Agnostic position. In theory it grants the possibility of the existence of God, in practice it denies it. Again, if Agnosticism permits one to declare impossible that which, if tested and found to be so by the ordinary methods of reasoning aided by what we really know, then it is, so far Atheism: because the Atheist does but say what is possible or impossible, judged by what is cognis­ able, by what is really known, he could do no other. Thus Agnosticism would seem superfluous. At best it can but be (as I think) a something to suit the extreme palate of the—I would almost say—over-logical epicure; a kind of luxury for the hair-splitter, the hypercritic who will not, physically speaking, say that what cannot be, is not, but who will, in order to escape the mere suspicion of illogical­ ness, drop his physical condition to admit the possibility of something about the Unknowable; although that admis­ sion involves the possibility—the may-be of propositions superbly ridiculous. Agnosticism would seem to me to be Atheism, plus the possibility of what both practically say is impossible?1 2 1 I notice that “D” (of the NationalReformer} takes exception to the idea of Agnosticism being a creed, but I do not think that affects the general view of Agnosticism as in reference to God. 2 R. Lewins, M.D., in a letter to the Agnostic Journaloi March 30th, remarks: “I cannot see the difference—other than academical, over which we might split hairs for ever—between Atheism and Agnostic­ �6 AGAINST AGNOSTICISM. It would appear to me that what is ■unknowable is not. Hence the superfluity of Agnosticism. It is possible there may be some points and niceties about it which pass my comprehension, but of this I feel convinced, there are some very serious difficulties in its way. If you hold that all things are possible in what is termed the Unknowable, an individual may—as indeed is done—assert the most extra­ ordinary rubbish imaginable, and knock you down with what I will call the Agnostic Closure : “ How can you prove to the contrary ? ” Of course one could shake one’s head, and venture a doubtful smile, and even go to the extreme of saying the thing is very improbable ; but the closure will come in again with quite as much force against the improbable as it did against the impossible, when used in reference to the Unknowable. It is doubtless a wise and judicious proceeding to hold a prisoner innocent till he is proven guilty. But surely it ought not to be necessary to hold that anything, no matter how completely idiotic, if only stated in a general way, is possible and might be tiue, because it is outside the possibility of being tested. Of course I comprehend the difficulty : I may be asked how I know it is foolish or idiotic since I cannot test it: my reply is that the thing spoken of simply is not, and hence the folly of holding that it may le this, that, or the other. The whole idea seems to be over and above and beyond reality—entirely wide of the mark. It would appear to me that, practically, no theory nor statement can be made or set up which shall be completely outside or free from considerations which ism. An Agnostic who doubts of God is certainly Godless, and Atheism is no more.” Whilst holding that Atheism is more definite and goes further than Agnosticism, and therefore disagreeing with Dr. Lewins, I am startled to find the Editor of the Agnostic Journal stating, by way of reply, that “ ‘God’ is just the one fact of which the Agnostic is assured. ‘God’, with the Agnostic, is the ontological and cosmic basis and fens et origo, just as the ego is with Dr. Lewins.” With great respect, I would remark that it would perhaps be difficult to find a better definition of what God is to the Theist; and if it be a correct one, Agnostics are something very like Theists, God being the basis, fountain, and origin of both cults. If we go on at this rate, and it be true that Agnosticism is the better and more correct form of Atheism, we shall soon have Atheists who believe in God. �AGAINST AGNOSTICISM. 7 ar© in connexion with the universe, or which are not based upon what we know or is knowable. (Therefore Agnos­ ticism is out of court.) And in coining a word which assumes that you can so speak or set up theories — or, what is much the same thing, that assertions and theories so set up may be true—you are but helping to obscure, rather than to throw more light upon what is already sufficiently difficult. As far as I can comprehend Agnosticism, and its teach­ ings and bearings, I do not and never did like it. This may look presumptuous on my part, possibly it is pre­ sumptuous ; but rightly or wrongly I cannot but regard it as a kind of half-way house between Atheism and Theism. I regard it as a reversion into the vicinity of the temples we have deserted, and which (as I thought) we had got to look upon as temples of myths and impossibilities. Of course much depends upon the starting point. The Theist becoming doubtful will possibly evolve into Agnosticism, or the may-be stage; tiring of this, he will naturally evolve further into Atheism, which says God is not. On the other hand, if the starting point be Atheism, or that the Atheist has evolved from something else into Atheism, which says no, and evolves from it into Agnosticism, which says perhaps ; he will in all probability continue the evolution till he arrives at Theism, which says yes. Agnosticism being, as I have said, a half-way house between the two extremes, there will at all times probably be a few—possibly many, who will find shelter in it. It will possibly form an asylum for the doubtful of Theism, and the timid or hypercritical of Atheism. It may become a common ground upon which the weary and wavering of faith and the weary and wavering of no faith will for a time find rest. But it is only a transition stage, being neither yes nor no; and will only satisfy those whose minds are not made up either way. It may be regarded as a kind of intellectual landing stage for passengers who are either going forward or returning, as the case may be. In the observations which follow I will endeavor to further explain myself, and to point out why I think an Atheist ought logically to be able to say there is no God. I was recently much struck by the similarity of Mrs. Besant’s definition of Secularism in her debate with the Rev. W. T. Lee, and the definition of Agnosticism quoted �8 AGAINST AGNOSTICISM. from, the “New Oxford Dictionary of the English lan­ guage ”, by the Rev. H. Wace, D.D., in his paper read at the late Church Congress at Manchester. It would appear to me that this adoption of Agnosticism, and discarding of Atheism, coupled with the hesitation which naturally follows, of saying point blank there is no God, is not only B very weak position, but goes a long way towards justi­ fying the boast made by many, that there is no living person who really believes there is no God. Of course this boast may be a very silly and unfounded one; but when they see an actual avoidance of the direct denial by those whose teachings and professions, if they mean anything, mean that “ God” is not, they may, I think, be excused to a very great extent in making it. If the case were reversed, and if Christians and Theists generally, whilst holding and teaching that God did exist, yet declined upon some kind of logical (?) ground to plainly say so; we Atheists would, I think, be much inclined to put our finger upon it as a weak spot. We cannot, then, be surprised if they do a similar thing. At the same time, I wish it to be borne in mind that I would not relinquish a position, nor hesitate in taking up a new one, simply because I thought it gave the enemy a seeming advantage. I hold that a position should be occupied by reason of its inherent strength and logical soundness, altogether irrespective of side issues, which may contain no principle. The question then arises which is the most logical position, that of declaring in direct fashion the ultimate end and meaning of your teaching, or of halting at the last gate by refraining from making such direct declaration ? At the outset I would ask—and I think the main part of the question hinges upon the answer given—why may not an Atheist logically and in set terms declare what his name implies—nay, actually means, viz, one who disbelieves in the existence of God ? The Theist asserts there is a God. Shall not the Atheist controvert that assertion ? Must he remain dumb ? And if he does controvert it how shall he do so without denying it ? And if he denies the proposi• tion or assertion (which the Agnostic formula 1‘ we do not and cannot know him”, really, though lamely, does) does he not in reality say “there is no God ” ? If you venture as far as denying the evidence of his existence, do you not �AGAINST AGNOSTICISM. 9 logically and actually deny that he exists, or do you mean that, in spite of the evidence of his non-existence, perhaps after all he does exist? Why is it rash—which the hesitation denotes—to give an unequivocal verdict? It appears to me that it is really a matter of evidence; and I do not quite see why, because it is a question of God, the common and consequent result of investigation should not be put into the usual yes or no, the same as in any other enquiry. If the result of the investigation be that we cannot form a decided opinion either way, and that we must therefore give an open verdict, by all means give an open one; but in that case we should not call ourelves Atheists. But is that really the true position of Atheists of to-day ? Is Atheism dead or deserted, and are those who professed it on their road back to Theism ? I hold that neither to affirm nor deny the existence of God is, not­ withstanding niceties of logic, virtually to admit the possi­ bility of his existence; which, taken in conjunction with the genuine Atheistic contention that there is no room for him in nature, becomes, to say the least, most contra­ dictory. If it be alleged that Agnosticism does not assume the possibility of God’s existence in nature, but only in supernature, i.e., the unknowable, I reply that you cannot assume anything as to supernature. It is not; therefore its God or Gods are not. If this position be not conceded then the most far-fetched ravings as to supernature that ever came from brain of madman must be held as possible. If you venture one whit further in the shape of denial than the agnostically orthodox perhaps or may be, the extinguisher is clapped upon you, and you are simply put out, to the great delight of those who have faith, and who do not hesitate to give direct form to what they hold to be true. I have said that the existence or non-existence of God is a matter of evidence, and ought to be treated as such. And that a man ought not to be held to be rash or illogical for giving direct form to his verdict, orresult of his investigation. I presume a person who upon the evidence of his purse declared it contained no money, would not be held to be illogical or rash; but if he, adopting the Agnostic prin­ ciple, doubtfully declared he saw no evidence that it con­ tained money, but would not venture upon saying out­ right that it did not—thereby inferring that perhaps it �10 AGAINST AGNOSTICISM. did, the evidence notwithstanding—he would go very near being considered both rash and illogical.1 And bear in mind that if this collateral inference is not to be drawn, and if the statement is to be taken as shutting out all possibility of it, I am entitled to ask in what consists the wisdom of discarding the direct statement, and substi­ tuting an equivocal, or less direct one ? Where the use in dropping one term and picking up another, which, whilst being less direct, finally means the same thing? If it does not mean the same thing, then it can only mean one other thing : the possibility of the existence of God, which, as I understand it, is a direct contradiction and denial of Atheism. Some years ago, Dr. E. B. Aveling advocated — or I think I should be more correct in saying, he stated with approval—that Darwin, in a conversation which he had with him, advocated Agnosticism in preference to Atheism, as being the safer course or term. This struck me at the time, and does so still, as pointing directly to the perhaps to which I have drawn attention; or if not, why safer ? But it is very like saying it is safer to hold the possibility of what cannot be possible. If not, then it can but mean that it is safer not to deny what may after all be a fact; thus conceding almost the entire position claimed by the Theist. The possibility of super-nature being once con­ ceded, the road is laid open for a belief in Gods, devils, ghosts, goblins, and all the rest of the unreal phantoms with which the regions of supernature are peopled. I regard Agnosticism as a going out of one’s way to admit of a may-le, which the whole universe proclaims may not be ; a leaving-behind of nature to worse than uselessly say “it is safer to hold there may be something beyond it”. I think those who deal in myth, especially those calling themselves Christians, will have much to be grateful for if this really becomes the Atheist’s position. It is certainly more difficult to argue against a position the possible correctness of which you have already 1 It is likely to be urged that nothing of the kind is asserted of a purse, but only of what we can know nothing. But it seems to me that the admission as to the Unknowable, i.e., supernature, is an admission which, although most contradictory in its nature, is still an admission that perhaps it (supernature) ; to the shutting out of the more reasonable and direct teaching of Atheism. �AGAINST AGNOSTICISM. 11 conceded, than against one whose correctness you entirely repudiate. It would seem to me there is a tremendous contradiction in what appears to be the principle of Agnosticism quitesavoring of the old belief in God, which I must repeat is not compatible with the principles of Atheism—and, as I thought, of Secularism. It is all very well to say that Agnosticism is safer because it teils you neither to affirm, nor deny in a matter of which you have no possible means of judging. But Atheism, if I read it aright, tells you. there can be no possibility of such a thing existing. If that be so, to talk of withholding your judgment becomes nonsense. If the universe says no, why should I say perhaps yes? Do I then doubt, or half believe? What logical nicety could carry me beyond the cognizable into myth? What logical necessity could carry me beyond Nature into supernature ? None. I cannot so much as think it, and to admit it would be equal to the non­ admission of the existence of nature. Supernature with its Gods, or its millions of Gods, is not. The “New Oxford Dictionary ”, to which I have alluded, and as quoted by the Bev. Dr. AVace, states that “an Agnostic is one who holds that the existence of anything behind and beyond natural phenomena is unknown, and, as far as can be judged, is unknowable, and especially that a first cause .... are subjects of which we know nothing”. This, taken alone, might be good.enough for the Secularistic standpoint, and might be sufficient warrant for neither affirming nor denying, except that it still allows the possibility of a God, and therefore is not Atheism. Of course if we are going to sink Atheism, well and good ; although it would certainly place us in the disadvantageous position of not being logically able to oppose the Theist in a thorough manner. Dr. Wace further points out that the name was claimed by Professor Huxley for those who dis­ claimed Atheism, and believed with him in an unknowable God or cause of all things.1 Quoting again from the late 1 Since writing the above I see by “ D’s.” articles in the National Reformer that he entirely doubts the accuracy of this statement. The correctness of this doubt would seem to be confirmed if the following quotation, given in the .Agnostic Journal as Prof. Huxley’s definition of the word, be correct: “As the inventor of the word, I am entitled, to say authentically what is meant by it. Agnosticism is the essence �12 AGAINST AGNOSTICISM. "bishop of the diocese in which he was speaking, he said that “the Agnostic neither affirmed nor denied God”. He simply put him on one side. Of course a Secularist, nor, indeed, an Agnostic or Atheist, is not bound to take a bishop’s rendering of the term, although for my own part I take it as being fairly correct. And it must, I think, be admitted that the statements quoted are com­ patible with the position now apparently assumed by leading Secularists. I certainly think all these statements taken together, whilst being contradictory in their ulti­ mate meaning, go a very considerable distance in the belief in the existence of a God. If there be wisdom and safety in this, I am bound to think that neither dwells in Atheism. But in my humble opinion such is not the case. To neither deny nor affirm simply shirks the point; it is, at best, withholding your opinion; it is to halt between the two theories; and to my mind it certainly does not demonstrate the folly of an Atheist saying “there is no God”. It only demonstrates the folly of an Agnostic doing so. of science whether ancient or modem. It .-imply means that a man shall not say he knows or believes that which he has no scientific grounds for professing to know or believe.” That, so far, certainly is in direct opposition to what Dr. Wace would have us infer Huxley to have meant by the word. If it means anything in reference to God, it means that man has no scientific grounds for believing in the existence of God, and that therefore he ought not to state such belief. So far it is Atheistic.; but if it further means that man has no scientific grounds for disbelieving in his existence, and ought not therefore to state his disbelief, then it is rot Atheistic. And if meaning both these things, it is equivocal and contradictory, If it means that we have no evidence either way and should be silent, then it drops Atheism and the evidence upon which it is built, and goes half way in support of Theism. Professor Huxley’s definition as here given, and taken alone, would seem to mean that a scientist should not state that he knows what he cannot scientifically prove. But Secularists and others seem to have placed upon it a wider mean­ ing (which of course it is contended logically follows), and allege that it also means that he should not deny what he cannot scientifi­ cally prove non-existent; and that therefore he ought not to deny the existence of God, but should refuse (conditionally) to discuss h m. Whilst thinking Atheism teaches that the non-existence of God is scientifically proved, I would point out that the other view is open to the objection that if the existence of forty thousand Gods, with their accompanying devils, were asserted we should not be in a position to deny. The same being true of any other absurdity, say, for instance, the Trinity. �AGAINST AGNOSTICISM. 13 It would appear to me that Agnosticism is at least illogical, if not altogether untenable, inasmuch as that, while it directly affirms that man can know nothing out­ side natural phsenomena, nor of the first cause which is the primary meaning of God—it yet admits that he may exist. Thus, by its direct teaching, man ought to act as though he is not; and by its indirect teaching, as though he possibly is. In other words, you must (and this would seem to be getting fashionable) profess Agnosticism and act Atheism. I am aware that it is held by authorities for whom we are bound to have great respect, that the word God, undefined, has no meaning; and that it would be the work of a fool to reason against a term which conveys no idea, or argue against a nonentity. To the latter, I will remark that, if it were not a nonentity, there would be no reason in arguing against its existence; and if it is a nonentity, where the folly or danger in saying so ? But is it quite true that the word God conveys no meaning ? It is doubtless defined differently by different creeds. It is said to mean the Creator, the Maker of heaven and earth, the Supreme Being, the Sovereign Lord, the Begin­ ning and the End, and many other things.. But the cardinal meaning which pervades all definitions is the supreme cause or maker of the universe. Surely there is meaning in this. I do not quite see how an Atheist, knowing what is broadly meant and held as. to God by those who believe in his existence, can quite fairly say the word has no meaning to him—or rather, that it conveys no moaning to him. Does it not convey the meaning, or can you not take it as conveying the meaning it is intended to convey ?1 Of course I may be asked how a person can ' know the meaning intended to be conveyed, unless defined. I recognise the difficulty; but reply: Would an Atheist subscribe to a belief in God under any, or all the ordinary —I think I might say—known definitions ? If he would not, I think the difficulty is removed, and that there is no 1 I am not here contending against the necessity of having words defined for the proper and expeditious discussion of the ideas, they are intended to convey. I am simply contending that this particular word does carry a sufficiently definite meaning—especially as put forward by Christians in general—to justify a thinker in either accepting or rejecting the theory of his existence. �14 AGAINST AGNOSTICISM. inconsistency in denying his existence when spoken of, or asserted in general terms. Words generally have meaning only in conjunction with the ideas they are intended to convey. This word conveys the idea, or is intended to convey the idea, of the existence of a supernatural intelli­ gent and supreme being, whom those who assert his existence believe to have been the creator or cause of the universe. It appears to me that it is not a question as to whether an Atheist could convey any thoughts or theories of his own in the same language ; but is rather a question of what the person who uses it intends to convey. As a matter of fact, I, for my own part, do think the meaning is sufficiently clear and understood as to enable an Atheist to say yes or no to such general meaning. If what I am endeavoring to explain—by which I mean the import of the term God—had not been sufficiently clear, we should not now have in our language, (and I presume in every scientifically arranged language in the world) the terms Theist, and Atheist, and their deri­ vatives, nor would Atheists themselves have existed. If then, the term does convey an idea, or conclusion arrived at either rightly or wrongly by Christians and Theists generally, that a maker or cause of all nature, and therefore of all natural phsenomena, called God, does exist; and thus distinctly—or even indistinctly if you will —put it forward. May not the Atheist who (even allowing room for variations of definition) holds that he does not exist say as much without coming under the ban of folly ? I venture to think that if he may not give direct form to his words and state what he holds not to exist, is not, then he is in a false position, and a false restraint is put upon him. I presume in any other matter, an Atheist may without doing violence to consistency declare that, what is not, is not. Where then the crime or folly in this particular case ? Is it so serious and awful a one that he must not venture upon making the logical and consequent avowal which his disbelief upon one hand, and his convic­ tions upon the other, force upon him ? It would appear upon the very face of it, to be the height of reason to affirm the non-existence—or perhaps I had better say, to deny the existence—of a nonentity, especially when its existence is forced upon you with such lamentable results. It appears to me that it is not only logical to do so, but that �AGAINST AGNOSTICISM. 15 it becomes an absolute duty, therefore a logical necessity. I say that, if God is, it is right to say so, and if he is not, it is equally right to say so. If a thinker has not formed an opinion either way, or has come to the conclusion that he cannot form an opinion, then I take it, he is not an Atheist and some other term may be found to better inter­ pret his position. I could understand taking up the position that, because we have not all-knowledge, therefore we cannot say what might, or might not be, what is absolutely possible or impos­ sible : and contenting ourselves with the words, probable and improbable ; although I should be strongly tempted to transgress therefrom. There are some things which I should consider beyond the improbable and to be im­ possible. But this circumscribing should apply all-round and include all questions, and not be confined to that.of the existence of a God, or Gods: I do not see the utility or wisdom in drawing the line at him or them. To my thinking it is illogical as well as giving color to a pretended lurking fear, or belief put upon Atheists. The God con­ cept is, I presume, like any other, a matter of evidence. I think an Atheist should find no more difficulty in giving­ expression to his conviction that God is not, that in giving expression to his conviction that a moon made of green cheese is not. An Atheist is one who is set down as being “ one who disbelieves in the existence of a God, or supreme intelligent being ”. Atheism is, shortly, this stated dis­ belief, and is put in opposition to Theism. It will thus be observed that Atheism goes altogether beyond “ neither affirming nor denying” : it is the embodiment of denial and disbelief. Of course one may retreat from it into another position; but in the meantime, I must again say that it does seem unreasonable upon the very face of it that an Atheist may not logically and in set terms declare the non-existence of the thing in whose existence he dis­ believes, such disbelief being signified by his very name, and it must be borne in mind that, whether he so states it or not, his life, if he be consistent, and his writings and teachings practically proclaim it, and are, so far, in opposi­ tion—at least to a great extent—to what I consider the weak avowal he makes when he says ‘ ‘ the Atheist does not say there is no God ”. The Atheistic school—if I may so term it—is actually founded upon reasoned-out conclusions �16 AGAINST AGNOSTICISM. based upon facts affirmed and attested by science. It stands upon a plan and theory which does not admit of God ; there is no room for him in it; or, in other words, he cannot be. If it were otherwise based, it would not be Atheism. Yet strangely enough, Atheists now hesitate to say he is not: and adopt a term which may with much reason be regarded as a loop-hole. But the curious point to me is, are we to continue to thus practically preach and teach Atheism, proclaiming in a hundred ways the non-existence of God, and yet evade the open declaration ? If we are, and in future are to be, careful to write and state merely that we do not know God — and forgive me if I once more say— thereby inferring that perchance he does exist; we ought, I think, in the name of consistency, to abolish, or allow to become obsolete by disuse, the term Atheist, and all its derivatives ; and substitute such Agnostic or other terms as shall better define our position. In that case we ought no longer to call ourselves and our literature Atheistic. If we do, it should at least be stated that the term is not to be taken in the generally, and hitherto accepted sense, but in that of the recently revived Agnostic one. For my own part, rightly or wrongly, foolishly or otherwise, I have no hesitation in asserting that, so far as I can think, weigh and judge, there is no God. Other­ wise, I could not be an Atheist. Since writing the foregoing, I have read “ D.’s ” articles in the National Reformer, “In Defence of Agnosticism”. They are, as indeed are all his articles, ably and profoundly written. I do not here profess to reply to them. But I feel bound to state that, so far, they seem to have confirmed me in some of my opinions and objections to Agnosticism. In his concluding article he says that an Atheist—and I now presume a Secularist—may not argue the existence of God, nor anything relating to him when considered as a supernatural being ; “ any such question ” being “ mere vanity and vexation of spirit ”, But he further says that some argument is admissible when he is taken in conjunction with the world; or as he puts it: “ Some assertions may be made respecting God, which it is possible negatively to verify”, because, as he goes on to explain, such assertions include statements with regard to the order of nature ; as, for instance : “We may argue �AGAINST AGNOSTICISM. 17 •from the existence of evil, the impossibility of the existence of an omnipotent, omnipresent, and omni-beneficent God ”, This is doubtless the result of very close reasoning, but to my wind savors a little of hair-splitting, and appears to leave the person awkwardly situated, who does. not believe in the existence of God. All the while a Theist puts his God forward as being supernatural only, and as having nothing to do with nature, one must not reply, but be dumb; or limit, one’s reply to a refusal to discuss; at most, giving reasons for such refusal. But if it is put forward in conjunction with our phenomenal universe (as indeed when is he not ?), and that we are thereby enabled to verify what he is not, we may, so far, discuss him. But suppose it were possible in like manner to verify what he is, or, as “D.” would put it : to verify affirma­ tively, might it then be discussed ? And how shall we know which way it can be verified, or whether it can be verified either way without full discussion ? And why should it be permissible to discuss one side and not the other ? Are you to assume that God is not, and only discuss such portion of the question as supports that view ? And finally, is that Agnosticism ? But apart from this, it appears to me to somewhat evade the manner in which the God idea is usually put forward. Bor my own part, I do not know that it is ever advanced except in conjunction with nature and in the sense of authorship, either supernaturally or otherwise. God is generally held to be supernatural, and at the same time the cause and author or creator of the universe and of all things. That, to my thinking, is the position anyone who does not hold it ought to be able to argue, and the enabling position, above all others, I take to be that of Atheism. If an Agnostic held to the first portion of the statement only, discussion upon the question of God would be well-nigh impossible for him; because all Churches and most creeds hold him to be a super­ natural being. But the qualification comes in as a kind of saving clause, and permits the Agnostic to discuss the question to a limited extent, thus showing at once the weakness of Agnosticism, and admitting that even by its aid the question cannot be entirely shut out of the arena. God may be discussed in part, but only nega­ tively. Taking the world as your witness, you may say, �18 AGAINST AGNOSTICISM. “ a good and almighty God does not exist ”, but you must not say, “ no God exists ”. You may only say you do not know him. This, to my thinking, is a lame and unsatis­ factory state of affairs, and is evasive, as indeed is Agnos­ ticism generally. For instance, and having some of “D.’s” further illustrations in my mind, I cannot but think, when a Christian states that “three times one God are one God” ; or “that God was three days and three nights in the bowels of the earth between Friday night and the following Sunday morning”, that it would be quite as logical, and certainly more forcible, to say I deny the possi­ bility, as to say “the subject matter is beyond the reach of my faculties, and that the assertion itself conveys no distinct meaning to my mind”. These seem to be quite distinct statements, and to convey distinctly impossible ideas; and I urge that it would be no more illogical to give direct form to my verdict—in fact less so—than to weakly pro­ fess not to understand what is intended to be conveyed. I make these remarks with “ much fear and trembling ”, but feel bound to say that I am surprised to be told that an Agnostic, or indeed anyone professing to rely upon common sense and science, “does not, or needs not, deny” the statement that God, i.e., Christ, remained three days and nights in the earth, between Friday evening and the following Sunday morning. “ D.” himself admits that if the doctrine of the trinity, viz, that three times one are one, “were asserted of apples”, he would disbelieve it; but being asserted of Gods he will neither believe nor disbelieve; or, if he does do either, the result must be hidden under the Agnostic formula of neither affirming nor denying. The ideas on Agnosticism to which I have endeavored to give form have been in my mind for a considerable period, and I have taken the present opportunity of putting them together, although in rather a hurried and, perhaps, in an insufficiently considered manner. But I put them more in the spirit of inquiry than in any other. The subject is a vast one, and has engaged the minds of some of the greatest thinkers of all ages. In the small space here at my command I have not been able to much more than touch it. I have made no reference to learned works, and but small reference to learned writers. I do but profess to have given such thoughts and ideas as �AGAINST AGNOSTICISM. 19 occurred to myself whilst thinking upon the subject. My observations are possibly better calculated to induce the ordinary individual to think, to ponder these matters, and to look for larger and more complete investigations than they are to do battle with the mighty of intellect and the great of learning. The universe, the raw material, lies before us all. We can all but deal with it according to our capabilities and our opportunities. I can only hope that my rough method and manner, whilst being accepted only for what they are worth, will yet do a small share in the work of regenerating humanity, and building up a people who shall consider their most sacred duty consists not only in free inquiry, but free and open assertion of the fruits of such inquiry, rather than blind and ignorant submission to churches and creeds, whose interest it is to stifle thought. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Victorian Blogging Description An account of the resource A collection of digitised nineteenth-century pamphlets from Conway Hall Library &amp; Archives. This includes the Conway Tracts, Moncure Conway's personal pamphlet library; the Morris Tracts, donated to the library by Miss Morris in 1904; the National Secular Society's pamphlet library and others. The Conway Tracts were bound with additional ephemera, such as lecture programmes and handwritten notes.<br /><br />Please note that these digitised pamphlets have been edited to maximise the accuracy of the OCR, ensuring they are text searchable. If you would like to view un-edited, full-colour versions of any of our pamphlets, please email librarian@conwayhall.org.uk.<br /><br /><span><img src="http://www.heritagefund.org.uk/sites/default/files/media/attachments/TNLHLF_Colour_Logo_English_RGB_0_0.jpg" width="238" height="91" alt="TNLHLF_Colour_Logo_English_RGB_0_0.jpg" /></span> Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Conway Hall Library & Archives Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2018 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Conway Hall Ethical Society Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Original Format The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data Pamphlet Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Against agnosticism, by "Humanitas" Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Ball, William Platt [1844-1917] Description An account of the resource Place of publication: London Collation: 19 p. ; 18 cm. Notes: Printed by Annie Besant and Charles Bradlaugh. Part of the NSS pamphlet collection. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Freethought Publishing Company Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1889 Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context N053 Subject The topic of the resource Agnosticism Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource <img src="http://i.creativecommons.org/p/mark/1.0/88x31.png" alt="Public Domain Mark" /><br /><span>This work (Against agnosticism, by "Humanitas"), identified by </span><span><a href="https://conwayhallcollections.omeka.net/items/show/www.conwayhall.org.uk">Humanist Library and Archives</a></span><span>, is free of known copyright restrictions.</span> Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource application/pdf Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Language A language of the resource English Agnosticism NSS https://d1y502jg6fpugt.cloudfront.net/25778/archive/files/4f0c71ebc0e72adef0c2fd6bedf8fb75.pdf?Expires=1779321600&Signature=m%7ER06E5HXSndSfvB-1tdItx9%7EXspeHzeiC5QrGYDdCspddi-6l8eFISu08FqEidPO8k80-ec1KHk0aG7asjBDg-u93yqmt2PuikeyC45%7EEYAP0MNfwzxsE6QCs1WcqTdJzqLXxFXhEy9pArimlkHRXqZ4gi7ro%7ETM5Ay088ggeXP%7EsLnKtr6u-KrCdARSVAsHuEPzGagtHglbk9Sa-m4ERuzTEfj5TiGo9ISere98oGvDUfnkitkj2NjBRXgRu%7EZTCLwUOoi51JeRxQLsBSAPEIMjTpYgJFTUhV76wQeNmY09700nov9c6d93JvbsMV%7E3j8ieMPLVmLCR0kr-9zyJQ__&Key-Pair-Id=K6UGZS9ZTDSZM a2000903cee70a690ada280668102e6e PDF Text Text NOTZ The following appeared in the “ Clarion ” of March 25th last:—■ r | A BRISTOL MINISTER ON “GOD AND MY NEIGHBOUR.” •_ AN OBJECT LESSON. t , , ( (By ROBERT BLATCHFORD.) A Bristol reader sends me a pamphlet, by the Rev. Hugh C. Wallace, containing, I am sorry to say, some spiteful and ill-considered per­ sonal attacks on me, and asks me to say “a few words in defence.” No defence is called for. My life and work are my defence. Neither is Mr Wallace’s pamphlet worthy of notice, .except as a regrettable manifestation of' littleness of mlind and bitterness of spirit which are, unfortunately, too common amongst pro­ fessing Christians. T'he pamphlet is entitled “ ‘ God and My Neighbour’: a Criticism of iMr Blatchford’s book, by Hugh C. Wallace.” It would have been more correctly described as “ A Personal Attack on Robert Blatchford, by one whoneither knows nor understands him.”, Now, although it .is perhaps advisable topoint out io tin Christian ministers who have descended to the level of personal recrimination, the error of theiir ways, .it is not easy to deal with a case like this without seeming to be severe. And I do not want tobe severe, nor to give pain to Mr Wallace, nor to any other Christian. My .sole desire is, to say a few words for the -cause of toleration and human kindness, and, -at the same time, to convince my assailants, if that is possible, that their conduct is mistaken and indefen­ sible. On page 5 of his pamphlet Mr Wallace says:— . One is disposed to ask, “ How has socialism affected ‘ Nunquam ’ ? ” He is no longer a ■private in the army 'b-ut the editor an in­ fluential ■and largely circulated paper. What effect has his infidelity had upon his position ? Instead' of going down-, the “Clarion” cir­ culation has gone up since he commenced his series- of attacks upon the Christian faith. In the- light of that I -am perfectly prepared' to believe his statement on page 190 that: — “ My attack is not. wanton, but- deliberate ; n>ot purposeless, but very purposeful.” Here Mr Wallace tacitly charges' me with attacking religion for the sake o.f making money. And he makes this charge, not hastily and in anger, but- deliberately and in cold! ■ blood. Now, I submit to Mr Wallace that even if he knew for*a certainty that his charge was true,, he ought, as a Christian minister to have ex­ pressed it more, gently, -and with more dignity. But he has chosen to be deliberately sarcastic and bitter. / �2. And I submit to him that as a matter of commom honesty and manliness he ought not to have made so gross and so offensive a sugges­ tion until he had taken great pains to make sure of its truth. But if he had taken even a very little trouble he would have found tout, that his suspicion was not only unfounded1, but grotesquely un­ true. I conclude, then, that Mr Wallace—a professed Christian and a minister of the gospel.—has allowed his anger and his pre­ judice ito mislead! him into' charging with base eoniducib a man of whose life1 and character he is utterly ignorant. But, besides being uncharitable and unjust, Mr Wallace’s personal attack on me is mani­ festly unwise. For even if what he insinuates were true, even if I were as contemptible a creature as he represents me, what 'bearing would that have upon the question at issue between us? Would the fact that one Agnostic was a rogue prove Christianity to 'be true? If so, the easy task of finding a professed Christian who is a liar or a thief might be alleged as a proof that Christianity is false. Mr Wallace, in his pamphlet, suggests that I am mercenary, insincere, incompetent, con­ ceited, frivolous, irreverent, and devoid of spirituality and the saving grace of humour. Suppose I am all that, I am what thousands of other men are, and -amongst them some ministers of the Gospel. But what has that to do with the case? A man writes a book in which he argues that the Christian religion is not true. Mr Wallace retorts 'by saying that infidelity pays. Is that a wise, or a dignified, or an effective reply. The question of truth or untruth of the national religion is a very serious public question. Mr Wallace iis trifling with the sub­ ject and with the public when he offers them a pamphlet in which personal attacks upon Robert Blatchford waste the space that -should be devoted to answering the arguments brought by Agnostics against Christianity. On page 14- of his pamphlet Mr Wallace says: A few years ago there lived at Bowdon a prosperous Christian man; he was clear­ headed, far-sighted, a genius and inventor; at the bidding of the Spirit of God he gave up his fine house and grounds, and went to live in one of the darkest slums of Man­ chester, Ancoats; he did this that he might redeem it from its vice and make it part of the Kingdom of God. iHis name was -Frank Crossley. There was another man who, by sheer force of character and by honest hard work, climbed up the ladder step by .step from being a, private in the army to an influential and responsible position in the newspaper world; and then he went to live in a snug little villa in a London suburb. His name was Robert Blatchford. Nothing .more need be said. I think a good deal more need be said', for I think Mr Wallace is very superficial in this matter. He honours Mr Crossley for going tolive in a slum, and he suggests that I am to blame because I do not live in a. slum. Am I right in assuming that the Rev. Hugh C. Wallace does not live in a slum? Am 1 right �in assuming that such popular religious leaders as Dr Horton, Dr Clifford, the Rev. R. J. Campbell, a*nd the Archbishop of Canterbury do not live in slums, but actually live in better houses than I can afford, and are better paid; for preaching the Gospel than I am for preach­ ing Socialism? I cannot see' that it is my duty tO' go and live in a slum, nor to take my wife and children to live in such an unlovely and un­ healthy place. Doubtless Mr Crossley was jus­ tified in his action, but is Mr Wallace sure that I am not justified in mine? No human being ought to live in a slum. The best way to help those who are. doomed to confinement in such miserable surroundings is by helping to- abolish such surroundings, 'by helping to remove the evil and the injustices which cause the slums. This I have tr:ed to do. in the only way in which it can be done, by preaching Socialism. And, although I may be wrong and- Mr Wallace may be right, I think I have done more good in the past dozen veai's ,by my public work than I could have done by going to live in a slum. The more especially as I should probably have died there, and done no good at all. Of course Mr Wallace wishes to convey the impression that Christianity makes men altruist's, and that Agnosticism makes them selfish. He might have taken a more logical and a less offensive' way of advanc:ng that ■claim. .But stated in any form I dispute it. During the recent discussion on religion in the “Clarion ” I could not help seeing that my Christian opponents were less generous- and less 'courteous to me than I was to them; that whereas I only attacked dogmas and arguments they attacked me- personally. Can Mr Wallace explain this difference ? I account for it by assuming that my philosophy is better than the Christians’ religion. Finally, I assure Mr Wallace that he1 has misunderstood' and misrepresented me, and I ask him to confine himself in the future- to answering his opponents’ arguments and to refrain from recklessly maligning their char­ acters. Anyone who- knows: me- or my work would convince Mr Wallace in a few minutes that he has acted unwisely, and has brought discredit upon himself in. hi-s desire to- injure ■me. Of course Mr Wallace: know no better, but a man in his position should be more careful -and discreet. On page 7 of his pamphlet Mr Wallace1 says: I judge him largely by his- preface. He finds his fellows: so “ amusing.” He walks along the Strand peopled, on his- own con­ fession, by thieves, gamblers, and prosti­ tutes, and he finds them “amusing”; and this is the kind of man who sets himself up to criticise a religion that teaches “Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself." This remarkable reading of the preface- to “ God and My Neighbour,” and thi® astounding picture of the frivolous author laughing at the misery of his fellow creatures proved my con­ tention that Mr Wallace does not know nor understand the -man he ha® attacked. To quote Mr Wallace—“ There is no more to- be said.”' �4. THE REV. HUGH C. WALLACE’S REPLY TO ROBERT BLATCHFORD’S BOOK, “ GOD AND 'MY NEIGHBOUR.” It has been thought well to issue in leaflet .form Mt Blatchford’s notes, which appeared in the “<£larion,” of 25th March last, on the pamphlet published by the Rev. Hugh C. Wal­ lace, of David Thomas Church, Bristol. As Mr Wallace's attack is mainly personal, stigmatising Mr Blatchford as unfit for the task undertaken, and representing him to be actuated by base and mercenary motives, it is but right that those interested should have a true .statement concerning these matters. Mt Blatohford has been for many years an earnest reformer, with a deep passion for the welfare and ennoblement of humanity, and has made this cause his life work. He has had a brilliant literary career, and is recognised as an. acute and logical thinker. He is the author of many books, amongst which are “Merrie England” and “Britain for the British.” The former obtained a circula­ tion of over a million, and has been translated into many languages. He is certainly aslfit for the work entered upon as were William ■ Cobbett and Shake­ speare for the services' they so brilliantly per­ formed. Previous to founding the “Clarion,” Mr Blatchford was receiving a salary of £1000 per annum for 'his services to .a. well-known paper. On this paper his advocacy of the cause he espoused was hampered, -and he voluntarily sacrificed the position rather than abandon his principles, and! launched the “■Clarion” for their free advancement, despite the fact, then known to him, that no. paper previously issued, for the same humanitarian purpose had paid. And, although the paper was not remunerative for m'any years, and Mr Bliatchford had received numerous outside offers for his services, greatly .superior to any­ thing the “ Clarion ” could provide in a financial sense, he has not abandoned ■his task. When .about, to. undertake the criticism of theology, Mr Blatchford was earnestly urged by friends of the paper to desist from so doing, in the interest of the circulation of the “’Clarion.” To this Mr Blatchford replied that he would not sacrifice what he believed to' be true to monetary con­ siderations. Such are the facts. It is dis­ tasteful to refer further to these matters, but it should be known that although Mr Blatch­ ford is a brilliant novelist and a. popular writer, with an international reputation, that, in consequence of allying himself with a.p unpopular cause, he is not 'So well paid for his public work as is the Rev. Wallace for his professional religious duties. Indeed, it is very., very probable that Mr Blatchford has sacrificed more in the furtherance of his principles than, even the Rev. Wallace. However, placing these matters aside, it is important that any further discussion should be confined to 'dealing with fundamental facts and essential argument. w >5 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Victorian Blogging Description An account of the resource A collection of digitised nineteenth-century pamphlets from Conway Hall Library &amp; Archives. This includes the Conway Tracts, Moncure Conway's personal pamphlet library; the Morris Tracts, donated to the library by Miss Morris in 1904; the National Secular Society's pamphlet library and others. The Conway Tracts were bound with additional ephemera, such as lecture programmes and handwritten notes.<br /><br />Please note that these digitised pamphlets have been edited to maximise the accuracy of the OCR, ensuring they are text searchable. If you would like to view un-edited, full-colour versions of any of our pamphlets, please email librarian@conwayhall.org.uk.<br /><br /><span><img src="http://www.heritagefund.org.uk/sites/default/files/media/attachments/TNLHLF_Colour_Logo_English_RGB_0_0.jpg" width="238" height="91" alt="TNLHLF_Colour_Logo_English_RGB_0_0.jpg" /></span> Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Conway Hall Library & Archives Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2018 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Conway Hall Ethical Society Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Original Format The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data Pamphlet Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource A Bristol minister on "God and my neighbour" : an object lesson Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Blatchford, Robert [1851-1943] Description An account of the resource Place of publication: [London] Collation: 4 p. ; 21 cm. Notes: At head of title: "The following appeared in the "Clarion" of March 25th last." P.4, apparently written by the editor of The Clarion, justifies the "issue of Mr Blatchford's notes [...] on the pamphlet published by the Rev. Hugh C. Wallace of David Thomas Church, Bristol." Part of the NSS pamphlet collection. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Clarion Press Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource [n.d.] Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context N077 Subject The topic of the resource Agnosticism Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource <a href="http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/mark/1.0/"><img src="http://i.creativecommons.org/p/mark/1.0/88x31.png" alt="Public Domain Mark" /></a><span> </span><br /><span>This work (A Bristol minister on "God and my neighbour" : an object lesson), identified by </span><a href="https://conwayhallcollections.omeka.net/items/show/www.conwayhall.org.uk"><span>Humanist Library and Archives</span></a><span>, is free of known copyright restrictions.</span> Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource application/pdf Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Language A language of the resource English Agnosticism NSS Robert Blatchford