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METHOD OF EDUCATION:
A. 1ST ADDRESS
INTRODUCTORY TO THE SESSION 1859-60
♦
OF THE
ST. LOUIS MEDICAL COLLEGE,
BY
J. H. WATTERS, M.D.,
Professor of Physiology and Medical Jurisprudence.
ST. LOUIS:
GEORGE KNAPP & CO., PRINTERS.
1 8 59.
��METHOD OF EDUCATION:
An Address Introductory to the Session 1859-60 of the St. Louis Medical
College. By J. H. WATTERS, M.D., Professor of Physiology and Med
ical Jurisprudence.
Gentlemen,—Under favorable auspices we meet to-night to
celebrate the opening of our eighteenth session, and in behalf of
the faculty I welcome you as students to these halls dedicated to
medical education.
The ardent aspirations of the young of a country to fit them
selves for useful and honorable activities, brings happiness not
only to the individual, but secures life, intelligence and refine
ment to society—stability, power and influence to the state. It is
this which engenders and fosters the very vitality, spirit and soul
of a community. General society — yes, our whole country—is
interested in this assemblage of young men gathered hither from
the various parts of our extensive and prosperous valley, all in
spired with a common desire to be enabled to render a reasonable
answer to the problem of life. Some answer, whether it be rea
sonable or not, must be given by every man. It is not optional,
but the necessity is implied in the very existence of a rational be
ing : it is not a request, but an imperative demand. Should one
think to avoid it by silence or refusal to act, he deceives himself;
for his very silence and supineness become contempt, and contain
already his answer.
Man is by nature most munificently gifted; but his character and
activities are the apswer he renders to the question, “ what will he
do with it”—with his life, his mind, his reason, his image of God?
The various grades of characters, from the lowest besotted dregs
of society to the highest and noblest men, present merely the dif
ferent uses made of nature’s high gifts. Consider now
“ The wisest of the sages of the earth
That ever from the stores of reason drew
Science, and truth, and virtue’s dreadless tone
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and now reflect upon this solemn fact, that
“ Him, every slave now dragging through the filth
Of some corrupted city his sad life,
Pining with famine, swoln with luxury,
Blunting the keenness of his spiritual sense
With narrow schemings and unworthy cares,
Or, madly rushing through all violent crime,
To move the deep stagnation of his soul,—
Might imitate and equal.”
We hear in our youth too much cant about “ poor weak human
nature, the flesh, and the deviland those who would throw
upon the shoulders of these imaginary personalities the necessary
and legitimate results of individual slothfulness, inactivity, and re
fusal to use what has been given, would obliterate what little of
the image of God is yet visible in humanity, and would put a stop
to progress—not by bold and open opposition, which would be ac
companied with corresponding reaction, but by smothering and
destroying the already enfeebled energy and spirit.
That each individual may use his talents and powers in the best
and most reasonable way possible, is the object of all education,
whether literary, professional, scientific, or religious. In other
words, the object of education is to enable man, in his activities,
to harmonize with the Infinite, the Universal, the Absolute. It is
only as his activities do harmonize and thus cooperate with the
Infinite, that man is emancipated and exalted; while in so far as
they are discordant, man militates against God, and in the con
flict is always vanquished, degraded and enslaved. This proposi
tion is universal, and extends in its application through the whole
range of human activities. And, gentlemen, as you propose to as
sume the responsible vocation of physicians, the object of your
professional studies is that you may be enabled so to act upon
physical nature as to cure disease and relieve suffering. This,
too, can be done only by cooperating with the universal and abso
lute in perfect obedience to the physical laws; which laws are to
us the outward expression or representation, in space and time, of
universal reason. If our acts are not in obedience to these laws,
our medications, like the prayers of the wicked, are an abomina
tion. It is a common saying that nature cures disease, and that
the physician’s province is to assist nature. While this expression
admits of very liberal interpretations, yet literally it is most false.
Man under no circumstances assists nature; this is neither his
province nor prerogative : it is his highest privilege to use nature.
But how are we to use nature ? By what method are we enabled
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to take advantage of her laws ? In other words, what relation has
education to success, science to art? This is the question I pro
pose discussing to-night; and while I address you, gentlemen,
especially, as medical students, the method by which you will be
enabled to attain the objects of your calling, is the method of
every human activity whatever—of your social and political rela
tions no less than professional.
As the object of all education is to enable man to harmonize his
activities with the Infinite, the Universal, the Absolute, this object
can be attained only so far as we know the Infinite, the Universal,
the Absolute. I am aware that there are those high in authority
who contend that the capacity for this knowledge is not vouch
safed to man. If this be so, then indeed are we most miserably
circumstanced. What! here—possessing hopes, desires, aspira
tions, longings for something better—condemned to disappoint
ment and ignoble defeat upon every side, except in so far as our
activities are in harmony with the Infinite, and yet having no ca
pacity to know that Infinite by whom we are judged and to whom
we are subject! This can not be so: else man could not adapt
means to ends; the result of his spontaneity would be altogether
accidental; his fortune would not be in his own hands. It is not so:
the development of science condemns it; our railroads, telegraphs,
and manufactures, and all the arts, condemn it; our social, politi
cal and religious relations condemn it; all culture and progress
condemn it. As the result of every human activity is determined
by its relation to the Infinite, the relation which any people bear
to the Infinite is expressed not only in their moral, social, political
and religious condition, but also as well in their machinery, their'
manufactures, their agriculture, their navigation, their architecture,
their painting, their sculpture, their poetry, their ornaments, their
dress, in all their activities and in every expression of their sponta
neity. All advancement and progress of the individual, of society,
of humanity, is proof that we have the faculty to know the Abso
lute to which we are subject, as all success is but an expression of
this knowledge, and a resulting harmony between our activities
and the Infinite.
But man is guided in his activities by his intelligence, and mind
is in its very nature active, spontaneous, self-determinate. Know
ledge, therefore, must be the determination of the mind itself, else
the spontaneity and self-determination of mind would be super
seded and abrogated by knowledge, which is absurd. Consequent
ly, the mind must possess the faculty of determining itself harmo
niously with the Universal and Absolutewhether you agree to
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designate this power of the mind thus to determine itself, as know
ledge of the Universal and Absolute, or not, matters nothing, so far
as the question under discussion is concerned—By what method
is man enabled to harmonize his activities with the Infinite, the
Universal, the Absolute ? This faculty is reason. Reason being
one and absolute to man, to nature, and to God, it is most appa
rent, that, so far as our activities harmonize with reason, they must
in that very fact harmonize with the Universe and with God.
Therefore, the method by which the object of all education is to
be attained, is the method by which we are enabled to harmonize
our activities with .Reason. This proposition, gentlemen, embod
ies the central idea which I hope to present to you to-night in an
intelligible manner. You yill observe the important point, that
in this proposition we have substituted Jieason for the Infi
nite, the Universal, the Absolute. I know full well, that, in
making this substitution here in a public lecture, I am in no little
danger of being understood as making man equal with God. But
if there were no danger here, there would be little or no occasion
for this lecture ; and if, on account of this danger, I had chosen
another theme, or had treated this in a manner to conform to the
more general and popular notions, I would in that have been hug
ging my own shackles; whereas my theme this night is, How are
we freed, emancipated, exalted? A just man has not his freedom
curtailed by just laws in so far as he cognizes justice, because the
law unto himself frees him from the external laws; that is, the ex
ternal laws cease to bind and restrain him just in so far as from his
own self-determination he would fulfil them. Just so, and for the
same reason, a reasonable man has not his freedom annulled by
the laws of reason in so far as he knows reason. As one in his own
spontaneity determines himself according to reason, he ceases to
be restrained by the external laws of reason. If all moral and
physical laws be laws of reason, then indeed can man be delivered
from the dominion of necessity only so far as reason in him be
comes self-conscious. We believe in Divine Omnipotence; that
in the Infinite “we live, and move, and have our beingthat with
out Him we can not think a good thought or do a good act; and
yet we believe that man is free and justly accountable. The truth
and consistency of these two positions is all I contend for in the
substitution I have made of Reason for the Infinite, the Absolute,
the Universal. He who believes in human freedom can not but
believe that man possesses the faculty of determining liimsflf in
harmony with the Universal; for in so far as man is determined
by anywhat not himself, he is necessitated and not free. He who
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believes in human freedom and also in Divine Omnipotence and
Omniscience, must believe these twq positions consistent; unless,
indeed, he be himself a slave, clinging in blind fanaticism to the
very chains which bind him. And what does he mean by consist
ency except their mutual harmony with reason? And when he
acknowledges that two truths must be consistent, in this necessity
he recognizes reason as the universal umpire, authoritative to man,
to nature, and to God.
If, therefore, the object of all education is to enable us to har
monize our activities with reason, then the method we seek is the
method of reason becoming self-conscious, or, in other words, it is
the method of reason coming to a knowledge of itself. This is
perfectly clear, that in order that we may harmonize our activities
with reason we must know reason. But the reason alone can
know reason; consequently we can know reason only as the reason
becomes self-conscious. Did you ever see a little child held before
a looking-glass ? Through its senses it cognizes the phenomenon
and through its understanding it is convinced of duality,—it peeps
behind the glass fully expecting to find another child. But as it
comes to know itself, with apparent rapture it recognizes itself
in the image. Not the senses, nor yet the understanding, but only
reason can know and comprehend reason. The spontaneity of man
may be under the dominion of the senses, or of the understanding,
or of the passions; but as these are all finite and related to the in
finite only in and through reason, when they guide, the blind lead
the blind and both fall into the ditch together. But when oui*
spontaneity is guided by reason, the outward expressions of this
spontaneity—our activities, our works—must harmonize with rea
son, with nature, and with God. The great problem of humanity,
therefore, is to identify our spontaneity in each, every and all of
its various possibilities with self-conscious reason. Our question,
therefore, as to the method by which the object of education is to
be attained is now reduced to this form: What is the method of
the reason in becoming self-conscious ?
As we are students of nature, and as in this department especial
ly we hope to assist in the great struggle of humanity, and to leave
the world the better of our having lived, (if this be not our ambi
tion we are unworthy of humanity,) I shall seek this method only
as expressed in the more developed sciences. And we may hope
to get some insight thus, because Science is the formal recognition
of reason. Do not allow yourselves to anticipate me here, and to
object in your thoughts to this position, that the physical sciences
treat of nature and her laws, and, consequently, that a knowledge
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of these laws can be obtained only through observation and ex
periment. Be patient one moment and we will consider this matter
together. It is admitted that observation and experiment are ne
cessary conditions to a knowledge of nature and her laws, but you
must admit also that you neither see, feel, taste, nor smell the physi
cal sciences. It is true you put ores and compounds into the
crucible, but you neither put therein nor take hence the science of
chemistry; it is true certain angles and distances must be obtained
by observation, but the transit instrument and the telescope are not
wonderfully devised machines for the manufacture of the science
of astronomy; you may examine and peep, but the science is not
there—you can not get it thus. What, then, is the relation between
observation and science ? This question is sub judice, and until
decided it might be well to suspend our anticipated objection.
Physical science is rendered possible only in and through the
identity of the laws of nature and the laws of thought. This is
a self-evident proposition; for if nature could in her mode of
action be whimsical or unreasonable, where, I ask, would be the
criterion whereby we could know nature or determine her mode
of action ? There would be none, and we would necessarily be ut
terly in the dark. If there be physical science at all, therefore, the
laws of nature must be identical with the laws of thought, and
Science must be the recognized identity. The senses do not and
can not give us science; observation and experiment can only give
phenomena. Physical science exists only so far as reason has come
to a recognition of itself in the phenomenal. That is, so far as we
have science reason must have become the criterion whereby na
ture is recognized as laws of thought. But reason can become
the criterion only in so far as it becomes self-conscious, or as it
knows itself. Consequently, we may hope by an examination and
careful analysis of the sciences, to learn something of the method
whereby the object of all education is to be attained; in other
words, of the method of reason in becoming self-conscious or in
recognizing itself. Though we may thus only obtain a partial in
sight, yet even this is not to be altogether despised.
As mathematics is more developed and more generally under
stood than any other science, we will direct our attention to it
especially. And let it be understood that our object here is not
to reduce all science to what has been termed the mathematical
method, but rather to seek in the mathematics the method of the
reason in becoming self-conscious, as all science (mathematics, of
course, included) has been shown to be the reason coming to know
and recognize itself. As my object, as a teacher, is always more to
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excite thought than to amuse,—to draw out the mind rather than
to instil dogmas, I hope you will excuse me for selecting for your
consideration a subject requiring so much study. My excuse is
that the principles involved in this subject, though they may seem
abstract, are most practical, forming as they do the very foundation
of all knowledge and all success.
Mathematics as a science starts with certain primary proposi
tions, which are divided usually into two classes—Definitions and
Axioms. But what mean these propositions ? whence came they,
and where is the authority for the use made of them in mathemat
ics ? If we can obtain correct answers to these questions, we will
have approached very near what we seek: but do not be uneasy, I do
not intend to lead you over the paths already well worn by the Sen
sationalists and Idealists. First let me call your attention to this most
important consideration— That there can be no existence, law, mode
of action, or phenomenon, without limitations; for all these im
ply determinations, and there can be no determinations without lim
itations. This is self-evident and absolute; think of it one moment.
There can be no this and that without a difference, and there can be
no difference without limitations. To vision, pure light would be
equivalent to pure darkness; there can be no seeing without a
mingling of the two—without shades or colors. Power is equiva
lent to no power without resistance; you can not lift yourself by
the hair; as Archimedes could not find a pou std, or place to fix
his machine, he could not move the earth. The equation sign
stands forever between absolute motion and no motion; the an
cients did not recognize the parallel lines, and they attached the
predicate no motion to the earth. And our physical sciences (so
called) now are mostly legerdemain to induce the student, by com
plicating the process, to believe he has succeeded in lifting him
self ; in lieu of the earth, physical science is placed on the back of
a tortoise. As there could be nothing to know, therefore, without
limitations, so there could be no knowing. As all things and phe
nomena depend upon the union of opposites, as of motion and rest,
of power and resistance, of light and darkness; so science is based
upon the union of opposites necessarily. As what is to be known
has its existence in this union, evidently the knowing must be bas
ed upon it. Now pure space, like pure light, is without limits, and
consequently is without determination. There is no this, as deter
mined from that; there is no here and no there; no outside and
no inside; no circumference, and no centre. As, for vision pure
light must be united with its opposite—darkness, so the science
of geometry must be based upon the union of the pure idea space
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and its opposite. Now, what stands opposed to space as darkness
is opposed to light? You at once recognize it as the point. The
point is not space, but it is related to space as its opposite, as its
negation, as its limitation. We are now prepared to understand
the meaning of the Definitions upon which geometry is based.
These definitions are the limitations of space by its opposite—the
point;—the motion of a point may be said to generate a line; the
motion of a line, to generate a surface; the motion of a surface, to
generate a solid. So, while pure space is without limitations or
determinations, yet united with its opposite we have definitions as
the bases of science. We now have a here and a there, a this and
a that. By this union we have a straight line, a curved line, a tri
angle, a square, a polygon, a circle, an ellipse, a parabola, an hy
perbola, a polyedron, a prism, a parallelopipedon, a sphere, an ellip
soid, &c. &c.
But before investigating further the meaning of the definitions
of mathematics, we must investigate whence they came; a know
ledge of their origin will contribute to the understanding of their
nature. You are aware that many contend that all our knowledge,
including of course mathematical definitions and axioms, is deri
ved from sensation; and that others contend, no less confidently,
for the existence of innate ideas, and for this origin of all know
ledge. It is not pertinent to our present object to meddle with
either of these systems. We have seen that all determination is
through limitation; that is, if all limitation were removed from
any thing, all determination would be removed; and what would
be left would be equivalent to nought—is nothing—the thing
would no longer have existence. But do you say something would
still be left ? Think one moment; your something left being with
out determinations, wherein, I ask, is its difference from nothing ?
You call it something, I call it nothing, and you can not apply a
predicate to your something which I can not also apply to my
nothing; if you can, then your “something left” has limitations
which is contrary to the hypothesis. It is perfectly apparent,
therefore, if we know not the limitations, we know not the thing;
and that, in so far as we know the limitations, we know the thing
in itself—the thing having an existence only in these limitations.
Therefore, if things in themselves were not related to us, we could
never know them; if there were no bond of union between nature
and ourselves, all things in nature by which we are surrounded
would be to us as though they were not,—we would be uncon
scious of their existence. Consequently, if we know nature at all,
(and no one will be likely to deny this,) there must be some means
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of our knowing or becoming conscious of the limitations of things
in themselves. But how can the mind know or become conscious
of that which is outside of itself? This is the difficult but most
important question. If we admit the duality of nature and mind,
must we admit that the mind can get outside of itself to know na
ture ? This would be a manifest absurdity, for nothing can get
outside of itself. Then, to admit a knowledge of nature, are we
compelled to do away with the duality, and to become out and out
materialists on the one hand, or idealists on the other ? I think
not. Then, if the mind can not get out of itself, how can the mind
know nature if duality be admitted ? I think I see one, and only
one possible solution of this problem; for, in admitting that the
mind can not get out of itself, we admit that our knowledge of na
ture comes from the mind knowing itself. This is the problem:
Admitting the duality of nature and mind, and that the mind can
not get out of itself, how can the mind know nature ?
It is admitted that we have some knowledge of nature, and, con
sequently, that there must be some relation between mind and
the external world. Now if we admit duality, the only possible
relation is that of mutual limitation; that is, in so far as nature and
mind are distinct and dual, they must reciprocally exclude and ne
gate each other. And in so far as they are distinct, the only pos
sible relation they can have on the side of their duality must be
xthe mutual limitation through this reciprocal exclusion and nega
tion. This is the only possible relation upon the admission of dual
ity, because neither could get outside of itself, which would of
course be necessary for any other relation. Consequently, this re
lation, so far from requiring the denial, is in virtue of the duality;
and, as this is the only possible relation consistent with duality, this
must be the avenue to a knowledge of nature; or else, we must de
ny either the duality, or, the possibility of such knowledge. These
three are the only possible alternatives:—You must either do away
with the duality and become materialists on the one side, or ideal
ists on the other; or else, admitting the duality, you must deny
the possibility of a knowledge of nature; or else, admitting both
the duality and a possibility of a knowledge of nature, you must
find in the mutual exclusion and limitation the condition of this
knowledge. Endorsing this last alternative, we must endeavor to see
how nature and mind mutually excluding and limiting each other, is
the avenue to a knowledge of nature. We are not now concerned
with the inquiry how nature and mind limit each other, but our
present inquiry starts with the fact that they must limit each other,
upon the admission of duality. This is the solution: Nature and
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mind mutually excluding and limiting each other, in so far as the
mind cognizes its own limitation, in that act, being limited by na
ture, it recognizes the limitation of nature. To illustrate: suppose
A and B own adjacent farms; A, in knowing the limitations of his,
knows, in that very fact, the limitations of B’s so far as they mutu
ally limit each other; just so, the mind, in knowing its own limita
tions, knows the limitations of nature so far as they exclude and
limit each other. Thus the mind knows nature in knowing itself.
This is the only possible solution; but we need no other as this is in
every respect most satisfactory, containing within itself evidence
of its truth, and is therefore worthy of all acceptation, even though
we were not forced to adopt it, or else either materialism or ideal
ism, or the doctrine that all knowledge of nature is impossible.
But, at first glance, all this may seem to have little to do with the
Definitions of mathematics. Upon reflection, however, I suspect it
will be found to have somewhat to do not only with mathematics
but with our political, social and even religious condition, with the
steam engine and weaver’s shuttle and doctor’s pill, and even with
our bread and butter.
But to continue;—all knowledge, therefore, including mathema
tics and the natural sciences, is the mind knowing itself. If this
be so, you may ask, how do we know that nature is actual and
real? You may say, “upon the admission of the duality of nature
and mind, and, that they mutually limit each other, it is clear
enough that the mind, in knowing itself, knows nature in so far as
they thus limit each other; but, if the mind only knows itself, how
do you get the duality ? How does the mind know that an actual
nature stands over against it limiting it; and that these limitations
of itself, which only it knows, have an external condition at all ?”
This knowledge comes through sensation, which gives us a con
sciousness of objectivity. This will be clear, I think, if you will
call to mind a point already discussed at some length. As we have
seen that all existence and phenomena depend upon the union of
opposites, as of motion and rest, of power and resistance, of light
and darkness, so all consciousness implies duality. Consequently,
consciousness in the line of our spontaneity—that is, a limitation
where we know there is no internal limitation—gives us objectiv
ity authoritatively. The primary condition of our knowledge of
the existence of nature, as opposed to and as limiting mind, is mo
tion. But I must not dwell upon this part of my subject.
On the other hand again, one disposed to sensationalism will ob
ject,—“this is all nonsense to talk about the mind knowing nature
by knowing itself,—I see and feel objects themselves, but I do not
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know the mind,—I can not see it!” I grant you your position fully—
that you see and feel objects, and that you know mind very little;
probably if you could only get it under a microscope, or into a cruci
ble, you would know it better. But I thank you for your objection
just here in close juxtaposition with the one of the idealist already
considered; as we have to steer here between Scylla and Charybdis,
we must keep in mind their localities. In reply to idealism just now,
it was maintained that objectivity is given authoritatively in sensa
tion, in that all consciousness implies duality,—the union of op
posites. This seems to the senses to approach dangerously close
to you, O voracious Charybdis! who would draw all knowledge
into th£ abyss of sensationalism. You say you do not know mind,
but that you know nature, objects, matter, which are given in
sensation. Hence you peep at nature; you make observations and
experiments; you turn her round to make her present herself to
your senses on as many sides as possible; probably you may use
a microscope to assist the senses; you note down very carefully
the results—what you see; you classify this and call it Physical
Science ! And to be so lucky as to see something fir§t, say a new
fossil, and to describe it and classify it, entitles one to endless fame
in the history of Science ! Can it be that now, in the latter half of
the nineteenth century, such a gross and bungling counterfeit is
palmed upon humanity so currently! You say you know little or
nothing of mind because you can not see it,—this I have granted
without the slightest mental reservation; but you say you know
nature and objects around you because you see them and feel
them! Hold! you feel the fire and say it is hot; you see the rose
and say it is red; you taste sugar and say it is sweet. But the
sugar is not sweet, the rose is not red, the fire is not hot; these are
but sensations which you objectify and put into things which you
say you know in sensation. Now you must acknowledge that you
know not the things you imagine you see, and you say that you
know not mind as you can not see it;—what, then, do you know ?
Your physical science is no science, containing as it does the two
factors—the things seen and the individual seeing—most hetero
geneously mixed up, neither known, both undetermined, and one
of them (the individual seeing) extremely variable. Call this
Science! It is mockery, it is trifling with common sense to palm
such stuff off as science.
We have seen that the mind can know nature only in knowing
itself, and, consequently, that the mind can know nature only in so
far as they mutually limit each other. Now the grossest sensa
tionalist acts upon this position; for when he says the rose is red,
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that sugar is sweet, that fii’e is hot, he actually makes his own
limitations in sensation the limitations of things; and the more re
fined of the class who say, “we can know nothing of nature except
the phenomena,” in this fully endorse the same position. The real
difference between these and me is not here therefore, but rather
in this, that they would restrict mind to sensation, or at most to
the understanding. They, no less than I, acknowledge their own
limitations as all they know of nature or indeed can know. But
it may be asked,—“ if the limitations of mind are the means of our
knowing things, or all of nature that we can know, are we not right
in objectifying our sensations?” Certainly we are right; if we
wished to, we could not help seeing the rose as red, feeling* the fire
as hot, and tasting sugar as sweet. But I do most solemnly pro
test against the currency of this, or of any classification or gen
eralization of what is given in sensation, as science either of na
ture or mind. It is not science, because the mind does not Tcnow
and recognize itself in what is given in sensation. It cognizes
only the sensation, the feeling, the redness, the heat, the sweet
ness, &c., which are cognized as well by beasts; for no doubt
they see the grass as green and feel the fire as hot as well as we.
In the language of Scripture,—“The ox knoweth his owner, and
the ass his master’s crib; but Israel doth not know, my people doth
not consider.” The mere cognition of phenomena is not know
ledge either of the thing or of mind; and although phenomena are
an essential condition of physical science, it is a gross blunder to
suppose we can get knowledge or science by an accumulation,
classification, and generalization of no-knowledge, no-science. You
can not hang your coat on the shadow of a nail; it will not sustain
it, try it as often as you please. From all we have said, it follows
most manifestly that, as the thing exists only in its limitations as
we have seen, and as the limitations of nature are the limitations of
reason, physical science can only exist in this,—the reason becoming
self-conscious and recognizing itself in what is given in sensation.
This is a most difficult process, but it alone is worthy of humanity
and of our highest ambition; the reason in becoming self-conscious
pulls down the “wall of partition,” and admits us into the very
presence of the Infinite, the Universal, the Absolute. It alone can
make us free indeed, not by doing away with the external law, but
by enabling us in our own spontaneity to fulfil the law; which is the
object of all education, and should be of all human aspiration.
But, as we have seen, the mind can not get out of itself, and yet,
what has been given in sensation you have thrown from you and
already put in the thing, or rather, have made it the thing. IIow
�17
are you to get it back into mind again, to enable the reason to re
cognize itself in it? It is absolutely necessary, as you see, to get in
terms of the reasoning the limitations given first in sensation. The
only possibility left now for science, is for the reason to go out and
limit itself by the limitations of sense made object. To illustrate:
suppose you wish to get a cast containing the limitations or form
of a given object; you first take an impression in plaster; you now
make it the object of 'which you take an impression in a given
metal; you now have in metal the limitations of the original ob
ject. So you first take an impression of nature in the terms of ex
ternal sense, you now make this the object and take an impression
of it in terms of the reason. You now have, not science, but the
first condition of science; you have the object in terms of the rea
son,—but the science is the reason coming to know and recognize
itself in this its own object. As the thing in itself exists in those
same limitations which you now have in terms of the reason, the
reason in knowing itself in its own object, knows the thing in itself.
The object of reason thus obtained is always an idea limited by its
opposite,—as we have already seen the “definitions” upon which
geometry is based consist of the idea Space limited by its opposite.
Now we see whence the definitions come, and understand clearly
what they are. We now have some insight, I think, back to where
science must begin, if it begin at all. The definitions upon which
geometry is based, are, in distinction from the objects of sense, ob
jects of reason : they are ideal, not sensual. The words, point, line,
triangle, &c., are but signs to represent to the understanding the lim
itations of the idea; consequently, when I say a triangle is a figure
bounded by three straight lines, I give only a verbal definition of the
word triangle; but the word defined is only a sigu of the Conception.
So when I draw a triangle on the blackboard, the diagram is only a
sensual representation. The real, which the verbal definition and
diagram represent, is the ideal object—the object of reason. There
are many who think they study mathematics, who never grasp the
real definitions, but only the shadow as given in sensations. All these
ever reach are forms and rules. When they get a little older and
dabble in philosophy, they tell us mathematics is based upon hy
potheses and even absurdities; for, say they, “nothing can have
position which has neithei- length, breadth, nor thickness, as the
the mathematician predicates of & point.” This only shows that
the objector himself does not see the point, and it is to be feared
he never will see it, because not given in sensation.
The science of mathematics, in all its various branches, from the
determining the product of two and two, to the highest achieve
�18
ments of Newton or LaPlace, is constituted of the expressions of
the reason in the act of coming to know itself in the various limit
ations of the idea Quantity. This definition follows from what has
already been sufficiently insisted upon, but I will try to make it
even more clear. The data of every mathematical problem must
limit the problem, or it can not be solved. This involves, if clearly
understood, the most that I have said to-night. Every standard
measure of real things must be given both in sensation and in rea
son ; that is, it must be both cognized in sensation and recognized
by the reason. For instance, when I say a foot is one straight line
twelve inches long, here the straight line and numbers one and
twelve are recognized limitations of reason, whereas foot and inch
are cognized limitations of objects. All the standard measures are
such as as are both cognized and recognized together, and hence
used with the least possible effort. But all which is necessary is
that the data should limit both the thing and the idea. Hence, on
the side of sensation I may use inch, foot, yard, pole, or any stand
ard, provided I cognize it; so on the side of reason I am not
restricted to straight line, but may use triangle, square, circle, &c.,
&c., provided they can be both cognized and recognized. Hence
you see the application of the whole of mathematics to physical
science in regard to its quantitative determinations. Though I
can not measure the height of a steeple with a straight line, a foot
stick, I can measure it with a triangle. Here the cognition and
recognition are not together, and apparently in the same act of
mind, as when a foot rule is used, since we can not recognize the
triangle in all its properties by a simple act of the reason. Hence,
when we get the base line, or one side of the triangle, in units of
feet, and the angles in units of degrees—all of which are both cog
nized and recognized—we neglect for a time the side of sensation,
that the reason may recognize itself in the triangle; and when we
thus recognize the other leg of the triangle in units—terms Of the
reason—we then put back these units into feet from which we took
them, and now both cognize and recognize the height of the stee
ple at once; that is, we know it. This is an illustration of every
application of mathematics to physical science.
But the different sciences may involve different ideas; quantity
is not the only idea involved in the physical sciences. The ancient
Greeks did not, for obvious reasons, succeed in developing a science
of other ideas as they did of the idea quantity, and with us other
ideas have but little to do with assumed knowledge, with sci
ence. We do not recognize the Platonic “Idea” as the very
life of all science, of all knowledge and all success; and it is
�19
fashionable in these days to declare, both implicitly and expli
citly, that the Organon of Bacon has superseded the Organon of
Aristotle. As both sensation and reason are essential to physical
science—the one to give the condition, the other the essence and
life—it is difficult to comprehend how the one can supersede the
other, except upon the assumption that reason is nonessential to
science. But if, as we have seen, science consists in the reason
knowing and recognizing itself, then this judgment can be but a
sign of ourselves, that sense has superseded reason in us;—
“ Doth the harmony
In the sweet lute-strings belong
To the purchaser, who, dull of ear, doth keep
The instrument ? True, she hath bought tjhz right
To strike it into fragments,—yet no art /
To wake its silvery tones, and melt with/bliss
Of thrilling song! Truth to the wise exists,
And beauty for the feeling heart.”
I now find that many points are left untouched which I intend
ed to discuss, and which would be necessary to give unity to the
subject; but I find time will not permit, and I must hasten to a
conclusion. Let me remark, however, that Axioms are but expres
sions in terms of the understanding of the living-force of the rea
son of each individual. How erroneous, therefore, is the definition
that an axiom is that which all men receive as absolutely true. An
axiom is an absolute and universal truth, but it may not be recog
nized by all men. If I had sufficient energy of thought or living
force of self-conscious reason, the proposition that the square of the
hypothenuse is equal to the sum of the squares of the other two
sides of a right-angled triangle, would become an axiom; but as I
have not this, and as the mind can not transcend itself, I have to
use the lever of method. But as all this is but the carrying out of
what has already been said, I need not dwell upon it. This living
energy of reason was so great in Plato, Shakspeare, and Goethe,
that they could lift greater weights directly than most men could
with all the appliances of levers and pullies.
We have seen that, as the mind can not get out of itself, (and
this position is implicitly admitted by all, though it may be expli
citly denied,) it can know only through a knowledge of itself. We
have seen that we can know physical nature even, only because
nature exists in its limitations, and these limitations are identical
with the limitations of mind or the laws of thought. And God being
Infinite Mind, in whose image we are created, the mind knows God
only in so far as it becomes self-conscious or knows itself. “ God
�20
is a Spirit, and they who worship Him must worship Him in spi
rit and in truth.” But we have seen, also, that the mind can know
itself only in self-conscious reason, and that reason hence is the
only criterion of truth. It is sad to reflect how little self-conscious
reason there is in the world, in humanity. Though reason is the
only criterion of truth, and it alone can exalt us and free us, by en
abling us to unite and cooperate with the Universal and Absolute,
yet, do we not see this our only hope condemned and upbraided
even in the pulpit, driven from the state, and trampled down and
spit upon by politics, and treated little better by science, so-called ?
When this is gone, what have we left? Nothing but individual
tape-strings! Oh, yes! they all talk loudly about the “ Higher
Law,” and say “ do right! do right I” And you ask them, what is
the Higher Law? what is right?—and they immediately and with
the most impudent assurance present their individual tape-strings,
and commence straightway measuring! measuring! But by what
authority are these stamped? By the senses, the feelings, the pas
sions. But each individual has a different standard stamped by
the same authority, except where what is called education induces
many to use the same string. And what power is umpire in these
irrepressible conflicts thus inevitably induced ? God is out of the
question, as reason has been dethroned, apd nothing is left but
physical force. Hence family, political and religious discord and
strife—one tape-string in conflict with another; no self-conscious
reason, no knowledge of the Absolute. If you direct your mind
through the whole range of human activities, you find labels ac
cording to these tape-strings stuck on every thing—the most sa
cred no less than secular. And this is called Knowledge! Truth!
Higher Law! And Education, in all its various departments, is,
in the main, the drilling into the young these lifeless forms, these
shams, these midnight apparitions, these labels arranged in order
to suit the easy method of the sensational understanding. Oh! it
is sad to behold how grossly humanity is engulfed into the senses.
We boast that we are the lords of creation; which means, that we
can bridle the horse, and that we will ultimately exterminate the
lion: for, the spirit of humanity is indicated, not in the question,
how shall we use those gifts to us which have not been vouchsafed
to beasts ? but rather, how shall we make up our deficit in beastly
gifts ?—“ What shall we eat ? what shall we drink ? and where
withal shall we be clothed?”
�St. Louis Medical College,
November 1st, 1859.
’
Prof. J. H. Watters.
Dear Sir,
At a meeting held by the Class, J. T. Marsh in the
chair, it was unanimously resolved, that a committee be appointed for the pur- •
pose of requesting from you permission to publish your Introductory Address,
delivered before the Class, in College Hall, on the evening of October 31st.
Hoping that the above resolve may receive your approbation, a favorable reply
will meet with the thanks of the Class, and of yours,
Respectfully,
J. L. WILCOX,
GRATZ A. MOSES,
CHAS. KNOWER,
JOHN THOMPSON,
J. C. HICKERSON.
St. Louis, Nov. 2, 1859.
Dear Sirs,
The manuscript of my lecture is at your service ; please present
to the Class my acknowledgment of the compliment,
And believe me, as ever,
Your attached friend,
J. H. WATTERS.
To Messrs. Wilcox, Moses, Knower, Thompson, Hickerson.
�
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Victorian Blogging
Description
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A collection of digitised nineteenth-century pamphlets from Conway Hall Library & Archives. This includes the Conway Tracts, Moncure Conway's personal pamphlet library; the Morris Tracts, donated to the library by Miss Morris in 1904; the National Secular Society's pamphlet library and others. The Conway Tracts were bound with additional ephemera, such as lecture programmes and handwritten notes.<br /><br />Please note that these digitised pamphlets have been edited to maximise the accuracy of the OCR, ensuring they are text searchable. If you would like to view un-edited, full-colour versions of any of our pamphlets, please email librarian@conwayhall.org.uk.<br /><br /><span><img src="http://www.heritagefund.org.uk/sites/default/files/media/attachments/TNLHLF_Colour_Logo_English_RGB_0_0.jpg" width="238" height="91" alt="TNLHLF_Colour_Logo_English_RGB_0_0.jpg" /></span>
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Conway Hall Library & Archives
Date
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2018
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Conway Hall Ethical Society
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Pamphlet
Dublin Core
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Title
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Method of education: an address introductory to the session 1859-60 of the St. Louis Medical College
Creator
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Watters, J. H.
Description
An account of the resource
Place of publication: St. Louis
Collation: 20 p. ; 23 cm.
Notes: From the library of Dr Moncure Conway.
Publisher
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George Knapp & Co.
Date
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1869
Identifier
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G5184
Subject
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Education
Medicine
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<a href="http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/mark/1.0/"><img src="http://i.creativecommons.org/p/mark/1.0/88x31.png" alt="Public Domain Mark" /></a><span> </span><br /><span>This work (Method of education: an address introductory to the session 1859-60 of the St. Louis Medical College), identified by </span><a href="https://conwayhallcollections.omeka.net/items/show/www.conwayhall.org.uk"><span>Humanist Library and Archives</span></a><span>, is free of known copyright restrictions.</span>
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application/pdf
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Text
Language
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English
Conway Tracts
Education
Medicine