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                    <text>NATIONAL SECULAR SOCIETY

THE

SOCIALIST MOVEMENT.

BY

ANNIE
[Reprinted

from the

BESANT.
“Westminster Review”.]

LONDON :
FREETHOUGHT PUBLISHING COMPANY,
63, FLEET STREET, E.C.

1 8 8 7.
PRICE

THREEPENCE.

�I

LONDON :
TRINTED BY ANNIE BESANT AND CHARLES BRADLAVGH,

63, FLEET STREET, E.C,

�n)(T7#

THE SOCIALIST MOVEMENT.
Some good-hearted people must have felt an uncomfortable
thrill when they heard Professor Huxley declare that he
would rather have been born a savage in one of the Fiji
Islands than have been born in a London slum. The
advantages of civilisation, from the slum point of view,
must appear somewhat doubtful; and as a considerable
part of the population of every large city live in the slums,
the slum view has an importance of its own as a factor in
the future social evolution. For it must be remembered
that the slum population is not wholly composed of
criminals and ne’er-do-weels—the “ good-for-nothings ”
•of Herbert Spencer. The honest workman and struggling
seamstress live there cheek by jowl with the thief and
and the harlot; and with the spread of education has
arisen an inclination to question whether, after all, every­
thing has been arranged quite as well as it might be in
this best of all possible worlds. The question, Whether
• on the whole civilisation has been an advantage? has
been a theme of academical discussion since Rousseau
won the prize for an essay on 11 Has the restoration of the
• Sciences contributed to purify or to corrupt Manners ? ”
■ and laid down the audacious thesis that riches gave birth
to luxury and idleness, and from luxury sprang the arts,
from idleness the sciences. But it has now changed its
form, and has entered the arena of practical life: men
. are asking now, Is it rational that the progress of society
should be as lopsided as it is ? Is it necessary that,
while civilisation brings to some art, beauty, refinement—
all that makes life fair and gracious—it should bring to
•others drudgery, misery, degradation, such as no un­

�4

THE SOCIALIST MOVEMENT.

civilised people know; and these emphasised and rendered
the bitterer by the contrast of what life is to many, thedream of what it might be to all ? For Professor Huxley
is right. The savage has the forest and the open sea, the
joy of physical strength, food easily won, leisure sweet
after the excitement of the chase; the civilised toiler hasthe monotonous drudgery of the stuffy workshop, the hell
of the gin-palace for his pleasure-ground, the pande­
monium of reeking court and stifling alley for his lullaby :
civilisation has robbed him of all natural beauty and
physical joy, and has given him in exchange—the slum.
It is little wonder that, under these circumstances, there
are many who have but scant respect for our social fabric,
and who are apt to think that any change cannot land
them in a condition worse than that in which they already
find themselves.
The tendency to think of complete social change as a
possible occurrence has come down to the present genera­
tion as an inheritance of the past. Old men still dwell
fondly on the hopes of the “ social missionaries ” who were
preaching when the men now of middle-age were born.
Some even fem ember the experiments of Fobert Owen and
of his personal disciples, the hopes raised by New Lanark
and Arbiston, the chill disappointment of New Harmony.
The dream that glorified their youth has remained a sacred
memory, and they have told how all might have been
different had society been prepared in Owen’s time for the
fundamental change. And the great and far-reaching
co-operative movement, born of Owen’s Socialism, has kept
“his memory green”, and has prepared men to think of
a possible future in which co-operation should wholly re­
place competition, and Owen’s dream of universal brother­
hood become a living reality. Such part of the energy of
the Owenite Socialists as was not merged in co-operative
activity was swamped in the sudden rush of prosperity
that followed the repeal of the Corn Laws and the English
triumph of Free Trade. Now that that rush is long over,
and the old misery is on the workers once .more, their
minds turn back to the old schemes, and they listen readily
to suggestions of a new social order.
.
The abnormally rapid multiplication characteristic of the
very poor is at once constantly rendering the problem to
be solved more difficult and more imperatively pressing.

�THE SOCIALIST MOVEMENT.

5

Unhealthy conditions force the young into premature
nubility; marriage takes place between mere lads and
lasses; parenthood comes while father and mother are
themselves legally infants; and the dwarfed, peaky little
•mortals, with baby frames and wizened faces, that tumble
-over each other in the gutters of the slums, are the un­
wholesome and unlovely products of the forcing-house of
extreme poverty.
The spread of education and of religious scepticism has
added the last touch necessary to make the poor ripe for
social change. Ignorance is a necessary condition for
prolonged submission to remediable misery. The School
Boards are teaching the children the beauty of order,
•cleanliness, and decency, and are waking up in them desire
for knowledge, hopes, and aspirations—plants unsuited for
■cultivation in the slums. They are sowing the seeds of a
noble discontent with unworthy conditions, while at the
same time they are developing and training the intelli­
gence, and are converting aimless, sullen grumbling into
a rational determination to understand the Why of the
present, and to discover the How of change. Lastly, reli­
gious scepticism has enormously increased the value put
upon the life which is. So long as men believed that the
present life was the mere vestibule of an endless future, it
was possible to bribe them into quiescence in misery by
.representing poverty as a blessing which should hereafter
bring in its train the “kingdom of heaven”. But now
that many look on the idea of a life beyond the grave with
•doubt, and even with disbelief, this life has taken giant
proportions in their eyes, and the human longing for
happiness, which erstwhile fed on hopes of heaven, has
fastened itself with passionate intensity on the things of
•earth.
Such is the soil, ploughed by misery, fertilised by edu­
cation and scepticism, ready to receive and nourish the
seed of social change.
While the soil has been thus preparing, the sowers who
•are to scatter the seed have been fashioning. Thoughtful
persons have noted the regular cycle of alternate depres­
sion and inflation trodden by industrialism during the last
century. At one time industry progresses ‘ ‘ by leaps and
bounds ”, employment is plentiful, wages high (as wages
.go), prices of coal and iron high, profits increase, and

�6

THE SOCIALIST MOVEMENT.

fortunes are rapidly built up. This inflation after a whilepasses away, and is succeeded by depression ; 11 short time
is worked, wages are reduced, profits diminish, the “ market
is overstocked”. This in its turn passes away, and tem­
porary prosperity returns, to be after a while succeeded
by another depression, and that by another inflation. But
it is noticeable that the depressions become more acute and
more prolonged as they return time after time, and that
there is less elasticity of revival after each. The position
of England in the world’s markets becomes yearly one of
diminished advantage ; other nations raise their own coaland their own iron instead of buying from us, and as thecompetition of nations becomes keener, English trade can
no longer monopolise the custom of the world. The radical­
weakness of our industrial system is thus becoming patent
•—no longer veiled, as it was during the first half of the
century, by a monopoly which brought such enormousgains that the drain of wealth into a few hands was com­
paratively little felt. Now that there is so much less to.divide, the unfairness of the method of division is becoming
obvious.
Nor can we overlook, in tracing the fashioning of thosewho are to sow the seeds of change, the effect on English
thought of the greatly increased communication with
foreign countries, and especially with Germany. English
religious thought has been largely influenced by the worksof Strauss and Eeuerbach ; philosophic thought by those
of Hegel, Kant, and Schopenhauer ; scientific by the specu­
lations of Goethe, the practical labors of Vogt, Buchner,
and Haeckel. English insularity has been broken down
in every domain of theoretical and speculative thought ; it
was inevitable that it should also be broken down in the ■
domain of practical sociology, and that German proposals-'for social change should win the attention of English
students of social problems. The works of Marx, Bebel,.
Liebknecht, and Engels have not reached any large num­
ber of English people ; neither have those of Strauss,
Hegel, and Kant. None the less in each case have they
exercised a profoundly modifying influence on religious,
philosophical, and sociological thought respectively ; for,
reaching a small band only, that band has in its turn in­
fluenced thought in the direction taken by itself, and has
modified the views of very many who are unconscious of the.-

�THE SOCIALIST MOVEMENT.

7

change thus wrought in their own attitude towards. pro­
gress. At the same time the German graft has been itself
modified by the English stock, and English Socialism is
beginning to take its own distinctive color ; it is influenced
by English traditions, race, habit, and methods of public
procedure. It shows, at its best, the influence of .the openair of English political life, the tolerance, of diversity of
thought which is bred of free speech ; it is less arrogant,
less intolerant, than it is with Germans, or witn those
English who are most directly under German influence.
In Germany the intolerance of oppression has caused in­
tolerance of revolt ; here the very power of the democracy
has a tendency to sober its speech, and to make it take its
Own way in the quiet consciousness of its resistless strength.
This peculiarity of English life must modify Socialism,
and incline it to resort to methods of legislation rather
than to methods of dynamite.
Nor has the effect of foreign thought been confined to
the influence exerted by thinkers over thinkers, through
the medium of the press. A potent worker for the inter­
nationalisation of thought has been silently busy for many
years past. At first insular prejudices were broken down
only for the wealthy and the nobles, when the ‘ grand
tour ” was a necessary part of the education of the fine
gentleman. Then the capitalist broke down.national fences
for his own gain, feeling himself nearer in blood to his
foreign colleagues than to the workers in his own land ;
for, after all, common interests lie at the root of all. fellowfeeling. And the capitalist abolished nationalism for
himself : he hired Germans and Erenchmen for his count­
ing-house work, finding them cheaper and better educated
than English clerks ; when his English wage-workers
struck for better wages he brought over foreigners to take
their place, so that he might live on cheap foreign labor
while he starved the English into submission. . The effect
of foreign immigration and of foreign importation has not
in the long run turned wholly to the advantage of the
capitalist ; for his foreign clerks and his foreign workers
have fraternised with the English they were brought, over
to displace. They have taken part in club discussions ;
they have spread their own views ; they have popularised
in England the ideas current among workers on the
tinent ; they have made numbers of Englishmen acquainted

�8

THE SOCIALIST MOVEMENT.

with the solutions suggested abroad for social problems.
Thus, the internationalism of the luxurious idle and of the
wealthy capitalist has paved the way for the interna­
tionalism of the future—the internationalism of the prole­
tariat, the internationalism of Socialism.
From this preliminary sketch of the conditions which
make for a Socialist movement in England at the present
time we must turn to an examination of the doctrines held
and taught by the modern school, which claims to teach
what is known as Scientific Socialism. The allegation, or
even the proof, that modern civilisation is to a large ex­
tent a failure, is obviously not sufficient ground for a com­
plete social revolution. Appeals to the emotions by means
of word-pictures of the sufferings and degradation of the
industrious, poor, may rouse sympathy, and may even
excite to. riot, but can never bring about fundamental
changes in society. The intellect must be convinced ere
we can look for any wise movement in the direction of
organic improvement; and while the passion of the igno­
rant has its revolutionary value, it is on the wisdom and
foresight of the instructed that we must rely for the work
of social reconstitution.
The. first thing to realise is that the Socialist move­
ment is an economic one. Despite all whirling words,
and revolution fire, and poetic glamor, and passionate
appeal, this one dry fact is the central one — Socialism
rej ects the present industrial system and proposes an ex­
ceedingly different one. No mere abuse can shake the
Socialist; no mere calling of names can move him.
He holds a definite economic theory—a theory wbieb
should neither be rejected without examination, nor ac­
cepted without study.
The preliminary stock objection which is often held to
be sufficient to wave Socialism out of court is the statement
that it is “against the laws of political economy”. No
statement could be more erroneous; though it may be
pleaded in extenuation that the abuse levelled by ignorant
Socialists at political economy has given excuse for sup­
posing that it is in antagonism to Socialism. With political
economy, as the science which deals with the nature, the
production, and the distribution of wealth, Socialism can
have no quarrel. Its quarrel is with the present industrial

�THE SOCIALIST MOVEMENT.

9

system, not with the science which points out the ascer­
tained sequence of events under that system. Suppose
a régime of avowed slavery : political economy, dealing
with the production of wealth in such a state, would lay
down how slaves might be worked to the best advantage—
how most might be got out of them with least expenditure.
But it would be irrational to attack political economy as
brutal under such conditions ; it would be the slave system
which would be brutal, and blame of the science which
merely dealt with the existent facts would be idle. The
work of political economy is to discern and expound for
any type of social system the best methods of producing
and distributing wealth under that system ; and it can as
easily study and develop those methods under a régime of
universal co-operation such as Socialism, as under a régime
of universal competition such as the present. Socialism is
in antagonism to the present system, and seeks to over­
throw it ; but only the ignorant and the thoughtless con­
found in their hatred the system itself, and the science that
deals with its phænomena.
In truth, Socialism founds part of its disapproval of
the present industrial system on the very facts pointed
out by orthodox economists. It accepts Ricardo’s “iron
law of wages ”, and, recognising that wages tend to fall
to the minimum on which the laborer can exist, it de­
clares against the system of the hiring of workers for a
fixed wage, and the appropriation of their produce by the
hirer. It accepts Ricardo’s theory of rent, with such
modifications as are adopted by all modern economists.
It assents to, and indeed insists on, the facts that all
wealth is the result of labor applied to natural agents,
that capital is the result of labor and abstinence, that in
all save the most primitive forms of industry capital and
labor—that is, the unconsumed result of past labor and
present labor—are both necessary factors in the produc­
tion of wealth.
Nor does Socialism challenge the aecuracy of the deduc­
tions from the “laws of political economy” in a com­
petitive system drawn by the trading community. That
a man who desires wealth should buy in the cheapest
market and sell in the dearest ; that he should drive the
hardest possible bargains ; that in selling he should be
guided by the maxim, caveat emptor ; that in buying he

�10

THE SOCIALIST MOVEMENT.

should take advantage of the ignorance or the necessities
of the seller; that the weakest should go the wall; that
feeling should not interfere with business; that labor
should be bought at the lowest possible price, and as
much got out of it as may be; that trade morality differs
from the morality of private life—all these maxims the
Socialist regards as the evil fruits of the perpetuation
among men of the struggle for existence; a struggle which,
however inevitable among brutes, is from his point of view
unworthy of human civilisation.
Recognising thus the unsatisfactory results which flow
naturally and inevitably from the present system, Socialism
proceeds to analyse the way in which wealth is produced
and accumulated under it, to seek for the causes of the
extreme wealth and. extreme poverty which are its most
salient characteristics.
Applying ourselves, then, to the study of the produc­
tion of wealth, we find taking part therein three things—
natural agents, capital, and labor. These, under the pre­
sent system, are represented in England by three types—
the landlord, the capitalist, and the proletarian. The
transitional organisms need not detain us: the landlord
who tills his land with his own hands, the capitalist who
works in his own mill—these are exceptions ; andwe are
concerned with the normal types. Abroad, the landlord
pure and simple is comparatively rare. Of these three, the
landlord owns the natural agents ; no wealth can be pro­
duced without his consent. John Stuart Mill (“Principles
of Political Economy”, bk. ii., ch. xvi., sec. 1) remarks
that “ the only person, besides the laborer and th©
capitalist, whose consent is necessary to production, and
who can claim a share of the produce as the price of that
consent, is the person who, by the arrangements of society,
possesses exclusive power over some natural agent ”.
Given a person who, by possession of the natural agents
from which wealth can be produced, can prevent the pro­
duction of wealth by withholding the raw material, and
you have a person who can successfully claim part of the
wealth to be produced as a condition of allowing produc­
tion to take place. He gains, by virtue of his position,
wealth which one less fortunately placed can only acquire
by prolonged labor. Nay, more ; since many capitalists
will compete for the raw material when it is advantageously

�THE SOCIALIST MOVEMENT.

11

situated, he will be able to obtain an ever higher price
from the most eager bidder ; as towns increase . and. trade
develops, competition will drive the price up still higher ;
and this ever-mounting “ rent”, paid, to the owner of the
natural agents, will enrich the lucky possessor, however
idle, ignorant, or useless he may be. Thus is produced
a class which has a vested right to tax industry, and
which taxes it in proportion to its success. Not an
improvement can be effected, nor a railway constructed,
nor a road made, without toll being first paid to the
owner of the soil. The whole nation is at the mercy
of a comparatively small class, so long as it consents to
admit that this class has a right to own the ground on
which the nation lives. Here is a point at which Socialism
finds itself in direct antagonism to the present system of
society. Socialism declares that natural agents ought not
to be private property, and that no idle class should be
permitted to stand between land and labor, and demand
payment of a tax before it will permit the production, of
wealth. Socialism holds that the soil on which a nation
is born and lives ought to belong to the nation as a whole,
and not to a class within the nation ; that the soil should
be cultivated by individuals, or by co-operative groups,
holding directly under the State—the ‘.‘State” here
meaning central organising body or district oiganising
body, according as the organisation is communal or cen­
tralised. And here, among different Socialist schools,
difference in detail manifests itself. All agree that the
soil must in some fashion be controlled by the community,
and the benefits derivable from it spread over the com­
munity. But some Socialists would have each commune
practically independent, with the soil on which it lives
vested in each; the agriculturists of the commune would
form an organised body for cultivating the soil, and the
agricultural products would be collected in the communal
store, and thence distributed as each member of the
commune had need of them. Nothing would here be
recognised as “ rent ”, since the total produce would pass
under communal control. Other Socialists favor a system
of more centralised management. But all agree that in­
dividual property in land must disappear, and that in. the
future land must not be used as an investment which is to
bring in a profit in the shape of rent to some speculator or

�12

THE SOCIALIST MOVEMENT.

idler, but must be used for purposes of production for the
general good, yielding food and raw materials for clothing
and other necessaries of life, but profit in the shape of
rent to no individual.
The extreme Radical school of politicians accepts the
Socialist theory of land, and denounces private property in
the soil as vigorously as does the Socialist. In fact, the
Radical is a half-fledged Socialist—indignant as many
would be at the description: he is in favor of the State
being the landowner, but he boggles at the idea of
the State being the capitalist. His attitude to the land
is, however, an important factor in the Socialist move­
ment, for it familiarises the national mind with the idea
of the State absorbing the functions hitherto belonging
to a class. The establishment of Land Courts, the fixing
of judicial rents, the legal restrictions put on the “rights”
of landlords—all these make for Socialism. M. Agathon
de Potter, a well-known Continental writer, rejoices over
the introduction of Mr. Charles Bradlaugh’s Bill for expro­
priating landlords who keep cultivable land uncultivated,
and for vesting the forfeited lands in the State, as a direct
step towards Socialism. The shrinking of English poli­
ticians from the name does not prevent their advance
towards the thing, and the Liberty and Property Defence
League is justified in its view that politics are drifting
steadily in a Socialist direction.
Pass we from the landlord who holds the natural agents
to the capitalist who holds the means of production. What
is capital, and how has it come into existence ? Capital is
any wealth which is employed for profit. On this there is
no dispute. As Senior says: “Economists are agreed
that whatever gives a profit is properly called capital ”.
Now, as all wealth is the result of labor applied to natural
agents, capital, being wealth, must have been so produced.
But another factor has been at work; as Marshall says:
it is “ the result of labor and abstinence ”. Wherever there
is capital there has been labor, and there has also
been abstinence from consumption. But in studying
the origin and the accumulation of capital, this remark­
able historical fact stares us in the face—that capital is
not found in the hands of the laborious and the
abstemious, but is obtained by a process of confiscation
of the results of labor and the imposition of privation on

�THE SOCIALIST MOVEMENT.

13

the laborious. On this John Stuart Mill has the following
pregnant passage :
“ In a rude and violent state of society it continually happens
that the person who has capital is not the very person who has
Saved it. but someone who, being stronger, or belonging to a
more powerful community, has possessed himself of it by
plunder. And even in a state of things in which property was
protected, the increase of capital has usually been, for a long
time, mainly derived from privations which, though essentially
the same with saving, are not generally called by that name,
because not.voluntary. The actual producers have been slaves,
compelled to produce as much as force could extort from them,
and to consume as little as the self-interest or the usually very
slender humanity of their taskmasters would permit. (“ Prin­
ciples of Political Economy”, bk. i., ch. v., sec. 5).

Capital always has been, and it always must be,
obtained by the partial confiscation of the results of
labor ; that is, it must be accumulated by labor which
is not paid for, or by labor of which the payment is
deferred. In slave communities the slave-owner becomes
a great capitalist by appropriating the total results of
his slaves’ toil, and returning to them only such small
portion of it as suffices to keep the wealth-producers in
capable working order. That is, the wealth produced
minus the amount consumed by the producers, goes to
the owner, and that part of it which he does not consume
is laid by to be employed as capital. And it is worth
noting that no considerable accumulation of capital was
made, and no rapid progress in civilisation was possible,
until slavery was introduced. In a low stage of evolution
men will not deny themselves present for the sake of future
enjoyment, nor incur present toil for the sake of future
ease. But when, as was neatly said to me, the barbarian
discovered that he could utilise his conquered enemy to
much greater advantage by making him work than by
merely eating him, civilisation had a chance. Slavery
was, in truth, a necessary stage in social evolution ; only
by forced toil and forced privation was it possible to accu­
mulate capital, and without capital no forms of complex
industry are realisable. At the present time that which
was done frankly and unblushingly in the slave régime is
done under a veil of fine phrases, among which free con­
tract, free laborer, and the like, play a striking part. But

�14

THE SOCIALIST MOVEMENT.

in reality the “free laborer” only obtains as wage such
portion of the results of his labor as enables him to exist
at the standard of living current for his class at the time,
and the remainder of his produce goes to his employer.
And too often this portion of his is not sufficient to keep
him in capable working order, as is shown by the sombre
fact that the average age of the hand-workers at death is
far less than that of the idlers. For in truth the slave of
the past had this advantage over the wage-worker of the
present—-that it was to his master’s interest to keep the
slave in high physical condition, and to prolong his working
life ; whereas it is to the modern employer’s interest to
get as much work out of the “ free laborer ” as is possible
in a short time, and then to fling him aside as he begins
to flag, and hire in his place a younger and more vigorous
competitor, to be in his turn wrung dry and thrown away.
Before considering what Socialism would do with the
capitalist, we must turn to the proletarian, his necessary
correlative. A proletarian is a person who is possessed of
labor-force, and of nothing else. He is the incarnation of
the “labor” necessary for the production of wealth, the
third factor in our trio. This type, in our modern society,
is numerous, and is rapidly increasing. He is the very
antithesis of the really free laborer, who works on his own
raw material with his own instruments of production, and
produces for his own subsistence. In the country the
proletarian is born on somebody else’s land, and as he
grows up he finds himself owner of nothing except his
own body. The raw material around him is owned by the
landlord ; the instruments of production are owned by the
capitalist farmers. As he cannot live on his own labor
force, which can only become productive in conjunction
with raw material and means of production (capital), he
must either sell it or starve. Nominally he may be free ;
in reality he is no more free than is the slave. The slave
is free to refuse to work, and to take in exchange the lash,
the prison, the grave ; and such freedom only has the
present proletarian. If he refuses to work, he must take
the lash of hunger, the prison of the workhouse, and, on
continued refusal, the actual gaol. Nor can he put his
own price on this solitary property of his, his body—he
must sell it at the market rate ; and in some agricultural
counties of England at the present time the market rate

�THE SOCIALIST MOVEMENT.

15

is from 7s. to 9s. a week. It is most significant of the
bearing of the propertyless condition of the proletarian
that many farmers obj ect to the very slight improvement
made in the laborer’s position by his being permitted to
rent at a high price a small allotment which he cultivates
for himself. The ground of the farmer’s objection is that
even such small portion of freedom makes the laborer
“too independent”, and thereby drives up wages. To
get the full advantage out of him, the proletarian must be
wholly dependent for subsistence on the wages he earns.
The town proletarian is in a similar position—neither land
nor instrument of production is his; but he also has his
labor force, and this he must sell, or he must starve.
We have arrived at the citadel of the Socialist position.
Here is this unpropertied class, this naked proletariat, face
to face with landlord and capitalist, who hold in their grip
the means of subsistence. It must reach those means of
subsistence or starve. The terms laid down for its accep­
tance are clear and decisive : “We will place within your
hands the means of existence if you will produce sufficient
to support us as well as yourselves, and if you will consent
that the whole of your produce, over that which is sufficient
to support you in a hardy, frugal life, shall be the property
of us and of our children. If you are very thrifty, very
self-denying, and very lucky, you may be able to save
enough out of your small share of your produce to feed
yourself in your old age, and so avoid falling back on us.
Your children will tread the same mill-round, and we hope
you will remain contented with the position in which
Providence has placed you, and not envy those born to a
higher lot.” Needless to say, the terms are accepted by
a proletariat ignorant of its own strength, and the way to
profit is open to landlord and capitalist. The landlord,
as we have seen, obtains his share of the gains by taxing
the capitalist through raising his rent. The capitalist
finds his profit in the difference between the. wage he pays
and the value of the produce of his hired workers. The
wage is fixed by the competition for employment in the
labor market, and limited in its downward tendency by
the standard of living. The minimum wage is that on
which the worker can exist, however hardly. For less
than this he will not work. Every shilling above this is
fought over, and wage rises and falls by competition. At

�16

THE SOCIALIST MOVEMENT.

everstage of their relationship there is contest betweèn
employer and employed. If the wage is paid for a fixed
day’s work—as in nearly every trade—the employer tries
to lengthen the day, the employed to shorten it ; the
longer the day, the greater the production of “surplus
value ”—¿&lt;?., of the difference between the wage paid and
the value produced. The employer tries to increase surplus
value by pressing the workers to exertion ; they lessen
exertion in order not to hasten the time of their discharge.
The employer tries still to increase surplus value by sup­
planting male labor with female and child labor at lower
wages. The men resist such introduction, knowing that
the ultimate result is to increase the amount taken by
capital and to lessen that obtained by labor.
Now the Socialist alleges that these antithetical interests
can never be reconciled while capital and labor are the
possessions of two distinct classes. He points to the results
brought about by the capitalist class while it was left un­
shackled by the State. The triumph of capitalism, and of
laisser-faire between employers and employed, was from
1764 to 1833. During that time not only adults but young
children were worked from fifteen to sixteen hours a day,
and the production of surplus value was enormous. The
huge fortunes of the Lancashire “cotton-princes” were
built up by these overtasked, quickly worn-out workers.
The invention of machinery centupled man’s productive
power, and its benefits were monopolised by a compara­
tively small class ; while those who made the wealth
festered in closely crowded courts, those who appropriated
the wealth luxuriated in country seats ; one side of industri­
alism is seen in the Lancashire mansions, pleasure-grounds,
and hothouses ; the Other in the reeking slums within the
sound of the factory bells. Under a saner system of pro­
duction, the introduction of machinery would have lightened
toil, shortened the hours of necessary labor, and spread
abundance where there was want. Under capitalistic in­
dustrialism it has built up huge fortunes for a few, and
has reduced thousands to conditions of insanitary living
and dreary degradation, worse than anything the world
has hitherto known. It has poisoned our rivers, polluted
our atmosphere, marred the beauty of our country’s face,
bestialised large numbers of our people. Improvements in
machinery, which should be hailed with joy, are regarded

�THE SOCIALIST MOVEMENT.

17

with dread by large classes of workers, because they will
throw numbers out of work, and reduce men, who were
skilled laborers with the old machinery, into the ranks of
the unskilled. True, the result of the introduction of
machinery has been to cheapen—in consequence of com­
petition among capitalists—many commodities, especially
articles of clothing. But this effect is little felt among the
laboring classes. They can buy perhaps three coats where
they used to buy one, but the easily worn-out shoddy,
thought good enough for clothes sold in poor quarters, is
but a poor exchange for the solid hand-made stuffs worn
by their ancestors.
What, then, is the remedy proposed by Socialism ? It
is to deal with capital as it deals with land; to abolish the
capitalist as well as the landlord, and to bring the means
of production, as well as the natural agents on which they
are used, under the control of the community.
Capital is, as we have seen, the result of unpaid labor;
in a complex system like our own it is the result of co­
operative—that is, of socialised—labor. It has been found
Iby experience that division of labor increases productive
ability, and in all forms of industry numbers now co­
operate to turn out the finished product. In each com­
modity is embodied the labor of many workers, and the
Socialisation of labor has reached a very advanced stage.
But while industrialism has been socialised in its aspect of
labor, it has remained individualistic in its aspect of capi­
tal ; and the results of the combined efforts of many are
appropriated to the advantage of one, and when the one
has exhausted his power of consumption he retains the
remaining results, and employs them for the further
enslavement and exploitation of labor. Thus labor con­
stantly adds new links to the chain which fetters it, and
is ever increasing the capital which, let out at interest by
its owners, becomes ever a heavier tax upon itself. Social­
ism contends that these unconsumed results of socialised
labor ought not to pass into the hands of individuals to be
used by them for their own profit; but should pass either
into the industrial funds of the several trades that produce
them, or into a central industrial exchequer. In either
case, these funds created by past labor would be used for
the facilitation of present and future labor. They would
be available for the introduction of improved machinery,

�18

THE SOCIALIST MOVEMENT.

for the opening up of new industries, for the improvement
of means of communication, and for similar undertakings.
Thus, in a very real sense, capital would become only the
deferred payment of labor, and the whole results of toil
would be constantly flowing back upon the toilers. Under
such conditions, fixed capital or plant would, like land, be
held for purposes of use by the workers who used it. Its
replacement would be a constant charge on the commodities it helped to produce. A machine represents so much
human labor; that embodied labor takes part in producing
the finished commodity as much as does the palpable labor
of the human worker who superintends the machine; that
worker does not produce the whole value added in the
factory to the material brought into it, and has no claim
to that whole value. The wear and tear of the machine is
an offset, and must be charged on the products, so that
when the machine is worn out there may be no difficulty
in its replacement. Under such conditions also the dis­
tinction between employers and employed would disappear.
All would be members of industrial communities, and the
necessary foremen, superintendents, organisers, and officers
of every kind, would be elected as the officers of trades
unions are elected at the present time.
Poverty will never cease so long as any class or any indi­
viduals have an interest in the exploitation of others.
While individuals hold capital, and other individuals can­
not exist unless that capital is used for their employment,
the first class will prey upon the second. The capitalists
will not employ unless they can “make a profit ” out of
those they hire to work for them; that is, unless they pay
them less than the value of the work produced. But if
one man is to have value for which he has not worked,
another must have less than the value of his work; and
while one class grows wealthy on unpaid labor, another
must remain poor, giving labor without return. Socialism
would give to each return for labor done, but it recognises
no claim in the idle to grow fat on the produce of the in­
dustrious.
Interest on capital, paid to individuals, has—as is obvious
from the foregoing—no place in Socialism. Strongly as
Socialism protests against the whole system of which land­
lords and capitalists form an integral part, it reserves its
uttermost reprobation for the theory which justifies a class

�THE SOCIALIST MOVEMENT.

19

of the latter in living solely on money drawn as interest on
investments. If a man possesses three or four thousand
pounds he can invest them, and live all his life long on
the interest without ever doing a stroke of honest work,
and can then bequeath to some one else the right to live in
idleness ; and so on in perpetuity. Money in the capitalist
system is like the miraculous oil in the widow’s cruse—it
can always be spent and never exhausted. A man in sixty
years will have received in interest at five per cent, three
times his original fortune, and although he may have spent
the interest, and thus have spent every penny of his for­
tune three times over, he will yet possess his fortune as
large as it was when he began. He has consumed in com­
modities three times the sum originally owned, and yet is
not one penny the worse. Other people have labored for
him, fed him, clothed him, housed him, and he has done
nothing in exchange. The Socialist argument against this'
form of interest lies in a nutshell: a man earns £5 ; he
gives labor for which he receives in exchange a power of
possession over £5 worth of commodities; he desires only
to consume £1 worth now, and to defer the consumption
of the remaining £4. He buys his £1 worth of commodi­
ties, and considers himself repaid for the fifth portion of
his work by possessing and consuming these. But he ex­
pects to put out his saved £4 at interest, and would con­
sider himself hardly used if, fourteen years hence, when he
desired to exercise his power of consumption, deferred for
his own convenience, that power had not increased although
he had done nothing to increase it. Yet it can only be in­
creased by other people’s labor being left unpaid for, while
he is paid twice over for his; and this arrangement the
Socialist stamps as unjust. So long as capital remains in
the hands of individuals, interest will be demanded by
them for its use, and will be perforce paid; and so long
also will exist an idle class, which will consume without
producing, and will remain a burden on the industrious^
who must labor to support these as well as themselves, and
must produce sufficient for all.
Now, Socialism aims at rendering impossible the exist­
ence of an idle class. No healthy adult but will have to
work in exchange for the things he requires. For the
young, freedom from labor ; they have to prepare for life’swork. For the aged, freedom from labor: they have.

�:20

THE SOCIALIST MOVEMENT.

worked, and at eventide should come rest. For the sick
also, freedom from labor ; and open hospitals for all, with­
out distinction of class, where tendance and all that skill
•can do shall be at the service of each. But for the strong
and the mature, no bread of idleness, no sponging upon
other people. With division of labor will come also divi­
sion of leisure ; the disappearance of the languid lady, full
of ennui from sheer idleness, will entail the disappearance of
the overworked slavey, exhausted from unending toil; and
there will be two healthy women performing necessary
work, and enjoying full leisure for study, for art, for
recreation, where now are the over-lazy and the over­
driven.
In thus condemning the existence of an idle class, Social­
ism does not assail all the individuals who now compose it.
These are not to blame for the social conditions into which
they have been born; and it is one of the most hopeful
■signs of the present Socialist movement, that many who
are working in it belong to the very classes which will be
.abolished by the triumph of Socialist principles. The man
who has inherited a fortune, and has embraced Socialism,
would do no good by throwing it away and plunging into
the present competitive struggle; all he can do is to live
simply, to utilise his position of advantage as a pedestal
•on which to place his advocacy of Socialism, and to employ
his money in Socialist propaganda.
It is feared by some that the success of the Socialist
movement would bring about the crushing of individualism
and an undue restriction of liberty. But the Socialist
contends that the present terrible struggle for existence is
the worst enemy of individualism, and that for the vast
majority individuality is a mere phrase. Exhausting toil
■and ever-growing anxiety, these crush out individuality,
-and turn the eager promising lad into the harassed drudge
■of middle age. How many capable brains are wasted,
how many original geniuses lost to the nations they might
illuminate, by the strife for mere livelihood ? The artist
.fritters away his genius in u pot-boilers ” ; the dramatist
writes down to the piece that will “pay”, and harnesses
h.is delicate fancy into coarse burlesque full of wretched
witticisms ; in the stress of the struggle to live, patient
study and straining after a great ideal become impossible.
Individualism will only develop fully when Socialism has

�TIIE SOCIALIST MOVEMENT.

21

lifted off all shoulders the heavy burden of care, and hasgiven to all leisure to think and to endeavor.
Nor is the fear of undue restriction of liberty better
founded than that of the crushing out of individualism.
One kind of liberty, indeed, will be restricted—the liberty
to oppress and to enslave other people. But with this
exception liberty will be increased. Only the very wealthy
are now free. The great majority of people must work,
and their choice of work is very limited. The poor. must
take what work they can get, and their complaint is not
that they are compelled to work, but that they often cannot
get work to do. In satisfying the complex wants of the
civilised human being there is room for all the most diverse
capacities of work; and if it be said that there, are un­
pleasant. kinds of work that must be done, which none
would willingly undertake, it may be answered that those
kinds of work have to be done now, and that the com­
pulsion of the community would not be a greater restriction
of personal liberty than the present compulsion of hunger;
and further, that it would be easy to make a short period
of unpleasant toil balance a long period of pleasant; and
that it would be far better to have such tasks divided
among a number, so that they would press very lightly upon
each, than have them, as now, pushed on to a compara­
tively few, whose whole lives are brutalised by the pressure.
The very strictest organisation of labor by the community
that can be imagined, would be to the great majority far
less oppressive than the present system, for at the worst,
it would but control an extremely small portion of each
working day, and would leave the whole of the rest of the
existence free, to be used at the pleasure of the individual,
untrammelled by anxiety and harassing care for the mere
necessaries of life. The pride in skill, the stimulus of
honorable ambition, the pleasure of success, all these would
be present, as they are to-day; but instead of being the
privilege of the few, they would brighten the life of all.
A profound moral impulse really underlies the whole
of the Socialist movement. It is a revolt against the
callous indifference of the majority in the “ comfortable
classes ” to the woful condition of large numbers of the
workers. It is an outburst of unselfish brotherhood,
which cannot bear to sit at ease while others suffer,
which claims to share the common human lot, and to bear

�22

TIIE SOCIALIST MOVEMENT.

part of the burden now pressing with crushing weight on
the shoulders of the poor. It detests the theory that there
must always be hewers of wood and drawers of water for
a luxurious class, and proclaims that human degradation
lies in idle living, not in earnest work. It would have
all work, that all may have leisure, and would so distribute
the necessary work of the world that none may be crushed
by it, but that all may be disciplined. And this very out­
burst of human brotherhood is in itself a proof that society
is evolving Socialismwards, and that the evolution of
humanity is reaching a stage in which sympathy is tri­
umphing over selfishness, and the desire for equality of
happiness is becoming a potent factor in human conduct.
The Socialist ideal is one which could not meet with wide
acceptance if humanity were not marching towards its
realisation.
On one matter the Socialist movement, both abroad and
at home, has set itself in opposition to science and to right
reason—&lt;?.y., on the law of population. It is easy to see
how this opposition has arisen, and it may be hoped that
when Socialists in general disentangle the scientific state­
ment of facts from Malthus’ unwise applications of them,
Socialism and prudential restraint will be seen to be
indissolubly united. Malthus accurately pointed out that
population has a tendency to increase beyond the means
of subsistence ; that as it presses on the available means,
suffering is caused ; and that it is kept within them by
what he termed “positive checks ”—¿.0, a high death-rate,
especially among the children of the poor, premature death
from disease, underfeeding, etc. The accuracy of his state­
ment has been proved up to the hilt by Charles Darwin,
who describes with abundant illustrations the struggle for
existence—a struggle which is the direct result of the fact
stated in the law of population, of the tendency of all
animated things to increase beyond their food supply ; this
has led, and still leads, to the survival of those who are
fittest for the conditions of the struggle. Unhappily, Malthus
added to his scientific exposition some most unfortunate
practical advice ; he advised the poor not to marry until,
practically, they had reached middle life. The poor felt,
with natural indignation, that in addition to all their other
deprivations they were summoned by Malthus to give up
tfie chief of the few pleasures left to them, to surrender

�TIIE SOCIALIST MOVEMENT.

23

marriage, to live in joyless celibacy through, the passion­
season of life, to crush out all the impulses of love until
by long repression these would be practically destroyed.
Under such circumstances it is little wonder that “ Mal­
thusianism ” became a word hated by the poor and
denounced by those who sympathised with them. It is
true that the advice of Malthus as to the putting off of
marriage has been and is very widely followed by the
.middle classes; but it is perfectly well known that the
putting off of marriage does not with them mean the
■observance of celibacy, and the shocking prostitution
which is the curse of every Christian city is the result of
the following of the advice of Malthus so far as marriage
is concerned. It is obvious that Malthus ignored the
strength of the sexual instinct, and that the only possible
result of the wide acceptance of his teaching would be
the increase of prostitution, an evil more terrible than
that of poverty. But the obj ection rightly raised to the
practical teaching of Malthus ought not to take the form of
assailing the perfectly impregnable law of population, nor
is it valid against the teachings of Neo-Malthusians, who
advise early marriage and limitation of the family within
the means of existence.
The acceptance of this doctrine is absolutely essential to
the success of Socialism. Under a system in which children
are forced to labor, they may begin to “keep them­
selves ” at a very early age; but under a Socialist system,
where education will occupy childhood and youth, and
where old age is to be free from toil, it will soon be found
that the adult working members will not permit an un­
limited increase of the mouths which they have to fill.
Facilitate production as we may, it will always take more
hours to produce the necessaries of life for families of ten
or twelve than for families of three or four. The practi­
cal enforcement of the question will probably come from
the women; highly educated women, full of interest in
public work and taking their share in public duty, will
not consent to spend year after year of their prime in
nothing but expecting babies, bearing babies, and suckling
babies. They will rebel against the constant infliction of
physical discomfort and pain, and will insist on the limita­
tion of the family as a condition of marriage. The sooner
this is recognised by Socialists the better, for at present

�24

THE SOCIALIST MOVEMENT.

they waste much strength by attacking a doctrine which
they must sooner or later accept.
A glance backward over the history of our own country,
since the Reform Bill of 1832 opened the gate of political
power to those outside the sacred circle of the aristocracy,
will tell how an unconscious movement towards Socialism
has been steadily growing in strength. Our Factory Acts,
our Mines Regulation Acts, our Education Acts, our Em­
ployers’ Liability Acts, our Land Acts—-all show the set
of the current. The idea of the State as an outside power
is fading, and the idea of the State as an organised com­
munity is coming into prominence. In the womb of time
the new organism is growing: shall the new birth come in
peace or in revolution, heralded by patient endeavor or by
roar of cannon ? Who can tell ? But this one thing I
know, that come it will, whether men work for it or
hinder; for all the mighty, silent forces of evolution make
for Socialism, for the establishment of the Brotherhood of
Man.

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                <text>The socialist movement</text>
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                <text>Besant, Annie Wood [1847-1933]</text>
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                <text>Place of publication: London&#13;
Collation: 24 p. ; 18 cm.&#13;
Notes: Reprinted from the "Westminster Review". Printed by Annie Besant and Charles Bradlaugh. Part of the NSS pamphlet collection.</text>
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                <text>1887</text>
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                    <text>UNSCIENTIFIC RELIGION;
OR,

REMARKS ON THE REV. J. M. WILSON’S

“ATTEMPT TO TREAT SOME RELIGIOUS QUESTIONS
IN A SCIENTIFIC SPIRIT”.

[Reprinted from

the

“National Reformer”.]

BY

s. s.

POPULUS VULT DECIPI, SED ILLUMINETUR.

LONDON:

fbeethought

publishing company,

63, FLEET STREET,

E.C.

1 8 8 7.
PRICE

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�UNSCIENTIFIC RELIGION;
OR,

REMARKS ON THE REV. J. M. WILSON’S

“ATTEMPT TO TREAT SOME RELIGIOUS QUESTIONS
IN A SCIENTIFIC SPIRIT”.

[Reprinted from

the

“National Reformer”.]

BY

s. s.

POPULUS VULT DECIPI, SED ILLUMINETUR.

LONDON:

fbeethought

publishing company,

63, FLEET STREET,

E.C.

1 8 8 7.
PRICE

FOURPENCE.

��N574-

TO THE READER.
Messrs. Macmillajst and Co. having published a volume
of Essays and Addresses by the Rev. James M. Wilson,
this opportunity is taken of reprinting some articles
that appeared in the National Reformer, after the first
appearance of the essays and addresses contained in the
volume referred to.
The second and third articles were written concerning
two sermons that Mr. Wilson preached in March, 1884,
and which are not included in the volume of essays and
addresses. They were published by Macmillan and Co.,
in pamphlet form, shortly after their delivery.
The paper of most interest in Mr. Wilson’s volume is
undoubtedly the “Letter to a Bristol Artisan” (p. 128175), which, though dated in 1885, is now for the first
time published. This letter (which has been recently
criticised with force and ability by Mr. J. M. Robertson
in the columns of the National Reformer} is Mr. Wilson’s
reply to the pamphlet (published by W. H. Morrish, 18,
Narrow Wine St., Bristol), wherein “ A Bristol Artisan ”,
took up the theme of Mr. Wilson’s two lectures to the
Secularists of that city, on the reasons why men do not
believe the Bible. These lectures are contained in the
new volume (p. 74-127), having previously been published
by the Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge. The
artisan had not the same facilities for making his views
known, his pamphlet appeared in modest guise, and a
small edition has not yet been sold. If, on our side, we
had a society for promoting Secular knowledge, it might
do well to bring out a second edition of this remarkable

�iv

TO THE READER.

essay, and to ensure that every thinking man and woman
in England should have a chance of mastering its contents.
But at present the want of such machinery is one of the
great difficulties we have to contend against. I may,
however, say that this pamphlet has extorted the approval
of those most opposed to the artisan’s views. Mr. Wilson
says of it: “ your pamphlet has deeply interested me, not
only from its singular directness, and lucidity, and general
moderation of tone, but because it is full of misconceptions,
etc.” Another clergyman says of it that “ it will probably
be widely read and influential both for good and evil”.
And the general opinion seems to be that no more discreet
and inoffensive statement of the higher secular philosophy
has ever been published.
Those who have read Mr. Robertson’s criticisms on Mr.
Wilson’s reply to the artisan will be prepared to hear that
no such complimentary language, can, in its turn, be used
of it. At the same time it seems to me that Mr. Robert­
son has not fully realised the enormous advantage gained
for Secularism, by the admissions that the letter contains.
Mr. Robertson’s own mind is clear—his horizon free from
haze and mist; has he not forgotten that such clearness
of vision is rare in times of transition. One of our univer­
sities, in its proud motto, offers lux and pocula, light and
ceremonials. But in these days the retention of the pocula
involves too often the darkening of the lux. And not
only do the traditionary status and ecclesiastical endow­
ments of the Church of England, that Cambridge offers
to its graduates, tend to a frame of mind that shrinks
from the full blaze of the rays of truth, but other and
nobler ties are at work in the same direction—so noble
and so human that I should be sorry to cast up the charge
of nebulous inconsistency against the man whose light
faileth. Let us, however, thank Mr. Wilson for these
words: “It is absolutely necessary for you to grasp the
conception of religion, as being NOT a system of dogmas
about the being of God and his relation to man, revealed
by some external and supernatural machinery, but as
being an education, an evolution, a growth of the spirit
of man towards something higher, by means of a gradual
revelation.” Let us, I say, ponder well these words.
And let us ask Mr. Wilson to consider if he can put
bounds to this growth, and say, “ Thus far! ” or predict

�V

TO THE READER.

safely that at this time, or at that time, finality will be
reached.
If I were inclined to be critical, I would also ask Mr.
Wilson to reconcile his use of the word religion in the
above extract with the conception of it given in the
sermon he preached in St. Paul’s Cathedral, hereinafter
referred to.
But while anxious to award to Mr. Wilson all the merit
that is due to him, I am entirely at one with Mr. Robert­
son in considering that this attempt to treat matters of
faith by the methods of science has been (as all such
attempts must be) a complete failure.
In conclusion I gratefully accept Mr. Charles Bradlaugh’s
permission to dedicate to him, as one of the leaders of
sincere and active freethought—active because sincere—
this attempt to state the issue between Materialism on one
hand, and the indefinite faltering neo-Christianity on the
other, which is clerical rather than agnostic, agnostic
rather than religious.

s. s.
July, 1887.

��UNSCIENTIFIC RELIGION.
I.—Mr. Wilson’s Bristol Lectures.
[From the National Reformer of 16th September, 1883.]

The late Archbishop of Canterbury, who combined the
shrewdness of a Scot with the tact of a courtier, said some
years ago that Atheism should not be regarded as a heresy
to be condemned, but met as an argument, to be seriously
and temperately answered. The attitude thus recommended
has been adopted by several enlightened clergymen, and
will probably commend itself to many more. But if gentle­
men in “holy orders” quit the vantage ground of ortho­
doxy, and meet Secularists on even terms, they must take
the chances of war. Real argument implies that the side
which has the best of it shall carry conviction to the other;
and if the clergy cannot convert us, they run the risk of
being themselves converted. The game is a perilous one
for the clergy, but none the less are they bound in honor
to play it out.
The lectures before us are the first fruits of Dr. Tait’s
remark. Mr. Wilson, head master of Clifton School, is
one of the most distinguished of that noble band of workers
in the cause of morality that the churches of to-day are
producing. It were presumption for me to speak of the
character and merits of such a man: if anyone wishes to
learn them, let him ask the poor of Bristol. He delivered
these lectures to audiences of the working men of that
city about six months ago, and they have now been repub­
lished under the auspices of the Society for Promoting

�8

UNSCIENTIFIC RELIGION.

Christian Knowledge. The Spectator remarks that the
Society never did a bolder or a wiser thing than this ; and
many who take a broader view of the subjects discussed
than the Spectator does, will probably acquiesce in that
opinion.
Mr. Wilson addressed himself to the question, “ Why
men do not believe the Bible ”, and in the first lecture
considered the intellectual difficulties ; in the second, the
. moral difficulties. By intellectual difficulties, Mr. Wilson
means “ those which are the consequences of a particular
theory as to the necessity of a literal translation and the
verbal accuracy of the Bible”. This particular theory,
viz., that the Bible is verbally or mechanically inspired, is
not, Mr. Wilson asserts, laid down by the Church, nor
found in the Bible, nor was it taught by Jesus Christ or
his apostles. Up to the time that the Roman Empire
became Christian, and the Canon of Scripture was formed,
“ there was no thought of a divinely-guaranteed accuracy”.
Even after the Reformation, when the thirty-nine articles
were promulgated, “ there was no theory of inspiration”.
But as the study of the Bible became more popular, theories
of inspiration were started, especially that of Calvin, who
held “that from Genesis to Revelation the Bible is not
only the Word of God, but the words of God ; and it is this
theory that lands men in endless contradictions ”,
I will leave it to the followers and admirers of Calvin to
prove, as I expect they easily can prove, that the theory
of inspiration, which Mr. Wilson attributes to him, was
not his invention, but was commonly held in the Church
centuries before his time. This does not concern us much.
But before I pass on to what Mr. Wilson would have us
substitute for the Calvinistic theory of inspiration, I would
hint that he took an unfair advantage of us Secularists, in
saying that we have no warrant for putting into the mouths
of Christians a theory of verbal inspiration, when it is
notorious that his assertion that the Church of England
does not teach the verbal inspiration of the Bible, fell like
a thunderbolt on the Christian public. Nine-tenths of the
religious people in these kingdoms firmly believe the Bible
to be inspired. Secularists have to deal with popular
superstition, and not with the esoteric creed of a few
priests. The sixth article of religion is so worded that it
can perfectly cover, if needs be, the Calvinistic theory;

�UNSCIENTIFIC RELIGION.

9

and if it suits Mr. Wilson and his friends to say now that
“Holy Scripture” is not verbally inspired, he ought not
to blame Colonel Ingersoll for addressing himself to the
current belief. I strongly suspect that if these doubts as
to the authority of the Bible had not reached the great
mass of our countrymen, the doctrine now produced by
Canon Westcott and Mr. Wilson would not have been
much heard of. It is to be regretted that Archbishop
Benson has, in a letter printed in the preface to these
lectures, apparently supported Mr. Wilson’s complaint of
Colonel Ingersoll.
The fact is, that Secularists make little use of the
Calvinistic theory of the Bible. It is to the book itself,
and not to any theory of it, that their apprehensions point.
They regard it as the history, more or less authentic, of a
small nation whose social ostracism is a fitting reward for
moral delinquency, and who have made themselves more
detested than any other race of men. They cannot admit
that the history of such a race, curious and interesting as
it is, ought to be our guide and standard here and now.
It was a rhetorical artifice, and nothing more, to bring
into contrast Colonel Ingersoll and Canon Westcott; clever
and momentarily effective, but attended with no permanent
gain. Mr. Wilson’s subsequent admission (page 31), that
some of his friends urged “ You will unsettle more than
you will help; you will shake the faith of believers, and
not convert the sceptics ”, proves that Colonel Ingersoll
was right and Canon Westcott wrong, in their estimate of
popular theology.
Mr. Wilson would remove from the portal of the temple
the bogey of Calvinism ; unsuspecting worshippers are to
be invited to enter ; but once inside the temple, and belief
in inspiration is the atmosphere they breathe : “ Let men
read the gospels as they would read any other book, with
any theory of inspiration, or with none; with the one aim
of learning the truth about Jesus Christ ”, and if this is
done in a proper spirit, Mr. Wilson promises that they will
soon get the belief in inspiration, though they may not be
able to define it. Is this so? Does an absolute rejection
of the Calvinistic theory, followed by careful, patient,
honest study of the Bible, lead men to be Christians, or to
form such an estimate of the character of Jesus Christ as
enables them to recognise him as God ? Experience

�10

UNSCIENTIFIC RELIGION.

meets Mr. Wilson’s promise with, no dubious or uncertain
answer.
Mr. Wilson avoids any definition of that theory which
he would have us substitute for Calvin’s. He says he can
no more define inspiration than he can define “ God”, and
that he can no more prove inspiration than he can listen
to the colors of the rainbow. It is surely irrational and
immoral to believe a theory that can neither be defined or
proved. Some clearly defined theory may commend itself
as possibly credible, even if it cannot be proved, but it
seems romantic, if not impossible, to believe without defi­
nition and without demonstration.
And here I would make a protest and an appeal. The
late Archbishop, and clergymen like Mr. Wilson, expect,
and invite us to meet them in discussion. Do they consider
that we do so with halters round our necks ? We may
freely discuss morality, and the non-essentials of religion,
but to deny by advised speaking or printing the truth of
the Christian religion, entails the penalties of that statute
of William and Mary, which Lord Coleridge termed
“ferocious” and “shocking”. Can not Mr. Wilson and
his friends help in getting the statute law and the common
law amended ? And cannot they give an earnest of their
sympathies, by signing the memorial to Mr. Gladstone for
Messrs. Foote and Ramsey’s release that is printed at the
head of page 265 of the Freethinker for 26tli August. Our
unhappy friends have now been thirty long weeks in gaol.
What is left of the “Christian religion ” that the statute
of William and Mary, joint defenders of the faith, so
jealously guarded? The Court of Queen’s Bench has by
mandamus lopped off the devil; Canon Farrar’s sermons
have eliminated hell; the Trinity is threatened when the
Athanasian creed is expunged; and now Mr. Wilson tells
us that inspiration is no part of it. Whatever happens,
let us hope that no blasphemous hand will touch the 36th
Article of religion that treats of the consecration of bishops.
So long as they are maintained in pomp and power,
Christianity has no cause to fear.
The moral difficulty in the way of belief in the Bible
with which Mr. Wilson’s second lecture deals, is thus
described: that as the Bible tolerates, or even approves
of, various forms of immorality, such as slavery, murder,
polygamy, cruelty, and treachery, it is hard to accept of

�UNSCIENTIFIC RELIGION.

11

the God of the Bible as an object of worship. I don’t
think that Mr. Wilson has fully guaged the depth and
strength of the moral difficulty felt by Secularists and
Freethinkers, but accepting his statement of it, as above
summarised, let us examine his mode of meeting it.
He admits that many of the persons mentioned in the
Bible as objects of God’s favor, are not fair examples of
moral goodness, and that some of their actions are unworthy
of our imitation. To get out of the Bible the moral teaching
that it contains, we must read between the lines, and dis­
cover “the working out and the development of the idea
of the kingdom of God ”. From the history of the “training
of a typical nation ” (the Jews) we are to “ trace the growth
of a purer morality, of personal responsibility, of the
spirituality of God, of the thought of a future life”. He
thinks that “ facts point unmistakably to the Jews as the
nation that formed the chief channel for divine influence
in religion”, qualifying this by the proviso that “the
morality of the Old Testament is no pattern for us, except
so far as our own consciences, enlightened by the completed
revelation, approve ”. This, I take it, is a fair summary,
mainly in his own words, of what Mr. Wilson told the
working-men of Bristol.
Close observation of these two lectures will show that
Mr. Wilson avoided in the second the line of argument
adopted in the first. When discussing the intellectual
difficulty, he said the theory of inspiration that Secularists
attributed to the Church was neither taught by it nor
found in the Articles of Religion, but was a man of straw,
set up for the purpose of being knocked down. He might
have said the same of the theory of God’s providence and
moral government.
The words “Kingdom of God”,
“ Morality ”, and “ Providence ” do not occur in any of the
Articles. The word “ moral ” occurs only once, in the
seventh Article, which speaks of “ the commandments
which are called moral ”. Mr. Wilson might then have
spoken of the moral difficulty, in the same form of words
as he used for the intellectual difficulty: “What I say will
doubtless surprise some of you, both Christians and
Secularists, but it is an undeniable fact that the Articles
of Religion do not assert that the Bible contains a moral
standard, or that God governs as well as reigns ”. That
he has not adopted this line of reasoning proves the truth

�12

UNSCIENTIFIC RELIGION.

of the remark recently made in these columns : “ Religion
seeks to secure her frail tenure by grasping the skirt of
that holy piorality who was once but her timid and shrinking
handmaid”.1 Mr. Wilson had the same ground for treating
the moral difficulty as a man of straw, as he had in regard
to the intellectual difficulty; but instead of doing so, he
has eagerly enlisted him as a valiant champion on his own
side.
The future of human happiness and morality, Mr. Wilson
would have us believe, depends on the esoteric teaching
derived by learned men from a number of treatises, written
we know not by whom and know not when; in an ancient
language few can read; of which no original exists (save
for some possible speculation of a future Shapira); and
about whose text and interpretation the best authorities
seldom agree. We learn from the first lecture that their
claim to inspiration is shadowy, undefined, and incapable
of proof; and from the second lecture that they contain a
veiled, and not a revealed, record of the will of God as
governor of the world. When these treatises agree about
any moral law, or in their estimate of the moral worth of
any human action, we are by no means to accept this as a
guide or pattern, but we must try to ascertain what indi­
cation is to be derived, from the history contained in the
Bible, of the general course of God’s providence in respect
to the Jews; and this indication, when obtained, is to be
subject to the veto of “ conscience ”. Is this a satisfactory
or practicable system of philosophy ?
What is conscience ? We may regard it as a knowledge
of, and fidelity to, the stored-up experience of generations
of men, as to what is best for human happiness on earth.
If Mr. Wilson accepts this definition of conscience, he
virtually accepts the secular philosophy. But whatever
definition he may give of conscience, why is it to have a
veto on the morality of the Old Testament, and not on the
morality of the New Testament ?
Let us apply Mr. Wilson’s system to a case of every day
life. The question arises whether a man may marry the
sister of his deceased wife. From a purely ethical point
of view the advantages preponderate over the objections.
But what does the Bible say ? is at once asked. The Bible
See National Reformer, 8th July, 1883, page 22.

�UNSCIENTIFIC RELIGION.

13

gives an uncertain sound, but its more weighty texts are
supposed to be against such marriages. But Mr. Wilson
says we may not be guided by texts, but by the “ history
of the development of the kingdom of God, as worked out
in the case of the Jews ”. Laymen are puzzled, and refer
the matter to divines. Divines differ—some say the pro­
posed marriage accords with that development, some say it
does not. Eventually a clear majority decide one way or
the other, it matters not which. Even then Mr. Wilson is
not satisfied, but would appeal to “Conscience”. Why
not let conscience decide it at first without all this
ceremony ?
It is hardly necessary to observe that the theory of
Biblical morality set up by Mr. Wilson, is, like Canon
Westcott’s theory of inspiration, new to the religious
public. Both have been evolved by the “ struggle for
existence ”. But for the certain and now ra,pid action of
Ereethought, we should not have heard of either. A few
years ago, and anyone who said that Mooses and Abraham
and David were immoral characters deserving censure,
would have been treated as a blasphemer. Mr. Wilson
has discovered that it is right and just to submit the
character and deeds of these old Jews to a tribunal and a
test, that may possibly brand them as foul disgraces to
humanity, and confirm the hatred with which in all ages
the uncircumcised Gentiles have regarded God s chosen
people, which is nearly as strong now as in the days of
Pharoah, and of Nebuchadnezzar, and of Titus. Freethought has scored a considerable success in eliciting such
admissions as Mr. Wilson has made. Wb are almost pre­
pared to concede to him the claim he made at last year s
Church Congres, that clergymen are Freethinkers. At all
events, some of them, if not actually Freethinkers, are not
unwilling captives at the chariot wheels of Freethought,
and will swell her approaching triumph.
In these remarks I have treated only of the more im­
portant and essential parts of Mr. Wilson’s two lectures.
There is much in them, and especially in the second lecture,
for the adequate notice of which more space is needed than
the columns of a newspaper can afford. The lectures form
an important point in the struggle between Superstition
and Freethought, and ought to be studied by all, on both
sides, who are interested in its issue. May I express my

�14

UNSCIENTIFIC RELIGION.

admiration of the learning, liberality, and rare human
sympathy they breathe? In the knowledge and love of
of man, they recall some high exemplars. Even if Mr.
Wilson has not succeeded in the objects with which his
lectures were given, he has secured the warm thanks and
true well-wishing of all Secularists, not those of Bristol
only.1

II.—Religion v. Revelation.
[From the National Reformer, 16th November, 1884 J

The Rev. Mr. Wilson, whose two lectures on “Inspira­
tion” were reviewed in these columns last year, has pub­
lished two sermons that he preached some months ago.
The first, entitled “Opinion and Service”, was preached
in Westminster Abbey, and reminds us that the question
to be asked of us will be, What have ye done ? and not
What did ye think? The second sermon, entitled “Religion
and Revelation ”, was preached in St. Paul’s Cathedral.
Both sermons—but especially the second one—prove the
extent to which Church teaching has been influenced by
hostile criticism, and what is now thought on these con­
troversial points by that section of enlightened Christian
men that Mr. Wilson represents.
In reviewing the Bristol lectures, we indicated the
following concessions that they made to Freethought.
(1) Mr. Wilson rejected the Calvinistic theory of inspira­
tion, and condemned it as “landing men in endless con­
tradictions”. (2) He professed himself unable to define
or prove the theory of inspiration which he would have
us substitute for Calvin’s. (3) He admitted that the Bible
revealed no immutable standard of morality, but that its
moral teaching must be sought for “ between the lines ”.
And (4) that, when found, it was not supreme, but sub1 Possibly this estimate of the value of the Bristol lectures may to
some persons appear too favorable, but I will leave unaltered the
terms in which I expressed the opinion that I originally formed of
them. Of course, my estimate refers to the lectures only, and does
not apply to the other writings included in Mr. Wilson’s volume
S. S.

�UNSCIENTIFIC RELIGION.

15

ject to the veto of conscience. Not only are these con­
cessions still maintained in the sermon before us, but in
other directions a retreat is sounded, and vantage ground
gained for the implacable foe of theology.
Taking that which is known as “religion” in the popular
and vague meaning assigned to it, the preacher divided it
into the idea, power, or spirit, which he termed “revela­
tion”, and the expression cultus or form to which he con­
fined the word “religion”. He regarded revelation as
ever antagonistic to religion, describing the latter as a
universal human instinct common to all races, savage and
civilised; dark and terrible in its history; stained with
idolatry, cruelty, and lust. On the other hand, he would
have us regard revelation as a divine work, spiritual,
accumulative, and imperishable, ever striving with the low
religious instinct, and illuminating and guiding man.1
Here I must ask if history affords any trace of this
struggle between revelation and religion, or if it exists
only in Mr. Wilson’s imagination? We know of the strife
between the ideas of the divine and the human, between
Spiritualism and Materialism, and that for long ages it
has been one-sided and unequal; we know that the idea
of man and matter is at length superseding that of God
and spirit; that securing the happiness of man is of more
importance than ascertaining the will of God; that human
affairs depend on ourselves, and not on the moral govern­
ment of a personal God. This great strife is tending to
the enlightenment and advancement of our race, but it is
not the strife described by Mr. Wilson. Revelation is not
mastering religion as he suggests, but religion and revela­
tion combined are about to fade away before morality.
The revelation that is on the winning side is not the
revelation of God’s will, but the revelation of man’s
reason.
All so-called divine revelations rest on the religious
instinct, spring from it, and strengthen it. The two are
inseparable, and history gives no indication of an inter1 One great merit of scientific system is accuracy of definition and
rigid adherence t &gt; a definition once laid down. If we compare the
meaning of the term “religion” given in the passages now referred
to with the conception of it that is inculcated in the passage quoted
in the introduction to this work we shall be able to estimate the
extreme tenuity of Mr. Wilson’s claim to scientific method. S. S.

�16

UNSCIENTIFIC RELIGION.

necine strife between them. On the contrary, they have
ever fought side by side against human reason and Freethought. Can Mr. Wilson find any instance of a stake or
rack or pillory having been used on behalf of revelation
against religion, or on behalf of religion against revela­
tion ? It is surely vain for him to say that a sentence like
this: “To obey is better than sacrifice” is revelation,1
while this other is religion: “And the Lord spake unto
Moses, saying .... He among the sons of Aaron that
offereth the blood of the peace offering shall have the
right shoulder. For the wave-breast and the heave
shoulder have i taken of the children of Israel, and have
given them unto Aaron the Priest, and unto his sons by
a statute for ever.” By what process of reading between
the lines does he venture to designate Samuel’s words as
revelation, and God’s words as religion? Mr. Wilson says
that “the cry ‘crucify him, crucify him,’ is the climax and
acme of the ceaseless contest between the lower religious
instincts of the human race and the higher divine light
that pours on men”. But supposing that the crucifixion
really occurred, that the record of it is not (as Eobert
Taylor avers) a Gnostic forgery emanating from Egypt,
that old hotbed of superstition and lies, why should we
regard that crucified “blasphemer” as “the unique
revealer of God ” ? Why should we not regard him as a
son of man, himself the slave of religion, using such poor
reasoning faculty as he possessed to expose the fraud and
hypocrisy of a priesthood ? What Jesus Christ revealed
was human, and not divine; and he died, not as a revealer
at the suit of religion, but as a reasoner at the suit of
revelation. For our knowledge of divinity we are indebted
to the Comforter, who never died for us.
Let Mr. Wilson tell us in his own words what he means
by revelation:
“The word ‘revelation’ implies a theory; it is a way of
regarding and grouping facts. The facts are the history of
man, the development, continuous and discontinuous, of the
spiritual insight and forces of mankind. These facts are what

1 The 15th chapter of 1 Samuel, from which Mr. Wilson quote
these words, is one we should have expected him to ignore, lhe
obedience inculcated by Samuel was an awful crime, and Saul’s clear
duty was to have disobeyed the order.
d

�UNSCIENTIFIC RELIGION.

17

they are, and we may hope by study to arrive at some know­
ledge of them. But we need theories to group facts; and the
theory which is expressed by the word revelation is this, that
man is, in his present condition, a partaker in some inchoate
manner of that controlling universal consciousness which we
call God; which illuminates the mind and conscience of man :
that man is, or possesses, a ^&gt;avepwcri9, a manifestation of God.
The control of God is exhibited in its effects, and one of the
effects is the moral education and evolution of man. The
growth, then, and development of this manifestation of the
spirit of God in man, and by man, and to man, is revelation.”

I fear that Mr. Wilson’s attempt to construct a safe
theory of revelation is as unsatisfactory as his attempt to
deal with inspiration. Why should any “way of regarding
and grouping facts ” be styled revelation and not science ?
What facts are there to be grouped ? The history of man
is not a fact, but a theory resting on facts. The “develop­
ment of man’s spiritual insight ” is not a fact, but a theory
resting on fictions. What is “spiritual insight”? from
what has it been developed ? what is it tending to ? Does
not the use of the word “spiritual” beg the whole question
of inspiration and revelation ? Mr. Wilson here seems to
fall into the same error that led Mr. Drummond to argue
for the existence of a spiritual world governed by natural
law.
Human history needs no belief in revelation for group­
ing the facts it records. The best historians eschew all
reference to a controlling providence. Sir Archibald
Alison wrote twenty volumes to prove that Providence
was always on the side of the Tories; but who reads Sir
Archibald Alison ? Beal history (such as Gibbon’s) cannot
be written if any such theory as Mr. Wilson’s “Revela­
tion ” is used to group its facts.
Let us continue our quotation from Mr. Wilson :
“ To those who are deeply impressed with God’s influence on
the hearts of man, to those who grasp this God-theory—this
revelation-theory—it carries conviction. They read and see the
history of man in its light—they see the Spirit striving with
man—the Eternal Consciousness more and more revealed in the
inchoate, time-bound individual. All the world of nature and
history speaks of God. It is a theory which man cannot per­
fectly master, nor apply to every detail, nor prove conclusively
to all minds; but in spite of this it convinces such as grasp it,

�18

UNSCIENTIFIC RELIGION.

Discovery becomes indistinguishable from revelation.
the work of God.”

All is

Passing by those parts of this quotation that are to me
incomprehensible, I would ask if this reference to a “ God­
theory ” is not either a palpable truism, or a misstatement
of facts. Those who worshipped the Olympian Zeus, or
Venus of the Myrtle-tree, or Diana of Ephesus; those who
built the great temples of Hindustan; the Mahomedans
who say that there is no God but Allah; were not all these
imbued with the God-idea, and did they know of this
eternal strife between revelation and religion ? If on the
other hand the idea of God to which Mr. Wilson refers
implies a being hostile to religion, and governing mankind
by a slow and partial process of revelation, then his sen­
tence simply amounts to this, that those who believe it,
believe it. Does this carry conviction to the great and
constantly increasing mass of mankind who cannot grasp
the God-idea ? They cannot “ see the spirit striving with
man”, but they see man’s reason striving with religion
and superstition. Mr. Wilson elsewhere says that it is
found possible by experience “ to feel all human history
instinct with God”.
Does he realize the fact that
those who have once grasped the profound solace of
Materialistic philosophy see all theological dogma instinct
with man ?
With reference to such men, those “who have abandoned
our dogma and are indifferent to our cultus ”, Mr. Wilson
remarks as follows :
“It is perhaps our fault if they think that this is all that
Christianity has to offer. But they do not and cannot escape
from the Christian revelation, even though they call it by
another name. It is light; and in that light some of them live
and walk; and the cultus, the ritual, the OpytTKeia which they
adopt may not be wholly dissimilar to that ‘ pure ’ cultus or
ritual or 6pt}&lt;TK£M of St. James, which consists in charity and
purity and unworldliness, and is, along with the sacraments,
the only Christian ritual ordained in the Bible.”

Here at least is consolation; whether we believe or
reject the dogma, the work of revelation will go on. Why,
then, should we force and strain our reason to accept a
theory which does not depend on our acceptance of it, but
which must remain true whether we accept it or not ?

�UNSCIENTIFIC RELIGION.

19

Better to maintain the rectitude and supremacy of our
reason, knowing that we shall not lose one iota of the
benefit of revelation. Is this Mr. Wilson’s advice? It
seems unanswerable.
Mr. Wilson’s own position as regards religion seems
to be delineated in the following sentences :—
“ But for the vast mass of mankind it is of far more import­
ance to hand down to them and through them the leading
truths of revelation in any form, than to insist on the inade­
quacy of the form. Of course men trained, as men ought to he
trained, to criticise and question everything, may feel that the
cultus and dogma of Christianity in its present form, if put
forward and insisted on as absolute, authoritative, exhaustive
truths, are a concealment of the higher light; and their honestyr
compels them to renounce and even to denounce them. But
when such men come in contact with their less critical brethren,
whose convictions and hopes and faiths must be clear, defined,
emphatic, dogmatic, to whom vaguer and more philosophical
expressions convey no meaning, they will discover that the
language in which revelation is transferable to them is, to a far
larger extent than they anticipated before trial, the current
language of cultus and dogma. They will be powerless.to find
another shell for the kernel. Nevertheless, such men will fear­
lessly purify their teaching from the grosser dogmas from which
Christian teaching is by no means wholly free, and will try to
contend, to a certain extent, with the lower religious instinct
in the true spirit of their Master, educating their people to feel
the spirit, and not only see the letter.”

Some of this quotation describes the position of Secu­
larists as well as of enlightened Churchmen. But in one
essential point our morality differs from theirs. Holding
as we do that the whole nut, shell and kernel alike, is
poisonous, we do not retain a worthless shell for the sake
of the kernel, but we boldly tell our less “critical
brethren ” to beware of both.
So far, therefore, as Mr. Wilson represents a distinct
school of thought, whose influence in the church is on the
increase, we may from this sermon, preached in our great
national cathedral, claim this further concession to Freethought, that religion is hateful, injurious, and of human
origin, and that it is committed to a long and eventually
losing strife. That is a clear advantage. It matters not
that Mr. Wilson would see a divine revelation in the power
that is to overcome religion. Let him cherish the delusion.

�20

UNSCIENTIFIC RELIGION.

—we know that it is man’s reason and not God’s spirit
that has maintained the glorious, and soon to be victorious,
conflict.1

III.—Religion

v.

Revelation.

[From the National Reformer of the 30th November, 1884.]

The theory of a ceaseless strife between the spirit of
God and religion, propounded in the remarkable sermon
preached at St. Paul’s Cathedral and recently reviewed
here, is so novel and startling as to justify a closer examination than was then attempted. It is with all the greater
pleasure that we again refer to it, because Mr. Wilson’s
opinions deserve, in no ordinary measure, our respect and
attention ; for no English churchman has made such efforts
as he has to understand the position of Secularists, or has
shown such a disposition to discuss philosophy with us on
terms of equality.
Freethinkers are in the habit of ascribing to human
reason the gradual illumination of man, and his liberation
from superstition. The claim, therefore, that these benefits
are due to the influence or spirit of a God who hates
superstition as much as any Secularist does, is well cal­
culated to arrest our attention.
I have already quoted Mr. Wilson’s definition of the
revelation to which he attributes such vast results ; and I
have attempted to show that before his hypothesis can be
placed before us for acceptance he must state with greater
precision what facts there are for theorising about. Of
ourselves we have no knowledge of such facts, and are
entirely dependent on him for information about them.
He tells us the facts are “the history of man, and the
development of the spiritual insight and forces of man­
kind ”, It is surely on the propounder of a novel theory
1 The words “Let him cherish the delusion” have a shade of
bitterness, and I should prefer to say * Let biw , if be can, prove
his new position; till it is proved we must hold that it is’man’s
reason, and not God’s spirit, that has maintained the conflict. ”,
S. S.

�UNSCIENTIFIC RELIGION.

21

that the onus lies of defining the historical facts on which
it rests. History contains many facts, but I can recall
none for the grouping of which this hypothesis is required.
Let us enumerate a few; the siege of Troy and the sacri­
fice of Polyxena at the tomb of Achilles; the rape of the
Sabine women and the death of Lucretia; the invention
of printing and the discovery of America; the Oxford
movement and the establishment of the Divorce Court.
These facts lend themselves to scientific grouping in every
direction save one; they may be arranged in support of
theories in morals and politics, arts and science, educa­
tion and political economy; they will even support Mr.
Wilson’s theory of religion; but the one thing on which
they have no apparent bearing is the ceaseless strife between
a divine revelation and religion.
As regards the so-called facts of spiritual development
on which Mr. AVilson relies, the sermon before us does not
furnish so clear a statement as is contained in a paper
which he read in 1882, before the Church Congress at
Derby, from which therefore we quote as follows:
“ Besides these facts of history and criticism, there are other
facts that cannot be traced to their ultimate origin ; the result
of the evolution of human nature under the influence, as we
believe, of God’s holy spirit; the facts of conscience and con­
sciousness, of hope and aspiration and worship, spiritual facts
which have no verification but themselves. With these lies most
of our concern. They contain the germ of the spiritual life
and progress of every man, the inner life which Christian
teaching fosters and trains, till it is supreme. These facts lie
in a region equally beyond authority and Freethought.

I submit that every phrase here used—evolution, con­
science, consciousness, aspiration, and worship—requires
definition. At first sight I should say that none of them
implied a fact; but it is possible I may be mistaken.
Still, without definition, we know not what facts are
implied and whether the facts are objective or spiritual.
Here again the onus of definition and proof lies on the
propounder. It is vain to tell men who profess to see no
phsenomena that prove the existence of a God that from
spiritual facts implied in such vague phrases as I have
quoted, and which “ have no verification but themselves ”,
they must admit not only the existence of a God but that
he has a spirit also.

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UNSCIENTIFIC RELIGION.

Having thus attempted to show that Mr. Wilson's
theory of revelation must remain in the hypothetical stage
until it is duly equipped with scientific definition and
demonstration, we will turn to his a posteriori sketch of
the history of revelation. The first instance he gives of
its existence is when it ‘ ‘ spoke in Moses and made the two
great commandments, love to God and man, stand out
above all else”. I am unaware of this event. Moses is
said to have received ten commandments, one of which
may be read as prescribing love to God (as if love
was ever a creature of command), but they contain
no trace of love to man. The precedence given by
Moses to an enforced and unnatural love of God.
and his silence about human love, far from illumi­
nating our race, has caused much of the evil that Mi*.
Wilson attributes to religion. I have already referred to
the second instance of revelation mentioned in the sermon :
“when it spoke in Samuel and taught the nations” that
command which King Saul was dethroned for disobeying.
I am confident that an impartial consideration of the
chapter referred to will lead to the conclusion that Samuel’s
speech was the reverse of illumination. The third instance
is when “ it spoke in David and in the prophets again and
again in words too familiar to need quotation ” : I know
not what passages Mr. Wilson refers to. There are many
verses in David and the prophets that inculcate religion in
its worst form; 1 can recall none that have helped to
suppress it. Then, Mr. Wilson says, from the time of
Ezra, for four centuries “ the natural growth of thought
and revelation was strangled by the grasp of religion”.
Here surely is a new idea introduced into the theory by
the use of the words “natural” and “thought”. Is the
spirit of God a natural force; and has it, like man, the power
of thinking ? But passing this difficulty, methinks that in
these four centuries man’s reason achieved some deeds of
renown. Buddha, Socrates, and Confucius taught; the
Spartans fought at Thermopylae; Sophocles wrote the
“Antigone”; Euclid, the “Elements”; and Lucretius,
the “ Book of Nature ” ; and human art will never surpass
the unknown sculptors of the Venus and the Apollo. We
got on so well in those four centuries when revelation
was hushed that one is tempted to ask if its revival has
bettered us. Let the eighteen centuries of Christianity

�UNSCIENTIFIC RELIGION.

23

and the twelve centuries of Mahomedanism answer the
query.
After this pause a fresh impetus was given to revelation
by the life and teaching of Jesus Christ. “ Obedience to
the will of God, purity, gentleness, sympathy with all, with
the sinful and the suffering, these and such as these were
the lessons taught by his life.” But it has been asserted
that none of the lofty sayings attributed to Jesus in the
three synoptic gospels were original: they are all said to
have occurred in some earlier writing; and even if we
give him the credit of selecting the best sentiments of those
who went before him, we must not forget that it was he
who said : “ I came not to send peace, but a sword ” (Matt,
x., 44), and that this prediction has been fulfilled. Not
even to his own Church has he brought peace, still less to
the world. “He abolished ritual” ; so did Buddha. He
‘‘broke down barriers of race and caste” ; if so, why do
they still exist? “He introduced no new dogma”; but
the Comforter, that Spirit of God whom he sent—the same,
I presume, who works for our illumination through revela­
tion—has introduced much dogma. Of this final effort of
revelation and its success Mr. Wilson says truly: “The
religious instinct is strong; it is deep in human nature,
and at times it would seem as if it had smothered the
revelation of Christ”.
Mr. Wilson has declined to define God. A God who has
a spirit engaged in a ceaseless strife against religion, and
which has been so near failure, suggests paradoxical ideas
that cannot be clothed in definite terms. But though he
does not define, he believes; and on this belief or con­
sciousness he founds the theology that he preaches. Many
learned divines hold that a theology resting on conscious­
ness is insufficient, and that it requires the support of the
understanding as well. Whether consciousness is of itself
an adequate basis for theology is a question for the theo­
logian, and does not concern us. No consciousness or
belief, either in his own mind or the mind of others, can
Influence the earnest student of secular philosophy. To
him such a theory as this, that rests both in its d priori
aspect of hypothesis and in its a posteriori aspect of history,
on unverifiable faets and sentimental consciousness, must
fail to commend itself, even if without it the history of
man were inexplicable.

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UNSCIENTIFIC RELIGION.

But it is not so : we do not find in our history any
entanglement that is insoluble save by the theory of a
divine spirit; we can group all man’s varied story, by man
himself, his passions and desires, his conscience and reason.
Surely that theory is better which rests on facts that can
be verified, which explains our history, which solves past
difficulty and future doubt—better than one which sets up
an agency whose very existence is an emotion, and whose
interference in mundane affairs is a mystery, for the solu­
tion of which we must eat of the fruit of the tree of knowledge of good and evil.
In these two articles I have tried to look at Mr. Wilson’s
theory from the point of view of a Secularist, and from the
point of view of a Christian. To a Materialist it must
appear illusory. But there are many Christians to whom
it will be welcome as a resting-place, or half-way house.
Those who recognise the hatefulness of religion, the hol­
lowness of dogma, the impossibility of miracles, the con­
tradiction of inspiration, the supremacy of morals, the
one-ness of human nature, the eternity of matter, and the
persistence of force; who cannot as yet relinquish the idea
of a personal God who takes some interest, however partial
and indirect, in our affairs, and who stands towards us in
some relation that implies mutual obligation—such men
may gladly accept the philosophy of this sermon. I should
be inclined, however, to predict that they will find it is but
a temporary refuge, and that the only secure citadel rests
on the everlasting rocks.

IV.—Authority

v.

Consent.

[From, the National Reformer of 14th December, 1884.]

The honest and persistent expression of secular opinion is
at length producing some effect on the public mind. We
address ourselves to all shades of religious thought. We
meet the unprincipled assertions of interested priests and
their too credulous flocks with satire and disapproval’;
those who show an inclination to argue we invite freely to

�UNSCIENTIFIC RELIGION.

25

discussion ; and the thoughtful men who see the instability
of the popular conception of religion and who desire to
understand the secular position are met half way, and are
sure of our best help to enable them to grasp those truths
which are our great consolation. As- befits the guardians
and expositors of truth, we strive to keep our walk and
conversation unspotted and free from reproach, so as to
show our fellows that morality is not dependent on belief.
We make all due allowance for the hereditary taint of
bigotry and intolerance, feeling that religion is an instinct
of primitive and uncivilised man, and that its errors arise
from no divine intervention, but from the ignorance and
weakness of our race. Though assured of the ultimate
triumph of truth, we accept with patience and forbearance,
while the contest lasts, the rude buffets, the social and
political disability which the laws of this country allot to
unbelievers, knowing that deep down in the heart of
England lies a feeling of justice, which must eventually
ensure for earnest men and women a fair hearing and no
disfavor. This is all we require; and when we obtain it
we shall gladly leave our own opinions and those of our
opponents to stand or fall by the test of truth.
I have been led to make these remarks on the present
position of Secularists by some statements in a paper on
the limits of Freethought and Authority read by the Rev.
J. M. Wilson at the Church Congress of 1882; because I
think that wide as is that gentleman’s charity, and broad
as are his views, he has failed to perceive that the weight
of authority is on our side, and not on that of his Church.
With much of Mr. Wilson’s paper we may agree. He
has accurately defined Freethought, and appreciates its
value ; he recognises its natural limits, and strongly depre­
cates any artificial limits ; he properly urges that between
it and authority there is not a relation of mutual exclusion,
but of mutual inter-dependence ; but when he speaks of
the consent of the past as an authority, and claims for it
in religion and morals the weight of authority, we are
bound to express our dissent.
I shall first quote the sentences where expression is given
to those opinions that I differ from, and having done so I
will state my views as to the real meaning of the words
“Authority” and “Consent”.
After stating that no artificial limit can be imposed on

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UNSCIENTIFIC RELIGION.

the mind of man, and that even the creeds and tests of a
Church must from time to time be interpreted and revised
so as to bring them into accordance with progressive know­
ledge, he proceeds :
“Nor, again, is there any limit to authority. Heredity,
education, the weight given instinctively to established beliefs’
the vast momentum of long-standing habits and institutions,
give to the past an influence on the present, which secures con­
tinuity amidst change, and makes progress steady. In other
words, there exists a natural authority, subtle, groundless, far
stronger than any artificial authority, and resented by none.
NV e are held by the past, not to our harm, but our good:
nursed by it, trained by it, for growth and for the right use of
freedom.”

Further on, speaking of the weight of authority in dif­
ferent branches of knowledge, he uses these words :
“We shall see that the weight to be assigned to a great
consensus of opinion in the past depends on the subject. In
objective fact it is nil............. In criticism the weight is very
small............. In theology it is far higher.................. In ethics it is
highest of all, because the axioms of ethics—honesty, justice,
patriotism, filial obedience, monogamy, purity—rest on such
an enormous mass of observed facts and experience in human
nature. In these subjects it is so high that we are right in
treating Free Thought, or rather its consequence, free action,
as a crime.”

It seems to me that Mr. Wilson has here confused the
two methods by which a man unable or unwilling to
investigate a subject for himself may arrive at an opinion
thereon without investigation. These methods are reliance
on authority, and reliance on consent. They are of very
different value, but are here treated as identical. We
may form an opinion on the authority of others, if we are
satisfied of the observance of three conditions: (1) That
their sagacity and intelligence is adequate ; (2) that they
have maturely studied the subject under consideration ;
and (3) that they are free from bias, interest, or compul­
sion. Given these conditions, and we bow to trustworthy
authority; if they are wanting, we feel hesitation and
distrust. No one would trust the advice or opinion of a
professional man whose intellect, or acquirements, or
integrity was doubtful.
But this highest form of authority is ignored by Mr.

�UNSCIENTIFIC RELIGION.

27

Wilson. When he speaks of authority, he refers to such
influences as these,—heredity, education, long-standing
habits, consensus of past opinion, experience of human
nature. This is not authority but consent. Idle, in­
different, or superficial men may use it as a guide, but no
earnest inquirer after truth can accept of it as a limit to,
or substitute for, Freethought. If the “consensus of the
past ” had continued to influence us, slavery would still
have been legal, and scores of wretches would have been
hanged every Monday morning at some modern substitute
for Tyburn. Fortunately, in some respects, we are a
practical people.
To secure the higher form of authority I have described,
absolute freedom of thought is indispensable; and no
thought is free that is bound by the weight of past con­
sensus. Knowledge and experience are requisite, but they
must be used as guides and not accepted as limits. Other­
wise the thought is fettered, and the opinion valueless as
authority.
In estimating the value of the opinion of another as
authority, the third condition—that of freedom from bias,
self-interest, and compulsion—is of such great importance
that there is apnma facie reason for preferring the opinion
of a Freethinker (I use the word in its common acceptation).
Given equal intelligence and study, the opinion of a man
who incurs obloquy by professing it, is more likely to be
authoritative than that of a man who conforms to Mrs.
Grundy and the “usages of society ”,
The higher form of authority is wanting in regard to
religion. Most dogmas are beyond human intellect, and
no man ever existed whose opinion is authority for be­
lieving such a doctrine as the trinity. Nor is the study
that Churchmen bring to bear on religious matters such
as to command our confidence. It has no scientific value,
and is bound by foregone conclusions. I shall wait till
the third condition is seriously claimed for apologists
before I dispute it, merely remarking that martyrdoms do
not consecrate with the halo of authority the opinions for
which men and women have died deaths of agony.
Though every church has its martyr roll, it has also its
black list of those who have suffered for free or for
fettered thought, at its suit, and because they differed
from it. Our fellow men have been so ready to die for all

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UNSCIENTIFIC RELIGION.

sorts of irrational emotions that it is easier to inquire for
oneself than to decide which of the martyrs is worthy to
be followed as a guide.
I admit, therefore, all the influence claimed for Consent
in the first of the two extracts quoted above. The influence
exists, and has some good and some bad effects : we think
the bad effects preponderate, and we object to its being
elevated into the position of Authority.
Turning to the second extract above quoted, I shall very
briefly state three objections of a more formidable nature
than any hitherto made. Mr. Wilson seems desirous to
impose on Freethought, in regard to morals, far more
stringent bonds than he would impose in regard to religion;
a course that appears to me so dangerous that I shall be
very glad to learn that I have mistaken the drift of his
opinion. My objections are: (1) The six “virtues”
named by Mr. Wilson are not axioms of ethics nor axioms
at all; an axiom must contain a statement of fact or opinion.
(2) Not one of the virtues named implies an idea that can
be transformed into axiomatic shape, resting on past con­
sent and adapted for future guidance. Let Mr. Wilson
try, as regards “Patriotism”, to construct an axiom for
the guidance of an Irish Nationalist, or, as regards
“Monogamy”, to construct one for a Turkish Pasha: he
will find that the light thrown by the past on the path of
the future is dim, indirect, and apt to mislead; and that
the “ authority ” of one man is more valuable than the
consent of millions. (3) So soon as Freethought condemns
an ethical rule that rests on past consent, then the crime is
not (as Mr. Wilson asserts) to translate the thought into
action, but to stifle the free thought by pretending that
consent is an authority that supersedes it.
In a word, I agree with Mr. Wilson in identifying
Authority and Freethought. We differ in this, that he
regards Consent as identical with Authority, and therefore
identical with Freethought, while I regard Consent as
opposed to and inconsistent with Authority and Freethought.

�UNSCIENTIFIC RELIGION.

29

V.—On Free Discussion.
[From the National Reformer of December 28th, 1884.]

The following extract from the Edinburgh Review of 1850
(vol. xci., page 525) will be read with interest. The work
reviewed is entitled “Influence of Authority in Matters of
Opinion”, and was published in 1849 by Mr. George
Cornewell Lewis, afterwards Sir G. C. Lewis, Bart., who
was a Cabinet Minister from 1855 till his death in 1863.
A second edition appeared in 1875, and was reviewed by
Mr. Gladstone in the opening article of the first volume of
the A^he^ew/A Century. A reply from the pen of Sir James
Stephen appears at page 270 ; and Mr. Gladstone s re­
joinder at page 902 of the same volume. The opinions on
authority and consent which I recently expressed in these
columns were to a great measure based on Sir G. C. Lewis s
book.
Times have changed since 1850, and it can no longer be
said with truth that “public opinion exercises a formidable
repression of infidelity ”, or that “ the avowedly infidel
books that appear are few”. No dogma of religion.is
now so sacred, no pretention so vital, as to preclude dis­
cussion from any point of view, however radical.
Mr. Gladstone has thus described Sir G. C. Lewis’ posi­
tion : “As a Theist he did not recognise the ark of the
covenant, but he recognised the presence within it as true,
though undefinable ”. {Nineteenth Century, vol. i., p. 921.)
“ There is one circumstance which, in England, impairs
authority in matters of religion, to which Mr. Lewis has not
adverted. It is the state of English law and English opinion
on infidelity.
“ Christianity, we are told, is parcel of the law of England ;
therefore to ‘write against Christianity in general’, to use
the words of Holt, or ‘to impugn the Christian religion
generally’, in those of Lord Kenyon, or ‘ to impeach the esta­
blished faith, or to endeavor to unsettle the belief of others,
in those of Justice Bayley, is a misdemeanor at common law,
and subjects the offender, at the discretion of the court, to fine,
imprisonment, and infamous corporal punishment. The statute
law is rather vague. By the 9th and 10th Will. III., cap. 32,
whoever, having been educated a Christian, shall bj writing,
printing, teaching, or advised speaking, deny any one of the

�30

UNSCIENTIFIC RELIGION.

persons in the Holy Trinity to be God, or assert that there
are more Gods than one, or deny the Christian religion to
be true, or the Holy Scriptures of the Old and New Testa­
ment to be of divine authority, shall for the first offence,
be incapable of holding any office or place of trust, civil
or military, and for the second, be imprisoned for three
years, and be incapable of suing in any court of law or equity,
or of accepting any gift or legacy. The punishment for deny­
ing the doctrine of the Trinity was repealed in our own times ;
but the remainder of the statute is in full force at this day. It
is true that, in these times, neither the common law nor the
statute is likely to be enforced against a sober, temperate dis­
putant. The publisher of the translation of Strauss has not
been punished. But his safety is precarious. If anyone were
so ill-advised as to prosecute him, he must be convicted of libel,
unless the jury should think fit to save him at the expense of
perjury; and we doubt whether the court would venture to
inflict on him a mere nominal sentence.
“ But the repression of infidelity by law is far less formidable
than that which is exercised by public opinion. The author of
a work professedly and deliberately denying the truth of Chris­
tianity would become a Pariah in the English world. If he
were in a profession, he would find his practice fall off; if he
turned towards the public service, its avenues would be barred.
In society he would find himself shunned or scorned —even his
children would feel the taint of their descent. To be suspected
of holding infidel opinions, though without any attempt at
their propagation, even without avowing them, is a great mis­
fortune. It is an imputation which every prudent man care­
fully avoids. Under such circumstances, what reliance can
an Englishman place on the authority of the writers who pro­
fess to have examined into the matter, and to have ascertained
the truth? Can he say, ‘Their premises and conclusions are
before the public. If there were any flaw in them, it would
be detected and exposed ’ ? The errors committed or supposed
to be committed by writers on the evidences of Christianity
may be detected, but there is little chance of their being ex­
posed. It may, perhaps be safe sometimes to impugn a false
premise, or an unwarranted inference, but never to deny a con­
clusion. It is dangerous, indeed, to assert on religious matters
any views with which the public is not familiar. It is to
this immunity from criticism that we owe the rash assumption
of premises, and the unwarranted inferences, with which many
theological writings abound. Facts and arguments are passed
from author to author, which in Secular matters would be dissi­
pated in the blaze of free discussion. Theological literature, at
least the portion of it which relates to the doctrines which ‘ are
parcel of the common law ’ has been a protected literature ;

�UNSCIENTIFIC RELIGION.

31

and much of its offspring has the ricketty distorted form which
belongs to the unhappy bantlings that have been swaddled by
protection.
“ To this state of things we owe the undue importance given
to the few avowedly infidel books which actually appear. They
are like the political libels which creep out in a despotism.
Their authors are supposed to be at least sincere, since they
peril reputation and fortune. 'What could have given popu­
larity to ‘ The Nemesis of Faith ’ but the persecution of its
author ? To this also we owe the insidious form in which in­
fidelity is usually insinuated—intermixed with professions of
orthodoxy, and conveyed by a hint or a sneer. If Gibbon could
have ventured, in simple and express terms, to assert his dis­
belief in Christianity, all his persiflage would have been omitted ;
and the reader, especially the young reader, would have known
that his anti-Christian opinions were the attacks of an enemy—
not the candid admissions of a friend. To this also we owe
much of the scepticism which exists among educated English­
men : usiug the word scepticism in its derivative sense—to
express not incredulity, but, doubt. They have not the means
of making a real independent examination of the evidences of
their faith. A single branch of that vast inquiry, if not aided by
taking on trust the results handed down by previous inquirers,
would occupy all the leisure which can be spared from a business
or a profession. All that they think they have time for is to
read a few popular treatises. But they know that these treatises
have not been subjected to the ordeal of unfettered criticism.
As little can they infer the truth of the established doctrine
from the apparent acquiesence of those around them. They
know that they may be surrounded by unbelieving conformists.
And thus they pass their lives in scepticism—in a state of in­
decision— suspecting that what they have been taught may
contain a mixture of truth and error which they are unable to
decompose. If a balance could be struck between the infidelity
that is prevented, and the infidelity that is occasioned, by the
absence of free discussion, we have no doubt that the latter
would greatly predominate.”

��iillj
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                    <text>WHAT WAS CHRIST?
JL REPLY
TO

JOHN

STUART MILL.

BY

1

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TWOPENCE,

PRICE

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LONDON :

PROGRESSIVE PUBLISHING COMPANY,
28 Stonecutter Street, E.C.
1887.

�LONDON :

POINTED AND PUBLISHED BY G. W. EOOTE,
AT 28 STONECUTTER STREET, E.C.

�11

national secular society

WHAT WAS CHRIST?
Thebe are many passages in John Stuart Mill’s Three
Essays on Religion which the apologists of Christianity very
prudently ignore. Orthodoxy naturally shrinks from the descrip­
tion of a God who could make a Hell as a “ dreadful idealisa­
tion of wickedness.” Nor is it pleasant to read that “ Not even
on the most distorted and contracted theory of good which
ever was framed by religious or philosophical fanaticism, can the
government of nature be made to resemble the work of a being
at once good and omnipotent.”
But Christian lecturers are never tired of quoting the pane­
gyric on their blessed Savior, which occurs in another part of
the same volume. They never mention the fact that the Essay
which contains this eulogium was not revised by the author for
publication, while the other two essays were finally prepared
for the press. It is enough for them that the passage is found
in a volume of Mill’s. Whether it harmonises with the rest of
the volume, or whether the author might have considerably
modified it-in revision, are questions with which they have no
concern. “ Here is Mill’s testimony to Christ,” they cry, “ and
we fling it like a bombshell into the Freethought camp.” We
propose to pick up this bombshell, to dissect and analyse it, and
to show that it is perfectly harmless.
Mill’s panegyric on Christ, as Professor Newman says, “ caused
surprise.”* Professor Bain, who was one of Mill’s most
intimate friends, and has written his biography,f uses the very
same expression. The whole of the Essay on Theism “was a
surprise to his friends,” not for its attacks on orthodoxy, but for
its concessions to “ modern sentimental Theism.” Professor
Bain observes that these concessions have been made the most
of, “ and, as is usual in such cases, the inch has been stretched
to an ell.” Speaking with all the authority of his position,
Professor Bain adds that the “ fact remains that in everything
* “ Christianity in its Cradle,” p. 57.
f “ John Stuart Mill: A Criticism; with Personal Recollections.”

�(4 )
characteristic of the creed of Christendom, he was a thorough­
going negationist.
He admitted neither its truth nor its
utility.”
How, then, did Mill come to write those passages of his
Three Essays which caused such surprise to his intimate friends ?
The answer is simple. “ Who is the woman ? ” asked Talley­
rand, when two friends wished him to settle a dispute.
There
was a woman in Mill’s case.
Mrs. Taylor, afterwards his wife,
and the object of his adoring love, disturbed his judgment in
life and perverted it in death. He buried her at Avignon, and
resided near her grave until he could lie beside her in the eternal
sleep. No doubt the long vigil at his wife’s tomb shows the
depth of his love, but it necessarily tended to make his brain the
victim of his heart. There can be no worse offence against the
laws of logic than to argue from our feelings; and when Mill
began to talk about “ indulging the hope ” of immortality, he
had set his feet, however hesitatingly, on the high road of senti­
mentalism and superstition. How different was his attitude in
the vigor of manhood, when his intellect was unclouded by
personal sorrow ! In closing his splendid Essay on fhe Utility
of Religion, he wrote :
“ It seems to me not only possible, but probable, that in a higher, and,
above all, a happier condition of human life, not annihilation, but immor­
tality, may be the burdensome idea; and that human nature, though
pleased with the present, and by no means impatient to quit it, would find
comfort and not sadness in the thought that it is not chained through
eternity to a conscious existence which it cannot be assured that it will
always wish to preserve.”

How great is the range of egoism, even with the best of us!
Writing before his own great loss, Mill sees no argument for
immortality in the yearning of bereaved hearts for reunion with
the beloved dead ; but when- he himself craves “ the touch of a
vanished hand and the sound of a voice that is still,” he perceives
room for hope. His own passion of grief lights a beacon in the
darkness, which his sympathy with the grief of others had never
kindled.
We can easily understand how Mill’s profound love for his
wife affected his intellect after her death, when we see how it
deluded him while she lived. In his Autobiography he describes
her as a beauty and a wit. Mr. Maccall says that she was 'not
brilliant in conversation, and decidedly plain-looking; and the
same objection appears to be hinted by Professor Bain. Carlyle
refers to her several times in his Reminiscences, always as a light
gossamery creature.
It is notorious that the Grotes regarded

�( 5 )

Mill’s attachment to her as an infatuation. And certainly he
did a great deal to justify their opinion. In the dedication of
his Essay on Liberty, he refers to her “ great thoughts and noble
feelings,” and her “ all but unrivalled wisdom.
This eulogium
a little astonished those who had read her Essay in the West­
minster Review, reprinted by Mill in his Dissertations and Dis­
cussions, which revealed no very wonderful ability, and assuredly
did not place her beside Harriet Martineau or George Eliot.
But in his Autobiography this panegyric was completely eclipsed.
Mill informs the world in that volume that her mind “included
Carlyle’s and infinitely more,” and that in comparison with her
Shelley was but a child. Apparently seeing, however, that
sceptics might inquire why a woman of such profound and
original genius did not leave some memorable work, Mill con­
fidingly tells us that she was content to inspire other minds
rather than express herself through the channels of literature.
In other words, she played second fiddle in preference to first,
which is exactly what men and women of original genius will
never do. But whom did she inspire ? We know of none but
Mill, and on examining his works chronologically we find that
all his greatest books were composed before he fell under her
influence. Mr. Gladstone explains Mill’s “ ludicrous estimate of
his wife’s powers,” by saying that she was a quick receptive
woman, who gave him back the echo of: his own thoughts, which
he took for the independent oracles of truth.
Over the tomb of this idolised wife, whom his fancy clothed
with fictitious or exaggerated attributes, Mill wrote his Essay on
Theism. Miss Helen Taylor says it shows “the carefullybalanced results of the deliberations of a life-time.” But she
allows that—
“ On the other hand, there had not been time for it to undergo the
revision to which from time to time he subjected most of his writings
before making them public. Not only, therefore, is the style less polished
than of any other of his published works, but even the matter itself, at
least in the exact shape it here assumes, has nevei' undergone the
repeated examination which it certainly would have passed through
before he would himself have given it to the world.”

If Mill had lived, he would perhaps have made many improve­
ments and excisions in this unfortunate essay. As it stands it is
singularly feeble in comparison with the two former Essays. He
“hopes” for immortality, and “regrets to say” that the Design
Argument is not inexpugnable, as though this were the language
of a philosopher or a logician. After writing several pages on
the “Marks of Design in Nature,” he passingly notices the

�( 6 )

Darwinian Theory and admits that, if established, it “would
greatly attenuate the evidence ” for Creation. Yet he drops
this great hypothesis in the next paragraph, and talks about
“ the large balance of probability in favor of creation by intel­
ligence ” in the present state of our knowledge. What he meant
was, in the present state of our ignorance. Mill neither under­
stood nor felt the force of Darwinism. We shall find, in
examining his panegyric on Christ, that he understood that
subject just as little, and that, where his knowledge did apply,
he flatly contradicted what he had written before.
Let us now ascertain what were Mill’s qualifications for the
task of estimating the teachings and personality of Christ. He
had a subtle logical mind, strong though restricted sympathies,
a singular power of mastering an opponent’s case, and remark­
able candor in stating it. But his intellect was of the purely
speculative order. He possessed a “ rich storage of principles,
doctrines, generalities of every degree, over several wide depart­
ments of knowledge,” as Professor Bain says ; but he “ had not
much memory for detail of any kind,” although “ by express
study and frequent reference he had amassed a store of facts
bearing on political or sociological doctrines.” In short, “ he
had an intellect for the abstract and the logical out of all pro­
portion to his hold of the concrete and the poetical.” He was
cut out for a metaphysician, a political speculator and a
sociologist. But he never could have become an historian or a
man of letters. He had little sense of style, no faculty of
literary criticism, a dislike of picturesque expression, a scanty
knowledge of human nature, and an extremely feeble imagina­
tion. He was a great philosopher, but perhaps less an artist
than any other thinker of the same eminence that ever lived.
Now the faculties required in dealing with the origin of
Christianity, including the character of its founder, are obviously
those of the literary critic and the historian, in which Mill was
deficient. He was, therefore, not equipped by nature for the
task.
Had he even the necessary knowledge ? Certainly not.
There is not the slightest evidence that he had studied the
relation of Christianity to previous systems, the growth of its
literature, the formation of its canon, and the development of
its ethics and its dogmas. He probably knew next to nothing
of the oriental religions, and was only acquainted with the name
of Buddhism. Nay, if we may trust Professor Bain (his friend,
his biographer, and his eulogist), he knew very little of Chris-

�( 7 )
inanity itself. He “ searcely ever read a theological book,” and
he only knew “ the main positions of theology from our general
literature.” Just when Mill’s Three Essays on Eehgwn ap­
peared, Strauss’s Old Faith and the New was published m
England, and Professor Bain justly remarks that Anyone
reading it would, I think, be struck with its immense superiority
to Mill’s work, in all but the logic and metaphysics. Strauss
speaks like a man thoroughly, at home with his subject.
Mill
does indeed say, in his Autobiography, that Ins. father made
him, at a very early age, “a reader of ecclesiastical history ;
but he does not tell us that he continued so in his after lite, and
even if he did, ecclesiastical, history begins just where the
problem of the origin of Christianity ends.
.
Another thing must be said. Professor Bain states, and we
can well believe him, that Mill was “ not even well read, m the
sceptics that preceded him.” He was really ignorant on both
sides of the controversy. His idea of Christ was formed from
a selection of the best things in the New Testament. A most
uncritical process, and in fact an impossible one ; for the New
Testament is not history, but an arbitrary selection from a
mass of early Christian tracts, of uncertain authorship, different
dates, and various value. The literature on this subject, even
from the pens of eminent writers, is vast enough to show, its
immense complication. Unless it is read m a cluld-like spirit
which in grown men and women is childish, the New. Testament
needs to be explained ; and when the process has fairly begun,
you find all the familiar features shifting like the pieces in. a
kaleidoscope, until at last they reassume an organic, but a dif­
ferent, form and color. Twenty Christs may be elicited from
the New Testament as it stands. Mill deduced one, but the
nineteen others are just as valid.
.
Strictly speaking, our task is completed. It would logically
suffice to say that Mill’s panegyric on Christ is a mere piece of
fancy. Like other men of genius, he had his special aptitudes
and special knowledge, and his authority only extends as far as
they carry him. Mr. Swinburne’s opinion of Newton is of no
particular importance, and Newton’s famous ineptitude about
Paradise Lost in no way affects our estimate of Milton.
Let us go further, however, and examine Mill’s panegyric on
Christ in detail. In justice to him, as well as to the subject, it
should be quoted in full:
“Above all, the most valuable part of the effect on the character
which Christianity has produced by .holding up m a Divine Person a

�ÉTotíe ufnbpH±nCe Td a m°del f01’ÍmÍtatÍOn’ bailable even to the
absolute unbellever and can never more be lost to humanity. For
is Christ, lather than God, whom Christianity has held up to
believers as the pattern of perfection for humanity.
It is the God
ideahsede’hTs°teithan
Gfd °/ tbe JeWS or °f Nature, who being
AndhXbdfh ^ken so,great and salutary a hold on the modern mind,
is stiH íeft T 6lS-e mac be tak&lt;3n aWay fr°m US by rational criticism, Christ
hL fnii
’ Umq?K figUre’ n0t more unlike a11 his precursors than 4»
Ins followers even those who had the direct benefit of his personal teachhiSoric« «nA th
tOi Say tha\Ohrist as exhibited in the Gospels is not
sunerad/lía h
7® ^°W n?tbow much of what is admirable has been
suffice« Í
7 t tradition of his followers. The tradition of followers
miSelf?
any number °f marvels’ and may have inserted all the
dSS™hlCh
.rePutedt°have wrought. But who among his
ascGbld + among their proselytes was capable of inventing the sayings
SV i,eT.01; Of lma«lnin&amp; the life and character revealed in the
p ? /
ertamly not the fishermen of Galilee; as certainly not St.
Sil í J th® cbara&lt;^®rand idiosyncracies were of a totally different sort:
fb?f th the TTly1 9bristlan writers m whom nothing is more evident than '
fXiS F? wbicb.was m timm was all derived, as they always professed that it was derived, from a higher source. What could be added
XJ^w rd?y a dlsclPle we may see in the mystical parts of the
gospel of St John, matter imported from Philo and the Alexandrian
himSí t
mt° the mouth of the Savior in long speeches about
tffi?™h S as?be/tber Gospels contain not the slightest vestige of,
though pretended to have been delivered on occasions of the deepest
interest and when his principal followers were all present; most promt,
nently at the last supper. The East was full of men who could have
stolen any quantity of this poor stuff, as the multitudinous Oriental sects
of Gnostics afterwards did. But about the life and sayings of Jesus there •
13vVa-?P of Per®onal originaiity combined with profundity of insight,
which if we abandon the idle expectation of finding scientific precision
wheie something very different was aimed at, must place the Prophet of
Nazareth, even m the estimation of those who have no belief in his
inspiration, m the very first rank of the men of sublime genius of whom
our species can boast. When this pre-eminent genius is combined with
the qualities of probably the greatest moral reformer, and martyr to that
mission, who ever existed upon earth, religion cannot be said to have
made a bad choice in pitching on this man as the ideal representative
ana guide of humanity; nor even now, would it be easy, even for ail un•
a better translation of the rule of virtue from the abstract
into the concrete, than to endeavor so to live that Christ would approve
our life.

Our first complaint is that the whole passage is too vague and
rhetorical. What is the meaning of “ the absolute unbeliever ”
m the first sentence ? If it means a person who rejects all the
pretensions of Christ, the sentence is absurd. If it means a
person who rejects his divinity, it is practically untrue ; for. as a
matter of fact, those who have thought themselves out of Chris­
tianity (which Mill did not, as he was never in it) very seldom
do take Christ as “ a standard of excellence and a model for

�(9)
imitation,” much less as “ the pattern of perfection for
humanity.” When the supernatural glamor is dispelled, we
see that Christ is no example whatever. He is simply a
preacher, and his personal conduct fails to illustrate a single
public or private virtue, or assist us in any of our practical diffi­
culties as husbands, fathers, sons, or citizens. Mill has himself
shown that even Christians do not attempt to imitate their
Savior ; and we are puzzled to understand how he could speak
of Christ’s having “ taken so great and salutary hold on the
modern mind ” after telling us, in his Essay on Liberty, that he
has done nothing of the kind. He there says:
“ By Christianity, I here mean what is acconnted such by all churches
and sects, the maxims and precepts contained in the New Testament.
These are considered sacred, and accepted as laws by all professing Chris­
tians. Yet it is scarcely too much to say that not one Christian in a
thousand guides or tests his individual conduct by reference to those
laws. . . . Whenever conduct is concerned, they look round for Mr. A
and B to direct them how far to go in obeying Christ.”

Had Mill forgotten this passage when he wrote the Essay on
Theism, or had Christendom changed in the interval ? Scarcely
the latter. John Bright has justly said that the lower classes
in England care as little for the dogmas of Christianity as the
upper classes care about its practice.
Until Christians follow their Savior’s teachings, it is idle to
expect unbelievers to do so. Yet it is perhaps as well they do
not, for there are many things recorded in the Gospels which are
far from redounding to his credit. It is a great pity that Mill,
before eulogising Christ, could not read the chapter on “Jesus
of Nazareth ” in Professor Newman’s last work. Why did Jesus
consort with Publicans (or Roman tax-gatherers), rhe very sight
of whom was hateful to every patriotic Jew ? .Why did he herd
with Sinners, who so far despised ceremony as to dip in the dish
with dirty fingers ? Why did he avoid all who were able to
criticise him ? Why did he exclaim, “Ye hypocrites, why put
ye me to proof?” when the Jews sought to test his claims, and
to act on his own advice to “ Beware of false prophets ” ? Why
did he rudely repel educated inquirers, and then solemnly thank
God that “ he had hidden these things from the wise and pru­
dent, and revealed them unto babes ” ? Why did he denounce
inhabitants of cities he could not convince, and prophesy that
they would fare worse in the Day of Judgment than the filthy
inhabitants of Sodom and Gomorrah ? Why did he assail his
religious rivals with invectives which, as Professor Newman

�( 10 )

says, “ outdo Tacitus and Suetonius in malignity,, and seem to
convict themselves of falsehood and bitter slander ?” Why, in
short, did he so constantly display the vanity and passion of a
spoilt child ? Surely these are not characteristics we should
emulate, but glaring blots in a “ pattern of perfection.” When
the arrogance of Christ is countenanced by a writer like Mill,
these defects must be insisted on. Professor Newman rightly
says that
“ If honor were claimed for Jesus as for Socrates, for Seneca, for Hillel,
for Epictetus, we might apologise for his weak points as either incident
to his era and country or to human nature itself—weakness to be forgiven
and forgotten. But the unremitting assumption of super-human wisdom,
not only made for him by the moderns, but breathing through every
utterance attributed to him, changes the whole scene, and ought to
change our treatment of it. Unless his prodigious claim of divine
superiority is made good in fact, it betrays an arrogance difficult to
excuse, eminently mischievous and eminently ignominious.”

But this prodigious claim cannot be made good. As Pro­
fessor Newman says : “It is hard to point to anything in the
teaching of Jesus at once new to Hebrew and Greek sages, and
likewise in general estimate true.” The same view was ex­
pressed by Buckle, with more vigor if less urbanity. “ Whoever,”
he said, “ asserts that Christianity revealed to the world truths
with which it was previously unacquainted, is guilty either of
gross ignorance or of wilful fraud.”
Mill had himself, in the Essay on Liberty, shown the evil of
taking Christ, or any other man, as “the ideal representative
and guide of humanity.” He there charged Christianity with
possessing a negative rather than a positive ideal; abstinence
from evil rather than energetic pursuit of good constituting its
essence, in which “ thou shalt not ” unduly predominated over
“ thou shalt.” He accused it of making an idol of asceticism,
of holding out “ the hope of heaven and the threat of hell as
the appointed and appropriate motives to a virtuous life, and
of thus “ giving to human morality an essentially selfish
character.” And he added that—
“ What little recognition the idea of obligation to the public obtains in
modern morality, is derived from Greek and Roman sources, not fiom
Christian; as, even in the morality of private life, whatever exists of
magnanimity, high-mindedness, personal dignity, even the sense of honor,
is derived from the purely human, not the religious, part of our educa­
tion, and never could have grown out of a standard of ethics in which the
only worth, professedly recognised, is that of obedience.”

Mill does indeed throw a sop to orthodoxy by allowing that
Christ and Christianity are different things ; but he is obliged

�(11)
to add that the Founder of Christianity failed to provide for
“ many essential elements of the highest morality.” He main­
tains that “ other ethics than any which can be evolved from
exclusively Christian sources must exist side by side with
Christian ethics to produce the moral regeneration of mankind.”
And he deprecates ihe policy of “formingthe mind and feelings
on an exclusively religious type.” Surely these arguments are
quite inconsistent with Mill’s later notion of taking Christ as our
ideal, and living so that he would approve our life.
Besides, as Professor Bain points out, the morality of Christ
belongs to this exclusively religious type. Its sanctions are all
religious, and if religion is dispensed with they “ must lose their
suitability to human life.” Professor Bain very justly observes
that “the best guidance, under such altered circumstances,
would be that furnished by the wisest of purely secular
teachers.”
That Christ was “ probably the greatest moral reformer ”
that ever lived is a statement easy to make and difficult to
prove. When Mill, in the Essay on Liberty, twits the Chris­
tians with professing doctrines they never practise, he furnishes
■a catalogue of the duties they neglect.
“ All Christians believe that the blessed are the poor and humble, and
those who are ill-used by the world ; that it is easier for a camel to pass
through the eye of a needle than for a rich man to enter the kingdom of
heaven; that they should judge not lest they should be judged; that
they should swear not at all; that they should love their neighbors as
themselves ; that if one take their cloak, they should give him their coat
also ; that they should take no thought for the morrow; that if they
would be perfect they should sell all they have and give it to the poor.”

Surely Mill was aware that all these absurd and impracticable
maxims were taught by Christ. Hgw, then, except on the
theory we have advanced, could he call him the greatest moral
reformer in history ?
The “rational criticism ” by means of which Mill obtains
the “ unique figure ” of Christ is a purely arbitrary process.
George Eliot, who knew the subject far better, said in one
of. her letters that the materials for any biography of Jesus
do not exist.
The Unitarians have tried Mill’s process
with small success ; and, as Professoi’ Bain maliciously observes,
“ It would seem in this, as in other parts of religion, that what
the rationalist disapproves of most the multitude likes best.”
Professor Bain’s remarks on Mill’s construction of his “ unique
figure ” from the Gospels are so pertinent and happy that we
venture to give them in full:

�(12)
“ We are, of course, at liberty to dissent from the prevailing view,
which makes Christ a divine person. But to reduce a Deity to the human
level, to rank him simply as a great man, and to hold ideal intercourse
with him in that capacity is, to say the least of it, an incongruity. His­
torians and moralists have been accustomed to treat with condemnation
those monarchs that, after being dethroned, have accepted in full the
position of subjects. Either to die, or else to withdraw into dignified isola­
tion, has been accounted the only fitting termination to the loss of royal
power. So, a Deity dethroned should retire altogether from playing a
part in human affairs, and remain simply as an historic name.”

Mill finds in Christ “ sublime genius ” and “ profundity of
insight.” Surely it did not require any very sublime genius to
teach those peculiar doctrines which Mill catalogued for back­
sliding Christians, nor any very great profundity of insight to
see that none but paupers and lunatics could evei’ practise them.
Many of the best sayings ascribed to Jesus were the common
possession of the East before his birth ; but many of the worst
seem more his own. “ Leave all and follow me ” is a vain and
foolish command. “ Give to everyone that asketh ” is an excel­
lent rule for pauperising society. “ That industry is a human
duty,” says Professor Newman, “ cannot be gathered from his
doctrine: how could it, when he kept twelve religious men­
dicants around him ?” “ Resist not evil ” is a premium on
tyranny. “ Blessed be ye poor ” and “• Woe unto you rich ” are
the exclamations of a vulgar demagogue, a cunning agent of
privilege, or an irresponsible maniac. “ By shovelling away
wealth,” says Professor Newman, “ we are to buy treasures in
heaven. Unless our narrators belie him, Jesus never warns
hearers that to give without a heart of charity does not prepare
a soul for heaven nor ‘ earn salvation ’; and that ¿elfish pre­
speculation turns virtue into despicable marketing. To forgive
that we may be forgiven, to avoid judging lest we be judged, to
do good that we may get extrinsic reward, to affect humility
that we may be promoted, to lose life that we may gain it with
advantage, are precepts not needing a lofty prophet.” - It is also
from the words of Christ alone, according to the New Testa­
ment, that the doctrine of Eternal Punishment can be estab­
lished ; and he is responsible for the intellectual crime of
identifying Credulity with Faith, which has been a fatal rotten­
ness at the very core of Christianity.
As for the “personal originality” of Mill’s “ unique figure,
**
he might be safely challenged to demonstrate it from the
Gospels.
We shall have something more to say about the
originality of Christ’s teaching presently ; we confine our-

�( 13 )
«elves now to his personal character. Take away from the
Gospel story the pathetic legend of Calvary, which throws around
him a glamor of suffering, and what is there in his whole life of
a positive heroic quality ? He is a tame, effeminate, shrinking
figure, beside hundreds of men who have not been made the
-object of a superstitious cultus. His brief, ineffective career, so
■soon closed by his own madness or ambition, will not bear a
moment’s comparison with the long and glorious life of Buddha.
It pales into insignificance before the mighty genius of
Muhammed. Doctrine apart, the Nazarene is to the Meccan as
a pallid moon to a fiery sun. With the single exception of
•Cromwell, who was a more original character than twenty Christs
rolled into one, where shall we find Muhammed’s equal in
history ? As Eliot Warburton well said, he stands almost alone
in “ the sustained and almost superhuman energy with which he
carried out his views, in defiance, as it would seem, of God and
man.” Christ quails in his Gethsemane. Muhammed struggles
through his seven years’ ordeal of obloquy and danger like a
resolute swimmer, who scorns to turn back, and will reach the
■other shore or die. When his followers faint under the burning
desert sun, he tells them that “Hell is hotter,” and silences
their murmurs. Christ cries in ah agony of despair, “My
■God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me ? ”
When
Muhammed’s assassination is resolved on at Mecca, each of
the tribes devoting a sword to drink his blood, and Abubekar,
the companion of his flight, says “We are but two,” the
indomitable prophet answers “We are three, for God is
with us.” Christ implores “ 0 my' father, if it be possible,
let this cup pass from me.” When Muhammed is threa­
tened by the Koreishites, so that his most devoted followers
remonstrate against his projects, he makes the sublime answer,
“ If they should place the sun on my right hand, and the moon
on my left, they should not divert me from my course.” Within
a century after the Hegira, the empire of Islam had spread from
Arabia eastward to Delhi and westward to Granada. Oh, it is
•said, Muhammed used the sword. True, but not before it was
drawn against him. The man who rode to Jerusalem, and
-called himself King of the Jews, would have used the sword too
had he dared. “ The sword indeed,” snorts Carlyle at this
rubbish, “ but where will you get your sword ? Every new
■opinion, at its starting, is precisely in a minority of one. In one
man’s head alone there it dwells as yet. That Ae'take a sword
•and try to propagate with that will do little for him. You

�( 14 )
must first get your sword. On the whole, a thing will propa­
gate itself as it can. We do not find, of the Christian religion
either, that it always disdained the sword, when once it had gotone.” True, thou sarcastic old sage of Chelsea, and the sting
is in the tail. From Constantine downwards, Christianity has
not been imposed on mankind without, as Sir James Stephen
remarks, exhausting all the terrors of this life as well as the
next.
Mill tells us that Christ was a “martyr” to his “mission ”
as a “moral reformer.” We should like to know how he dis­
covered the fact. Certainly not from the Gospels. It was not
the Sermon on the Mount, but his vagaries at Jerusalem, that
led to the crucifixion. Christ deliberately chose twelve disciples,
the legendary number of the tribes of Israel, and told them that
when he came into his kingdom they should sit on twelve
" thrones as judges. Professor Newman answers those who call
this language figurative with the just remark that “ we should
call a teacher mad who used such words to simple men, and did
not expect them to understand him literally.” When the dis­
ciples ask him, “ Lord, wilt thou at this time restore the kingdom '
unto Israel ?” he does not rebuke them (although it is after his
resurrection), but simply says that the time is a secret. His
triumphal entry into Jerusalem can only be considered as a
, declaration of sovereignty, and his countenancing the shout
' of Hosanna! (the war cry of previous insurrections, and an
appeal to Jehovah against the foe) could only be construed as
rebellion against Rome. His conduct inside Jerusalem was that
of a man intoxicated with vanity and ambition, without judg­
ment, policy, or purpose. The very inscription on the cross shows
that he was believed to aim at earthly royalty. Pontius Pilate
tried to save Jesus, acting wisely and humanely as the repre­
sentative of an empire that was always tolerant in matters of
religion. He would not receive a charge of blasphemy, but he
could not overlook a charge of sedition. Yet he still gave Jesus
an opportunity of escaping. “ Come now,” he seems to say,
“ your enemies want your blood. Your blasphemy is no businessof mine, and I shall not decide a squabble between your rabid
sects. But I must try you if they accuse you of sedition. You
are young, and cannot wish to die. Plead ‘not guilty.’ Deny
the charge. Say you are not the King of the Jews and do not
contemplate rebellion. One word, and I save you from death. You
shall go free though all the rabbis in Jerusalem howled like mad
dogs. Rome shall stand between bigotry and blood.” But-

�( 15 )
Jesus actually admits the indictment, and afterwards remains
contumaciously silent. Pilate had no alternative ; he sentenced
Jesus to execution ; but amid all the absurd fictions of the nar­
rative, the fact shines out clearly that he did so with the utmost
reluctance. To call the death of Christ, in these circumstances,
a martyrdom, is to degrade the name. He died for no principle.
The truth would have saved him, and he would not utter it.
Either he was in a stupor of despair, or so crazed with the
Messianic delusion that he still trusted to the legion of angels
for his rescue. In any case it was an act of insanity. He
courted his doom. It was not a martyrdom but a suicide.
We may also observe that, if a cultus had not been formed
around it, and men’s imaginations suborned in its favor from
the cradle, the “ martyrdom ” of Christ would be obviously lesssevere than that of many persecuted reformers.
Giordano
Bruno’s Gethsemane was an Inquisition dungeon, where he
languished in solitude for seven years, and was tortured no one
knows how often. What was Christ’s few hours’ agony of
weakness before death compared with this ? Bruno died by.
fire, the most cruel form of murder, whilst Christ suffered the
milder doom of crucifixion. Christ was watched by weeping
women, whose sympathy must have alleviated his pain; and it
was not until the hand of death touched his very heart that he
despaired of assistance from heaven. Bruno stood alone against
the world, without any sources of courage but his own quench­
less heroism. Christ quailed before the inevitable. Bruno met
it with a serene smile, for he had that within him which only
death could extinguish—a daring fiery spirit, that nothing could
quell, that outsoared the malice of men, and outshone the flames
of the stake.
Mill’s remarks on the originality of Christ’s teaching betray
his utter ignorance of the subject. It is of no use, he says, to
assert that the Christ of the Gospels is not historical. Begging
his pardon, that is the most important factor in the problem.
If the Gospels are what we allege (and no scholar would dispute
it), George Eliot is right in saying that the materials for a
biography of Jesus do not exist, and Mill’s “ rational criticism ”
is a purely fantastic process. But the reason he assigns for his
position is still more absurd. Who, he asks, could have in­
vented the sayings ascribed to Jesus ? Certainly, he says, not
St. Paul: a sentence which alone stamps him as an incompetent
critic. No man who understood the subject would ever have
thought of anticipating such a preposterous objection. “Cer­

�( 16 )

tainly not the fishermen of Galilee,” is equally futile, for no
student of the origin of Christianity supposes that the Gospels
were written by the first disciples. They are of much later
date. But except for that fact, why might not the “ fishermen
of Galilee ” have been able to invent the logia of the Gospels
as well as Jesus ? He was only a carpenter, and there is no
reason in the nature of things why fishermen should not equal
carpenters as prophets, preachers, and moralists. Mill is alto­
gether on the wrong scent. There was no need for Christ or
his disciples to invent the sayings ascribed to him. As we have
already remarked, they were the common possession of the East
before his birth. The Lord’s Prayer is merely a cento from the
Talmud, and, as Emanuel Deutsch showed, every catchword of
Christ’s was a household word of Talmudic Judaism before he
began his ministry. There is not a single maxim, however good
or bad, however sensible or silly, in the whole of Christ’s dis­
courses that cannot be found in the writings of Pagan moralists
and poets or Jewish doctors who flourished before him; and his
best sayings, if they may be called his, were all anticipated by
Buddha several centuries before he was born. It is also well
known that the Golden Rule, as it is called, was taught by Con­
fucius long before the time of Christ, without any of the
absurdities with which the Nazarene surrounded it. “ Love
your enemies,” says Christ, as though it were wise or possible to
do so. Confucius corrected this exaggeration. “No,” he said,
“ if I love my enemies, what shall I give to my friends ? To
my friends I give my love, and to my enemies—justice.! ”
We think we have said enough to show that Mill’s panegyric
on Christ is utterly valueless. Mr. Matthew Arnold is far more
subtle and dexterous in his eulogy; but he knows the subject
as well as Mill knew it badly. If the apologists of Christianity
are prudent, they will cease to make use of Mill’s tribute to
their Blessed Savior, or at least employ it only before people
who are in that blissful ignorance which fancies it folly to be
•wise.

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                <text>Place of publication: London&#13;
Collation: 16 p. ; 17 cm.&#13;
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1

-

-

NATIONAL SECULAR SOCIETY

WH¥ I DO NOT BELIEVE

IN GOD.
BY

I

ANNIE BESANT.

r
J./
LONDON:

FREETHOUGHT PUBLISHING COMPANY,
63, FLEET STREET, E.C.
1 887.
PRICE

THREEPENCE.

.

�LONDON :

PRINTED BY ANNIE BESANT AND CHARLES BBADLAUGH,
63, ELEET STREET, E.C.

�WHY I DO NOT BELIEVE IN GOD.
■There is no doubt that the majority of people in most
parts of the world—save in those in which Buddhism is
supreme—believe in the existence of a God. The kind of
God may vary indefinitely, but there is generally “some God
Or other ”. Now a growing minority in every civilised
■Country finds it intellectually impossible to make the affir­
mation which is necessary for belief in God, and this
growing minority includes many of the most thoughtful
and most competent minds. The refusal to believe is
unfortunately not always public, so cruel is the vengeance
Worked by society on those who do not bow down to its
dretish.es; but as John Stuart Mill said: ‘1 The world would
be. astonished if it knew how great a proportion of its
brightest ornaments—of those most distinguished even in
popular estimation for wisdom and virtue—are complete
sceptics in religion” (“Autobiography,” p. 45).
It is sad that all should not recognise that, as the late
Professor Clifford put it, Truth is a thing to be shouted
from the housetops, not to be whispered over the walnuts
and wine after the ladies have left; for only by plain and
honest speech on this matter can liberty of thought be
won. Each who speaks out makes easier speech for others,
and none, however insignificant, has right of silence here.
Nor is it unfair,. I think, that a minority should be chal­
lenged on its dissidency, and should be expected to state
clearly and definitely the grounds of its disagreement with
the majority.
Ere going into detailed argument it may be well to remind
the reader that the burden of affording proof lies on the
afiirmer of a. proposition; the rational attitude of the
human mind is not that of a boundless credulity, accepting
every statement as true until it has been proved to be
false, but is that of a suspension of judgment on every

�4

WHY I DO NOT BELIEVE IN GOD.

statement which, though not obviously false, is not sup­
ported. by evidence, and of an absolute rejection of a state­
ment self-contradictory in its terms, or incompatible with
truth® already demonstrated. To remove this position
from the region of prejudice in which theological discus­
sion is carried on, it may be well to take the following*
illustration : a man asks me, “Do you believe that Jupiter
is inhabited by a race of men who have one eye in the
middle of their foreheads, and who walk about on three
legs, with their heads under their left arms ? ” I answer
“No, I do not believe it; I have no evidence that such
beings exist”. If my interlocutor desires to convince mo
that Jupiter has inhabitants, and that his description of;
them is accurate, it is for him to bring forward evidence
in support of his contention. The burden of proof evi­
dently lies on him; it is not for me to prove that no such
beings exist before my non-belief is justified, but for him
to prove that they do exist before my belief can be fairly
claimed. Similarly, it is for the affirmer of God’s existence
to bring evidence in support of his affirmation; the burden
of proof lies on him.
Tor be it remembered that the Atheist makes no general
denial of the existence of God; he does not say, “There is
no God”. If he put forward such a proposition, which he
can only do intelligently if he understand the term “God”,
then, truly, he would be bound to bring forth his evidence
in support. But the proof of a universal negative requires
the possession of perfect knowledge of the universe of
discourse, and in this case the universe of discourse
is conterminous with the totality of existence. No*
man can rationally affirm “There is no God”, until
the word “ God ” has for him a definite meaning, and until
everything that exists is known to him, and known with
what Leibnitz calls “perfect knowledge”. The Atheist’s
denial of the Gods begins only when these Gods are defined
or described. Never yet has a God been defined in terms
which were not palpably self-contradictory and absurd ;•
never yet has a God been described so that a concept of
him was made possible to human thought. Again I fall
back on an illustration unconnected with theology in order
to make clearly apparent the distinction drawn. If I am
asked: “Do you believe in the existence of a triangle in
space on the other side of Saturn?” I answer, “I neither

�WHY I HO HOT BELIEVE IN GOD.

5

lielieve in, nor deny its existence; I know nothing about it”.
But if I am asked: “Do you believe in the existence
there of a boundless triangle, or of a square triangle ? ”
-then my answer is : “I deny the possibility of the exist­
ence of such triangles”. The reason for the different
answers to the two questions is that as I have never visited
the other side of Saturn I know nothing about the exist­
ence or non-existence of triangles there ; but I deny the
possibility of the existence of a boundless triangle, because
the word triangle means a figure enclosed by three limiting
lines; and I deny the possibility of the existence of a square
triangle, because a triangle has three sides only while a square
has four, and all the angles of a triangle taken together
ar® equal to two right angles, while those of a square are
equal to four. I allege that anyone who believes in a
square triangle can have no clear concept either of a
triangle or of a square. And so while I refuse to say
“there is no God”, lacking the knowledge which would
justify the denial, since to me the word God represents no
.concept, I do say, “there is no infinite personality, there
is no infinite creator, there is no being at once almighty
and all-good, there is no Trinity in Unity, there is no
-eternal and infinite existence save that of which each one
• of us is mode”. Dor be it noted, these denials are justified
.by our knowledge: an undefined “God” might be a
limited being on the far side of Sirius, and I have no
knowledge which justifies me in denying such an existence;
but an infinite God, i.e., a God who is everywhere, who
has no limits, and yet who is not I and who is therefore
limited by my personality, is a being who is self-contra­
dictory, both limited and not-limited, and such a being
■ cannot exist. No perfect knowledge is needed here. “ God
is an infinite being” is disproved by one being who is not
God. “God is everywhere ” is disproved by the finding
• of one spot where God is not. The universal affirmative
-is disproved by a single exception. Nor is anything
gained by the assertors of deity when they allege that he
is incomprehensible. If “God” exists and is incompre­
hensible, his incomprehensibility is an admirable reason
for being silent about him, but can never justify the affirma­
tion of self-contradictory propositions, and the threatening
. of people with damnation if they do not accept them.
I turn to examine the evidence which is brought forward

�6

WHY I DO NOT BELIEVE IN GOD.

in support of the existence of God, taking “ God ” to mean
some undefined being other than and superior to the
various forms of living and non-living things on thisearth—or those forming part of the 1 ‘material universe”
in which we exist—and related to these as creator and
controller. Now the existence of anything may be sensated or it may be inferred; the astronomer believed in
the existence of Saturn because he saw it; but he also
believed in the existence of the planet afterwards named
Neptune before he saw it, attaining this belief by way of'
induction from the otherwise inexplicable behavior of
Uranus. Can we then by the senses or by the reason find
out God ?
The most common, and to many the most satisfactory
and convincing evidence, is that of the senses. A child
bom into the world has open to him these sense avenues
of knowledge; he learns that something exists which is
not he by the impressions made on his senses; he sees, he
feels, he hears, he smells, he tastes, and thus he learns to
know. As the child’s past and present sensations increase
in number, as he begins to remember them, to compare,
to mark likenesses and unlikenesses, he gathers the
materials for further mental elaboration. But this sen­
sational basis of his knowledge is the limit of the area on
which his intellectual edifice can be built; he may rear it
upward as far as his powers will permit, but he can neverwiden his foundation, while his senses remain only what
they are. All that the mind works on has reached it by
these senses; it can dissociate and combine, it can break
in pieces and build up, but no sensation no percept, and
no percept no concept.
When this fundamental truth is securely grasped it will'
be seen of what tremendous import is the admitted fact
that the senses wholly fail us when We seek for proof of
the existence of God. Our belief in the existence of all
things outside ourselves rests on the testimony of the
senses. The “objective universe” is that which we sensate. When we reason and reflect, when we think of love,,
and fear, when we speak of truth and honor, we know
that all these are not susceptible of being sensated, thatis, that they have no objective existence; they belong to
the Subject universe. Now if God cannot be sensated healso must belong to the Subject world; that is, he must

�WHY I DO NOT BELIEVE IN GOD.

7

be a creation of the mind, with no outside corresponding
reality. Granted that we can never know “the thing in
itself ” ; granted that all we know is only the effect on the
■mind produced by something which differs from the effect
it produces ; yet this fundamental physiological distinction
remains between the Object and the Subject worlds, that
the Object world announces itself by nervous action which
is set up at the periphery, while the Subject world results
from the centrally initiated travail of the brain.
It might., indeed, be argued by the Theist that God may
exist, but may be incognisable by our senses, we lacking
the sense which might sensate deity. Quite so. There
may be existences around us but unknown to us, there
being no part of our organism differentiated to receive
from them impressions. There are rays beyond the solar
spectrum which are invisible to us normally, the existence
of which was unknown to us some years ago, but some
of which apparently serve among light rays for the ant;
so there may be all kinds of existences in the universe
of which we are unconscious, as unconscious as we were
of the existence of the ultra-violet rays until a chemical
reagent rendered them visible. But as we cannot sensate
them, for us they do not exist. This, then, cannot avail
the Theist, for an incognisable God, a God who can enter
into no kind of relation with us, is to us a non-existent
God. We cannot even conceive a sense entirely different
from those we possess, let alone argue over what we should
find out by means of it if we had it.
It is said that of old time the evidence of the senses for
the existence of God was available; the seventy elders
“ saw the God of Israel” ; Moses talked with him “ face
to face ”; Elijah heard his “ still small voice ”. But these
experiences are all traditional; we have no evidence at
first hand; no witness that we can examine ; no facts that
we can investigate. There is not even evidence enough
to start a respectable ghost story, let alone enough to bear
the tremendous weight of the existence of God. Yet, if
some finite “God” exist—I say finite, because, as noted
above, the co-existence of an infinite God anda finite creature
is impossible—how easy for him to prove his existence;
if he be too great for our “comprehension”, as some
Theists argue, he might surely bestow on us a sense which
■might, receive impressions from him, and enable us to

�8

WHY I DO NOT BELIEVE IN GOD.

reach, at least a partial, an imperfect, knowledge of him.
But if he exist, he wraps himself in darkness; if he exist,
he folds himself in silence. Leaning, as it were, over the
edge of being, men strive to pierce the dark abyss of the
unknown, above, below; they strain their sight, but they
see nothing; they listen, but nothing strikes their ear;
weary, dizzy, they stagger backwards, and with the dark­
ness pressing on their eyeballs they murmur 11 God!
Bailing to discover God by way of the senses, we turn to
such evidence for his existence as may be found by way of
the reason, in order to determine whether we can establish
by inference that which we have failed to establish by
direct proof.
As the world is alleged to be the handiwork of God, it
is not unreasonable to scrutinise the phenomena of nature,
and to seek in them for traces of a ruling intelligence, of
a guiding will. But it is impossible even to glance at
natural phenomena, much less to study them attentively,
without being struck by the enormous waste of energy,
the aimless destruction, the utterly unintelligent play of
conflicting and jarring forces. For centuries “nature”
has been steadily at work growing forests, cutting out
channels for rivers, spreading alluvial soil and clothing it
with grass and flowers ; at last a magnificent landscape is
formed, birds and beasts dwell in its woods and on its
pastures, men till its fertile fields, and thank the gracious
God they worship for the work of his hands; there is a
far-off growl which swells as it approaches, a trembling
of the solid earth, a crash, an explosion, and then, in a
darkness lightened only by the fiery rain of burning lava,
all beauty, all fertility, vanish, and the slow results of
thousands of years are destroyed in a night of earthquake
and volcanic fury. Is it from this wild destruction of
slowly obtained utility that we are to infer the existence
of a divine intelligence and divine will ? If beauty and
use were aimed at, why the destruction? If desolation
and uselessness, why the millenniums spent in growth ?
During the year 1886 many hundreds of people in
Greece, in Spain, in America, in New Zealand, were killed
or maimed by earthquakes and by cyclones. Many more
perished in hurricanes at sea. Many more by explosions
in mines and elsewhere. These deaths caused widespread
misery, consigned families to hopeless poverty, cut short

�WHY I DO NOT BELIEVE IN GOD.

9

•careers of use and of promise. They were caused by
“ natural ” forces. Is “ God ” behind nature, and are all
these horrors planned, carried out, by his mind and will ?
•John Stuart Mill has put the case clearly and forcibly :

“Next to the greatness of these cosmic forces, the quality
which most forcibly strikes everyone who does not avert his
•eyes from it is their perfect and absolute recklessness. They
go straight to their end, without regarding what or whom they
crush on the road. Optimists, in their attempts to prove that
‘ whatever is, is right ’, are obliged to maintain, not that nature
‘ ever turns one step from her path to avoid trampling us into
destruction, but that it would be very unreasonable in us to
•expect that she should. Pope’s ‘ Shall gravitation cease when
you go by ?’ may be a just rebuke to anyone who should be so
silly as to expect common human morality from nature. But
if the question were between two men, instead of between a
man and a natural phenomenon, that triumphant apostrophe
Would be thought a rare piece of impudence. A man who
should persist in hurling stones or firing cannon when another
man ‘ goes by ’, and having killed him should urge a similar
plea in exculpation, would very deservedly be found guilty of
murder. In sober truth, nearly all the things which men are
hanged or imprisoned for doing to one another, are Nature’s ,
■everyday performances. Killing, the most criminal act recog­
nised by human laws, Nature does once to every being that
lives; and in a large proportion of cases, after protracted
tortures such as only the greatest monsters whom we read of
ever purposely inflicted on their living fellow creatures. If, by
an arbitrary reservation, we refuse to account anything murder
but what abridges a certain term supposed to be allotted to
human life, nature also does this to all but a small percentage
of lives, and does it in all the modes, violent or insidious, in
which the worst human beings take the lives of one another.
Nature impales men, breaks them as if on the wheel, casts them
to be devoured by wild beasts, burns them to death, crushes
them with stones like the first Christian martyr, starves them ;
With hunger, freezes them with cold, poisons them by the quick
■ or slow venom of her exhalations, and has hundreds of other
hideous deaths in reserve, such as the ingenious cruelty of a
Nabis or a Domitian never surpassed. All this, Nature does
with the most supercilious disregard both of mercy and of
Justice, emptying her shafts upon the best and noblest indiffer­
ently with the meanest and worst; upon those who are engaged
in the highest and worthiest enterprises, and often as the direct
consequence of the noblest acts; and it might almost be imagined
as a punishment for them. She mows down those on whose
existence hangs the wellbeing of a whole people, perhaps the

�10

WHY I DO NOT BELIEVE IN GOD.

prospects of the human race for generations to come, with aslittle compunction as those whose death is a relief to them­
selves, or a blessing to those under their noxious influence”"
(“Three Essays on Religion,” pp. 28, 29, ed. 1874).
It is not only from the suffering caused by the unde­
viating course of the phenomena which from the invariable
sequence of their happening are called “laws of nature”
that we infer the absence of any director or controller of
these forces. There are many absurdities as well as
miseries, caused by the “uniformity of nature”. Dr.
Buchner tells us of a kid he saw which was born perfect
in all parts save that it was headless (“Force and Matter”,
page 234, ed. 1884). Here, for weeks the kid was a-forming,
although life in the outer world was impossible for it.
Monstrosities occur in considerable numbers, and each one
bears silent witness to the unintelligence of the forces that
produced it. Nay, they can be artificially produced, as
has been shown by a whole series of experiments, eggstapped during incubation yielding monstrous chickens. In
all these cases we recognise the blind action of unconscious
forces bringing about a ridiculous and unforeseen
result, if turned slightly out of their normal course.
From studying this aspect of nature it is certain that we
cannot find God. So far from finding here a God to
worship, the whole progress of man depends on his
learning to control and regulate these natural forces, so asto prevent them from working mischief and to turn them,
into channels in which they will work for good.
If from scrutinising the forces of nature we study the
history of the evolution of life on our globe, and the
physical conditions under which man now exists, it is
impossible from these to infer the existence of a benevolent
power as the creator of the world. Life is one vast battle­
field, in which the victory is always to the strong. More
organisms are produced than can grow to maturity; they
fight for the limited supply of food, and by means of this
struggle the weakest are crushed out and the fittest survive
to propagate their race. Each successful organism stands
on the corpses of its weaker antagonists, and only by this
ceaseless strife and slaying has progress been possible.
As the organisms grow more complex and more developed,
added difficulties surround their existence; the young of
the higher animals are weaker and more defenceless at-

�WHY I DO NOT BELIEVE IN GOD.

ii

■birth than those of the lower, and the young of man, the
highest animal yet evolved, is the most helpless of all, and
his hold of life the most precarious during infancy.
So clumsy is the “plan of creation” that among the
most highly-evolved animals a new life is only possibleby peril to life already existing, and the mother must
pass through long weeks of physical weariness and
hours of acute agony ere she can hold her baby in her
arms. All these things are so “natural” to us that weneed to think of them, not as necessary, but as deliberately
planned by a creative power, ere we can realise the mon­
strous absurdity of supposing them to be the outcome of’
“design”. Nor must we overlook the sufferings caused
hy the incomplete adaptation of evolving animals to the
conditions among which they are developing. The human
race is still suffering from its want of adaptation to theupright position, from its inheritance of a structure from
quadrupedal ancestors which was suited to the horizontal
position of their trunks, but is unsuited to the vertical
position of man. The sufferings caused by child-birth,
and by hernia, testify to the incomplete adaptation of therace to the upright condition. To believe that all the
slow stages of blood-stained evolution, that the struggle
for existence, that the survival of the fittest with its other
side, the crushing of the less fit, together with a million
subsidiary consequences of the main “plan”, to believethat all these were designed, foreseen, deliberately selected
as the method of creation, by an almighty power, to believe
this is to believe that “ God ” is the supreme malignity, a
creator who voluntarily devises and executes a plan of the
most ghastly malice, and who works it out with a cruelty
in details which no human pen can adequately describe.
But, again, the condition and the history of the world
are not consistent with its being the creation of an
almighty and perfect cruelty. While the tragedy off
life negates the possibility of an omnipotent goodness asits author, the beauty and happiness of life negate equally
the possibility of an almighty fiend as its creator. Thedelight of bird and beast in the vigor of their eager life
the love-notes of mate to mate, and the brooding ectasy of
the mother over her young; the rapture of the song which
sets quivering the body of the lark as he soars upwards
in the sun-rays; the gambols of the young, with every

�12

WHY I DO NOT BELIEVE IN GOD.

curve telling of sheer joy in life and movement; the
beauty and strength of man and woman; the power of
intellect, the glory of genius, the exquisite happiness of
■sympathy; all these things could not find place in the
handiwork of a power delighting in pain. We cannot,
then, from the study of life on our globe infer the exist­
ence of a God who is wholly good ; the evil disproves
him: nor can we infer the existence of a God who is
wholly evil; the good disproves him. All that we learn
from life-conditions is that if the world has a creator his
■character must be exceedingly mixed, and must be one
to be regarded with extreme suspicion and apprehension.
Be it noted, however, that, so far, we have found no reason
to infer the existence of any creative intelligence.
Leaving the phenomena of nature exclusive of man, as
yielding us no information as to the existence of God, we
turn next to human life and human history to seek for
traces of the “divine presence”. But here again we are
met by the same mingling of good and evil, the same
waste, the same prodigality, which met us in non-human
nature. Instead of the “Providence watching over the
affairs of men” in which Theists believe, we note that
“there be just men, unto whom it happeneth according to
the work of the wicked; again, there be wicked men, to
whom it happeneth according to the work of the righteous ”.
A railway accident happens, in which a useful man, the
mainstay of a family, is killed, and from which a profligate
escapes. An explosion in a mine slays the hardwork­
ing breadwinners at their toil, and the drunken idler
whose night’s debauch has resulted in heavy morning
sleep is “providentially” saved as he snores lazily at
home in bed. The man whose life is invaluable to a
nation perishes in his prime, while the selfish race-haunt­
ing aristocrat lives on to a green old age. The honest
•conscientious trader keeps with difficulty out of the bank­
ruptcy court, and sees his smart, unscrupulous neighbor
pile up a fortune by tricks that just escape the meshes of
the law. If indeed there be a guiding hand amid the
vicissitudes of human life, it must be that of an ironical,
mocking cruelty, which plays with men as puppets for
the gratification of a sardonic humor. Of course, the real
■explanation of all these things is that there is no common
factor in these moral and physical propositions; the

�WHY I BO NOT BELIEVE IN GOD.

1®

quantities are incommensurable; the virtues or vices of
a man ar® not among the causes which launch, or do not
launch, a chimney pot at his head.
Outside these “changes and chances” of human life,,
the thoughtful mind feels conscious of a profound
dissatisfaction with many of the inevitable conditions
of human existence: the sensative faculties are at
their keenest when the intelligence is not sufficiently
developed to utilise them; the perceptive faculties begin
to fail as the reflective touch their fullest development;
and when experience is ripest, judgment most trained,
knowledge most full, old age lays its palsy on thebrain, and senility shakes down the edifice just
when a life’s toil has made it of priceless value. To-,
recognise our limitations, to accept the inevitable, to amend
—so far as amendment is possible—both ourselves and
our environment, all this forms part of a rational philo­
sophy of life ; but what has such self-controlled and keen­
eyed sternness of resolve to do with hysterical outcries for
help to some power outside nature, which, if it existed as
creator, must have modelled our existence at its pleasure,
and towards which our attitude could be only one of bit­
terest, if silent, rebellion ? To bow to the inevitable evil,
While studying its conditions in order to strive to make it
the evitable, is consistent with strong hope which lightens
life’s darkness; but to yield crushed before evil delibe­
rately and consciously inflicted by an omnipotent intelli­
gence—in such fate lies the agony of madness and despair.
Nor do we find any reliable signs of the presence of a
God in glancing over the incidents of human history.
We note unjust wars, in which right is crushed by might,
in which victory sides with “the strongest battalions”, in
the issue of which there appears no trace of a “ God that
judgeth the earth”. We meet with cruelties that sicken
us inflicted on man by man; butcheries that desolate a
city, persecutions that lay waste a province. In every
civilised land of to-day we see wealth mocking poverty,,
and poverty cursing wealth ; here, thousands wasted on a
harlot, and there children sobbing themselves in hunger to
sleep. Our earth rolls wailing yearly round the sun,
bearing evidence that it has no creator who loves and
guides it, but has only its men, children of its own
womb, who by the ceaseless toil of countless genera­

�14

WHY I DO NOT BELIEVE IN GOD.

lions are hewing out the possibility of a better and gladder
world.
Similar testimony is borne by the slow progress of the
human race. Truth is always fighting; each new truth
undergoes a veritable struggle for existence, and if Her­
cules is to live to perform his labors he must succeed in
strangling the serpents that hiss round his cradle. The
new truth must first be held only by one, its discoverer ; if
he is not crushed at the outset, a few disciples are won;
then the little band is persecuted, some are martyred, and,
it may be, the movement destroyed. Or, some survive,
and gain converts, and so the new truth slowly spreads,
winning acceptance at the last. But each new truth must pass
through similar ordeal, and hence the slowness of the up­
ward climb of man. Look backwards over the time which
has passed since man was emerging from the brute, and
then compare those millenniums with the progress that has
been made, and the distance which still separates the race
from a reasonably happy life for all its members. If a
God cannot do better for man than this, man may be well
content to trust to his own unaided efforts. Weturn from
the phenomena of human life, as from those of non-human
nature, without finding any evidence which demonstrates,
or even renders probable, the existence of a God.
There is another line of reasoning, however, apart from
the consideration of phenomena, which must, it is alleged,
lead us to believe in the existence of a God. This is
the well-used argument from causation. Every effect
must have a cause, therefore the universe must have a
cause, is a favorite enthymeme, of which the suppressed
minor is, the universe is an effect. But this is a mere
begging of the question. Every effect must have a
cause; granted; for a cause is defined as that which
produces an effect, and an effect as that which is pro­
duced by a cause; the two words are co-relatives, and
the one is meaningless separated from the other. Prove
that the universe is an effect, and in so doing you will
have proved that it has a cause; but in the proof of that
quietly-suppressed minor is the crux of the dispute. We
see that the forces around us are the causes of various
effects, and that they, the causes of events which follow
their action, are themselves the effects of causes which
preceded such action. From the continued observation

�WHY I DO NOT BELIEVE IN GOD.

■of these sequences, ourselves part of this endless chain,
the idea of causation is worked into the human mind,
and becomes, as it were, part of its very texture, so that
we cannot in thought separate phsenomena from their
causes, and the uncaused becomes to us the incon­
ceivable. But wo cannot rationally extend reasoning
wholly based on pheenomena into the region of the noumenon. That which is true of the phsenomenal universe
gives us no clue when we try to pass without it, and to
penetrate into the mystery of existence per se. To call
God “the first cause” is to play with words after their
meaning has been emptied from them. If the argument
from causation is to be applied to the existence of the
universe, which is, without any proof, to be accepted as
an effect, why may it not with equal force be applied to
“ God ”, who, equally without any proof, may be regarded
as an effect ? and so we may create an illimitable series of
Gods, each an assumption unsupported by evidence. If we
once begin puffing divine smoke-rings, the only limit to the
exercise is our want of occupation and the amount of suit­
able tobacco our imagination is able to supply. The belief
of the Atheist stops where his evidence stops. He believes
in the existence of the universe, judging the accessible proof
thereof to be adequate, and he finds in this universe sufficient
cause for the happening of all pheenomena. He finds no
intellectual satisfaction in placing a gigantic conundrum be­
hind the universe, which only adds its own unintelligibility
to the already sufficiently difficult problem of existence.
Our lungs are not fitted to breathe beyond the atmosphere
which surrounds our globe, and our faculties cannot
breathe outside the atmosphere of the phsenomenal. If I
went up in a balloon I should check it when I found it
carrying me into air too rare for my respiration; and I
decline to be carried by a theological balloon into regions
wherein thought cannot breathe healthily, but can only
fall down gasping, imagining that its gasps are inspiration.
There remain for us to investigate two lines of evidence,
either of which suffices, apparently, to carry conviction to
a large number of minds; these are, the argument from
human experience, and the argument from design.
I have no desire to lessen the weight of an argument
drawn from the sensus communis, the common sense, of
mankind. It is on this that we largely rely in drawing

�16

WIIY I DO NOT BELIEVE IN GOD.

distinctions between the normal and the abnormal; it isthis which serves as test between the sane and the insane
no thoughtful student can venture to ignore the tre­
mendous force of the consensus of human experience.
But while he will not ignore, he must judge : he must
ask, first, is this experience universal and unanimous ?
Secondly, on what experimental or other evidence is it
based ? The universal and unanimous verdict of human
experience, based on clear verifiable experience, is one
which the thinker will challenge with extreme hesitation.
Yet cause may arise which justifies such challenge.
Perhaps no belief has at once been so general, and so
undeniably based on the evidence of the senses, as the
belief in the movement of the sun and the immobility of
our globe. All but the blind could daily see the rising of'
the sun in the eastern sky, and its setting in the west; alL
could feel the firmness of the unshaken earth, the solid
unmoving steadfastness of the ground on which we tread.
Yet this consensus of human experience, this universality
of Tinman testimony, has been rejected as false on evidence
which none who can feel the force of reasoning is able to
deny. If this belief, in defence of which can be brought
the no plus ultra of the verdict of common sense, be not
tenable in the light of modern knowledge, how shall a
belief on which the sensus communis is practically non­
existent, on which human testimony is. lacking in many
cases, contradictory in all others, and which fails to main­
tain itself on experimental or other evidence, how shall it
hold ground from which the other has been driven ?
The reply to the question, “Is the evidence universal
and unanimous ? ” must be in the negative. The religion
of Buddha, which is embraced by more than a third of the
population of the globe, is an Atheistic creed; many
Buddhists pay veneration to Buddha, and to the statues of
their own deceased ancestors, but none pretend that these
objects of reverence are symbols of a divine power. Many
of the lower savage tribes have no idea of &amp;od. Darwin
writes: “There is ample evidence, derived not from hasty
travellers, but from men who have long resided with
savages, that numerous races have existed, and still exist,
who have no idea of one or more Gods, and who have no
words in their language to express such an idea” (“Descent
of Man,” pp. 93, 94, ed. 1875). Buchner (“Force and

�WHY I DO NOT BELIEVE IN GOD.

17

Matter,” pp. 382—393) has collected a mass of evidence
showing that whole races of men have no idea of God at
all. Sir John Lubbock has done the same. When
savages reach a stage of intelligence at which they begin
to seek the causes of phenomena, they invariably postulate
many Gods as causes of the many objects around them.
A New Zealander who was told of the existence of the one
God by a missionary, asked him scoffingly if, among
Europeans, one man made things of every sort; and he
argued that as there were various trades among men, so
there were various Gods, each with his own business, and
one made trees, another the sea, another the animals, and
so on. Only when intelligence has reached a comparatively
high plane, is evolved the idea of one God, the creator and
the rurs^of the universe. Moreover this idea of “God”
is essentially an abstract, not a concrete idea, and the fancy
that there ia an entity belonging to it is but a survival of
Realism, a/meory which is discredited in everything save
in this one theological remnant.
It has been alleged by some writers that, however
degraded may be the savage, he still has some idea of
supernatural existences, and that error on this head has
arisen from the want of thoroughly understanding the
savage’s ideas. But even these writers do not allege that
the belief of these savages touches on a being who can be
called by the most extreme courtesy “God”. There may
be a vague fear of the unknown, a tendency to crouch
before striking and dangerous manifestations of natural
forces, an idea of some unseen power residing in a stone
or a relic—a fetish; but such things—and of the existence
of even these in the lowest savages evidence is lacking—
can surely not be described as belief in God.
Not only is the universal evidence a-wanting, but such
evidence as there is wholly lacks unanimity. What at­
tribute of the divine character, what property of the
divine nature, is attested by the unanimous voice of human
experience ? What is there in common between the
Mumbo-Jumbo of Africa, and the “heavenly Father”, of
refined nineteenth century European Theism.? What tie,
save that of a common name, unites the blood-dripping
Tezcatlepoca of Mexico with him “ whose tender mercy is
over, all his works ” ? Even if we confine ourselves to the
Gods of the Jews, the Christians, and the Mahommedans,

�18

WHY I DO NOT BELIEVE IN GOD.

how great is the clash of dissension. The Jew proclaims
it blasphemy to speak of a divine Trinity, and shrinks
with horror from the thought of an incarnate God. The
Christian calls it blasphemy to deny the deity of the man
Christ Jesus, aqd affirms, under anathema, the triune
nature of the Godhead. The Mahommedan asserts the
unity of God, and stamps as infidel everyone who refuses
to see in Mahommed the true revealer of the divinity.
Each is equally certain that he is right, and each is
equally certain that the others are wrong, and are in peril
of eternal damnation for their rejection of the one true
faith. If the Christian has his lake of fire and brimstone
for those who deny Christ, the Mahommedan has his drinks
of boiling water for those who assert him. Among 'this
clash of tongues, to whom shall turn the bewildered
enquirer after truth ? All his would-be teachers are
equally positive, and equally without evidence. All are
loud in assertion, but singularly modest in their offers of
proof.
Now, it may be taken as an undeniable fact that where
there is confusion of belief there is deficiency of evidence.
Scientific men quarrel and dispute over some much con­
troverted scientific theory. They dispute because the
experimental proofs are lacking that would decide the
truth or the error of the suggested hypothesis. While
the evidence is unsatisfactory, the controversy continues,
but when once decisive proof has been discovered all
tongues are still. The endless controversies over the ex­
istence of God show that decisive proof has not yet been
attained. And while this proof is wanting, I remain
Atheist, resolute not to profess belief till my intellect can
find some stable ground whereon to rest.
We have reached the last citadel, once the apparently
impregnable fortress of Theism, but one whose walls are
now crumbling, the argument from design. It was this
argument which so impressed John Stuart Mill that he
wrote in his Essay on “ Theism ” : “I- think it must be
allowed that, in the present state of our knowledge, the
adaptations in Nature afford a large balance of probability
in favor of creation by intelligence. It is equally certain
that this is no more than a probability ” (“ Three Essays
on Religion ”, p. 174). This Essay was, however, written
between the years 1868 and 1870, and at that time the

�■WHY I DO NOT BELIEVE IN GOD.

19

tremendous effect of the hypothesis of evolution had not
yet made itself felt; Mill speaks (p. 172) of the “recent
speculations ” on “ the principle of the ‘ survival of the
of the fittest’ ”, and recognising that if this principle were
sound “there would be a constant though slow general
improvement of the type as it branched out into many
different varieties, adapting it to different media and
modes of existence, until it might possibly, in countless
ages, attain to the most advanced examples which now
exist ” (p. 173), he admits that if this be true “ it must be
acknowledged that it would greatly attenuate the evidence
for ” creation. And I am prepared to admit frankly that
until the “how” of evolution explained the adaptations
in Nature, the weight of the argument from design was
very great, and to most minds would have been absolutely
decisive. It would not of course prove the existence of an
omnipotent and universal creator, but it certainly did
powerfully suggest the presence of some contriving intel­
ligence at work on natural phenomena. But now, when
we can trace the gradual evolution of a complex and highly
developed organ through the various stages which separate
its origin from its most complete condition ; when we can
study the retrogression of organs becoming rudimentary
by disuse, and the improvement of organs becoming
developed by use; when we notice as imperfections in the
higher type things which were essential in the lower: what
wonder is it that the instructed can no longer admit the
force of the argument from design ?
The human eye has often been pointed to as a trium­
phant proof of design, and it naturally seemed perfect in
the past to those who could imagine no higher kind of
optical instrument; but now, as Tyndall says, “Along
list of indictments might indeed be brought against the
eye—its opacity, its want of symmetry, its lack of achro­
matism, its absolute blindness, in part. All these taken
together caused Helmholtz to say that, if any optician sent
him an instrument so full of defects, he would be justified
in sending it back with the severest censure” (“On
Light”, p. 8, ed. 1875). It is only since men have made
optical instruments without the faults of the eye, that we
have become aware how much better we might see than
we do. Nor is this all; the imperfections which would
show incompetence on the part of a designer become inte­

�20

WHY I DO NOT BELIEVE IN GOD.

resting and significant as traces of gradual development,
and the eye, which in the complexity of its highest form
seemed, notwithstanding its defects, to demand such great
intelligence to conceive and fashion it, becomes more in­
telligible when we can watch it a-building, and, as it were,
See it put together bit by bit. I venture to quote here
from a pamphlet of my own a very brief statement of the
stages through which the eye has passed in its evolution:
“ The first definite eye-spot that we yet know of is a little
colored speck at the base of the tentacles of some of the
Hydromedusse, jelly-fish in common parlance. They are
only spots of pigment, and we should not know they were
attempts at eyes were it not that some relations, the Discophora, have little refractive bodies in their pigment
spots, and these refractive bodies resemble the crystalline
cones of animals a little higher in the scale. In the next
class (Vermes), including all worms, we find only pigment
spots in the lowest; then pigment spots with a nerve­
fibre ending in them; pigment spots with rod-shaped cells,
with crystalline rods ; pigment spots with crystalline cones.
Next, the cones begin to be arranged radially; and in
the Alciopidse the eye has become a sphere with a lens
and a vitreous body, layer of pigment, layer of rods, and
optic nerve. To mark the evolution definitely in another
way, we find the more highly developed eye of the
adult appearing as a pigment spot in the embryo, so
that both the evolution of the race and the evolution
of the individual tell the same story. In the Echino­
derma (sea-urchins, star-fishes) we find only pigment
spots in the lower forms, but in the higher the rod-shaped
cells, the transparent cones projecting from pigment cells.
In the Arthropoda (lobsters, insects, etc.,) the advance
continues from the Vermes. The retina is formed more
definitely than in the Alciopidm, and the eye becomes more
complex. The compound eye is an attempt at grouping
many cones together, and is found in the higher members
of this sub-kingdom. In the lowest vertebrate, the Amphioxus, the eye is a mere pigment spot, but in the others
the more complex forms are taken up and carried on to
the comparative perfection of the mammalian eye” (“Eyes
and Ears”, pp. 9, 10). And be it noted that in the
most complex and highly developed eye there is still the
same relation of pigment layer, rod layer, cone layer,

�WHY I DO NOT BELIEVE IN GOD.

21

seen in its earliest beginnings in the Discophora and the
worms.
The line of argument here applied to the eye may be
followed in every instance of so-called design. The ex­
quisite mechanism of the ear may be similarly traced, from
the mere sac with otoliths of the Medusse up to the elabo­
rate external, middle, and internal ears of man. Man’s
ear is a very complex thing. Its three chambers ; the
curious characteristics of the innermost of these, with its
three “semi-circular canals”, its coiled extension, like a
snail-shell, called the cochlea, its elaborate nervous mechan­
ism ; the membrane between the middle and outer cham­
bers, which vibrates with every pulsation of the air; we
can trace all these separate parts as they are added one to
one to the auditory apparatus of the evolving race. If we
examine the edge of the “ umbrella ” of the free-swimming
Medusa, we shall find some little capsules containing one
or more tiny crystals, the homologues of the inner ear; the
lower forms of Vermes have similar ears, and in some there
are delicate hairs within the capsule which quiver con­
stantly ; the higher worms have these capsules paired and
they lie close to a mass of nervous matter. Lobsters and
their relations have similar ears, the capsule being some­
times closed and sometimes open. In many insects a
delicate membrane is added to the auditory apparatus, and
stretches between the vesicle and the outer air, homologue
of our membrane. The lower fishes have added one semi­
circular canal, the next higher two, and the next higher
three : a little expansion is also seen at one part of the
vesicle. In the frogs and toads this extension is increased,
and in the reptiles and birds it is still larger, and is curled
a little at the further end. In the lowest mammals it is
still only bent, but in the higher it rolls round on itself
and forms the cochlea. The reptiles and birds have the
space developed between the vesicle and the membrane,
and so acquire a middle ear; the crocodile and the owl
show a trace of the external ear, but it is not highly
developed till we reach the mammals, and even the lowest
mammals, and the aquatic ones, have little of it developed.
Thus step by step is the ear built up, until we see it com­
plete as a slow growth, not as an intelligent design.
And if it be asked, how are these changes caused, the
answer comes readily : “ By variation and by the survival of

�22

WHY I DO NOT BELIEVE IN GOD.

the fittest ”. Since organisms and their environments re-act
on each other, slight variations are constantly occurring;
living organisms are ever in very unstable equilibrium,
chemical association and disassociation are continually going
on within them. Some of these changes are advantageous
to the organism in the struggle for existence; some are
indifferent; some are disadvantageous. Those that are
advantageous tend to persist, since the organism possessing
them is more likely to survive than its less fortunate com­
petitors, and — since variations are transmissible from
parents to progeny—to hand on its favorable variation to
its young. On the other hand the disadvantageous varia­
tions tend to disappear, since the organism which is by
them placed at a disadvantage is likely to perish in the
fight for food. Here are the mighty forces that cause evo­
lution ; here the “ not ourselves which makes for righteous­
ness”, i.e., forever-increasing suitability of the organism
to its environment.
It is, of course, impossible in so brief a statement as
this to do justice to the fulness of the explanation of all
cases of apparent design which can be made in this fashion.
The thoughtful student must work out the line of argu­
ment for himself. Nor must he forget to notice the argu­
ment from the absence of design, the want of adaptation,
the myriad failures, the ineptitudes and incompetences of
nature. How, from the point of view of design, can he
explain the numerous rudimentary organs in the higher
animals ? What is the meaning of man’s hidden rudimen­
tary tail? of his appendix coeci vermiformis? of the
branchial clefts and the lanugo of the human being dur­
ing periods of ante-natal life ? of the erratic course of the
recurrent laryngeal? of the communication between the
larynx and the alimentary canal ? I might extend the list
over a page. The fact that uninstructed people do not
appreciate these difficulties offers no explanation to the
instructed who feel their force; and the abuse so freely
lavished on the Atheist does not carry conviction to the
intellect.
I do not believe in God. My mind finds no grounds
on which to build up a reasonable faith. My heart revolts
against the spectre of an Almighty Indifference to the pain,
of sentient beings. My conscience rebels against the
injustice, the cruelty, the inequality, which surround me

�WHY" I DO NOT BELIEVE IN GOD.

23

on every side. But I believe in Man. In man’s redeeming
power; in man’s remoulding energy; in man’s approach­
ing triumph, through knowledge, love, and work.

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                <text>Why I do not believe in God</text>
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                <text>Besant, Annie Wood [1847-1933]</text>
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                <text>Place of publication: London&#13;
Collation: 23 p. ; 18 cm.&#13;
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                    <text>WORK AND WEALTH
ESSAY

AN

ON THE

OF

ECONOMICS

SOCIALISM,

BY

J. K. INGALLS.

ONE

PENNY.

LONDON:

INTERNATIONAL PUBLISHING COMPANY,
*
r

35, NEWINGTON GREEN ROAD, N.

1887.

��WORK AND WEALTH.4
&lt;Ti HAVE chosen the above terms in preference to Labour and
W Capital, because they convey more exact ideas. Thè word
labour carries with it the impression of compulsory, or servile
toil. Capital is a word which economists themselves cannot satis­
factorily define, and to which they apply only an arbitrary meaning.
The things signified by work and wealth are subject to no equivocal
interpretation, are understood by all, and stand to each other in the
relation of a natural sequence.
Speaking from the standpoint of the trader, from which political
economists mainly speak, Adam Smith lays down this fundamental
proposition : “ It was not by gold or silver, but by labour, that all
the wealth of the world was originally purchased.” For him the
term labour was appropriate, because, in his time, a large proportion
of the world’s work was performed by bondmen or by hirelings,
even more the mere dependents of the legal possessors of the world’s
wealth than are the workers of to-day.
Starting from this comprehensive, but exact, proposition that work
is the only source from which wealth can be produced or purchased
as an axiom, the opposite of which is simply unthinkable, let us
direct our attention to an inquiry into the manner in which wealth
to appearance is transferred so often in exchange for no equivalent
in labour. Even the trader may be interested in the attempt to
account for the fact that wealth, at first purchasable only by work,
comes to be possessed mainly by those who do no work.
The thing which a man has produced by his work, and which is an
object of desire to himself and others, can be transferred in several
different ways. The natural or simplistic methods are: (r) Force,
involving robbery, theft, and, in an advanced stage, cheating, over­
reaching, and advantage-taking of every description ; (2) Gift, involving partial and invidious bestowments, as well as noble gene­
rosities ; (3) Hazard, involving all kinds of gaming, and, in the
progress of society, all speculative ventures.
* This paper originally appeared in the Ameiican “ Radical Review.”

*

�4

v

i

The rational method, and one which is arrived at only by culture
and the recognition of social obligations, is mutual exchange.
With the earlier method^ as they have existed in the past, we need
have no quarrel. They were the only ones possible under the con­
dition of social and moral development then obtaining. Robbery is
the main element of organic and animated life. The carnivorous
animals all support life by drawing it from orders less powerful or
aggressive than themselves, and even the herbivorous sustain life by
devouring vegetable life. Man destroys the lives of the creatures
beneath him that he may eat their flesh and robe himself with their
furs and skins.. He robs the sheep of its fleece, the silk-worm of its
web that he may clothe himself. That he pursues a similar course
with his fellow is not to be wondered at. Only a conception of the
brotherhood of man and the real dignity of work can win him from
his tendency to devour the substance of the weak and simple who
fall into his hands, instead of producing wealth for himself.
The rude man, who has spent hours in the forest gathering fagots,
but lies down at night without a fire, while another enjoys the genial
warmth those same fagots yield while burning, may have transferred
their possession in several different ways. He may, with a certain
degree of equity, have exchanged them, for different products which
the other had worked to obtain ; he may have engaged in some
game of chance, and lost them wholly ; or he may have been met
by a stronger man, while returning laden, and deprived of his fagots
by force. Or, he already may have been reduced to a bond-slave,
his life having bten spared in war on condition of his submission to
a life of slavery; and thus have given his captor the perpetual
ability to purchase wealth with his and his childrens’ toil.
From the mental state which results from such motives as sway
the successful warrior and slave-holder, to that of the enlightened
moralist and economist who discovers that, if another has created
wealth which he himself desires, the true thing to do is to create
something which the other will equally desire, that so the transfers
may be mutually agreeable and beneficial, is a distance which
requires ages of toil and struggle to overcome.
It may be urged that in the capture and management of slaves,
who would not willingly work if left to themselves, a certain necessary
work was performed, and a larger production of wealth obtained.
If we were to admit this as regards the past, it would serve as no justi­
fication for the continuance of slavery ; but it should also be con­
sidered that the robber class, until taught by the toil of the indus­
trious that labour will produce or purchase wealth, never seeks to
subject the toilers to slavery. Besides, all experience shows that

•••

�5

slavery, so far from promoting industry, begets a general repugnance
to work on the part of both slave and slave owner : thus the thing
urged in its justification is seen to have been caused mainly by
itself.
It was not till after centuries of advancement that civilized nations
began to discourage chattel slavery. Its entire abolition in our
country is a recent event. But by its abolition we have by no
means reached any thing like an equitable system of exchange. We
still have class legislation, protecting the vast accumalations of
wealth and ownership of land in unlimited quantities, just as incom­
patible with justice as the older tyranny.
To be able to purchase wealth with others’ labour, it is not at all
necessary to own their bodies. The strong assumed “ property in ■
man ” and “ property in the soil ” at the same time. Now, since the
soil is absolutely essential to the application of labour to productive
uses, he who has an exclusive claim to it can labour under any
tribute he pleases, or deny it opportunity to employ itself or be
employed at all. Since ownership in man has been abolished,
private ownership of land is the chief basis, the great fulcrum, of alt
devices for purchasing wealth by the work of others.
By the workers themselves this power is little understood, because
it affects them indirectly. They come in immediate contact with
their employers, and questions of raising or lowering wages, lengthen­
ing or shortening hours, attract their attention and divert it from
more fundamental questions. They hardly reflect that their em­
ployers are also subject to the competitive struggle, and are often
broken down by the operation of the same law which shortens the
rations, and renders more and more precarious the employment, on
which the labourer depends.
The indifference of the working-men to this question of the land,
and their failure to obtain even enough of it to enable them to rear
homes for themselves and families, has a curious, as well as sad,
result. Quite twenty-five per cent, of the earnings of labourers,
clerks, and mechanics who do not own a home of their own, goes
to the landlords for rent. In many instances, this is for structures
which have been paid for a hundred times over, and are not worth in
their material the labour of pulling down and carrying away. It is
true that a portion of this rent comes back in payment of repairs,
taxes, etc., but still leaving a large percentage for which labour
receives no return whatever, and may almost be said to yield
voluntarily, thus permitting others, to that extent, to purchase wealth
with their unrequited toil.
Had our Government established a system of easy access to the

*

�6

soil through nationalization of the land or a judicious limitation to
private ownership, the questions arising between employer and em­
ployed would have a ready solution. On the recurrence of a de­
pression in business, general or special, the parties feeling themselves
crowded would betake themselves to the cultivation of the soil, or
some self-employment; or at least enough would do so to relieve the
overstocked labour market, thus increasing the demand for the
things which had been over-produced.
Out of our semi-feudal land system grow also many of the giant
evils which afflict our commerce and finance. The man who has no
land must hire it or pay for its use, before he can apply his labours
in cultivation, however willing and capable he may be. This basic
necessity of borrowing is the foundation of all other borrowing ;
paying for the use of land is the basis of all rent and usury and
speculative profit of every description. Distressed by unnatural dis-'“*^* possession and deprivation, people are in no condition to resist the
temptation to borrow anything which promises relief, and to pledge
themselves to pay therefor impossible rates of interest. The poor
man, to free himself from present deprivation, borrows the means to
do a little business • the man of considerable means borrows that he
may do more business; and for the result, we have most of the real
estate and much of the personal property of both in the hands of
the money-lender through foreclosures. A large proportion of all
transfers of real estate, especially for the last three years, has been
through foreclosures, and to avoid foreclosures.
An annual half-billion does not cover the amount which goes into
or through the hands of corporations in the form of interest in this
country, not to mention the enormous rentals, private speculative
profits, etc.
The industrious man, who purchases by his work any desired
wealth, gets only one-half, or less, himself,—the other half going to
the usurer, landlord, or profit-monger. These are enabled to pur­
chase, or get recognized possession of, this other half through
unlimited control of land, and the system of usance and annuities
growing up from that basis.
It may be said with too much truth that working-men get now
more than they wisely use; but it is still truer that, in proportion as
their share in what they have produced is diminished, they become
more and more indifferent to saving, and more and more shiftless
and unreliable.
It is not the purpose of this paper to attempt to point out what
is right and equitable between employer and employed under our
system of wages. W-hen any considerable portion of mankind

�7

desires equity and mutualism in industry and division, there will be
no difficulty in arriving at exact conclusions. My object will be
more than realized, if I draw attention to these things as they
actually exist, and to the positive relation which work and wealth
sustain to each other, the truth in regard to which can only be
ascertained by careful analysis.
Into all production of wealth only two factors enter: (i) the raw
material—the soil or its spontaneous productions; (2) human effort.
However complex or extended, in the last analysis only these two
elements are found. It is not the carbon and nitrogen, the salts and
gases, of which our food and clothing are composed, which we pro­
duce as wealth, but that specific form and aptitude for use which our
work has wrought or effected.
According to that ingenious political economist, Bastiat, even
when we purchase things with money or by barter, we do not
exchange things, but forms of service. The inference, however,
which he draws from this truthful proposition—that, therefore, any
one in possession of wealth to whatever amount must necessarily
have rendered an equivalent service for that wealth (either by him­
self, or through an ancestor or donor)—is so monstrous as to be
accepted only by specialists in 11 exact science.” On the contrary,
we find mutuality of service nowhere recognized as at all requisite in
the business transactions of the world. We might as well look for
it under the chattel system, where men and women are bought and
sold, and where labour does not have to be purchased with equiva­
lent service, but can be enforced by the lash. Adam Smith says :
“ It is impossible for one to become excessively rich without making
many others correspondingly poor.” This is a result which could
not possibly arise from any mutual exchange of services, or from any
honest transfers of equivalents, any more than we can have an
equation with one side plus and the other minus. Hence it follows
that, where inordinate wealth exists, it has been purchased by the
labour of others than the possessors, and through transfers by force,
fraud or hazard.
To produce or have wealth at all, human effort must be put forth.
Even the spontaneous productions of Nature cannot constitute
wealth, until taken out of their natural state. The savage who has
fagots and game in store for a week has wealth, as compared with
him who has to gather a daily supply. Application and frugality
seem the only requisites for its acquirement. By a wise division of
labour and special adaptation of functions, the wealth of the world
has been vastly increased; but we must not let the complexity of
work and diversity of employments confuse our ideas in regard to

�8

*

the main question,—namely, the source of wealth, and the equity or
iniquity of the present method of distribution.
As society advanced from the simply savage state, the search,
capture, and transportation of natural wealth was followed by various
handicrafts which added value thereto. It was work, nothing less
and nothing more, of hand and brain which formed social wealth
from the resources of Nature. In all these elaborate transforma­
tions, we can discover no other earthly agency, nor indeed make any
material distinction in the essential character of these varied services.
One and all are necessary to each other. By no logic can we decide
that one service is more important than another, except in the utility
of its product.
If one has discovered, another secured, and a third transported
the prize to the place where it is needed for consumption, we can
decide no otherwise than that the pay of each should be propor­
tioned to the time employed in labour and the useful result accom­
plished. Even the labour necessary to divide and distribute it comes
in justly for a share.
So far all must be plain in regard to the facts involved in our
question. It seems to me the principles must also be clear. But
it will be answered that still the distinctions in life and the inequali­
ties of distribution of which we complain have been transmitted to
us from previously existing conditions, and result from the operations
of forces that can be traced back through every form of civilization.
This is, however, very far from proving that they exist in accordance
with elementary principles or any rational interpretation of law.
Really it comes to this,—whether we will continue the essential
injustice, while dropping the barbaric methods of the savage, or
attempt a truly scientific solution of the problem of work and wealth.
In the discovery, procurance, and manipulation of natural produc­
tions, I have indicated all the steps in the production of wealth.
Services in the preservation or conservation of wealth are equally
entitled to consideration, but cannot be yielded a superior claim.
With our inequitable division, and the disorganized methods of dis­
tribution which it begets, the number of traders becomes sadly
disproportioned to the number of actual producers ; and since those
despoiled are chiefly those who perform the most useful labour, the
smart and shrewd seek the more indirect methods of obtaining
wealth. And just here the principle of competition, which political
economists seem to think ought to reconcile the wealth producers to
starvation, does not work with facility, for no one can do a business
at a loss, and hence society has to support numbers to do the work
which one might do.

�9
I may, in this connection, refer to the instrumentality of money
or currency, serviceable in moving crops and the work of distribu­
tion generally. Its importance, however, is ’ mainly due to the want
of mutualism in our distributive system and of equity in our methods
of exchange.
A charge for the time-use of this instrument, in defiance of the
sentiments of all moralists from Moses and Cato to Ruskin and
Palmer, has been enforced by our laws, because labour was at the
mercy of the few who hold the soil, and because operations could
be made to pay dividends out of the wealth purchased by the labour
of the poor arid simple. Chattel slavery enabled the planter to pay
interest. ‘Land monopoly enables the capitalist to assume that there
is a usufruct ’to wealth. In return, usury has been the great lever by
which millions of homes have been alienated, and gone to swell the
domain of avarice and love of lordly domination.
As war was the parent of slavery, by which whole families, tribes,
and nations were reduced to bondage,—made “ hewers of wood and
drawers of water” to the victors,—so it has been employed to
enslave labour by the creation of immense national debts, the mere
interest of which is an onerous tax upon the worker. Hazard has
also played as large, if not so conspicuous, a part as war in reducing
labour to the condition of dependence and distress. The liberty of
self, wife, and children, in barbaric times, was often staked. And
when this was not done, borrowing to prolong play was practised, as
to-day in Turkey and in some Christian and even republican
countries, upon conditions and at rates which can have no termina­
tion but in life-long bondage or peonage. To relieve present dis­
tress, or deluded by the hope of acquiring the ability to live by
others’ labour, many people to-day, who would despise the mere
gambler, fall into a similar fatuity, and wake from it only to find
themselves slaves to the power they expected to use to lay others*
labour under contribution.
I am not urging sympathy for these dupes. I am only pointing
out some of the causes, still in operation, which have resulted in
making the few the actual masters of labour, and given them the
ability to purchase wealth without work of their own. In our country
and time we do not enforce gambling debts as they do in Turkey ;
but we do enforce contracts to pay interest, often just as oppressive,
and only outwardly less barbarous and inhuman.
In.thus tracing the. working of these crude methods, we find that
the productive labour of our time has its .inheritance, through the
wage system, serfdom, and slavery, from primitive subjection to
force; or through speculative trade, from the hazard which ruined

�ro
the victim without permanently benefiting the winner. It is not
important to our purpose to inquire whether the plunderers or
plundered are more to blame, or the greater sufferers. This is plain;
with the land in the hands of the hereditary or speculative lord, the
labourer has no resources for self-employment, however fit or unfit
he may be.
The working-man can obtain independence now only by the
possession of exceptional powers, or by special good fortune, and
then only through schemes and operations which raise one at the
expense of many.
The inheritance of the property class consists of a transmission of
power attained by forceful conquest, or by the varied forms of hazard,
fraud, and corruption. With their wealth they inherit generally the
tendency to take advantage of the necessities of others, and to apply
new methods of overreaching when the spirit of progress will no
longer tolerate the old ones.
1 do not make this application to individuals, but only to those
given to the shrewd use of wealth; well I know that many parvenus
far outdo, in management, those who inherit wealth.
In this country we have changed some things to suit republican
prejudices. For instance, our land is no longer entailed in a family.
Yet it is all falling into the hands of a class; and although the great
fortunes sometimes change to other hands, they are controlled by
those with still greater, and their attitude and relation to industry
remain the same. Of the large fortunes now enjoyed in New York
and New England, many had their foundations laid by successful
privateers and slave traders ; and by other methods no less dis­
cordant with principles of natural justice.
The immense fortunes made by two well-known citizens in the
generation now past are quite exceptional, and yet they well illustrate
the present divorced relation between work and wealth. In a certain
sense, both were industrious workers. Each has said of himself that,
when he worked in the ordinary way, his income was trifling. It
was only after lon^ struggle, in which many worthy men went to the
wall, that their fortunes began to accumulate with great rapidity.
Both were greatly indebted to our civil war, which reduced whole
populations to poverty, left the nation three billions in debt, and
sacrificed a million lives. It is also worthy of note that a great
banker at our nat onal capital was made rich by privileges granted
him to trade during the Mexican war. When it is said in justifica­
tion of these men that they did not go outside the acknowledged
rules of I usiness. it is admitting that our systems of trade, finance,
etc., are essentially the same as in barbarous ages whose forms we
have discarded.

�11

Another great estate, also recently left in the city of New York
was mainly inherited, being now in the possession of the third gene­
ration. In mentioning these instances I disclaim any purpose of
judging the men. They were what inheritance and environment
made them. My only purpose is to show the irrational and fatal
policy which places in the hands of any men, however good or great,
the power to purchase, ad libitum, wealth with other people’s work.
I am quite well aware that for many years to come this remonstrance
will remain measurably unheeded. The workers are so depressed
with hardship, or so readily elated with the prospect of success in
some exceptional field, that they are quite unwilling to look away
from prospects of temporary relief to the consideration of broad
questions of reform, even if they were less idiotically joined to party,
labelled republican or democratic, by leaders who form a mutual
ring, whichever party attains power, and conspire to make the
plunder of public funds and public trusts a fine art.
But from the operation upon the public mind of works like those
of Spencer, Mill, Lewes, and Ruskin, much is to be hoped. Our
own country, also, has the names of men, not unknown to fame,
who are deeply impressed with the importance of this vital social
and ethical problem. Its development promises to take form like
this :
First, As a civil right,—freedom of access to the soil and oppor­
tunity of self-employment;
Second, As a principle of law,—the partnership of all concerned
in the production of wealth requiring division of labour;
Third, As a matter of commercial ethics,—equivalents of service
in all exchanges.
In connection with these developments in the intellectual and
ethical field, it occurs to me that there is a probability, at least, of
a movement which shall greatly hasten the downfall of our barbarous
system of division, and the approach of the era when work shall be
the only recognized title to wealth. Within the present century,
men like Robert Owen, Peter Cooper, Gerrit Smith, and many
others who could be mentioned, have shown, with more or less
success, that it is “nobl-e to live for others,” and that personal
interests may be subordinated to social aims. It seems to me no
dream of romance to indulge the faith that, at a time near at hand,
a class of true men and women will arise and form an order, which
will abstain from preying on the results of others’ toil. These social
knights-errant will scorn to rely on the efforts of others for their
support, or to apply to their own use, in any way, that for which
another has wrought. They will no more consider the necessity or

�12

weakness of their toiling fellow a reason why they should overreach
and plunder him, than would the model knight of the days of
chivalry have considered that the weakness and defenceless state of
a persecuted woman was a reason why he should outrage rather than
protect her. These will organize industries on an equitable basis,
promote emigration to districts where the exactions of landlords are
less intolerable, and turn the current of many now questionable,
though well-intended, charities into channels of self-employment and
self-help. It is not too much to hope that they will be able ulti­
mately to change the application of the vast amount of labour and
wealth now expended in “ plans of salvation ” to save the souls of
men in a future world, into a broadly beneficent measures of indus­
trial organization and social renovation, and thus render possible the
coming of the “ kingdom of heaven upon the earth,” under the
equitable rule of which it&lt;£ shall be given to every one according to
his work.”

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                  <text>A collection of digitised nineteenth-century pamphlets from Conway Hall Library &amp;amp; Archives. This includes the Conway Tracts, Moncure Conway's personal pamphlet library; the Morris Tracts, donated to the library by Miss Morris in 1904; the National Secular Society's pamphlet library and others. The Conway Tracts were bound with additional ephemera, such as lecture programmes and handwritten notes.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Please note that these digitised pamphlets have been edited to maximise the accuracy of the OCR, ensuring they are text searchable. If you would like to view un-edited, full-colour versions of any of our pamphlets, please email librarian@conwayhall.org.uk.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span&gt;&lt;img src="http://www.heritagefund.org.uk/sites/default/files/media/attachments/TNLHLF_Colour_Logo_English_RGB_0_0.jpg" width="238" height="91" alt="TNLHLF_Colour_Logo_English_RGB_0_0.jpg" /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;</text>
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              <name>Creator</name>
              <description>An entity primarily responsible for making the resource</description>
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                  <text>Conway Hall Library &amp; Archives</text>
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            <element elementId="40">
              <name>Date</name>
              <description>A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource</description>
              <elementTextContainer>
                <elementText elementTextId="16309">
                  <text>2018</text>
                </elementText>
              </elementTextContainer>
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              <name>Publisher</name>
              <description>An entity responsible for making the resource available</description>
              <elementTextContainer>
                <elementText elementTextId="16310">
                  <text>Conway Hall Ethical Society</text>
                </elementText>
              </elementTextContainer>
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    </collection>
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      <name>Text</name>
      <description>A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.</description>
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          <name>Original Format</name>
          <description>The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data</description>
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              <text>Pamphlet</text>
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        <name>Dublin Core</name>
        <description>The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.</description>
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          <element elementId="50">
            <name>Title</name>
            <description>A name given to the resource</description>
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                <text>Work and wealth: an essay on the economics of socialism</text>
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            <name>Creator</name>
            <description>An entity primarily responsible for making the resource</description>
            <elementTextContainer>
              <elementText elementTextId="11806">
                <text>Ingalls, J.K.</text>
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            <name>Description</name>
            <description>An account of the resource</description>
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                <text>Place of publication: London&#13;
Collation: 12 p. ; 23 cm.&#13;
Notes: Stamp on front flyleaf: South Place Chapel Finsbury, Lending Library. "This paper originally appeared in the American 'Radical Review'". Publisher's list on numbered page at the end.</text>
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            <name>Publisher</name>
            <description>An entity responsible for making the resource available</description>
            <elementTextContainer>
              <elementText elementTextId="11809">
                <text>International Publishing Company</text>
              </elementText>
            </elementTextContainer>
          </element>
          <element elementId="40">
            <name>Date</name>
            <description>A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource</description>
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              <elementText elementTextId="11810">
                <text>1887</text>
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            </elementTextContainer>
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          <element elementId="43">
            <name>Identifier</name>
            <description>An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context</description>
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              <elementText elementTextId="11811">
                <text>G4968</text>
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            <name>Subject</name>
            <description>The topic of the resource</description>
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              <elementText elementTextId="16911">
                <text>Economics</text>
              </elementText>
            </elementTextContainer>
          </element>
          <element elementId="47">
            <name>Rights</name>
            <description>Information about rights held in and over the resource</description>
            <elementTextContainer>
              <elementText elementTextId="17491">
                <text>&lt;a href="http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/mark/1.0/"&gt;&lt;img src="http://i.creativecommons.org/p/mark/1.0/88x31.png" alt="Public Domain Mark" /&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span&gt;This work (Work and wealth: an essay on the economics of socialism), identified by &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href="https://conwayhallcollections.omeka.net/items/show/www.conwayhall.org.uk"&gt;&lt;span&gt;Humanist Library and Archives&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;, is free of known copyright restrictions.&lt;/span&gt;</text>
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            </elementTextContainer>
          </element>
          <element elementId="42">
            <name>Format</name>
            <description>The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource</description>
            <elementTextContainer>
              <elementText elementTextId="17492">
                <text>application/pdf</text>
              </elementText>
            </elementTextContainer>
          </element>
          <element elementId="51">
            <name>Type</name>
            <description>The nature or genre of the resource</description>
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              <elementText elementTextId="17493">
                <text>Text</text>
              </elementText>
            </elementTextContainer>
          </element>
          <element elementId="44">
            <name>Language</name>
            <description>A language of the resource</description>
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              <elementText elementTextId="17494">
                <text>English</text>
              </elementText>
            </elementTextContainer>
          </element>
        </elementContainer>
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        <name>Economics</name>
      </tag>
      <tag tagId="72">
        <name>Socialism</name>
      </tag>
    </tagContainer>
  </item>
</itemContainer>
