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We hold in our hand a volume printed on thin yellow-brown paper,
almost exactly the same size and thickness as a monthly number of the
CornliiU Magazine. Though equal in bulk, its weight is hardly one-half
that of the magazine ; and so thin is the paper, that the foreign book,
although printed only on one side of the sheet, contains about seventy pages
more than the English one. The writing runs from top to bottom of the
page, as is shown by the dividing lines between the columns. Neither the
arrow-headed inscriptions of Ninevite marbles, nor the hieroglyphics of
Egyptian papyri, present such an intricate puzzling appearance to the un
initiated eye as do these complicated characters j and yet they are more
familiar to our English vision than any other oriental writing ; indeed, we
may venture to say, than any other foreign language whatever. For there
can hardly be man, woman, or child in the British isles, certainly there can
be none among the four millions of London, who have not frequently gazed
at this strange character where it stares them in the face in every
grocer s window upon the sides of tea chests. Owing to its extreme dis
similarity to all other forms of writing, possibly the majority of these
gazers never imagine that what they see is intelligible written language,
but take it to be grotesque ornamentation, congruous to the willow-pattern
piate style of beauty.' Yet these queer-looking pages, with their endlessly
diversified combinations of crosses and squares, straight lines and
flourishes, curves and dots, picture forth to the instructed eye the
thoughts and feelings of a heart that ceased to beat thousands of years
ago, and a brain long since decomposed to join the dust of a land ten
thousand miles away, and that with no less precision than the columns of
the morning s Times, still damp from the press, reflect the ideas which
passed through the editor’s mind last night. If thought be but a mode
of matter in motion, our brain has been just now agitated by vibrations
first set in movement about two thousand three hundred years ago within
the skull of a black-haired, yellow-skinned Mongolian, who pondered the
mysteries of existence while he cultivated his rice-field, somewhere not far
from where the impetuous Hoang-ho turns its turbid rush from a southerly
direction eastward. It is curious to review the strange and various media,
along which the vibrations must have passed from his brain to ours. In
his age pen, ink, and paper were yet unknown. Either he himself, or
more probably his disciples after him, painfully scratched with a knife’«
point rude figures on the smooth surface of slips of split bamboo, to
record the memories of thoughts they would not willingly let die. As the
�LEIH-TSZE.
45
centuries rolled on, woven silk was substituted for the wood, and a brush
of hair took the place of the graving-tool. Later still this costly material
yielded to coarse paper made from the inner bark of trees, ends of hemp,
©r old fishing nets, and by and bye of the fibre of the very bamboo plant
which had afforded the earliest writing-tablets. Centuries before Guthenberg, Faust, and Caxton, this book of tea-chest symbols was once more
graven on wood, but now cut in relief on a block of pear-tree wood, from
which copies were printed off with ink made of lamp-black and gum.
Multiplied by the press, the book held a more secure tenure of existence,
though in a country where book-tvorms and white ants rapidly devour
neglected libraries, new editions must have been frequently issued to pre
serve the work for posterity. Originally the outcome of a human mind,
thinking and teaching amid poverty and obscurity, its author could hardly
have expected it to be remembered beyond the third or fourth generation,
yet here it is, after more than two millenniums, a standard book among
millions of reading men in Eastern Asia ; and at present it is putting in
motion the brain- cells of a red-haired stranger on the banks of the Thames,
and perhaps, by means of these pages, may awaken some interesting and
not altogether valueless trains of thought in the minds of English readers.
The catalogue of the imperial library of China, commenced by the eru
dite Lew Heang, and completed by his son Lew Hin about the commence
ment of the Christian era, enumerated and described upwards of eleven
thousand sections by more than six hundred authors. Three thousand
*
of these contained the classics and their commentators. The remainder
were classified under the heads of philosophy, poetry, the military art,
mathematical science, and medicine. Of this respectable amount of lite
rature by far the larger portion perished ages ago; the imperial library
itself, with nearly its whole contents, being reduced to ashes during an
insurrection in the generation succeeding the completion of the catalogue.
But this library of the two Lew was only a collection of the scattered and
charred fragments of a much larger antecedent literature ; a restoration by
means of new copies of half-legible tablets disinterred from their hidingplaces in gardens, or dug out of old walls, in dilapidated houses. Midway
between Leih-tsze’s time and the labours of the Lew family, occurred the
infamous attempt of that Chinese Vandal, Shih Hwang Te, the first Em
peror of China, to annihilate all literature, with slight exceptions, that
existed in his dominions, that is, throughout what was to him and his
people the whole civilized world. Leih-tsze lived in the feudal age of
China, when the area drained by the Yellow River, was divided into a
hundred petty kingdoms, dukedoms, and baronies, nominally owning
allegiance to one Suzerain, but practically independent. Two centuries
after his death, a Chinese Alexander the Great issued from the extreme
* The meaning of peen, translated “ section,” is uncertain. Originally a slip of
bamboo, it came to mean a chapter of a book, or a book. Probably it stands for sec
tion, or chapter, in the catalogue above referred to, as the authors hardly could have
written eighteen or nineteen works apiece.
�46
LEIH-TSZE.
west of that Eastern orbis terrarum, and welded all these states into one
great despotic empire. Inflated by an insane pride which could not brook
comparison with the mythic glories of the semi-fabulous hero-kings of an
tiquity, and irritated by the conservatism of the literati, who were to him
what the French Legitimists were to Napoleon the First, he resolved to com
mit to the flames every memorial of the past, in order that the history of hu
manity might begin with his reign. The attempt failed. Literature was too
widely spread, and the love of literature too deeply ingrained in the hearts
of the people, for the efforts of a tyrant to exterminate it, even though the
monster went to the length of burying alive four hundred and sixty learned
men who resisted his decrees. But only those books which possessed the
largest amount of inherent vitality could sustain so severe an assault.
Among these was this work of Leih-tsze. This suggests to us a remark of
some importance. Shih Hwang Te’s very objectionable form of biblio
mania was happily as exceptional in Chinese history as Khalif Omar’s
consignment of the library of the Ptolemies to heat the bath fires of Alex
andria was in Western history. But apart from any special and extraordi
nary attacks upon literature, every generation saw multitudes of books
perish in China, either through neglect, or in the catastrophes of fire, war,
or civil commotion. That this particular book should have survived from
the fourth century b.c. to the age of printing, of itself marks it out as
worthy of attention. The preface of the earliest extant commentator,
Chang Sham, who edited Leih-tsze in the fourth century a.d., gives an
interesting glimpse at the process of natural selection which was always
going on, preserving a few favoured volumes from the oblivion into which
numbers of other works continually lapsed. Chang Sham tells us, “I
have heard my father say that his father married a Miss Wong, one of
three sisters. Mr. Wong belonged to an old literary family which had a
passion for book-collecting, and had become possessed of a vast library.
The other Misses Wong also married scholars, and the three young men
vied with each other in transcribing rare books. When there ensued a
time of confusion in the reign of the Emperor Wai (a.d. 310), he and one
of his brothers-in-law fled southward, each one putting as many books as
he could into his baggage-waggons. The road, however, was long, and
frequent attacks of robbers diminished their load greatly; so he said to
the other, ‘We cannot save all the books, let us select the rarer ones to
preserve them from extinction.’ Among those which he himself chose for
preservation were the writings of Leih-tsze.”
The continued existence of an author through two thousand years o
literary vicissitudes, the earlier millennium of which was especially fatal to
literature, may not, perhaps, prove its superior fitness to survive, accord
ing to our estimate of fitness. But it indicates that the book was con
genial to the tastes, and interested the minds, of its preservers. We have
met with the complaint on the part of English readers of Chinese transla
tions, that “ they contain nothing new.” It would be strange, indeed, if
Chinese poetry, philosophy, or religion, should contain any ideas abso
�LEIH-TSZE.
47
lutely new to those who have inherited the wealth of Sanscrit and
Semitic, of Greek and Roman literatures, with all their offspring of later
date. The value of a work like this is not in the novelty of its contents,
but in the light it throws upon the development of the human mind
among a people entirely uninfluenced by our Western progress. We
should find great light would be thrown upon many interesting but difficult
questions in psychology if we could discriminate always between original
and imitative thought. Much which seems to us the purely spontaneous
operation of our minds is, no doubt, unconscious reproduction of what
has been first put into them from outside. If, however, we could enter
into communication with the inhabitants, supposing there to be such, of
Venus, Jupiter, and other planets, and upon comparison of the respective
conditions and developments of mind in each we should find that the
same dominant ideas and principles had manifested and established them
selves in other planets as in our own, our conviction that these ideas and
principles are not the artificial product of restless, baseless speculation,
but the natural and necessary effect of the interaction between mind and
the universe in which it works, would be greatly strengthened. The
mutual comparison which is impossible for us with those star-dwelling
neighbours of ours, we can obtain upon the surface of our own globe,
whenever impassable mountain-ranges, and vast breadths of stormy ocean,
have isolated any portion of mankind for a time sufficiently long to
permit the independent evolution of thought, and its being recorded in
literature. Whenever the time comes that science marks out our globe
into distinct areas of independent mental evolution, China will occupy a
prominent place, making one great division by itself, and affording in its
ancient, vast, unbroken stream of literature the richest materials for
comparison with the rest of the world. In this article we aim at nothing
more than to give the reader a glimpse into the thoughts of an ancient
thinker, some might say, dreamer rather, belonging to a long obsolete
school of Chinese philosophy.
Conclusive proof of the mental isolation, and, therefore, independence
of those old Chinese thinkers is derived from the extant literature itself.
This does not militate against the theory that the black-haired race,
which has almost obliterated the traces of earlier peoples in Eastern Asia,
originally immigrated into the country, probably in successive waves
separated by hundreds of years, from some part of Western Asia, taking
its long pilgrimage across the sterile plateau of Thibet, and following the
course of the Yellow River, until it founded its first permanent settlements
on its banks about seven hundred miles from the sea. These immigrants
may have brought with them the rudiments of writing, as they doubtless did
bring many oral traditions, and habits of thought already formed, or in
formation, before they bade a long farewell to the streams of humanity
which tended south and west. Something, therefore, we must allow them
as their original stock of mental furniture when they came into the land,
at an unknown distant date, two, three, or more thousands of years
�48
LEIH-TSZE.
That which was strongest and most durable of this primitive floating
stock of thought was crystallised in their most ancient books, called the
Classics. We can see in these earliest national records that already, when
they were first inscribed on the bamboo tablets, all memory of derivation
from the West had died out of the minds of the people ; and if a portion of
their contents came into China from beyond the Western mountains, the
earliest scribes had not the faintest sense of the fact. All Chinese litera
ture after this, for about a thousand years, is beyond suspicion purely
Chinese. Take our author for example ; the whole known world to him
extended only about three hundred miles east and west, and about half
that distance north and south. All beyond this region was wrapt in
Cimmerian darkness. On every hand a fringe of savage tribes surrounded
the very limited area of civilisation, through which not the faintest
rumour of what existed to the north and south had penetrated, while the
ocean to the east was but dimly known by vague report, and the great
mountain region to the west was the chosen abode of genii, deified men,
and celestial spirits. Confucius, Laou-tsze, Leih-tsze, Yang-Choo, and
all other leaders of thought in China for some centuries were either
original thinkers, or were indebted to their own national literature only,
not a trace of outside influence being discernible in their writings.
Leih-tsze is for us the name of a book rather than of a man. Unlike
the great national hero Confucius, whose disciples Boswellized before
Boswell, Leih-tsze’s personality has left so faint an impression on his
literary remains, that he has been taken by some Chinese critics for an
imaginary personage. This incredulity we may comfortably waive aside
on the high authority of the imperial catalogue of the reigning dynasty,
which discusses the question temperately and fairly, and decides that
there are no good grounds for doubting that there did live a man by name
Leih Yu-kow, [or, as literature quotes him, Leih-tsze, the philosopher
Leih, whose teachings were compiled into a book by his disciples, in the
form in which we now have it, barring some errors and interpolations
which have crept into the text. Beyond the bare fact of his existence in
the kingdom of Ch’ing, nearly central among the feudal states, about four
hundred years before the Christian era, we have only the most meagre in
formation about him. Though a light of the age, a pupil of distinguished
rabbis, and himself the revered master of a band of attached disciples, he
was neglected by Government, and lived in obscurity and poverty. Once,
indeed, he came into contact with the ruling powers, as the following
anecdote shows :—“ So poor was Leih-tsze, that he bore the traces of
hunger in his emaciated frame. A travelling scholar drew the attention
of the Prince of Ch’ing to this, saying, ‘ In your territory one of the
leading teachers of the age lives in extreme poverty; is it because you,
0 prince, do not love learned men ? ’ The prince immediately sent an
officer to carry relief to Leih-tsze. Leih-tsze came out to receive the
messenger, and with a double obeisance declined the gift. When he
went inside again, his wife taunted him with the reproach, ‘ I was told
b.c.
�LEIH-TSZE.
49
that a philosopher’s wife and children were sure to be well off. Here we
are all starving, and when the ruler sends us relief, you refuse it. This, no
cToubt, is an instance of the fate you are always preaching ! ’ (Leih-tsze
taught necessity and pooh-poohed free will. So his angry spouse seemed
to have him on the hip.) But he quietly rejoined, ‘ The prince only sent
his help in consequence of another man’s report; he has no personal
knowledge of me. Another day he will be listening to some one else’s
report, and finding me a criminal, that is why I declined the gift.’ ” These
philosophers were a proud, at least self-respecting, set, counting it shame
to be pensioners on royal bounty, unless royalty respectfully received
their admonitions. The narrative intimates that, in this case, Leih-tsze’s
independence of spirit saved his life during a revolution which succeeded.
We have a peep at the man inside the philosopher’s cloak in this next
incident. “ Leih-tsze started for Tsai, went half-way, and returned. A
friend asked, ‘ Why have you come back ? ’ ‘I was afraid,’ he replied.
‘What made you afraid ? ’ ‘On the road I stopped to get a meal at the
sign of “ The Ten Syrups,” and they presented me with a grand dinner.’
‘ What was there in this to frighten you ? ’ ‘ Truly it made me very un
comfortable. I thought that if my personal appearance won me such
reverence from a poor innkeeper, how much more would it make an
impression upon a monarch of ten thousand chariots, who would surely
employ me in Government, and ascribe merit to me. On this account I
was afraid.’ ‘Excellent,’ replied his mentor, ‘ I see you know how to
conduct yourself. You will come to honour.’ ” The popularity from
which the philosopher shrank, nevertheless, found him out and besieged
him in the form of a numerous band of disciples, who showed their
respect by taking off their shoes before entering his door. This, again,
we are told, is an illustration of destiny. Leih-tsze was to be famous,
and he became so, even against his will.
Though a few passing allusions give us all that we can glean of the
personal individuality of Leih-tsze, this book, supplemented by other con
temporary records, affords a very vivid picture of the state of society in
which he moved. We are apt to think that times so far anterior to our
own must still have retained lingering traces of primeval arcadian sim
plicity of thought and manners. But we are introduced by these pages
to a highly artificial state of civilization, which felt itself removed by
immense spaces of time from the youth of the world. Kings and nobles
feasted in their halls, rode out in four-horse chariots to the chase or the
battle; minstrels, jugglers, mechanicians crowded to their courts for
employment and reward. Ladies sighed in the harems, or plotted with
eunuchs to secure the advancement of their own children in place of the
legitimate heir. Travelling statesmen and philosophers wandered from
court to court with the latest recipe for establishing universal peace, and
bringing mankind under one sway. Below them all was the great mass
of the people engaged in trade, handicrafts, and the cultivation of the
soil, but liable to be called upon for military service, and frequently
�50
LEIH-TSZE.
suffering the calamities of war. In this highly complex condition of
society there were a few men who, instead of taking existence as they
found it, laboured to discover its secret, or to amend its conditions.
Some of these, by the fame of their learning or their wisdom, attracted
disciples around them, and thus established informal schools, where the
instruction was chiefly oral and by example, and in which keen debate
upon the principles of philosophy and ethics was frequent. Among such
self-constituted teachers Leih-tsze held a distinguished place, and to the
admiration of his disciples we owe this record of his doctrines from which
we will now present some specimens.
Mr. G. H. Lewes, after reviewing the history of philosophy from
Thales to Kant and Hegel, considers that he has abundantly proved the
barrenness of all metaphysics and the impossibility of ontology. These
conclusions we do not venture to dispute. His numerous examples from
Ancient Greece and Modern Europe might be paralleled by a third depart
ment in which the metaphysics of China should be exhibited, and India,
of course, would add a crowded fourth. This agreement in prosecuting
inquiries so inevitably barren seems to indicate an innate tendency in the
human mind to ask these questions, unanswerable though they be.
Granted that it is utterly impossible for man ever to extricate himself
from the great stream of phenomena of which he is himself part, and to
survey from the lofty altitude of absolute perception the realities of being,
which here he knows only in its relations, will he ever learn to be con-.
tented in his necessary ignorance ? A few thousands of generations more
may perhaps evolve a human race which shall be incapable of curiosity
about these profoundest speculations ; and the man of the future, having
thoroughly acquiesced in the hereditary conviction that truth is but the
order of ideas corresponding to the order of phenomena, may have ceased
even to scorn metaphysics as equivalent to inquiring about lunar politics,
because the very memory that once such contemplations possessed
irresistible fascination for the human mind shall have been long lost. If
so, the future will be very unlike the past and the present, and for our
selves we acknowledge that the vista of human progress thus opening out
before us does not seem attractive. Leih-tsze, however, lived in a meta
physical age, and in the very foreground of his philosophy we find
abstruse speculations upon the nature of being in itself. A bare transla
tion into English without explanatory notes would hardly be intelligible,
but we may select a few sentences to show the style. “That which
brings forth all things is not born; that which changes things is itself
changeless.
Spontaneously it lives, changes, takes form and colour,
knows, is strong, decays and dies. Yet if you say that it lives and
changes, has shape and hue, possesses knowledge and strength, is subject
to decay and death, you err.” Again : “ There are living things and a
cause of life; there is form, and a cause of form; there is sound
and a cause of sound; there is colour and a cause of colour;
there is flavour and a cause of flavour. That which life produces
�LEIH-TSZE.
51
is death, but the cause of life never comes to an end.
That which
form produces is substance, but the cause of form is immaterial.
That which sound produces is hearing, but the cause of sound is ever
inaudible. That which colour produces is beauty, but the cause of
colour is ever invisible. All these are functions of the Absolute.
*
It can
be male and female, yielding and rigid, short and long, square and
round, living and dead, hot and cold, sweet and bitter, stinking and
fragrant. It is without knowledge and without power, and it is omnis
cient and omnipotent.” All this seems the childish babbling of a
philosophy which has not grown up to manhood, and entered into
possession of a polysyllabic terminology for its ideas ; yet its meaning is
equivalent to Herbert Spencer’s fundamental proposition “ the origin of
all things is inscrutable.” It recognises the existence of that “ some
thing ” which is above, and behind, and in, all phenomena; which no
acuteness of observation can reach, no profundity of meditation can
fathom, but which we know is there. In this direction the latest
researches of modern science and the crude reflections of our Chinese
philosopher both come to a dead stop at exactly the same point.
How crude and fanciful the metaphysical speculations of Leih-tsze
were is apparent in the following imaginary dialogue :—“ King T‘ang asked
Hea-Kih, ‘Was there originally a time when nothing material existed?’
Hea-Kih replied, ‘ If originally there was nothing, whence have existing
things come from ? Will it be reasonable if some day posterity should
ask whether anything existed at this time ? ’ The King continued, ‘ Then is
there really no succession of events ? ’ Hea-Kih said, ‘ The succession of
things is infinite. Beginnings may be endings, and endings may be
beginnings. Who can discriminate them ? But as to that which exists
beyond all phenomena, and before all events, I am ignorant.’ ‘Then is the
universe without limit ?’ asked the monarch. ‘I know not,’ Hea-Kih
replied ; but when pressed for an answer, added : ‘ The non-existent is
infinite. Existence is finite. How do I know this ? It is involved in the
idea of the infinite. The infinite cannot have a greater infinite to bound it.
But as to what limits the finite, I confess my ignorance.’ T‘ang asked,
‘ What is the nature of being beyond the limits of our world ? ’ ‘ Just
like it is in the middle kingdom,’ was the answer. ‘ How know you that ?’
‘ Because,’ he replied, ‘ I have travelled east and west to the limits of civi
lisation, and everywhere I found things the same. At the extreme points
of my wanderings I inquired of the people, and they assured me that
they knew of nothing different beyond them. Thus I conclude that the
whole universe is alike.’ ”
If disposed to smile at the superficiality of these reasonings, yet one
must remember that whether we sound a bottomless ocean with a deepsea line or a pole, the result is the same ; in each case we fail to reach
* We must make apology to the sinologue for the audacity of this translation of
moo wei by the Absolute. Yet does it not approach nearer to the idea of the Chinese
than any other English expression ?
�52
LEIH-TSZE.
the bottom. Our Chinese used the longest line he had, and could do no
more, nor can we.
Leih-tsze’s philosophy of life was fatalism, yet fatalism of a peculiar
shade. He belonged to the school originated by the famous contemporary
of Confucius, Laou-tsze, the watchword of which was taou, “ the path/’
Confucius, too, believed in “ the path,” but his path was the path of duty,
the way of righteousness, following the higher instincts of our moral nature.
“ What Heaven has conferred is called the 'nature; an accordance
with this nature is called the path; the regulation of this path is called
instruction." It is much more difficult to grasp Laou-tsze’s and Leih-tsze’s
meaning when they speak of “ the path ” ; but this difference between
the rival schools is clear. Confucius fixed his mind exclusively on the
ethical side of human nature, while his opponents included in their idea
of “ the path ” not only the totality of human nature, but the totality of
the universe. One student of Taouism explains taou as the “ultimate
ideal unity of the universe.” [It is simpler to take “ the path” for what we
express by “ the course of nature,” only extending nature beyond physical
things to embrace gods and men, mind and matter, heaven and earth, and
all theii’ contents in one universal stream of being, all pervaded by one
uniting principle it is true, but that principle inscrutable to us, and
inseparable from the stream of existence itself. This infinite march of
events moves on of itself in its own irresistible current; it is folly to
struggle against it, wisdom to resign ourselves to be borne along by the
stream whithersoever it tends. “ The Emperor Shun asked Ching : ‘ Can
I attain to the possession of ‘1 the path ” ? ’ ” (Tuott here stands for the inner
secret of being, the reality behind appearances, and perhaps might be
rendered by “ the truth.”) “ Ching replies to him : ‘ Your body is not your
own, how can you acquire and possess taou ? ’ Shun said, ‘ If my body
is not my own, whose is it ? ’
‘ It is a form entrustedto you by Heaven
and Earth,’ was the answer.
‘ Life is not yours. It is a harmony
entrusted to you by Heaven and Earth. Your nature is not yours, it is
a concord entrusted to you by Heaven and Earth. Your children and
grandchildren are not yours. They are new forms entrusted to you by
Heaven and Earth. When you move, you do not know whither you are
going; when you are at rest, you know not what you are grasping. The
very food you eat is made by Heaven and Earth to nourish you, you
know not how. Why should you talk of attaining to the possession of
anything ? ’ ”
In the sixth chapter we have an amusing discussion between fate and
free-will personified. What we call free-will is represented by Mr. Effort,
who challenged Mr. Fate thus : “ How can you compare your merits with
mine ? ” Fate retorted : “ What are these merits of yours which you wish
to compare with me ? ” Effort replied : “ Long life and early death,
failure and success, honour and obscurity, riches and poverty, all depend
upon me.” Fate said : “ Pang-tso .was not wiser than the sages Yau
and Shun, yet he lived to be eight hundred years old. Ngan Uen’s
�LEIH-TSZE.
53
talents were not mediocre, yet he died at thirty-two. Confucius virtue
was not inferior to that of the princes of his day, yet he wandered about
in poverty. The tyrant Chow’s morality was not better than that of the
three sages, yet he enjoyed the royal seat. If these things are your work,
Mr. Effort, why do you confer long life, riches, and honours upon the bad,
and accumulate misfortune on the good ?
Effort replied : ‘ Accoiding
to what you say, I have no merits at all. But that things happen so con
trary is your arrangement, not mine.” Fate answered : “ Since you say
Fate does these things, why talk about their being arranged so ? Crooked
and straight are all the same to me. All things are what they are of
themselves. How can I know anything about it ? ”
The sentimentalism of Xerxes weeping at his grand review would
have met with small sympathy from a Taouist, as the following anecdote,
told by Leih-tsze, shows
“ The King of Tsai, returning from a journey,
came in sight of his capital from the northern hills and burst into tears,
saying, ‘ Beautiful, beautiful, is my royal city ! So stately and spacious,
yet I must leave it and die ! If I were to live for ever, I should never
wish to quit this place and go elsewhere.’ His courtiers wept with him,
saying, ‘ Our food and clothing, our chariots and horses, are poor com
pared with yours. Yet we, too, are unwilling to die, how much more
reason have you to dislike the prospect 1 ’ One among them, however, only
sniiW. The king, observing this, ceased to weep, and demanded of him
why he alone smiled when all the others sympathised with their master’s
grief? The philosopher replied: ‘If virtuous rulers never left their
thrones, T’ae Kung and Hwan Kung would be always reigning. If valiant
Tn An never died, Chong Kung and Ling Kung would constantly occupy
the royal seat. If these monarchs had not vacated the throne, you, my
prince, would to-day be clad in mats and tilling the ground. You owe
your occupancy of the throne to the mutations of life and death.
This same doctrine of fatalism rudely jostles against an Englishman’s
conceptions of providence in our next illustration. Listen to this.
“ Mr. Tien made a great feast in his hall, and sat down among a
thousand guests to the banquet. While the waiters were bringing in fish
and wild geese, Mr. Tien heaved a sigh and said, How generous is
Heaven to man I For our use the corn grows ; for us the waters yield fish,
and birds fly in the air.’ The guests re-echoed these sentiments; until
a boy of twelve years old stepped forth and said, ‘ Not so, my lord. All
things in heaven and earth live by the same right as ourselves. The
large prey upon the small; the strong and intelligent eat the stupid and
weak. It is not that they are made for each other. Man takes what is
eatable and eats it. Why should you think that Heaven produced things
for man’s sake ? Mosquitoes bite man’s skin, and tigers devour his flesh.
Did Heaven produce men for the mosquitoes and tigers ? ’ ”
Fate rules all ; or, since there can be no such conscious intelligence
in fate as the word “ rules ” suggests, all things are by fate. But this
conviction does not interfere with human activity, A considerable part of
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LEIH-TSZE.
Leih-tsze’s teaching is devoted to illustrate the power of mind over
matter. Laying hold of such facts as the immense superiority in feats of
skill, driving four-in-hand, swimming, rowing, archery, and music, and
handicrafts, which is attained by unremitting practice, concentrated atten
tion, utter fearlessness, and freedom from self-consciousness, our author
seems to push them to the extreme of believing that man may possibly
attain, by a still higher degree of abstraction, to an omnipotent command
over material forces. Many of his tales, which have the appearance of
extravagant credulity, may perhaps be intended to convey an allegorical
meaning. We read of men who could ride upon the wind, walk through
fire, over water, and even through solid rocks as through empty space.
These marvellous stories, perhaps, only clothe in fables the philosopher’s
conviction of the power of wisdom and virtue to render the soul independ
ent of the shocks and changes of external circumstances. These mystical
utterances, however, lack the clue needed for their interpretation, and we
are never sure whether Leih-tsze is credulous himself, or playing upon human
credulity, or veiling some subtle meaning under his marvellous narratives.
A few of these tales occupy a border-land between fact and fiction. Here
is one which embodies a notion common enough among ourselves, that
there is a wonderful power in faith, apart altogether from the reality of
what is believed. “ Tsze Wa was a favourite with the Prince of Tsun.
Those whom he patronised were ennobled ; those whom he spoke against
were degraded. Two guests of his on a journey passed the night at a
farm-house. The old farmer, by name Yau Hoi, overheard them con
versing about the power of life and death, riches and poverty, possessed
by Tsze Wa. The farmer, who was grievously poor, drank in all their
words, and on the morrow went into the city and found his way to Tsze
Wa’s door. Tsze Wa’s disciples were all men of good birth, used to dress
in silk and ride in carriages, to walk with a stately step, and look about
them with a lofty air. When they saw Yau Hoi, a weak old man with a
dirty face and untidy clothes, come into the school, they despised him,
and amused themselves by making game of him and pushing him about.
Yau Hoi exhibited no sign of anger. Presently Tsze Wa led them up to
the top of a lofty tower, and cried out, ‘ I’ll give a hundred pieces of silver
to any one who will throw himself down.’ All of them eagerly responded,
and Yau Hoi thinking they were sincere, determined to be first, and threw
himself over. He clave the air like a bird, and alighted upon the ground
without a broken bone. Tsze Wa thought he had escaped by chance. So
he again pointed to a deep pool in the river and said, 1 Down there is a
precious pearl: dive and you will get it.’ Yau Hoi again complied;
dived into the flood, and when he came up, he had really got a pearl.
The spectators then began to suspect something extraordinary ; and Tsze
Wa ordered that food and clothing should be prepared to present to him.
Suddenly a great fire was discovered in Tsze Wa’s treasury. Tsze Wa
exclaimed, ‘ If any one dare venture in, he shall have whatever treasure
he rescues as his reward.’ Yau Hoi entered calmly, and came out again
�LEIH-TSZE.
55
unsoiled and unhurt. Then every one thought he possessed a magic
charm. They crowded round to do him reverence, apologising for their
former rudeness, and begging for his secret. Yau Hoi said, ‘ I have no
secret. I myself do not know how it was done ; but I will try to recount
it to you. Last night Tsze Wa’s guests lodged at my house, and I over
heard them praising Tsze Wa’s power of life and death, riches and poverty,
nnd I perfectly believed it. When I came here, I took all your words to
be true, and only feared lest I should not perfectly trust them and act
them out. I was unconscious of my bodily frame, and knew no fear.
Now that I know you have deceived me, I tremble, and wonder at what I
have gone through. I consider myself lucky that I was not burnt or
drowned. Now I shake with fear, and I shall never dare to approach fire
or water again.’ From this time forward, if Tsze Wa’s pupils met a
beggar or a horse-dealer on the road, they did not dare to be rude to him,
but stopped and bowed.” This represents the power of faith as inherent
in itself. There is another view of faith which regards its efficacy as not
in itself, but in its appeal to a higher Power. Leih-tsze was no theist,
and he was so careless of the national objects of worship that they are
hardly alluded to in his pages. Yet he gives us a story which will convey
to many minds a meaning far beyond his own. “A stupid countryman,
ninety years of age, had his dwelling on the northern slope of a lofty
mountain-range, two hundred miles long and ten thousand cubits high.
One day he was struck with the thought that a road to the south was emi
nently desirable, so he called his family together and proposed to level
the precipices, and make a road through to the southern waters. His
wife remonstrated, hinting that the old man’s strength would not suffice to
demolish a hillock, let alone those great mountains. But the old man
was not daunted, and leading on his son and grandson, the three of them
began to pick and dig, and to carry away the stones and earth in baskets,
and an old widow sent her child of seven years old to help them. Winter
and summer they toiled away, and after a whole year seemed to be where
they began. A shrewd old grey-beard mocked their slow progress ; but
the stupid countryman replied with a sigh, ‘ Your heart is not so intelli
gent as that of this widow’s feeble child. Although I am old, and shall
die, I have a son, and he has a son; these will have children and grand
children. My posterity will go on multiplying without end, and the
mountain will not grow bigger. 'What is to prevent our levelling it ?/
The old man had nothing to say, but the spirit which presides over
snakes heard what was said, and fearing that the work would not stop,
reported the matter to God.
God was affected by their sincerity, and
commanded two genii to remove the mountains, shifting one to the east,
and another to the south, so as to open a pass to the river Han.”
In that last reference to God, Leih-tsze does but for a moment borrow
the language of the ancient creed which he usually lost sight of in his
speculations. On the subject of immortality he seems to have speculated
much, and at times to have indulged some faint hope of existence beyond
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LEItl-TSZE.
the range of present vision. “ Once on a journey he sat down with a
group of his disciples to take a meal by the road-side. One of the
company saw a skull, bleached with age, half hidden by the grass; he
pulled the long grass aside and pointed to it. Leih-tsze said to his disciple
Pak-fung, ‘ Only he and I know, and are independent of life and death.’ ”
But his utterances on this are indistinct, and rather point to an absorption
into an infinite substance than continued conscious individuality. “ The
living, according to nature, must end. The pure spirit-essence is
Heaven’s part, the bodily framework is Earth’s part. When the spirit
essence leaves the form, both return to their true state. From birth to
death man has four great changes, childhood, youth, old age, and death.
In childhood his physical nature is simple, and his will is not divided,
which is the perfection of harmony. External things cannot injure him,
and his virtue is complete. In manhood his passions change like the
wind and overflow like a flood. His desires and anxieties arise in abund
ance. External things fight against him, therefore his virtue declines.
In old age his desires and anxieties become feeble, and his body is near
its rest. External things do not occupy the first place. Although it does
not reach the completeness of childhood, it is superior to middle age. In
death he attains to rest, and returns to its extreme limit.” The Taouist
philosophers are never tired of aiming a blow at Confucianism, and thus
the great sage is made to figure sometimes in ridiculous situations. In
the next extracts there is probably a covert attack on the melancholy
which overshadowed the life of Confucius, and wrapt his end in gloom.
“ Confucius roaming about the Tai mountain, saw Wing K’ai Ki walking
in the fields, dressed in a deer-hide, with a bit of rope for his girdle,
striking his guitar and singing. He asked him, ‘ Sir, what makes you so
joyful ? ’ K’ai Ki replied, ‘ I have many reasons for joy. Of all things
Heaven has made, human beings are most noble, and I have been made a
human being; that is one reason for joy. Men are more honourable
than women, and I was made a man ; this is a second cause for joy.
Some men are born and die before they are out of the nurse’s arms, but I
have gone along for ninety years ; that is a third cause for joy. Scholars
are always poor, and death is the end of man. Why should I regret
being as others and coming to my end ? ’ Confucius exclaimed, ‘ Capital 1
you know how to be magnanimous.’ ” Another of these refreshingly
contented spirits meets us in the following :—“ LamLu, when a hundred
years old, was gleaning in his patrimonial fields, clad only in a sheep
skin, and he sang as he went along. Confucius saw him from a distance,
and said to his disciples, ‘ That old man is worth speaking to, go and
question him.’ Tsze Kung requested leave to go. Encountering him on
a hillock, he looked him m the face, sighed, and said, ‘ Sir, have you not
yet any regrets that you go on singing as you glean ? ’ Lam Lil neither
stopped walking nor singing. Tsze Kung kept on asking, until he looked
up, and replied, ‘ What should I regret ? ’ Tsze Kung said, ‘ In youth you
failed in diligence, in manhood you did not struggle with the times,
�57
LEIH-TSZE.
now you are old you have neither wife nor child; death’s appointed
day is near; what occasions for joy can you have that you should
sing as you glean ? ’ Lam Lu smiled and said, ‘ All men share in
my causes for joy; but they, on the contrary, take them for sorrows ;
because when I was young I did not work hard, and in my manhood
I did not struggle with the times, therefore I have attained to this green
old age. Now I am old, because I have neither wife nor child, and
death’s appointed day is near, therefore I rejoice like this.’ Tsze Kung
replied, ‘ It is natural to man to love long life and to dislike death;
how is it that you take death to be a cause for joy ? ’ Lam Lil said,
‘ Death and life are but a going forth and a returning, therefore when I
die here, how do I know that I shall not live there ? And how do I know
that planning and craving for life is not a mistake ? Also, how know I
that for me to die now is not better than all my previous life ? ’ Tsze
Kung heard, but did not understand what he meant; so he went back and
told the Master. The Master said, ‘ I knew he was worth speaking to,
and so it has proved. But though he has got hold of the thing, he has
not got to the bottom of it.’ ”
Live without care, die without fear; such was our author’s philosophy
of life. When we compare his ethical teaching with that of his great
predecessor Laou-tsze, five or six generations before, we are struck with
the marked degeneracy of his moral tone. In his Taou Teh King, the
founder of the Taouist sect, despite his sphinx-like style, impresses us
with a sense of his profound moral earnestness. Though Laou-tsze dis
sented altogether from the Confucian system, nevertheless we see in him
an eager yearning for perfection, a pensive sadness in the contemplation
of human follies and crimes, a positive inculcation of personal virtue,
which draw out our hearts towards “ the old philosopher.” Confucius
was the stern practical reformer like Calvin, whom we rather admire than
love ; while Laou-tsze possesses the attractive power of the mystic Tauler.
It would be utterly unjust to attribute to the founder of Taouism the
moral aberrations of his successors, even though we can detect in his
teachings the germ of the subsequent evil development. For if we can
detect it, he could not, and we cannot doubt that his devotion to virtue
was as sincere as his conception of it was beautiful. If called upon to
express the guiding principle of his moral teachings by one word, we
shall not be exalting it above its intrinsic merits by choosing that noblest
of words, self-abnegation. Not that he in the dim light of heathenism
could see all that that word now implies to us in the clear light of our
Christianity. The passive side of self-abnegation was more evident to
him than the active. But amid the confused noises of a distracted world,
the shock of battles, the intrigues of courts, the restless contentions for
honour and advancement of the officials and scholars, the fierce pursuit of
wealth by the merchants and artizans, Laou-tsze distinctly heard a still
small voice, summoning him, and through him mankind, to the calm serenity
of a life freed from selfish desires, devoid of covetousness, envy, and ambiVOL. XXX.—NO. 175.
4.
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LEIH-TSZE.
tion, strong in acknowledged weakness, and victorious over pride and
violence by the might of meekness and humility. To him the type of
perfect goodness was water; “ water which is good to benefit all things,
while it does not strive, but runs to the place which all men disdain.”
The defects of his conception are manifest to us, though while yet untested
by experience he may well have failed to perceive them. He disliked
political reformers, because in them self-exaltation mingled with their
desire to reform the world. He disliked preachers of morality, because
their labours were an indication of, in a sense, the result of, the loss of
morality. He disliked an artificial state of society, because it abounded
in temptations to pride, covetousness, and deceit. This antagonism to
effort, led him into the extreme of depreciating even effort for self-improve
ment. He appeared to entertain a vague hope that if men would only let
themselves alone, strive for nothing, not even for goodness, the great Taou,
that ineffable, inexplicable something, too mysterious to have even a name,
would itself flow through the channels of the human heart, and bear the
life along in the right direction. With all this exaggeration of his favourite
precept “ do nothing,” his own personal attachment to virtue was sincere
and supreme ; and doubtless, while he continued to influence his own
philosophy, this loyalty to virtue endured among his followers.
Leih-tsze lived near two centuries later, and in his teachings the
earnest moral purpose of Taouism has given place to a licentious indifferentism. Here and there, indeed, we come across some lingering echoes
of the traditional admiration for meekness and humility, but for the most
part the philosopher is so lost in contemplation of the mystery of existence
that he has not a spare thought left for these particular phenomena, virtue
and vice. He is much more interested in the question whether man may
not, by the power of abstract contemplation, penetrate into the secret of
existence, and gain a superhuman control over natural forces. He still
holds theoretically that the riches, power, and fame of the world are all
delusive appearances, and that to be free from appetites, and passions,
and self-assertion, is “the path;” but he -has ceased to entertain the
slightest hope that out of this doctrine will ever come a moral renovation
of the world. Indeed, he suspects now that the distinctions of virtue and
vice are themselves but delusive imaginations, as much as the pomps and
vanities of life which his leader eschewed. One can hardly read the
following specimens of his teaching without a shudder of disgust:—
“ Tsze Ch‘an * became Prime Minister of Ch'ing, and had sole authority
in the Government. Within three years he brought the whole kingdom
into a state of order. The good gladly submitted to his sway, and the
bad obeyed his laws from fear. But his own brothers, Ch‘iu and Muk,
were addicted to vicious pleasures ; Ch‘iu loved wine, and Muk loved
women. A thousand jars of wine stood in Ch‘iu’s cellar, and heaps of
grain in his barns. When one passed his door at the distance of a
hundred paces, the smell of distillation filled the nostrils. In his drink
* A disciple of Confucius, and one of his personal attendants.
�LEIH-TSZE.
59
ing bouts Ch'iu forgot politics and morals, riches and poverty, friends
and relatives, care of life and fear of death. Although the house were on
fire, or swords clashing in his very face, he would know nothing about it.
In Muk’s harem were scores of concubines, selected for their youth and
beauty; and at times he would shut himself in the inner apartments for
three months together, not at home to his nearest relative or dearest
friend. His emissaries haunted the whole country-side in search for
lovely maidens, whom gold might tempt to enter his harem. Tsze Ch‘an
grieved over his brothers’ ill-conduct night and day, and at last secretly
consulted Tang Sik about it. ‘ I have heard,’ said he, ‘ that a man
must first of all regulate himself, next his family, and then the kingdom,
proceeding from the near to the distant. Now I have brought the
kingdom under government, but my own family is disorderly; this is
contrary to “ the path.” Tell me, I pray you, how I may save my brothers.’
Tang Sik replied, ‘ I have been wondering at it for a long time, but was
afraid to speak about it. Why, sir, do you not find some opportunity of
instructing them in the importance of following one’s (moral) nature, and
according with (Heaven’s) decree, and also of alluring them by setting
before them the high esteem which attends upon the practice of propriety
and righteousness ? ’
“ Tsze Ch'an took Tang Sik’s advice, and went to visit his brothers;
and began his instructions by saying, ‘ Man’s superiority to the brutes con
sists in intelligence and forethought. Intelligence and forethought produce
the rules of propriety and righteousness. Propriety and righteousness
lead to fame and office. If you act upon the incentives of your passions,
and abandon yourselves to wine and lust, you imperil your own lives.
Listen to a brother’s words, and if you repent in the morning, before
night you shall receive a government appointment.’ Ch‘iu and Muk
replied, ‘ Long ago we attained to knowledge, and made our choice; do
you suppose we waited for you to come and teach us before we could un
derstand ? Life is not easy to get, but death comes of itself. Who
would think of wasting a life so hard to get, by spending it in watching for
a death which comes so easily ? And as to caring for proprieties and
righteousness, in order that we may brag over others, and doing violence
to our own natures, in order to win an empty name, in our view this
would be worse than death itself. All we wish is to exhaust the joys of
life, and seize the pleasure of the present moment. Our only grief is that
our physical capacity for pleasure is so small, we have no leisure to sorrow
over loss of reputation or danger to life. If you are so puffed up by your
political success, as to think of leading our minds astray by the seductions
of glory and official salary, we think it mean of you and pitiable. Now
we will tell you the difference. External government, however clever, is
not certain of success, and inflicts suffering upon people. Internal go
vernment never leads to disorder, and men joyfully conform to nature.
Your external government barely gets a temporary success in one small
kingdom, and after all does not accord with the hearts of the people. Our
4—2
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LEIH-TSZE.
internal government may be applied to the whole world, and then kings
and statesmen will have no more to do. We have long been wishing to
teach you our doctrine, and do you on the contrary bring your doctrine to
teach us ! ’ Tsze Ch'an was dumfoundered, and departed without a word.
Next day he reported the interview to Tang Sik. Tang Sik said, ‘ You,
sir, have been living with perfect sages, and you did not know it. Who
will say that you are wise ? The good order of the kingdom is an
accidental circumstance, not to be imputed as merit to you.’ ”
This licentious creed was the deliberate choice of Taouism ; though of
course Taouists used to the full our grand human liberty of inconsistency,
and by no means carried out their principle either to its full logical or
practical consequences. Still it remains a fact, that for a space, if only a
brief space, philosophy in China rejected morality, and exalted licentious
ness to the dignity of a religion. As a natural result Taouism rapidly de
generated, and at the same time lost its hold upon the people. If in their
lifetime Laou-tsze held his banner of spontaneity bravely aloft, and Confu
cius waged a desperate but hardly equal strife under the standard of rigid
self-discipline, the two teachers were in their hearts fighting on the same
side, to reclaim a lost world to truth and virtue. But while the Confucianists remained staunch to this double object of pursuit, truth and
virtue, the Taouists thought they perceived an inconsistency between
them, and chose truth rather than virtue. The complete victory of Con
fucianism along the whole line is a fact worthy of our consideration.
Confucius was the prophet of conscience, not only grasping tenaciously
the truth of the moral supremacy of conscience, but believing most
devoutly in its divine origin, and his own divine mission to defend its
rights, and also that there could not be salvation for humanity except in
obedience to its behests. In his lifetime he fought an Ishpaaelitish con
flict, a guerilla warfare for his sacred faith. Every man’s hand seemed
against him, apd it was as much as he could do to live with his principles,
though the life of a wanderer from one city to another, from one kingdom
to another people. After his death his disciples fought for his truth like
soldiers combating desperately over the corpse of their dead leader, and
still for generations the battle seemed to hang in the balance. But at last
the victory was achieved, and it was final and glorious. Conscience
proved its own supremacy, by putting these doctrines of natural licence to
disgraceful rout. Now, and for these thousand years and more, that be
wildering attempt of Leih-tsze’s to confuse the distinctions between right
and wrong has seemed as strange and unnatural to the Chinese mind as
it seems to our own. The sect continued, but as a small minority of the
nation, a minority given over to idolatry, superstitious arts, magic,
alchemy, the philosopher’s stone, and the elixir of life. But the name of
Taou has never lost its potency in China, and for centuries it has been
united with Confucianism and Buddhism as a member of the trinity of
philosophies. At the parting of the ways, whei’e the doctrine of nature
and spontaneous life diverged from the doctrine of virtue and stern self
�LEIH-TSZE.
61
discipline, the nation bade farewell to the dreamy mysticism of Laou-tsze,
to follow the banner of Confuciu's and conscience. Yet a memory of the
sweetness and serenity of those earlier musings lingered long in the
national mind, preserving the ancient doctors of Taou from oblivion and
their writings from contempt. They appealed to our nature on one side,
and they had glimpses of one side of truth also, and although we rejoice
in the clear victory of the teacher of righteousness and benevolence, as a
notable instance of the survival of the fittest in the mutual struggle for
life of the philosophies, we acknowledge that the far-off echoes of ancient
Taou sound a note, an under-tone of which can be detected in many
quarters, even in our modern Christian England.
There is a vein of humour in Leih-tsze which enlivens with a genial
light some of his shrewd observations of human nature ; and though he
fails to smite at vice with the trenchant blade of moral faith, he manifests
a visionary longing for a happier state in which vice is not. With a few
extracts illustrative of these traits, we will close this notice of him.
‘ ‘ In the state of Ki there was a man who was anxious lest heaven and
earth should fall to pieces and he have no place to lodge his body in. He
could neither eat nor sleep from anxiety. And there was another who
was anxious about his distress and went to enlighten him. ‘ The heaven
gathers air,’ he said, ‘ and there is no place which is not full of air: sun,
moon, and stars are only collected air which contains light; even if they
could fall they would do no harm.’ His pupil said, ‘ Suppose the earth
should break, what then ? ’ ‘ The Earth,’ replied his mentor, ‘ is an ac
cumulation of clods, packed close together on all sides. You may go
about the whole day treading and trampling on the earth without any fear
of its breaking.’ His hearer rejoiced like a released prisoner, and the
teacher rejoiced in sympathy with him. But Chang Lo heard it and said
with a smile : ‘ Rainbows and clouds, wind and rain, sky and mountains,
seas and rivers, metals and stones, fire and wood, are all but forms of
matter in combination. Who says they will not be destroyed ? A little
thing like man in the midst of the vast universe may think it
indestructible, and to trouble ourselves about such a remote contingency
is needless. But heaven and earth will inevitably be destroyed, and if
you encountered that time, how could you help being anxious ? ’ Leih-tsze
heard and smiled, saying : ‘ It is equally erroneous to say that the universe
will be destroyed, and to say that it will not be destroyed. We are
unable to determine it either way. Life does not know death, and death
does not know life. Why should I trouble my mind about the permanency
of the universe ? ’ ”
“ Yang Choo was travelling through Sung, and came to an inn. The
inn-keeper had two wives, one of whom was pretty and the other was
ugly. He esteemed the ugly one and slighted the pretty one. Yang Choo
asked the reason. The inn-keeper replied : ‘ That pretty one thinks herself
pretty, but I do not perceive her beauty. The ugly one thinks herself
ugly, but I do not perceive her lack of comeliness.’ Yang Choo said to
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LEIH-TSZE.
his disciples : ‘ Remember this; if you act virtuously without attributing
the merit of it to yourself, where will you go without being loved ? ’ ”
“ When the great Yu was regulating the waters, one day he lost his
way, and wandered into a country on the northern shore of the North
Sea, he knew not how many times ten thousand miles from China. In *
that land was neither wind nor rain, frost nor dew, nor did he meet with
any kinds of animal or vegetable life. On all sides the ground was per
fectly smooth, only gently rising in elevation in the centre. A vase-shaped
mountain rose in the middle of that country, with a circular orifice on
the summit, from which a fountain issued, called the spiritual fountain.
Its fragrance was sweeter than rose-gardens or cinnamon groves, and its
taste was more exquisite than that of the finest wine. From one source it
divided into four channels and flowed down the mountain, meandering
through the whole land and watering every corner of it. The climate was
serene, perfectly free from malaria. The people who lived there were of a
gentle disposition and in harmony with their external circumstances. No
strife nor violence marred their peace. Their hearts were tender and their
frames were soft. They were innocent of pride and envy. Old and
young dwelt together, and they had neither prince nor official among
them. Men and women wandered about in company, and they employed
no match-makers, sent no marriage presents. They dwelt on the banks of
the stream, and needed not to plough and sow. The climate was so
genial that they did not weave nor wear clothes. They lived to be a
hundred years old; premature death and disease being unknown among
them. The population was always increasing, till it was innumerable ;
and enjoyed perpetual felicity, ignorant of decay, old age, grief and
hardship. Delighting in music, the voices joining harmoniously in song,,
ceased not throughout the day. If hungry or weary they drank of the
spiritual fountain and their strength and spirits were restored to their
normal condition. Too deep a draught intoxicated, and then they slept
for a week without waking. When they bathed in the spiritual fountain
their skin became glossy and the fragrance exhaled for a week. When
King Muh of Chau entered that kingdom he tarried there for three years
without a thought of home. On his return to his royal palace he was
plunged in profound melancholy, refused food and wine, and all the
delights of his harem, and several months passed before he recovered.”
“ A man in the East, while on a journey, was reduced by starvation,
and lay dying by the road-side. A celebrated highwayman passed that
way, and, pitying him, dismounted, and put a bottle to his lips. After
three sucks the dying man revived, and opened his eyes. Seeing his
deliverer bending over him, he inquired his name, and being told, ex
claimed, ‘ Are not you the famous robber ? What induced you to give
me drink ? I am an honest man, and cannot receive food from you.’
Thereupon he beat the ground with his arms and tried to vomit, gasped
and gurgled in his throat, fell back, and expired. But if the man was a
robber, his drink had not committed theft. How strangely men confuse
�LEIH-TSZE.
63
**
things.
This is a satire upon certain well-known anecdotes of Confucian
worthies, whose unbending scrupulousness appeared ridiculous to our
Taouist believer in non-resistance to the universal life-stream of nature.
“ A neighbour of Yang Choo lost a sheep, and calling upon the
villagers to go in search of it, he asked the assistance of Yang Choo’s
servant also. Yang Choo inquired why so many persons were needed to
seek for a single sheep. His neighbour said, ‘ Because the roads and by
paths are many.’ When they returned, he asked if the sheep had been
found. ‘ No, it is lost,’ they answered. ‘ How lost ? ’ he demanded.
‘ The bypaths branch out into other bypaths, and we could not pos
sibly tell which way it had gone, so we returned.’ A shade of sadness
fell upon Yang Choo’s countenance ; for a long time he did not speak,
and he did not smile again that day. His disciples marvelled, and
requested an explanation. 1 The sheep was not a valuable animal, and it
did not belong to you; why should it cloud over your happiness like
this ? ’ Yang Choo returned no answer. Discussing it among them
selves, one of them said, ‘ The great path divides into many by
paths, and many sheep are lost therein.. How is it that you sit in the
master’s school, and have not yet learned to interpret the master’s
meaning ? ’ ”
“ Yang Choo’s younger brother went out for a walk in a suit of
white silk, but rain coming on, he borrowed a black cloak to return in.
When he reached the door, his dog came out and barked at him. The
young man was provoked, and raised his hand to strike the dog. Yang
Choo said, ‘ Do not beat him; you are no better yourself. Suppose
your dog went out white, and came back black, would it not startle
you ? ’ ”
“ One new year’s day, the people of Ham Tan presented a number of
pigeons to their lord. He was very pleased, and liberally rewarded them.
A guest of his inquired the reason. ‘ This is new year’s day,’ he said,
‘ and I shall set them all at liberty to fly back to the woods, and
so express the good-will of my heart to all living things.’ His guest
replied, ‘ The people are aware of your intention to release the birds, and
therefore they entrap and catch them, and many are killed in their
attempts. If you wish to keep them alive, the better way would be to
prohibit catching them.’ ”
“A man who had lost his axe, suspected his neighbour’s son. He
watched him, and said to himself, ‘ He is the thief; he has the gait of a
thief, the face of a thief, the voice of a thief; everything in his appearance
and behaviour says as plainly as possible that he has stolen the axe.’
But happening one day to find the axe in his own garden, when he next
met his neighbour’s son, there was nothing whatever in his looks or
behaviour which could lead one to suspect him to be a thief.”
“ Confucius, on a journey, saw two children disputing, and asked the
reason. One of the lads said, ‘1 say that the rising sun is near us, and
at noon it is far off.’ The other said, ‘ No, the sun is far off at dawn, but
�64
LEIH-TSZE.
near at mid-day.’ The first said, 1 Why, when the sun rises it is as large
as a chariot-wheel, but in the middle of the day it is no larger than
a plate ; is it not small when at a distance, and large when it is near ? ’
The other said, ‘ When the sun first rises, its rays are mild and genial;
but at noon it is blazing hot. Surely it is hotter when near, and cooler
when afar.
Confucius could not decide the point. The two children
smiled and said, ‘ Who will say that you know much ? ’ ”
The English reader may be disposed to think that in this respect there
is not much to choose between Confucius and Leih-tsze and all the rest
of China s boasted sages. They lived before the Baconian philosophy;
and a clever boy from one of our primary schools could instruct them in
the exact sciences. But unless, in the progress of human evolution,
man develops into a being very different from what he always has been,
the subject-matter of Taouistic speculation will continue to possess
intensest interest and unrivalled practical importance for mankind. Our
meditations upon the whence and the whither may fail to lead to those
definite and clear conclusions which science craves, but they exert a
momentous influence upon the formation of a practical rule of life. One
does not need to go far in modern literature in order to detect an order of
thought which is strictly parallel to that naturalistic philosophy of which
Leih-tsze is a representative. Those old Chinese thinkers were but
following a tendency in human nature, which exists in us still; and
it can do us no harm to learn whither it led them, and what it ended in.
Happily we have a sure confidence that, as nobler instincts and loftier
aspirations prevailed in the far East, leaving this indolent epicurean
philosophy to lose itself in the ignominious quagmire of absurd and
degrading superstition, so the philosophy of conscience and duty, of effort
and conflict, will prevail, and must prevail in the long run, however for a
time men may seem to lose heart and long for the land of the lotos
eaters.
F. S. T.
�
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A collection of digitised nineteenth-century pamphlets from Conway Hall Library & Archives. This includes the Conway Tracts, Moncure Conway's personal pamphlet library; the Morris Tracts, donated to the library by Miss Morris in 1904; the National Secular Society's pamphlet library and others. The Conway Tracts were bound with additional ephemera, such as lecture programmes and handwritten notes.<br /><br />Please note that these digitised pamphlets have been edited to maximise the accuracy of the OCR, ensuring they are text searchable. If you would like to view un-edited, full-colour versions of any of our pamphlets, please email librarian@conwayhall.org.uk.<br /><br /><span><img src="http://www.heritagefund.org.uk/sites/default/files/media/attachments/TNLHLF_Colour_Logo_English_RGB_0_0.jpg" width="238" height="91" alt="TNLHLF_Colour_Logo_English_RGB_0_0.jpg" /></span>
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2018
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Conway Hall Ethical Society
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Leih-tsze
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Storrs-Turner, Frederick
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Place of publication: [London]
Collation: [44]-64 p. ; 23 cm.
Notes: From the library of Dr Moncure Conway. Article signed F.S.T. The Reverend Frederick Storrs-Turner was a British clergyman and campaigner against the opium trade. From the Cornhill Magazine 30 (July 1874). Full name of author, magazine title and issue number from Wellesley Index to Victorian Periodicals, 1824-1900.
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[Smith, Elder & Co.]
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[1874]
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G5346
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China
Opium
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<a href="http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/mark/1.0/"><img src="http://i.creativecommons.org/p/mark/1.0/88x31.png" alt="Public Domain Mark" /></a><span> </span><br /><span>This work (Leih-tsze), identified by </span><a href="https://conwayhallcollections.omeka.net/items/show/www.conwayhall.org.uk"><span>Humanist Library and Archives</span></a><span>, is free of known copyright restrictions.</span>
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English
China
Conway Tracts
Leih-Tsze
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gbbenx Snrmg.
Had someone stood under the crystal dome of the first great Exhibition,
and foretold that in a quarter of a century after that inauguration of the
millennium of common sense, England would incur the denunciations of
the Hebrew prophets on a land of wizards and necromancers, and of
those who “ seek after familiar spirits,” how merrily should we have
laughed the absurd prediction to scorn ! Not much more attention
should we have paid to it even had we known that just three years before
(in 1848) Miss Kate Fox, of Hydesville, State of New York, at the mature
age of nine, had received monitions from the spirit world in the form of a
hail-storm of raps on the walls and floors of her abode. It seemed,
indeed, scarcely more likely that the juvenile “ medium” should open a
new dispensation for Europe and America, than that her contemporary little
visionaries (or naughty little impostors, as the case may be) of La Salette
should send half France on pious pilgrimage to the spot where they saw,
or did not see, the Virgin. The lesson that great events may spring from
small causes, and that the foolish things of the world not seldom confound
the wise, is, however, by no means a new one for mankind, and we have
now very plainly to reckon with Spiritualism as one of the prominent
facts of the age. We will not take upon ourselves to guess how many
disciples it may boast in America before these sheets pass to the press ;
a few millions, more or less, seem to count for little in the statements of its
triumphant advocates ; but here, in England, there are evidences enough
of its flourishing condition. In nearly every company may be met at least
one lady or gentleman who looks grave and uncomfortable when the
subject is treated with levity ; confesses to a conviction that there is
“ something in it; ” and challenges disproof of miracles which she or he
has actually beheld, heard, and handled. Not seldom are to be seen
persons in a later stage of faith, easily recognisable by wild and vision
seeking eyes, and hands and feet in perpetual nervous agitation, who
take no interest in other conversation, but eagerly pour out narratives,
arguments, and appeals concerning Spiritualism whenever they can make
an opportunity introducing the subject. Even the pulpit is no longer free
from spiritualistic interpretations of religious mysteries ; and the periodical
press, which long confined itself to such attacks and refutations as those
by Lord Amberley, in the Fortnightly Review, by an anonymous writer in
the New Quarterly Magazine, and by a well-known physiologist in the
Quarterly Review (October, 1871), has now opened its columns to two
very remarkable papers in its defence, by Dr. Alfred Wallace (Fortnightly
�MODERN SORCERY.
37
Review, May and June, 1874). This double essay, indeed, by the dis
tinguished traveller and fellow-originator with Dr. Darwin of the
“Doctrine of Natural Selection,” may be justly said to mark an epoch in
the progress of the movement, and we can scarcely do wrong in taking it
as the first serious challenge to us from competent authority, to give to
the marvels of Spiritualism a fair and full investigation.
To many readers, indeed, we believe it has not unsuccessfully so ap
pealed ; causing them to hesitate as to whether they were justified in
holding back any longer from enquiry, even while the process remains
to them eminently distasteful. In view of such a dilemma it may be
not inopportune to discuss briefly, not the Evidences of Spiritualism, but
the preliminary question—Whether we are intellectually or morally bound
to examine and weigh those evidences ? Spiritualists, to do them justice,
very candidly warn us that the task is no trivial one to be performed in a
hurry. They scoff indignantly at the notion that five unsuccessful
séances (in one of which Di Vernon appeared as an historical character,
and, in another, Socrates with a straight nose and a disinclination to
speak Greek) were sufficient to warrant Lord Amberley in pronouncing
Spiritualism an imposition ; and they bid us admire men who, like Dr.
Sexton, are prepared to spend fifteen years in inquiry before the
“ needful evidence ” to convince them is vouchsafed/' To sift and
collate the mass of evidence already produced ; to cross-examine the
witnesses, and weigh the value of their individual testimony ; finally,
to institute the requisite actual experiments at séances innumerable,
would be to exceed the labours of Hercules, and repeat the weariness
of the Tichborne trial. It is not too much to insist that excellent
reason should be shown for the devotion of so much time and toil to such
an end ; nor need we be alarmed at the adoption by Spiritualists of the
tone of high moral indignation against indolent non-inquirers, natural to
all persons who think they are advocating some important discovery.
Few amongst us who have reached middle life regret that we did not
obey the solicitations of early friends to devote the years of our prime to
investigations of the “ discoveries ” of St. John Long, Spurzheim, and
Reichenbach,—to testing the therapeutic agencies of tar-water, “ tracttors,” and brandy and salt ; or nicely studying the successive solutions
triumphantly propounded of the problem of human flight and of perpetual
motion. We have borne with tolerable equanimity to be called hasty
and prejudiced in these matters ; and we may now endure the taunt of
Spiritualists that we display indifference to truths possibly indefinitely
valuable to the human race. Some limits there must needs be to the
duty of inquiring into everything proposed to us as a subject of inves
tigation ; and those limits we may perhaps in the present case find in the
nature of the subject, the methods of the investigation to be pursued,
and the results which follow in the contingency of such inquiries proving
successful.
Quarterly Review, May 1874, p, 651.
�38
MODERN SORCERY.
The propensity which ethnologists attribute, especially to Touranian
races, to seek after intercourse with inferior grades of spiritual existence, or
(to give it the old name) the passion for Sorcery, is one which seems to
flourish like the olive, the Phoenix of trees. Cut down, or burnt down,
in one land or age, it springs up and branches forth afresh in the next;
and while the main tendency of human thought seems constantly towards
a stricter monotheism, a counter eddy of the current for ever fills and
re-fills the invisible world with legions of imps, ghosts, and lying spirits,
meaner and more puerile than human nature in its basest condition.
Fifty years ago such delusions seemed to have ebbed out, and the few
writers who dealt with them, spoke of them as things of the past; and
assured us that, save in some Tartar tent in the East, or Gipsy one in
the West, magic and incantations would be heard no more. The future
historian of the England of to-day may truly relate that such incantations
were more common in London in 1874 than they were in Palestine when
the witch of Endor deluded Saul; or in Byzantium, when Santabaren
restored his long lost son to the arms of the Emperor Basil the Mace
*
donian.
What is the origin of this widespread and seemingly ineradicable
propensity ? Of course the answer which first suggests itself is, that it
is the result of a most natural and blameless curiosity to learn the
mysteries of that life into which we ourselves expect to pass through
the gates of the tomb, and wherein it is our hope that the beloved
ones who have left us have already entered. That in some cases this
is the real spring of the desire, we will not question. But it is certain
that the passion for Sorcery has far other springs beside, and that those
who addict themselves to it most completely have neither ardent long
ings for immortality on their own account, nor common reverence for
the dead. The special characteristic of the propensity, and of the
practices to which it gives rise, is the absence of all the more delicate
sentiments or spiritual aspirations of true human love, or true religion;
and the presence, in their stead, of a brutal familiarity and irreverence
as regards the dead, and of a gross materialism touching the experiences
of communion, divine or human.
In this respect superstitious Sacerdotalism and Sorcery have in all ages
borne some strong features of resemblance, even while mutually denouncing
one another. Each of them disregards really spiritual gifts as needful
to qualify Priest or Medium for intercourse with the unseen world; and
relies upon rites and incantations, rather than upon such liftings-up of
the human soul in longing and prayer, as should draw (if anything
might draw) the Divine aid from heaven and human love back from
the grave. The Sacerdotalist forgets the truth that, not by the help of
* This latter marvel is vouched for by Leo Grammaticus in vita Basilii Imp., § 20.
It was obviously accomplished by phantasmagoria and a magic lanthorn. See, for a
most valuable explanation of a multitude of such wonders,Eusebe Salverte’s Sciences
Occultes.
�MODERN SORCERY.
39
ecclesiastical machinery, but by spiritual worship, must the Father of
Spirits be approached ; and the Spiritualist forgets that not by his
machinery of raps and alphabets, but indeed “spiritually,” must “ spiritual
things” (such as immortality), be discerned. It was well said of late
by a profound thinker, that “if our belief in a future life could be
verified by the senses, Heaven would cease to be a part of our religion, and
become a branch of our geography.” “ Spiritualism ” is indeed a singular
misnomer, or, rather, it is a case of lucus a non lucendo, for there is no
“ spirituality ” in the system at all. It is materialism, pure and simple,
applied to a spiritual truth.
No one who entertains natural reverence and awe for the dead
can contemplate the practices of spiritualists in their séances without
pain and indignation, and only the example of unfeeling mediums and
excited friends can have prompted many tender natures to sanction or
endure them. In the midnight silence and stillness of our chambers,
or in some calm evening solitude of hills and woods, it might be pos
sible to bear the overwhelming emotions of awe ; the rush of unspeak
able tenderness, which must come upon us with the genuine convic
tion that the one who was “ soul of our soul ” has actually returned from
the grave, and is near us once more, conveying to us (as his presence even
in silence would surely do) the ineffable sense of love triumphant over
death ; and ready to receive from us the passionate assurances of neverforgotten regret and affection. Such a meeting of the spirits of the dead
and the living would be among all life’s solemn and affecting incidents the
most profound and touching ; the one which would move us to the very
foundations of our being, and leave us evermore other men than we had been.
Nay, we may further conceive that, bending over the dying, and speak
ing to them of the world into which they are about to enter, and where it
is at least not impossible they may meet our long lost friend or parent,
we might with faltering lips charge them to bear for us to the dead the
message of unchanged fidelity. Such as these are forms of communion
with the departed which involve no shock to our reverence, no sin against
the holiness of buried affection. But what shall we say for the travesty
and mockery thereof which goes on at every spiritualistic séance, amid
the circumstances with which we are all too well acquainted; and as
an alternate evening diversion to music, cards, or tea ? In a drawing
room with gas raised or extinguished a score of times to suit the require
ments of the medium, amid a circle of pleasantly excited ladies and gentle
men dabbling with alphabets, and slates, and planchettes, and ready'to
catch up every straw of “ evidence ” to be published or gossiped about on
the morrow ; in such a scene as this, and with the aid of a psychagogue,
who can scarcely pronounce three common-place sentences without betray
ing his ignorance or his vulgarity, we are told that wives ask to com
*
* Charles Sumner has just been brought back from the grave, and proves to have
very quickly acquired that disregard of adverbs which is common among the weaker
�40
MODERN SORCERY.
municate with their dead husbands ; parents are made to “feel” a lost
child in their arms; and sons listen to words professedly spoken to
them by their mother’s souls. We do not need to be told that the com
munications thus made are utterly unworthy of the majesty of death, and
are patently calculated rather to convince and entertain the audience by
verifiable allusions to names and places, than to convey what—if it were
truly the departed soul which had returned—would inevitably be the heartwrung utterances of supreme love. Strange is it indeed that persons not
otherwise devoid of tender and reverent feeling, when caught by the passion
for this sorcery, permit themselves and the company they may happen to
join ; to find the entertainment of an evening in practice so revolting.
Shall we give to it the name which it deserves, and say that the act of
evoking the dead in such a manner, and for such a purpose, is seta ileye ?
We have spoken of the objects and method of spiritualistic inquiry.
Its results even more emphatically exonerate any man of sound and re
verent mind from engaging in the task of its investigation. Dr. Wallace
asks us to “ look rather at the results produced by the evidence, than
to the evidence itself,” and we are thankful to accept his challenge.
Never, we venture to say, may the principle of judging a tree by its fruits
be more fairly applied. The grand and obvious result of Spiritualism is
to afford us one more (real or fictitious) revelation of the state of de
parted souls, added to those which we possessed before. Let us consider
it a little carefully, and observe what it really reveals.
The pictures of a future world which men have drawn in different
lands and ages, all possess at least one claim to our interest. They afford
us not indeed the faintest outlines of that Undiscovered Country beyond
the bourne of death, but they reveal with unimpeachable, because un
intentional sincerity, the innermost desires and fears of living men. On
that “cloud” which receives every departing soul out of our sight, the
magic-lantern of fancy casts its bright or gloomy imagery, and we need
but watch the phantasms as they pass to know the hidden slides of the
brain which produced them. The luscious gardens and Houris anticipated
by the Moslem; the eternal repose of Nirvana sighed for by the Budd
hist; the alternate warfare and wassail of Walhalla, for which the Norse
man longed as the climax of glory and felicity, convey to us at a glance
a livelier conception of the sensuality, the indolence, and the fierceness,
of the respective races than could be acquired by elaborate studies of
their manners and morality. In a similar way other characteristics are
revealed by the terrors of Future Punishment,—which the lively Greek
imagined to himself as the endless hopeless labours of an Ixion or a
Sisyphus ; the dignified Egyptian, as degradation to a bestial form; and
the grim-souled Teuton of the Dark Ages, as eternal torture in a fiery
brethren, in America—and also, perhaps, among American mediums. He is repotted
to have said, “ Oh, my friends, that you would ponder well that sacred injunction from
spirit life, * Lay up treasures in Heaven. Yhu need not be told how to do this, you
must act unselfish.'1'
�41
MODERN SORCERY.
cave. Whatever has constituted man’s highest pleasure on earth, that
he has hoped to find again in heaven, and whatever he has most dreaded,
that he has imagined as forming the retribution of guilt hereafter. From
this point of view the Christian idea of a serene empyrean, wherein saints
and archangels for ever cast their crowns before the great White Throne,
and worship the thrice Holy One who sitteth thereon—affords singular
evidence of the spiritual altitude to which those souls had attained to
whom 'such an Apocalypse opened the supremest vision of beatitude.
The attitude of Adoration—of sublime ecstatic rapture in the presence
of perfect Holiness and Goodness, is assuredly the loftiest of which we
have any conception, and to desire to enjoy and prolong it for ever can
only genuinely pertain to a soul in which the love of Divine goodness is
already the ruling passion. Wider thought and calmer reflection may
teach that not alone on such mountain peaks of emotion, but on the plains
of sacred service, should the faithful son of God desire to spend his
immortality. But the modern American poet who has taken on himself
to sneer at the notion of angels “ loafing about the Throne,” has given
curious evidence of his incompetence to understand what sublime passion
it was which inspired that wondrous vision of Patmos.
Accepting then the Heaven and Hell of each creed as a natural test
of the characteristic sentiments of its disciples, we turn somewhat in
quisitively to discover what sort of a future existence the new faith of
Spiritualism proposes to give us. Of course it affords every facility for
such an inquiry ; for, while other religions teach primarily concerning God,
and secondly, and with much more reserve, about the life after death ;
Spiritualism teaches first, and at great length, about the future life, and
frankly confesses that it has no light to throw on the problems of
theology. What then, we ask, has Spiritualism told us respecting the
state of the dead, or rather (as a sceptic mustinwardly pose the question)__
What do its narratives betray concerning the ideals of existence which
Spiritualists have created out of the depth of their own consciousness ? Do
they prove an advance upon those of earlier creeds; or, on the contrary, do
they mark a singular and deplorable retrogression towards the material
istic, the carnal, and the vulgar ? Of course such an enquiry would be
met at the outset by a Spiritualist with the vehement assertion that it was
not he who devised what the spirits say of themselves, but the spirits
who have lifted the veil of their own existence, for whose ignoble details
he is in no way responsible. As, however, every Pagan and Buddhist
Mahometan and Parsee would say as much on his own behalf, and main
tain that Elysium and Nirvana, Paradise and Gorotman, had each been
revealed by such “mediums” as Orpheus and Buddha, Mahomet and
Zoroaster, we must be content to pass by this argument and treat the
phase of immortality discovered (or invented) by Mr. Hume and his friends
as no less significant of the moral ideals of Spiritualists and the general
level of their aspirations.
Let it be granted cordially that there is nothing in the spiritualistic
3—5
�42
MODERN SORCERY.
Hades akin to the “ Hell of the Red Hot Iron,” the “ Hell of the Little
Child,” the “ Hell of the Burning Bonnet,” and the “ Hell of the
Boiling Kettle ” set forth with such ghastly circumstantiality in these
latter days in Dr. Furness’ Books for the Young, and in older times by
numberless Calvinistic and Catholic divines. Theodore Parker went,
indeed, so far as to say that “ there was, at all events, one good service
which the Spiritualists had done, they had, knocked the bottom out of Hell.”
Considering that the peculiarity of that terrible Pit has been generally
understood to be that it is “bottomless,” the achievement would seem
rather difficult; but in any case we may candidly agree that on this side
no exception need be taken against the spiritualist doctrine, save that
perchance it fails to afford indication of any sense of how profound must
be the mental anguish through which it is possible for a soul, stained
with vice and cruelty, to recover its purity and peace.
Spiritualist
remorse seems almost as colourless as spiritualist beatitude is vulgar
and inane.
On the other hand, when we ask to be informed (beyond the testimony
of sweet smiles and assurances of felicity), of the nature of the happiness
of virtuous departed souls, we are confronted with narratives much more
nearly realizing our notion of humiliating penance and helplessness than of
glory and freedom ; of Purgatory rather than of Paradise. The dead, it
seems, according to Spiritualism, have not (even after vast intervals of time)
advanced one step nearer to the knowledge of those diviner truths for
which the soul of man hungers, than they possessed while on earth. The
Hope of Immortality is bound up, in religious minds, with the faith that
though no actual vision can ever be vouchsafed of the all-pervading Spirit,
yet that some sense beyond any which earthly life affords, of the presence
and love of the Father will come to the soul when it has gone “ home to
God,” and that Doubt will surely be left behind among the cerements of
the grave. But Spiritualists cheerfully tell us such hopes are quite as
delusive as those of the material crowns and harps of the New Jerusalem.
“ Nothing,” says Dr. Wallace, “ is more common than for religious people
at seances to ask questions about God and Christ. In reply they never
get more than opinions, or more frequently the statement that they, the
spirits, have no more actual knowledge than they had on earth ” (p. 805.)
There are indeed, Dr. Wallace assures us, Catholic and Protestant,
Mahommedan and Hindoo spirits, proving that the “mind with its
myriad beliefs is not suddenly changed at death,” nor, seemingly, for ages
afterwards. Thus from our estimate of the Spiritualist state of future
felicity, we are called on to make, at starting, the enormous deduction of
everything resembling religious progress. The Spiritualist is perfectly
content with an ideal Heaven wherein he will remain in just as much doubt
or error as he happens to have entertained upon earth.
Further, as regards his personal and social affections, Does he at least
image to himself that he will be nearer and more able to protect and
bless his dear ones after death ? Or that he will pass freely hither
�MODERN SORCERY.
43
and thither, doing service like a guardian angel to mankind, strengthening
the weak, comforting the mourner, and awakening the conscience of the
wicked? There is (so far as we have followed the literature of Spiritualism)
no warrant for such a picture of bénéficient activity. Good spirits, as well
as bad—the souls of Plato and Fénélon, as well as those of the silliest
and wickedest “twaddler” (as Dr. Wallace honestly describes many
spirits Zmôàiiés of séances)—have seemingly spent all the centuries since
their demise humbly waiting to be called up by some, woman, or child
precisely, as if they were lackeys ready to answer the downstairs’ bell.
In many cases we are led to infer that the dead have been striving for
years and ages to make themselves known, and now for the last quarter
of a century have very clumsily and imperfectly succeeded in doing so.
Let us conceive for' a moment a grand and loving soul—a Shakespeare,
or Jeremy Taylor, or Shelley, who once spoke to mankind in free and
noble speech, a man among men, fumbling about the legs of tables,
scratching like a dog at a door, and eagerly flying to obtain the services
of an interpreter like Miss Fox, Mr. Hume, or Mrs.Guppy,—and we have
surely invented a punishment and humiliation exceeding those of any
purgatory hitherto invented. If Virtue itself has nothing better to hope
for hereafter than such a destiny, we may well wish that the grave should
prove indeed, after all, the last home of “ earth’s mighty nation.”
Where Oblivion’s pall shall darkly fall
On the dreamless sleep of annihilation.
In conclusion, Is it too much now to ask that we may be exonerated,
once for all, from the charge of unreasonable prejudice, if we refuse to
undertake the laborious inquiry into the marvels of Spiritualism which its
advocates challenge,— an inquiry pursued by methods bordering upon the
sacrilegious, and terminating, either in the exposure of a miserable delu
sion, or else in the stultification and abortion of man’s immortal Hope ?
�
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Modern sorcery
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Cobbe, Frances Power [1832-1907.]
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Notes: From the library of Dr Moncure Conway. From the Cornhill Magazine 30 (July, 1874). Attribution of author, the magazine title, and date from Wellesley Index to Victorian Periodicals 1824-1900. The top of the first page has been cut out, no text is missing.
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Spiritualism
Witchcraft
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Conway Tracts
Spiritualism
Witchcraft
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Text
1874.]
Mysticism.
5
MYSTICISM.
Herbert Spencer has affirmed that the one essential princi
ple of religion is’ the sense of mystery. We have about us the
visible world of things. Each of these things stands in definite
relations with the things about it. These' relations we can under
stand ; or at leaskwe' can put them into formulas which seem clear
to the understanding. But we feel that behind these visible
things and these finite relations there is a something which we can
not see, which we cannot put into formulas, and which, thus, we
cannot even pretend to understand. This unknowable something
is a power present in all things, manifesting itself in all things,
the life of all things; but though it is always manifesting
itself, it can never make itself known ; though so near us, it
can never be grasped. It remains ever the infinite, the unknown.
The consciousness of the reality of this unknowable power is, ac
cording to Spencer, the element peculiar to all religions, the only
element that may properly be called religious.
The definition of religion, as given by Herbert Spencer, tells
only half the story. There is another element which is essential
to religion and which is common to all religions. There is light in
religion as well as darkness. If God dwells in the darkness He
dwells also in the light, and the darkness and the light are alike
filled with His presence. I refer, however, at this time to the po
sition of Herbert Spencer, not to criticize it, not to attempt to
supply its deficiency, but to recognize its real though partial
truth. The sense of mystery is not the only element of religion,
but it is an essential element of it; an element too much lost sight
of in these days of brilliant, though largely superficial thought.
The religious world owes a debt of gratitude to Herbert Spencre
for bringing back to its consciousness so forcibly the great fact of
this essential principle of mystery. We are apt to forget that
much as we need to know, just so much do we need to feel the
presence of the unknowable. We are apt to look upon the moun
tain of truth only as a ledge to be quarried. We are so busied
• with our machinery of one sort and another for drilling and blow
�6
Mysticism.
[Mar.
ing, for raising and shaping and carrying, so pleased with the
smoothly hammered blocks which attest onr labor and our skill,
that we forget to look up at the sublime vastness of the mountain,,'
at its precipitous sides, at the clouds which veil forever its snowy
and inaccessible summit. And yet the mountain in its wholeness
may be more helpful to us than in its fragments. All the archi
tecture in which these fragments may be embodied are puny in
comparison with it. All the physical luxury to which they may
minister is as nothing compared with the vigor which the sense of
its sublimity may bring to the spirit. So, also, our square-hewn
truths, however fair, however wonderful, are as nothing to the
infinitude of truth. The spirit of man needs to feel its strength.
It is well that among the finite things about it, it should feel
strong, proud and defiant; that it should come to the world as a
conqueror to his realm; but it is well also that it should feel the
presence of a mightier than it. There are minds to which the
sense even of the sublimities of earth would be a salvation. No
where does the spirit show its greatness more than in the sense of
awe, in the presence of the infinitudes of life and thought, and no
where does it gain greater strength than in such contemplation.
Religion has at all times, and among all nations, recognized this
element of the unknowable. “ They best know Thee who confess
that they do not know Thee,” cried the Hindoo; “ Canst thou
know the Almighty to perfection ? ” exclaimed the Hebrew. And
thus, wherever there has been a religion worthy of the name,
there has been this solemn gladness, this bowed exaltation, this
mighty helplessness, this blending of the deepest and loftiest of
man’s nature, which comes from the sense of knowing that which
passes knowledge.
While religion has thus openly and triumphantly recognized the
element of mystery as essential to its existence, it has, I believe,
covertly, recognized the same thing in its ceremonies and creedp.
I cannot understand how else many of these extravagant and
sometimes even absurd forms and formulas should have taken such
a hold upon the hearts of men. Take, for instance, some of the
peculiarities of the Roman Catholic service. It seems sometimes ab
surd to see an ignorant worshipper taking part in a service con
ducted in a language which he cannot understand. A poor Irish
�1874.]
Mysticism.
7
girl, for instance, worships through the Latin tongue. At least, how
ever, she feels herself in the presence of a mystery behind which is
the Divine ; and if we take even the loftiest terms that we use in
our English prayers, with realistic literalness, if we regard them as
simply and wholly true, perhaps our worship maybe more imperfect
than hers. A divinity that could be wrapt in any terms however
fair and sweet would be a living divinity no longer. So also the
dimness of the Mediaeval church, its wondrouW music with its
heights of joy and abysmal depths of ’sorrow, its architecture with
its soaring arches and its gloomy cryp|L-all combined force home
this sense of mystery upon th^soul.’ Tlje creeds of the Mediaeval
church bringing together opposites in the. same breath, setting at
defiance the most fundamentaOaWs, of thought and reason, at least
brought men into the presen’bfeiS^he unknown, and were doubtless
helpful in this respect. I have spoken thus of the Mediaeval
church, but all religons have had their mysteries. The mysteries
of the Greek must have brought a healthful spirit of awe and reverence into the midst of much that was superficial add frivolous in the
Greek culture.
It would be interesting to consider the nature and the limit of
this element of mystery that underlies all religion, to examine the
forms under which, it confronts us, and the light that^omes to us
through and around them. It would be interesting to consider the
mystery that waits upon the finite soul, by reason of its very finite
ness, when it strives to comprehend the infinite ; or to examine that
mystery which meets us under every form of thought when we strive
to reconcile the freedom of man with inevitable and invariable law,
or with the all-embracing provident of G-od ; or it would be inter
esting to drop our plummets farther than sight could reach, down
into the dark depths of the mystery of suffering and sin.
My object in this essay is, however, to consider one form of this
mystery which underlies all others, and which, so far as the solutions
is possible, gives the only hint towards the solution of any of them.
I mean that form of mystery which is involved in what is called mys
ticism.
The word mysticism is often used in a very vague manner. At
first it is probable that it had no very definite signification, except
as it referred to whatever was connected with mystery in general,
�8
Mysticism.
[Mar.
or with the so-called mysteries of religion in particular. But as
the nature of this mystery and of these mysteries became more
apparent, as the vital element of all began to manifest itself more
distinctly from amid the hulls that enveloped it, the words mystic
and mysticism assumed a very definite meaning ; and this meaning,
in spite of much vague and careless use, still belongs to them. The
word mysticism, whenever properly used, refers to the fact that all
lives, however distinct they may appear, however varied may be
their conditions and their ends, are at heart one; that they are the
manifestations of a common element; that they all open into this
common element and thus into one another. Merely philosophical
mysticism calls this common element by one name or another ac
cording to the nature of the system. Religious mysticism finds
this common element in the life of Grod. Mysticism then is the
recognition of the universal element in all individual forms; re
ligious mysticism finds everywhere the presence and power of the
divine life.
Mysticism is so foreign to much of our modern habit of thinking ;
it is so foreign to our habits of life ; it is so foreign to that hard
individualism which both our thinking and our living tend to nour
ish, that it may not be easy for all to enter into the spirit of it, or
even to comprehend its meaning. Moreover the word has been as
sociated with so much that is extravagant and absurd that it has
somewhat fallen into disrepute. Those, most often, have been
known as mystics in whom mysticism has run riot. But in spite of
modern atomism and individualism, in spite of former extrava
gance and fanaticism, mysticism expresses the profoundest fact of
our being. All the greatest thinkers and seers of the world have
been more or less imbued with it. Modern creed makers and creed
holders may disown it; but the religious founders, those on whose
mighty foundations the creed makers rear their shapeless and un
substantial fabrics, wrought from the intuition and the inspiration of
the mystical view of life.
However distinct our little individual lives may seem, these
mighty thinkers and seers have perceived that they had a common
root and a common substance. Within and beneath all existences
there is the being from which all spring and in which they all qxist.
We ask the leaf, Are you complete in yourself? and the leaf
�1874.]
Mysticism.
9.
answers, No, my life is in the branches. We ask the branch, and
the branch answers, No, my life is in the trunk. We ask the
trunk, and it answers, No, my life is in the root. We ask the
root, and it answers, No, my life is in the trunk and the branches
and the leaves; keep the branches stripped of leaves and I shall
die. So is it with the great tree of being. Nothing is completely
and merely individual. All are expressions, higher and lower, of a
common life.
Illustrations of this fact may $e found in the comparatively
superficial relations of life in th®e realms which seem intermediate
between the body and the mind. The relations of which I here
speak are those which connect one life with another. They show
a relation which is deeper than any that the senses can account for,
and thus manifest .a direct communication between one life and
another. We see this in the great pulses of feeling which thrill
through communities and assemblies. On a large scale we see it in
the frenzy of a nation, a state of things which has found its most
striking exemplification in the history of Fran®; on a smaller
scale we see it in the enthusiasm or excitement of any crowd.
There are occasions in which the calmest and most balanced mind
is drawn into the common whirl and wmult of feeling, not form
anything that has been said or done, but because the depths of the
spirit are stirred by the mighty movements in the life about it.
Such a common movement may be found, for instance, in the en
thusiasm of the camp-meeting, which becomes filled with a com
mon terror or a common fervor; and in the rout of some great
army when a strange and inexeplicable panic spreads from heart
to heart. Such mighty stirrings of the common life suggest to us
the movements of the s,ea. The fury of the waves is felt in every
cove and inlet, however sheltered, that has a communication open
with the ocean. When a great tidal wave sweeps over the sea the
whole line of coast feels its power, and all the rivers that pour into
it heave and swell,with its influx. So do lives thrill and stir with
the convulsions of the common life about them.
We find examples of this direct relation between life and life
in individuals as well as in masses. There are spiritual harmonies
and discords from which result much of the happiness or unhappi
ness of life.
�10
Mysticism.
Mar.]
There are individuals who possess what is called magnetism.
They attract or move or govern, we can hardly tell why. We can
see that this is not mere association with the past history of such
persons, that the effect does not arise merely because it is expected
to arise, by the fact that animals are frequently affected in a similar
way. They become submissive to one whose nature possesses this
element; they wait upon his movements, they seem to live for him.
We see further illustrations of this inner relation between life
and life in the communication that seems sometimes to flow from
one life to another, in the case of friends closely bound together.
Especially does this occur in the case of the death of one. Cases
of this kind are so common that the German language has set
apart a word to stand for this sort of communication. Sometimes
the living friend appears to see the form of the one who has just
died, sometimes the effect is less striking though not less real.
This sort of connection between one life and another reaches its
climax in what is known as animal magnetism. In this the inde
pendent will and consciousness of the one is entirely given up.
The whole nature is taken possession of by another. The will,
the thought, the emotions and the sensations of the one depend
upon the will of the other. In the same category stand the
phenomena of spiritualism. Whatever view we may take of the
reality of the claims to spiritual manifestations, this at least would
appear to be true, that the life pf the medium is invaded by some
external personality, whether this external personality be that of an
embodied or disembodied spirit.
One of the strangest, we might even say the most inexplicable'
exhibitions of this hidden interlacing of life with its surroundings,
is found in that foreshadowing which is sometimes felt of the future.
This yields itself to our comprehension far less than the other
phenomena to which I have referred, because it appears to regard
the future as already existing, at least as fixed. Perhaps we may
find an example of this in the history of our martyred president,
Abraham Lincoln. In Lamon’s Life of Lincoln, a book which
with all its faults is one of almost unparalleled interest, show
ing as it does, in all its details, the growth of one of the
noblest, purest, and strongest natures of which we have
record, out of circumstances which would seem to render such
�1874.]
Mysticism.
11
a development impossible, — in this marvellous story of a true
life, we are told that for years Lincoln was haunted by
an impression that he was set apart for the execution of some
great work, and that he should fall in the accomplishment of it.
This impression cast a shadow over his life which he could not
shake off. Of course this impression may have been the result of
his ambition united with his temperament. But when we consider
on the one side the morbid and somewhat abnormal elements of
his nature, and, on the other, the exceptional work to which he was
summoned and the no less exceptional end which was to befall it,
it does not seem strange that this nature should have felt some
foregleams of the glory and some fdreshadowings of the gloom.
When I think of this strong and patients, this tender and heroic
soul, pressing on its serene course, unsoiled by pollution, never
misled by the sophistries of legal chicanery or political corruption,
never led a step beyond the true path by its mighty ambition,
never sinking beneath its burdens, never shrinking from peril, see
ing ever before it vaguely in the darkness alike the glory and the
terror, it seems to me one of the sublimest figures of history.
Of course I know that the whole class of facts to which I have
referred are denied by some; of course, too, any individual case
may be doubtful; yet I believe that this class of phenomena is ac
cepted by the unprejudiced among thinking men, by those who do
not let theory exclude fact.
The class of facts to which I have referred stand in a somewhat
superficial relation to our theme, to which however they may well
serve to introduce us. I have tarried among these outlying facts
so long, because there are some to whom an introduction to the
theme, the being brought into its sphere^so as to feel the reality
and the power of it, is more difficult and important than the elabora
tion of it.
Deeper than that class of facts to which I have alluded, lies the
sense of sympathy with the lives and actions of others, however
far we may be from the ability to reproduce them. This relation
Emerson has happily expressed in the opening paragraph of his
essay on history. Though the words are fortunately familiar, they
are so apt to our present needs that I will quote them: “ There is
one mind, common to all individual men. Every man is an inlet
�12
Mysticism.
[Mar.
to the same and to all of the same. He that is once admitted to
the right of reason is made a freeman of the whole estate. What
Plato has thought he may think; what a saint has felt, he may
feel; what at any time has befallen any man, he can understand.
Who hath access to this universal mind is a party to all that is or
can be done, for this is the only and sovereign agent.”Somewhat similar to this is the sympathy that we feel with na
ture. The sense of beauty is at heart a sense _of companionship.
We recognize in the nature about us a life which is kindred to our
own. We rejoice to be wrapped in by this infinite life of nature.
The early peoples have loved to speak of the earth as their mother.
From this feeling of relationship comes the sympathy which we
have with the outward world. Sometimes nature reflects our
mood. She is glad or sorrowful according as we are glad or
sorrowful. Sometimes she takes us up into her lofty moods. Our
spirits grow strong with her strength, tender with her tenderness,
calm with her calmness. Whatever form the effect may take it
springs from our sense of unity with the life about us.
Still deeper lies the metaphysical and religious sense of the
unity of all being. This is the principle that our modern science
fancies it has discovered while really it is the principle upon which
science itself rests, and of which the scientific formulas in regard
to the uniformity of law form only a partial expression. It is a
principle that the thought of man has always taken for granted,
and which finds its complete expression alike in Greece and India,
countries the types and habits of whose thought are so largely
antithetical to one another. Philosophy takes it for granted. The
religious element is not essential to it. Schopenhauer is as
thorough a mystic as Madame Guyon. Indeed, some of the fair
est thoughts of Madame Guyon have been transplanted by Schop
enhauer to the uncongenial soil of his system, where amid the
darkness and the chill they seem scarcely less at home than be
neath the warm and sunny heavens that before similed about them.
It is indeed difficult to draw the exact line where metaphysical
passes into religious mysticism. Men may differ, for instance, as
to the side of the line on which Spinoza stands, or even in regard
to the location of much Hindoo thought, — may doubt as to
whether it shall be called''metaphysical or religious. It is, how
�1874.]
Mysticism.
13
ever, in the sphere of religion that mysticism reaches its fairest
growth. The oriental religions have given themselves up most
thoroughly to this principle. Indeed, it is this that characterizes
the central period in the history of the Brahmins, while it is
powerfully manifested both in the earlier and later periods of this
history. It finds its perfect expression in this Hindoo prayer,
Thou art the sacrifice, the prayer of oblation ; the sovereign of
'all creatures; Thou art all that is to be known or to be unknown;
0 universal soul, the whole world consists of thee.” Among the
Sufis, whose type of religion is a reaction against the hard super
ficialness of Mohammedanism, mysticism has found its most pic
turesque and poetical expression. They tell us, fob? instance, that
a saint knocked at the door of Paradise. Who is there ? asked
the Lord. It is I, answered the saint. But the gate remained
fast closed against him. Again he drew near and knocked, and
when the Lord asked, as before, Who is there ? the saint, grown
wiser, answered, Lord, it is Thou; and the gates of Paradise flew
open to grant him prompt admittance.
But though this principle is associated in our minds rather with
the religions that I have named than with Christianity, yet in
Christianity it is no less truly present. In Him we live, and
move, and have our being, cried the clear-headed, active Paul, no
less a mystic than the contemplative John. All through the Chris
tian history have arisen souls as purely mystical in feeling and in
thought as any to be found under warmer skies. Their type of
religion was exceptional in Christianity only in its degree. The
pious Fenelon could justify his mystical piety by unanswerable
arguments drawn from the church fathers. Indeed, no religion
that has any soul to it can avoid the touch of mysticism. It is the
very life of religion. Men may talk of an external creation, may
shut up each soul to a sharp and separate individuality, may set
off the infinite over against the finite, forgetting that thereby they
have two finites and no infinite. But then comes the doctrine of
the Holy Spirit, which is that of the very indwelling of God in the
soul, and all these finely drawn lines disappear, the hard distinc
tions become fluid; men become partakers of the divine life, and
God is all,and in all. Our tenderest hymns are full of a beautiful
�14
[Mar.
Mysticism.
mysticism. Thus we sing with Furness, —in what I am sometimes
tempted to call the sweetest of hymns, —
“ What is it ? and whither, whence,
This unsleeping, secret sense,
Longing for its rest and food
In some hidden, unknown good ?
“’Tis the soul — mysterious name ;
Him it seeks from whom'it came :
While I muse I feel the fire
Burning on and mounting higher.
.
;
“ Onward, upward to thy throne,
O thou Infinite, Unknown !
Still it presseth, till it see
Thee in all, and all in Thee.”
Mysticism is Protean in its shapes. It possesses the key to all
forms and all creeds. The smallest cell opens into God’s infini
tude. The harshest dogmas assume a tenderness, the most varied
rites a meaning for it. The mystic can take the sacred wafer on
his lips finding in it the real presence of God, for is not God in all
things ? He can affirm the absolute divinity of Christ, for is not all
life divine, the highest and fullest the most divine ? He can af
firm the dogma of the Trinity, for does not this furnish the formula
that includes all the deep and vast relations of the universe ? On
the other hand, the mystic, for like reasons, may disown all forms
and cast off all creeds. Out of such mysticism, pure and tender,
sprang the sect of the friends. He may justify to himself at least
the most extreme and solitary individualism; for am not I, the
soul may ask, one of the manifestations of the eternal mind ? If
I have access to the eternal mind what do I need of other help
and guidance ?
Not only does mysticism thus hold in solution the forms of reli
gion ; it brings to the mysteries of religion a solution, so far as any
solution is possible. At least it absorbs all other mysteries into
itself.
Nothing has taxed the thought of men more than the relation
between God’s sovereignty and man’s free will. If man is free
how is it possible that the will of God should be absolute in the
�1874.]
Mysticism.
15
moral no less than in the physical world. But if the life of man
Ks born out of the life of God, if so far as man truly lives he lives
in God and God lives in him, then when man comes to himself,
when he lives his true life, his will is one with the will of God.
The will of God does not act upon him from without, subduing
him by external force. It acts from within. It is indeed his own
truest life.
Sin is the blackest mystery of the universe. We cannot under
stand how it should have a place in the universe of Go$l. Mys
ticism teaches us that there is but one life, and that iffis the divine
life. Sin is the absence of this life. It thus is death. If we
should mark the presence of this life by light., ther perfect man
would be wholly luminous, showing that every part is living; the
worst man would be seen to have only a few intermittent;sparks of
brightness at the heart of his being. Sin is nothing but the ab
sence of life, and that is the absence of everything. With all its
parade of pride and pomp, sin is thus seen in its psthingness. The
leaf, as we have seen, has its life only in the tree, When in the
autumn it begins to loosen its ho®: upon the tree, it puts on the
greatest appearance of glory. Its gold and its purple fill the
earth with splendor. We rejoice in the beauty*, but we rejoice
with a sense of sadness in our hearts, fqp we know that what we
see is the pomp and glory of death. Such is the splendor that
springs from the pride and selfishness of the world. The true
man may, in his. humility, confront them with calm confidence.
They also spring from the separation of the individual from the
universal life. They also are the flaunting glories of death.
So also does mysticism help to answer the great question as to
the possibility of knowing anything of God. Some thinkers, as
we have seen, love to resolve the thought of God into that of an
unknown force. But if this power lives in us, if it thinks in us,
how shall we not have some revelation of it in ourselves ? Indeed
why should we not know more of it than of anything besides. If
in religion, then, we find the darkest mystery, in it we find
also the clearest light. We may doubt wholly in regard to the
nature and even the reality of the things which we see merely
from the outside; but of that life that lives ip us, that is the life •
of our life, how can we wholly doubt.
'
�16
Mysticism.
[Mar.
Thus does mysticism have the central, the supreme place in the
religious thought and life ; but owing to this very supremacy it is
beset with perils. From this source of life and strength and
knowledge may spring the blackest errors, the most fantastic
delusions.
The fundamental errors which have too often marred the beauty
of mysticism, and which have made the very word so often a re
proach are, in the first place, the belief, natural enough in theory,
that if the true life be life in God, then to reach this true life in
its fullness the individual life must be given up. The life must
flow backward and downward to become one with its source. Thus
in all nations men have sought to find God by giving up all rela
tion with the world, by shutting up the avenues of sense, by giv
ing up feeling and thought. Thus the Hindoo mystic sits with his
eyes fixed upon a single point, with measured or suspended breath,
so far as possible with no emotion in his heart and no thought in
his brain, seeking thus, by entering into perfect inanity, to become
one with God. Christian mystics have resorted to like measures,
and marked out all the steps that lead to the state which is at once
the absence and the fullness of life. They have not seen that this
fullness which they seek is emptiness. The being they would
share is the negation of being. By this process they do not be
come God, they become nothing. It is as if the bud, knowing
that its life is in the life of the parent tree, should seek to become
one with the tree by withering and shrinking, and letting its life
ebb back into the common life. Seeing it, we should not say,
Behold how this bud has become one with the tree ; we should say,
The bud is dead.
Errors, in the second place, somewhat different from the one I
have named, grow out of a less extreme application of the same
theory. Instead of giving up the life of thought and feeling, the
mystic gives up the control of thought and feeling. Whatever
comes to him, apparently, from the depths of his own conscious
ness, he takes it for granted comes from God. The exercise of
reason, of thought, reference to the results of other minds,
would mar the freedom of the revelation of God. The favorite
motto of the mystic, which may be applied to both forms
that I have named, is this: When man sleeps, God wakes.
�1874.]
Mysticism.
17
He considers himself one of the beloved of God to whom he giveth
in their sleep. But when men sleep, answers Hegel, they dream.
Hence in the writings of so many mystics we have by the side of
thoughts whose depth and beauty thrill us with an inspiration of
fresh life, conceits the most fantastic and absurd, multiplied till the
reading becomes a weariness and a disgust • Such-men think that
by this falling back into the hearts of things they can understand
all the phenomena of time and eternity | some ewhhaVe believed
that their life could thus become so blended with the common life
that they could control the course of things by a word. Thus we
have growing out of a grand and fundamental truth all the ex
travagances of Theosophy and Theurgy. In a more superficial
and modern view we have abnormal states ^f the nervous system,
or of the bodily life, prized more highly than the-normal. The
state of the mesmeric or other trance is cowi'dered by some
higher than the state of consciousness. • Buch do not realize that
this is a falling back and down, a losing of the re a? individual life
in the indistinguishable mass
The individual ceases to
be a person and becomes a thing acted upon by -wills and forces
outside of itself. I do not say that such a process may not, like
that of sleep, be sometimes useful. It may Bring to light facts in
our nature otherwise unknowable^ Like Sleep, however, it is not
an exaltation, but a lowering of the nature.
If the life of man is born out of the life of God, if-tfe-divine
life is to flow into and fill out the human life, then($he channels for
its entrance are those which God himself has Seated; and the
most normal life is the life which is most filled with iM^presence.
Very refreshing after the distorted, theories which we Have been
considering sounds the cry of John, '^God is love, and he that
dwelleth in love dwelleth in God, and God in himand
that of Paul, “ The fruit of the spirit is lov^j joy, peace, long
suffering, gentleness, goodness, faith.” This^is the true inysticism.
It is the true identification of the human with the divine. The
bud is most full of the life of the tree when it swells and bursts
into the leaf or the flower. So man is most full of the life of God
when his natural powers are most fully developed. Not when he
sleeps but when he is most awake can he best see God. Th ex
form of mysticism we first considered cries that God is; it does
3
�18
Mysticism.
Mar.]
not say what he is. It gives us the copula without the predicate.
The /soul gives up also its predicates and sinks back into empty
abstraction to find him. The true mysticism adds the predicate.
It tells what God is. God is love, and he that would live in God
must not fall back but press forward-. He will find. Him, not in
emptiness but in fullness. The life of God visits the soul as the
life of nature pours itself into the tree, not to bring into it any
thing strange, but to fill out that which is natural to it. The fruit
of the spirit is love, and joy, and peace, the simple, natural flow
ering and fruitage of the soul.
I and my Father are one, said Jesus ; he also said: My Father
worketh hitherto, and I work, making thus 'his union with the
Father to consist, not in passivity, but in activity. Christianity,
thus, while preserving the great truth of mysticism, disentangles
it from the perversions which have too often corrupted it, and
makes of it the incentive to the noblest and fullest life.
Thus mystieism, rightly understood, would increase our confi
dence. in human nature rather than destroy it. It would increase
our confidence in human thought. It would teach us that this is
akin to the creative thought of God. He that should stop think
ing in order to find the truth, would be like one who should close
his eyes’ that he might see.
But thought alone is partial and superficial. There are depths
in the nature of man which thought alone can bring to light, but
which thought has only just begun to sound. There are forces in
human nature which thought must accept as given. There are
spiritual growths of which thought cannot lay bare the roots.
Certain habits and instincts spring out of experience.
The roots lie near the surface and thought can uncover them and
show their place and nature. There are others that are not thus
rooted in any superficial experience. As we trace them they
stretch down through the drift and debris of our past lives. They
are rooted only in the absolute life. They are offshoots from the
life of God.
Of this nature pre-eminently is the moral sense. I will
dwell at some little length upon the aspect of our theme, on ac
count of its practical importance ; and also that our theme itself
may be seen to be not merely a matter of dreamy speculation, but
�1874.]
Mysticism.
19
bound up in the most momentous issues of our times. Kant was
right in making the moral sense pre-eminently the medium by
which the reality of the divine being is manifested to us. He was
wrong and inconsequent in denying validity to the other fundamental
elements of our nature ; but the moral sense, the practical reason,
is so much more authoritative, so much more clear and final in its
utterances than the rest, it brings us so into the presence of the
awfulness and sublimity, as well as of the beauty of the divine*
holiness, that we can forgive him that ‘the sense of it obscured
everything beside.
Especially can we forgive him in the days in which we live, in
which the grandeur and authority of morality ar© to susch an extent
lost sight of. I think we do not enough realize the terrible pressure
against which morality has to contend at this time. . We need not
delay to speak much of external causes of this pressure, though
these are very powerful. The wa$? in spites of M high purpose,
left the legacy that all wars leave, a tendency to demoralization
and brutality. Much of the most popular and plausible thought
of the age tends in the same direction. I will not here discuss nor
question the truth of the theory that human life is a development
out of animal life. Least of all will I join in the outcry against
it. It is a theory which is compatible with the highest faith;
which may, indeed, introduce a new element of beauty and hope
fulness into our faith. But Bowever readily we may accept the
theory, however clearly we may see the high applications of it, it
is no less obvious that in the world at large the first impression of
it, the superficial judgment in regard toits would feesuit in a lower
ing of the dignity of human feature. If it is accepted as truth by
the scientific world its tendency will in time be seen to be no more
anti-spiritual than that of the fact that w< have bodies ; but it will
be long before the popular mind will recover from the shock of it. Its
tendency will be to put a burden upon many an upward struggling
soul, and to sink deeper many a depraved os®. It will seem to
degrade human nature, to justify its brutalizaSon,
This crisis is one that cannot and could not be avoided ; but the
crisis is rendered more perilous to appearance from the fact that
the same process of thought which brings man physically nearer
to the brute seeks to separate him spiritually from the divine.
�20
Mysticism.
Mar.]
While opening a gulf below, it seeks to unclasp his hold upon the
support above. This is especially seen in the manner in which this
thought makes light of, or seeks to take away the authority of the
moral sense. Bain, one of the foremost English writers on psy
chology and morality, refers to the old motto, Fiat justitia ruat
coelum, Let justice be done though the heavens should fall, only to
stigmatize it as the climax of sentimentalism. It is indeed a
motto which utilitarianism can have little place for. It shows that
to whatever extent utilitarianism may be the guide of morality,
there comes at last a point where the two part company. It is a
motto which can be used fanatically and foolishly; but yet it is a
motto that has sustained and inspired many a noble soul. The
sentiment it expresses has, in one and another form, done more to
purify the moral atmosphere, to keep human life strong and
healthy, and society sweet and clean, than all the treatises on
morality that could be piled together. How many a man has it
sustained in the performance of an act of justice which would
make of his fortunes a mere wreck. The act has been done ; his
little heaven has fallen; his little world has collapsed. He has
found indeed a heaven within. The sense of justice done has
brought its own satisfaction to his soul; but if justice has no inner
authority, no inner life, the inner heaven would have fallen with
the outer. When John Stuart Mill exclaimed that he would go to
hell rather than call that just in God which would be unjust in man,
what was that but a new application of the old cry, Let justice be
done though heaven should fall. Acting upon this principle the
whole human race, the whole community of finite spirits, would
leave heaven empty rather than countenance injustice though it
might be called divine. If we dismiss the heroic motto with a
sneer, we shall find that not only our sentimentalism but that the
strength of our manhood, has gone with it.
Bain is not the only writer whose theorizing tends in the same
direction. Herbert Spencer seeks to solve the question why men
have attached special sanctity to the dictates of morality, and he
gives as reasons, in effect, the selfish maxims of society and the
mistaken assumptions of theology, repeated so often through count
less generations as to produce a permanent effect on human nature.
I do not forget that he elsewhere indicates a system of morality
�1874.]
Mysticism.
21
which is not without inspiration. I here consider the explanation ‘
which he gives of the authority of morality itself. Now any man
who should accept this explanation as all sufficient, and who should
find in his own . nature no moral principle that this could not ac
count for, would, I believe, hold himself free from any responsibilty
to the moral principle. SchopMhOr ap#oached the theme in
the same manner that Spencer doW| He states, distinctly, that
he has not to ask why men should olfejswl mopijj law, but whv
they do obey it. Schopenhauer was an atheist and Hrpessimist;
but at the same time he was a philosopher and a mystic, and be
cause he was a mystic, his explanation of the moral sense is such
that if you and I accepted it, even though we could find within
ourselves no moral instinct which ’this c®uld not amount for, the
principle of morality would be stronger within
than it was be
fore ; because we should see its rea® nature more clearly than we
did before.
Darwin also attempts the explanation of the moral sense with
morality left out. He explains the power of c«cience by the
simple fact of the prominence of the social instincts:Mel the com
parative transientness of tHe selfish impulses. No authority is
given to morality except the greater prominence of the instincts on
which it is based. But the truth is that the regal dignity of .the
moral law is never more stronglyfelt <a« when it confronts the
selfish impulses. Even when^-t suffers-'Violence at theif hands, it
yet receives their homage. With the king in Hamlet ambition
was as permanent as the sense of justice. Indeed it was only now
and then that the voice of justice made itself heard in his heart.
That wonderful soliloquy of his shows us the collision between the
two principles. It shows us/®l |ing yieldl A® 7his selfish am
bition, but, while doing this, feeling himself ashamed in* the
presence of the divinity of justice. Shakspeare knew less than
Darwin does about plants and animals, but he knew infinitely more
about human nature 5 and this single passage, the single picture of
this —
Limed soul, that struggling to be free
Was more engaged,
refutes by the simplicity of truth the flimsy reasoning of the
naturalist.
�22
Mysticism.
Mar.]
There is a story, happily familiar, that Theodore Parker, when
a boy, took up a stone to throw at a tortoise in a pond; but some
thing within him seemed to forbid the act. He went home and
asked his mother what this something was. Suppose she had given
him any of the definitions to which I have just referred. Suppose
she had told him, for instance, that it was the inherited effects of
the maxims of a self-interested society and the assumptions of pre
sumptuous theologians. It was a turning point in Parker’s life.
I think that if his mother had told him this, and he had thoroughly
believed her, the next tortoise that he saw would have been in
peril. What his mother really did tell him was this: That the
something that bade him hold his hand was what men commonly
called conscience; but she preferred to call it the voice of God
within him. Parker himself tells us the power of these words.
His true life seemed to date from them. The voice of conscience,
instead of being silenced by sophistry, was recognized and. listened
to as the voice of God. His conscience thus nurtured became the
conscience of the land.
I have dwelt upon this matter that we might realize the odds
against which the moral principle has to contend amid the super
ficial teaching of the time. Such teaching is not shut up within
books of science that are sealed to the common thought. Such
theories spread more rapidly than the books which contain them,
and their effects extend more rapidly than they.
I make here no complaint against the science of the day. It is
doing its work bravely and well. I reverence the devotion of its
students and rejoice in their success. But physical science has to
do with only one side of facts. There is another side which is
recognized by religion. Religion and science are like two oarsmen
on ^opposite sides of one boat. Science is pulling with all its
strength. It does not do for religion to drop its oar that it may
wave applause to its comrade. Still less does it do for it to wring
its hands and cry with terror that the strokes of science are swing
ing the boat’s head out of its course, that it will be dashed against
the rocks or swept far out into the open sea. Rather let religion
do what science is doing. Let it also bend itself to the oar.
While it rejoices in the strength of its comrade’s stroke, let it make
�BW.j
Mysticism.
23
its stroke as strong, and the boat will shoot along in its course with
a speed that it has never reached before.
In other words, religion should emphasize the spiritual facts of
life, just as science emphasizes the physical facts of life. While
science shows the relation of man to the brute, religion should show
his relationship with God. This is to be done, not by fulminations
and anathemas, not by ecclesiasticisms and eternal authority;
but by making men feel the poweac of God within them ; by bring
ing into consciousness what I have called the mystical element of
life.
Mysticism and physical science recognize the opposite poles of
being. We need not wait, then, for physical science to come to its
aid. Physical science has to do with points, with atoms; mysti
cism has to do with wholes. The results of mysticism, physical
science calls unthinkable ; but they are the-staple of our thoughts.
Physical science boasts of the clearness of her results; but these
results, without the aid of mysticism, are unthinkable. Physical
science can see in each man only a congeries of atoms mingled in
a mazy dance. Can you think of yourself as simply a figure in the
dance of atoms ? Can you think of the friend you love the most
as such a whirl of atoms, a whirl closer and more intricate than
that of the sand-column that sweeps across the desert, the material
more pliant, but the nature of the two being otherwise alike ? The
only element of thought from which.,, we never can escape is per
sonality. If physical science fails to give us this we see that it
needs its complement, if only that its own ilsults may bethinkable.
The recognition of personality, of the unity in the midst of the
variety of physical elements, is the beginning of mysticism ; its
culmination is the recognition of a like unity amid all the variety
of the universe, the infinite personality, of which we are a part,
but which yet is distinct from us and from which we are distinct;
from which and in which is our only life ; to which we must return,
not by the mere absorption of being, but by the higher absorption
of a joyful love.
C. C. Everett.
�
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Mysticism
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Everett, Charles Carroll [1829-1900]
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Notes: From the library of Dr Moncure Conway. From the Unitarian Review and Religious Magazine. Vol. 1 (March 1874). For content of complete issue see: https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=wu.89069654465;view=1up;seq=7 (accessed 11/2017).
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Mysticism
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�ON RESPONSIBILITY.
BY THE LATE
REV. JAMES CBANBROOK,
EDINBURGH.
PUBLISHED BY THOMAS SCOTT,
NO. 11, THE TERRACE, FARQUHAR ROAD,
UPPER NORWOOD, LONDON, S.E.
Price Threepence.
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ON RESPONSIBILITY.
HE doctrine of Responsibility is one that holds a
and
Tis most important place in all systems of morals,religion.
a mighty means of influence in all systems of
I purpose this evening to sift the idea as well as I am
able, and to separate the truth from the error mixed up
with it. Nothing is more common than to hear dis
cussions about the extent to which we are responsible for
this thing or that, and nothing more terrific sometimes
than the manner in which the consequences of our re
sponsibility to God is urged from the pulpit; and yet,
it is seldom the disputants and deciaimers pause to ask
themselves, or others, what the meaning of the word
is, and in what sense we are, or can be responsible/ to
God and man. And yet the clear and precise defini
tion of a word is the first and essential step towards the
satisfactory and conclusive discussion of the subject
which it involves. Let us ask ourselves, therefore,
what jf is we mean by the word responsibility. I
need scarcely say, that literally and etymologically the
word means to promise, pledge oneself, or answer in
return. It is out of this latter meaning it has acquired
its moral use. He who is responsible has to answer in
return to the questions put to him concerning his con
duct. . It is generally employed as a synonym for
accountable ; he who is responsible, is accountable for
his actions; i.e., must give an account of them, explain
them, justify them, be examined about them, by the
authority to which he is amenable. Properly speak-
�6
On Responsibility.
ing, the word denotes one able to respond, answer, or
give an account; but it is also used to denote one who
is under the necessity or obligation of responding or
answering. The use of this word in application to our
human relations is plain and simple enough. We are
responsible to the government under which we live for
the manner in which we obey its laws—i.e., we are
compelled, when called upon, to answer inquiries as
to that obedience, to give an account of ourselves, and
explain and justify our actions. In like manner, the
employed are responsible to their employers, servants
to their masters and mistresses, for the manner in
which they have done the work they have engaged to
do : they must answer and give an account of themselves
when called upon to answer and give an account. And
in like manner, children up to a certain age are' respon
sible to their parents, and all kinds of dependents to
those upon whom they depend. In all these cases,
you will observe there is involved the idea of a superior
power capable of insisting upon the answer, the account
being rendered, and of inflicting some penal conse
quences, if, when rendered, it be not satisfactory. The
government, by its superior power, can force its sub
jects to give an account of their doings, and punish
them for any infraction of the law, they discover when
the account is rendered ; parents in like, manner can
force their children to give an account, and so in
the other relations referred to, though these, for the
most part in the present day, can only inflict their
punishments through tbe medium o£ the government.
In former times, as we know, there was a much more
general power of inflicting summary punishments pos
sessed by private individuals than now. The lords
of the soil Were often the rulers and judges within
their own territories, and although they werq. nominally
responsible to the sovereign for their doings, the respon
sibility was very light in reality, and practically they
were all but absolute. Masters, too, in the towns had
■great power over their apprentices and workmen, and
�On Responsibility.
7
the system of responsibility generally was in every
respect more rigorous. Now, so long as God is regarded,
as a being like unto ourselves, and his government is
likened to earthly governments, it is natural to transfer
all these notions connected with responsibility to our
relations to him; and, accordingly, we are said to be
responsible to God in the same way as we are respon
sible to the government under which we live, or as our
children are responsible to us. Only then, it is not
merely for one particular class of actions that -we are
responsible, but for every one, each moment of our lives;
and God being omniscient, there can be no possible
escape or mistake through the defect of evidence or the
want of personal knowledge. And this responsibility
is generally considered, I think, to have reference to a
future day of judgment. God is acknowledged, indeed,
to administer some corrections and punishments in the
present life; but, for the most part, our account will
have to be given in at the last great assize, when, in a
manner more or less formal, and more or less'after the
style of our law courts, every action we have done, and
every word we have spoken, will be examined and in
quired into ; we. shall have to explain and account for
each one, and shall be judged according to our answers.
So that the. idea of our moral responsibility resolves
itself into this necessity of undergoing the judgment of
God, and of liability to reward or punishment accords
ing to the character of our conduct. This idea of responsibility, however, is now, I believe, generally
limited by two conditions, which again, seem to be
suggested by the analogies of dur responsibilities to
men.
•
'
*
First of-all, it is said, knowledge is essential to this
responsibility, and that it would be altogether unjust,
and so impossible, for God to make a man answerable
for an action concerning which he (Jid not know, or
could not know, whether it was good or bad. More
often, perhaps, it is the possibility of knowledge than
J
. . . *
*
�8
On Responsibility.
the actual possession of it which is insisted on. If
knowledge of good and evil be within one’s reach, and
one does not use the means to acquire that knowledge,
we are held to he equally responsible for the action
done in this voluntary ignorance as if it were done in
the full possession of the knowledge. This distinction,
however, is only considered of much importance with
regard to questions of religious life. Men living within
the reach of the means of grace—-that is, having a
church or chapel near to them, Bibles to be bought at
the Society’s depots, and ministers to be consulted—if
they neglect these means, are equally guilty for ne
glecting the Gospel, as though they used the means,
knew the truth, and yet rejected it. They have not
the knowledge indeed, but they have the means of
knowledge, which they neglect.
But whilst it is thought important to *note this dis
tinction for the sake of the positive institution of Chris
tianity, it is scarcely necessary in the case of morals.
For it is held that the moral law is written upon the
heart of all men alike, there is . an instinctive percep
tion of what is right and what is wrong, and so the
necessary knowledge is common to all, whether civilised
or uncivilised, Christian or heathen. And being so, all
are equally responsible to God. These- instincts may
indeed be obscured by the degraded condition into
which men have fallen; but still, there they are, and
if consulted and yielded to, would lead.to the perfect
knowledge of the will of God. All are thus brought
within the sphere of responsibility, so far as this con
dition of knowledge is concerned, and every one will
have to give an account of himself to God.
The second condition recognised amongst most moral
philosophers as essential to responsibility is freedom of
choice or will, as it used to be termed. It is said it
would be perfectly unjust, and therefore impossible, for
the righteous God to hold a man responsible and to
punish him for what he could not help, and did not
�On Responsibility.
9
freely choose of himself. And, therefore, all who are
responsible must be perfectly free to choose or reject
the actions for which they are responsible. That we
are so free, our own consciousness, it is said, clearly
testifies. We all feel that if we had chosen, we could
have refrained from any particular action, and that no
power could have compelled us to commit it against
our will. There has always been, however, considerable
difference between these theologians and philosophers
concerning the precise nature of this freedom, and as
to where it begins, and where it ends. One class
insists that all that is necessary to it is, that we are
able to do as we choose, without, i.e., regarding what
it is which causes us to choose this rather than that.
Whilst the other class contends that, besides this
power of doing as we choose, it is absolutely necessary
to perfect freedom, and so to moral responsibility, that
the choice itsllf be free—that we possess in ourselves a
self-determining power, capable of originating the choice
which should be made independently of, and unbiassed
by, all motives or anything of that kind. It would be
beside my purpose to-night to enter upon this contro
versy, but I must, say that, if I occupied the stand
point of these controversialists, and held their views
of God’s government, and of responsibility, I should be
compelled in sentiment to side with the latter class.
For nothing could be more monstrously wieked than to
suppose God had created men subject to a law of causa
tion, which determines absolutely whether they choose
this action or not, and yet that he is angry with
them when they do noi^ choose what he wishes, and
punishes them for it in the pains of an eternal hell.
It would be in vain to tell me that I am free to do.
what I choose, if I am under a law which compels me'
to choose this or that. The law and he who made and
sustains the law, are responsible for the result, and if
any one ought to be punished for the results of the
law’s operation, surely it is that law maker 1
�Io
On Responsibility.
It was the perception of this which led the late Sir
William Hamilton to accept the doctrine of the abso
lute freedom of the will, although it appeared to him
contradictory to facts. And nothing can be more as
tounding, and seem more revolting, than when the
pure and devout Jonathan Edwards, having in the
most logical piece of reasoning that ever was composed
in this world, proved the doctrine of necessity, that
is, that the will is subject to law, and so that our choice
is determined by certain conditions, without any notice
or reason assigned, excepting what arises out of his
religious feelings, plunges into the assumption that we
are responsible, and so that all which is necessary to
responsibility is freedom to do as we choose. Both
these parties, however, are alike agreed upon the re
sponsibility, and equally contend for it under the same
form.
But upon what evidence is belief in this form of
responsibility made to rest ? Of course, mere scripturalists quote texts of Scripture, but the more thought
ful endeavour to place it upon a wider basis. They
perceive that, if true, it must be a doctrine accessible
and patent to all antecedently to and independently of
any supernatural revelation. Accordingly, the basis
upon which this belief is almost universally made to rest,
is that of an asserted universal, uneradicable, instinc
tive conviction, feeling or persuasion, that we are re
sponsible. Every man, it is said, however evil or de
praved he may be, feels and knows within himself that
he is accountable to God for his actions, and that they
will bring him reward or punishment according as they
are good or bad.
And these universal convictions, persuasions, or in
stincts must be accepted as representing truth, and the
doctrines they deliver to us, must be therefore believed ;
of course, if there be a universal persuasion or convic
tion of anything, that persuasion or conviction must be
trusted. For the very universality of the persuasion
�On Responsibility.
11
implies that it is trusted, whilst the want of trust upon
the part of any would prove that it is not universal. It
is here, therefore, I join issue, and refuse to accept the
doctrine of responsibility as it is thus set forth. I
deny that there is a universal conviction that we are
responsible in the sense alleged. I myself have no
such conviction, and I meet with others that have
none. The conviction is false, founded upon a misin
terpretation of the real facts of our human nature.
The whole form which this doctrine is made to
assume, is evolved out of that most mischievous con
ception of God to which I have so often an occasion to
allude. I mean the conception which makes him such
a one as ourselves, and our relations to him similar to
our relations to one another. Directly you fall back
upon the fact that we have no right or pretence to set
forth God under such a conception, and that we know
nothing of him, but what he does, and through the
various forces of the universe, all that ground upon
which the common notions of responsibility rest, at
once disappears, and you are left to examine the facts
of life, and reconstruct the doctrine for yourselves. I
will not now occupy the time by showing the down
right barbarism of likening the judgment of God to the
judgment exercised in our law courts, with its assessors,
its witnesses and attendant officers, in the persons of
good and bad angels ; because the more enlightened
of even the strictly orthodox have given up such repre
sentations : but equally false and equally without justi
fication are the notions to which the most enlightened
amongst the orthodox cling, when they still represent
God’s judgment after the similitude of a parent sitting
in judgment on the actions of his child, and as main
taining somewhat similar forms, at least so far as the
questioning and answering between the infinite and the
finite spirit are concerned. All such representations
are purely gratuitous, and in the present case the em
ploying of them, even as mere figures of speech, tends
�12
On Responsibility.
to obscure instead of helping to illustrate the subject.
Rejecting all such methods, then, and falling back upon
the simple facts, what do we find presented for our
consideration ? We find that every action of both our
inner and outer life has attached to it certain conse
quences ; produces, i.e., certain effects ; these effects
leading to our wellbeing and happiness according to
the character of the action; and that this effect has
wrought itself more or less distinctly into the convic
tion of mankind, and constitutes whatever of truth
there is in the doctrine of responsibility. So that in
the popular doctrine, I discern two elements, a true and
a false one. The true element is this conviction, that
every man reaps the consequences of whatever he does.
The false element is that heap of fanciful notions which
represent these consequences as wrought out by God
after the manner in which parents or earthly govern
ments inflict the penalties of their violated laws.
The only evidence for this false element consists in
the fancies of man. The evidence for that true element
lies in facts open to the observation of every one. We
are responsible in the sense, that an action committed
is not done with—it produces certain effects • and these
effects tend to promote our happiness or misery accord
ing to the character of the action ; and this responsi
bility every one may discern for himself. When the
subject is put upon this ground, you will see that it at
once does away with those subtle distinctions and con
ditions, and those metaphysical discussions which I
have before pointed out as accompanying the popular
doctrine. For, in the first place, we do not find as a
matter of fact, that the consequences of actions depend
upon our knowledge of their moral character. Neither
knowledge nor the power of obtaining knowledge, influ
ences the effects they produce. The consequence follows
inevitably whether the action be looked upon as good or
bad. Aft hen a number of men combine amongst them
selves against others in order to secure their own per
�On Responsibility.
13
sonal interest, as, e.g., masters against their workmen,
or workmen against their masters, the action, of course,
is either morally good or had. But whether the com
biners look, upon it in this respect correctly or not, the
effects of the combination are precisely the same, so tar
as it affects the interests of those performing it. bo,
when people act unkindly to themselves, under whatever
light they look upon the act, the consequences inevit
ably follow. They may call the untruth a courteous
compliance with the world, a necessary yielding to
social opinion, a prudent consideration of one’s personal
interests, or by any other mild name, and may believe
it is nothing worse than the name implies; but the
effects of the untruth are not disturbed or interrupted
by their blindness, they follow sharp, and sure, and
inevitable. I do not mean by this, that the action
wrongly done against one’s convictions or knowledge,
does not produce consequences which the same action
done in ignorance would not give rise to.
But those consequences are apart from the action
itself, they are due to the additional element of know
ledge brought into the account. And, indeed, the best,
way of stating the fact would be, that all actions are
conditions and antecedents of certain fixed consequents
or effects which depend upon the character. of the
the actions ; when, to an action wrong in itself, is added
the knowledge that it is wrong, certain other consequents
are introduced besides those which simply follow
from the wrong action, consequents which arise out
of the fact that the action is known to be wrong.
And the same additional consequences follow although
the action be right in itself, if the agent suppose it to
be wrong. “ He that doubteth is punished if he eat,
(to quote an old saying), even though the eating be
perfectly right. He is punished in the injury done to
his moral nature by acting against, or not in accordance
with, his convictions.
But this you will see is quite a distinct thing from
�14
On Responsibility.
the popular doctrine which makes responsibility depend
upon our knowledge. Whether we know the wrong
ness of an action or not, facts show, that a wrong
action produces immediate evil, as a good action pro
duces good. And then this limitation of our notion of
responsibility to what we observe in facts, entirely
supersedes the discussion of that other question
about necessity or freedom of the will. Be the will
free or not, let us be able to understand even the con
ception of such freedom or not, the facts remain the
same, that good actions produce good, evil actions evil.
In fact, we entirely change our ground of observation,
and view the whole subject under entirely new aspects,
immediately we thus remove it from the region of meta
physical or semi-metaphysical speculation, and limit
ourselves to the actual knowledge we possess through
experience. Then, this doctrine of responsibility
becomes merely the expression of certain observed
phenomena occurring in our daily life, the declaration
of^certain connections between actions and their results.
W e do not, therefore, look forward to a future retribu
tion in which these actions shall bring upon us conse
quences which are now suspended and delayed ; but
we find an instant and a prompt result which begins
its development immediately the action is done. We
do not answer for what we have done as detected school
boys do under the rod of their master, or as detected
pickpockets do before the bench of magistrates, but we
answer in and through the effects which immediately
follow the action for which the answer is given.
And if you have taken in my meaning in its fullness,
you will see that the area of our responsibility under
this view is greatly extended beyond that which is
comprehended by the popular doctrine. Responsibility
under the popular doctrine is merely extended to actions
which concern our moral and religious life. Respon
sibility as interpreted by facts, comprehends the whole
sphere of our existence.
�On Responsibility.
*5
Every action of the most trivial character leads to
some consequence or the other, produces some effect or
the other, and for it we therefore are as truly respon
sible as for the most solemn and the most momentous.
All actions which produce effects on our wellbeing and
happiness, constitute a part of our responsibility, and
there is not an action we perform in our inner or outer
life, but what tends to do this. But then, again, this
does not mean that all actions affect our wellbeing and
happiness in the same degree. Experience shows that
they do not. There are some of so trivial a nature that
it requires the keenest eye to detect the consequences
which follow them. Others, again, are so momentous
and marked, that their effects have been recognised
from the most early times. Some produce their results
instantaneously and unmistakenly, others arrive at
them in an apparently roundabout way, and through
the least expected media.
But the great thing is to know, that there is not one,
whether we are observant of it or not, but what con
tributes to make up or diminish the sum which con
stitutes human happiness. And you will observe, it is
the reflex consequences of actions to which I am now
specially referring. For every action almost has this
twofold action—it goes forth and affects the external
world, and it returns, as it were, upon the person, the
mind and body, we may say, of him who does it, and
affects his next moment’s state and condition. You
utter a truth—the utterance has communicated some
thing to him who heard it, and has awakened a new
order and chain of thoughts and feelings in his mind ;
but the utterance has also affected the train of your
thoughts—the motives which influenced the utterance
have given strength or weakness to your moral charac
ter, and have brought peace or sorrow to your mind.
You utter by word or act a falsehood—-the utterance
misleads and betrays him who has received it; but it
tells still more upon yourself; it degrades your moral
�16
On Responsibility.
nature, it weakens your power of goodness, and leaves
you a prey to the repetition of the vice. And there is
even more than this ; for, in the constitution of nature
it comes about that the falsehood uttered generally
comes home again to the conviction of him who utters
it, bringing shame and confusion before his fellow-men.
So subtle are the workings of the mind, so close,
intimate, and minute are the bonds of society, so much
are all men one, that the truth or falsehood you utter,
and the good or evil you do, however much they may
seem to be separated from you, and to go travelling
about in the midst of society, somehow or the other,
constantly come home again, bringing you good or evil,
joy or vexation, according to their respective natures.
Just what the fable tells us happened to Jonah, when,
to avoid shame and disgrace, he fled from his duty,
constantly in life happens to all men ; and what there
is said to have been done by an absurd miracle, is done
by God’s constituted laws in nature,—that is, the very
wrong-doing is made to bring about the particular
vexation and sorrow, to avoid which the wrong was
done. Jonah, to avoid shame, took ship to go to
Tarshish. His taking to the ship, brought him, it is
said, into shame. And you need not believe this tale in
order to be convinced that that principle is widely true.
Open your eyes upon life, refer even to the experience
of your own life, and you will find the principle abun
dantly confirmed. You must flee from life itself if you
would escape these and the other consequences of all
your doings.
Now, the doctrine of responsibility as thus expound
ed, will enable us to solve many questions of a prac
tical character which have much perplexed those who
hold the popular doctrine. I will only mention two.
The one is that which often has been agitated, but
which, I remember, in quite my youth, attracted great
attention and discussion in Scotland and elsewhere, in
consequence of what was said by Lord Brougham in a
�On Responsibility.
T7
speech he delivered as Lord Rector of Glasgow Uni
versity. I mean the question of responsibility for one’s
belief. Lord Brougham, in a very startling antitheti
cal style, had answered this question decidedly in the
negative ; and, of course, had roused against him the
whole tribe of theologians and metaphysicians.
When one looks at the question from the popular
ground, all wonder that Lord Brougham should have
taken the negative side ceases. We know upon how
many accidental consequences the formation of belief
depends. Had we been all born in some parts of
India, at this hour we should have all been believers
in Brahma. Had we been born in Spain, we should
have been professed Roman Catholics.
When you come to minuter differences, you find
them constantly determined by consequences over which
men have no control,—birth, education, and a thousand
evident influences. And then we know what a vast
difference natural capacities, temperaments, and the
balance of the faculties make in the result. Who, then,
viewing these and other such things, can believe that
the beneficent father will reward a man eternally in
heaven, or punish him eternally in hell, in consequence
of his belief? In that sense surely, no man would
maintain the affirmative of the dogma. But when we
have abandoned that ground of pure fancies, and theo
logical speculation, and betake ourselves to facts, what
do we find? We find that a man’s real beliefs—not
his merely professed beliefs, but what he has thought
out, or at all events what he holds as real, living con
victions, do produce certain effects on his thoughts and
feelings, consequences follow that otherwise would
not exist. The Hindoo belief, e.g., in the metempsy
chosis, influences their food, which again influences their
physical condition and temperament. The Roman
Catholic belief in transubstantiation produces certain
feelings when they receive the Host in the sacrament;
and their belief in the power of the priest to pronounce
�18
On Responsibility.
absolution in connection with the sacrament of confes
sion, tends very much to keep Roman Catholic servants
honest. The Anglican belief in baptismal regeneration
has a powerful effect upon the feelings of mothers if their
children happen to die without baptism.
The belief that God is only known through his works,
has a powerful influence in producing reverence for,
and the study of, those works. In all these instances,
then, we see responsibility for one’s beliefs presented,
before us in facts. But then it is a responsibility
altogether unlike that which Lord Brougham justly
declaimed against; it is a responsibility which consists
merely in the connection of the thoughts with the feel• ings and actions to which they give rise.
The other question this simple view of the matter
helps us to solve, is that which relates to the age at
which children become responsible. I have heard that
most warmly debated under the popular notions of
responsibility. And I have known mothers who have
lost children when about six or seven years of age, be
come inconsolable under the fear that the children
were old enough to be responsible, and had gone to hell
because they had not personally accepted Christianity.
And the mothers were quite right, under those notions ;
for, on the one hand, it must always be a doubtful,
problematical thing, when a child knows enough to be
responsible, whilst, on the other hand, the asserted
consequences of that responsibility are most terrible.
But the question is determined immediately you recog
nise the simple doctrine of facts ; for then you clearly
see a child’s responsibility begins the moment it is born.
For then it begins actions which have consequences
attached to them affecting its wellbeing and happiness.
It takes its food, and that nourishes its body; it stretches
its limbs, and that developes its muscles; it utters
cries, and that promotes the growth of its lungs; it looks
around upon the room, and that trains the eye to judge
of distances and forms. Every action has some definite
�On Responsibility.
*9
consequence flowing from it, and therefore every action
constitutes responsibility. As it grows up, it begins to
think, to speak, and act. The speech and action truth
fully represent the thought and feeling within it or they
do not; the consequences attached immediately follow.
It is sent to school, and is idle or industrious, a waster
of time or studious ; fixed consequences follow the one
course or the other without fail.
The certainty of these consequences is what consti
tutes the responsibility. You cannot deny it, because
you cannot deny them. There they are. If the child
be idle and neglect his lessons, the most amiable temper
in the world will not save him from being an unmiti
gated dunce.
I hope, then, all understand what I mean by respon
sibility—it is the simple fact, that every action of mind
and body produces a definite effect upon our wellbeing
and happiness according to its character. And to my
mind, there is something much more serious and solemn
in this, than in that old fly-blown doctrine of the
popular theologies. That responsibility sits lightly
upon men now-a-days, because they cannot really be
lieve in it. It is absolutely incredible that God should
doom men to eternal perdition for actions over which
they have little or no control. It is absolutely in
credible, and purely barbarous, to believe that he would
doom them to eternal perdition for anything. But we
see that he has set to actions fixed results which in
evitably follow, and when an action is good, it pro
duces good, and when evil it produces sorrow. True
it is, this sorrow is disciplinal and intended to edu
cate and lead into a wiser course—to bring the wrong
doer to right doing. But not the less it is sorrow
whilst it lasts, and that w7e all seek to avoid. And
some actions bring a very deep sorrow, shame, and de
gradation to our whole nature. Only by welldoing can
we be sure of happiness and good.
Ought we not then to begird ourselves to search out
�20
On Responsibility.
what is right ? to watch .diligently and faithfully the
tendencies of actions ? to bring ourselves into confor
mity with all the laws of our being established by God,
both moral and physical, mental and bodily ? Surely
it is not wise when the laws of life are so fixed and
certain, to remain ignorant of, or to neglect them ! Let
us, then, my brothers and sisters, all become more ear
nest students of God’s ways of dealing with us, and
more obedient to his laws, and then shall we regard
the fact of our responsibility, not as a subject of super. stitious terror, but as it is in fact, a help to our well
being and our greatest blessing.
• • TURNBULL AND SPEAKS PRINTERS EDINBURGH.
�
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On responsibility
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Cranbrook, James
Description
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Place of publication: London
Collation: 20 p. ; 18 cm.
Notes: From the library of Dr Moncure Conway. Printed by Turnbull and Spears, Edinburgh. Date of publication from KVK. Some ink stains.
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Thomas Scott
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[1874]
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Ethics
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Conway Tracts
Responsibility
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Text
ON THE ATONEMENT
ANNIE BESANT.
PUBLISHED BY THOMAS SCOTT
NO. 11, THE TERRACE, FARQUHAR ROAD,'
UPPER NORWOOD, LONDON, S.E.
Price Sixpence.
��ON THE ATONEMENT.
HE Atonement may be regarded as the central doc
T trine of Christianity, the very raison d'etre of the
Christian faith. Take this away, and there would
remain indeed a faith and a morality, but both would
have lost their distinctive features : it would be a faith
without its centre, and a morality without its founda
tion. Christianity would be unrecognisable without its
angry God, its dying Saviour, its covenant signed with
“ the blood of the Lamb •” the blotting out of the
atonement would deprive millions of all hope towards
God, and would cast them from satisfaction into
anxiety, from comfort into despair. The warmest
feelings of Christendom cluster round the Crucifix, and
he, the crucified one, is adored with passionate devo
tion, not as martyr for truth, not as witness for God,
not as faithful to death, but as the substitute for his
worshippers, as he who bears in their stead the wrath
of God, and the punishment due to sin. The Christian
is taught to see in the bleeding Christ the victim slain
in his own place ; he himself should be hanging on
that cross, agonised and dying ; those nail-pierced
hands ought to be his; the anguish on that face should
be furrowed on his own; the weight of suffering
resting on that bowed head should be crushing himself
into the dust. In the simplest meaning of the words,
Christ is the sinner’s substitute, and on him the sin of
the world is laid: as Luther expressed it, he “ is the
greatest and only sinner j” literally “ made sin ” for
>
�6
On the Atonement.
mankind, and expiating the guilt which, in very deed,
was transferred from man to him.
I wish at the outset, for. the sake of justice and can
dour, to acknowledge frankly the good which has been
drawn forth by the preaching of the Cross. This good
has been, however, the indirect rather than the direct
result of a belief in the Atonement. The doctrine, in
itself, has nothing elevating about it, but the teaching
closely connected with the doctrine has its ennobling
and purifying side. All the enthusiasm aroused in the
human breast by the thought of one who sacrificed
himself to save his brethren, all the consequent longing
to emulate that love by sacrificing all for Jesus and for
those for whom he died, all the moral gain caused by
the contemplation of a sublime self devotion, all these
are the fruits of the nobler side of the Atonement.
That the sinless should stoop to the sinful, that holi
ness should embrace the guilty in order to raise them
to its own level, has struck a chord in men’s bosoms
which has responded to the touch by a harmonious
melody of gratitude to the divine and sinless sufferer, and
loving labour for suffering and sinful man. The Cross
has been at once the apotheosis and the source of self
sacrificing love. “ Love ye one another as I have
loved you : not in word but in deed, with a deep self
sacrificing lovesuch is the lesson which, according to
one of the most orthodox Anglican divines, 11 Christ
preaches to us from His Cross.” In believing in the
Atonement, man’s heart has, as usual, been better than
his head; he has passed over the dark side of the idea,
and has seized on the divine truth that the strong
should gladly devote themselves to shield the weak,
that labour, even unto death, is the right of humanity
from every son of man. It is often said that no doc
trine long retains its hold on men’s hearts which is not
founded on some great truth; this divine idea of self
sacrifice has been the truth contained in the doctrine
of the Atonement, which has made it so dear to many
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7
loving and noble souls, and which, has hidden its
“ multitude of sins ”—sins against love and against
justice, against God and against man. Love and self
sacrifice have floated the great error over the storms of
centuries, and these cords still bind to it many hearts
of which love and self-sacrifice are the glory and the
crown.
This said, in candid homage to the good which has
drawn its inspiration from Jesus crucified, we turn to
the examination of the doctrine itself: if we find that
it is as dishonouring to God as it is injurious to man, a
crime against justice, a blasphemy against love, we
must forget all the sentiments which cluster round it,
and reject it utterly. It is well to speak respectfully
of that which is dear to any religious soul, and to
avoid jarring harshly on the strings of religious feeling,
even though the soul be misled and the feeling be mis
directed ; but a time comes when false charity is cruelty,
and tenderness to error is treason to truth. For long
men who know its emptiness pass by in silence the
shrine consecrated by human hopes and fears, by love
and worship, and the “ times of this ignorance God (in
the bold figure of Paul) also winks atbut when
11 the fulness of the time is come,” God sends forth
some true son of his to dash the idol to the ground,
and to trample it into dust. We need not be afraid
that the good wrought by the lessons derived from the
Atonement in time past will disappear with the doctrine
itself; the mark of the Cross is too deeply ploughed
into humanity ever to be erased, and those who no
longer call themselves by the name of Christ are not
the most backward scholars in the school of love and
sacrifice.
The history of this doctrine has been a curious one.
In the New Testament the atonement is, as its name
implies, a simply making at one God and man : how
this is done is but vaguely hinted at, and in order to
deduce the modern doctrine from the bible, we must
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On the Atonement.
import into the books of the New Testament all the
ideas derived from theological disputations. Words
used in all simplicity by the ancient writers must have
attached to them the definite polemical meaning they
hold in the quarrels of theologians, before they can be
strained into supporting a substitutionary atonement.
The idea, however, of “ ransom ” is connected with the
work of Jesus, and the question arose, “to whom is
this ransom paid ? ” They who lived in those first
centuries of Christianity were still too much within the
illumination of the tender halo thrown by Jesus round
the Father’-s name, to dream for a moment that their
redeemer had ransomed them from the beloved hands
of God. No, the ransom was paid to the devil, whose
thrall they believed mankind to be, and Jesus, by
sacrificing himself, had purchased them from the devil
and made them sons of God. It is not worth while to
enter on the quaint details of this scheme, how the
devil thought he had conquered and could hold Jesus
captive, and was tricked by finding that his imagined
gain could not be retained by him, and so on.
Those who wish to become acquainted with this
ingenious device can study it in the pages of the Chris
tian fathers : it has at least one advantage over the
modern plan, namely, that we are not so shocked at
hearing of pain and suffering as acceptable to the
supposed incarnate evil, as at hearing of them being
offered as a sacrifice to the supreme good. As the
teaching of Jesus lost its power, and became more and
more polluted hy the cruel thoughts of savage and
bigoted men, the doctrine of the atonement gradually
changed its character. Men thought the Almighty to
he such a one as themselves, and being fierce and
unforgiving and revengeful, they projected their own
shadows on to the clouds which surrounded the Deity,
and then, like the shepherd who meets his own form
reflected and magnified on the mountain mist, they
recoiled before the image they themselves had made.
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The loving Father who sent his son to rescue his
perishing children by sacrificing himself, fades away
from the hearts of the Christian world, and there
looms darkly in his place an awful form, the inexor
able judge who exacts a debt man is too poor to pay,
and who, in default of payment, casts the debtor into
a hopeless prison, hopeless unless another pays to the
uttermost farthing the fine demanded by the law. So,
in this strange transformation-scene God actually takes
the place of the devil, and the ransom once paid to
redeem men from Satan, becomes the ransom paid to
redeem men from God. It reminds one of the quarrels
over the text which bids us “ fear him who is able to
destroy both body and soul in hell,” when we remain
in doubt whom he is we are to fear, since half the Chris
tian commentators assure us that it refers to our Father
in heaven, while the other half asseverate that the
devil is the individual we are to dread. The seal was
set on the “redemption scheme” by Anselm in his
great work, “ Cur Deus Homo," and the doctrine which
had been slowly growing into the theology of Christen
dom was thenceforward stamped with the signet of the
church. Roman Catholics and Protestants, at the
time of the Reformation, alike believed in the vicarious
and substitutionary character of the atonement wrought
by Christ. There is no dispute between them on this
point. I prefer to allow the Christian divines to speak
for themselves as to the character of the atonement:
no one can accuse me of exaggerating their views if
their views are given in their own words. Luther
teaches that “ Christ did truly and effectually feel
for all mankind, the wrath of God, malediction and
death.” Flavet says that “to wrath, to the wrath of
an infinite God without mixture, to the very torments
of hell, was Christ delivered, and that by the hand of
his own father.” The Anglican homily preaches that
“ sin did pluck God out of heaven to make him feel the
horrors and pains of death,” and that man being a fire-
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On the Atonement.
"brand of hell and a bondsman of the devd, “ *vvas
ransomed by the death of his own only and well-beloved
son ; ” the “ heat of his wrath,” 11 his burning wrath”
could only be “ pacified ” by Jesus, “ so pleasant was
this sacrifice and oblation of his son’s death.” Edwards
"being logical, saw that there was a gross injustice
in sin being twice punished, and in the pains of hell,
the penalty of sin, being twice inflicted, first on Christ,
the substitute of mankind, and then on the lost, a
portion of mankind. So he, in common with most
Calvinists, finds himself compelled to restrict the atone
ment to the elect, and declared that Christ bore the
sins, not of the world, but of the chosen out of the
world; he suffers “ not for the world, but for them
whom Thou hast given me.”. But Edwards adheres
firmly to the belief in substitution, and rejects the
universal atonement for the very reason that “to
believe Christ died for all is the surest way of proving
that he died for none in the sense Christians
have hitherto believed.” He declares that “Christ
suffered the wrath of God for men’s sins : ” that “ God
imposed his wrath due unto, and Christ underwent the
pains of hell for ” sin. Owen regards Christ’s suffer
ings as “a full valuable compensation to the justice of
God for all the sins” of the elect, and says that he
underwent “ that same punishment which.......... they
themselves were bound to undergo.”
The doctrine of the Christian Church—in the widest
sense of that much fought-over term—was then as
follows, and I will state it in language which is
studiously moderate, as compared with the orthodox
teaching of the great Christian divines : if any one
doubts this assertion let him study their writings for
himself. I really dare not transfer some of their ex
pressions to my own pages. God the Father having
cursed .mankind and condemned them to eternal
damnation, because of Adam’s disobedience in eating
an apple—or some other fruit, for the species is only
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11
preserved by tradition, and is not definitely settled by
the inspired writings—and having further cursed each
man for his bwn individual transgressions, man lay
under the fierce wrath of God, unable to escape, and
unable to pacify it, for he could not even atone for his
own private sins, much less for his share of the guilt
incurred by his forefather in paradise. Man’s debt
was hopelessly large, and he had “ nothing to pay; ”
so all that remained to him was to suffer an eternity
of torture, which sad fate he had merited by the crime
of being born into an accursed world. The second
person of the Trinity, moved to pity by the helpless
and miserable state of mankind, interposed between
the first person of the Trinity and the wretched
sinners; he received into his own breast the fire
tipped arrows of divine wrath, and by suffering incon
ceivable tortures, equal in amount to an eternity of
the torments of hell, he wrung from God’s hands the
pardon of mankind, or of a portion thereof. God,
pacified by witnessing this awful agony of one who
had from all eternity been “ lying in his bosom ”
co-equal sharer of his Majesty and glory, and the
object of his tenderest love, relents from his fierce
wrath, and consents to accept the pain of Jesus as a
substitute for the pain of mankind. In plain terms,
then, God is represented as a Being so awfully cruel,
so implacably revengeful, that pain as pain, and death
as death, are what he demands as a propitiatory
sacrifice, and with nothing less than extremest agony
can his fierce claims on mankind be bought off. The
due weight of suffering he must have, but it is a matter
of indifference, whether it is undergone by Jesus or by
mankind. Did not the old Fathers do well in making
the awful ransom a matter between Jesus and the devil ?
When this point is pressed on Christians, and one
urges the dishonour done to God by painting him in
colours from which heart and soul recoil in shuddering
horror, by ascribing to him a revengefulness and
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On the Atonement.
pitiless cruelty in comparison with which the worst
efforts of human malignity appear but childish mis
chief, they are quick to retort that we are caricatur
ing Christian doctrine j they will allow, when over
whelmed with evidence, that “strong language” has
been used in past centuries, but will say that such
views are not now held, and that they do not ascribe
such harsh dealing to God the Father. Theists are
therefore compelled to prove each step of their
accusation, and to quote from Christian writers the
words which embody the views they assail. Were
I simply to state that Christians in these days ascribe
to Almighty God a fierce wrath against the whole
human race, that this wrath can only be soothed by
suffering and death, that he vents this wrath on an
innocent head, and that he is well pleased by the
sight of the agony of his beloved Son, a shout of
indignation would rise from a thousand lips, and I
should. be accused of exaggeration, of false witness,
of blasphemy. So once more I write down the
doctrine from Christian dictation, and, be it remem
bered, the sentences I quote are from published works,
and are therefore the outcome of serious deliberation ■
they are not overdrawn pictures taken from the fervid
eloquence of excited oratory, when the speaker may
perhaps be carried further than he would, in cold
blood, consent to.
Stroud makes Christ drink “ the cup of the wrath of
God.” Jenkyn says, “he suffered as one disowned
and reprobated and forsaken of God.”
Dwight
considers that he endured God’s “hatred and con
tempt.” Bishop Jeune tells us that “ after man had
done his worst, worse remained for Christ to bear.
He had fallen into his father’s hands.” Archbishop
Thomson preaches that “the clouds of God’s wrath
gathered thick over the whole human race : they
discharged themselves on Jesus only ; ” he “becomes a
curse for us, and a vessel of wrath.” Liddon echoes
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the same sentiment : “ the apostles teach that mankind
are slaves, and that Christ on the Cross is paying their
ransom. Christ crucified is voluntarily devoted and
accursed
he even speaks of “the precise amount of
ignominy and pain needed for the redemption,” and
says that the “ divine victim ” paid more than was
absolutely necessary.
These quotations seem sufficient to prove that the
Christians of the present day are worthy followers
of the elder believers. The theologians first quoted
are indeed coarser in their expressions, and are less
afraid of speaking out exactly what they believe, but
there is no real difference of creed between the awful
doctrine of Flavel and the polished dogma of Canon
Liddon. The older and the modern Christians alike
believe in the bitter wrath of God against “ the whole
human race.” Both alike regard the atonement as so
much pain tendered by Jesus to the Almighty Father
in payment of a debt of pain owed to God by humanity.
They alike represent God as only to be pacified by the
sight of suffering. Man has insulted and injured God,
and God must be revenged by inflicting suffering on
the sinner in return. The “ hatred and contempt ”
God launched at Jesus were due to the fact that Jesus
was the sinner’s substitute, and are therefore the feel
ings which animate the divine heart towards the sinner
himself. God hates and despises the world. He
would have “ consumed it in a moment ” in the fire
of his burning wrath, had not Jesus, “his chosen,
stood before him in the gap to turn away his wrathful
indignation.”
Mow how far is all this consistent with justice ? Is
the wrath of God against humanity justified by
the circumstances of the case so that we may be
obliged to own that some sacrifice was due from sinful
man to his Creator, to propitiate a justly incensed and
holy God ? I trow not. On this first count, the
atonement is a fearful injustice. For God has allowed
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On the Atonement.
men to be brought into the world with sinful inclina
tions, and to be surrounded with many temptations
and much evil. He has made man imperfect, and the
child is born into the world with an imperfect nature. It
is radically unjust then that God should curse the work
of His hands for being what He made them, and con
demn them to endless misery for failing to do the
impossible. Allowing that Christians are right in
believing that Adam was sinless when he came from
his Maker’s hands, these remarks apply to every other
living soul since born into the world; the Genesis
myth will not extricate Christians from the difficulty.
Christians are quite right and are justified by facts
when they say that man is born into the world frail,
imperfect, prone to sin and error; but who, we ask
them, made men so ? Does not their own Bible tell
them that the “ potter hath power over the clay,” and,
further, that “ we are the clay and thou art the potter?”
To curse men for being men, i.e., imperfect moral
beings, is the height of cruelty and injustice ; to con
demn the morally weak to hell for sin, i.e., for failing
in moral strength, is about as fair as sentencing a sick
man to death because he cannot stand upright.
Christians try and avoid the force of this by saying
that men should rely on God’s grace to uphold them,
but they fail to see that this very want of reliance is part
of man’s natural weakness. The sick man might be
blamed for falling because he did not lean on a
stronger arm, but suppose he was too weak to grasp
it 1 Further, few Christians believe that it is possible
in practice, however possible in theory, to lead a
perfect life ; and as to “ offend in one point is to be
guilty of all,” one failure is sufficient to send the
generally righteous man to hell. Besides, they forget
that infants are included under the curse, although
necessarily incapable of grasping the idea either of sin
or of God; all babies born into the world and dying
before becoming capable of acting for themselves
�On the Atonement.
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would, we- are taught, have been inevitably consigned
to hell, had it not been for the atonement of Jesus.
Some Christians actually believe that unbaptized
babies are not admitted into heaven, and in a Roman
Catholic book descriptive of hell, a poor-little baby
writhes and screams in a red-hot oven.
This side of the atonement, this unjust demand on
men for a righteousness they could not render, neces
sitating a sacrifice to propitiate God for non-compliance
with his exaction, has had its due effect on men’s
minds, and has alienated their hearts from God. No
wonder that men turned away from a God who, like a
passionate but unskilful workman, dashes to pieces the
instrument he has made because it fails in its purpose,
and, instead of blaming his own want of skill, vents
his anger on the helpless thing that is only what he
made it. Most naturally, also, have men shrunk from
the God who “ avengeth and is furious ” to the tender,
pitiful, human Jesus, who loved sinners so deeply as to
choose to suffer for their sakes. They could owe no grati
tude to an Almighty Being who created them and cursed
them, and only consented to allow them to be happy
on condition that another paid for them the misery he
demanded as his due ; but what gratitude could be
enough for him who rescued them from the fearful
hands of the living God, at the cost of almost intoler
able suffering to himself? Let us remember that
Christ is said to suffer the very torments of hell, and
that his worst sufferings were when “ fallen into his
father’s hands,” out of which he has rescued us, and
then can we wonder that the crucified is adored with a
very ecstasy of gratitude ? Imagine what it is to be
saved from the hands of him who inflicted an agony
admitted to be unlimited, and who took advantage of
an infinite capacity in order to inflict an infinite pain.
It is well for the men before whose eyes this awful
spectre has flitted that the fair humanity of Jesus gives
them a refuge to fly to, else what but despair and
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On the Atonement.
madness could have been the doom of those who, with
out Jesus, would have seen enthroned above the wail
ing universe naught but an infinite cruelty and an
Almighty foe.
We see, then, that the necessity for an atonement
makes the Eternal Father both unjust in his demands
on men and cruel in his punishment of inevitable
failure; but there is another injustice which is of the
very essence of the atonement itself. This consists in
the vicarious character of the sacrifice: a new element
of injustice is introduced when we consider that the
person sacrificed is not even the guilty party. If a
man offends against law, justice requires that he should
be punished : the punishment becomes unjust if it is
excessive, as in the case we have been considering
above; but it is equally unjust to allow him to go free
without punishment. Christians are right in affirming
that moral government would be at an end were man
allowed to sin with impunity, and did an easy forgive
ness succeed to each offence. They appeal to our in
stinctive sense of justice to approve the sentiment that
punishment should follow sin: we acquiesce, and hope
that we have now reached a firm standing-ground from
which to proceed further in our investigation. But,
no; they promptly outrage that same sense of justice
which they have called as a witness on their side, by
asking us to believe that its ends are attained provided
that somebody or other is punished. When we reply
that this is not justice, we are promptly bidden not to be
presumptuous .and .argue from our human ideas of justice
as to the course that ought to be pursued by the absolute
justice of God. “Then'why appeal to it at all?” we
urge; “why talk of -justice in the matter if we are
totally unable to judge as to the rights and wrongs of
the case?” At -this point we are commonly over
whelmed with Paul’s notable argument—“Nay, but,
0 man, who art thou that repliest agaipst God ? ”
But if Christians value the simplicity and straight
�On the Atonement.
J7
forwardness of their own minds, they should not use
words which convey a certain accepted meaning in this
shuffling, double sense. When we speak of “justice,”
we speak of a certain well-understood quality, and we
do not speak of a mysterious divine attribute, which
has not only nothing in common with human justice,
but which is in direct opposition to that which we
understand by that name. Suppose a man condemned
to death for murder: the judge is about to sentence him,
when a bystander—as it chances, the judge’s own son
interposes: “My Lord, the prisoner is guilty and
deserves to be hanged; but if you will let him go, I
will die in his place.” The offer is accepted, the
prisoner is set free, the judge’s son is hanged in his .
stead. "What is all this ? Self-sacrifice (however mis
directed), love, enthusiasm—what you will; but cer
tainly not justice—nay, the grossest injustice, a second
murder, an ineffaceable stain on the ermine of the out
raged law. I imagine that, in this supposed case; no
Christian will.be found to assert that justice was done;
yet call the judge God, the prisoner mankind, the sub
stitute Jesus, and the trial scene is exactly reproduced.
Then, in the name of candour and common sense, why
call that just in God which we see would be so unjust
and immoral in man ? This vicarious nature of the
atonement also degrades the divine name, by making
him utterly careless in the matter of punishment:
all he is anxious for, according to this detestable
theory, is that he should strike a blow somewhere.
Like a child in a passion, he only feels the desire to
hurt somebody, and strikes out vaguely and at random.
There is no discrimination Used; the thunderbolt is
launched into a crowd; it falls on the head of the
sinless son,” and crushes the innocent, while the
sinner goes free. What matter? .It has fallen some
where, and the “ burning '■fire of his wrath” is cooled.
This is what men call the vindication of the justice of
the Moral Governor of the universe: this is “the act of
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God’s awful holiness,” which marks his hatred of sin,
and his immovable determination to punish it. But
when we reflect that this justice is consistent with
letting off the guilty and punishing an innocent per
son, we feel dread misgivings steal into our minds.
The justice of our Moral Governor has nothing in
common with our justice—indeed, it violates all our
notions of right and wrong. What if, as Mr Vance
Smith suggests, this strange justice be consistent also
with a double punishment of sin; and what if the
Moral Governor should bethink himself that, having
confused morality by an unjust—humanly speaking, of
course—punishment, it would be well to set things
straight again by punishing the guilty after all 1 We
can never dare to feel safe in the hands of this unjust
—humanly speaking—Moral Governor, or predicate
from our instinctive notions of right and wrong what
his requirements may be. One is lost in astonishment
that men should believe such things of God, and not
have manhood enough to rise up rebellious against
such injustice—should, instead, crouch at his feet, and
while trying to hide themselves from his wrath should
force their trembling lips to murmur some incoherent
acknowledgment of his mercy. Ah 1 they do not be
lieve it; they assert it in words, but, thank God, it
makes no impression on their hearts; and they would
die a thousand deaths rather than imitate, in their
dealings with their fellow-men, the fearful cruelty
which the Church has taught them to call the justice
of the Judge of all the earth.
The Atonement is not only doubly unjust, but it is
perfectly futile. We are told that Christ took away
the sin of the world ; we have a right to ask, “ how ? ”
So far as we can judge, we bear our sins in our own
bodies still, and the Atonement helps us not at all.
Has he borne the physical consequences of sin, such as
the loss of health caused by intemperance of all kinds ?
Not at all, this penalty remains, and, from the nature
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of things, cannot be transferred. Has he borne the
social consequences, shame, loss of credit, and so on. ?
They remain still to hinder us as we strive to rise after
our fall. Has he at least borne the pangs of remorse
for us, the stings of conscience 1 By no means; the
tears of sorrow are no less bitter, the prickings of
repentance no less keen. Perhaps he has struck at the
root of evil, and has put away sin itself out of a
redeemed world ? Alas ! the wailing that goes up to
heaven from a world oppressed with sin weeps out a
sorrowfully emphatic, “ no, this he has not done.”
What has he then borne for us ? Nothing, save the
phantom wrath of a phantom tyrant; all that is real
exists the same as before. We turn away, then, from
the offered Atonement with a feeling that would be
impatience at such trifling, were it not all too sorrow
ful, and leave the Christians to impose on their
imagined sacrifice, the imagined burden of the guilt of
an accursed race.
Further, the Atonement is, from the nature of things,
entirely impossible : we have seen how Christ fails to
hear our sins in any intelligible sense, but can he, in
any way, bear the “punishment” of sin ? The idea that
the punishment of sin can be transferred from one
person to another is radically false, and arises from
a wrong conception of - the punishment consequent on
sin, and from the ecclesiastical guilt, so to speak,
thought to be incurred thereby. ' The only true pun
ishment of sin is the injury caused hy it to our moral
nature: all the indirect punishments, we have seen,
Christ has not taken away, and the true punishment
can fall only on ourselves. For sin is nothing more
than the transgression of law. All law, when broken,
entails of necessity an appropriate penalty, and recoils,
as it were, on the transgressor. A natural law, when
broken, avenges itself by consequent suffering, and so
does a spiritual law : the injury wrought by the latter
is not less real, although less obvious. Physical sin
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On the Atonement.
brings physical suffering; spiritual, moral, mental sin
brings each its own appropriate punishment. “ Sin ”
has become such a cant term that we lose sight, in
using it, of its real simple meaning, a breaking of law.
Imagine any sane man coming and saying, “ My dear
friend, if you like to put your hand into the fire I will
bear the punishment of being burnt, and you shall not
suffer.” It is quite as absurd to imagine that if I sin
Jesus can bear my consequent suffering. If a man
lies habitually, for instance, he grows thoroughly
untrue : let him repent ever so vigorously, he must
bear the consequences of his past deeds, and fight his
way back slowly to truthfulness of word and thought:
no atonement, nothing in heaven or earth save his own
labour, will restore to him the forfeited jewel of in
stinctive candour. Thus the “ punishment ” of untruth
fulness is the loss of the power of being true, just as
the punishment of putting the hand into the fire is the
loss of the power of grasping. But in addition to this
simple and most just and natural “ retribution,” theolo
gians have invented certain arbitrary penalties as a
punishment of sin, the wrath of God and hell fire.
These imaginary penalties are discharged by an equally
imaginary atonement, the natural punishment remain
ing as before; so after all we only reject the two sets
of inventions which balance each other, and find our
selves just in the same position as they are, having
gained infinitely in simplicity and naturalness. The
punishment of sin is not an arbitrary penalty, but an
inevitable sequence : Jesus may bear, if his worshippers
will have it so, the theological fiction of the “ guilt of
sin,” an idea derived from the ceremonial uncleanness
of the Levitical law, but let him leave alone the
solemn realities connected with the sacred and immutable laws of God.
Doubly unjust, useless, and impossible, it might be
deemed a work of supererogation to argue yet further
against the Atonement; but its hold on men’s minds
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2I
is too firm to allow ns to lay down a single weapon
which can he turned against it. So, in addition to
these defects, I remark that, viewed as a propitiatory
sacrifice to Almighty God, it is thoroughly inadequate.
If God, being righteous, as we believe Him to be, re
garded man with anger because of man’s sinfulness,
what is obviously the required propitiation? Surely
the removal of the cause of anger, i.e., of sin itself, and
the seeking by man of righteousness. The old Hebrew
prophet saw this plainly, and his idea of atonement is
the true one: “ lolierewitli shall I come before the
Lord,” he is asked, with burnt-offerings or—choicer
still—parental anguish over a first-born’s corpse?
“ What doth the Lord require of thee,” is the reprov
ing answer, “but to do justly and to love mercy, and
to walk humbly with thy God?” But what is the
propitiatory element in the Christian Atonement ? let
Canon Liddon answer : “ the ignominy and pain needed
for the redemption.” Ignominy, agony, blood, death,
these are what Christians offer up as an acceptable
sacrifice to the Spirit of Love. But what have all
these in common with the demands of the Eternal
Righteousness, and how can pain atone for sin ? they
have no relation to each other; there is no appropriate
ness in the offered exchange. These terrible offerings
are in keeping with the barbarous ideas of uncivilized
nations, and we understand the feelings which prompt
the savage to immolate tortured victims on the altars
of his gloomy gods; they are appropriate sacrifices to
the foes of mankind, who are to be bought off from
injuring us by our offering them an equivalent pain to
that they desire to inflict, but they are offensive when
given to Him who is the Friend and Lover of Hu
manity. An Atonement which offers suffering as a
propitiation can have nothing in common with God’s
will for man, and must be utterly beside the mark,
perfectly inadequate. If we must have Atonement, let
it at least consist of something which will suit the
�22
On the Atonement.
Righteousness and Love of God, and be in keeping
with his perfection; let it not borrow the language of
ancient savagery, and breathe of blood and dying
victims, and tortured human frames, racked with pain.
Lastly, I impeach the Atonement as injurious in
several ways to human morality. It has been extolled
as “ meeting the needs of the awakened sinner ” by
soothing his fears of punishment with the gift of a
substitute who has already suffered his sentence for
him; but nothing can be more pernicious than to con
sole a sinner with the promise that he shall escape the
punishment he has justly deserved. The atonement
may meet the first superficial feelings of a man startled
into the consciousness of his sinfulness, it may soothe
the first vague fears and act as an opiate to the
awakened conscience ; but it does not fulfil the cravings
of a heart deeply yearning after righteousness ; it offers
a legal justification to a soul which is longing for
purity, it offers freedom from punishment to a soul
longing for freedom from sin. The true penitent does
not seek to be shielded from the consequences of his
past errors: he accepts them meekly, bravely, humbly,
learning through pain the lesson of future purity. An
atonement which steps in between us and this fatherly
discipline ordained by God, would be a curse and not
a blessing; it would rob us of our education and
deprive us • of a priceless instruction. The force of
temptation is fearfully added to by the idea that
repentance lays the righteous penalty of transgression
on another head ; this doctrine gives a direct encourage
ment to sin, as even Paul perceived when he said,
“ shall we continue in sin that grace may abound 1 ”
Some one has remarked, I think, that though Paul
ejaculates, “ God forbid,” his fears were well founded
and have been widely realised. To the atonement we
owe the morbid sentiment which believes in the holy
death of a ruffianly murderer, because, goaded by
ungovernable terror, he has snatched at the offered
�On the Atonement.
23
safety and been “ washed in the blood of the lamb.”
To it we owe the unwholesome glorying in the pious
sentiments of such an one, who ought to go out of this
life sadly and silently, without a sickening parade of
feelings of love towards the God whose laws, as long
as he could, he has broken and despised. But the Chris
tian teachers will extol the “ saving grace ” which has
made the felon die with words of joyful assurance,
meet only for the lips of one who crowns a saintly life
with a peaceful death. The atonement has weakened
that stern condemnation of sin which is the safe-guard
of purity ; it has softened down moral differences and
placed the penitent above the saint; it has dulled the
feeling of responsibility in the soul; it has taken
away the help, such as it is, of fear of punishment for
sin; it has confused man’s sense of justice, outraged
his feeling of right, blunted his conscience, and mis
directed his repentance. It has chilled his love to
God by representing the universal father as a cruel
tyrant and a remorseless and unjust judge. It lias
been the fruitful parent of all asceticism, for, since God
was pacified by suffering once, he would of course be
pleased with suffering at all times, and so men have
logically ruined their bodies to save their souls, and
crushed their feelings and lacerated their hearts to
propitiate the awful form frowning behind the cross of
Christ. To the atonement we owe it that God is
served by fear instead of by love, that monasticism
holds its head above the sweet sanctities of love and
home, that religion is crowned with thorns and not
with roses, that the miserere and not the gloria is the
strain from earth to heaven. The atonement teaches
men to crouch at the feet of God, instead of raising
loving joyful faces to meet his radiant smile ; it shuts
out his sunshine from us and veils us in the night of
an impenetrable dread. What is the sentiment with
which Canon Liddon closes a sermon on the death of
Christ; I quote it to show the slavish feeling
�24
On the Atonement.
engendered by this doctrine in a very noble human
soul : “ In ourselves, indeed, there is nothing that
should stay his (God’s) arm or invite his mercy. But
may he have respect to the acts and the sufferings of
his sinless son ? Only while contemplating the
inestimable merits of the Redeemer can we dare to
hope that our heavenly Father will overlook the count
less provocations which he receives at the hands of the
redeemed.” Is this a wholesome sentiment either as
regards our feelings towards God or our efforts towards
holiness? Is it well to look to the purity of another as
a makeweight for our personal shortcomings ? All
these injuries to morality done by the atonement are
completed by the crowning one, that it offers to the
sinner a veil of “ imputed righteousness.” Not only
does it take from him his saving punishment, but it
nullifies his strivings after holiness by offering him a
righteousness which is not his own. It introduces into
the solemn region of duty to God the legal fiction of a
gift of holiness, which is imputed, not won. We are
taught to believe that we can blind the eyes of God
and satisfy him with a pretended purity. But that
very one whose purity we seek to claim as ours, that
fair blossom of humanity, Jesus of Nazareth, whose
mission we so misconstrue, launched his anathema
at whited sepulchres, pure without and foul within.
What would he have said of the whitewash of
“imputed righteousness?” Stern and sharp would
have been his rebuke, methinks, to a device so untrue,
and well-deserved would have been his thundered
“ woe ” on a hypocrisy that would fain deceive God as
well as man.
These considerations have carried so great a wreight
with the most enlightened and progressive minds
among Christians themselves, that there has grown up
a party in the Church, whose repudiation of an atone
ment of agony and death is as complete as even we
could wish. They denounce with the utmost fervour
�On the Atonement.
25
the. hideous notion of a “bloody sacrifice,” and are
urgent in their representations of the dishonour done
to God by ascribing to him “ pleasure in the death of
him that dieth,” or satisfaction in the sight of pain.
They point out that there is no virtue in blood to
wash away sin, not even “ in the blood of a God.”
Maurice eloquently pleads against the idea that the
suffering of the “well-beloved Son” was in itself an
acceptable sacrifice to the Almighty Father, and he
sees the atoning element in the “holiness and gracious
ness of the Son.” Writers of this school perceive that
a moral and not a physical sacrifice can be the only
acceptable offering to the Father of spirits, but the
great objection lies against their theory also, that the
atonement is still vicarious. Christ still suffers for
man, in order to make men acceptable to God. It is
perhaps scarcely fair to say this of the school as a
whole, since the opinions of Broad Church divines
differ widely from each other, ranging from the
orthodox to the Socinian standing-point. Yet, roughly
speaking, we may say that while they have given up
the error of thinking that the death of Christ reconciles
God to us, they yet believe that his death, in some
mysterious manner, reconciles us to God. It is a
matter of deep thankfulness that they give up the
old cruel idea of propitiating God, and so prepare the
way for a higher creed. Their more humane teaching
reaches hearts which are as yet sealed against us, and
they are the John Baptist of the Theistic Christ. We
must still urge on them that an atonement at all is
superfluous, that all the parade of reconciliation by
means of a mediator is perfectly unnecessary as
between God and his child, man ; that the notion put
forward that Christ realised the ideal of humanity and
propitiated God by showing what a man could be, is
objectionable in that it represents God as needing to
be taught what were the capacities of his creatures,
and is further untrue, because the powers of God in
�26
On the Atonement.
man are not really the equivalent of the capabilities of
a simple man. Broad Churchmen are still hampered
by the difficulties surrounding a divine Christ, and are
puzzled to find for him a place in their theology which
is at once suitable to his dignity, and consistent with
a reasonable belief. They feel obliged to acknowledge
that some unusual benefit to the race must result from
the incarnation and death of a God, and are swayed
alternately by their reason, which places the cruci
fixion of Jesus in the roll of martyrs’ deaths, and by
their prejudices, which assign to it a position unique
and unrivalled in the history of the race. There are,
however, many signs that the deity of Jesus is, as an
article of faith, tottering from its pedestal in the
Broad Church school. The hold on it by such men as
the Rev. J. S. Brooke is very slight, and his inter
pretation of the incarnation is regarded by orthodox
divines with unmingled horror. Their moral atone
ment, in turn, is as the dawn before the sunrise, and
we may hope that it will soon develop into the real
truth : namely, that the dealings of Jesus with the
Father were a purely private matter between his own
soul and God, and that his value to mankind consists
in his being one of the teachers of the race, one “with
a genius for religion,” one of the schoolmasters
appointed to lead humanity to God.
The theory of M‘Leod Campbell stands alone,
and is highly interesting and ingenious—it is the
more valuable and hopeful as coming from Scotland,
the home of the dreariest belief as to the relations
existing between man and God. He rejects the penal
character of the atonement, and makes it consist, so to
speak, in leading God and man to understand one
another. He considers that Christ witnessed to men
on behalf of God, and vindicated the father’s heart by
showing what he could be to the son who trusted in
him. He witnessed to God on behalf of men—and
this is the weakest point in the book, verging, as it
�On the Atonement.
does, on substitution—showing in humanity a perfect
sympathy with God’s feelings towards sin, and offering
to God for man a perfect repentance for human trans
gression. I purposely say “ verging,” because Camp
bell does not intend substitution; he represents this
sorrow of Jesus as what he must inevitably feel at see
ing his brother-men unconscious of their sin and
danger, so no fiction is supposed as between God and
Christ. But he considers that God, having seen the
perfection of repentance in Jesus, accepts the repen
tance of man, imperfect as it is, because it is in kind
the same as that of Jesus, and is the germ of that feel
ing of which his is the perfect flow’er; in this sense,
and only in this sense, is the repentance of man
accepted “for Christ’s sake.” He considers that men
must share in the mind of Christ as towards God and
towards sin in order to be benefited by the work of
Christ, and that each man must thus actually take part
in the work of atonement. The sufferings of Jesus he
regards as necessary in order to test the reality of the
life of sonship towards God, and brotherhood towards
men, which he came to earth to exemplify. I trust I
have done no injustice in this short summary to a very
able and thoughtful book, which presents, perhaps, the
only view of the atonement compatible with the love
and the justice of God, and this only, of course, if the
idea of any atonement can fairly be said to be consis
tent with justice. The merits of this view are practi
cally that this work of Jesus is not an “ atonement ” in
the theological sense at all. The defects of Campbell’s
book are inseparable from his creed, as he argues from
a belief in the deity of Jesus, from an unconscious
limitation of God’s knowledge (as though God did not
understand man till he was revealed to him by Jesus)
and from a wrong conception of the punishment due
to sin.
I said, at starting, that the atonement was the raison
d'etre of Christianity, and, in conclusion, I would
�On the Atonement.
challenge all thoughtful men and women to say
whether good cause has or has not been shown for
rejecting this pillar “ of the faith.” The atonement
has but to be studied in order to be rejected. The
difficulty is to persuade people to think about their
creed. Yet the question of this doctrine must be
faced and answered. “ I have too much faith in the
common sense and justice of Englishmen when once
awakened to face any question fairly, to doubt what
that answer will be.”
Annie Besant.
TURNBULL AND SPEAKS, PRINTERS, EDINBURGH
�
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On the atonement
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Place of publication: London
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[1874]
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NATIONAL SECULAR SOCIETY
THE FREE-WILL CONTROVERSY.
BY
THOMAS DANCER HUTCHISON, Ex-Siz. T.C.D.
PUBLISHED BY THOMAS SCOTT,
NO. 11, THE TERRACE, FARQUHAR ROAD,
UPPER NORWOOD, LONDON, S.E.
Price Sixpence.
�1
�13 '2-6 IS
ON THE FREE-WILL CONTROVERSY.
HATEVER may be thought of the interest and
importance hitherto attaching to the Problem of
the Human Will, whether regarded as the subject of
religious or of metaphysical disputation, it is certain
that at no period in its history has it come forward
with such weighty and urgent claims to the serious
attention of all thinking men, as in our own immediate
times. Emerging into notoriety some fourteen hun
dred years ago, in the celebrated Pelagian controversy
concerning human freedom, it was not until the middle
of the seventeenth century that it escaped from the
dark and bewildering mists of theological discussion,
into the higher and serener atmosphere of purely
philosophical enquiry. For our own time was reserved
the further step which it was destined to take, and
whereby it has descended from the remoteness of
abstract speculation, to take its place among the
importunate problems of practical life, challenging
with an ever increasing emphasis the exertion of our
highest efforts in its solution.
Tremendous as were the issues that hung upon the
decision of the theological phase of the Free-Will
controversy, it must not be supposed that these issues
were any of them of a distinctively practical character.
Terrible and repugnant as it might well seem to be
forced to regard man “as incurably wicked—wicked
by the constitution of his flesh, and wicked by eternal
decree—as doomed, unless exempted by special grace
A
W
�4
On the Free-Will Controversy.
which he cannot merit, or hy any effort of his own
obtain, to live in sin while he remains on earth, and to
be eternally miserable when he leaves it,—to regard
him as born unable to keep the commandments, yet
as justly liable to everlasting punishment for break
ing them,” *—nevertheless these, and all other such
conclusions of theology, left the men by whom they
were entertained, for all practical purposes pretty much
in the same position as that in which they found them.
We do not observe that the possession of a fatalist
creed exercised any blighting or paralysing influence on
the active nature of the great leaders on the Calvinistic
side: indeed, if we are to believe Mr Froude, “they
were men possessed of all the qualities which give
nobility and grandeur to human nature,—unalterably
just when duty required them to be stern, but with the
tenderness of a woman in their hearts ; frank, true,
cheerful, humorous, as unlike sour fanatics as it is pos
sible to imagine any one.”
However stupendous, then, the questions involved in
the Arminian controversy concerning Human Freedom,
this much is certain, that these questions had, one and
all of them, little or no bearing upon the conduct of
men in this present life. As far as external behaviour
went, you would have had no grounds for distinguish
ing between Libertarian and Calvinist,—between the
man who believed himself to be the arbiter of his own
destiny, and the man who regarded himself as a mere
puppet in the hands of an irresistible and unyielding
external Power. In a word, the differences which
separated the Calvinist from the Arminian were
theological, not moral,—points of belief, and not of
practice. In matters involving considerations purely
ethical,—good or evil, virtue, responsibility, wrong
doing—the two antagonistic parties met on common
ground.
While it is thus manifest that the theological phase
* Froude, “Short Studies,” vol. ii. p. 3.
�On the Free-Will Controversy.
5
of this great controversy is open to the charge of a
want of practical interest, it must at the same time be
allowed that the Problem of the Will, when viewed in
the aspect which it presents to us of the present day,
comes home to men’s business and bosoms with a
cogency and force which are unquestionable. The
main controversy now-a-days lies between those who
uphold the Principle of Determinism, or the uniformity
of Sequence between motive and action, on the one
hand, and the defenders of the metaphysical theory
*
of Free-Will, on the other. The Determinists maintain
(to use the words of one of the ablest of their number)!
that “ an invariable sequence exists between the sum
of motives present in the mind of a given individual,
and the action (or attempted action) which follows ; ”
and that consequently the phenomena of human voli
tion constitute a legitimate subject for scientific
explanation, calculation and prediction.
Thus the
great department of human action is brought under the
sway of the law of causation; and as a necessary result
following the recognition of the correlation between
mental and cerebral changes, the vast principle of the
transformation and equivalence of forces is seen to
embrace and pervade, not only the action, organic and
inorganic, of the external world, but also the widelyextended field of volitional agency, whether individual
or in the aggregate.| It may readily be imagined how
numerous and how momentous are the results of the
application of this Determinist principle or doctrine to
the subjects of morality and education; but its import
ance does not rest on this alone. It is made the basis
of a science of politics or sociology, which, applying
the laws of mind to the scientific explanation of the
* We say metaphysical theory, as opposed to the practical feeling
of freedom, which, as J. Stuart Mill points out, (Logic, Bk. vi. ch.
ii.) is in no wise inconsistent with the Determinist, or (as it is
often improperly called), the Necessitarian theory.
■f See Westminster Review for October 1873.
t Cf. Herbert Spencer’s work “ On the Study of Sociology," p. 6.
�6
On the Free-Will Controversy.
actions of mankind in the aggregate, seeks thereby to
arrive at a system of general principles for the guidance
of the politician. Nay more,—this principle is at the
very root of the science of Psychology itself; for if we
refuse to acknowledge uniformity of succession in the
phenomena of volition,—if we believe that the normal
action of motives is liable to he at any time neutralised
and superseded, in a manner wholly irregular and un
foreseeable by us,—then indeed the attempt to establish
any even approximate general principles or laws of the
association and reproduction of ideas becomes as absurd
as it would be to set about developing a science of
mechanics “ on a planet where gravitation was liable to
fits of intermission.” Annihilate the principle of
Determinism, and Mental Science becomes the baseless
fabric of a vision.
Thus it is quite clear that the principleof Determinism,
if admitted to be true, Carries with it practical results
of wide and deep importance. To the Determinist, the
ordinary notions of responsibility and punishment will
appear to be merely the vague and unreal products of
the imagination; virtue will be simply good luck, and
vice misfortune, while punishment will be regarded
simply as a means to an end—the end being the refor
mation of the criminal and the protection of society.
For him, the science of education opens a prospect of
unlimited advancement in the condition of the indi
vidual; while Sociology, through the long vista of
future years, gives glimpses of a coming golden age.
He is possessed with the idea “ of the gradual develop
ment of the human mind—of the spiritual unity of the
human race; ” and throughout the troubles and
anxieties that attend the fluctuating and often appar
ently retrogressive movement of his day, he is sustained
and cheered by a firm belief in the mighty “ human
organism, fraught with the vast results of ages, and big
with a life which stretched over myriads of years,” *
* VFesimMsier Review for October 1860, p. 308.
�On the Free-Will Controversy.
7
ever slowly growing more and more unto the light of
perfect day.
It need hardly be said that all this is absolutely
incompatible with the Libertarian’s creed. He believes
that the phenomena of volition are marked out in the
strongest manner from all other phenomena whatever ;
that whereas by reason of the uniformity of sequence
which is permitted to prevail in the material world, the
whole of the vast department of physical phenomena
forms a legitimate subject for scientific explanation and
prediction, the individual and collective action of man
kind, on the contrary, admits neither “ scientific calcu
lations before the fact,” nor “scientific explanations
after the fact.” His theory maintains that there is
inherent in man a mysterious power, completely inde
pendent of motives, and capable of acting against the
preponderance of them—“ as if ” (to quote the words of
Dr Carpenter), “ when one scale of a balance is inclining
downwards, a hand placed on the beam from which the
other scale is suspended, were to cause that lighter
scale to go down.” It arrogates for man a faculty of
undetermined Choice, called forth indeed into active
operation on the presentation of some motive or
motives to the mind, but in no wise conditioned or
coerced by their influence. This notion of an undeter
mined power of choice is regarded by those who hold
the doctrine of Free Will as a necessary factor in our
common emotions of admiration, disapprobation, and
contrition. “ If there is no free choice ” (says Mr
Froude), “the praise or blame with which we regard
one another are impertinent and out of place.”
Of course, those who maintain this theory ipso facto
deny the possibility of the sciences of Psychology and
Sociology, together with the fair hopes which they
hold out to us. Mr Froude talks of the time “ when
the speculative formulas into which we have mapped
out the mysterious continents of the spiritual world
shall have been consigned to the place already thronged
�8
On the Free-Will Controversy.
with the ghosts of like delusions which have had their
day and perished ”—thus contemplating the possible
collapse of Psychology at some future day. He scouts
at the notion of a science of History (i.e., a social
science developed after the Deductive or Historic
method) so long as “ natural causes are liable to be set
aside and neutralised by what is called volition.” True,
men are “ at least half animals, and are subject in this
aspect of them to the conditions of animals. So far as
those parts of man’s doings are concerned, which
neither have, nor have had, anything moral about
them, so far the laws of him are calculable. . . . But
pass beyond them, and where are we ? In a world
where it would be as easy to calculate man’s actions by
laws like those of positive philosophy as to measure
the orbit of Neptune with a foot-rule, or weigh Sirius
in a grocer’s scale.”
After what has been already said, it will be readily
admitted that the decision of the Free Will question
at the present day, carries with it results of no small
practical importance, and that it is manifestly incum
bent on us to put forth our best efforts in the attempt
to solve it. In some quarters, indeed, our endeavours
would meet with small encouragement. Many persons
—notably, Professor Huxley—believe that the battle
between Libertarian and Necessitarian is destined for
ever to remain a drawn one. But it is only right that
before we acquiesce in so disheartening an opinion, we
should ourselves review with some carefulness the con
troversy as it stands at present, and try to find out
whether after all the battle does not afford us indica
tions, however faint, of a definite issue.
“The advocate of Free Will appeals to conscience
and instinct—to an b, priori sense of what ought in
equity to be. The Necessitarian falls back upon the
experienced reality of facts.” * It is admitted on all
hands that the testimony of experience is in favour of
* Froude, “ Short Studies,” vol. i. p. 4.
�On the Free-Will Controversy.
9
necessity. Thus even Mr Mansel writes:—“Were it
not for the direct testimony of my own consciousness
to my own freedom, I could regard human actions only
as necessary links in the endless chain of phenomenal
cause and effect.” * This fact, when taken in connec
tion with the extremely unique and exceptional nature
of the Free Will theory (according to which there is,
as Herbert Spencer says, “ one law for the rest of the
universe, and another law for mankind ”), seems fully
to justify the enquiry whether in thus denying the
universality of the law of uniform Succession, men may
not be under the influence of some bias which misleads
their judgment. Now, it is a well known fact that
the universality of this law has often been denied, both
in ancient and in modern times, the supposed excep
tions to it being always some one or other of the more
mysterious and apparently unpredictable phenomena of
nature. Thus Sokrates denied that Astronomy or
Physical Philosophy in general were fit subjects for
human study, maintaining that these two departments
were under the immediate and special control of the
gods. We are all familiar with that type of the pietist
which sees the handiwork of an all-wise and doubt
less retributory Providence in each of the petty acci
dents of life —so long as these be advantageous to
himself or calamitous merely to his neighbour.f This
attitude of mind is well illustrated by the following
story, which Dean Stanley relates as having been told
of a late dignitary of the Church by himself :—“ A
friend,” he used to relate, “ invited me to go out with
him on the water. The sky was threatening, and I
declined. At length he succeeded in persuading me,
and we embarked. A squall came on, the boat
lurched, and my friend fell overboard. Twice he sank,
* “ Metaphysics,” p. 168.
_
>
f “Think ye that those eighteen upon the tower of Siloam fell,”
is the characteristic lesson of the Gospel on the occasion of any
sudden visitation. Yet it is another reading of such calamities
which is commonly insisted upon.”—“ Essays and Reviews,” p. 365.
�io
On the Free-Will Controversy.
and twice he rose to the surface. He placed his hands
on the prow, and endeavoured to climb in. There was
great apprehension lest he should upset the boat.
Providentially I had brought my umbrella with me.
I had the presence of mind to strike him two or three
hard blows over the knuckles. He let go his hand,
and sank. The boat righted itself, and we were saved.”
Mr Huxley reminds us of the vast difference between
our mode of accounting for the Great Plague and the
Great Fire which devastated London in the 17th cen
tury, and that which recommended itself to our ances
tors. * It can hardly be asserted even of the most
cultivated classes of this country, that there prevails
amongst them a unanimous belief in the uniformity of
physical phenomena. The Prayer Book of the Estab
lished Church of England still contains prayers for
rain and for fair weather • and a public Thanksgiving
was celebrated not long since on the recovery of the
heir to the Throne from a dangerous illness ; though
in this latter case (as Herbert Spencer points out) a
different interpretation of the issue would seem to be
indicated by the conferring of a baronetcy upon the
attendant physician. The doctrine of a particular
providence, as it is preached from our pulpits, while
conceding the prevalence of law in all those phenomena
which are familiar and thoroughly understood, main
tains that in the as yet unexplained mysteries of nature
(such as the changes of the weather, the process of
deliberative thought, &c.), the Deity may and does
direct the course of nature according to his pleasure.
We see then that there is, and always has been, in the
human mind a tendency to refer all the apparently
irregular and unforeseeable phenomena of nature to the
agency of some free and unconditioned power. Viewed
in the light of this fact, the undoubtedly complex and
(to all appearance) variable nature of volitional action
* “ Lay Sermons: Essay on the Advisableness of Improving
Natural Knowledge.”
�On the Free-Will Controversy.
11
assumes at once a deep significance in the explanation of
the origin of the Free Will hypothesis.
Another influence modifying our conceptions of the
will is to be found in the conservative power which
language exercises over our thoughts and beliefs. It
is notorious that the Libertarian theory can claim a far
higher antiquity than its rival; indeed, even during
the period in which speech was in process of formation,
some conception more or less crude of Indeterminism
must have prevailed amongst mankind. This concep
tion has by means of language become fixed and
crystallised in the general mind, to such a degree that
it is only by means of a considerable effort, and after
some practice, that we can entertain the notion of an
unbroken sequence of antecedent and consequent in the
world of human action. Thus it is seen that a potent
influence on the side of the Free-Will theory is con
stantly at work in the language of every-day life.
Here too we must call attention to the unfortunate
complication which has been introduced into the Pro
blem of the Will by the general adoption of the figure
embodied in the terms “Freedom of the Will,”
“ NecessityI’ and others of like nature. This metaphor
originated with the Stoics, who declared the virtuous
man to be free, the vicious man to be a slave. It was
subsequently adopted, and applied in a similar sense,
by Philo Judeeusand the early Christian Fathers. It
need hardly be said that this figure was addressed to
the heart rather than to the understanding; “as
regards appropriateness in everything but the associa
tions of dignity and indignity” says Professor Bain,
“ no metaphor could have been more unhappy. So far
as the idea of subjection is concerned, the virtuous man
is the greater slave of the two.” * The epithet “ free ”
was subsequently adopted by those who controverted
the Predestinarían theories of Augustine.
This
theologian taught that all men were the slaves of some
* Bain, “ Mental and Moral Science,” p. 398.’
�12
On the Free-Will Controversy;
external constraining power—the elect being subject
to irresistible grace, and the reprobate to original sin.
As opposed to this notion of earfernaZ compulsion, the
term Free-Will had a definite intelligible meaning.
Augustine maintained that for every man there existed
a certain class of motives, the due operation of which
in arousing him to volitional action was hindered by
some external force—that the elect were restrained
from sinning, and the reprobate from doing what was
good. This was evidently to suspend volitional action,
quite as much as it is suspended when men are thrown
into prison; and in opposition to this notion, any
conscious being “under a motive to act, and not
interfered with by any other being, is to all intents
free ; * and this moreover is the only meaning which
can possibly be attached to the word Freedom. But,
most unhappily, after the emergence of the theory of
determinism in the writings of Hobbes and his followers,
this term “ Freedom of the Will ” was borrowed from the
ancient theological controversy by the opponents of the
new philosophical system, and, carrying with it all the
inveterate and potent associations of dignity which had
belonged to it in its former employment, thus intro
duced an emotional bias of immense force into the
question now at issue. The Determinists were called
Necessitarians, and their antagonists were men who
upheld the Freedom of the Human Will. In conse
quence of the associations attaching to these words,
necessity and freedom, it came to pass that “ the
doctrine of causation, when considered as obtaining
between our volitions and their antecedents, was almost
universally conceived as involving more than uniform
sequence.................. Even if the reason repudiated, the
imagination retained, the feeling of some more intimate
connection, of some peculiar tie, or mysterious con
straint exercised by the antecedent over the consequent.
Now this it wras which, considered as applying to
the human will, conflicted with men’s consciousness
* Bain, “ Mental and Moral Science,” p. 398.
�On the Free-Will Controversy.
13
and revolted their feelings. They were certain that, in
the case of their volitions, there was not this mysterious
constraint. They felt, that if they wished to prove
that they had the power of resisting the motive, they
could do so (that wish being, it needs scarcely be
observed, a new antecedent;) and it would have been
humiliating to their pride, and (what is of more import
ance) paralysing to their desire of excellence, had they
thought otherwise. But neither is any such mysterious
compulsion now supposed, by the best philosophical
authorities, to be exercised by any other cause over its
effect. Those who think that causes draw their effects
after them by a mystical tie, are right in believing that
the relation between volitions and their antecedents is
of another nature. But they should go further, and
admit that this is also true of all other effects and their
antecedents. If such a tie is considered to be involved
in the word necessity, the doctrine is not true of human
actions ; but neither is it then true of inanimate objects.
It would be more correct to say that matter is not
bound by necessity, than that mind is so.” *
There is a further emotional influence tending to
foster the belief in Free-Will which must be briefly
noticed here. It is manifest that when men claim to
have a direct consciousness of liberty, they are thinking,
not so much of their past conduct as of their future and
yet unrealised volitions. With regard to the past, as has
already been remarked, most persons are ready to admit
that experience proves their actions to have uniformly
followed some preponderating motive. Now the con
templation of a man’s past history does not, in the
majority of cases, bring with it any keen emotions of
pride or satisfaction ; too often it is but the record of
the conquest of temporary fleeting solicitations of the
present over the permanent interests embodied in our
more comprehensive and ideal motives. Hence the
belief that our course of action will be pretty much the
* J. S. Mill, “ Logic,” Bk. vi., Chap, ii., § 2.
�14
On the Free-Will Controversy.
same in the future as it has been in the past is one
which administers a heavy blow to our feelings of self
satisfaction and of power ; and we are apt under the
influence of these feelings to imagine that in our future
course of life the higher and more permanent aims will,
through the operation of our hitherto inactive power of
Free Choice, predominate over the more sensual and
transient motives,—“ the fleeting actualities of pleasure
and pain.” Here also, then, it is evident that the
notion of an undetermined Will finds strong support in
the natural instincts of emotion.
In concluding this portion of our subject, it will be
necessary to call attention to a well-known infirmity of
thought, which plainly operates in favour of the per
sistence of Libertarianism. We allude to the strong
tendency existing in the mind to objectify, or ascribe
separate existence to, its abstractions. “ Mankind in
all ages have had a strong propensity to conclude that
wherever there is a name, there must be a distinguish
*
able separate entity corresponding to the name ; and
every complex idea which the mind has formed for
itself by operating upon its conceptions of individual
things, was considered to have an outward objective
reality answering to it. Fate, Chance, Nature, Time,
Space, were real beings, nay, even gods. In ancient
times to the vulgar and to the scientific alike, whiteness
was an entity, inhering or sticking in the white sub
stance : and so of all other qualities.” * Language
favours this fallacious tendency of the mind; the
abstract name (“alike the facility and the snare of
general expression,” as it has been aptly described), is
generally understood to denote something more than
the bare fact of similarity between a number of objects,
some mysterious entity whereby they resemble each
other as they do, and which resides in each and all
of them. We are inclined to believe that for every
name there must be a corresponding thing. In this
* Mill, “ Logic,” Bk. v., Chap, iii., § 4.
�On the Free-Will Controversy.
15
manner, after that men had found it convenient to
frame a general term which should embrace all volitional
phenomena, the constant employment of this term
(velle “to will,”) easily generated a belief in some
mysterious entity or power, underlying all volitional
action, and originating within itself all those effects of
“deliberating, weighing, and choosing,” which con
stituted the most obvious common element originally
embodied in the abstract idea of Will. Just as the
Eleatic Philosophy taught that a peculiar entity or sub
stance, to sv or Oneness, inhered in all things which are
said to be one,, so did men frame for themselves
“ the conception of an underlying substantive power,
the will, from which all single acts of volition were
supposed to emanate.”*
Having now enumerated some of the principal
psychological causes for the wide and early prevalence,
and the long continuance of the doctrine of Free-Will,
we will now proceed to pass in review some of the de
finitions of freedom which have been advanced by the
upholders of this doctrine. In doing so, we shall pass
over without comment the theological phase of the
controversy, as conducted on principles, and proceed
ing by a method wholly alien to the spirit of scientific
enquiry, and we shall commence with a notice of
Descartes, who may be said to be the first of the purely
philosophical libertarians.
Descartes was a cotemporary of Hobbes, the first
philosopher who consistently taught and believed the
doctrine of Determinism. It would be a mistake, how
ever, to suppose that in writing on the subject of the
Will, Descartes had any conception of this doctrine in
his mind; for the pamphlet in which Hobbes made
known his system to the world was not published until
* Westminster Review, July 1871. Whoever desires to attain to an
adequate conception of the various causes of the genesis and per
sistence of Libertarianism, cannot do better than read the masterly
article on the subject contained in this number of the Review.
�16
On the Free-Will Controversy.
after the year 1655, while the writings in which
Descartes’ opinions concerning the Will are chiefly
found, appeared at Paris in the year 1641. As might
have been expected, then, Descartes’ doctrine of FreeWill was set up in opposition, not to Determinism, but
to that system of Necessitarianism or Fatalism with
which Bishop Butler deals in his Analogy, and which,
it need hardly be said, is altogether distinct from and
incompatible with the Determinist theory. Accord
ingly, Descartes’ definition of Freedom is such as might
be conscientiously adopted by the most scrupulous of
Determinists. “ The power of will,” he says, “ consists
in this alone, that in pursuing or shunning what is
proposed to us by the understanding, we so act that
we are not conscious of being determined to a particular
action by any external force.
*
This is a perfectly
truthful, though inadequate, definition of the Will,
and it is with strict justice that Descartes replies to
Hobbes (who had remarked on the passage quoted
above, that it assumed, without proving, the doctrine
of Free-Will) ; “I have assumed or advanced nothing
concerning Freedom, save that which we experience to
be true every day of our lives, and which the light of
nature plainly teaches us.” * That Descartes was not
far off from Determinism in his views is seen from his
remarks on Indifference. “ In order to be free,” he
says, “it is not necessary that I should be indifferent
as to the choice of one or other of two contrary things.
Nay, rather, the more I incline towards one thing
(whether because I see clearly that right and truth agree
in it, or because God has so ordered the course of my
feelings), with so much the greater freedom do I make
my choice and adhere to that thing. And assuredly the
grace of God and my natural understanding, far from
diminishing my freedom, augment it and strengthen it
rather ; so that the indifference which I feel when I
am not led away on one side more than on the other by
* Quatrième Meditation.
4 Troisième Response.
�On the Free-Will Controversy.
17
the influence of any motive, is the lowest kind of
liberty, and indicates rather a defect in knowledge than
a perfection of the will. For if I always knew clearly
what was true and what was good, I would never have
to go to the trouble of deliberating what decision and
w’hat choice I should make j and so I should be per
fectly free without ever being indifferent.
*
Accord
ing to Descartes, then, “every sentient being, under a
motive to act, and not interfered with by any other
being, is to all intents free;”! and thus “the fox
impelled bv hunger, and proceeding unmolested to the
poultry yard, would be a free agent.But this, it
needs hardly be said, is precisely the teaching of De
terminism. Indeed Descartes has fallen short of that
system merely in so far as he has admitted the con
ception of a liberty of indifference. This is, of course,
to give a double sense to the word liberty, and so to
confuse the question not a little. But we have already
seen that on this point Descartes speaks with hesitation,
and we may safely agree with Professor Bain in regard
ing him as “ willing to give up the liberty of in
difference,” while anxious to establish the internal feel
ing of freedom.
While Descartes is thus to be regarded merely as the
exponent of the popular practical feeling of liberty
protesting against the paralysing creed of fatalism,. or
of an overruling and irresistible external power which
guides men’s actions irrespective of their will ; Clarke,
Price, and Reid, on the other band, have each framed
definitions of Freedom, having special reference to, and
combating, the doctrine of Determinism. Clarke and
Price agree in making freedom to consist in a power of
self-motion or self-determination, which in all animate
agents, is spontaneity, in moral agents, is liberty. How,
they asked, can it be supposed that motives are the
immediate cause of action 1 It is true that our faculty
* Quatrième Meditation,
f Bain, “ Mental and Moral Science,” page 398.
Î Bain, “Mental and Moral Science,” p. 398.
B
�18
On the Free-Will Controversy.
of self-determination is never called forth into action
save on the presentation of some end or design to the
mind. But it is unmeaning to make such ends or
motives the physical causes of action. “ Our ideas may
be the occasion of our acting, but are certainly
not mechanical efficients.” “ If,” says Clarke, “ every
action of man is to be regarded as determined by some
motive, then either abstracted notions (f.e. motives)
have a real subsistence (which would be Realism),
or else what is not a substance can put a body in
motion.”* According to Leibnitz, the will is to be
compared to a balance, whose motion one way or an
other is determined by the weights in the scales (the
motives). In the opinion of Clarke and his followers,
however, the true comparison would be to a hand
placed on either side of the beam, and determining the
motion of the scales irrespective of, and possibly in
opposition to, the preponderance of weights.
In thus assimilating Spontaneity and Freedom,
Clarke and Price laid themselves open to the severe
criticism of Sir W. Hamilton, who writes (note to
Reid on “The Active Powers”):—“The Liberty from
Go-action or Violence—the Liberty of Spontaneity—is
admitted by all parties; is common equally to brutes
and men; is not a peculiar quality of the Will; and
is, in fact, essential to it, for the will cannot possibly
be forced. The greatest spontaneity is the greatest
necessity. Thus a hungry horse, who turns of necessity
to food, is said, on this definition of liberty, to do so
with freedom, because he does so spontaneously; and,
in general, the desire of happiness, which is the most
necessary tendency, will, on this application of the
term, be the most free. The definition of liberty
given by the celebrated advocate of moral freedom,
Dr Samuel Clarke, is in reality only that of the liberty
of spontaneity.”
But while Clarke and Price, by incautiously identi* For an explanation of the misconception involved here, see
Bain “ Mind and Body,” pp. 76, 132.
�On the Free-Will Controversy.
19
fying spontaneity and liberty, were guilty of confusing
together the freedom of self-determination with the
freedom which is opposed to external constraint (z.e.,
the “ liberty from co-action ” of Hamilton, Reid is
careful to withhold from the brute creation the posses
sion of any faculty analogous to our volitional power.
Reid, Clarke, and Price, however, unite in regarding
this power as a faculty of self-determination. “ By the
liberty of a Moral Agent,” says Reid, “I understand
a power over the determinations of his own will.” “A.
free agent,” says Clarke, “when there is more than one
perfectly reasonable way of acting (i.e., when there is
a perfect equilibrium of motives), has still within itself,
by virtue of its self-motive principle, a power of acting.”
This notion of a self-determining agent has been criti
cally examined both by Edwards and Hamilton, a brief
outlineof whose remarks on the subjectwill next hegiven.
Edwards starts by proclaiming the inconceivability
of such a notion as that of self-determination. The
Will, he says, is said to determine its own acts. Now,
it is manifest that it can do this solely by means of an
act of volition; for (to quote Hamilton’s words) “it is
only through a rational determination or volition that
we can freely exert power.” But if this be so, then it
follows that every free volitional act requires a preceding
volition to constitute it free; and so on ad infinitum.
This evidently is to bring the matter to an absurdity.
If it be answered that the act of determining the
volitional action, and the act of willing, are one and
the same, then the obvious rejoinder is, that a freeaction is determined by nothing, and is entirely un
caused. Self-determinism, therefore, is a misnomer,
and the correct name for such a creed is Indeterminism.
Now Indeterminism teaches that the actions of our will
do not originate in any causes. It therefore contradicts
the law of causality. But if this law be made void,
then the foundation of all reasoning—nay, the only
possible proof for the existence of God—will have
vanished; and there will remain nothing save the
�20
On the Free-Will Controversy.
fleeting thoughts present to our consciousness, of the
existence of which we can be certain.
*
Nor is Sir William Hamilton less emphatic when he
exposes the inconsistent and inconceivable character of
Heid’s definition of Freedom. “ According to Reid,” he
writes, “ Moral Liberty does not merely consist in
doing what we will, but in the power of willing what
we will. For a power over the determinations of our
will supposes an act of will that our will should deter
mine so and so. . . . But here question upon question
remains (and this ad infinitum)—Have we a power (a
will) over such anterior will ? And until this question
shall be distinctively answered, we must be unable to
conceive the possibility of the fact of Liberty!’
To those Libertarians who endeavoured to evade the
charge of denying causality by affirming that the per
son was the cause of his volitions, Hamilton puts the
question :—“Is the person an original undetermined
cause of the determination of his will ? If he be not,
then he is not a free agent, and the scheme of Necessity
is admitted. If he be, in the first place, it is imposs
ible to conceive the possibility of this ; and, in the
second, if the fact, though inconceivable, be allowed, it
is impossible to see how a cause, undetermined by any
motive, can be a rational, moral, and accountable cause.”
But while Sir William Hamilton insisted so unspar
ingly on the inconceivability of the liberty of a moral
agent as defined by Reid, and on the fact that, if
conceived, it could only he conceived as morally worth
less, it is nevertheless notorious that he regarded this
* “To show that any doctrine contradicted the law of cause and
effect was, Edwards conceived, a perfect reductio ad dbsurdum. He
did not anticipate that anyone would impugn the universality of
cause and effect.” Some Libertarians, endeavouring to save the
law of causation by a verbal quibble, asserted that the soul was the
cause of its volitions. “Edwards answers, that this may explain
why the soul acts at all, but not why it acts in a particular manner.
And unless the soul produce diverse acts, it cannot produce diverse
effects, otherwise the same cause, in the same circumstances, would
produce different effects at different times.”—Bain, Mental and
Moral Science, page 417.
�On the Free-Will Controversy.
2I
definition as correct, and that he was a strenuous
upholder of the doctrine of self-determination. Hamil
ton adopts a peculiar attitude towards the controversy
of the Will, and his positions on this subject cannot he
understood without a reference to his general philo
sophical system. In this system a very prominent
place is assigned to what he calls the Law of the
Conditioned, which is expressed thus :—“ All that is
conceivable in thought lies between two extremes,
which, as contradictory of each other, cannot both be
true, but of which, as. mutual contradictories (by the
Law of Excluded Middle), one must.’’ This law
Hamilton illustrates by adducing our conceptions of
Space and Time. “ Space must be bounded or not
bounded, but we are unable to conceive either alter
native. We cannot conceive space as a whole, beyond
which there is no further space. Neither can we
conceive space as without limits. Let us imagine space
never so large, we yet fall infinitely short of infinite
space. But finite and infinite space are contradictories ;
therefore, although we are unable to conceive either
alternative, one must be true and the other false. The
conception of Time illustrates the same law. Starting
from the present, we cannot think past time as
bounded, as beginning to be. On the other hand, we
cannot conceive time going backwards without end ;
eternity is too big for our imaginations. Yet time had
either a beginning or it had not. Thus ‘ the con
ditioned or the thinkable lies between two extremes or
poles ; and these extremes or poles are each of them
unconditioned, each of them inconceivable, each of
them exclusive or contradictory of the other.’ ” *
To apply this doctrine to the subject of the Will;
the two unconditioned extremes or poles are here
represented by the contradictory doctrines of Deter
minism and Casualism (or the self-determinist theory
of Liberty). These two contradictory schemes are
* Bain’s Compendium of Mental and Moral Science, Appendix
B, p. 68.
�'ll
On the Free-Will Controversy.
equally inconceivable. “ For, as we cannot compass
in thought an undetermined cause, an absolute com
mencement-—the fundamental hypothesis of the one ;
so we can as little think an infinite series of determined
causes—of relative commencements,—the fundamental
hypothesis of the other. The champions of the opposite
doctrines are thus at once resistless in assault and
impotent in defence. The doctrine of Moral Liberty
cannot be made conceivable, for we can only conceive
the determined and the relative. All that can be
*
done is to show, (1.) That, for the fact of Liberty, we
have immediately or mediately, the evidence of con
sciousness ; and (2.) that there are, among the
phenomena of mind, many facts which we must admit
as actual, but of whose possibility we are wholly unable
to form any notion/’ Thus according to Hamilton,
the inconceivability of the self-determinist scheme is
counterbalanced by a co-equal inconceivability in the
doctrine of determinism, and the scale is turned in
favour of self-determinism by the testimony, mediate
or immediate, of consciousness.
If Sir William Hamilton has displayed no small
stringency in his destructive criticisms upon the defini
tions of Freedom coming from Clarke and Reid, and
has thus saved his adversaries a considerable amount
of trouble by vigorously demolishing his friends, his
own peculiar doctrines, on the other hand, have been
subjected to an examination no less searching and no
less destructive, by the illustrious philosopher recently
gone from among us, John Stuart Mill. In one of the
concluding chapters of his masterly work, the
“ Examination of Sir W. Hamilton’s Philosophy,”
Mill enters upon a minute and exhaustive discussion
on the subject of the Will, and of the Libertarian
theories of it. After severely censuring Hamilton for
his attempt to give a fictitious importance to his
doctrine of Freedom by representing it as affording the
* It has already been pointed out that Hamilton rejects the
evasive quibble that the soul is the cause of our volitions.
�On the Free-Will Controversy.
23
only valid argument in support of the existence of God,
he proceeds :—“ Let us concede to Hamilton the co
equal inconceivability of the conflicting hypothesis, an
uncaused commencement and an infinite regress. But
this choice of inconceivabilities is not offered to us in
the case of volitions only. We are held, as he not only
admits but contends, to the same alternative in all
cases of causation whatever. But we find our way out
of the difficulty, in other cases, in quite a different
manner. In the case of every other kind of fact, we
do not elect the hypothesis that the event took place
without a cause : we accept the other supposition, that
of a regress, not indeed to infinity, but either generally
into the region of the unknowable, or back to a
universal cause, regarding which, as we are only con
cerned with it in relation to what it preceded, and not
as itself preceded by anything, we can afford to make
a plain avowal of our ignorance.” Now why do we
thus, in all cases save only our volitions, accept the
alternative of regress 1 “ Apparently it is because the
causation hypothesis, inconceivable as he ” (Hamilton)
“ may think it, possesses the advantage of having
experience on its side. And how or by what evidence
does experience testify to it 1 Not by disclosing any
nexus between the cause and the effect, any sufficient
reason in the cause itself why the effect should follow
it. No philosopher now makes this supposition, and
Sir W. Hamilton positively disclaims it. What
experience makes known, is the fact of an invariable
sequence between every event and some special com
bination of antecedent conditions, in such sort that
wherever and whenever that union of antecedents
exists, the event does not fail to occur. Any must in
the case, any necessity, other than the unconditional
universality of the fact, we know nothing of. Still
this a posteriori “does,” though not confirmed by an
a priori “must,” decides our choice between the two
inconceivables, and leads us to the belief that every
event within the phenomenal universe, except human
�24
On the Free-Will Controversy.
volitions, is determined to take place by a cause. Now
the so-called Necessitarians demand the application of
the same rule of judgment to our volitions. They
maintain that there is the same evidence for it. They
affirm as a truth of experience that volitions do, in
point of fact, follow determinate moral antecedents with
the same uniformity and . . . with the same certainty
as physical effects follow their physical causes. . . .
Whether they must do so, I acknowledge myself to be
entirely ignorant, be the phenomenon moral or
physical; and I condemn accordingly the word
necessity as applied to either case. All I know is that
they tZo.”*
The testimony of experience, then, which is admitted
on all hands to be in favour of (so called) Necessity, is
that on which the Determinists ground their system.
The Libertarians, on the other hand, agree in claiming
the evidence of consciousness as making for their side.
“We have by our constitution,” says Reid, “a natural
conviction or belief that we act freely.” In his notes
to Reid’s essay on the Active Powers, Hamilton
hesitates between regarding the sense of freedom as an
ultimate datum of consciousness, and treating it as
involved in our consciousness of the law of moral
obligation or responsibility; in his lectures on Meta
physics, however, he speaks of it more plainly as a fact
of which we are directly conscious. Is it really the
case, then, asks Mill, that the admitted testimony of
man’s universal experience, is hopelessly at variance
with the testimony of his consciousness 1 If this be so,
then is the mental philosopher in an unenviable plight
indeed. But let us examine more nearly what is meant
by the testimony of consciousness. “To be conscious
of free-will, must mean, to be conscious before I have
decided that I am able to decide either way. Exception
may be taken, in limine, to the use of the word
consciousness in such an application. Consciousness
tells me what I do or feel. But what I am able to do,
* “ Examination of Sir W. Hamilton's Philosophy,” p. 500.
�On the Free-Will Controversy.
25
is not a subject of consciousness. Consciousness is
not prophetic; we are conscious of what is, not of
what will or can be. We never know that we are able
to do a thing except from having done it or something
equal or similar to it. . . . If our so-called conscious
ness' of what we are able to do is not borne out by
experience, it is a delusion. It has no title to. ciedence
but as an interpretation of experience, and if it is a
false interpretation it must give way.” Our so-called
consciousness of, or belief in, freedom,, therefore, must
be an interpretation of our past experience, t.e., with
regard to foregone acts of deliberation and choice, we
must be conscious that we could have decided the
other way ; “ but, the truth is, not unless we preferred
that way. 'When we imagine ourselves acting .differ
ently from what we did, we think of a change in the
antecedents, as by knowing something that we did not
know. Mill therefore altogether disputes the assertion
that we are conscious of being able to act in opposition
to the strongest present desire or aversion.”*
Having in this manner pointed out the error of those
who claim the testimony of consciousness in support of
the Freedom or Indeterminatensss of the will, Mill
proceeds to consider the other position assumed by
Hamilton, viz., that the fact of freedom is involved m
our consciousness of moral obligation or responsibility.
To quote Hamilton’s words
“ Our consciousness of
the m oral law, which, without a moral liberty in man,
would be a mendacious imperative, gives a decisive
preponderance to the doctrine of freedom over the
doctrine of fate. AVe are free in act, if we are account
able for our actions.” Now this is the main argument
of the Indeterminist; it seeks to establish the doctrine
of free-will by representing it as inextricably involved
in the common conception of accountability or moral
desert, so that the two must stand or fall togethei.
There is not a writer on the side of Libertarianism who
has not dwelt with emphasis upon this argument.
* Bain, “ Mental and Moral Science,” p. 427.
�26
On the Free-Will Controversy.
Thus Reid writes, “Let us suppose a man necessarily
determined in all cases to will and to do what is best
to be done • he would surely be innocent and inculp
able. But as far as I am able to judge, he would not
be entitled to the esteem and moral approbation of
those who knew and believed this necessity. . . . On
the other hand, if a man be necessarily determined to
do ill, this case seems to me to move pity, but not dis
approbation. He was ill because he could not be
otherwise. Who can blame him ? Necessity has no
law.” “If there is no free choice,” writes Mr Froude,
“ the praise or blame with which we regard one another
are impertinent and out of place.”* “ Man,” says
Hamilton in another place, “ is a moral agent only as
he is unaccountable for his actions—in other words, as
he is the object of praise or blame ; and this he is only
inasmuch as he has prescribed to him a rule of duty,
and as he is able to act, or not to act, in conformity
with its precepts. The possibility of morality thus
depends on the possibility of liberty • for if a man be
not a free agent he is not the author of his actions, and
has, therefore, no responsibility,—no moral personality
at all.”
Now, in order to determine whether freedom from
causation is involved in the notion of moral responsi
bility, we shall be obliged to subject that notion to a
careful analysis. What, then, is meant by the feeling
of responsibility 1 Simply a conviction that if we
committed certain actions, we should deserve punish
ment for so doing. A sense of responsibility is pre
cisely identical with a sense of the justice of punish
ment. Now, punishment presupposes Law, of which
it is the sanction, i.e., to ensure obedience to which it
is inflicted on the disobedient. Accountability, then,
or responsibility, involves a sense of the justice of Law;
and the question before us resolves itself into this—Is
it necessary to assume that human voluntary action is
undetermined by any moral antecedents, in order to
* Quoted before on p. 7.
�On the Free-Will Controversy.
27
justify the institution of law and punishment ? So far
is this from being the case, that (to use the words of
Herbert Spencer) “if there is no natural causation
throughout the actions of incorporated humanity,
government and legislation are absurd. Acts of Par
liament may, as well as not, be made to depend on the
drawing of lots or the tossing of a coin; or, rather,
there may as well be none at all.” * The exigencies of
human society require that restrictions should be placed
upon the conduct of the individuals who together make
it up ; this justifies the institution of Law. The justi
fication of Punishment absolutely necessitates the
assumption that men’s actions follow the law of cause
and effect. “Unless pain, present or prospective,
impels human beings to avoid whatever brings it, and
to perform whatever delivers from it, punishment has
no relevance, whether the end be the benefit of the
society, or the benefit of the offender, or both to
gether.” f It may be asked—“ Is it just to punish a
man for what he cannot help ? Certainly it is, if
punishment is the only means by which he can be
enabled to help it. Punishment is inflicted as a
means towards an end—that is to say, if our volitions
are not determined by motives, then punishment is
without justification. If an end is justifiable, the sole
and necessary means to that end must be justifiable.
Now the Necessitarian theory proceeds upon two ends
-—the benefit of the offender himself and the protection
of others. To punish a child for its benefit, is no
more unjust than to administer medicine.” $
Such is a brief outline of Mill’s answer to the
position of Hamilton, that freedom is involved in our
consciousness of moral responsibility. Those who wish
to examine the arguments on both sides in detail, will
find them in the 26th chapter of Mill’s “ Examination
of Sir W. Hamilton’s Philosophy,” and in the admir* “Study of Sociology,” p. 46.
t Bain, “ Compendium,” p. 404,
+ Bain, “ Compendium," p. 428.
�28
On the Free-Will Controversy.
able remarks on “ Liberty and Necessity,” contained in
the lltli chapter of Bain’s “Exposition of the Will,”
to be found in his invaluable “ Compendium of Psy
chology and Ethics.” We have seen that in demolish
ing this position of his opponent, Mill has established
the very opposite principle, viz., that the doctrine of
Determinism is necessarily implicated in the notion of
moral agency or responsibility. This, however, does
not hinder but that there should be some truth in the
assertion that the common notion of responsibility
involves in it the hypothesis of a free and undeter
mined will. For, according to the common conception
of moral desert, there is inherent in moral evil or
wrong-doing a heinousness and a perniciousness quite
unique, irrespective of its consequences; and it is
obviously difficult to reconcile with this view the hypo
thesis of a will determined by the strongest motive,
seeing that the peculiar pravity which is the essential
characteristic of moral evil ought in the natural course
of things to exercise a deterring influence stronger than
any counter-influence arising from the prospect of pos
sible advantage to be gained thereby. Accordingly,
the notion of a free and undetermined will, raised
above the influence of motive, and resolving on a course
of wickedness in spite of the dissuasive considerations
suggested by the horrible nature of wrong-doing, was
called in to explain the phenomena of man’s moral
frailty; and this notion soon generated a conception of
punishment as of a kind of vengeance, rightly and duly
inflicted upon the ill-doer, without regard to any bene
ficial results accruing to himself or to society. Now,
this vague notion of the nature of punishment is wholly
incompatible with the definition of it which has been
already given, and which is admitted on all hands to
embody some at least, if not all, of the elements con
tained in the positive signification of the word “ pun
ishment.” On the Determinist theory of volition,
therefore, the vulgar notions of virtue and of vice, as
qualities to be lauded and reprobated irrespective of
�On the Free-Will Controversy.
29
their consequences, as well as the conception of punish
ment as a righteous retribution for ill-doing, apart from
any consideration of the useful ends to be served by it,
must disappear altogether. Virtue is « a great happi
ness but no merit in the vulgar sense of the term;
and vice is “ a great misfortune, but no demerit. *
We have now concluded our review of the great
controversy of the Will. Starting with the considera
tion of the question as it stands at the present day, we
saw how numerous and how momentous are the practi
cal issues involved in its solution. We then went on
to enquire whether any, and if so, what psychological
or other causes there were, which would exercise a dis
turbing influence in the decision of this question, and,
as a result, we found that there were many and potent
emotional and other agencies at work in generating and
fostering the belief in an indeterminate will. ± .inally,
we have passed in review the leading definitions of
pree-Will which have been advanced on the side of
Indeterminism, and have given a brief outline of the
destructive criticism of these definitions which has pro
ceeded from Edwards, Hamilton, and Mill.successively.
We have seen that our consciousness, which has been
so triumphantly appealed to by the supporters of free
will, does not in truth, when closely interrogated, yield
any evidence whatever in. favour of that doctrine ; and
that the testimony of experience, which is universally
regarded as a sufficient ground for the belief m the law
of°causality as holding throughout the pheenomenal uni
verse (volitional acts alone being excepted), is admitted
by everybody to be altogether in favour of Determinism,
i.e. of the law of causality as extending over the field
of human action also. We have noticed, however, that
the theory of Determinism involves the sacrifice of the
common notions of moral excellence and depravity;
and it is precisely here (as has been shown by the writer
in the Westminster Review) that the strength of Libertar
ianism lies. Men are indignant when it is insinuated
* Westminster Review, October 1873, p. 311,
�50
On the Free-Will Controversy.
that the popular beliefs with regard to merit and demerit,
responsibility, and punishment, are in great part the
products of lying imagination. They refuse to allow
any moral excellence to actions performed unconsciously
under the constraining influence of unreflecting love or
sympathy. Mr Mivart declares that “acts unaccom
panied by mental acts of conscious will directed towards
the fulfilment of duty ” are “ absolutely destitute of
the most incipient degree of real or formal goodness.”*
According to Reid, a man necessarily determined by
the constitution of his nature to will and to do what is
best to be done, “ would not be entitled to the esteem
and moral approbation of those who knew and believed
this necessity.” “ What was by an ancient author said
of Cato, might indeed be said of him :■—he was good be
cause he could not be otherwise. But this saying if
understood literally and strictly is not the praise of
Cato, but of his constitution, which was no more the
work of Cato than his existence?’ Now, in the first
place, be it remarked that this view of moral excellence,
as involving free and undetermined choice of the good,
excludes not only the man who does good without
thinking about it, but the Deity also, from the category
of beings possessed of a claim to our moral approbation.
We are compelled to think of God as necessarily good;
to attribute to Him the power of moral evil is, as
Hamilton has pointed out, to detract from his essential
goodness. Precisely in the same sense as Cato was
said to be good, because he could not be otherwise, so
is God declared to be, in virtue of his nature, necessarily
determined to goodness. “ As Euripides hath it, h
(hoi ri dpuciiv differpbv, ovx, iislv
According to the
Libertarian definition of moral excellence, then, we
shall be obliged to deny that God possesses any moral
attributes at all, or else to detract from his essential
goodness by admitting the possibility of his becoming
* “On the Genesis of Species,” quoted by Huxley, “Critiques,”
&c. p. 287.
Hamilton, note to Reid’s Essay on the Active Powers.
�On the Free-Will Controversy.
31
evil; and it need hardly be said that this is a corollary
of their doctrine from which most Libertarians would
recoil with horror. But, not to press this point any
further—can it be possible that we are to regard all
actions prompted by unreflecting sympathy and affection
as “ absolutely destitute of the most incipient degree of
real or formal goodness ?” Surely not; the unanimous
verdict of mankind forbids it. The perfect ideal of a
virtuous character is that of the man whose actions
invariably have for their spring and source an instinc
tive feeling of sympathy for his fellow-men, irrespective
of any selfish considerations. Or do Mr Mivart and
those who agree with him think to persuade us that
the mother who rushes forward to save her child’s life
at the sacrifice of her own—that a Howard and a
Nightingale, whom the importunate promptings of their
inn er nature nrge irresistibly forth from the refinements
and the pleasures of domestic life, to all the horrors
and miseries of an existence passed in the midst of
prisons, lazar-houses, and hospitals that these are
creatures devoid of any “ title to our esteem or moral
approbation?” Such a doctrine only requires to be
fully and definitely stated, in order to be instantly and
unequivocally repudiated.
Our space will not permit us to enter upon a con
sideration of the various collateral arguments urged by
the two sides of this great controversy of the wifi. For
a full account of these, the reader is referred to the
admirable “ History of the Free-Will Controversy,” to
be found in Professor Bain’s Compendium of Mental
and Moral Science. We will merely add, in conclusion,
that the Determinist hypothesis has always been practi
cally recognised by men in their dealings with one
another. It has been already shown that the institution
of Law presupposes the fact of a uniform connection
between pain and the action necessary to avoid it, that
is, of the law of uniform succession in our acts and
their moral antecedents. Nor does the conduct of
individuals towards one another show less clearly the
�22
On the Free-Will Controversy.
conviction of such a principle of uniformity. For ex
ample (to quote an instance from J. Stuart Mill), “Men
often regard the doubt what their conduct will be, as
a mark of ignorance of their character, and sometimes
even resent it as an imputation.”* Indeed, not only
is prevision concerning the conduct of others constantly
necessary, in virtue of the interdependence of human
beings aggregated in society j it is also no less easy and
sure than the prevision of physical phenomena. “ If,
in crossing a street, a man sees a carriage coming upon
him, you may safely assert that, in nine hundred and
ninety-nine cases out of a thousand, he will try to get
out of the way. ... If he can buy next door a com
modity of daily consumption better and cheaper than
at the other end of town, we may affirm that, if he does
not buy next door, some special relation between him
and the remoter shopkeeper furnishes a strong reason
for taking a worse commodity at greater cost of money
and trouble.” f Finally, what logical justification of
sympathy can there be—how is it possible to reconcile
reason and fellow-feeling, save on the hypothesis of
determinism 1 Is it not in this creed that we find the
strongest incentive to mercy, charity, long-suffering—
to “hatred of the sin, and yet love for the sinner j in
a word, to all that is highest and noblest in the charac
ter of man as a social being ? May the day soon come
—and perhaps it is not far distant—when a public and
practical recognition shall be given to this great prin
ciple, and when the popular sanction shall establish a
basis and a system of psychology so fruitful in beneficial
result, not only in Legislation, but in the Sciences of
Morality and Education also. This paper will not
have been written in vain, if it should arouse any to
the earnest and sincere examination of the great sub
ject with which it has dealt.
* Mill, “ Logic,” Book VI., chapter it, §2.
f Spencer, “Study of Sociology,” page 38.
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PADRE OF THE ESTABLISHED CHURCH.
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The Unity of the Faith among all Nations
PARENT AND TEACHER, A. Is Death the end of all things for Man? - 0
pyj-y T0IA ~N~ A
A Dialogue by way of Catechism,—Religious, Moral, and Philosophical
1
Parts I. and II. 6d. each Part
'
'
'
The Pentateuch, in Contrast with the Science and Moral Sense ot our Age
Part I.—Genesis, Is. fid. Part II.-Exodus, Is. Part III.-Leviticus, Is. 4
Numbers, Is.,
--------PRESBYTER ANGLICANUS.
.
.
m
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Eternal Punishment. An Examination of the Doctrines held by theCleigj oi
the Church of England
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The Doctrine of Immortality in its Bearing on Education
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ROBERTSON, JOHN, Coupar-Angus.
Intellectual Liberty’
The Finding of the Book
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SCOTT, THOMAS.
O 9
Basis of a New Reformation V____
Commentators and Hierophants ; or, The Honesty of Christian Commentatoi s
in Two Parts. 6d. each Part
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Miracles and Prophecies
Original Sin
Practical Remarks on “The Lord’s Prayer.”
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�List of Publications—continued.
s. d.
SCOTT, THOMAS—continued.
of Ripon on the Physical Resurrection of Jesus, in its Bearing
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on the Truth of Christianity
4 4
The English Life of Jesus. A New Edition
0 fi
The Tactics and Defeat of the Christian Evidence Society
The Dean
STRANGE, T. LUMISDEN, late Judge of the High Court of Madras.
A Critical Catechism. Criticised by a Doctor of Divinity, and defended by
T. L. Strange
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Clerical Integrity
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Communion with God ----- 0
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The Bennett Judgment
The Bible; Is it “The Word of God?”
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The Speaker’s Commentary Reviewed
The Christian Evidence Society'
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The Exercise of Prayer,
SUFFIELD, Rev. ROBERT RODOLPH.
The Resurrection An Easter Sermon at the Free Christian Church, Croydon - 0 3
Five Letters on Conversion to Roman Catholicism 0 3
TAYLOR, P. A., M.P. Realities ------VOYSEY, The Rev. CHAS. On Moral Evil
----- 0
W. E. B.
0 6
An Examination of some Recent Writings about Immortality 0 6
The Province of Prayer,
- *
WHEELWRIGHT, Rev. GEORGE.
The “ Edinburgh Review” and Dr Strauss
Three Letters on the Voysey Judgment
Society’s Lectures,
-
WIFE OF BENEFIOED CLERGYMAN.
On the Deity’ of Jesus. Parts I. and II., 6d. each Part
WORTHINGTON, The Rev W. R.
On the Efficacy
of
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Christian Evidence
and the
Opinion in Matters of Religion
0 6
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Two Essays : On the Interpretation of the Language of the Old Testament, and
Believing Yvithout Understanding ZERFFI, G. G., Ph.D.
The Vedas and the Zend-Avesta : The First Dawn of Awakening Religious Con
sciousness in Humanity
-
0
fi
3
SCOTT’S “ ENGLISH LIEE OF JESUS.”
Tn One Volume, 8ro, bound in doth, post free, Is. 4d.,
SECOND EDITION OF
THE ENGLISH LIFE OF JESUS.
RECENTLY PUBLISHED BY THE AUTHOR,
THOMAS SCOTT,
11 THE TERRACE, FARQUHAR ROAD, UPPER NORWOOD, LONDON, S.E.
Notice.—Post Office Orders to be made payable to Thomas Scott,
Westow Hill Office, Upper Norwood, London, S.E.
Friends to the cause of “ Free Inquiry and Free Expression," are
earnestly requested to give aid in the wide dissemination of these
publications.
�
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On the free-will controversy
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Hutchison, Thomas Dancer
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Free will
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Free Will and Determinism
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ON THE
MATERIALISM OF MODERN SCIENCE ;
OPENING
ADDRESS,
READ BEFORE
THE
LITERARY AND PHILOSOPHICAL SOCIETY OF LIVERPOOL,
October 5th, 1871.
BY
ALBERT
J.
MOTT,
President.
��ON THE MATERIALISM OF MODERN SCIENCE.
The time is near at hand, if we may judge our age by its
tendencies, when the pursuit of science will have to justify
itself anew to the reason of mankind. It is not a matter of
course that human beings should spend the hours which
remain to them, after the necessities of life have been pro
vided for, in exploring the mysteries of Nature or unravel
ing the threads of history. That great happiness may
co-exist with little knowledge is a fact of daily observation.
That it increases in this world in the ratio of our intellectual
acquirements has never been proved, and is far from pro
bable. We know how often the lives of learned men are
melancholy lives. Health injured in the laboratory ; eye
sight dimmed behind the telescope; strength exhausted in
toiling over hills and deserts; time, which never returns,
spent in the severities of study or the languor of overwork ;
all these are the common incidents of scientific research, and
must continue to be so while human nature remains the
same. And although there are some men in all ages who
devote themselves to science by an irresistible impulse, which
requires no stimulus, asks for no reason and defies all
possible discouragement, this fact, instead of recommending
such studies to mankind at large, removes one powerful
motive to their general pursuit. For nature will in any case
be continually explored by these, her natural devotees ; the
main truths discoverable at any given period will be dis
covered by them; the rest will receive whatever practical
benefit arises from such discoveries without any effort of
�2
president’s address.
their own, and the utilitarian purposes of science are in this
way sure to be attained, at all events to a considerable
degree.
The grounds on which the acquisition of knowledge
through laborious study, not forced upon us by immediate
wants or special instincts, can be seriously advocated,
belong altogether to our conception of human life itself, its
destiny, its purposes and its proper aims, and these being
themselves among the subjects of scientific research, our
conclusions concerning them are the most important and
fundamental of its products ; the elements by which alone
we can determine whether its further prosecution can be
worth the time and pains it must demand.
Now we are accustomed to take for granted that it is of
course worth this time and pains, and the reason is very
obvious. We belong to a race which as such has never
doubted the immortality of the human soul, and the special
form in which this is the belief of Christendom at once
determines our views of the nature and ends of life. Mental
powers which are to be used, not for fifty years but for ever,
are of course worth cultivating for their own sakes here. To
fit ourselves for future and endless occupations, not to make
an ephemeral life as pleasant as may be while its lasts, is the
work suited to our present condition. Nothing in the
universe can be uninteresting to us whom the universe itself
cannot outlive. No acquisition of knowledge can possibly
satisfy our proper wish for it, when the field and the time
before us are both of them recognised as infinite. These,
which are the mere aphorisms of common sense, are raised
into the axioms of philosophy by that conception of higher
natures and Power diviner than our own, which is the neces
sary adjunct of a belief in human immortality in any form ;
and this belief gives a final reason for unlimited effort
�president’s address.
3
towards our own mental progress, by altogether freeing us
from the fear, which would otherwise be overwhelming, that
life may slip away for ever while we are only preparing the
ground on which no harvest can ripen, and where our labour
will have been in vain.
It is this philosophy, deeply planted in all civilised
nations of modern times, that causes an intuitive assent to
be given to the wisdom of laborious study and of present
sacrifice, for the sake of mental growth. It is of course in
perfect harmony with Christianity itself, inasmuch as all the
reasons that are valid in seeking our own improvement are,
from the Christian point of view, still more so if we seek the
improvement of others.
But modern science has been coming to some momentous
conclusions, which are in their essence destructive of every
philosophy of this kind, and if these are true we have no
right to take for granted on the existing grounds that the
advancement of knowledge must be good for us. The
philosophy on which all our habits of thought are founded
assumes as its first postulate that two different kinds of being
actually exist, and are apprehended by us as existing. Wc
call them matter and mind; body and spirit; the material
and the immaterial. We never question the fact that in
using these words we are naming two orders of things essen
tially unlike each other, or that their existence and their
difference are intelligible to us. One of the most essential
points of difference is in their relation to human life.
Human life, so far as it depends on the existence of our
bodies, depends on that which is in its nature transitory.
The elements of which our bodies are composed appear
themselves to be indestructible, but they exhibit none of
the phenomena of human life unless combined in this com
plicated and unstable form. And since different living bodies
are successively formed by the combination of the same
�4
president’s address.
particles of matter, no power can reconstruct them so that
all should exist again at the same time. A living body is
not in fact, but only in appearance, the same being from day
to day. If we watch a moving crowd at such a distance that
we can see no movement, but only see that the same points
are always occupied by similar forms, those forms seem
permanent in those positions, and that which changes at
every moment may appear unaltered for any length of time.
But as in a crowd like this, so in our bodily frames, if each
successive particle or union of particles possessed a con
sciousness of its own, they would have no notion of identity
with those which preceded them. Such a notion can only
be entertained by a looker-on, and by him only through
imperfect observation.
On the other hand, our mental nature constantly asserts
its own permanent identity, and while perfectly aware that
thoughts, feelings, and all mental operations or states suc
ceed each other, and form a series and a process, it main
tains always that these do not constitute a mental being any
more than motion constitutes a material particle, and that
the being who feels and acts continues the same being, as
strictly as the moving particle continues to be the same.
All the explanations of what we mean by mental identity
either admit this or else they are arguments to prove that
successive thoughts and feelings give rise to one permanent
thought or feeling, which we call the consciousness of
identity; and that the notion thus embodied is untrue.
The notion, however, is ineradicable, and forms a necessary
part of the philosophy I am considering.
Now the bearing of this part of our philosophy upon the
question of human immortality is very clear. To think of
a dead body as simply restored to life, and as being then the
same living person as before, is easy enough in a certain
�president’s address.
5
stage of ignorance, but becomes quite impossible as soon as
we notice what happens to the body after death. This has
been everywhere perceived, and the literal identity of bodily
forms in a future life does not, I suppose, form part of any
theory on the subject. The identity with which we all feel
concerned is mental identity. We change our bodies con
stantly in the present world, and can imagine ourselves
inhabiting any sort of external form. But the very forms
we now stand in would cease instantly, not only to be our
selves, but in any way to belong to us, if our minds left
them and other minds took possession of them.
Now if my mental identity does in fact depend on the
existence of my present body, that is, if it depends on the
maintenance of this organic form by the constant succession
of material particles, replacing each other in one unbroken
series, it must follow that when this body goes to pieces in
such a way that it cannot be reconstructed, I myself must
perish with it altogether and for ever. Anothei being,
*
exactly like me, might be made, and thoughts and feelings
like my own might possibly be given him. But the simple
fact would still only be that two individuals precisely similar
to each other had lived, and that one of them was dead ; not
that the dead one was alive again. My existence has no
concern in, and no influence upon, the existence of my dupli
cate. What is really necessary to my continued existence
hereafter is that my mental identity should depend on
something which does not go to pieces as the body does, or
which, if this should happen, does not become the material
out of which other beings are made, and which, therefore, it
is not impossible to put together again. If the material
body constitutes the whole of the living being, this indis
pensable condition can never be fulfilled, except by the
grotesque theory, sometimes adopted, which supposes that
the living principle resides in some small, and of course
�6
president’s address.
undiscovered, portion of the body, which in fact is never
decomposed.
But if mental existence is a different thing from material
existence, that is, if the fundamental postulate of our com
mon philosophy is true, this difficulty never can arise.
Whatever the essence of mind may be, we have no ground
for thinking that dead minds, like dead bodies, are used up
again in the construction of living ones. There is no such
reason, therefore, why consciousness may not be restored to
the mind which has lost it. The identity of the being is not
destroyed by the mere fact that it has ceased to think and
feel. The destruction occurs only when the being itself is
divided into parts, and these parts become portions of other
beings. You may keep a seed for centuries without a sign
of animation, yet able to revive and continue the life it had
before. But if you once break it up, and let its elements
become the elements of other seeds, revival is of course out
of the question.
When any doctrine of a future life is presented to us,
whether as the inference of reason, or the teaching of autho
rity, or both, the reception we give to it as rational beings
must evidently depend on the view we take of this funda
mental question. If there is no preliminary objection to the
fact asserted, on general grounds, we can weigh the evidence
without prejudice, and judge according to its cogency ; while
if our philosophical views have already placed it among impos
sible things, we are obliged either to reject all evidence in its
favour as necessarily faulty, or else to affirm that there are
two kinds of truth while we deny that there are two kinds of
being, and to admit that what we see to be impossible may
nevertheless take place. The latter view is doubtless held at
present by many men of high scientific attainments, but
there are no elements of stability in it. When our faith and
�president’s address.
7
our philosophy mutually support each other, there is no
reason to fear that either will be overturned; but when they
contradict each other, the ultimate destruction of one or both
is already certain.
It is this all but universal philosophy which, by asserting
two kinds of existence, has made the continued life of the
human soul a thing probable in itself, and therefore suscep
tible of proof by ordinary evidence, and which has thus
become the true foundation of our general view of life, its
objects, and therefore its motives, and through these its
maxims, and the common standards by which we estimate
the value of its pursuits; it is this philosophy with all its
consequences which is now assailed by the theories of
modern physical science, as they are accepted and taught by
many of its leaders, and probably by the majority of its
younger students.
These theories assert that the only
existing things known to us are material things, and that if
anything of a different nature does in fact exist, we have no
faculties by which it can be apprehended. The facts con
cerning material bodies, their properties and their changes,
are therefore the only facts within the reach of human intel
ligence ; the search after anything else is a vain and useless
search, and any fancied knowledge on such subjects is fancy
only. These views are supported by considering the sources
of human knowledge. We become acquainted with things
around us only by the action of the physical organs of sense.
That action itself is only physical change, and is only
brought about by the physical changes of other bodies. All
that is thus communicated to us, therefore, is in fact nothing
but physical change, and this alone is the substance of all
our knowledge.
The full result of these theories is not indeed generally
appreciated, is often kept out of sight, and is believed by
many to be cancelled by certain explanations, the soundness
�8
president’s address.
of which is vaguely hoped for, but is not vigorously put to
the test. But it is clear that, on this materialistic view of
things, any belief in human immortality must be founded on
the supposition that its inherent difficulties can be got over
in some way which is unintelligible to ourselves. But why,
then, should we make this supposition ? In what manner
could we come to know that it is justified ? The question is
a crucial one, and the inevitable answer is, that the suppo
sition could not be justified.
„
For if our only sources of knowledge are only able to
make us acquainted with the facts of material change, our
ignorance of all other facts is necessarily absolute, and no
supposition concerning them can have anything to rest upon.
Knowledge, like the senses which supply it, is on this
theory only a name for material change, and what, then, is
meant by knowledge of anything besides ? Yet the suppo
sition must be that we do come to know that there is some
thing else, and that this justifies a belief in immortality.
That is to say, that, being ourselves purely material, and in
relation only with matter and its changes, we yet come to
know a fact which material changes not only cannot account
for, but cannot so much as render possible in itself. This is
the climax of self-contradiction.
Let me recapitulate a little. Our desire for the advance
ment of knowledge, and our conviction that a great part of
life should be devoted to intellectual pursuits, are the result
not of a universal and irresistible impulse, but of a reason
able judgment, founded on our general view of human life
itself, as expressed by our common maxims concerning it,
which are the axioms of thought in this direction. But
these themselves are founded on and derived from the
assumption that human life is not related to this world only,
and that it is not ended with the grave. And this assump
tion of immortality itself depends on the belief that there are
�president’s address.
9
two kinds of existence, and that the human soul is not the
same thing as the human body.
If the fact is otherwise, the doctrine of continued life
becomes incredible, or can only be held in defiance of all
the inferences of reason. If life is thus shortened to a few
brief years, our whole view of it with all its objects must, if
we are rational beings, be utterly changed. If it is thus
changed, the maxims which serve as guides, and the conduct
based upon them, cease to be reasonable since they lose their
foundation. The entire theory of life must be re-considered,
and, as I began by saying, the pursuit of science will have to
justify itself anew to the reason of mankind.
There are philosophers of the purely materialistic school
who will not shrink from accepting this challenge, and will
undertake to prove that sufficient reason can be given for
intellectual and moral culture, even on the supposition that
our conscious identity expires with our latest breath. I
believe their arguments are futile, and their efforts neces
sarily vain, but I postpone the discussion of that question.
That it is of infinite importance no one will dispute. My
object so far has been to show that the question is neces
sarily raised, if the materialistic doctrine is accepted, and I
shall now endeavour to point out to you what I conceive to
be the general fallacy of the reasoning which leads to its
acceptance by the students of physical science.
On the threshold of the inquiry we are met by the fact
that a belief in two kinds of existence, material and imma
terial, has been nearly universal everywhere. It is necessary
to the materialistic philosophy that this fact should be
accounted for, and the task has been undertaken by Mr.
Tylor, in those remarkable chapters on Animism which
occupy more than four hundred pages in his book on Primi
tive Culture. Very few, I believe, have read these chapters
�10
president’s address.
carefully. It is a work of considerable labour ; and even the
sense in which Mr. Tylor uses the word Animism is perhaps
unknown to many. He means by it the doctrine of spiritual
beings generally; the belief, that is, in some kind of exist
ence which is not material. He shows by an enormous
accumulation of details that this belief is not a product of
recent civilisation, but is universal among all savage tribes.
Adopting the savage theory as to the origin of existing races,
he assumes that civilised man has inherited this belief from
his rude ancestors, and that the grounds on which they
acquired it are therefore the grounds on which it really rests.
He then considers in what way the lowest races can have
acquired it, and he finds an answer to this question in the
effect of dreams upon the imagination of savages. Dreams
are common to all men. The beings we seem to meet in
them appear to us to be really present. But we find their
bodily forms have not been really present. Hence an inference
that they have a second form which is independent of the
body. The excitement of fever leads to similar results.
The inference is supported also by imaginary forms which
we often think we see in dim light; by the shadows of
objects, and by their reflection in water. In all these cases,
what appear to us to be material beings are found in fact to
have no objective existence.
This constant experience,
according to Mr. Tylor, has produced in the minds of savages
generally a belief in the double nature of all visible things;
in a material body which can be touched, and in an immaterial body which cannot be touched.
From this settled conviction, originating in the lowest
tribes and handed down to other races, Mr. Tylor supposes
the belief in spiritual beings to have been derived. It is, I
think, the only attempt that has been made to give a reason
able account of the universality of this belief on purely
physical grounds. It is extremely interesting in itself, and
�president’s address.
11
it has at first sight a very plausible appearance, but it will
not bear close examination.
You will see at once that the savage origin of mankind
must be assumed before the reasoning can have any force
whatever. But in fact it has no force even on that assump
tion. If savages believe in spirits because they cannot
otherwise account for dreams and optical illusions, it is
certain that cultured races do nothing of the kind. It is
soon perceived that shadows and reflections have no separate
existence, and that the general phenomena of dreams are
like those of fancy and of memory. If in special cases
communication with spiritual beings is ever believed to occur
in sleep, among ourselves, it is because we already believe
that there are such beings who might thus address us; not
because the evidence of this is furnished by our dreams.
This is not a case of a belief received traditionally and
accepted carelessly, without considering the grounds on
which it rests. The validity of its evidence has occupied the
profoundest thought of the greatest thinkers for an unknown
length of time, and the reasons suggested by Mr. Tylor have
had no influence upon minds like these. It is in moral and
intellectual evidence, not in the evidence of the senses, that
the great leaders of cultivated thought in all ages have found
the proof of spiritual existence ; and there is no reason in
the world to think that the effect of this evidence upon the
minds of the higher races has anything to do with the con
clusions drawn by savages from facts of a totally different
kind.
In all departments of thought different men support the
same beliefs, both true and false, by different and independent
reasonings, and it is remarkable how often that which could
never be really anything more than confirmatory evidence in
favour of an opinion is mistaken for the actual source of it.
What, for example, can be more striking than the difference
�12
president’s address.
among the reasons given for general obedience to human
governments. All races, savage or civilised, in which
governments exist, are agreed as to the obligation; but some
found it on the divine right of kings, some on the natural
rights of majorities, some on the precepts of religious
teachers, some on vague superstitious fears, some on notions
of inherited rank, some on general expediency. The last of
these is doubtless the effective reason in all cases. The
practical advantage of having a government and of submit
ting to it is universally felt; and the other reasons are
really only reasons for submission to particular forms of it,
the necessity for some form or other being taken for granted.
It is precisely so with the belief in spiritual existence.
Certain mental facts, of which all men are conscious, pro
duce in most men the belief that soul and body are different
things, and the various arguments which in different states
of culture are brought forward in support of this, are only
the grounds on which particular conceptions of the fact, and
not our assurance of the fact itself, are founded.
And since it is certain that civilised races hold their
belief in spiritual existence for reasons which are not those
suggested by Mr. Tylor as the cause of savage opinion on
the subject, it is impossible to prove and unreasonable to
imagine that savage opinion has really been formed in this way.
Without discussing here the question of a real savage
origin for the human race, I must point out how vast an
error is committed when it is supposed, even as a possible
truth, that the existing savage races can have remained
isolated and unaffected by the ideas of civilised men from
what are called primeval times. The tacit assumption that
this has been or may be the case is, I think, the most
serious fallacy in the whole modern theory on this subject.
�president’s address.
13
For consider the ascertained facts. We know that
powerful and civilised nations existed four thousand years
ago; that for at least that length of time the great bulk of
the world’s population has been under the influence of such
thought as is expressed in the ancient literature of Egypt,
Assyria, Judea, Persia, India, and China; that war, com
merce and adventure have been hurrying men to and fro
upon the earth during the whole of that long period. What
part of the world can we suppose to have remained altogether
unvisited by either the armies, the emigrants, the merchants,
or the travellers of its civilised states ? We mistake the
absence of remembered intercourse and present knowledge
for evidence of a permanent isolation, which is quite impos
sible in a world full of living and restless beings. Every
nation has next door neighbours who receive some influence
from it, and convey this again to those beyond. Every
nation has individual stragglers who pass in all directions
beyond its boundaries and never return. Even in the ocean,
in the course of many centuries, all islands are visited by
strangers either through accident or design. Actual proof of
these facts, though really needless, is abundant everywhere.
Stone implements are frequently found, made of materials
that must have come from a distance. Metal work gives
evidence of the same kind. Special resemblances in the arts
of life; the wide diffusion of languages and races; the
frequent legends concerning the advent of strangers; all
•show us, as might be expected beforehand, that on this earth,
where there are only fifty million square miles of dry land,
and a thousand million human beings to live upon it, an
interchange of thought goes on perpetually and reaches to
every part. This is so simple a question of common sense,
.that it seems only necessary to state it in plain words in
order to command assent. Yet it has been entirely over
looked, though it strikes at the root of the whole evolution
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theory as applied to the development of human thought.
For it is clear that the knowledge and the arts of savage life
tell us nothing about an earlier condition of human nature,
unless they have been really self-developed, and have not
been suggested by intercourse with higher races. But we
can never know this to be the fact unless we know that higher
races cannot have had any influence over them, and this,
instead of being probable in any case, is manifestly impossible
in almost all. A single straggler from a higher race into
the midst of a lower one is certain to introduce a whole set
of new ideas, and forty centuries are more than sufficient to
convey this influence to the ends of the earth. Mr. Tylor is
so fully aware of the rapidity with which savage ideas are
modified by any intercourse with civilised men, that he very
properly rejects as doubtful examples of purely savage
thought the legends of a later date than the period when
such intercourse is known to have been established. But he
falls into the common error of supposing an absolute isola
tion to have existed previously.
The fact that a belief in two kinds of existence is almost
universal among mankind, in all shapes of culture, still
remains, therefore, to be accounted for. But that there
should be any difficulty in accounting for it arises, I think,
from a cardinal defect in that doctrine of Experience on
which the materialistic philosophy supposes itself to stand.
That doctrine appears to take the following form. Expe
rience includes all our successive states of consciousness,
or at least all that can be remembered. Every state of
consciousness depends on changes in the condition of our
material organism. Those changes are brought about by
contact with the material universe, through the organs
of sense, external or internal. The changes themselves,
therefore, are only such as one material thing can produce in
another. Knowledge, being one form of consciousness,
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15
depends on these very changes, and cannot therefore relate
to anything that is not material. When we speak of imma
terial existence, therefore, we speak of something about
which nothing can be known, because there is no avenue of
sense by which it can affect us.
The defect of this view, and of the materialistic doctrine
generally, is that it confounds the physical conditions of
experience with experience itself, which is nothing but
mental change; and that it tacitly assumes, in defiance
of the evidence, that consciousness depends on nothing but
physical change.
Now this could only be proved by showing that conscious
ness consists of nothing else but physical change, and the
fallacy discloses itself the moment we use these words. For
if our words have any meaning, physical change and con
sciousness are the names of two different things, not of one
and the same thing. It is not possible for us to understand
by any physical state or motion what we understand by
consciousness. If I see an object, certain molecules vibrate
in my brain. If they do not vibrate, I do not see; but the
vibration and the seeing are not only not the same thing,
they are totally dissimilar, and are quite as incomparable as
a colour is with a number, or a clock with the hour of the
day.
This is admitted as a fact, but is very imperfectly appre
hended. Professor Tyndall, for example, adopts the mis
leading statement that, when we see, what we are really
conscious of is an affection of our own retina.
*
An affection
of the retina is one of the external conditions of sight, but
we are no more conscious of it than of the ethereal move
ments by which it is affected, or of their remotest physical
causes. Consciousness knows nothing about a retina, or
• Tyndall, Belfast Address, 1874, p. 29.
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any of its changes. Our own bodies are as much external
objects to ourselves as any other material things; and this is
especially and unreservedly true concerning the brain and
the nervous system, the very existence of which is only
known to most of us through a series of inferences drawn
from other men’s observation.
The absolute difference between a conscious state and a
physical condition is felt where its consequences are not
acknowledged; and we generally find consciousness spoken
of, not as physical change itself, but as the product
of it.
But, then, what is a product? Unless it is a new creation
it is something which in fact existed before, but is now in an
altered state. If we say that consciousness is a product of
physical change alone, we can only mean that the physical
substance which has undergone a change has at the same
time become conscious. What, then, is our notion of con
sciousness as a condition or quality of a physical substance,
and by which of our senses do we apprehend it as such ? If
I say a thing is hard, I appeal to the sense of touch ; if red,
to the eye; if sweet, to the palate; if noisy, to the ear; if
fragrant, to the nose; if heavy, to the muscles or the nerves.
These are all avenues of sense by which I believe that
external things affect me. From the mode in which I am
thus affected, I infer the existence and the qualities of those
external things, and I call them material objects. But when
I say of anything that it is conscious, what sense am I
appealing to ? In what way does it affect me by being
conscious ? Clearly, in no way whatever. I have no avenue
of sense by which the fact can be made known to me as the
facts concerning material objects are made known. Your
bodily forms and movements affect me as I address you, and
make your bodily presence known; but how can I know your
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17
thoughts by any such means ? or how can I conceive it
possible so to know them? All my knowledge of physical
facts comes to me through my physical senses, but none of
my knowledge of mental facts is attained in that way. I do
not know what they are by inference from my sensations ;
I know it by direct knowledge of myself as a mental being
alone.
The mistaken idea, that what can be verified by the
physical senses is worth attending to, but that what cannot
be thus verified can never be known, requires a few more
words of examination.
Absolute unconditional knowledge is only possible con- .
cerning our inward selves. We are conscious, and we know
the facts of our own present consciousness; and this know
ledge is absolute. To be conscious, and to know the facts of
consciousness, are not identical states, but they are both
states the existence of which we are always able to affirm
unconditionally.
Some of the facts of consciousness, which we call the
impressions of the senses, make us infer the existence of
material things. This inference we also call knowledge, but
it is never absolute or unconditional; it is knowledge of
another kind. We cannot affirm that a material object
exists and affects our consciousness, in the way in which we
affirm that we exist and are conscious.
But the absolute knowledge we have of ourselves extends
to nothing beyond ourselves, and is therefore of very limited
interest to us as living beings. To know our own states
of consciousness is not to satisfy our natural desires, which
turn continually from the feelings we experience to the infe
rences we draw, and find their proper exercise and pleasure
in doing so. The inferences drawn directly from our sensa
tions constitute the most perfect kind of knowledge we are
B
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president’s address.
able to acquire concerning things external to ourselves.
Experience assures us that within certain limits such infe
rences may be relied upon, that expectations raised by them
will be fulfilled, that wishes guided by them will be gratified,
that our confidence in their general truth is never shaken,
and that the more carefully we examine them the more
correct our conception of external facts appears to be. These
inferences thus form the largest portion of human know
ledge, and especially of scientific knowledge, in which the
desire for exact conclusions, which can be verified again
and again without difficulty, finds the fullest satisfaction.
Now the reason why an inquiry into anything beyond
these direct inferences from what is called the evidence
of the senses is discouraged by scientific men in the present
day, is supposed to be because no real evidence exists by
which Buch an inquiry can be answered. The truth, how
ever, is that the evidence is the same as that on which
modern science itself relies, but that the conclusion has to be
arrived at by a double inference instead of a single one. It
is, in consequence, far more difficult, and far more liable
to mistake, and it requires corresponding diligence, patience,
and caution.
In considering the growth of a tree, for example, we have
first to infer the physical facts from our own sensations
of sight and touch, and then, from this first inference, to
draw a second, as to those causes of growth which cannot be
inferred directly from our sensations.
But the basis of all other knowledge is the knowledge of
ourselves as beings who can think and feel. This is not the
knowledge of any physical fact, all that we know of physical
facts being inference founded on it.
Now when something is known to us which cannot be
intelligibly accounted for by the elements supposed to be
present, the natural and the strictly scientific inference
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is that some other element is also there. A new line in the
spectrum suggests the existence of a new material. The
radiation of light and heat through an apparent vacuum
determines our belief in an all-pervading ether. The move
ments of a magnetic needle convince us that the needle
is controlled by other sources of energy. The facts of
gravitation between bodies at a 'distance satisfy men of all
schools that something besides the gravitating bodies is
concerned in them.
Nor is there much disposition to assume that matter
itself is only of one kind. The difficulty of supposing
all the known elements to consist of precisely similar atoms,
differing only in their grouping, is very great. Nor can any
reason be given why only one kind of thing should be
in existence, or why there should not be mutual relations
between different kinds. When, therefore, we see the facts
of life associated with certain material arrangements which
cannot in themselves account for them, we ought, as sound
philosophers, to conclude at once that there is something
here besides these material arrangements.
A serious error of conception on one particular point has
much to do with the prevailing materialism of scientific
thinkers. We are asked whether, when we speak of “ living
powers,” or “ ourselves,” we can form a mental picture
of any one of these apart from the organism through which
it is supposed to act.
*
The question inverts the whole
mental process. It is not from a consciousness of the
organism that we infer the existence of ourselves and our
living powers ; it is from a knowledge of ourselves as exist
ing, and of our powers as living, that we infer the existence
of the organism. How do I know that this hand, this head,
or this brain are actual realities ? I know it only inferen* Tyndall, Belfast Address, 1874, p. 13.
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tially, and only because I first know, not inferentially but
absolutely, the fact that I myself exist, not as a material
organism, but as a conscious being. The mental picture I
form of myself is of a being using its living powers; and as
my conception of the external world, and, of course, of every
organism, is all derived from my knowledge of what happens
to myself when those living powers are used, the mental
picture of myself necessarily includes my relations to out
ward things as I conceive them, and the outward things
themselves are necessarily thought of when I form the
picture.
But mental existence, not physical existence, is the one
thing absolutely known to us, and though this absolute
knowledge of it is limited to ourselves, it enables us to draw
inferences concerning the existence of other immaterial
beings as valid in their nature as any inference about
physical things. All we have to remember is, that any facts
concerning other immaterial beings can only be known to us
through a double inference, so far as things external to
ourselves only affect us through our physical senses. What
is possible in mental existence we may know from our
own self-knowledge, but what is really the fact beyond
ourselves can only be learned by patient observation and the
judgment of reason upon its results.
And here I think we may take a final and conclusive step
in this important argument.
When a man addresses a single word to a fellow-creature,
believing that it will be understood, he virtually abandons
the materialistic doctrine, and admits that he himself
possesses knowledge which the physical senses can never
give. He assumes that his neighbour thinks and feels ; but
on what ground does he assume this? That a material
object of this particular shape is there; that it moves, and
speaks, and feeds; that certain acts of his own and certain
�PRESIDENT 8 ADDRESS.
21
conditions in surrounding things are followed by certain
changes in this object, including all the sensible pheno
mena of what we call human life in others; all this is
conveyed to him by his physical senses. But they tell him
nothing at all about thought and feeling in the object before
him; and in assuming that these exist, he cuts off the very
root of the materialistic philosophy, for he takes for granted
that he knows something concerning objects external to
himself, which it is not and could not be possible under any
circumstances to verify by any appeal to physical experience.
The thoughts of his neighbours, if they have any
thoughts, cannot possibly be made evident to himself in any
single case whatever, and the canon of Materialism demands
that under such circumstances he should have no opinion as
to their existence, and should content himself with observing
and recording the laws by which the outward actions of the
human forms about him are governed, without pretending to
know anything as to their unseen causes.
Yet we are all aware that there is no fact external to
ourselves of which we have a more absolute assurance than
the fact that our fellow-men do think and feel. What can
the materialist say to this ? He knows their forms and
movements through his own favourite means; he learns
them directly through the evidence of his physical senses.
He sees their faces with his eyes; hears their voices with
his ears; touches them with his fingers; knows that they
offer resistance to his muscular sense. But his senses tell
him no more about their thoughts than they do about the
cause of gravitation.
If he should say he believes his neighbours have minds
like his own, because he knows they have bodies like his
own, I shall tell him he deceives himself. The bodily form
does not give him this belief if the acts are idiotic ; and he
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president’s address.
would attribute a human intelligence to any form whatever
if it gave practical evidence of human motives and purposes.
I should tell him also that the co-existence of his own mind
with his own body is not known to him as a necessary
co-existence. He cannot learn from experience whether his
mind could exist without his body, or whether similar bodies
must always have similar minds.
And lastly, since experience in any case can never be
conceived of as verifying the fact of thought and feeling in
his neighbours, but only as verifying other facts from which
this is inferred, the inference according to his principles can
be nothing better than a working hypothesis, useful only so
far as it enables him to predict results.
And yet in what respect does this hypothesis differ from
the actual knowledge of material things, supposed to be
derived directly from experience itself? That knowledge
rests entirely on a similar hypothesis. It rests on our belief
in the trustworthiness of memory, which is what we refer to
when we speak of experience, and which is verified only as
we verify our belief in the intelligence of other men ; by the
judgment of a living soul.
The conception of memory by the modern physical school
is so important, and I think so irrational, that having here
referred to it in this way I shall ask you to consider the
matter parenthetically for a few moments.
Every sensation or other mental change is supposed by
this school to be dependent on molecular alteration of nerv
ous matter. This matter is conceived of as composed of an
almost infinite number of connected threads, each of which
is a channel of sensibility. To feel anything is to have one
of these channels altered. This alteration is either perma
nent or not. If it is permanent, the feeling may be recalled
in memory by again stimulating the same nervous channel.
�president’s address.
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Now on physical grounds the whole theory appears irra
tional. Firstly, because all organic substance is constantly
changing, so that there is nothing permanent about it.
Secondly, because to admit the idea of permanent change is
to deny that memory consists in a repetition of what
occurred before in the nervous substance, for this could only
happen if the substance remained as before. If a stimulus
passing through A, B, C, changes it into A, C, B, another
stimulus through A, C, B will not be a repetition of the
first through A, B, C. Yet if there is no permanent change,
what is the physical fact of memory ?
Still more important is it to consider that memory does
not consist in the reproduction of former mental states, but
in the recognition of the fact that they are thus reproduced ;
that the thing now thought of has been thought of before.
And this is a totally different affair.
Sights, sounds,
thoughts, and feelings are really repeated day by day in our
consciousness without the slightest memory attending the
repetition. Memory depends on our perception of Time;
on our conscious knowledge of a past existence; and to
attempt to explain it by any physical conditions, which
necessarily represent the present only, is a symptom of a
false philosophy, and a science which forgets its own founda
tions.
Happily our practice is often wiser than our theories, and
there is no reason to fear that we shall ever doubt the
mental existence of our friends. And, till we doubt it, a
permanent materialism is impossible. For if one thing can
be known to us which is beyond the reach of sensible expe
rience, other things of a like nature may also be known ; and
if we can justly infer the presence of a living soul in a
human body, we may with equal reason infer the presence of
a Divine Spirit in the universe.
There is one particular idea, commonly connected with
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president’s address.
the conception of mental or spiritual beings, as dis
tinct from material beings, which has been, I believe, a
very serious impediment to sound views upon the sub
ject. It is taken for granted that a human soul, if it
has a separate existence, must also have a conscious exist
ence independently of a human body.
If you examine
the argument used by Professor Tyndall, in his Belfast
address, in opposition to Butler’s reasoning, you will find
that all its force depends upon this assumption.
*
The
reply put into Bishop Butler’s mouth is based on the same
conception, as I dare say it would have been by Butler him
self. But it is in consequence an insufficient and unsatis
factory reply. The true answer would be that a human soul
does not require a body in order to exist, but does require a
body in order to be conscious. We have no more ground for
thinking that our souls could feel as they do without the
help of an organised body, than we have for thinking that
our bodies could act as they do without the guidance of a
living soul. The facts concerning automatic action, so finely
brought forward by Professor Huxley, do not affect this
question.^ If a frog’s body accommodates itself to certain
circumstances after its brain is removed, and if we really
know, which however is extremely doubtful, that no con
scious volition is concerned in it, the fact only furnishes one
more example of involuntary action which is like voluntary
action. The cases are very numerous. Nay, it is probable
that everything we do of a physical kind may be done
involuntarily at certain times; and habits which we are
perfectly aware have been formed by the action of our own
will, appear often to be like the winding up of machinery,
which, being thus wound up, will carry out our purposes for
a given period whether we know it or not. Habits of self♦ Tyndall, Belfast Address, 1874, p, 14.
f Belfast Lecture, lb74.
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preservation are expressly of this kind. We are quite
ignorant of the nature of the machinery, and are likely to be
so till we discover why or how it is that bodily movements
take place at all. But that our own will has a distinct
relation to them, and that we understand enough of this to
determine whether other men have wills and are using them,
by observing their bodily movements, will,. I suppose, be
admitted ; though we may be mistaken with regard to any
one of them, if we form our opinion on too narrow a basis of
observation.
The effect of bodily disease upon the mind and character
is great, but all it amounts to is the well-known fact that all
our conscious states are influenced by physical conditions.
It does not affect the question of our own permanent
identity, which does not even depend on our own recognition
of it. We forget our existence every night, and our
characters, by which we mean the relative force of many
inclinations, vary more or less every day. But we do not
cease to be the same individuals on this account.
The direct power of a human mind over the movements
of matter is undoubtedly extremely small in amount, and is
confined within very narrow limits of possible action. And
no portion of matter is under mental control to the exclusion
of other forces, so that all the movements of which it
is capable may be produced by other means as well. Thus,
after an ordinary involuntary inspiration, I can, by the
exercise of my will, draw in more breath, which would not
have been drawn involuntarily. My will in this case has
caused a sort of movement which is usually caused by other
means. And going to the bottom of this movement, as far
as we are able, it seems probable at present that the only
material substance over which any one human mind has
direct control is the nervous organism of one human body.
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president’s address.
And in exercising this control we are not ourselves aware of
the substance on which we are acting. We are only aware
that by some means our will is obeyed. In this respect we
are not unlike the clerks in a telegraph office, who know
by experience that if they do certain acts themselves a
distant hand will move, though they have no real knowledge
of the agency by which this is effected.
But however small the mental power over material move
ment may be, it is quite sufficient for its purpose. We are
surrounded by infinite forces, acting or ready to act in
all directions, and all we need is ability to guide a certain
number of them to a certain extent. The mind, acting as a
cause of change in the nervous system, is, to refer to a
familiar illustration, precisely like the driver of a locomotive,
who is only able himself to move the steam valve and
the break lever, and who can only move even these through a
very small space — a space which may be indefinitely reduced
by perfect mechanical arrangements till the actual movement
and the actual force employed may be inappreciable to sense.
Yet this is quite sufficient. There is physical force enough
in the steam and in the friction. He does not want to add
anything to it; he supplies nothing out of his own strength
to the forces by which the wheels are moved or stopped. He
only wants to determine the direction in which those forces
act, for by determining their direction he controls their
effect. And those delicate movements which his own
strength does bring about may also be brought about by
other causes, the difference being, however, that the whole
combination and series of effects which really distinguish
the action of human intelligence will not be produced with
out it.
This seems to me the common sense explanation of
voluntary activity. We may discover hereafter that even the
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nervous organism is only indirectly affected by the mind, or
that mental power is only able to determine the direction in
which static forces can become active ones; or we may learn,
on the other hand, that all force is mental, and that either
small forces are partial manifestations of great ones, or that
great forces are the accumulated result of small ones.
These are questions of method only.
That defective psychology, which has not distinguished
between the fact of spiritual existence and the power of
mental consciousness, has had its origin in unscientific
times, and has led to much extravagance of thought. We
owe to it, for example, the notion that in sleep we are always
dreaming, and that nothing once known to us can be really
forgotten. Such views are only examples of the kind of
thought which makes the physicist so impatient of the meta
physician, and gives Materialism an undue advantage in
many discussions. They are obviously based on fancy only,
and not on knowledge of any kind.
But we do know that mental existence and consciousness
are not the same things as material existence and motion ;
and as they are not the same things, we are justified in
concluding that the universe contains at least two different
kinds of being, and that we, as human creatures, are made
of these two kinds united. We know our bodies as a
succession of moving particles, which come and go, and are
never at any moment what they were the moment before.
We know our living selves as permanent beings, not coming
and going; changing in power and in knowledge, but remain
ing in identity the same from day to day. Our bodies give
us knowledge of the world without, and all the consciousness
we can remember is dependent on their assistance. Con
tinually while we live, and finally when we die, these bodies
go entirely to pieces, and are used up again and again
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president’s address.
in other forms; but our mental nature being different, there
are no grounds for thinking that it is either broken up
or changed by death; and since it has already inhabited
a body continually changing, there is no reason why some
other body may not be its dwelling hereafter, giving it again
the means of consciousness, and of outward communication
with the universe.
Such a view accounts for all the facts known to us,
in accordance with our entire experience, which Materialism
can never do; and it leaves before us the prospect of a
conscious life to come, as in its nature probable on strictly
scientific grounds.
That science should recognise this, and .teach it, appears
to me absolutely essential to its own continued hold upon
human interest; for consider again, What are the real conse
quences of the opposite view ? Suppose we were agreed that
only one kind of thing has real and permanent existence, and
that this one kind of thing is matter. It follows, from the
nature of organisation, that no organised being is a perma
nent being, any more than the water in a running stream
to-day is the water that was there yesterday. The water
may appear to be the same to others, but it could not appear
so to itself if it were a sentient thing. No one will deny
that one material atom cannot transfer its own identity
to another, or that twTo different atoms, doing similar things,
can never be one atom doing the same thing twice; or
that, when we speak of ourselves as continuing to exist,
we are not speaking of other beings; or that the question
in which we feel a personal interest is, whether we our
selves shall continue to exist, and not whether other
people exactly like us will exist after us. The very word
“identity” would otherwise be without a meaning, and all
knowledge would be illusion. And it follows that, on the
theory of Materialism, to continue or to restore the lives of
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human beings after their bodies have been dissolved and
used again, is impossible. This world then, and the short
period of our present lives, could alone be of any real
concern to us; and I ask, What are the reasons by which
scientific studies, and the general culture of the intellect, are
in such a case to be recommended to our choice ? If we
choose them by nature, in preference to anything else, well
and good; but if our natural choice is for other things, what
is to induce us to alter it ?
A man knows by the tables of mortality what his average
chance of life in this world amounts to. He knows that,
although he may happen to exceed the average, he may also
happen to be one of those who die to-morrow. We cannot
help looking before and after. We find ourselves, when
we begin to think for ourselves, with tastes and dispositions
already formed. We cannot act at all without a motive, and
all our motives are either present impulse or reasonable
purpose. What reasonable purpose can be set before our
minds to make us undertake the slow labours of study,
the hardships of self-sacrifice, the risk of losing all by dying
while nothing is accomplished ?
The question, you must remember, is not whether we
should do these things if it happens that we wish to do them,
but whether other wishes should be changed to these, and
what is to change them. For this is the educational problem
of every age. The natural desire of most men, if left
to themselves, is to lead easy lives, and to enjoy present
pleasures. This desire is disturbed by thoughts of a future
life, or of a Divine Presence; but if these thoughts can be
discarded, still more if their whole foundation can be
disbelieved, what is there in the ordinary course of life
to bring about a similar disturbance ? Self-interest could
never do it with the majority of men. The gifts and oppor
tunities of the majority are comparatively very small, and if
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president’s address.
the object is to make this life, while it lasts, a pleasant one,
their safest way is to take things easily, and make sure
of the pleasure that lies nearest. A selfish Epicureanism
becomes at once the highest wisdom.
c And the reasonableness of an unselfish life on such
a theory .cannot be successfully maintained.
No doubt there is in every human being a power of
loving and desiring, for its own sake only, whatever
is pure and noble and disinterested.
No doubt there
are many in whom this power asserts itself so strongly that
it must be exercised ; who of their own free choice prefer
the happiness of others, and the moral elevation of their
own characters, to anything else that is set before them. No
doubt, also, the voice of conscience is universally heard, and
is always impelling us in the same direction. But why are
we to encourage these feelings when they are not naturally
strong ? Why are we to say to the men of lower tastes and
habits, You are degrading your nature ; you are wasting
your opportunities ; you are sinning against right and duty;
jf our nature, our opportunities, our conscience, are all the
mayflies of an hour, and our own concern in them will end for
ever when the hour is past ? It is not true that the pleasure
of this life is known to be increased by cultivating either the
heart or the intellect. Its nature is known to be changed by
such cultivation, and those who have experienced this change
can no longer content themselves without it. But prior
to such experience, most men can very easily content them
selves without it; and who is to measure degrees of satisfac
tion, or show the actual balance between pleasures of
different kinds ? There are many savage tribes in whom the
enjoyment of life is far more unmixed than ours, and what
are the reasons by which Materialism would induce us
to disturb their present state, and raise them, as we esteem
it, into civilised beings ? To store the mind with knowledge,
�president’s
.
to quicken and purify the affections
this world can never satisfy. It is
flower in an English garden, where wi
before it has time to blossom. It is liL
the sun, certain as we are that the earth v
And I must for a moment call your sp>
the fact that the physical theories in which Mu
its chief support are really speculations of the 1
kind, resting on the narrowest possible basis o±
truths.
What Mr. Darwin has discovered, for example, is that,
the present world, filled with life as we find it, the
process of natural selection will account for continued change
in the specific characters of living things.
What we know about evolution generally is that, within
the limits of our observation, there is, in the common order
of change, a very frequent resemblance to the process which
we call development in the growth of living things.
What we know about the dissipation of heat is, that
bodies like the earth and sun are cooling, unless there
is some external source, not at present understood, from which
internal heat can be supplied.
These are most important additions to human knowledge,
but they are utterly insufficient to justify the theories now
derived from them concerning the origin of life and the
history of the universe; and science, in the meantime, while
adopting these theories with dogmatic faith, is hiding, under
the name of Energy, its own inability to account for the
facts relating to the material world, without the help of that
which is immaterial. For energy, like consciousness, is not
cognisable outside ourselves by any physical sense. We
know what we mean by it, but that is because we ourselves
possess it, and can infer its external presence by reason of
this internal knowledge.
�.t’s
address.
>0 impress upon you as strongly as
belief in two kinds of being has been
4; that all the maxims of human conrmed under its influence; and that in
_ie cultivation of the human intellect is a
j in itself, and in the highest degree, we are
.aoms which have been thus produced, and for
.ere is at least no other obvious justification. If
mndamental belief is overturned, all its consequences go
.th it, and it rests with the lovers of science to show by
some new method of their own why study of any kind is
worth pursuing. And before replying to this challenge it is
necessary to consider another and not a smaller difficulty.
If there is really no such thing as immortality, and if the
study of science destroys the belief in it, it leads us then to
sacrifice a glorious and beneficent illusion for the sake of a
painful and depressing truth. Why should we make this
sacrifice ? Why is it well for us in such a case to know the
truth ? I think we may be sure of one thing ; that mankind
generally would decide that it is not well. Whatever we do,
our real knowledge of truth is very limited and most imper
fect, and the only ground we have for wishing to know as
much of it as possible is the assurance, not only that it
cannot be altered, but that it is in harmony with our highest
and most permanent desires. This assurance is strongly
rooted in all Christian nations, but, I believe, in them
alone; and it is clear that it must depend on the general
view we take of our position in the universe. Science
assumes that natural Truth ought to be loved for its own
sake, and forgets that it owes this idea entirely to religious
trust; to the conviction that all things are governed by
infinite wisdom and absolute goodness, and therefore that to
know what is true is to know what is best. This conviction
�president’s
.
has become so much a habit of tho<_
we forget what it rests upon, and
needs no support. Yet who does no
the lower animals, concerning death t
happy ignorance ? And who does not
ourselves, it is good to find some thing
impenetrable veil ? To draw such a veil over .
knowledge of which could only destroy human
without bringing any compensation, is only commo,
ness to others and common prudence for ourselves,
know by the long experience of the past how fully immor
tality can be believed in and trusted to, under the ordinary
conditions of human knowledge, and how perfectly it is
fitted to satisfy and purify the desires of our hearts ; and if
it were a fact that it could never be enjoyed, our wisest
course would be to retain the happiness of that belief, and
for this purpose to prevent, if not for ourselves at least for
our children, the pursuit of studies which led to its rejec
tion. Thus it is, happily as I think, that Materialism will
always defeat itself, by turning men away from any form of
science which evidently involves the acceptance of its
doctrine. And it is therefore in the supreme interest of
science itself that I recommend its present tendencies to
your earnest consideration. It is a matter on which the
leaders of science should speak their whole minds without
hesitation. It will not do to say, as is so generally said, We
study the physical world, and leave other matters to other
men, unless it is plainly shown that these other matters are
not affected by the results of physical research. And when,
on the contrary, those results as interpreted by science are
seen by every one to have the most direct and momentous
bearing upon the deepest interests of human nature, there is
a cold and forbidding cruelty in the science that will calmly
dig about the foundations of our dearest hopes, will lead us
�t’s address.
je or nothing left to stand on, and
.aking no pains to learn whether the
nether it has been necessary.
science is alone to blame in this matter.
Jy with theology. It was the constant
^ans, a few years ago, to deny the truth of
. been verified, while they assumed the truth of
3 that could not be verified. The human mind
posed to be capable of deciding correctly, by a kind
.xStinct, whether particular events had happened or par
ticular words were spoken in ancient times; and decisions
arrived at in this way were held to have a higher validity
than inferences drawn from the patient observation of exist
ing facts. Against such habits of thought the scientific
spirit is necessarily and always absolutely opposed, but they
are equally inconsistent with the religious spirit, which
desires to know the truth as earnestly as science does, and
is even more deeply interested in avoiding the pitfalls of
false reasoning. But theology, which, in needless alarm,
had closed its gates at first against what seemed to be a host
of enemies, is opening them again to the reinforcements of
its truest friends ; and the present danger is that science
will remain outside, in a position of cold antagonism, sacri
ficing its own best interests to the materialistic idea.
Science in other days has held a noble and sacred office,
strengthening and elevating by its discoveries the conviction
of a divine presence in the universe, and of an immortal
future for ourselves ; exposing many errors, correcting many
prejudices, teaching modesty, tolerance, and patience to our
reasoning powers, but maintaining always the essential truth
that there are two kinds of Being, and the fact that, while
our own mental existence is absolutely known to us, the
presence of any bodily organs can only be inferred. If
this conception is abandoned, we stand indeed upon one
�president’s address.
35
bright spot of life; but there is an abyss of endless darkness
into which, within a few short years, every one of us must
take his final plunge. The universe becomes dreadful in
the presence of that yawning gulph, and he is wisest who
sees the least of it, and who can hide the future in a golden
haze of present pleasure till the moment when he drops
away. Not such, however, is the true teaching of science in
a world like this. It is the closing of our eyes, not the
keenness of our vision, that brings such phantoms into view;
and the first fresh flower, the first sparkling dew-drop, the
first smile of a friend or a little child will take us back to
the grand realities of nature, if we look at them in the light
of a sound philosophy, and see them as they really are.
�_
i
í
Ü
5
«
I
���
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On the materialism of modern science; opening address read before the Literary and Philosophical Society of Liverpool, October 5th, 1871
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Notes: From the library of Dr Moncure Conway. Inscription on front page: Sir Charles Lyell with the author's kind regards. The top right corners of pages 31/32-33/34 have been torn out; text missing.
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Conway Tracts
Materialism
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CT
ORTHODOX
THEORIES OF PRAYER.
BY
A BARRISTER.
*
PUBLISHED BY THOMAS SCOTT,
NO. 11, THE TERRACE, FARQUHAR ROAD,
UPPER NORWOOD, LONDON, S.E.
Price Threepence.
��ORTHODOX THEORIES OF PRAYER.
OME time ago, a controversy was raging in various
■ periodicals on the subject of prayer—our reason
for noticing which, at this late period, will udirectly
appear.
The real issue raised was this—Is there any reason
for supposing that human supplications are capable of
influencing directly the processes of external nature ?
We say “ external,” because no one seems to deny that
a man may, by this agency, produce a great effect upon
himself, and his own nature. To be sure, the modus
operands is a matter of dispute between the philosopher
and the theologian, the former attributing whatever
result may have followed solely to what is called reflex
action, the latter to the immediate action of the Deity.
Still, an effect is in both cases admitted, and it is not
round this point that the controversy has raged. Again,
we have used the word “ directly,” because it is quite
plain that human supplication may have a considerable
indirect effect, say, upon a religious person at a critical
period who knows that he is being prayed for, and who
believes that a great force is being exerted on his behalf.
So, too, curses (which are a species of prayer) have
often brought about their own fulfilment, by the fears
they have instilled into their objects. In these sorts
of cases, candid theologians, even when adhering to
their own views, are willing to admit that a solution,
such as does not suppose any interference with natural
laws, may fairly be submitted for consideration. If
S
�4
Orthodox Theories of Prayer.
men would go on praying for benefits on behalf of
themselves, or of others in reach of their voices, or in
reach of knowledge that those voices were being
thus raised ; then, although there would be a differ
ence of opinion as to the mode in which the results of
such action, admitting that it had results, must be held
to have been brought about, still the man of science
would have very little to say. But the contention of
theologians goes a great deal farther than this, and it
appears to us that the men of science have been justi
fied, nay, that they have only discharged an imperative
duty, in entering a most earnest protest against it. The
contention is, as we have said, that human prayer is
capable of modifying directly the course of external
nature. No better illustration of this claim can be
given than the familiar case of rain and fine weather.
The churches maintain that the faithful are able to
procure at one time a downfall, and at another a cessa
tion of rain ■ and they have imposed it as a duty upon
their members, when called upon by the officiating
minister, or other higher authority, to put in force the
machinery for this end. Upon this well-worn subject,
we repeat that we have hitherto refrained from offering
any observations to the readers of this series, in which,
indeed, two or three excellent papers on Prayer in
general have already appeared.
We have been induced to break our silence in con
sequence of an article which has recently appeared in
an able contemporary (Fraser’s Magazine, Sept. 1873).
This article puts forward a theory of prayer, which is
not new,* but which is very clearly stated and agree
ably illustrated by the writer. For aught we know, it
may have been still better set forth elsewhere—for we
do not profess to have read everything which has been
written on this subject of late. We, at any rate, have
not met with any clearer recent statement of it, nor do
* For instance, it is to be found in Euler’s Lettres a une princesse
Allemande.
�Orthodox Theories of Prayer.
5
we remember to have seen it anywhere distinctly ex
posed. Probably men of the calibre of Professor Tyn’dall have thought that it would be a waste of time to
show its inherent weakness. Yet it is never a waste of
time to refute theories of this kind, which, from their
plausibility are particularly liable to attract superficial
minds, and which, under the guise of offering scientific
solutions are really the offspring, of a spirit which is
fundamentally opposed to true science.
The theory is this, that prayer may be able to ope
rate directly upon the sequence of external events,
without any violation of law. The Almighty may have
so adjusted the course of nature as to make the favour• able issue of a prayer an effect dependent upon the
prayer as a cause; the particular cause having been
foreseen and having its effect assigned to it in the
general scheme. Thus, for example, a high reading of
the barometer at Bergen, and a low reading at Dundee
will indicate the approach of a storm, for the inhahitants of the East Coast of Scotland; yet, a pious
mother, with a son in the North Sea, may succeed in
averting it by her entreaties to Heaven, without any
violation of law, or consequent disturbance. For the
law may be that the wind blows from a high to a low
barometer, with a force proportioned to the differences
of the barometric pressures in all cases where prayer to
the contrary is not put up, or, rather, put up success
fully. In cases where it has been decided that the
prayer shall be granted, as suppose in the foregoing
instance, there may have been “ an adjustment from
eternity of physical causes to this specific moral end,”
the result “ being serenely wrought out by the natural
operation of remote causes, the combination of which
no science could have predicted beforehand, albeit after
the fact no science can detect any trace of violence or
interference with the steadfast order of things. The
event which answered to the prayer had lain latent
from of old in the undeveloped plan of nature, just as
�6
Orthodox Theories of Prayer.
surely as it had lain from the beginning in the secrets
of the Divine foreknowledge."
We have here, by the way, an illustration of the
strange mode in which theologians are endeavouring to
engraft on their system the modern conception of
“Uniformity of Law.” A little while ago, compara
tively speaking, it would have been considered by their
predecessors in the highest degree blasphemous to sug
gest that the Almighty either would not, or could not
comply directly with the requests of his supplicants, in
the same manner as men are able to oblige others ; andthat inconceivably complex and intricate chains of ar
rangements stretching up into infinite time must neces
sarily have been made in every case where prayer had
to be answered. Science, however, having forced this
conception of Law upon them, they are in the position
of men in the fairy tale who have got hold of a Genius
without being possessed of the means of making him
obey them. They really suppose that they have en
listed science on their side, or at any rate have dis
armed all reasonable opposition from that quarter, when
in view of a series of phenomena the precise causes of
which have not been ascertained, they exhibit another
series of entirely dissimilar phenomena, and without
proving the faintest connection between the two, call
upon us to recognise in the latter a 11 possible cause ”
of the former. It is the old story of the Goodwin
Sands and Tenterden steeple. And supposing the phe
nomenon in that case had been, as it is easy to conceive
that it might have been, the disappearance of a shelf
that had stopped up Sandwich haven, instead of the
appearance of a new one, it might have been argued on
these lines, that the building of Tenterden steeple, an
act presumably agreeable to the Almighty, was a “ pos
sible cause ” of the harbour being opened. We might
then have been able with Mr Bacon, the author of the
article we are considering, to detect “ in the day when
the earth and sea shall yield up their secrets, running.
�Orthodox Theories of Prayer.
7
parallel with a line of moral influences, the vestiges of
an old train of geologic causes, working down through
all the periods of creation until the two lines of diverse
operation converge upon a distinct predeterminate point
of time and space,” the points upon which these parallel
lines have all along been converging having been on
this hypothesis the building of the steeple, on the one
hand, and the clearing away of the sand on the other.
■“ Tous les evenements sont enchain&s dans le meilleur
des mondes !” in a way which even Pangloss did not
suspect. On reading the above, we are irresistibly re
minded of Sheridan’s simile. Whatever science there
■may be in all this, has been disfigured, as gipsies are
supposed to disfigure stolen children, to prevent its
being recognised.
Of course, where real causes are unknown, anything
whatever, the agency of which in producing the given
phenomenon has not been actually disproved, may be
-labelled as a possible agent or cause. We can prove
that the presence of the Sun above the horizon is not the
cause of dew, because we have dew by night after the
setting of the sun. But we cannot disprove the hypo
thesis of some of the low church papers, that Ritualism
and Infidelity attract cholera to our shores. Nor can we
disprove the hypothesis, that prayer is able to influence
storms. But we can submit some considerations which
render these and similar hypotheses so violently im
probable, that they may be safely neglected. Indeed,
if any account had to be taken of them, there could be
no science in the proper sense of the term.
Whenever we are able to trace natural phenomena up
to their real causes, it is found that human prayer is
not among these causes. This is a conclusion co-extensive with human experience, and must be accepted as a
truth of universal application. No person, for instance,
supposes that eclipses are now-a-days in any.way affected
by prayer. The opposite is demonstrable.
For an
eclipse, say of the Sun, being immediately due to the
�8
Orthodox Theories of Prayer.
interposition of the moon between us and that lumi
nary, a calculation is made of the time when this collo
cation of the three bodies will be known to take place,
and it is found not to be subject to any disturbance
such as would be produced by the introduction of a new
cause not previously accounted for. What is true of
an eclipse holds good of the most ordinary physical
phenomena of every-day life, with the causes of which
we have become acquainted. The presumption is enor
mous, that in all those cases in which the imperfection
of our instruments leaves us unable to trace phenomena
to their true causes, there is similarly no room left for
the agency of prayer. This conclusion is immensely
strengthened by the fact, that even where we are un
able to penetrate to the ultimate laws of phenomena,
yet, whenever we are able to make any way at all in a
discovery of their nature, we find ourselves in a region
of absolute law, i.e., in the presence of secondary laws-,,
which may be plainly conjectured to be dependent
upon more general laws. At any rate, the onus probandi is thrown upon those who assert the contrary,
and it is difficult to see how they can shape their ob
jections so as not to fall under one of the three follow
ing heads.
1. It maybe said that, even granting all this, no
absolute case is made out against the efficacy of prayer
of this particular kind. For it cannot be demonstrated
that the future order of nature will resemble the past
order. This has been admitted by Hume ; and we
think that Theology in its struggles is capable of
snatching at the admission as at a straw. Indeed, Canon
Mozley has turned it to considerable account in his Bampton Lectures. According to this view, even although
eclipses should be shown to have been due to certain
well-defined causes in the past, yet it by no means
necessarily follows that they will not be influenced by
prayer in the future; and it would be therefore by no
means an absurdity to pray against the occurrence of
�Orthodox Theories of Prayer.
9
one, supposing such, a course should at any time seem
desirable in the interests of the supplicant or others.
This theory would, of course, render an entreaty for
any miracle (as we term it), however stupendous, per
fectly legitimate. This point, however, the value of
which may be left to the consideration of the reader, is
not taken by Mr Bacon. The argument here is that
prayer may be conceived as having such and such an
effect in an altered constitution of nature, to which our
past experience could furnish no guide. Whereas, his
contention is, that there is reason to suppose it may
have an effect in the present constitution of things.
And indeed, unless this latter ground be established,
it is clear that although many ingenious metaphysical
invitations might be addressed to them, yet, as a matter
of practice, no persons would offer up these prayers.
2. Prayer may be asserted to be one of the possible
causes of physical phenomena, till the other causes are
discovered. The law may be so arranged that when
these other causes are found out by man, prayer ceases
to act as an agency, in consequence, it may be said, of
its ceasing to be put up, though this, by the way, is
not strictly the case, for long after the truth as to any
phenomenon is laid bare by science, the uninstructed will
continue to pray in the direction of their supposed
interests. According to this view, although a thousand
years hence meteorology may be so far advanced as that
rain and fine weather will be predicted with certainty
a long while beforehand, and prayer will accordingly
then be futile, it may not be futile now. Or, to take
eclipses again, some thousands of years ago prayer may
have been effectual in warding them off, though it
would be idle to offer it up now-a-days. This is some
thing in the shape of the former theory reversed. It
is a projection of chaos into the past instead of the
future. The Egyptians may have been right when they
informed Herodotus that the sun had twice risen in the
west and twice set in the east. And this singular re
�IO
Orthodox Theories of Prayer.
suit will follow, that any one who gets hold of what
afterwards t turns out to be a natural law, for the first
time, and keeps it to himself, will be wrong, as omitting
one important ingredient, viz., prayer, which would
still be presumably capable of being followed by an
effect not allowed for. But what is here supposed as
to a person keeping a discovery to himself for a while
is, as has already been stated, exactly what takes place,
if for one person we substitute a small body of scientific
men. These discoveries do not penetrate to the mass
of citizens in civilised communities for many years •
and here is an excellent opportunity for observing
whether the calculations of philosophers are liable to
be disturbed by such an agency as prayer. Yet no
single instance of any such disturbance has been verified.
3. The above theories may excite a smile in the
minds of those who are unfamiliar with the methods of
theology. But is there anything one whit less absurd
in the remaining theory to which we shall be driven,
and which is supported by most of the leading thinkers
on the orthodox side,—which is indeed the one upon
which the case of Prayer (in the sense in which we are
using the word) is mainly rested ? It is thus clearly
stated by Mr Mill:—Originally all natural events
were ascribed to such (special) interpositions. At pre
sent, every educated person rejects this explanation in
regard to all classes of phenomena of which the laws
have been fully ascertained, though some have not yet
reached the point of referring all phenomena to the
idea of law, but believe that rain and sunshine, famine
and pestilence, victory and defeat, death and life, are
issues which the Creator does not leave to the opera
tion of his general laws, but reserves to be decided by
express acts of volition.” * In judging this latter
theory it will be found that as is constantly the case in
matters not admitting absolute determination, we are
reduced to a balancing of probabilities. We must re_
* “ System of Logic,” fifth ed., vol. ii., p. 521, note.
�Orthodox Theories of Prayer.
n
peat that the matter stands thus. Prayer having once
been held capable of producing an effect upon all phy
sical phenomena, and being now by general consent
restricted to those only the laws of which have not
been discovered and established, and this process of
adding phenomena to the domain of law, and conse■quently subtracting them from the domain of prayer,
having gone on uninterruptedly, and pari passu with,
accurate observation, is it more probable that pheno
mena the causes of which are unknown resemble those
which have been explained, in being governed by simi
lar laws, or that they are exceptions, in which our
prayers, demonstrably useless in all other like cases (if
the present constitution of the universe is to be main
tained), may be, after all, efficient causes ? Or, in other
words, no single instance being scientifically established
in which prayer has had any effect on external nature,
and the course of nature, as far as it has been ascer
tained in countless cases and for countless ages, abso
lutely excluding this agency, is there any ground for
-claiming it as a power in those cases where we are at
present unable to trace effects to their true causes ?
Theologians reply that there is such a ground ; and
we do not know that in our day they have found a
more able spokesman than the late Dean Mansel, whom
we shall accordingly quote. In his “ Limits of Reli
gious Thought ” he writes as follows :—
“ Even within the domain of Physical Science, how
ever much analogy may lead us to conjecture the uni
versal prevalence of law and orderly sequence, it has
been acutely remarked that the phenomena which are
most immediately important to the life and welfare of
man are precisely those which he never has been, and
probably never will be, able to reduce to a scientific
calculation.” *
This, by the way, is a very slovenly classification, for
if there be any phenomena “ immediately important to
* P. 134, fifth edition.
�12
Orthodox Theories of Prayer.
the life and welfare of man,” such are, certainly, before
all others, the regular transmission of light and heat
from the sun, the alternation of day and night and the
seasons, in compliance with laws which prevent our
being sent wandering through space or absorbed in the
central luminary, and other phenomena of the kind
which are capable of being reduced to a scientific cal
culation. However, Dean Mansel continues :—
“ This argument admits of a further development, in
which it may be applied to meet some of the recent
objections urged, on supposed scientific grounds, against
the efficacy of prayer, as employed in times of national
calamity, such as pestilence or famine. The celestial
phenomena, recurring at regular intervals and calculable
to a second, are by no means a type of the manner in
which the whole course of nature is subject to law.
On the contrary, there are other classes of natural phe
nomena, with respect to which matter is to some extent
directly subject to the influence of mind; man being
capable, by his own free action, not indeed of changing
or suspending the laws of nature, but of producing, in
accordance with those laws, a different succession of
phenomena from that which would have taken place
without his interposition. Franklin sends up his elec
tric kite, and directs the fluid with which the thunder
cloud is charged to a course different from that which
it would otherwise have taken, and the same thing is
now done by every man who erects a lightning-con
ductor. Subject to these influences, the material world
must be regarded, not as a rigid system of pre-ordained
antecedents and consequents, but as an elastic system,
which is undoubtedly capable of being influenced by
the will of man, and which may, therefore, without any
violation of scientific principle, be supposed to be also
under the influence of the will of God.” *
* P. 135, note. How about earthquakes (against which men are
taught to pray), and in which of the two classes of phenomena
shall we rank them, and the cognate phenomena of volcanic
eruptions ?
�Orthodox Theories of Prayer.
ij
The argument is, that where phenomena are capable
of being directly influenced by man, and so removed
from the sphere of exact prediction, they may be sup
posed to be capable of being directly influenced by
God, and so made the subject of prayer. The reverend
Dean has put the point rather strangely, but we will
not dwell on this. Every one, that is, every Theistr
admits the above proposition and something more.
We believe that all phenomena are capable of being
directly influenced by the Almighty. But this is not a
fair statement of the point in issue. The argument, to
have any bearing on the subject, should be capable of
being maintained in this form. “ Where phenomena
are capable of being directly influenced by man, there
is reason to suppose that they will be directly influenced
by God at the request of man.” The real question is
not as to the power of God, but as to his mode of
working as revealed to us. That the Deity could, if
he thought fit, in answer to human prayer, arrest the
course of a thunder-storm or a pestilence, may be con
ceded, without any appreciable weight being thereby
accorded to the argument for prayer. What we have
to consider is, whether there is any reliable evidence of
his ever having worked in this fashion. If there is
not, then to talk about prayer as a “cause” is an idle
speculation. On the other hand, human labour or
effort is a vera causa capable of producing determinate
results on external nature, as every day experience
shows us. Not only does Franklin divert the course
of the electric fluid, but men have changed the climate
of large tracts of the earth by cultivation, thus entirely
altering what, but for their intervention, would have
been the course of rain, storms, &c. Zoophytes have
produced an analogous effect by raising coral islands.
To argue that because man is able to act immediately
on nature in certain cases, therefore God in those par
ticular cases may be supposed to act in a like way, is a
complete non-sequitur. Again, to argue from the power
�34
Orthodox Theories of Prayer.
of human effort over nature, the power of human prayer
to accomplish like results in the same field, is equally
•absurd. In the one case, as, for instance, in the clear
ing away of large forests, and the consequent diminntion of rainfall in those districts, we have a regular
■ chain of causation, entitling us to rank the burn an
effort as an antecedent and the increased dryness as
a consequent. Here a fresh antecedent being intro
duced is followed by a change in the phenomena, and
in this sense of course all nature is an “ elastic system,”
the stars of heaven as well as drops of rain. When
prayer has been exhibited to us as an unmistakeable
antecedent, followed in like manner by clearly ascer
tained consequents, we shall think it as much a matter
of duty to pray as to labour; but not till then.
Strange to say, theologians have never made an at
tempt in this direction. More than this, they have
looked upon all efforts to ascertain the value of prayer,
even when undertaken with the most single-minded
■desire of arriving at the truth, as so many attempts
nearly resembling blasphemies. Surely this is a mis
take on the part of the upholders of this supposed
agency. For, if it be capable of influencing pheno
mena, in the way suggested, this influence may pos
sibly in some one case (and one would suffice) be
capable of being traced ; and this possibility would be
a sufficient justification of research, even in the eyes of
the theologian, inasmuch as if it were realised, the
sceptic would be silenced. Meanwhile, we are com
pelled to say with the lawyers, “ De non apparentibus
et non existentibus eadem est lex.”
To return to the theory of which Mr Bacon, the
author of the article in Fraser, is the latest spokesman.
It possesses what to many will be the incontestable
advantage of extending the power of prayer by making
it applicable to past as well as future events. He in
forms us at the outset that he was travelling twenty
years ago in Mesopotamia with two American theolo-
�Orthodox Theories of Prayer.
15
gians, one of them a missionary. A letter reached the
latter, dated long months before at Shanghai in China,
informing him that his brother was dangerously ill of
a typhus fever that was approaching its crisis. The
question arose, would it be right to pray for the sick
man ? To which the theologians replied, no. He is
either recovered or dead. In the first case, prayer is
superfluous; in the second, it is useless. Mr Bacon
was not satisfied with this answer at the time, and after
much consideration he deems it wrong. “ The reasons
against excluding such a case from the domain of
prayer are like those which apply against excluding all
cases which come within the sphere of physical law.”
“ The difficulty involved in it is not substantially different from that involved in prayer for future physical
blessings; it is only more vivid, and more incapable of
being evaded. It does not need a great philosopher, it
is possible for a childlike mind, to recognise that an
unknown fixed event in the past, as well as in the
future, may have been fixed with reference to its rela
tions, not only in the physical but also in the moral
system; so that it is no absurdity to believe that a cer
tain chain of invisible and imponderable morbific in
fluences, terminating in an unknown issue of life and
death on the banks of the Yang-tse-Kiang might have
been adjusted with fatherly reference to what, six or
twelve months later, was to be the spiritual attitude
and act of a heavy-hearted missionary wanderer floating
on a goatskin raft down the Tigris.”
The common-sense of the reader will, it is needless
to say, be perfectly satisfied with the reply of “the
theologians.” There is, indeed, a very great difference
between praying for future and praying for past “ phy
sical blessings.” In the one case it is possible that theprayer may have an effect: in the other case, to sup
pose this is in reality a contradiction in terms. A thing
cannot have for a consequent that which has preceded
it. It must be remarked, however, that, according to-
�16
Orthodox Theories of Prayer.
this theory, the possible antecedent e.g., in the case of
the missionary’s brother recovering or dying, is not,
strictly speaking, the missionary’s act (praying or de
clining to pray), but God's foreknowledge of what the
act would be. Not that this really mends the matter.
But, before looking into this question a little more
closely, let us see whither we shall be led if we adopt
the line of action which Mr Bacon prescribes.
Any past event whatever, the issue of which is un
known to the person praying, may be made the subject
of prayer, and (provided there be nothing improper or
immoral in the request) of legitimate prayer. To entreat
that Judas Iscariot, or even Cain, may have repented
before dying, that the number of slaughtered in some
• ancient battle was not so great as reported by ancient
historians, that Seneca may have made acquaintance
with Paul and become a convert to Christianity, all
these are fair objects of supplication. The event may
have been adjusted in reference to the subsequent
spiritual attitude and act. Prayer for the dead becomes
■ a solemn duty for all of us, as wre are reminded by the
illustrations just given. For their permanent condi
tion may have been adjusted (we cannot help using Mr
Bacon’s own tenses) in the same way. If the missionary
on the Tigris was authorised to pray that his brother
at Shanghai had recovered six months before, he wTas
just as much, nay, very much more, called upon to pray
that, in the event of that brother not having recovered,
he might have departed this life in the odour of sanc
tity. Similarly we may pray this on behalf of any
person whatever whom we know to be dead, and whose
final earthly state of mind we do not know. And this
being so, surely all those who believe in the efficacy of
retrospective prayer, ought to set to work and pray for all
the dead. We may add that a very rude shock is given
by this theory to the doctrine of free-will, as might
easily be shown. This, however, we shall not press,
-though we apprehend that it would have weight
�Orthodox Theories of Prayer.
17
with a writer holding the theological views of Mr
Bacon.
According to this theory, prayer, impertinent and
indeed impious to one man, would he a solemn duty to
a person standing by him—we mean in reference to an
■event one and the same, and possessing an equal in
terest for both.
Let us suppose that, instead of being on the Tigris,
the missionary had been at a hotel in New York, and
that a gentleman had called upon him with the an
nouncement that he had recently come from Shanghai.
“ Here is a letter,” he says, “ which I had intended to
post to you on my arrival here, but have preferred
bringing with me, on accidentally learning your address.
It informs you of a serious illness of your brother’s, six
months ago, and of the issue. Open the letter and
you will see whether he recovered or died.” It would
seem that it would be the missionary’s duty, before
breaking open the seal, to kneel down and pray that
his brother had recovered, inasmuch as to him the
result is unknown. Indeed, Mr Bacon puts a pre
cisely similar case in reference to a “telegraphic de
spatch.” Would it not be the duty of the visitor to
reply, “ My good sir, if you don’t know, I do. No
thing that you can devise can alter the event you will
find recorded in that letter.” “ 0 ! but the Almighty
may have so adjusted a chain of morbific influences,
&c., with fatherly reference to what is nowr going to be
my spiritual act.” “ But the very words you have
used, ‘may have adjusted,’ show you what nonsense
you are talking.” The pious missionary, however, ad
heres to his view, offers his prayer, opens the letter,
.and reads the result. Hereupon his equally pious and
very delicate sister chances to come into the room, and
is informed of the illness, but the result' is withheld
from her. How is the missionary to advise his sister ?
•Clearly that she ought to pray.* Prayer, which is a
* "W e might go further.
It would be the duty of the missionary
•
�18
Orthodox Theories of Prayer.
futility for him, still remains a duty to her, or else all
this theory tumbles to pieces. But he cannot advise
her to pray with any reference to the result, for the
result is known to him. He is in the position the
visitor stood in a short time before. He can only ad
vise her to pray in a sense quite different from that in
which prayer is used in this theory, viz., as a pos
sible means of influencing past events. Now transport
the missionary back to the Tigris, and suppose the
visitor (Smith) at Shanghai. Smith (and a number of’
other people) know the event: the only difference is
that he does not happen to be at hand to tell the mis
sionary that he knows it. But this does not make the
prayer less futile.
As this is a theory extremely likely to lay hold of
certain persons of a theological turn, we do not think
it a waste of time to repeat that prayer of this kind is
an attempt to tamper with a past event by getting at a
past antecedent which (admitting the theory) has already
produced a consequent. It is plain that a person, C.,.
who knows what happened six months ago,—say that
A. then recovered of a dangerous illness,—and who is
a believer in Mr Bacon’s general theory, would reason
correctly thus as to B., A.’s surviving brother : “ God
may have so adjusted the result in this particular instance
in accordance with his foreknowledge that B. would
either pray or not pray. If B. prays I shall think that
this was very likely the case. If he does not pray,
■ then clearly it was not the case. But either way prayer
can be of no avail now/’ One of the numerous falla
cies of this theory lies in supposing that this view
which is true to C. need not be true to B. ; that be
cause a thing is not known to B. it may be presumed
to be in a certain sense undetermined, by B. If it is
true to C. it must be true generally. It follows that
wheD any event is known to any being in creation
not to inform his sister of the result, with the view of inducingher to pray.
�Orthodox Theories of Prayer.
19
prayer about it becomes useless to everybody. Another
fallacy consists in not observing that in either case,
i.e., whether the issue of the disease be or be not known
to the supplicant, a known past event has to be dealt
with, viz., the Deity’s complete foreknowledge of what
would be the supplicant’s course. The prayer is offered
up in order that the Deity foreseeing it—which now he
■is enabled to have done—may have been thereby dis
posed to save the sick man. But if a cannon may
have been fired off, or not fired off, at Waterloo, ac
cording as a foreknowledge of whether I should this
day pull or not pull a string influenced a superior
power, I can no more by my action on the string affect
that foreknowledge than I can fire off the cannon of 1815.
This theory, then, viz., that of the Supreme Being
adjusting the issue of sickness, &c., to subsequent en
treaties, is not only a wild figment of the brain, opposed
to the lessons derived from a study of nature, but it
does not even justify the practice which is sought to be
founded upon it.*
* Theologians, like common jurymen, require to have things
often put before them ; so I shall make no apology for again set
ting the matter out thus. Granting Mr Bacon’s wild theory of
the existence of a law in virtue of which persons’ lives or deaths
may, in certain cases (for there is no pretence that this is always
•so), depend on subsequent prayers, we will suppose that a certain
event, the issue of which is to me unknown, has reached me, e. gr.,
the illness of my brother six months ago. Now I believe that the
Deity 'nwjy have ordered that issue in reference to his foreknowledge of what would be my action. The only effect of my prayer
now can be to inform me whether the issue, when ascertained, can
be brought into possible connection with the law.
I pray—news comes of his recovery—law has possibly come into
operation.
I pray—news comes of his death—the case did not come under
the law.
I don t pray news comes of his death—law has possibly come into
operation.
I don’t pray—news comes of his recovery—the case did not come
under the law.
In the two cases where my prayer does not correspond with the
past event, law could not have operated.
In the two cases where my prayer did correspond with the past
event, law might have operated.
�20
i
Orthodox Theories of Prayer.
What, we may ask in conclusion, is gained to the
cause of theology by these wild assertions of the power
of prayer over external nature ? To what purpose all
these astounding complications ? The belief, it may
be said, is necessary to stimulate a prayerful spirit.
Yes, but then it ought to be shown that this is a prayer
ful spirit exercised in the right direction. No one, it
is clear, from the theological point of view, can know
for certain whether supplications of this kind meet
with success or not. We should have thought that the
spirit which it is deemed so desirable to cultivate might
find a sufficient scope in the internal sphere, where,
though the modus operand,! may be in dispute, no one
denies that prayer is capable of producing effects,
which is the chief thing. With regard to external
nature, may not a spirit of submission to supreme wis
dom—rather than one of a desire for change in our
own interests—be, at least as “ theological” as it is
philosophical ? Are not, we say, true philosophy and
true religion at one, the former in urging that it is
wiser, the latter in admitting that it is more devout, to
leave external nature in the hands of the Author of
Nature ?
The fallacy consists in putting it that, if I pray God may have
saved my brother; or, if I (Lortt pray, God may not have saved
my brother.
The fact is, that my brother has been saved or not saved with
full foreknowledge of what I should do.
If saved, saved either Secawse it was known I would pray; or,
though it was known I would not.
If dead, dead either because it was known I would not pray ; or,
in spite of its being known that I would pray.
TURNBULL AND SI’BAKS, PRINTERS, EDINBURGH.
�
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PLEAS FOR FREE INQUIRY.
PART II.
SOME OBSERVATIONS ON “THE ARGUMENT
FROM ANALOGY.”
BY
“M. A.”
TRINITY COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE.
PUBLISHED BY THOMAS SCOTT,
MOUNT PLEASANT, RAMSGATE.
Price Sixpence.
��PLEAS FOR FREE INQUIRY.
N a paper, which I had the honour to contribute to
this series some months ago, I ventured to point
*
out that this much might be affirmed with confidence of
the religious creed commonly, or perhaps rather nomi
nally, entertained in this island, viz., that it is one which
ought to inspire all men, and must certainly inspire all
unselfish men, with the hope that it is untrue. Tn
saying, and in repeating this, I do not conceive myself
to" have lit upon any new or strange argument bearing
upon Revelation, or indeed to be doing anything more
than drawing a very simple and obvious inference from
the alleged facts which it brings under my notice. “ AR
men are accursed ; their natural destination is Hell, a
place of excruciating and endless torment; from this
fate, impending over all,’ some (or, if you please, many)
will be rescued by miraculous means.” The inference
or conclusion which I draw from these statements is
the necessary and unavoidable one, that they constitute
very bad tidings, indeed tidings of the most appalling
character, for mankind in general. And (suppose I
put out of sight my own personal interest in the matter)
this conclusion will certainly involve the hope—from
which I am powerless to defend myself if it be a sin,
and unwilling to defend myself, if I had the power,
whether it be a sin or not—that the so-called Revela
tion, containing these announcements, may prove wholly
untrue. Nor shall I be induced to smother the hope,
if I am told (what, indeed, I am not very clearly told
* Pleas for Free Inquiry, Part 1.
I
�4
Pleas for Free Inquiry.
in this case) that every man in the world, hy the
*
exercise of due care, may escape the dreadful fate im
pending over him ; since this will leave quite untouched
the particular announcement which has called forth the
emotion in question. I shall continue to hope that a
number of persons will not perish in a coal-mine to
morrow, even after being informed that the death of every
one of them, if it takes place, will be the result of his own
fault. But, for a fuller discussion of this subject, I
must refer the reader ro the paper above mentioned, f
Yet, as I pointed out at the end of that paper, and
as must suggest itself to every impartial mind, to assert
(what I think is plainly demonstrable) that it would
be greatly for the interest of mankind that such terrible
tidings should be untrue, and that we are therefore en
titled to hope that they may be untrue, is a very differ
ent thing from concluding that they are untrue. It may
turn out that such a conclusion is by no means warranted,
and we must be very eareful not to mistake our wishes
for proofs in the matter. No doubt it is difficult to under
stand that the Supreme Being (represented to us as in
vested with the attributes of power, justice, goodness,
mercy, &c., infinitely multiplied) should reveal himself
to us under such a terrific form, and animated by such
intentions towards our race. Yet, satisfactory evidence
that he had thus revealed himself and his intentions
would, of course, be a complete answer as to the fact :
though, whether we could continue to employ with
respect to him the epithets “just,” “good,” “merciful,”
in any other than a non-natural sense, is another ques
tion. It is not proposed to discuss the evidences of
Christianity in this paper, except in so far as a resem
blance between what is to be found in nature on the
one hand, and the matter and method of Revelation
* See note at the end of Pleas for Free Inquiry, Part I.,
and the “Larger Catechism of the Church of Scotland,” &c.,
quoted there.
t Note (A) at end.
�Pleas for Free Inquiry.
5
so-called on the other, constitutes a part of such evi
dences. It is of this resemblance, or what is styled the
“Argument from analogy,” that I wish to say something.
I have said that it is difficult for any dispassionate
person to suppose certain parts of Revelation (which
word I use in the sense of the alleged miraculous Bib
lical Revelation) to be true. They come into direct
conflict with the moral sense of such a person. There
is, for instance, no orthodox believer out of the “ Evan
gelical” School,—I mean no reasonable Christian—who
does not admit that the endless torturing of sentient
beings by their Creator is a difficulty of this kind.
Accordingly, some sincere men, owing to the shock to
their consciences of such a communication, and many
others, carelessly jumping to a desired conclusion, have
gone their way, satisfied that it would be a waste of
time to inquire into the evidences of such a revelation
as this.
It is at this point that the “ Argument from Ana
logy comes in. The very same difficulties, it is
alleged, which are found in Revelation are also to be
found in nature, and can in no wise be urged as objec
tions against the former,- unless they are admitted to
be objections against the latter, which, however, is
allowed to be from the hand of God (for Atheists are
not dealt with by this argument). And this conside
ration not only removes all ground for holding that
Revelation cannot be from the same hand, but also fur
nishes some positive reasons for supposing that it is
from the same hand. Instead of imagining what God
is, or is not likely to do, we are told, let us consider
what he has done and is doing in this world of ours.
For example, he certainly is permitting the existence
of a great deal of evil here, to use the mildest form of
words; and surely a greater difficulty than the exist
ence and incidence of Evil is not to be conceived. Not
only is there in the world a terrible amount of suffer
ing, which an Omnipotent Being might have prevented,
�6
Pleas for Free Inquiry.
but it is perpetually lighting upon the persons who
from our point of view are the wrong persons. Indeed, •
nothing is more clear than that suffering is not pro
portioned to guilt in this world. Now, if you suppose
a being with faculties even vastly superior to our own,
but with no experience or information of a constitution
of things like that of our planet, a being such as “may
possibly be in the creation, to whom the Author of
Nature has manifested himself under the most amiable
of all characters, that of infinite absolute benevolence,” *
and should proceed to inform him, if he needed to he
informed, that this world is under the immediate
government of the same omnipotent, all-wise, and
benevolent Creator, he would certainly deem it before
hand inconceivable that suffering of any kind should
exist here ; still more inconceivable, if such an expres
sion, be permitted me, that it should be inflicted on
the innocent as well as on the guilty. He would indeed
presume not only that there would be no suffering, but
that there would be no sin. Possibly, the very nature
of suffering (if not of sin) would be unintelligible to
him. Yet here is sin and here is suffering. Surely
then, it is most absurd to contend that a revelation
which informs us of a great amount' of misery to be in
flicted hereafter (and that, not upon wholly innocent
beings, nor according to its more humane adherents,
upon any that might not have escaped) must needs on
this account be untrue; that it may be rejected without
examination of its proofs, as not possibly coming from
God, by such poor ignorant creatures as ourselves. The
writer who by his masterly treatment of it has made
this subject of analogy his own is, as every one knows,
Bishop Butler, the “ Bacon of Theology,” as he has
been styled. Nor can I help saying that his argument
seems to me unanswerable, if not pressed beyond a
certain point. What that point is we shall shortly have
occasion to consider.
* Butler, Analogy, Pt. i., ch. 3.
�Pleas for Free Inquiry.
7
It may be as well, however, to mention at once an
inference or conclusion which this Analogy is not strong
Enough to sustain. For it has been contended by some
recent imitators of Butler that we should expect a Reve
lation to contain the same difficulties as are to be found
in Nature. This is equivalent to saying that we should
expect the Almighty’s handwriting, like that of a man,
to be always the same; or, perhaps rather that from one
ill-deciphered character we can form an idea of what
his general hand-writing is. This kind of reasoning
furnishes one, among many examples, of the way in
which the guarded conclusions of great thinkers are
often exaggerated by their disciples.
*
We should, I
venture to think, anticipate exactly the contrary. We
should expect that a revelation
from an
all-good Deity—and such a one is taken for granted on
both sides—would be, as the name indicates, an “ un
covering,” not a means of darkening what was diift be
fore ; of clearing up some of the mysteries of life, not
of deepening them; of removing, if only to a small
extent, some of our difficulties, not of multiplying them
a thousandfold. If we saw great suffering inflicted on
many persons by a Prince of whose benevolence we had
reason to feel assured, we should not be inclined to
predict that a message from him purporting to deal
with their case, would, while explaining nothing, con
vey news of a still more dreary, and dismal and, worse
than all, of an unalterable fate, to these same persons.
However, to argue that the occurrence of certain diffi
culties in connection with revelation is not a sufficient
ground for rejecting it, inasmuch as the same or like
difficulties are to be found in Nature—this is to take
up quite a different position. And this really is a large
part of Butler’s contention. It will be observed that
here are two distinct propositions stated—(1), That a
Revelation is not rendered incredible by reason of
certain difficulties, when the same or similar difficulties
* Note (B) at end.
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Pleas for Free Inquiry.
are found in Nature ; (2), That the same &c. difficulties
are found in Nature as are connected with this Reve
lation. The former of these two propositions seems
to me indisputable, and is taken for granted; the
latter (which is the real point) is, in my opinion, open
to some observations. Supposing, however, it be ad
mitted to the fullest extent, the reader will please to
observe how far we shall be carried. Not by any means
to the conclusion that revelation is not incredible (since
the evidence for it may completely break down); but to
this, that it is not rendered antecedently incredible by
the particular objections referred to. Now, whether all
the objections that may be brought against Revelation,
before evidence heard, be or be not such as may also be
urged against Nature, I take it that now-a-days few
reasonable men contend that any of these objections,
or any combination of them, render Revelation in
credible ; but only that it is rendered very unlikely. If
the argument from Analogy were supposed incapable of
being pushed to a further point than I have above in
dicated, it would not be styled “ an impregnable fortress
erected for the defence of Christianity.”* Bishop
Butler does carry it a stage further: so far as to meet
this presumption by a counter-presumption of likeli
hood; and as nothing more than a probable conclusion
can be drawn from any Analogy, he has in reality made
the utmost available use of it. His propositions, then,
embrace what I have above stated and something more.
They go to this (a) If there be an analogy or likeness
between that system of things and dispensation of Provi
dence which a Revelation informs us of, and that
system of things and dispensation of Providence which
Experience together with Reason inform us of, i.e., the
known course of Nature; this is a presumption that
they both have the same author and cause;+ (&) There
to such an analogy, &c., between Revelation and Nature,
or, as he himself expresses it further on—They are
* Professor Alden. Bartlett’s Life of Bishop Butler, p. 320.
+ Note (C).
r
F
�Pleas for Free Inquiry.
9
very much, of a piece, and may be traced up to the
same general laws, and resolved into the same prin
ciples of divine conduct. The conclusion is that it is
probable that Revelation has a divine author. In this
syllogism (and I have thrown the argument into this
form merely for the convenience of remarking upon its
parts) it seems to me that both the major and minor
premiss are, to say the least, open to some criticism.
Let us take the latter first. What are the resem
blances alleged to exist between Nature and Revelation ?
And a consideration of the points in which they are
said to resemble each other will include that of “diffi
culties ” common to both.
Now these resemblances may be classed under two
heads. Firstly, those which exist between the subject
matter of Revelation and the inferences to be drawn
from an examination of what may be called the natural
scheme. Secondly, those which exist between the
mode in which Revelation has been communicated
to man, and the manner in which natural knowledge
is conveyed. The first head includes a comparison
of the two communications; the second, of the respective
modes of communication;
Under the first head, probably most theists will
admit, that there are some strong indications from other
sources than revelation, of the present life not being
the end of all things for man; that we may gather in
the same way that we are under the government of God,
a government carried on by rewards and punishments
(many startling observations forcing themselves upon
our minds as tp both these means so employed; for
instance, that punishment is often, to all seeming, quite
out of proportion to guilt; and that there is often a
point in a man’s career at which no repentance or
alteration of conduct will serve to stave off the earthly
punishment incurred); that moreover the government
of God wears the appearance of a moral government,
one under which the practice of virtue has a tendency
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Pleas for Free Inquiry.
to promote happiness, and that of vice, misery; that
hence it would seem likely that we are in a state of
probation, as implying difficulties, trial and danger,
with regard to this world, and that there are reasons
for inferring that we are in a similar state with regard
to another world; that this state of probation seems
intended for our moral discipline and improvement,
certainly here, and probably hereafter; that we are
seemingly in the midst of a scheme which is quite in
comprehensible to man, full of mysteries and difficulties,
and in which what would strike us as the best means
are not always adopted to produce the required ends,
but which is presumably—the wisdom and goodness of
God being taken for granted—related to other parts of
a great and general scheme, the very nature of which
we are incapable of seizing; yet a part of which, we
are entitled to infer, or at least to surmise, will consist
in a final adjustment of our condition, in accordance
with the principles of strict justice; of which final
orderly settlement the germs are plainly discoverable in
this our present state, where God has unmistakably
marked his approval of virtue and disapproval of vice.
Now all these and other indications of a divine and
moral scheme which an examination of the natural
course of things suggests to us are authoritatively con
firmed and republished by the voice of Revelation.
Besides its statements on these heads, revelation
makes several others which will not be so generally
accepted, e.g. (1.) that we are in a fallen and ruined
condition. But whether this be true or not, it cannot
be said (it may be alleged) that we are without an
intimation to that effect from nature. Since all nations,
even such as have never heard of the revelation we are
discussing, have held substantially the same view. (2.)
that we stand in need of some means of propitiating an
angry Deity. Now, no one can deny that there is no
notion more deeply impressed than this one by nature
upon the mind of man, as is proved by the existence
of sacrifices all over the world.
�Pleas for Free Inquiry.
11
Further, Revelation teaches some dogmas (and pre
scribes certain ordinances) not to be discovered or
approached to by reason. For example, the existence
of the Trinity. We cannot compare these directly with
anything in nature, or draw a comparison in any way
*
further than by observing that they are mysteries, and
that there are in nature also mysteries. Yet they are
not, properly speaking, difficulties. I mean that the
presence of such alleged truths, not discoverable by
reason, in a revelation is not a difficulty. For we
certainly should expect it to contain some things not only
not discoverable by reason (else, why a revelation at all ?)
but also incomprehensible by us; though not, indeed,
as has been before said, to reproduce in an aggravated
form, and without explanation, all the difficulties of
life. It is not intended in the argument from analogy
to imply that everything out of what we are calling
“ nature ” must needs be exactly like everything in it
—which would be absurd. And the presence of such
mysteries in a revelation would be quite in accordance
with the acknowledged constitution and course of
nature, which, as Butler justly remarks, is quite dif
ferent from what, before experience, might have been
looked for. Nor can any one say that the allegation
of the existence of a Trinity in any way offends his
moral sense, or furnishes an A priori reason for refusing
to examine into the evidences of a revelation which in
culcates it as a fact. Eternal punishment does indeed
shock the mind. This and a few other dogmas, such
as the atonement, should be considered apart, as being
of an exceptional character.
It is rather in glancing at the second head, viz., the
resemblance or analogy between the mode in which
Revelation has been communicated, and that in which
natural knowledge has been conveyed to mankind, that
(subject to the exceptions just mentioned) the greater
part of what have generally been considered h priori
* Note (D).
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objections to revelation will be met with. Thus, that
the light of revelation is not universal; that its evidence
is not so strong as it might have been, on the contrary,
is such as to leave many honest enquirers, before whom
it is placed, in great doubt; that, supposing man in a
fallen state, the remedy should have been introduced
only after so many ages, and then made known so
gradually and partially, and through so long and intri
cate a series of means; that there should be such
diversities of opinion among those who accept Revela
tion, as to its real meaning, as are implied in the several
creeds of the Roman Catholic, Protestant, &c.; that all
men who receive revelation are not necessarily made
the better for it; these and other considerations of a
like kind have often been cited as difficulties in the
way of belief. And certainly whatever may be thought
of the force of the others, the second one instanced
above is a difficulty, in the case of the persons to whom
it applies, since there cannot be a greater difficulty to a
man in the way of believing anything than the fact
(admitted in this instance, in the case of many men)
that the evidence for it is to him wholly inconclusive.
Bishop Butler replies that it is precisely under similar
conditions, and with like apparent inequalities and un
certainties, that God distributes all his blessings, and
that all knowledge makes its way in the world. He
bestows all his gifts with the most promiscuous variety
among creatures of the same species.
*
We are obliged
to act, in the affairs of life, upon very uncertain evi
dence, and “strong objections are often seen to lie
against the best concerted schemes, not to be removed
or answered, but which seem overbalanced by reasons
on the other side, so that the certain difficulties and
dangers of the pursuit are by every one thought justly
disregarded, upon the account of the appearing greater
advantages in case of success, though there be but little
probability of it.” And again, “ numberless instances
* Part ii. ch. 6.
�Pleas for Free Inquiry.
r3
there are, in the daily course of life, in which all men
think it reasonable to engage in pursuits, though the
probability is greatly against succeeding
*
And ad
summam, he waves off, as it were by a flourish of his
wand, all possible or conceivable objections against re
velation, under either of the above heads (except one
presently to be mentioned) with the remarks that we
are no judges of what a revelation might be expected
to contain, supposing one to be made; nor of the means
which God would adopt to communicate it ; nor as to
how far he might choose to secure its transmission un
corrupted to posterity, or, on the other hand, suffer it
to be handed down and consequently corrupted by
verbal tradition. + Again, that things appearing “fool
ish” may, in a scheme so greatly beyond our compre
hension, be the very best means to the very best ends.|
(1.) The first observation to be made with regard
to this analogy is, that—in Butler’s own words, though
he, indeed, uses them with a different application—
“ it is of pretty large extent.” § The legitimate conclu
sion to be drawn from it is, that there can be no such
thing as an a priori objection, or indeed an objection
or difficulty of any kind, in connection with any alleged
revelation whatever (unless it be an objection to its
morality, or by reason of plain contradictions in it—points to be presently considered). There are a number
of religions in the world of which it may be said that
they are republications of natural truths, and that they
announce some dogmas not discoverable by reason ; ob
jections to the doctrines of which, as well as to the mode
of their communication, may be met by precisely the
same arguments as are here employed on behalf of the
Christian Revelation. The very first objection which
will perhaps occur to the mind against examining the
claims of any of these religions, viz., that they are
held by nations which occupy a comparatively low
* Part ii. ch. 6.
+ Part ii. ch. 3.
§ Introduction.
I Part ii. ch. 4.
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place in the world, and whose civilisation is unpro
gressive, may he met in this same way. We are no
judges of the manner in which a revelation would be
given, nor to what sort of persons or peoples it might
he given. Thus, there is great reason to suppose that
a knowledge of the directive power of the magnet was
first communicated to the Chinese, though it might
have been expected that it would first have been made
known to the maritime nations of the West, to whom
it would have been of greater use. Nor are we in the
least degree entitled to infer that the recipients of a
divine revelation must needs, on that account, advance
beyond others in other kinds of knowledge, or in
material prosperity.
*
For if so, certainly any one
living between the ninth and the thirteenth centuries
of our era might justly have concluded that Maho
metanism was the true religion. Nor can any seeming
absurdities or follies in any of these religions furnish
us with a sufficient ground for not examining them ;
e.g., the transmigration of souls, the passage of the
departed over a bridge as fine as a hair, the invocation
of the moon-plant and its juice, the avatars of Vishnu,
the sacred character of crocodiles, oxen and snakes ;
and many other things of a like kind. If we were
told that there is a devil with horns and hoofs, that
it is incumbent on us to cross our fingers every time
we see a magpie, and to pick up and throw over our
left shoulder every rusty nail we find in the road—
in none of which dogmas or ordinances can anything
self-contradictory or clearly immoral be shown—such
ingredients could furnish no objection to a revelation
which contained them ; since, every seeming absurdity
is at once cured, as the lawyers style it, by the doc
trine that we are no judges beforehand of what a
revelation, supposing one to be given, might or might
not contain, or how far things foolish and ridiculous
in our eyes might be the very best means to the very
* Note (E).
�Pleas for Free Inquiry.
*5
best ends. Again, in reference to the religions of which
*
I have been speaking, the fact, if it be a fact, that there
is very slender evidence for the supernatural events re
corded in them can be no objection, “since we are
equally ignorant whether the evidence of it (revelation)
Would be certain, or highly probable, or doubtful.-Y
This very want of proof may be part of our probation
in respect to some one of these religions. And it may
be a true religion, even though the absurdities in it
were admitted to be real; since these absurdities may
be, after all, only corruptions of truths originally com
municated ; for, as we have just seen, we are no judges
how far God, if he gave a revelation at all, might
choose to secure its transmission uncorrupted to pos
terity. And it may be added, that as the difficulties
in nature are numberless, it would be easy to find one
which would match any given difficulty in any one of
these religions, or even, to carry the argument a step
further, and show a general resemblance between it and
the constitution of nature. £ Indeed, I will presently
show why there must be such a resemblance, more or
less marked, between what man learns, or thinks he learns,
from nature and what is taught him in any religion.
Try this analogy, for example, on Mahometanism.
And this may be shortly and fairly done by turning to
the last paragraph in Butler’s Introduction, where he
has given “ a general account of what may be looked
for in his treatise.” Every single word of that summary
will hold good of Mahometanism, except one sentence,
where, for “ (dispensation) carried on by the mediation
of a divine person, the Messiah,” we shall have to sub
stitute another form of words ; as for instance, “ carried
on by a succession of divinely appointed persons,—
Moses, Jesus, finally Mahomet.” And this would be
the substitution in place of a dogma for which even
Butler finds it extremely hard to extract a satisfactory
* Butler, Pt. ii., ch. 4.
J Note (F).
| Pt. ii., ch. 3.
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analogy from nature (the atonement) of a much more
simple and natural one, for which abundant analogies
could be shown ; and, so far, the task of the Mahometan
would be easier than that of the Christian apologist.
*
It may be added, that the former would have no sort of
difficulty in meeting, on Butler’s lines, an objection
which is commonly and foolishly brought against the
divine character of his religion, viz., that it was propa
gated by the sword. We are no judges of the means
by which a revelation would be propagated ; and it
would be the height of presumption to argue d priori
that God could not, or would not, use the sword for
that purpose. And the examples from nature which
make in an opposite direction are numerous. Know
ledge constantly finds its way in the world in the train
of brute-force. And brute-force has been largely em
ployed as a means of spreading both Judaism and
Christianity.!
In short, if any dispassionate person will look with
a little care into this subject, he will not fail to see
that, mutatis mutandis, the “ Analogy ” will hold good
for the creed of Islam, at least so far as this—which is
indeed the furthest point to which it can legitimately
be pushed in support of any religion—that there are
no d priori objections such as to render Mahometanism
. incredible, and that there are certain resemblances be
tween its teachings, the circumstances attending its
introduction, &c., and what we observe in the consti
tution of nature.
Turn, again, to Brahmanism or Buddhism. Here,
we shall be told (what we cannot be told in the case
of Mahometanism) that the analogy does not apply.
For in these religions there are things—precepts en
joined, and actions related of deities—distinctly im
moral. Now, immorality constitutes a clear a, priori
objection to a so-called revelation, as has been admitted
when we conceded (at least I have been willing to con* Note (G).
+ Note (H).
�Pleas for Free Inquiry.
17
cede) that the government of God is a moral govern
ment. This is a point which merits very careful
consideration. And this seems to me a suitable place
for considering it
First, I must ask, What is meant by the word
“immoral” in this place? The reader need not be
afraid of being dragged into the interminable contro
versy to which such a question may seem to open the
way. It will suffice, for my present purpose, to take
an example or two of actions, and to inquire whether
the term is held to apply in these instances. Is it im
moral to bind one’s unoffending son upon an altar, with
the view of putting him to death ? Is it immoral to
borrow one’s neighbour’s jewels of gold and jewels of
silver, and not to return them, or their equivalent in
case they are lost ? Is it immoral, after capturing a
strong city, or subduing a hostile nation, to put to
death in cold blood the enemy’s women and their babes
at the breast ? I suppose there can be but one answer.
Yet all these and similar things are found to have
been enjoined by the Deity of our Eevelation.
*
Are
we not, then, bound, on the above reasoning, if not to
reject in toto the revelation -of which they form a part j
at any rate, to reject those portions of it in which they
are represented as having been commanded by God ?
“ Not at all, says Bishop Butler j and to show the
desperate straits to which he is driven, I shall give this
part of his argument entire :—
‘ Reason can, and it ought, to judge, not only of the mean
ing, but also of the morality and the evidence of a revelation.
First, it. is the province of reason to judge of the morality of
the Scripture; i.e., not whether it contains things different
from what we should have expected from a wise, just, and
good Being ; for objections from hence have now been obvi
ated : but whether it contains things plainly contradictory to
wisdom, justice, or goodness ; to what the Light of Nature
teaches us of God, And I know nothing of this sort objected
against Scripture, excepting such objections as are formed
upon suppositions which would equally conclude that the
* Note (I).
B
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constitution of nature is contradictory to wisdom, justice, or
goodness, which most certainly it is not, Indeed, there are
some particular precepts in Scripture, given to particular
persons, requiring actions which would be immoral and vicious
were it not for such precepts. But it is easy to see that all
these are of such a kind as that the precept changes the whole
nature of the case and of the action, and both constitutes and
shows that not to be unjust and immoral which, prior to the
precept, must have appeared and really have been so ; which
may well be, since none of these precepts are contrary to im
mutable morality. If it were commanded to cultivate the prin
ciples and act from the spirit of treachery, ingratitude, cruelty,
the command would not alter the nature of the case or of the
action in any of these instances. But it is quite otherwise in
precepts which require only the doing an external action ; for
instance, taking away the property or life of any. For men
have no right to either life or property, but what arises solely
from the grant of God. When this grant is revoked they
cease to have any right at all in either. And when this re
vocation is made known, as surely it is possible it may be, it
must cease to be unjust to deprive them of either. And
though a course of external acts which, without command,
would be immoral, must make an immoral habit, yet a few
detached commands have no such natural tendency. I thought
proper to say thus much of the few scripture precepts which
require not vicious actions, but actions which would have
been vicious had it not been for such precepts ; because they
are sometimes weakly urged as immoral, and great weight is
laid upon objections drawn from them.”—(Analogy, pt. ii.,
ch. 3.)
If the above reasoning is to be accepted, it must
lead necessarily to this : that nothing in any revelation
or religion—nothing, I mean, which is represented as
an act or command of a Deity—can be objected to as
being immoral. For every such objection, it may be
urged, is also an objection to the constitution of nature
in which effects similar to those caused by the acts or
the carrying out of the injunctions in question are cer
tainly to be found. If the Hebrew Divinity’s orders
to the Israelites to massacre the children at the breast
of the Canaanites present no difficulty in view of the
fact that God repeatedly smites infants at the breasts,
and causes them to perish by diseases, and to be
�Pleas for Free Inquiry.
19
swallowed up by earthquakes, fires, tempests, &c., all
antecedent objections to infanticide as a religious rite
are removed at the same time. The rapes of Jupiter
and the thefts of Mercury cease to be immoral from
this point of view, since it is certain that women are
ravished and men are robbed in this world. And it
comes to the same thing in the end whether the gods
permit an act to be done, or order it to be done by an
other, or do it themselves. But the absurdity of even
discussing this question at all, under the conditions set
forth, is clearly shown by a consideration of Butler’s
next plea. It really comes to this, (1.) We ought to
reject a revelation in which God is represented as com
manding or doing anything immoral ; (2.) Nothing
which God commands or does can be immoral. Surely
on the strength of this, a Hindu may unanswerably
contend that no orders or exploits of (say) Vishnu,
however extravagant or cruel—if such there be—can be
held as constituting an h, priori objection to his creed.
The question will be simply as to the facts. Bor if
Vishnu did order or do the things in question they
became, ipso facto, right.
Bishop Butler of course sees this difficulty, and
makes desperate efforts to get out of it. He distin
guishes between “ the doing an external action” and
“ the cultivating of certain principles and a certain
spirit;” between “a few detached commands which
have no natural tendency to form an immoral habit,”
and “ a course of external acts which, without such a
command, would be immoral, and would have such a
tendency.” It is obvious that here are distinctions
which will not hold. It is quite idle to say that to
order a man to massacre a few babes is not to cause
him to cultivate a spirit of ferocity, or, at the least, of
insensibility to human suffering. Or that to instigate
a man to cheat a few people is not to develope in him
more or less, according to his nature, a taste for appro
priating what does not belong to him. Or take the
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case, which just now suggested itself to me, of rape.
Rape is an external action: the depriving a woman of
what may he of more value to her than life itself. Yet
a woman has no right to this possession, except what
is given her by God. When he has signified his re
vocation of the grant, it ceases to be unjust to deprive
her of it. Now will any one contend that a man who,
by divine command, had perpetrated a small number of
rapes (or, if you please, one) would not necessarily
have the spirit of lust cultivated in him ? There is no
-distinction to be drawn here between a few immoral
■acts and many immoral acts, except as to their number;
nor between cultivating certain principles and a certain
spirit, and doing by command external actions which
must tend towards their formation, except this much:
that the doing by command of these actions would be
calculated to foster in the agent and others those bad
principles and to stimulate that bad spirit in an extra
ordinary degree, since such deeds would seem to have
been invested with a divine sanction.
It may be thought, at first sight, that the argument
might have been boldly driven over this difficulty. And,
indeed, it might be contended, very much on the lines
of the “ Analogy,” that we are no judges of what con
stitutes “immutable morality:” that actions, injunc
tions, &c., appearing in the highest degree immoral to
us. might, if we knew more of the general scheme, be
shown to be moral. That, consequently, it might be
quite in accordance with the principles of such a
scheme that certain persons should be ordered to culti
vate the spirit of treachery, lust, cruelty, &c. In other
words, that we are quite at sea as to absolute right
and absolute wrong. And this is virtually the argu
ment of those who uphold the dogma of eternal punish
ment, which is not maintainable except on these prin
ciples. This argument would, however, be quite at
variance with the main positions of Butler (indeed,
impossible to him), who, by the way, nowhere encum-
�Pleas for Free Inquiry.
II
bers himself with the doctrine of eternal punishment,
and avoids it as carefully as he avoids the subject of
inspiration. It might, however, be plausibly urged by
the adherent of any so-called false religion, in which an
unusual number of monstrosities occurred. We need
not, however, go into this. Taking the “ Analogy” as
it stands, and not debiting the author, even in imagina
tion, with pleas which he would have repudiated, it seems
there can be no objection on the score of morality to
any religion, or else that there are objections on that
score to Revelation. I venture to hold the latter view,
for which I will endeavour shortly to state my reasons.
This not being admitted by Butler, it will be found
that his general reasoning leads to the former conclu
sion. And, since there can be no a, priori objections on
any other ground, save, indeed, such as may arise from
manifest contradictions, in so far as these may be
brought under this head, it follows that, with this ex
ception, there can, on Butler’s principles, be no h priori
objection of any kind to any revelation or religion.
This consideration in no way weakens the Bishop’s
legitimate argument, since objections of a certain class
to Christianity are not the less removed, because ob
jections of the same kind to other creeds are removed
at the same time. But it is well to observe the wide
scope of the general argument, and to notice at once
that it is applicable, in its main features, to a vast
number of religions, not all of which can be, possibly
not one of which is, true, in the sense of containing
' nothing but truth.
(II.) The second observation which must, I think,
force itself on the mind is, that this argument is not
altogether satisfactory in its mode of dealing with
certain difficulties. Bor instance, the one which as I
said at the beginning has, more than any other, driven
some people to pass by the evidence for revelation ; the
doctrine of Eternal Punishment. One scarcely likes to
use the word with regard to a writer usually so candid,
�22
j
I •
Pleas for Free Inquiry.
but it certainly seems to me that Butler has somewhat
evaded this difficulty. We read of punishment to be
inflicted hereafter, punishment which may be greater
than the offence seems to deserve, greater than the en
joyment derived from the sin, of people being finally
disposed of according to their deserts (a belief which it
is impossible to reconcile with this one) &c., but we no
where, that I can recollect, meet with unmistakeable
Eternal Hell-fire in the pages of the Analogy.
*
Yet
that it is to be found in Revelation is as plain as any
thing can be. If we attempt to soften down this
doctrine into something which is not in the words
conveying it, we shall be introducing a solvent of
immense power and unknown range of application.
There it is in the Bible, and we must make what we
can of it. Now there is nothing in Nature at all corre
sponding to this ; unless it be said that there are such
things as pain and punishment in the world. But
punishment here-—if we admit the existence of a moral
scheme—is apparently inflicted, partly as a discipline
and means of reformation (in which, its proper char
acter, as opposed to the conception of a mere wreaking
of vengeance, men, i.e. legislators, &c., have been
gradually led by God to contemplate it, when appointed
or inflicted by themselves). It appears, at any rate, to
be designed for this purpose in most cases, and we can
not say that it is not so designed in all cases coming
under our observation: since we cannot affirm that
punishments seemingly final to us are really such.
Indeed, (revelation apart) the opposite hypothesis
would be more probable.! On the other hand,
punishment made everlasting assumes the form of
pure vindictiveness.| There is no analogy to be
drawn between what is finite and what is infinite in
this connection ; between what is after all of a nearly
imperceptible character—for all the earthly sufferings
of all who have ever lived, or will ever live, are but a
mere prick of the thumb, not even that by comparison
* Note (J).
f Note (K).
J Note (L).
�Pleas for Free Inquiry.
*3
—and what is beyond all that the imagination can
conceive in horror, intensity and duration; between
what is often seen, and may be always conjectured, to
fulfil an end, and what cannot be conceived as fulfilling
*
any.
Indeed, it would be just as reasonable to call
upon us to infer from the fact that a benevolent autocrat
had been sometimes known to enjoin an extra drill upon
a soldier who had neglected his duty, or even, if you
please, upon one who had not neglected his duty, that
the same monarch would be likely to order the greater
part of his army to be roasted at a slow fire; though
even here the ratio of the difference between the two
commands to that between what we see in the course of
nature and what is presented to us as a prospect
by revelation is as the breadth of a human hair to
the distance between the earth and the furthest measured
part of the heavens infinitely multiplied. There is, I
say, no analogy to be drawn between finite punishment
and punishment involving unimaginable conditions.
And as for pain and suffering, Butler (who like every
other man was under the influence of the tone of
thought prevalent in his day) is very fond of drawing
similes from civil government, the government of the
master over his servant, the parent over his child, &c.
In the course of human training and education, a wise
governor, parent, teacher, master, officer in an army,
will constantly inflict pain and ordain sufferings, 'not
for the mere gratification of causing them, or because
he cannot help doing so, but with a view to the
ultimate benefit and improvement of the sufferer. It
was pain to the Spartan youth to have to endure his
discipline, it is pain to the recruit to acquire his
exercises, it is pain, often real pain, to the schoolboy to
learn his lessons. This modus operandi may often for
wise reasons be immediate!y exercised by the Almighty.
And if it be replied that Omnipotence might have
devised some other plan for the object in view, the
answer may be found in Butler’s own profound observa* Note (M).
�24
Pleas for Free Inquiry.
tion. “ The benevolence of God may not be a bare
single desire to make all men happy, but to make the
virtuous and wise man happy.” And how virtue can
be tested and called forth, except by suffering, it is im
possible for us so much as to conceive. And as to
what is sometimes remarked, that suffering often seems
to fall on the wrong people, we must answer that we
really do not know that this is so. The still more pro
found saying of the writer of the Epistle to the H ebrews,
“ whom the Lord loveth he chasteneth, and scourgeth
every son whom he receiveth,” may be a complete solu
tion of the difficulty.. These people so>exceptionally and
as it would appear undeservedly tried may be ultimately
advantaged in that they have been deemed worthy of a
higher examination It is not indeed pretended that here
*
is a full explanation of the final causes of human suffering;
but that here is an account of it not wholly unsatisfac
tory to our minds. Now, none of these consideratoin
hold good with regard to eternal pain and punishment., t
Again, look at the case of alleged' immoral commands
of the Deity. The difficulty is not to be cut by the
assertion that whatever God commands must be moral,
any more than the former difficulty can be settled by
alleging that whatever he does must be just. This is
only to use words in a non-natural sense. There is no
resemblance or analogy to be found in nature for these
commands. A revelation which represents the Almighty
as enjoining murder and theft presents difficulties which
are not at all paralleled by the undoubted fact that in
this world people are murdered and robbed: since in the
latter case it is admitted in the argument which we are
considering that such acts bear the stamp of his dis
pleasure ; in the former ease, they bear the very
strongest mark of his approval which we can imagine it
possible for God to put upon them, viz. the breaking
through the general order of the Universe specially to
enjoin them. And strange as it may seem to us that
* Note (N).
+ Note (0).
�Pleas for Free Inquiry.
^5
an all-powerful Being should endure things, indeed all
forms of evil, which at the same times he disapproves,
yet this is a mystery the existence of which is admitted;
and it is impossible therefore to show an analogy in
things permitted but disapproved to similar things
ordered and approved * Nor can any analogy he shown
between these immoral commands and the operation of
diseases, pestilences, earthquakes, fires, &c. Some
people suppose the matter quite settled by pointing to the
course of nature. A thousand children (say) are swept
away by small -pox, so many others go down in a ship,
and so on. “ Does not this,” they ask, “ amount in
effect to precisely the same thing as if God had ordered
their slaughter through the agency of man ? ” This is
not so clear to me. The introduction of human agency
into the problem seems to me to make all the difference.
From no source can we gather that God approves of the
pestilence, &c., as a pestilence. Much less is it possible
to conceive that the work which it effects could be en
trusted to man without his being thereby demoralized,f
for the direct contrary of this can be proved. To be
sure this pestilence may be the best, perhaps the only,
means of accomplishing an object in the end beneficent
for the race; just as a surgical operation which,
though if viewed per se, and by some one who did not
understand its purport, it would seem a cruel and
horrible process, might yet he of great service to the
patient and a beneficent act on the part of the operator
who knew all about it; while to make a man hack and
mangle a number of other men, without his knowing
the why or the wherefore, could not but injure him.
We should deem in the highest degree unlikely the
news that a good schoolmaster had set his boys to flog
each other, because such a course could not be other
wise than deeply injurious, particularly (which is the
point here) to the floggers. And it would not remove
our difficulty to be informed that the Schoolmaster had
* Note (P).
+ Note (Q).
�26
Pleas for Free Inquiry.
himself flogged boys for the same offences. But, further,
it is not absolutely certain that God approves of
the catastrophe, earthquake, pestilence, &c., at all.
These things may be as hateful to him as sin itself.
Nor will it suffice to reply that he must approve of
them, since he as the Author of everything must be
held to send them, or since he does not prevent them,
though he is admittedly able to do so. For, if so, then
God must approve of the murder of B. by A., since he
is the author of everything and did not prevent A. from
sticking B. Which supposition would be fatal to the
whole theory of a moral scheme. Here, indeed, is an
old difficulty, the existence of evil side by side with an
all-wise and all-powerful God: and we must at once
pronounce it insoluble by man. But it is important
to note that certain forms of evil (sins) are allowed
full scope in the world, while yet it is certain that they
are reprobated and loathed by God: for it follows
that the same may hold of many processes which we
call natural ones, the presence of which, due it may be
to some mysterious cause quite out of our reach and
range of apprehension, need not by any means show
that they are viewed with divine favour. At any rate,
unless it can be demonstrated that this is not so, it is not
certain that the destruction of a hundred persons by a
tempest can be in any way compared, for the purposes
of this argument, with the killing of those persons by
human agents on express command, z.e., that there is
any analogy, of the kind required, between evil, as to
the genesis of which we are in the dark, knowing only
that it exists, and evil with the process of manufacture
of which, and the direct agents in producing which, we
are made acquainted, in the shape of a God miraculously
ordering a crime and man executing it.
The common-sense of civilised mankind has per
ceived the force of this distinction, without, perhaps,
(as often happens), having analysed it. There can be
no doubt that news of the most extensive destruction
�Pleas for Tree Inquiry.
27
of human life, magno arva tenerr Diluvio, nutare urbes,
subsidere terras, would not affect us in the same pain
ful way as if we had learnt that God had ordered
a man to sacrifice one of his own sons. It maybe said
that this difference in our feelings would be owing to
the comparatively ordinary character of the former
series of events, and the (in any case, happily) un
common character of the latter event. But the com
monness or uncommonness, the natural or miraculous
character of the news would have nothing to do with
the peculiarity of the shock occasioned. The reason of
the difference lies in this, that nowhere in nature is
there to be found an intimation that human life is “ to
be held sacred ” by God. Quite the contrary. But
there is to be found in the human conscience an inti
mation from God that human life is to be held sacred
by man.
Of course it will be said—it is virtually said by
Butler—that the intimation only amounts to this, that
human life is not to be taken by man (to keep to this
illustration) unless an order from God to the contrary
is received. Very well. I am willing to accept this
account of the matter. But now arises a question of
the utmost importance in this inquiry. What evidence
am I entitled to require in order to be satisfied that
such a command has really been given? Here are, as
it were, signs of God calling me in two different direc
tions at one and the same time. Which is the voice,
and which is the counterfeit ?
Let us look a little more closely to this point, which
goes to the very heart of the analogy.
We must approach the consideration of an alleged
Revelation either with no preconceived notions of the
nature of God, or with some preconceived notions.
Butler, of course, takes the latter view, and he fairly
admits that injunctions contained in it, which should
be contrary to immutable morality or plain manifest
contradictions, would form a sufficient reason for re
�28
Pleas for Free Inquiry.
jecting a revelation. Why? Because we evidently
start on our inquiry with these among other assump
tions : that God is moral, that God is truthful, and
will not deceive us. Indeed, without postulating the
latter quality for the Deity, all inquiry would be use
less. The ground would be cut from under our feet.
Now, we must derive these notions (1) from an obser
vation of the course of external nature, and the indi
cations as to the character of God given in it; or (2)
from some other source, which can only be human
conscience—using the word without entering into nice
discussions, wholly unnecessary in this place; or (3)
from a combination of the two.
If our notions are to be derived wholly from (1)
external nature, the question will arise, “ How can we
get from this source an assurance of the veracity of
God ? ” I must confess I do not see how we are to
infer this from nature. There are, indeed, no such
things in nature as truth and falsehood ; because
nature makes no assertions, no positive promises ; while
instances abound every hour of the day of men being
cruelly and fatally deceived by her supposed promises.
It may be said that the observed uniformity of natural ,
processes, what is called the order or course of nature,
contains in it an implied promise that it will never be
broken through, and that that promise is kept. But
this ground, which is not really philosophically sus
tainable, is at any rate not open to orthodox theo
logians, part of whose case it is that past uniformity
in nature is no guarantee whatever (i.e., contains no
promise) of future uniformity.'
*
For, indeed, if it were
admitted that it did, either there could be no miracles,
or every miracle would be a divine lie. It will be
found, as a matter of fact, that the idea of God’s
veracity does not come into existence in our minds,
till we have begun to anthropomorphize God, which,
from the very constitution of our minds, we are com* Note (R).
�Pleas for Free Inquiry.
29
pelled to do. We can only take in a knowledge of
God, like all other knowledge, subjectively. He can
(perhaps rather, does) only reveal himself to us in
terms of the human conscience. It will he found that
from this latter source mainly spring our ideas of God’s
truthfulness j so also of his infinity, omnipotence, and,
in a large degree, of his morality, justice, benevolence.
For though (as I have allowed) there are indications in
nature of a benevolent Deity, a moral government, &c.,
I by no means admit that these are strong enough,
taken alone, to justify anything like an assurance on
the subject. To use, with a little latitude, the language
of the metaphysicians, it is from the ego rather than
the non-ego that these conclusions are drawn. Simi
larly, it may be remarked, that our belief in a future
state (without which, all these our inquiries would
lose the greater part of their interest) is almost entirely
drawn from within. It is the resultant of an internal
desire implanted in us by our Maker, and a confidence
in his goodness and justice similarly communicated to
us : from which we gather that he would not be likely
so cruelly to mock and deceive us as to implant in us
a natural instinct destined never to be satisfied.
*
Several indications in nature serve to confirm this in
ternal anticipation of a future life : not all of them put
together are strong enough to serve as its foundation. +
If this internal apprehension of the essential qualities
of God (essential, that is, to the conception which he
himself compels us to form of him) be, as the very
statement of it imports, a revelation of himself from
God to man, made in the terms of human conscience
it follows :
(1) That we must accept the revelation in those
terms. Any other so-called Eevelation which contra
dicts this one in one particular, is as unlikely to be
true (I am satisfied to put it in this way) as one which
contradicts it in another particular. We should all -of
* Note (S).
t Note (T).
�30
Pleas for tree Inquiry.
us, I suppose, cry out that we found it very hard
to believe a message, no matter how great and how
numerous the miracles which were said to confirm it,
which should represent God as having lied continuously
for six thousand years ; because this would contradict
our fundamental conception of God’s veracity, fie.,
what he has told us of himself on this head. Yet this
message would certainly not be more unlikely to be
true than one which represents him as ruthlessly
fiendish and cruel to all eternity. For I shall not
waste words upon any one who tells me that the doc
trine of eternal punishment does not contradict his
conception of God’s benevolence. The notion of good
ness having come to us in the same way as the notion
of veracity, must be accepted on the same terms, fie.,
as meaning what we mean by it. And a statement
which conflicts with our necessary conceptions on one
point, is as improbable as one that conflicts with them
on another point. The only way of getting out of this
is, by making “ goodness ” to mean something different
from what we mean by it. But in that case, as I have
already pointed out, we are entitled to apply the same
process to “ veracity ; ” * and the basis of all possible
religion, natural or revealed, crumbles away beneath
our feet.
(2) That no act, command, &c., contradicting our
conscience can be accepted on evidence less strong than
that given in our conscience. Hence, evidence that
would be sufficient to establish a physical miracle would
be insufficient to establish immorality — immorality
in a human sense, there is no other sense in which
language can be used—on the part of the Deity. An
authoritative communication from on high, “ the voice
of God speaking in us,” as Butler terms conscience,
cannot be overthrown by any amount of doubtful evi
dence. Yet it is admitted by Butler that the evidence
n favour of a miraculous revelation, containing these
mmoral acts and commands, is doubtful; this very
41 “Pleas for Free Inquiry,” Pt. i., p. 33.
�Pleas for Free Inquiry.
31
doubtfulness being part of our probation in respect to
it. I conclude, not indeed (I will take it) that there
is any absolute antecedent incredibility in the state
ments that God has encouraged lies, and prompted
various cruel and immoral actions in this world, and
that he will torture sentient beings eternally in the
next world ; not that statements to that effect are in
capable of being established by any evidence ; but that,
on Butler’s own showing, the evidence which he is
prepared to adduce on their behalf cannot be held
sufficient for the purpose which he has in view, since
nothing short of a demonstration will suffice; and he
says he is not (and, indeed, we know he is not) pre
pared with a demonstration.
(III.) The question of miracles seems to me to be
very unsatisfactorily treated by Butler and his chief
*
followers.
It is clear that nothing in the remotest
degree approaching to a supernatural interference with
established laws can be traced in nature. The utmost,
therefore, that can fairly be urged, in the course of this
argument, on behalf of Revelation, is that Miracles are
not impossible. And this I should be, for my part,
quite prepared to concede.
But instead of maintaining this impregnable position,
orthodox theologians of eminence, in their desire to
carry the war into the enemy’s camp, have gone so far
as to assert that we ought to approach the miracles of
revelation with a presumption in their favour. They
seem to think that by assigning what they choose to
call an “ adequate cause” for these interferences, they
have thrown the cuw/s probcindi on their adversaries.
At least, so I cannot help understanding the late Dean
Mansel, who paraphrases a passage in the argument of
Butler (the original of which is, however, far more
guardedly and cautiously expressed) in these words,
“ If we ‘ take in the consideration of religion’ we see,
not merely that there may be some possible reason, but
* Note (U).
�32
Pleas for Free Inquiry.
that there is an actual reason for such a departure (from
God’s ordinary course of government); and thus, when
the miracle is part of a religious revelation, the weak
presumption against it, merely as a miracle, is de
stroyed, and gives place to a positive presumption in
its favour.”*
It is impossible not to protest against this assump
tion, which makes miracles immediately probable, on
condition of their being wrought in behalf of some
religious system, and deduces from this, their supposed
function, an actual (z.e., an adequate and sufficient)
reason for God’s departing from his ordinary course of
government. We are no judges at all of what would
constitute to God an adequate cause, or occasion, for
such an exercise of his power; still less are we entitled
to assume that the communication of certain mysterious
dogmas or religious truths would furnish such a cause,
or even the faintest approach to it. For it is at any
rate conceivable that these might be conveyed to us by
the Almighty in the same way as in point of fact all
other kinds of knowledge have been conveyed. Mira
cles, I repeat, are quite possible, but I deny that you
can anywhere point to a spring likely to set them in
motion : for this would be attributing to you an approxi
mate knowledge of the Deity’s ultimate intentions
which neither you nor any one else on this earth can
possess. Your argument is virtually this:—“ Here is a
world plunged in darkness, from which it can only
emerge by supernatural aid directly applied. This
supernatural aid -can only be given by means of a
Revelation. A Revelation can only be given through
the medium of miracles. Therefore an actual reason
for miracles has been shown.” Here is nothing more
than a series of assumptions. Miracles, in whatever
* “Critical Examination of the Argument of Butler” by
the Rev. H. L. Mansel, B.D., given as an Appendix to
“Lectures on Butler’s Analogy,” by the Right Hon. Joseph
Napier, LL.D..
�Pleas for Free Inquiry.
33
connection they may he alleged to occur, must he judged
of on the evidence produced, no test as to the A priori
probability or improbability of their being wrought
being possible to us in our present state of knowledge,
or rather of ignorance. And it is as gross ignorance
and presumption to talk of their probability under some
given circumstances (however important these may
seem to us) as to deny their possibility under a.ny cir
cumstances.
It does not fall within the scope of this paper to
discuss the evidence which may be produced in favour
of the Biblical miracles. But perhaps I may be per
mitted in passing to submit a consideration, obvious
indeed, and, on that very account, to be borne in mind,
because it will be found naturally to suggest itself
whenever the question arises, as it must do at some
point in the enquiry, “ What is the precise amount of
evidence requisite to establish such and such alleged
violations of what we call Law?”
Granting that the most stupendous miracle may take
place to-morrow, I hold it for a clear and certain law
or canon with regard to all past alleged suspensions of
the course of nature (those in Scripture excluded) that
“ The miraculous element in every such narrative
fades away in proportion as light is poured upon
it: so that full light (by which I mean sufficient
to guide us to a proof or demonstration on the
subject) causes it instantly to vanish.”
Now if we find this law illustrated in any one of the
miracles—and it is admitted that they all hang together
—in the Inspired Records submitted for our examina
tion, this will raise a suspicion that they may all of
them be subject to the same Law. If we find it apply
to a second, the suspicion will be deepened, and so on.
If we find it apply to all the miracles on which direct
light can be thrown, and only not applicable to those
which cannot be subjected to such a test, here are
grounds for an Induction—not indeed a complete one,
c
�34
Pleas for Free Inquiry.
but something a long way towards it—that if the same
process could be employed in their case, the latter would
in like manner vanish from sight; in other words, that
they are only kept in a fictitious state of existence
owing to their nature being such as to elude the pro
cess of verification.
For example, no one can prove that Jonah did not
voyage in the belly of a large fish, that Jesus was not
miraculously conceived and raised from the dead, &c.
And it would have been well for them as a whole, if all
Biblical miracles had been of this character. But un
fortunately some of them do confront science in such a
way as to fall directly under the law above mentioned :
with the result of entirely vanishing in some cases, of
being practically effaced in others, partially effaced in
other numerous cases—according as the light thrown
on them is full, or of a strength less than this in vary
ing degrees.
Thus the Deluge is a miracle on which full light can
be thrown. This, it is needless to say, is one of the
greatest physical miracles on record; indeed, in respect
to its material effects on the race of man, the greatest.
We know that it was accepted as an historical event by
Jesus and his apostles. Yet nothing is more certain
than that no supernatural interference such as that
which is here related ever took place. The earth has
been interrogated and has told its story, written by
the hand of Almighty God, and the revelation thus
accorded us is to the effect that vast tracts of country
have never undergone the universal submersion recorded
in Genesis. Again we have full light poured upon the
alleged miraculous creation of animals, after man and
before woman, contained in the Jehovist’s account of
the world’s beginning, and the whole narrative disap
pears as a history.
Two other stupendous physical miracles are to be
found in the Scriptures—stupendous, that is to say,
relatively to man. since they arc not really more won
�Pleas for Free Inquiry.
35
derful than an interposition which should produce a
shower of rain, or heal a sick person in an exalted
station; miracles which the Church of England
habitually prays for.
*
They have moreover an excep
tional importance for us, in that their character renders
them subject to the test which I have proposed. These
are the stoppage of the sun in Joshua, and its retrograde
movement in Isaiah. Of these we may say with con
fidence that they never happened; that they are, except
upon the wildest suppositions, demonstrably untrue.
They are evidently founded on the idea that the sun
was a ball of fire, of comparatively small size, subject
to no law except that of appearing in the heavens to
give light during the day, and disappearing at night,
and capable of being waved to and fro, without causing
disturbance to anything else, like a lantern. From no
individual, from no nation possessing a correct idea on
this subject, could such a tradition have emanated.!
Accordingly, after a desperate resistance to scientific
teaching (God’s truth) founded on this very passage,
the orthodox have devised an explanation to the effect
that popular language is used here to describe a stoppage
of the earth’s motion. But the earth itself could not
be stopped without another series of miracles being
wrought to avert the consequences of such an event.
And if we are driven to evoke an immense series of
subsidiary miracles, it would be better, one would think,
to suppose such as should confirm the literal accuracy
of the inspired writer. This might be done by making
the sun boldly circulate round the earth for the occasion,
and be stopped, things being afterwards restored, with
out disturbance, to their usual order—a double change
in the arrangements of the solar system which might
have been effected by a series of interpositions not more
wonderful than would be required on any other hypo
thesis, and the narrator’s credit being completely savedThen, there is the supernatural darkness which over.
* Note (V).
t Note (W).
�36
Pleas for Free Inquiry.
spread 11 the whole earth” at the crucifixion of Jesus.
The absence of all mention of such an occurrence by
contemporaries, or of any tradition confirming it, is to
us (who are better able to estimate, than were our pre
decessors some centuries ago, the amount of light which
such a silence throws on the subject), conclusive proof
that it never took place. So, some have taken the
words to mean the land of Judeea only. If the event
had been laid a thousand years earlier, we should never
have heard of this subterfuge. It would have been
confidently asserted that the words mean what they do
mean, and what the early Christians held them to mean,
the whole earth. Similarly, that Jesus saw all the king
*
doms of the world from a lofty mountain is disposed of
by the discovery that the earth is not flat. The idea
of the narrator evidently was that Jesus on this occasion
was furnished with the power of seeing to an immense
distance. He would never, we may be sure, if he had
known the facts, have placed his hero under the
necessity of seeing round an immense globe. Here,
“a vision” is nowadays adopted as the solution, in
absolute defiance of the context, for why should any
one be taken to the top of “ a lofty mountain” to
see a vision ? These clumsy tonings-down of events,
once honestly accepted in the sense they were in
tended to bear, furnish good illustrations of the opera
tion of our Law. Where the full light of science
penetrates, miracles disappear. Let but its beams strike
upon them ever so little, their limits contract.
Again, diabolical possession, witchcraft, divination,
the prophetical and monitory character of dreams,
throwing of lots, &c., in the Bible, have had some
additional indirect light thrown upon them in recent
centuries, and with the inevitable result of causing
them to lose something of their distinctness even to
orthodox eyes. Of course, it cannot be proved that the
scriptural narratives on these heads are not true; but they
* Note (X).
�Pleas for Free Inquiry.
37
are certainly somewhat dimmed by the discovery that
everywhere else the phenomena in question are gross
delusions engendered by ignorance—a discovery which
has, comparatively speaking, been only recently made.
This last observation, it is true, holds good of all
miracles. We believe all so-called supernatural oc
currences, outside the Bible, to be mere delusions. But
then, as we have seen, those who support the Biblical
miracles see some special reasons for the more impor
tant ones, which render them worthy of credit. Now
it cannot be pretended, at least it is not generally
alleged, that there was some special and exceptional
cause why witchcraft, proved everywhere else to he a
mischievous superstition, should have been a reality in
Judsea and in some other countries. So that these
occurrences have been allowed, by general consent, to
sink into a kind of half-light from which we may be
sure that they will never emerge.
The above consideration (and it is time that I should
apologise for what has been somewhat of a digression)
is only one of many which would I think entitle us to
ask for very strong evidence as to any alleged miracle,
lying quite out of the path of direct observation : and
would not permit us to accept Butler’s statement that
no stronger evidence “ is necessary to prove the truth
and reality of them than would be sufficient to convince
us of other events, or matters of fact,” or to agree with
him that “ it is by no means certain that there is any
peculiar presumption at all, from analogy, even in the
lowest degree, against miracles, as distinguished from
other extraordinary phenomena.”
(IV.) The line of argument adopted in the “Analogy”
is surely fraught with great danger to the doctrine of
Inspiration, a subject which the author has somewhat
passed over. It may be urged, with great force and
truth, that there is no a priori incredibility in a
miraculous revelation, nor in the circumstance of such
a revelation being attended with great difficulties (1.)
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in relation to the character of the doctrines conveyed,
ordinances prescribed, &c., (2.) in reference to the
means employed for propagating a knowledge of these.
And it may fairly be shown, or attempted to be shown,
in support of this line of argument, that similar diffi
culties exist in the constitution of nature. But all
these observations bring us, of course, no nearer to
Inspiration than this: that it is not incredible that a
miraculous record of the revelation might be given us
(which we admit); and that we must judge on the
evidence, as in the more general case of a revelation
itself, whether such a record has been given to us or
not; while as to this particular dogma, the ground is
completely cut away from under those a priori con
siderations which lend to the evidences which we have
for its truth all the value that they possess.
It must be borne in mind that the evidence of Scrip
tural Inspiration is wholly different in kind from that
adduced in favour of open and patent miracles. For
inspiration such as we are treating of is, from its very
nature, a secret process; in the course of which the
Spirit of God is supposed to operate upon the mind
of the writer, without any witnesses. It might, of
course, rest upon the same kind of evidence as other
miracles. Thus, five hundred persons who asserted
that they had seen and heard an angel dictate to St
Matthew the words of his gospel, would furnish us with
the same kind of testimony for his inspiration which
we are said to possess for the resurrection of Jesus.
Or, again, if we were told that Mark had gone about
performing miracles in attestation of the divine guidance
vouchsafed to him in the composition of his book, here
again would be evidence of the same sort brought
before us. But we are confessedly without anything
of the kind. We are not even told by the Evangelists
themselves that they are writing under other than
ordinary conditions. A few passages which have been
cited from the Epistles are of much too doubtful a
�Pleas for Free Inquiry.
39
character to constitute evidence, even if we could accept
a writer’s own hare statement of his inspiration as
*
evidence.
It will be found, then, that the argu
ments on which a belief in inspiration is founded are
mainly two. (1.) It is not likely that God would
interpose miraculously to give man a religion without
providing an infallible record of it for his guidance ;
(2) the early Christians and the Universal Church have
always held the Bible to be inspired—an argument
which, even admitting the literal truth of what is here
stated, is of no weight at all, since the early Christians
were no better judges of the divine character of pub
lished documents than we are, unless it be implied that
God would not be likely to suffer the early Christians
and the Church to be mistaken in so important a par
ticular. But both these a priori considerations are
entirely upset by the argument from analogy. It
teaches us that we are no judges at all of what God
would be likely to do in such a case. There is no a
priori unlikelihood that he would give a revelation,
and suffer its incidents and doctrines to be communi
cated to posterity through ordinary channels. Nor
can it be said to be improbable that he should have
allowed a mistaken notion on this head to be held
along with substantial truths. Indeed, analogy shows
us that it is extremely probable that he would do this.
To take one conspicuous example out of many that
might be cited. A belief in the immediate return of
Christ was certainly held most firmly in the first
centuries ; and most justifiably, since there is no dogma
more unmistakably asserted than this is, throughout
the whole of the New Testament; and it was among
the most potent (if it was not the most potent) means
of spreading Christianity.
Yet we know that this
belief was a complete mistake. Similarly, it might be
necessary for the success of Christianity, in some of its
early stages, that the New Testament books should be
* Note (Y).
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looked upon as inspired. Yet this belief might be
equally unfounded.
As this point is of the utmost importance, 1 may
be excused for saying, at the risk of some repetition,
that here, in my opinion, is one form of the Nemesis
which must pursue this “Argument from Analogy.” Here
is the inevitable “ reverse of the medal.” The ortho
dox champion may legitimately take the ground that
there is no improbability in God surrounding revelalation with, and introducing into it, all manner of
difficulties (ground which he is indeed driven to, on
observing the unquestionable difficulties that there are
in it). But having done this, having gone to the con
stitution of nature for his guide, he is estopped, as the
lawyers style it, from all a priori defences of inspira
tion, and driven back upon the evidence; which, if
arguments of this kind be excluded, is nil, as far as
any external support of the Bible is concerned. Some
of the more able and candid religious writers have per
ceived this dilemma; and, accordingly, a prelate, who
has taken a conspicuous position in these discussions,
has recently announced that the history and doctrines
of the New Testament “might be capable of proof,
and so deserving of credence,” even if we adopted the
lowest view of inspiration, or gave it up altogether.
*
Unfortunately for this view, some of the most vital
dogmas of the Bishop’s creed are supported wholly and
solely by the inspiration of the writers from whose
pages we take them ; and if this be withdrawn, or if it
be supposed that the writers in question may have
made mistakes, there is worse than no evidence for
these events; there is evidence of the strongest kind,
internal and external, against them. Thus, to take
one example, the narratives of the nativity in Matthew
and Luke, recording events wholly unknown to, and
unsuspected by Paul and Peter, and utterly irreconcileable either with themselves, or with each other, or with
* Note (Z).
�Pleas for Free Inquiry.
41
other parts of the Gospels, will have to he rejected
by every dispassionate inquirer as obviously legendary.
What applies to the whole applies also to the parts,
since we have no miraculous guarantee that the canon
was formed under infallible guidance. Admitting,
*
then, that the whole of the rest of the New Testament
were inspired, there is no difficulty in supposing (in
deed, there are many reasons to induce us to suppose)
it likely that God might permit an uninspired Gospel
(e.g., say that of John), good for edification generally,
but containing exaggerated statements of certain doc
trines, to circulate with the rest. Again, there is no
difficulty in supposing that, the bulk of the New Testa
ment being inspired, the Divine Being might allow
spurious passages to be interpolated into the divine
text. Indeed we have one momentous example of an
admitted insertion of this kind (the one text on
which the doctrine of the Trinity reposes), still read
in our churches, and accepted as inspired by the bulk
of the Christian world.! On either of the above
suppositions we let in Unitarianism. And, indeed, it
has always appeared to me that, with some changes
here and there in forms of expression, Butler’s argu
ment might be adopted in its entirety by members of
that creed.
Let us see how far the foregoing observations are
confirmed by a reference to the principal passage in
which Bishop Butler deals with the subject of Inspira
tion. It is to be found in Pt. ii. chapter 3 of the
Analogy. The words between brackets are my own.
‘ ‘ These observations, relating to the whole of Christianity,
are applicable to inspiration in particular. As we are in no
sort judges beforehand by what laws or rules, in what degree,
or by what means it were to have been expected that God
would naturally instruct us ; so, upon supposition of his af
fording us light and instruction by revelation, additional to
what he has afforded us by reason and experience, we are in
* Note (AA).
+ Note (BB).
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no sort judges by what methods and in what proportion it
were to be expected that this supernatural light and instruc
tion would be afforded us. (It might be afforded us through
ordinary channels. A supernatural revelation by no means
necessarily involves the idea of a supernatural medi-nm for
communicating it to all ages. The substance of the revelation
and the events attending it, might be left to the world on
evidence of the usual kind, the same kind of evidence that
we have for the existence and exploits of Csesar, and the
discourses of Socrates. Nobody on the above reasoning can
say this is unlikely. “We are no judges, &c.” Surely this
goes to the root of Inspiration itself). We know not before
hand what degree or kind of natural information it were to be
expected God would afford men, each by his own reason and
experience ; nor how far he would enable and effectually dis
pose them to communicate it, whatever it should be, to each
;
*
other nor whether the evidence of it would be certain, highly
probable, or doubtful; nor whether it would be given with
equal clearness and conviction to all. Nor could we guess,
upon any good ground I mean, whether natural knowledge or
even the faculty itself by which we are capable of attaining
it, reason, would be given us at once or gradually. In like man
ner we are wholly ignorant what degree of new knowledge it
were to be expected God would give mankind by revelation,
upon supposition of his affording one, or how far, or in what
way (or whether at all) he would interpose miraculously to
qualify them to whom he should originally make the revela
tion for communicating the knowledge given by it, and to
secure their doing it to the age in which they should live, and
to secure its being transmitted to posterity. We are equally
ignorant whether the evidence of it would be certain or
highly probable, or doubtful; or whether all who should have
any degree of instruction from it, and any degree of evidence
of its truth, would have the same; or whether the scheme
would be revealed at once, or unfolded gradually. (So that we
could not say beforehand, it was at all unlikely that God
would suffer the bulk of Christians to misunderstand his
revelation so far as to believe in the Divinity of Jesus, for two
thousand years ; gradually—through such means as improved
knowledge which should lead them to reject some interpolated
passages, and better to understand others—unfolding to them
Unitarianism as the truth. * Nay, we are not in any sort
)
able to judge whether it were to have been expected that the
revelation should have been committed to writing, or left to
be handed down and consequently corrupted by verbal tradi
tion (or have been committed to writing and got consequently
corrupted, e.gr. by insertion of foolish traditions about the
*Note (CC).
�Pleas for free Inquiry.
43
Nativity) and at length, sunk under it, if mankind so pleased,
and during such time as they are permitted, in the degree
they evidently are, to act as they will.” *
There is more to the same effect, the argument, as
the above extract will sufficiently show, being virtually
this : that as we are no judges of the circumstances
and conditions under which God would give us an in
spired record of revelation, supposing he gave one at
all, we can in no wise say that it might not be attended
with precisely those difficulties which are now urged
against its acceptance. And this is a good answer to
certain assumptions in the form of objections which
are alleged against the Bible and other sacred books,
the Koran, Vedas, &c. But it is equally, in effect,. an
answer to similar assumptions in favour of Inspiration,
viz., that God would not be likely to grant a revela
tion without providing an inspired record of it, that he
would not be likely to suffer the early Church to be
deceived. And as these assumptions appear to me the
only grounds on which the doctrine of Inspiration can
be based,f (since we have no direct evidence for it), I
cannot but think that this Dogma is rudely shaken by
the line of argument adopted in the Analogy.
(V.) There is an observation to be made upon what
I have called the Major premiss (a) at page 8.—
“ If there be an analogy or likeness between that
system of things and dispensation of Providence which
a revelation informs us of and that system of things and
dispensation of Providence which Experience together
with reason inform us of i.e. the known course of
nature ; this is a presumption that they both have the
same author and Cause.”
This may be admitted, with Butler’s limitation “ at
least so far as to answer objections against the former’s
being from God, drawn from anything which is analogi
cal or similar to what is in the latter.”
*Note(DD).
+ There is, of course, the argument from internal evidence,
to which reference is made in p. 52.
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And this remark, so limited, will apply to all religions,
for in all religions there are the same difficulties as are
to be found in nature, and a general resemblance be
tween what is taught in any one of these religions and
what is found in the course of nature could be estab
lished. The correct way of putting it would be, as we
have seen, that there is no objection whatever to be
raised beforehand against any religion, and that each
must be judged of on the evidence. However, all
apologists are not so cautious as Butler, and unquestion
ably the argument has often been put in this form :
that if the same difficulties are exhibited in nature as
are urged against revelation, and if a general resem
blance can be shown between the two,'we ought to accept
the latter as being from the same hand as the former.
*
Now this, is by no means to be at once admitted in
the sense intended. For it is at any rate possible that
man might have put his experiences and impressions,
his hopes and fears, into the so-called revelation; indeed,
on the supposition (and whether this be a correct one
or not is precisely the point at issue) that it was the
outcome of human reflection and speculation on the
mysteries of the universe, he would be compelled to do
this. These speculations would be founded on what
he saw, or fancied he saw, in the constitution of nature,
including under this term the operations of his own mind.
Indeed, they could not be founded upon anything else.
Thus revelation teaches us, among other things, that
there is a God, and a future life, that we are now in a
state of probation for this future life in which rewards
and punishments will be dealt out, that we are at the
same time in a condition “ of apostacy and wickedness,
and consequently of ruin,” that this gave occasion for the
scheme called the atonement, &c., &c. It is said that
these dogmas which we will call collectively (R), bear a
strong resemblance to and are confirmed by what is ob
served in the constitution of nature (N). But it by no
means follows from this thatR andN are both to be traced
* Note (EE).
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45
directly to God (G) in the sense intended. One may spring
from the other, and as N cannot he made to come from
R, it is possible that R may have been deduced by man
from N. It does not from this by any means follow
that a vast number of the inferences contained in R
may not be true ones, for this may have been the par
ticular mode adopted by providence for the evolution of
these truths. But neither does it follow that we are
bound to accept them as thesubject of a miraculous reve
lation. And a resemblance between R and N is not of
itself sufficient to establish the probability of any such
revelation having been made.
To give an illustration or two of what I mean. The
atonement may be instanced, because I have just men
tioned it, and because it happens to be the leading
dogma of Christianity, yet a variety of other instances
would serve as well. The prevalence of sacrifices all
over the heathen and savage world has been repeatedly
pointed to as confirming this dogma ; inasmuch as -this
shows that there is a natural sense of guilt in man
and a belief that the Deity, or Deities, require some
offering by way of propitiation. But the opposite
theory is, to say the least, as worthy of attention, viz.,
that man has himself put these notions, which may be
partly true and partly false, into revelation; so that an
announcement of the wickedness of the world (let us
suppose a very true one) is found in it side by side with
that of a supreme sacrifice, which may be after all only
an example of “ survival ” of a baseless superstition,
which has come down to us in a transmuted form in
the shape of the dogma of the Atonement. We cannot
pronounce a dogmatic judgment prima facie between
these theories; but some light is thrown upon them
by analogy, at least so far as to render it by no means
necessary that we should immediately accept the for
mer ; and this is all I am contending for. Dor instance,
an idea quite as indigenous to the mind as the efficacy
of sacrifice, is that of the supernatural character of
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dreams. Every savage tribe is imbued with this idea,
every child, every untutored person retains strong traces
of it, nor has civilization by any means completely
eradicated all vestiges of it even from the minds of the
most educated. Now it will not be asserted that the
prevalence of this belief all over the world could be of
the slightest value for confirming any religious dogma
that might be represented as corresponding to it, since
the belief itself is now-a-days known to be a false one.
On the other hand, supposing revelation to be after all
only a human creation, we should expect to find this
superstition extensively introduced into it; and so to
be sure it is. The Old and New Testaments literally
teem with prophetic and monitory dreams ; and the
same may be said of witchcraft, magic, throwing of
lots, ghosts, evil spirits, &c. A strong suspicion is en
gendered that the notion of sacrifice may have been
introduced in a like way, and that the doctrine rests
upon no better foundation. At any rate, a correspond
ence between a wide-spread natural belief and a scrip
tural dogma, &c., cannot be cited as any confirmation
of the truth of the miraculous communication of the
latter, since, as we see (1), its prevalence is no proof of
its being true; (2), whether true or false it may have
engendered the dogma.
Again, Death has always seemed to man, and espe
cially to primitive man, a very terrible and mysterious
thing. This idea, or instinct, is confirmed by revela
tion, in which we are expressly told that Death came
into the world as a punishment for sin. Here we have
an undoubted resemblance between what is conveyed in
natural and in so-called miraculous teaching. Does it
follow that because of this resemblance the latter is to
be accepted off-hand for what it pretends to be ? Here
we are, in the present day, not without light which, as
far as it reaches, is full light upon the subject. For
we know that there was such a thing as Death in this
planet ages before the first appearance of man. Death,
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then, could not have been brought into the world by
the sin of man. If inflicted on account of the sins of
any beings, these must have been shell-fish of some
kind—foraminifera, or trilobites,—or, in the event of
successive acts of creation having taken place, perhaps
sins of these and subsequently of the iguanodon and
megalosaurus. If it be contended that it was inflicted on
man, for the sins of man, this is equivalent to asserting
that our species was alone originally intended for
earthly immortality, in the midst of the decay and disso
lution of every other material form surrounding it: a
wild hypothesis, rendered violently improbable (to use
no stronger term) by the constitution of our bodies and
by a variety of other considerations.
*
It is as impos
sible to disprove it as to disprove the assertion that
Sirius has satellites of green cheese revolving round
him ; but its value may be left to be estimated by
every unbiassed mind. Here is a case where a resem
blance between what is taught in revelation and an
instinct or prompting of nature (greatly confirmed as
this must have seemed to be previously to geological
discoveries by an observation of the apparent order of
nature) cannot convince us that we ought to accept the
teachings of revelation. On the contrary, there is over
whelming evidence that man has put his rude impres
sions and superstitious guesses on this subject into the
revelation.
The same observations apply, with increased force,
to the mode in which the so-called revelation has been
conveyed to man. It is legitimately argued by Bishop
Butler that the circumstances of the latter having been
very gradually made known to the world—and as yet
indeed only to a portion of the world—of the evidence
for it being doubtful, of errors having been suffered to
be mixed up with it, &c. &c., furnish no conclusive
objections against its Divine origin, inasmuch as the
same phenomena are observed to attend the progress of
* Note (FF).
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all kinds of knowledge. This, I say, is perfectly fair
(even if not convincing to all minds) as an answer to
objections. But to pnsh the argument a step further,
and to urge that a revelation ought to be accepted
because its course has been attended by the same cir
cumstances as attend the progress of naturally acquired
knowledge, is evidently ridiculous. For the question here
is as to whether this revelation has or has not been
naturally developed, and if developed by natural means,
it must, of course, have followed the same course' as
other kinds of natural knowledge.
(VI.) But the chief observation to be made upon
Butler’s main line of argument—and, as far as I know,
it has not been made before—is this: that it is per
fectly good, in defence of a system of pure Theism, in
defence of the belief that there exists a God who has
never, except by natural means, revealed himself to
mankind. All the objections and difficulties which can
be urged against such a belief can also be urged against
the constitution of Nature. And it has the advantage
of being in complete accordance with the natural con
stitution of things, whereas, on the other supposition,
the analogy has constantly to be strained in order to
make it fit in with a set of pre-established dogmas upon
which, so to speak, it has to wait; or is otherwise not
conclusive for the purpose intended, just as a resem
blance between the anatomy of man and that of the
monkey is not conclusive as to the miraculous creation
of each species by the same hand, but is consistent with
the theory of a natural development of the one from
the other.
What are the objections which can be urged before
hand against a system of pure Theism ? Virtually, it
will be found that there is only one, however much the
form of expressing it may be varied. “ It is not likely
that God would leave us in a state of ignorance on such
momentous topics as those treated of in revelation. It
is not likely that God would submit his children to
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such pain and confusion as would result from their
uncertainty as to their duties here and their destiny
hereafter. Or (which amounts to the same thing)
without revelation, man would not have sufficient light
to guide him, and it is not likely that a benevolent God
would leave him without sufficient light.”
But these objections or difficulties, formidable as
they may appear to some, and may be in reality, can
not consistently be raised by an adherent of the “ Argu
ment from Analogy.” For the very basis of this
argument is that we have no means of judging before
hand of what God would be likely to do, other than
such inferences as may be drawn from an observation
of what he has done and is doing; in other words,
from the constitution of the world in which we find
ourselves. I shall directly have occasion to advert
briefly to the inferences to be drawn from such a sur
vey, and their bearing on the whole question of what
I call Theism. Let it suffice here to say, in reference
to these particular objections, that the most cursory
glance at Nature will show us man left by God in a
state of uncertainty, i.e., without proof of absolute
Truth, on all the most. momentous questions which
affect him. This uncertainty as to our whereabouts,
prompting to searches and explorations in various
directions would seem to be the source of the same kind
of healthy movements as those which in the physical
world prevent stagnation and corruption. Be that as
it may, its existence in the case of all other subjects
save this one is indisputable. Nay, as to religion itself,
it is admitted by the orthodox that the vast majority
of the human race have always been and still are and
(for ought that can be proved to the contrary) always
will be in a state of profound ignorance and uncertainty;
indeed this allegation is part of their case. It follows
that the objection if good for anything is good against
any revelation which is not universal. Again, if stress
be laid on the pain and misery which absence of
D
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certainty on such a topic would cause us to endure, and
the improbability of a benevolent God inflicting them,
then—putting altogether out of sight the condition of
the bulk of the world in this very respect—the objec
tion in this form is utterly demolished by an observa
tion of the constitution of things, that is to say by
analogy, which at any rate shows that a benevolent
God does inflict or suffer to be inflicted on us pain and
misery of various kinds. And there is no reason a
priori why we should not be made to endure pain in this
way as well as in any other; while very many reasons
could be given why we should, if the course of nature
be the same here as elsewhere. Moreover, such pain
and misery as may be involved in an absence of absolute
certainty as to the existence of a God, a future state,
&c., is as nothing compared to Eternal Damnation;
and to be sure it would be singular that the theory of
a divine revelation should be based on an a priori con
ception of God being too good to leave us without one,
yet that it is to be no presumption against this revela
tion, when set before us, that it upsets this h priori
conception of God’s goodness. Again the objection
*
put in this form, that without revelation man would not
have sufficient light to guide him, that the light of
nature would be insufficient, &c., is itself open to very
serious objections. What is meant by “ sufficient 1 ” We
are no judges of what God might deem sufficient in
such a case. What is meant by the “ Light of Nature ? ”
If it be intended that God could not convey a know
ledge of himself and of our duties to us such as should
be adequate for our guidance, by natural means, and
without the help of miracles, this is a baseless assertion
not an argument. If it be meant that, in point of
fact, natural light has hitherto everywhere proved in
adequate, as is evidenced by the condition of the
Heathen world past and present, the answer from the
other side is that the growth of man’s religious know* Note (GG).
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51
ledge has been extremely gradual, like that of all other
kinds of knowledge. It is still, to use Butler’s words,
“ a small light shining in a dark place.” This “ very
gradualness” observable in natural operations, has
we have seen been appealed to by the apologist on be
half of revelation. It is no reason, he says, because
the progress of certain religious dogmas has been slow,
that they may not have been miraculously communi
cated. And assuredly the slow progress of any religious
knowledge can form no reason why it may not be of
natural growth ; and conversely, if of natural growth
then judging from analogy its progress would be slow.
There is therefore no ground for the assumption that
because such light as the Romans had attained to in
the first, or the Chinese in the nineteenth century, was
insufficient for their guidance (granting this) therefore
no light sufficient for such a purpose could or would
ever be likely to be kindled in the human mind by
natural means. This assumption does not take account
of the immense scale, as to time, of the Almighty’s
natural operations, and moreover it takes for granted —
what is indeed one of the main points in issue, viz.—
that a great part of the teaching of Christ, which we all
accept, is not to be admitted as an element in our
progressive religious knowledge naturally imparted to
and acquired by man.
So then, neither absence of “ sufficient light,” i.e.,
of certainty as to God, our duty, our future; nor the
consideration that a development and dissemination of
a belief in God, &c., by natural means must needs be
exceedingly gradual; nor again, that all sorts of false
notions and superstitions would probably for a long
time disfigure these beliefs in their natural progress, or
that in point of fact they have always done so: none
of these or other considerations of the same kind can
be urged as objections to a system of pure Theism by
those who argue from Analogy ; for Analogy shows us
a like wrant of certainty, a like gradual development, a
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like admixture of error accompanying, and marking the
growth of all other kinds of knowledge.
So also there are other objections which are not pro
perly speaking a priori objections to Theism, but objec
tions to Theism on a comparison of that system with
Revelation, which are similarly overthrown by analogy.
Thus; that the moral teaching, at any rate, of Christ
is inexpressibly sublime and full of divine truths,
according to the admission of infidels themselves, and
that it is not likely that God would have allowed these
truths to be circulated in conjunction with narratives
of impostures or hallucinations such as Theists represent
miracles to be; that it is not likely that God would
have allowed so many generations of civilised men, in
cluding saints and martyrs, to be mistaken in this matter
and to build their hopes on a foundation of sand, &c.
And many other similar arguments will readily occur
to the mind, since they are indeed those on which a
very large portion of the Christian world, often un
consciously to themselves, found their belief in the
supernatural’ parts of their creed. Yet Analogy will
show that it is extremely likely that God would act in
the way here objected to, and that in supposing a Deity
unlikely so to act, we are only dealing with a creation
of our own fancy, not at all representing God as he
reveals himself to us in the constitution of nature.
An objection of this kind against Theism may be
noticed in passing. It is said that revelation carries
with it its own credentials, that it bears internal evidence
not only of the truth of the doctrines which it conveys,
but of their having been miraculously conveyed: it shows
us a system such as man could not have evolved for
himself. This is very much the way in which a savage
looks upon a watch. Without entering into the very
large question which is completely begged by this
objection, it may suffice to say that the votary of every'
religion holds precisely the same view as to his par
ticular creed; which indeed presents itself to him
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53
subjectively, and through the medium of that sixth
sense (I had almost called it) formed by education and
habit; whereas, to the rest of the world, looking at it
objectively and with their natural eyes, the natural
filiation of its tenets is plainly discernible. There is
not a single dogma, hardly a precept, in the Christian
revelation which might not have been, nay, which had
not been, already in some shape or other evolved by
man. And this is a complete
a
*nswer
—not indeed to
those who contend that they were miraculously con
veyed and confirmed, since this might be established by
external evidence—but it is a complete answer to their
alleged internal miraculous character. And if this fact
of their having been confusedly evolved by man, be urged
—not very consistently it seems to me,—as additional
evidence of their truth, as the voice of nature confirming
revelation ; I say that the voice of nature repeating itself
in revelation is by no means a confirmation of revelation,
in the sense intended; for this would serve to show
that revelation is, to this extent, only the echo of the
natural voice of mankind, not (as the savage just men
tioned supposes echoes to be) the miraculous voice of
an unseen being. But as I have touched on this point
in the preceding section, I will not dwell further
on it.
*
Let us, then, for a moment, do as Butler bids us,
and, “ instead of that idle and not very innocent em
ployment of forming imaginary models of a world, and
schemes of governing it, turn our thoughts to what we
experience to be the course of nature with respect to
intelligent creatures/ and we shall find such a course
of nature perfectly consistent with the gradual and
natural growth of religious knowledge—a knowledge
not including certain proof in matters commonly called
transcendental, yet amounting to probable evidence,
that will serve as a light to humanity. And this is
very much of a piece with the general “ Scheme of
* Note (HH).
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Nature,” in conformity with which man, from the be
ginning, seems to have been placed under the neces
sity of forming opinions with reference to questions
most practical and vital to him, upon very uncertain
data 5 the better opinions pushing their way onwards
by a principle of natural selection, and through the
medium of the more favoured races,— a process slow,
indeed — to theological eyes, intolerably slow — yet
startling to those only’who have not sufficiently con
sidered the processes of nature as recently made known
to us by the Almighty in a revelation which cannot be
disputed. Science, in these late days, has changed the
popular conceptions as to the physical world, and will
assuredly change the popular conceptions as to the
moral world. Instead of the earth and the heavenly
bodies having been called into being by a series of
instantaneous fiats (the representation most consistent
with the old ideas of the mode of working and dignity
of the Creator), we now see their origin thrown far
back into what, to us, is the Eternity of the Past.
Instead of the heavenly luminaries dancing attendance
upon our planet, we see the latter to be a mere in
finitesimal speck in the midst of space, with no ap
parent connecting link between the system to which
it belongs and countless other systems, except such as
are to be found in uniformity of observed laws, and in
the consideration borne in upon a thinking being by
all that he finds without and within him, that “ the
hand which shaped them is divine.” And this planet
of ours, with which we are mainly concerned, grew,
only after long ages, into a habitation fit for man.
Man, after his appearance, crawled upon its surface, an
ignorant, brutal, and naked savage, for thousands, and
possibly tens of thousands, of years before the date
commonly assigned to the supposed Adam. His di
vinities were malignant spirits; of a life beyond the
grave he had either no conception, or at the best a
very vague one. Ninety-nine hundredths of the
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55
human race have lived under these conditions. Yet,
just as happened in the physical world, layers of
morality and religion seem early to have been forming.
These people, we may be sure, went on robbing and
murdering each other till it was found that, without
protection to life and property, human society could
not go on. Here was a revelation that murder and
robbery are wrong. Other experiences were gathered
and reduced into form, which means that other beliefs
were founded. The ground reached by the furthest
wave was necessarily retained and made good, as long
as there was a general advance of humanity represented
by the races which, for the time being, constituted its
vanguard ; and that this general advance (to whatever
cause it may have been due) has taken place to the
present time, seems very plain. So, step by step, out
of the first Cimmerian darkness and the subsequent
twilight, there emerge into the clear morning of His
tory certain advanced races, the Egyptian, the Jewish,
the Greek, each of them bearing to the common fund
treasures wrought from the common soil by its own
individual genius ; treasures in the shape of science,
art, philosophy, and religious knowledge. In each of
these cases the rude instincts of early man saw in such
possessions gifts supernaturally bestowed by the gods.
Just as Ceres teaches man to cultivate the staff of life,
and Saturn frames laws for the Latians, and Prome
theus saves the human race from destruction, and in
structs them in astronomy and mathematics; so the
Hebrew Jehovah miraculously instructs his people in
the worship of one supreme Divinity.
*
In all these
cases, save one, the notion of supernatural communica
tions is now discarded : the miracles have dropped off,
the truths and discoveries which they enveloped, and
at one time served to protect, remain. In one region
alone, that of religion and morality, “Survival” still
keeps alive a belief in miraculous interventions. Yet
* Note (II).
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analogy is strongly in favour of religion and morality
having been developed in the same way as all other
kinds of knowledge. And dreadful as It may appear
to some that such countless generations should have
been left without any external light for their guidance;
that the truths painfully arrived at by man should have
been so largely mixed up with fables and errors, often
indeed owing their lives to these fables and errors;
that even now we are without anything like certainty
on questions of the deepest interest to us, and are ob
liged to content ourselves with inferences more or less
plausible ;—yet, after all, this state of things is strictly
in accordance with “what we experience to be the
course of nature with respect to intelligent creatures.”
My limits do not permit me to enter into a closer
examination of the analogy which might be established
between the general course or scheme of nature, and a
system of non-miraculous development of religious
knowledge or (if the term be preferred) of religious
ideas. It has here been only hinted at: it will be
found to form a subject full of interest and instruction
to those who inquire more narrowly into the matter.
To revert, before concluding, to Butler’s main argu
ment, the theme of Part I. of his famous “Analogy.”
On behalf of revelation it has swept away certain objec
tions (still very often raised by people who ought to
know better), just as similar objections against a system
of pure Theism, or Mahometanism, or even Spirit
*
ualism might be demolished. And it has shewn a
certain resemblance between Revelation and the course
of nature, just as resemblances between nature and
many other religious systems might be established.
Only, that on behalf of none of the latter has a oham.
pion in this particular line of Butler’s powers arisen.
The writer renders no light service to a creed who
* The author has attempted to shew how some of Butler’s ar
guments may be employed on behalf of the last-named creed in
“Hints f<?r the Evidences of Spiritualism,” Trubner&Co.,1872<
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57
establishes this much, that its evidences demand serious
investigation j and at the same time he renders service
to the truth by establishing a true proposition on this
as on any other subject, ’lhe evidences of Christianity
do then demand inquiry. Its witnesses are entitled to
come into court j and the greater part of the ft priori
objections which have been, urged against their admis
sibility must be held to have been overruled. This
much—no more than this, but still this much must
be conceded to Bishop Butler and his followers.
It is not my intention, either now or hereafter, to
adventure myself into such a vast subject as is here
presented to us—that of the claims of Christianity to a
miraculous origin. There is, however, one point of
capital importance lying on the threshold of such an
inquiry, and which seems to me capable of being
adequately considered within a moderate compass.
Necessarily, the first step in the investigation will be
to examine the records of Revelation. Now it is dis
tinctly alleged by those who put them in evidence that
they are different in character from all other records, in
that they have been divinely inspired, and are conse
quently (the veracity of God being admitted) infallibly
true. Should this claim be established, it is clear that
we shall have to accept whatever they contain. . On the
other hand, should the claim fail, or even if it be left
doubtful, it is equally clear that we shall be entitled to
submit their contents to the same sort of criticism
which we are authorized, indeed bound, to employ in
regard to all other books. I propose, then, in a suc
ceeding paper, to offer a few further remarks on this
subject of Inspiration,
�NOTES.
Note, (A) p. 4.—One would think that this proposition
that it is greatly to be hoped that a large portion of
mankind are not destined to be excruciatingly and un
ceasingly tormented, or, in other words, that a Revelalon SO fearfully opposed to the interests and happiness
of the race may prove to be untrue, is so self-evident,
that no person who had reflected on the subject could
be found to dispute it. I mean no person outside a
lunatic asylum, whither reflection on this hideous
theme has driven many people. One would think that
the ground the orthodox must needs take up would be
this: that no doubt the tidings were inexpressibly awful,
but that unfortunately they were true. And yet (as
noticed in Part I.) divines will boldly stand up and
argue as though their orthodox belief— doubtless a very
sincere one—were not a fearful necessity to them ; as if
it were the wjz&eZzever or sceptic who had cause to be
frightened and awe-struck at his conclusions or uncer
tainties. Thus, for instance, Mr Henry Rogers, a
writer of great reasoning powers, and a candid° writer
when his prejudices do not obscure his reason, can pen
what follows :—
“What may be expected in the genuine sceptic is a
modest hope that he may be mistaken; a desire to be
confuted ; a retention of his convictions as if they were
a guilty secret; or the promulgation of them only as
the utterance of an agonized heart, unable to suppress
the language of its misery ; a dread of making prose
lytes, &c.—(Eclipse of Faith, 4tli edit., p. 32.)
What a conscientious sceptic (in the author’s sense,
of one who has brought himself to doubt the truth of
Revelation) ought to feel and to do, is to experience a
lively sense of joy to be able to think that mankind
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59
may not be in such an awful position as that which
Revelation represents them to be in ; to welcome even
the gloomiest suggestions of scepticism—such as uni
versal annihilation (which, though not, as I relieve,
representing the truth, would be only an evil to the
fancy of the living man, and soon therefore to him
no evil at all) —as a happy substitute for the
frightful and very realistic bugbear of countless mil
lions seething in eternal flames, from which lie has
in some degree delivered his mind; to be anxi
ous to impart his doubts to all whom he meets ; and,
in case they should become something more than doubts,
and amount to reasonable convictions on that side, then,
as the happiest of all discoveries, as the utterances of
an over-joyed heart unable to suppress the language of
its contentment; to wish to make as many proselytes
as possible ; in fact, his feelings and course of conduct
ought to be the exact opposite of what the author of
the “Eclipse of Faith” enjoins on him.
(B) p. 7.—It is true that Origen, from whom Bishop
Butler is supposed to have taken the hint for his Ana
logy,” has expressed himself to the effect that “he
who believes the Scripture to have proceeded from him
who is the Author of Nature may well expect to find
the same sort of difficulties in it as are found m the
constitution of naturebut this does not amount to
more than this, that he who believes the Bible to be
from God need not be startled by any difficulties similar to those attending the constitution of nature which
may be found in it. Butler always expresses himself
very cautiously on this point, e.g.,“ the things objected
against, considered as matters of fact, are shown to be
credible from their conformity to the constitution of
nature.” This reasoning is perfectly legitimate, and is
quite a different thing from asserting that we should
expect beforehand that a revelation from God would
contain the same difficulties as are to be found in nature.
In addition to the above passage from Origen, a verse
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in the Apocrypha has been frequently cited, as having
furnished Bishop Butler with the key-note to his work.
It.is to be found in Ecclesiasticus, xlii., v. 24, “All
things are double one against another, and he hath
made nothing imperfect.”
But this verse really does not bear the sense which is
sought to be fixed upon it, viz. : that the visible order of
things may be surmised to be a copy of the invisible.
The real meaning of the writer is to be gathered from
another passage of the same book, where he sets forth
the same sentiment more in detail, “ Good is set against
evil, and life against death. So is the godly against
the sinner, and the sinner against the godly. So look
upon all the works of the Most High, and there are
two and two, one against the other.”—Ecclesiasticus
xxxiii., v. 14, 15.
The meaning of the writer is plain, and we may be
sure that he had nothing resembling the “Argument
from Analogy” in his mind. His views are exactly
those alleged by Chrysippus (and by a great many men
before and since Chrysippus) in explanation of the
existence of evil in the world. “ Nihil est prorsus
istis imperitius, nihil insubidius, qui opinantur bona
esse potuisse, si non essent ibidem mala. Nam c.irm
bona malis contraria sint, utraque necessarium est opposita inter sese, et quasi mutuo adverso queeque fulta
nisu consistere: nullurn adeo contrarium sine contrario
altero. Quo enim pacto justitiae sensus esse posset, nisi
essent injuriae? . . . quid item fortitudo intelligi posset
nisi ex ignaviae oppositione ?” &c.—Chrysippus apud
Aul. Gell. Noctes Atticae, vi. 1.
(C) p. 8.—It is true, he adds, “ at least so far as to
answer objections against the former’s being from God,
drawn from anything which is analogical or similar to
what is in the latter.” Indeed, as Reid observes, But
ler “ only makes use of analogy to answer objections
against the truths of religion.” Still, the ground taken
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6i
up here is in advance of that indicated in (1) and (2).
It is asserted, not only that there are the same difficul
ties in Nature as in Revelation, hut that there is a
general likeness between them; not only that the
difficulties do not render the latter incredible, but that
the resemblances render it probable.
Under the words “ system of things and dispensation
of things which a revelation informs us of, ’ the author
must be held to include the character of the revelation
(“not made known to all men, nor proved with the
strongest possible evidence,” &c.) for this its character
furnishes him with much of his analogy.
Further on, the expression “ the same author and
cause,” may be objected to on the ground that a Theist
would admit Christianity, and, indeed, everything else,
to have God for its author and cause in a certain
sense. But every one understands what Butler
means.
(D) p. 11.—Of course scores of fanciful analogies have
been drawn between the mysteries of the Trinity, In
carnation, &c., and things observed in nature ; e.y., In
the simplest figure there are three lines, in every body
three dimensions. For other examples see Buchanan’s
“ Analogy considered as a Guide to Truth,” pp. 36, 37.
(E) p. 14.—The heads of themost important, if not the
most ancient, branch of the Christian church have
always taken care to distinguish between material pro
gress, and much that we should hold to evidence in
creased civilization on the one hand, and advancement
in divine knowledge on the other. Indeed, the re
morseless logic of events has forced them to this. The
Pope and all his Cardinals were quite ready to admit
that London was richer, better lighted, better paved,
better drained than Rome when under their sway; that
life was more secure in England than in the Papal
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states, Ireland, or Spain; that there were more rail
ways in Middlesex than in the Campagna, &c., &c.,
hut they by no means drew the inference that Pro
testantism was, on these accounts, more likely to be
true than Catholicism.
(F) p. 15.—Let any one carefully peruse the chapter
(Part ii., c. 5,) in which Butler brings forward Analo
gies in Nature for “ the appointment of a mediator, and
the redemption of the world by him,” and then set
himself, as an exercise, to apply the same kind of rea
soning to almost any doctrine that has ever been
believed in by man, Manichaeism, Sun-worship, the
Metempsychosis, the Nirwana of Buddhism, the imma
culate conception of the Virgin, the infallibility of the
Pope, and he will be surprised to find how any or all
of these dogmas may be shown to be credible in a like
way, and to be greatly confirmed by what we observe
in Nature.
As a specimen of this kind of perverted ingenuity,
though by no means one of the strongest that might
be quoted, the following from Dr Bannerman’s “ In
spiration” merits attention. He tells us that “in the
province of nature there are analogies appropriate and
sufficient to meet the objection brought against the doc
trine of plenary inspiration.” The way he establishes this
is by showing that “ in one sense the actions of men are
their own, moved by their own will, &c. In another
sense the actions of men are God’s, dependent on his will,”
&c. “ And standing upon the ground of such analogies,
we have reason to assert that the objection so generally
urged against the doctrine of Scripture inspiration, that
we cannot conceive or explain the possibility of the
human agency in its freedom and variety combining
with the divine in its plenary perfection, is no objection
at all, seeing that the very same difficulty is found in
every other department of the operations of God.”
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63
(G) p. 16.—It may be said also that the passage in
Butler’s introduction “ (dispensation) proved by mira
cles” would not apply to Mahometanism. If so, this
again would render the task of the Turkish or Persian
apologist all the easier. However (not to speak of the
night-journey to Jerusalem, &c.,) there are miracles in
Mahometanism, even though it cannot perhaps be said
that they proved the revelation in the above sense.
The divine inspiration of the Prophet was miraculous.
(H) p. 16.—Ko one can dispute that Christianity has
been greatly indebted to force for its spread. With
out going so far as a writer in this series who asserts
that from and after the date of Constantine “ The Eoman soldiers spread the Christian Church over the
Eoman Empire ” we must at any rate admit that “ the
native religion in Mexico was literally butchered out
of existence; while the countries of Quito, Peru, and
Chili, were baptized in blood into the pale of the
Christian Church.” (Date of the New Testament
Canon, p. 7). Christians have forcibly taken posses
sion of the whole continents of America and Australia,
and multiplied there : and this was just as much
spreading their religion by force as if they had in all
cases (like the Mahometans) compelled the aborigines
to choose between conversion and death. If we were
to land in France and gradually extirpate the French
till we occupied their country, this would be greatly to
spread the English language in Europe, by the help of
force. And it is no answer to say that it was not the
object of the colonizers to spread their religion: so again
in the latter supposed case it might not be, and proba
bly would not be, the object of the invaders to spread
their language. The question is, not whether means
were intended for a particular end, but by what means
that end was achieved.
As a specimen of the manner in which the Christians
obtained their foothold in the New World let the fol
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lowing account suffice. The Pilgrim Fathers (probably
the most respectable body of emigrants that ever left
these shores) made a night expedition against a fortress
of the Pequod Indians. “Their guns dealt out death
pitilessly. Still the number and arrangement of the
wigwams made the task of conquest slow and difficult.
‘ We must burn them out!’ cried the leader, and he
threw a firebrand into one. The English formed a
chain round the place, and in a few minutes the whole
settlement was ablaze. Thus embarrassed and beset,
the Indians were shot down easily j none were spared.
As the Israelites slew the Amalekites, so did the Pil
grims slay the Pequods. In an hour, six hundred of
them had perished, and only two Englishmen had
fallen. When morning dawned, three hundred more
warriors came confidently up from the other fort;
aghast at the scene of carnage which met their
astonished eyes, they tore their hair and beat the
ground j they too were swept down. Before many
days were over, not a man, woman, or child of that Pequod tribe was left behind!” (Westminster Review,
vol. lxxx. p. 336).
(I) p. 17.—Besides these immoral actions directly en
joined, and examples of immoral legislation, e.g., Ex
odus xxi. 2-6: 20, 21, there are, as is well known, a
number of actions of a similar kind recorded in the Hebrew
Scriptures with the approval of the narrator and which,
on the supposition of his having been divinely inspired,
must be held to have been approved by God. In this
category are the lies of Abraham about his wife, the
theft of her father’s images by Rachel, the treachery of
Rahab, the cold-blooded perfidy of Jael, the hewing in
pieces of Agag by Samuel, the vindictive curses of
Elisha entailing the violent death of children (or young
men) who had wounded his vanity by a harmless jibe,
&c., &c. The whole career of Jacob furnishes an ex
ample of the lowest and meanest vices crowned with
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65
Divine favour. What would be the estimate formed
by the Christian of these events and transactions if he
found them in the Vedas or the Koran1? Or what would
he say to the morality of Mahomet cursing a barren
fig tree, or Abubekr striking with death two persons
guilty of the same offence as Ananias and Sapphira 1
(J) p. 22.—In a note to Pt. i., ch. ii. of the Analogy,
the author certainly speaks of “the duration and
degree” of future punishment held out by Scripture.
In the same note we have that “ each shall receive ac
cording to his deserts,” that God “ will render to every
one according to his works.’ It is impossible for me
to reconcile these two conceptions, except by that use
of language in a non-natural sense, which is a favouiite
device of Theologians for escaping from difficulties in
a cloud. I do not think that Butler (one of the most
humane and benevolent of men) had ever brought
himself fairly to face the difficulty, as his gingerly mode
of handling the topic shows. “ Butler argued that the
Analogy of Nature gave much reason to suspect that the
punishment of crimes may be out of all proportion
with our conceptions of their guilt,” says Mr Becky,
Rationalism in Europe I. 368. bo they might be,
without anything in the faintest degree approaching to
Hell being realized.
Beibnitz on the other hand
(quoted by the same author) goes straight to the mark,
without any compromise. Offences against an Infinite
Being, he says, acquire an infinite guilt, and therefore
deserve an infinite punishment.
(K) p. 22.—Butler (in his note just quoted) admits
that the opposite hypothesis would be as probable. “All
that can positively be asserted to be matter of mere
revelation with regard to this doctrine (that of a i future
state of punishment) seems to be that the great dis
tinction between the righteous and the wicked shall be
made at the end of this world '} that each shall then
E
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receive according to his deserts. Reason did, as it well
might, conclude that it should finally and, upon the
whole, be well with the righteous and ill with the
wicked; but it could not be determined upon any
principles of reason whether human creatures might
not have been appointed to pass through other states
of life and being, before that distributive justice should
finally and effectually take place.” Revelation apart,
then, there is no reason whatever why death, when
viewed as the punishment of an offence or offences,
may not be inflicted as a discipline and means of re
formation, just the’ same as (say) a fit of the gout after
drinking. This is what is meant in the text.
With regard to human creatures being destined to
pass through other states of being, an hypothesis as
reasonable as any other in a matter on which we have
no certain information-—the notion certainly must be
held to derive some support from the fact of the vast
proportion of mankind who die in infancy and child
hood, and to whom this world cannot be said to have
been a place “of probation.” If the next state be final,
then the law of probation which we are told is “a
general doctrine of religion,” does not hold universally
for natives of our earth. If it does hold, then there
must be a probation for these excepted ones in another
state. In other words, the next state will not be final
for some. If not final for some, it may be not final
for all of us. Analogy is strongly in favour of this
view, and the wide-spread belief in the metempsychosis
may as fairly be cited in its favour, as a belief in the
efficacy of sacrifices in favour of the doctrine of the
Atonement.
(L) p. 22.—This, so far frombeing an objection in their
eyes, is precisely the light in which many eminent and
devout Christians love to contemplate Hell. It would
be difficult, without quoting him at some length, to
give an idea of the almost boyish glee of the exemplary
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67
Baxter at the prospect of the exquisite torments pre
pared for the greater part of his fellows ; with what an
evident gusto he rolls about in his mouth the words
“revenge,” “vengeance,” &c., like a child sucking
lollipops; how the mere iteration and reiteration of the
sounds fascinate him. Here are specimens from his book,
which was one of the earliest books put into my hands,
and without which I suppose that no Evangelical’s
library “is complete,” the well-known “ Saints’ Rest.”
“The torments of the damned must needs be ex
treme, because they are the effect of divine revenge.
Wrath is terrible; but revenge is implacable............
And how hotly revenge will pursue them all to the
highest..................Consider also how this justice and
revenge will be the delight of the Almighty,” &c.,
&c.
And we have God with a rod in his hand, “laying
it on,” God laughing at sinners, mocking at them,
rejoicing over their calamities, never wearied of plagu
ing them, the wrath of God burning up souls as fire
burns fuel, the flames of hell taking hold upon them
with fury as gunpowder seizes tinder, &c., &c.
By’the wray, in reference to these frightful descriptions
of the place of torment, I have heard it said that such
language as Baxter’s would not be used by Protestants
now-a-days. This seems to me, then, a suitable place
for introducing a few quotations from a published
sermon by the most popular nonconformist preacher of
our day, Mr Spurgeon. For although Mr Spurgeon’s
readers to mine are doubtless as a thousand to one, yet
I think it likely that the one person, here and there,
whom I have in my eye, may not have seen this
sermon. The Italics are my own. But every one who
has heard this famous preacher will readily imagine the
unction with which these passages must have been
italicised in the delivery. I quote from the “ New
Park Street Pulpit,” No. 86. “That endless period
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of unmingled misery which is the horrible doom of the
impenitent.” . . . . “ If you have not (confessed your
sins) you have not felt the sentence of death in your
selves, and you are still waiting till the solemn death
knell shall toll the hour of your doom, and you shall
be dragged out, amidst the universal hiss of the execra
tion of the ivorld, to be condemned for ever to flames
which shall never know abatement............... hell itself
is but a rightful punishment for sin. I have heard
some men dispute whether the torments of hell were
not too great for the sins which men can commit. We
have heard men say that hell was not a right place to
send such sinners to as they were; but we have always
found that such men found fault with hell because they
knew right well they were going there............... I ask
you, when you were convinced of God, whether you did
not solemnly feel that he would be unjust if he did not
damn your soul for ever. Did you not say in your
prayer, ‘ Lord, if thou shouldst now command the
earth to open and swallow me up quick, I could not
lift up my finger to murmur against thee; and if thou
wert now to roll o’er my head the billows of eternal fire,
I could not, in the midst of my bowlings in misery,
utter one single word of complaint about thy justice V
And did you not feel that if you were to be ten
thousand thousand years in perdition, you would not
have been there long enough? You felt you deserved
it all; and if you had been asked what was the right
punishment for sin, you dare not, even if your own
soul had been at stake, have written anything except
that sentence, 1 everlasting fire.’ .... Oh what a
horrible fate will yours be, when, as you walk into the
mouth of hell, you will see eyes staring at you, and
hear a voice saying, ‘Here he comes. Here comes the
man that helped to damn my soul.’ And what must
be your fate, when you must lie for ever tossed on the
bed of pain, with that man whom you were the means
of damning. As those who are saved will make jewels
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^9
in the crown of glory to the righteous, sure those whom
you help to damn will forge fresh fetters for you, and
furnish fearful faggots to increase the flames of torment
which shall blaze around your spirits............ But as
for my poor words, they are but air. For I have not
heard the miserere of the condemned, nor have I
listened to the sighs and groans and moans of lost
spirits. If I had ever been permitted to gaze within
the sheet of fire which walls the gulf of despair, if I
had ever been allowed to walk for one moment o’er that
burning marl whereon is built the dreadful dungeon
of eternal vengeance, then I might tell you somewhat
of its misery. But I cannot now, for I have not seen
those doleful sights which might fright our eyes from
their sockets, and make each individual hair stand
upon your heads............... Those bones of yours which
you thought were of iron will suddenly be melted, that
heart of yours which was like steel or the nether mill
stone will be dissolved like wax in the midst of your
bowels, you will begin to cry before God, and weep and
howl............... And thou wilt say, 1 0 Lord! it is true
I am now tossed in fire, but I myself lit the flame. It
is true that I am tormented, but I forged the irons
which now confine my limbs. I burnt the brick that
hath built my dungeon. I myself did bring myself
here. I walked to hell even as the fool goeth to the
stocks, or an ox to the slaughter. I sharpened the
knife which is now cutting my vitals. I nursed the
viper which is now devouring my heart............... One
of the miseries of hell will be that the sinner will feel
that he deserves it all. Tossed on a wave of fire, he
will see written in every spark that emanates therefrom,
‘ Thou knewest thy duty, and thou didst it not.’
Tossed back again by another wave of flam e, he hears a
voice saying, ‘Itemember, you were warned.’ lie is
hurled upon a ■ rock, and whilst he is being wrecked
there, a voice says, ‘ I told thee it would be better for
Tyre and Sydon in the day of judgment than for thee.’
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Again he plunges under another wave of brimstone, and
a voice says, ‘ He that believeth not shall he damned.
Thou didst not believe, and thou art here.’ And when
again he is hurled up and down on some wave of torture,
each wave shall bear to him some dreadful sentence
which he read in God’s word, in a tract, or in a
sermon.”
I should myself have been unable to conceive a more
dreadful mode of torture than that of being perpetually
roasted by a slow fire. The author’s ingenuity has
refined upon this, by adding the forced perusal of
tracts and sermons to the agonies of the damned. And
this is the religion of a large portion of the English
middling classes in the nineteenth century. This is
their idea of a good God! This is the sort of creed, the
denouncers of which are stigmatised as seeking to rob
mankind of their dearest hopes, &c., &c. Passages
quite as bad as the above (nothing indeed could be
worse) might be cited from the pages of Anglican and
Roman Catholic divines. See especially a pamphlet
called “ A Sight of Hell,” which must be debited to a
writer of the last-named Church, quoted by Lecky,
“ European Morals” ii. 237, and commented on in the
Examiner of March 30, 1872.
(M) p. 23.—There is, indeed, one end, and one only,
which (if we exclude the notion of pure vindictiveness
as a quality of the Deity) eternal punishment might be
conceived as fulfilling-—that of serving as a warning to
some sentient beings other than the men of this world.
This would be on the principle of hanging men for
forging one-pound notes, &c., an arrangement which is
not, now-a-days, held to have been a very moral one.
One difficulty about this view is, that we must suppose
the beings in question to be furnished with some sort
of idea of the offences for which this punishment had
been decreed. For mere information, or knowledge,
that so many people were being tortured everlastingly
(for offences of unknown extent) would surely not
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answer the object; which must be to convey that the
slightest sin will, in the course of things, be visited by
eternal wrath. And we can scarcely suppose that it
such a knowledge were furnished them, the spectacle
of the incongruity between the offences committed and
the measure meted out, would raise in theirjminds a high
idea of the Almighty’s justice, or tend to their moral
improvement. Slavish fear would be the sentiment
engendered, and a sense of horror precisely like that
caused by the executions of forgers and sheep-stealers,
the injurious effects of which to society were found to
outweigh their supposed advantages. Moreover, the
prospect of their own eternal punishment does not, on
the Christian hypothesis, deter the greater part of those
who believe in it from incurring it (not to speak of the
received fate of devils, which is a case strictly in
point).
(N) p. 24.—The doctrine that we are in a state of pro
bation, that this world is a school, dimly seen by some
of the heathen, is, we know, clearly brought out by
Jesus, who may fairly be said to have been the first
to announce it in definite terms. It is, of course, not
capable of proof, but it embodies a theory which ac
counts for a great deal of what is mysterious in this
life, and is the only theory which does in any way
account for these mysteries. What I am concerned
with here is to show that it furnishes a possible solu
tion of some of those so-called anomalies and enigmas
of human existence, which are specially brought for
ward by the upholders of what I am forced to call an
immoral Deity, as justifying the most extreme views
of his cruelty and ruthlessness to us in another state.
11 You are dreadfully shocked,” say these people, at
any course of action which does not come up to your
standard of justice, humanity, mercy, benevolence,
being attributed to the Almighty. How, then, do you
explain the case of a street arab, a ‘ gutter child,
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bom of a family of criminals in the back slums of a
town, set to thieve at an early age, and who goes on
from crime to crime, till at last he expiates his offences
on the scaffold, without perhaps having ever heard the
name of God out of an oath till the last few weeks of
his life 1 ” I will throw in, into the bargain, if you
please, and if you believe in phrenology, that such a
man has been cursed with the most atrocious cerebral
development, with the organs of combativeness, des
tructiveness, &c., inordinately pronounced ; nature shall
have fitted him out as devoid of benevolent and virtuous
instincts as it is possible for a man to be. And, for
purposes of comparison, I will take, on the other side,
a person born of virtuous parents, tenderly and re
ligiously reared, having enjoyed the best education,
living in affluence, gifted by nature with the noblest
qualities, deservedly beloved by his fellows, a good
son, husband, father, master, landlord, the promoter of
every good work, dying finally in the odour of sanctity.
Now, are you prepared to affirm that, looking to a future
life, the murderer has necessarily been placed at a dis
advantage as compared with the philanthropist ? You
cannot show this, and the contrary is quite conceivable.
The former has had every kind of obstacle, external
and internal, to contend against; the latter has had,
so to speak, none. The former may have gained the
greater number of marks, and have passed, on the whole,
the better examination. A ship which makes the port,
after a tempestuous voyage, with her masts gone and
the crew hard at work at the pumps, is often a better
ship than the one which puts in, with her gear un
touched, after a smooth sail. It may be a more meri
torious act in the eyes of the Supreme for a man of
a certain temperament to refrain, at a particular moment,
from thrusting a knife into his fellow, than for another
man to build a hospital. “ To whom much is given,
of him much is required,” involves the converse ; and
the parable of the talents is a clear intimation of what
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I may, without profanity, call a system of handicap
ping. And so some slight indication of softening and
repentance on the part of your street arab, as he is
being led out to the gallows, when perhaps the very
existence of virtue has only been recently brought be
fore him (and we have an instance of this very kind in
the beautiful story of the penitent thief), may outweigh
all the virtuous actions of the other mans life; just as
it might be a greater feat of strength for one person to
crawl a yard in an hour with several hundredweight
attached to him, than for another to run ten miles in
the same time; and the relative strength and endurance
of the two men might fairly be tested in this way by
any one who possessed the requisite data for a com
parison.
At any rate, here is a possible solution (I myself be
lieve it to be the real one) of the inequalities of life,
which would leave quite undimmed our conceptions of
the justice, mercy, goodness, &c., of God, using those
words in a purely human sense. Where, I say, is the
solution of this kind which you can postulate as con
ceivable for eternal punishment ?
N.B.—I suppose I shall scarcely be met with the
silly observation, that if the above view (undoubtedly
the view of Jesus) be correct, we should be entitled to
leave people alone, and not try to raise their condition.
“ If every one’s probation is perfectly fair, why seek to
alter the terms of it ? ” For many reasons ; this among
them, that, quite irrespectively of any other world, the
duty is put upon us of promoting and increasing virtue
generally in this world. The man who, with one talent
committed to him, makes another talent, may be neither
better nor worse than he who to ten talents adds ten other.
But as it is better for the world that for every one talent
existing in it there shall be ten, so by putting the
former in the way of acquiring nine others, we shall
not indeed be altering the character of his probation,
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but increasing the sum of the general happiness (as
well as the man’s own happiness here, which counts
for something).
Will it be contended, that if a philanthropist had met
the penitent thief in the midst of his career, well knowing
that if the man were let alone,,he would find his way on to
a cross by the side of Jesus and, so, through this chance
companionship, to heaven,—that it would not have
been equally the duty of that person to turn the thief
from his evil ways, if such a result had been possible 1
To be sure, the latter could not well .have had his
eternal prospects bettered, but he might have spent a
pleasant and honoured evening of life here below into
the bargain, and many people would have been spared
anxieties and loss of property. And a number of other
results might have followed, with which the good man
would have had no concern, if he had foreseen them;
because, quite irrespectively of them, his duty was
clear—to convert, if he was able to do so, a sinner.
(0) p. 24.—I make no apology for adding another note
on this subject of eternal punishment. For a chain is
never stronger than its weakest link. This doctrine is
an integral part of Christianity, announced in unmistakeable terms by its founder (Matt, xviii. 8, xxv. 41,
46 ; Mark iii. 29, ix. 43-48), and preached and taught
by the apostles (2 Thess. i. 9 ; Jude 6, 7 ; Rev. xx. 10);
and if they were mistaken on such a subject, the whole
fabric of orthodoxy will be loosened. Now, it has often
occurred to me, and seems indeed indisputable, that
no person who holds this view is justified in bringing a
child into the world. Such an act becomes a monstrous
crime perpetrated for the gratification of one’s own
selfishness. And if any men deserved eternal punish
ment, they would be those who, holding this dogma,
did not immediately combine, or take individual action
to put an early end, as far as they were able, to the
existence of our race on the earth. For, every child
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75
brought into the world is introduced into an existence
in which there is a strong chance that he will finally
be unutterably miserable. Indeed, this is not an ade
quate statement of the case with regard to a vast num
ber of Christian parents; since a large proportion of
those who procreate children actually believe that the
average chance for any given human being of escaping
this doom is exceedingly small. What is most re
markable to the philosopher is that one constantly
hears of wise and prudent parents forbidding marriages
on temporal grounds such as these : “ One of the parties
comes of a consumptive family. It would be wrong to
be the means of bringing into the world children who
would be likely to suffer from sickness, to inherit a
malady.” What more common than to hear something
like this? Yet it never seems to occur to any Christian
that the same considerations apply with infinite force
to a future life; that it must be wrong to call into life
beings who come into the world inheriting God’s curse
and who are likely to suffer from hell fire. What can
be the defence for such conduct ? A religious parent
may say, “ I will answer for my child’s bringing up,
and shall take care so to train him that the chances
will be great of his being saved.” Yes ; but how are
you going to answer for your grandchildren and great
grandchildren and descendants at a remote period, of
whom there may be thousands in various walks of life,
and who will presumably only enjoy the average small
chance of salvation of the bulk of mankind?
Or it may be said, “ 1 am obeying God’s orders.
He has commanded us to ‘be fruitful and multiply.’ ”
I am not so sure about the conclusion that might be
drawn on this head from the Bible, for more than one
passage in the New Testament might be cited in favour
of celibacy. And, in case of doubt, one would think
the decision ought to be in favour of the course most
consistent with humanity. Yet granted that the
words “ Be fruitful and multiply,” addressed to Noah
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and to Jacob, entail upon every individual Englishman
the obligation of getting a wife as soon as he can afford
it, and procreating as many children as possible, the
birth of every child ought even then to be looked
upon as a very sad event only brought about to obey
the command of God. And I do not observe that
these events are so regarded by Christians. Again,
this command, “Be fruitful and multiply,” i.e., “Pro
duce as large a number of victims as you can for hell
fire,” was surely a most horrible command of the Deity
to people who could not have understood the real force of
it; since there was no knowledge of a future state given
at the time the words were uttered. A God who could
deceive mankind in this way is capable of deceiving
them in any other way.
Some people think they have found an argument
on behalf of the appalling superstition which we are
considering in the statement that “God has surely a
to do what he likes with his own.” This really means
that he has the poiver, which we are not disputing.
A moral God could have no such right. “ I believe,”
says Butler, “ in the moral fitness and unfitness of
actions prior to all will whatever, which I apprehend
certainly to determine the Divine conduct.” This
belief (if the word “ moral ” is used in the only sense
in which any one is entitled to use the word at all) is
altogether fatal to the dogma in question. This point
has been touched upon by an ingenious writer, “ Henry
Holbeach,” who has on some points arrived at conclu
sions (as many other persons must have done) very
like my own, though without my knowledge, as his
writings have just now come under my notice for the
first time. Cf. Henry Holbeach, Student in Life and
Philosophy, vol. ii., article “ Reason and Faith,” and
the “Contemporary Review,” May, 1871.
(P) p. 25.—It might be argued (probably has been
argued) in a like way that the story of Jacob’s career
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—a career which, as I have said, is one of vice
and perfidy and meanness crowned by divine favour •
presents no difficulty, because in fact we do often see
knavish men prospering, and becoming rich and power
ful, and founding great families. But this is altogether
to misapprehend the difficulty, which consists not in a
bad man enjoying material prosperity, . but in God
miraculously according to the bad man his moral bless
ing. Imagine God Almighty openly blessing Napoleon
I. from heaven after the battle of Austerlitz ! Will any
one say that this is not altogether a different thing from
Napoleon being at that time what he was (by divine
permission) arbiter of Europe ?
(Q) p. 25.—Unless we suppose a fresh miracle, to pre
serve his mind from undergoing this process,, e.g. to
enable him to kill a number of people without being the
worse for it. But (putting aside the spectators of his
deeds and the persons informed of the command given
to him, who would require similar miracles for them
selves) would not this virtually come to the same thing ?
For the effect of such a miracle would^ only be to
blunt his moral sense.
(R) p. 28.—The present Regius Professor of Divinity
at Oxford, Mr Mozley, has made this position the theme
of his Bampton Lectures in defence of Miracles.
(S) p. 29—No doubt the statement in the text is open
to some criticism. “How,” it may be asked, and has
often been asked, “ can a desire for a future state be evi
dence of a future state ? May we not be deceived and
tortured in this respect, as it is admitted that we are in
so many others ? And is there such a general desire
or belief? The Buddhists and. Confucians (a. large
portion of the human race) seem to be entirely without
it.” I think these objections might be met, if space
permitted. The statement in the text is, however,
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to the effect that a belief in a future state, where it ex
ists, is drawn chiefly from within, and rests on much
the same basis as the doctrine of God’s veracity, &c.
Of this I think there can be no doubt.
I must observe further, in anticipation of an objec
tion which may occur further on, that the withholding
from man of any proof positive of a future state, of which
I speak elsewhere as in a certain sense a pain to which
we are subjected and which might have been expected,
is altogether different from endowing man with an
instinct, without anything objective to satisfy it. To
the latter mode of proceeding we might, without
violence, apply the terms “ mocking and deceiving us : ”
not so, to the former.
(T) p. 29.—Butler’s first chapter “Of a future Life” is
the weakest chapter in his book. It must suffice here
to say that all the reasons given by the author in
Sections i., ii. for a belief in the existence of living
beings after death are as applicable to brutes as to men.
And though he himself notices the difficulty, he does
not fairly meet it. Immortality, he says, does not
necessarily imply a capacity for eternal happiness, or
that the immortal being should ever become a rational
and moral agent. Yet, even if it did, this would offer
no difficulty, since we do not know what latent powers
and capacities brutes may be endowed with. But in
fact it does not imply any such thing, it does not imply
any such latent powers. And the economy of the Uni
verse might require that there should be living
creatures without any capacities of this kind (?'.e. that
every flea that we crack and oyster that we eat should
exist to all eternity in the character of a flea and an
oyster) and, after all—he ends by saying—the ultimate
disposal of brutes is a great mystery of which we, who
are not acquainted with the whole system of things, must
be profoundly ignorant. This is quite true, but can
scarcely be thought satisfactory by those who take the
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liberty of observing that all the Bishop’s previous pre
sumptions in favour of death not being the destruction
of living beings are either valueless, or must extend to
animals. Either he has shown strong reasons for sup
posing every cow and sheep to be immortal, or he has
shown nothing at all. The argument goes the length of
asserting that sentience in whatever form awakened will
probably never be extinguished. Our sponges may
meet us in another world. Butler, however, goes on to
state grounds for a belief in the immortality of man
as distinguished from that of the brutes. He dis
tinguishes between the capacities of reason, memory,
and affection on the one hand, and perceptions by our
organs of sense on the other: and adds that the former do
not depend upon our gross body in the same manner as
the latter do. It has been well observed that no one in
the present day will surmise that though sensation and
perception are dependent on the organism, reason,
reflection, &c., may not be. And I must add that even
if the above distinction could be established, yet to
draw an arbitrary line including beings possessing a cer
tain amount of memory, reason, and affection (of which
capacities the beasts certainly have two, and we can
not be sure that they are altogether destitute of the
third) and to place outside the line beings falling be
low a certain standard in these respects : to say that
here is a reason for supposing that the former class is
immortal and the second class not so, is altogether as
gratuitous an assumption as any that can be made.
(U) p. 31.—Butler’s chief argument in favour of mir
acles (Pt. ii. ch. 2, sec. 3) or, to speak with precision, his
statement of the case as regards the presumption against
miracles, is pronounced by one of the ablest living
believers in these phenomena to be “ not an adequate
representation of the presumption against a miracle ; ”
as one which “ does not carry our common sense along
with it.” (Mozley, Bampton Lectures. Leet. V., note
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2). Bishop Fitzgerald speaks of it as “ a passage in
which we may perhaps detect a misconception of the
subject in the pages even of this great writer.” (Dic
tionary of the Bible, Article “ Miracles.”) The Bt.
Hon. Joseph Napier, who has published a volume of
Lectures on the Analogy, styles the argument in this
place “at first subtle, if not obscure,” and the
whole chapter “ somewhat difficult,” admitting that the
author “ is generally supposed to have lapsed into fal
lacy : ” while Dean Mansel, who like Mr Napier and
Archdeacon Lees maintains the soundness of Butler’s
reasoning, confesses that his arrangement of heads is “ a
little awkward.”
The fact is that there is not a more obscure passage
than this in the whole of Butler’s writings. The reader
who wishes to learn what can be said on both sides of
the question and to arrive at a conclusion for himself as
to whether the author has or has not “ confounded im
probability before the fact and improbability after”
must refer to the above works. I think that Mr Mozley
has well said all that there is to be said on the subject.
While on the subject of this chapter, I may remark
that few scientific men in the present day would accept
the distinction which Butler, in accordance with the
state of knowledge in his time, draws between the
course of nature “a,t the beginning of the world,” “upon
the first peopling of worlds” &c., and the present
settled course of nature. Science shows us processes
in operation in this planet, ages before the appearance
of man, precisely similar to those which we observe at
this day. And if the introduction of man, and of life
generally, into the world be an effect incapable of being
referred to any known causes, we are no more entitled
to postulate a miracle on its behalf than in the case of
rain and fine weather,
p.
(V) 35.—I am far from saying that prayers for a sick
person put up by himself or by others, may not some
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times be of great physical service to the sufferer. They
may act on his imagination and so on his body. In
the same way bread-pills have often been of great use.
(W) p. 35.—See some striking remarks on this miracle
in Professor Tyndall’s “Fragments of Science,” 2d edit.,
pp. 446-447.
“ There is a scientific imagination as well as a historic
imagination, and when by the exercise of the former
the stoppage of the earth’s rotation is elearly realised,
the event assumes proportions so vast in comparison
with the result to be obtained by it that belief reels
under the reflection. The energy here involved is equal
to six trillions of horses working for the whole of the
time employed by Joshua in the destruction of his foes.
The amount of power thus expended would be sufficient
to supply every individual of an army a thousand
times the strength of that of Joshua with a thousand
times the fighting power of each of Joshua’s soldiers,
not for the few hours necessary to the extinction of a
handful of Amorites, but for millions of years. All
this wonder is silently passed over by the sacred
historian, confessedly because he knew nothing about
it. Whether, therefore, we consider the miracle as
purely evidential, or as a practical means of vengeance,
the same lavish squandering of energy stares the scien
tific man in the face. If evidential, the energy was
wasted, because the Israelites knew nothing of the
amount; if simply destructive, then the ratio of the
quantity lost to that employed may be inferred from the
foregoing figures.”
(X) p. 36.—This was the view held by nearly all the
early fathers. I believe that there is not a single pas
sage in the New Testament in which y5j oecurs, where
it may not be translated by our “ earth,” in the sense
of the whole earth; and that nowhere can it be made
to bear the sense of a region of the earth, such as
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Judaea. There are of course passages where it might he
rendered by “ the ground,” “ he went and digged in the
ground” (sb rr, yri) Matt. xxv. 18. “Saul falling upon
the ground” frttsuv sirl rfy y5h) Acts ix. 4, &c., where
we should similarly use 11 earth,” and indeed that word
is used in the authorized version. But there would not
be the slightest doubt about the meaning of an English
author who spoke of “darkness covering the whole
earth,” nor can there be the least doubt about evi vaeav
T7iv y%v, Matt, xxvii. 45; if ohrjv rqv yrtv, Mark xv. 33,
Luke xxiii. 44. The last named evangelist adds that
the sun was darkened.
Dean Alford has a singular note here. “ Of course the
whole globe cannot be meant, as it would be night
naturally over half of it!” Why could there not be
darkness over the whole globe, because half of it was
already dark ? But the Dean is doubtless laying stress
on the supernatural character of the event. “The
whole world could not be made miraculously dark, in
asmuch as a portion of it was already naturally in that
state.” Very true; but who does not see that this is
a reason, founded on our present additional knowledge,
against the whole miracle, which, as conceived by the
evangelists, is shown to have been impossible !
(Y) p. 39.—Passages have been adduced from the
Apocalypse in which the author speaks of himself as “ in
the spirit.” This is a natural introduction to a divine
message which he supposes to have been (or, if the ex
pression be preferred, which actually was) communicated
to him by afflatus of the Spirit for transmission to the
churches, as also to the narrative of the wonderful
visions subsequently vouchsafed to him. No argument
can be drawn from these expressions for the Inspiration
of Matthew, Mark, &c., writing accounts of what they
had seen and heard, and heard of, with their fleshly eyes
and ears. If anything, the inference would be rather the
©ther way : that Inspiration was a condition of which the
�Pleas for Free Inquiry.
83'
subject was distinctly conscious, and the absence of all
mention of so remarkable an experience in the.pages of
a writer, would be some presumption against his having
been inspired.
(Z) p. 40.—Bishop Harold Browne in “Aids to
Faith,” Essay vii., on Inspiration.
(AA) p. 41.—I am of course supposing myself to ba
addressing Protestants here and elsewhere. The Roman
Catholics hold a much more formidable position in
respect to Inspiration.
(BB) p. 41.—The allusion is, I need hardly say, to 1st
John v. 7, 8, where the best orthodox scholars candidly
admit an interpolation of the words within brackets..
“ For there are three that bear record [in heaven, the
Father, the Word and the Holy Ghost; and these
three are one. And there are three that bear witness
in earth] the spirit and the water and the blood, and
these three agree in one.” Dean Alford says, “ There
is not the shadow of a reason for supposing them
genuine.”
(CC)p. 42. There is no difficulty in supposing that the
Arians may have occupied a position, in the Divine
scheme, analogous to that which the orthodox Protestant
assigns to the Waldenses, Albigenses, &c. Their be
lief, though stamped out by violence in part, and in
part fallen to decay, may have been the true belief, and
may be destined to revive at the appointed time, after
a long period of darkness.
(DD) p. 43.—Butler admits, in this passage, that we
have no ground for expecting beforehand an Inspired
record of a Divine Revelation. He goes on thus :
“ But it may be said ‘ that a revelation in some of
the above-mentioned circumstances—one, for instance,
�84
Pleas for Free Inquiry.
which was not committed to writing, and thus secured
against danger of corruption—would not have answered
its purpose. I ask, what purpose ? It would not
have answered all the purposes which it has now
answered, and in the same degree, but it would have
answered others, or the same in different degrees. And
which of these were the purposes of God, and best fell
in with his general government, we could not at all
have determined beforehand.
“Now since it has been shown beforehand that we
have no principles of reason upon which to judge
beforehand how it were to be expected revelation should
have been left, or what was most suitable to the divine
plan of government in any of the forementioned re
spects, it must be quite frivolous to object afterwards
as to any of them against its being left in one way
rather than another, for this would be to object against
things upon account of their being different from ex
pectations which have been shown to be without rea
son. And thus we see that the only question concerning
the truth of Christianity is whether it be a real revela
tion, not whether it be attended with every circum
stance which we should have looked for; and concerning
the authority of scripture, whether it be ivhatit claims
to be (surely, rather, what it is claimed for it by Theo
logians that it is)—not whether it be a book of such
sort and so promulged as weak men are apt to fancy a
book containing a divine revelation should. And,
therefore, neither obscurity nor seeming inaccuracy of
style, nor various readings, nor early disputes about the
authors ofparticular parts, nor any other things of the
like kind (how about manifest contradictions ?) though
they had been much more considerable in degree than
they are, could overthrow the authority of the Scripture,
unless the Prophets, Apostles, or our Lord had pro
mised that the book containing the divine revelation
should be secure from those things.”
As to the last sentence, I would venture to observe
�Pleas for Free Inquiry.
85
(1.) That it certainly cannot be meant here to imply
that disputes (i.e. doubtfulness) about the authors , of
parts of Scripture ought not to weaken the authority
of Scripture. They must of course weaken.it very
materially as to those particular parts, and in some
degree as a whole. What are the New Testament
Scriptures ? That collection of works about which the
early Christians agreed in the main that they were in
spired. This is the external “ Evidence ” we have for
them—positively there is no other—else why not admit
the Gospel of Nicodemus into the canon ? Now dis
putes about the second Epistle of Peter (doubts
generally felt as to whether it was the work of an
Apostle at all) weaken the evidence for that part of
Scripture and its consequent authority for Protestants.
At the same time they weaken the authority of Scripture
in general to this extent, that the bare suspicion of a
mistake having been made in the composition of the
canon in one case, engenders the further suspicion that
a mistake may have been made in the case of other
books. (2.) Butler has with candour added, unless the
Lord, &c., had promised that the book should be secure
from those things. But the modern Theologian, argu
ing on Butler’s lines, would probably think this quite
an unnecessary limitation. Eor we surely must have
heard of the promise through the Book itself. And
(it might fairly be argued) as we are no judges before
hand how far God would permit this record to be
corrupted by verbal traditions, this alleged promise
might be one of them; and, practically, the whole
thing would be explained away in a hundred easy
fashions, like the distinct promises of the Lord’s early
reappearance.
Before leaving this subject of Inspiration, I must
glance at Coleridge’s argument, for it is a common one.
The Bible finds me, finds me more than all the other
books in the world, finds me at greater depths of my
being.” No doubt. But how can the statement of
�86
Pleas for Free Inquiry.
this fact (true enough, I am ready to admit with regard
to parts of the Bible) he taken for a valid argument in
favour of the Inspiration—I mean the inspiration of
the writer—even of those parts 1 The sermon on the
mount, taken down roughly, or even summarized
by a newspaper reporter, would find most people.
Much less can it stand as an argument for the inspira
tion of the whole Bible. For there are large portions
of it which, whatever might be the pretensions or claims
to inspiration of the writer, would certainly find no one.
As to these, the test fails. On Coleridge’s principle,
we should have to pick and choose, each for himself,
according to his inner light (which would lead to curious
results) or else to accept a great part of Scripture as in
spired, on the ground of its being unlikely that God
should have allowed dross to be mixed up with the
gold ; an assumption which, we have seen, is repugnant
to analogy and disproved by experience.
(EE) p. 44.—According to the Times’ report, this is
the precise expression used by Canon Liddon in one of
the series of discourses on Christianity, delivered at St
Paul’s towards the end of last year (1871).
(FF) p. 47.—The theory of the “ Fall,” viewed as a
general dislocation of nature, is intelligible, and this is
of course the theory which underlies the old legend.
Then, it was supposed, death and suffering were in
troduced, the earth was cursed and brought forth
thorns and thistles, in the sweat of his brow man was
made to eat bread. Before ^that time earth was a
paradise, &c. But, as we now know, the world was
not a paradise before that time. Very much the same
conditions prevailed as prevail now. Carnivorous
animals preyed upon the weaker species; crops fit for
human food required labour to produce them in any
quantity that would be sufficient for a growing human
population (happily for mankind, for the idea of a
�Pleas for Free Inquiry.
87
garden with, people in it who should have nothing to
do but walk about and pluck delicious fruits and bask
in the sunshine and go to sleep, is clearlyquite alien,
to all that we can gather of the Creator’s purposes itt
©lacing man here below, and a mere dream of early
humanity) and these and other considerations show the
mythical character of the narrative. Yet writers of Mr
Henry Rogers’ ability go on harping about “ man not
being in his original state,” “the religious constitution
of his nature having received a shock,” &c.
(GG) p. 50.—Mr Henry Rogers calls attention to the
profound immorality which would have to be ascribed
to a God who left his creatures without a miraculous
revelation, “remorselessly exposing them“ chucking
his human offspring into the world ; ” “ suffering them
to make their appearance under the benediction of an
infinitely beneficent Creator in the condition of one of
the aborigines of Australia,” “allowing them to grope
their way during unnumbered ages,” &c., &c. Indeed
this is a point which the ingenious writer constantly
reverts to. See his “ Eclipse of Faith,” 4th Ed., p. 162.
“ A Defence of the Eclipse of Faith,” 3d Ed., pp. 45,
47,48. “ Greyson Correspondence,” vol. ii., p. 221.
It does not seem to him in the least shocking that the
same beneficent and omnipotent Creator should intro
duce into his revelation, when made, an announcement
of eternal damnation to a large part of the human race.
(HH) p. 53. Nothing in the above paragraph is in
tended by the author to be hostile to the opinion (which
he himself holds) that in the Bible is to be found a valu
able system of religious teaching expressly designed by
God for man, and nowhere else accessible. That the
disjecta membra of this system are to be found else
where does not in the slightest degree detract from the
value of the service rendered to mankind by him who
co-ordinated them into a whole.
�88
Pleas for Free Inquiry.
(II) p. 55.-—Modern research, has established, almost
beyond the possibility of cavil, that a belief in one
Supreme Being was conveyed to the Hebrew race by
natural and gradual means. Cf. Revue des Deux
Mondes, September 1, 1869 for a succinct account of
Professor Kuenen’s inquiries in this direction; and
another article in the same review of February 1, 1872,
bearing the title “La Bible et 1’Archeologie ” which
contains a good deal of information, very loosely put
together, on the subject. That it was gradually con
veyed is patent on an examination of the Bible itself.
TURNBULL AND SPEARS, PRINTERS, EDINBURGH.
�
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A collection of digitised nineteenth-century pamphlets from Conway Hall Library & Archives. This includes the Conway Tracts, Moncure Conway's personal pamphlet library; the Morris Tracts, donated to the library by Miss Morris in 1904; the National Secular Society's pamphlet library and others. The Conway Tracts were bound with additional ephemera, such as lecture programmes and handwritten notes.<br /><br />Please note that these digitised pamphlets have been edited to maximise the accuracy of the OCR, ensuring they are text searchable. If you would like to view un-edited, full-colour versions of any of our pamphlets, please email librarian@conwayhall.org.uk.<br /><br /><span><img src="http://www.heritagefund.org.uk/sites/default/files/media/attachments/TNLHLF_Colour_Logo_English_RGB_0_0.jpg" width="238" height="91" alt="TNLHLF_Colour_Logo_English_RGB_0_0.jpg" /></span>
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2018
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Conway Hall Ethical Society
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Pleas for free inquiry. Part II: Some observations on "the argument from analogy"
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Place of publication: Ramsgate
Collation: 88 p. ; 18 cm.
Notes: From the library of Dr Moncure Conway. Includes bibliographical references. "By M.A., Trinity College, Cambridge" [Title page]. Date of publication from KVK.
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[1874]
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Free thought
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Conway Tracts
Free Thought
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PROFESSOR TYNDALL’S
INAUGURAL ADDRESS.
[From The Inquirer of September 5, 1874.]
HE Inaugural Address delivered at Belfast, on
August 19, by Professor Tyndall, President of
the British Association, has probably come like a
thunder-clap to thousands who have read it or heard
of it. For here is one of the strongest, one of the
most generally acknowledged, representatives of
science, the chief, indeed, of the highest scientific
society in the world, from the very throne of science
—the presidential chair—speaking what will seem to
multitudes no other, than the most undisguised
Materialism, which to them will also be the blankest
Atheism. For it will seem the burden of the Address,
that matter alone is the mother and cause of all things,
and that beside it there is no other cause. No God,
no human soul.
When so intelligent a journal as the Spectator thus
interprets the Address in the issue immediately after
its delivery, we may be sure that thousands of persons
will thus interpret it also. And this word of Tyndall,
coming from such a source, supported by such pres
tige and such authority, will make the hearts of many
quail and sicken with fear and sadness. They will
feel a great darkness falling on them. The same
doctrine they will no doubt have often heard before,
but not from such a quarter, with such distinctness,
and coming with such terrible weight. They have
T
�2
thought of it hitherto as the craze of individual and
eccentric scientists, but now it comes as the testimony
of the whole spirit of science, past and present,
spoken through the mouthpiece of one of her latest
and greatest sons. And the thought cannot but
whisper itself: “ Is it, then, really true, or, if not
true, is science going to be all-powerful and make it
seem true, and so make it ultimately prevail ? If so,
then hope and faith must fade. Religion will have
no place. Prayer and preaching will cease. All the
various creeds through which we believe and about
which we contend will equally vanish. Religious
societies will be dissolved, and the whole spirit of
our civilisation must be changed, so that it is terribleto think what the future ages may be.”
We cannot wonder that already the tocsin of alarm
has resounded from many a pulpit. We may be sure
that for months, perhaps years to come, there will be
heard from thousands of pulpits protests, arguments,
denunciations, pleadings, intended to lay the terrible
ghosts which this memorable Address has raised.
But what is it that Dr Tyndall has really said to
cause such sensation and such fear ? He has simply
said out boldly what science has been really saying,
though often with timid, hesitating speech, for many a
year, we may say for many an age. It is this : that
matter, as we become more and more acquainted with it,
shows itself to us as capable, by its own inherent laws
and forces, of developing into all the forms and causing
all the phenomena in the universe that we witness or
experience. And so with matter given to begin with,
existing it may be in its crudest form, but still with
all its inherent laws and forces, there is no need of
any other Being, any Creator, any God to mould it,
for it will infallibly mould itself. It is but the same
thought with a wider extension which Laplace
uttered : “ I ask no more than the laws of motion,
heat, and gravitation, and I will write you the
nativity and biography of the solar system.”
�3
Yet do not let us be alarmed through mistaking
the real force and bearing of this apparently most
materialistic affirmation. Observe at the outset the
expression, that matter being given with its inherent
laws and forces, no other creator is necessary to
mould it. Surely not, we, too, say, because the
Creator, the eternal former and sustainer, is in the
laws and forces : they are but the expression of his
action. It is not, then, against the idea of God
Himself that the hostility of science, as represented
by the President of the British Association, is
directed, but against a form of thought in which
men in general have clothed God and presented him
to their minds. They have thought of Him under
the image of a Great Artificer, one who, using matter
as his raw material, worked it up by his power and
skill into the forms which we behold. It is this
thought of an Almighty Artificer, separate from
matter, that science cannot tolerate. But the de
struction of this form of thought, instead of plunging
us into the darkness of Atheism, opens upon us the
light of true Theism. It leaves us free to form
another far grander and worthier thought of God,
that of the In-dwelling, all-forming, and all-sustaining
Spirit of the Universe, which it is clear that Dr Tyndall
recognises under what he calls a Cosmical life—that
is, a life of the Universe.
The truth is, that this conception of God as the
Great Artificer has been inadequate and erroneous
from the beginning. We can now see that it was an
idol, because not the highest conception that we can
form, though perhaps inevitable to the times of
ignorance at which God has winked. And science,
like a young Abraham, has sought from its very
youth to break the idol in pieces. This is why
science has seemed so Atheistic in its tendencies.
The legend of Abraham preserved in the Koran is,
that when he was a young man he went into one of
the temples of his people in their absence and broke
�in pieces all the idols except the biggest there.
Abraham’s hostile feeling towards the idols was
known. He was arrested and brought before the
Assembly. “ Hast thou done this unto our gods,
O Abraham ? ” they inquired. “Nay, that biggest
of them has done the deed : ask them, if they can
speak.” For a time the people were confounded
with his reply, but soon recovered to say to oneanother, “Burn him, and avenge your gods.” The
young Abraham, science, conceived from the first a
hostility to the idol of an artificer God set up in the
temple of man’s mind, and sought to destroy it.
Dr Tyndall’s Address is partly a history of these
endeavours of science to break in pieces the idol.
He tells how in the infancy of Greek science Demo
critus, the laughing philosopher, declared his uncom
promising antagonism to those who deduced the
phenomena of nature from the gods. Empedocles,
who probably met death in his zeal for science in the
burning crater of Etna, and then Epicurus, followed
in the footsteps of Democritus. In the century
before Christ the Roman poet Lucretius boldly
announced the doctrine that Nature was sufficient for
herself. “If,” said he, “you will apprehend and
keep in mind these things, Nature, free at once and
rid of her high lords (the gods and demons), is seen
to do all things spontaneously of herself without the
meddling of the gods.” Whilst science slept, during
the Middle Ages, the voice of protest was not heard;
but when she awoke again, in the era of the Refor
mation, Giordano Bruno, once an Italian monk, again
raised the old witness, and declared that the infinity
of forms under which matter appears were not
imposed upon it by an external artificer. “ By its
own intrinsic force and virtue f he said, “ it brings
these forms forth. Matter is not the mere naked,
empty capacity which philosophers have pictured it,
but the universal mother who brings forth all things
as the fruit of her womb.” And the devotees of the
�5
idol, an artificer god, which he sought to break in
pieces, said, “Burn him, and avenge your god.” And
the Venetian Inquisitors did burn him at the stake.
Taking up Tyndall’s thought, we can now see that
the whole progress of science has seemed to strengthen
the protest and to give more strength to the doctrine
of Lucretius and Bruno, that “ matter, by its own
intrinsic force and virtue, brings these forms (of
nature) forth.”
Newton’s “Principia” went to show that, given,
in matter, the force and law of gravitation and the
laws of motion, there needed no artificer now to
conduct the solar system. The nebular hypothesis
of Kant and Laplace set forth that matter originally
needed no artificer to mould it into worlds, if we
suppose its particles scattered abroad in space
endowed with repulsion and attraction. They would
of themselves form rings, planets, satellites, and sun.
Dalton’s Chemistry showed that if we suppose a few
kinds of primordial atoms of different magnitudes, or
endowed with different forces and possessing certain
laws of attractive affinity, no artificer is necessary to
combine them into the innumerable compounds and
endow them with the qualities with which we are
familiar.
Darwin’s “ Origin of Species ” and
“ Descent of Man ” suggested that, given certain
organic forms of lowly type, no artificer was needed
to construct all the countless forms of organic nature.
For there were in these lowly forms intrinsic force and
virtue, by which they develop into higher forms, and
these into higher, until the ascidian becomes the man.
Herbert Spencer, and now Tyndall, suggest that even
in the inorganic forms of air, water, phosphorus, and
a few other elements, there are intrinsic force and
virtue to make them at some period or other of the
world’s history—Bastian says to make them now—of
themselves combine and form organisms of low type,
which develop, according to Darwin’s idea, even into
higher type ; therefore these inorganic atoms possess
�6
a latent life. Huxley would persuade us not only
that these inorganic atoms come in organic forms to
live, but that in the human brain they think and feel
and will. Thus every line of scientific inquiry seems
to have led to larger and larger belief in Bruno’s
intrinsic force and virtue of matter, making more
and more needless the conception of a Supreme
Artificer.
But we shall be mistaken if we suppose that this
antagonism between matter and God—that is, God
as the Artificer—has been felt only in the world of
science. It has been felt, too, though with less open
confession, in the world of religion. It has been
felt, it may be, where ignorance was bliss. As long
as science was unknown or ignored in the Church,
as during the Middle Ages, religions minds could
hold the belief in an artificer God without misgiving.
But as soon as science began to creep into the Church,
the paralysis of faith began. From that moment was
acted over again the story which the Greek poets
give us of the Theban Sphinx, the beautiful monster,
half-maid, half-lion, who, sitting on a rock, proposed
enigmas to the passers-by, and those who could not
answer them destroyed.
Beautiful but terrible science became the Sphinx.
She was always proposing to those who came near
her the enigma, “How can matter, which seems to
have force and virtue in it sufficient to account for
all things, have any need for an artificer Creator ? ”
And those who could not answer the question were
lost as to their faith in God. This, we believe, is
partly the explanation of the coldness and deadness
that came upon our Churches, especially our Pres
byterian Churches, during the last century. Ministers
and people had become more educated, they had
learnt something of the new science that was rising;
and then they heard the enigma of the Sphinx and
were troubled. Thenceforth it was a struggle with
them to believe. They had lost the child-like faith of
�7
their fathers. The old heartiness of prayer was gone.
Ministers and people began to be shy of strictly reli
gious topics, and to fall back on these ethical common
places of which they were more sure. And if this
same coldness and deadness has lasted on in some of
our churches till our own day, we suspect it has been
because there the old conception of God as the Arti
ficer has been maintained, whilst all the while the
Sphinx has been putting the question which has made
it unbelievable ; and that it is chiefly where the new
conception of the In-dwelling God has been introduced
through the influence of men like Dr Channing,
Martineau, and Theodore Parker, that the devotional
life has been again quickened and deepened.
Truly, then, men like Tyndall and Huxley, Spencer
and Darwin, with the terrible weapons of their
materialism, do but break down an old and much
battered idol which has long been the cause of dread
ful doubts, even to its own devotees, and has set
religion and science at bitter variance. But in
breaking down the idol they are doing us the greatest
service. They are letting in the light; they are
leaving us face to face with a conception of God
before hidden from us by our idol, but which presents
him to us not only in a form which science will allow
—before which, indeed, science and religion become
one—but in a form which is immeasurably grander,
more beautiful, and every way worthier of God than
that which has been broken down. Let us clearly
recognise that, when Tyndall claims for matter that
it is sufficient for everything, he is not thinking of
matter as that dead brute thing which the mass of
men suppose it. To him, as to Herbert Spencer,
matter is but the manifestation of a Great Entity, in
itself unknown and unknowable. It is but the
garment of what Tyndall calls the great cosmical
life—the great life of the cosmos—the Universe.
What is this Great Entity, what is this Great
Cosmical Life, but the Eternal God Himself, of whom,
�8
and through whom, and to whom are all things, who
“besets us behind and before,” and “ in whom we
live and move and have our being ” ? What is this
■conception suggested of the relation of God to the
world but that of the Psalmist—“The heavens shall
wax old as doth a garment, and as a vesture shalt
thou change them ” ? And what is this doctrine of
the unknown and unknowable life but that of Job?
“Lo ! these are parts of his ways, but how little a
portion is heard of him ! but the thunder of his power
who can understand ? ”
T. E. P.
FRITTED BY C. W. REYNELL, LITTLE PULTEKEY STREET, HAYMARKET.
�
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Description
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A collection of digitised nineteenth-century pamphlets from Conway Hall Library & Archives. This includes the Conway Tracts, Moncure Conway's personal pamphlet library; the Morris Tracts, donated to the library by Miss Morris in 1904; the National Secular Society's pamphlet library and others. The Conway Tracts were bound with additional ephemera, such as lecture programmes and handwritten notes.<br /><br />Please note that these digitised pamphlets have been edited to maximise the accuracy of the OCR, ensuring they are text searchable. If you would like to view un-edited, full-colour versions of any of our pamphlets, please email librarian@conwayhall.org.uk.<br /><br /><span><img src="http://www.heritagefund.org.uk/sites/default/files/media/attachments/TNLHLF_Colour_Logo_English_RGB_0_0.jpg" width="238" height="91" alt="TNLHLF_Colour_Logo_English_RGB_0_0.jpg" /></span>
Creator
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Conway Hall Library & Archives
Date
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2018
Publisher
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Conway Hall Ethical Society
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Original Format
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Pamphlet
Dublin Core
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Title
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Professor Tyndall's inaugural address
Description
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Place of publication: [London]
Collation: 4 p. ; 18 cm.
Notes: From the library of Dr Moncure Conway. Signed 'T.E.P.'; possibly Thomas Elford Poynting. The Address was given in Belfast to the British Association for the Advancement of Science on August 19, 1874. Reprinted from 'The Inquirer', September 5, 1874. Printed by C.W. Reynell, Little Pulteney Street, London. "The address before the annual meeting of the British Association for the Advancement of Science was an occasion to state the aims and concerns of the premiere body of elite men of Victorian science. It was consequently one of the most prestigious places from which to pronounce on what men of science should be doing. John Tyndall famously used his address in 1874 to argue for the superior authority of science over religious or non-rationalist explanations. By the time of this address the Association had largely been taken over by the young guard, men like T.H. Huxley and Tyndall. Nevertheless, Tyndall's bold statement for rationalism and natural law was made in Belfast, a stronghold of religious belief then as now and so it was taken as an aggressive attack on religion. The address was popularly believed to advocate materialism as the true philosophy of science. It remains a powerful call for rationalism, consistency and scepticism." From Victorianweb: http://www.victorianweb.org/science/science_texts/belfast.html [accessed 12/2017].
Publisher
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[Thomas Scott]
Date
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[1874]
Identifier
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G5529
Creator
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[Unknown]
Subject
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Philosophy
Rationalism
Rights
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<a href="http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/mark/1.0/"><img src="http://i.creativecommons.org/p/mark/1.0/88x31.png" alt="Public Domain Mark" /></a><span> </span><br /><span>This work (Professor Tyndall's inaugural address), identified by </span><a href="https://conwayhallcollections.omeka.net/items/show/www.conwayhall.org.uk"><span>Humanist Library and Archives</span></a><span>, is free of known copyright restrictions.</span>
Format
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application/pdf
Type
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Text
Language
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English
Conway Tracts
Materialism
Natural Law
Philosophy and Science
Rationalism
Science and Religion