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NATIONAL SECULAR SOCIETY
AN
ESSAY
* ON MIRACLES.
BY 'p
DAVID HUME.
WITH AN INTRODUCTION
Commenting upon the views of Campbell, Paley, Mill,
Powell, Greg, Mozley, Tyndall, Huxley, etc.,
1SY
JOSEPH MAZZINI WHEELER.
“Apologists find it much more convenient to evade the simple but
effective arguments of Hume than to answer them."—11 Supernatural
Religion," vol. i.,p. 78.
LONDON :
I
FREETHOUGHT PUBLISHING COMPANY,
28, STONECUTTER STREET, E.C.
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�BIBLE
ROMANCES.
By G. W. FOOTE.
1. —THE CREATION. STORY' ..................
2. —NOAH’S FLOOD
..................................
3. —EVE AND THE APPLE..........................
4. —THE BIBLE DEVIL..................................
5. —THE TEN PLAGUES
..........................
6. —JONAH AND THE WHALE..................
7. —THE WANDERING JEWS ..................
A—THE TOWER OF BABEL ..................
9.—BALAAM’S ASS.........................................
10. —GOD’S THIEVES IN CANAAN ...........
11. —CAIN AND ABEL ..................................
12. —LOT’S WIFE
..........................................
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
BIBLE ROMANCES—First Series—Containing the above Twelve
Numbers, bound in handsome wrapper. Is.
SECOND SERIES.
13. —DANIEL AND THE LIONS
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14. —THE JEW JUDGES
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Id.
The SECOND SERIES will soon be completed in six
instalments.
Other Pamphlets by G. W. Foote.
Secularism the True Philosophy of Life.
and a Defence
...
...
...
An Exposition
Atheism and Morality
........................................... 2d.
The Futility of Prayer....................................... '
... 2d.
Death’s Test: or Christian Lies about Dying Infidels. 2d.
Atheism and Suicide. (A reply to Alfred Tennyson—Paet
Laureate)...
...
...
..
" ...
The God Christians Swear By
.............................. 2d.
Was Jesus Insane P
................................................. Id.
London: FREETHOUGHT PUBLISHING COMPANY
28, Stonecutter Street, E.C.
�INTRODUCTION.
When an author has the fortune to be attacked by every
succeeding writer upon the same subject for upwards of a
century, and when his opinions, so far from being crushed out,
become more widely spread by each “ refutation,” it induces
a supicion that “ sophisms ” so constantly refuted may be
truisms after all. This has been notably the case with the
essay here reprinted. Since its first publication in 1748 it has
been the bête noire of Christian controversialists. Campbell,
IPhley, De Quincey, Chalmers, Whately, Babbage, Mansel,
Mozley, and a shoal of ministerial minnows sailing in the
wake of these theological Tritons, have felt it incumbent
upon them to refute the “ sophisms ” of the sceptic Hume
Yet no one will say that unbelief in the miraculous is upon
the decline.. On the contrary, never were Christians less
anxious to insist upon the supernatural elements of their
îehgion, and never more willing to seek reconcilements with
science ; never were there so many trained minds with perfect
confidence that the uniformity of nature has never been dis
turbed by coups d’état célestes.
In truth, Hume’s argument, though so constantly assailed,
has never been refuted at all. It has been misapprehended
and evaded, but it remains as unanswerable as that of Arch
bishop Tillotson against the real presence. And this, because
m point of fact—the terms being rightly understood—it is a
truism. John Stuart Mill well says: “Hume’s celebrated
principle that nothing is credible which is contradictory to
experience, or at variance with laws of nature, is merely this
very plain and harmless proposition, that whatever is contra
dictory to a complete induction is incredible. That such a
maxim as this should either be accounted a dangerous heresy,
or mistaken for a great and recondite truth, speaks ill for the
state of philosophical speculation on such subjects-.” (“System
of Logic,” book 3, chap, xxv., sec. 2.)
Few essays so brief, for it must be borne in mind that the
first part contains the argument complete in itself, have been
so persistently misunderstood. The whole school of Christian evidence writers have either argued as it were an à priori
argument against the possibility of miracles, or as if it were
an argument against testimony being received for wonders •
whereas it is neither the one nor the other. Principal Campbell, as Mill points out, considered it a complete answer to
*
Hume’s doctrine (that things are incredible which are contrary
to the uniform course of experience) that we do not disbelieve.
* “ Logic.” See the “ Three Essays,” p. 217.
�2
merely because the chances were against them, things in strict
conformity to the uniform course of experience. Yet no one
would call an unusual combination which was found by experi
ence to occur among the whole number of possible cases a.
miracle, save in the popular, indefinite style of speech which
is totally unfit for theological, and still more for logical, pur
poses. And here lies the gist of the whole misunderstanding.
Everyone knows that both etymologically and popularly the
word miracle is equivalent simply to a wonder. But Hume’s
argument is not directed against the occurrence of wonders,
prodigies or unprecedented events; though it offers a criterion
by which the value of their evidence can be judged. He was
not such a simpleton as to contend, or intend, that no testi
mony could be sufficient to add to our knowledge of the laws
of nature. His argument is based on the theological definition
of miracles as infractions of the laws of nature by a super
natural being or beings exterior to those laws.
The essay has done much to modify the views of theolo
gians, and they have since its time done their best to class
their miracles under’ “unknown laws.” Yet Canon Mozley,
certainly the ablest late defender of miracles, admits that
“ their evidential value depends entirely upon their deviating
from the order of nature.” A miracle in the theological sense
denotes not simply the counteraction of one natural law by
another, which is not opposed to experience, but the suppres
sion of the law of uniformity of cause and effect, which ex
perience shows to be universal, and in which all other laws
are included. As Hume puts it, unless there were an uniform
*
experience against any miraculous event, “the event would not
merit that appellation.” If, by some unknown law, persons
could, under given c onditions, be raised from the dead, such facts,
however wonderful, would take their place in the vast scheme
of nature, and no more be properly entitled supernatural than
any other. But such an event is classed as a miracle, as our
essayist says, “ because it has never been observed in any age
or country.”
The instance of the King of Siam rejecting accounts of ice
has often, foolishly enough, been quoted against Hume by
opponents who failed to notice the distinction between a dis
covery of the laws of nature and their suspension. If we could
be taken to a region where the dead rise at command with the
same certainty that water freezes when the temperature is
below a certain point the fact would be indubitable, but the
miracle would be gone. We cannot admit a proposition as a
law of nature and yet believe a fact in contradiction to it.
We must disbelieve the alleged fact, or believe that we are
See Mill’s “Essay on Theism,” p. 222.
�8
mistaken in admitting the supposed law. In gaming the fact
the miracle is lost; because to this, the supernatural nature or
the fact, all testimony is incompetent. Mr. Vv. H. Greg
pointed out that the assertion of a miracle being performed
*
involves three elements, a fact and two inferences. It predi
cates, first, that such an event took place; second, that it
was brought about by the act and will of the individual to
whom it is attributed ; third, that it could not have been pro
duced by natural means. The fact may have been conectly o served, and yet either or both of the inferences be unwarranted;
or either inference may be rendered unsound by the slightest
deviation from accuracy in the observation or statement ot
the fact. Nay, any new discovery in science may show that
the inference which has hitherto appeared quite irrefragable,
was, in fact, wholly unwarranted and incorrect.
But it has been said : Assume a supernatural power and the
antecedent improbability of supernatural visitations is re
moved. Paley says, “ In a word, once believe that there is a
God, and miracles are not incredible.’’t To this assertion
Mill has been thought to lend his. authority. He endorses
Hume’s argument only as substantiating that ‘‘ no evidence
can prove a miracle to anyone who did not previously believe
the existence of a being or beings with supernatural power ;
or who believes himself to have full proof that the character
of the Being whom he recognises, is inconsistent with his
having seen fit to interfere on the occasion in question. +
Now this statement is inadequate. The existence of.God, if He
be the Supreme Cause of the order of the universe, is rather an
additional difficulty to those who think that order was created
by Him and subsequently disturbed. The argument against
miracles rests on our experience of the order of nature ; and
is, therefore, equally valid whether a cause of that order be
assumed or not. For the only test of the will or way of work
ing of such a cause is to be found within the order itself.
Any interference with that order still has to be. proved by
testimony; and the question remains whether it is more
credible that men have been deceived, or that the laws of
nature have been disturbed?
This last is the aspect of the argument which comes home
to the popular mind. Every individual has experience that
men lie and make mistakes ; none that miracles occur. Expe
riment upon experiment; the records of generation after
* “ Creed of Christendom,” vol. ii., p. 136.
+ Evidences of Christianity. “Preparatory Considerations.”
+ “System of Logic,” Bk. 3, ch. xxv., sec. 2. Dr. Farrar’s abuse
of Mill’s reasoning is well exposed by the author of “ Supernatural
Religion,” Pt. 1, ch. iii.
�4
generation; the very stability of our life depends upon and
confirms the belief m the uniformity of law
“In the
case of miracles, then,” says Professor Tyndall, “ it behoves
us to understand the weight of the negative before we assign
a value to the positive ; to comprehend the protest of nature
before we attempt to measure with it the assertions of
men. *
Paley’s supposition of “ twelve men whose probity and good
sense I had well known,” who should be ready, one after
another, to be racked, burnt or strangled, rather than give up
the assertion that they had witnessed miracles, does not even
meeu the case. For how could it be shown that it was impos
sible tor these twelve men to be deceived? Twelve infallible
men w ould be as incredible as any miracle they were supposed
to assert. Paley’s reference is simply a disingenuous attempt
to. imply that twelve good witnesses testified to the Christian
miracles at the time and in the place where they are said to
have occurred, and that they suffered on this account. Whereas
not one single original witness is known ; nor can even any
early Christian be proved to have suffered for his belief in
miracles.
Professor Huxley, who,, in his admirable little book on
Hume, very captiously, as it seems to me, takes exception to
iiume s defining miracles in their theological sense, agrees
that his arguments on the matter of testimony resolve them
selves into a simple statement of the dictates of common
sense, which may be expressed in this canon: the more a
statement of fact conflicts with previous experience, the more
complete must be the evidence which is to justify us in be
lieving it. It is upon this principle that everyone carries on
the business of common life. “ If,” continues the Professor,
a man tells me he saw a piebald horse in Piccadilly, I believe
~.lm w^hout hesitation. The thing itself is likely enough, and
there is no imaginable motive for his deceiving me. But if
the.same person tells me he observed a zebra there, I might
hesitate a little about accepting his testimony, unless I were
well satisfied, not only as to his previous acquaintance with
zebras, but as to his powers and opportunities of observation
in the present case. If, however, my informant assured me
that he beheld a centaur trotting down that famous thoroughrare, I should emphatically decline to credit his statement; and
this even if he were the most saintly of men, and ready to
suffer martyrdom in support of his belief. In such a case I
could, of course, entertain no doubt of the good faith of the
witness; it would be only his competency, which, unfortunately,
* “ Fragments of Science,” “ On Miracles and Special Providence ”
vol. ii., p. 33. 1879.
’
�5
has very little to do with good faith or intensity of conviction,
which I should presume to call in question.”*
The sceptic being securely entrenched in the first part of the
essay, the second carries the war into the supernaturalists’
camp. With the confidence of a thorough student of human
nature and historian, Hume gives his conviction that there is
not in all history an wholly trustworthy testimony to mira
culous events. Huxley says on this passage (page 10 of this
edition):—“ These are grave assertions, but they are least
likely to be challenged by those who have made it their busi
ness to weigh evidence and to give their decision under a due
sense of the moral responsibility which they incur in so
doing.”
Miracles are only alleged to have happened among people
devoid of scientific information and critical spirit. The learned
author of “ Supernatural Religion,” in his chapter on “ The
Age of Miracles,’’gives abundant proof that the miracles now
credited arose in a time of the grossest superstition, among a
people believing in the every-day operations of angels and
demons, full of religious excitement, and prone to exaggera
tion. In an age of science, where no one expects miracles,
they do not occur, and most are ready to take as evidence of
superstition the belief in any others than those in faith of
which they have themselves been reared. The same silent
process which has destroyed the belief in fairies and witch
craft has undermined all other supernatural beliefs, and they
only await the application of criticism to be levelled with the
dust. It is true the universe remains a mystery. In one
sense every atom is a miracle. It is so because man’s faculties
are finite and the relations of nature infinite. But the mystery
ef nature affords no ground for belief in miraculous events,
the only testimony for which has been handed down from
superstitious and ill-informed ancestors. It is rather a reason
for abiding by the only light we have—the light which comes
from reason and observation. The part of a wise man is to
study and investigate, and “ proportion his belief to the
evidence.”
There being slight variations in the various editions of the
Essay, the present text has been carefully compared with all
those in the library of the British Museum.
* “English Men of Letters : Hume,” p. 134.
�ON MIRACLES.
-------- ♦--------
PART
I.
There is in Dr. Tillotson’s writings an argument against the real
presence, which is as concise, and elegant, and strong as any
argument can possibly be supposed against a doctrine that is
so little worthy of a serious refutation. It is acknowledged on
all hands, says that learned prelate, that the authority, either
of the scripture or of tradition, is founded merely in the testi
mony of the apostles, who were eye-witnesses to those miracles
of our Savior, by which he proved his divine mission. Our
evidence, then, for the truth of the Christian religion is less
than the evidence for the truth of our senses ; because, even in
the first authors of our religion, it was no greater; and it is
evident it must diminish in passing from them to their disciples;
nor can any one be so certain of the truth of their testimony,
as of the immediate object of his senses. But a weaker evidence
can never destroy a stronger; and therefore, were the doctrine
of the real presence ever so clearly revealed in scripture, it
were directly contrary to the rules of just reasoning to give
our assent to it. It contradicts sense, though both the scripture
and tradition, on which it is supposed to be built, carry not
such evidence with them as sense, when they are considered
merely as external evidences, and are not brought home to
every one’s breast by the immediate operation of the Holy
Spirit.
Nothing is so convenient as a decisive argument of this kind,
which must at least silence the most arrogant bigotry and
superstition, and free us from their impertinent solicitations.
I flatter myself, that I have discovered an argument of a like
nature, which, if just, will, with the wise and learned, be an
everlasting check to all kinds of superstitious delusion, and
consequently, will be useful as long as the world endures. For
so long, I presume, will the accounts of miracles and prodigies
be found in all history, sacred and profane.
Though experience be our only guide in reasoning concerning
matters of fact; it must be acknowledged that this guide is
not altogether infallible, but in some cases is apt to lead us
into errors and mistakes. One, who, in our climate, should
expect better weather in any week of June than in one of
December, would reason justly, and conformably to experience;
but it is certain that he may happen, in the event, to find
himself mistaken. However, we may observe, that, in such
a case, he would have no cause to complain of experience;
�7
because it commonly informs us beforehand of the uncertainty,
by that contrariety of events, which we may learn from a
diligent observation. All effects follow not with like certainty
from their supposed causes. Some events are found, in all
countries and all ages, to have been constantly conjoined to
gether : Others are found to have been more variable, and
sometimes to disappoint our expectations; so that, in our
reasonings concerning matter of fact, there are all imaginable
degrees of assurance, from the highest certainty to the lowest
species of moral evidence.
A wise man, therefore, proportions his belief to the evidence.
In such conclusions as are founded on an infallible experience,
he expects the event with the last degree of assurance, and
regards his past experience as a full proof of the future
existence of that event.
In other cases he proceeds with
more caution: He weighs the opposite experiments: He
considers which side is supported by the greatest number of
experiments: To that side he inclines with doubt and hesi
tation ; and when at last he fixes his judgment, the evidence
exceeds not what we properly
probability. All probability,
then, supposes an opposition of experiments and observations;
where the one side is found to overbalance the other, and to
produce a degree of evidence proportioned to the superiority.
A hundred instances or experiments on one side, and fifty
on another, afford a very doubtful expectation of any event;
though a hundred uniform experiments, with only one that is
contradictory, reasonably beget a pretty strong degree of
assurance. In all cases, we must balance the opposite experi
ments, where they are opposite, and deduct the smaller number
from the greater, in order to know the exact force of the
superior evidence.
To apply these principles to a particular instance ; we may
observe that there is no species of reasoning more common,
more useful, and even necessary to human life, than that
derived from the testimony of men, and the reports of eye
witnesses and spectators. This species of reasoning, perhaps,
one may deny to be founded on the relation of cause and
effect. I shall not dispute about a word. It will be sufficient
to observe, that our assurance in any argument of this kind is
derived from no other principle than our observation of the
veracity of human testimony, and of the usual conformity of
facts to the reports of witnesses. It being a general maxim,
that no objects have any discoverable connexion together, and
that all the inferences which we can draw from one to another
are founded merely on our experience of their constant and
regular conjunction; it is evident that we ought not to make
an exception to this maxim in favor of human testimony,
whose connexion with any events seems, in itself, as liitJo
�8
necessary as any other. Were not the memory tenacious to a
certain degree ; had not men commonly an inclination to
truth and a principle of probity; were they not sensible to
snanie wh.cn detected in a falsehood : TiVere not these, I say,
discovered by experience to be qualities inherent in ’human
natuie, we should never repose the least confidence in human
testimony. A man delirious, or noted for falsehood and villainy
has no manner of authority with us.
’
And as the evidence, derived from witnesses and human
testimony, is founded on past experience, so it varies with
the experience, and is reg'arded either as a proof or a proba
bility according as the conjunction between any particular kind
of report and any kind of objects, has been found to be constant
or variable. There are a number of circumstances to be taken
into consideration in all judgments of this kind; and the
ultimate standard, by which we determine all disputes that
may arise concerning them, is always derived from experience
and observation. . Where this experience is not entirely uni
form on any side, it is attended with an unavoidable contrariety
in our judgments, and with the same opposition and mutual
destruction of arguments as in every other kind of evidence.
We frequently hesitate concerning the reports of others. We
balance the opposite circumstances which cause tiny doubt or
uncertainty; and when we discover a superiority on any side,
we incline to it; but still with a diminution of assurance in
proportion to the force of its antagonist.
This contrariety of evidence, in the present case, may be
derived from several different causes; from the opposition of
contrary testimony, from the character or number of the wit
nesses, from the manner of their delivering their testimony,
or from the union of all these circumstances. We entertain a
suspicion concerning any matter of fact when the witnesses
contradict each other, when they are but few or of a doubtful
character, when they have an interest in what they affirm,
when they deliver their testimony with doubt and hesitation’
or, on the contrary, with too violent asseverations. There are
many other particulars of the same kind, which may diminish
or destroy the force of any argument derived from human
testimony.
Suppose, for instance, that the fact which the testimony
endeavors to establish partakes of the extraordinary and the
marvellous, in that case, the evidence resulting from the testi
mony admits of a diminution greater or less in proportion as
the fact is more or less unusual. The reason why we place
any credit in witnesses and historians is not from any con
nexion, which we perceive a priori, between testimony and
reality, but because we are accustomed to find a conformity
between them. But when the fact attested is such a one as
�9
has seldom fallen under our observation, here is a contest of
two opposite experiences; of which the one destroys the othc-,
-as far . as its force goes, and the superior can only operate on
the mind by the force which remains. The very same principle
of experience, which gives us a certain degree of assurance in
the testimony of witnesses, gives us also, in this case, another
'degree of assurance against the fact which they endeavor to
establish; from which contradiction there necessarily arise a
•counterpoise, and mutual destruction of belief and authority.
“ I should not believe such a story were it told me by Cato ; ”
was a proverbial , saying in Rome, even during the lifetime
of that philosophical patriot (1). The incredibility of a fact,
at was allowed, might invalidate so great an authority.
The Indian prince who refused to believe the first relations
concerning the effects of frost reasoned justly, and it naturally
required very strong testimony to engage his assent to facts
which, arose from a state of nature with which he was un
acquainted, and bore so little analogy to those events of which
he had had constant and uniform experience. Though they
were not contrary to his experience, they were not conform
able to it (2).
But in order to increase the probability against the testi
mony of witnesses, let us suppose that the fact which they
n,inrm, instead of being only marvellous, is really miraculous,
suppose also, that the testimony, considered apart and in
itself, amounts to an. entire proof ; in that case there is proof
against proof, of which the strongest must prevail, but still
with a diminution of its force, in proportion to that of its
antagonist.
A miracle is a violation of the laws of nature; and as a firm
and unalterable experience has established these laws, the
proof against a miracle, from the very nature of the fact is
as entire as any argument from experience can possibly ’be
imagined Why is it more than probable that all men must
y?e»
iea(l cannot of itself remain suspended in the air •
that fire consumes wood, and is extinguished by water; unless
it be that these events are found agreeable to the laws of
nature, and there is required a violation of these laws, or in
other words, a miracle to prevent them? Nothing is esteemed
a miracle if it ever happen in the common course of nature
It is no miracle that a man seemingly in good health should
•die on a sudden : because such a kind of death, though more
unusual than any other, has yet been frequently observed to
happen. But it is a miracle that a dead man should come to
-Ute; because that has never been observed in any age or countrv
There must, therefore, be an uniform experience against every
miraculous event, otherwise the event would not merit that
appellation. And as an uniform experience amounts to a proof
�10
there is here a direct and full proof from the nature of the
fact against the existence of any miracle; nor can such a proof
be destroyed or the miracle rendered credible by an opposite
proof, which is superior (3).
.
The plain consequence is (and it is a general maxim worthy
of our attention), “ That no testimony is sufficient to establish
a miracle unless the testimony be of such a kind that its false
hood would be more miraculous than the fact which it en
deavors to establish: And even in that case there is a mutual
destruction of arguments, and the superior only gives us an
assurance suitable to that degree of force which remains after
deducting the inferior.” When anyone tells me that he saw
a dead man restored to life, I immediately consider with myself
whether it be more probable that this person should either
deceive or be deceived, or that the fact which he relates, should
really have happened. I weigh the one miracle against the
other; and, according to the superiority which I discover, I
pronounce my decision, and always reject the greater miracle.
If the falsehood of his testimony would be more miraculous
than the event which he relates; then, and not till then, can
he pretend to command my belief or opinion.
PART II.
In the foregoing reasoning we have supposed that the testi
mony upon which a miracle is founded may possibly amount to
an entire proof, and that the falsehood of that testimony would
be a real prodigy : But it is easy to show that we have been
a oreat deal too liberal in our concession, and that there never
was a miraculous event established on so full an evidence.
*
For first, there is not to be found in all history any miracle
attested by a sufficient number of men, of such unquestioned
yood sense, education, and learning as to secure us against all
delusion in themselves; of such undoubted integrity as to place
them beyond all suspicion of any design to deceive others; of
such credit and reputation in the eyes of mankind as to have
a o-reat deal to lose in case of being detected in any falsehood;
and at the same time attesting facts, performed m such a
public manner and in so celebrated a part of. the world, as to
render the detection unavoidable: All which circumstances are
requisite to give us a full assurance in the testimony of men.
Secondly. We may observe in human nature a principle
which, if strictly examined, will be. found to dimmish ex
tremely the assurance which we might have from human
testimony in any kind of prodigy. The maxim by which we
commonly conduct ourselves in our reasonings, is, that the
objects, of which we have no experience, resemble those of
* The 1750 edition inserts: “ In any history.”
�11
which we have; that what we have found to be most usual is
always most probable; and that where there is an opposition
of arguments, we ought to give the preference to such of them
as are founded on the greatest number of past observations.
But though, in proceeding by this rule, we readily reject any
fact which is unusual and incredible in an ordinary degree;
yet in advancing farther, the mind observes not always the
same rule, but when anything is affirmed utterly absurd and
miraculous, it rather the more readily admits such a fact, upon
account of that very circumstance which ought to destroy all
its authority. The passion of surprise and wonder, arising from
miracles, being an agreeable emotion, gives a sensible tendency
towards the belief of those events from which it is derived.
And this goes so far, that even those who cannot enjoy this
pleasure immediately, nor can believe those miraculous events of
which they are informed, yet love to partake of the satisfaction
at second-hand or by rebound, and place a pride and delight
in exciting the admiration of others.
With what greediness are the miraculous accounts of
travellers received, their descriptions of sea and land mon
sters, their relations of wonderful adventures, strange men,
and uncouth manners ! But if the spirit of religion join itself
to the love of wonder, there is an end of common-sense, and
human testimony, in these circumstances, loses all pretensions
to authority. A religionist may be an enthusiast, and imagine
he sees what has no reality : He may know his narration to be
fal3e, and yet persevere in it with the best intentions in the
world for the sake of promoting so holy a cause: Or even where
this delusion has no place, vanity, excited by so strong a tempta
tion, operates on him more powerfully than on the rest of
mankind in any other circumstances; and self-interest with
equal force. His auditors may not have, and commonly have
not, sufficient judgment to canvass his evidence : What
judgment they have, they renounce by principle, in these
sublime and mysterious subjects : Or if they were ever so
willing to employ it, passion and a heated imagination disturb
the regularity of its operations. Their credulity increases his
impudence ; and his impudence overpowers their credulity.
Eloquence, when in its highest pitch, leaves little room for
reason or reflection, but addressing itself entirely to the fancy
or the affections, captivates the willing hearers, and subdues
their understandings. Happily, this pitch it seldom attains.
But what a Cicero or a Demosthenes could scarcely operate
over a Roman or Athenian audience, every Capuchin, every
itinerant or stationary teacher, can perform over the generality
of mankind, and in a higher degree, by touching such gross
and vulgar passions (4).
Thirdly. It forms a very strong presumption against all
�12
supernatural and miraculous relations, that they are observed
chiefly to abound among ignorant and barbarous nations; or if
a civilised people has ever given admission to any of them,
that people will be found to have received them from ignorant
and barbarous ancestors, who transmitted them with that in
violable sanction and authority which always attend received
opinions. When we peruse the first histories of all nations
we are apt to imagine ourselves transported into some new
world, where the w’hole frame of nature is disjointed and every
element performs its operations in a different manner from
what it does at present. Battles, revolutions, pestilence,
famine, and death, are never the effects of those natural
causes which we experience. Prodigies, omens, oracles,
judgments, quite obscure the few natural events that are
intermingled with them. But as the former grow thinner
every page, in proportion as we advance nearer the enlightened
ages of science and knowledge, we soon learn that there is
nothing mysterious or supernatural in the case, but that all
proceeds from the usual propensity of mankind towards the
marvellous, and that, though this inclination may at inter
vals receive a check from sense and learning, it can never
thoroughly be extirpated from human nature.
‘‘ It is strange,” a judicious reader is apt to say upon the peru
sal of these wonderful historians, “that such prodigious events
never happen in our days.” But it is nothing strange, I hope,
that men should lie in all ages. You must surely have seen
instances enow of that frailty. You have yourself heard
many such marvellous relations started, which, being treated
with scorn by all the wise and judicious, have at last been
abandoned even by the vulgar. Be assured, that those re
nowned lies which have spread and flourished to such a
monstrous height, arose from like beginnings, but being sown
in a more proper soil, shot up at last into prodigies almost
equal to those which they relate.
It was a wise policy in that false prophet, Alexander, who,
though now forgotten, was once so famous, to lay the first
scene of his impostures in Paphlagonia, where, as Lucian tells
us, the people were extremely ignorant and stupid, and ready
to swallow even the grossest delusion. People at a distance,
who are weak enough to think the matter at all worthy inquiry,
have no opportunity of receiving better information. The
stories come magnified to them by a hundred circumstances.
Fools, are industrious in propagating the imposture; while
the wise and learned are contented, in general, to deride its
absurdity, without informing themselves of the particular facts
by which it .may be distinctly refuted. And thus the impostor
above-mentioned was enabled to proceed from his ignorant
Paphlagonians to the enlisting of votaries, even among the
�13
Grecian philosophers and men of the most eminent rank and
distinction in Rome : Nay, could engage the attention of that
sage emperor, Marcus Aurelius, so far as to make him trust
the success of a military expedition to his delusive prophecies.
The advantages are so great, of starting an imposture among
an ignorant people, that even though the delusion should be
too gross to impose on the generality of them—which, though
seldom, is sometimes the case—it has a much better chance of suc
ceeding in remote countries, than if the first scene had been laid
in a city renowned for arts and knowledge. The most ignorant
and barbarous of these barbarians carry the report abroad.
None of their countrymen have large correspondence or
sufficient credit and authority to contradict and beat down
the delusion. Men’s inclination to the marvellous has full
opportunity to display itself. And thus a story, which is
universally exploded in the place where it was first started, shall
pass for certain at a thousand miles distance. But had Alex
ander fixed his residence at Athens, the philosophers of that
renowned mart of learning had immediately spread throughout
the whole Roman empire, their sense of the matter; which, being
supported by so great authority, and displayed by all the force of
reason and eloquence, had entirely opened the eyes of mankind.
It is true, Lucian, passing by chance through Paphlagonia, had
an opportunity of performing this good office. But, though much
to be wished, it does not always happen, that every Alexander
meets with a Lucian, ready to expose and detect his im
postures (5).
I may add as a fourth reason which diminishes the authority
of prodigies, that there is no testimony for any, even those
•which have not been expressly detected, that is not opposed
by an infinite number of witnesses ; so that not only the miracle
destroys the credit of the testimony, but even the testimony
destroys itself. To make this the better understood, let us
consider, that in matters of religion, whatever is different is
contrary, and that it is impossible the religions of ancient Rome,
of Turkey, of Siam, and of China should, all of them, be
established on any solid foundation. Every miracle, there
fore, pretended to have been wrought in any of these religions
(and all of them abound in miracles), as its direct scope is
to establish the particular system to which it is attributed; so
has it the same force, though more indirectly, to overthow every
other system. In destroying a rival system, it likewise destroys
the credit of those miracles on which that system was
established ; so that all the prodigies of different religions are
to be regarded as contrary facts, and the evidences of these
prodigies, whether weak or strong, as opposite to each other.
According to this method of reasoning, when we believe any
miracle of Mahomet or any of his successors, we have for our
�14
warrant the testimony of a few barbarous Arabians : And on
the other hand, we are to regard the authority of Titus Livius,
Plutarch, Tacitus, and, in short, of all the authors and witnesses,
Grecian, . Chinese, and Roman Catholic, who have related any
miracle in their. particular religion; I say, we are to regard
theii testimony in . the same light as if they had mentioned
that .Mahometan miracle, and had in express terms contradicted
it, with the same certainty as they have for the miracles they
relate. This argument may appear over subtle and refined,
but is not in reality different from the reasoning of a judge
who supposes that the credit of two witnesses maintaining a
crime against any one is destroyed by the testimony of two
others who affirm him to have been two hundred leagues dis
tant, at the same instant when the crime is said to have been
committed.
One of the best attested miracles in all profane history is
that .which Tacitus reports of Vespasian, who cured a blind
man in Alexandria by means of his spittle, and a lame man by
the mere touch of his foot; in obedience to a vision of the god
Serapis, who had enjoined them to have recourse to the
Emperor for these miraculous cures. The story may be
seen in that fine historian (6); where every circumstance
seems to add weight to the testimony, and might be dis
played at large with all the force of argument and eloquence
if anyone were now concerned to enforce the evidence of that
exploded and idolatrous superstition. The gravity, solidity,
age, and probity of so great an emperor, who, through the
whole course of his life conversed in a familiar manner with
his. friends and. courtiers, and never affected those extra
ordinary airs of divinity assumed by Alexander and Demetrius:
The historian, a cotemporary writer noted for candor and
veracity, and withal the greatest and most penetrating genius
perhaps of all antiquity; and so free from any superstition and
credulity that he even lies under the contrary imputation of
Atheism and pro.faneness : The persons, from whose testimony
he related.the miracle, of established character for judgment
and veracity, as we may well presume; eye-witnesses of the
fact, and confirming their verdict after the Flavian family
were despoiled of the empire, and could no longer give any
reward as the price of a lie. TJtrumque, qui interfuere, nunc
quoque memorant, postquam nullum mendacio pretium. To which,
if we add the public nature of the facts as related, it will ap
pear that no evidence can well be supposed stronger for so
gross and. so palpable a falsehood.
There is also a memorable story related by Cardinal de
Betz, which may well deserve our consideration. When
that intriguing politician fled into Spain to avoid the perse
cution of his enemies he passed through Saragossa, the capital
�15
of Arragon, where he was shown
^n^was well known
had served seven years as a doo_ - p ,
devotions
to everybody in
at that chnrch. He had bee
ri1bbin" of holy oil upon,
a leg; but recovered that limb by the rub
Jwo leUgiP’Thids mirade X vouched by all the canons3 of the
the relator was also cotemporary.to the&nius;
S7X°x^":"r<; i :«»:
r»e“ardS»
-to give any credit to it ^d conseq
CO]lsidered justly,
of anv concurrence m the holy traua.
f+li..Atl,re
“ ? Z accSly to ^■s^)rro^^^ree''^S^'^OQfr SavSy^and
its falsehood through all the °irc^s^an
k
Y
£
mediately present, by reason of the bigotry, 1g°^^0C™0^
ss-sssaaxgs
by any human testimony, was more propeily a subject o
^Tteh^XieXalabreater number of miracles ascribed
to o“^E those which were lately ;
to have been
wrought in France upon the tomb of Abbe Pans,
ta
Jansenist, with whose sanctity the people ^re s° 1on deluclecL
Whp pnri-no- of the sick, giving hearing to the deal ana si&m io
S bhnd wire everywhere talked of as the usual effects of
Iw hSv sepulchre. But what is more extraordinary; many
oflh^miraclto were immediately proved upon the spot^before
iudo-es of unquestioned integrity, attested y
rnoqf
Stand distinction. in a learned Xid N^r is ftis alb
l^SX^ofSem w^pSisSd and disperse'd everywhere ;
nor were the Jesuits though a learned body supP°rted
in
oivil magistrate, and determined enemies to those opimonsi
whose favor the miracles were said to h^7^eei».g^ll we
.able distinctly to refute or detect them ( ).
�16
XIS>of^fiSp°A±Z?i1Ce5 agreeiag t0 the “r-
tb?utao?tnSie.U^ jusf; bTu?e some huma“ testimony has-
distance have been able to determine between them ? The
contrariety is equally strong between the miraclesTreated bv
or
th“e deUYered by MariaUa’ Me'
country, his family, Or himself, or in any other way§strikes in
with his natural inclinations and propensities
But what
greater temptation than to appear a missionary, a prophet an
d±Zad0^?m uaVeU? Wh0^uld not encounter man?
ter ?°%r ?fdh^U1pV inporde.r to attaiu so sublime a charac°
?y t^e help of vaW and a heated imagination ainf? the 5? made a ?onvert of himself and entered^seriously
into the delusion; who ever scruples to make use of pious
frauds m support of so holy and meritorious a cause ?
lhe smallest spark may here kindle into the greatest flame
because the materials are always prepared for it. The avicbum
genus aurwularum(8), the gazing populace, receive greedily
motesUwondSmatl°n’ whatever soothes superstition, and prol
St?EeSi ?f this nature have in a11 ages been
detected and exploded in their infancy? How many more have
been celebrated for a time, and have afterwards sunk into
negiect and oblivion? Where such reports, therefore, fly
about, the solution of the phenomenon is obvious, and we iudge
m conformity to regular experience and observation when we
account for it by the known and natural principles of credulity
and delusion. And shall we, rather than have a resource to so.
natural a solution allow of a miraculous violation of the most
established laws of nature ?
i I need not mention the difficulty of detecting a falsehood in
any private or even public history, at the time and place where
it is said to happen, much more where the scene is removed to
ever so small a distance. Even a court of judicature, with all
�17
the authority, accuracy, and judgment, which they can employ,
find themselves often at a loss to distinguish between truth
and falsehood in most recent actions. But the matter never
comes to any issue if trusted to the common method of alter
cation and debate and flying rumors ; especially when men’s
passions have taken part on either side.
In the infancy of new religions the wise and learned com
monly esteem the mattei- too inconsiderable to deserve their
attention or regard. And when afterwards they would will
ingly detect the cheat in order to undeceive the deluded multi
tude, the season is now past, and the records and witnesses, which
might clear up the matter, have perished beyond recovery.
No means of detection remain but those which must be
drawn from the very testimony itself of the reporters : And
these, though always sufficient with the judicious and know
ing, are commonly too fine to fall under the comprehension of
the vulgar.
_ Upon the whole, then, it appears that no testimony for any
kind of miracle has ever amounted to a probability much less
*
to a proof; and that, even supposing it amounted to a proof,
it would be opposed by another proof; derived from the very
nature of the fact which it would endeavor to establish. It is
experience only, which gives authority to human testimony;
and it is the same experience, which assures us of the laws
of nature. When, therefore, these two kinds of experience are
contrary, we have nothing to do but subtract the one from
the other, and embrace an opinion either on one side or the
other with that assurance which arises from the remainder.
But according to the principle here explained, this subtraction
with regard to all popular religions, amounts to an entire
annihilation; and therefore we may establish it as a maxim that
no human testimony can have such force as to prove a miracle
and make it a just foundation for any such system of
religion (9).
I am the better pleased with this method of reasoning, as X
think it may serve to confound those dangerous friends or
disguised enemies to the Ghistian religion, who have under
taken to defend it by the principles of human reason. Our
most holy religion is founded on Faith, not on reason, and it
is a sure method of exposing it to put it to such a trial, as it is
by no means fitted to endure. To make this more evident, let us
examine those miracles related in scripture, and not to lose our
selves in too wide a field, let us confine ourselves to such as we
find in the Pentateuch, which we shall examine according to
the principles of these pretended Christians, not as the word
or testimony of God himself, but as the production of a mere
* The first two editions read; “ Can ever possibly amount.'
�18
human writer and historian. Here, then, we are first to con
sider a book presented to us by a barbarous and ignorant
people, written in an age when they were still more barbarous
•and in all probability long after the facts which it relates,
corroborated by no concurring testimony, and resembling those
fabulous accounts which every nation gives of its origin.
Upon reading this book, we find it full of prodigies and
miracles. It gives an account of a state of the world and
of human nature entirely different from the present: Of our
fall from that state : Of the age of man extended to near a
thousand years : Of the destruction of the world by a deluge :
•Of the arbitrary choice of one people as the favorites of heaven
and that people the countrymen of the author: Of their deliver
ance from bondage by prodigies the most astonishing imagin
able : I desire anyone to lay his hand upon his heart and after
serious consideration declare whether he thinks that the false
hood of such a book, supported by such a testimony, would be
more extraordinary and miraculous than all the miracles it
relates ; which is, however, necessary to make it be received
according to the measures of probability above established.
What we have said of miracles may be applied without any
variation to prophecies; and indeed all prophecies are real
miracles, and as such only, can be admitted as proofs of any
revelation. If it did not exceed the capacity of human nature
to foretel future events, it would be absurd to employ any
prophecy as an argument for a divine mission or authority
from heaven; so that, upon the whole, we may conclude that
the Christian religion not only was at first attended with
miracles, but even at this day cannot be believed by any
reasonable person without one. Mere reason is insufficient to
•convince us of its veracity: And whoever is moved by Faith to
assent to it is conscious of a continued miracle in his own
person, which subverts all the principles of his understanding,
and gives him a determination to believe what is most con
trary to custom and experience.
NOTES.
(1) Plutarch, in vita Catonis Min. 19.
*(2) No Indian, it is evident, could have experience that water
did not freeze in cold climates. This, is placing. nature in a
situation quite unknown to him, and it is impossible for him
to tell a priori what will result from it. It is making a new
experiment, the consequence of which is always uncertain.
One may sometimes conjecture from analogy what will follow;
but still this is but conjecture. And it must be confessed, that
in the present case of freezing, the event follows contrary to
�19
Ihe rules of analogy, and is such, as a rational Indian would
not look for. The operations of cold upon water are not
Gradual according to the degrees of cold, but. whenever it
comes to the freezing point the water passes m a moment
from the utmost liquidity to perfect hardness. Such an event
therefore may be denominated extraordinary, and requires a
pretty strong testimony to render it credible to people in a
warm climate ; but still it is not miraudous., nor contrary to
uniform experience of the course of nature in cases where all
the circumstances are the same. The inhabitants of Sumatra
have always seen water fluid in their own climate,.and the
freezing of their rivers ought to be deemed a prodigy: but
they never saw water in Muscovy during the winter; and
therefore they cannot reasonably be positive what would there
be the consequence.
(3) Sometimes an event may not, in itself, seem, to be con
trary to the laws of nature, and yet, if it were real, it might, by
reason of some circumstances, be denominated a miracle, be
cause, in fact, it is contrary to these laws. Thus, if a person,
claiming a divine authority, should command a sick person to
be well, a healthful man to fall down dead, the clouds to pour
rain, the winds to blow—in short, should order many natural
events which immediately, follow upon his commandthese
might justly be esteemed miracles, because they arereally, in this
case, contrary to the laws of nature. For if any suspicion remain
that the event and command concurred by accident there is no
miracle and no transgression of the laws of nature. If this
suspicion be removed, there is evidently a miracle, and a trans
gression of these laws; because nothing can be more contrary
to nature than that the voice or command of a man should have
such an influence. A miracle may be accurately, defined, a
transgression of a law of nature by a particular volition of the
Deity, or by the interposition of some invisible agent. A miracle
may either be discoverable by men or not. This alters not its
nature and essence. The raising of a house or ship into the
air is a visible miracle. The raising of a feather, when the
wind wants ever so little of a force requisite.for that purpose,
is as real a miracle, though not so sensible with regard to us.
(4) The many instances of forged miracles, and prophecies,
and supernatural events, which, in all ages, have either been
detected by contrary evidence, or which detect themselves by
their absurdity, mark sufficiently the strong propensity of
man kind to the extraordinary and the marvellous., and ought
reasonably to beget a suspicion against all relations of this
kind. This is our natural way of thinking, even with regard
to the most common and most credible events. i^For instance,
there is no kind of report which rises so easily and spreads so
quickly, especially in country places and provincial towns, as
�20
those concerning marriages; insomuch that two young persons’
n^Sr1!,00^1011 “?ver see each Other twice, but thePwTole
“fh’kborhood immediately join them together. The pleasure
so interesting, the^ntefiSenceAnd
of r.6 • 1Ug k Plece reporters of it, spread of propagating it and
being the first
hSeXS1 ¿ST
“,r “of rnse
evidenc? Bn „S
confirmed by some greater
inel^n fi. D noV?6 Sfme Pa?sions, and others still stronger
ino- tv'+p e generality of mankind to the believing and reportm&ade^V116 Sre&teSt vebemence and assurance all religious
(5)It may here perhaps be objected that I proceed rashlv
Mvenrf mJ motions of
-erely froâ the aecS
given ot Mm by Lucian, a professed enemy. It were indeed,
foil 6 Wisbed tbat some of the. accounts published by his
contSSbSiaCCO^P neS had remained- The oppositio? and
as^X hvZf? J6 Character aHd conduct of the same man
Hfe m^ohbwnrï - ?b°r aU
as strong’ even in common
two ZÎin T * mSe ^l1^0118 matters, as that betwixt any
two men m the world—betwixt Alexander and St. Paul for
instance. See a letter to Gilbert West, Esq., on the conver
sion and apostlesMp of St. Paul.
4
oonver
aoSuSÏ’X VespP
Suetoaius
“““IF the seme
ri„^j^^SA%°^:jra8yr^ei1 by Mons. deMontgeron, counsellor
or judge of the Parliament of Paris, a man of figure and cha
racter, who was also a martyr to the cause, and is now said to
be somewhere m a dungeon on account of his book.
/here is another book, in three volumes (called “Recueil des
Miracles de 1 Abbe Pans ”), giving an account of many of these
miracles and accompanied with prefatory discourses, which
XiVerp ^Iel1 Wri-jt.en-1 Tbere runs’ however, through the
whole of these a ridiculous comparison between the miracles
SaV-f an<l th?S%0f tbe Abbé’ therein it is asserted
that the evidence for the latter is equal to that for the former •
Übu
etesfr-onyof men could ever be put in the balance
with that of God himself, who conducted the pen of the
inspired writers. If these writers, indeed, were to be con
sidered merely as human testimony, the French author is very
moderate m his comparison, since he might, with some appear
ance of reason, pretend that the Jansenist miracles much
surpass the others in evidence and authority. The following
circumstances are drawn from authentic papers inserted in the
above-mentioned book.
Many of the miracles of Abbé Paris were proved immediately
by witnesses before the officiality or bishop’s court at Paris»
under the eyes of Cardinal Noailles, whose character for in
tegrity and capacity was never contested even by his enemies»
�21
His successor in the archbishopric was an enemy to the
Jansenists, and for that reason promoted to the see by the
•Court. Yet twenty-two rectors or cures of Paris, with infinite
earnestness, press him to examine those miracles, which they
assert to be known to the whole world, and indisputably certain:
But he wisely forbore.
The Molinist party had tried to discredit these miracles in
-one instance, that of Madamoiselle le Franc. But besides that,
their proceedings in many respects are the most irregular in the
world, particularly in citing only a few of the Jansenist’s wit
nesses, whom they tampered with: Besides this, I say they
•soon found themselves overwhelmed by a cloud of new witnesses
one hundred and twenty in number, most of them persons of
•credit and substance in Paris, who gave oath for the miracle.
This was accompanied with a solemn and earnest appeal to the
Parliament. But the Parliament were forbidden by authority to
meddle in the affair. It was at last observed that where men
are heated by zeal and enthusiasm there is no degree of human
testimony so strong as may not be procured for the greatest
absurdity : And those who will be so silly as to examine the
affair by that medium, and seek particular flaws in the testi
mony, are almost sure to be confounded. It must be a miser
able imposture indeed that does not prevail in that contest.
All who have been in France about that time have heard of
the great reputation of Mons. Heraut, the Lieutenant de Police,
whose vigilance, penetration, activity and extensive intelligence
Fave been much talked of. This magistrate, who by the nature
of his office is almost absolute, was invested with full powers
on purpose to suppress or discredit these miracles; and he
frequently seized immediately and examined the witnesses
.and subjects of them; but never could reach anything satis
factory against them.
In the case of Madamoiselle Thibaut he sent the famous
■de Sylvia to examine her, whose evidence is very curious. The
physician declares that it was impossible she could have been
so ill as was proved by witnesses, because it was impossible
she could in so short a time have recovered so perfectly as he
found her. He reasoned like a man of sense from natural
•causes ; but the opposite party told him that the whole was a
miracle, and that his evidence was the very best proof of it.
The Molinists were in a sad dilemma. They dared not
assert the absolute insufficiency of human evidence to prove a
miracle. They were obliged to say that these miracles were
wrought by witchcraft and the devil. But they were told that
this was the resource of the Jews of old.
No Jansenist was ever embarrassed to account for the
cessation of the miracles, when the churchyard was shut up
by the king’s edict. It was the touch of the tomb which
�22
produced these extraordinary effects ; and when no one could
approach the tomb, no effects could be expected. God indeed
could have thrown down the walls in a moment; but he is
master of his own graces and works, and it belongs not to us
to account for them. He did not throw down the walls of
every city like those of Jericho on the sounding of the rams’’
horns, nor break up the prison of every apostle like that of
St. Paul.
No less a man than the Due de Chatillon, a duke and peer
of France of the highest rank and family, gives evidence of a
miraculous cure performed upon a servant of his, who had
lived several years in his house with a visible and palpable
infirmity.
I shall conclude with observing that no clergy are more
celebrated for strictness of life and manners than the secular
clergy of France, particularly the rectors or cures of Paris
who bear testimony to these impostures.
The learning, genius, and probity of the gentlemen, and the
austerity of the nuns of Port Royal, have been much celebrated
all over Europe. Yet they all give evidence for a miracle
wrought on the niece of the famous Pascal, whose sanctity of
life, as well as extraordinary capacity, is well known. The
famous Racine gives an account of this miracle in his famous
history of Port-Royal, and fortifies it with all the proofs which
a multitude of nuns, priests, physicians and men of the world,
all of them of undoubted credit, could bestow upon it. Several
men of letters, particularly the Bishop of Tournay, thought
this miracle so certain, as to employ it in the refutation of
Atheists and Freethinkers. The Queen-Regent of France,
who was extremely prejudiced against the Port-Royal, sent
hei’ own physician to examine the miracle, who returned an
absolute convert.. In short, the supernatural cure was so uncontestable that it saved for a time that famous monastery
from the ruin with which it was threatened by the Jesuits.
Had it been a cheat, it had certainly been detected by such
sagacious and powerful antagonists and must have hastened
the ruin of the contrivers. Our divines who can build up a
formidable castle from suoh despicable materials, what a pro
digious fabric could they have reared from these and many
other circumstances which I have not mentioned!—How oft
would the great names of Pascal, Racine, Arnaud, Nicole, have
resounded in our ears ? But if they be wise, they had better
adopt the miracle as being more worth a thousand times than
all the rest of their collection. Besides, it may serve very
much to their purpose. For that miracle was really per
formed by the touch of an authentic holy prickle of the holy
thorn, which composed the holy crown, which, etc.
(8) Lucret, iv., 594.
�('9'1 I beg the limitations here made may be remarked when
I say that a miracle can never be proved so as to be the founda
tion of a system of religion. For I own, that otherwise there
may possibly be miracles or violations of the usual course of
nature, of such a kind as to admit of proof from human testi
mony, though perhaps it will be impossible to find any such in
51 ¿he recordsP of history. Thus, suppose all authors m all
languages agree that from the 1st of January 1600, there was
a total darkness over the whole earth for eight days: SuPPos®
that the tradition of this extraordinary event is still strong and
lively among the people, that all travellers who return from
foreign countries bring us accounts , of the same tradition
without the least variation or contradiction: It¡is evident that
our present philosophers, instead of doubting that fact,
to receive it for certain, and ought to search for the causes
whence it might be derived. The decay, corruption, and dis
solution of nature, is an event rendered probable by so many
analogies, that any phsenomenon which seems to have a
tendency towards that catastrophe, comes within the reach
of human testimony, if that testimony be very extensive and
U1 But^uppose that all the historians who treat of England
should agree, that, on the 1st of January 1600, Queen Eliza
beth died; that both before and after her death she was seen
by her physicians and the whole court, as is usual with person»
of her rank; that her successor was acknowledged and pro
claimed by the Parliament; and that, after being interred a
month, she again appeared, took possession of the throne, and
governed England for three years : I must confess I should be
surprised at the concurrence of so many odd circumstances,
but should not have the least inclination to believe somiraculous an event. I should not doubt of her pretended
death and of those other public circumstances that followed
it: I should only assert it to have been pretended, and that.it
neither was nor possibly could be real. You would m vam
obiect to me the difficulty and almost impossibility of deceiving
the world in an affair of such consequence ; the wisdom and
integrity of that renowned queen; with the little or no advantage which, she could reap from so poor an artifice: All
this might astonish me; hut I would still reply that the
knavery and folly of men are such common phenomena that
I should rather believe the most extraordinary events to arise
from their concurrence than admit so signal a violation ot the
laws of nature.
,
~
But should this miracle be ascribed to any new system of
religion men in all ages have been so much imposed on by
ridiculous stories of that kind, that this, very .circumstance
would be a full proof of a cheat, and sufficient with all men of
�24
sense not only to make them reject the fact, but reject
it without farther examination. Though the being to whom
the miracle is ascribed be in this case Almighty, it does not
upon that account, become a whit more probable ; since it is
impossible for us to know the attributes or actions of such a
Benig, otherwise than from the experience which we have of
ms productions m the usual course of nature. This still
reduces us to past observation, and obliges us to compare the
instance of the violations of truth in the testimony of men
with those of the violation of the laws of nature by miracles
m order to judge which of them is most likely and probable’
As the violations of truth are more common in the testimony
concerning religious miracles than in that concerning any
other matter of fact; this must diminish very much the
authority of the former testimony, and make us form a
general resolution never to lend any attention to it, with
whatever specious pretext it may be covered.
‘■’•Lord Bacon seems to have embraced the same principles
of reasoning:—“ We ought,” says he, “to make a collection
or particular history of all monsters and prodigious births or
productions, and in a word of everything new, rare, and extra
ordinary m nature. But this must be done with the most
severe scrutiny, lest we depart from truth. Above all every
relation must be considered as suspicious which depends in
any degree upon religion, as the prodigies of Livy: And no less
so, everything that is to be found in the writers of natural
magic or alchemy, or such authors, who seem, all of them to
have an uncontrollable appetite for falsehood and fable.”
hacienda enim est congeries sive historia naturalis par
ticulars omnium monstrorum et partuum naturse prodio-i®sorum; omnis denique novitatis et raritatis et inconsueti
in natura. Hoc vero faciendum est cum severissimo delectu, ut constet fides. Maxime autem habenda sunt pro
suspectis quae pendent quomodocunque ex religione, ut prodigia Livn: Nec minus quae inveniuntur in scriptoribus ma^iae
naturals, aut etiam alchymiae, et hujusmodi hominibns; qui
tanquam proci sunt et amatores fabularum.”—“Nov Organ ”
lib. 2., Aph. 29.
° ”
London: Freethought Publishing Company, 28, Stonecutter St., E.CL
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THE
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BEING
Astronomico-Theological Discourses.
By the Rev. ROBERT TAYLOR, B.A., of St. John’s
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Author of the “ Diegesis,” “ Syntagma,” &c.
(Reprinted verbatim from Richard Carlile's original edition.)
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Essenes : examines the prophetical claims of the Evangelists on
behalf of Christ ; and freely criticises, although in no ungenerous
spirit, the moral and religious ideas of Christ himself. He does
all this with considerable aid from authoritative scholars, and his
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champions of Freethought in their contests with the representa
tives of Christianity. We cordially recommend this little volume
of 138 pages which is one of the cheapest shilling’s-worth we
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London: Freethought Publishing Company, 28, Stonecutter St.,E.C.
�THE FREETHINKER.
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�
Dublin Core
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Title
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Victorian Blogging
Description
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A collection of digitised nineteenth-century pamphlets from Conway Hall Library & Archives. This includes the Conway Tracts, Moncure Conway's personal pamphlet library; the Morris Tracts, donated to the library by Miss Morris in 1904; the National Secular Society's pamphlet library and others. The Conway Tracts were bound with additional ephemera, such as lecture programmes and handwritten notes.<br /><br />Please note that these digitised pamphlets have been edited to maximise the accuracy of the OCR, ensuring they are text searchable. If you would like to view un-edited, full-colour versions of any of our pamphlets, please email librarian@conwayhall.org.uk.<br /><br /><span><img src="http://www.heritagefund.org.uk/sites/default/files/media/attachments/TNLHLF_Colour_Logo_English_RGB_0_0.jpg" width="238" height="91" alt="TNLHLF_Colour_Logo_English_RGB_0_0.jpg" /></span>
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Conway Hall Library & Archives
Date
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2018
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Conway Hall Ethical Society
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Pamphlet
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
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An essay on miracles
Creator
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Hume, David [1711-1776]
Wheeler, Joseph Mazzini [1850-1898]
Description
An account of the resource
Place of publication: London
Collation: 24 p. ; 18 cm.
Notes: Includes bibliographical references. Publisher's advertisements inside front cover and inside and on back cover. "With an introduction commenting upon the views of Campbell, Paley, Mill, Powell, Grey, Mozley, Tyndall, Huxley, etc. by Joseph Mazzini Wheeler". [Front cover]. Part of the NSS pamphlet collection.
Publisher
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Freethought Publishing Company
Date
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1882
Identifier
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N315
Rights
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<a href="http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/mark/1.0/"><img src="http://i.creativecommons.org/p/mark/1.0/88x31.png" alt="Public Domain Mark" /></a><span> </span><br /><span>This work (An essay on miracles), identified by </span><a href="https://conwayhallcollections.omeka.net/items/show/www.conwayhall.org.uk"><span>Humanist Library and Archives</span></a><span>, is free of known copyright restrictions.</span>
Format
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application/pdf
Type
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Text
Language
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English
Subject
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Miracles
Superstition
Miracles
NSS