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THE
LOGIC AND PHILOSOPHY
OF
’ATHEISM.
WYTTS.
BY JOHN
4-e
LONDON :
Austin & Co., 17, Johnson’s Couet, Fleet Street, E.C.
1 865.
PBICE THE EEPENCE.
��e
THE
LOGIC AND PHILOSOPHY OF ATHEISM.
BY
JOHN
WATTS.
If any apology be necessary for calling attention to a sub
ject that has been so often previously investigated, it may
be found in the fact that current literature generally receives
more patronage from the multitude than older, and, in many
cases, abler productions. And further, every writer and
every speaker will, as a rule, treat any given subject from
a different point of view, and make especially clear some one
point in connection with the particular question under con
sideration-. And as Theistic advocates are so numerous,
their advocacy so varied, and their expositions so frequent,
no advantage that legitimately belongs to Atheistic propagandism should be lost sight of, and no effort omitted to be
made that is calculated to set forth in all their strength
those truths represented by the term Atheism. It would
be the climax of folly to suppose that because error has
once been exposed, the reign of truth is not far distant.
That “ truth is great and must prevail ” we doubt not; but
its speedy or deferred victory will depend, to a very great
extent at least, upon the wisdom, the valour, and the per
sistency of those who undertake to secure its triumph. In
the present instance nothing more will be attempted than to
give a kind of panoramic view of the Atheist’s position, and
to exhibit the immense advantage he possesses over the or
thodox Christian. Originality we care not to claim, as our
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THE LOGIC AND PHILOSOPHY
desire is rather to prove useful thanto be considered great.
It is not new truths that mankind requires—it is the under
standing and adoption of those already proclaimed. Our
duty, therefore, is to recapitulate the nature and tendency
of the principles in which we believe, until misunderstand
ing or misrepresentation shall be impossible.
Perhaps*it will be advisable at this preliminary stage to
notice a supposition entertained by Christians as to the
audacity of any man daring to call in question the existence
of their supposed Deity. It is said that every nation, hea
then or otherwise, believes in such a Being, and that it is
only the few corrupt minds in any country who “ make the
wish father to the thought,” and blaspheme that power in
whom they “ live, move, and have their being.’’ In the
first place we frankly say that did this presumed universal
belief in Deity actually exist, it would have not the slighest
weight with us ; neither should Christians desire it to have
any. When they tell us that we are each to be held res
ponsible for our own beliefs and actions, they surely cannot
deny the justice of each investigating for himself, and form
ing his own conclusions, independently of any other person
or all other nations. It is useless to tell an Atheist what
another man believes ; he very properly answers that it is
not another’s faith but his own reason which he accepts as a
guide. With Drummond he declares that “ he who will not
reason is a bigot; he who cannot is a fool; and he. who
dares not is a slave.” But this oft-repeated statement in re
ference to the universality of belief is very far from being true,
and we need not therefore further notice it. Any one who
will take the trouble to read M. Pouchet’s recently published
volume on the “Plurality of the Human Race,” will find
instances cited of nations having no idea whatever of Divi
nity. Speaking of various African and Oceanic tribes, he
describes them as having no notion of anything outside
themselves. “ Ideas, abstract ideas, arise from their own
domain; the past, that which preceded their birth; the
future, that which follows their death, does not occupy their
attention ; the present is their only business in life. They
do not demand ‘ Whence do I come ?’ What am I ?
Where am I going ?’ And they have no idea whatsoever of
�OF ATHEISM.
5
a Divinity !”* These cases, it should be remembered, are
not the only ones; almost all travellers bear the same or
similar testimony. It follows, therefore, that Christians are
neither right as to the truth of a universal belief in God, nor
in the inference they would draw from such belief did it
really exist. Instead of the idea of God being universal, we
should rather say that in no country, nor in any one person
is it to be found. Nothing is more easy or more prevalent
than to pronounce the word God, and to say in him I be
lieve. But in whom or in what ? Ask a thousand persons
to give some definition of God, or to explain their ideas of
what he really is, or what they believe him to be, and you
would have to pause for a reply. Strange as it may appear,
we will venture the statement that the most logical answer
would, we think, come from the Atheist. In the words of
Allen Davenport, he may say:—
“ You ask me what is God ? And I
Am no way puzzled to reply.
My inward lights so clearly shine
That heavenly things I may divine;
And although but a finite creature,
Tell what is God and what is Nature.
Whatever can be seen or felt,
Whatever can be heard or smelt,
Whatever can be tasted, and all the mind can understand,
All that our wisdom can conceive,
All that in which we can believe;
All o’er where Fancy ever trod, is Nature;
All the rest is God ”
And what the “rest” is no Theist ever told us. He that
can form an idea of something more than everything is the
man and the only man that can have any “ idea ” of God.
Locke, who is often quoted as a Christian authority, was
conscious of the confusion that existed in men’s minds as to
what “ God ” is. His words are :—“ How many amongst
us are to be found, upon inquiry, to fancy God in the shape
of a man sitting in heaven, and to have other absurd and
unfit conceptions of him. Christians as well as Turks have
had whole sects owning or contending earnestly for it, that
the Deity was corporeal and of human shape.” To do Locke
Quoted by M, Pouchet, page 29.
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THE LOGIC AND PHILOSOPHY
justice, however, we are bound to say that he considered
such conceptions of “ Deity ” to be confined to the “ igno
rant and uninstructed.” But that equally absurd notions
have obtained among the most learned philosophers the
history of the world will readily prove. Socrates, for in
stance, defined God as the cause of the universe, a defini
tion as unintelligible as the word God itself is. A selfexistent universe never could have had a cause; and were the
universe not self-existent, its cause must have been the effect
of some previous cause, and so on ad infinitum. To speak
of & first cause is only to indulge in Christian babblement,
Aristotle, too, considered God to be “ a mind immutable and
impassable, an eternal and most perfect animal, perpetually
employed in imparting motion to the universe.” Upon
reading which the late Julian Hibbert justly remarked, “It
must be dull work to be eternally trundling a wheel-barrow,
and perhaps hard work too for an incorporeal Being.”
Synesius, however, would make no compromise with com
mon sense, but resolved (if the expression be allowable) to
“ go the whole hog.” Apostrophising “ Deity,” he says,
“ Thou art a father and a mother, a male and a female ; thou
art voice and silence ; thou art the fruitful nature of natures ;
thou art the father of all fathers; and being without a
father, thou art thine own father and son. 0 source of
sources, principle of principles, root of roots, thou art the
unity of unities, the number of numbers, being both unity
and number. Thou art one and all things, one of all
things, and one before all things.” Now if Synesius
were not right in any one of his many descriptions,
who can hope ever (o successfully guess what the “ Deity ”
really is ? And it is useless for modern Christians to
say that their idea of God is more rational than the des
criptions just given ; for whilst they are less wordy in their
so-called definition, they are equally absurd. To say, as
they do, that God is a spirit, is only to use another word
of which they know nothing, to describe the nature of a
Being in whom they believe, but of whom they have no idea,
nor can they form of him the slightest conception.
If the preceding statements be true, are we not justified
in saying, as Mr. Southwell has often remarked to us, that
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7
Atheism is man’s normal state, and that Theists are just
like fishes out of water ? The position of the Atheist may
be described in a few words. He believes that something
is, and that something always has been. He believes in the
existence of Nature, by which he means the aggregate of
matter or substance. And as the totality of things is all
that he can form any conception of, together with his un
avoidable belief that something always was, he is forced to
the conclusion that Nature is eternal, without beginning
and without end. Being eternal, he can only view it as
self-existent, and as self-existence is the climax of attributes,
it doubtless, he considers, includes all other attributes.
Here the Atheist, who is generally spoken of as a negation
ist, appears as decidedly a positivist as it is possible to be.
The Theist comes forth as the negationist, and assures the
Atheist that in believing only in everything, he is in error.
To be right he must believe in something more than every
thing, in a Being that existed before anything was, who
occupies some place outside everywhere, and who created
all that exists. The Atheist very properly replies, that it
seems to him impossible that there ever was a time when
nothing was; and if Nature were produced from something
already in existence, whence came that something ? It
could never have been created if it as “ something ” always
existed. The Atheist then inquires what this existence or
something is which the Theist calls God. It cannot, he
conceives, be matter, or it would be part of Nature, and the
part could never be the cause of the whole. If it be not
matter, it can neither be the part nor the whole of anything.
If the universe be boundless and material, nothing imma
terial can possibly exist. If a Being really do exist who
created all things, the obvious question at once is, where
was this Being before anything else existed? “ Was there
a time when the God over all, was God over nothing?
Can we believe that a God over nothing began to be out of
nothing, and to create all things when there was nothing.
Is it, therefore, not easier to believe that this stupendous
and mighty frame of Nature always was, infinite and eter
nal ?” This appears to the Atheist to be the true state of
the case, and although it explains not the why and the
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THE LOGIC AND PHILOSOPHY
wherefore of existence, it is far more consistent and logical
than the gigantic assumptions of the Theist, who is favoured
with no more light on the subject than the Atheist possesses.
“ What I hold to be the truth,” says a well-known German
writer, “ shall be welcome to me, let it sound as it may;
but I will know, and should this be impossible, thus much
at least I will know—that it is not possible to know.” This
is the spirit underlying the logic and philosophy of Atheism.
We adopt, therefore, without the slightest hesitation, those
forcible words translated by Thomas Carlyle :—“ What went
before and what will follow me I regard as two black impene
trable curtains which hang down at the two extremities of
human life, and which no living man has yet drawn aside.
Many hundreds of generations have already stood before
them, with their torches, guessing anxiously what lies behind.
On the curtain of futurity many see their own shadows,
the forms of their passions enlarged and put in motion; they
shrink in terror at this image of themselves. Poets, philo
sophers, and founders of states have painted this curtain
with their dreams, more smiling or more dark as the sky
above them was cheerful or gloomy; and their pictures
deceive the eye when viewed from a distance. Many jug
glers, too, make profit of this our universal curiosity; by
their strange mummeries they have set the outstretched
fancy in amazement. A deep silence reigns behind this cur
tain; no one once within will answer those he has left
without; all you can hear is a hollow echo of your question,
as if you shouted into a chasm.” Atheists, recognising the
truth of these remarks, are content to leave to Theists the
unenviable presumption of being able to draw back the cur
tain and present a clear view of what has been and of what
is to be. They should remember, however, that even from
their own stand-point:—
“Divines can say but what themselves believe;
Strong proofs they have, but not demonstrative;
For were all sure, then all minds would agree,
And faith itself be lost in certainty.
To live uprightly, then, is sure the best;
To save ourselves, and not to damn the rest.”
The Theist comes forward, however, with what he considers
to be a crushing argument. Thomas Cooper has taken it as
�Or ATHEISM.
travelling companion through. England and Scotland for
some years past, and he makes it do duty still. It is said
that things cannot produce what they have not. . Matter
hath not mind, or every atom of matter would contain mind.
A table or a stone would be as intelligent as Thomas
Cooper or Richard Weaver. If matter be not necessarily
intelligent, mind must exist independently of matter, which
cannot therefore be infinite or eternal. First, we would
observe that to our minds it by no means follows that for
intelligence to be a quality of matter it must necessarily
belong to every atom of matter. Brightness is a quality of
matter, but all matter is not bright. Neither is all matter
hard—in fact we find a great quantity, with “ intelligence,”
to be very soft. The same may be said of colours and other
qualities. The position taken by our friend Iconoclast in
his various debates on this question is in reality the only
strong and logical one. One substance—infinite or bound
less—is affirmed; call it matter if you will—numerous
modes of that substance exist. Each mode has its essential
quality, and we should be no more surprised to find some
matter without the quality of intelligence, than we are at
finding some minus the quality of brightness. It is not
true, either, that compound bodies do not possess qualities
and properties not to be found in their elementary consti
tuents. Any chemist could prove the contrary. Our old
friend Robert Taylor used to keep his opponents to this
point. “ How is it that sulphur and oxygen by combination
produce acid ? For neither sulphur nor oxygen have acid.
How is it that cold bodies produce heat (caloric)?” “ How
is it that nitrate of silver is a powerful caustic, when neither
of its elementary constituents has the least causticity ?
These constituents are silver, nitrogen, and oxygen.” When
these questions were recently put to Thomas Cooper, he
replied by saying he did not believe in their truth. Mr.
Taylor naturally smiled at so great a man being ignorant
of these simple truths, and recommended him to publish
“ Chemistry made Easy for Pious Flats,” ignoring all ex
perimental facts in connection with the science. He then
quoted for Mr. Cooper’s enlightenment from Professor
Fownes’s “ Rudiments of Chemistry,” wherein he says—
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THE LOGIC AND PHILOSOPHY
“ The various rocks, clays, sands, and soils, which compose
the solid earth : the water of seas and rivers, the materials
of plants and animals, are of a compound nature—that is,
made up of two or more other substances, united or com
bined together in a manner so close and intimate, as not to
be generally separable by any common means, and the com
pound so produced is almost always different in properties
and appearance from the substances of which it is really
composed.” This being true,' why should we deny that
under certain combinations of matter intelligence should be
one of its qualities ? But we are asked if we can conceive
how non-intelligence can in any way produce intelligence.
We, without the least reluctance, answer in the negative.
And in return we may ask the Theist whether he can con
ceive the possibility of an immaterial Being, having neither
“ body, parts, nor passions
having nothing whatever in
common with material substance, working upon, moulding,
and fashioning the entire universe, and all in it that lives,
and moves, and has being ? We, having only partial know
ledge of Nature’s properties, remain suspensive.
The
Theist, with no more knowledge, undertakes to answer au
thoritatively, and to solve the great problem of human ex
istence. Which is the more consistent we need not here
state.
Theists should never accuse Atheists of dogmatism ; for
no one can be more dogmatic than the Theist. He says,
for instance, that matter cannot be eterftal, for whatever is
eternal exists of necessity ; that whatever exists of necessity
must exist everywhere; that matter is not everywhere, or
there could be no locomotion. This is certainly clearly,
although not modestly stated. Why, we ask, is locomotion
impossible if matter be everywhere ? We find locomotion
going on every day in places where matter is certainly not
absent. A cab, for instance, may be driven along the public
thoroughfare, and meet with no impediment to its locomo
tion from the air, which is matter, or from collision with a
dog, or any small object. But if a house were to fall across
the road locomotion would be impeded. The fact is, one
kind, or rather one mode of matter is constantly replacing
another, without the absence of matter in any one known
�OF ATHEISM.
11
place. The argument too about the mind being distinct
from and independent of the body is equally worthless.
Theists say very pompously that we all know our minds
are not our bodies, and our bodies not our minds. Of
course we do ; and we also know that our teeth are not our
toe nails; but both our teeth and toe nails form parts of
our body when it is in a perfect state. But from disease of
some kind we may lose both our nails and our teeth, and
from disease we may also lose our mind. That is, the
normal functional activity of the brain may be arrested,
and that intelligence, which is the result of such activity—
by us called mind—is more or less lost also. If, on the
contrary, the mind were something independent of the
body ; if it were some divine and immaterial principle, ex
isting before the body did, and destined to live when the
body has passed into other modes; surely the temporary
disturbance of its present tenement would not affect its
manifestation or destroy its power. If so, what hope can
be entertained of immortality when the body is entirely
transformed ? If a healthy constitution is now necessary to
the existence of mind, upon what principle of reasoning is
it supposed that when the body ceases altogether to existthe mind will live for ever in that world of w’hich Christians
dream ? '
It is argued, too, that mind must be independent of matter,
from the fact that within an average period of about seven
years every particle of matter constituting the human body
is removed and a new body consequently formed, while
memory, one of the attributes of mind, may continue cog
nisant of all the principal events of a lifetime, showing
therefore thatzi had not changed with the material particles.
But this conclusion falls to the ground immediately in face
of the equally potent fact that the scar of a severe wound
received in infancy by an octogenarian, may accompany him
to the grave, notwithstanding that his body has been a dozen
times renewed. The new particles of matter adapt them
selves to the altered configuration of the injured part, and
the scar therefore remains, and, by parity of reasoning, the
new particles of matter constituting the mental organism
also take to themselves the conditions of existence of those
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THE LOGIC AND PHILOSOPHY
which they have replaced. The muscular power of an arm,
or the suppleness of the fingers of a pianist, may be the re
sult of forty years of training, although the actual muscles
themselves are but of seven years’ growth ; the vigour and
clearness of the intellect may be the result of as many years
of educational exercise, although acting through the medium
of tissues equally recent in their formation as the muscular
ones.
Paley admits in the thirty-third chapter of his “ Natural
Theology” the nonsensical idea of Deity. He says, “The
Deity, it is true, is the object of none of our senses.” This
statement exactly coincides with our opinion ; and yet men
undertake to demonstrate his existence. Can it be that
such men have lost their senses, and suppose that their
fellow-men are suffering from the same calamity ? A peru
sal of Gillespie’s “Necessary Existence of God” would
tend to confirm some such theory. Thomas Cooper, although
a disciple, has written of Gillespie as being “ eccentric,” a
very mild term, we imagine, if he be in the same state of
mind as he was when he wrote his book. Iconoclast has
just published “A Plea for Atheism,” which is mostly de
voted to an examination and complete refutation of Gilles
pie’s propositions. We need not, therefore, refer to them
at any great length. The propositions consist of wellselected jargon. The wTord Infinity is so much used that
one would think Mr. Gillespie knew all about its significa
tion, and yet there is no word upon which so much mis
understanding exists. It expresses simply a negation. As
Sir William Hamilton says, “ Infinite directly denotes only
the negation of limits.” The same author gives instances
of the folly of talking about the infinite as though it could
be comprehended. Here is one—“ A quantity, say a foot,
has an infinity of parts. Any part of this quantity, say an
inch, has also an infinity. But one infinity is not larger
than another. Therefore an inch is equal to a foot.” We
will only add in the words of Dr. Thomas Brown, in re
ference to this a priori argument—“ It is a relic of the
mere verbal logic of the schools, as little capable of produc
ing conviction as any of the wildest and most absurd of the
scholastic reasonings on the properties, or supposed pro
�OF ATHEISM.
13
perties, of entity and non-entity.” This we verily believe,
and having not the slightest faith in its efficacy to convince
either one way or the other, we pass on to the considera
tion of an argument more calculated to arrest the attention
and to convince the mind of the inquirer.
The. so-called Design argument is considered by many
Christians—lay and clerical—to be a complete answer to all
Atheistic objections to Theistic theories. Very few of those
who have escaped from the Theistic maze have had the good
fortune to get clear without encountering in more than one
avenue that terrible antagonist—“ Design.’’ He would
point to the heavens, direct your attention to the stars and
various planets, bid you consider their wonderful arrange
ment, and the regularity of their movements, and then
demand to know if it be not true that—
The spangled heavens—their shining frame
Their Great Original proclaim ?
He would then bring you back to earth, and expatiate on.
the marvellous arrangements of terrestrial objects. The eye
and the telescope, the watch and the human frame, are
eagerly compared, preparatory to the final blow to all scep
ticism in this question.. If we cannot believe that the tele
scope and the watch, with their marks of contrivance, were
produced without an intelligent artificer, why should we for
one moment doubt that the human frame, so wonderfully
made,.had not also an intelligent Being for its maker?
Dallacious. as this argument must appear to those wh-o have
properly investigated it, there are, it must be admitted,
thousands who consider it conclusive evidence of Deity’s
existence. Paley is, we know, with many Theists, consi
dered out of date, but with a vast majority of orthodox
Christians his arguments are still considered to be unmis
takably convincing. Thomas Cooper repudiates the idea of
Paley not being conclusive and convincing; and although a
long list of eminent names may be quoted against Paley’s
entire reasoning, Mr. Cooper, in unison with the general
orthodox Christians, maintain that Paley has never vet been
answered. “ Paley Refuted in his Own Words,” by Mr. G.
J. Holyoake, is haughtily pooh-poohed by the peevish
“ Lecturer on Christianity.” To our minds, however, no
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thing could be more conclusive than Mr. Holyoake’s little
volume. Paley concludes his chapter “ Of the Personality
of the Deity ” in these words :—“ Upon the whole, after all
the schemes and struggles of a reluctant philosophy, the
necessary resort is to a Deity. The marks of Design are too
strong to be gotten over. Design must have had a designer.
That designer must have been a person. That person is God.”
Now it should be borne in mind why Paley uses the word
“ must.” Design must have had a designer. That designer
must be a person. That person must be God. Why, we
ask, must design prove a designer ? Why must a designer
be a person ? Paley answers, because experience tells us so.
Granted, say we. But then we also add, that experience
also tells us that every “ person ” is an organised being.
And if Deity be the designer of Nature, and if that designer
be a person, then Deity must be an organised being; and as
every organised being, according to Paley, bears marks of
contrivance, Deity himself was' designed. The designer of
him must also have been designed; and go back as far as we
may, we should never reach the “ First Cause ” of the Chris
tian. Mr. Cooper and others say that a person need not
imply an organised being, but an immaterial principle, an
“ unorganised Divine Being.” In reply, we ask on what
authority is such a statement made ? It is certainly not
made on Paley’s authority—experience. Our experience
has never proved any unorganised person ; and Paley’s en
tire argument is based on experience, and whatever that fails >
to prove weakens in the same ratio Paley’s position. Mr.
Holyoake’s words are these:—“We ask why does design
imply a designer ? Paley answers, experience tells us so.
Why does a designer imply a person ? Paley answers, ex
perience tells us so. Why does a person imply organisation ?
Nature gives the same answer, experience tells us so. The
Natural Theologian asserts that the Designer of Nature
must be a person, because, as he observes, we never knew
design proceed except from a person. To which it may be
added, that we never knew a person unassociated with or
ganisation.” If Mr. Thomas Cooper, or any one else, can
refute these statements from Paley’s position of experience,
we will willingly listen to the refutation. Until that is
�OF ATHEISM.
15
done, however, we shall insist that Paley has been refuted
in his own words. But there is another fallacy in connec
tion with this so-called Design argument—a fallacy that has
often been exposed, and one that must be obvious at the
very threshold of thought. Assuming, for a moment, that
man, like a watch, was designed by some person, then the
analogy is by no means complete. The watchmaker is not
a creator of the material out of which the watch is made :
he simply puts into certain order material placed before him.
To make the analogy complete, a watchmaker should be
placed in an empty room with no material allowed him, and
told to produce forthwith a fine gold chronometer, just to
“ oblige Benson.” The Being believed in by Paley had no
thing out of which to make the world. He first had to
create something out of nothing, and then produce every
thing out of this something, of which no one knows any
thing.
Enough, then, of this so-called Design argument. A more
important question is, “ Is there Design in the universe ?”
We are disposed to reply in the negative. Of course in
stances may be cited where there is w’hat appears to us to
be perfect and harmonious arrangements of means to ends.
Man’s eve is adapted for sight, his hands and arms for
various necessary uses, his legs and feet for locomotion.
The air and food are found to be necessary to life. The
rain descends to nourish the earth, and the sun shinfe? to
produce vegetation, and to cheer the heart of man. All
this, and much more, is quite true. But because we find
such admirable adaptation in Nature, are we bound to con
clude that it has been all designed by some external cause ?
May there not be in Nature an inherent adaptative power,
and each mode of its manifestation have its essential cha
racteristic ? Natural occurrences seem to corroborate such
a supposition. Certain modes of life continue only so long
as the conditions continue necessary to their existence.
And they exist, not because they were designed to exist,
but because they cannot help existing. And when any in
terference of the necessary conditions takes place, by the
action of some natural law, life becomes extinct, one species
dies out, and another species takes its place. Humboldt,
�16
THE LOGIC AND PHILOSOPHY
with his giant-intellect, observed what we believe to be
perfectly true, that were man not a designer we should
never hear anything of design. Or as Kant says, “ It is
reflecting reason which brought design into the world, and
which admires a wonder created by itself.” When we see
any given organ suited for the purpose to which it is
assigned, we, or rather some persons, at once say, “ There’s
design ! without such a provision such and such an animal
could not live.” This general exclamation simply amounts
to this. If a bird had not wings he could not fly, any more
than a man could w’alk without legs. But, as Dr. Louis
Buchner says, “ The stag was not endowed with long legs to
enable him to run fast, but he runs fast because his legs are
long. He might have become a very courageous animal
instead of a timid one, had his legs been unfit for running.
The mole has short spatulated feet for digging; had they
been different it would have never occurred to him to dig.
Things are just as they are, and we should not have
found them less full of design, had they been different.”*
In the serpent tribe feet are partly developed, although
perfectly useless. Was this designed ? Rudimentary organs
which answer no purpose appear in various species of animals.
Are they specially designed? Or, shall we not rather look
upon them as forming links in the development of one
species to another. The author just quoted further ob
serves in his chapter on “ Design in Nature ”—“ Is it by
design that a foetus should fix itself and become developed
in any other but its natural place, the uterus?—a case
which frequently occurs, and conduces to the death of the
mother. Or even that in such extra-uterine pregnancies,
after the lapse of the normal time, pains are felt in the
uterus, though nothing is to be expelled? There is a healing
power of nature in its usual sense, as little as there is a
vital power. The organism proceeding in certain definite
directions frequently adjusts morbid disturbances. At other
times the contrary occurs. The existence of certain specifics
against certain diseases, is frequently quoted as a striking
argument in favour of design in nature. But there are no
* Force and Matter.
Page 91.
�OF ATHEISM.
17
remedies which heal definite diseases with certainty and
under all circumstances, and can be looked upon as intended
to heal them. All rational physicians deny the existence of
specific remedies in the above sense, and are of opinion that
the effects of medicines are not the result of a specific neu
tralisation of the disease, but must be ascribed to very
different causes, mostly accidental. Hence we must also
abandon the theory that nature has created various plants
to act as antidotes—a theory which imputes an absurdity to
a creative power, which is to have created an evil with its
antidote, instead of omitting the creation of either. A crea
tive power acting with design could not have been guilty of
so useless an act.” “ One of the most important facts which
speaks againt the theory that nature acts with conscious
design, is the production of monstrosities. The unsophis
ticated human mind could so little reconcile these pheno
mena with the belief in a creator acting with design, that
they were formerly considered as indicative of the wrath of
the gods ; and they are, even at present, not unfrequently
looked upon as punishments from heaven. The author saw
in a veterinary cabinet, a goat fully developed in every part,
but born without a head. Can we imagine anything more
absurd than the development of an animal, the existence of
which is impossible from the beginning ?” “ The existence
of dangerous animals has ever been a thorn in the side of
theologians, and the most comical arguments have been used
to justify their existence; with what little success, is proved
by the assumption of those religious systems which consider
sin as the cause of that abnormity. According to Meyer
and Stilling, dangerous reptiles and insects are the conse
quence of the curse pronounced on the earth and its inha
bitants. Their frequently monstrous form, etc., is made to
represent sin and destruction! The old German heathens
looked upon these animals as evil spirits, from which all
diseases originated. These whimsical explanatory attempts
prove how little was effected in showing the usefulness or
the design in tfeese troublesome and disgusting creatures.
We know, on the other hand, that very innocent, or even
useful, animals have become extinct, without nature taking
any means to preserve their existence. Such, within his-
�18
THE LOGIC AND PHILOSOPHY
torical times, was the case with the Irish elk, the rytina
stelleri, the dodo, etc. There are other useful animals which
are constantly diminishing, threatening to become extinct;
whilst very many injurious animals, as field mice, are so
fruitful, that their extinction cannot be thought of. Locusts
and migratory pigeons form swarms which darken the hori
zon, and bring destruction, famine, and death over the spots
they alight upon. ‘ Whoever,’ says Giebel, ‘ expects to find
in nature nothing but wisdom, conformity, and design, let
him exercise his acumen in the study of the natural history
of the tape-worm. The main object of its life consists in
the production of eggs, the development of which can only
be effected by the sufferings of other creatures. Millions
of such eggs perish; some few are developed and trans
formed into a sucking and productive scolex, the progeny
of which again produce eggs which putrify in the excre
ments.
In this process there is, according to human
conception, neither beauty, wisdom, nor design.’ ” “ If
green woodpeckers,” says Darwin, “alone had existed,
and we did not know that there were black and pied
kinds, I dare say that we should have thought that the
green colour was a beautiful adaptation to hide this tree
frequenting bird from its enemies.” The author of the
“ Trial of Theism ” puts the fallacy of this design argument
in a very comic yet forcible manner. “ The Natural Theo
logian praises the divine contrivance which has given man
two eyes. They would have been equally rapturous had he
had four, so that he could have looked east, west, north,
and south at the same time; and successive Paleys would
have celebrated the providential arrangement which enabled
policemen and sentinels to conduct four-fold observations
without turning their heads. Again, if man, like Poly
phemus, had but one eye given him, Dr. Paley would have
proved it impossible that he could ever have seen at all
with two; or if he had, that he would see double. . . .
Had man only one arm no Natural Theologian would have
missed the other ; had he three they would find reason to
praise the Trinitarian arrangement, and no doubt declare it
to be a mystic symbol for the confutation of Unitarians.”
This nassage, although funny, is not devoid of serious truth.
�OF ATHEISM.
19
And we can only now add that whoever relies on the socalled design argument to prove the existence of the Chris
tian’s Deity, relies indeed upon a broken reed.
We come now to the really practical part of the logic and
philosophy of Atheism. To prove that some kind of Deity
exists would not satisfy the Christian. His attributes must
be demonstrated. He must be shown not only to be power
ful, but to be also wise and good ; not only to be our
Creator but also our loving Father. It must be shown that
he not only desired to see us live, but that he also wished us
to live happily. And the happiness enjoyed by one must
be equally attainable by all, for the Christian’s God is no
respector of persons. In combatting such theories the
Atheist really proves himself to be a friend to the human
race. He sees the many organised systems of superstition
that have grown out of a belief in Deity. He knows how
these systems tend to enslave the mind and to tax the mate
rial resources of the great mass of mankind. He knows
how much happier the world in general would be if the
chain of superstition could once be snapped, and if
men could be taught to know the truth, to obey the
truth, and to be guided by the truth. He knows it
to be impossible for the Christian’s Deity to exist, with
all his reputed attributes, simultaneously with such an illgoverned world as that in which we live. And he looks
upon Christian teachers, who are constantly preaching the
contrary doctrine, as the great enemies of human improve
ment. This belief is a sufficient justification for Atheistic
propagandism, and a sufficient answer to those who say
that we are mere hair-splitting negationists, or noisy logic
choppers. If Theism were simply a speculative question,
to be discussed at our leisure or avoided at our pleasure,
having no practical influence over human society, producing
no hatred in families and impeding no progress in states,
then we should care as little about discussing the possibi
lity of Deity’s existence as we should to debate whether or
not the moon is made of green cheese. But when thousands
are every day told that they have a heavenly Father, who
watches over them, and who will see justice done to them,
and when we know how heavily they are taxed and how much
�20
THE LOGIC AND PHILOSOPHY
they are compelled to pay for such a monstrous delusion,
we consider ourselves justified at any risk in exposing such
a disastrous imposition. Paley saw the inequalities of the
arrangements of society, and endeavoured to explain them
away. Speaking to the poor he says, « How much is acti
vity better than attendance ; beauty than dress; appetite,
digestion, and tranquil bowels, than all the studies of
cookery, or than the most costly compilation of forced, or
far-fetched dainties.” And in the same chapter he says,
“ It is a happy world after all. The air, the earth, the water,
teem with delighted existence. In a spring noon or summer
evening, on whichever side I turn my eyes, myriads of happy
beings crowd upon my view. ‘ The insect youth are on the
wing.’ Swarms of new-born flies are trying their pinions
in the air. Their sportive motions, their wanton mazes,
their gratuitous activity, their continual change of place,
without use or purpose, testify their joy and the exultation
which they feel in their lately discovered faculties. A bee
amongst the flowers in spring, is one of the most cheerful
objects that can be looked upon.” These extracts are in
tended by Paley to show the goodness of Deity, as well as
his personality. But is it not the veriest special pleading ?
Who doubts that many of the rich become deteriorated for
want of activity ? Who doubts that beauty is better than
dress ? Who doubts that a good appetite is better than
forced niceties ? But who does not also know that thou
sands die from overwork ? Who does not know that there
are thousands with neither beauty nor proper dress ? Who
doe8 not know that there are thousands who have good
appetites, but nothing to satisfy them ? And who will not
admit the immense difficulty of believing in the existence of
an all-powerful, all-good, and perfectly just Being while
such injustice is allowed to continue, and such misery
allowed to exist? Does not the human heart untainted
with superstition revolt against such misgovernment; and
would it not be better to adopt every possible means for its
removal, rather than deceive its victims with promises of an
upper and a better world ?
However impregnable the logical position of the Atheist
may be, there will always exist numbers of persons without
�OF ATHEISM.
21
the courage to look fearlessly at his principles, or to regard
him in any other than a prejudicial light. He will, by
many whose judgments have been warped by priestly teach
ings, be considered either deficient in intellect or depraved
in heart. It is a curious fact in connection with human
nature, that many men who have no regard for morality;
who care little for the welfare of those by whom they are
surrounded; whose duties as parents, neighbours, and
citizens are seldom if ever properly fulfilled—such men, we
say, are pretty firm believers in Deity, and will listen to no
argument from the Atheist, lest he should rob him of his
God. So terrible is the effect of superstitious teaching
when young, that many men remain children all their lives.
We never attempt to take God out of the world, for the
best of all reasons—we have never been able to find him in
the world. Could we be convinced that a God exists, who
may properly be considered the loving and wise parent of
the human family; a Being on whom we could all rely for
help in the time of need, for solace in the hour of sorrow,
and for assistance when in danger and distress, we should
gladly recognise such existence, and be thankful for such
a blessing. But all our knowledge seems to confirm our
belief that, however much we may lament it, the world has
no such superintending Being as the Deity believed in by
Christians^ Science proclaims, with imperial authority,
that we are under the dominion of general laws—laws of
nature. “ That whether there be a Deity independent of
Nature, or whether Nature be God, it is still the God of
the iron foot, that passes on without heeding, without feel
ing, and without resting; that Nature acts with a fearful
uniformity, stern as fate, absolute as tyranny, merciless as
death; too vast to praise, too inexplicable to worship, too
inexorable to propitiate; it has no ear for prayer, no heart
for sympathy, no arm to save. We reap from it neither
special help nor special knowledge ; it protects itself from
our curiosity by giving us only finite powers; its silence
is profound, and when we ask its secret, it points to death.
Yet if we are wise to learn from this great mystery before
which creeds are shattered and dogmas are cancelled, it is
a magnificent monitor. Men fable to us the future with
�22
THE LOGIC AND PHILOSOPHY
fearful presumption; they dazzle us with a world they have
never visited, amaze us with images they have never seen,
alarm us by the ideal and cheat us of the real ; and betray
us, by a false dependence, to our own destruction.” In the
logic and philosophy of Atheism there is no superstition,
no supernatural religion. With us the proper study of
mankind is man, and whatever tends to develop his mental
and moral nature, and increase his comfort and happiness,
comes within the scope of Atheistic philosophy. Every
day facts compel us to reject the Christian teaching con
cerning Deity. With such a faith we could not believe
that thousands would be allowed to awake every morning
not knowing where or how to obtain food during the day,
and when night approaches have to make the bare earth
their resting place, and the canopy their only covering. If
such a Being did exist, we should never witness, as we now
do, the daily agony of some fellow-creatures, shivering with
cold and faint with hunger, lying in some corner of a street
whose inhabitants are securely housed, with wealth at their
command, and ease and plenty for their daily attendants. If
such a Being did exist, that which man laments his inability
to remove, God would surely prevent occurring. We agree
with Bacon that “ it were better to have no opinion of God
at all, than such an opinion as is unworthy him.” And
surely we must form an unworthy opinion of him if we
suppose he allows so much misery to exist when he has the
power to prevent it. Every week our newspapers contain
accounts of starvation and of disease engendered by the
want of the necessaries of life. And the clergy—the special
servants of God—instead of demanding improved dwellings
and proper means of sustenance for those unfortunate vic
tims, solicit money to repair one church, and to build
another. The only consolation they offer to the starving
victims of Christian misrule, is the blood of the Lamb, when
a pound of meat would be far more acceptable. Man’s
“ future life ” is considered, or rather taught by priests to
be all-important, and churches and chapels are deemed
necessary to the realisation of heavenly bliss. Hence the
present misery, disease, and starvation are nothing com
pared with the calamities that would ensue if the spiritual
�OF ATHEISM.
23
wants of the poor were neglected. Theistic philosophy is
that we are simply in this life journeying to our everlast
ing home, and that, therefore, our first consideration should
be to make and to keep our peace with God, no matter
how miserable we are with man. Atheistic philosophy, on
the contrary, is, that our first concern should be to ascertain
what we are and what are our duties, the performance of
which would secure to all, or at least to the majority, health,
wealth, happiness, and peace.
One word as to the usual and oft-repeated statement that
the Atheist’s faith is a cold and barren one, and that the
Atheist cannot be a truly happy man. We reply that a
greater mistake could not be entertained. We are surely
as happy as any Christian can be. If we have not the
consolation spoken of by Christians, arising from the pros
pect or anticipation of heavenly bliss, neither have we the
misgivings, doubts, or fears as to the misery of hell. The
magnificence of the universe; the comparative regularity of
her operations; the grandeur of her seasons; the beauty
of her products, all afford equal joy to the Atheist as to the
Christian. To him—
“ Not the lightest leaf but trembling teems
With golden visions and romantic dreams.”
And as in life, so in death. The Atheist, though not
fearing death, certainly loves life.
He loves to see the
lives prolonged of his relatives and his friends. He laments
the loss—when it comes—of those who have shared his
happiness, and participated in his sorrows. He would
even be glad to see reasons to cherish a hope that they
would all meet again in another and a better world, where
they may enjoy an eternity of bliss denied them on this
earth. And when life’s duty is accomplished; when Nature
warns him of approaching decay; when friendship, love,
and life are about to forsake him, he can fearlessly look
back on a life the secrets of which he could never fathom,
but the recognised duties of which he had endeavoured to
fulfil.
And lastly, as the chilling messenger from the
tomb approaches, with Death’s imperial summons, he can
meet the inexorable envoy without fear, without sadness,
and without despair.
�BY THE SAME AUTHOR:
The Origin of Man, 2d. The Christian Theory of the En,d of the
World Refuted, 2d. The Christian Doctrine of Man’s Depravity
Refuted, 2d. The Devil: who he is, and where he came from, 2d.
Who were the Writers of the New Testament ? 2d. Was Christ the
Best of Men and the Wisest of Teachers ? 2d.
London : Austin & Co., 17, Johnson’s Court, Fleet Street.
WORKS BY ICONOCLAST.
A Plea for Atheism, price 3d., containing a reply to William Gillespie’s
argument for the Necessary Existence of Deity. Why do Men
Starve ? Id. The Atonement, Id.
Polemical Essays, price Is. This volume contains the following
essays:—The Real Representation of the People. Poverty: its Effect
on the Political Condition of the People. Prohibition of Free
Speech. Jesus, Shelley, and Malthus. Who was Jesus Christ?
What did Jesus Teach ? Is there a God ? A Few Words about the
Devil.
Debate on the Existence of Deity with Thomas Cooper, with a Plea for
Atheism, Is. Debate with the Rev. Dr. Baylee, on God; Man, and
the Bible : the only debate on the Socratic method of reasoning ; 6d.
Christianity and Secularism Contrasted : two nights’ debate with W.
M. Hutchings, Esq., at Wigan; Is. New Testament Christianity:
three nights’ debate with the Rev. J. H. Rutherford; 6d. Two
nights’ discussion with Mr. Mackie (Editor of the Warrington
Guardian); revised by the Disputants; 8d. Prohibition of Free
Speech, a Letter to the Judges of the Court of Common Pleas; with
a report of the proceedings in Bradlaueh v. Edwards; 2d.
London : Austin & Co., 17, Johnson’s Court, Fleet Street.
Now complete, Cloth, 2s. 6d. (also to be had in Penny Numbers),
HALF-HOURS WITH FREETHINKERS.
Edited by J. Watts and Iconoclast.
Austin <S Co., 17, Johnson’s Court, Fleet Street, E.C.
Professor Pusey and his party are requested to reply to the arguments
advanced in
THE DOCTRINE OF ETERNAL TORMENT REFUTED.
By Melampus (Dr. Sexton).
This pamphlet, which exhausts the entire question, from a Biblical
point of view, may be had (price 3d.) of G. Abington, 107, Shoe Lane,
and of Austin & Co., 17, Johnson’s Court, Fleet Street. Austin & Co.
will send three copies post free on the receipt of nine stamps.
THE ANTIQUITY OF THE HUMAN RACE.
By George Sexton, M.A., M.D. Price 2d.
London : Austin & Co., 17, Johnson’s Court, Fleet Street.
TRACTS BY WILLIAM MACCALL.
Individuality of the Individual, 6d. Doctrine of Individuality, 6d.
Sacramental Services, 6d. Lessons of the Pestilence, 6d. Creed
of a Man, 4d. Commercial Restrictions, 3d.
Trubner & Co., Paternoster Row.
Outlines of Individualism. Price 6d.—Jenkins, 286, Strand.
Charles Napier, 2d. Song of Songs, 2d.—Truelove, 240, Strand.
�
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The logic and philosophy of atheism
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Watts, John [1834-1866]
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Place of publication: London
Collation: 23, [1] p. ; 20 cm.
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1865
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Atheism
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Atheism
Logic
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Philosophy