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AN ANSWER
TO THE
ARGUMENTS OF HUME, LECKY,
AND OTHERS,
AGAINST MIRACLES,
BY
ALFRED R. WALLACE,
Author of “ TJie Malay Archipelago" and “ Contributions to the
Theory of Natural Selection."
PRINTED FOR PRIVATE CIRCULATION, BY JAMES BEVERIDGE,
FULL WOOD’S RENTS, HIGH HOLBOBN.
1871.
��AN ANSWER
TO THE
ARGUMENTS OF HUME, LECKY, AND OTHERS,
AGAINST MIRACLES
It is now generally admitted, that those opinions and
beliefs in which men have been educated generation
after generation, and which have thus come to form
part of their mental nature, are especially liable to be
erroneous, because they keep alive and perpetuate the
ideas and prejudices of a bygone and less enlightened
age. It is therefore in the interest of truth, that every
doctrine or belief, however well established or sacred
they may appear to be, should at certain intervals be
challenged, to arm themselves with such facts and
reasonings as they possess, to meet their opponents in
the open field of controversy, and do battle for their
right to live. Nor can any exemption be claimed in
favour of those beliefs which are the product of modern
civilisation, and which have, for several generations,
been held unquestioned by the great mass of the edu
cated community ; for the prejudice in their favour will
be proportionately great, and, as was the case with the
doctrines of Aristotle and the dogmas of the schoolman,
they may live on by mere weight of authority and force
of habit, long after they have been shown to be opposed
alike to fact and to reason. There have been times when
popular beliefs were defended by the terrors of the law,
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and when the sceptic could only attack them at the
peril of his life. Now we all admit that truth can take
care of itself, and that only error needs protection. But
there is another mode of defence which equally implies
a claim to certain and absolute truth, and which is
therefore equally unworthy and unphilosophical—that
of ridicule, misrepresentation, or a contemptuous
refusal to discuss the question at all. This method is
used among us even now; for there is one belief, or
rather disbelief, whose advocates claim more than papal
infallibility, by refusing to examine the evidence brought
against it, and by alleging general arguments which
have been in use for two centuries to prove that it
cannot be erroneous. The belief to which I allude is,
that all alleged miracles are false,—that what is com
monly understood by the term supernatural does not
exist, or if it does is incapable of proof by any amount
of human testimony,—that all the phenomena we can
have cognisance of depend on ascertainable physical
laws, and that no other intelligent beings than man
and the inferior animals can or do act upon our material
world. These views have been now held almost un
questioned for many generations; they are inculcated
as an essential part of a liberal education ; they are
popular, and are held to be one of the indications of
our intellectual advancement; and they have become so
much a part of our mental nature that all facts and
arguments brought against them are either ignored as
unworthy of serious consideration, or listened to with
undisguised contempt. Now this frame of mind is
certainly not one favourable to the discovery of truth,
and strikingly resembles that by which, in former ages,
systems of error have been fostered and maintained.
The time has, therefore, come when it must be called
upon to justify itself.
This is the more necessary because the doctrine,
whether true or false, actually rests upon a most unsafe
and rotten foundation. I propose to show that the
best arguments hitherto relied upon to prove it are, one
and all, fallacious, and prove nothing of the kind. But
a theory or belief may be supported by very bad argu
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ments, and yet be true ; while it may be supported by
some good arguments, and yet • be false. But there
never was a true theory which had no good arguments
to support it. If therefore all the arguments hitherto
used against miracles in general can be shown to be
bad, it will behove sceptics to discover good ones ; and
if they cannot do so, the evidence in favour of miracles
must be fairly met and judged on its own merits, not
ruled out of court as it is now.
It will be perceived, therefore, that my present pur
pose is to clear the ground for the discussion of the
great question of the so-called supernatural. I shall
not attempt to bring arguments either for or against the
main proposition, but shall confine myself to an examina
tion of the allegations and the reasonings which have been
supposed to settle the whole question on general grounds.
One of the most remarkable works of the great
Scotch philosopher, David Hume is, An Inquiry con
cerning Human Understanding, and the tenth chapter
of this work is On Miracles, in which occur the argu
ments which are so often quoted to show that no evi
dence can prove a miracle. Hume himself had a very
high opinion of this part of his work, for he says at the
beginning of the chapter, “ I flatter myself that I have
discovered an argument which, if just, will with the
wise and learned be an everlasting check to all kinds of
superstitious delusion, and consequently will be useful
as long as the world endures; for so long, I presume,
will the accounts of miracles and prodigies be found in
all history, sacred and profane.”
DEFINITION OF THE TEEM “ MIRACLE.”
After a few general observations on the nature of
evidence and the value of human testimony in different
cases, he proceeds to define what he means by a miracle.
And here at the very beginning of the subject we find
that we have to take objection to Hume’s definition of a
miracle, which exhibits unfounded assumptions and
false premises. He gives two definitions in different
parts of his essay. The first is, “ A miracle is a viola
tion of the laws of nature.” The second is, “ A miracle
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is a transgression of a law of nature by a particular
volition of the Deity, or by the interposition of some
invisible agent.” Now both these definitions are bad
or imperfect. The first assumes, that we know all the
laws of nature, that the particular effect could not be
produced by some unknown law of nature overcoming
the law we do know ; it assumes, also, that if any in
visible intelligent being held an apple suspended in the
air, that act would violate the law of gravity. The
second is not precise; it should be “ some invisible
intelligent agent,” otherwise the action of galvanism or
electricity, when these agents were first discovered, and
before they were ascertained to form part of the order
of nature, would answer accurately to this definition of
a miracle. The words. “ violation ” and “ transgression ”
are both improperly used, and really beg the question
by the definition. How does Hume know that any
particular miracle is a violation of a law of nature ?
He assumes this without a shadow of proof, and on
these words, as we shall see, rests his whole argument.
Before proceeding further, it is necessary for us to
consider what is the true definition of a miracle, or
what is most commonly meant by that word. A miracle,
as distinguished from a new and unheard of natural
phenomenon, supposes an intelligent superhuman agent
either visible or invisible. It is not necessary that what
is done should be beyond the power of man to do : the
simplest action, if performed independently of human
or visible agency, such as a teacup lifted in the air at
request, as by an invisible hand and without assignable
cause, would be universally admitted to be a miracle;
as much so as the lifting of a house into the air, the
instantaneous healing of a wound, or the instantaneous
production of an elaborate drawing. My definition of
a miracle therefore is as follows :—“ Any act or event
implying the existence and agency of superhuman in
telligences,” considering the human soul or spirit, if
manifested out of the body, as one of these superhuman
intelligencies. This definition is more complete than
that of Hume, and defines more accurately the essence
of that which is commonly termed a miracle.
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THE EVIDENCE OF THE REALITY OF MIRACLES.
We now have to consider Hume’s arguments.
first is as follows :—
The
“ A miracle is a violation of the Ians of nature; and as a
firm and unalterable experience has established these laws,
the proof against a miracle, from the very nature, of the fact,
is as entire as any argument from experience can possibly be
imagined. Why is it more than probable that all men must die;
that lead cannot of itself remain suspended in the air; that
fire consumes wood, and is extinguished by water ; unless it
be, that these events are found agreeable to the laws of nature,
and there is required a violation of these Ians, or, in other
words a miracle, to prevent them ? Nothing is esteemed a
miracle, if it ever happened in the common course of nature.
It is no miracle that a man seemingly in good health should
die on a sudden ; because such a kind of death, though more
unusual than any other, has yet been frequently observed to
happen. But it is a miracle that a dead man should come to
life ; because that has never been observed in any age or coun
try. There must, therefore, be an uniform experience against
every miraculous event, otherwise the event would not merit
that appellation. And as an uniform experience amounts to a
proof, there is here a direct and full proof, from the nature of
the fact, against the existence of any miracle ; nor can such a
proof be destroyed, or the miracle rendered credible, but by
an opposite proof, which is superior.”
This argument is radically fallacious, because if it
were sound, no perfectly new fact could ever be proved,
since the first and each succeeding witness would be
assumed to have universal experience against him.
Such a simple fact as the existence of flying fish could
never be proved, if Hume’s argument is a good one;
for the first man who saw and described one, would
have the universal experience against him that fish do
not fly, or make any approach to flying, and his evi
dence being rejected, the same argument would apply to
the second, and to every subsequent witness, and thus
no man at the present day who has not seen a flying
fish ought to believe that such things exist.
Again, painless operations in a state produced by
mere passes of the hand, were, twenty-five years ago,
maintained to be contrary to the laws of nature, con
trary to all human experience, and therefore incredible.
On Hume’s principles they were miracles, and no
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amount of testimony could ever prove them to be real.
But miracles do not stand alone, single facts opposed to
uniform experience. Reputed miracles abound in all
periods of history; every one has a host of others
leading up to it; and every one has strictly analogous
facts testified to at the present day. The uniform op
posing experience, therefore, on which Hume lays so
much stress does not exist. What, for instance, can
be a more striking miracle than the levitation 01
raising of the human body into' the air without visible
cause, yet this fact has been testified to during a long
series of centuries.
A few well known examples are those of St. Francis
d’Assisi, who was often seen by many persons to rise
in the air, and the fact is testified to by his secretary,
who could only reach his feet. Saint Theresa, a nun in
a convent in Spain, was often raised into the air in the
sight of all the sisterhood. Lord Orrery and Mr.
Valentine Greatorex both informed Dr. Henry More
and Mr. Glanvil, that at Lord Conway’s house at
Ragley in Ireland, a gentleman’s butler, in their pre
sence and in broad daylight, rose into the air and floated
about the room above their heads. This is related by
Glanvil in his Sadducismus Triumphatus. A similai
fact is narrated by eyewitnesses of Ignatius de Loyola :
and Mr. Madden, in his life of Savonarola, after narrat
ing a similar circumstance of that saint, remarks, that
similar phenomena are related in numerous instances,
and that the evidence upon which some of the narra
tives rest, is as reliable as any human testimony can be.
Butler, in his Lives of the Saints, says that many such
facts are related by persons of undoubted veracity, who
testify that they themselves were eyewitnesses of them.
So, we all know that at least fifty persons of high
character may be found in London, who will testify
that they have seen the same thing happen to Mr.
Home. I do not adduce this testimony as proving that
the circumstances related really took place; I merely
bring it forward now to show how utterly unfounded is
Hume’s argument, which rests upon universal testi
mony on the one side, and no testimony on the other.
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THE CONTBADICTOBY NATUBE OF HUME’S ESSAY.
I now have to show that in Hume’s efforts to prove
his point, he contradicts himself in a manner so gross
and complete, as is perhaps not to be found in the
works of any other eminent author. The first passage
I will quote is as follows :—
“ For, first, there is not to be found, in all history, any mira
cle attested by a sufficient number of men, of such unques
tioned good sense, education, and learning, as to secure us
against all delusion in themselves ; of such undoubted integrity,
as to place them beyond all suspicion of any design to deceive
others ; of such credit and reputation in the eyes of mankind,
as to have a great deal to lose in case of their being detected
in any falsehood ; and at the same time attesting facts per
formed in such a public manner, and in so celebrated apa/rt of
the world, as to render the detection unavoidable : all which
circumstances are requisite to give us a full assurance in the
testimony of men.”
A few pages further on, we find this passage :—
“ There surely never was a greater number of miracles as
cribed to one person, than those which were lately said to
have been wrought in France upon the tomb of Abbe Paris,
the famous Jansenist, with whose sanctity the people were so
long deluded. The curing of the sick, giving hearing to the
deaf, and sight to the blind, were everywhere talked of as the
usual effects of that holy sepulchre. But what is more extra
ordinary, many of the miracles were immediately proved upon
the spot, before judges of unquestioned integrity, attested by
witnesses of credit and distinction, in a learned age, and on
the most eminent theatre that is non in the norld. Nor is this
all. A relation of them was published and dispersed every
where ; nor were the Jesuits, though a learned body, supported
by the civil magistrate, and determined enemies to those
opinions, in whose favour the miracles were said to have been
wrought, ever able distinctly to refute or detect them. Where
shall we find such a number of circumstances, agreeing to the
corroboration of one fact ? And what have we to oppose to
such a cloud of witnesses, but the absolute impossibility, or
miraculous nature of the events which they relate ? And this,
surely, in the eyes of all reasonable people, will alone be re
garded as a sufficient refutation.”
In the second passage he affirms the existence of
every single fact and quality which in the first passage
he declared never existed, and he entirely changes his
ground of argument by appealing to the inherent impos
�10
sibility of the fact, andnot at all to the insufficiency of the
evidence. He even makes this contradiction still more
remarkable by a note which he has himself given to
this passage, a portion of which is as follows : —
“ This book was writ by Mons. Montgeron, councillor or
judge of the parliament of Paris, a man of figure and charac-i
ter, who was also a martyr to the cause, and is now said to be
somewhere in a dungeon on account of his book. . . .
“Many of the miracles of Abbe Paris were proved immedi
ately by witnesses before the officiality or bishop’s court at
Paris, under the eye of Cardinal Ncailles ; whose character for
integrity and capacity was never contested, even by his ene
mies.
“ His successor in the archbishopric was an enemy to the Jan
senists, and for that reason promoted to the see by the court.
Yet twenty-two rectors or cures of Paris, with infinite earnest
ness, press him to examine those miracles, which they assert to
be known to the whole world, and indisputably certain; but
he wisely forbore. . . .
“ All who have been in France about that time have heard of
the reputation of Mons. Herault, the lieutenant of Police,
whose vigilance, penetration, activity, and extensive intelli-l
gence, have been much talked of. This magistrate who, by
the nature of his office, is almost absolute, was invested with
full powers, on purpose to suppress or discredit these miracles;
and he frequently seized immediately, and examined the wit
nesses and subjects to them : but never could reach anything
satisfactory against them.
“ In the case of Mademoiselle Thibaut he sent the famous De
Sylva to examine her ; whose evidence is very curious. The
physician declares, that it was impossible that she could have
been so ill as was proved by witnesses ; because it was impos
sible she could in so short a time have recovered so perfectly
as he found her. He reasoned like a man of sense, from
natural causes; but the opposite party told him, that the whole
was a miracle, and that his evidence was the very best proof
of it. , . .
“ No less a man than the Due de Chatillon, a duke and peer
of France, of the highest rank and family, gives evidence of a
miraculous cure performed upon a servant of his, who had
lived several years in his house with a visible and palpable in
firmity.
“ I shall conclude with observing, that no clergy are more
celebrated for strictness of life and manners than the regular
clergy of France, particularly the rectors or cuiAs of Paris, who
bear testimony to these impostures.
“ The learning, genius, and probity of the gentlemen, and
the austerity of the nuns of Port-Royal, have been much cele
brated all over Europe. Yet they all give evidence for a
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miracle, wrought on the niece of the famous Pascal, whose
sanctity of life, as well as extraordinary capacity, is well
known. The famous Racine gives an account of this miracle
in his famous history of Port-Royal, and fortifies it with all
the proofs, which a multitude of nuns, priests, physicians, and
men of the world, all of them of undoubted credit, could be
stow upon it. Several men of letters, particularly the Bishop
of Tournay, thought this miracle so certain, as to employ it in
the refutation of Atheists and Freethinkers. The queen-regent
of France, who was extremely prejudiced, against the PortRoyal, sent her own physician to examine the miracle, who
returned an absolute convert. In short the supernatural cure
was so incontestible, that it saved, for a time, that famous
monastery from the ruin with which it was threatened by the
Jesuits. Had it been a cheat, it had certainly been detected
by such sagacious and powerful antagonists, and must have
hastened the ruin of the contrivers."
It seems almost incredible that this can have been
written by the great sceptic David Hume, and written
in the same work in which he has already affirmed that
in all history no such evidence is to be found. In order
to show how very remarkable the evidence is to which
he alludes, I think it well to give you one of the cases
in greater detail, as recorded in the original work of
Montgeron, and quoted in Mr. William Howitt’s History
of the Supernatural:—
“ Mademoiselle Coirin was afflicted, amongst other ailments,
with a cancer in the left breast, for twelve years. The breast
was destroyed by it, and came away in a mass ; the effluvia
from the cancer was horrible, and the whole blood of the
system was pronounced infected by it. Every physician pro
nounced the case utterly incurable, yet, by a visit to the tomb,
she was perfectly cured ; and, what was more astonishing, the
breast and nipple were wholly restored, with the skin pure
and fresh, and free from any trace of scar. This case was
known to the highest people in the realm. When the miracle
was denied, Mademoiselle Coirin went to Paris, was examined
by the royal physician, and made a formal deposition of her
cure before a public notary. Mademoiselle Coirin was daughter
of an officer of the royal household, and had two brothers in
attendance on the person of the king. The testimonies of the
doctors are of the most decisive kind. M. Gaulard, physician
to the king, deposed officially, that, ‘ to restore a nipple abso
lutely destroyed, and separated from the breast, was an actual
creation, because a nipple is not merely a continuity of the
vessels of the breast, but a particular body, which is of a distinct
and peculiar organisation.’ M. Souchay, surgeon to the Prince
of Conti, not only pronounced the cancer incurable, but, having
�12
examined the breast after the cure, went of himself to the public
notary, and made a formal deposition ‘ that the cure was per
fect that each breast had its nipple in its natural form and
condition, with the colours and attributes proper to those
parts.’ Such also are the testimonies of Seguier, the surgeon
of the hospital at Nanterre ; of M. Deshieres, surgeon to the
Duchess of Berry • of M. Hequet, one of the most celebrated
surgeons in France; and numbers of others, as well as of
public officers and parties of the greatest reputation, univer
sally known ; all of whose depositions are officially and fully
given by Montgeron.”
This is only one out of a great number of cases
equally marvellous, and equally well attested, and we
therefore cannot be surprised at Hume’s being obliged
to give up the argument of the insufficiency of the evi
dence for miracles and of the uniform experience against
them, the wonder being that he ever put forth an argu
ment which he was himself able to refute so completely.
We now have another argument which Hume brings
forward, but which is, if possible, still weaker than the
last. He says :—
“I may add, as a fourth reason, which diminishes the au
thority of prodigies, that there is no testimony for any, even
those which have not been expressly detected, that is not op
posed by any infinite number of witnesses ; so that not only
the miracle destroys the credit of testimony, but the testimony
destroys itself. To make this the better understood, let us
consider that, in matters of religion, whatever is different is
contrary; and that it is impossible the religions of ancient
Borne, of Turkey, and Siam, and of China, should, all of them,
be established on any solid foundation. Everymiracle, therefore,
pretended to have been wrought in any of these religions (and
all of them abound in miracles), as its direct scope is to estab
lish the particular system to which it is attributed ; so has it
the same force, though more indirectly, to overthrow every
other system. In destroying a rival system, it likewise des
troys the credit of those miracles on which that system was
established ; so that all the prodigies of different religions are
to be regarded as contrary facts ; and the evidences of these
prodigies, whether weak or strong, as opposite to each other.
According to this method of reasoning, when we believe any
miracle of Mahomet or his successors, we have for our war
rant the testimony of a few barbarous Arabians. And, on the
other hand, we are to regard the authority of Titus Livius,
Plutarch, Tacitus, and, in short, of all the authors and wit
nesses, Grecian, Chinese, and Roman Catholic, who have
related any miracle in their particular religion ; I say, we are
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to regard their testimony in the same light as if they had
mentioned that Mahometan miracle, and had in express terms
contradicted it, with the sam e certainty as they have for the
miracle they relate.”
Now this argument, if argument it can be called,
rests upon the extraordinary assumption that a miracle,
if real, can only come from God, and must therefore
support only a true religion. It assumes also that
religions cannot be true unless given by God. Mr.
Hume assumes, therefore, to know that nothing which
we term a miracle can possibly be performed by any of
the probably infinite number of intelligent beings who
may exist in the universe between ourselves and the
Deity. He confounds the evidence for the fact with the
theories to account for the fact, and most illogically and
unphilosophically argues, that if the theories lead to con
tradictions, the facts themselves do not exist.
I think, therefore, that I have now shown that—1.
Hume gives a false definition of miracles, which begs
the question of their possibility. 2. He states the fal
lacy that miracles are isolated facts, to which the entire
course of human testimony is opposed. 3. He delibe
rately and absolutely contradicts himself as to the
amount and quality of the testimony in favour of
miracles. 4. He propounds the palpable fallacy as to
miracles connected with opposing religions destroying
each other.
MODERN OBJECTIONS TO MIRACLES.
We will now proceed to some of the more modern
arguments against miracles. One of the most popular
modern objections consists of making a supposition and
drawing an inference, which looks like a dilemma, but
which is really none at all.
This argument has been put in several forms. One
is, “ If a man tells me he came from York by the tele
graph-wire, I do not believe him. If fifty men tell me
they came from York by telegraph wires, I do not
believe them. If any number of men tell me the same,
I do not believe them. Therefore, Mr. Home did not
float in the air, notwithstanding any amount of testimony you may bring to prove it.”
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Another is, “ If a man tells me that he saw the lion
on Northumberland-house descend into Trafalgar-square
and drink water from the fountains, I should not believe
him. If fifty men, or any number of men, informed
me of the same thing, I should still not believe them.”
Hence it is inferred that there are certain things so
absurd and so incredible, that no amount of testimony
could possibly make a sane man believe them.
Now, these illustrations look like arguments, and at
first sight it is not easy to see the proper way to answer
them ; but the fact is that they are utter fallacies, be
cause their whole force depends upon an assumed pro
position which has never been proved, and which I
challenge anyone to prove. The proposition is, that
a large number of independent, honest, sane, and sen
sible witnesses, can testify to a plain matter of fact
which never occurred at all.
Now, no evidence has ever been adduced to show,
that this ever has happened or ever could happen. But
the assumption is rendered still more monstrous when
we consider the circumstances attending such cases as
those of the cures at the tomb of the Abbe Paris, and
the cases of modern scientific men being converted to
a belief in the reality of the phenomena of modern
Spiritualism; for we must assume that, being fully
warned that the alleged facts are impossible and are
therefore delusions, and having the source of the sup
posed delusion pointed out, and all the prejudices of the
age and the whole tone of educated thought being
against the reality of such facts, yet numbers of edu
cated men, including physicians and men of science, are
convinced of the reality of the facts after the most
searching investigation. Yet the assumption that such
an amount and quality of independent converging
evidence can be all false, must be proved to be a fact if
the argument is to have the slightest value, otherwise
it is merely begging the question. It must be remem-l
bered that we have to consider, not absurd beliefs or false
inferences, but plain matters of fact; and it cannot be
proved, and never has been proved, that any large
amount of cumulative evidence of disinterested and
�15
sensible men, was ever obtained for an absolute and
entire delusion. To put the matter in a simple form,
the asserted fact is either possible, or not possible. If
possible, such evidence as we have been considering
would prove it; if not possible, such evidence could not
exist. The argument is, therefore, an absolute fallacy,
since its fundamental assumption cannot be proved. If
it is intended merely to enunciate the proposition, that
the more strange and unusual a thing is the more and
the better evidence we require for it, that we all admit;
but I maintain, that human testimony increases in value
in such an enormous ratio with each additional inde
pendent and honest witness, that no fact ought to be
rejected when attested by such a body of evidence as
exists for many of the events termed miraculous or
supernatural, and which occur now daily among us.
The burden of proof lies on those who maintain that
such evidence can possibly be fallacious ; let them point
out one case in which such cumulative evidence existed,
and which yet proved to be false; let them give not
supposition, but proof.
THE UNCEBTAINTY OF THE ASSEBTED PHENOMENA OF
MODEBN SPITITUALISM.
Another modern argument is used more especially
against the reality of the so-called Spiritual phenomena.
It is said, “ These phenomena are so uncertain, you
have no control over them, they follow no law; prove
to us that they follow definite laws like all other groups
of natural phenomena, and we will believe them.”
This argument appears to have weight with some per
sons, and yet it is really an absurdity. The essence
of the alleged phenomena (whether they be true or not,
is of no importance) is, that they seem to be the result
of the action of independent intelligences, and are
therefore deemed to be Spiritual or superhuman. If
they had been found to follow strict law and not inde
pendent will, no one would have ever supposed them to
be Spiritual. The argument, therefore, is merely the
statement of a foregone conclusion, namely, “ As long
as your facts go to prove the existence of distinct intel
�16
ligences, we will not believe > them; demonstrate that
they follow fixed law, and not.,intelligence, and then
we will believe them,” This argument appears to me
to be childish, and yet it is used by some persons who
claim to be philosophical.
THE NECESSITY OE SCIENTIFIC TESTIMONY.
Another objection which I have heard stated in publicJ
and received with applause is, that it requires immense
scientific knowledge to decide on the reality of any un
common or incredible facts, and that till scientific men
investigate and prove them they are not worthy of
credit. Now I venture to say, that a greater fallacy
than this was never put forth. The subject is a very
important one, and the error is a very common one, but
the fact is the exact opposite of what is stated ; for I
assert that, whenever the scientific men of any age have
denied the facts of investigators on a priori grounds,
they have always been wrong.
It is not necessary to do more than refer to the worldknown names of Galileo, Harvey, and Jenner; the great
discoveries they made were, as we all know, violently
opposed by their scientific contemporaries, to whom
they appeared absurd and incredible; but we have
equally striking examples much nearer to our own day.
When Benjamin Franklin brought the subject of light
ning conductors before the Boyal Society, he was
laughed at as a dreamer, and his paper was not admitted
to the Philosophical Transactions. When Young put
forth his wonderful proofs of the undulatory theory of
light, he was equally hooted at as absurd by the popular
scientific writers of the day. The Edinburgh Review
called upon the public to put Thomas Gray into a
straight jacket for maintaining the practicability of
railroads. Sir Humphry Davy laughed at the idea of
London ever being lighted with gas. When Stephenson
proposed to use locomotives on the Liverpool and Man
chester Bailway, learned men gave evidence that it was
impossible that they could go even twelve miles an
hour. Another great scientific authority declared it to
be equally impossible for ocean steamers ever to cross
�17
the Atlantic. The French Academy of Sciences ridi
culed the great astronomer Arago, when he wanted even
to discuss the subject of the electric telegraph. Medical
men ridiculed the stethoscope 'when it was first dis
covered. Painless operations during the mesmeric coma
were pronounced impossible, and therefore impostures.
But one of the most striking, because one of the most
recent cases of this opposition to, or rather disbelief in
facts opposed to the current belief of the day, among
men who are generally charged with going too far in
the other direction, is that of the doctrine of the “Anti
quity of Man.” Boue, an experienced French geologist,
in 1823, discovered a human skeleton eighty feet deep
in the loess or hardened mud of the Rhine. It was
sent to the great anatomist Cuvier, who so utterly dis
credited the fact that he threw aside this invaluable
fossil as worthless, and it was lost. Sir C. Lyell, from
personal investigation on the spot, now believes that
the statements of the original observer were quite accu
rate. So early as 1715 flint weapons were found with
the skeleton of an elephant in an excavation in Gray’sinn-lane, in the presence of Mr. Conyers, who placed
them in the British Museum, where they remained,
utterly unnoticed till quite recently. In 1800, Mfr.
Frere found flint weapons along with the remains of
extinct animals at Hoxne, in Suffolk. From 1841 to
1846, the celebrated French geologist, Boucher de
Perthes, discovered great quantities of flint weapons in
the drift gravels of the North of France, but for many
years he could convince none of his fellow scientific
men that they were works of art, or worthy of the
slightest attention. At length, however, in 1853, he
began to make converts. In 1859-60, some of our own
most eminent geologists visited the spot, and fully
affirmed the truth of his observations and deductions.
Another branch of the subject was, if possible, still
worse treated. In 1825, Mr. McEnery, of Torquay,
discovered worked flints along with the remains of
extinct amimals in the celebrated Kent’s Hole Cavern,
but his account of his discoveries was simply laughed at.
tin 1840, one of our first geologists, Mr. Godwin Austen,
�18
brought this matter before the Geological Society, and
Mr. Vivian, of Torquay, sent in a paper fully confirming
Mr. McEnery’s discoveries, but it was thought too im
probable to be pubhshed. Fourteen years later, the
Torquay Natural History Society made further observa
tions, entirely confirming the previous ones, and sent
an account of them to the Geological Society of London,
but the paper was rejected as too improbable for publi
cation. Now, however, for five years past, the cave
has been systematically explored under the superinten
dence of a Committee of the British Association, and all
the previous reports for forty years have been confirmed,
and have been shown to be even less wonderful than
the reality. It may be said that “ this was proper
scientific caution.” Perhaps it was; but at all events
it proves this important fact, that in this, as in every
other case, the observers have been right, those who
rejected their observations have been wrong.
Now, are the modern observers of some phenomena
usually termed supernatural and incredible, less worthy
of attention than these already quoted ? Let us take,
first, the reality of what is called clairvoyance. The
men who have observed this phenomenon, who have
carefully tested it through long years or through their
whole lives, will rank in scientific knowledge, and in
intellectual ability, as quite equal to any observers in
any other branch of discovery. We have no less than
seven eminent medical men, Drs. Elliotson, Gregory,
AshburneK, Lee, Herbert Mayo, Esdaile, and Haddock,
besides persons of such high ability as Miss Martineau,
Mr. H. G. Atkinson, Mr. Charles Bray, and Baron
Richenbach. With the history of previous discoverers
before us, is it more likely that these eleven educated
persons, knowing all the arguments against the facts,
and investigating them carefully, should be all wrong,
and those who say a priori that the thing is impossible
should be all right, or the contrary? If we are to
learn anything by history and experience, then we may
safely prognosticate that, in this case as in so many
others, the disbelievers in other men’s observations will
be found to be in the wrong.
�19
REVIEW OF MB. LECKY’S STATEMENTS ABOUT MIRACLES.
We now come to the modern philosophical objectors,
most eminent among whom is Mr. Lecky, author of the
History of Rationalism and the History of Morals. In
the latter work he has devoted some space to this ques
tion, and his clear and well expressed views may be
taken to represent the general opinions and feelings of
the educated portion of modern society.
He says:—
“The attitude of ordinary educated people towards miracles
is not that of doubt, of hesitation, of discontent with the
existing evidence, but rather of absolute, derisive, and even
unexamining incredulity.”
He then goes on to explain why this is so :—
“ In certain stages of society, and under the action of cer
tain influences, an accretion of miracles is invariably formed
around every prominent person or institution. We can
analyse the general causes that have impelled men towards the
miraculous; we can show that these causes have never failed
to produce the effect; and we can trace the gradual alteration
of mental conditions invariably accompanying the decline of
the belief.
“When men are destitute of the critical spirit, when the
notion of uniform law is yet unborn, and when their imagina
tions are still incapable of rising to abstract ideas, histories
of miracles are always formed and always believed ; and they
continue to flourish and to multiply until these conditions are
altered. Miracles cease when men cease to believe and ex
pect them. . . .”
Again:—
“We do not say they are impossible, or even that they are
not authenticated by as much evidence as many facts we
believe. We only say that, in certain states of society, illu
sions of this kind inevitably appear. ...”
“ Sometimes we can discover the precise natural fact which
the superstition has misread, but more frequently we can give
only a general explanation, enabling us to assign these legends
to their place, as the normal expression of a certain stage of
knowledge or intellectual power; and this explanation is their
refutation.”
Now, in these statements and arguments of Mr.
Lecky, we find some fallacies hardly less striking than
�20
those of Hume. His assertion that in certain stages of
society an accretion of miracles is invariably formed
round every prominent person or institution, appears to
me to be absolutely contradicted by certain wellknown historical facts.
The Church of Home has ever been the great theatre
of miracles, whether ancient or modern. The most
prominent person in the Church of Rome is the Pope;
the most prominent institution is the Papacy. We
should expect, therefore, if Mr. Lecky’s statement be
correct, that the Popes would be pre-eminently miracle
workers. But the fact is, that with the exception of
one or two very early ones, no miracles whatever are
recorded of the great majority of the Popes. On the
contrary, it has been generally among the very humblest
members of the Romish Church, whether clergy or
laity, that the power of working miracles has ap
peared, and which has led to their being canonized
as saints.
Again, to take another instance, the most prominent
person connected with the reformed churches is Luther.
He himself believed in .miracles. The whole world in
his day believed in miracles, and miracles, though gene
rally of a demoniac character, continued rife in all Pro
testant churches for many generations after his death ;
yet there has been no accretion of miracles round this
remarkable man.
Nearer to our own day we have Irving, at the head
of a church of miracle-workers; and J oe Smith, the
founder of the miracle-working Mormons • yet there
is. not the slightest sign of any tendency to impute any
miracles to either of these men, other than those which
the latter individual claimed for himself before his
sect was established. These very striking facts seem
to me to prove that there must be some basis of fact
in nearly every alleged miracle, and that the theory of
any growth or accretion round prominent individuals
is utterly without evidence to support it. It is one of
those convenient general statements which sound very
plausible and very philosophical, but for which no proof
whatever is offered.
�21
THE DECLINE OF BELIEF IN MIRACLES.
Another of Mr. Lecky’s statements is, that there is
an alteration of mental conditions invariably accom
panying the decline of belief. But this “invariable
accompaniment” certainly cannot be proved, because
the decline of the belief has only occurred once in the
history of the world ; and, what is still more remark
able, while the mental conditions which accompanied
that one decline have continued in force or have even
increased in energy and are much more widely diffused,
belief has now for twenty years been growing up again.
In the highest states of ancient civilisation, both among
the Greeks and Romans, the belief existed in full force,
and has been testified to by the highest and most intel
lectual men of every age. The decline which in the
present century has certainly taken place, cannot,
therefore, be imputed to any general law, since it is but
an exceptional instance.
Again, Mr. Lecky says that the belief in the super
natural only exists “ when men are destitute of the
critical spirit, and when the notion of uniform law is
yet unborn.” Mr. Lecky in this matter contradicts
himself almost as much as Hume did. One of the
greatest advocates for the belief in the supernatural was
Glanvil, and this is what Mr. Lecky says of Glanvil.
He says that Glanvil “ has been surpassed in genius
by few of his successors.”
‘‘ The predominating characteristic of Glanvil’s mind was
an intense scepticism. He has even been termed by a modern
critic the first English writer who has thrown scepticism into
a definite form ; and if we regard this expression as simply
implying a profound distrust of human faculties, the judgment
can hardly be denied. And certainly it would be difficult to
fmd a work displaying less of credulity and superstition than
the treatise on ‘The Vanity of Dogmatising,’ afterwards pub
lished as Scepsis Scientifica, in which. Glanvil expounded his
philosophical views......... The Sadducismus Triumphatus is
probably the ablest book ever published in defence of the
reality of witchcraft. Dr. Henry Moore, the illustrious Boyle,
and the scarcely less eminent Cudworth, warmly supported
Glanvil; and no writer comparable to these in ability or in
fluence appeared on the other side ; yet the scepticism steadily
ingreased.”
�22
Again Mr. Lecky thus speaks of Glanvil:—
-‘It was between the writings of Bacon and Locke that that
latitudinarian school was formed which was irradiated by the
genius of Taylor, Glanvil, and Hales, and which became th*
very centre and seedplot of religious liberty.”
M__‘
jail
ipg
These are the men and these the mental conditions vtwi
which are favourable to superstition and delusion !
The critical spirit and the notion of uniform law are
certainly powerful enough in the present day, yet ir
every country in the civilised world there are now hun
dreds and thousands of intelligent men who believe, on
the testimony of their own senses, in phenomena which
Mr. Lecky and others would term miraculous, anc
therefore incredible. Instead of being, as Mr. Lecky
says, an indication of “ certain states of society”—“ tht
normal expression of a certain stage of knowledge or in wtt
tellectual power”—this belief has existed in all states oi Ml-*
society, and has accompanied every stage of intellectual
power. Socrates, Plutarch, and St. Augustine alike, givr
personal testimony to supernatural facts ; this testimony
never ceased through the middle ages; the early reformers, Luther and Calvin, throng the ranks of wit- ~
nesses ; all the philosophers, and all the judges oi
England down to Sir Matthew Hale, admitted that the ara
evidence for such facts was irrefutable. Many cases tji
have been rigidly investigated by the police authorities
of various countries, and, as we have already seen, th-1
miracles at the tomb of the Abbe Paris, which occurred :.i_
in the most sceptical period of Trench history, in the ofv
age of Voltaire and the encyclopaedists, were proved by wk
such an array of evidence, and were so open to investi- mw
gation, that one of the noblemen of that court—con---- *
vinced of their reality after the closest scrutiny— /'.bi
suffered the martyrdom of imprisonment in the Bastite
A
for insisting upon making them public. And in our
_
own day we have, at the lowest estimate, many millions—afcr
of believers in modern Spiritualism in all classes oi
society; so that the belief which Mr. Lecky imputes '/rat'
to a certain stage of intellectual culture only, apau
pears on the contrary to have all the attributes of uni
versality.
�23
7/
IS THE BELIEF IN MIRACLES A SURVIVAL OF SAVAGE
THOUGHT ?
The philosophical argument has been put in another
form by Mr. E. B. Tylor, in a lecture at the Royal
Institution, and in several passages in his other works.
He main tains-that all Spiritualistic and other beliefs in
the supernatural are examples of the survival of savage
thought among civilised people; but he ignores the facts
which compel the beliefs. The thoughts of those edu
cated men who know, from the evidence of their own
senses, that things called supernatural are true and real
facts, are as totally distinct from those of savages, as
are their thoughts respecting the sun, or thunder, or
disease, or any other natural phenomenon. As well
might he maintain that the modern belief that the sun
is a fiery mass, is a survival of savage thought, because
some savages believe so too ; or that our belief that cer
tain diseases are contagious, is a similar survival of the
savage idea that a man can convey a disease to his
enemy. The question is a question of facts, not of
theories or thoughts, and I entirely deny the value or
relevance of any general arguments, theories, or analo
gies, when we have to decide on matters of fact.
Thousands of intelligent men now living know,
from personal observation, that some of the strange
phenomena which have been pronounced absurd and
i impossible by scientific men, are nevertheless true. It
is no answer to these and no explanation of the facts,
to tell them that such beliefs, only occur when men are
destitute of the critical spirit, and when the notion of
uniform law is yet unborn; that in certain states of
society illusions of this kind inevitably appear, that
they are only the normal expression of certain stages of
knowledge and of intellectual power, and that they
clearly prove the survival of savage modes of thought in
the midst of modern civilisation.
I believe that I have now shown—1. That Hume’s
arguments against miracles are full of unwarranted
assumptions, fallacies, and contradictions; 2. That the
modern argument of the telegraph-wire conveyance and
�24
drinking stone-lion, are positively no arguments at all,
since they rest on false or unproved premises ; 3. That
the argument, that dependence is to be placed upon
men of science and upon them only, is opposed to uni
versal experience and the whole history of science ; 4.
That the philosophical argument' so well put by Mr.
Lecky and Mr. Tylor, rests on false or unproved assump
tions, and is therefore valueless.
In conclusion, I must again emphatically declare that
the question I have been discussing is—in no way
whether miracles are true or false, or whether modern
Spiritualism rests upon a basis of fact or of delusion,—
but solely, whether the arguments that have hitherto
been supposed conclusive against them have any weight
or value. If I have shown, as I flatter myself I have
done, that the arguments which have been supposed to
settle the general question so completely as to render it
quite unnecessary to go into particular cases, are all
utterly fallacious, then I shall have cleared the ground
for the production of evidence, and no honest man
desirous of arriving at truth will be able to evade an
enquiry into the nature and amount of .that evidence, by
moving the previous question—that miracles are unprovable by any amount of human testimony. It is
time that the “ derisive and unexamining incredulity ”
which has hitherto existed should give way to a less
dogmatic and more philosophical spirit, or history will
again have to record the melancholy spectacle of men, who
should have known better, assuming to limit the dis
covery of new powers and agencies in the universe, and
deciding, without investigation, whether other men’s
observations are true or false.
�
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Victorian Blogging
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A collection of digitised nineteenth-century pamphlets from Conway Hall Library & Archives. This includes the Conway Tracts, Moncure Conway's personal pamphlet library; the Morris Tracts, donated to the library by Miss Morris in 1904; the National Secular Society's pamphlet library and others. The Conway Tracts were bound with additional ephemera, such as lecture programmes and handwritten notes.<br /><br />Please note that these digitised pamphlets have been edited to maximise the accuracy of the OCR, ensuring they are text searchable. If you would like to view un-edited, full-colour versions of any of our pamphlets, please email librarian@conwayhall.org.uk.<br /><br /><span><img src="http://www.heritagefund.org.uk/sites/default/files/media/attachments/TNLHLF_Colour_Logo_English_RGB_0_0.jpg" width="238" height="91" alt="TNLHLF_Colour_Logo_English_RGB_0_0.jpg" /></span>
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Conway Hall Library & Archives
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2018
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Conway Hall Ethical Society
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An answer to the arguments of Hume, Lecky and others, against miracles
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Wallace, Alfred Russel [1823-1913]
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Place of publication: London
Collation: 24 p. ; 18 cm.
Notes: From the library of Dr Moncure Conway.
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Printed for private circulation by James Beveridge, High Holborn
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1871
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G5231
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<a href="http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/mark/1.0/"><img src="http://i.creativecommons.org/p/mark/1.0/88x31.png" alt="Public Domain Mark" /></a><span> </span><br /><span>This work (An answer to the arguments of Hume, Lecky and others, against miracles), identified by </span><a href="https://conwayhallcollections.omeka.net/items/show/www.conwayhall.org.uk"><span>Humanist Library and Archives</span></a><span>, is free of known copyright restrictions.</span>
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application/pdf
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Text
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English
Subject
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Superstition
Conway Tracts
Miracles
Superstition