1 10 4 https://d1y502jg6fpugt.cloudfront.net/25778/archive/files/ee46a3293447f9ae4c5ddb99ca412b5a.pdf?Expires=1776902400&Signature=aGiCR2gyFX0aTYclrVcn1U2D2Hx0MetbnkVPBQ3y7pdCJNIfffQsYp0ccATmbqOl8jcPnkKt2epKWSQR7UXxvHA2JFQZfTl847cbahcSStd0sL762PWcbLNzgWdjI1R72W2vu4fWZIiJnHZA-qWt1guMWJTFJJOuXBOjM2C0drUwzCZHsi10LMDYy8tMPxWv22y95OZTOm3Mw7Fk5J3O04Yw0Azr-j08CcdKC9YRdVjn7V8BPNkwNm0tH-2IKjtuCrKRYDBbZehaW3H4Ql1aou-AW8WDP7R2ZDLfn0N7JKX55nXUVBMo%7EH7XI3BLnE71aLUBrfyIQeczTYPlX5L6Mw__&Key-Pair-Id=K6UGZS9ZTDSZM 759ee295be73e9dfdfbe30803c85d797 PDF Text Text DIALOGUES CONCERNING NATURAL RELIGION, DAVID HUME, Esq. A new Edition, with a Preface and Notes, which bring the Subject down to the present time. PUBLISHED BY THOMAS SCOTT, NO. 11, THE TERRACE, FARQUHAR ROAD, UPPER NORWOOD, LONDON, S.E, Price One Shilling. ��PREFACE. “ Among the sayings of Homer mark well this one too and improve upon it; he says :—A good messenger brings the great­ est credit on every transaction.”—Pindar’s Pythian, iv. 277-78.' TF ever Truth sent “a good messenger” to the human. race, it was in the person of David Hume, who was born at Edinburgh, on the 7th May 1711, N. S. But Hume did not receive his message from Truth written, as it were, on a sheet of paper. No : like Pindar’s messenger of old, Hume had to acquire by labour and care the knowledge which enabled him to learn and deliver the message which he conveyed to mortals. ' Moreover, he was obstructed by two obstacles, which few men, prosecuting such studies as he laboured in,. succeed in surmounting. His first obstacle was poverty. In his delightful little autobiography, (“ My Own Life,”) he informs us that his fortune was “very slender.” How he surmounted this obstacle he tells us thus :— “I resolved to make a very rigid frugality supply my deficiency of fortune, to maintain unimpaired my inde­ pendency, and to regard every object as contemptible, except the improvement of my talents in literature.” His second obstacle was Christianity. It is not permitted to mortal man, in his present state of existence, to be by nature free from the pre­ judices which arise from his education, and the prepossessions imperceptibly springing from it. These adhered to Hume for a long time. He sent the manu­ script of his “ Dialogues concerning Natural Beligion ’’ A �2 Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. to his friend, Sir Gilbert Elliott, with whom he corresponded on the subject. Writing to Sir Gilbert Elliott in March 1751, Hume says, “The general pro­ gress of my thoughts began with an anxious search after arguments to confirm the common opinion—doubts stole in—dissipated—returned—were again dissipated—re­ turned again, and it was a perpetual struggle of a restless imagination again st inclination—perhaps against reason.” Most probably this is virtually the true inner history of every honest thinker. It was about the year 1730 that Hume commenced his “ anxious search.” Before that time, the inductive philosophy, or rather the logic of induction, first given to the world in a scientific shape by Bacon in his Novum Organum, 1620, had been applied solely to the phenomena of the physical world, especially by Elamsteed, James Gregory, Boyle, and Sir Isaac Newton."' But the application of that logic to the * It may be explained here that the Logic of induction consists in dealing with facts, not words. Thus, to prove that John, or any other man, is mortal, a disciple of Aristotle would say, “ All men are mortal; John is a man ; therefore John is mortal.” To this a disciple of Bacon would object that the mortality of all men had been begged not proved. This objection is fatal to the argu­ ment; for we cannot prove that all men are mortal. We may believe that such is the case ; but all we can prove regarding it amounts to this, namely, “ So well as we know all men preceding those now alive have died; we do not know that any man now living has any element of immortality in him ; therefore we infer that all men are mortal—probably.” The truth is that this in­ ference is grounded on instinct rather than on reason : in the words of Hume, “ ’tis certain, that the most ignorant and stupid peasants, nay infants, nay even brute beasts, improve by experience, and learn the qualities of natural objects, by observing the effects which result from them. When a child has felt the sensation of pain from touching the flame of a candle, he will be careful not to put his hand near any candle ; but will expect a similar effect from a cause which is similar in its sensible qualities and appearance.” That we cannot prove to demonstration any matter of fact is the chief principle of Hume’s philosophy. If the reader will reflect on the idea contained in the word probability he will thereby more clearly perceive the value of the inductive logic, and the truth of Hume’s philosophy, than by anything that can be written by the editor. �Preface. 3 so-called world of spirit had been scarcely thought of. It is true, indeed, that Locke in his “ Essay concerning Human Understanding,” and more particularly in his subsequent letters in defence of that work, had main­ tained that matter might possess the quality of thinking power as well as the qualities of extension and solidity. But that matter contained the principle of its order within itself, and had of itself arranged the material universe, was an idea which had long ceased to influence the world of Thinkers: alas! a very small world indeed, and possessing very few inhabitants. Even if before Hume any of those “ happy few” entertained that idea, it is very probable that he would have been deterred from publishing it; for by so doing he ran the risk of acquiring something more than fame from those Christians who chose to prosecute him, under the provisions contained in the mild “ Act of Toleration,” and other “ tender mercies ” of the Christians ; and so, when Hume began his “anxious search,” prudence required him to shew its results primarily on objects not generally calculated to excite suspicion. So, his first effort was in his essay 11 Of the Idea of Necessary Connexion.” In this essay he shews that we cannot assign a cause to any single phenomenon without having the opportunity of comparing it and its cause with other similar phenomena. He shews also that even when we perceive an instance of cause and effect we cannot tell why or how the cause produces the effect. Of course here he suppresses (although he doubtless perceived) the further inference that since Divine Providence never, for instance, was seen by any man in the act of creating a planet like our own, we have not sufficient proof, on even the ground of an argument from cause and effect, to shew that this planet, called the Earth, is not self-created. But he hinted at this inference in his essay “ Of a Particular Providence and of a Future State.” There he says, “ I much doubt whether it be possible for a �4 Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. cause to be known only by its effect, or to be of so singular and particular a nature as to have no parallel, and no similarity with any other cause or object, that has ever fallen under our observation. ’Tis only when two species of objects are found to be constantly con­ joined, that we can infer the one from the other ; and were an effect presented, which was entirely singular,, and could not be comprehended under any known species, I do not see that we could form any conjecture, or inference at all concerning its cause. If experience and observation and analogy be, indeed, the only guides which we can reasonably follow in inferences of this nature; both the effect and the cause must bear a similarity and resemblance to other effects and causes which we know, and which we have found, in many instances, to be conjoined with each other. As the antagonists of Epicurus always suppose the universe, an effect quite singular and unparalleled, to be proof of a Deity, a cause no less singular and unparalleled; reasonings, upon that supposition, seem, at least, to merit our attention. There is some difficulty, how we can ever return from the cause to the effect, and, reason­ ing from our ideas of the former, infer any alteration on the latter, or any addition to it.” To human beings this Earth is a singular performance. We do not know anything of what goes on in the other planets and stars. Consequently, from what we know of our own planet we cannot logically infer anything decided and definite regarding the other heavenly bodies, or prove whether or not they even shew marks of design. In his “Dialogues concerning Natural Religion,” Hume has brought forward almost every argument for and against the existence of Divine Providence that has been adduced on that subject from the days of Anaxagoras to those of Professor Tyndall. Hume says, “ all religious systems, it is confessed, are subject to great and insuperable difficulties. Each disputant �Preface. 5 triumphs in his turn; while he carries on an offensive war, and exposes the absurdities, barbarities, and pernicious tenets of his antagonist. But all of them, on the whole, prepare a complete triumph for the Sceptic, who tells them that no system ought ever to be embraced with regard to such subjects; for this plain reason,—that no absurdity ought ever to be .assented to with regard to any subject. A total suspense of judgment is here our only reasonable resource.” Nevertheless, so far as the human mind can judge, the material universe probably shews traces of design. But if so it is a design very different in its nature from that shewn in human works of art. Consequently the weight of probability is in favour of the supposition that the present material universe has been arranged by some Intelligence capable of the task, but who is in all other respects utterly unknown to us, and, probably, unknowable by us. In the words of Hume, “ The whole of Natural Theology, as some people seem to maintain, resolves itself into one simple, though some­ what ambiguous, at least undefined proposition, that the cause or causes of order in the universe probably bear some remote analogy to human intelligence.” One great merit of this doctrine is that it is consistent with all the phenomena in the moral as well as in the physical world. Instead of trying to force Philosophy to fit into beds and boxes far too small for the purpose, this doctrine leaves Philosophy free either to make or find for herself a suitable resting-place. Moreover, by shewing that all we can know is only a very small amount of knowledge, this doctrine proves to demonstration the uselessness and the immorality of bigotry and persecu­ tion. It is melancholy to think that the masses of mankind are nearly as ignorant of the practical worth of this invaluable doctrine in the present day as they were a century ago, in the days of Hume. Our object is now to republish it in a form accessible to every one �6 Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. able and willing to read and study it; and its inestimable value to mankind justifies us in expecting that its republication will receive the blessing of Divine Providence. Hume’s opinions excluded him from the professorships in the universities of Scotland, and, in fact, from all places in the state and in literature : just as they would exclude any one who professed them in the present day. He died at Edinburgh on Sunday the 25th August 1776, after having triumphantly surmounted all the miseries arising from both poverty and Christianity. The scope of this edition of the “ Dialogues ” precludes the Editor from entering upon the details of Hume’s life. These the reader will find in Mr John H. Burton’s admirable work on that subject, which will well repay its perusal. For the history of David Hume affords a lesson of the utmost value, as an example, to the courageous Student and Thinker in this and probably many future ages. �DIALOGUES CONCERNING NATURAL RELIGION. RAMPHILUS TO HERMIPPUS. has been Hermippus, though IT the ancientremarked, my conveyed mostthat their in­ philosophers of struction in the form of dialogue, this method of composition has been little practised in later ages, and has seldom succeeded in the hands of those who have attempted it. Accurate and regular argument, indeed, such as is now expected of philosophical inquirers, naturally throws a man into the methodical and didactic manner ; where he can immediately, without preparation, explain the point at which he aims; and thence proceed, without interruption, to deduce the proofs on which it is established. To deliver a system in conversation, scarcely appears natural; and while the dialogue-writer desires, by departing from the direct style of composition, to give a freer air to his per­ formance, and avoid the appearance of Author and Reader, he is apt to run into a worse inconvenience, and convey the image of Pedagogue and Pupil. Or if he carries on the dispute in the natural spirit of good company, by throwing in a variety of topics, and preserving a proper balance among the speakers, he often loses so much time in preparations and transitions, that the reader will scarcely think himself compensated, by all the graces of dialogue, for the order, brevity, and precision, which are sacrificed to them. �8 Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. There are some subjects, however, to which dialogue­ writing is peculiarly adapted, and where it is still preferable to the direct and simple method of com­ position. Any point of doctrine, which is so obvious that it scarcely admits of dispute, but at the same time so import­ ant that it cannot be too’often inculcated, seems to require some such method of handling it; where the novelty of the manner may compensate the triteness of the subject; where the vivacity of conversation may enforce the precept; and where the variety of lights, presented by various personages and characters, may appear neither tedious nor redundant. Any question of philosophy, on the other hand, which is so obscure and uncertain, that human reason can reach no fixed determination with regard to it; if it should be treated at all, seems to lead us naturally into the style of dialogue and conversation. Reason­ able men may be allowed to differ, where no one can reasonably be positive: opposite sentiments, even without any decision, afford an agreeable amusement : and if the subject be curious and interesting, the book carries us, in a manner, into company ; and unites the two greatest and purest pleasures of human life, study and society. Happily, these circumstances are all to be found in the subject of Natural Religion. What truth so obvious, so certain, as the being of a God, which the most ignorant ages have acknowledged, for which the most refined geniuses have ambitiously striven to produce new proofs and arguments ? What truth so important as this, which is the ground of all our hopes, the surest foundation of morality, the firmest support of society, and the only principle which ought never to be a moment absent from our thoughts and meditations ? But in treating of this obvious and important truth ; what obscure questions occur, concerning the nature of that •divine Being; his attributes, his decrees, his plan of �Part I. 9 providence ? These have been always subjected to the ■disputations of men : Concerning these, human reason has not reached any certain determination : But these are topics so interesting, that we cannot restrain our restless inquiry with regard to them; though nothing but doubt, uncertainty, and contradiction, have as yet been the result of our most accurate researches. This I had lately occasion to observe, while I passed, as usual, part of the summer-season with Cleanthes, and was present at those conversations of his with Philo and Demea, of which I gave you lately some imperfect account. Your curiosity, you then told me, was so excited, that I must of necessity enter into a more exact detail of their reasonings, and display those various systems which they advanced with regard to so delicate a subject as that of Natural Religion. The remarkable contrast in their character still further raised your -expectations ; while you opposed the accurate philo­ sophical turn of Cleanthes to the careless scepticism of Philo, or compared either of their dispositions with the rigid inflexible orthodoxy of Demea. My youth rendered me a mere auditor of their disputes ; and that ■curiosity, n atural to the early season of life, has so deeply imprinted in my memory the whole chain and connection of their arguments, that, I hope, I shall not omit or confound any considerable part of them in the recital. PART I. After I joined the company, whom I found sitting in Cleanthes’ library, Demea paid Cleanthes some compli­ ments, on the great care which he took of my education, and on his unwearied perseverance and constancy in all his friendships. The father of Pamphilus, said he, was your intimate friend : the son is your pupil ; and may indeed be regarded as your adopted son, were we to judge by the pains which you bestow in conveying �io Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. to him every useful "branch, of literature and science. You are no more wanting, I am persuaded, in prudence than in industry. I shall, therefore, communicate to you a maxim which I have observed with regard to my own children, that I may learn how far it agrees with your practice. The method I follow in their education is founded on the saying of an ancient, “ That students of philosophy ought first to learn Logics, then Ethics, next Physics, last of all the Nature of the Gods.”* This science of Natural Theology, according to him, being the most profound, and abstruse of any, required the maturest judgment in its students ; and none but a mind, enriched with all the other sciences, can safely be entrusted with it. Are you so late, says Philo, in teaching your children the principles of religion ? Is there no danger of their neglecting, or rejecting altogether, those opinions, of which they have heard so little during the whole course of their education ? It is only as a science, replied Demea, subjected to human reasoning and disputation, that I postpone the study of Natural Theology. To season their minds with early piety, is my chief care ; and by continual precept and instruc­ tion, and I hope too by example, I imprint deeply on their tender minds an habitual reverence for all the principles of religion. While they pass through every other science, I still remark the uncertainty of each part ; the eternal disputations of men ; the obscurity of all philosophy; and the strange, ridiculous conclusions, which some of the greatest geniuses have derived from the principles of mere human reason. Having thus tamed their mind to a proper submission and self­ diffidence, I have no longer any scruple of opening to them the greatest mysteries of religion ; nor appre­ hend any danger from that assuming arrogance of philosophy, which may lead them to reject the most established doctrines and opinions. * Chrysippus apud Plat de repug. Stoicorum. �Part I. ir Your precaution, says Philo, of seasoning your children’s minds early with piety, is certainly very reasonable; and no more than is requisite in this profane and irreligious age. But what I chiefly admire in your plan of education, is your method of drawing advantage from the very principles of philosophy and learning, which, by inspiring pride and self-sufficiency,, have commonly, in all ages, been found so destructive to the principles of religion. The vulgar, indeed, we may remark, who are unacquainted with science and profound inquiry, observing the endless disputes of the learned, have commonly a thorough contempt for Philosophy; and rivet themselves the faster, by that means, in the great points of theology which have been taught them. Those who enter a little into study and inquiry, finding many appearances of evidence in doctrines the newest and most extra­ ordinary, think nothing too difficult for human reason ; and, presumptuously breaking through all fences, profane the inmost sanctuaries of the temple. But Cleanthes will, I' hope, agree with me, that, after we have abandoned ignorance, the surest remedy, there is still one expedient left to prevent this profane liberty. Let Demea’s principles be improved and cultivated: Let us become thoroughly sensible of the weakness, blindness, and narrow limits, of human reason : Let us duly consider its uncertainty and endless contrarieties, even in subjects of common life and practice : Let the errors and deceits of our very senses be set before us ; the insuperable difficulties which attend first principles in all systems; the contradictions which adhere to the very ideas of matter, cause and effect, extension, space, time, motion; and, in a word, quantity of all kinds, the object of the only science that can fairly pretend toany certainty or evidence. When these topics are displayed in their full light, as they are by some philo­ sophers and almost all divines ; who can retain such confidence in this frail faculty of reason as to pay any �12 Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. regard to its determinations in points so sublime, so abstruse, so remote from common life and experience ? When the coherence of the parts of a stone, or even that composition of parts which renders it extended; when these familiar objects, I say, are so inexplicable, and contain circumstances so repugnant and contra­ dictory ; with what assurance can we decide concerning the origin of worlds, or trace their history from eternity to eternity ? While Philo pronounced these words, I could observe a smile in the countenance both of Demea and Clean­ thes. That of Demea seemed to imply an unreserved satisfaction in the doctrines delivered : but in Cleanthes’ features, I could distinguish an air of finesse; as if he perceived some raillery or artificial malice in the reasonings of Philo. You propose then, Philo, said Cleanthes, to erect religious faith on philosophical scepticism ; and you think, that if certainty or evidence be expelled from every other subject of inquiry, it will all retire to these theological doctrines, and there acquire a superior force and authority. Whether your scepticism be as absolute and sincere as you pretend, we shall learn by and by, when the company breaks up ; we shall then see, whether you go out at the door or the window ; and whether you really doubt, if your body has gravity, or can be injured by its fall; according to popular opinion, derived from our fallacious senses and more fallacious experience. And this consideration, Demea, may, I think, fairly serve to abate our ill-will to this humorous sect of the sceptics. If they be thoroughly in earnest, they will not long trouble the world with their doubts, cavils and disputes : if they be only in jest, they are, perhaps, bad raillers; but can never be very dangerous, either to the state, to philosophy, or to religion. In reality, Philo, continued he, it seems certain, that though a man, in a flush of humour, after intense reflection on the many contradictions and imperfections �Part I. of human reason, may -entirely renounce all belief' and opinion; it is impossible for him to persevere in this total scepticism, or make it appear in his conduct for a few hours. External objects press in upon him : passions solicit him : his philosophical melancholy dis­ sipates ; and even the utmost violence upon his own temper will not be able, during any time, to preserve the poor appearance of scepticism. And for what reason im­ pose on himself such a violence ? This a point in which it will be impossible for him ever to satisfy himself, consistently with his sceptical principles : so that upon the whole nothing could be more ridiculous than the principles of the ancient Pyrrhonians ; if in reality they endeavoured, as is pretended, to extend, throughout, the same scepticism, which they had learned from the de­ clamations of their schools, and which they ought to have confined to them. In this view, there appears a great resemblance between the sects of the Stoics and Pyrrhonians though perpetual antagonists : and both of them seem founded on this erroneous maxim, That what a man can perform sometimes, and in some dispositions, he can perform always, and in every disposition. When the mind, by Stoical reflections, is elevated into a sublime enthusiasm of virtue, and strongly smit with any species of honour or public good, the utmost bodily pain and sufferings will not prevail over such a high sense of duty; and it is possible, perhaps, by its means, even to smile and exult in the midst of tortures. If this sometimes may be the case in fact and reality,, much more may a philosopher, in his school, or even in his closet, work himself up to such an enthusiasm,, and support in imagination the acutest pain or most calamitous event which he can possibly conceive. But how shall he support this enthusiasm itself ? The bent of his mind relaxes, and cannot be recalled at pleasure: avocations lead him astray: misfortunes attack him unawares : and the philosopher sinks by degrees into the plebeian. �14 Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. I allow of your comparison between the Stoics and Sceptics, replied Philo. But you may observe, at the same time, that though the mind cannot, in stoicism, support the highest flights of philosophy; yet, even when it sinks lower, it still retains somewhat of its former disposition; and the effects of the Stoic’s reasoning will appear in his conduct in common life, and through the whole tenor of his actions. The ancient schools, particularly that of Zeno, produced examples of virtue and constancy which seem astonishing to present times. Vain wisdom all and false philosophy. Yet with a pleasing sorcery could charm Pain, for a while, or anguish ; and excite Fallacious Hope, or arm the obdurate breast With stubborn patience, as with triple steel. * In like manner, if a man has accustomed himself to sceptical considerations on the uncertainty and narrow limits of reason, he will not entirely forget them when he turns his reflection on other subjects; but in all his philosophical principles and reasoning, I dare not say in his common conduct, he will be found different from those, who either never formed any opinions in the case, or have entertained sentiments more favour­ able to human reason. To whatever length any one may push his speculative principles of scepticism, he must act, I own, and live, and converse, like other men ; and for this conduct he is not obliged to give any other reason, than the absolute necessity he lies under of so doing. If he ever carries his speculations farther than this necessity constrains him, and philosophises either on natural or moral subjects, he is allured by a certain pleasure and satisfaction which he finds in employing himself after that manner. He considers, besides, that every one, even in common life, is constrained to have more or less of this philosophy ; that from our earliest infancy we make continual advances in forming more general * “ Paradise Lost.” ii., 565. �Part I. »5 principles of conduct and reasoning; that the larger experience we acquire, and the stronger reason we are endued with, we always render our principles the more general and comprehensive; and that what we call philosophy is nothing but a more regular and methodical operation of the same kind. To philo­ sophise on such subjects is nothing essentially different from reasoning on common life ; and we may only expect greater stability, if not greater truth, from our philosophy, on account of its exacter and more scrupu­ lous method of proceeding. But when we look beyond human affairs and the pro­ perties of the surrounding bodies : when we carry our speculations into the two eternities, before and after the present state of things; into the creation and formation of the universe; the existence and properties of spirits ; the powers and operations of one universal Spirit, existing without beginning and without end; omnipotent, omniscient, immutable, infinite, and in­ comprehensible : we must be far removed from the smallest tendency to scepticism not to be apprehensive that we have here got quite beyond the reach of our faculties. So long as we confine our speculations to trade, or morals, or politics, or criticism, we make appeals, every moment, to common sense and ex­ perience, which strengthen our philosophical con­ clusions, and remove (at least, in part) the suspicion which we so justly entertain with regard to every reasoning that is very subtle and refined. But, in theological reasonings, we have not this advantage; while at the same time we are employed upon objects, which, we must be sensible, are too large for our grasp, and, of all others, require most to be familiarised to our apprehension. We are like foreigners in a strange country, to whom every thing must seem suspicious, and who are in danger every moment of transgressing against the laws and customs of the people with whom they live and converse. We know not how far we �16 Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. ought to trust our vulgar methods of reasoning in such a subject; since, even in common life, and in that province which is peculiarly appropriated to them, we cannot account for them, and are entirely guided by a kind of instinct or necessity in employing them. All sceptics pretend, that, if reason be considered in an abstract view, it furnishes invincible arguments against itself; and that we could never retain any con­ viction or assurance, on any subject, were not the sceptical reasonings so refined and subtile, that they are not able to counterpoise the more solid and more natural arguments derived from the senses and ex­ perience. But it is evident, whenever our arguments lose this advantage, and run wide of common life, that the most refined scepticism comes to be upon a footing with them, and is able to oppose and counterbalance them. The one has no more weight than the other. The mind must remain in suspense between them ; and it is that very suspense or balance, which is the triumph of scepticism. But I observe, says Cleanthes, with regard to you, Philo, and all speculative sceptics, that your doctrine and practice are as much at variance in the most abstruse points of theory as in the conduct of common life. Wherever evidence discovers itself, you adhere to it, notwithstanding your pretended scepticism ; and I can observe, too, some of your sect to be as decisive as those who make greater professions of certainty and assurance. In reality, would not a man be ridiculous, who pretended to reject Newton’s explication of the wonderful phenomenon of the rainbow, because that explication gives a minute anatomy of the rays of light; a subject, forsooth, too refined for human com­ prehension ? And what would you say to one, who having nothing particular to object to the arguments of Copernicus and Galileo for the motion of the earth, should withhold his assent, on that general principle, that these subjects were too magnificent and remote to �Part I. l7 be explained by the narrow and fallacious reason of mankind ? There is indeed a kind of brutish, and ignorant scepticism, as you well observed, which gives the vulgar a general prejudice against what they do not easily ■understand, and makes them reject every principle which requires elaborate reasoning to prove and esta­ blish it. This species of scepticism is fatal to knowledge, not to religion; since we find, that those who make greatest profession of it, give often their assent, not only to the great truths of Theism and natural theology, but even to the most absurd tenets which a traditional superstition has recommended to them. They firmly believe in witches; though they will not believe nor attend to the most simple proposition of Euclid. But the refined and philosophical sceptics fall into an incon­ sistence of an opposite nature. They push their researches into the most abstruse corners of science; .and their assent attends them in every step, proportioned to the evidence which they meet with. They are even obliged to acknowledge, that the most abstruse and remote objects are those which are best explained by philosophy. Light is in reality anatomized : The true system of the heavenly bodies is discovered and ascer­ tained. But the nourishment of bodies by food is still an inexplicable mystery : the cohesion of the parts of matter is still incomprehensible. These sceptics, there­ fore, are obliged, in every question, to consider each particular evidence apart, and proportion their assent to the precise degree of evidence which occurs. This is their practice in all natural, mathematical, moral, and political science. And why not the same, I ask, in the theological and religious? Why must conclusions of this nature be alone rej ected on the general presumption of the insufficiency of human reason, without any parti­ cular discussion of the evidence? Is not such an unequal •conduct a plain proof of prejudice and passion ? Our senses, you say, are fallacious; our understandB �18 Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. ing erroneous; our ideas even of the most familiar objects, extension, duration, motion, full of absurdities and contradictions. You defy me to solve the diffi­ culties, or reconcile the repugnancies, which you discover in them. I have not capacity for so great an undertak­ ing : I have not leisure for it: I perceive it to be superfluous. Your own conduct, in every circumstance, refutes your principles; and shows the firmest reliance on all the received maxims of science, morals, prudence, and behaviour. I shall never assent to so harsh an opinion as that of a celebrated writer*, who says, that the sceptics are not a sect of philosophers, they are only a sect of liars. I may, however, affirm, (I hope, without offence) that they are a sect of jesters or railers. But for my part, when­ ever I find myself disposed to mirth and amusement, I shall certainly choose my entertainment of a less perplexing and abstruse nature. A comedy, a novel, or at most a history, seems a more natural recreation than such metaphysical subtleties and abstractions. In vain would the sceptic make a distinction between science and common life, or between one science'and another. The arguments employed in all, if just, are of a similar nature, and contain the same force and evidence. Or if there be any difference among them,, the advantage lies entirely on the side of theology and natural religion. Many principles of mechanics are founded on very abstruse reasoning; yet no man who has any pretensions to science, even no speculative sceptic, pretends to entertain the least doubt wtth regard to them. The Copernican system contains the most surprising paradox, and the most contrary to our natural conceptions, to appearances, and to our very senses : yet even monks and inquisitors are now constrained to withdraw their opposition to it. And shall Philo, a. man of so liberal a genius, and extensive knowledge, entertain any general undistinguished scruples with *L’art de perser. �Part I. J9 regard to the religious hypothesis, which is founded on the simplest and most obvious arguments, and, unless it meets with artificial obstacles, has such easy access and admission into the mind of man ? And here we may observe, continued he, turning himself towards Demea, a pretty curious circumstance in the history of the sciences. After the union of philosophy with the popular religion, upon the first establishment of Christianity, nothing was more usual, among all religious teachers, than declamations against reason, against the senses, against every principle derived merely from human research and inquiry. All the topics of the ancient Academics were adopted by the lathers ; and thence propagated for several ages in every school and pulpit throughout Christendom. The Reformers embraced the same principles of reasoning, or rather declamation; and all panegyrics on the excel­ lency of faith were sure to be interlarded with some severe strokes of satire against natural reason. A cele­ brated prelate too *, of the Romish communion, a man of the most extensive learning, who wrote a demonstra­ tion of Christianity, has also composed a treatise, which contains all the cavils of the boldest and most determined Pyrrhonism. Locke seems to have been the first Christian, who ventured openly to assert, that faith was nothing but a species of reason; that religion was only a branch of philosophy; and that a chain of argu­ ments, similar to that which established any truth in morals, politics, or physics, was always employed in discovering all the principles of theology, natural and revealed. The ill use which Rayle and other libertines made of the philosophical scepticism of the fathers and first reformers, still farther propagated the judicious sentiment of Mr Locke: And it is now, in a manner, avowed, by all pretenders to reasoning and philosophy, that Atheist and Sceptic are almost synonymous. And as it is certain, that no man is in earnest when he *Mons. Huet. �20 Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. professes the latter principle ; I would fain hope, that there are as few who seriously maintain the former. Don’t you remember, said Philo, the excellent saying of Lord Bacon on this head i That a little philosophy, replied Cleanthes, makes a man an Atheist: a great deal converts him to religion. That is a very judicious remark too, said Philo. But what I have in my eye is another passage, where, having mentioned David’s fool, who said in his heart there is no God, this great philo­ sopher observes, that the Atheists now-a-days have a double share of folly : for they are not contented to say in their hearts there is no God, but they also utter that impiety with their lips; and are thereby guilty of multi­ plied indiscretion and imprudence. Such people, though they were ever so much in earnest, cannot, methinks, be very formidable. But though you should rank me in this class of fools, I cannot forbear communicating a remark that occurs to me from the history of the religious and irreli­ gious scepticism 'with which you have entertained us. It appears to me, that there are strong symptoms of priestcraft in the whole progress of this affair. During ignorant ages, such as those which followed the dis­ solution of the ancient schools, the priests perceived, that Atheism, Deism, or heresy of any kind, could only pro­ ceed from the presumptuous questioning of received opinions, and from a belief that human reason was equal to every thing. Education had then a mighty influence over the minds of men, and was almost equal in force to those suggestions of the senses and common understand­ ing, by which the most determined sceptic must allow himself to be governed. But at present, when the influ­ ence of education is much diminished, and men, from a more open commerce of the world, have learned to com­ pare the popular principles of different nations and ages, our sagacious divines have changed their whole system of philosophy, and talk the language of Stoics, Platonists, and Peripatetics, not that of Pyrrhonians and Acad­ �Part II. 21 emics. If we distrust human reason, we have now no other principle to lead us into religion. Thus, sceptics in one age, dogmatists in another; whichever system best suits the purpose of these reverend gentlemen, in giving them an ascendant over mankind, they are sure to make it their favourite principle, and established tenet. It is very natural, said Cleanthes, for men to embrace those principles, by which they find they can best defend their doctrines; nor need we have any recourse to priest­ craft to account for so reasonable an expedient. And surely, nothing can afford a stronger presumption, that any set of principles are true, and ought to be embraced, than to observe that they tend to the confirmation of true religion, and serve to confound the cavils of Atheists, Libertines; and Freethinkers of all denominations. PART II. I must own, Cleanthes, said Demea, that nothing can more surprise me, than the light in which you have all along put this argument. By the whole tenor of your discourse, one would imagine that you were maintaining the Being of a God, against the cavils of Atheists and Infidels: and were necessitated to become a champion for that fundamental principle of all religion. But this, I hope, is not, by any means, a question among us. No man; no man, at least, of common sense, I am per­ suaded, ever entertained a serious doubt with regard to a truth so certain and self-evident. The question is not concerning the Being, but the Nature, of God. This I affirm, from the infirmities of human understanding, to be altogether incomprehensible and unknown to us. The essence of that Supreme Mind, his attributes, the manner of his existence, the very nature of his duration; these, and every particular which regards so divine a Being, �'ll Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. are mysterious to men. Finite, weak, and blind crea­ tures, we ought to humble ourselves in his august presence; and, conscious of our frailties, adore in silence Iris infinite perfections, which eye hath not seen, ear hath not heard, neither hath it entered into the heart of man to conceive. They are covered in a deep cloud from human curiosity: it is profaneness to attempt penetrating through these sacred obscurities : and next to the impiety of denying his existence, is the temerity of prying into his nature and essence, decrees and attri­ butes. But lest you should think, that my piety has here got the better of my philosophy, I shall support my opinion, if it needs any support, by a very great authority. I might cite all the divines, almost, from the foundation of Christianity, who have ever treated of this or any other theological subject: but I shall confine myself, at present, to one equally celebrated for piety and philo­ sophy. It is Father Malebranche, who, I remember, thus expresses himself: * “ One ought not so much (says he) to call God a spirit, in order to express posi­ tively what he is, as in order to signify that he is not matter. He is a Being infinitely perfect: Of this we cannot doubt. But in the same manner as we ought not to imagine, even supposing him corporeal, that he is clothed with a human body, as the Anthropomorphites asserted, under colour that that figure was the most perfect of any • so neither ought we to imagine, that the Spirit of God has human ideas, or bears any resem­ blance to our spirit; under colour that we know nothing more perfect than a human mind. We ought rather to believe, that as he comprehends the perfections of mat­ ter without being material .... he comprehends also the perfections of created spirits, without being spi­ rit, in the manner we conceive spirit: That his true name is, He that is; or, in other words, Being without restriction, All Being, the Being infinite and universal.” * Recherche de la Verite, liv. 3. cap. 9. �Part II. 23 After so great an authority, Demea, replied Philo, as that which you have produced, and a thousand more which you might produce, it would appear ridiculous in me to add my sentiment, or express my approbation of your doctrine. But surely, where reasonable men treat these subjects, the questions can never be con­ cerning the Being, but only the Nature, of the Deity. The former truth, as you well observe, is unquestion­ able and self-evident. Nothing exists without a cause; and the original cause of this universe (whatever it be) we call God; and piously ascribe to him every species of perfection. Whoever scruples this fundamental truth, deserves every punishment which can be inflicted among philosophers, to wit, the greatest ridicule, con­ tempt, and disapprobation. But as all perfection is entirely relative, we ought never to imagine that we comprehend the attributes of this divine Being, or to suppose that his perfections have analogy or likeness to the perfections of a human creature. Wisdom, Thought, Design, Knowledge; these we justly ascribe to him; because these words are honourable among men, and we have no other language or other concep­ tions by which we can express our adoration of him. But let us beware, lest we think, that our ideas any wise correspond to his perfections, or that his attributes have any resemblance to these qualities among men. He is infinitely superior to our limited view and compre­ hension; and is more the object of worship in the temple, than of disputation in the schools. In reality, Cleanthes, continued he, there is no need of having recourse to that affected scepticism, so dis­ pleasing to you, in order to come at this determination. Our ideas reach no further than our experience: We have no experience of divine attributes and operations : I need not conclude my syllogism : you can draw the inference yourself. And it is a pleasure to me (and I hope to you too) that just reasoning and sound piety here concur in the same conclusion, and both of them �24 Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. establish the adorably mysterious and incomprehensiblenature of the Supreme Being. Not to lose any time in circumlocutions, said Cleanthes, addressing himself to Demea, much less in. replying to the pious declamations of Philo; I shall briefly explain how I conceive this matter. Look round the world : contemplate the whole and every part of it: you will find it to be nothing but one great machine, subdivided into an infinite number of lesser machines, which again admit of subdivisions to a degree beyond, what human senses and faculties can trace and explain. All these various machines, and even their most minute parts, are adjusted to each other with an accuracy,, which ravishes into admiration all men who have ever contemplated them. The curious adapting of means to ends, throughout all nature, resembles exactly, though it much exceeds, the productions of human contrivance ; of human design, thought, wisdom, and intelligence. Since therefore the effects resemble each other, we are led to infer, by all the rules of analogy, that the causesalso resemble : and that the Author of Nature is some­ what similar to the mind of man ; though possessed of much larger faculties, proportioned to the. grandeur of the work which he has executed. By this argument a posterion, and by this argument alone, do we prove at once th’e existence of a Deity, and his similarity tn human mind and intelligence. I shall be so free, Cleanthes, said Demea, as to tell' you, that from the beginning I could not approve of your conclusion concerning the similarity of the Deity to men; still less can I approve of the mediums by which you endeavour to establish it. What! No demonstration of the Being of God! No abstract argu­ ments ! No proofs a priori ! Are these, which have hitherto been so much insisted on by philosophers, all fallacy, all sophism ? . Can we reach no further in this subject than experience and probability ? I will not say, that this is betraying the cause of a Deity : But �Part II. surely, by this affected candour, you give advantages to Atheists, which they never could obtain by the mere dint of argument and reasoning. What I chiefly scruple in this subject, said Philo, is not so much that all religious arguments are by Cleanthes reduced to experience, as that they appear not to be even the most certain and irrefragable of that inferior kind. That a stone will fall, that fire will burn, that the earth has solidity, we have observed a thousand and a thousand times ; and when any new instance of this nature is presented, we draw without hesitation the accustomed inference. The exact similarity of the cases gives us a perfect assurance of a similar event; and a stronger evidence is never desired nor sought after. But wherever you depart, in the least, from the similarity of the cases, you diminish proportionably the evidence; and may at last bring it to a very weak analogy, which is confessedly liable to error and uncertainty. After having experienced the circulation of the blood in human creatures, we make no doubt that it takes place in Titius and Msevius: but from its circulation in frogs and fishes, it is only a presumption,, though a strong one, from analogy, that it takes place in men and other animals. The analogical reasoning is much weaker when we infer the circulation of the sap in vegetables from our experience that the blood circulates in animals; and those, who hastily followed that imperfect analogy, are found, by more accurate experi­ ments, to have been mistaken. If we see a house, Cleanthes, we conclude, with the greatest certainty, that it had an architect or builder; because this is precisely that species of effect which we have experienced to proceed from that species of cause. But surely you will not affirm, that the universe bears such a resemblance to a house, that we can with the same certainty infer a similar cause, or that the analogy is here entire and perfect. The dissimilitude is so striking that the utmost you can �2 6 Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. here pretend to is a guess, a conjecture, a presumption concerning a similar cause; and how that pretension will be received in the world, I leave you to consider. It would surely be very ill received, replied Cleanthes ; and I should be deservedly blamed and detested, did I allow that the proofs of a Deity amounted to no more than a guess or conjecture. But is the whole adjustment of means to ends in a house and in the universe so slight a resemblance ? The economy of final causes ? The order, proportion and arrangement of every part? Steps of a stair are plainly contrived, that human legs may use them in mounting; and this inference is certain and infallible. Human legs are also contrived for walking and mount­ ing ; and this inference, I allow, is not altogether so certain, because of the dissimilarity which you remark; but does it, therefore, deserve the name only of presumption or conjecture? Interrupting him, Demea cried, where are we ? Zealous defenders of religion allow that the proofs of a Deity fall short of perfect evidence! And you, Philo, on whose assistance I depended in proving the adorable mysteriousness of the Divine Nature, do you assent to all these extravagant1 opinions of Cleanthes ? For what other name can I give them ? Or why spare my censure, when such principles are advanced, supported by such an authority, before so young a man as Pamphilus ? You seem not to apprehend, replied Philo, that I argue with Cleanthes in his own way ; and by showing him the dangerous consequences of his tenets, hope at last to reduce him to our opinion. But what sticks most with you, I observe, is the representation which Cleanthes has made of the argument a posteriori ; and finding that that argument is likely to escape your hold and vanish into air, you think it so disguised that you can scarcely believe it to be set in its true light. Now, however much I may dissent, in other respects, from �Part II. the dangerous principles of Cleanthes, I must allow, that he has fairly represented that argument; and I shall endeavour so to state the matter to you, that you will entertain no further scruples with regard to it. Were a man to abstract from every thing which he knows or has seen, he would be altogether incapable, merely from his own ideas, to determine what kind of scene the universe must be, or to give the preference to one state or situation of things above another. For as nothing which he clearly conceives could be esteemed impossible or implying a contradiction, every chimera of his fancy would be upon an equal footing; nor could he assign any just reason why he adheres to one idea or system, and rejects the others which are equally possible. Again; after he opens his eyes, and contemplates the world as it really is, it would be impossible for him, at first, to assign the cause of any one event, much less of the whole of things or of the universe. He might set his fancy a rambling ; and she might bring him in an infinite variety of reports and representations. These would all be possible; but being all equally possible, he would never, of himself, give a satisfactory account for his preferring one of them to the rest. Experience alone can point out to him the true cause of any phenomenon. Now, according to this method of reasoning, Demea, it follows (and is, indeed, tacitly allowed by Cleanthes himself), that order, arrangement, or the adjustment of final causes, is not, of itself, any proof of design; but only so far as it has been experienced to proceed from that principle. For aught we can know a priori, matter may contain the source or spring of order, originally, within itself as well as mind does; and there is no more difficulty in conceiving, that the several elements from an internal unknown cause, may fall into the most exquisite arrangement, than to ■conceive that their ideas, in the great universal mind �28 Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. from a like internal unknown cause, fall into that arrangement. The equal possibility of both these suppositions is allowed. But by experience we find, (according to Cleanthes), that there is a difference between them. Throw several pieces of steel together, without shape or form; they will never arrange them­ selves so as to compose a watch. Stone, and mortar, and wood, without an architect, never erect a house. But the ideas in a human mind, we see, by an unknown, inexplicable economy, arrange themselves so as to form the plan of a watch or house. Experience, therefore, proves that there is an original principle of order in mind, not in matter. From similar effects we infer similar causes. The adjustment of means to ends is alike in the universe, as in a machine of human contrivance. The causes, therefore, must be resem­ bling. I was from the beginning scandalised, I must own, with this resemblance, which is asserted, between the Deity and human creatures ; and must conceive it to imply such a degradation of the Supreme Being as no sound Theist could endure. With your assistance, therefore, Demea, I shall endeavour to defend what you justly call the adorable mysteriousness of the Divine Nature, and shall refute this reasoning of Clean­ thes ; provided he allows, that I have made a fair representation of it. When Cleanthes had assented, Philo, after a short pause, proceeded in the following manner. That all inferences, .Cleanthes, concerning fact, are founded on experience ; and that all experimental reasonings are founded on the supposition that similar causes prove similar effects, and similar effects similar causes; I shall not, at present, much dispute with you. But observe, I entreat you, with what extreme caution all just reasoners proceed in the transferring of experiments to similar cases. Unless the cases be exactly similar, they repose no­ �Part IL 29 perfect confidence in applying their past observation to any particular phenomenon. Every alteration of circumstances occasions a doubt concerning the event; and it requires new experiments to prove certainly, that the new circumstances are of no moment or importance. A change in bulk, situation, arrangement, age, disposition of the air, or surrounding bodies; any of these particulars, may be attended with the most unexpected consequences: and unless the objects be quite familiar to us, it is the highest temerity to ex­ pect with assurance, after any of these changes, an event similar to that which before fell under observation. The slow and deliberate steps of philosophers, here, if anywhere, are distinguished from the precipitate march of the vulgar, who, hurried on by the smallest similitude, are incapable of all discernment or con­ sideration. But can you think, Cleanthes, that your usual phlegm and philosophy have been preserved in so wide a step as you have taken, when you compared to the universe, houses, ships, furniture, machines : and from their similarity in some circumstances inferred a similarity in their causes ? Thought, design, intelligence, such as we discover in men and other animals, is no more than one of the springs and principles of the universe, as well as heat or cold, attraction or repulsion, and a hundred others which fall under daily observation. It is an active cause, by which some particular parts of nature, we find, produce alterations on other parts. But can a conclusion, with any propriety, be transferred from parts to the whole ? Does not the great dispro­ portion bar all comparison and inference ? From observing the growth of a hair, can we learn anything concerning the generation of a man ? Would the \ manner of a leaf’s blowing, even though perfectly ) known, afford us any instruction concerning the vegetation of a tree ? But allowing that we were to take the operations of one ■ part of nature upon another for the foundation of �30 Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. our judgement concerning the origin of the whole, (which never can be admitted); yet why select so minute, so weak, so bounded a principle as the reason and design of animals is found to be upon this planet ? What peculiar privilege has this little agitation of the brain which we call thought, that we must thus make it the model of the whole universe ? Our partiality in our own favour does indeed present it on all occasions; but sound philosophy ought carefully to guard against so natural an illusion. So far from admitting, continued Philo, that the operations of a part can afford us any just conclusion concerning the origin of the whole, I will not allow any one part to form a rule for another part, if the latter be very remote from the former. Is there any reasonable ground to conclude, that the inhabitants of other planets possess thought, intelligence, reason, or anything similar to these faculties in men ? When nature has so extremely diversified her manner of operation in this small globe ; can we imagine, that she incessantly copies herself throughout so immense a universe ? And if thought, as we may well suppose, be confined merely to this narrow corner, and has even there so limited a sphere of action; with what propriety can we assign it for the original cause of all things? The narrow views of a peasant, who makes his domestic economy the rule for the gov­ ernment of kingdoms, is in comparison a pardonable sophism. But were we ever so much assured, that a thought and reason, resembling the human, were to be found throughout the whole universe, and were its activity else­ where vastly greater and more commanding than it ap­ pears in this globe ; yet I cannot see why the operations of a world constituted, arranged, adjusted, can with any propriety be extended to a world which is in its embryo-state, and is advancing towards that con­ stitution and arrangement. By observation, we know somewhat of the economy, action, and nourishment of �Part IL 31 a finished animal; but we must transfer with great caution that observation to the growth of a foetus in the womb, and still more to the formation of an animalcule in the loins of its male parent. Nature, we find, even from our limited experience, possesses an infinite number of springs and principles, which incessantly discover themselves on every change of her position and situation. And what new and unknown principles would actuate her in so new and unknown a situation as that of the formation of a universe we can­ not, without the utmost temerity, pretend to determine. A very small part of this great system, during a very short time, is very imperfectly discovered to us; and do we thence pronounce decisively concerning the origin of the whole ? Admirable conclusion! Stone, wood, brick, iron, brass, have not, at this time, in this minute globe of earth, an order or arrangement without human art and contrivance: therefore the universe could not originally attain its order and arrangement, without something similar to human art. But is a part of nature a rule for another part very wide of the former ? Is it a rule for the whole ? Is a very small part a rule for the universe ? Is nature in one situation, a certain rule for nature in another situation vastly different from the former ? And can you blame me, Cleanthes, if I here imitate the prudent reserve of Simonides, who, according to the noted story, being asked by Hiero, What God was ? desired a day to think of it, and then two days more; and after that manner continually prolonged the term, without ever ‘bringing in his definition or description 1 Could you even blame me, if I had answered at first, that I did not know, and was sensible that this subject lay vastly beyond the reach of my faculties? You might cry out sceptic and railer, as much as you pleased : but having found, in so many other subjects much more familiar, the imperfections and even con­ tradictions of human reason, I never should expect any �32 Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. success from its feeble conjectures, in a subject so sublime, and so remote from the sphere of our observa­ tion. When two species of objects have always been observed to be conjoined together, I can infer, by custom, the existence of one wherever I see the exist­ ence of the other : and this I call an argument from experience. But how this argument can have place, where the objects, as in the present case, are single, individual, without parallel, or specific resemblance, may be difficult to explain. And will any man tell me with a serious countenance, that an orderly universe must arise from some thought and art, like the human; because we have experience of it ? To ascertain this ■masoning, it were requisite, that we had experience of the origin of worlds; and it is not sufficient, surely, that we have seen ships and cities arise from human art and contrivance. Philo was proceeding in this vehement manner, some­ what between jest and earnest, as it appeared to me ; when he observed some signs of impatience in Cleanthes, and then immediately stopped short. What I had to suggest, said Cleanthes, is only that you would not abuse terms, or make use of popular expressions to subvert philosophical reasonings. You know, that the .vulgar often distinguish reason from experience, even where the question relates only to matter of fact and existence; though it is found, where that reason is properly analyzed, that it is nothing but a species of experience. To prove by experience the origin of the universe from mind, is not more contrary to common speech, than to prove the motion of the earth from the same principle. And a caviller might raise all the same objections to the Copernican system, which you have urged against my reasonings. Have you other earths, might he say, which you have seen to move ? Have .... Yes ! cried Philo, interrupting him, we have other earths. Is not the moon another earth, which we see �Part II. 33 to turn round its centre ? Is not Venus another earth, where we observe the same phenomenon ? Are not the revolutions of the sun also a confirmation, from analogy, of the same theory? All the planets, are they not earths, which revolve about the sun? Are not the satellites moons, which move round Jupiter and Saturn, and along with these primary planets round the sun ? These analogies and resemblances, with others which I have not mentioned, are the sole proofs of the Coper­ nican system: and to you it belongs to consider, whether you have any analogies of the same kind to support your theory. In reality, Cleanthes, continued he, the modern system of astronomy is now so - much received by all inquirers, and has become so essential a part even of our earliest education, that we are not commonly very scrupulous in examining the reasons upon which it is founded. It is now become a matter of mere curiosity to study the first writers on that subject, who had the full force of prejudice to encounter, and were obliged to turn their arguments on every side in order to render them popular and convincing. But if we peruse Galileo’s famous Dialogues concerning-the system of the world, we shall find, that that great genius, one of the sublimest that ever existed, first bent all his endeavours to prove, that there was no foundation for the distinction commonly made between elementary and celestial substances. The schools, proceeding from the illusions of sense, had carried this distinction very far; and had established the latter substances to be ingenerable, incorruptible, unalterable, impassible ; and had assigned all the opposite qualities to the former. But Galileo, beginning with the moon, proved its similarity in every particular to the earth; its convex figure, its natural darkness when not illuminated, its density, its distinc­ tion into solid and liquid, the variations of its phases, the mutual illuminations of the earth and moon, their mutual eclipses, the inequalities of the lunar surface, C �34 Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. &c. After many instances of this kind, with regard to all the planets, men plainly saw that these bodies became proper objects of experience; and that the similarity of their nature enabled us to extend the same arguments and phenomena from one to the other. In this cautious proceeding of the astronomers, you may read your own condemnation, Cleanthes; or rather may see, that the subject in which you are engaged exceeds all human reason and enquiry. Can you pre­ tend to show any such similarity between the fabric of a house, and the generation of a universe? Have you ever seen Nature in any such situation as resembles the first arrangement of the elements ? Have worlds ever been formed under your eye; and have you had leisure to observe the whole progress of the phenomenon, from the first appearance of order to its final consumma­ tion? If you have, then cite your experience, and deliver your theory. PAET III. How the most absurd argument, replied Cleanthes, in the hands of a man of ingenuity and invention, may acquire an air of probability! Are you not aware, Philo, that it became necessary for Copernicus and his first disciples to prove the similarity of the terrestrial and celestial matter; because several philosophers, blinded by old systems, and supported by some sensible appear­ ances, had denied this similarity ? but that it is by no means necessary, that Theists should prove the similarity of the works of Nature to those of Art; because this similarity is self-evident and undeniable ? The same matter, a like form : what more is requisite. to show an analogy between their causes, and to ascertain the origin of all things from a divine purpose and intention? Your objections, I must freely tell you, are no better than the �Part III. 35 abstruse cavils of those philosophers who denied motion ; and ought to be refuted in the same manner, by illustrations, examples, and instances, rather than by serious argument and philosophy. Suppose, therefore, that an articulate voice were heard in the clouds, much louder and more melodious than any which human art could ever reach : suppose, that this voice were extended in the same instant over all nations, and spoke to each nation in its own language and dialect: suppose, that the words delivered not only contain a just sense and meaning, but convey some in­ struction altogether worthy of a benevolent Being, superior to mankind: could you possibly hesitate a moment concerning the cause of this voice 1 and must you not instantly ascribe it to some design or purpose ? Yet I cannot see but all the same objections (if they merit that appellation) which lie against the system of Theism, may also be produced against this inference. Might you not say, that all conclusions concerning fact were founded on experience : that when we hear an articulate voice in the dark, and thence infer a man, it is only the resemblance of the effects which leads us to conclude that there is a like resemblance in the cause: but that this extraordinary voice, by its loudness, extent, and flexibility to all languages, bears so little analogy to any human voice, that we have no reason to suppose any analogy in their causes : and consequently, that a ra­ tional, wise, coherent speech proceeded, you knew not whence, from some accidental whistling of the winds, not from any divine reason or intelligence ? You see clearly your own objections in these cavils ; and I hope too, you see clearly, that they cannot possibly have more force in the one case than in the other. But to bring the case still nearer the present one of the universe, I shall make two suppositions, which imply not any absurdity or impossibility. Suppose, that there is a natural, universal, invariable language, common to every individual of the human race; and that books are �36 Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. natural productions, which, perpetuate themselves in the same manner with animals and vegetables, by descent and propagation. Several expressions of our passions contain a universal language: all brute animals have a natural speech, which, however limited, is very intelli­ gible to their own species. And as there are infinitely fewer parts and less contrivance in the finest composition of eloquence, than in the coarsest organized body, the propagation of an Iliad or JEneid is an easier supposition than that of any plant or animal. Suppose, therefore, that you enter into your library, thus peopled by natural volumes, containing the most refined reason and most exquisite beauty : could you possibly open one of them, and doubt that its original cause bore the strongest analogy to mind and intelli­ gence? When it reasons and discourses; when it expostu­ lates, argues, and enforces its views and topics; when it applies sometimes to the pure intellect, sometimes to the affections ; when it collects, disposes, and adorns every consideration suited to the subject: could you persist in asserting, that all this, at the bottom, had really no meaning; and that the first formation of this volume in the loins of its original parent proceeded not from thought and design? Your obstinacy, I know, reaches not that degree of firmness: even your sceptical play and wanton­ ness would be abashed at so glaring an absurdity. . But if there be any difference, Philo,, between, this supposed case and the real one of the universe, it is all to the advantage of the latter. The anatomy of an animal affords many stronger instances of design than the perusal of Livy or Tacitus: and any objection which you start in the former case, by carrying me back to. so unusual and extraordinary a scene as the first formation of worlds, the same objection has place on the supposi­ tion of our vegetating library. Choose, then, your party, Philo, without ambiguity or evasion : assert either that a rational volume is no proof of a rational cause, or admit of a similar cause to all the works of nature. �Part III. 37 Let me here observe, too, continued Cleanthes, that this religious argument, instead of being weakened by that scepticism so much affected by you, rather acquires force from it, and becomes more firm and undisputed. To exclude all argument or reasoning of every kind, is either affectation or madness. The declared profession of every reasonable sceptic is only to reject abstruse, remote, and refined arguments; to adhere to common sense and the plain instincts of nature; and to assent, wherever any reasons strike him with so full a force, that he cannot, without the greatest violence, prevent it. Now the arguments for natural religion are plainly of this kind ; and nothing but the most perverse, obstinate metaphysics can reject them. Consider, anatomize the eye; survey its structure and contrivance ; and tell me, from your own feeling, if the idea of a contriver does not immediately flow in upon you with a force like that of sensation. The most obvious conclusion, surely, is in favour of design; and it requires time, reflection, and study, to summon up those frivolous, though abstruse objections, which can support Infidelity. Who can behold the male and female of each species, the correspondence of their parts and instincts, their passions, and whole course of life before and after generation, but must be sensible, that the propagation of the species is intended by Nature ? Millions and millions of such instances present themselves through every part of the universe; and no language can convey a more intelli­ gible, irresistible meaning, than the curious adjustment of final causes. To what degree, therefore, of blind dogmatism must one have attained, to reject such natural and such convincing arguments ? Some beauties in writing we may meet with, which seem contrary to rules, and which gain the affections, and animate the imagination, in opposition to all the precepts of criticism, and to the authority of the established masters of art. And if the argument for �38 Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. Theism be, as you pretend,. contradictory to the principles of logic j its universal, its irresistible influence proves clearly, that there may be arguments of a like irregular nature. Whatever cavils may be urged; an orderly world, as well as a coherent, articulate speech, will still be received as an incontest­ able proof of design and intention. It sometimes happens, I own, that the religious arguments have not their due influence on an ignorant savage and barbarian j not because they are obscure and difficult, but because he never asks himself any question with regard to them. Whence arises the curious structure of an animal ? From the copulation of its parents. And these whence? From their parents ? A few removes set the objects at such a distance, that to him they are lost in darkness and confusion j nor is he actuated by any curiosity to trace them farther. But this is neither. dogmatism nor scepticism, but stupidity; a state of mind very different from your sifting, inquisitive disposition, my ingenious friend. You can trace causes from effects : you can compare the most distant and remote objects: and your greatest errors proceed not from barrenness of thought and invention; but from too luxuriant a fertility, which suppresses your natural good sense, by a profusion of unnecessary scruples and objections. Here I could observe, Hermippus, that Philo was a little embarrassed and confounded: but while he hesitated in delivering an answer, luckily for him, Demea broke in upon the dis,course, and saved his countenance. . Your instance, Cleanthes, said he, drawn from books and language, being familiar, has, I confess, so much more force on that account: but is there not. some danger too in this very circumstance ; and. may it not render us presumptuous, by making us imagine we comprehend the Deity, and have some adequate idea Ox his nature and attributes ? When I read a volume, 1 �Part III. 39 enter into the mind and intention of the author: I become him, in a manner, for the instant; and have an immediate feeling and conception of those ideas which revolved in his imagination while employed in that composition. But so near an approach we never surely can make to the Deity. His ways are not our ways. His attributes are perfect, but incomprehensible. And this volume of Nature contains a great and in­ explicable riddle, more than any intelligible discourse or reasoning. The ancient Platonists, you know, were the most religious and devout of all the Pagan philosophers ; yet many of them, particularly Plotinus, expressly declare, that intellect or understanding is not to be •ascribed to the Deity; and that our most perfect worship of him consists, not in acts of veneration, reverence, gratitude, or love; but in a certain mysterious self-annihilation, or total extinction of all our faculties. These ideas are, perhaps, too far stretched ; but still it must be acknowledged, that, by representing the Deity as so intelligible and comprehensible, and so familiar to a human mind, we are guilty of the grossest and most narrow partiality, and make ourselves the model of the whole universe. All the sentiments of the human mind, gratitude, resentment, love, friendship, approbation, blame, pity, emulation, envy, have a plain reference to the state and situation of man, and are calculated for preserving the existence and promoting the activity of such a being in such circumstances. It seems, therefore, unreasonable to transfer such sentiments to a supreme existence, or to suppose him actuated by them; and the phenomena, besides, of the universe will not support us in such a theory. All our ideas derived from the senses are confessedly false and illusive : and cannot, therefore, be supposed to have place in a supreme intelligence: and as the ideas of internal sentiment, added to those of the external senses, �40 Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. compose the whole furniture of human understanding, we may conclude, that none of the materials of thought are in any respect similar in the human and in the divine intelligence. Now as to the manner of think­ ing; how can we make any comparison between them, or suppose them any wise resembling? Our thought is fluctuating, uncertain, fleeting, successive, and compounded; and were we to remove these circumstances, we absolutely annihilate its essence, and it would in such a case be an abuse of terms to apply to it the name of thought or reason. At least, if it appear more pious and respectful (as it really is) still to retain these terms, when we mention the Supreme Being; we ought to acknowledge, that their meaning, in that case, is totally incomprehensible ; and that the infirmities of our nature do not permit us to reach any ideas which in the least correspond to the ineffable sublimity of the divine attributes. PART IV. It seems strange to me, said Cleanthes, that. you, Demea, who are so sincere in the cause of religion, should still maintain the mysterious,, incomprehensible nature of the Deity, and should insist so strenuously that he has no manner of likeness or resemblance to human creatures. The Deity, I can readily, allow, possesses many powers and attributes, of. which we can have no comprehension: but if our ideas, so far as they go, be not just, and adequate, and cor­ respondent to his real nature, I . know not what there is in this subject worth insisting on. Is the name, without any meaning, of such mighty importance? Or how do you IMystics, who maintain the absolute incomprehensibility of the Deity, differ from Sceptics or Atheists, who assert, that the first cause of all is �Part IV. 4i unknown and unintelligible ? Their temerity must be very great, if, after rejecting the production by a mind, I mean a mind resembling the human, (for I know of no other), they pretend to assign, with certainty, any other specific intelligible cause : and their conscience must be very scrupulous indeed, if they refuse to call the universal, unknown cause a God or Deity; and to bestow on him as many sublime eulogies and un­ meaning epithets as you shall please to require of them. Who could imagine, replied Demea, that Cleanthes, the calm, philosophical Cleanthes, would attempt to refute his antagonists, by affixing a nickname to them ; and, like the common bigots and inquisitors of the age, have recourse to invective and declamation, instead of reasoning ? Or does he not perceive, that these topics are easily retorted, and that Anthropomorphite is an appellation as invidious, and implies as dangerous consequences, as the epithet of Mystic, with which he has honoured us ? In reality, Cleanthes, con­ sider what it is you assert when you represent the Deity as similar to a human mind and understanding. What is the soul of man ? A composition of various faculties, passions, sentiments, ideas ; united, indeed, into one self or person, but still distinct from each other. When it reasons, the ideas, which are the parts of its discourse, arrange themselves in a certain form or order ; which is not preserved entire for a moment, but immediately gives place to another arrangement. New opinions, new passions, new affec­ tions, new feelings arise, which continually diversify the mental scene, and produce in it the greatest variety and most rapid succession imaginable. How is this compatible with that perfect immutability and simplicity which all true Theists ascribe to the Deity 1 By the same act, say they, he sees past, present and future : His love and hatred, his mercy and justice, are one individual operation : He is entire in every point of �42 Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. space ; and complete in every instant of duration. No succession, no change, no acquisition, no diminution. What he is implies not in it any shadow of distinction -or diversity. And what he is, this moment, he ever has been, and ever will he, without any new judgment, sentiment, or operation. He stands fixed in one simple, perfect state : nor can you ever say, with any propriety, that this act of his is different from that •other; or that this judgment or idea has been lately formed, and will give place, hy succession, to any -different judgment or idea. I can readily allow, said Cleanthes, that those who maintain the perfect simplicity of the Supreme Being, to the extent in which you have explained it, are complete Mystics, and chargeable with all the con­ sequences which I have drawn from their opinion. They are, in a word, Atheists, without knowing it. For though it be allowed, that the Deity possesses attributes of which we have no comprehension; yet ought we never to ascribe to him any attributes which are absolutely incompatible with that intelligent nature essential to him. A mind, whose acts and sentiments and ideas are not distinct and successive ; one, that is wholly simple, and totally immutable; is a .mind, which has no thought, no reason, no will, no. sentiment, no love, no hatred ; or in a word, is no mind at. all. It is an abuse of terms to give it that appellation; and we may as well speak of limited extension without figure, or of number without composition. Pray consider, said Philo, whom you are at .present inveighing against. You are honouring with . the appellation of Atheist all the sound, orthodox divines, almost, who have treated of this subject; and you will at last be, yourself, found, according to your reckoning, the only sound Theist in the world. But if idolaters be Atheists, as, I think, may justly be asserted, and Christian Theologians the same ; what becomes of the argument, so much celebrated, derived from the universal consent of mankind ? �Part IV. 43 But because I know you are not much swayed by names and authorities, I shall endeavour to show you, a little more distinctly, the inconveniencies of that Anthropomorphism, which you have embraced; and shall prove, that there is no ground to suppose a plan of the world to be formed in the divine mind, con­ sisting of distinct ideas, differently arranged; in the same manner as an architect forms in his head the plan of a house which he intends to execute. It is not easy, I own, to see what is gained by this supposition, whether we judge of the matter by Reason or by Experience. We are still obliged to mount higher, in order to find the cause of this cause, which you had assigned as satisfactory and conclusive. If reason (I mean abstract reason, derived from inquiries a priori) be not alike mute with regard to all questions concerning cause and effect; this sentence at least it will venture to pronounce, That a mental world, or universe of ideas, requires a cause as much as does a material world, or universe of objects; and, if si mil ar in its arrangement, must require a similar cause. For what is there in this subject, which should occa­ sion a different conclusion or inference ? In an abstract view, they are entirely alike ; and no difficulty attends the one supposition, which is not common to both of them. Again, when we will needs force Experience to pro­ nounce some sentence even on these subjects, which lie beyond her sphere; neither can she perceive any material difference in this particular, between these two kinds of worlds; but finds them to be governed by similar principles, and to depend upon an equal variety of causes in their operations. We have specimens in miniature of both of them. Our own mind resembles the one: a vegetable or animal body the other. Let Experience, therefore, judge from these samples. Noth­ ing seems more delicate, with regard to its causes, than thought; and as these causes never operate in two �44 Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. persons after the same manner, so we never find two persons who think exactly alike. Nor indeed does the same person think exactly alike at any two different periods of time. A difference of age, of the disposition of his body, of weather, of food, of company, of books, of passions; any of these particulars, or others more minute, are sufficient to alter the curious machinery of thought, and communicate to it very different move­ ments and operations. As far as we can judge, vegetables and animal bodies are not more delicate in their motions, nor depend upon a greater variety or more curious adjustment of springs and principles. How therefore shall we satisfy ourselves concerning the cause of that Being, whom you suppose the Author of Nature, or, according to your system of Anthro­ pomorphism, the ideal world, into which you trace the material ? Have we not the same reason to trace that ideal world into another ideal world, or new intelligent principle ? But if we stop, and go no further ; why go so far ? Why not stop at the material world 1 How can we satisfy ourselves without going on in infinitum ? And after all, what satisfaction is there in that infinite progression ? Let us remember the story of the Indian philosopher and his elephant. It was never more applicable than to the present subject. If the material world rests upon a similar ideal world, this ideal world must, rest upon some other j and so on, without end. It were better, therefore, never to look beyond the present material world. By supposing it to contain the principle of its order within itself, we really assert it to be God; and the sooner we arrive at that divine Being, so much the better. When you go one step beyond the mundane system, you only excite an inquisitive humour, which it is impossible ever to satisfy. * So long ago as about B.C. 450, the doctrine that the material universe contains the principle of its order within itself had been preached, at Athens, by Anaxagoras, from whom the tragic poet, Euripides, learned it, and embodied it m the fine lines, which have been preserved in the “ Stromata of Clemens Alexandrmus, �Part IV. 45 To say, that the different ideas, which compose the reason of the Supreme Being, fall into order, of them­ selves, and by their own nature, is really to talk with­ out any precise meaning. If it has a meaning, I would fain know, why it is not as good sense to say, that the opas rov wpov rov8’ tiireipov al'Srbpa Kai yqv irbpi^ fy-Oifo’ iiypais1 ev dyKaXais; tovtov vipufe Zrjva, tov8’ 7)yov 'S-ebv. “Do you see on high this boundless ether and holding the Earth in its soft arms ? Consider this to be Zeus, and regard this to be God.” This doctrine was held by Epicurus and other ancient philo­ sophers. It was celebrated by Euripides, Lucretius, Virgil and Shelley. After lying in obscurity during many centuries Hume gave it fair play in his “Dialogues.” Little if any notice was taken of it. The clerics had utterly failed in their attempts to refute the reasoning contained in Hume’s essay “of Miracles.” This may have deterred them from attacking the “Dialogues,” or, more probably, the clerics were unable to understand the arguments contained in the “ Dialogues. ” Be that as it may : so matters remained until at a meeting of the British Association for the Advancement of Science, held at Belfast on the 19th August 1874, Professor Tyndall, in his inaugural address, republished this doctrine. The circumstances under which it was thus ushered into the world rendered it almost impossible that the clerics could safely remain silent and entrust their various and conflicting forms of Christianity to the healing effects of time. On the other hand, as a body, the clerics were wholly ignorant of Hume’s arguments. Very few of them had even read his “Dialogues.” So, on their part it was dangerous to attempt in public the refutation of a doctrine which rested on arguments with which the clerics were wholly unacquainted. But the doctrine had been published and was ringing in the ears of the lay Christians as well as in the ears of the clerics ; and it could not be snuffed out with an exclamation of “Pooh! Pooh!” the favourite rhetoric of Divines. The clerics resolved to do their best —and bad was their best. To an unconcerned observer their con­ duct was ridiculous in the extreme. On the next Sunday (23d August,) during the morning, noon and evening, the pulpits of Belfast reverberated with the screams of the clerics, not one of whom showed that he understood Mr Tyndall’s argument. They shrieked and screamed, and roared and shouted, and ranted and raved about clocks and watches, and stars and planets, and trees and flowers, and “ babbled of green fields ; ” but not one of them touched on Mr Tyndall’s argument, or gave the slightest “ outward and visible sign ” of knowing what it was. �46 Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. parts of the material world fall into order of themselves and by their own nature. Can the one opinion be intelligible, while the other is not so ? Indeed, on that bright and genial Sunday the Belfast clerics furnished a definite illustration of those who are “worse than worst Of those, that lawless and incertain thoughts Imagine howling.” Collaterally with this screaming business, almost all the lay and clerical journals in England, Ireland and Scotland, headed by the “ Times, ” denounced Mr Tyndall “ by bell, book and candlebut not one of the writers in those journals gave the slightest indica­ tion that he understood Mr Tyndall’s argument. But although the clerics throughout these three kingdoms do not appear to have grasped Mr Tyndall’s process of reasoning, they showed a keen, instinctive “ anticipated precognition ” of what his conclusion was likely to be. They suspected that the result would be “the deification of matter. ” And they knew that if this should be effected, not only this our craft is in danger to be set at nought; but also that the temple of the great Trinity should be despised, and his magnificence should be destroyed, whom all Asia and the world worshippeth. Consequently, like their worthy predecessors, (Acts xix, 27, 28) the Christians “ were full of wrath. ” Not being able to refute Mr Tyndall, they reviled him in every possible style. A characteristic element in the sermons preached on that Sunday was an utter disregard of Truth. _ Not one of the preachers even pretended to consider whether it was possible that the material universe did really contain within itself the principle of its own order. All they attempted was to vilify that doctrine and to insult Mr Tyndall. Since the burning of Dr Prestley’s house, in Birmingham, 14th July 1791, the history_ of England does not record such a blind and disgraceful persecution as that contained in the insults hurled at Mr Tyndall on that Aristotle (“Ethics” x. 9,) says, “He who exercises himself in the wav of thought, and does his best to improve it, and has the best mental disposition, seems also to be the most beloved by the gods. Commenting on this passage, an eminent scholar says A very noble and consoling sentiment to those who care little for popular notions, but everything for Truth. It is humiliating to think how immeasurably the Greek philosophers surpassed us of the present dav in this best and holiest of all virtues, love of Truth. While waiting for a settlement of this question, it may be observed that the supposition that matter contains the principle of its own order within itself, and that the present material universe has been arranged by that Principle, is not in the least more difficult to understand than the supposition that the material universe has been created and arranged by a so-called Spirit, infinite m wisdom, power and goodness, of whom we do not know anything, through the medium of his limited and imperfect works. Both suppositions are only hypotheses. �Part IP. 47 We have, indeed, experience of ideas, which fall into order of themselves, and without any known cause : But, I am sure, we have a much larger experience of matter, which does the same; as in all instances of generation and vegetation, where the accurate analysis of the cause exceeds all human comprehension. We have also experience of particular systems of thought and of matter, which have no order : of the first, in madness; of the second, in corruption. Why then should we think, that order is more essential to on© than the other 1 And if it requires a cause in both, what do we gain by your system, in tracing the universe of objects into a similar universe of ideas? The first step, which we make, leads us on for ever. Itwere, therefore, wise in us, to limit all our inquiries to the present world, without looking farther. No satis­ faction can ever be attained by these speculations, which so far exceed the narrow bounds of human under­ standing. It was usual with the Peripatetics, you know, Clean­ thes, when the cause of any phenomenon was demanded, to have recourse to their faculties or occult qualities; and to say, for instance, that bread nourished by its nutritive faculty, and senna purged by its purgative: but it has been discovered, that this subterfuge was nothing but the disguise of ignorance ; and that these philosophers, though less ingenuous, really said the same thing with the sceptics or the vulgar, who fairly confessed that they knew not the cause of these phenomena. In like manner, when it is asked, what cause produces order in the ideas of the Supreme Being; can any other reason be assigned by you, Anthropomorphites, than that it is a rational faculty, and that such is the nature of the Deity ? But why a similar answer will not be equally satisfactory in accounting for theorder of the world, without having recourse to any such intelligent creator as you insist on, may be difficult to determine. It is only to say, that such is the nature. �48 Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. of material objects, and that they are all originally possessed of a faculty of order and proportion. These are only more learned and elaborate ways of confessing our ignorance; nor has the one hypothesis any real advantage above the other, except in its greater conformity to vulgar prejudices. You have displayed this argument with great emphasis, replied Cleanthes: you seem not sensible how easy it is to answer it. Even in common life, if I assign a cause for any event, is it any objection, Philo, that I cannot assign the cause of that cause, and answer every new question which may incessantly be started? And what philosophers could possibly submit to so rigid a rule? philosophers who confess ultimate causes to be totally unknown, and are sensible that the most refined principles into which they trace the phenomena, are still to them as inexpli­ cable as these phenomena themselves are to the vulgar. The order and arrangement of nature, the curious adjustment of final causes, the plain use and intention of every part and organ; all these bespeak in the clearest language an intelligent cause or author. The heavens and the earth join in the same testimony : the whole chorus of Nature raises one hymn to the praises of its Creator: you alone, or almost alone, disturb this general harmony. You start abstruse doubts, cavils, and objections : you ask me, what is the cause of this cause ? I know not; I care not; that concerns not me. I have found a Deity; and here I stop my enquiry. Let those go further, who are wiser or more enterprising. I pretend to be neither, replied Philo : and for that very reason, I should never, perhaps, have. attempted to go so far; especially when I am sensible that 1 must at last be contented to sit down with the same answer, which, without further trouble, might have satisfied me from the beginning. If I am still to remain in utter ignorance of causes, and can absolutely �Part V. 49 give an explication of nothing, I shall never esteem it any advantage to shove off for a moment a difficulty which, you acknowledge, must immediately, in its full force, recur upon me. Naturalists indeed very justly explain particular effects by more general causes• though these general causes themselves should remain in the end totally inexplicable : but they never surely thought it satisfactory to explain a particular effect by a particular cause, which was no more to be accounted for than the effect itself. An ideal system, arranged of itself, without a precedent design, is not a whit more explicable than a material one, which attains its order in a like manner; nor is there any more difficulty in the latter supposition than in the former. PART V. But to show you still more inconveniencies, continued Philo, in your Anthropomorphism; please to take a new survey of your principles. Like effects prove like causes. This is the experimental argument; and this, you say, too, is the sole theological argument. Now it is certain, that the liker the effects are which are seen, and the liker the causes which are inferred, the stronger is the argument. Every departure on either side diminishes the probability, and renders the experiment less conclusive. You cannot doubt of the principle: neither ought you to reject its conse­ quences. All the new discoveries in astronomy, which prove the immense grandeur and magnificence of the works of Nature, are so many additional arguments for a Deity, according to the true system of Theism : but, accord­ ing to your hypothesis of experimental Theism, they become so many objections, by removing the effect still further from all resemblance to the effects of human art and contrivance. For if Lucretius, D �50 Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. even, following the old system of the world, could exclaim, Quis regere immensi summam, quis habere profundi Indu manu validas potis est moderanter habenas ? Quis pariter ccelos omnes convertere ? et omnes Ignibus setheriis terras suffire feraces ? Omnibus inque locis esse omni tempore prtesto ? * If Cicero esteemed this reasoning so natural as to put it into the mouth of his Epicurean : Quibus enim oculis animi intueri potuit wester Plato fabricam illarn tanti operis, qua construi a Deo atque cedificarl mundum facit? quoemolitio? quae ferramenta 1 quivectes? quat machines ? qui ministri tanti muneris fuerunt ? quernadmodum, autern obedire et parere voluntati architect aer, ignis, aqua, terra potuerunt If If this argument, I say, had any force in former ages ; how much greater must it have at present; when the bounds of Nature are so infinately enlarged, and such a magnificent scene is opened to us ? It -is still more unreasonable to form our idea of so unlimited a cause from our experience of the narrow productions of human design and invention. The discoveries by microscopes, as they open a new universe in miniature, are still objections, according to you, arguments, according to me. The farther we push our researches of this kind, we are still led to infer the universal cause of all to be vastly different from man­ kind, or from any object of human experience and observation. * Bk. ii. 1094.—“ Who is able to rule"the whole of this immen­ sity ? Who can hold in his hand, with power to guide them, thestrong reins of this unlimited expanse ? Who can, at the same time, turn round all the heavens, and warm all the Earth with ethereal fires ? or, who can be, at the same moment, present in all places. ” + De nat. Deor. lib. i. . “ With what mental vision could your Plato behold that fabric involving so much labour, by which he represents the world to have been arranged and erected by Divine Providence ? What contrivance was there ? What iron instruments ? What levers . What engines ? What servants were there in so great a work. Besides, in what way could fire, air, earth and water be caused to obey and submit to the will of the architect ? ” �Part K. 51 And what say you to the discoveries in anatomy, chemistry, botany ? . . . . These surely are no objec­ tions, replied Cleanthes: they only discover new in­ stances of art and contrivance. It is still the image of mind reflected on us from innumerable objects. Add, a mind like the human, said Philo. I know of no other, replied Cleanthes. And the liker the better, insisted Philo. To be sure, said Cleanthes. Now, Cleanthes, said Philo, with an air of alacrity and triumph, mark the consequences. First, By this method of reasoning, you renounce all claim to infinity in any of the attributes of the Deity. For as the cause ought only to be proportioned to the effect; and the effect, so far as it falls under our cognizance, is not in­ finite ; what pretensions, have we, upon your supposi­ tions, to ascribe that attribute to the divine Being? You will still insist, that, by removing him so much from all similarity to human creatures, we give in to the most arbitrary hypothesis, and at the same time weaken all proofs of his existence. Secondly, You have no reason, on your theory, for ascribing perfection to the Deity, even in his finite capacity; or for supposing him free from every error, mistake, or incoherence, in his undertakings. There are many inexplicable difficulties in the works of Nature, which, if we allow a perfect author to be proved a priori, are easily solved, and become only seeming difficulties, from the narrow capacity of man, who cannot trace in­ finite relations. But according to your method of reasoning, these difficulties become all real; and perhaps will be insisted on, as new instances of likeness to human art and contrivance. At least, you must acknowledge, that it is impossible for us to tell, from our limited views, whether this system contains any great faults, or deserves any considerable praise, if compared to other possible, and even real systems. Could a peasant, if the JEneid were read to him, pronounce that poem to be absolutely faultless, or even assign to it its proper �52 Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. among the productions of human wit; he, who had never seen any other production ? But were this world ever so perfect a production, it must still remain uncertain, whether all the excellencies of the work can justly be ascribed to the workman. If we survey a ship, what an exalted idea must we form of the ingenuity of the carpenter who framed so com­ plicated, useful, and beautiful a machine?. And what surprise must we feel, when we find him a stupid mechanic, who imitated others, and copied an art, which, through a long succession of ages, after multiplied trials, mistakes, corrections, deliberations, and controversies had been gradually improving? Many worlds might have been botched and bungled, throughout an eternity, ere this system wTas struck out; much labour lost; many fruitless trials made; and a slow, but continued improve­ ment carried on during infinite ages in the art of world­ making. In such subjects, who can determine, where the truth; nay, who can conjecture where the probability, lies • amidst a great number of hypotheses which may be proposed, and a still greater number which may be imagined ? . ™ ... And what shadow of an argument, continued Philo, can you produce, from your hypothesis, to prove the unity of the Deity? A great number of men join, m building a house or ship, in rearing a city, in framing a commonwealth : why may not several deities combine in contriving and framing a world ? This is only so much greater similarity to human affairs By sharing the work among several, we may so much farther.limit t e attributes of each, and get rid of that extensive power and knowledge, which must be supposed in one deity, and which, according to you, can only serve to weaken the proof of his existence. And if such, foolish, such vicious creatures as man, can yet often unite m framing and executing one plan; how much more those deities or daemons, whom we may suppose several degrees more perfect ? �Part V. 53 To multiply causes, without necessity, is indeed con­ trary to true philosophy : but this principle applies not to the present case. Were one deity antecedently proved by your theory, who were possessed of every attribute requisite to the production of the universe ; it would be needless, I own, (though not absurd), to suppose any other deity existent. But while it is still a question, whether all these attributes are united in one subject, or dispersed among several independent beings ; by what phenomena in nature can we pretend to decide the controversy ? Where we see a body raised in a scale, we are sure that there is in the opposite scale, however concealed from sight, some counterpoising weight equal to it: but it is still allowed to doubt, whether that weight be an aggregate of several distinct bodies, or one uniform united mass. And if the weight requisite very much exceeds anything which we have ever seen conjoined in any single body, the former supposition becomes still more probable and natural. An intelligent being of such vast power and capacity as is necessary to produce the universe, or, to speak in the language of ancient philosophy, so prodigious an animal, exceeds all analogy, and even comprehension. But further: Cleanthes, men are mortal, and renew their species by generation; and this is common to all living creatures. The two great sexes of male and female, says Milton, animate the world. Why must this circumstance, so universal, so essential, be excluded from those numerous and limited deities ? Behold, then, the theogony of ancient times brought back upon us. And why not become a perfect Anthropomorphite ? Why not assert the deity or deities to be corporeal, and to have eyes, a nose, mouth, ears, &c. 1 Epicurus main­ tained, that no man had ever seen reason but in a hu­ man figure; therefore the gods must have a human figure. And this argument, which is deservedly somuch ridiculed by Cicero, becomes, according to you,, solid and philosophical. �54 Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. In a word, Cleanthes, a man, who follows your hypothesis, is able, perhaps, to assert, or conjecture, that the universe, sometime, arose from something like design: but beyond that position he cannot ascertain one single circumstance; and is left afterwards to fix every point of his theology, by the utmost licence of fancy and hypothesis. This world, for aught he knows, is very faulty and imperfect, compared to a superior standard; and was only the first rude essay of some infant deity, who afterwards, abandoned it, ashamed of his lame performance: it is the work only of some dependent, inferior deity, and is the object of derision to his superiors : it is the production of old age and dotage in some superannuated deity; and ever since his death, has run on at adventures, from the first im­ pulse and active force which it received from him. You justly give signs of horror, Demea, at these strange suppositions j but these, and a thousand more of the same kind, are Cleanthes’s suppositions, not mine. From the moment the attributes of the Deity are supposed finite, all these have place. And I cannot, for my part, thiuk, that so wild and unsettled a system of theology is, in any respect, preferable to none at all. These suppositions I absolutely disown, cried Clean­ thes : they strike me, however, with no horror; especially, when proposed in that rambling way in which they drop from you. On the contrary, they give me pleasure, when I see, that, by the utmost in­ dulgence of your imagination, you never get rid of the hypothesis of design in the universe; but are obliged at every turn to have recourse to it. To this concession I adhere steadily ; and this I regard as a sufficient foundation for religion. �Part VI. 55 PART VI. It must be a slight fabric, indeed, said Demea, which can be erected on so tottering a foundation. While we are uncertain, whether there is one deity or many; whether the deity or deities, to whom we owe our existence, be perfect or imperfect, subordinate or supreme, dead or alive; what trust or confidence can we repose in them ? What devotion or worship address to them ? What veneration or obedience pay them ? To all the purposes of life, the theory of religion be­ comes altogether useless : and even with regard to speculative consequences, its uncertainty, according to you, must render it totally precarious and unsatisfactory. To render it still more unsatisfactory, said Philo, there occurs to me another hypothesis, which must acquire an air of probability from the method of rea­ soning so much insisted on by Cleanthes. That like effects arise from like causes : this principle he supposes the foundation of all religion. But there is another principle of the same kind, no less certain, and derived from the same source of experience; that where several known circumstances are observed to be similar, the un­ known will also be found similar. Thus, if we see the limbs of a human body, we conclude, that it is also attended with a human head, though hid from us. Thus, if we see, through a chink in a wall, a small part of the sun, we conclude, that, were the wall removed, we should see the whole body. In short, this method of reasoning is so obvious and familiar, that no scruple can ever be made with regard to its solidity. Now if we survey the universe, so far as it falls under our knowledge, it bears a great resemblance to an animal or organized body, and seems actuated with a like principle of life and motion. A continual cir­ culation of matter in it produces no disorder : a contin­ �56 Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. • ual waste in every part is incessantly repaired : the closest sympathy is perceived throughout the entire system: and each part or member, in performing its proper offices, operates both to its own preservation and to that of the whole. The world, therefore, I infer, is an animal; and the Deity is the soul of the world, actuating it and actuated by it. You have too much learning, Cleanthes, to be at all surprised at this opinion, which, you know, was main­ tained by almost all the Theistsof antiquity, and chiefly prevails in their discourses and reasonings. For though sometimes the ancient philosophers reason from final causes, as if they thought the world the workmanship of God; yet it appears rather their favourite notion to consider it as his body, whose organization renders it subservient to him. And it must be confessed, that as the universe resembles more a human body than it does the works of human art and contrivance ; if our limited analogy could ever, with any propriety, be extended to the whole of nature, the inference seems juster in favour of the ancient than the modern theory. There are many other advantages, too, in the former theory, which recommended it to the ancient theolo­ gians. Nothing more repugnant to all their notions, because nothing more repugnant to common experience, than mind without body; a mere spiritual substance, which fell not under their senses nor comprehension,, and of which they had not observed one single instance throughout all nature. Mind and body they knew, because they felt both : an order, arrangement, organi­ zation, or internal machinery, in both, they likewise knew, after the same manner: and it could not but seem reasonable to transfer this experience to the universe; and to suppose the divine mind and body tobe also coeval, and to have, both of them, order and arrangement naturally inherent in them, and insepar­ able from them. Here, therefore, is a new species of Anthropomor­ �Part VI. 57 phism, Cleanthes, on which you may deliberate; and a theory which seems not liable to any considerable difficulties. You are too much superior, surely, to systematical prejudices, to find any more difficulty in. supposing an animal body to be, originally, of itself, or from unknown causes, possessed of order and organization, than in supposing a similar order to belong to mind. But the vulgar prejudice, that body and mind ought always to accompany each other, ought not, one should think, to be entirely neglected; since it is founded on vulgar experience, the only guide which you profess to follow in all these theological inquiries. And if you assert that our limited experi­ ence is an unequal standard, by which to judge of the unlimited extent of nature, you entirely abandon your own hypothesis, and must thenceforward adopt our Mysticism, as you call it, and admit of the absolute incomprehensibility of the Divine Nature. This theory, I own, replied Cleanthes, has never before occurred to me, though, a pretty natural one; and I cannot readily, upon so short an examination and reflection, deliver any opinion with regard to it. You are very scrupulous, indeed, said Philo : were I to examine any system of yours, I should not have acted with half that caution and reserve, in starting objections and difficulties to it. However, if anything occur to you, you will oblige us by proposing it. Why then, replied Cleanthes, it seems to me, that, though the world does, in many circumstances, re­ semble an animal body; yet is the analogy also defective in many circumstances, the most material : no organs of sense ; no seat of thought or reason; no one precise origin of motion and action. In short, it seems to bear a stronger resemblance to a vegetable than to an animal, and your inference would be so far inconclusive in favour of the soul of the world. But in the next place, your theory seems to imply the eternity of the world; and that is a principle,. �58 Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. which, I think, can be refuted by the strongest reasons and probabilities. I shall suggest an argument to this purpose, which, I believe, has not been insisted on by any writer. Those who reason from the late origin of arts and sciences, though their inference wants not force, may perhaps be refuted by considerations derived from the nature of human society, which is in continual revolution, between ignorance and knowledge, liberty and slavery, riches and poverty ; so that it is impossible for us, from our limited experience, to foretell with assurance what events may or may not be expected. Ancient learning and history seem to have been in great danger of entirely perishing after the inundation of the barbarous nations ; and had these convulsions ■continued a little longer, or been a little more violent, we should not probably have now known what passed in the world a few centuries before us. Nay, were it not for the superstition of the Popes, who preserved a little jargon of Latin, in order to support the appearance of an ancient and universal church, that tongue must have been utterly lost: in which case, the western world, being totally barbarous, would not have been in a fit disposition for receiving the Greek language and learning, which was conveyed to them after the sacking of Constantinople. When learning and books had been extinguished, even the mechanical arts would have fallen considerably to decay; and it is easily imagined, that fable or tradition might ascribe to them a much later origin than the true one. This vulgar argument, therefore, against the eternity of the world, seems a little precarious. But here appears to be the foundation of a better argument. Lucullus was the first that brought cherrytrees from Asia to Europe ; though that tree thrives so well in many European climates, that it grows in the woods without any culture. Is it possible, that, throughout a whole eternity, no European had ever passed into Asia, and thought of transplanting so �Part VI. 59 delicious a fruit into his own country ? Or if the tree was once transplanted and propagated, how could it ever afterwards perish ? Empires may rise and fall; liberty and slavery succeed alternately; ignorance and knowledge give place to each other; but the cherrytree will still remain in the woods of Greece, Spain, and Italy, and will never be affected by the revolutions of human society. It is not two thousand years since vines were trans­ planted into France ; though there is no climate in the world more favourable to them. It is not three centuries since horses, cows, sheep, swine, dogs, corn, were known in America. Is it possible, that, during the revolutions of a whole eternity, there never arose a Columbus, who might open the communication between Europe and that continent ? We may as well imagine, that all men would wear stockings for ten thousand years, and never have the sense to think of garters to tie them. All these seem convincing proofs of the youth, or rather infancy, of the world ; as being founded on the operation of principles more constant and steady than those by which human society is governed and directed. Nothing less than a total convulsion of the elements will ever destroy all the European animals and vegetables which are now to be found in the Western world. And what argument have you against such convul­ sions, replied Philo. Strong and’ almost incontestible proofs may be traced over the whole earth, that every part of this globe has continued for many ages entirely covered with water. And though order were supposed inseparable from matter, and inherent in it; yet may matter be susceptible of many and great revolutions, through the endless periods of eternal duration. The incessant changes, to which every part of it is subject, seem to intimate some such general transformations ; though at the same time it is observable, that all the -changes and corruptions of which We have ever had �60 Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. experience, are but passages from one state of order to another; nor can matter ever rest in total deformity and confusion. What we see in the parts, we may infer in the whole ; at least, that is the method of reasoning on which you rest your whole theory. And were I obliged to defend- any particular system of thisnature (which I never willingly should do), I esteem none more plausible than that which ascribes an eternal inherent principle of order to the world; though attended with great and continual revolutions; and alterations. This at once solves all difficulties; and if the solution, by being so general, is not entirely com­ plete and satisfactory, it is at least a theory that we must, sooner or later, have recourse to, whatever system we embrace. How could things have been as they are, were there not an original, inherent principle of order somewhere, in thought or in matter ? And it is very indifferent to which of these we give the pre­ ference. Chance has no place, on any hypothesis, sceptical or religious. Everything is surely governed by steady, inviolable laws. And were the inmost essence of things laid open to us, we should then discover a scene, of which, at present, we can have no idea. Instead of admiring the order of natural beings, we should clearly see, that it was absolutely impossible for them, in the smallest article, ever to admit of any other disposition. Were any one inclined to revive the ancient Pagan Theology, which maintained, as. we learn from Hesiod, that this globe was governed by 30,000 deities, who arose from the unknown powers of nature : you would naturally object, Cleanthes, that nothing is gained by this hypothesis ; and that it is as easy to suppose all men and animals, beings more numerous, but less perfect, to have sprung immediately from a like origin. Push the same inference a step farther ; and you will find a numerous! society of deities as explicable as one universal deity, who possesses, within himself, the �Part VI. 61 powers and perfections of the whole society. All these systems, then, of Scepticism, Polytheism, and Theism, you must allow, on your principles, to be on a like footing, and that no one of them has any advantage over the others. You may thence learn the fallacy of your principles. TURNBULL AND SPEARS, PRINTERS, EDINBURGH. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Victorian Blogging Description An account of the resource A collection of digitised nineteenth-century pamphlets from Conway Hall Library &amp; Archives. This includes the Conway Tracts, Moncure Conway's personal pamphlet library; the Morris Tracts, donated to the library by Miss Morris in 1904; the National Secular Society's pamphlet library and others. The Conway Tracts were bound with additional ephemera, such as lecture programmes and handwritten notes.<br /><br />Please note that these digitised pamphlets have been edited to maximise the accuracy of the OCR, ensuring they are text searchable. If you would like to view un-edited, full-colour versions of any of our pamphlets, please email librarian@conwayhall.org.uk.<br /><br /><span><img src="http://www.heritagefund.org.uk/sites/default/files/media/attachments/TNLHLF_Colour_Logo_English_RGB_0_0.jpg" width="238" height="91" alt="TNLHLF_Colour_Logo_English_RGB_0_0.jpg" /></span> Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Conway Hall Library & Archives Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2018 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Conway Hall Ethical Society Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Original Format The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data Pamphlet Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Dialogues concerning natural religion Description An account of the resource Edition: New ed. Place of publication: London Collation: 61 p. ; 18 cm. Notes: Includes bibliographical references. From the library of Dr Moncure Conway. 'A new Edition, with a Preface and Notes, which bring the Subject down to the present time'. [Title page]. Printed by Turnbull and Spears, Edinburgh. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Hume, David [1711-1776] Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Thomas Scott Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource [1875] Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CT210 Subject The topic of the resource Theology Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource <a href="http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/mark/1.0/"><img src="http://i.creativecommons.org/p/mark/1.0/88x31.png" alt="Public Domain Mark" /></a><span> </span><br /><span>This work (Dialogues concerning natural religion), identified by </span><a href="https://conwayhallcollections.omeka.net/items/show/www.conwayhall.org.uk"><span>Humanist Library and Archives</span></a><span>, is free of known copyright restrictions.</span> Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource application/pdf Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Language A language of the resource English Conway Tracts Natural Theology Religion-Philosophy https://d1y502jg6fpugt.cloudfront.net/25778/archive/files/40046674e3800d115e995cd2b9cb5b9c.pdf?Expires=1776902400&Signature=U5tP7Hm6HpxGatTBfpQAGyKuZ4iNkkosutHYrAElqESLVMCYI2fALrLxA9JNXBlRLlJA6BM7J-DvZw2A6cCh3QVYIxPaOQ%7EhYlo6%7EROLWLcywS0Eyj2gYXzFhajGZMHGXtZEaiAz7VOVaKzUOq3d7WIIX7z5jv-Vrg2g74gIihH2fLAa4wfoh1I3xPULgSfHLZWp8jsrrJEE-XEFSUtDQxwooR09yWUBHQvyV-xCUVKZ38xacm-C-V%7EyGMe1pZE%7EGBY7YG2ZSh8SnFIw5-zpy%7EYHMHMomoqtCeMV9-PLTiK5BqAeloYsMBaFoRgep%7EQYJovVgBM99ScYBsBPeg8MCw__&Key-Pair-Id=K6UGZS9ZTDSZM dfda06568c88fc6c0257c224f761b4e7 PDF Text Text NATIONAL SECULAR SOCIETY THE MORTALITY OB' the soul BY . DAVID HUME. Reprinted from the Original Edition of liS-> WITH An Introduction by G. AV. Foote. Price Twopence. LONDON progressive PUBLISHING company, 28 Stonecutter Street, E.O. 1890. �LONDON: TRUSTED AND PUBLISHED BY G. W. FOOTE AT 2ft STONECUTTER STREET, E.C. �1 ’’W'W N T RO DUCT I ON. By G. W. FOOTE. à i 'I I 3 i 1 q rl u q » fi. it Referring to David Hume, in his lecture on the Physical m ine rny Basis of Life, Professor Huxley speaks of “ the vigor of thought and the exquisite clearness of style of the man whom I make bold to term the most acute thinker of the eighteenth century —even though that century produced Kant.”* Even Carlyle assigns Hume a place “ among the greatest,”! which for a writer like Carlyle to a thinker like Hume is a remarkable tribute. No less clearly is the Scotch philosopher’s greatness acknowledged by Joseph de Maistre, the foremost champion of the Papacy in this century. “ I believe,” he says, “taking all into account, that the eighteenth century, so fertile in this respect, did not produce a single enemy of religion who can be compared with him. His cold venom is far more dangerous than the foaming rage of Voltaire. If ever, among men who have heard the gospel preached, there has existed a veritable Atheist (which I will not undertake to decide) it is he. + Hume’s influence has been felt through the whole course of philosophy since his day, and the writings of such a man—so lucid, yet so profound; so acute, yet so comprehensive—can never be neglected. Upon religious topics, no less than on political and philosophical, he was singularly penetrative. His Essay on Miracles is the starting-point of all subsequent dis­ cussions of that most vital element of the Christian faith; his Natural History of Religion strikingly anticipates many of the teachings of modern Evolution; and his Dialogues on * Lay Sermons and Addresses, p. 141. t Essays (People’s Edition), vol. iv., p. 130. t Lettres sur I’Inquisition, pp. 147, 148. �iv. Introduction. Religion turn the arguments of Theism in every possible light, leaving little but elaboration to his successors. In the ordinary editions of Hume’s Essays the following reprint is not to be found. This essay was published for- the first time after his death, at Edinburgh, in 1789, by C. Hunter, Par­ liament Square. It was the second of two posthumous essays, the first being a remarkable essay on Suicide. A copy of the original edition has been faithfully followed in this reprint. Not a word has been changed, but such forms as “ ’tis ” have been brought into accord with the sedater fashion of to-day, and the frequent dashes in the midst of long passages have been treated as the marks of fresh paragraphs. Professor Huxley, whose thoroughness is apparent to all who follow him, gives the title of this essay On the Immortality of the Soul, but the word used on the original title-page is mortality, which indicates the author’s argument. This is a mere inadvertence, however, for Huxley is well acquainted with the essay, and gives long extracts from it in his splendid little volume on Hume. He calls it a “ remarkable essay,” * and “ a model of clear and vigorous statement.” It long remained but little known, but “ possibly for that reason its influence has been manifested in unexpected quarters, and its main arguments have been adduced by archiépiscopal and episcopal authority in evidence of the value of revelation. Dr. Whately, sometime Archbishop of Dublin, paraphrases Hume, though he forgets to cite him ; and Bishop Courtenay’s elabo­ rate work, dedicated to the Archbishop, is a development of that prelate’s version of Hume’s essay.” Anyone who turns to the first essay in Whately’s Some Peculiarities of the Christian Religion will perceive the truth of these remarks, at least with respect to the Archbishop. Sometimes he follows Hume step by step, and even uses his very illustrations. But Hume himself had doubtless profited by the arguments of Anthony Collins in his replies to Dr. Samuel Clarke’s letters to Dodwell. Clarke argued for the Immateriality of the Soul, and Collins for its Materiality ; and, as Huxley elsewhere admits, Collins had by far the best of the discussion. He wrote, says Huxley, with “ wonderful power and closeness of reasoning,” and “in this battle the Goliath of * Hume, English Men of Letters Series. �Introduction. V. Freethinking overcame the champion of what was considered * Orthodoxy. Some readers may notice one omission in Hume’s essay. He does not refer, as Huxley remarks, to “ the sentimental argu­ ments for the immortality of the soul which are so much in vogue at the present day,” and a perhaps he did not think them worth notice.” But he does fence them by anticipation in saying thata All doctrines are to be suspected which are favored by our passions.” Nothing but man’s overweening egotism could induce him to think that he will live for ever because he would like to; and that such an argument for a future life should be put forward by theologians, only proves what is so obvious on many other grounds, that religion, with all its fine pretences, is constantly appealing to the blind irrationality of individual selfishness. We must conclude this Preface with a word of warning to the reader. Let him not be misled by the opening and closing paragraphs of Hume’s essay into supposing that the great sceptic deferred to the authority of Revelation. They are only his ironical bows to orthodoxy. He indulges in the same gestures in his Essay on Miracles. This has brought upon him, as it brought upon Gibbon, a charge of disingenuousness. But both of those masters of irony were perfectly aware that every sensible man understood them. If they wore a mask, it was transparent, and did not conceal their features; and those who upheld the Blasphemy Laws for the persecution of Freethinkers, had no right to complain when conformity was yielded with an expressive grimace. Critiques and Adresses, “ The Metaphysics of Sensation.’ ��The Mortality of the Soul. By DAVID HUME. By the mere light of reason it seems difficult to prove the Immortality of the Soul; the arguments for it are commonly derived either from metaphysical topics, or moral or physical. But in reality it is the Gospel and the Gospel alone, that has brought 'ft/e and immor­ tality to light. I. Metaphysical topics suppose that the Soul is immaterial, and that it is impossible for thought to belong to a material substance. But just metaphysics teach us that the notion of substance is wholly confused and imperfect, and that we have no other idea of any substance, than as an aggregate of particular qualities, inhering in an unknown something. Matter, there­ fore, and spirit, are at bottom equally unknown, and we cannot determine what qualities inhere in the one or in the other. They likewise teach us that nothing can be decided a priori concerning any cause or effect and that experience being the only source of our judg­ ments of this nature we cannot know from any other principle, whether matter by its structure or arrange­ ment, may not be the cause of thought. Abstract reasonings cannot decide any question of fact or existence. But admitting a spiritual substance to be dispersed throughout the universe, like the etherial fire of the Stoics, and to be the only inherent subject of �8 The Mortality of the Soul. thought, we have reason to conclude from analogy that nature uses it after the same manner she does the other substance matter. She employs it as a kind of paste or clay; modifies it into a variety of forms and existences ; dissolves after a time each modification, and from its substance erects a new form. As the same material substance may successively compose the body of all .animals, the same spiritual substance may compose their minds. Their consciousness, or that system of thought which they formed during life may be con­ tinually dissolved by death. And nothing interests them in the new modification. The most positive assertors of the morality of the Soul, never denied the immortality of its substance. And that an immaterial substance as well as a material, may lose its memory or consciousness appears in part from experience, if the Soul be immaterial. Reasoning from the common course of nature, and without supporting any new interposition of the supreme cause, which ought always to be excluded from philosophy, what is incorruptible must also be ingenerable. The Soul therefore, if immortal, existed before our birth; and if the former existence no ways concerned us, neither will the latter. Animals undoubtedly feel, think, love, hate, will, and even reason, though in a more imperfect manner than men ; are their Souls also immaterial and immortal ? II. Let us now consider the moral arguments, chiefly those derived from the justice of God, which is sup­ posed to be farther interested in the farther punish­ ment of the vicious and reward of the virtuous. But these arguments are grounded on the supposition that God has attributes beyond what he has exerted in this universe, with which alone we are acquainted. Whence do we infer the existence of these attributes ? �The Mortality of the Soul. 9 It is very safe for us to affirm that whatever we know the Deity to have actually done, is best; but it is very dangerous to affirm, that he must always do what to us seems best. In how many instances would this reasoning fail us with regard to the present world ? But if any purpose of nature be clear, we may affirm, that the whole scope and intention of man’s creation, so far as we can judge by natural reason, is limited to the present life. With how weak a concern from the original inherent structure of the mind and passions, does he ever look farther ? What comparison either for steadiness or efficacy, betwixt so floating an idea, and the most doubtful persuasion of any matter of fact that occurs in common life. There arise indeed in some minds some unaccountable terrors with regard to futurity; but these would quickly vanish were they not artificially fostered by precept and education. And those who foster them ; what is their motive ? Only to gain a livelihood, and to acquire power and riches in this world. Their very zeal and industry therefore is an argument against them. What cruelty, what iniquity, what injustice in nature, to confine all our concern, as well as all our knowledge, to the present life, if there be another scene still waiting us, of infinitely greater consequence ? Ought this barbarous deceit to be ascribed to a benificent and wise being ? Observe with what exact proportion the task to be performed and the performing powers are adjusted throughout all nature. If the reason of man gives him a great superiority above other animals, his neces­ sities are proporti onably multiplied upon him ; his whole time, his whole capacity, activity, courage, passion, find sufficient employment in fencing against the miseries of his present condition, and frequently, �10 The Mortality of the Soul. nay almost always, are too slender for the business assigned them. A pair of shoes perhaps was never yet wrought to the highest degree of perfection which that commodity is capable of attaining. Yet it is necessary, at least very useful, that there should be some politicians and moralists, even some geometers, poets and philosophers among mankind. The powers of men are no more superior to their wants, considered merely in this life, than those of foxes and hares are, compared to their wants, and to their period of existence. The inference from parity of reason is therefore obvious. On the theory of the Soul’s mortality, the inferiority of women’s capacity is easily accounted for. Their domestic life requires no higher faculties, either of mind or body. This circumstance vanishes and becomes absolutely insignificant, on the religious theory : The one sex has an equal task to perform as the other ; their powers of reason and resolution ought also to have been equal and both of them infinitely greater than at present. As every effect implies a cause, and that another, till we reach the first cause of all, which is the Deity ; everything that happens is ordained by him, and nothing can be the object of his punishment or vengeance. By what rule are punishments and rewards dis­ tributed ? What is the divine standard of merit and demerit? Shall we suppose that human sentiments have place in the Deity ? How bold that hypothesis. We have no conception of any other sentiments. According to human sentiments, sense, courage, good manners, industry, prudence, genius, etc., are essential parts of personal merits. Shall we therefore erect an asylum for poets and heroes like that of the ancient mythology ? Why confine all rewards to one species of virtue? Punishment without any proper end or �The Mortality of the Soul. 11 purpose is inconsistent with our ideas of goodness and justice, and no end can be served by it after the whole scene is closed. Punishment according to our concep­ tion, should bear some proportion to the offence. Why then eternal punishment for the temporary offences of so frail a creature as man ? Can anyone approve of Alexander's rage, who intended to exterminate a whole nation because they had seized his favorite horse Bucephalus ? * Heaven and Hell suppose two distinct species of men, the good and the bad ; but the greatest part of mankind float betwixt vice and virtue. Were one to go round the world with an intention of giving a good supper to the righteous, and a sound drubbing to the wicked, he would frequently be embarrassed in his choice, and would find that the merits and demerits of most men and women scarcely amount to the value of either. To suppose measures of approbation and blame different from the human confounds everything. Whence do we learn that there is such a thing as moral distinctions, but from our own sentiments ? What man who has not met with personal provocation (or what good natured man who has) could inflict on crimes, from the sense of blame alone, even the com­ mon. legal, frivolous punishments ? And does anything steel the breast of judges and juries against the senti­ ments of humanity but reflection on necessity and public interest? By the Roman law those who had been guilty of parricide and confessed their crime, were put into a sack along with an ape, a dog, and a serpent and thrown into the river. Death alone was the punishment of those who denied their guilt, how­ ever fully proved. A criminal was tried before Quint. Curtius lib. vi., cap. 5. �12 The Mortality of the Soul. Augustus and condemned after a full conviction, but the humane emperor when he put the last interrogatory, gave it such a turn as to lead the wretch into a denial of his guilt. “ You surely (said the prince) did not kill your father.”* This lenity suits our natural ideas of right even towards the greatest of all criminals, and even though it prevents so inconsiderable a sufferance. Nay even the most bigoted priest would naturally without reflection approve of it, provided the crime was not heresy or infidelity ; for as these crimes hurt himself in his temporal interest and advantages, perhaps he may not be altogether so indulgent to them. The chief source of moral ideas is the reflection on the interest of human society. Ought these interests so short, so frivolous, to be guarded by punishments eternal and infinite ? The damnation of one man is an infinitely greater evil in the universe than the sub­ version of a thousand millions of kingdoms. Nature has rendered human infancy peculiarly frail and mortal, as in were on purpose to refute the notion of a probationary state ; the half of mankind die bfore they are rational creatures. III. The Physical arguments from the analogy of nature are strong for the mortality of the soul, and are really the only philosophical arguments which ought to be admitted with regard to this question, or indeed any question of fact. Where any two objects are so closely connected that all alterations which we have ever seen in the one, are attended with proportional alterations in the other ; we ought to conclude by all rules of analogy, that, when there are still greater alterations produced in the former, and it is totally dissolved, there follows a total dissolution of the latter. * Suet. Augus. cap. 3. �The Mortality of the Soul. 13 Sleep, a very small effect on the body, is attended with a temporary extinction, at least a great confusion of the soul. The weakness of the body and that of the mind in infancy are exactly proportioned, their vigor in man­ hood, their sympathetic disorder in sickness, their common gradual decay in old age. The step further seems unavoidable ; their common dissolution in death. The last symptoms which the mind discovers are dis­ order, weakness, insensibility, stupidity, the fore­ runners of its annihilation. The farther progress of the same causes increasing, the same effects totally extinguish it. Judging by the usual analogy of nature, no form can continue when transferred to a condition of life very different from the original one, in which it was placed. Trees perish in the water, fishes in the air, animals in the earth. Even so small a difference as that of climate is often fatal. What reason then to imagine, that an immense alteration such as is made on the soul by the dissolution of its body and all its organs of thought and sensation can be effected with­ out the dissolution of the whole ? Everything is in common betwixt soul and body. The organs of the one are all of them the organs of the other. The existence therefore of the one must be dependent on that of the other. The souls of animals are allowed to be mortal; and these bear so near a resemblance to the souls of men, that the analogy from one to the other forms a very strong argument. Their bodies are not more resembling ; yet no one rejects the argument drawn from comparative anatomy. The Metempsychosis is therefore the only system of this kind that philosophy can hearken to. Nothing in this world is perpetual, everything however seemingly firm is in continual flux and change, �14 lhe Mortality of the Soul. the world itself gives symptoms of frailty and dis­ solution. How contrary to analogy, therefore, to imagine that one single form, seemingly the frailest of any, and subject to the greatest disorders, is immortal and indissoluble ? What a daring theory is that; how lightly, not to say, how rashly entertained! How to dispose of the infinite numbers of posthumous exist­ ences ought also to embarrass the religious theory. Every planet in every solar system, we are at liberty to imagine peopled with intelligent mortal beings, at least we can fix on no other supposition. For these then a new universe must every generation be created beyond the bounds of the present universe, or one must have been created at first so prodigiously wide as to admit of this continual influx of beings. Ought such bold suppositions to be received by any philosophy, and that merely on the pretext of a bare possibility ? When it is asked whether Agamemnon, Thersites, Hannibal, Varro, and every stupid clown that ever existed in Italy, Scythia, Bactria or Guinea are now alive ; can any man think, that a scrutiny of nature will furnish arguments strong enough to answer so strange a question in the affirmative ? The want of argument without revelation sufficiently establishes the negative. “Quante facilius (says Pliny } * certius que sibi quemque credere, ac specimen securitatis antigene tali sumere experimento." Our insensibility before the composition of the body, seems to natural reason a proof of a like state after dissolution. Were our horror of annihilation an original passion, not the effect of our general love of happiness, it would rather prove the mortality of the soul. For as nature does nothing in vain, she would never give us a horror * Lib. 7, cap. 55. �The Mortality of the Soul. 15 against an impossible event. She may give us a horror against an unavoidable event provided our endeavors, as in the present case may often remove it to some distance. Death is in the end unavoidable; yet the human species could not be preserved had not nature inspired us with an aversion towards it. All doctrines are to be suspected which are favored by our passions, and the hopes and fears which gave rise to this doctrine are very obvious. It is an infinite advantage in every controversy to defend the negative. If the question be out of the common experienced course of nature, this circum­ stance is almost if not altogether decisive. By what arguments or analogies can we prove any state of existence, which no one ever saw, and which no way resembles any that ever was seen ? Who will repose such trust in any pretended philosophy as to admit upon its testimony the reality of so marvellous a scene ? Some new species of logic is requisite for that purpose, and some new faculties of the mind that may enable us to comprehend that logic. Nothing could set in a fuller light the infinite obligations which mankind have to divine revelation, since we find that no other medium could ascertain this great and important truth. �Free Will and Necessity. A Philosophical Inquiry concerning Human Liberty. By ANTHONY COLLINS. First Published in 1715. Now Reprinted", with Preface and Annotations, by G-. W. Foote, and a Biographical Introduction by J. M. Wheeler. “ I do not know of an^fcqg thartrhas been advanced by later writers in support of the scheme of Nece^ity^of which the germ is not to be found in the Inquiry of Collins.”—Prof. Dugald Stewart. . “ColUns states "the arguments against human freedom with a logical force unsurpassed by any Necessitarian. —Prof A. C. Eraser. _ „ “ Collins writes with -wonderful power and closeness of reasoning. P“°"CoE^was one of the most terrible enemies of the Christian religion.”—Voltaire. PRICE ONE SHILLING. - Superior Edition, printed on and b°Und ™ Cl°™’ Progressive Publishing Co., 28 Stonecutter St., London, E.C. The Essence of Religion? GOD THE IMAGE OF MAN. MAN’S DEPENDENCEWDN NATDRE^THE LAST AND ONLT By LUDWIG- FEUERBACH. price one shilling. “ No one has demonstrated and explained the purely human oilgin o the idea of God better than Ludwig Feuerbach. —Buchnei. ■ confess that to Feuerbach I owe a debt of inestimable gratitude. FeeUne about in uncertainty for the ground, and finding everywhere SS§g sands, Feuerbach cast a sudden blaze in the darkness and dis­ closed to me the way.”—Rev. S. Baring Gould.________ _ _____________ me Rev- 8. Bating Gould. THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND CATECHISM EXAMINED. By JEREMY BENTHAM. With a Biographical Preface by J. M. WHEEI^R. PRICE ONE SHILLING. also . Ä . UTILITARIANISM. By JEREMY BENTHAM. PRICE THREEPENCE. “A place must be assigned to Bentham among the masters of wisoom. —John Stuart Mill. . IffÄ&ÄÄ admltog a„a 11» P® «too the M « Mr. Benthem iS ÄÄÄSeft It a .etoeer-^a,.,« � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Victorian Blogging Description An account of the resource A collection of digitised nineteenth-century pamphlets from Conway Hall Library &amp; Archives. This includes the Conway Tracts, Moncure Conway's personal pamphlet library; the Morris Tracts, donated to the library by Miss Morris in 1904; the National Secular Society's pamphlet library and others. The Conway Tracts were bound with additional ephemera, such as lecture programmes and handwritten notes.<br /><br />Please note that these digitised pamphlets have been edited to maximise the accuracy of the OCR, ensuring they are text searchable. If you would like to view un-edited, full-colour versions of any of our pamphlets, please email librarian@conwayhall.org.uk.<br /><br /><span><img src="http://www.heritagefund.org.uk/sites/default/files/media/attachments/TNLHLF_Colour_Logo_English_RGB_0_0.jpg" width="238" height="91" alt="TNLHLF_Colour_Logo_English_RGB_0_0.jpg" /></span> Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Conway Hall Library & Archives Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2018 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Conway Hall Ethical Society Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Original Format The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data Pamphlet Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource The mortality of the soul Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Hume, David [1711-1776] Foote, G. W. (George William) [1850-1915] Description An account of the resource Place of publication: London Collation: 15 p. ; 18 cm. Notes: Reprinted from the original edition of 789. Publisher's advertisements on back cover. Includes bibliographical references. Part of the NSS pamphlet collection. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Freethought Publishing Company Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1890 Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context N316 Subject The topic of the resource Soul Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource <a href="http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/mark/1.0/"><img src="http://i.creativecommons.org/p/mark/1.0/88x31.png" alt="Public Domain Mark" /></a><span> </span><br /><span>This work (The mortality of the soul), identified by </span><a href="https://conwayhallcollections.omeka.net/items/show/www.conwayhall.org.uk"><span>Humanist Library and Archives</span></a><span>, is free of known copyright restrictions.</span> Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource application/pdf Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Language A language of the resource English Immortality NSS Soul https://d1y502jg6fpugt.cloudfront.net/25778/archive/files/fb8c72ceaed855269677f11ed7fcc672.pdf?Expires=1776902400&Signature=Nyi3McE%7ELsv69Dzs1fbT2JQqH59OCj-%7ElK82c%7EYHJUvAZ63NOWTaCixNmb%7EfyM%7EmvOre8Q0Jo2Hay1WSXJUBgNZiPnOyHyLMgulH5OmF9sXucxMGMf7wUCeUDdb425s3rNzGOuWZJlxsmFJJ-mZ-5Uao8v%7EPcGm5XLFTYxL22yEotfAFZXYta-C%7EP14Iohbe4uZI0%7EFsxN%7Eis4JQURoX1dJJ9rmBSH%7Evi-jxk1fiq7xDBaLaYqmhppbkZK0GqJSpq%7ED1LbDXMiGvomDvTSfbx8y7lHZhe%7EBDVq5mCo9ilT3YW02ap%7E0FVGarVy4dhy6nunwiBs3WIDlsP0Ix%7EB6qmg__&Key-Pair-Id=K6UGZS9ZTDSZM 92af1ef847474167df1cfd59a5c85d56 PDF Text Text NATIONAL SECULAR SOCIETY AN ESSAY * ON MIRACLES. BY 'p DAVID HUME. WITH AN INTRODUCTION Commenting upon the views of Campbell, Paley, Mill, Powell, Greg, Mozley, Tyndall, Huxley, etc., 1SY JOSEPH MAZZINI WHEELER. “Apologists find it much more convenient to evade the simple but effective arguments of Hume than to answer them."—11 Supernatural Religion," vol. i.,p. 78. LONDON : I FREETHOUGHT PUBLISHING COMPANY, 28, STONECUTTER STREET, E.C. 1 882. PRICE THREEPENCE. �BIBLE ROMANCES. By G. W. FOOTE. 1. —THE CREATION. STORY' .................. 2. —NOAH’S FLOOD .................................. 3. —EVE AND THE APPLE.......................... 4. —THE BIBLE DEVIL.................................. 5. —THE TEN PLAGUES .......................... 6. —JONAH AND THE WHALE.................. 7. —THE WANDERING JEWS .................. A—THE TOWER OF BABEL .................. 9.—BALAAM’S ASS......................................... 10. —GOD’S THIEVES IN CANAAN ........... 11. —CAIN AND ABEL .................................. 12. —LOT’S WIFE .......................................... Id. Id. Id. Id. Id. Id. Id. Id. Id. Id. Id. Id. BIBLE ROMANCES—First Series—Containing the above Twelve Numbers, bound in handsome wrapper. Is. SECOND SERIES. 13. —DANIEL AND THE LIONS .......... 14. —THE JEW JUDGES .......................... Id. Id. The SECOND SERIES will soon be completed in six instalments. Other Pamphlets by G. W. Foote. Secularism the True Philosophy of Life. and a Defence ... ... ... An Exposition Atheism and Morality ........................................... 2d. The Futility of Prayer....................................... ' ... 2d. Death’s Test: or Christian Lies about Dying Infidels. 2d. Atheism and Suicide. (A reply to Alfred Tennyson—Paet Laureate)... ... ... .. " ... The God Christians Swear By .............................. 2d. Was Jesus Insane P ................................................. Id. London: FREETHOUGHT PUBLISHING COMPANY 28, Stonecutter Street, E.C. �INTRODUCTION. When an author has the fortune to be attacked by every succeeding writer upon the same subject for upwards of a century, and when his opinions, so far from being crushed out, become more widely spread by each “ refutation,” it induces a supicion that “ sophisms ” so constantly refuted may be truisms after all. This has been notably the case with the essay here reprinted. Since its first publication in 1748 it has been the bête noire of Christian controversialists. Campbell, IPhley, De Quincey, Chalmers, Whately, Babbage, Mansel, Mozley, and a shoal of ministerial minnows sailing in the wake of these theological Tritons, have felt it incumbent upon them to refute the “ sophisms ” of the sceptic Hume Yet no one will say that unbelief in the miraculous is upon the decline.. On the contrary, never were Christians less anxious to insist upon the supernatural elements of their îehgion, and never more willing to seek reconcilements with science ; never were there so many trained minds with perfect confidence that the uniformity of nature has never been dis­ turbed by coups d’état célestes. In truth, Hume’s argument, though so constantly assailed, has never been refuted at all. It has been misapprehended and evaded, but it remains as unanswerable as that of Arch­ bishop Tillotson against the real presence. And this, because m point of fact—the terms being rightly understood—it is a truism. John Stuart Mill well says: “Hume’s celebrated principle that nothing is credible which is contradictory to experience, or at variance with laws of nature, is merely this very plain and harmless proposition, that whatever is contra­ dictory to a complete induction is incredible. That such a maxim as this should either be accounted a dangerous heresy, or mistaken for a great and recondite truth, speaks ill for the state of philosophical speculation on such subjects-.” (“System of Logic,” book 3, chap, xxv., sec. 2.) Few essays so brief, for it must be borne in mind that the first part contains the argument complete in itself, have been so persistently misunderstood. The whole school of Christian evidence writers have either argued as it were an à priori argument against the possibility of miracles, or as if it were an argument against testimony being received for wonders • whereas it is neither the one nor the other. Principal Campbell, as Mill points out, considered it a complete answer to * Hume’s doctrine (that things are incredible which are contrary to the uniform course of experience) that we do not disbelieve. * “ Logic.” See the “ Three Essays,” p. 217. �2 merely because the chances were against them, things in strict conformity to the uniform course of experience. Yet no one would call an unusual combination which was found by experi­ ence to occur among the whole number of possible cases a. miracle, save in the popular, indefinite style of speech which is totally unfit for theological, and still more for logical, pur­ poses. And here lies the gist of the whole misunderstanding. Everyone knows that both etymologically and popularly the word miracle is equivalent simply to a wonder. But Hume’s argument is not directed against the occurrence of wonders, prodigies or unprecedented events; though it offers a criterion by which the value of their evidence can be judged. He was not such a simpleton as to contend, or intend, that no testi­ mony could be sufficient to add to our knowledge of the laws of nature. His argument is based on the theological definition of miracles as infractions of the laws of nature by a super­ natural being or beings exterior to those laws. The essay has done much to modify the views of theolo­ gians, and they have since its time done their best to class their miracles under’ “unknown laws.” Yet Canon Mozley, certainly the ablest late defender of miracles, admits that “ their evidential value depends entirely upon their deviating from the order of nature.” A miracle in the theological sense denotes not simply the counteraction of one natural law by another, which is not opposed to experience, but the suppres­ sion of the law of uniformity of cause and effect, which ex­ perience shows to be universal, and in which all other laws are included. As Hume puts it, unless there were an uniform * experience against any miraculous event, “the event would not merit that appellation.” If, by some unknown law, persons could, under given c onditions, be raised from the dead, such facts, however wonderful, would take their place in the vast scheme of nature, and no more be properly entitled supernatural than any other. But such an event is classed as a miracle, as our essayist says, “ because it has never been observed in any age or country.” The instance of the King of Siam rejecting accounts of ice has often, foolishly enough, been quoted against Hume by opponents who failed to notice the distinction between a dis­ covery of the laws of nature and their suspension. If we could be taken to a region where the dead rise at command with the same certainty that water freezes when the temperature is below a certain point the fact would be indubitable, but the miracle would be gone. We cannot admit a proposition as a law of nature and yet believe a fact in contradiction to it. We must disbelieve the alleged fact, or believe that we are See Mill’s “Essay on Theism,” p. 222. �8 mistaken in admitting the supposed law. In gaming the fact the miracle is lost; because to this, the supernatural nature or the fact, all testimony is incompetent. Mr. Vv. H. Greg pointed out that the assertion of a miracle being performed * involves three elements, a fact and two inferences. It predi­ cates, first, that such an event took place; second, that it was brought about by the act and will of the individual to whom it is attributed ; third, that it could not have been pro­ duced by natural means. The fact may have been conectly o served, and yet either or both of the inferences be unwarranted; or either inference may be rendered unsound by the slightest deviation from accuracy in the observation or statement ot the fact. Nay, any new discovery in science may show that the inference which has hitherto appeared quite irrefragable, was, in fact, wholly unwarranted and incorrect. But it has been said : Assume a supernatural power and the antecedent improbability of supernatural visitations is re­ moved. Paley says, “ In a word, once believe that there is a God, and miracles are not incredible.’’t To this assertion Mill has been thought to lend his. authority. He endorses Hume’s argument only as substantiating that ‘‘ no evidence can prove a miracle to anyone who did not previously believe the existence of a being or beings with supernatural power ; or who believes himself to have full proof that the character of the Being whom he recognises, is inconsistent with his having seen fit to interfere on the occasion in question. + Now this statement is inadequate. The existence of.God, if He be the Supreme Cause of the order of the universe, is rather an additional difficulty to those who think that order was created by Him and subsequently disturbed. The argument against miracles rests on our experience of the order of nature ; and is, therefore, equally valid whether a cause of that order be assumed or not. For the only test of the will or way of work­ ing of such a cause is to be found within the order itself. Any interference with that order still has to be. proved by testimony; and the question remains whether it is more credible that men have been deceived, or that the laws of nature have been disturbed? This last is the aspect of the argument which comes home to the popular mind. Every individual has experience that men lie and make mistakes ; none that miracles occur. Expe­ riment upon experiment; the records of generation after * “ Creed of Christendom,” vol. ii., p. 136. + Evidences of Christianity. “Preparatory Considerations.” + “System of Logic,” Bk. 3, ch. xxv., sec. 2. Dr. Farrar’s abuse of Mill’s reasoning is well exposed by the author of “ Supernatural Religion,” Pt. 1, ch. iii. �4 generation; the very stability of our life depends upon and confirms the belief m the uniformity of law “In the case of miracles, then,” says Professor Tyndall, “ it behoves us to understand the weight of the negative before we assign a value to the positive ; to comprehend the protest of nature before we attempt to measure with it the assertions of men. * Paley’s supposition of “ twelve men whose probity and good sense I had well known,” who should be ready, one after another, to be racked, burnt or strangled, rather than give up the assertion that they had witnessed miracles, does not even meeu the case. For how could it be shown that it was impos­ sible tor these twelve men to be deceived? Twelve infallible men w ould be as incredible as any miracle they were supposed to assert. Paley’s reference is simply a disingenuous attempt to. imply that twelve good witnesses testified to the Christian miracles at the time and in the place where they are said to have occurred, and that they suffered on this account. Whereas not one single original witness is known ; nor can even any early Christian be proved to have suffered for his belief in miracles. Professor Huxley, who,, in his admirable little book on Hume, very captiously, as it seems to me, takes exception to iiume s defining miracles in their theological sense, agrees that his arguments on the matter of testimony resolve them­ selves into a simple statement of the dictates of common­ sense, which may be expressed in this canon: the more a statement of fact conflicts with previous experience, the more complete must be the evidence which is to justify us in be­ lieving it. It is upon this principle that everyone carries on the business of common life. “ If,” continues the Professor, a man tells me he saw a piebald horse in Piccadilly, I believe ~.lm w^hout hesitation. The thing itself is likely enough, and there is no imaginable motive for his deceiving me. But if the.same person tells me he observed a zebra there, I might hesitate a little about accepting his testimony, unless I were well satisfied, not only as to his previous acquaintance with zebras, but as to his powers and opportunities of observation in the present case. If, however, my informant assured me that he beheld a centaur trotting down that famous thoroughrare, I should emphatically decline to credit his statement; and this even if he were the most saintly of men, and ready to suffer martyrdom in support of his belief. In such a case I could, of course, entertain no doubt of the good faith of the witness; it would be only his competency, which, unfortunately, * “ Fragments of Science,” “ On Miracles and Special Providence ” vol. ii., p. 33. 1879. ’ �5 has very little to do with good faith or intensity of conviction, which I should presume to call in question.”* The sceptic being securely entrenched in the first part of the essay, the second carries the war into the supernaturalists’ camp. With the confidence of a thorough student of human nature and historian, Hume gives his conviction that there is not in all history an wholly trustworthy testimony to mira­ culous events. Huxley says on this passage (page 10 of this edition):—“ These are grave assertions, but they are least likely to be challenged by those who have made it their busi­ ness to weigh evidence and to give their decision under a due sense of the moral responsibility which they incur in so doing.” Miracles are only alleged to have happened among people devoid of scientific information and critical spirit. The learned author of “ Supernatural Religion,” in his chapter on “ The Age of Miracles,’’gives abundant proof that the miracles now credited arose in a time of the grossest superstition, among a people believing in the every-day operations of angels and demons, full of religious excitement, and prone to exaggera­ tion. In an age of science, where no one expects miracles, they do not occur, and most are ready to take as evidence of superstition the belief in any others than those in faith of which they have themselves been reared. The same silent process which has destroyed the belief in fairies and witch­ craft has undermined all other supernatural beliefs, and they only await the application of criticism to be levelled with the dust. It is true the universe remains a mystery. In one sense every atom is a miracle. It is so because man’s faculties are finite and the relations of nature infinite. But the mystery ef nature affords no ground for belief in miraculous events, the only testimony for which has been handed down from superstitious and ill-informed ancestors. It is rather a reason for abiding by the only light we have—the light which comes from reason and observation. The part of a wise man is to study and investigate, and “ proportion his belief to the evidence.” There being slight variations in the various editions of the Essay, the present text has been carefully compared with all those in the library of the British Museum. * “English Men of Letters : Hume,” p. 134. �ON MIRACLES. -------- ♦-------- PART I. There is in Dr. Tillotson’s writings an argument against the real presence, which is as concise, and elegant, and strong as any argument can possibly be supposed against a doctrine that is so little worthy of a serious refutation. It is acknowledged on all hands, says that learned prelate, that the authority, either of the scripture or of tradition, is founded merely in the testi­ mony of the apostles, who were eye-witnesses to those miracles of our Savior, by which he proved his divine mission. Our evidence, then, for the truth of the Christian religion is less than the evidence for the truth of our senses ; because, even in the first authors of our religion, it was no greater; and it is evident it must diminish in passing from them to their disciples; nor can any one be so certain of the truth of their testimony, as of the immediate object of his senses. But a weaker evidence can never destroy a stronger; and therefore, were the doctrine of the real presence ever so clearly revealed in scripture, it were directly contrary to the rules of just reasoning to give our assent to it. It contradicts sense, though both the scripture and tradition, on which it is supposed to be built, carry not such evidence with them as sense, when they are considered merely as external evidences, and are not brought home to every one’s breast by the immediate operation of the Holy Spirit. Nothing is so convenient as a decisive argument of this kind, which must at least silence the most arrogant bigotry and superstition, and free us from their impertinent solicitations. I flatter myself, that I have discovered an argument of a like nature, which, if just, will, with the wise and learned, be an everlasting check to all kinds of superstitious delusion, and consequently, will be useful as long as the world endures. For so long, I presume, will the accounts of miracles and prodigies be found in all history, sacred and profane. Though experience be our only guide in reasoning concerning matters of fact; it must be acknowledged that this guide is not altogether infallible, but in some cases is apt to lead us into errors and mistakes. One, who, in our climate, should expect better weather in any week of June than in one of December, would reason justly, and conformably to experience; but it is certain that he may happen, in the event, to find himself mistaken. However, we may observe, that, in such a case, he would have no cause to complain of experience; �7 because it commonly informs us beforehand of the uncertainty, by that contrariety of events, which we may learn from a diligent observation. All effects follow not with like certainty from their supposed causes. Some events are found, in all countries and all ages, to have been constantly conjoined to­ gether : Others are found to have been more variable, and sometimes to disappoint our expectations; so that, in our reasonings concerning matter of fact, there are all imaginable degrees of assurance, from the highest certainty to the lowest species of moral evidence. A wise man, therefore, proportions his belief to the evidence. In such conclusions as are founded on an infallible experience, he expects the event with the last degree of assurance, and regards his past experience as a full proof of the future existence of that event. In other cases he proceeds with more caution: He weighs the opposite experiments: He considers which side is supported by the greatest number of experiments: To that side he inclines with doubt and hesi­ tation ; and when at last he fixes his judgment, the evidence exceeds not what we properly probability. All probability, then, supposes an opposition of experiments and observations; where the one side is found to overbalance the other, and to produce a degree of evidence proportioned to the superiority. A hundred instances or experiments on one side, and fifty on another, afford a very doubtful expectation of any event; though a hundred uniform experiments, with only one that is contradictory, reasonably beget a pretty strong degree of assurance. In all cases, we must balance the opposite experi­ ments, where they are opposite, and deduct the smaller number from the greater, in order to know the exact force of the superior evidence. To apply these principles to a particular instance ; we may observe that there is no species of reasoning more common, more useful, and even necessary to human life, than that derived from the testimony of men, and the reports of eye­ witnesses and spectators. This species of reasoning, perhaps, one may deny to be founded on the relation of cause and effect. I shall not dispute about a word. It will be sufficient to observe, that our assurance in any argument of this kind is derived from no other principle than our observation of the veracity of human testimony, and of the usual conformity of facts to the reports of witnesses. It being a general maxim, that no objects have any discoverable connexion together, and that all the inferences which we can draw from one to another are founded merely on our experience of their constant and regular conjunction; it is evident that we ought not to make an exception to this maxim in favor of human testimony, whose connexion with any events seems, in itself, as liitJo �8 necessary as any other. Were not the memory tenacious to a certain degree ; had not men commonly an inclination to truth and a principle of probity; were they not sensible to snanie wh.cn detected in a falsehood : TiVere not these, I say, discovered by experience to be qualities inherent in ’human natuie, we should never repose the least confidence in human testimony. A man delirious, or noted for falsehood and villainy has no manner of authority with us. ’ And as the evidence, derived from witnesses and human testimony, is founded on past experience, so it varies with the experience, and is reg'arded either as a proof or a proba­ bility according as the conjunction between any particular kind of report and any kind of objects, has been found to be constant or variable. There are a number of circumstances to be taken into consideration in all judgments of this kind; and the ultimate standard, by which we determine all disputes that may arise concerning them, is always derived from experience and observation. . Where this experience is not entirely uni­ form on any side, it is attended with an unavoidable contrariety in our judgments, and with the same opposition and mutual destruction of arguments as in every other kind of evidence. We frequently hesitate concerning the reports of others. We balance the opposite circumstances which cause tiny doubt or uncertainty; and when we discover a superiority on any side, we incline to it; but still with a diminution of assurance in proportion to the force of its antagonist. This contrariety of evidence, in the present case, may be derived from several different causes; from the opposition of contrary testimony, from the character or number of the wit­ nesses, from the manner of their delivering their testimony, or from the union of all these circumstances. We entertain a suspicion concerning any matter of fact when the witnesses contradict each other, when they are but few or of a doubtful character, when they have an interest in what they affirm, when they deliver their testimony with doubt and hesitation’ or, on the contrary, with too violent asseverations. There are many other particulars of the same kind, which may diminish or destroy the force of any argument derived from human testimony. Suppose, for instance, that the fact which the testimony endeavors to establish partakes of the extraordinary and the marvellous, in that case, the evidence resulting from the testi­ mony admits of a diminution greater or less in proportion as the fact is more or less unusual. The reason why we place any credit in witnesses and historians is not from any con­ nexion, which we perceive a priori, between testimony and reality, but because we are accustomed to find a conformity between them. But when the fact attested is such a one as �9 has seldom fallen under our observation, here is a contest of two opposite experiences; of which the one destroys the othc-, -as far . as its force goes, and the superior can only operate on the mind by the force which remains. The very same principle of experience, which gives us a certain degree of assurance in the testimony of witnesses, gives us also, in this case, another 'degree of assurance against the fact which they endeavor to establish; from which contradiction there necessarily arise a •counterpoise, and mutual destruction of belief and authority. “ I should not believe such a story were it told me by Cato ; ” was a proverbial , saying in Rome, even during the lifetime of that philosophical patriot (1). The incredibility of a fact, at was allowed, might invalidate so great an authority. The Indian prince who refused to believe the first relations concerning the effects of frost reasoned justly, and it naturally required very strong testimony to engage his assent to facts which, arose from a state of nature with which he was un­ acquainted, and bore so little analogy to those events of which he had had constant and uniform experience. Though they were not contrary to his experience, they were not conform­ able to it (2). But in order to increase the probability against the testi­ mony of witnesses, let us suppose that the fact which they n,inrm, instead of being only marvellous, is really miraculous, suppose also, that the testimony, considered apart and in itself, amounts to an. entire proof ; in that case there is proof against proof, of which the strongest must prevail, but still with a diminution of its force, in proportion to that of its antagonist. A miracle is a violation of the laws of nature; and as a firm and unalterable experience has established these laws, the proof against a miracle, from the very nature of the fact is as entire as any argument from experience can possibly ’be imagined Why is it more than probable that all men must y?e» iea(l cannot of itself remain suspended in the air • that fire consumes wood, and is extinguished by water; unless it be that these events are found agreeable to the laws of nature, and there is required a violation of these laws, or in other words, a miracle to prevent them? Nothing is esteemed a miracle if it ever happen in the common course of nature It is no miracle that a man seemingly in good health should •die on a sudden : because such a kind of death, though more unusual than any other, has yet been frequently observed to happen. But it is a miracle that a dead man should come to -Ute; because that has never been observed in any age or countrv There must, therefore, be an uniform experience against every miraculous event, otherwise the event would not merit that appellation. And as an uniform experience amounts to a proof �10 there is here a direct and full proof from the nature of the fact against the existence of any miracle; nor can such a proof be destroyed or the miracle rendered credible by an opposite proof, which is superior (3). . The plain consequence is (and it is a general maxim worthy of our attention), “ That no testimony is sufficient to establish a miracle unless the testimony be of such a kind that its false­ hood would be more miraculous than the fact which it en­ deavors to establish: And even in that case there is a mutual destruction of arguments, and the superior only gives us an assurance suitable to that degree of force which remains after deducting the inferior.” When anyone tells me that he saw a dead man restored to life, I immediately consider with myself whether it be more probable that this person should either deceive or be deceived, or that the fact which he relates, should really have happened. I weigh the one miracle against the other; and, according to the superiority which I discover, I pronounce my decision, and always reject the greater miracle. If the falsehood of his testimony would be more miraculous than the event which he relates; then, and not till then, can he pretend to command my belief or opinion. PART II. In the foregoing reasoning we have supposed that the testi­ mony upon which a miracle is founded may possibly amount to an entire proof, and that the falsehood of that testimony would be a real prodigy : But it is easy to show that we have been a oreat deal too liberal in our concession, and that there never was a miraculous event established on so full an evidence. * For first, there is not to be found in all history any miracle attested by a sufficient number of men, of such unquestioned yood sense, education, and learning as to secure us against all delusion in themselves; of such undoubted integrity as to place them beyond all suspicion of any design to deceive others; of such credit and reputation in the eyes of mankind as to have a o-reat deal to lose in case of being detected in any falsehood; and at the same time attesting facts, performed m such a public manner and in so celebrated a part of. the world, as to render the detection unavoidable: All which circumstances are requisite to give us a full assurance in the testimony of men. Secondly. We may observe in human nature a principle which, if strictly examined, will be. found to dimmish ex­ tremely the assurance which we might have from human testimony in any kind of prodigy. The maxim by which we commonly conduct ourselves in our reasonings, is, that the objects, of which we have no experience, resemble those of * The 1750 edition inserts: “ In any history.” �11 which we have; that what we have found to be most usual is always most probable; and that where there is an opposition of arguments, we ought to give the preference to such of them as are founded on the greatest number of past observations. But though, in proceeding by this rule, we readily reject any fact which is unusual and incredible in an ordinary degree; yet in advancing farther, the mind observes not always the same rule, but when anything is affirmed utterly absurd and miraculous, it rather the more readily admits such a fact, upon account of that very circumstance which ought to destroy all its authority. The passion of surprise and wonder, arising from miracles, being an agreeable emotion, gives a sensible tendency towards the belief of those events from which it is derived. And this goes so far, that even those who cannot enjoy this pleasure immediately, nor can believe those miraculous events of which they are informed, yet love to partake of the satisfaction at second-hand or by rebound, and place a pride and delight in exciting the admiration of others. With what greediness are the miraculous accounts of travellers received, their descriptions of sea and land mon­ sters, their relations of wonderful adventures, strange men, and uncouth manners ! But if the spirit of religion join itself to the love of wonder, there is an end of common-sense, and human testimony, in these circumstances, loses all pretensions to authority. A religionist may be an enthusiast, and imagine he sees what has no reality : He may know his narration to be fal3e, and yet persevere in it with the best intentions in the world for the sake of promoting so holy a cause: Or even where this delusion has no place, vanity, excited by so strong a tempta­ tion, operates on him more powerfully than on the rest of mankind in any other circumstances; and self-interest with equal force. His auditors may not have, and commonly have not, sufficient judgment to canvass his evidence : What judgment they have, they renounce by principle, in these sublime and mysterious subjects : Or if they were ever so willing to employ it, passion and a heated imagination disturb the regularity of its operations. Their credulity increases his impudence ; and his impudence overpowers their credulity. Eloquence, when in its highest pitch, leaves little room for reason or reflection, but addressing itself entirely to the fancy or the affections, captivates the willing hearers, and subdues their understandings. Happily, this pitch it seldom attains. But what a Cicero or a Demosthenes could scarcely operate over a Roman or Athenian audience, every Capuchin, every itinerant or stationary teacher, can perform over the generality of mankind, and in a higher degree, by touching such gross and vulgar passions (4). Thirdly. It forms a very strong presumption against all �12 supernatural and miraculous relations, that they are observed chiefly to abound among ignorant and barbarous nations; or if a civilised people has ever given admission to any of them, that people will be found to have received them from ignorant and barbarous ancestors, who transmitted them with that in­ violable sanction and authority which always attend received opinions. When we peruse the first histories of all nations we are apt to imagine ourselves transported into some new world, where the w’hole frame of nature is disjointed and every element performs its operations in a different manner from what it does at present. Battles, revolutions, pestilence, famine, and death, are never the effects of those natural causes which we experience. Prodigies, omens, oracles, judgments, quite obscure the few natural events that are intermingled with them. But as the former grow thinner every page, in proportion as we advance nearer the enlightened ages of science and knowledge, we soon learn that there is nothing mysterious or supernatural in the case, but that all proceeds from the usual propensity of mankind towards the marvellous, and that, though this inclination may at inter­ vals receive a check from sense and learning, it can never thoroughly be extirpated from human nature. ‘‘ It is strange,” a judicious reader is apt to say upon the peru­ sal of these wonderful historians, “that such prodigious events never happen in our days.” But it is nothing strange, I hope, that men should lie in all ages. You must surely have seen instances enow of that frailty. You have yourself heard many such marvellous relations started, which, being treated with scorn by all the wise and judicious, have at last been abandoned even by the vulgar. Be assured, that those re­ nowned lies which have spread and flourished to such a monstrous height, arose from like beginnings, but being sown in a more proper soil, shot up at last into prodigies almost equal to those which they relate. It was a wise policy in that false prophet, Alexander, who, though now forgotten, was once so famous, to lay the first scene of his impostures in Paphlagonia, where, as Lucian tells us, the people were extremely ignorant and stupid, and ready to swallow even the grossest delusion. People at a distance, who are weak enough to think the matter at all worthy inquiry, have no opportunity of receiving better information. The stories come magnified to them by a hundred circumstances. Fools, are industrious in propagating the imposture; while the wise and learned are contented, in general, to deride its absurdity, without informing themselves of the particular facts by which it .may be distinctly refuted. And thus the impostor above-mentioned was enabled to proceed from his ignorant Paphlagonians to the enlisting of votaries, even among the �13 Grecian philosophers and men of the most eminent rank and distinction in Rome : Nay, could engage the attention of that sage emperor, Marcus Aurelius, so far as to make him trust the success of a military expedition to his delusive prophecies. The advantages are so great, of starting an imposture among an ignorant people, that even though the delusion should be too gross to impose on the generality of them—which, though seldom, is sometimes the case—it has a much better chance of suc­ ceeding in remote countries, than if the first scene had been laid in a city renowned for arts and knowledge. The most ignorant and barbarous of these barbarians carry the report abroad. None of their countrymen have large correspondence or sufficient credit and authority to contradict and beat down the delusion. Men’s inclination to the marvellous has full opportunity to display itself. And thus a story, which is universally exploded in the place where it was first started, shall pass for certain at a thousand miles distance. But had Alex­ ander fixed his residence at Athens, the philosophers of that renowned mart of learning had immediately spread throughout the whole Roman empire, their sense of the matter; which, being supported by so great authority, and displayed by all the force of reason and eloquence, had entirely opened the eyes of mankind. It is true, Lucian, passing by chance through Paphlagonia, had an opportunity of performing this good office. But, though much to be wished, it does not always happen, that every Alexander meets with a Lucian, ready to expose and detect his im­ postures (5). I may add as a fourth reason which diminishes the authority of prodigies, that there is no testimony for any, even those •which have not been expressly detected, that is not opposed by an infinite number of witnesses ; so that not only the miracle destroys the credit of the testimony, but even the testimony destroys itself. To make this the better understood, let us consider, that in matters of religion, whatever is different is contrary, and that it is impossible the religions of ancient Rome, of Turkey, of Siam, and of China should, all of them, be established on any solid foundation. Every miracle, there­ fore, pretended to have been wrought in any of these religions (and all of them abound in miracles), as its direct scope is to establish the particular system to which it is attributed; so has it the same force, though more indirectly, to overthow every other system. In destroying a rival system, it likewise destroys the credit of those miracles on which that system was established ; so that all the prodigies of different religions are to be regarded as contrary facts, and the evidences of these prodigies, whether weak or strong, as opposite to each other. According to this method of reasoning, when we believe any miracle of Mahomet or any of his successors, we have for our �14 warrant the testimony of a few barbarous Arabians : And on the other hand, we are to regard the authority of Titus Livius, Plutarch, Tacitus, and, in short, of all the authors and witnesses, Grecian, . Chinese, and Roman Catholic, who have related any miracle in their. particular religion; I say, we are to regard theii testimony in . the same light as if they had mentioned that .Mahometan miracle, and had in express terms contradicted it, with the same certainty as they have for the miracles they relate. This argument may appear over subtle and refined, but is not in reality different from the reasoning of a judge who supposes that the credit of two witnesses maintaining a crime against any one is destroyed by the testimony of two others who affirm him to have been two hundred leagues dis­ tant, at the same instant when the crime is said to have been committed. One of the best attested miracles in all profane history is that .which Tacitus reports of Vespasian, who cured a blind man in Alexandria by means of his spittle, and a lame man by the mere touch of his foot; in obedience to a vision of the god Serapis, who had enjoined them to have recourse to the Emperor for these miraculous cures. The story may be seen in that fine historian (6); where every circumstance seems to add weight to the testimony, and might be dis­ played at large with all the force of argument and eloquence if anyone were now concerned to enforce the evidence of that exploded and idolatrous superstition. The gravity, solidity, age, and probity of so great an emperor, who, through the whole course of his life conversed in a familiar manner with his. friends and. courtiers, and never affected those extra­ ordinary airs of divinity assumed by Alexander and Demetrius: The historian, a cotemporary writer noted for candor and veracity, and withal the greatest and most penetrating genius perhaps of all antiquity; and so free from any superstition and credulity that he even lies under the contrary imputation of Atheism and pro.faneness : The persons, from whose testimony he related.the miracle, of established character for judgment and veracity, as we may well presume; eye-witnesses of the fact, and confirming their verdict after the Flavian family were despoiled of the empire, and could no longer give any reward as the price of a lie. TJtrumque, qui interfuere, nunc quoque memorant, postquam nullum mendacio pretium. To which, if we add the public nature of the facts as related, it will ap­ pear that no evidence can well be supposed stronger for so gross and. so palpable a falsehood. There is also a memorable story related by Cardinal de Betz, which may well deserve our consideration. When that intriguing politician fled into Spain to avoid the perse­ cution of his enemies he passed through Saragossa, the capital �15 of Arragon, where he was shown ^n^was well known had served seven years as a doo_ - p , devotions to everybody in at that chnrch. He had bee ri1bbin" of holy oil upon, a leg; but recovered that limb by the rub Jwo leUgiP’Thids mirade X vouched by all the canons3 of the the relator was also cotemporary.to the&nius; S7X°x^":"r<; i :«»: r»e“ardS» -to give any credit to it ^d conseq CO]lsidered justly, of anv concurrence m the holy traua. f+li..Atl,re “ ? Z accSly to ^■s^)rro^^^ree''^S^'^OQfr SavSy^and its falsehood through all the °irc^s^an k Y £ mediately present, by reason of the bigotry, 1g°^^0C™0^ ss-sssaaxgs by any human testimony, was more propeily a subject o ^Tteh^XieXalabreater number of miracles ascribed to o“^E those which were lately ; to have been wrought in France upon the tomb of Abbe Pans, ta Jansenist, with whose sanctity the people ^re s° 1on deluclecL Whp pnri-no- of the sick, giving hearing to the deal ana si&m io S bhnd wire everywhere talked of as the usual effects of Iw hSv sepulchre. But what is more extraordinary; many oflh^miraclto were immediately proved upon the spot^before iudo-es of unquestioned integrity, attested y rnoqf Stand distinction. in a learned Xid N^r is ftis alb l^SX^ofSem w^pSisSd and disperse'd everywhere ; nor were the Jesuits though a learned body supP°rted in oivil magistrate, and determined enemies to those opimonsi whose favor the miracles were said to h^7^eei».g^ll we .able distinctly to refute or detect them ( ). �16 XIS>of^fiSp°A±Z?i1Ce5 agreeiag t0 the “r- tb?utao?tnSie.U^ jusf; bTu?e some huma“ testimony has- distance have been able to determine between them ? The contrariety is equally strong between the miraclesTreated bv or th“e deUYered by MariaUa’ Me' country, his family, Or himself, or in any other way§strikes in with his natural inclinations and propensities But what greater temptation than to appear a missionary, a prophet an d±Zad0^?m uaVeU? Wh0^uld not encounter man? ter ?°%r ?fdh^U1pV inporde.r to attaiu so sublime a charac° ?y t^e help of vaW and a heated imagination ainf? the 5? made a ?onvert of himself and entered^seriously into the delusion; who ever scruples to make use of pious frauds m support of so holy and meritorious a cause ? lhe smallest spark may here kindle into the greatest flame because the materials are always prepared for it. The avicbum genus aurwularum(8), the gazing populace, receive greedily motesUwondSmatl°n’ whatever soothes superstition, and prol St?EeSi ?f this nature have in a11 ages been detected and exploded in their infancy? How many more have been celebrated for a time, and have afterwards sunk into negiect and oblivion? Where such reports, therefore, fly about, the solution of the phenomenon is obvious, and we iudge m conformity to regular experience and observation when we account for it by the known and natural principles of credulity and delusion. And shall we, rather than have a resource to so. natural a solution allow of a miraculous violation of the most established laws of nature ? i I need not mention the difficulty of detecting a falsehood in any private or even public history, at the time and place where it is said to happen, much more where the scene is removed to ever so small a distance. Even a court of judicature, with all �17 the authority, accuracy, and judgment, which they can employ, find themselves often at a loss to distinguish between truth and falsehood in most recent actions. But the matter never comes to any issue if trusted to the common method of alter­ cation and debate and flying rumors ; especially when men’s passions have taken part on either side. In the infancy of new religions the wise and learned com­ monly esteem the mattei- too inconsiderable to deserve their attention or regard. And when afterwards they would will­ ingly detect the cheat in order to undeceive the deluded multi­ tude, the season is now past, and the records and witnesses, which might clear up the matter, have perished beyond recovery. No means of detection remain but those which must be drawn from the very testimony itself of the reporters : And these, though always sufficient with the judicious and know­ ing, are commonly too fine to fall under the comprehension of the vulgar. _ Upon the whole, then, it appears that no testimony for any kind of miracle has ever amounted to a probability much less * to a proof; and that, even supposing it amounted to a proof, it would be opposed by another proof; derived from the very nature of the fact which it would endeavor to establish. It is experience only, which gives authority to human testimony; and it is the same experience, which assures us of the laws of nature. When, therefore, these two kinds of experience are contrary, we have nothing to do but subtract the one from the other, and embrace an opinion either on one side or the other with that assurance which arises from the remainder. But according to the principle here explained, this subtraction with regard to all popular religions, amounts to an entire annihilation; and therefore we may establish it as a maxim that no human testimony can have such force as to prove a miracle and make it a just foundation for any such system of religion (9). I am the better pleased with this method of reasoning, as X think it may serve to confound those dangerous friends or disguised enemies to the Ghistian religion, who have under­ taken to defend it by the principles of human reason. Our most holy religion is founded on Faith, not on reason, and it is a sure method of exposing it to put it to such a trial, as it is by no means fitted to endure. To make this more evident, let us examine those miracles related in scripture, and not to lose our­ selves in too wide a field, let us confine ourselves to such as we find in the Pentateuch, which we shall examine according to the principles of these pretended Christians, not as the word or testimony of God himself, but as the production of a mere * The first two editions read; “ Can ever possibly amount.' �18 human writer and historian. Here, then, we are first to con­ sider a book presented to us by a barbarous and ignorant people, written in an age when they were still more barbarous •and in all probability long after the facts which it relates, corroborated by no concurring testimony, and resembling those fabulous accounts which every nation gives of its origin. Upon reading this book, we find it full of prodigies and miracles. It gives an account of a state of the world and of human nature entirely different from the present: Of our fall from that state : Of the age of man extended to near a thousand years : Of the destruction of the world by a deluge : •Of the arbitrary choice of one people as the favorites of heaven and that people the countrymen of the author: Of their deliver­ ance from bondage by prodigies the most astonishing imagin­ able : I desire anyone to lay his hand upon his heart and after serious consideration declare whether he thinks that the false­ hood of such a book, supported by such a testimony, would be more extraordinary and miraculous than all the miracles it relates ; which is, however, necessary to make it be received according to the measures of probability above established. What we have said of miracles may be applied without any variation to prophecies; and indeed all prophecies are real miracles, and as such only, can be admitted as proofs of any revelation. If it did not exceed the capacity of human nature to foretel future events, it would be absurd to employ any prophecy as an argument for a divine mission or authority from heaven; so that, upon the whole, we may conclude that the Christian religion not only was at first attended with miracles, but even at this day cannot be believed by any reasonable person without one. Mere reason is insufficient to •convince us of its veracity: And whoever is moved by Faith to assent to it is conscious of a continued miracle in his own person, which subverts all the principles of his understanding, and gives him a determination to believe what is most con­ trary to custom and experience. NOTES. (1) Plutarch, in vita Catonis Min. 19. *(2) No Indian, it is evident, could have experience that water did not freeze in cold climates. This, is placing. nature in a situation quite unknown to him, and it is impossible for him to tell a priori what will result from it. It is making a new experiment, the consequence of which is always uncertain. One may sometimes conjecture from analogy what will follow; but still this is but conjecture. And it must be confessed, that in the present case of freezing, the event follows contrary to �19 Ihe rules of analogy, and is such, as a rational Indian would not look for. The operations of cold upon water are not Gradual according to the degrees of cold, but. whenever it comes to the freezing point the water passes m a moment from the utmost liquidity to perfect hardness. Such an event therefore may be denominated extraordinary, and requires a pretty strong testimony to render it credible to people in a warm climate ; but still it is not miraudous., nor contrary to uniform experience of the course of nature in cases where all the circumstances are the same. The inhabitants of Sumatra have always seen water fluid in their own climate,.and the freezing of their rivers ought to be deemed a prodigy: but they never saw water in Muscovy during the winter; and therefore they cannot reasonably be positive what would there be the consequence. (3) Sometimes an event may not, in itself, seem, to be con­ trary to the laws of nature, and yet, if it were real, it might, by reason of some circumstances, be denominated a miracle, be­ cause, in fact, it is contrary to these laws. Thus, if a person, claiming a divine authority, should command a sick person to be well, a healthful man to fall down dead, the clouds to pour rain, the winds to blow—in short, should order many natural events which immediately, follow upon his commandthese might justly be esteemed miracles, because they arereally, in this case, contrary to the laws of nature. For if any suspicion remain that the event and command concurred by accident there is no miracle and no transgression of the laws of nature. If this suspicion be removed, there is evidently a miracle, and a trans­ gression of these laws; because nothing can be more contrary to nature than that the voice or command of a man should have such an influence. A miracle may be accurately, defined, a transgression of a law of nature by a particular volition of the Deity, or by the interposition of some invisible agent. A miracle may either be discoverable by men or not. This alters not its nature and essence. The raising of a house or ship into the air is a visible miracle. The raising of a feather, when the wind wants ever so little of a force requisite.for that purpose, is as real a miracle, though not so sensible with regard to us. (4) The many instances of forged miracles, and prophecies, and supernatural events, which, in all ages, have either been detected by contrary evidence, or which detect themselves by their absurdity, mark sufficiently the strong propensity of man kind to the extraordinary and the marvellous., and ought reasonably to beget a suspicion against all relations of this kind. This is our natural way of thinking, even with regard to the most common and most credible events. i^For instance, there is no kind of report which rises so easily and spreads so quickly, especially in country places and provincial towns, as �20 those concerning marriages; insomuch that two young persons’ n^Sr1!,00^1011 “?ver see each Other twice, but thePwTole “fh’kborhood immediately join them together. The pleasure so interesting, the^ntefiSenceAnd of r.6 • 1Ug k Plece reporters of it, spread of propagating it and being the first hSeXS1 ¿ST “,r “of rnse evidenc? Bn „S confirmed by some greater inel^n fi. D noV?6 Sfme Pa?sions, and others still stronger ino- tv'+p e generality of mankind to the believing and reportm&ade^V116 Sre&teSt vebemence and assurance all religious (5)It may here perhaps be objected that I proceed rashlv Mvenrf mJ motions of -erely froâ the aecS given ot Mm by Lucian, a professed enemy. It were indeed, foil 6 Wisbed tbat some of the. accounts published by his contSSbSiaCCO^P neS had remained- The oppositio? and as^X hvZf? J6 Character aHd conduct of the same man Hfe m^ohbwnrï - ?b°r aU as strong’ even in common two ZÎin T * mSe ^l1^0118 matters, as that betwixt any two men m the world—betwixt Alexander and St. Paul for instance. See a letter to Gilbert West, Esq., on the conver­ sion and apostlesMp of St. Paul. 4 oonver aoSuSÏ’X VespP Suetoaius “““IF the seme ri„^j^^SA%°^:jra8yr^ei1 by Mons. deMontgeron, counsellor or judge of the Parliament of Paris, a man of figure and cha­ racter, who was also a martyr to the cause, and is now said to be somewhere m a dungeon on account of his book. /here is another book, in three volumes (called “Recueil des Miracles de 1 Abbe Pans ”), giving an account of many of these miracles and accompanied with prefatory discourses, which XiVerp ^Iel1 Wri-jt.en-1 Tbere runs’ however, through the whole of these a ridiculous comparison between the miracles SaV-f an<l th?S%0f tbe Abbé’ therein it is asserted that the evidence for the latter is equal to that for the former • Übu etesfr-onyof men could ever be put in the balance with that of God himself, who conducted the pen of the inspired writers. If these writers, indeed, were to be con­ sidered merely as human testimony, the French author is very moderate m his comparison, since he might, with some appear­ ance of reason, pretend that the Jansenist miracles much surpass the others in evidence and authority. The following circumstances are drawn from authentic papers inserted in the above-mentioned book. Many of the miracles of Abbé Paris were proved immediately by witnesses before the officiality or bishop’s court at Paris» under the eyes of Cardinal Noailles, whose character for in­ tegrity and capacity was never contested even by his enemies» �21 His successor in the archbishopric was an enemy to the Jansenists, and for that reason promoted to the see by the •Court. Yet twenty-two rectors or cures of Paris, with infinite earnestness, press him to examine those miracles, which they assert to be known to the whole world, and indisputably certain: But he wisely forbore. The Molinist party had tried to discredit these miracles in -one instance, that of Madamoiselle le Franc. But besides that, their proceedings in many respects are the most irregular in the world, particularly in citing only a few of the Jansenist’s wit­ nesses, whom they tampered with: Besides this, I say they •soon found themselves overwhelmed by a cloud of new witnesses one hundred and twenty in number, most of them persons of •credit and substance in Paris, who gave oath for the miracle. This was accompanied with a solemn and earnest appeal to the Parliament. But the Parliament were forbidden by authority to meddle in the affair. It was at last observed that where men are heated by zeal and enthusiasm there is no degree of human testimony so strong as may not be procured for the greatest absurdity : And those who will be so silly as to examine the affair by that medium, and seek particular flaws in the testi­ mony, are almost sure to be confounded. It must be a miser­ able imposture indeed that does not prevail in that contest. All who have been in France about that time have heard of the great reputation of Mons. Heraut, the Lieutenant de Police, whose vigilance, penetration, activity and extensive intelligence Fave been much talked of. This magistrate, who by the nature of his office is almost absolute, was invested with full powers on purpose to suppress or discredit these miracles; and he frequently seized immediately and examined the witnesses .and subjects of them; but never could reach anything satis­ factory against them. In the case of Madamoiselle Thibaut he sent the famous ■de Sylvia to examine her, whose evidence is very curious. The physician declares that it was impossible she could have been so ill as was proved by witnesses, because it was impossible she could in so short a time have recovered so perfectly as he found her. He reasoned like a man of sense from natural •causes ; but the opposite party told him that the whole was a miracle, and that his evidence was the very best proof of it. The Molinists were in a sad dilemma. They dared not assert the absolute insufficiency of human evidence to prove a miracle. They were obliged to say that these miracles were wrought by witchcraft and the devil. But they were told that this was the resource of the Jews of old. No Jansenist was ever embarrassed to account for the cessation of the miracles, when the churchyard was shut up by the king’s edict. It was the touch of the tomb which �22 produced these extraordinary effects ; and when no one could approach the tomb, no effects could be expected. God indeed could have thrown down the walls in a moment; but he is master of his own graces and works, and it belongs not to us to account for them. He did not throw down the walls of every city like those of Jericho on the sounding of the rams’’ horns, nor break up the prison of every apostle like that of St. Paul. No less a man than the Due de Chatillon, a duke and peer of France of the highest rank and family, gives evidence of a miraculous cure performed upon a servant of his, who had lived several years in his house with a visible and palpable infirmity. I shall conclude with observing that no clergy are more celebrated for strictness of life and manners than the secular clergy of France, particularly the rectors or cures of Paris who bear testimony to these impostures. The learning, genius, and probity of the gentlemen, and the austerity of the nuns of Port Royal, have been much celebrated all over Europe. Yet they all give evidence for a miracle wrought on the niece of the famous Pascal, whose sanctity of life, as well as extraordinary capacity, is well known. The famous Racine gives an account of this miracle in his famous history of Port-Royal, and fortifies it with all the proofs which a multitude of nuns, priests, physicians and men of the world, all of them of undoubted credit, could bestow upon it. Several men of letters, particularly the Bishop of Tournay, thought this miracle so certain, as to employ it in the refutation of Atheists and Freethinkers. The Queen-Regent of France, who was extremely prejudiced against the Port-Royal, sent hei’ own physician to examine the miracle, who returned an absolute convert.. In short, the supernatural cure was so uncontestable that it saved for a time that famous monastery from the ruin with which it was threatened by the Jesuits. Had it been a cheat, it had certainly been detected by such sagacious and powerful antagonists and must have hastened the ruin of the contrivers. Our divines who can build up a formidable castle from suoh despicable materials, what a pro­ digious fabric could they have reared from these and many other circumstances which I have not mentioned!—How oft would the great names of Pascal, Racine, Arnaud, Nicole, have resounded in our ears ? But if they be wise, they had better adopt the miracle as being more worth a thousand times than all the rest of their collection. Besides, it may serve very much to their purpose. For that miracle was really per­ formed by the touch of an authentic holy prickle of the holy thorn, which composed the holy crown, which, etc. (8) Lucret, iv., 594. �('9'1 I beg the limitations here made may be remarked when I say that a miracle can never be proved so as to be the founda­ tion of a system of religion. For I own, that otherwise there may possibly be miracles or violations of the usual course of nature, of such a kind as to admit of proof from human testi­ mony, though perhaps it will be impossible to find any such in 51 ¿he recordsP of history. Thus, suppose all authors m all languages agree that from the 1st of January 1600, there was a total darkness over the whole earth for eight days: SuPPos® that the tradition of this extraordinary event is still strong and lively among the people, that all travellers who return from foreign countries bring us accounts , of the same tradition without the least variation or contradiction: It¡is evident that our present philosophers, instead of doubting that fact, to receive it for certain, and ought to search for the causes whence it might be derived. The decay, corruption, and dis­ solution of nature, is an event rendered probable by so many analogies, that any phsenomenon which seems to have a tendency towards that catastrophe, comes within the reach of human testimony, if that testimony be very extensive and U1 But^uppose that all the historians who treat of England should agree, that, on the 1st of January 1600, Queen Eliza­ beth died; that both before and after her death she was seen by her physicians and the whole court, as is usual with person» of her rank; that her successor was acknowledged and pro­ claimed by the Parliament; and that, after being interred a month, she again appeared, took possession of the throne, and governed England for three years : I must confess I should be surprised at the concurrence of so many odd circumstances, but should not have the least inclination to believe somiraculous an event. I should not doubt of her pretended death and of those other public circumstances that followed it: I should only assert it to have been pretended, and that.it neither was nor possibly could be real. You would m vam obiect to me the difficulty and almost impossibility of deceiving the world in an affair of such consequence ; the wisdom and integrity of that renowned queen; with the little or no advantage which, she could reap from so poor an artifice: All this might astonish me; hut I would still reply that the knavery and folly of men are such common phenomena that I should rather believe the most extraordinary events to arise from their concurrence than admit so signal a violation ot the laws of nature. , ~ But should this miracle be ascribed to any new system of religion men in all ages have been so much imposed on by ridiculous stories of that kind, that this, very .circumstance would be a full proof of a cheat, and sufficient with all men of �24 sense not only to make them reject the fact, but reject it without farther examination. Though the being to whom the miracle is ascribed be in this case Almighty, it does not upon that account, become a whit more probable ; since it is impossible for us to know the attributes or actions of such a Benig, otherwise than from the experience which we have of ms productions m the usual course of nature. This still reduces us to past observation, and obliges us to compare the instance of the violations of truth in the testimony of men with those of the violation of the laws of nature by miracles m order to judge which of them is most likely and probable’ As the violations of truth are more common in the testimony concerning religious miracles than in that concerning any other matter of fact; this must diminish very much the authority of the former testimony, and make us form a general resolution never to lend any attention to it, with whatever specious pretext it may be covered. ‘■’•Lord Bacon seems to have embraced the same principles of reasoning:—“ We ought,” says he, “to make a collection or particular history of all monsters and prodigious births or productions, and in a word of everything new, rare, and extra­ ordinary m nature. But this must be done with the most severe scrutiny, lest we depart from truth. Above all every relation must be considered as suspicious which depends in any degree upon religion, as the prodigies of Livy: And no less so, everything that is to be found in the writers of natural magic or alchemy, or such authors, who seem, all of them to have an uncontrollable appetite for falsehood and fable.” hacienda enim est congeries sive historia naturalis par­ ticulars omnium monstrorum et partuum naturse prodio-i®sorum; omnis denique novitatis et raritatis et inconsueti in natura. Hoc vero faciendum est cum severissimo delectu, ut constet fides. Maxime autem habenda sunt pro suspectis quae pendent quomodocunque ex religione, ut prodigia Livn: Nec minus quae inveniuntur in scriptoribus ma^iae naturals, aut etiam alchymiae, et hujusmodi hominibns; qui tanquam proci sunt et amatores fabularum.”—“Nov Organ ” lib. 2., Aph. 29. ° ” London: Freethought Publishing Company, 28, Stonecutter St., E.CL �A new edition, the best ever issued, printed in large type, on good paper, Is.; cloth gilt, Is. 6d. THE AGE OF REASON. Complete, with Preface by C. Bradlaugh. In Two Volumes, neatly bound in cloth, 8s.; or in Forty-Six Numbers, 2d. each. THE DEVIL’S PULPIT: BEING Astronomico-Theological Discourses. By the Rev. ROBERT TAYLOR, B.A., of St. John’s College, Cambridge, Author of the “ Diegesis,” “ Syntagma,” &c. (Reprinted verbatim from Richard Carlile's original edition.) Paper Covers, Is.; Cloth Gilt. Is. Gd. The True Source of Christianity; 0r5 A Voice from the Ganges. By AN INDIAN OFFICER. “ This is a reprint of a very scarce work. The author gives a thorough analysis of the Gospels, and shows how they differ from each other and from authentic history ; traces the obliga­ tions of Christianity to Pagan and Rabbinical teaching, and the close resemblance of many of its doctrines to the tenets of the Essenes : examines the prophetical claims of the Evangelists on behalf of Christ ; and freely criticises, although in no ungenerous spirit, the moral and religious ideas of Christ himself. He does all this with considerable aid from authoritative scholars, and his numerous quotations will be especially valuable to the amateur champions of Freethought in their contests with the representa­ tives of Christianity. We cordially recommend this little volume of 138 pages which is one of the cheapest shilling’s-worth we have yet seen.”—Freethinker. London: Freethought Publishing Company, 28, Stonecutter St.,E.C. �THE FREETHINKER. Edited PUBLISHED by G. W. FOOTE. EVERY THURSDAY. Price One Penny. THE FREETHINKER is first of all aggressive. It wages relent­ THE THE THE THE THE less war against Superstition in general, and against Christian Superstition in particular. No personal attacks, however, will. he made, except when the practical rights of Freet&iukers are assailed, in which case retaliation is only a form of Self-defence; or when persons and principles are s0 closely identified that both must be struck together. FREETHINKER assists the propaganda of heresy by fur­ nishing hints to those engaged in it as to the policy they .. should pursue. Special attention is given during the summer months to out-door advocacy. FREETHINKER is not full of long, lumpy articles. It is something between English and American journalism, and, without being trivial, as smart as the editor can make it. Under the head of “ Acid Drops ” the reader will find some racy paragraphs on orthodox ideas and practices ; jvhile under the head of “ Sugar Plums ” will be found succinct records of the progress of Freethought in all parts of the world whence such information can be obtained. American and European papers are laid under contribution. FREETHINKER, in order to stimulate the courage and activity of all workers in the good cause, from time to time gives biographical sketches of those heroes and martyrs of progress who in past days made greater sacrifices for freedom than are now either necessary or possible. FREETHINKER keeps a sharp eye on professional Chris­ tians (priests, parsons, preachers or lecturers), and does its utmost to catch them tripping in their advocacy or public conduct, and to expose them before the world. FREETHINKER also does its best to employ the resources of Science, Scholarship, Philosophy, and Ethics against the claims of the Bible as a Divine Revelation; and it does not scruple to employ for the same purpose any weapons of ridi­ cule or sarcasm that may be borrowed from the armory of Common Sense. A copy sent weekly for one year, post free, for (i.s\ Qcl.; six months, ?js.?>d. Freethought Publishing Company, 28, Stonecutter St., E.C. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Victorian Blogging Description An account of the resource A collection of digitised nineteenth-century pamphlets from Conway Hall Library &amp; Archives. This includes the Conway Tracts, Moncure Conway's personal pamphlet library; the Morris Tracts, donated to the library by Miss Morris in 1904; the National Secular Society's pamphlet library and others. The Conway Tracts were bound with additional ephemera, such as lecture programmes and handwritten notes.<br /><br />Please note that these digitised pamphlets have been edited to maximise the accuracy of the OCR, ensuring they are text searchable. If you would like to view un-edited, full-colour versions of any of our pamphlets, please email librarian@conwayhall.org.uk.<br /><br /><span><img src="http://www.heritagefund.org.uk/sites/default/files/media/attachments/TNLHLF_Colour_Logo_English_RGB_0_0.jpg" width="238" height="91" alt="TNLHLF_Colour_Logo_English_RGB_0_0.jpg" /></span> Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Conway Hall Library & Archives Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2018 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Conway Hall Ethical Society Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Original Format The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data Pamphlet Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource An essay on miracles Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Hume, David [1711-1776] Wheeler, Joseph Mazzini [1850-1898] Description An account of the resource Place of publication: London Collation: 24 p. ; 18 cm. Notes: Includes bibliographical references. Publisher's advertisements inside front cover and inside and on back cover. "With an introduction commenting upon the views of Campbell, Paley, Mill, Powell, Grey, Mozley, Tyndall, Huxley, etc. by Joseph Mazzini Wheeler". [Front cover]. Part of the NSS pamphlet collection. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Freethought Publishing Company Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1882 Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context N315 Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource <a href="http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/mark/1.0/"><img src="http://i.creativecommons.org/p/mark/1.0/88x31.png" alt="Public Domain Mark" /></a><span> </span><br /><span>This work (An essay on miracles), identified by </span><a href="https://conwayhallcollections.omeka.net/items/show/www.conwayhall.org.uk"><span>Humanist Library and Archives</span></a><span>, is free of known copyright restrictions.</span> Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource application/pdf Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Language A language of the resource English Subject The topic of the resource Miracles Superstition Miracles NSS https://d1y502jg6fpugt.cloudfront.net/25778/archive/files/f4ea7d4a0230cc071a88958cecb30d5e.pdf?Expires=1776902400&Signature=XjoPsaYkGjWMpb58Qc%7EjzQF9sSk2RwmJvLnHtNKqWGXGjx8CTEHL73UUCEThT2cRLRp8cDobLw0032UrsXiI%7EUu7-x7a-H9WyoKlhjBU8yAduolQSuXPxdvqDgRqNwSJa7ThQMhBGchbSj0X8y-eTjuh69N6M1wSsInV3EJQFpkw-KS%7E-MflUQY7wWCeaifMmWPBfLd76iupXRbt8nTfoYWoUBHXdNAbuEj-uqcsi%7ERS8qEhEtFIrutPNusCMMWV5jXhdHfzrIMmRXgomMpbmjFGlPdBZTJBruKCN-mRAChlXfEOIKpARrSjAaAGIxXD3a9SGO-1733OiioA7uIh9Q__&Key-Pair-Id=K6UGZS9ZTDSZM 34c46eb8b613cfa6caf90fc3cc3ef96f PDF Text Text DIALOGUES CONCERNING NATURAL RELIGION. No. II. BY DAVID HUME, Esq. 4 nezo Edition, with a Preface and Notes, which bring the Subject do wn to the present time. PUBLISHED BY THOMAS SCOTT, NO. 11, THE TERRACE, FARQUHAR ROAD, UPPER NORWOOD, LONDON, S.E, Price One Shilling. ��DIALOGUES CONCERNING NATURAL RELIGION. PART VII. DUT here, continued Philo, in examining the ancient system of the soul of the world, there strikes me, all on a sudden, a new idea, which, if just, must go near to subvert all your reasoning, and destroy even your first inferences, on which you repose such confidence. If the universe bears a greater likeness to animal bodies and to vegetables, than to the works of human art, it is more probable, that its cause resembles the cause of the former than that of the latter, and its origin ought rather to be ascribed to generation or vegetation than to reason or design. Your conclusion, even according to your own principles, is therefore lame and defective. Pray open up this argument a little farther, said Demea. For I do not rightly apprehend it, in that concise manner in which you have expressed it. Our friend Cleanthes, replied Philo, as you have heard, asserts, that since no question of fact can be proved otherwise than by experience, the existence of a Deity admits not of proof from any other medium. The world, says he, resembles the works of human contrivance : Therefore its cause must also resemble that of the other. Here I we may remark, that the operation of one very small part of nature, to wit man, upon another very small part, to wit that inanimate E �64 Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. matter lying within his reach, is the rule hy which Cleanthes judges of the origin of the whole, and he measures objects, so widely disproportioned, by the same individual standard. But to waive all objections drawn from this topic; I affirm, that there are other parts of the universe (besides the machines of human invention) which bear still a greater resemblance to the fabric of the world, and which therefore afford a better conjecture concerning the universal origin of this system. These parts are animals and vegetables. The world plainly resembles more an animal or a vegetable, than it does a watch or a knitting-loom. Its cause, therefore, it is more probable, resembles the cause of the former. The cause of the former is generation or vege­ tation. The cause, therefore, of the world, we may infer to be something similar or analogous to generation or vegetation. But how is it conceivable, said Demea, that the world can arise from anything similar to vegetation or generation ? Very easily, replied Philo. In like manner as a tree sheds its seed into the neighbouring fields, and produces other trees ; so the great vegetable, the world, or this planetary system, produces within itself certain seeds, which, being scattered into the surrounding chaos, vegetate into new worlds. A comet, for instance, is the seed of a world ; and after it has been fully ripened, by passing from sun to sun, and star to star, it is at last tossed into the unformed elements which everywhere surround this universe, and immediately sprouts up into a new system. Or if, for the sake of variety (for I see no other advantage), we should suppose this world to be an animal; a comet is the egg of this animal : and in like manner as an ostrich lays its egg in the sand, which, without any further care, hatches the egg, and produces a new animal; so.................I understand you, says Demea: But what wild, arbitrary suppositions �Part VII. 65 are these ? What data have you for such extraordinary conclusions ? And is the slight, imaginary resemblance of the world to a vegetable or an animal sufficient to establish the same inference with regard to both ? Objects, which are in general so widely different; ought they to be a standard for each other? Right cries Philo : This is the topic on which I have all along insisted. I have still asserted, that we have no data to establish any system of cosmogony. Our experience, so imperfect in itself, and so limited both in extent and duration, can afford us no probable conjecture concerning the whole of things. But if we must needs fix on some hypothesis; by what rule, pray, ought we to determine our choice ? Is there any other rule than the greater similarity of the objects compared ? And does not a plant or an animal, which springs from vegetation or generation, bear a stronger resemblance to the world, than does any artificial machine, which arises from reason and design ? But what is this vegetation and generation of which you talk, said Demea ? Can you explain their opera­ tions, and anatomize that fine internal structure on which they depend 1 As much, at least, replied Philo, as Cleanthes can explain the operations of reason, or anatomize that in­ ternal structure on which it depends. But without any such elaborate disquisitions, when I see an animal, I infer that it sprang from generation ; and that with as great certainty as you conclude a house to have been reared by design. These words, generation, reason, mark only certain powers and energies in nature, whose effects are known, but whose essence is incom­ prehensible ; and one of these principles, more than the other, has no privilege for being made a standard to the whole of nature. In reality, Demea, it may reasonably be expected, that the larger the views are which we take of things, the better will they conduct us in our conclusions �66 Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. concerning such, extraordinary and such magnificent subjects. In this little corner of the world alone, there are four principles, Reason, Instinct, Generation, Vegetation, which are similar to each other, and are the causes of similar effects. What a number of other principles may we naturally suppose in the immense extent and variety of the universe, could we travel from planet to planet and from system to system, in order to examine each part of this mighty fabric ? Any one of these four principles above mentioned (and a hundred others, which lie open to our conjecture) may afford us a theory, by which to judge of the origin of the world ; and it is a palpable and egregious partiality, to confine our view entirely to that principle by which our own minds operate. Were this principle more intelligible on that account, such a partiality might be somewhat excusable: but reason, in its internal fabric and structure, is really as little known to us as instinct or vegetation ; and perhaps even that vague, undeterminate word, Nature, to which the vulgar refer everything, is not at the bottom more inexplicable. The effects of these principles are all known to us from experience: but the principles themselves, and their manner of operation, are totally unknown : nor is it less intelligible, or less conformable to experience, to say, that the world arose by vegetation from a seed shed by another world, than to say that it arose from a divine reason or contrivance, according to the sense in which Cleanthes understands it. But methinks, said Demea, if the world had a vegetative quality, and could sow the seeds of new worlds into the infinite chaos, this power would be still an additional argument for design in its author. For whence could arise so wonderful a faculty but from design ? Or how can order spring from any­ thing which perceives not that order which it bestows ? You need only look around you, replied Philo, to satisfy yourself with regard to this question. A tree �Part VII. 6y bestows order and organization on that tree which springs from it, without knowing the order : an animal, in the same manner, on its offspring; a bird, on its nest: and instances of this kind are even more frequent in the world than those of order, which arise from reason and contrivance. To say that all this order in animals and vegetables proceeds ultimately from design, is begging the question : nor can that great point be ascertained otherwise than by proving, a priori, both that order is, from its nature, inseparably attached to thought; and that it can never, of itself, or from original unknown principles, belong to matter. But further, Demea ; this objection, which you urge, can never be made use of by Cleanthes, without renouncing a defence which he has already made against one of my objections. When I inquired con­ cerning the cause of that supreme reason and intelligence, into which he resolves everything; he told me, that the impossibility of satisfying such inquiries could never be admitted as an objection in any species of philosophy. “ We must stop somewhere,” says he; “ nor is it ever within the reach of human capacity to explain ultimate causes, or show the last connections of any objects. It is sufficient, if the steps, so far as we go, are supported by experience and observation.” Now, that vegetation and generation, as well as reason, are experienced to be principles of order in nature, is undeniable. If I rest my system of cosmogony on the former, preferably to the latter, it is at my choice. The matter seems entirely arbitrary. And when Cleanthes asks me what is the cause of my great vegetative or generative faculty, I am equally entitled to ask him the cause of his great reasoning principle. These questions we have agreed to forbear on both sides; and it is chiefly his interest on the present occasion to stick to this agreement. Judging by our limited and imperfect experience, generation has some privileges above reason : for we see every day the latter arise from the former, never the former from the latter. �68 Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. Compare, I beseech you, the consequences on both sides. The world, say I, resembles an animal; there­ fore it is an animal, therefore it arose from generation. The steps, I confess, are wide ; yet there is some small appearance of analogy in each step. The world, says Cleanthes, resembles a machine • therefore it is a machine, therefore it arose from design. The steps here are equally wide, and the analogy less striking. And if he pretends to carry on my hypothesis a step farther, and to infer design or reason from the great principle of generation, on which I insist; I may, with better authority, use the same freedom to push farther lus hypothesis, and infer a divine generation or theogony from his principle of reason. I have at least some faint shadow of experience, which is the utmost that can ever be attained in the present subject. .Beason, in innumerable instances, is observed to arise from the principle of generation, and never to arise from any other principle. Hesiod, and all the ancient Mythologists, were so struck with this analogy, that they universally explained the origin of nature from an animal birth, and copula­ tion. Plato too, so far as he is intelligible, seems to have adopted some such notion in his Timaeus. The Bramins assert, that the world arose from an infinite spider, who spun this whole complicated mass from his bowels, and annihilates afterwards the whole or any part of it, by absorbing it again, and resolving it into his own essence. Here is a species of cosmogony, which appears to us ridiculous; because a spider is a little contemptible animal, whose operations we are never likely to take for a model of the whole universe. But still here is a new species of analogy, even in our globe. And were there a planet wholly inhabited by spiders, (which is very possible), this inference would there appear as natural and irrefragable as that which in our planet ascribes the origin of all things to design and intelligence, as explained by Cleanthes. Why an �Part VIII. 69 orderly system may not be spun from the belly as well as from the brain, it will be difficult for him to give a satisfactory reason. I must confess, Philo, replied Cleanthes, that of all men living, the task which you have undertaken, of raising doubts and objections, suits you best, and seems, in a manner, natural and unavoidable to you. So great is your fertility of invention, that I am not ashamed to acknowledge myself unable, on a sudden, to solve regularly such out-of-the-way difficulties as you incessantly start upon me : though I clearly see, in general, their fallacy and error. And I question not, but you are yourself, at present, in the same case, and have not the solution so ready as the objection : while you must be sensible, that common sense and reason are entirely against you ; and that such whimsies as you have delivered, may puzzle, but never can convince us. PART VIII. What you ascribe to the fertility of my invention replied Philo, is entirely owing to the nature of the subject. In subjects, adapted to the narrow compass of human reason, there is commonly but one deter­ mination, which carries probability or conviction with it; ■and to a man of sound judgment, all other suppositions, but that one, appear entirely absurd and chimerical. But in such questions as the present, a hundred contradictory views may preserve a kind of imperfect analogy ; and invention has here full scope to exert itself. Without any great effort of thought, I believe that I could, in an instant, propose other systems of cosmogony, which would have some faint appearance of truth; though it is a thousand, a million to one, if either yours or any one of mine be the true system. For instance; what if I should revive the old Epicurean hypothesis ? This is commonly, and I believe �7° Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. justly, esteemed the most absurd system that has yet been proposed ; yet, I know not, whether, with a few alterations, it might_ not be brought to bear a faint appearance of probability. Instead of supposing matter infinite, as Epicurus did ; let us suppose it finite. A finite number of particles'is only susceptible of finite transpositions j and it must happen, in an eternal duration, that every possible order or position must be tried an infinite number of times. This world, there­ fore, with all its events, even the most minute, has before been produced and destroyed, and will again be produced and destroyed, without any bounds and limitations. No one, who has a conception of the powers of infinite, in comparison of finite, will ever scruple this determination. But this supposes, said Demea, that matter can acquire motion, without any voluntary agent or first mover. And where is the difficulty, replied Philo, of that supposition ? Every event, before experience, is equally difficult and incomprehensible; and every event, after experience, is equally easy and intelligible. Motion, in many instances, from gravity, from elasticity, from electricity, begins in matter, without any known voluntary agent: and to suppose always, in these cases, an unknown voluntary agent, is mere hypothesis ; and hypothesis attended with no advantages. The beginning of motion in matter itself is as conceivable a priori as its communication from mind and intelligence. Besides ; why may not motion have been propagated by impulse through all eternity; and the same stock of it, or nearly the same, be still upheld in the universe ? As much as is lost by the composition of motion, as much is gained by its resolution. And whatever the causes are, the fact is certain, that matter is, and always has been, in continual agitation, as far as human experience or tradition reaches. There is not probably, at present, in the whole universe, one particle of matter at absolute rest. �Part VIII. 71 And this very consideration too, continued Philo, which we have stumbled on in the course of the argu­ ment, suggests a new hypothesis of cosmogony, that is not absolutely absurd and improbable. Is there a system, an order, an economy of things, by which matter can preserve that perpetual agitation which seems essential to it, and yet maintain a constancy in the forms which it produces ? There certainly is such an economy : for this is actually the case with the present world. The continual motion of matter, therefore, in less than in­ finite transpositions, must produce this economy or order; and by its very nature, that order, when once established, supports itself for many ages, if not to eternity. But wherever matter is so poised, arranged, and adjusted, as to continue in perpetual motion, and yet preserve a constancy in the forms, its situation must, of necessity, have all the same appearance of art and contrivance which we observe at present. All the parts of each form must have a relation to each other, and to the whole: and the whole itself must have a relation to the other parts of the universe; to the element, in which the form subsists ; to the materials, with which it repairs its waste and decay; and to every other form, which is hostile or friendly. A defect in any of these particulars destroys the form; and the matter, of which it is composed, is again let loose, and is thrown into irregular motions and fermen­ tations, till it unite itself to some other regular form. If no such form be prepared to receive it, and if there be a great quantity of this corrupted matter in the universe, the universe itself is entirely disordered; whether it be the feeble embryo of a world in its first beginnings that is thus destroyed, or the rotten carcase of one languishing in old age and infirmity. In either case, a chaos ensues; till finite, though in­ numerable revolutions produce at last some forms, whose parts and organs are so adjusted as to support the forms amidst a continued succession of matter. �Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. Suppose, (for we shall endeavour to vary the ex­ pression) that matter were thrown into any position, by a blind, unguided force ; it is evident, that this first position must in all probability be the most confused and most disorderly imaginable, without any resemblance to those works of human contrivance, which, along with a symmetry of parts discover an adjustment of means to ends, and a tendency to self-preservation. If the actuating force cease after this operation, matter must remain for ever in disorder, and continue an immense chaos, without any proportion or activity. But suppose, that the actuating force, whatever it be, still continues in matter, this first position will immediately give place to a second, which will likewise in all probability be as disorderly as the first, and so on through many successions of changes and revolutions. No particular order or position ever continues a moment unaltered. The original force, still remain­ ing in activity, gives a perpetual restlessness to matter. Every possible situation is produced, and instantly destroyed. If a glimpse or dawn of order appears for a moment, it is instantly hurried away, and confounded by that never-ceasing force which actuates every part of matter. Thus the universe goes on for many ages in a con­ tinued succession of chaos and disorder. But is it not possible that it may settle at last, so as not to lose its motion and active force (for that we have supposed inherent in it), yet so as to preserve a uniformity of appearance, amidst the continual motion and fluctuation of its parts ? This we find to be the case with the universe at present. Every individual is perpetually changing, and every part of every individual; and yet the whole remains, in appearance, the same. May we not hope for such a position, or rather be assured of it, from the eternal revolutions of unguided matter; and may not this account for all the appearing wisdom and contrivance which is in the universe ? Let us �Part VIII. 73 contemplate the subject a little, and we shall find that this adjustment, if attained by matter, of a seeming stability in the forms, with a real and perpetual revolution or motion of parts, affords a plausible, if not a true solution of the difficulty. It is in vain, therefore, to insist upon the uses of the parts in animals or vegetables, and their curious adjustment to each other. I would fain know how an animal could subsist, unless its parts were so adjusted ? Do we not find, that it immediately perishes whenever this adjustment ceases, and that its matter, corrupting, tries some new form ? It happens, indeed, that the parts of the world are so well adjusted, that some regular form immediately lays claim to this corrupted matter: and if it were not so, could the world subsist ? Must it not dissolve as well as the animal, and pass through new positions and situations; till in a great, but finite succession, it fall at last into the present or some such order. . It is well, replied Cleanthes, you told us, that this hypothesis was suggested on a sudden, in the course of the argument. Had you had leisure to examine it, you would soon have perceived the insuperable objections to which it is exposed. No form, you say, can subsist unless it possess those powers and organs requisite for its subsistence : some new order or economy must be tried, and so on, without intermission ; till at last some' order, which can support and maintain itself, is fallen upon. But according to this hypothesis, whence arise the many conveniences and advantages which men and all animals possess ? Two eyes, two ears, are not absolutely necessary for the subsistence of the species. Human race might have been propagated and preserved, without horses, dogs, cows, sheep, and those innumer­ able fruits and products which serve to our satisfaction and enjoyment. If no camels had been created for the use of man in the sandy deserts of Africa and Arabia would the world have been dissolved ? If no loadstone �74 Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. had been framed to give that wonderful and useful direction to the needle, would human society and the human kind have been immediately extinguished ? Though the maxims of Nature be in general very frugal, yet instances of this kind are far from being rare; and any one of them is a sufficient proof of design, and of a benevolent design, which gave rise to the order and arrangement of the universe. At least, you may safely infer, said Philo, that the foregoing hypothesis is so far incomplete and imperfect; which I shall not scruple to allow. But can we ever reasonably expect greater success in any attempts of this nature 1 Or can we ever hope to erect a system of cosmogony, that will be liable to no exceptions, and will contain no circumstance repugnant to our limited and imperfect experience of the analogy of Nature 1 Your theory itself cannot surely pretend to any such advantage; even though you have run into Anthropo­ morphism, the better to preserve a conformity to common experience. Let us once more put it to trial. In all instances which we have ever seen, ideas are copied from real objects, and are ectypal, not archetypal, to express myself in learned terms : You reverse this order, and give thought the precedence. In all instances which we have ever seen, thought has no influence upon matter, except where that matter is so conjoined with it as to have an equal reciprocal influence upon it. No animal can move immediately anything but the members of its own body ; and indeed, the equality of action and reaction seem to be a universal law of Nature. But your theory implies a contradiction to this experience. These instances, with many more, which it were easy to collect, (particularly the supposition of a mind or system of thought that is eternal, or, in other words, an animal ingenerable and immortal); these instances, I say, may teach all of us sobriety in condemning each other ; and let us see, that as no system of this kind ought ever to be received �Part IX. 75 from a slight analogy, so neither ought any to he rejected on account of a small incongruity. For that is an inconvenience from which we can justly pronounce no one to he exempted. All religious systems, it is confessed, are subject to great and insuperable difficulties. Each disputant triumphs in histurn; while he carries on an offensive war, and exposes the absurdities, barbarities, and pernicious tenets of his antagonist. But all of them, on the whole, prepare a complete triumph for the Sceptic ; who tells them that no system ought ever to be embraced with regard to such subjects : for this plain reason, that no absurdity ought ever to be assented to with regard to any subject. A total suspense of judgment is here our only reasonable resource. And if every attack, as is commonly observed, and no defence, among Theolo­ gians, is successful; how complete must be his victory, who remains always, with all mankind, on the offensive, and has himself no fixed station or abiding city,* which he is ever, on any occasion, obliged to defend ? PART IX. But if so many difficulties attend the argument a pos­ teriori, said Demea; had we not better adhere to that simple and sublime argument a priori, which, by offer­ ing to us infallible demonstration, cuts off at once all doubt and difficulty ? By this argument, too, we may prove the Infinity of the divine attributes ; which, I am afraid, can never be ascertained with certainty from any other topic. For how can an effect, which either is finite, or, for aught we know, may be so; how can such an effect, I say, prove an infinite cause ? The unity too of the Divine Nature, it is very difficult, if not absolutely impossible, to deduce merely from con­ templating the works of nature; nor will the uni* Hebrews xiii. 14. �7 6 Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. formity alone of the plan, even were it allowed, give us any assurance of that attribute. Whereas the argu­ ment a priori .... You seem to reason, Demea, interposed Cleanthes, as if those advantages and conveniences in the abstract argument were full proofs of its solidity. But it is first proper, in my opinion, to determine what argument of this nature you choose to insist on; and we shall afterwards, from itself, better than from its useful con­ sequences, endeavour to determine what value we ought to put upon it. The argument, replied Demea, which I would insist on, is the common one. Whatever exists, must have a cause or reason of its existence; it being absolutely impossible for anything to produce itself, or be the cause of its own existence. In mounting up, therefore, from effects to causes, we must either go on in tracing an infinite succession, without any ultimate cause at all; or must at last have recourse to some ultimate cause, that is necessarily existent: now that the first supposi­ tion is absurd, may be thus proved. In the infinite chain or succession of cause and effect, each single effect is determined to exist by the power and efficacy of that cause which immediately preceded; but the whole eternal chain or succession, taken together, is not determined or caused by anything; and yet it is evident that it requires a cause or reason, as much as any particular object which begins to exist in time. The question is still reasonable, why this particular succession of causes existed from eternity, and not any other succession, or no succession at all. If there be no necessarily-existent being, any supposi­ tion which can be formed is equally possible; nor is there any more absurdity in Nothing’s having existed from eternity, than there is in that succession of causes which constitutes the universe. What was it, then, which determined Something to exist rather than Nothing, and bestowed being on a particular possibility, �Part IX. 77 exclusive of the rest ? External causes, there are supposed to he none. Chance is a word without a meaning. Was it Nothing ? But that can never pro­ duce anything. We must, therefore, have recourse to a necessarily-existent Being, who carries the Reason of his existence in himself; and who cannot be supposed not to exist, without an express contradiction. There is consequently such a Being ; that is, there is a Deity. I shall not leave it to Philo, said Cleanthes, (though I know that the starting objections is his chief delight) to point out the weakness of this metaphysical reason­ ing. It seems to me so obviously ill-grounded, and at the same time of so little consequence to the cause of true piety and religion, that I shall myself venture to show the fallacy of it. I shall begin with observing, that there is an evident absurdity in pretending to demonstrate a matter of fact, or to prove it by any arguments a priori. Nothing is demonstrable, unless the contrary implies a contra­ diction. Nothing, that is distinctly conceivable, im­ plies a contradiction. Whatever we conceive as existent, we can also conceive as non-existent. There is no being, therefore, whose non-existence implies a contradiction. Consequently there is no being, whose existence is demonstrable. I propose this argument as entirely decisive, and am willing to rest the whole controversy upon it. It is pretended that the Deity is a necessarilyexistent being; and this necessity of his existence is attempted to be explained by asserting, that if we knew his whole essence or nature, we should perceive it to be as impossible for him not to exist as for twice two not to be four. But it is evident, that this can never happen, while our faculties remain the same as at present. It will still be possible for us, at any time, to conceive the non-existence of what we formerly con­ ceived to exist; nor can the mind ever lie under a necessity of supposing any object to remain always �7 8 Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. in. being j in the same manner as we lie under a necessity of always conceiving twice two to be four. The words, therefore, necessary existence, have no meaning; or, which is the same thing, none that is ■consistent. But farther : why may not the material universe be the necessarily-existent Being, according to this pre­ tended explication of necessity? We dare not affirm that we know all the qualities of matterj and for aught we can determine, it may contain some qualities, which, were they known, would make its non-existence appear as great a contradiction as that twice two is five. I find only one argument employed to prove that the material world is not the necessarily-existent Being; .and this argument is derived from the contingency both of the matter and the form of the world. “ Any particle of matter,” it is said *, “ may be conceived to be annihilated; and any form may be conceived to be altered. Such an annihilation or alteration, therefore, is not impossible.” But it seems a great partiality not to perceive, that the same argument extends equally to the Deity, so far as we have any conception of him; and that the mind can at least imagine him to be non­ existent, or his attributes to be altered. It must be some unknown, inconceivable qualities, which can make his non-existence appear impossible, or his attri­ butes unalterable : and no reason can be assigned, why these qualities may not belong to matter. As they are altogether unknown and inconceivable, they can never be proved incompatible with it. Add to this, that in tracing an eternal succession of objects, it seems absurd to inquire for a general cause or first author. How can anything that exists from eternity, have a cause; since that relation implies a priority in time, and a beginning of existence ? In such a chain, too, or succession of objects, each part is caused by that which preceded it, and causes * Dr Clarke. �Part IX. 79 that which succeeds it. Where then is the difficulty ? But the whole, you say, wants a cause. I answer, that the uniting of these parts into a whole, like the uniting of several distinct counties into one king­ dom, or several distinct members into one body, is performed merely by an arbitrary act of the mind, and has no influence on the nature of things. Did I show you the particular causes of each individual in a collec­ tion of twenty particles of matter, I should think it very unreasonable, should you afterwards ask me, what was the cause of the whole twenty. That is suffi­ ciently explained in explaining the cause of the parts. Though the reasonings which you have urged, Cleanthes, may well excuse me, said Philo, from start­ ing any farther difficulties; yet I cannot forbear insisting still upon another topic. It is observed by arithmeticians, that the products of 9 compose always either 9, or some lesser product of 9 ; if you add to­ gether all the characters, of which any of the former products is composed. Thus, of 18, 27, 36, which are products of 9, you make 9 by adding 1 to 8, 2 to 7, 3 to 6. Thus, of 369 is a product also of 9 ; and if you add 3, 6, and 9, you make 18, a lesser product of 9 *. To a superficial observer, so wonderful a regularity may be admired as the effect either of chance or design: but a skilful algebraist immediately concludes it to be the work of necessity; and demonstrates, that it must for ever result from the nature of these numbers. Is it not probable, I ask, that the whole economy of the universe is conducted by a like necessity, though no human algebra can furnish a key which solves the diffi­ culty ? And instead of admiring the order of natural beings, may it not happen, that, could we penetrate into the intimate nature of bodies, we should clearly see why it was absolutely impossible they could ever admit of any other disposition ? So dangerous is it to intro­ duce this idea of necessity into the present question 1 * Republique des Lettres, Aout, 1685. F �80 Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. and so naturally does it afford an inference directly opposite to the religious hypothesis ! But dropping all these abstractions, continued Philo ; and confining ourselves to more familiar topics ; I shall venture to add an observation, that the argument a priori has seldom been found very convincing, except to people of a metaphysical head, who have accustomed themselves to abstract reasoning, and who, finding from mathematics, that the understanding frequently leads to truth, through obscurity, and contrary to first appear­ ances, have transferred the same habit of thinking to subjects where it ought not to have place. Other people, even of good sense and the best inclined to religion, feel always some deficiency in such argu­ ments, though they are not perhaps able to explain dis­ tinctly where it lies. A certain proof, that men ever did, and ever will, derive their religion from other sources than from this species of reasoning. P A R T X. It is my opinion, I own, replied Demea, that each man feels, in a manner, the truth of religion within his own breast; and from a consciousness of his imbecility and misery, rather than from any reasoning, is led to seek protection from that being, on whom he and all nature is dependent. So anxious or so tedious are even the best scenes of life, that futurity is still the object of all our hopes and fears. We incessantly look forward, and endeavour, by prayers, adoration and sacrifice, to appease those unknown powers, whom we find, by experience, so able to afflict and oppress us. Wretched creatures that we are ! what resource for us amidst the innumerable ills of life, did not religion sug­ gest some methods of atonement, and appease those terrors with which we are incessantly agitated and tormented ? �Part X. 81 I am indeed persuaded, said Philo, that the best, and indeed the only, method of bringing every one to a due sense of religion, is by just representations of the misery and wickedness of men. And for that purpose a talent of eloquence and strong imagery is more requisite than that of reasoning and argument. For is it necessary to prove, what every one feels within bimself? It is only necessary to make us feel it, if possible, more intimately and sensibly. The people, indeed, replied Demea, are sufficiently convinced of this great and melancholy truth. The miseries of life; the unhappiness of man; the general corruptions of our nature; the unsatisfactory enjoyment of pleasures, riches, honours; these phrases have become almost proverbial in all languages. And who can doubt of what all men declare from their own immediate feeling and experience ? In this point, said Philo, the learned are perfectly agreed with the vulgar; and in all letters, sacred and profane, the topic of human misery has been insisted on with the most pathetic eloquence that sorrow and melancholy could inspire. The poets, who speak from sentiment, without a system, and whose testimony has therefore the more authority, abound in images of this nature. From Homer down to Dr Young, the whole inspired tribe have ever been sensible, that no other re­ presentation of things would suit the feeling and observation of each individual. As to authorities, replied Demea, you need not seek them. Look round this library of Cleanthes. I shall venture to affirm, that, except authors of particular sciences, such as chemistry or botany, who have no occasion to treat of human life, there is scarce one of those innumerable writers, from whom the sense of human misery has not, in some passage or other, extorted a complaint and confession of it. At least, the chance is entirely on that side; and no one author has ever, so far as I can recollect, been so extravagant as to deny it. �82 Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. There you must excuse me, said Philo : Leibnitz has denied it; and is perhaps the first * who ventured upon so bold and paradoxical an opinion; at least, the first who made it essential to his philosophical system. And by being the first, replied Demea, might he not have been sensible of his error ? For is this a subject in which philosophers can propose to make discoveries, especially in so late an age ? And can any man hope by a simple denial (for the subject scarcely admits of reasoning) to bear down the united testimony of man­ kind, founded on sense and consciousness 2 And why should man, added he, pretend to an exemption from the lot of all other animals ? The whole earth, believe me, Philo, is cursed and polluted. + A perpetual war is kindled amongst all living creatures. Necessity, hunger, want, stimulate the strong and courageous: Fear, anxiety, terror, agitate the weak and infirm. The first entrance into life gives anguish to the new-born infant and to its wretched parent: weakness, impotence, distress, attend each stage of that life: and it is at last finished in agony and horror. Observe too, says Philo, the curious artifices of Nature in order to embitter the life of every living being. The stronger prey upon the weaker, .and keep them in per­ petual terror and anxiety. The weaker too, in their turn, often prey upon the stronger, and vex and molest them without relaxation. Consider that innumerable race of insects, which either are bred on the body of each animal, or flying about infix their stings in him, These insects have others still less than themselves, which torment them. And thus on each hand, before and behind, above and below, every animal is surround­ ed with enemies, which incessantly seek his misery and destruction. Man alone, said Demea, seems to be, in part, an That sentiment had been maintained by Dr King*, and some few others, before Leibnitz; though by none of so great fame as that German philosopher. t Romans viii. 22. �Part X. exception to this rule. For by combination in society, he can easily master lions, tigers, and bears, whose greater strength and agility naturally enable them to prey upon him. On the contrary, it is here chiefly, cried Philo, that the uniform and equal maxims of Nature are most ap­ parent. Man, it is true, can, by combination, surmount all his real enemies, and become master of the whole animal creation : but does he not immediately raise up to himself imaginary enemies, the daemons of his fancy, who haunt him with superstitious terrors, and blast every enjoyment of life ? His pleasure, as he imagines, becomes, in their eyes, a crime: his food and repose give them umbrage and offence : his very sleep and dreams furnish new materials to anxious fear: and even death, his refuge from every other ill, presents only the dread of endless and innumerable woes. Nor does the wolf molest more the timid flock, than superstition does the anxious breast of wretched mortals. Besides, consider, Demea: This very society, by which we surmount those wild beasts, our natural enemies; what new enemies does it not raise to us ? What woe and misery does it not occasion 1 Man is the greatest enemy of man. Oppression, injustice, contempt, contumely, violence, sedition, war, calumny, treachery, fraud; by these they mutually torment each other: and they would soon dissolve that society which they had formed, were it not for the dread of still greater ills, which must attend their separation. But though these external insults, said Demea, from animals, from men, from all the elements, which assault us, form a frightful catalogue of woes, they are nothing in comparison of those which arise within ourselves, from the distempered condition of our mind and body. How many lie under the lingering torment of diseases ? Hear the pathetic enumeration of the great poet— Intestine stone and ulcer, colic-pangs, Daemoniac frenzy, moping melancholy, �84 Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. And moon-struck madness, pining atrophy, Marasmus, and wide-wasting pestilence. Dire was the tossing, deep the groans : Despair Tended the sick, busiest from couch to couch. And over them triumphant Death his dart Shook ; but delay’d to strike, tho’ oft invok’d With vows, as their chief good and final hope.* The disorders of the mind, continued Demea, though more secret, are not perhaps less dismal and vexatious. Remorse, shame, anguish, rage, disappointment, anxiety, fear, dejection, despair; who has ever passed through life without cruel inroads from these tormentors ? How many have scarcely ever felt any better sensa­ tions ? Labour and poverty, so abhorred by every one, are the certain lot of the far greater number : and those few privileged persons, who enjoy ease and opulence, never reach contentment or true felicity. All the goods of life united would not make a very happy man : but all the ills united would make a wretch indeed ; and any one of them almost (and who can be free from every one ?) nay often the absence of one good (and who can possess all ?) is sufficient to render life ineligible. Were a stranger to drop, on a sudden, into this world, I would show him, as a specimen of its ills, an hospital full of diseases, a prison crowded with malefactors and debtors, a field of battle strewed with carcases, a fleet foundering in the ocean, a nation languishing under tyranny, famine, or pestilence. To turn the gay side of life to him and give him a notion of its pleasures ; whither should I conduct him ? to a ball, to an opera, to court 1 He might justly think, that I was only showing him a diversity of distress and sorrow. There is no evading such striking instances, said Philo, but by apologies, which still farther aggravate the charge. Why have all men, I ask, in all ages, complained incessantly of the miseries of life ? . . . They have no just reason, says one : these complaints * Paradise Lost, xi. 484— 493. �Part X. 85 proceed only from their discontented, repining, anxious disposition. . . . And can there possibly, I reply, be a more certain foundation of misery, than such a wretched temper ? But if they were really as unhappy as they pretend, •says my antagonist, why do they remain in life 1 . . . Not satisfied with life, afraid of death. This is the secret chain, say I, that holds us. We are terrified, not bribed to the continuance of our ex­ istence. It is only a false delicacy, he may insist, which a few refined spirits indulge, and which has spread these ■complaints among the whole race ? of mankind. . . . And what is this delicacy, I ask, which you blame ? Is it anything but a greater sensibility to all the pleasures and pains of life ? and if the man of a delicate, refined temper, by being so much more alive than the rest of the world, is only so much more unhappy; what judgment must we form in general of human life ? Let men remain at rest, says our adversary; and they will be easy. They are willing artificers of their own misery. . . . No ! reply I: an anxious languor follows their repose; disappointment, vexation, trouble their activity and ambition. I can observe something like what you mention in some others, replied Cleanthes : but I confess, I feel little or nothing of it in myself; and hope that it is not so common as you represent it. If you feel not human misery yourself, cried Demea, I congratulate you on so happy a singularity. Others, seemingly the most prosperous, have not been ashamed to vent their complaints in the most melancholy strains. Let us attend to the great, the fortunate -emperor, Charles V. when, tired with human grandeur, he resigned all his extensive dominions into the hands of his son. In the last harangue, which he made on �86 Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. that memorable occasion, he publicly avowed, “ that the greatest prosperities which he had ever enjoyed, had been mixed with so many adversities, that he might truly say he had never enjoyed any satisfaction or contentmentBut did the retired life, in which he sought for shelter, afford him any greater happiness 1 If we may credit his son’s account, his repentance commenced the very day of his resignation. Cicero’s fortune, from small beginnings, rose to the greatest lustre and renown; yet what pathetic com­ plaints of the ills of life do his familiar letters, as well as philosophical discourses, contain ? And suitably to his own experience, he introduces Cato, the great, the fortunate Cato, protesting in his old age, that had he a new life in his offer, he would reject the present. Ask yourself, ask any of your acquaintance, whether they would live over again the last ten or twenty years of their life. No ! but the next twenty, they say, will be better : And from the dregs of life, think to receive What the first sprightly running could not give. * Thus at last they find (such is the greatness of human misery; it reconciles even contradictions) that they complain, at once of the shortness of life, and of its vanity and sorrow. And is it possible, Cleanthes, said Philo, that after all these reflections, and infinitely more, which might be suggested, you can still persevere in your Anthro­ pomorphism, and assert the moral attributes of the Deity, his justice, benevolence, mercy, and rectitude, to be of the same nature with these virtues in human creatures ? His power we allow infinite : whatever he wills is executed: but neither man nor any other animal is happy: therefore he does not will their happiness. His wisdom is infinite: he is never mistaken in choosing the means to any end : but the course of Nature tends not to human or animal felicity : * From Dryden’s “ Aurengzebe. ” �Part X. 87 therefore it is not established for that purpose. Through the whole compass of human knowledge, there are no inferences more certain and infallible than these. In what respect, then, do his benevolence and mercy resemble the benevolence and mercy of men ? Epicurus’ old questions are yet unanswered. Is he willing to prevent evil, but not able 1 then ishe impotent. Is he able, but not willing ? then is he malevolent. Is he both able and willing 1 whence then is evil 1 You ascribe, Cleanthes, (and I believe justly) a purpose and intention to Nature. But what, I beseech you, is the object of that curious artifice and machinery, which she has displayed in all animals ? The preserva­ tion alone of individuals, and propagation of the species. It seems enough for her purpose, if such a rank be barely upheld in the universe, without any care or con­ cern for the happiness of the members that compose it. No resource for this purpose : no machinery, in order merely to give pleasure or ease : no fund of pure joy and contentment: no indulgence, without some want or necessity accompanying it. At least, the few . phenomena of this nature are overbalanced by opposite phenomena of still greater importance. Our sense of music, harmony, and indeed beauty of all kinds, gives satisfaction, without being absolutely necessary to the preservation and propagation of the species. But what racking pains, on the other hand, arise from gouts, gravels, megrims, toothaches, rheu­ matisms ; where the injury to the animal-machinery is either small or incurable ? Mirth, laughter, play, frolic, seem gratuitous satisfactions, which have no farther tendency : spleen, melancholy, discontent, superstition, are pains of the same nature. How then does the divine benevolence display itself, in the sense of you Anthropomorphites ? None but we Mystics, asyou were pleased to call us, can account for this strange mixture of phenomena, by deriving it from attributes, infinitely perfect, but incomprehensible. �88 Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. And have you at last, said Cleanthes smiling, betrayed your intentions, Philo ? Your long agreement with Demea did indeed a little surprise me; but I find you were all the while erecting a concealed battery against me. And I must confess, that you have now fallen upon a subject worthy of your noble spirit of opposition and controversy. If you can make out the present point, and prove mankind to be unhappy or corrupted, there is an end at once of all religion. Por to what purpose establish the natural attributes of the Deity, while the moral are still doubtful and uncertain ? You take umbrage very easily, replied Demea, at opinions the most innocent, and the most generally re­ ceived even amongst the religious and devout themselves: and nothing can be more surprising than to find a topic like this, concerning the wickedness and misery of man, charged with no less than Atheism and profane­ ness. Have not all pious divines and preachers, who have indulged their rhetoric on so fertile a subject; have they not easily, I say, given a solution of any difficulties which may attend it! This world is but a . point in comparison of the universe; this life but a moment in comparison of eternity. The present evil phenomena, therefore, are rectified in other regions, and in some future period of existence. And the eyes of men, being then opened to larger views of things, see the whole connection of general laws; and trace, with adoration, the benevolence and rectitude of the Deity, through all the maze and intricacies of his providence. No 1 replied Cleanthes, No ! These arbitrary sup­ positions can never be admitted, contrary to matter of fact, visible and uncontroverted. Whence can any cause be known but from its known effects ? Whence can any hypothesis be proved but from the apparent phenomena ? To establish one hypothesis upon another, is building entirely in the air ; and the utmost we ever attain, by these conjectures and fictions, is to �Part X. 89 ascertain the bare possibility of our opinion; but never can we, upon such terms, establish its reality. The only method of supporting divine benevolence (and it is what I willingly embrace) is to deny ab­ solutely the misery and wickedness of man. Your representations are exaggerated; your melancholy views mostly fictitious ; your inferences contrary to fact and experience. Health is more common than sickness; pleasure than pain ; happiness than misery. And for one vexation which we meet with, we attain, upon computation, a hundred enjoyments. Admitting your position, replied Philo, which yet is extremely doubtful; you must, at the same time, allow, that, if pain be less frequent than pleasure, it is in­ finitely more violent and durable. One hour of it is often able to outweigh a day, a week, a month of our common insipid enjoyments. And how many days, weeks, and months, are passed by several in the most acute torments ? Pleasure, scarcely in one instance, is ever able to reach ecstasy and rapture : and in no one in­ stance can it continue for any time at its highest pitch and altitude. The spirits evaporate ; the nerves relax; the fabric is disordered • and the enjoyment quickly de­ generates into fatigue and uneasiness. But pain often, how often ! rises to torture and agony ? and the longer it continues, it becomes still more genuine agony and torture. Patience is exhausted; courage languishes ; melancholy seizes us ; and nothing terminates our misery but the removal of its cause, or another event, which is the sole cure of all evil, but which, from our natural folly, we regard with still greater horror and consternation. But not to insist upon these topics, continued Philo, though most obvious, certain, and important; I must use the freedom to admonish you, Cleanthes, that you have put the controversy upon a most dangerous issue, and are unawares introducing a total Scepticism into the most essential articles of natural and revealed theology. �90 Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. What! no method of fixing a just foundation for religion, unless we allow the happiness of human life, and maintain a continued existence even in this world, with all our present pains, infirmities, vexations, and follies, to he eligible and desirable! But this is con­ trary to every one’s feeling and experience : It is con­ trary to an authority so established as nothing can subvert. No decisive proofs can ever be produced against this authority; nor is it possible for you to compute, estimate, and compare, all the pains and all the pleasures in the lives of all men and of all animals and thus by your resting the whole system of religion on a point, which, from its very nature, must for ever be uncertain, you tacitly confess, that that system is equally uncertain. But allowing you, what never will be believed; at least, what you never possibly can prove; that animal, or at least human happiness, in this life, exceeds its misery; you have yet done nothing : For this is not, by any means, what we expect from infinite power, infinite wisdom, and infinite goodness. Why is there any misery at all in the world 1 Not by chance surely. From some cause then. Is it from the intention of the Deity ? But he is perfectly benevolent. Is it contrary to his intention? But he is almighty. Nothing can shake the solidity of this reasoning, so short, so clear, so decisive : except we assert, that these subjects exceed all human capacity, and that our common measures of truth and falsehood are not applicable to them; a topic, which I have all along insisted on, but which you have from the beginning rejected with scorn and indignation. But I will be contented to retire still from this intrenchment, for I deny that you can ever force me in it: I will allow, that pain or misery in man is com­ patible with infinite power and goodness in the Deity, even in your sense of these attributes : What are you advanced by all these concessions? A mere possible �Part XI. 91 ■compatibility is not sufficient. You must prove these pure, unmixed, and uncontrollable attributes from the present mixed and confused phenomena and from these alone. A hopeful undertaking ! Were the phenomena ever so pure and unmixed, yet being finite, they would be insufficient for that purpose. How much more, where they are also so jarring and discordant? Here, Cleanthes, I find myself at ease in my argu­ ment. Here I triumph. Formerly, when we argued concerning the natural attributes of intelligence and design, I needed all my sceptical and metaphysical subtlety to elude your grasp. In many views of the universe, and of its parts, particularly the latter, the beauty and fitness of final causes strike us with such irresistible force, that all objections appear (what I believe they really are) mere cavils and sophisms; nor can we then imagine how it was ever possible for us to repose any weight on them. But there is no view of human life, or of the condition of mankind, from which, without the greatest violence, we can infer the moral attributes, or learn that infinite benevolence, conjoined with infinite power and infinite wisdom, which we must discover by the eyes of faith alone. It is your turn now to tug the labouring oar, and to support your philosophical subtleties against the dictates of plain reason and experience. PAET XI. I scruple not to allow, said Cleanthes, that I have been apt to suspect the frequent repetition of the word infinite, which we meet with in all theological writers, to savour more of panegyric than of philosophy; and that any purposes of reasoning, and even of religion, would be better served, were we to rest contented with more accurate and more moderate expressions. The �92 Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. terms admirable, excellent, superlatively great, wise, and holy; these sufficiently fill the imaginations of men; and anything beyond, besides that it leads into absurdities, has no influence on the affections or senti­ ments. Thus, in the present subject, if we abandon all human analogy, as seems your intention, Demea, I am afraid we abandon all religion, and retain no conception of the great object of our adoration. If we preserve human analogy, we must for ever find it impossible to reconcile any mixture of evil in the universe with infinite attributes ; much less can we ever prove the latter from the former. But supposing the Author of Nature to be finitely perfect, though far exceeding mankind ; a satisfactory account may then be given of natural and moral evil, and every untoward phenome­ non be explained and adjusted. A less evil may then be chosen, in order to avoid a greater: Inconveniencies be submitted to, in order to reach a desirable end. And, in a word, benevolence, regulated by wisdom, and limited by necessity, may produce just such a world as the present. You, Philo, who are so prompt at starting views, and reflections, and analogies; I would gladly hear, at length, without interruption, your opinion of this new theory • and if it deserve our attention, we may afterwards, at more leisure, reduce it into form. My sentiments, replied Philo, are not worth being made a mystery of; and therefore, without any cere­ mony, I shall deliver what occurs to me with regard to the present subject. It must, I think, be allowed, that if a very limited intelligence, whom we shall suppose utterly unacquainted with the universe, were assured, that it were the production of a very good, wise, and powerful Being, however finite, he would, from .his conjectures, form beforehand a different notion of it from what we find it to be by experience; nor would he ever imagine, merely from these attributes of the cause, of which he is informed, that the effect could be �Part XI. 93 so full of vice, and misery, and disorder, as it appears in this life. Supposing now, that this person were brought into the world, still assured that it was the workmanship of such a sublime and benevolent Being ; he might, perhaps, be surprised at the disappointment; But would never retract his former belief, if founded on any very solid argument; since such a limited intelli­ gence must be sensible of his own blindness and ignorance, and must allow, that there may be many solutions of those phenomena, which will for ever escape his comprehension. But supposing, which is the real case with regard to man, that' 'this creature is not antecedently convinced of a supreme intelligence, benevolent and powerful, but is left to gather such a belief from the appearances of things; this entirely alters the case, nor will he ever find any reason for such a conclusion. He may be fully convinced of the narrow limits of his understanding ■ but this will not help him in forming an inference concerning the goodness of superior powers, since he must form that inference from what he knows, not from what he is ignorant of. The more you exaggerate his weakness and ignorance, the more diffident you render him, and give him the greater suspicion that such subjects are beyond the reach of his faculties. You are obliged, therefore, to reason with him merely from the known phenomena, and to drop every arbitrary supposition or conjecture. Bid I show you a house or palace, where there was not one apartment convenient or agreeable ; where the windows, doors, fires, passages, stairs, and the whole economy of the building, were the source of noise, con­ fusion, fatigue, darkness, and the extremes of heat and cold; you would certainly blame the contrivance, with­ out any farther examination. The architect would in vain display his subtlety, and prove to you, that if this door or that window were altered, greater ills would ensue. What he says may be strictly true: The alteration of one particular, while the other parts of the �94 Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. building remain, may only augment the inconveniences. But still you would assert in general, that, if the archi­ tect had had skill and good intentions, he might have formed such a plan of the whole, and might have adjusted the parts in such a manner, as would have remedied all or most of these inconveniences. His ignorance, or even your own ignorance, of such a plan, will never convince you of the impossibility of it. If you find many inconveniencies and deformities in the building, you will always, without entering into any detail, condemn the architect. In short, I repeat the question. Is the world, con­ sidered in general, and as it appears to us in this life, different from what a man, or such a limited being, would, beforehand, expect from a very powerful, wise, and benevolent Deity ? It must be strange prejudice to assert the contrary. And from thence I conclude, that, however consistent the world may be, allowing certain suppositions and conjectures, with the idea of such a Deity, it can never afford us an inference concerning his existence. The consistence is not absolutely denied, only the inference. Conjectures, especially where infinity is excluded from the divine attributes, may perhaps, be sufficient to prove a consistence; but can never be foundations for any inference. There seem to be four circumstances, on which depend all, or the greatest part of the ills, that molest sensible creatures j and it is not impossible but all these circumstances may be necessary and unavoidable. We know so little beyond common life, or even of common life, that, with regard to the economy of a universe, there is no conjecture, however wild, which may not be just; nor any one, however plausible, which may not be erroneous. All that belongs to human understanding, in this deep ignorance and obscurity, is to be sceptical, or at least cautious; and not to admit of any hypothesis whatever; much less, of any which is supported by no appearance of probability. Now, this I assert to be the �Part XI. 95 case with regard, to all the causes of evil, and the cir­ cumstances on which it depends. None of them appear to human reason, in the least degree, necessary or unavoidable; nor can we suppose them such, without the utmost license of imagination. The first circumstance which introduces evil, is that contrivance or economy of the animal creation, by which pains, as well as pleasures, are employed to excite all creatures to action, and make them vigilant in the great work of self-preservation. Now pleasure alone, in its various degrees, seems to human understanding sufficient for this purpose. All animals might be constantly in a state of enjoyment; but when urged by any of the necessities of nature, such as thirst, hunger, weariness; instead of pain, they might feel a diminution of pleasure, by which they might be prompted to seek that object which is necessary to their subsistence. Men who pursue pleasure as eagerly as they avoid pain ; at least, might have been so constituted. It seems, therefore, plainly possible to carry on the business of life without any pain. Why then is any animal ever rendered susceptible of such a sensation 1 If animals can be free from it an hour, they might enjoy a perpetual exemption from it • and it required as particular a contrivance of their organs to produce that feeling, as to endow them with sight, hearing, or any of the senses. Shall we con­ jecture that such a contrivance was necessary, without any appearance of reason ? and shall we build on that conjecture, as on the most certain truth ? But a capacity of pain would not alone produce, pain, were it not for the second circumstance, viz., the conducting of the world by general laws; and this seems nowise necessary to a very perfect Being. It is true ; if everything were conducted by particular voli­ tions, the course of nature would be perpetually broken, and no man could employ his reason in the conduct of life. But might not other particular voliG �g6 Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. tions remedy this inconvenience ? In short, might not the Deity exterminate all ill, wherever it were to be found ; and produce all good, without any prepara­ tion or long progress of causes and effects ? Besides, we must consider, that, according to the present economy of the world, the course of nature, though supposed exactly regular, yet to us appears not so, and many events are uncertain, and many dis­ appoint our expectations. Health and sickness, calm and tempest, with an infinite number of other accidents, whose causes are unknown and variable, have a great influence both on the fortunes of particular persons, and on the prosperity of public societies ; and indeed all human life, in a manner, depends on such accidents. A being, therefore, who knows the secret springs of the universe, might easily, by particular volitions, turn all these accidents to the good of mankind, and render the whole world happy, without discovering himself in any operation. A fleet, whose purposes were salutary to society, might always meet with a fair wind; good princes enjoy sound health and long life; persons born to power and authority, be framed with good tempers and virtuous dispositions. A few such events as these, regularly and wisely conducted, would change the face of the world, and yet would no more seem to disturb the course of nature, or confound human conduct, than the present economy of things, where the causes are secret, and variable, and com­ pounded. Some small touches given to Caligula’s brain in his infancy, might Lave converted him into a Trajan; one wave, a little higher than the rest, by burying Caesar and his fortune in the bottom of the ocean, might have restored liberty to a considerable part of mankind. There may, for aught we know, be good reasons, why Providence interposes not in this manner; but they are unknown to us; and though the mere supposition, that such reasons exist, may be sufficient to save the conclusion concerning the divine �Part XI. 97 attributes, yet surely it can never be sufficient to establish that conclusion. If everything in the universe be conducted by general laws, and if animals be rendered susceptible of pain, it scarcely seems possible but some ill must arise in the various shocks of matter, and the various con­ currence and opposition of general laws. But this ill would be very rare, were it not for the third circum­ stance, which I proposed to mention, viz., the great frugality with which all powers and faculties are dis­ tributed to every particular being. So well adjusted are the organs and capacities of all animals, and so well fitted to their preservation, that, as far as history or tradition reaches, there appears not to be any single species which has yet been extinguished in the universe.* Every animal has the requisite endow­ ments ; but these endowments are bestowed with so scrupulous an economy, that any considerable diminu­ tion must entirely destroy the creature. Wherever one power is increased, there is a proportional abate­ ment in the others, Animals, which excel in swift* Here Hume was quite in error, and consequently made an admission against himself by thinking that no race of animals has ever become extinct. The truth is that the very reverse is the. case. A whole animal and vegetable creation have become extinct, as the fossil remains of gigantic animals and gigantic trees abundantly testify. Even tropical climates in parts of the earth have been, as it were, extinguished, and their places occupied in some cases by arctic, and in others by temperate climates. It was probably a change of climate which came on in places whence the now extinct animals could not get away, that caused their destruction. At Maidstone, in England, there have been found the fossil remains of a ’ saurian reptile, called iguanodon. From these remains naturalists have calculated that the animal was seventy feet (or more) in length. Therefore these facts strengthen Hume’s position. They shew at least that this part of creation is imperfect. They shew that the present order of things on earth may be as mortal and perishable as that which preceded it. The fossil remains of the human race may prove a puzzle to a superior order of animals four hundred thousand years hence. But in the days of Hume, geology was not among the sciences then known. Fossils were an insoluble riddle. It was not until a long time after Hume’s death, and after the pioneers of �98 Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. ness, are commonly defective in force. Those which possess both, are either imperfect in some of their senses, or are oppressed with the most craving wants. The human species, whose chief excellency is reason and sagacity, is of all others the most necessitous, and the most deficient in bodily advantages; without clothes, without arms, without food, without lodging, without any convenience of life, except what they owe to their own skill and industry. In short, nature seems to have formed an exact calculation of the necessities of her creatures; and, like a rigid master, has afforded them little more powers or endowments than what are strictly sufficient to supply those necessities. An indulgent parent would have bestowed a large stock, in order to guard against accidents, and secure the happiness and welfare of the creature in the most unfortunate concurrence of circumstances. Every course of life would not have been so surrounded with precipices, that the least departure from the true path, by mistake or necessity, must involve us in misery and ruin. Some reserve, some fund, would have been provided to ensure happiness; nor would the powers and the necessities have been adjusted with so rigid an economy. The author of nature is inconceivably • powerful; his force is supposed great, if not altogether inexhaustible: nor is there any reason, as far as we can judge, to make him observe this strict frugality in Geology had groped and lost their way through numbers of Noachian, and other equally absurd theories by which they tried to account for the origin and existence of fossil organisms, that the true theories of geological science were discovered. There is scarcely any thing in the history of human enlighten­ ment, that is more strange and interesting than the steady advance and triumph of scientific geology over the fables of the Hebrew and other nonsensical cosmogonies. Only at rare intervals, and in remote corners of civilization, can there be found even a Christian priest who has the stupidity, ignorance, and audacity to question the completeness of this triumph. Religion has fre­ quently led men astray, when seeking moral and scientific Truth ; but religion has never taught men anything worth knowing, except the knowledge of its own immorality and worthlessness. �Part XI. 99 his dealings with his creatures. It would have been better, were his power extremely limited, to have created fewer animals, and to have endowed these with more faculties for their happiness and preservation. A builder is never esteemed prudent, who undertakes a plan beyond what his stock will enable him to finish. In order to cure most of the ills of human life, I require not that man should have the wings of the eagle, the swiftness of the stag, the force of the ox, the arms of the lion, the scales of the crocodile or rhinoceros ; much less do I demand the sagacity of an angel or cherubim. I am contented to take an increase in one single power or faculty of his soul. Let him be endowed with a greater propensity to industry and labour ; a more vigorous spring and activity of mind; a more constant bent to business and application. Let the whole species possess naturally an equal diligence with that which many individuals are able to attain by habit and reflection; and the most bene­ ficial consequences, without any alloy of ill, is the immediate and necessary result of this endowment. Almost all the moral, as well as natural evils of human life arise from idleness ; and were our species, by the original constitution of their frame, exempt from this vice or infirmity, the perfect cultivation of land, the improvement of arts and manufactures, the exact execution of every office and duty, immediately follow ; and men at once may fully reach that state of society, which is so imperfectly attained by the best regulated government. But as industry is a power, and the most valuable of any, nature seems determined, suitably to her usual maxims, to bestow it on men with a very sparing hand; and rather to punish him severely for his deficiency in it, than to reward him for his attain­ ments. She has so contrived his frame, that nothing but the most violent necessity can oblige him to labour; and she employs all his other wants to over- �ioo Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. come, at least in part, the want of diligence, and to endow him with some share of a faculty of which she has thought fit naturally to bereave him. Here our demands may be allowed very humble, and therefore the more reasonable. If we required the endowments of superior penetration and judgment, of a more delicate taste of beauty, of a nicer sensibility to bene­ volence and friendship; we might be told, that we impiously pretend to break the order of nature; that we want to exalt ourselves into a higher rank of being; that the presents which we require, not being suitable to our state and condition, would only be pernicious to us. But it is hard ; I dare to repeat it, it is hard, that being placed in a world so full of wants and necessities, where almost every being and element is either our foe, or refuses its assistance . . . we should also have our own temper to struggle with, and should be deprived of that faculty which can alone fence against these multiplied evils. The fourth circumstance, whence arises the misery and ill of the universe, is the inaccurate workmanship of all the springs and principles of the great machine of nature. It must be acknowledged, that there are few parts of the universe, which seem not to serve some purpose, and whose removal would not produce a visible defect and disorder in the whole. The parts hang all together ; nor can one be touched without affecting the rest, in a greater or less degree. But at the same time, it must be observed, that none of these parts or prin­ ciples, however useful, are so accurately adjusted, as to keep precisely within those bounds in which their utility consists ; but they are, all of them, apt, on every occasion, to run into the one extreme or the other. One would imagine, that this grand production had not received the last hand of the maker; so little finished is every part, and so coarse are the strokes with which it is executed. Thus, the winds are requisite to convey the vapours along the surface of the globe, and to assist �Part XI. IOI Bien in navigation : bnt how oft, rising up to tempests and hurricanes, do they become pernicious ? Rains are necessary to nourish all the plants and animals of the earth: but how often are they defective, how often ex­ cessive ? Heat is requisite to all life and vegetation; but is not always found in the due proportion. On the mix­ ture and secretion of the humours and juices of the body depend the health and prosperity of the animal: but the parts perform not regularly their proper function. What more useful than all the passions of the mind, ambition, vanity, love, anger ? But how oft do they break their bounds, and cause the greatest convulsions in society 1 There is nothing so advantageous in the universe, but what frequently becomes pernicious, by its excess or defect; nor has Nature guarded, with the requisite accuracy, against all disorder or confusion. The irregu­ larity is never, perhaps, so great as to destroy any species; * but is often sufficient to involve the in­ dividuals in ruin and misery. On the concurrence, then, of these four circumstances, does all or the greatest part of natural evil depend. Were all living creatures incapable of pain, or were the world administered by particular volitions, evil never could have found access into the universe : and were ani­ mals endowed with a large stock of powers and faculties, beyond what strict necessity requires; or were the several springs and principles of the universe so accur­ ately framed as to preserve always the just temperament and medium; there must have been very little ill in comparison of what we feel at present. What then shall we pronounce on this occasion ? Shall we say, that these circumstances are not necessary, and that they might easily have been altered in the contrivance of the universe ? This decision seems too presump­ tuous for creatures so blind and ignorant. Let us be more modest in our conclusions. Let us allow, that if the goodness of the deity (I mean a goodness like the * See the Note at page 97. �102 Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. human) could be established on any tolerable reasons a priori, these phenomena, however untoward, would not be sufficient to subvert that principle; but might easily, in some unknown manner, be reconcilable to it. But let us still assert, that as this goodness is not antece­ dently established, but must be inferred from the phe­ nomena, there can be no grounds for such an inference, while there are so many ills in the universe, and while these ills might so easily have been remedied, as far as human understanding can be allowed to judge on such a subject. I am sceptic enough to allow, that the bad appearances, notwithstanding all my reasonings, may be compatible with such attributes as you suppose : But surely they can never prove these attributes. Such a conclusion cannot result from scepticism; but must arise from the phenomena, and from our confidence in the reasonings which we deduce from these phenomena. Look round this universe. What an immense pro­ fusion of beings, animated and organized, sensible and active 1 You admire this prodigious variety and fecundity. But inspect a little more narrowly these living existences, the only beings worth regarding. How hostile and destructive to each other! How insufficient all of them for their own happiness I How contemptible or odious to the spectator 1 The whole presents nothing but the idea of a blind Nature, impregnated by a great vivifying principle, and pouring forth from her lap, without discernment or parental care, her maimed and abortive children.* Here the Manichaean system occurs as a proper hypothesis to solve the difficulty : and no doubt, in some respects, it is very specious, and has more probabil­ ity than the common hypothesis, by giving a plausible account of the strange mixture of good and ill which * “As is the race of leaves, even such is the race of men. Leaves, some indeed the wind sheds on the ground, but the bud­ ding wood produces others when the season of spring comes on ; thus does the race of men, one produce, another cease [produc­ ing].”—Iliad vi. 146-9. �Part XL Io3 appears in life. But if we consider, on the other hand, the perfect uniformity and agreement of the parts of the universe, we shall not discover in it any marks of the combat of a malevolent with a benevolent being. There is indeed an opposition of pains and pleasures in the feelings of sensible creatures : but are not all the operations of Nature carried on by an opposition of principles, of hot and cold, moist and dry, light and heavy? The true conclusion is, that the original Source of all things is entirely indifferent to all these principles ; and has no more regard to good above ill, than to heat above cold, or to drought above moisture, or to light above heavy* There may four hypotheses be framed concerning the first causes of the universe : that they are endowed with perfect goodness ; that they have perfect malice ; that they are opposite, and have both goodness and malice; that they have neither goodness nor malice. Mixed phenomena can never prove the two former un­ mixed principles. And the uniformity and steadiness of general laws seem to oppose the third. The fourth, therefore, seems by far the most probable. What I have said concerning natural evil will apply to moral, with little or no variation; and we have no more reason to infer, that the rectitude of the Supreme Being resembles human rectitude, than that his benevolence resembles the human. Nay, it will be thought, that we have still greater cause to exclude from him moral sentiments, such as we feel them; since moral evil, in the opinion of many, is much more predominant above moral good than natural evil above natural good. * A remarkable passage in Tacitus (Annals xvi. 33,) contains a similar idea. He says, “ The same day furnished a bright ex­ ample of virtue in the person of Cassus Asclepiodotus, a man con­ spicuous among the Bithynians for the extent of his wealth, who continued to treat Soranus in his decline with the same respect he had constantly shewn him in the meridian of his fortune. The consequence was, that he was stripped of all his property and driven into exile: thus exemplifying the indifference of the Gods towards patterns of virtue and of vice ! ” �104 Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. But even though, this should not he allowed; and though the virtue, which is in mankind, should be acknowledged much superior to the vice; yet so long as there is any vice at all in the universe, it will very much puzzle you Anthropomorphites, how to account for it. You must assign a cause for it, without having recourse to the first cause. But as every effect must have a cause, and that cause another; you must either carry on the progression in infinitum, or rest on that original principle, who is the ultimate cause of all things............. Hold ! Hold! cried Demea: Whither does your imagination hurry you ? I joined in alliance with you, in order to prove the incomprehensible nature of the Divine Being, and refute the principles of Cleanthes, who would measure everything by a human rule and standard. But I now find you running into all the topics of the greatest libertines and infidels; and betraying that holy cause, which you seemingly espoused. Are you secretly, then, a more dangerous enemy than Cleanthes himself ? And are you so late in perceiving it 1 replied Cleanthes. Believe me, Demea; your friend Philo, from the beginning, has been amusing himself at both our expense; and it must be confessed, that the injudicious reasoning of our vulgar theology has given him but too just a handle of ridicule. The total infirmity of human reason, the absolute incom­ prehensibility of the Divine Nature, the great and universal misery and still greater wickedness of men; these are strange topics, surely, to be so fondly cherished by orthodox divines and doctors. In ages of stupidity and ignorance, indeed, these principles may safely be espoused; and, perhaps, no views of things are more proper to promote superstition, than such as encourage the blind amaze­ ment, the diffidence, and melancholy of mankind. But at present .... �Part Xll. 105 Blame not so much, interposed Philo, the ignorance of these reverend gentlemen. They know how to change their style with the times. Formerly it was a most popular theological topic to maintain, that human life was vanity and misery, and to exaggerate all the ills and pains which are incident to men. But of late years, divines, we find, begin to retract this position ; and maintain, though still with some hesitation, that there are more goods than evils, more pleasures than, pains, even in this life. When religion stood entirely upon temper and education, it was thought proper to encourage melancholy; as indeed, mankind never have recourse to superior powers so readily as in that dis­ position. But as men have now learned to form principles, and to draw consequences, it is necessary to change the batteries, and to make use of such argu­ ments as will endure at least some scrutiny and examination. This variation is the same (and from the same causes) with that which 1 formerly remarked with regard to Scepticism. Thus Philo continued to the last his spirit of opposition, and his censure of established opinions. But I could observe, that Demea did not at all relish the latter part of the discourse; and he took occasion soon after, on some pretence or other, to leave the company. PART XII. After Demea’s departure, Cleanthes and Philo con­ tinued the conversation in the following manner. Our friend, I am afraid, said Cleanthes, will have little inclination to revive this topic of discourse, while you are in company; and to tell truth, Philo, I should rather wish to reason with either of you apart on a subject so sublime and interesting. Your spirit of controversy, �io6 Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. joined to your abhorrence of vulgar superstition, carries you strange lengths, when engaged in an argument; and there is nothing so sacred and venerable, even in your own eyes, which you spare on that occasion. I must confess, replied Philo, that I am less cautious on the subject of Natural Religion than on any other; both because I know that I can never, on that head, corrupt the principles of any man of common sense; and because no one, I am confident, in whose eyes I appear a man of common sense, will ever mistake my intentions. You in particular, Cleanthes, with whom I live in unreserved intimacy; you are sensible, that not­ withstanding the freedom of my conversation, and my love of singular arguments, no one has a deeper sense of religion impressed on his mind, or pays more profound adoration to the Divine Being, as he discovers himself to reason, in the inexplicable contrivance and artifice of Nature. A purpose, an intention, a design, strikes everywhere the most careless, the most stupid thinker; and no man can be so hardened in absurd systems, as at all times to reject it. That Nature does nothing in vain, is a maxim established in all the schools, merely from the contemplation of the works of Nature, without any religious purpose; and, from a firm conviction of its truth, an anatomist, who had observed a new organ or canal, would never be satisfied till he had also dis­ covered its use and intention. One great foundation of the Copernican system is the maxim, That Nature acts by the simplest methods, and chooses the most proper means to any end; and astronomers often, without thinking of it, lay this strong foundation of piety and religion. The same thing is observable in other parts of philosophy; And thus all the sciences almost lead us insensibly to acknowledge a first intelligent Author; and their authority is often so much the greater, as they do not directly profess that intention. It is with pleasure I hear Galen reason concerning the structure of the human body. The anatomy of a �Part XII. 1O7 man, says he, * discovers above 600 different muscles ; and whoever duly considers these, will find, that in each of them Nature must have adjusted at least ten different circumstances, in order to attain the end which she proposed; proper figure, j ust magnitude, right disposition of the several ends, upper and lower position of the whole, the due insertion of the several nerves, veins, and arteries: So that, in the muscles alone, above 6000 several views and intentions must have been formed and executed. The bones he calculates to be 284 : The distinct purposes, aimed at in the structure of each, above forty. What a prodigious display of artifice, even in these simple and homogeneous parts ? But if we consider the skin, ligaments, vessels, glandules, humours, the several limbs and members of the body; how must our astonishment rise upon us, in proportion to the number and intricacy of the parts so artificially adjusted 1 The farther we advance in these researches, we discover new scenes of art and wisdom: But descry still, at a distance, farther scenes beyond our reach ; in the fine internal structure of the parts, in the economy of the brain, in the fabric of the seminal vessels. All these artifices are repeated in every different species of animal, with wonderful variety, and with exact propriety suited to the different intentions of Nature in fra,mi ng each species. And if the infidelity of Galen, even when these natural sciences were still imperfect, could not withstand such striking appearances • to what pitch of pertinacious obstinacy must a philosopher in this age have attained, who can now doubt of a Supreme Intelligence ? f * De formations foetus. t Without denying the truth of what Hume says here, to the effect, that the human frame shews clear and unmistakable proofs of design ; yet it is doubtful whether his eminently philosophical mind would have allowed him to state the fact in such very decided terms as these, if he had been acquainted with even a glimpse of the evolution theory. But Oken was not born until three years after Hume’s death. And Darwin’s “Descent of Man” was not published until more than a century after Hume had ceased to �io8 Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. Could I meet with one of this species, I would ask him: Supposing there were a God, who did not dis­ cover himself immediately to our senses; were it possible for him to give stronger proofs of his exist­ ence, than what appear on the whole face of nature ? What indeed could such a divine being do but copy the present economy of things ; render many of his artifices so plain, that no stupidity could mistake them; afford glimpses of still greater artifices, which demonstrate his prodigious superiority above our narrow apprehensions; and conceal altogether a great many from such imperfect creatures? Now, according to all rules of just reasoning, every fact must pass for undisputed, when it is supported by all the arguments write. Oken and his followers discovered that the skull and limbs of vertebrate animals are merely modified forms. And Darwin discovered that the human animal is merely a development from an inferior one. Oken has left on record how the light first dawned on his mind ; and a knowledge of the circumstance is of importance to the thinker. In August 1806, while Oken was among the Hartz mountains, he unexpectedly saw the well-preserved skull of a hind. From the appearance which the skull accidentally presented to him, he exclaimed “ a vertebral column ! ” This was a piece of reasoning a priori. Nevertheless, by thinking over this suggestion he ultimately discovered that, in all vertebrate animals, the bones of the skull are only modified vertebrae. Perhaps he who thinks on Probability will perceive that although arguments grounded on a priori reasoning are utterly barren of proof and consequently of result, yet, so far as we know, all the important discoveries, hitherto made, have been generated from suggestions arising from a priori considerations. “ Nature does nothing in vain.” As yet, it is on such suggestions that the evolution theory is grounded. From considerations such as this the true thinker will be on his guard, and will not give way to that prevalent weakness of the human mind, when, upon a comparison of two important things relating to the same subject, one is found to be of less importance than the other,To consider the less important as_ of scarcely any value whatever. “ The Cyclic Poems ” are a fair sample of an important matter which was despised unphilosophically. During twenty-one centuries they were regarded as nearly beneath contempt. Yet from Mr F. A. Paley’s “ Introduction ” to his first volume of the Iliad, we know, in his skilful hands, how almost invaluable the remains of the “ Cyclic Poems ” proved towards ascertaining the correct date of our “ Homer.” �Part XII. 109 which, its nature admits of; even though these arguments be not, in themselves, very numerous or forcible. How much more, in the present case, where no human imagination can compute their number, and no understanding estimate their cogency ? I shall farther add, said Cleanthes, to what you have so well urged, that one great advantage of the principle of theism, is, that it is the only system of cosmogony which can be rendered intelligible and complete, and yet can throughout preserve a strong analogy to what we every day see and experience in the world. The comparison of the universe to a machine of human contrivance, is so obvious and natural, and is justified by so many instances of order and design in nature, that it must immediately strike all unprejudiced apprehensions, and procure universal approbation. Whoever attempts to weaken this theory, cannot pretend to succeed by establishing in its place any other that is precise and determinate. It is sufficient for him, if he start doubts and difficulties, and by remote and abstract views of things, reach that suspense of judgment, which is here the utmost boundary of his wishes. But besides that this state of mind is in itself unsatisfactory, it can never be steadily maintained against such striking appearances as continually engage us into the religious hypothesis. From the force of prejudice, human nature is capable of adhering, with obstinacy and perseverance, to a false absurd system. But I think it absolutely impossible, by valid argument, to maintain or defend any system at all, inculcated by natural propensity and by early education, in opposition to a theory supported by strong and obvious reason. So little, replied Philo, do I esteem this suspense of judgment in the present case to be possible, that I am apt to suspect there enters somewhat of a dispute of words into this controversy, more than is usually imagined. That the works of nature bear a great analogy to the productions of art, is evident; and �11 o Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. according to all the rules of good reasoning, we ought to infer, if we argue at all concerning them, that their causes have a proportional analogy. But as there are also considerable differences, we have reason to suppose a proportional difference in the causes, and in par­ ticular ought to attribute a much higher degree of power and energy to the supreme cause, than any we have ever observed in mankind. Here then the existence of a Deity is plainly ascertained by reason; and if we make it a question, whether on account of these analogies, we can properly call him a mind or intelligence, notwithstanding the vast difference which may reasonably be supposed between him and human minds ; what is this but a mere verbal controversy ? No man can deny the analogies between the effects. To restrain ourselves from inquiring concerning the causes, is scarcely possible. From this inquiry, the legitimate conclusion is, that the causes have also an analogy, and if we are not contented with calling the first and supreme cause a God or Deity, but desire to vary the expression ; what can we call him but Mind or Thought, to which he is justly supposed to bear a considerable resemblance ? All men of sound reason are disgusted with verbal disputes, which abound so much in philosophical and theological inquiries ; and it is found, that the only remedy for this abuse must arise from clear definitions, from the precision of those ideas which enter into any argument, and from the strict and uniform use of those terms which are employed. But there is a species of controversy, which, from the very nature of language and of human ideas, is involved in perpetual ambiguity, and can never, by any precaution or any definitions, be able to reach a reasonable certainty or precision. These are the controversies concerning the degrees of any quality or circumstance. Men may argue to all eternity, whether Hannibal be a great, or a very great, or a superlatively great man; �Part XII. 111 what degree of beauty Cleopatra possessed; what epithet of praise Livy or Thucidydes is entitled to, without bringing the controversy to any determination. The disputants may here agree in their sense, and differ in the terms, or vice versa ; yet never be able to define their terms, so as to enter into each other’s meaning: Because the degrees of these qualities are not, like quantity or number, susceptible of any exact mensuration, which may be the standard in the con­ troversy. That the dispute concerning theism is of this nature, and consequently is merely verbal, or perhaps, if possible, still more incurably ambiguous, will appear upon the slightest inquiry. I ask the theist if he does not allow, that there is a great and immeasurable, because incomprehensible, difference between the human and the divine mind. The more pious he is, the more readily will he assent to the affirmative, and the more will he be disposed to magnify the difference. He will even assert that the difference is of a nature which cannot be too much magnified. I next turn to the atheist, who, I assert, is only nominally so, and can never possibly be in earnest; and I ask him, whether, from the coherence and apparent sympathy in all the parts of this world, there be not a certain degree of analogy among all the operations of nature, in every situation and in every age, whether the rotting of a turnip, the generation of an animal, and the structure of human thought, be not energies that probably bear some remote analogy to each other. It is impossible he can deny it. He will readily acknowledge it. Having obtained this concession, I push him still farther in his retreat; and I ask him, if it be not probable, that the principle which first arranged, and still maintains, order in this universe, bears not also some remote inconceivable analogy to the other operations of nature, and among the rest to the economy of human mind and thought. However reluctant, he must give his assent. Where H �112 Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. then, cry I to both these antagonists, is the subject of your dispute ? The Theist allows that the original intelligence is very different from human reason. The atheist allows, that the original principle of order bears some remote analogy to it. Will you quarrel, gentle­ men, about the degrees ; and enter into a controversy which admits not of any precise meaning, nor conse­ quently of any determination ? If you should be so obstinate, I should not be surprised to find you insensibly change sides; while the theist, on the one hand exaggerates the dissimilarity between the supreme Being, and frail, imperfect, variable, fleeting, and mortal creatures; and the atheist, on the other, magni­ fies the analogy among all the operations of nature, in every period, every situation, and every position. Consider then, where the real point of controversy lies, and if you cannot lay aside your disputes, endeavour, at least, to cure yourselves of your animosity. And here I must also acknowledge, Cleanthes, that, as the works of Nature have a much greater analogy to the effects of our art and contrivance, than to those of our benevolence and j ustice ; we have reason to infer, that the natural attributes of the Deity have a greater resemblance to’those of men, than his moral have to human virtues. But what is the consequence ? Nothing but this, that the moral qualities of man are more defective in their kind than his natural abilities. For as the Supreme Being is allowed to be absolutely and entirely perfect; whatever differs most from him, departs the farthest from the supreme standard of recti­ tude and perfection.* * It seems evident, that the dispute between the Sceptics and Dogmatists is entirely verbal; or at least regards only the degrees of doubt and assurance, which we ought to indulge with regard to all reasoning : and such disputes are commonly, at the bottom, verbal, and admit not of any precise determination. No philosophical Dogmatist denies, that there are difficulties both with regard to the senses and to all science ; and that these difficulties are in a regular, logical method, absolutely insolvable. No Sceptic denies �Part XII. 1T3 These, Cleanthes, are my unfeigned sentiments on this subject; and these sentiments, you know, I have ever cherished and maintained. But in proportion to my veneration for true religion, is my abhorrence of vulgar superstitions ; and I indulge a peculiar pleasure, I confess, in pushing such principles, sometimes into absurdity, sometimes into impiety. And you are sensible, that all bigots, notwithstanding their great aversion to the latter above the former, are commonly equally guilty of both. My inclination, replied Cleanthes, lies, I own, a con­ trary way. Religion, however corrupted, is still better than no religion at all. The doctrine of a future state is so strong and necessary a security to morals, that we never ought to abandon or neglect it. For if finite and temporary rewards and punishments have so great an effect, as we daily find: how much greater must be expected from such as are infinite and eternal ? How happens it then, said Philo, if vulgar super­ stition be so salutary to society, that all history abounds so much with accounts of its pernicious consequences on public affairs ? Factions, civil wars, • persecutions, subversions of government, oppression, slavery ; these are the dismal consequences which always attend its prevalency over the minds of men. If the religious spirit be ever mentioned in any historical narration, we are sure to meet afterwards with a detail of the miseries which attend it. And no period of time can be happier or more prosperous, than those in which it is never regarded or heard of. The reason of this observation, replied Cleanthes, is obvious. The proper office of religion is to regulate that we lie under an absolute necessity, notwithstanding these difficulties, of thinking, and believing, and reasoning, with regard to all kinds of subjects, and even of frequently assenting with confidence and security. The only difference, then, between these facts, if they merit that name, is, that the Sceptic, from habit, caprice, or inclination, insists most on the difficulties; the Dog­ matist, for like reasons, on the necessity. �114 Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. * the heart of men, humanize their conduct, infuse the spirit of temperance, order, and obedience : and as its operation is silent, and only enforces the motives of morality and justice, it is in danger of being overlooked, and confounded with these other motives. When it distinguishes itself, and acts as a separate principle oyer men, it has departed from its proper sphere, and has become only a cover to faction and ambition. And so will all religion, said Philo, except the philosophical and rational kind. Your reasonings are more easily eluded than my facts. The inference is not just, because finite and temporary rewards and punishments have so great influence, that therefore such as are infinite and eternal must have so much greater. Consider, I beseech you, the attachment which we have to present things, and the little concern which we discover for objects so remote and uncertain. When divines are declaiming against the common be­ haviour and conduct of the world, they always represent this principle as the strongest imaginable, (which indeed it is); and {describe almost all human kind as lying under the influence of it, and sunk into the deepest lethargy and unconcern about their religious interests. Yet these same divines, when they refute their specu­ lative antagonists, suppose the motives of religion to be so powerful, that, without them, it were impossible for civil society to subsist; nor are they ashamed of so palpable a contradiction. It is certain, from experience, that the smallest grain of natural honesty and benevo­ lence has more effect on men’s conduct, than the most pompous views suggested by theological theories and systems. A man’s natural inclination works incessantly upon him ; it is for ever present to the mind; and ■ mingles itself with every view and consideration : whereas religious motives, where they act at all, operate only by starts and bounds ; and it is scarcely possible 4'or them to become altogether habitual to the mind. The force of the greatest gravity, say the philosophers, �Part XII. JI5 is infinitely small, in comparison of that of the least impulse : yet it is certain, that the smallest gravity will, in the end, prevail above a great impulse ; because no strokes or blows can be repeated with such constancy as attraction and gravitation. Another advantage of inclination : it engages on its side all the wit and ingenuity of the mind : and when get in opposition to religious principles, seeks every method and art of eluding them : in which it is almost always successful. Who can explain the heart of man, or account for those strange salvos and excuses, with which people satisfy themselves, when they follow their inclinations in opposition to their religious duty ? This is well understood in the world; and none but fools ever repose less trust in a man, because they hear, that, from study and philosophy, he has entertained some speculative doubts with regard to theological subjects. And when we have to do with a man, who makes a great profession of religion and devotion ; has this any other effect upon several, who pass for prudent, than to put them on their guard, lest they be cheated and deceived by him ? We must farther consider, that philosophers, who-. ♦ cultivate reason and reflection, stand less in need of such motives to keep them under the restraint of morals : and that the vulgar, who alone may need them, are utterly incapable of so pure a religion as - * represents the Deity to be pleased with nothing but virtue in human behaviour. The recommendations to the Divinity are generally supposed to be either frivolous observances, or rapturous ecstasies, or a bigoted credulity. We need not run back into antiquity, or wander into remote regions, to find instances of this degeneracy. Amongst ourselves, soniehave been guilty of that atrociousness, unknown to the '* Egyptian and Grecian superstitions, of declaiming, in express terms, against morality ; and representing it as, a sure forfeiture of the divine favour, if the least trust •or reliance be laid upon it. �116 Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. But even though superstition or enthusiasm should not put itself in direct opposition to morality; the very diverting of the attention, the raising up a new and frivolous species of merit, the preposterous distri­ bution which it makes of praise and blame, must have the most pernicious consequences, and weaken ex­ tremely men’s attachment to the natural motives of justice and humanity. Such a principle of action likewise, not being any of the familiar motives of human conduct, acts only by intervals on the temper; and must be roused by continual efforts, in order to render the pious zealot satisfied with his own conduct, and make him fulfil his devotional task. Many religious exercises are entered into with seeming fervour, where the heart, at the time, feels cold and languid. A habit of dissimulation is by degrees contracted: and fraud and falsehood become the predominant principle. Hence the reason of that vulgar observation, that the highest zeal in religion and the deepest hypocrisy, so far from being incon­ sistent, are often or commonly united in the same individual character. The bad effects of such habits, even in common life, ' are easily imagined : but where the interests of religion are concerned, no morality can be forcible enough to bind the enthusiastic zealot. The sacredness of the cause sanctifies every measure which can be made use of to promote it. The steady attention alone to so important an interest as that of eternal salvation, is apt to extinguish the benevolent affections, and beget a narrow, con­ tracted selfishness. And when such a temper is encouraged, it easily eludes all the general precepts of charity and benevolence. Thus the motives of vulgar superstition have no great influence on general conduct; nor is their opera­ tion very favourable to morality, in the instances where they predominate. �Part Xll. 117 Is there any maxim in politics more certain and infallible, than that both the number and authority of priests should be confined within very narrow limits; and that the civil magistrate ought, for ever, to keep his fasces and axes from such dangerous hands ? But if the spirit of popular religion were so salutary to society, a contrary maxim ought to prevail. The greater number of priests, and their greater authority and riches, will always augment the religious spirit. And though the priests have the guidance of this spirit, why may we not expect a superior sanctity of life, and greater benevolence and moderation, from persons who are set apart for religion, who are continually inculcat­ ing it upon others, and who must themselves imbibe a greater share of it ? Whence comes it then, that, in fact, the utmost a wise magistrate can propose with regard to popular religions, is, as far as possible, to make a saving game of it, and to prevent their pernicious consequences with regard to society ? Every expedient which he tries for so humble a purpose is surrounded with inconveniences. If he admits only one religion among his subjects, he must sacrifice, to an uncertain prospect of tranquillity, every considera­ tion of public liberty, science, reason, industry, and even his own independency. If he gives indulgence to several sects, which is the wiser maxim, he must pre­ serve a very philosophical indifference to all of them, and carefully restrain the pretensions of the prevailing sect; otherwise he can expect nothing but endless disputes, quarrels, factions, persecutions, and civil commotions. True religion, I allow, has no such pernicious con­ sequences : but we must treat of religion, as it has commonly been found in the world ; nor -have I any­ thing to do with that speculative tenet of Theism, which, as it is a species of philosophy, must partake of the beneficial influence of that principle, and at the same time must lie under a like inconvenience, of being always confined to a very few persons. �118 Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. Oaths are requisite in all courts of judicature ; but it is a question whether their authority arises from any popular religion. It is the solemnity and importance of the occasion, the regard to reputation, and the reflecting on the general interest of society, which are the chief restraints upon mankind. Custom-house oaths and political oaths are but little regarded even by some who pretend to principles of honesty and religion ; and a Quaker’s asseveration is with us justly put upon the same footing with the oath of any other person. I know, that Polybius * ascribes the infamy of Greek faith to the prevalency of the Epicurean philosophy : but I know also, that Punic faith had as bad a reputation in ancient times, as Irish evidence has in modern ; though we cannot account for these vulgar observations by the same reason. Not to mention, that Greek faith was infamous before the rise of the Epicurean philosophy; and Euripides f, in a passage which I shall point out to you, has glanced a remark­ able stroke of satire against his nation, with regard to this circumstance. Take care, Philo, replied Cleanthes, take care : push not matters too far : allow not your zeal against false religion to undermine your veneration for the true. Forfeit not this principle, the chief, the only great comfort in life; and our principal support amidst all the attacks of adverse fortune. The most agreeable reflection, which it is possible for human imagination to suggest, is that of genuine Theism, which represents us as the workmanship of a Being perfectly good, wise, and powerful; who created us for happiness ; and who, having implanted in us immeasurable desires of good, will prolong our existence to all eternity, and will trans­ fer us into an infinite variety of scenes, in order to satisfy those desires, and render our felicity complete and * Lib. vi. cap. 54. + Iphigenia in Tauride, 1206. Triarov 'EXXas ol8ei> ovSev. “ The Greeks are ignorant of good faith. ” �Part XII. 119 durable. Next to such a Being himself (if the comparison be allowed), the happiest lot which we can imagine, is that of being under his guardianship and protection. These appearances, said Philo, are most engaging and alluring; and with regard to the true philosopher, they are more than appearances. But it happens here, as in the former case, that, with regard to the greater part of mankind, the appearances are deceitful, and that the terrors of religion commonly prevail above its comforts. It is allowed, that men never have recourse to de­ votion so readily as when dejected with grief or depressed with sickness. Is not [this a proof, that the religious spirit is not so nearly allied to joy as to sorrow 1 But men, when afflicted, find consolation in religion, replied Cleanthes. Sometimes, said Philo : but it is natural to imagine, that they will form a notion of those unknown beings, suitably to the present gloom and melancholy of their temper, when they betake themselves to the contemplation of them. Accordingly, we find the tremendous images to predominate in all religions ; and we ourselves, after having employed the most exalted expression in our descriptions of the Deity, fall into the flattest contradiction, in affirming, that the damned are infinitely superior in number to the elect. I shall venture to affirm, that there never was a popular religion, which represented the state of departed souls in such a light, as would render it eligible for human kind, that there should be such a state. These fine models of religion are the mere product of philosophy. Eor as death lies between the eye and the prospect of futurity, that event is so shock­ ing to Nature, that it must throw a gloom on all the regions which lie beyond it; and suggest to the generality of mankind the idea of Cerberus and Furies ; devils, and torrents of fire and brimstone. �120 Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. It is true, both, fear and hope enter into religion ; because both these passions, at different times, agitate the human mind, and each of them forms a species of divinity suitable to itself. But when a man is in a cheerful disposition, he is fit for business, or company, or entertainment of any kind; and he naturally applies himself to these, and thinks not of religion. When melancholy and dejected, he has nothing to do but brood upon the terrors of the invisible world, and to plunge himself still deeper in affliction. It may, indeed, happen, that after he has, in this manner, engraved the religious opinions deep into his thought and imagination, there may arrive a change of health or circumstances, which may restore his good-humour, and raising cheerful prospects of futurity, make him run into the other extreme of joy and triumph. But still it must be acknowledged, that, as terror is the primary principle of religion, it is the passion which always predominates in it, and admits but of short intervals of pleasure. Not to mention, that these fits of excessive, enthusi­ astic joy, by exhausting the spirits, always prepare the way for equal fits of superstitious terror and dejection ; nor is there any state of mind so happy as the calm and equable. But this state it is impossible to support, where a man thinks, that he lies, in such profound darkness and uncertainty, between an eternity of happiness and an eternity of misery. No wonder, that such an opinion disjoints the ordinary frame of the mind, and throws it into the utmost confusion. Ard though that opinion is seldom so steady in its operation as to influence all the actions; yet is it apt to make a considerable breach in the temper, and to produce that gloom and melancholy so remarkable in all devout people. It is contrary to common sense to entertain appre­ hensions or terrors upon account of any opinion what­ soever, or to imagine that we run any risk hereafter, by the freest use of our reason. Such a sentiment implies �Part XII. I2I both, an absurdity and an inconsistency. It is an absurdity to believe that the Deity has human passions, and one of the lowest of human passions, a restless appetite for applause. It is an inconsistency to believe, that, since the Deity has this human passion, he has not others also • and in particular, a disregard to the opinions of creatures so much inferior. “ To know God,” says Seneca, “ is to worship him.” All other worship is indeed absurd, superstitious, and even impious. It degrades him to the low condition of mankind, who are delighted with intreaty, solicitation, presents, and flattery. Yet is this impiety the smallest of which superstition is guilty. Commonly, it de­ presses the Deity far below the condition of mankind; and represents him as a capricious demon, who exercises his power without reason and without humanity! And were that Divine Being disposed to be offended at the vices and follies of silly mortals, who are his own workmanship ; ill would it surely fare with the votaries of most popular superstitions. Nor would any of human race merit his favour, but a very few, the philosophical Theists, who entertain, or rather indeed endeavour to entertain, suitable notions of his divine perfections : as the only persons, entitled to his com­ passion and indulgence, would be the philosophical Sceptics, a set almost equally rare, who, from a natural diffidence of their own capacity, suspend, or endeavour to suspend, all judgment with regard to such sublime and such extraordinary subjects. If the whole of Natural Theology, as some' people seem to maintain, resolves itself into one simple, though somewhat ambiguous, at least undefined pro­ position, That the cause or causes of order in the universe probably bears some remote analogy to human intelligence : if this proposition be not capable of ex­ tension, variation, or more particular explication : if it affords no inference that affects human life, or can be the source of any action or forbearance: and if the analogy, imperfect as it is, can be carried no farther �122 Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion,, than to the human intelligence; and cannot be trans­ ferred, with any appearance of probability, to the other qualities of the mind: if this really be the case, what can the most inquisitive, contemplative, and religious man do more than give a plain, philosophical assent to the proposition, as often as it occurs ; and believe that the arguments on which it is established, exceed the objections which lie against it ? Some astonishment indeed will naturally arise from the greatness of the object; some melancholy from its obscurity; some contempt of human reason, that it cannot give any solution more satisfactory with regard to so extraordin­ ary and magnificent a question. But, believe me, Cleanthes, the most natural sentiment, which a welldisposed mind will feel on this occasion, is a longing desire and expectation that heaven would be pleased to dissipate, or at least alleviate this profound ignorance by affording some more particular revelation to man­ kind, and making discoveries of the nature, attributes, and operations of the divine Object of our faith. A person seized with a just sense of the imperfections of natural reason, will fly to revealed truth with the greatest avidity: while the haughty dogmatist, per­ suaded that he can erect a complete system of theology by the mere light of philosophy, disdains any further aid, and rejects this adventitious instructor. To be a philosophical sceptic, in a man of letters, is the first and most essential step towards being a sound, believing Christian ; a proposition which I will willingly re­ commend to the attention of Pamphilus; and I hope Cleanthes will forgive me for interposing so far in the education and instruction’of his pupil. Cleanthes and Philo pursued not this conversation much further; and as nothing ever made greater impression on me than all the reasonings of that day; so, I confess, that upon a serious review of the whole I cannot but think that Philo’s principles are more probable than Demea’s ; but that those of Cleanthes approach still nearer to the truth. �POSTSCRIPT. A short account of the “ Dialogues ” will probably be acceptable to the reader. It has been stated, in the Preface to this edition of them, that they were laid in manuscript before Sir Gilbert Elliott in the year 1751. Hume was most anxious to publish them, but his friends always dis­ suaded him from doing so, knowing how dangerous to his personal and social peace the experiment might prove. So, by his will, he appointed his friend Dr. « -Adam Smith his literary executor, with full power over all his papers except the “ Dialogues,” which, however, Dr. Smith was directed to publish. As an inducement to Dr. Smith to comply with this direction, Hume added the following clause :—“ Though I can trust to that intimate and sincere friendship which has ever subsisted between us for his faithful execution of this part of my will, yet as a small recompense of his pains in correcting and publishing this work, I leave him £200 to be paid immediately after the publication of it.” Although there is not the least reason to call in question the sincerity of the friendship above referred to, yet Hume foresaw that Dr. Smith would not com­ ply with the direction, couched in such affectionate language, and followed by a substantial legacy; for by a codicil bearing date the 7 th’ August 1776, only a few days before Hume’s death, he made the following provision :—“ I do ordain that if my Dialogues, from whatever cause, be not published within two years and a half after my death, as also an account of my �124 Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. life, the property shall return to my nephew, David, whose duty in publishing them, as the last request of his uncle, must be approved of by all the world/’ Almost immediately after Hume’s death, his friend, Dr. Smith, edited the autobiography, “ My own Life,” alluded to in the codicil; and in a letter addressed to William Strahan, Esq., dated 9 Nov. 1776, Dr. Smith gave an account “ of the behaviour of our late excellent friend, Mr Hume, during his last illness.” That letter concludes thus :—“ Upon the whole, I have always considered him, (Hume) both in his lifetime, and since his death, as approaching as nearly to the idea of a perfectly wise and virtuous man, as perhaps the nature of human frailty will permit.” But Dr. Smith was afraid to publish the “ Dialogues,” and, although both they and the legacy of <£200 were offered to him independently of any condition that might be implied in the terms of the bequest, he refused both. So it was left to be seen what “ my nephew, David,” would do. This David Hume was an advocate at the Scotch bar, and subsequently a baron in the Court of Exchequer. He was a true Christian, a very bad writer, a staunch supporter of terrorism, and a bigoted upholder of all the arbitrary oppressions exercised by the English government during the period from 1793 to 1830. He was very unwilling to publish the “ Dialogues.” However, in the year 1779, he printed them, but without the name of any publisher, printer, or even place of printing attached to the volume. The editor has in his possession a copy of this first and merely printed edition of the “ Dialogues.” Its title page stands thus:—“Dialogues concerning Natural Reli­ gion, by David Hume, Esq.; Printed in 1779.”—On the fly leaf there is written, “From the Author’s Nephew,” indicating that the merely printed copies were not exposed -for sale, and were circulated only privately. But as delivery of any written or printed �Postscript. 125 matter to only one person is “publication ” in the eye of the law, perhaps the baron persuaded himself that he had complied with “ the last request of his uncle ”— in the eye of the law. So intense was Baron Hume’s dread of the social persecution which hitherto has always been suffered by those persons who have sided with the plaintiff in the good old cause of “ Truth v. Christianity. ” A cause not yet decided against the plaintiff, notwith­ standing the atrocities which the defendant inflicts, almost every year on those who side with the plaintiff. The late Dr. John P. Nichol of Glasgow University, says, “It is at once unjust and unwise to consider errors and crimes of this sort (persecutions) as ex­ clusive attributes of the Romish Church; on the contrary, their root lies deep in the heart of man. The domain of physical inquiry is now wholly safe from the disorders of intolerance; but there are large departments of knowledge within which Reason is not yet free; where authority abides on its throne, and popular prejudice stores its thunderbolts’’ TURNBULL AND SPEAKS, PRINTERS, EDINBURGH. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Victorian Blogging Description An account of the resource A collection of digitised nineteenth-century pamphlets from Conway Hall Library &amp; Archives. This includes the Conway Tracts, Moncure Conway's personal pamphlet library; the Morris Tracts, donated to the library by Miss Morris in 1904; the National Secular Society's pamphlet library and others. The Conway Tracts were bound with additional ephemera, such as lecture programmes and handwritten notes.<br /><br />Please note that these digitised pamphlets have been edited to maximise the accuracy of the OCR, ensuring they are text searchable. If you would like to view un-edited, full-colour versions of any of our pamphlets, please email librarian@conwayhall.org.uk.<br /><br /><span><img src="http://www.heritagefund.org.uk/sites/default/files/media/attachments/TNLHLF_Colour_Logo_English_RGB_0_0.jpg" width="238" height="91" alt="TNLHLF_Colour_Logo_English_RGB_0_0.jpg" /></span> Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Conway Hall Library & Archives Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2018 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Conway Hall Ethical Society Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Original Format The type of object, such as painting, sculpture, paper, photo, and additional data Pamphlet Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Dialogues concerning natural religion No. II Description An account of the resource Place of publication: London Collation: 64-125 p. ; 18 cm. Notes: New edition. Includes bibliographical references. From the library of Dr Moncure Conway. "A new edition, with a Preface and Notes..."[Title page]. Printed by Turnbull and Spears, Edinburgh. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Hume, David [1711-1776] Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Thomas Scott Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource [n.d.] Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context CT105 Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource <a href="http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/mark/1.0/"><img src="http://i.creativecommons.org/p/mark/1.0/88x31.png" alt="Public Domain Mark" /></a><span> </span><br /><span>This work (Dialogues concerning natural religion No. II), identified by </span><a href="https://conwayhallcollections.omeka.net/items/show/www.conwayhall.org.uk"><span>Humanist Library and Archives</span></a><span>, is free of known copyright restrictions.</span> Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource application/pdf Type The nature or genre of the resource Text Language A language of the resource English Subject The topic of the resource Natural Theology Religion Philosophy Conway Tracts Natural Theology Religion Religion-Philosophy